

THE DUKE DIVINITY SCHOOL REVIEW

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Spring 1968



A Memorial Prayer

Let us offer unto God our prayer of thanksgiving—for the manifestation of his will and way and power and love in his servant Martin Luther King, Jr.

O God of all peoples and races and nations who have lost this leader, in sorrow and contrition we mourn with millions this day, yet in gratitude and devotion we celebrate thy gift of this life poured out faithfully in thy service.

We thank thee for
the joy and freedom of his song,
the depth and range of his compassion,
the faith and fervor of his prayer,
the discipline and devotion of his mind,
the glow and eloquence of his word,
the courage and persistence of his march,
the power of his inclusive love, his non-violent
action, his trust in eventual response of
others, his trust in thee.

We thank thee for
his fearless exposure of wrongs,
his clarion call for their righting,
his challenging word to our consciences,
his effective power in political action,
his faithful witness against all war,
his willingness to give his life for his people,
for all people, for thee. . . .

We thank thee for showing us once again what it means to be a man, to be thy man, to be thy man for others, to take up a cross and follow him who went about doing good and gave his life in serving love.

We thank thee for another chance now for us to be awakened, and directed, and committed to responsible service and leadership for the good of all men, beginning with those who are oppressed.

THE
DUKE
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REVIEW

Volume 33

Spring 1968

Number 2

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Published three times a year (Winter, Spring, Autumn)
by The Divinity School of Duke University

Postage paid at Durham, North Carolina (27706)

“You Have Wrought A Revolution!”

“You have wrought a revolution!” “Your actions have had a profound effect on this University. I don’t think it will ever be the same again.” These two statements—made by faculty members to students—characterized Holy Week at Duke in the Year of our Lord 1968.

The assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. profoundly moved this academic community, as it did the nation and the world. In two memorial services held in Duke Chapel, Dean Cushman, Professor Richey and others of our Divinity School family made inspiring contributions to the comforting—and the challenging—of the entire University. Dean Cushman had hoped to compose an introductory statement for “The Dean’s Discourse” but did not have time before his departure to General Conference. His meditation from one service and his prayer from another speak eloquently for us all (pp. 119-122).

During the second memorial, held simultaneously with the funeral of Dr. King in Atlanta, a sizable portion of the seminary faculty and students participated on the lawn immediately in front of the Chapel and the Divinity School building. They did so as a living link between the formal ceremonies in the great Gothic cathedral and a thousand students camped in Vigil on the main Quadrangle, around the statue of James B. Duke. These “demonstrators”, “protesters”, “resisters”, “Vigil-antes”—as they have variously been called—were supporting, in memory of Martin Luther King, the demands of non-academic workers for a minimum wage rate and collective bargaining.

By April 16 the University Trustees had promised the appointment of a committee to study “the adequacy of the relationship between the University and its non-academic employees”, and a minimum wage of \$1.60 per hour by July 1969. In May they substantially increased wages toward that goal. In June they accepted a proposal for an Employees’ Council and an Employee Relations Advisory Committee of faculty.

What made this an intense and exciting week in recent Duke history were the caliber and commitment of participation. On the

Monday after Dr. King's death, *before* employees had gone on strike, the Divinity faculty voted unanimously to forego their annual salary increment for the coming fiscal year: not as a pious moral gesture, not to provide a substantial sum (from our small pittance) toward the enormous cost of wage increases, but to challenge Trustees and Administration to find other ways of meeting the avowed goal. This prompt action, together with other individual involvement, led one student leader to refer to the Divinity School as "the most radical faculty on the Duke campus". It has been a long time since any segment of the Church has been called the most radical element in society!

The greatest credit belongs, however, to students engaged in the Vigil and to their Strategy Committee. Camped on the Quadrangle for four days, alternately sunburned and soaked, they maintained a discipline, an organization, a dedication, an order that would have been unimaginable. The "religious" tone of the entire enterprise was manifest in the prayers and hymns which came over the loud-speakers, the active participation of University Christian Movement leaders—and the early exhortation of encouragement from Jürgen Moltmann, whose "Theology of Hope" was under learned discussion on campus when these events began. Provost R. Taylor Cole, as Acting Chief Executive Officer of the University during President Knight's illness, called the Vigil "unique among college students in our country today because it was purposeful, peaceful, and orderly throughout the six days. . . . I would like to publicly commend our students both for their self-discipline and for their high ideals, which prompted them to seek more rapid progress toward the attainment of social justice and better wages for our non-academic employees." (Amid many divergent interpretations of the Vigil we are glad to print herein a "Quad's eye view" by a Divinity School participant, James Lawrence.)

The goals are not attained as yet. But certain by-products are already obvious: a new understanding and mutual respect between faculty and students, a new community across departmental and professional lines, a new sense of power in participation for sincerely moral aims. Those of us in the midst of these happenings have in truth seen the making of a revolution; beyond that, we hope and believe that we have seen the making of a *University*. And more has been at work than student activism—or faculty guilt—or employee agitation—or any combination of these. Said one: "What a pity that it took the death of a man to crystallize, to catalyze, this action!" Came the reply: "But that is the Christian Gospel!"

—Creighton Lacy

Sociological Reflections on Theological Education

EDWARD A. TIRYAKIAN

Professor of Sociology

It is most gratifying to be asked, as a sociologist, to comment upon theological education; as one whose familiarity with divinity schools is based solely upon occasional visits to their libraries to borrow works of sociological relevance unavailable in the general libraries, it is with "fear and trembling" that I undertake this task.

To be sure, I need not feel that I am starting from a position of weakness, but if anything from one of strength. By that I mean that in recent years the "sociological" point of view has gained increasing adherents in the ministry and among certain "young Turk" theologians, typified by Harvey Cox of *Secular City* vintage. Social change and social problems, at many levels of complexity, have intruded themselves in the preoccupations of the divinity school. In themselves, they constitute sufficient materials for an extensive addition to the theological curriculum. Let me suggest in this vein some of the themes and topics which could warrant needed new offerings.

The adaptation of religion (and theology) to urbanization has several dimensions of major significance. Not only is the exodus from rural areas to urban areas continuing, both inside and outside the United States, but also as a secondary movement, the flight from the core cities to suburban areas is a major demographic trend, attended by an equally significant movement to the inner cities by new ethnic/racial minorities, e.g., Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Mexicans. Qualitative and quantitative shifts of parishioners, not only of different ethnic backgrounds but also of different socio-economic backgrounds, poses major institutional problems for church organization, to say nothing of sheer financial problems which parallel the problems of municipal governments. The problems of urbanization spill over into those of race relations and the social conflicts involved in civil rights legislation and enforcement. Where and how to take a position on race relations, the nature and difficulties of religious "activism", certainly constitute an area for a curriculum offering. Closely cor-

related with race relations is social class, which opens up the question of the church's involvement with the poor—no longer the overseas poor of missionary activity, but the domestic poor. From here we can go into the subject of the political involvements of the ministry, not only on behalf of the poor, but also on behalf of a variety of other disenfranchised or so-called "alienated" groups, e.g., student protest movements, etc.

I have not even mentioned the manifold sociological problems attending the ministry and religious organizations from within. The problem of recruitment to the ministry in the face of apparent decline in the social prestige of the minister, irrespective of denominational affiliation, is acute enough to warrant a course; the bureaucratization of religious organizations is another.

We could go on in this manner, and by stressing the need of the seminary or the divinity school to adjust to the social world a case could be made for a very substantial increase in essentially sociological offerings. That, in a sense, is what you might normally expect a sociologist to say about "up-grading" theological education. However, being somewhat of an unorthodox sociologist, I have some alternative observations to make.

For one thing, it seems to me that theological schools presuppose implicitly the grounding of Christianity in Western civilization. There is, to be sure, a positive and significant correlation between the two, but it is not an identity. I would propose that any theological curriculum needs very much to incorporate courses dealing with comparative materials on Christianity: what has happened to Christianity, both in its social structure and in its creed, as it has gone to other shores? And here I mean the development of separatist churches, syncretic movements, millenary movements of all sorts as they have developed in Africa, Latin America, Asia and other far-flung areas. These, for the most part, are "nativistic" religious movements which spun-off from Christian missions; they have come under increasing attention by anthropologists and social scientists as significant social phenomena, but my feeling is that they are still in limbo as far as the theological curriculum is concerned. Not only should they not be ignored by any theological school or seminarian interested in social change and the adaptations of religion to the social world, but, furthermore, the beliefs and symbolisms of these "new" Christian and neo-Christian groups may offer refreshing insights into the nature of Christian truth and revelation. Why, for example, limit the theological offering on prophetic movements to ancient Israel when

modern Africa offers just as rich data, say the figures of Simon Kimbangu in the Congo or William Wade Harris in the Ivory Coast (the latter, by the way, being the product of a Methodist mission in Liberia)? Perhaps these sectarian movements may be seen as outside the pale of traditional Christianity, as something a bit too "exotic" to be dealt with by budding theologians; yet, in terms of social structure, they are of the same genus as those studied in the context of Western Civilization, and they are just as exciting to study as the Anabaptists, the Camisards, the Shakers, or what have you.

In my previous remarks I have been suggesting that theological training may have been guilty of neglecting the social context which is an integral part of religious reality, of "putting in brackets" or abstracting away social and cultural variations in expressions of religious life. This is, to be sure, a caricature of things, but all caricatures (or stereotypes) have a certain empirical justification. Now, however, let me suggest a different kind of neglect which I consider of greater significance, and which also has an important bearing on the contemporary situation.

What I have in mind, bluntly put, is that theology tends in its intellectualization of its subject matter to cut itself off from the depth existential levels of religious reality by reducing the manifold complexity of the sacred to some rather simplistic notions of the deity. "Monotheism" is the fruit of a certain philosophical speculation which blandly overlooks that on a cross-cultural basis the experiences of religious, transcendental reality have been experiences of antithetical religious forces that tend to be grouped in terms of a "divine-demonic" antinomy. If popular language uses the phrase "good Lord" or "good God", this suggests that the divine's moral opposite also exists, and therefore that both sets of religious forces manifest themselves in human society. I would go even so far as to suggest that human society *is* the medium or vehicle in which antithetical spiritual forces express themselves. It is all too easy to dismiss the Manichean heresy as an intellectual fallacy of an earlier historical period, but theologians might want to reconsider it as a structural aspect of the human condition.

In this vein I would suggest that theological training would be wise to incorporate materials on religious rituals, which social anthropologists have observed in great detail in so-called "primitive" societies. Rituals embody existential experiences of social groups with the realm of the sacred; they are not "intellectual" or "rational" constructs but are grounded in pre-reflective awareness of dimen-

sions of religious reality. I would certainly hope that Emile Durkheim's *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* be required reading for any theologian, for it is of central importance in the consideration of rituals. The themes of "purification", "expiation", "defilement", "sacrifice", which rituals embody, have been treated by Durkheim and his pupils, such as Mauss and Herz, and more recently in the brilliant study by Mary Douglas, *Purity and Danger*, well deserve the attention of theologians. Such readings should give theologians a greater sensitivity to the complexity of their own subject matter, particularly, of the non-rational if not irrational dimensions of the sacred. If theologians had a greater appreciation and understanding of the existential layers of the transcendental, which are manifested in rituals and symbols more than in their intellectual articulations, if they understood that there is nothing *passé* to this reality since it always encompasses the social world, they might not feel so defensive about their position in the modern academic setting or in the larger society. Instead of having to get attention by (1) shocking their flock (e.g., "God is dead"), (2) "jazzing up" their language, (3) trying to get accepted by secularist intellectuals, they could regain a more meaningful place in the social sun by talking about religious reality, not as a simple intellectual affair but as an existential aspect of the present setting. This may seem to be what Cox and others are doing, but it is the obverse; for Cox, as I view him, is reducing the religious to the social when for him speaking about God must be political—the *polis* or politics is the salvation of religion, whereas from my viewpoint, the relation is reversed: Christ, to put it in Christian terms, is the redeemer, not the redemptee. It is in a secularistic society, which is more anti-religious in its ethos than irreligious, that a pauperization of the psyche or soul occurs; to "de-mythologize" religion on the part of theologians is to become the unwitting instrument of the profane. Jung's *Modern Man in Search of a Soul* is one of the few really profound expositions of the modern predicament, and I would suggest that if the present crisis is a spiritual malaise more than any socio-economic or socio-political thing, theology has contributed to this crisis by denuding religion of its psychical, spiritual, symbolic strata, by losing its militancy and verve. In recent years, courses in religion, including sociology of religion courses, have had a marked increase in attendance. This is not due to an intellectual curiosity *per se*, as I see it, so much as an unconscious search for identity, for one's spiritual identity, or if you wish, a search of the psychic self for its roots (which have been up-

rooted in the development of an impersonal technological civilization).

But instead of a radical alternative to the rationalistic and depersonalizing ethos of mass society, students in these courses (and perhaps in seminaries as well) find the same emphasis on abstraction and intellectualization, or else find religion treated as just another social institution. Their search is therefore bound to end in frustration unless theologians are able to get attuned to the psychic need for spiritual nourishment, one which cannot be filled in any genuine way by the mainstream of today's academic psychology.

There is another consideration I wish to raise in terms of the role of theology/religion in modern society. An old European folk saying has it, "Where God steps out, the Devil steps in." Theologians who have lost attunement to the demonic aspect of the transcendental might be skeptical about the presence of Satan in a modern enlightened world (if God is dead, surely—or hopefully—Satan should also be dead). But as I look at the cultural setting of our own society, I am struck with the emergence in the last few years of demonic symbols—kabbalistic and astrological symbols, mentions of "black masses", witchcraft, ritualistic murders (for example, the instance of a group of "Hell's Angels" crucifying a woman on a motorcycle), themes of ghouls and ghoulish activity undertaken by some leaders of the "hippies", depictions of morbid and sadistic activity in plays and movies. Is this anything for theological schools to worry about? As far as I am concerned, assuredly yes, for they cannot be simply dismissed as "innocent", "absurd" or just "irrational" activities. They are, rather, proof to me of the dualism of the sacred, of the power of the demonic and its human agents to exercise an all-too-powerful influence in a social setting which has stripped itself of the protection of the divine. What we are witnessing is the reverse process of *civilization*, what I would call *paganization*.

If the vocation of the theologian and the minister is, in part, pastoral care, then in their training they must learn how to protect their flock from the onslaughts of predators. Of course, the secular psychoanalyst will explain these phenomena as being "phantasies" or "projections", and thereby seek to lull us back to sleep rather than have us face the very grave dangers of these phenomena for society and for personality formation. But these kinds of cultural "innovations" may be projections from another source than that of individuals—they may be projections from the demonic itself which gladly intrudes upon a society that has let down its guard. And to know how to guard society from being taken over by the demonic and its human

agents, theologians must know something about the latter. What I am suggesting—which is probably the last thing you might expect from a sociologist as a course recommendation—is that the divinity school should have at least one course in demonology, which would offer comparative, cross-cultural and cross-historical materials on the manifestations of the demonic, as well as therapeutic measures for it. In this context, let me highly recommend an exciting book I have recently come across which has some very relevant materials, H. te Velde's *Seth, God of Confusion* (1967)—not because of what it tells us about an aspect of ancient Egyptian religion as such, but because in the process of reading it you may see how much of contemporary social disorder ties in with Egyptian notions about Seth. If Seth may still be present, so may be other aspects of the demonic which Church fathers fought against as heresies, such as Gnosticism. If that seems like a quaint notion, then take a good look at the symbols of the great seal of the United States, displayed on the reverse side of every dollar bill, for they are Gnostic symbols, which should horrify every Christian theologian who innocently assumes the United States to be (or have been) a Christian nation.

It is the theological school, not sociology or anthropology, which must supply the shock troops against the demonic, but it must first realize that this is a real “hot” war against the forces of the Anti-Christ, a war where “honorable negotiations” have no place; the “Christian revolution” did not end with the triumph of the Resurrection twenty centuries ago—it is a “permanent” revolution that has to be waged in every century, for every age has to be Christianized anew. Perhaps sociology and anthropology can help theology realize what is involved by enriching the theological horizon concerning religious reality.

Tradition, Impotence and the Seminary

HENRY B. CLARK

Associate Professor of Religion

Thesis

"Then shall the King say unto them on his right hand, 'Come, ye blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world. You seldom fed me when I was hungry; you seldom clothed me when I was naked; you hardly ever visited me when I was sick or in prison. But you were careful about your historical generalizations, you spent years of your life elaborating a sophisticated mode of ethical discourse, and you were faithful to the hallowed values of the university and the church, so that you never lost the esteem of your colleagues in other departments and your peers in the ecclesiastical Establishment.'"

No, Matthew 25 doesn't read that way—but you would think it did by the look of the curriculum and the feel of the ethos of many theological schools. Not that this is the order of priorities consciously chosen by many seminary faculties and administrators, for they are persuaded that their emphasis upon essentially meta-ethical concerns will ultimately lead to ethical fruits. The discipline of ethics is commonly considered as the thought and talk which precede or accompany action designed to benefit one's neighbors. I contend that this is an erroneous and fundamentally ideological understanding of the term, and that ethics does not really begin until we have actually *done something* for others. This is not to minimize the importance of the meta-ethical process, because action apart from disciplined reflection may in some cases be almost as bad as endless jabbering about what one ought to do. But that is not the major temptation of the intellectual, and it behooves us to admit that a great deal of the palaver which passes for ethics is nothing more than *recreational* activity. Once again, there is nothing evil *per se* about play—but we should

Reprinted, with permission, from *Reflection* (Yale Divinity School, Vol. 65, No. 2, January, 1968). Dr. Clark returned this year to Duke, his undergraduate alma mater, from the faculty of Union Theological Seminary, New York.

label properly what it is we're doing and it should not be sold to ourselves or to others as an effective (or even a seriously intended) means to mission if it is simply an activity which leads to nothing more than our own amusement.

The seminaries are still attracting some of the best young men and women in the country, and their graduates often turn out to be effective agents of Christian mission. But my fear is that the good products are in most cases good despite their theological school training, not because of it—and my empirical judgment is that for every good one the supposedly sophisticated seminaries are turning out, they are turning out a score of misdirected, ill-prepared Establishment intellectuals who wind up being custodians of the status quo.

Some Presuppositions

My analysis of the sickness of the seminaries is based on the following presuppositions. The first presupposition is this: *the established order in which the writer and most of the readers of this piece so comfortably exist is rotten to the core*. If that is an overstatement, it is a *necessary* use of hyperbole. Future generations will look back on the economic and political arrangements of our century, and upon our complacency regarding them, with a horror very much akin to that which we feel when we contemplate slavery, human sacrifice, and other prize examples of the blood-curdling inhumanities accepted in the past. They will marvel at the moral insensitivity which allowed middle-class citizens of the developed countries to enjoy all of their privileges while the majority of their brothers lived in misery and degradation. They will wonder how on earth we managed to rationalize our preoccupation with security, status and affluence. That's why mission has to have a clear priority over academic elegance and the kind of ecclesiastical business-as-usual so fatuously glorified in James Dittes' article in the May (1967) issue of *Reflection*.

The second presupposition is this: *attitudinal change follows behavioral change, and political, economic and psychological power are more important in bringing about social change than the power of ideas*. Anyone with a grain of common sense will pay lip service to the importance of self-interest as manifested in the psychology of the individual and the sociology of institutional life, but few intellectuals really take seriously the implications of this truth. To do so would be to go against their own self-interest insofar as it would challenge the self-image they have of themselves and of the significance of their work. Insofar as it would undermine the importance of the institu-

tions in which they work and have achieved status, it would necessitate the kind of radical change in our usual way of doing things which everyone finds threatening.

This is not to say that ideas are totally unimportant, nor is it to deny that there is an elective affinity between material interests and ideas which allows the latter to provide a decisive acceleration to material and institutional developments already under way. It is to say, however, that the very great emphasis placed upon the manipulation of verbal symbols and the rearrangement of intellectual furniture which is now characteristic of seminary education, and of the academic tradition as a whole, is disproportionate. We do need scholars and thinkers. Indeed, they are crucially important for the church at the present moment. But their focus needs to be on reinterpreting the tradition for the present and the future, not in trying vainly to hang on to it as received.

Furthermore, we do not need as many of them as of strategists and front-line action troops. Our present patterns of theological education put bows and arrows into the hands of the infantrymen, and it makes too many of them want to be generals. What we need is the kind of education which will give them modern rifles and bazookas, and which will make them realize that the time-honored role of the general is only for a few with special talents and limitations, and that the role of the infantrymen and the lieutenants who have the battle-line skills is of greater relevance for the majority of them. To be concrete, we need relatively few scholars and technical theologians in comparison with the number of congregational and community mobilizers needed. We do require a few of the former, because what Ruel Tyson has aptly called "urban renewal in the holy city" is a continuing necessity, but to have more than a few of our limited personnel involved in writing articles, quarreling and quibbling about the subtleties of articles others have written about the books of a hundred years ago based on books of five hundred years ago, which are based on scrolls and stones of even greater antiquity—well, it's a waste. Any contemporary student who fails to perceive this elementary fact of life, through exaggerated reverence for the wisdom of his professors or through sheer inertia, is well on his way to becoming an intellectual and a moral Uncle Tom. The implication is that we need large numbers of young men and women trained in a *professional* degree program (such as the new D. Min. program at the University of Chicago Divinity School), and fewer trained in conventional Ph.D. and Th.D. programs.

The third presupposition is this: *our whole understanding of the nature and the meaning of Christianity must undergo a drastic alteration.* As Robert Bellah observes in a brilliant article on "Religious Evolution", it is impossible to speak of a symbol system in a contemporary religion, because our whole understanding of the character and the function of the belief system of a religion is quite different today from what it ever was before. Even if we continue to believe in God and to allow some room for the possibility that the Holy Spirit guides the action of men in ways which are real even though they are difficult to define, we must admit that all religions, including Christianity, are creations of men. They are designed to provide a superordinate meaning structure which causes men to give allegiance to the highest values affirmed in a given culture, and to legitimize the roles and behavioral norms considered necessary for a realization of these values.

It is quite possible for a religious leader to acknowledge all this and to continue to use the traditional language and rituals of Christianity without bad faith. For it is still possible to reinterpret biblical mythology in such a way as to make it the expression of man's highest values and a vehicle for their attainment. But we must be very clear about the distinction between the value-affirmations we commit our lives to and the rhetoric we employ, and we must be very clear about what we are doing and which of the two takes priority. Seminaries must convey this message unambiguously to their students, and the students must have the integrity to receive the message and to adjust their beliefs and their lives accordingly. Otherwise, they are likely to be a menace to their society instead of a blessing.

The Backwardness of the Seminaries

One way to describe the backwardness of the seminaries is to analyze the kinds of wisdom needed by the agent of mission and compare this to the educational process and the life-experience offered in the typical theological school. Three kinds of wisdom are necessary for the effective agent of mission. The first is moral wisdom, which includes sufficient knowledge of the good and sufficient motivation to seek and work for it. Moral wisdom is the sphere of the *ought*: the vision of cosmic righteousness and love expressed in biblical mythology and elaborated in various ways at various times by the church, the norms of behavior taught by various exponents of the tradition, and the mode of ethical decision-making appropriate for members of the household of faith.

The second type of necessary wisdom is technical wisdom, which includes knowledge about the *is* of the human psyche and human collectivities. This is the sphere of social science, the area in which we try to learn about the cultural and reference group pressures that operate on all sorts and conditions of men, the way that institutions operate, the strategies and tactics which the social change agent may most fruitfully pursue in various settings. The third type of wisdom is the kind that comes primarily through experience. It is the practical wisdom or "savvy" about how to utilize academic learning without which the latter is of little value except to the person who enjoys possessing it or fiddling around with it in his mind.

Most seminaries devote too much attention to the first type of wisdom, not enough (and not enough of the right kind) to the second, and too much to the wrong kind of the third. They clutter up the student's mind with an enormous load of information about theology, the Bible, and church history, and they train him to regard it with entirely too much importance. They take up his time with courses in homiletics and exegesis, and with field work in traditional roles which are of less value for the ultimate ends of the church than for her institutional ends, and which are in any case of diminishing importance. And they give him almost nothing in the way of detailed knowledge about and experience in certain decisive areas: the new actualities, possibilities and trends in science and technology (which render so much of our traditional moral wisdom obsolete, or demand new interpretations and new specifications of it); new patterns of institutional and social organization (which lead to or call for new allocations of resources and energies, and new administrative arrangements); and how to locate issues, define goals, set priorities, identify targets, devise tactics, and assess probabilities in the planning of strategy.

Another way to express my complaint is to examine the natural history of a typical seminary graduate. What happens to a man when he gets out? Well, maybe he makes it. Having received from the seminary a solid theological foundation, keener motivation, and certain intellectual tools, maybe he has enough common sense not to spend the rest of his life engaging in meta-ethical reflection, study, and conversation. If he has enough guts and shrewdness to gather the required technical and practical wisdom for himself, he might become an effective agent of mission.

But it's a different story in the case of the *typical* graduate of one of our theological schools. He is, remember, a man who has been

taught (by the ethos of the seminary as well as its curriculum content) to believe that words and concepts are all-important, and to feel most comfortable with words and concepts. He also knows, of course, that institutions are important, and that he must endeavor to work through, with, and on them. But when he tries to exercise leadership in church or community (especially if he tries to re-form institutional structures or practices), he lacks the requisite skills and experience. Unless he is extraordinarily secure, gifted, persistent, or lucky, he is relatively unsuccessful in his efforts to work with institutions or in his efforts to be a strategist, and therefore he retreats to his study to lick his wounds. The pattern revealed in Kenneth Underwood's *Protestant and Catholic* is all too common. In the words of one of the ministers portrayed in this study: "The whole fiasco of political action has convinced me that I and other clergymen ought to concentrate in the future upon personal counseling."

Having made his retreat, he then makes a virtue of his necessity by believing more than ever—and proclaiming—that salvation comes mainly through words and concepts, and/or that *his* vocation is working with words and concepts. So he falls back into the traditional career pattern of the pastorate—and since, having indeed been well trained in the manipulation of words and concepts in seminary, he finds success, status, and comfort in this traditional career pattern. The further he progresses in it, the more of an interest, psychological and sociological, he develops in perpetuating the traditional hierarchy of values embodied in the above pattern. So he advises others to follow the same course that he has followed (and succeeded in). Specifically, he directs money and prospective students to the same kind of seminary he attended.

Had we but worlds enough and time, this comfy routine would be perhaps no crime. But the possibilities for good and evil are so momentous in our time, and time is so short, it is hard to justify fooling around with the cozy little world of traditional ideas and practices which most seminaries and most seminarians get bogged down in. The real world is bigger than this, and God calls us to something more than this. Our seminaries ought to be training cadres of responsible and intelligent revolutionaries, not custodians of the status quo.

Curriculum content: Instead of disproportionate emphasis upon traditional fields, taught by traditional pedagogical methods, which encourage selective perception of relatively irrelevant issues and stultify initiative and skill, we need more knowledge of the technical wis-

dom provided by social science, e.g., models of social change, group dynamics and leadership techniques, community organization skills, facts and how they are brought to bear on the lives of citizens (effect of mass media, advertising, education processes, etc.).

Field education: Instead of training, and growing ego-investment, in relatively insignificant traditional role activities, which leads to a mind-set that overlooks the highest priority concerns or is unable to grapple with them effectively, we need experience in decision-making roles which require accurate perception and analysis of complex situations, sophisticated goal-setting, planning of strategy, and execution of tactics, in a group or an organization working for social change.

Ethos: Instead of a conservative (and fundamentally ideological) definition of role expectations, ego-ideals and style of life aspiration, we need an atmosphere in which living arrangements, economic and social disciplines, sensitivity-trained personal relationships, all proclaim that commitment is more important than comfort and revolution more important than respectability.

It is often argued by seminary professors that the present curriculum content, pattern of field education and ethos are required by the university and the churches. The seminaries must offer solid classical education in the traditional disciplines, it is said, because otherwise the "high standards" of the university could not be maintained. A positive attitude toward the existing church (which at the present time means the parish) must be communicated, for that is where the jobs are, and in many cases, that is where financial support for the seminary comes from. These are, of course, realities which have to be taken into account in plotting a pragmatic administrative strategy. But in our definition of the goals of seminary education, we must never fail to perceive that the values of the university and of the existing social institution we call the church are by no means sacred, and that in many cases they represent just another group of obsolescing cultural values which must be denied or overcome in the name of Christ. If it is a choice between God and humanizing action in the world on the one hand, or a set of idols enshrined in academic or ecclesiastical institutionalism on the other, we must always choose the former. What we should and must be concerned about is the treasure, not the earthen vessels of dogma, ritual and ministerial role which once contained it, but which must now be re-fashioned.

What is Christian Ministry?

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Probably no great clamor of opposition will be raised against the assertion that the purpose of theological education is to train men for the ministry. Moreover, it is also the case that the way we conceive the nature and purpose of ministry is by and large determinative of the shape and content of theological education. As C. H. Hwang says, "Behind every pattern of theological education lies an implicit *image of the ministry*."¹ Robert E. Cushman has illustrated this by pointing out that for over three hundred years ministry, in the American Protestant churches, was viewed primarily as preaching the gospel, and that accordingly theological seminaries were concerned with training men to preach accurately and authoritatively.² Similar correlations between the nature of ministry and the nature of theological education are apparent in those periods when ministry was viewed in other ways—in primarily sacramentarian terms, for example, or in terms of a dominant ethical concern. The point is that any prevailing conception of ministry largely governs the shape of theological education, and is in turn perpetuated by it, particularly when the seminaries permit themselves so to function without continual self-examination and criticism. Indeed, part of the proper responsibility of the seminary is to be the church's organ of self-examination, and continually to raise questions about those views, central to the life and work of the church, too often uncritically assumed.

All this is preface to one major point: that the question of the nature of theological education "in light of its objective" requires extensive and deliberate consideration of the prior question of the theology of ministry.³ Many of the essays on training for ministry provide very little in the way of explicit discussion of "what is the nature of Christian ministry?" The report edited by Charles R.

1. C. H. Hwang, "A Rethinking of Theological Training for the Ministry in the Younger Churches Today," *The South East Asia Journal of Theology*, IV, No. 2 (October, 1962), 9.

2. Robert E. Cushman, "Theological Education, A Reconsideration of Its Nature in Light of Its Objective," *The Duke Divinity School Review*, XXXIII, Number 1 (Winter, 1968). 8-9.

3. *Ibid.*, p.1.

Feilding speaks to this question only briefly, defining ministry as a profession and mentioning various kinds of ministerial responsibilities.⁴ With all its value in assessing the critical state of ministry today, the "Feilding Report" is deficient in that it makes proposals about ministerial education on the basis of assumptions about the nature of ministry which are neither explicitly stated nor critically examined.

Theological seminaries are having difficulty in self-understanding, and with specific matters such as curriculum reform, because the question of the nature of ministry, for which they are endeavoring to prepare men, is not clear, nor is it always adequately considered. The local church ministry is in a similar quandary. If old conceptions of ministry and its purpose seem to be somewhat obsolete, no new articulations of the theology of ministry have yet been overwhelmingly accepted. Surely part of the necessary work of theological schools, in conversation with the practicing church, is to contemplate the "theology of ministry", to examine and formulate creatively what the historic Christian ministry is, and then to project prophetically and constructively, in increasingly competent awareness of present and probable future directions of society, what forms that ministry must take by, say, 1984 or the year 2000. In this, perhaps, the seminaries must lead the church, and serious constructive work is essential before seminaries can significantly and relevantly rearrange their curricular furniture.

I

The nature of the church's "historic ministry" needs examination. In these revolutionary days, it is a great risk to take anything for granted, and the definition of the nature of Christian ministry is no exception. Little more can be done here, however, than to outline the kinds of questions requiring consideration, and to suggest one method of approach to them.

What is the essential character of the *Christian* ministry? The primary basis for defining the nature of Christian ministry is the ministry of Jesus Christ as pictured in the New Testament. The ministry of the church originates with Christ. It is something *given* to the church, something the church receives as a trust from its Lord. The church ministers in his name and is responsible to him for the adequacy and faithfulness of its ministering. This means that the

4. Charles R. Feilding (ed.), *Education For Ministry* (Dayton, Ohio: American Association of Theological Schools, 1966), pp. 69f.

church's ministry is not its own, but the ministry of Jesus brought to contemporary expression in such way that, while continually changing in form or shape, it is nevertheless his ministry which continues in the present. As John W. Deschner has said, the ministry of Jesus "is the revelation of the character of his continuing ministry today".⁵

The servant-image of Jesus in the New Testament is a central element in defining a theology of ministry. "I am among you as one who serves." (Luke 22:27) Attempting a definition, one could say that Christian ministry is *service* motivated by faith which works through love in fulfillment of duty. Even so, this definition of service is extremely general, and left without further elaboration is of little practical value. Fortunately, the New Testament record presents a more specific picture of ministry.

One of the New Testament terms for ministry is *diakonia*. Viewed in relation to the ministry of Jesus, *diakonia* has at least two directions. In the first place, Jesus assumed ministry to his own followers and to the existing religious community. Ministry or service in this dimension took the form of *preaching* the words of condemnation of sin, of forgiveness, and of the promise of the kingdom of God to those who repent and believe. (Mark 1:15) It also took the form of *teaching* about the meaning of the kingdom. Further, it was a *healing* ministry which sought to restore to life hearts dead to God through sin. This was service directed both to those within the Jewish religious institutions and those devoted to Jesus himself who needed to hear the words of judgment and promise, to understand the Gospel, and to be made whole.

The ministry of Jesus, secondly, took the form of service beyond the religious communities in and to the world in its needs. Itineracy was a characteristic form of Jesus' *diakonia* to the world. He went to people in need wherever they were to be found and in whatever conditions of life—the oppressed, the poor, the affluent. His was a service of healing carried on by entering into the "life-places" of people and into the affairs of the world with the purpose of transforming them. He sought to heal souls, to be sure, but also to heal broken relationships between men, to better the conditions of the poor, to prick the consciences of the affluent, to condemn and replace inequity and injustice with the rule of God in the world.

These two forms of *diakonia*, exemplified in the work of Christ,

5. John W. Deschner, "Jesus Christ and the Christian Mission," in *The Christian Mission Today*, (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1960), p. 24.

are essential parts of the pattern for ministry in his name. There is a necessary service of the church to itself involving judgment on its fallenness and the renewal and reformation of its life before God. There is an essential service of the church to the world which calls for sensitivity and action in meeting the needs of individual persons and, further, which seeks to change, remove, replace those conditions in the social order which are inconsistent with the justice and mercy of God revealed in Christ. Neither dimension of ministry should be considered optional.

Another kind of service is reflected in the ministry of Jesus—the service *to* God. To be sure, *diakonia* understood as ministry to men in need may appropriately be considered as service *of* God. But the meaning of ministry is not completely defined in terms of service to the church and to the world, that is, by the horizontal direction of service. There is in Christian ministry an essential service *to* God which has, so to say, a vertical direction. It is a service which recognizes God's majesty and mercy and involves personal and corporate response to him. This ministry may be called, using a biblical term, *leitourgia*, the offering of the service of praise and confession and thanksgiving to God. The warrants for *leitourgia* are so clearly apparent in the model of Jesus' ministry as to make it a central concern for those who minister in his name. Indeed, the service of the response of man to God in worship constitutes one of the fundamental ministries of the church.

II

The foregoing description of the nature of Christian ministry as *diakonia* and *leitourgia*, following the pattern of Jesus' ministry, is intended to be indicative of the kind of defining of the nature and purpose of ministry in which the seminary and church need to be engaged. Theological clarity on the conception of ministry, deliberately arrived at and articulated, is required if the questions of the nature and structure of theological education are to be adequately considered. Having clarified a theology of ministry, the question of how to bring it to expression in relation to the problems of the present and the future can be entertained fruitfully, providing important clues for defining the task of a seminary and the reform of curriculum.

As noted at the outset, theological education is concerned with the training of ministerial leaders for today and tomorrow. It is important in order to avoid undue one-sidedness that education for ministry be carried on in relation to a view of ministry that is broader

rather than narrower in scope. Ministry is not just preaching, or teaching, or ethical and social service. The identifying of particular ministries, traditional and experimental, is called for, to be sure, but these forms should be exercised in an awareness of the nature of ministry in its wholeness.

Christian ministry has been defined as service of the church to the church and to the world, and service to the church to God. What does such a definition mean for the work of a seminary? It means, for one thing, as D. Moody Smith has suggested, that "the theological school ought to teach theology."⁶ The theological catechumen needs to acquire theological knowledge—biblical, historical, contemporary, ethical—to provide the reservoir of understanding upon which he draws in the formulation and exercise of creative ministry. He needs further to learn to think theologically, in order imaginatively to perform service to church, world and God in the constantly changing contexts that confront him. Robert E. Cushman recognizes this in his claim that in training for ministry "it is basic theological understanding that counts, an acquired habit of critical investigation, and familiarity with and respect for the sources and resources of Christian understanding."⁷ The provision of opportunity and means for attaining this foundation in theological knowledge and in the habit of intelligent and creative thinking is one of the primary tasks of theological education.

This task is necessarily related to another. Christian ministry is service motivated by faith, and working through love in the fulfilling of duty. Theological education must make searching inquiry into what forms of love and duty are demanded of the faithful by the gospel and the fluid conditions of human life. The forms of Christian ministry cannot become static. To do so is to invite obsolescence and petrification. This is especially true of the church's ministry to itself. The forms of Christian ministry as traditionally practiced should be under constant examination, and subject to continual revision or replacement in the interest of a renewal of ministry in the church with its purpose of bringing judgment and seeking human fulfillment. The forms which Christian ministry will take the future are likely to be very different from those presently dominant. For psychological and sociological reasons, the shapes of the ministry of the church to itself will certainly have to be different from some of those presently prac-

6. D. Moody Smith, "Comments on Dean Cushman's Address," *The Duke Divinity School Review*, XXXIII, Number 1 (Winter, 1968), p. 22.

7. Robert E. Cushman, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

ticed—for example, in Fuller's geodesic "city of the future" in which an entire population lives in a self-contained apartment-house metropolis.⁸ Theological schools will need increasingly to ponder the shape of future ministry and to provide in its educational process such opportunities for theological guidance and learning as will enable future ministerial leaders sensitively to perceive the sinfulness and need of men in the church, and to create imaginative new forms of or alternatives to Christ's preaching, teaching and healing ministry.

Theological education should, moreover, train men for service in and to the world. It is conceivable that the present trend toward disillusionment and suspicion of institutional Christianity will continue. If it is convinced of the importance of its message, the church, in order to sustain its influence for good, will have to go to the people, to go "where the action is". The church's *diakonia* must take creative new forms in what Van A. Harvey calls its "service in the modern world".⁹ The present struggles for bread and equity and justice and peace, involving the use of economic and political power, are areas in which human need and Christian ministry coincide. Clearly part of the church's ministry to the world, consistent with that of Christ, is to involve itself fully in the fight against oppression and poverty. In addition to this encompassing issue stands the question of the forms of the church's ministry to the world in the more distant future. A recent work entitled *The Year 2000* makes intelligent and calculated predictions, based on the findings of sociology, economics, medicine, and political science, about the world in the last third of this century.¹⁰ Curiously, in this very lengthy book the influence or role of the church is nowhere evident. Perhaps it will not have a role in the future of world civilization. But if the church is to exercise leadership in the future, it is now time to examine and contemplate that future in terms of its own ministerial responsibility and through the eyes of other reputable disciplines. The seminaries increasingly need to relate their theological perspectives in a sophisticated way to the sociological, psychological and economic sciences. On the basis of such knowledge the church will be able significantly to exercise its ministry of healing and hope to the world.

Finally, what about the church's service to God? We cannot sur-

8. R. Buckminster Fuller, "City of the Future," *Playboy Magazine* (January, 1968), pp. 166 f.

9. Van A. Harvey. "On Separating Hopes From Illusions," *motive*, XXVI, Number 2 (November, 1965), 4-6.

10. Herman Kahn and Anthony J. Wiener, *The Year 2000* (New York: Macmillan, 1967).

render either intentionally or by default this ministry, for the service of praise and thanksgiving, confession and self-offering is the outward expression of loyalty to the ground and power of all *diakonia*. But, like other ministries, service to God is not static in form. James F. White has correctly pointed out that the forms of *leitourgia* may change, may even be disposed of, but not *leitourgia* itself.¹¹ In this aspect of ministry flexibility and creativity are essential. The forms of *leiturgia* for the "city of the future" or the year 2000 cannot at this point be clearly foreseen. But the purpose of all *leiturgia* can be inquired into, and it is one basic task of theological education, in formal curriculum and other ways, to emphasize the centrality and essentiality of this ministry.

The church, then, has ministry to itself, to the world, and to God. The task of theological education is to stimulate understanding, expression and application of this ministry. Engagement in this task in the totality of its directions and requirements defines the nature of theological education. Education which prepares leaders for ministry such as this will be professional education in the highest sense.

11. James F. White, *The Worldliness of Worship* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 31.

The Duke Silent Vigil

H. JAMES LAWRENCE, '69

The "Silent Vigil", the phenomenon that took place on the Duke University campus during April of 1968, provoked a wide spectrum of response, ranging from enthusiastic support to vigorous opposition. Though its significance and lasting value may be the subject of much debate, one thing is certain: Duke has been greatly affected by the explicit activity and the rather far-reaching implications of the Vigil. The University was so shaken by the occurrence that *The Duke Chronicle* (April 12, 1968) editorialized about the birth of a "new university," and one professor proclaimed to a night rally of students that "you have wrought a revolution." It will take time to delineate the multiple dimensions and ultimate consequences of what actually happened. At present even those who have been an integral part of the movement from the beginning "know only in part". For this reason, one must establish a rationale for attempting to glean theological significance from the Vigil.

The Duke University Divinity School community was jarred loose from its moorings—not only by the presence of student demonstrators outside its windows, but also (perhaps primarily) by the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., on Thursday, April 4, 1968. In numerous meetings and discussions opinions were polarized concerning actual physical participation in the Vigil, and over goals and purposes. Consciences were disturbed and the desire for "action" was greatly intensified. A special issue of the Divinity School newspaper, *Response*, cited no less than *fourteen* different community projects that were virtually non-existent prior to the Vigil.

Though student reaction and response greatly varied, the Divinity School faculty appeared to reach some unity of purpose in their pronouncements as a group. On April 8 a statement was "unanimously adopted" by the faculty in which they offered to relinquish their annual salary increment in order that the amount be used to help raise the wages of non-academic employees. On April 9, "Members of the Divinity School community" issued a statement which voiced support for the Vigil, recognized the strike and the boycott, and urged the University to grant *all* non-academic employees a minimum wage of \$1.60 per hour. In addition, when *The Duke Chronicle* (April 17)

printed a "Statement of Concerned Faculty," the names of fourteen Divinity School professors and associate professors appeared as signers of the petition.

The ambiguity of student response, and the rather decisive action of the faculty, present interesting material for study in themselves. (One must be careful not to over-simplify the extremely complex dimensions involved, or to set up artificial polarities). But our purpose here is to deal with the ethical problem that permeated the whole of the Vigil and created such profound reaction within the Divinity School itself; namely, *the extent to which the ministerial community* (specifically, the Duke Divinity School) *is called to political involvement* (specifically, active participation in the Vigil). This paper is offered not as a depth analysis of the Duke Student Vigil, but as the setting for the crucial issue of *theology as involvement*. We believe with William Lee Miller that "each religious man . . . has the responsibility to carry on his own social thinking and action in the framework of the doctrine and ethics of his faith, even though others of the same faith will think and act differently."¹ The Duke Vigil proved to be a laboratory for such thinking and acting. But we also believe that "the religious man should not wait for unanimity before doing his own work as a political animal and a social being."² It is these two points, political responsibility and a call to individual action, that form the focus of this study.

Background and Development

The Vigil itself had its beginnings following the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., on April 4, 1968. On Friday, April 5, approximately 450 students and faculty marched to President Knight's house, and about 250 remained there for two nights. Spokesmen for the group presented four demands:

(1) That President Knight sign an advertisement in the *Durham Morning Herald* calling for a day of mourning for Dr. King, asking citizens of Durham to do all they can to bring about racial equality and freedom.

(2) That Dr. Knight press for \$1.60 minimum wage for Duke employees.

(3) That President Knight resign from Hope Valley Country Club.

(4) That President Knight appoint a committee of students, faculty, and workers to make recommendations concerning collective bargaining and union recognition at Duke.

1. William Lee Miller, "The Church and Politics," *Reflections on Protest* (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1967), p. 43.

2. *Ibid.*

The events that initiated the Vigil are probably best described in a *Duke Chronicle* article (April 8) :

When they reached the president's home, a gracious Mrs. Knight met them at the door. She maintained a hospitable air as around 200 of them crowded into the house.

Meanwhile, Dr. Knight stood outside in a light drizzle and talked to 150 more marchers. He urged them to understand that he, too, was both saddened and concerned by King's death. He pleaded for time in which to make decisions. . . .

Knight went inside and, after appearing initially surprised at the sudden influx of visitors, met with three spokesmen . . . for nearly two hours. . . .

Jack Boger, one of the students, expressed the mood of the marchers: "An old order is changing—we cannot allow institutions that are amoral, good men who can't take moral stands because of something they can't control . . . We must take a stand in this situation. . . ." The students then told President Knight: "We'll stand behind you if you take a stand."³

The issue was complicated on the following afternoon when Dr. Knight's physician ordered him into seclusion. He was suffering from exhaustion (and a possible relapse of hepatitis). As part of a memorial service for Dr. King, Knight had delivered a speech which left the student demands unsatisfied, so new strategy had to be developed.

Faced with being guests in a home where host and hostess were absent, the demonstrators then made their decision Sunday morning (April 7) to move onto the Quad.

Throughout the day supporters joined the demonstrators on the chapel quad. A few students stood nearby and heckled occasionally, but for the most part only the curious came and stared.⁴

In a prepared statement, the steering committee of the Vigil (as the movement came to be called) declared that "from the beginning the Vigil members had one overriding goal: to bring the University to address itself to the political and social inequalities in its midst."⁵ The statement went on to point out the importance of Dr. King's death and the need for action now: "We can no longer tolerate the economic degradation and consequent dehumanization of the black community in our midst." A further policy statement described the Vigil as a "political action aimed at an impersonal institution. . . ."⁶ Due to

3. *The Duke Chronicle*, April 8, 1968.

4. *Ibid.*

5. "What is the Vigil?"

6. "I Have a Dream"

certain objections raised to the demonstration and its "four points,"⁷ a revised statement of purpose was issued (*alongside* the original demands):

(1) Despite our past acts this university must publicly reassure our commitment to the community.

(2) Although Dr. Knight obviously does not have the power to grant \$1.60 minimum wage, we are asking him to endorse this as Duke's first priority. This would require that he press for a re-orientation of Duke's fund-raising and fiscal policy to accomplish this end.

(3) Dr. Knight certainly has the right to associate with whom he chooses. But we feel that his membership in a segregated country club requires him, as president of a major university, either to alter its membership policy or withdraw.

(4) We can imagine no objections to the establishment of a committee with representatives from all sectors of the university community to explore the possibility of a democratic solution to Duke's labor problems.⁸

The spokesmen for the Vigil continued to affirm that their supporters would work constantly to "phrase our demands in such flexible terms as to encourage an atmosphere of creative change rather than one of belligerent confrontation."

Labor Situation

One element which contributed to the complexity of the situation was the desire on the part of the non-academic workers for recognition of their union, intermingled with the aims of the Vigil. The general problem represented by the union's cause was set forth succinctly in a Vigil pamphlet:

. . . the university argues that it can do more 'for' the employees than a union. Yet this position merely deepens the basic problem. Employees need to have a voice in their own future, and that voice can only come through collective bargaining. Only then *must* employees agree to wage scales and fringe benefits for which they will work. Only then may employees negotiate and sign a contract as mutual, equal participants rather than dependents of a paternal employer with unilateral decision-making power. . . .⁹

7. The letters in the issues of *The Duke Chronicle* from April 8 through April 15 express very well the range of the opposition to the Vigil. See also "The Vigil: Children's Crusade to Fascism," by Seth Grossman, April 17, 1968. "Vigil Leaders Reflect Diversity," (April 8, 1968) sets the tone for the internal friction that was inherent within the Vigil itself.

8. "I Have a Dream", *op. cit.*

9. "Why Local 77?"

The paper went on to point out that in the dining halls, \$1.25 per hour is the minimum wage earned by "only" twenty per cent of service employees. The bulk of these earn less than \$1.40 an hour (still well under the \$1.60 minimum wage). Maids (according to the pamphlet) make from \$1.25 to \$1.40, while the bulk of them make between \$1.25 and \$1.35. Janitors make a maximum of \$1.65 after many years of service, and hospital blue collar workers earn from \$1.15 to \$1.40. In the laundry most workers earn below \$1.25. In all of these cases workers can serve this university for twenty years and still fall within this wage scale—almost all below poverty level.¹⁰

The strike of the non-academic employees went into effect on April 9.¹¹ The East, West, and Graduate Center dining halls were picketed, and boycott of these facilities was initiated. A union assessment of the strike indicated that it was ninety per cent effective in the first day.¹²

On the Quad

The actual Vigil itself presents a wealth of material for sociologists and psychologists, as well as political scientists to study. (Just the fact that at least eighty per cent of the demonstrators came from upper middle class families and had never "rebelled" for or against anything before is an interesting statistic for those who tend to associate student demonstrations with student activists.)

Each participant in the Vigil was given a list of "ground rules" for the duration of his stay on the Quad. These included: (1) Remember that this is a day of mourning; (2) Remember the sense of purpose—we are very serious; (3) No talking. Please study or read; (4) No eating but at group snack and meal breaks; (5) No sunbathing; (6) No singing except at specified periods under the direction of the song leader; (7) No conversation with the spectators; (8) There should be no response to harassment; (9) Please do not give out information to the press, to avoid misinformation; (10) We must boycott the West Dining Halls. Finally, each participant was reminded that "the monitors are in charge so please listen to them." (As the number grew to approximately 1400, more than thirty monitors were chosen to carry out certain defined duties.)

10. These wages were considerably improved in May, with a promise of \$1.60 minimum by July 1, 1969.

11. Some workers (perhaps 25%) remained on duty, aided by student volunteers.

12. *The Duke Chronicle*, April 10, 1968. Also, "Why Local 77?"

The organization of the Vigil was really quite amazing, for it included among its more obvious expressions :

(A) An information center: mimeographed statements were available, explaining each step in the development of the Vigil. Basic points were continually re-asserted.

(B) An "Actions Table" was the source of petitions. Also, a list of courses offered on the Quad was continually revised there. Registration of all women participants was also required.

(C) A Lost and Found was maintained.

(D) A medicine table stocked sun-tan lotion, aspirin, salt tablets, and various cold medications.

(E) A main "office area" with a microphone and amplifying system was maintained. Radio news was broadcast to participants. Announcements were made periodically. A bulletin board was kept up to date.

(F) An inside office was maintained in Flowers.

(G) A banking service was established.

(H) Collection points were set up, and money was continuously collected for food and for the "Strike Fund".

(I) A kitchen area and sandwich counter served as the dispensing point for food. The organization was such that 1400 people could be served in little over an hour.

(J) A steering committee (later the "strategy committee") handled negotiations, and notified the Vigil participants of each step taken.

(K) Monitors circulated from time to time collecting suggestions, criticisms, ideas. Many were implemented.

(L) Picket lines (run on volunteer basis) were maintained and changed regularly.

(M) All blankets, sleeping bags, etc. were collected, stored, and re-distributed.

(N) Clean-up crews operated continuously. All bathroom facilities were cleaned after use. All paper, cigarette butts, etc., were picked up.

(O) Seminar classes were arranged and conducted on the Quad.

(P) Periodic group singing, guest speakers, and announcements helped pass the time.

(Q) There was a continuous dispensing of information regarding the goals and purposes of the Vigil.

(R) Demonstrators were seated in straight rows, and were requested to remain quiet and orderly (which they did).

On Monday night, April 8, folk-singer Joan Baez and her husband, Mr. Harris, addressed the assembled Vigil. Harris delivered a rather lengthy oration directed against the draft and the evils of the American military establishment. This writer was greatly impressed when one of the student participants rose at the conclusion of Mr. Harris' remarks and said: "We appreciate what you have said, but this is not why we're here!" He received a standing ovation. It was

on this night that this writer and four other Divinity students joined the Vigil. (To my knowledge, a total of *nine* seminary students were actively involved in the Vigil itself. Two were already involved in the movement before we arrived on Monday night. The rest joined later. One joined on Monday and left the following day.)

Tuesday, April 9, was an eventful day. Martin Luther King, Jr., was buried in Atlanta. A class boycott was called "in memoriam for Dr. King and in support of our effort". A memorial service was conducted in the Duke Chapel, and broadcast to the demonstrators on the Quad. Dean Robert E. Cushman of the Divinity School delivered the sermon, in which he referred to the "cruciform quality" of the events that had taken place in the preceding days.¹³ During the afternoon, telegrams of support were received from Senators Eugene J. McCarthy and Robert F. Kennedy, as well as from Benjamin E. Mays, and others. It was announced that the Divinity School faculty had voted to relinquish its annual pay raise in favor of the non-academic employees (see above). The strike of Local 77 went into effect; picket lines were set up, and a boycott of the cafeterias was begun. Also, Howard Fuller, a local Negro leader and organizer of the black community in Durham, appeared, to tell the Vigil: "Although I'm a black man and proud of it, you all look good to me today." Fuller ended his appearance with a warning:

. . . Now is the beginning, and all those who are within the reach of my voice who have anything to say about anything had better start listening to those who preach peace, because if they don't listen to the voice of peace they are going to listen to those who have no peace on their minds.¹⁴

The Plot Thickens

The events of Wednesday, April 10, were climactic in character. No one sitting on the Quad was unaware that before the day was over, some type of significant turning point would be reached. The total number of active participants "camping out" on the Quad had grown to nearly 1400. Local and national interest in the Vigil had increased considerably, definitely making it a force to be reckoned with. The stage was set.

A steady drizzle of rain lasted throughout the day, but from early afternoon on events began to happen that kept spirits from dampening along with the bodies. A statement by the "Divinity School Community" (see above, p. 89) supported the aims of the Vigil. Dr.

13. See below, p. 121.

14. *Duke Chronicle*, April 10, 1968.

Samuel DuBois Cook, Associate Professor of Political Science at Duke and a representative to Dr. King's funeral, delivered a moving address expressing his feelings about the Vigil: ". . . you are sacrificing for humanity; you are finding yourselves by losing yourselves in the needs, aspirations, and just demands of your fellows."

"The University administration," he continued, "has taken the wrong side of a great moral issue." At one point in the afternoon a large delegation of law school students and faculty marched onto the Quad, announcing their support for the Vigil and presenting the Strike Fund¹⁵ with a substantial contribution.

At five o'clock Wright Tisdale, Chairman of the Board of Trustees, appeared on the Quad and read a prepared statement which expressed his concern over Dr. Knight's illness, and voiced sympathy for the issues that had prompted the calling of the Vigil. Turning to the "four demands" presented to President Knight, Tisdale gave July 1, 1969, as the date by which the \$1.60 minimum would be in effect at Duke. "We will make a significant step toward this by July 1, 1968," he added, and pointed out that the minimum wage will be achieved two years earlier than specified by federal law. Reference was made to a committee mentioned by President Knight in his chapel address, but the other demands of the Vigil were put aside as "of a personal nature, answerable only by Dr. Knight". However, as *The Duke Chronicle* (April 11) pointed out, what Tisdale failed to say and do may be as important as the text of the speech:

No mention was made of Local 77, its strike, or the possibilities of collective bargaining for the union. Collective bargaining has been named the 'number one goal' by the strikers.

The opportune moment had arrived, but the general aims and specific goals of the Vigil were still unfilled. Clearly, *something* had to be done—some action must be taken. But what? That question was on everyone's mind as the Vigil quietly moved into Page Auditorium to contemplate its position and chart a course of action.

Time of Crisis

The air was charged with emotion. Fourteen hundred demonstrators crowded into the auditorium and waited impatiently for the Vigil leaders to arrive. The days and nights of physical hardships, the lack of sleep, and the overwhelming disappointment with Tisdale's

15. The Strike Fund was created to provide financial assistance for workers on strike. It was estimated that approximately \$3000 per week was needed to enable them to stay off the job.

remarks combined to make tempers short and nerves ragged. Also, for a second time the inherent diversity within the Vigil began to rise to the surface: Radical "activists," militant black students, "first time" demonstrators, as well as thoughtful, concerned strategists formed a motley conglomeration of feelings. When the leadership finally arrived, they were greeted with rhythmic chants of "Four! Four! Four! Four! Four!" The anger and frustration were very apparent.

This afternoon session centered around an announcement made by the chairman of the Academic Council (a committee of professors). The council urged the University not to disregard "justice and morality in the larger community in which it operates and in the non-academic community within its own bounds."¹⁶ The statement urged co-operation in working out racial problems in the community at large, but was actually pretty weak in its direct support of the Vigil's aims and the union's fight for collective bargaining (though it recommended a committee "study the feasibility of collective bargaining"). The report concluded by urging students to return to their classes, implying that a significant moral victory had already been won. The disappointment was obvious, and was vocalized by Jack Boger, who said: "As the logic of events transcends finance, the logic of morality goes beyond mere rational thinking. In the context of events in this country and in the context of dealing with the administration of the University, I must say that this statement is unacceptable!"¹⁷

Dr. John Strange, Assistant Professor of Political Science, opened the evening session by outlining a plan of action. He suggested that the Vigil make supporting the goals of the union top priority (i.e., \$1.60 per hour and collective bargaining). Further support of the union would be expressed by: manning the picket lines, maintaining the food boycott (offering alternate food plans), contributing financially to the Strike Fund, continuing to meet as a strategy committee, and electing a group of four students to deal with collective bargaining. Strange felt strongly that the Vigil should now move from the Quad, with the understanding that it could be reconvened or could return to the Quad if the situation demanded it.

Mr. Oliver Harvey, founder of the union, describing his experiences with the administration at Duke, and the growth of Local 77, repeatedly emphasized the importance of collective bargaining. The need to have a say in working out work loads, wages, hours, and fringe benefits was crucial in his eyes. He referred to the "hard-boiled

16. *The Duke Chronicle*, April 11, 1968.

17. *Ibid.*

policy" of Duke University that was adamantly against unionism. (Earlier in the afternoon Tisdale had pointed to the progress made at Duke in improving working conditions. However, Harvey pointed out that literally nothing had been done until the union began to make its presence felt in 1965.)

Following Harvey's talk, Jack Boger presented what he termed an alternate proposal. "We can't just support them with a lot of money we have . . . This will satisfy a lot of liberal consciences, but it is not what we started out to do," he proclaimed. He suggested that a committee be organized to co-ordinate activities with the union, and to look to the faculty for support. He wanted to leave a token of about 200 pickets on the Quad, and invite the Trustees to join in a discussion of collective bargaining in about a week. Boger seemed (to me) to be caught between radical impulses and common sense.

Feelings and opinions flew fast and furiously. Some wanted to remain on the Quad; some supported Boger's suggestion; some felt with Dr. Strange that the Quad had served its purpose, and it was now time to do something else. One suggestion was an Easter Sunday "confrontation" (which was actually adopted). Too, it was pointed out that the labor personnel were working within a six-week time period: at the end of the semester, their student support would be away from the campus. It was also pointed out that the "black community" had lent its support to the endeavor, and "we can't let them down by giving in!" Many felt (the writer among them) that the Trustees would view the Vigil as "over" now, and any continued presence on the Quad would be self-defeating. What was needed was a "new approach", a new dimension of the Vigil, that would be as effective in a deeper and more comprehensive way. However, exactly *what* that approach was (with the exception of Strange's proposals) was a mystery at this particular hour of the night! The wisest suggestion of the long evening was that nothing definite be decided until Thursday morning, when heads were clearer and emotions had cooled. Vigil participants headed for the Chapel and the Divinity School to bed down.

An interesting phenomenon occurred immediately following the adjournment of the session. Small groups sprang up all over the Quad, usually consisting of one or two black students and ten or twelve white. Passionate discussions were taking place, in which the Vigil was denounced by the black students as a "failure"—a "typical expression of how the white man works". Many students were trying to defend the long, drawn-out process of rational decision-making, but

there was also a real yearning for radical action of *some kind*. Then, about two o'clock in the morning, Wright Tisdale suddenly appeared in the University Chapel. He told the students (who immediately surrounded him) that he had come in to "meditate and to pray".

Whatever Mr. Tisdale's motives for his coming to the Chapel, it almost turned out to be disastrous. Under intense questioning by Vigil members, he stated that (1) he personally did not believe in unions; and, (2) he felt that Duke "knew best" when it came to dealing with non-academic employees—Duke would "take care" of its workers. He said that the administration would talk only to *individual* employees, and would not recognize their union representatives; there could be absolutely no intermediaries. The student reaction was very strongly negative, almost violent. One black student, standing on one of the Chapel pews, muttered, "You leave us no choice but to burn!" Tisdale requested to be left alone for a few minutes—and had to slip out of the Chapel to avoid being cornered by the students again.

The discussions that flared up following Tisdale's appearance really threatened to disrupt the Vigil totally. One group was trying to organize to meet Tisdale's plane in the morning and prevent him from leaving. Another wanted to "take over" Allen Building via a sit-in. Some were suggesting that the Vigil move to the dining hall kitchens and lie down on the stoves. The crisis had arisen partly due to the fact that the responsible Vigil leadership had *all* retired (out of sheer exhaustion) in order to get a good night's sleep. Into this vacuum of leadership, the more "radical-activist" elements of the Vigil eagerly stepped. They fanned the fires of bitterness, urging militant action in response to Tisdale's adamant stance.

Around 2:30 A.M., six Divinity students huddled on the steps of the Chapel. Abbie Doggett, president of the Women's Student Government Association, joined us as we discussed what *we* could do in the face of the rising agitation. Abbie suggested that the first thing was to get everyone to bed and break up the various groups that were gathering around the Chapel. We felt also that it was crucial to restore rationality. Separating, we moved into the various groups, trying to break the intense emotionalism by introducing some type of cogent and rational arguments into the discussions. It was after 3:30 when most of the groups had been dispersed and the Vigil had finally retired.

The Decision of Thursday Morning

The mass meeting came together again at 7 o'clock on Thursday morning. Bunny Small began the discussion by pointing out that the

goal now had to be collective bargaining, and that this would be a long-range action. "We cannot expect instant justice," she said. She made a strong appeal for a commonsensical approach and urged effective support of the union.

The discussion that followed was tense, enthusiastic, and represented the vast spectrum of feelings represented in the group. I think it helpful to reconstruct as much of it as possible :

—Where can we put the most pressure, and how?

Can we put financial pressure on the Duke Endowment?

Let's sign a statement saying that we will never buy a Ford!

Let's seek alumni support—organize a letter campaign.

—We need a "physical commitment"!

We have to have a physical presence: A sit-in in the kitchen of the West campus dining hall would be effective.

Let's organize a "division of labor" and set ourselves to different tasks.

—We are experiencing what any Mass Movement must come to:

We began with the actual sit-in itself, committed to "social justice". Sentimentalism and emotionalism dominated this period. We must now forget the emotional dimension and move to the realm of reason.

We need now the execution of *reasonable ideas*.

There has to be some type of *confrontation*.

We have to keep together, supporting different methods.

"We're here for action, not discussion!"

We're just tired; we haven't lost our commitment.

Peter Brandon, the union representative, addressed the group :

Up until last night this was a tremendous movement! Your actions focused national attention here . . .

Tisdale came down here to bust you up. He took a hard position to force internal stress to the surface . . .

My feeling is that to act now in an unwound state would be to disintegrate what has already been built up . . .

I would propose that we disregard the difficulties in trying to understand and deal with Tisdale. . . . You should ask about anything you decide:

Does it support collective bargaining?

Does it support the workers?

Be sure you *listen* to the striking workers.

Be willing to fight with the strikers down the line for collective bargaining . . . *NOW!*

The broadest possible support of the campus is needed. Therefore you must re-create the credibility of your movement . . . any action you take must be done in a thoughtful, effective, genuine, sincere way. . . .

When a vote was called, the principal proposals made by Dr. Strange the night before were passed. Also, it was decided that a

rally would be held at 9 P.M., and that a march from Page Auditorium to the Women's East Campus would mark the official "end" of the Vigil. The evening rally would allow the union the opportunity to express its demands. Faculty were also urged to attend, and at this time some members ventured some more direct support for the aims of the Vigil. The Vigil disbanded with the understanding that the strategy committee would continue to meet, and that the entire body could be re-called at any time. No one really thought "everything was over", and the victories won were surely limited indeed. However, the general sentiment seemed to be that *something* had been accomplished; *now* it was time to do something else to enable the union to achieve their goals.

THEOLOGY AS INVOLVEMENT

One of the fascinating aspects of the Duke Vigil is that it presented a "political laboratory" for the Divinity School. The presence of the Vigil forced the theological community to respond to a condensed version of what it faces in the broader sphere of social relationships. This is especially true today, when theology is taking renewed interest in the world of politics. More and more we are realizing that "politics is the business of everybody," including the minister.¹⁸ The time is gone (if indeed it ever existed) when the minister and/or theologian could be viewed as somehow dealing only with "the spiritual realm"—keeping himself carefully removed from "dirty politics". The theologian learns as much about man from the political arena as from introspection. And the new humanism is at least as much concerned with civil rights, war in Vietnam, and the struggle against poverty as it is with the inner world (of the existentialists).¹⁹ Bruce Douglass has put this point more succinctly:

God is not captive in the church but active in the world, and the mode of his action is *political*. He is "making human life human" by transforming the structures of society, and the task of Christians is to follow his lead. Therefore out of the churchy ghetto and into the world away from pietist individualism toward *social* change, away from bourgeois complacency toward revolutionary radicalism. . . .²⁰

The mood is similar to that of the social gospel,²¹ with its emphasis on the *tension* that exists between the world (i.e., society) as it is,

18. See Roger L. Shinn, *Tangled World*, pp. 102 ff. Also, R. L. Shinn, *Man: The New Humanism*, pp. 112-113.

19. R. L. Shinn, *Man: The New Humanism*, p. 112.

20. Bruce Douglass, *Reflections on Protest*, p. 13.

21. See W. Rauschenbusch, *A Theology for the Social Gospel*, pp. 131-145.

and the world as it is meant to be in the "Kingdom of God". The cry for action is best put forth by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. in his "Letter from a Birmingham Jail":

Human progress never rolls in on wheels of inevitability; it comes through the tireless efforts of men willing to be co-workers with God, and without this hard work, time itself becomes an ally of the forces of social stagnation. We must use time creatively, in the knowledge that the time is always ripe to do right. Now is the time to make real the promise of democracy and transform our pending national elegy into a creative psalm of brotherhood. Now is the time to lift our national policy from the quicksand of racial injustice to the solid rock of human dignity.²²

Jürgen Moltmann has based his whole theology on an eschatological perspective that emphasizes the position of man as "one-on-the-way", living in the tension of the not-yet. The Christian Church must be a church for the world; it "has not to serve mankind in order that this world may remain what it is, or may be preserved in the state in which it is, but in order that it may transform itself and become what it is promised to be."²³ Christianity takes up mankind; it performs its service only when it infects men with hope. "This kindling of live hopes that are braced for action and prepared to suffer, hopes of the Kingdom of God that is coming to earth in order to transform it, is the purpose of mission."²⁴ It is not surprising that revolution has a prominent place in Moltmann's thought (as well as in the thought of Harvey Cox). This is a clear call for the "creative extremists" mentioned by Martin Luther King.²⁵ The Christian man is acutely aware of the painful tension between a broken world and the promises of God's kingdom; and he is called toward the future of God through action and involvement *within* the society of which he is a part.

What does all this have to do with the Duke Silent Vigil? For one thing, it sets forth the basis of a *motivation* for participation in the activity of the Vigil. Just as a "political theology" seeks to relieve the tension between promise and practice, so the *raison d'être* for student politics is that it provides a source of renewal and creative change in both university and society-at-large.²⁶

One of the real strengths of the Vigil movement was the "righteousness" of its cause, the morality of its purpose. The issues in-

22. Martin Luther King, Jr., *Why We Can't Wait*, p. 86.

23. Jürgen Moltmann, *Theology of Hope*, pp. 327-328.

24. *Ibid.*

25. M. L. King, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

26. Bruce Douglass, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

volved were clearly *moral* in character (i.e., they transcended mere political expediency and appealed to the broader concept of “justice and racial equality”). Also, the demonstrators were calling for reforms that were basically *for someone else*. The physical hardship of the days on the Quad—the “vicarious suffering”—contributed to the morality of the movement. Bruce Douglass has outlined certain guidelines for student protests, and it is interesting to note that the first one is “discipline in the selection of issues for action”.²⁷ The original “Four Points” were explicit requests with broad moral overtones—they were *specific instances* within a more general goal, i.e., preservation of basic human rights.

Douglass’ second criterion is that *discipline* in the pursuit of a certain issue be maintained over an extended period of time.²⁸ Fickleness is a characteristic of many student protest movements. The desire for “instant justice” (see Bunny Small’s remarks above) and the confrontation of a firmly unyielding power structure often produces disappointment and disillusionment. Within the Duke Vigil the temptation was very great. However, the presence of the union and the realization that they were to some extent dependent upon the support of the students contributed to the disciplined pursuit of the basic goals of the Vigil.

Thirdly, Douglass emphasizes that a detailed analysis of the problem and the preferred solutions be continuously undertaken.²⁹ The Vigil expresses very well the problems involved in keeping a large protest movement focused on the “hard-headed” facts and probabilities involved. Shouting “Four! Four! Four!” was of the same dynamic as “Ban the Bomb!” “Stop the War!”, etc. Understanding and analysis must accompany passion and idealism if a movement is to succeed. A social program and prescription must translate the idealistic vision into hard-core reality.

In the fourth place, according to Douglass a long-term strategy must be developed.³⁰ Though the Vigil made plans for future action, it was really impossible to set up real long-range plans. The time limit of six weeks had to figure heavily in the planning. The real danger is that students will respond to a call to action with a “crisis-response” mentality, because of their tendency to focus on dramatic issues, and then only for short periods. The strategy committee has followed

27. *Ibid.*, p. 26.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 27.

29. *Ibid.*

30. *Ibid.*, p. 28.

Douglass' advice in developing a carefully organized plan which plots gradual development toward change over an extended period. Another difficulty, however, came about because each statement by the Trustee committee and/or administration made strategy revisions necessary.

The development of a multi-faceted strategy, Douglass' fifth criteria, seems to appear at various points during the Vigil. In fact, Dr. Strange's proposals were representative of a number of different activities parallel and complementary to one another: manning picket lines, collecting money, boycotting the cafeterias, etc. "The ideal for student action . . . is a strategy which brings together protest and 'construction' so that they are interdependent and mutually complementary."³¹ This is what the strategy committee of the Vigil attempted to work toward.

Douglass recommends that the development of coalitions with like-minded groups beyond the student community be considered next.³² This was stressed throughout the Vigil. One of the strongest arguments against any extreme or "radical" action was that it might alienate our faculty and community support. A tightrope had to be walked, however, between the "oppressed and exploited groups" (i.e., workers and people in the black community) and "reform-minded persons that work within the 'system' ". How successfully this was carried out is still an open question, since members of the black community have expressed disappointment with the accomplishments of the Vigil.

The elements of *protest* and *construction* were both involved in the Duke Vigil, and both had certain basic functions. R. S. Moore's article on "Protest and Beyond" is helpful in delineating these functions. The functions of *protest*, especially within a student setting, may be described as follows:

- (1) *Publicity*: it provides a way of bringing social problems to the attention of a wider public, and keeping them in the public eye.
- (2) *Building social and political movements*: it provides a context in which support can be attracted, organized, mobilized, and consolidated.
- (3) *Serves to embarrass and press the relevant authorities*: Directed at public and those responsible for conditions.³³

Responsible protest, however, involves the proposal of one or more *viable* policy proposals to deal with the grievances in question. This

31. *Ibid.*

32. *Ibid.*, p. 29.

33. R. S. Moore, "Protest and Beyond," *Reflections on Protest*, pp. 51-57.

means that “construction” needs to be a companion to protest. Four broad categories of constructive action may be suggested :

- (1) *political organization*: an attempt is made to create new centers of power from which to effect change in the existing distribution of power. . . .
- (2) *exemplary project*: students organize a pilot or demonstration project designed to make clear that it can be approached constructively.
- (3) *education*: gathering, distribution, and interpretation of information.
 - (a) general public must be informed;
 - (b) those who suffer the grievances must be completely informed;
 - (c) students themselves need continuous education
- (4) *reconstruction*: practical service projects and fund raising.

In various ways and degrees, each of these aspects of protest and construction was present in the Duke Vigil. It found much strength in struggling with the political and social dynamics of the situation, and directing its forces into a sound, practical approach to reach its ends.

There is more to the case in point than structural dynamics. The elements of student protest, especially the structure and framework of the Duke Vigil, are extremely important—and that is why we have taken so much care to point them out. However, there is “transcendent” (yes, religious) rationale that permeates the activity itself. Perhaps this motivational feeling can best be expressed by the “Port Huron” statement of the Students for a Democratic Society :

We are people of this generation, bred in at least modest comfort, housed in universities, looking uncomfortably to the world we inherit.

Our work is guided by the sense that we may be the last generation in the experiment with living. . . . We ourselves are imbued with urgency, yet the message of our society is that there is no viable alternative to the present. . . .

We regard *men* as infinitely precious and possessed of unfulfilled capacities for reason, freedom, and love.

Human relationships should involve fraternity and honesty. Human interdependence is contemporary fact. Human brotherhood must be willed, however, as a condition of future survival and as the most appropriate form of social relations. . . .³⁴

This humanistic approach to life-in-general is typical of the motivation of much student involvement in social protest. The interesting thing is that, whereas the protest movements generally seem to have very *moral* overtones, and demands are based on an appeal to human dignity and certain inalienable rights of all men, the “religious”

34. “Port Huron Statement,” 1962, *The New Student Left*, pp. 9-13.

motivation *per se* is either negligible or "has had a negative role in shaping the ideology of the college student".³⁵ Students who instinctively want to *do* something are often repelled by the hypocrisy of churches which engage in segregation while preaching equality. The Church has increasingly identified itself with the middle class to such a degree that it is difficult for sensitive young people to see that the values of the middle class cannot wholly fit into an ethical system consistent with the teachings of their religion.³⁶

The Church must become *relevant* for the student again. We have heard that so much it sounds trite—but it is still true. A revolutionary change in the religious institutions is called for: "ministers, rabbis, and educators must again preach and act, not soothe. They must be willing to risk as much as the sit-in students in the South risked in their actions. Only when students feel that the church is again the Church will they be able to identify with it. Until that time, one of the most potent forces for justice and peace will remain without meaning for large numbers of concerned and active students."³⁷ Or to express it as forcefully as C. Wright Mills:

Politics, understood for what it really is today, has to do with the decisions men make which determine how they shall live and how they shall die . . . Politics is the locale of both evil and good. If you do not get the church into politics, you cannot confront evil and you cannot work for good. You will be a subordinate amusement and a political satrap of whatever is going. You will be the great Christian joke.³⁸

It must be apparent by now that what we are calling for is a conception of *theology as involvement*. This is not to negate the reflective, contemplative aspect of systematic theology, but it *is* to say that a theological "system" born and bred in hallowed halls or cloisters is irrelevant and meaningless in the complex world of today. The *starting point*, at least for Christians, should be the *reality of the incarnation*. God's embodiment, his "enfleshment", in all the problematic perplexities of life makes *all* of life the sphere of God's activity. The tension between the reality of Christ's *presence* now, and God's future intention for mankind must of necessity be a painful one for the Christian. There is really no decision to be made about *whether or not to act* when we experience injustice, poverty, disease, war, hunger, and suffering: the question is *where* and *how* to act, to become involved.

35. P. Altbach, "The Student and Religious Commitment," *The New Student Left*, p. 24.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 25.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 26.

38. C. Wright Mills, *The Causes of World War Three*, p. 155.

Several of us who became involved in the Vigil, who made the decision to sit on the Quad and to join in the actual demonstration, did so with mixed and uncertain motives. We knew the *cause* was just, but we had no assurance that the Vigil would maintain its "dignity". Many things could go wrong. It could very well become a misdirected, scatter-brained activist movement that would defeat its noble purposes by faulty decisions and unwise actions. The decision to cross the rope and place our sleeping bags on the Quad involved an unavoidable *RISK*. We simply could not *know* how it would turn out. We could possibly look "foolish"; we could be "sucked in" by effective propaganda; we could be sacrificing school-work and personal comfort for nothing. Maybe the Vigil would be a complete failure. The fact is, however, a decision was made. There was a real need to "act out" our feelings about Martin Luther King's assassination, I'm sure of that—and this was doubtlessly influential. But the goals of the Vigil were *right, reasonable* and *constructive* attempts to protest certain manifestations of racial injustice in the Duke University community. Somehow we knew that in this particular existential moment a commitment had to be made—and the inherent risk taken.

The crucial point here is that we began with no "*theology of the Vigil*". We started from a Christological base that *seemed to demand a definite response to this situation*, but we were not totally convinced that "God was on our side," so to speak. We did not enter with predetermined ideas of what our "ministry" would be while we sat on the Quad. However, the theology and the ministry both evolved *within* and *through* the experience of participation. We became a part of the group, and participants in the collective cause—we happened to be ministers, too. In moments of crisis and decision we were personally accredited and listened to *because we had earned the right to speak first, and were ministers second!*

Perhaps this is a controversial point, but *it was actually our participation and involvement that seemed to validate our ministry*. If we had arrived in the wee hours of the morning on Thursday and said exactly the same things, we might or might not have been as effective—the chances are we would *not* have been. Our ministry was meaningful and valid (and effective to some extent) because we were expressing an "*incarnational*" view of ministry: we had become embodied within the perplexities and problematics of the Vigil, and the "costliness" of this experience somehow accredited our right to speak.

The parallel between the Vigil experience and our political experience in general should, I hope, be apparent. The ministerial community is called to political involvement—there is really no way around it. I honestly believe that the Duke Vigil demanded some kind of supportive response on the part of the Divinity School, if for no other reason, by the very rightness of its cause. The minister does not have the luxury today to “deal in spiritual things” while the world “goes to hell”. He must realize that if the world goes to hell, he goes with it. Political responsibility is a vital part of our interpersonal and social existence in the world today. It is even more so for the minister: how can he live with the reality of the incarnation and the promise of the Kingdom of God, and refuse to “dirty his hands” in the problems of society and the world? Surely, he cannot!

The final point concerns individual action. What is the responsibility of the minister as a man, as *one man*? I have answered the question repeatedly throughout the paper. The *risk of commitment* is now imperative. Just as the Church can no longer be the last to act or speak out, so the minister can no longer wait to sift public opinion before addressing himself to a controversial issue. The prophetic nature of the ministry demands that the word of God be spoken wherever the will of God is frustrated. And, finally, we are called to the realization that the ministry is ultimately the diakonic expression of Christ’s involvement in the world. We are servants of the needs of men as well as proclaimers of God’s coming Kingdom. In the light of this double-dimension of our vocation, how can we understand theology in any other way? Costly, incarnational involvement is the *way* of Christ’s ministry today—and it is our calling to walk in his way.

“Hope Beyond Time”

JÜRGEN MOLTMANN

Visiting Professor of Theology

All hopes of man sooner or later come upon their most difficult test of verification: death. In that darkness in which man arrives at his end and which spreads itself out from death already into the midst of life, it becomes apparent how much light his hope can disperse. Man becomes conscious of himself and his life because he knows of his death. Thus his hopes always originate in the problem of death. They flare up and break through here. If there is no hope against death, then there is also no sustaining of hope in life. But what is there to hope for in death? Is there hope which also overcomes death?

In our Western history we know two conceptions of hope in view of death, i.e. the Greek concept of the immortality of the soul and the biblical concept of the resurrection of the dead. Thus on one side is the certainty of the invulnerability of the soul in the death of the body and on the other side is the certainty in the God who will create a new life out of death.

If we ask Christians and atheists which hope Christianity offers the dying, they answer ordinarily: hope in a life after death, hope for the immortal soul. But if we hear the Christian confession of faith in the worship service, it says there: “I believe in the resurrection of the body and in a life everlasting,” and “I wait upon the resurrection of the dead and a life of the future world.” What should we think?

Let me first of all delineate the fundamental difference between the two conceptions of hope in face of death. It becomes clear to us if we compare two kinds of death with each other.

A. The Greek philosopher Plato has portrayed for us the death of Socrates in order to show us what the immortality of the soul means and what attitude this understanding confirms in death. As is well known, Socrates was condemned, as a blasphemer and enticer of youth, to death by means of a cup of poison. In his last hour he sits

with his disciples gathered around him and explains to them his philosophical insight and attitude with respect to death. Our body is only an outer garment that as long as we live hinders our soul from becoming free and coming to itself. Inferior passions and bodily pains bind it to this world where all is changeable and transient and where is found nothing true, constant and binding. Thus is the soul, our true self, confined in the body as in a straight jacket. As in a prison the soul lives here in a foreign land and yearns for its eternal homeland. The body, which fetters us with the weal and woe of transitory things, is the soul's house of troubles. It is alienated from itself here and must constantly do things which do not belong to its true nature. But through insight and recollection the soul of man can recognize already here its ground in eternity and its own immutable nature and thus gain distance over against the fortune and pain of the world. What, then, does death mean for it?

Death makes the soul free from the body. It leads the soul out of transitoriness into permanence and out of a world of deception into the eternal truth. Death can only consume that which is transitory and therefore belongs to it. But if the soul is of immutable origin, death can not hurt it. The innermost self of man is invulnerable and unassailable. Whoever in this life already comes to this insight is more than a match for death and can look forward to it in peace and self-composure. Whoever, on the contrary, fears death only indicates that his soul is still entangled in earthly passions and is not yet detached and composed. But whoever has reflected upon the immortal, unassailable kernel of his soul does not tremble when death breaks the bodily shell. He welcomes the death of the body as the friend of the soul.

When Socrates saw to what extent one of his disciples who loved him suffered from the idea that he would soon be laid before them as a corpse, he said with surpassing irony that the true Socrates would have already slipped away when they would be worried about his corpse afterwards.

Here we have a "beautiful death" before us. Serene freedom and exelling calmness emanate from the dying Socrates.

Men in the Old Testament die in a completely different way. Let us hear the prayer of King Hezekiah in peril of death: "In the noontime of my days, I must depart; I am consigned to the gates of Sheol. I shall no longer see the Lord in the land of the living. My time is past. Like a weaver I roll up my life. He breaks me off like a fine thread. I clamor like a crane and I moan like a dove; my

eyes are weary with looking upward. Lo, Sheol cannot praise thee, nor can death glorify thee, and those who go down to the pit cannot hope for thy faithfulness, but all those who are living praise thee. Lord, help me."

Here somebody is afraid of death because he loves life. He cannot look upon it with serene composure. This death is so deadly because it annihilates the whole man, body and soul. This death is so deadly because it is godless and leads into godforsakenness. It is a hell because there one can no longer see and praise God.

The death of Jesus is not so beautiful either. Jesus "begins to tremble and be faint-hearted". His soul is troubled unto death. He pleads that this cup pass by him. He dies with the words on his lips: "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" The deadliness of this death is the terrible forsakenness by God, by the Spirit, and from every inner support of eternity. This death is no friend of the soul but rather the enemy of man and the enemy of God. Thus Jesus dies "with great cries and tears", as Hebrews says, and not in self-composure and calm irony. In view of Jesus' suffering death on the cross the disciples gained the certainty of the resurrection from the dead in his Easter appearances: Jesus the first fruit of the dead, the pioneer of the resurrection. Through him appears "life out of death".

We understand now that this Christian hope in resurrection by God is something other than the certainty of the divine immortality of the soul. Resurrection hope is a hope against death. For it death is the "last enemy" of God and man. True life is for it a life in which death is subdued and destroyed, indeed, completely eliminated. Such a life is hoped for from God who showed his power in the resurrection of Jesus. When he shows it also to us for the first time, we will sing: "Death is swallowed up in victory. Death, where is thy victory? Hell, where is thy sting?" God who spoke to man in the resurrection of Christ is alone adequate to a new world in which death is subdued and destroyed. One of the two must yield: either God or death. Whoever considers death as final and invincible, to him God becomes obscure. But whoever believes in God for the sake of Christ hopes against death. He cannot take death for the end. For the sake of the divinity of this God he believes in the final victory of life, of the dear and glorified life of the promise. Therefore, he suffers here in death.

Now, we can imagine the life of the immortal soul in the heaven of spirits just as little as we can imagine the eternal life of the resur-

rection from the dead. The conceptions for them fail us because we always form our conceptions out of our experiences and because we have experienced neither one nor the other up to now. But it is different with hope than with our conceptions. Faith and hope come not after experiences but go before experiences. Faith does not come out of experience but experience out of faith. Therefore, we must ask ourselves what has the precedence by reason of faith and hope: the immortality of the soul or the hope in resurrection and, furthermore, how we experience life and death in the one and the other?

One definite attitude toward life is grounded in the certainty surrounding the unassailable immortality of the soul. It is the attitude of distance and superiority in the face of fortune and suffering, in the face of pleasure and pain. The Greek philosophy of life in the Stoa educated men for apathy, which means passionlessness. Whether happiness or pain: pass by the world, it is nothing. Whoever binds himself to nothing, whoever does not love anything too much, he also does not suffer. Equanimity and self-composure are the virtues of the wise man who is certain of his origin in another world and therefore is not perturbed by the conflicts of this world. Many have believed that, in view of the belief in immortality, this world is only the waiting room of the soul in which one has to take nothing really seriously. One waits and indifferently turns the pages in the illustrated magazine of this world of appearance until the doors to the consulting room of eternity open up. But we must also see as positive this inner distance of man from the physical world. Out of this distance are born praise-worthy human characteristics: serenity, self-composure, the stance above things and the capacity to take oneself not so terribly seriously.

A wholly different attitude toward life is grounded in the hope in the resurrection of the dead, the attitude of love. In love man opens his heart. He binds his soul to the life of his loved one. In love he does not want to preserve himself and his soul. He forgets himself and surrenders himself. For love, life here is everything. Therefore, for it the death of loved ones becomes so deadly. The soul which loves suffers from transitoriness. Its passion makes it wholly present with things and loved ones and makes it suffer when they pass away. Death is known for the first time by the soul not when we ourselves die; its bitter presence is already felt in the death of those we love. How should life overcome death without abandoning itself and becoming apathetic? It needs a hope beyond death and against death

so that love can last, so that it will not be resigned and indifferent to life.

We must not understand the Christian hope in resurrection as remote speculation on the conditions after death. The love which gives up everything here, risks everything, passionately involves itself—this love alone grasps this hope because this hope grasps it. The hope in resurrection prepares man to give up his life in love, to say an undivided *yes* to a life which is vulnerable and surrounded by death. The hope in resurrection makes one ready to take upon himself the pains and sufferings which love brings to him. It does not remove the physical, earthly life from the soul but inspires this earthly life with devotion, willingness to obey, readiness to sacrifice and with gladness, too. Thus he who hopes in love no longer needs a protective covering of indifference and irony which guards the soul against the unexpected onslaughts of evil and death. He sheds his defensive armor for new offensive action in the world. He spontaneously gives his life in love out of expectation that God will raise the dead out of the dust which everything eventually becomes and that God will create a new life. The Bible has for this transformed relationship of out-flowing love and hope in resurrection the image of the wheat seed. "Unless a grain of wheat falls into the earth and dies, it remains alone; but if it dies, it bears much fruit. Whoever will save his life will lose it, but whoever loses his life for the sake of Christ and the Kingdom of God will gain it." "What you sow does not come to life unless it dies." The hope in resurrection opens in love that future of God and that freedom which it needs to be able to love and to remain in love. What the hope in resurrection essentially is we experience here in love, and what love and affirmation of life mean in the apprehension of God is revealed through the hope in resurrection.

With that we come to the last question: If the Christian hope in resurrection is so completely divorced from the certainty surrounding the invulnerability of the soul, is there in this life, which is moving toward death, nothing which remains and endures and makes man invulnerable? Is the doctrine of the resurrection hope only a mournful truth for men in this life? No, there is also, according to Christian understanding, already in this life something which is equally immortal and therefore makes man secure against death. That is for the Apostle Paul the Spirit which blows out of the resurrection of Christ as a strong, irresistible wind through the life of the believing and hoping ones. It leads them out of apathy into the midst of today's

problems. To be sure they also will die. Body and soul, the whole man sinks into the grave. But the resurrection spirit bestows on life a direction and an openness forward which is indestructible and already extends beyond death into a life which overcomes death. This spirit is no substance in man but an act of the whole spiritual and physical life. Where man gives himself up completely to this direction, where he lives wholly out of the future of God, and seizes the power of this future in his life, there he has overcome death, there he has, as it were, out-stripped the coming death. Death comes too late. It no longer affects him. That is no utopia which rescues itself by flight into another world, for this openness of man in the spirit of the hope in resurrection beyond death leads man into a life of love. Therefore, the resurrection power utters—with deeper meaning, I think, than with Socrates—in the First Letter of John: "We know that we have passed out of death into life, because we love the brethren." Amen.

“Descent Into Hell”

JÜRGEN MOLTSMANN

If we went into a church and listened to a sermon about hell, many of us would laugh and with a shrug of the shoulders inquire, “Where is it supposed to be, this hell, where the evil devils torment the poor souls and roast them in the fire? Those are fairy tales with which one can horrify children. But we are grown up, enlightened and of age. We will not be browbeaten. This hell, with which the church makes threats, does not exist.” Therefore when we go into a church today, we can be fairly certain that hell will not be the topic of the sermon.

But does that mean that there are no hells? After the other world has become obscure, we have made this world, this life and this earth into hell. Everywhere human life seems to be plastered with hells. We speak of the “hell of Auschwitz” and know that not even the most horrible fantasy could conceive the meaningless genocide of the innocent, the cold, calculated evil of mass murder. We wander over the death fields of the world wars. There was the “hell of Verdun”; there, the “hell of Stalingrad”; and now here is the “napalm hell of Vietnam”. We hear the gasp of the dying, the torment of the tortured. Injustice stretches heavenwards. Suffering finds no compassion. And we find no meaning in all this—because there is none. “Lose all hope, those who enter here,” Dante inscribed above his hell. We know that the history in which we are involved bears out this superscription in manifold ways and places. Therefore we very often sink into apathy. “Consider the darkness and the great coldness,” cried Bertolt Brecht. We do not willingly consider it, but we know that it is there and surrounds us on all sides. “Damned in all eternity”: since we no longer get to hear that from the church, films, book titles, and the theater shout it in our ears.

But it is not necessary for us to scurry to these media, where, after all, we are able to witness the horror only secondarily at a safe distance. “Hell is others,” announced Sartre in his post-war play *No Exit*. How often do we complain to each other: “You make life hell for me!” Where men are assembled in utter closeness, they can prepare themselves a heaven on earth or they can also make life into hell. One expects acknowledgment and fellowship and suddenly

terrible disdain, helpless rage is there. A forlornness appears and struggles in deathly fear. This is the experience of hell. It is not only a simile. Inescapably and imperceptibly it disintegrates happiness and transforms a passionate hunger for life into a pitiful hate for life. And something else: we are not only hell's victim but also always the lighter of its fire. Then no one will guarantee us that the "hell of Auschwitz" has been the last hell on earth. No one can promise not to make life a hell for his neighbor.

Thus we understand well how near that is to us which we thought to be at a distance and how real that is which appeared to be a misty fairy tale. Martin Luther has expressed it in a classical hymn:

In the midst of life we are surrounded by death;
 In the midst of death the jaws of hell tempt us;
 In the midst of hell our fear stimulates our sins.

Death is in the midst of life. The agony of this death in the midst of life is hell: to live and not to be able to live, to love and not be able to love, to help and not be able to help. That develops into a fear which has no name. Its sting is the guilt, the burning torment of an empty life. That is why all hells fall back on us and remain with us. "For I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want is what I do" (Rom. 7:19).

The song changes these illusionless statements into a shout *ad infinitum*: For whom should we search, who makes redress, that we may obtain mercy? Who will make us free and untrammelled from such a misery? Where should we flee, we who would like to remain here?" Is there an answer? Would it still be the hell of life if we knew already the answer? And if we ourselves give the answer by promising: No more war! No more Auschwitz! No more bombing of Vietnam! Nor any more making hell out of the lives of others!—would we be safe from the evil of hell which threatens us so much? Are we certain of ourselves? In view of our present experiences of hell the religious answers and also the moralistic answers have only a faint and colorless relevance. But even if we no longer had these answers, the question would still remain: Whom do we seek? Where should we go? Who makes us free from such a misery?

II

What do Christians mean when they affirm that Jesus, who was taken to be the Son of God, "descended into hell"? Is that an answer? Does this answer have any validity in face of our hells? To begin

with let us make clear to ourselves by means of a few dates what is meant. It was not until the Synod of Sirmium in the year 359 that this sentence was added to the confession of faith. The Syriac theologian Markus of Arethusa had proposed it. He meant by it: Jesus the Son of God actually died. In his suffering, his being crucified and buried, he himself actually suffered the absolute agony of godforsakenness. The descent of Christ meant the lowest point of the suffering of Christ. It meant not a transmigration of Christ through the mythical realm of the departed. "Suffered-crucified-was buried": What really took place here was Christ's entering into the hell of guilt, of suffering, of death, and what goes beyond that in the metaphysical evil of the *nihil* itself. Christ is not so divine that all these things had not been able to affect him. He is divine precisely in that he became our brother throughout all our hells. That was the first meaning of the belief in Christ's descent into hell.

The Latin Church of the West, however, very soon understood it differently. Here Christ's descent into hell came to mean: triumphal procession of the Savior through the underworld, victorious conquest of hell, redemption of the imprisoned righteous ones of the old covenant. One therefore understood Christ's descent into hell as the beginning of his ascent into heaven, in which he would become Lord over all, over the living and the dead. Nothing is excluded from his power which is capable of bringing salvation to all. So already in First Peter we find: "Christ went and preached to the spirits in prison who formerly did not obey" (3:19). Even "to the dead the gospel was preached" (4:6) and salvation brought. Christ overcame death in his own body; therefore he had the "keys of hell and of death" in his hands. Thus there is none who is "damned in all eternity". Even the dead, murdered, gassed and burned are not forsaken. Whether they all will be saved, however, remained an open question.

Thus both conceptions— 1) Christ's descent into hell as the embodiment of his suffering on the cross of godforsakenness, and 2) Christ's descent into hell as the beginning of his resurrection to salvation for all—are transmitted through the Christian tradition of faith. Luther and Calvin understood it from the point of view of the cross, as did Markus of Arethusa. The Lutheran theology of the seventeenth century understood it from the vantage point of the resurrection. Thus whether it meant the suffering through the torment of hell on the cross or the triumph of Christ over hell, in both conceptions something true remains.

That becomes understandable when we look upon the real death of Jesus in the company of criminals (outside) the gate of Jerusalem. Jesus died the death of the excommunicated. Condemned by his own people in the name of God's law, he died as one cursed and forsaken by God. He was delivered over to the Romans and profaned by them with crucifixion. What is so extraordinary about this death? It is said seven thousand were crucified on the Via Appia after the Spartacus revolution. One grasps the extraordinary character of Jesus' death only when he recognizes *who* was forsaken and disgraced here. Jesus had preached the kingdom of God as near and had lived wholly in this nearness of the Kingdom. God is with men. Therefore he had forgiven sins like God, granted grace to the poor, the prostitutes and the tax-collectors, like God. When this one died the death of a criminal, something lay in his death which is of no consequence in the death of any other, namely, the experience of forsakenness by God whose nearness he had auspiciously communicated. That means the experience of godforsakenness with clear consciousness that God is not far off but is very near. And precisely this: in full consciousness of the nearness of God to be excluded from God, that is the agony of hell. No one can be more forsaken than he who had been so much at home with God. Therefore Christians have always found comfort in the fact that Jesus was the most tempted and forsaken of all who have God and life and yet find death and hell. That even Albert Camus understood when he summoned up sympathy, not, to be sure, for God, but for the crucified one, sympathy in the brotherhood of suffering.

It is different with the triumphant understanding of the descent of Christ. For it takes for granted the belief that God raised up even this most forsaken of the forsaken from the dead and led him out of hell. If God has proved his nearness and his liberating power in precisely this one, then hell, which this one suffered through in solidarity with all the damned, is no longer what it was. Then that Kingdom, where "peace and joy" rejoice, appeared with this one who suffered for all others in the midst of hell. And in him hell is broken open and conquered. It is no longer fear without end, but the beginning of the end of all fears. The torments of hell are no longer eternal. They are also not the last things. "Death is swallowed up in victory. Hell, where is they sting?" as Paul kicks against the pricks (I Cor. 15). Hell is open. One can go through it freely. And that holds good not only for his hell but for all hells on this earth. If God has allowed his future to begin in the crucified one, a glimmer

of dawn gleams even over history's fields of death and abodes of the dead and also over the everyday, minute hells of life.

III

If we compare this faith in Christ's descent into hell with the hells which make the earth unbearable for us, we will find the courage to identify through the crucifixion of Christ with those in agony. Not between two candles on an altar but between two blasphemers on a rubbish heap before the gates of the city he was crucified. He became the brother of the forsaken, the solitary, the tortured, the innocent murdered and the guilty hated. He is with them and not with the others. To be sure they are in the dread of hell, but they are not alone. God has left behind his loftiness and is present with the forsaken. Among the lowly, among the tortured, among those for whom we make life a hell—there is our God.

But then that means on the other hand: do not look upon yourself, do not become numb in the moment of misery on the earth. Look upon the wounds of Christ, for there your hell is conquered for you (Luther). God goes into hell, hell extends to him: that is the meaning of Christ's descent into hell. Not that agony is diminished for us or for others, but trusting that God is in hell, we are able to go through it—freely. "He tears through death, through world, through sin, through need; he tears through hell; I am constantly his companion" (Gerhard). Certainly we ourselves are not so. But we do live together not only with the "hell of Auschwitz", but also with the martyrs who have found God and Christ in this hell.

Thus also the other becomes inevitable: If Christ really rose out of death and hell, then that leads to the revolt of conscience against hell on the earth and against everyone who lights it. For the resurrection of this condemned one is attested and also realized in the revolt against the condemnation of man by man. The more real the hope in a shattered hell, the more militant and political it will become in the shattering of hells, the white, black, and green hells, the loud hells of napalm bombs, and the sullen hells of solitary but bitter suffering. The Christ who has gone to hell is not only a comfort in suffering but also a passionate protest of God against submersion in suffering. For he has risen.

In whatever hell you are, lift up your heads—for salvation is near. Amen.

(Both Meditations translated by M. Douglas Meeks,
Teaching Assistant in Theology and Preaching)

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“I Have a Dream”

ROBERT E. CUSHMAN

It is now nine score and twelve years ago that “our fathers brought forth upon this continent a new nation, conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that *all* men are created equal.” So Lincoln pointed to the corner-stone of American democracy.

Was not the anguish of Lincoln's years that he lived in a time when a perilous *contradiction* had become acute between the dedication of the nation and its actual practice? But is it not true that, in an altered form and context, a like *contradiction* has become both our vexation and our anguish? Is not this the real reason for our assembly today? Do we resort to this place today to confess that this is so? What is the power of this recent event to galvanize with almost unprecedented strength the emotions (albeit contrary ones) of a whole people? Is it that in various and sundry ways we have been at odds with ourselves and that the murder of a wholly dedicated man has proved it beyond any power of ours to deceive ourselves longer? Is this the reason why a noted local citizen is reported this morning to have said we can no longer endure a “dual society”?

This is Holy Week! What a passing strange coincidence! Ever since last Thursday night I have been haunted by the words: “Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends.” And there is added: “Ye are my friends, if you do whatsoever I command you!” Is it possible that Martin Luther King accepted the friendship of Christ and, thereby, became a friend to all? Is it possible, by some strange providence, that there is a cruciform character in his life and death and that this Holy Week is hallowed by Martin Luther King's valiant effort to resolve the *contradiction* in American life between the principle of its dedication and maxims of its practice? I do not claim to know. I would not venture to prove it. But I am deeply impressed by the visible signs of an upwelling response of a great people and a suddenly galvanized re-commitment to the principle of dedication on which Lincoln said the nation is founded.

If I am not mistaken, this is the underlying ground of current

student and faculty action, this re-commitment. It takes almost complete shock at times to jar us awake to the contrariety in our lives and our manner of living. The resolution of the contrariety releases powers, slumbering and unsuspected, and devotes us to causes previously viewed with indifference or disdain. And one of the questions before Americans in this hour is whether they will allow themselves really to be converted.

But with all the admirable qualities of "the expulsive power of a new affection", there is a great need for us to see to it that the newly released powers are properly mated to the ends they may advance and serve. Powers not governed by ends, and consonant with them, may easily be harmful and actually obstructive to the vision that has lately dawned and the ends that have been crystallized. Yet the newly engendered resolve is to be honored and cherished. It is to be respected and nurtured. Yet the implementation of vision requires both patience and a willingness to let the healing powers of the new motivation alter the conditions of our life without willfulness, vengeance, or anarchy. Healthful change requires, in a society so complex as ours, or in a university so complex as ours, time for a nest of negotiations. And peaceful negotiation is the way of democracy, for it makes way for change while it preserves freedom.

So I think that no small part of the greatness of Martin Luther King was this: In him the vision and the end were properly mated with the use of powers—powers suited to the ends he had in view. He affirmed means and, quite recently, stubbornly reaffirmed those means that comported well with the democratic principle he affirmed. He was a man of vision. He was a young man who dreamed dreams. Not long ago he said:

I have a dream that one day this nation will rise up and live out the true meaning of its creed: 'We hold these truths to be self evident, that all men are created equal.' I have a dream that my four little children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their character. I have a dream that one day every valley shall be exalted, every hill and mountain shall be made low, the rough places will be made plain, and the crooked places will be made straight, and the glory of the Lord shall be revealed and all flesh shall see it together. This is our hope.

In commentary, the Editor of the Divinity School *Response* wrote last Friday these words:

Martin Luther King led his people in search of their promised land. It is a tribute to democracy that he believed he could find it here, and it is a tragedy that for many of us his dream became our night-

mare . . . but he was one of those men of vision who demanded of democracy its potential.

The Editor of *Response* is right: Martin Luther King had a *dream*. He was "one of those men of vision who demanded of democracy its potential". If so, then indeed he stood in the tradition of Lincoln. He saw clearly that the issue confronting American life was *contradiction* with its own heart and core. It was founded on equality of humanity and opportunity, but it has paid lip service to and withheld full commitment to its own creed.

Dr. Neal Hughley [Chaplain of North Carolina College in Durham] was wholly right the other day when he urged that it was the American dream, the struggle for American justice, for human justice throughout the world, that impelled Dr. King's crusade. It was not the struggle of blacks versus whites that animated his campaign but the integrity and agreement of the American spirit with itself. He called upon America to be at one with itself. He sought a reconciliation between the principle and the practice of American life. So he takes his place, I believe, among the seers and prophets of moral integrity. He calls upon all men to be no more at odds with themselves, but to realize and fulfill their true humanity. In this respect, it is surely true that Martin Luther King "demanded of democracy its potential".

Perhaps it is true, as the Editor of *Response* said, "it is a tragedy that for many of us his dream became our nightmare." For some it may be so, for some it may continue to remain only a nightmare, the nightmare of a tortured conscience. For others it has already been a restoration. For some it has been a rebirth of conscience, and this rebirth is the hope of America. The resurrection of conscience is the hope of the fulfillment of the American dream, the wedding of principle and practice. If America is sick, it is not for want of material resources but of a moribund conscience and a divided soul. Let us pray that, passing through this Good Friday of the spirit, the Easter that is upon us may be the resurrection of the American dream.

Martin Luther King—as I understand his *faith*, his *dream*, and his *gospel*—beckons America to a recovery of its inner concord, of unanimity between the principle to which it was dedicated and the practice to which it *must* be committed. "I have a dream," he said, "that one day this nation will rise up and live out the true meaning of its creed."

This can become a truly Holy Week for us if we will unite

ourselves to his dream and claim his vision for our own. If our lives can be galvanized by this cause, we will have done something more than "emote" with the time. We will have participated in a rebirth of conscience and a resurrection of the American spirit. Then we shall keep faith with the dream of Lincoln and of Martin Luther King.

Nine score and twelve years ago "our fathers brought forth upon this continent a new nation, conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal." Of this master statement Martin Luther King's words will probably remain the greatest interpretation of the twentieth century—written in his own blood: "I have a dream that one day this nation will rise up and live out the true meaning of its creed."

Men and women: it is up to us with God's help! Amen.

* * * * *

O God of our fathers, we come before Thee to make a solemn act of penitence on behalf of ourselves, our community, and our nation. With our fathers before us, we have honored Thee with our lips, but we have withheld the devotion of our lives. We have affirmed the equality of all men before Thee and before the law, but we have not made way for equal opportunities in education, in housing, in employment, in the franchise, or in the courts. As we have been at odds with ourselves, so we have been in opposition and rebellion against Thee. We have made laws to circumvent the Law of Thy righteousness. We have left unrevised and uncriticized inherited ways and inequitable arrangements. We have temporized, postponed, and obstructed Thy purposes. We have subordinated the common good to advance private and partisan gain. We have turned deaf ears to the prophets of old and to the words and message of the Master of our race. We have extolled the golden rule and not lived by it. We have not done unto others as we would they should do unto us. We have flown in the face of Thy teaching that he who saves his own life shall lose it. Look with pity upon us miserable sinners, hypocrites. We acknowledge before Thee that we have sown the winds of discord, but preserve us from the whirlwind of division and strife. Help us to amend our ways. Convert all Thy people from stubborn resistance to the common good. Let neighborliness replace defensiveness and hostility. Guide our feet into the paths of peace. "Lord, make us instruments of Thy peace: where there is hatred, let us sow love; where there is injury, pardon; where there is discord, union." Unite us, O God, unto Thee, that through the long pilgrimage of our national sorrow we be united to one another; through the grace and light of Jesus Christ, our Lord. Amen.

LOOKS
at
BOOKS

Jesus. Edited by Hugh Anderson in "Great Lives Observed" series. Prentice-Hall. 1967. 182 pp. \$4.95 (\$1.95 paper).

This particular book will be of special interest to readers of the *Review* because the editor will be remembered by many as a revered teacher, scholar, and friend. Hugh Anderson in this work has condensed for the non-scholar and beginner much of the discussion found in his well-received book *Jesus and Christian Origins*.

The work begins with an introductory chapter by Dr. Anderson outlining in brief the background, problems, and present status of research into the "life" of Jesus. Then follows a series of chapters illustrating various "solutions" to the problem. The method employed is that of the editor's selecting from representative writers sections of their works which illustrate the point being made.

The first "Part" deals with what the editor calls "the last stage", defined as ". . . the assured historical minimum that criticism has left us." (p. 37) In this section the editor relies heavily on the works of G. Bornkamm and M. Goguel.

Part Two is entitled, "Nineteenth Century Liberal Views of Jesus." This section includes selections from E. Renan, D. F. Strauss, Shailer Matthews, W. Rauschenbusch, and A. Von Harnack. This is, in the mind of the present reviewer, the best section of the book.

Part Three deals with the aftermath of the nineteenth century, "Jesus in the Twentieth Century," and this section naturally begins with Albert Schweitzer. Further liberal scholars are noted as well as popular treatments of Jesus'

life, and twentieth-century Jewish and existentialist treatments are presented also.

The book concludes with a short statement by the editor and a bibliographical chapter which is annotated and should prove useful to those who wish to go further into this area of study.

This book is not intended for advanced scholars but for beginners, and therefore scholarly criticisms really have no place here. One could quarrel with the editor's selection of persons or passages or his arrangement of the material, but this would only be quibbling over minutiae. Dr. Anderson has done an excellent job of presenting a wide range of opinions over a long period of time in a short amount of space. For this he should be applauded, because this work will prove invaluable to advanced laymen wishing to know more about research into the life of Jesus, to college students studying in this area, and even to seminary students who have not previously been introduced to this fascinating aspect of New Testament studies. Scholars and students have been in Dr. Anderson's debt for his earlier book (mentioned above). Now the depth of his scholarship will reach even further, hopefully into the laity of the church, and this should please Dr. Anderson and Christian ministers very much.

—James M. Efrid

Christian History and Interpretation: Studies Presented to John Knox. W. R. Farmer, C. F. D. Moule, and R. R. Niebuhr, editors. Cambridge University Press. 1967. 428 pp. \$9.50.

The editors have produced an excellent *festschrift* for a distinguished

New Testament scholar. Appropriately, the two parts of the volume represent the two principal areas of Knox's interest, namely, "Problems of History and Faith" and "Chapters in Paul's Life and Thought."

"Problems of History and Faith," especially the problem of Jesus and Christian faith, are dealt with by Norman Pittenger ("Some Implications, Philosophical and Theological, in John Knox's Writing," pp. 3-16), Daniel Day Williams ("John Knox's Conception of History," pp. 17-34), F. W. Dillistone ("The Atonement," pp. 35-56), Durwood Foster ("Theological Arguments for Christ's Historicity: Parallels with the Theistic Proofs," pp. 57-77), Richard R. Niebuhr ("Archegos: An Essay on the Relation between the Biblical Jesus Christ and the Present-Day Reader," pp. 79-100), William R. Farmer ("An Historical Essay on the Humanity of Jesus Christ," pp. 101-26), W. D. Davies ("Reflexions on Tradition: The Aboth Revisited," pp. 127-59), F. W. Beare ("Sayings of the Risen Jesus in the Synoptic Tradition: An Inquiry into their Origin and Significance," pp. 161-181), C. H. Dodd ("The Portrait of Jesus in John and in the Synoptics," pp. 183-198), and D. E. Nineham ("... et hoc genus omne—An Examination of Dr. A. T. Hanson's Strictures on Some Recent Gospel Study," pp. 199-222).

Pittenger and Williams are in general agreement on Knox's "dynamic view of history" as "shared communal existence in a temporal process." Both accept with few demurrals Knox's conviction that the resolution of the problem which historical criticism presents to faith is to be found in the church, understood as the guarantor and mediator of the reality of its historical origin. Certain reservations concerning Knox's position are made explicit in Dillistone's article, and some may also underlie the noteworthy contributions of Foster and Niebuhr.

Most illuminating is Foster's adaptation of classical theological arguments for the existence of God to the Christological problem. While not claiming that they can be conclusive, he demonstrates their considerable dialectical value. Equally stimulating is Niebuhr's discussion of how the Biblical Christ impinges upon the modern reader. Implicit in his position is a rejection of Knox's propensity for placing Christology strictly within the limits of ecclesiology. The Biblical picture of Christ may make contact with the reader apart from the church and the constellation of interests and ideas associated with it.

Farmer seeks to show conclusively that Jesus actually did rebuke for their self-righteousness the scribes and Pharisees who criticized him for association intimately with tax-collectors and sinners. This reviewer never thought to doubt that he did, but it is always useful to have one's opinions undergirded with solid historical and exegetical argument. Davies writes an interesting and significant essay on the Pirke Aboth, showing that it undercuts certain commonplace ideas about Judaism at the beginning of the Christian era. He also believes that it bespeaks the conservative character of the Gospel tradition. Beare performs a useful service in showing why it can scarcely be doubted that the early church created sayings of the Risen Lord and ascribed to Jesus sayings which he actually did not utter. Superficially, at least, Beare's conclusions seem to contradict the inferences about the conservative character of the Gospel tradition which Davies draws on the basis of the Rabbinic materials. The contradiction may be more apparent than real, however, since Davies grants that tradition was interpreted in both Judaism and early Christianity. If so, it would not be unlikely in view of the church's faith in the reality of the Risen Lord that such interpretations would in some

instances have taken the form of additional *Herrnworte*. In a splendid essay Dodd shows just how far one may go in bringing to light the substantive agreement between the Johannine and Synoptic portraits of Jesus without transgressing the bounds of critical exegesis. The final article of this section is Nineham's reply to Hanson's misinterpretations and criticisms of his own and Knox's views. The article is of general interest insofar as it brings to light and disposes of certain common misapprehensions concerning form criticism and related matters.

In Part II Paul Schubert ("Paul and the New Testament Ethic in the Thought of John Knox," pp. 363-88) and C. F. D. Moule ("Obligation in the Ethic of Paul," pp. 389-406) politely but firmly prefer Paul to Knox in their discussion of Knox's charge that Paul has separated God's justice from his mercy and open the way to antinomianism through his doctrine of justification. The other articles on Paul, while of less general interest, are quite significant. J. C. Hurd follows up his study of the origins of I Corinthians with a vigorous plea that the problems of "Pauline Chronology and Pauline Theology" (pp. 225-48) not be kept in separate watertight compartments. Robert Funk ("The Apostolic Parousia: Form and Significance," pp. 249-68) examines the modes of apostolic presence—personal, by emissary, and by letter—and the literary formulae associated with it in the Pauline letters. In "Epistemology at the Turn of the Ages: 2 Corinthians 5:16" (pp. 269-87), J. Louis Martyn argues that eschatology is the key to Paul's famous statement about having once known or regarded Christ *kata sarka*, but now knowing him so no longer. (Martyn understands "according to the flesh" adverbially with *oidamen*.) Henceforth Paul's knowledge of Christ must be appropriate to the new age that is breaking in. Paul actually knows

Christ *kata pneuma*—according to the Spirit—but does not say this because he knows it would be misunderstood by gnosticizing elements in the Corinthian church. M. Jack Suggs, "The Word is Near You': Romans 10:6-10 within the Purpose of the Letter" (pp. 289-312), contributes to our understanding of the purpose of Romans while shedding important light from the Jewish Wisdom tradition on this specific passage. In a study of "Paul and the Church at Corinth according to I Corinthians 1-4" (pp. 313-35), N. A. Dahl gives a sober reconstruction of the Corinthian situation, using the explicit evidence of the letters primarily, and on this basis proceeds to show the connection between chapters 1-4 and the rest of I Corinthians. G. W. H. Lampe discusses "Church Discipline and the Interpretation of the Epistles to the Corinthians" (pp. 337-361). He concludes that apostasy and radically false teaching tantamount to apostasy were the only grounds for total, irrevocable excommunication in New Testament times. In the case of the incestuous man (I Cor. 5) he argues that the punishment which Paul demanded was remedial in intention and had its desired effect, as subsequent references to the case (II Cor. 2:9-11; 7:11) show.

Within the scope of a review it is, of course, impossible to discuss even the more important issues raised by these essays, most of which are of uncommon quality and significance. Like the recent Schubert *festschrift* on Luke-Acts and the Dodd *festschrift* of over a decade ago, it is a volume which the serious student of the New Testament will want to add to his library.

—D. Moody Smith, Jr.

The Gospels in Scouse. Frank Shaw and Dick Williams, editors. Gear Press. 1967. 55 pp. \$1. paper.

The Cotton Patch Version of Paul's

Epistles. Clarence L. Jordan, tr. Association. 1968. 158 pp. \$4.50 cloth. \$2.25 paper.

Don't shoot yer mouth off about the good turns you do. Don't do em in public if yer kin elp it. If yer figure out ow to get a audience for yer good turns, yer kin take it fer grantid God's got yer prop'ly weighed up. So when you give a ten-bob dropsy to a neighbor don' make a song and dance about it. Some folk turn dare religion into a "I love me" campaign. Religious exhibitionists dat's wot! I tell yer straight, the attention dey attract is the on'y reward dur gonna get! When you elp somebody—keep yer trap shut about it. Remember—God kin see wen its pitch dark.

* * * * *

Wen yer pray get lost someplace. Yew gatter be yerself wen yer pray. So yer can't afford to be tinkin about wot other people tink about you. Wen nobody's thinking about you at all—God's all ears! Dare's no need to go on like a cracked grammyphone record. (Matthew 6:1-7)

This day e got is lads ter fetch im a likkle donkey wot nobody ad ever rid on before. An wen day'd fetched it dey chucked dare coats over de back uv de likkle ting—fer saddle like—and give Jesus a leg up. (Luke 19:29-30, 35)

Dis boss give a big do for his son's weddin. He sends out a lorra invitations. But there was a big race or footee game or summit and dey makes all sorts a excuses. And him with all the chucky ready to be et. So he sent again. Norra a sign of em. So he says, "I'm finished with dat lot . . . And he sends out for all the ragtag and bobtail in the scruffy part of town and dey all had a gear do. (Matthew 22:2-10)

These are samples of the Scouse version of the Gospel. The Scouse dialect is the rough-hewn colloquial

speech of Merseyside Liverpool, home of the Beatles. It is the instrument selected by an Anglican pastor to communicate the "gear story" (great gospel), just as his parishioners speak. "It is no gimmick," say Williams and Shaw; "it was written with the utmost possible degree of reverence." Their edition does not present the full text of the four Gospels, but rather paraphrased excerpts and in some passages harmonistic medley.

The style is not for liturgy and, indeed, it may impress some as solecistic. But we must take it for what it is, an effort to "identify" and to communicate where traditional forms seem stilted and obscure. It is an interpretational "translation" that effectively conveys the basic morality, even if it does strain the proper text. Its unique expression provokes a thoughtful attention to the sense of a passage. The reviewer finds it perfectly charming, and wishes that the full gospel text were so set forth in Scouse.

But turn now to the "Cotton Patch," of similar inspiration and purpose: a translation of thirteen "Pauline" letters, including the Pastorals but excluding Hebrews. This version claims the critical Nestle Greek text as its basis and it does reflect the best sources and the latest emendation (e.g. Romans 8:28). Dr. Jordan brings to his task excellent training in Greek and in exegetical insights. A Southern Baptist, he is the founder and director since 1942 of the Koinonia community in Georgia, a pioneer ministry in interracial understanding.

Jordan employs the device of allegory, imagining Paul writing to the Christians of Washington (Romans), Atlanta (Corinthians), Georgia (Galatians), Birmingham (Ephesians), etc. Jerusalem becomes Charleston, and Macedonia and Achaia are Mississippi and Louisiana (he states that these equations are merely "stage setting"). The Jews (Pharisees) of "the establishment" become White American Protestants (WAP's). The

pagan, non-Christian gentiles take the role of Negroes. The "Law" becomes the "Bible;" circumcision becomes instead church membership.

Observe how Jordan's version addresses his Negro community in the "Letter to . . . the Georgia Convention."

When the time for our manhood came, God sent forth his Son—through a woman and into the Southern system—in order that he might rescue those caught by the system and that we might receive our full sonship. Because you are now sons, God has implanted the spirit of his Son in our hearts, and we murmur, "Father, Father." So, you aren't a slave anymore. You are a son. And if you are a son, you are, through God, a noble heir of the heritage. (Galatians 4:4-7)

Note further, in Romans, some colloquial phrases from the "Cotton Patch:"

Puffed-up braggarts, blowhards, slick operators (1:31).

A man's face cuts no ice with God (2:11).

So what's the score? Are we church members ahead? Nope, not at all (3:9).

Their throat is a waiting grave.

Their tongues are lie factories (3:13).

All sinned and flunked out on God's glory (3:23).

God has given us a love transfusion (5:5).

Half the time I don't know which end is up. . . . What a scoundrel I am! (7:15, 24).

God will give life to your hellbent egos (8:11).

We don't know beans about praying (8:26).

If God is rootin' for us, who can win over us? (8:31).

God decides who gets mercy and who gets the works. He calls the signals (9:18f.).

The day is dawning. So let's take off our pajamas and put on our work clothes (13:12).

The God movement is not doughnuts and coffee (14:17).

I want you to be geniuses at goodness but duds at deviltry (14:19).

Jordan explains that he translates ideas, freely, not words. So he does, with trustworthy interpretation and with conscious application. He has chosen Paul's Letters as the best medium for his message, although they hold the greatest difficulty for the interpreter. Since this publication appeared, he has pursued his Cotton Patch translation in additional books, and has utilized it also in two LP records: *The Rich Man and Lazarus*, and *The Great Banquet*.

In both of these special versions, "involvement" is the key; and they are a natural product of contemporary social concern. Scouse and Cotton Patch are characteristic of the mood and movement of our day. With all of us they do have a place, and I commend them to the attention of colleagues.

—Kenneth W. Clark

Interpreting the Resurrection. Neville Clark. Westminster. 1967. 129 pp. \$2.75.

At my desk, sit I, in a quandary. Having read this book twice, I want to say that it is a first rate piece of work: valid as to content; readable as to style; carefully developed as to organization. But, being more of a homiletician than a New Testament scholar, I realize that flaws and errors and failures may be obvious to the textual and theological pundit. However, as a pulpiteer reviewing this volume for pulpiteers, I say, frankly and flatly, that it is a great wee book.

The headings of his six chapters are arresting: According to the Scriptures; Between Two Worlds; Tomorrow is Now; The Last Day; The Third Day; The Lord's Day. The sub-headings are as arresting, e.g. in

Chapter 5: The Easter Narratives; The Easter History; The Easter Reality. (There is sermonic material for three sermons in Eastertide.)

The Preface carries this assertion in its first paragraph: "For the Resurrection is not one belief among others, one doctrine in the Christian corpus; it is rather the concealed reality on which the whole of Christian faith depends" (p. 7). That opens the doors to vigorous debate. Is the Resurrection true? In what sense is it an "historical" event? What do we mean when we say that it "happened". Is it "according to the scriptures"? Is it an eschatological event, to be understood only in terms of faith? Does it draw a line between the past and the future, and yet somehow tie them together in the present? Is tomorrow now? Is the Easter fact now? Is it a fact? Is the emphasis to be located in the empty tomb or on the appearance of the risen Jesus, who is the Christ? What is the stuff of the resurrection "body"?

With all these questions the author wrestles. He may walk lame after the encounter, but he walks blessed; and he lets us share in the blessing. Is he worthy to be a guide to us? Well, he was a Visiting Professor of New Testament and later of Systematic Theology in a good American seminary, and is now a Free Church minister in England. For your comfort, he lives up to the intent of the series of which this is but one volume: "It is concerned to set forth the faith in a way that will aid preaching, hearing, understanding" (p. 7).

—James T. Cleland

We Jews and Jesus. Samuel Sandmel. Oxford. 1965. X + 164 pp. \$5.00.

We Jews and You Christians. Samuel Sandmel. Lippincott, 1967. 146 pp. \$3.95.

The James A. Gray lectures which have been a boon and a blessing to the Duke community and our friends (thanks to the generosity of the late

James A. Gray of Winston-Salem, a man worthy of grateful remembrance) will present a very different emphasis this fall. The lectureship was Methodist in its 1950 inception (Ralph W. Sockman): but it quickly became interdenominational: Lutheran, Congregational, Baptist, Presbyterian, Episcopalian, with Methodists regularly interspersed. Then in 1964, the ecumenical note was heard, when Father Godfrey L. Diekmann, O.S.B. shared a series on "The Second Vatican Council" with Dean Cushman. In the last week of this year's October, the lectureship will become inter-faith, with Rabbi Samuel Sandmel, Professor of Bible and Hellenistic Jewish Literature in, and Provost of, Hebrew Union College, the distinguished Jewish Institute of Religion, in Cincinnati, Ohio. His tentative subject is: "The Several Israels."

To introduce Provost Sandmel to you, let us look at two recent volumes by this recognized Biblical scholar, who has made the study of the New Testament an avocation, almost a vocation. *We Jews and Jesus* is an honest, objective, appreciative, critical piece of writing, which ends up with the author still a Jew, and glad to be so. He is grateful for the new climate in Christian-Jewish relations; but he declines to be a rabbinic, male Pollyanna about the spiritual weather. His approach, as he says, "is Jewish and not neutral" (p. 4). Yet he confesses a "warm sympathy", even "concern and respect", for Christianity (p. 4). He knows that the history of the relationship "is marred by many chapters that are ugly" (p. 4), and he is not sure that the end is yet. In successive chapters he sketches early Christianity and its Jewish background, recognizing that our only source material is the New Testament, whose historical trustworthiness he questions repeatedly. Appreciating the problem of separating the Jesus of reliable history from the Jesus of theological belief, he tackles both

facets, starting, interestingly enough, with the latter: "The Divine Christ" (pp. 30-50). He concludes that for the Jew "Jesus is never more than a man" (p. 48), which leads him to Chapter 4, "Jesus the Man". Here he reveals a wide-ranging knowledge of early lives of Jesus: German, French, Jewish, English, American. His conclusions are vigorous and appreciative, but he says "most plainly that Jesus has no bearing on me in a religious way", though the situation is quite different for him culturally (p. 111). Then, to my complete surprise, he admits, in Chapter 5, that he would rather read the letters of Paul than the Gospels! For him, Paul has "a challenging mind, a profoundly sensitive perception, a remarkably fluent and poetic pen, and hence a level which is far above the achievement of Matthew, Mark, Luke, or John" (p. 128).

In a final chapter, "Toward a Jewish Attitude to Christianity", he starts with the assertion that "Early Christianity was a Judaism; within a century after the death of Jesus it was a separate religion. It was critical of its parent and hostile to it, and elicited from its parent reciprocal criticism and hostility" (p. 135). He looks at the matter of Jews as responsible for the death of Jesus, and the resultant pogroms which involved his own Eastern European parents. But he acknowledges that "the descendants of the persecutors became rescuers" (p. 143). Moreover, he is not convinced that the Christian attacks on Jews were any worse than their attacks on heretics. He somewhat anticipates his Gray Lectures in a sentence almost at the end of this volume: "Indeed, of the many varieties of Judaism which existed in the days of Jesus, two alone have abided into our time, rabbinic Judaism and Christianity" (p. 151).

We Jews and You Christians is a different kind of book—no footnotes, much more involved in the contemporary situation, dedicated to Sid Lovett,

the beloved Chaplain of Yale University, 1932-1958, "My cherished friend for all time." Its purpose is to give an answer to the question which Christians regularly ask him: "What is the attitude of you Jews to us?" (p. 1). He admits that there is no official answer, but he hopes, and believes, that what he says in the next eight chapters is "in its essence a responsible Jewish statement, even though the language and the wording are the voice of one man" (p. 4). He deals with historical backgrounds, but acknowledges that ours is a time of reappraisals, for both Judaism and Christianity, though with undertones of the discordant past. He reminds us not only of Hitler but of American anti-Jewish movements, yet gladly admits that "so significantly have matters changed for the better that in the United States at least we stand on the threshold of understanding each other" (p. 42). He will raise some eyebrows with his comments on the present situation in the Middle East.

The author recognizes that there are basic theological differences between Christianity and Judaism, though he avers that much of the problem is, at root, sociological. His contrast of fundamental divergencies in the two faiths reveals that there are points of view, ethical emphases, religious usages, and creedal affirmations which prohibit any fundamental theological at-one-ness. This may be a matter of sorrow, of joy, of inevitability to us, but it is a hard fact. In the secular world there is hope for rapprochement; in the religious world there is common ground for joint-action; in the theological realm there is, at best, understanding but no agreement. We can be good neighbors. We are related!

My colleagues of the Committee on Lectures and Public Events were unanimous in their choice of Rabbi Sandmel as this year's Gray Lecturer. Some of them know him. (He studied at Duke and served the Hillel Society at the University of North Carolina before he became a Navy Chaplain in

World War II.) The phrases they used about him were "always worth listening to", "a telling speaker", "a charismatic fellow". We present him to you with confidence. Come and hear him. You will want to, if you have read these books prior to the evening of Monday, October 28, in Page Auditorium.

—James T. Cleland

Come Sweet Death: a Quintet from Genesis. B. D. Napier. United Church Press. 1967. 96 pp. \$3.50 (\$1.95 paper).

This slender book is concerned with five stories from the book of Genesis: the Garden, the Brothers, the Flood, the Tower, and the Land (the call of Abraham). To read these accounts is to share in a re-creation of the inner life of these people in the Genesis narratives and thereby to become more aware of the agony and glory of our own lives under God.

Napier gives us this absorbing yet difficult material in an attractive style, combining lyric description with direct, common language and occasional rhymes of deliberate familiarity. Almost every passage is eminently quotable, expressing lightly those things with which men bolster their self-esteem, yet treating with utmost seriousness the one important thing: God and men and the relationships thereof.

Like Adam in the Garden we luxuriate in the pleasures of creation, yet protest being put into a world we never asked for. We participate in his rejection of the terrible close relationship with God, the tight supervision of the "Landlord". Adam's fierce desire for freedom from God's sovereignty is also ours, and God allows this rebellion though not forever.

Cain and Abel are the brothers who are seemingly at opposite poles, one respectable and successful, the other "different" and happily so. There is a strain here, a rawness of nerves from rubbing too closely against

others; like Cain we also resent being *pushed* into brotherhood. We, too, deny our responsibility and proceed in various ways to murder men in body and mind. Cain cannot endure being accepted by God when the hated brother is equally acceptable to God. Thus Cain becomes a fugitive, estranged from all supportive relationships "until the day when Cain becomes a Keeper" and "all estrangement will be at last redeemed in death".

"The Flood" combines Noah's story with Jeremiah's lament over the state of the world and the person of the Adversary from the book of Job. It is the Adversary who argues that God should send a lethal inundation to bring the "anguish and creation to an end". Indeed, in the heavenly host, "Some now refer to earth as Yahweh's folly." But God will not destroy his creation, for God will not go beyond his Word.

"The Tower" must be an even further temptation to God as object of destruction, for men have built it to be their mighty fortress, their order and destiny. God sees their sorry attempt at creation, their pain at trying to understand and speak to one another. And God comes down to remind them of himself and his judgment.

The day
the awful day
is every day because
man cannot live by man alone
but by the word of judgment and
redemption.

The book concludes with "The Land", God's call to Abraham to listen and to respond, to renew with him the promise and the commitment. We also are called but are too absorbed in commanding and possessing to listen and respond. Even our temples are "much too noisy in the task of making temple sounds." We lose the promised land because we claim it for our own and use it for our own sakes.

The land is come upon in doing the
work,

redemptive work of him who is the Word. . . .

We cannot even recognize the land until we die unto ourselves and our own possessiveness, and then we may enter the land of God's clear possession.

"Sweet Death" may mean a number of things, among them an escape from God into "freedom", an end to unbearable existence, the end of one's selfish desires, and ultimately that Death which ends all estrangement. This book is nourishing to both intellect and imagination, and surely it will be welcomed by ministers, teachers, and all others who cherish works of richness, depth, and humanity.

—Harriet V. Leonard

A Theology for Christian Education.

Nels F. S. Ferré. Westminster. 1967. 224 pp. \$4.95.

The dialogue between theologians and religious educators is clearly more profound and relevant because of this volume by a major theologian. The book does not present a new theology, it does not offer a set of theological directives for a new religious education. Instead it undertakes to transpose theology into the "educational key". It suggests a theology for the church school, the keynote for which is found in the concept of God as Educator.

In the first section of the book, entitled *Methodological Considerations*, Nels Ferré responds as a theologian to specific problems of the church in its teaching ministry today, and calls for an education that is identifiably Christian yet is not divorced from education in general. He analyzes the interrelationships between theology, the behavioral sciences, and philosophy as well as their bearing on the practice of the church, noting carefully that "theology in principle cannot be contrary to authentic science and philosophy" (p. 34). There are ways the educator can and must help the theologian, specifically by "informing theo-

logians of what is being learned in other realms," by further "informing theologians of what it discovers about man" and above all by guiding "the practical concerns of the church in their concrete application" (p. 26).

In assisting the theologian the educator has a distinctive responsibility and role. "Education centers majestically in learning and in fostering the processes of learning. Not to be primarily intellectual in nature is to forfeit its distinctive role and to fail in its peculiar task." (p. 25) To this admonition Ferré adds a friendly but direct warning. Religious educators must choose their theologies. This is a part of the "majestic learning" which is central and basic. In recent decades religious education has been both tardy in its response to theological shiftings and guilty, at times, of being primarily influenced by culture-dominated theologians. In the author's words. "there is no hope for an enduring contribution on the part of Christian education until enough educators . . . embrace the kind of Christian theology that searches more the sea itself than the restless waves of contemporary acculturation." (pp. 30, 31) This is followed by the plea for Christian education to lead the church in a long and disciplined study of the history of the faith. "Having attained some depth of insight as to the nature of the Christian faith it can then proceed to listen to contemporary theology once again and this time to advantage." (p. 31)

This position may account for the scant attention given by Ferré to contemporary voices in theological discussion. He does comment that theology is never completely formulated and must regularly be rewritten. He does insist that the time is at hand for a fresh theological formulation in terms of distinctively Christian categories. Such a formulation is an obligation shared with the theologians by the religious educators. Ferré is an effective representative and spokesman of this kind of collaboration.

In the second section Dr. Ferré discusses Christian theology in pedagogical phraseology and proposes a reorientation of Christian thought patterns suited to educational presuppositions. He sweeps through the main themes of Christian doctrine declaring that for most men in this century the nature of God can best be interpreted by shifting from the traditional concepts of Father, King and Judge to that of Educator.

One basic presupposition supporting this theology for education is that for man existence is a pedagogical process. Life is a school, and the purpose of creation for humanity is learning. The Creator desires his creatures to reflect his nature, which is love; therefore he created man for learning love under his own faithful instruction.

A Theology For Christian Education is not a new theology. Familiar doctrinal concepts and many traditional terms have been preserved. The trinitarian formula is present in an educational key: God the Educator, Christ the Exemplar, Holy Spirit the Tutor; but God the Educator remains God the Father; Jesus Christ the Exemplar is still Son and Savior, and the Holy Spirit as Tutor continues as companion and source of power. Many central Christian doctrines are given direct consideration—creation, revelation, man, sin, atonement, eschatology—the list is extensive. Related themes are not ignored. The orientation for all of them is pedagogical, and this makes the book significant. It is a well-considered effort to accomplish in one volume what Ferré calls, near the end of the book, “a herculean task for oncoming generations”.

The book illustrates the difficulty and complexity of the task to which Dr. Ferré set himself in response to insistent invitations from and in regular consultation with prominent Christian educators. The material is necessarily condensed and so tightly packed that meanings are sometimes obscured. More importantly the effort to transpose theology into a different key does

not bring Christian education into a real confrontation with the complex issues of today's changed and changing society and with the phenomenon of man as a being “characterized by his will to understand and explain the world without God” (from Father John Courtney Murray. “The Structure of the Problem of God” in *Theological Studies*, March, 1962). To relate to man in the context of a pervasive secularism and to be admitted with respect into the world where important decisions are made, Christian educators need more help than is offered in this very able volume.

—W. A. Kale

John Macquarrie, ed. *Dictionary of Christian Ethics*. Westminster. 1967. 366 pp. \$7.50.

Professor John Macquarrie of Union Theological Seminary (NYC) is already well-known and highly-esteemed as the author of several scholarly works in Christian theology; and this latest book will put us further in his debt for a lucid, instructive, and much-needed reference volume in Christian ethics. Apart from its virtual uniqueness, there are other features which will make this book more than commonly useful: entries have been written by eighty knowledgeable contributors who represent both the relevant sub-specialties in theological and philosophical disciplines and a broad range of Western religious traditions; many items have helpful bibliographic references appended to them; distinctively contemporary problems are given prominence; and, to its credit, the book (more often than not) is styled after an encyclopedia rather than a dictionary.

Contrary to the extraordinary claim on the dust-jacket, this volume does not cover the “whole field of Christian ethics, past and present, and all subjects related to it” (what single volume likely could!); nor is it comprehensive and representative except

in a limited sense. There are doubtless restrictions imposed upon and by an editor in an undertaking of this sort but these cannot foreclose certain modest caveats. In the excellent biographical entries which range from Moses to John Bennett and Reinhold Niebuhr, one is at a loss to account for the omission of H. Richard Niebuhr (as well as, among others, G. F. Moore and W. E. Channing). And, related to this point, one's professional curiosity is aroused by omission from the list of contributors of such men, among others, as Paul Ramsey, James Gustafson, Helmut Thielicke, and Carl F. H. Henry. Further, technical errors (however unavoidable in such a wide-ranging work) detract from both the authority and amplitude of the volume. Some of these are, of course, trivial (as, e.g., separate references to G. Murphy's book *Personality: A Biosocial Approach to Origin and Structure*, which cite different publication dates) but others prompt more substantive questions (as, e.g., the entry on "pacifism" which instructs the reader to "see peace and war," but in that article one nowhere sees explicit mention or definition of pacifism). One should note also that the criticism of "unevenness," typically made of symposia, is appropriate here with respect to style, content, subject matter, and contributors: e.g., the article on "euthanasia" incomplete for failure to discuss so-called "direct" and "indirect" means; the pertinence of an entry on "dreams" is far from self-evident; the article on "contextual ethics" is written by its best-known advocate and forcefully presented as a normative method, but the article on "situation ethics" is written by the editor, who gives more space to discussing its "errors" than to describing its method; and, similarly, the article on "conservatism" (a fairly vague term) is critically done by the editor rather than by a more sympathetic scholar (e.g., Carl F. H. Henry).

These instances are simply illustrative, I suspect, of the difficulties one may expect to encounter in any book that ventures so much in so brief a space. In the main, they serve as reminder that even the "best" reference work (as this one is) must be used critically and that, for serious students, nothing substitutes for primary sources. So do not interpret these criticisms as diminishing appreciation for this exceptional book; indeed, in a day when ethics and morals appear to be the special competence of anybody with an opinion about right or wrong on any subject, one hopes that Macquarrie's *Dictionary of Christian Ethics* will be widely-read and frequently consulted.

—HARMON L. SMITH

That the World May Believe. Albert C. Outler. Methodist Board of Missions. 1966. 195 pp. \$1 paper.

Convinced that it is time "for the church folk generally to make the cause of unity their own cause," Albert Outler has prepared this study book for Methodist groups—and it should be widely used. In it the author, a "soul brother" of Duke (in the best sense of that term), deals with theological, historical and practical issues in the quest for Christian unity, facing frankly the obstacles as well as the hopes. If the optimism outweighs the realism at times, it may be simply that Outler thinks more of the Holy Spirit than of Original Sin.

Less forceful, perhaps, than his earlier book, *The Christian Tradition and the Unity We Seek* (Oxford, 1957), this brings the ecumenical story up-to-date, past Vatican II (at which the author was one of the Methodist observers). It provides an appendix of eight crucial documents, including not only Protestant ecumenical statements, but Pope Pius XI's hopelessly negative encyclical of 1928 to contrast with the 1964 decree *On Ecumenism*. Best of all the last chapter shows how "Christian Community Begins at

Home," with comparative study, joint worship, and united action—for "renewal must show itself, first of all, in mission."

There is an error in the date of the International Missionary Council (p. 26); Harry Ward was *not* one of the "architects" of the Federal Council of Churches (p. 67), and only one of the other four men cited (p. 26) in connection with its formation was a delegate at the 1908 meeting. It may be disconcerting to some readers, clerical as well as lay, that the editors felt it necessary to include a glossary, not merely of ecumenical terms (confirmands, de-mythologize, latitudinarianism, uniates), but also of Outlerisms (canard, congeries, paraclete, prolepsis, quintessential). But as Dr. Outler reminds us with his occasional sly humor, *ecumenicity* is less tongue-twisting than *denominationalism*—and far more Christian.

—Creighton Lacy

Christian Mission in Theological Perspective. Edited by Gerald H. Anderson. Abingdon. 1967. 286 pp. (\$2.50 paper).

When the Methodist General Conference of 1968 gave its attention to a new "Aim of Mission", it acknowledged that theological perspectives—if not theology itself!—have changed in

the forty years since John R. Mott composed the previous Disciplinary statement. Since 1956 Methodist mission executives and theologians from Methodist seminaries have been meeting annually to discuss their aims and assumptions, their purposes and pre-suppositions.

Eleven of the position papers (plus an essay by D. T. Niles to represent the Asian view) have now been brought together by the Board of Missions. A few of the authors and titles will indicate the scope better than extended commentary: Carl Michalson—"Ultimate Meaning in History" (ah, *there* was a lively disputation on a lakeshore in Michigan!); Walter Muelder—"Christian Responsibility with Respect to Revolution"; J. Robert Nelson—"Christian Theology and the Living Faiths of Men"; John Godsey—"History of Salvation and World History" (Barth and Reinhold Niebuhr vs. Bultmann and Cullmann); Richey Hogg—"New Thrusts in the Theology and Life of the Christian Mission".

Between canoe trips and rides on the "dunesmobiles" these theologians turned out some vital perspectives on the Christian mission. They deserve reading by all who are concerned with theological foundations for evangelism.

—Creighton Lacy

Yet we confess

our own involvement in this great tragedy,

our hardness of heart,

our slowness to act,

our blindness to the sufferings, and injustices, and needs, and problems, of those around us,

our complicity in decades of privileged profiting from the sacrifices of others,

our self-deceiving willingness to shift the burdens of repair of wrong,

our resistance to the cost of righting the inequities of our society, of our community,

our tendency to exhaust our awakened conscience in word, not deed,

to enjoy repentance but fail in performance, to give up easily

when our little efforts do not suffice to change the entrenched evils we deplore,

our preference for comfort and privilege rather than identification and service,

our deep-set racism, prejudice, discrimination, injustice,

our evasion in blaming others for the evils in which we share. . . .

Thou knowest, O God, how cheaply we may take the sacrifice of this thy servant, how glibly we may talk and how miserably we may fail.

O thou high and lofty One . . . have mercy upon us. . . . Amen.

April 9, 1968

—McMurry S. Richey

