# THE DUKE DIVINITY SCHOOL REVIEW

*Spring 1964*



# A Prayer for Our Colleagues

Bidding: Now let us pray for our teachers and colleagues who are undergoing trial of their faith in court of law. . . .

Almighty God, Who didst send Thy Son into the world to lead us into the way of righteousness, bestow Thy blessing and strength upon these our colleagues, who because of their witness for Thee are now being tested by fiery trial.

Give them great gifts and great holiness, that wisely and charitably, diligently and lovingly, prudently and acceptably, they may be guides to the blind, comforters to the confused and weary. May they boldly rebuke sin, patiently suffer for the truth, and be exemplary in their lives and actions.

Amidst enmity and rejection, sustain them by Thy loving presence, and may they love their neighbors as themselves.

Amidst the tensions of prolonged uncertainty, may they be renewed daily and hourly in the strength of Thy Holy Spirit, the Comforter.

In the disruption of their ordered lives and work, let them rest tranquilly in Thee, in Whom alone is our peace.

Grant to their families courage and patience to await Thy will, confident that they and we remain securely in Thy loving care.

Save them, their families, and all of us from bitterness and from factionalism, that despite the confusion of conflicting claims they and we may have a part in the fulfillment of Thy larger purposes.

Grant unto us all a gallant spirit, let our loads be lightened by being shared, and let our prayers, which we now offer to Thee, become a means of our sharing with Thee in Thy ministry of reconciliation.

Now we commit all these for whom we pray, and ourselves, to Thine almighty care. And unto Thee, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, we offer praise and honor, trust and obedience, now and evermore. Amen.

John J. Rudin, II

York Chapel
March 13, 1964

# THE DUKE DIVINITY SCHOOL REVIEW

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# Contents



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# From the Courthouse Steps....

Hillsboro, N. C.
April 17, 1964

Those who are concerned with the witness of the Word in the world will appreciate the fact that this editorial note is being written of necessity on the courthouse steps. Necessity of time because a printing deadline has arrived. Necessity of place because our friend and faculty colleague, Harmon Smith, is being tried on charges of trespass in a civil rights demonstration. (Fifteen minutes after those words were written, the jury returned a verdict of guilty, and the judge imposed a sentence of ninety days in jail, plus costs.)

Yesterday—to the confusion of the jury, with the reluctant consent of the judge to "corroborative evidence," and over the strenuous objection of the prosecuting solicitor, who first introduced phrases out of context—Dr. Smith's article on "Conscience and Grace" (Duke Divinity School Review, Winter 1964, pp. 37-41) was read in its entirety into the court record. It is because the Editor and other members of the faculty feel strongly that such a moving testimony to Christian decision-making should not be left to stand alone, that we offer in this issue a variety of comments and expressions of support.

This is not the place to review the legal issues involved, or the prejudicial attitudes which have been so obvious behind the judicial forms in these trials. It *is* appropriate, however, to report to our readers the factual situation to date. In five weeks of Superior Court sessions, during which the defendants spent most of their time in the courtroom lest they be cited for contempt or forfeiture of bond, five Duke professors and one from the University of North Carolina have been tried. Two cases have ended in a "hung jury," a mistrial. Those convicted have received varying sentences, ranging up to the one today—all active penalties, even though every other prison sentence which this observer heard in five weeks (except for escaped convicts) was conditionally suspended! Each case has been appealed. One retrial remains to be handled by the court, along with over 1000 student demonstration cases from Chapel Hill.

This is not the place to argue the ethical issues involved, or the motivations and reactions—differing widely—among the defendants.

A majority of jurors apparently find our colleagues guilty of violating the trespass statute, despite their consistent testimony that—in addition to being brutally assaulted—they were never given the requisite orders to leave. Others clearly believe that the avowed willingness—"*if necessary*!"—to "*risk* civil disobedience for the sake of protesting the indignity of racial injustice" is equivalent to breaking the law. Some friends and supporters wish that even greater stress had been placed on the dubious application of the trespass law in public accommodations (recently upheld by the North Carolina Supreme Court but denied by the Delaware Supreme Court and pending in the United States Supreme Court). Still others, fully sympathetic with the cause of civil rights, would argue that a more direct and unequivocal witness might have been made by pleading guilty and accepting the consequences without contest. Some of us, consciously or unconsciously, feel a pang of guilt that we have not displayed such costly courage for our convictions.

Each of these positions—plus many more—can probably be found within the Divinity School faculty. But all who know and love and trust Frederick Herzog and Harmon Smith—and those who have come to know and love and trust their co-defendants during this ordeal—can join in Christian sympathy. We can share in pride that they at least have not been disobedient to the "heavenly vision." Divinity students have raised approximately two hundred dollars for their "convicted" professors. Scores of friends all over the country, many of them frankly critical of the tactics used, have donated over two thousand dollars to a defense fund for the five Duke defendants. The bonds of Christian fellowship are far more valuable than those which have had to be signed in court.

At its meeting on January 13 the Divinity School Faculty unanimously adopted the following resolution: "That as professional colleagues we recognize the recent action of Messrs. Harmon Smith and Frederick Herzog in their support of Human Rights; that we commend the ultimate cause and objective which their personal action seeks to propagate; that we support their right as individual citizens so to act in their good conscience; that we are one with them in Christian love and in the prayer for the fulfillment of Human Rights in our American society."

The statement is inadequate—as all formal statements are inadequate—to express the personal faith and Christian support extended to our associates. It applies in spirit to the other defendants as well—a Methodist minister, a Quaker zoologist, and an Episcopal mathema-

tician. The conscience which leads men to suffer indignity for the sake of others' dignity, imprisonment for the sake of others' freedom, speaks in many ways. So does the grace which God gives in gardens of Gethsemane. We who have been privileged to witness both conscience and grace at work in our very midst praise God for His sustaining power thus far on a painful pilgrimage. And we reaffirm to our colleagues the continuing confidence and affection of those who stand on the courthouse steps.

Creighton Lacy

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# Risk and Grace

I. *A Memorandum to a Colleague*

This is a note of appreciation for your recent insightful use of the word risk. You will recall that you placed it in a key sentence in the article on "Conscience and Grace", which explicates your reasons for participation in the incident which resulted in your arrest and trial on a charge of trespass. After listing both negative and positive reasons, you carefully enunciated the "considerations . . . adopted as the ground for my decision to risk civil disobedience for the sake of protesting the indignity of racial injustice." Later, while you were on the witness stand, you found it appropriate, indeed necessary, to quote the sentence and to explain that the decision "to risk" civil disobedience was not necessarily a decision to plan and execute an act of civil disobedience. The verdict of the jury does not indicate that your distinction was understood and accepted, but you successfully provoked new and more profound interest in the meaning of risk-taking in this period of social revolution.

Some of the hazards of your situation have been obvious. You have been misquoted and misinterpreted. Some friends have judged you to be misguided; others have considered you impulsive and adventure-loving. Few have regarded this episode as a threat to your professional status; indeed the possibility of enhancement is believed to be real. One surprising element stands out. The risk you and others have taken is proving to be a means of grace. Through this incident, you have provided a well-timed and needed witness concerning the "unmerited love and favor of God to man." Perhaps you will concur with this paraphrase of a Pauline statement: "Where risk abounded, God's grace did much more abound." In addition to the

testimony of your personal awareness of God's grace in recent weeks, you have prompted others to revise their understandings of risk-taking and to sense at least the possibility of an encounter with God's love and favor in moments of threatened danger or loss.

II. *A Memorandum to the Thoughtful Reader*

This is an invitation to move beyond considerations of the inevitability of risk in human experience to reflections upon some contributions an experience of risk-taking can make to individuals and groups. Feelings of dread are unavoidable, but they are not necessarily predominant. Exhilaration of spirit and alertness of mind are often intensified by an event which requires taking a chance. An example may be seen in the courtroom when the prosecutor and the professor are engaged in dramatic verbal exchanges regarding the truth. There is risk on both sides. The "whole truth" probably never comes forth, but the attitudes toward truth are not casual. What would be the results if all inquiries into truth—all research, all testing of theory and review of information, all exercises of classroom, laboratory, and library—were conducted with a sense of urgency and an awareness of risk, even when the routines are dull, comparable to the atmosphere of the courtroom?

III. *A Memorandum to Fellow Citizens*

This is a reminder that historically we are indebted to leaders who are willing to take risks, involving both themselves as individuals and the nation as a whole. The signers of the Declaration of Independence engaged in an act of disobedience. They were willing to chance failure at the time and the condemnation of all future centuries. The late Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, boldly announced his policy of leading the nation to the brink of war. In every generation we have found it necessary and wise at the national level to involve ourselves in grave risks. Do you agree that through repetitions of this policy our nation has become great?

IV. *A Memorandum to Churchmen*

This is a question for consideration: Does an experience of risk such as the one involving theological professors in the civil rights movement have sacramental connotations? We are prone to dwell upon the obvious interpretations. The professors have jeopardized their popularity, if not their acceptability. Their actions have not been widely acclaimed as either effective or wise and well-timed projects in the cause they wished to aid. They have perhaps encouraged their

opponents to offer more stubborn resistance. But what more should be considered? Is the readiness on the part of rational, mature and responsible men to become involved in the civil rights movement an outward sign of the workings of God's grace in their lives? One of them has forthrightly declared that his act can be justified by grace alone. Another has announced his conviction that "the Word never becomes effective until it becomes flesh." Is this "an outward sign of an inward and spiritual grace"? The outward sign has unacceptable meanings and connotations to the courts and to many citizens. For the Christian, the possibility of the presence of the Holy Spirit in every moment of this incident cannot be set aside.

W. A. Kale

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## The Sin of Segregation

He was a burly and sullen looking sergeant with a dozen of those flat and shiny medals that Russians generously bestowed on their heroes during World War II. In searching through a Latvian farm house he came upon a newspaper that had a cartoon which caught his attention. The caption, written in Latvian, he could not understand; it read, "Stalin, the great caretaker of the world." But the cartoon he understood. It showed Stalin taking care of the world with a long knife in one hand, and a noose in the other. Blood was dripping from both. The Russian sergeant stared at the cartoon—and suddenly he wept aloud. A man who had been through many battles, whose face was tough, whose soul knew no fear, such a man wept in anguish when he recognized his idol ridiculed.

I saw this almost twenty years ago during my refugee days and some time before I was able to make my way west and to freedom. I think that the memory of this weeping sergeant will never leave me because it reminds me that the world lives and dies by ideals even when they happen to be wrong ideals. Moreover, the event serves to recall the agony which must come upon anyone who is forced to watch the light of freedom blotted out—the agony of living under idolaters. I still remember how within my own family we used to listen to broadcasts from London. This was not permitted under either the Communist or the Nazi occupations, but we still did it in order to catch a fresh breath of air. I am not certain that we would have been able to survive the insane fanaticism of totalitarianism had

we not been able to remind ourselves that somewhere in the world there still was freedom where the truth could be spoken aloud. In the madness of those days, the West was more than a geographical direction. It was for us then, as it is still for millions today, the only hope which makes life bearable.

As Christians we cherish the Western democratic way of life precisely because we believe that a democracy embodies a very significant measure of Christian idealism: a deep respect for the equality of all men and their inalienable right for freedom. And we know that such a heritage is never automatically retained. It must be repossessed anew as new situations require a fresh application of the age-old insights. Hence—to look at a recent example that has assumed rather wide proportions—the discussion about Rolf Hochhuth's play *The Deputy* is not merely an attempt either to accuse or excuse the late Pope Pius XII for not interfering with the Nazi slaughter of six million Jews. What is ultimately under scrutiny is the conscience of a very large segment of the Western world, which had chosen silence and non-interference toward the evil it could not immediately eradicate.

Perhaps we can say that the fact that such an inquiry is undertaken is in itself salutary. Perhaps it is irrelevant how we judge past events as long as we obtain from them the proper lesson for future decisions. Perhaps—but the world in which we live still seeks to judge the past and to record its judgment. And therefore, regardless of whatever the ultimate evaluation of Pius XII will be, as one of the uncanny suspicions that will go down in history there will be the insight so eloquently formulated by a reader of *The New York Times Book Review* (March 22, 1964, page 35):

> Pope Pius's failure is not that he did not save the Jews, which he probably could not have done, but that by failing to speak out he bypassed the magnificent opportunity to rouse untold numbers of passive Christians to testify to their faith in the values of the New Testament, and thereby save their souls.

What is true of the pope in regard to saving the Jews may by analogy also be true of the Southern churchmen in regard to the racial situation. Even if we should suppose that we cannot persuade the segregationist that his views are directly opposite to the teachings and examples of Jesus Christ, or, in the same way, even if it were true that we could not be directly instrumental in bringing about the integration of our churches—the inability to act successfully does not excuse us from acting at all. The truth of the matter is, of course,

that at present we simply do not know whether or not our attempts at persuasion would be successful. We have not really tried it out on any wide scale! Instead, we have practiced what in German is called "the policy of the ostrich". This is at least how outsiders view us. In *The New York Times Magazine* (April 5, 1964) there appeared an article entitled, "Silent White Ministers of the South". The main point of the article is as clear as it is agonizing: "The truth is evident: On the issue of race, the white Southern minister refuses to lead. He follows and parrots the feelings of his congregation." Moreover, to the author of this article it seemed that the majority of white Southern ministers could not even be charged with a militant belief in segregation. They had rather merely followed the course of least resistance.

'Give him a couple of years to get his highfalutin' seminary ideas out of his head, let him get his family started, give him a decent salary and a nice parsonage, and a membership in the local country club, and he's got a good living and knows it,' said a prominent businessman and church leader in one town. 'And when it comes to dealing with the colored folks, he's as likely to be as conservative as any of us.'

In so far as such a portrayal of the South is accurate, the irony of the situation is obvious. For decades it has been the standard Communist propaganda that Christian ministers do not really believe what they preach, and serve their cause only when it pays well. Likewise, it has also been a standard item of Communist propaganda that the West is only seemingly free, while in reality the Negro and other minorities are denied their basic rights. Yet today in the most outspokenly Protestant and democratic region of the Western world, where church attendance is at a peak, we discover ourselves caught as living proofs for the wrong side. With the eyes of the entire world upon us, as the life-and-death struggle between the Free World and Communism goes on, we ministers of the Gospel are singled out as proofs of irrelevance or cowardice—or both. It does not help that we thunder away from our pulpits against the evils of Communism. Our deeds speak louder and overshadow our words. When our Lord and Master is blasphemed by the patterns of segregation, we preserve our composure and silence.

What hurts me is that I cannot even reply to the Northern magazine that it should investigate its own words and deeds and see whether there is not perchance some slight discrepancy between the two. Having lived in the North and served in an up-state New York parish, I think I might have some concrete data at hand. But such a

reply is of no avail. And even New York City does not claim to be a very Christian one, at least not statistically, as its Protestant population is relatively small. We, however, are in the majority, with Protestant Christianity in high repute. Therefore we must look at ourselves as we are without trying to excuse ourselves by accusing others. We must ask ourselves: is there anything at all hopeful about us?

In the last forty years Communism has risen to world prominence. It has conquered more than one-fifth of the earth. Except for the United States, it might have conquered the entire earth. Frightening as this may be, our nation is the last halt before the abyss. And we do not really know whether we will be able to prove wrong the prophecy of Khrushchev that he will bury us. Or do we? As I see it, the answer is an answer of faith. Men are not created for slavery but for freedom. Within the human breast there is an inextinguishable thirst for self-respect and human dignity. All men long for this.

We may look for a moment at the new nations of Africa. Against great odds, slowly but certainly they are reaching out for independence. Their steps may be faltering, as those of a child, yet the child is a giant and knows it. There is no human power that could any more bring back the bygone age of colonialism! Thus the present power balance between Communism and the United States is not a static one. It belongs to the future to tell whether the new nations will turn to us or succumb to the lure of Communism, and thus help to extinguish the light of freedom forever. This is why I say that the future victory is a matter of faith—our faith or theirs. Having seen at close range the fruits of Communist fanaticism, I am not inclined to belittle it. But much less am I inclined to belittle the power of Christ. He can redeem even a segregated land.

But are there any signs of such a redemption? Admittedly, they are not very obvious. On Sundays at 11 a.m. we still have the most segregated hour. But statistics show only what has happened, and not what is about to happen. Statistics cannot measure the long germinating processes of grace within the human heart. It cannot predict how many men will eventually speak out in fearless courage and break this ungodly silence that plagues us all.

On a relatively smaller scale, the turning point may well have already taken place. I am referring to the five Duke University professors who for the sake of their consciences dared to witness to the

truth as they saw it. The editor of this REVIEW has already reported to you what has happened to them up to this point.

How the higher courts will ultimately evaluate their case still lies in the future. All we may surmise is that an arduous and expensive road lies ahead.

At the same time, there are several observations that can be made about the present significance of the recent events.

In the first place, it is now patently obvious that not all Southern Christians are insensitive to the heinous sin of segregation. The willingness to spend two or three months on a road gang among common criminals is a clear gauge of the level of agony that the Christian conscience must feel about the unjust mores of a society.

Secondly, it is worth noting that the extraordinary witness comes from very levelheaded and highly respected men. They have been very successful within their various callings. Three of them are ordained ministers. They have taken their stand without a false eagerness for martyrdom and in full awareness of the ambiguities of all human decisions.

Thirdly, those who care to know are hereby reassured that the Christian faith can still produce heroes—stalwart men whose ultimate allegiance is to Christ Jesus. And those who would rather not hear about such a stance are hereby reminded that religion is a very serious business. It can save sinners and damn hypocrites. It is a narrow road which leads to life eternal. And it differs from the wide and the popular road which leads to everlasting death.

Egil Grislis

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For further information, write to the Director of the Convocation and Pastors' School, Dr. McMurry S. Richey, Box 4673, Duke Station, Durham, North Carolina.

# 'He Was Reckoned with Transgressors'

Robert E. Cushman

"For I say unto you that this which is written must be fulfilled in me, And he was reckoned with transgressors." (Luke 22:37)

That Jesus Christ stands at the summit of imaginable goodness few would deny. Yet it is a plain fact of history that, in his day, he was reckoned with transgressors. Furthermore, he was so regarded by the most respected and influential leaders of his society. This realization is shocking enough, but I wonder how startled we might be to contemplate the possibility—indeed the likelihood—that, were Christ among us today, he would still be reckoned as transgressor—even by church people. For is there not a good possibility that Christ would be reckoned among transgressors in any society that incriminates conscientious defenders of frustrated human rights who can only make such defense at the risk of challenging existing laws or the propriety of their application?

For both society and its challengers there is an ancient and ugly dilemma here of which either the change of society and its laws is one horn or the Cross is the other. For, where justice is obstructed in society, how shall men evade either of two options? Either they must change the laws to emancipate a larger good that is presently suppressed or they confront a sober alternative: like the Pharisees and the Scribes, they must crucify, in one manner or another, the defenders of justice outraged and human good presently imprisoned. Exactly this is the tough and somber logic of the New Testament. It is the logic of the Cross, and it is recurrently exemplified in history. Let us look at this logic, always remembering Jesus' prayer from the Cross: "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do."

In Lent and Holy Week Christians are deeply sensible of the foreboding shadows of the Cross. Then Easter comes and shadows give place to the brightness of the resurrection. And quickly, too quickly, the appalling Cross becomes transfigured. It is transformed into the sign of indefectible goodness and love and eternal promise.

[This sermon—printed by urgent request of the Editor and many others who heard it—was preached in Duke Chapel on Sunday, April 19, 1964.]

Whereas it was a thing of ultimate despair, it now becomes the sign of God's power and victory over man's unrighteousness. And, shortly, the transfiguration of the Cross is heralded in the first sermon of the Apostle Peter: "Let all the house of Israel therefore know assuredly that God hath made him both Lord and Christ, this Jesus whom ye crucified." Plainly, Peter meant to say: in your eyes he was reckoned among transgressors; in God's eyes, he is Lord and Christ. In your eyes, he was despised and rejected; in God's eyes, he is the Son of the Father.

Here indeed is recorded a revolution of perspective! It marks the beginning of the Christian Church. In all truth, the transfiguration of the Cross roots in the early Christian insight of faith that God has turned man's most despicable deed to the occasion of his most redemptive act. Man's most hideous rejection of God was and is, on its other side, God's ultimate acceptance of man even in his total unworthiness. Thus, in the Cross, St. Paul found the unsearchable riches of God's forgiving grace. Thus, he gloried in the Cross alone. In it, he affirmed, was to be found the refutation of the world's wisdom. In the Cross was made visible a foolishness of God that is wiser than men and an apparent weakness of God that is stronger than men (1 Cor. 1:25f). Thus, unabashed and boldly, Paul preached Christ crucified, though it was to the Jews (who reckoned Jesus with transgressors) a stumbling block and to the Greeks foolishness. Against the appearances, roundly Paul affirms the paradox: "God forbid that I should glory save in the Cross of Christ, my Lord!"

No doubt we have become too remote in time and understanding to comprehend so astounding a Gospel! Paradox loses its force as conventionalized belief induces believers to slight and pass over the original shame and infamy of the Cross. In any case, we are prone to pass quickly to the dawning realization of its vindicated glory in the maturing faith of the early Church. Most of us are scarcely conscious of the transition from the infamy to the glory of the Cross in the mind of the primitive Christians. On Golgotha, the disciples were stunned into silent hopelessness by the infamy of the Cross—that is, Christ reckoned with transgressors. But, with Easter and Pentecost, they acquired unshakable assurance of the glory of the Cross; and, in that assurance, they and their successors ventured even martyrdom in fidelity to their Lord. And, in the same sign, the Cross, they conquered.

We are heirs of their victory—the conquest of the ancient heathen world by the Christian faith. It was a victory, however, not without

its heavy cost. It secured the glory of the Cross and obscured its infamy. Gradually men came to see only Christ victorious not Christ humiliated. The Cross became the sign of Christ's victory in which men were glad to include themselves. Insofar as it remained the sign of his humiliation, men tended to exempt themselves.

So the paradox of the Cross with which St. Paul astonished the ancient world faded. Recollection dimmed that Christ had been reckoned with transgressors. Today it is almost forgotten. All but unknown it is that the matchless doer of the Law—fulfiller of the "Great Commandment"—died under condemnation of the law. What a contradiction! What absurdity is this that fulfillment of the Law should receive the condemnation of the law! Is the infamy of the Cross in this, that otherwise righteous people invoke and misuse the law to overthrow and subvert the essential aim and spirit of the Law? Nothing, I think, would do more to recover health and authenticity to complacent, blinded, and compromised church-religion of our land than honest facing up to the real infamy of the Cross. It is time we knew for a certainty that the Cross is no more the perfect sign of God's forgiveness than it is the matchless mirror of what men need forgiveness for—and above all, for the sin of hypocrisy.

## II

What, then, more narrowly, is the infamy of the Cross? From long habit of thought, we are prone to view the infamy of the Cross as the despiteful and politic murder of the most righteous of men. The eighteenth century rationalists of the Enlightenment insisted upon it, and there is truth in it. Or, again, we conceive the infamy of the Cross as Israel's blinded rejection of its own expected Messiah. In Christian perspective, this also is true. Yet, again, we see the infamy of the Cross as the fear-ridden and jealous deed of benighted religious bigots frantic to safeguard their ecclesiastical and political empire. In considerable measure, this also is true. Or, generalizing once more in Christian perspective, we may think of the infamy of the Cross as the apogee of man's rebellious rejection of God in the person of his Son. Christian faith holds this true. But there is a more subtle and also a more basic infamy we are prone to ignore and ought never to miss.

Consider, then, what it really means that the Lord of the Christian Church was executed among condemned criminals. The gospel writers are unanimous: "And with him they crucify two robbers." Do not presume to accord the crucified one of that day the exaltation of the

ages of faith. Consider him on that day unattested by the faith of centuries, crucified between robbers! Was it only an ugly coincidence? To be sure, there was execution to be done that day and the time-saving efficiency of Roman justice doubtless suggested economy of effort. But do not attribute to the mocking soldiers, the curious populace, and the blinded leaders the eyes either of love or of faith to accord special significance to the central figure. Our eyes are Christologically focused and enlightened by faith, but not theirs. They had not yet come to garnish the tomb of the prophet!

And just this the gospel writers wish to affirm—the hard brutal fact, the infamy of the Cross. It was this: "He was reckoned with transgressors." The Cross consummated in irrevocable deed the long-standing and hardening judgment of Jesus' persecutors that he was in fact a destroyer of the law and a subverter of the religion of Moses. We say it was an error, a heinous case of mistaken identity. But it was the judgment of the only jury Jesus had. It was the sentence of the leaders of Judaism. And, in the face of it, for Paul boldly, even defiantly, to preach Christ crucified was incredible presumption and unbelievable paradox. It required a revolution of perspective so radical and powerful that it could turn the hinge of history and create both the Christian conscience and the Christian era.

But we, with our ready-made heroic and triumphal view of Christ, slight the awful awareness of the early Church that Jesus was executed under the law as a condemned perverter of the people: a revolutionary, an agitator, an enemy of the tradition of the elders, and a gainsayer of the Law of Moses. Today, we honor neither their understanding of that Law nor their mistaken identification of Jesus. Today, we know that the scribes could not hear nor understand when Jesus said he came not to destroy the Law but to fulfill it. We know that he did fulfill it by undeviating love to God and unfaltering love of neighbor. But the Scribes and Pharisees did not so understand the Law, and the laws, as they read them, obscured and prevented their knowing who their neighbors were—just as our laws, especially the trespass law, assists us to mis-identify our neighbors.

So the Scribes and the Pharisees summed up their indictment of Jesus in their words to Pilate: "We have a law, and by that law he ought to die." It was that serious! We have no warrant for discrediting or discounting the scribes' zeal for the Law, as they understood it, or their outrage in Jesus' breach of it. By his indifference to some parts of the Law, it seemed to them that he threatened the integrity of the whole legal fabric of Judaism. That Jesus ignored

the rules of the Sabbath by travel and healing was scandalous violation of the inviolable Law; so also that he ignored ceremonial rules of diet and cleanliness; that his disciples satisfied hunger by grain plucked from the fields on the Sabbath; that Jesus fraternized and dined with publicans and sinners. This was libertinism and desegregation! The despised publicans and sinners should remain despised. It was the letter of the law. And at the root of it all was the profanity of Jesus' claim that love of neighbor—even of the despised Samaritan—and human well-being are prior claims to men's loyalty exceeding in urgency many others of the Law of Moses. This was blasphemy, the equivalent of treason in the theocratic society of Jesus' day! To the scribes and Pharisees, Jesus was a transgressor of great peril to the people, and by their law he ought to die.

They could not take in Jesus' criticism: "Ye tithe mint, anise, and cummin, and have left undone the weightier matters of the law, justice, mercy, and faith . . . ye blind guides that strain the gnat and swallow the camel!" The Pharisees and lawyers could not get the message. Jesus' basic premise quite escaped them. And that premise was this: that every particular law, together with its application, is judged, vindicated, or found wanting by reference to the standard of the essential Law. What laws therefore do not implement or express the Great Commandment—unalloyed love of God and love of man—are indifferent, at times may be ignored, at others actually breached in answerability to the Great Commandment, the essential Law. Accordingly, Jesus taught that God judges men, not by their legal righteousness, but by their *intention* and by their *fruits,* and both intention and fruits by the standard of the Great Commandment.

This is how our Lord lived. Implicit in it is the logic of the Cross. That logic only became explicit when he was reckoned with transgressors. Today, in our society, we face a like situation and a similar logic. Are all laws, at all times, equally to be honored whether they serve human good and civil justice or not? It may surprise you when I say that Jesus did not so believe respecting the law of his day and did not so act, that is, if we may trust the New Testament record. He subordinated particular laws to the standard of the Great Commandment—"thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and with all thy soul and with all thy mind . . . and thy neighbor as thyself." Laws or tradition which failed by this standard, or, in their application, were no vehicles of its spirit and purpose, Jesus set aside in fidelity to the purer meaning of the Law. The tradition of men he

subordinated to the Word of God (Mk. 7:13). For this he was crucified; he was reckoned with transgressors.

III

But, now, what verdict do we render concerning Christ in our enlightened age? I do not mean the verdict of our lips but of our lives. In our churches we own him as Lord, we say; and our society professes, ungrudgingly, to place him upon the moral pinnacle of history. But do we know what we do? For, in our preference for the glory of the Cross, we often hide from ourselves the infamy of the Cross. There is even some evidence that, while we Christians hail him as Lord, we continue to crucify him as transgressor. And this is the basic self-contradiction, pathetic incoherence, and consequent hypocrisy of American Christianity and culture. The contradiction permeates our churches and erodes the social fabric as a moral disease.

For what else can be said of those that hail Jesus as Lord and willfully oppose the enactment of legislation that would better assure equal dignity and rights for their neighbors? I do not mean merely the calculated obstructionism of the Senate but the electorate to which lawmakers do defer. What else, if not a moral disease, is this cunning employment of our legal system to perpetuate segregation in the schools and to utilize the trespass laws for the continuing abridgment of human rights? I know we have made progress. But inalienable rights are abridged—the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. And, surely, happiness or life-fulfillment is incompatible with "second-class citizenship" enforced by law or not assured by law. If enforced by law, then law comes to be in contradiction with itself. Painfully, it manifests a dreadful contradiction within the soul of the "in-group", the unenlightened majority.

Can we not see that it is this employment of particular laws to obstruct the purpose and intent of the sovereign Law of our land that is the sign of spiritual sickness among us? Potentially, it is a mortal illness for both Church and nation. Our Lord said, a house divided against itself cannot stand. The human soul divided against itself is guilt ridden, demon possessed, and verging always on madness. Churchmen will hardly recover inner unity and the peace that passes understanding until we accept the infamy of the Cross as preliminary to the glory of the Cross. Christians can neither know nor participate in the victory of the Cross until they acknowledge Christ condemned under the law in fidelity to the sovereign purpose of the Law. This is the infamy of the Cross. And, on its other side, it is Jesus'

attack upon both religion and culture. All ye shall be offended in me, he said. And they were offended!

Once again we ask, what difference is there between the society that reckoned Christ among transgressors and ours which also invokes sundry legalities to frustrate the sovereign purpose of the Law? The Pharisees invoked laws of the sabbath, cleanliness, diet, and ethnic exclusiveness to void the Great Commandment. "You void the word of God by your tradition," Jesus charged (Mk. 7:13). What shall we say of churches which invoke laws of trespass and breach of peace to eject from the place of worship ministers and bishops of their own denomination because there are colored brethren among them? Plainly, it is the peace of God which is breached, and the trespass is the profanation of the Divine sanctity!

How, then, can we escape the fact that, in our society also, Christ would be reckoned with transgressors? In a charge to a jury recently a judge instructed in such words as these: In rendering your verdict you are to understand that it does not matter how laudable the intention of an act, it is the sole business of the jury to decide whether the law has or has not been breached by the defendant. I could not but recall that, on this same premise, our Lord was convicted of perverting the people and was crucified. This was inevitable because his intention and motive were ignored, or if not ignored then misunderstood and resented. The infamy of the Cross is this, and it is potential in every legalistic society: Jesus ignored particular laws and breached others in absolute devotion to the sovereign principle of the Law—the Great Commandment.

The scandal of the Cross is possible in any and every society that does not maintain a living and organic union between the essential and sovereign Law and the plurality of particular laws. Or, the Cross is potential whenever society declines to enact and apply particular laws in accordance with the spirit and purpose of its sovereign Law. The "sovereign Law" is any society's avowed declaration of the common good. In a society where the laws are out of joint with the sovereign Law these consequences will follow: Society will be at odds with itself morally; it will tolerate injustice and inequality; it will inevitably persecute the morally enlightened; and it will be ripe for revolution; and, at length, it will "garnish the tombs of the righteous" saying, "if we had been in the days of our fathers we would not have been partakers with them in the blood of the prophets!"

For Christians the sovereign rule of life is the Great Commandment. By fidelity to it, Christ was reckoned with transgressors. The

pitiful weakness and incoherence of the churches is that they will have the crown without the cross. The infamy of the Cross terrifies into silence their careful respectability.

For America, the sovereign law is the word of the great Declaration that men are endowed by their Creator with the inalienable right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness or life fulfillment. To frustrate the realization of these commanding principles by misapplication of laws or willful failure to enact enabling laws is the nation's self-stultification. It is the real and most perilous form of civil disobedience.

But it was Christ who was reckoned with transgressors in those callous and ugly days, not the Pharisees and the lawyers. He was, in fact, crucified for theocratic disobedience. For some time now we have regarded this reckoning as a case of mistaken identity. Indeed, we have reversed the verdict and long since convicted his jury. But we are blind about ourselves; and, in our blindness, we do not see that Christ is still in our midst and that, all unwittingly, we still reckon him with transgressors. For surely the Cross is in our midst whenever God's will is perversely ignored and obstructed and while men are persecuted for righteousness sake. In our disobedience and hypocrisy, we may yet, by God's grace, repent and hope that, from the infamous Cross, our Lord still prays on our behalf: "Father, forgive them for they know not what they do." Amen.

# Temple Research in Jerusalem

William F. Stinespring

From the beginning of the modern age, Christian scholarship has shown a deep interest in the temple and the temple area in Jerusalem. Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible* in its article "Temple" in Volume IV, published in 1902, lists a work by two Italians from 1605; one by a Dutchman from 1643; another by a Frenchman from 1720; still another by a German from 1809; one by a Britisher from 1825; and so on.

From this time forward, as the possibility of travel and personal visitation at the site increased, the literature likewise increased, to something like flood proportions, so great was the interest of the western world in the subject. Much of this literature now seems useless and some of it downright foolish. But there were notable exceptions, and a few of these must be mentioned.

The exploratory visit in 1838 of Professor Edward Robinson of Union Theological Seminary of New York resulted in the publication in 1841 of the famous two-volume work entitled *Biblical Researches in Palestine.* This work marked the beginning of Palestinian archaeology as a scientific pursuit. Among very many other things, it contained an accurate description of the temple area, and especially of the outside of the walls enclosing it, supplemented with keen historical observations based largely on a vast knowledge of Flavius Josephus. Robinson connected the huge stones in these walls with the Biblical period, although he was not sure whether the stones were Herodian or Solomonic. That clarification was to come later.

In the west wall of the temple area near the southwest corner, he observed some projecting stones, "which at first sight seemed to be the effect of a bursting of the wall from some mighty shock or earthquake." When he mentioned this phenomenon that evening to a friend, Mr. Whiting, who lived in the city, the friend incidentally remarked that the stones appeared to have belonged to a large arch. Robinson thereupon thought of Josephus's description of a bridge connecting the temple area of Herod with the western hill of the city

[The annual Faculty Lecture given in York Chapel on February 26, 1964, by the Professor of Old Testament and Semitics, who has been at Duke since 1936.]

and became so excited that he could hardly wait to return to the spot. The next day he returned, confirmed the arch idea and made the identification, in his own mind, with the Josephus passage. Though there are still doubts about the exactitude of the identification, the projecting stones to this day are called "Robinson's Arch." The prickly pears or cacti that impeded Robinson's path have now been cleared away and every tourist is led to see his arch.

Very worthy of mention is *La Temple de Jérusalem* by Melchior de Vogüé, Paris 1864, based on exploratory visits in 1852 and 1862. This large folio volume, with 142 pages of illustrated text and 37 hand-engraved plates, 12 of them in color, is one of the most magnificent books ever published anywhere on any subject. This whole hour could easily be spent in a review of this work. Suffice it to say here and now that the greatest historical contribution of de Vogüé was to enunciate what I like to call the Herodian thesis: namely, that what we can see in Jerusalem today around and below the present Muslim holy place are parts of the substructure of Herod's temple area, the temple area of the New Testament, with little or nothing remaining from the Old Testament temples of Solomon and Zerubbabel, except perhaps the Sacred Rock itself.

Our next concern is the so-called Ordnance Survey of Jerusalem, 1864-65, by Captain (later Sir) Charles Wilson. This survey came about through the generosity of a philanthropically minded British lady, Miss Burdett Coutts, who made a subvention for a study of Jerusalem looking towards an improvement in the water supply and sanitary facilities of the city, which had acquired a bad reputation for unhealthfulness. Captain Wilson of the Royal Engineers was put in charge of the project, which, with the aid of a small staff of assistants, was completed in a little over one year. Unfortunately, the survey, though competently done, did not accomplish its primary purpose. For to this very day, one hundred years later, the water supply of Jerusalem is still inadequate, though sanitary conditions in general have greatly improved in recent years, owing to the introduction of modern medical and public-health techniques.

The results for archaeology, however, were well-nigh revolutionary. We can list only a few: (1) a map of Jerusalem that is still the basis of the cartography of the city, plus a more accurate plan of the temple area than had hitherto been available; (2) the exact determination of levels above the Mediterranean Sea in various parts of the city as it then was, and, more important still, the determination in a number of areas of the depth of bedrock below the existing

surface; (3) the discovery and description of the great arch under the present main entrance to the temple area on the west; this arch, ever since called Wilson's Arch, being of about the same size as Robinson's, but unlike Robinson's being almost perfectly preserved; in Wilson's own words, "one of the most perfect and magnificent remains in Jerusalem." It is at this place, rather than at Robinson's Arch, that we are to look for Josephus's bridge over the Tyropoeon Valley, the valley lying between the eastern or temple hill and the western hill or residential area of the ancient city, the valley so important for understanding the topography of New Testament Jerusalem.

Captain Wilson's business was not to conduct archaeological excavations, but he could not restrain his curiosity about the difference between ancient levels and modern levels, especially in the Tyropoeon Valley, lying along the western wall of the temple area in the southeastern part of the city. He descended into a deep well just west of the temple area and north of the arch called by his name to look for bedrock. He found it—80 feet below the modern surface. Then he attempted to excavate near Robinson's Arch. He got down 40 feet; still no bedrock; "but," he says, "having no means of keeping the loose rubbish back, the Arab workmen became frightened, and refused to go on; and, to our great regret, we had to fill up the excavation." But in a few other places he had more success, and his survey is the basis of all scientific exploration of the city.

While Wilson was still in Jerusalem, the Palestine Exploration Fund was organized in London on June 22, 1865. Upon Wilson's return later in the year he was immediately hired by the Fund and sent out again, though not to Jerusalem, but to make a general survey of Palestine with a view to future archaeological work.

This expedition was considered only preliminary. The real work of the Fund began when another captain of the Royal Engineers, Charles Warren, was engaged in November 1866 for the specific purpose of examining "the ruins and *débris* of Jerusalem." Captain (later Sir) Charles Warren worked almost continuously from near the beginning of 1867 (February 17th) to the spring of 1870. His achievements were notable and Warren is probably still the greatest name in Jerusalem research. We are concerned here only with what he did around the temple area. I wish I had time to relate some of the enormous hardships and difficulties which he met and overcame. They would make a fascinating story in themselves.

Warren took up where Wilson had left off in the Tyropoeon Val-

ley. He sank a series of shafts down to bedrock and proved not only that in ancient times this valley was deeper than now, but showed how much deeper by establishing bedrock levels along with modern ground levels. In general, the *débris* was shown to be from 30 to 85 feet in depth. This work was done nearly a century ago, but conditions are about the same today. For example, the pavement at the Wailing Wall is 74 feet above the ancient level. The true bottom of the Kidron Valley is 40 feet below where the bottom is now. In one place the *débris* was found to be 130 feet deep. Again, one may say in general that the once deep Tyropoeon Valley is now so silted up that many people walk through it lengthwise or across it without even noticing the slight depression that still exists. And they wonder why the lengthwise street is called Valley Street, as it actually is to this day. Josephus, of course, told us much about this valley; but it was Wilson and especially Warren who told us how right the ancient historian was.

For our purposes today the work of Warren at Wilson's Arch is most important and we must conclude this section of our paper with some remarks on this work.

Wilson's Arch lies about 20 feet below the present double gate of the main entrance on the west side of the temple area. At this point the main east-west street of today is 80 feet above bedrock. The great arch, with a span of 42 feet and a width of 43 feet, is made up of 23 courses of stones of equal thickness. The stones are not quite so large as those in the ruined Robinson's Arch, but their perfect state of preservation is remarkable. Here, as at Robinson's Arch farther to the south, the stones of the first three courses are a part of the enclosing wall of the temple area, and hence must be Herodian in date.

At 3½ feet below the spring of the arch a disused modern pool was found. Warren began sinking a shaft under the east end of the arch by breaking through the thick concrete of this pool. 24 feet farther down he came upon a mass of broken masonry, apparently the drafted stones and voussoirs of an earlier arch at the same place. With great difficulty he drove through this mass of stones and finally reached bedrock, 80 feet down, as already mentioned. He also sank a shaft under the west end of the arch and excavated around the western pier. In the search for bedrock he struck water, but managed to ladle it out and go on. With the poorest equipment he did incredible things.

Warren did not discover Wilson's Arch. He did discover the

older fallen arch under the one now in place. This discovery raises the problem of the respective dates of the two arches at this spot. More on that in a moment.

Warren discovered some other things here—remarkable things. I refer to what he called the Causeway Vaults, the Secret Passage, and the Masonic Hall in *Underground Jerusalem,* to use the title of a book later published by him. The beginning of these discoveries came on January 18, 1868. The explorer accidentally broke into a vaulted room underground a little west of Wilson's Arch. This turned out to be the first of a series of such vaults leading westward, each with a low exit leading into the next room. More amazing still, there were two series of rooms leading westward side by side. Together they are about 44½ feet wide, or about 1½ feet wider than Wilson's Arch. Bear in mind that their floors are about twenty feet below the modern street, which is the main east-and-west street leading from the temple area to the Jaffa Gate.

Warren traced the northern row of rooms for about 200 feet. When he started to explore the southern row, he found it interrupted by a much larger chamber constructed of finer masonry and with a great column sticking up from the center. This imposing chamber lay at a lower level, its vault just below the floor level of the other rooms. Here again we see evidence of at least two different historical periods, as at Wilson's Arch just to the east.

Warren named the great chamber the Masonic Hall. A Dutch Jesuit scholar, Father Simons, in his fine book on Jerusalem, seems unable to explain the name. Probably a Jesuit would not know about the Freemasons. He would not know that underground Jerusalem is most dear to the Masons as the place where their order was founded by King Solomon. Obviously he did not know that Warren was an enthusiastic and loyal Mason who had shortly after his arrival initiated the opening of a lodge at Jerusalem in Solomon's Quarries, so-called, the most hallowed spot on earth to Masons. Nor did Father Simons know that Masonic lodges in England were among the heaviest financial contributors to Warren's work.

When Warren resumed the exploration of the southern row of rooms, he found a low exit to the south in the second room beyond the Masonic Hall. Going through the exit, he found himself in a long vaulted corridor, which he explored for about 200 feet; there he and his party met a dead end, but were able to break through a small door in the south wall to find themselves in a room used as a donkey stable. The owner of the stable, seeing these grime-covered men emerging

suddenly from beneath one of his walls, thought the intruders were from the nether regions and was frightened almost to death.

When the east end of the corridor was explored, it was found to come to a dead end before reaching a point near Wilson's Arch. Warren dubbed this corridor, lying just south of and parallel to the two rows of vaulted rooms, the Secret Passage, because of the tradition related by a medieval Arab author that David had built such a passage all the way from the temple area to the Citadel on the western edge of the city. The attribution to David is valueless, but it is entirely possible that Herod constructed such a passage for communication between temple and citadel in time of siege. The dead ends now existing would be due to the intrusion of the foundations of medieval or modern buildings.

A further word about the dating of this whole amazing underground complex is here in order.

As we have already stated, Robinson hastily identified the fragment of arch that bears his name with the bridge over the Tyropoeon Valley described by Josephus as connecting the temple with the upper or western part of the city at a point near the so-called Xystus, or gymnasium. Now the approximate location of the Xystus is known: it is more nearly opposite Wilson's Arch than Robinson's. Hence a controversy about the location of the Tyropoeon Bridge was raging and Warren sought to settle the matter by excavation. He sank vertical shafts and ran horizontal galleries in the vicinity of Robinson's Arch. He found no evidence of an earlier arch beneath the known one, and he found no evidence of other arches that could have been linked with the known one to form a series that would support a bridge. Above ground there was and is no real evidence of a gate into the temple area at this point. He could only conclude that the one span of Robinson's Arch supported some unknown and unrecorded structure projecting a short distance westward from the temple area, near the southern end. And that is about where the matter remains today, 96 years later. Warren's more positive conclusion is also valid today. Let me quote his own words: ". . . if this was not the bridge stretching across the valley, and it is not, where was that bridge? It could be no other than that at Wilson's Arch."

Let us return, therefore, to Wilson's Arch for a moment to consider the possible dating of the two historical periods indicated there by the two arches, the one intact below the present street, the other collapsed and buried at a still lower level. Warren guessed that the older, buried arch was of the time of Herod; he was probably right

about this, judging from the marginal drafts on the stones. But he said that Wilson's Arch itself is "probably of the fourth or fifth century" (*Underground Jerusalem,* 1876, p. 369). At first he had even said "not earlier than the fifth or sixth century" (*Recovery of Jerusalem,* 1871, p. 64). Wilson published in 1880 a commentary on Warren's work, interpreting Warren's opinion as referring to a rebuilding by Constantine (reigned 324-337) or Justinian (reigned 527-565), and at the same time expressing doubt about the dating (*Palestine Exploration Quarterly,* 1880), without offering an opinion of his own. Simons (*Jerusalem in the Old Testament,* 1952, p. 427) merely says vaguely that the present Wilson's Arch is "of Roman or Byzantine date." H. Vincent, however, dares to be a little more specific and suggests that Wilson's Arch as it now stands may belong to the reconstruction of the city by Hadrian (*Jérusalem de l'Ancien Testament,* 1954-56, pp. 61, 552) in the second century.

What about the date of the Causeway Vaults? Here the problem is more complicated, since these rooms were probably not intended to be seen above ground as was Wilson's Arch; masonry intended for underground use is less distinctive in any age. The vaults proper, that is, the roofs of the rooms, are more or less on a level with the vault of Wilson's Arch, though they show signs of rebuilding. Warren thought he detected signs of four different periods and he was frankly puzzled. He planned to investigate further, but was prevented, as we shall see. One can only guess that these chambers had a relation to the Tyropoeon Bridge, and hence that their earliest period was pre-Herodian, their main period Herodian, and their latest period post-Herodian. The same might be said of the Secret Passage, except that there is no evidence of an earlier period here as there is in some of the rooms, and one can more easily imagine the hand of Herod and no one else involved in this sort of underground construction.

As to the Masonic Hall, Warren noted that it lies at a lower level than any other of the rooms. He was greatly impressed by the quality of its construction and he considered it the oldest piece of masonry he had seen in Jerusalem, with the exception of certain parts of the wall around the temple area, which he wrongly thought to be Solomonic. As a matter of fact, because of its depth, the Masonic Hall may be the earliest structure in the vicinity. Wilson saw this in his commentary of 1880 and suggested a Maccabean date; and there the matter rests at the present time, except for the additional opinion of Vincent, the most recent writer on the subject

(1954) that the Masonic Hall is the most remarkable edifice in all this complex.

Warren knew that more excavation and more study were needed to unravel the many problems of these complicated structures; but he had been having trouble with the Pasha, or district governor, of Jerusalem, the official representative of the Turkish government in the area. Though Warren had a vizierial letter, or permit, from the Turkish government, the Pasha was afraid that the archaeologist would excavate under the temple area itself and thus stir up Muslim religious sensitivities so as to unleash a bloody riot or other trouble that would endanger his hold on a lucrative political position. So, in the summer of 1868, while Warren was temporarily away on a visit to Jericho, the Pasha had the easy entrance, which the archaeologist had opened, blocked up with solid masonry and he issued an order forbidding further work in the area. Warren commented that they "were thus stopped in the midst of the solution of a most intricate problem" (*Underground Jerusalem,* p. 395). Wilson commented in 1880, "the shafts within the vaults have never been closed, but it may be many years before any one is able to resume the excavations." Many years indeed, for in 1952 Simons complained: "Presumably the Pasha's wall is still there, waiting to be removed by a yet greater diplomat than Charles Warren" (*Jer. in the O. T.,* p. 365).

* * * * *

With this review of previous exploration in underground Jerusalem in your minds, I can now pass on to a description of my own brief experience, less than a year ago, at this sacred and fascinating spot. Little did I realize, even after beginning my work, that an opportunity might come to walk in the footsteps of Warren and even to dream of resuming his work, so suddenly abandoned in 1868, and ever since considered so impossible to resume.

But I must first tell how one goes about temple research in Jerusalem, and speak briefly of two other projects, thus leaving the best to the last.

The temple area is now a shrine of Islam, its third most holy place. Father Simons complains that no archaeological work can be done there because "with almost barbaric jealousy Islam is on its guard against such a profanation of its most holy place of worship after Mecca and Medina. *Not even Warren's experiment, though it was practically limited to the exterior of the enclosure, can be repeated or completed"* (emphasis added). This was said in 1952, when

present conditions were already in effect. I do not agree with it, or at least not with the tone of it. I respect and admire the Muslims' sense of the holiness of this place and I am thankful for their zealous (not jealous) guardianship. Their architectural masterpiece, the Dome of the Rock, completed in A.D. 691, nearly 1300 years ago, now stands at the place or near the place where the Biblical temples stood. I am mindful of the hard-earned contributions of humble Muslims in many lands to the upkeep and repair of this beautiful building. At this moment a major renovation is in progress, made necessary by the age of the structure and by shellfire in the war of 1948-50. May God grant that unholy men with their unholy weapons do not destroy this holy place or Noble Sanctuary, as its keepers call it!

With these thoughts in mind, then, I did not rush into the Noble Sanctuary demanding rights and leveling criticisms. Knowing the value of proper communication and the Arabs' love of their language, I began refreshing my Arabic some time before departure and continued every day on shipboard. Upon arrival I procured the services of a Christian Arab teacher of Arabic at St. George's School, the school of the Anglican mission in Jerusalem. Every day I bought and tried to read *Falastin,* the newspaper that I had learned to know and respect thirty years ago.

It was suggested by someone at the School, the American School of Oriental Research, where we had lived and worked from 1932 to 1935, and where we were living and working again, that Aref el-Aref might help me. I did not know he was still alive. I had met him at the School in 1934, while he was district governor of Beersheba. He had already in those days made a name for himself as an author of regional history as well as a competent administrator. After the war and its tragic consequences he had served as mayor of Jerusalem. Now he was retired and engaged in writing a series of books on the Palestine War and the Palestine Tragedy. My wife and I called on him to enlist his help in making the proper approach to the authorities at the Noble Sanctuary. He readily agreed, pointing out that he had written a history of the Sanctuary, also the guidebook currently being furnished to visitors to the area, and hence was well known to the authorities at the Sanctuary, which is owned and operated by a private religious foundation, entirely independent of the government. In return for Mr. Aref's services, I was to help him with matters pertaining to the Christian Bible, which, as a Muslim he could not readily understand, but which he knew had played a part in the

tragedy of his country. I was also to procure for him a U. S. Government report which was available to me but not to him.

To make a long story short, Mr. Aref introduced me properly to the officers of the foundation, from whom a letter was obtained permitting me free access to the sanctuary area at all times except the noon hour of worship on Fridays. Not only so, but my wife was to be permitted to accompany me as photographer and to photograph more or less anything she or I desired. I might add that at the first few times of entry I showed the letter to the gatekeeper and entered into friendly conversation with him. After that, we were privileged characters, entering freely without question and always greeted with a smile and a word of welcome. A far cry indeed from the "almost barbaric jealousy" imagined by Simons. One must go to people and get on their side of the fence; things look different from there.

Our first work was at the northern end of the sanctuary area. Lieut. (later Colonel) Claude R. Conder, another member of the British Royal Engineers and the successor of Warren as the field director of the Palestine Exploration Fund, had proposed a modification of the Herodian thesis of de Vogüé, thus: that the present sanctuary area is coterminous with the temple area of Herod except on the north, where there has been an extension of some 330 feet in a total length of about 1550 feet. From the literature, I did not doubt the correctness of this hypothesis; I merely wished to check it on the spot for my own satisfaction, and in the process to observe, in the northwest corner, the site of the ancient fortress called Antonia, traditionally the Praetorium or judgment hall where Christ was condemned to death, and certainly the barracks on the steps to which St. Paul stood and proclaimed to the raging mob the moving story of his conversion (Acts 21:40-22:49).

Our observations easily confirmed Conder's theory. There is no great wall on the north as on the other sides. This northern sector is not paved at all, as is some of the southern and western parts of the area. The eastern side of this northern sector has been leveled by filling in the shallow valley that cut diagonally across it in Herod's day. By contrast, the western side has been leveled by cutting down to ground level great rocks that once projected above ground. One sees smoothed off rock surfaces alternating with beaten earth. The great rock with sloping sides on which the fortress stood now shows a perpendicular escarpment facing the sanctuary area and forming part of its northern boundary. Thus the sanctuary area has now encroached upon a part of the rock that once supported the Antonia

fortress, whereas in New Testament times there was between the fortress and the temple area a gap, partly filled in by the connecting stairway on which Paul stood as the soldiers were taking him up to the fortress to save him from the fury of the mob. The great escarpment facing the sanctuary and the plainly visible leveled-off rocks between the escarpment and the central platform of the sanctuary made for good picture-taking and easy archaeological interpretation.

Our next project was not quite so easy. I had decided to work at the problem of whether the Sacred Rock, now within the Muslim shrine called after it the Dome of the Rock, was (1) within or under the temple of Herod and the temple of Solomon, or whether the rock was (2) in front of (east of) the temple serving as the base of the altar of sacrifice. A fierce argument rages among the scholars and the disciples of scholars on this matter. Most of those holding the former theory locate the rock under the holy of holies. I had already pointed out in my article on the temple in the *Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible* that both the holy of holies and the altar of sacrifice were only 20 cubits (about 33 feet) square, while the Rock measures about 58 feet from north to south and about 44 feet from east to west. If the Rock were larger than the altar, it could have served as the base of the altar without difficulty in the open court in front of the temple if we accept the altar theory; but according to one form of the other theory, the holy of holies was elevated above the floor of the rest of the temple to accommodate the rock, and hence the rock would have needed to be within the building. It seems to me that other writers have not been sufficiently concerned about the problem of getting the 58-foot north-south span of rock within the 33 feet between the two side walls of the temple. It has also been argued that if the temple were far enough east to be over the Rock, there would not have remained enough room still farther east to accommodate the extensive forecourts of Herod's temple as described by Josephus, because of the deep declivity leading to the Kidron Valley.

My first concern was not about room for the courts on the east of the Rock, but about room on the west for the temple itself if it stood behind (west of) the Rock on the small space between the Rock and Tyropoeon Valley. So, in spite of a certain amount of evidence for this position and its espousal by a few eminent scholars such as Dalman and Vincent, I had come to doubt it and wished to examine its physical possibility or impossibility before coming to an hypothesis of my own about the relation of the rock to the temple. It was thus that I became more than ever a disciple of Wilson and Warren, be-

cause they had revealed to us by scientific method the depth of the Tyropoeon; and I felt sure that the ancient Biblical temples could not have had their rear or western ends hanging out over the precipice of this valley.

Now today a great paved platform about twelve feet high surrounds the Dome of the Rock with the Rock within it. The western edge of this platform obviously, to me at least, marks the place where the precipice or declivity of the Tyropoeon began in ancient times. Josephus tells us that the distance from the altar to the vestibule of Herod's temple was 22 cubits and that the outside length of the temple building itself was 100 cubits. Thus there was a distance of 122 cubits or 204 feet from the rock to the rear of the temple, and we should allow another 20 feet for the inner court that went all the way around the temple building. But the distance today from the west edge of the rock to the west edge of the platform is only about 177 feet. Thus there would have been an overhang of from 20 to 40 feet over a declivity of at least 20 feet, the distance today of levels between the top of the rock and the courtyard on the west. Not only so, but another 200 feet west of the rear of the temple and one is over the bottom of the Tyropoeon Valley, 100 feet below the surface of the Sacred Rock. To make a long story short once more, we pondered over and photographed the narrow space between the rock and the western edge of the platform and the narrow space between the platform and the outer wall on the west. We studied and photographed from above, from below, and from all around; and I convinced myself that the temple could not have stood behind (west of) the rock. It must have stood *over* the rock in some fashion, but just how I have yet to work out, since I have rejected the idea of the rock being *within* the holy of holies on the grounds of physical impossibility, as stated above.

Two only of our various projects have been described. We observed and photographed in and around the Noble Sanctuary, north, east, south, and west, inside and outside the walls, and even underground in the vaults below the southeast corner of the area, the so-called Solomon's Stables, which have nothing to do with Solomon, but were actually used as stables by the Crusaders. We even had the small adventure of being locked in the vaults of Solomon's Stables one day by a forgetful police officer, who soon remembered, however, and returned in haste to release us, very fearful that we would report him to his superiors. Needless to say, we did not.

The opportunity referred to above came about the first of June.

We had been in Jerusalem three months and were putting the finishing touches on our studies of the rock, the walls, the gates and the ground levels. Word came that Miss Negua Husseini, Research and Public Relations Officer of the Jordan Department of Antiquities, wanted to see me with regard to Robinson's Arch. Miss Husseini, an attractive member of one of the first families of Jerusalem and a recent graduate of the American University of Beirut in archaeology, was at that time the only woman serving as an official of the antiquities department in Jerusalem. We had met her at a reception shortly after our arrival. My wife and I went over to her office, thinking that she wanted to get some bibliographical advice on the problem of the purpose of Robinson's Arch, or something of that sort. We soon found that it was Wilson's Arch in which she was interested, that apparently no one then living in Jerusalem had seen it and no one knew how to find it; hence she had been making some quiet investigations and had discovered an underground passage which she thought might lead to it. She inquired if we would like to bring a couple of students from the American School and join her and her archaeological assistants in exploring the passage in question. She warned us that we would need to wear old clothing that could be discarded because of possible contact with sewage. I immediately thought of how many times the word "'sewage" occurred in Warren's descriptions of his explorations in underground Jerusalem; but I said nothing of that and we readily agreed to go.

A few days later we reported by appointment to Miss Husseini at her office in the Museum. She led us to the Old City and to the main east-west street (called David Street by westerners). At a point some 300 feet west of the main entrance to the sanctuary, we stood before the door of a private residence on the south side of the street. Miss Husseini told us to wait. She knocked on the door, and after a long pause, a small crack of the door was opened and the face of a woman could be dimly seen through the crack. Miss Husseini exchanged a few words with the woman, the door opened just a bit more and Miss Husseini slipped in, leaving the rest of us outside wondering. We Westerners began to realize that this discovery, whatever it was, could only have been made in this very modern age when a Muslim woman could hold an official position in a government office with authority over men, even men of twice her age or more. For the discovery necessitated going through a private Muslim home at hours when the head of the house was away at work. A Muslim home, and especially the bedrooms and other quarters where the women and chil-

dren stay, is *hareem,* that is sacrosanct and inviolable; and no man from outside, and especially no foreigner of any kind, is ever allowed to enter, except under exceptional circumstances. The exceptional circumstances were created by Miss Husseini. A Muslim woman herself, and theoretically a member of her father's *hareem,* she could go into these homes and persuade the wife and mother to admit a party of archaeologists in the name of science and to the glory of Jerusalem and the Arab Nation before the eyes of the world.

In a little while, Jordan's first female antiquities officer reappeared and beckoned us to enter. Her two assistants, trusty, mature men, the two students of the American School (one male, one female), and my wife and I entered the cramped and dingy home. We saw the mother, we saw children, we saw bedrooms, but paid little attention. We followed our guide and her assistants to the kitchen and a small door in the wall. Going through this, we descended a rather long stone stairway leading down to a sort of subbasement. We had to watch our steps because garbage had been thrown on the stairway. Once down in the subbasement, we saw a rough opening in the northern wall. Going through this we found ourselves in an arched passageway lined with masonry of good quality. The passageway led eastward, apparently directly under the modern street but about 20 feet below it. We had advanced only a short distance when the smell became overpowering and we stood before a small pool of horribly black and incredibly foul sewage. The pool had been formed by the drippings from a leaky sewer just above. On their previous trip, the people from the Department of Antiquities had thrown some large stones into the shallow pool of sewage, hoping to use them as stepping-stones for the present trip. Thus our feet might have made it through the cesspool this time, but our noses could not. We decided to withdraw and come back later armed with gas masks, better lights, and even worse clothing.

In the meantime, we had a discussion about the identity of the passage which we had only begun to explore. The people from the Department thought that they had discovered a hitherto unknown passage that led to Wilson's Arch. I contended that we had only rediscovered Warren's Secret Passage which now comes to a dead end before reaching Wilson's Arch, though it once went all the way.

The only way this argument could be settled was by getting through the sewer gas and the cesspool to the east end of the passage, wherever it led. So we prepared carefully, especially to protect ourselves from foul odors and gases, and went again. We got through

the sewage barrier and saw a low door on the left leading apparently to another chamber or passage north of the one we were in. But we pressed on in the main passage and before long came to the dead end which I had predicted. Turning back, we crawled through the entrance to the north into an arched chamber. Since some of our party were waiting for us on the other side of the sewage barrier to give an alarm if we did not return, we did not explore farther, but rejoined the others. It soon became apparent that my accurate prediction of exactly what was going to happen and did happen had made a great impression on the people from the Department of Antiquities. At the moment I was *the* authority on underground Jerusalem and there was no more argument against the identification of what we had explored as Warren's Secret Passage. It was also clear that the chamber to the north which we had entered was one of the row of rooms making up the southern part of the Causeway Vaults, also explored by Warren as described in the earlier part of this paper.

The Antiquities Department was now concerned to find Wilson's Arch, with a view first to further study and ultimately to opening it to the public as an archaeological monument and tourist attraction. I was consulted as to how this could be done. I said we must find the Pasha's Wall, which had blocked the progress of Warren in 1868, and of which Simons had said it would take a greater diplomat than Warren to remove. Workers of the Department were sent downtown to look for it. They had no success, reporting that the whole area was now built over with private houses, making exploration extremely difficult, especially for men. So I suggested that we try at least to see the Arch by the back way, so to speak, by crawling through the vaults underneath the former Turkish court house between the main entrance to the sanctuary, under which the Arch lies, and the Wailing Wall some distance to the south. Wilson and Warren have left us descriptions of how the Arch may be approached and seen in this manner.

So we went down to spy out the land, so to speak, in the garden just north of the Wailing Wall. We found that it was no longer public property, but was occupied by a family. In short, it was another *hareem*. So, as before, Miss Husseini knocked, was admitted, and stayed in a long time. Finally, she emerged and said the rest of us could enter. We found that the entrance to the vaults, which are comparatively modern, and hence are at a high level, was from a ledge about 20 feet high, so that a ladder would be needed. There was no ladder available on the spot and no one in the household had ever

explored above and beyond that ledge. We got permission to send in a ladder and to be allowed to return. We did return, wearing our old clothing, and equipped with strong lights.

Since all this was my idea, and it was up to me to decide whether there was any point in this particular expedition, I was given the opportunity of being the first to ascend the ladder and start exploring. If I saw anything that looked interesting, I was to return to the ledge at the top of the ladder and invite the others to come on up. Up I went, but found it somewhat difficult to get from the top of the ladder on to the ledge, for the ladder was too short and the ledge was not a ledge of stone but of loose earth. I finally made it and started north with the great sanctuary wall on my right. At the lower left-hand corner of the wall in front of me I saw an opening through which a man could crawl. I crawled, and found myself in another chamber with a similar wall and a similar hole through which one could crawl. Since it seemed likely that one could go on and on like this, I returned to the ledge and told the others to come up. Someone had to stay behind to hold the ladder for the last person to go up and to sound the alarm if the party did not return in a reasonable time. This honor fell to my wife, who bravely sacrificed a chance to see Wilson's Arch to the good of the cause.

Again to make a long story short, we went through a series of rooms in the manner described and soon stood on the brink of the great cemented pit under Wilson's Arch which had been used as a pool in modern times as already noted. And there before us was the great arch, perfect in every detail, every stone in place, in sharp contrast to Robinson's Arch, of which only a ruined fragment remains. Even Warren's last shaft, still open as he had left it 96 years ago, could be plainly seen. What a grand archaeological monument and tourist attraction this would make indeed!

We could not go down under the arch without special equipment because of the steep bank of the pool. So after gazing in rapturous awe for a while, we started to withdraw and look around. We found the entrance which Warren had made from the court-house vaults to the Causeway Vaults and went through the southern row of rooms in these vaults until we came to the one from which we could look down at the Masonic Hall. Having seen this, our archaeological hearts were full, for now we had seen Wilson's Arch, the Causeway Vaults, the Secret Passage, and the Masonic Hall. That was enough for the time being and we went back to the ladder. The descent was dangerous, but finally all were down safely. I might add that the sewer

did not trouble us this time. This day we were above it and east of it, though a strong whiff from time to time reminded us that underground Jerusalem was today much the same as in the days of Wilson and Warren.

What did we say back in Miss Husseini's office? We agreed that this backstage method of seeing Wilson's Arch and its contiguous structures would serve for an occasional visit by a small party of archaeologists, but could not be used for bringing in a large gang of workmen to excavate the area and lay open the arch to public view. Clearly, the Pasha's Wall must be found and removed. What was needed was no longer a greater diplomat than Charles Warren, as Simons said. The enlightened views of the Jordanian Department of Antiquities had taken care of that problem. What was needed was first to find the Pasha's Wall and then to organize an archaeological expedition sponsored jointly by the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and some great university, such as Duke.

Our time was about up. July had come, and we were to leave on the ninth of that month. There was time for only one more trip of a few hours one morning to search again for the Pasha's Wall from the outside. We made the trip but found nothing. Our next move would have been to go again through the backstage route, get ourselves let down by ropes into the old pool, now dry, and search for the Pasha's Wall from the inside. We had to leave before this could be done. Even so, our last month (the month of June, 1963) was a fabulous one, almost as fabulous as our trip to Egypt in April. Can you wonder that I should like to go back? Do you recall Simons' words? I quote them again: "Not even *Warren's* experiment, though it was practically limited to the exterior of the [temple] enclosure, can be repeated or completed." This statement may have been true in 1952. I do not think it true today and I should like to be the one to disprove it.

# Toward the Renewal of Faith and Nurture—II

McMurry S. Richey

*Introductory Note*

This is a sequel to my article in The Duke Divinity School Bulletin, XXVIII, No. 2 (May 1963), pp. 127-141. The purpose of these articles is to illuminate the unique role of H. Shelton Smith in the theological critique, reconstruction, and renewal of Christian nurture.

Readers of my former article are due a red-faced confession and correction! Because it was one of several surreptitious enterprises of colleagues preparing to honor Shelton Smith on the occasion of his "retirement" from teaching at Duke, I was obliged to extract some of my information from him without his knowing what I was doing. When I put two and two together from some of our personal conversations, I came up with at least one wrong answer which calls for correction:

I mistakenly inferred that his article, "Let Religious Educators Reckon with Barthians," was a late 1933 address to the Religious Education Association. Rather, it was simply (!) a January 1934 published article; and my references to Dr. Smith's provocative address on pp. 130, 132, 133 and 140, especially footnote 22 on p. 133, should refer to his 1936 paper, "Is Religious Naturalism Enough?" It was the latter that stirred up the hornets' nest of the Religious Education Association. (But why was he not already labelled as an apostate after the 1934 article? Was it for lack of his impelling oratory to drive home the critique?)

Originally I planned for two articles; but the happy event of securing from Shelton Smith several bulging files of letters, reviews, and unpublished lectures, has forced me to delay and expand these studies, leaving it to a later one to develop further his positive contributions to reconstruction of Christian nurture, and the ways in which his desiderata are being worked out (to some extent) in contemporary books and curricula.

## *A Jeremiah Among the Religious Educators*

With the publication of H. Shelton Smith's *Faith and Nurture* in 1941,[1] any progressive religious educators who had managed to ignore his earlier peremptory challenges[2] to their liberal faith must

1. Published by Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, and given especially wide currency as the Religious Book Club selection for November, 1941.

2. See H. Shelton Smith, "Let Religious Educators Reckon with Barthians," *Religious Education,* XXIX, No. 1 (January 1934), pp. 45-50; "Is Religious Naturalism Enough?" *Religious Education,* XXXI, No. 2 (April 1936), pp. 107-111; "The Gospel for an Age of Good Works," *Advance,* CXXVIII, No. 13 (October 1936), pp. 579-581; and "Theological Reconstruction in Religious Education," *Christendom,* IV, No. 4 (Autumn 1939), pp. 565-574. All of these were discussed in my preceding article.

have been forced at last to reckon with this disturber of their ideological concord. For Shelton Smith had become a Jeremiah among them. Member of their priestly caste,[3] disciple of Coe and Dewey,[4] he had turned and become their prophetic critic, as if called "to pluck up and to break down, to destroy and to overthrow" their cultus of religious education. At least this is how some of the hierarchy of the moment perceived him. If, like Jeremiah,[5] he was summoned also "to build and to plant," to show faith in the redeemed future, to suggest "waymarks" and "guideposts" and to point toward an "evangelical Christian nurture,"[6] the negative aspects of his criticism were then too threatening to allow adequate recognition of such constructive promise. Because retrospect affords us better insight into the latter, and a view of some of religious education's subsequent "fruits meet for repentance," we shall be able later to emphasize Shelton Smith's positive contributions to the renewal of faith and nurture.[7]

In anticipation of such later emphasis on the constructive service of *Faith and Nurture,* we should take account here, as evidently some critics did not, of the author's own expressed purposes in the issuance of this manifesto. As in his earlier articles, he was profoundly concerned for the salvation of Christian nurture from further deterioration. As he saw it, Protestant religious education faced a "crucial decision" between theological reconstruction in accord with post-liberal "realistic theology," and eventual collapse or decline through continued involvement with an outmoded liberal faith.[8] There need be neither "iconoclastic rejection of religious liberalism" nor uncritical adoption of the new theology, which also had its defects;

3. As a former Director of Leadership Education for the International Council of Religious Education, and a member of the Board of Directors of the Religious Education Association.

4. Before his reversal in 1931; see my preceding article, p. 129.

5. Jeremiah 1:10; 31:21; 31:31ff., R.S.V.

6. Title of a later article: "Evangelical Christian Nurture," *Religion in Life,* XVII, No. 4 (Autumn 1948), pp. 549-558.

7. In a projected sequel to this article. See my preceding article, p. 128: "That he was chief spokesman in the critical phase of that renewal is generally acknowledged; that he sought to preserve gains of liberal theology and progressive educational thought in the course of theological reconstruction is less widely recognized; that he pointed the way for constructive advance, and contributed to it, is often denied; that others have moved far along that way toward the renewal of Christian nurture . . . may come as unexpectedly good news to those unfamiliar with this aspect of our continuing theological renaissance."

8. *Faith and Nurture,* p. vii.

rather there should be "penetrating and persistent criticism" of both and willingness to learn from either.[9]

Dr. Smith acknowledged that the book might seem primarily negative as a critical analysis of liberal faith, but he maintained that its total argument focused "not only upon elements of weakness in religious liberalism, but also upon lines of constructive advance." Nevertheless the crisis in Protestant nurture called "less for construction than for unsparing criticism. For until religious educators recognize more fully the grave limitations of the underlying theology of liberal nurture, there can be little hope of any serious effort at positive reconstruction."[10] Thus a modern Jeremiah was constrained "to pluck up and to break down" in order "to build and to plant," as if the Lord called him to prophecy again "wherein my people have committed two evils: they have forsaken me, the fountain of living waters, and hewed out cisterns for themselves, broken cisterns, that can hold no water."[11]

### *The Legacy of Nineteenth-Century Liberal Theology*

The tone and substance of *Faith and Nurture* as a critique of liberal theological elements in Protestant religious educational philosophy are not materially different from those of Shelton Smith's previous polemics. The 1939 article on "Theological Reconstruction in Religious Education" had succinctly crystallized the essence of earlier stages of this book. The completed book renews the criticism of liberal theology, not for its method of seeking truth and its concern for relevance—which the author would still zealously defend—but for its arrested form in an outmoded, now unrealistic nineteenth-century credo. "Viewed in historical perspective," he reiterated, "present-day nurture is essentially the child of the religious faith of the late nineteenth century. Its most characteristic theological ideas had attained cultural maturity in American Protestantism before the advent of the first World War."[12] In the article he had already analyzed the historical emergence and the present values and disvalues of certain elements of that liberal faith—its one-sided immanentalist theology, its romantic anthropology, its reliance on human rather than divine initiative in religious regeneration—and had urged needed theological correctives from the standpoint of post-liberal

9. *Ibid.*, p. viii.
10. *Ibid.*, p. ix.
11. Jeremiah 1:10; 2:13, R.S.V.
12. *Faith and Nurture*, p. viii.

theology.[13] Now in *Faith and Nurture* he could devote a full chapter to each of these, exploring implications, giving fuller historical documentation, and citing current instances.[14] It was this last kind of specification that would provoke most vigorous reaction from criticized colleagues in the movement.

The liberal theology in which Shelton Smith sought the chief roots of religious education was not the older legacy of the Age of Reason in colonial America, nor yet the immediate influence of more recent European liberalisms (however indirectly related to these), but a more indigenous development from the New England Theology (Edwardian Calvinism) as variously modified by such minds as William E. Channing, Theodore Parker, and Horace Bushnell.[15] Its major themes which "moulded decisively" the theology of Christian nurture emphasized (1) divine immanence, (2) growth, (3) the goodness of man, and (4) the historical Jesus.[16] The second and fourth of these, not identified and discussed earlier, require brief notice here.

Dr. Smith discovered the idea of growth to be characteristic of religious liberalism under three aspects: "(1) growth of religion in the individual; (2) growth of religion in the race; and (3) growth as a mode of achieving individual and social change."[17] Thus Bushnell emphasized the Christian growth of the child, the moral and religious growth of the race, and gradual social progress; Parker, more radically, proclaimed progressive revelation and a continuously growing religion; Darwinian evolutionary theory powerfully supported theological views of gradual religious change of individuals and society; and G. Stanley Hall's genetic psychology affirmed the recapitulation theory of the child's mental, moral and religious growth.[18] It was not surprising, concluded Dr. Smith, "that the idea of growth became one of the most conspicuous emphases in the rise of twentieth-century education, whether secular or religious. It was this idea, perhaps as no other, that brought modern education and liberal Christianity into fruitful cooperation."[19]

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13. See my preceding article, pp. 137-141.
14. See Chapter II, "Beyond the Social-Gospel Idea of the Kingdom of God"; Chapter III, "Man in Christian Perspective"; and Chapter IV, "Faith in the Divine Initiative."
15. *Faith and Nurture,* pp. 4-5.
16. *Ibid.,* pp. 5-26.
17. *Ibid.,* p. 10.
18. *Ibid.,* pp. 11-14.
19. *Ibid.,* p. 14.

While the emphasis on the historical Jesus was more obviously related to European liberal influences, Smith focused on its characteristically American expressions. He found in Thomas Jefferson, Channing, and Parker early reductions of orthodox Christology to the idea of a morally exemplary Jesus, superlative yet imitable, genius yet a man among men.[20] Of greater interest to him was Bushnell's long, original effort to retain and to give new life and relevance to orthodox doctrines of the person and work of Christ; but Smith saw even Bushnell's mediating reinterpretations as contributing to the "trend toward an attenuated Christology."[21] With the further influence of Schleiermacher and Ritschl, American liberal theology appeared more Christocentric but belied that appearance with an idea of Jesus as "little more than the ethical prophet of Nazareth."[22]

The liberal theological developments were especially significant for religious education, Shelton Smith affirmed, because "just here lie the roots of the assumptions and guiding notions which became the stock-in-trade for the theories of the religious educators of the twentieth century. . . . For at no point did liberalism come to more marked expression than in the twentieth-century movement of religious education."[23] To demonstrate this he examined the earlier writings of George A. Coe as the most influential philosopher of religious education. In two of Coe's early works,[24] products of the period before his philosophy of personal idealism yielded to the influences of John Dewey's pragmatic naturalism, Smith found full expression of the doctrine of divine immanence, the concept of growth, the idea of the goodness of man, and the liberal view of the historical Jesus.[25] He concluded:

> In light of this analysis of Coe's early thought, it is manifest that the contemporary movement of Protestant nurture emerged as an integral part of liberal theological thought. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the theory of religious education has passed through many different phases, as new knowledge has been made available through further research and experimentation. Furthermore, as we shall see, public education in its progressive phase has had a fundamental part in the development of religious nurture. Yet running throughout this entire period of

20. *Ibid.*, pp. 19-21.
21. *Ibid.*, pp. 21-24.
22. *Ibid.*, pp. 25f.
23. *Ibid.*, pp. 26f.
24. *The Religion of a Mature Mind* (Fleming H. Revell, 1902), and *Education in Religion and Morals* (Fleming H. Revell, 1904).
25. *Faith and Nurture,* pp. 27-30.

development one can find these same four tendencies of liberal religious thought.[26]

It was this congeries of "basically outmoded" ideas, rather than liberalism as a method, which Dr. Smith would critically reconsider and revise, and along with them, the liberal Protestant nurture rooted in them.[27]

*The Influence of Progressive Education and Religious Naturalism*

Shelton Smith saw progressive religious education as having two main roots, one in the liberal religion on which the preceding analysis was focused, the other in modern educational philosophy.[28] It may be recalled that his original revolt from progressive religious educational thought back in 1931 was precipitated by the reading of John L. Childs' book on *Education and the Philosophy of Experimentalism,* which made him more keenly aware of the character of the empirical naturalism which he had absorbed, and of its fundamental conflict with the Christian faith he still would teach.[29] It may be remembered also that his provocative address to the Religious Education Association in 1936, when he openly broke with the progressive ideology and its advocates, was primarily an attack on religious naturalism, which some religious educators were proclaiming as the way ahead in religious education.[30] It is not surprising, then, that in *Faith and Nurture* his severest strictures on religious education were not at the point of "outmoded" liberal theology—which he called to repent and be converted to a new theocentric realism—but at the point of the subtle assimilation of liberal theology and nurture to naturalistic educational theory and its close relative, religious naturalism. The book bristles with this kind of criticism, relentless and sharp, informed with the insight of a former devotee and inspired with the zeal of a convert. Three lines of such attack may be identified briefly.

One key instance of this severer reaction to the assimilation of liberal nurture to more naturalistic educational philosophy may be seen in his criticism of the social theory of religious education for its deficient understanding of the Kingdom of God. Smith regarded religious education as a prime expression of social gospel teaching,

26. *Ibid.,* pp. 30f.
27. *Ibid.,* p. 32.
28. *Ibid.,* pp. 40, 173.
29. Childs' book was published by The Century Company, 1931. See my preceding article, pp. 129-130, for an account of Dr. Smith's "revolt."
30. See the same article, pp. 134f., and my "Introductory Note" above.

which repudiated other-worldly and individualistic views of the Kingdom of God in favor of earthly and social interpretations—an ideal social order, a universal democracy.[31] George A. Coe, again the pre-eminent example, affirmed for Protestantism "a distinctive religious principle, that of a divine-human industrial democracy."[32] The goal of Christian nurture then became, in Coe's now well-known words, "Growth of the young toward and into mature and efficient devotion to the democracy of God, and happy self-realization therein."[33] This "democracy of God" was a universal fellowship, a divine-human society ruled by ethical love.[34]

Dr. Smith acknowledged the cultural origins and validity of such democratic ideals: "A growing democratic experience in Church and State expressed itself most naturally in a democratic doctrine of the Kingdom and of Christian nurture." He acknowledged also that "this idea of the Kingdom of God has profoundly influenced the nature, presuppositions, and content of modern Christian nurture. . . . [and] enriched the educational content of the contemporary Church at many points. . . ." Moreover, he insisted that such "gains should be cherished and stubbornly defended against those who would destroy democratic values in both the Church and the State."[35] But the democratic social theory of religious education, Smith charged, tended to subvert its own values by reducing the Kingdom of God to an "anthropocentric kingdom." Even though Coe's "personality principle" of respect for personality presupposed the immanence of God, and therefore fellowship with the divine in and through human fellowship, his emphasis on the supreme value of persons obscured the "theocentric nature of the Kingdom."[36]

It was the accommodation of religious education to public educational theory, however, that Smith held more responsible for this substitution of the kingdom of man for the Kingdom of God. The Religious Education Association, in seeking to unite educational and religious forces for the common good, had helped to foster such assimilation. If Shailer Mathews had exaggerated in saying "that re-

31. *Faith and Nurture,* pp. 33-35.

32. Coe, *A Social Theory of Religious Education* (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1917), p. viii (quoted in *Faith and Nurture,* p. 35).

33. Coe, *op. cit.,* p. 55 (quoted in *Faith and Nurture,* p. 36). Quoted thus apart from its context in Coe's vigorous advocacy of social reform, this dictum has a bland aspect not really true to Coe's thought. Coe was as outspoken a social prophet as H. Shelton Smith!

34. *Faith and Nurture,* p. 36.

35. *Ibid.,* pp. 37-38.

36. *Ibid.,* pp. 38-39.

ligious education had become little more than public education fitted out in a Prince Albert coat," it still was true "that religious educators have been deeply influenced by the general theory of the state school . . . particularly . . . those who have sought to blend the democratic theory of education and the democratic theory of the Kingdom of God."[37] Especially influential were John Dewey's "humanitarian theory of democracy" and George H. Mead's naturalistic interpretation of the origin and development of selfhood within natural-social processes.[38] The resulting democratic, anthropocentric religious education—as typified by Coe and William Clayton Bower, for instance—tended to accord final value to persons, instead of acknowledging their creaturely contingency and the divine ground of their meaning and value; it tended to reduce the divine sovereignty to immanence in social processes, and to reduce religion to human discovery and valuing, and values to subjective social emergents; it tended thus to dissolve the tension between the Kingdom of God and human society, and to espouse a romantic social ethic of evolutionary progress toward a reconstructed, idealized society, in effect a kingdom of man. This was the burden of Shelton Smith's complaint.[39] Religious education had forsaken the fountain of living waters, and hewed out broken cisterns.

A second and closely related instance of Dr. Smith's sharper polemic against naturalistic influences in liberal nurture may be seen in his critique of the understanding of man in progressive religious education. It is instructive to note that this criticism is in the context of a positive affirmation of a post-liberal (some would say neo-orthodox) theological anthropology for Christian nurture. If not an original, it was a constructive contribution; and those who decried *Faith and Nurture* as lacking in positive statement either did not take this doctrine seriously enough, or perhaps were too defensive under criticism, to recognize its significance and relevance.

The categories and content of his doctrine were essentially similar to those of Emil Brunner, Reinhold Niebuhr, and the Oxford Conference volume on Man.[40] For Christian nurture, he held, man must

37. *Ibid.*, pp. 39-41. Dr. Smith referred to an article by Shailer Mathews, "Let Religious Education Beware!" in *The Christian Century,* XLIV (1927), pp. 362-368.

38. *Faith and Nurture,* pp. 41-44.

39. *Ibid.*, pp. 45-66, *passim.*

40. See Emil Brunner, *Man in Revolt* (English translation, The Westminster Press, 1939); Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Nature and Destiny of Man,* Volume I, *Human Nature* (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1941), and T. E. Jessop et al., *The*

be understood in theocentric reference, as a "theonomous being," created in the image of God. Such creaturehood is only partially understandable in empirical terms, for man's origin is ultimately in God's creative action. His worth and the worth of his fellows are not intrinsic or autonomous but derived from their transcendent source. His individuality is grounded in God's concern with each man and each man's dependence on and responsibility to God. His community has its nature and dynamic likewise in God, in relation to whom all are interdependent children. Finally, he is both image of God and perverter of that image in disobedience, and his sin is not only against his fellows but against God.[41]

By these theological specifications for a doctrine of man for Christian nurture, religious education manifestly fell far short. Liberal theology and nurture had found in "reverence for personality" the best key to understanding of man, history, and God. But all its consequent preoccupation with "the nature, experience, and activity of persons" had yielded religious education an inadequate, unrealistic, sub-Christian anthropology. Shelton Smith attributed this in part to the domination of religious education by psychology, sociology, and anthropology, which by their focus on the empirical tended to obscure or deny man's richer meanings, especially his ultimate ground in God.[42] This reductionist tendency was strongly reinforced by the influence of religious naturalism on religious education. In contrast to the Christian view of man as creature of God, for example, was John Dewey's interpretation of man's emergence "in terms of empirical natural forces operating in and through the process of organic and cultural evolution."[43] In Dewey's humanistic naturalism "God" meant not creative, ultimate Being but "the unity of all ideal ends arousing us to desire and action," or the "*active* relation between ideal and actual."[44] Smith found little more in common with the similar views of Edward Scribner Ames, or the "theistic naturalism" of Henry Nelson Wieman, or the religious educational philosophy of their disciple William C. Bower:

As in the case of naturalists in general, Bower views religion as a functional process in which persons seek a twofold integration: (a) integration

*Christian Understanding of Man* (Allen & Unwin, 1938), especially the essays by Robert L. Calhoun and Emil Brunner.

41. *Faith and Nurture,* pp. 69-97, *passim.*

42. *Ibid.,* pp. 67-69.

43. *Ibid.,* p. 72.

44. John Dewey, *A Common Faith* (New Haven, 1934), pp. 42, 51 (as quoted in *Faith and Nurture,* p. 73).

within the self and (b) integration with the environing world. The human self is the outgrowth of the interaction of growing selves. What, then, is the nature of the ultimate ground of this twofold process of emerging life? It is 'that behavior of the universe which most religious persons represent to themselves in terms of God.' More recently Bower has used the term God to signify the creative aspect of 'ultimate and comprehending values.' But if, as Bower maintains, the 'kingdom of values is within the self,' it is clear that value is essentially subjective; and on this view the term God can denote no really objective ground of human existence.[45]

Smith was ready to acknowledge that the empirical perspective of these naturalists, drawing on the sciences, had "shed much light on the growth and behavior of human personality. Any perspective of man that fails to take due account of the tested findings of empirical observation and research must be considered incomplete," he warned, with special reference to Fundamentalist orthodoxy.[46] But his indictment still stood against religious naturalism for denying the Christian faith "that man owes his ultimate origin to the creative word of the living God, in relation to whom man exists as responsible creature to Sovereign Creator."[47] To this indictment he would add (and we must omit) related charges of comparable gravamen in reference to the failure of religious naturalism on each of the other main points of his doctrine of man—"the Christian ground of human value," "the root of Christian individuality and community," the tragic and troublesome sinfulness of the children of God.[48]

A third instance of Shelton Smith's polemic against naturalistic educational theory and religious naturalism may be seen in his direct, sustained attack on Dewey's (and John L. Childs' and others') "positive creed of life implicit in democracy and in science"[49]—the anthropocentric "religion of experimental democracy" as represented especially in the philosophy of public education. The issue was joined in the conflicting efforts of the churches to introduce, and of the naturalistic educators to prevent, the teaching of religion in the public schools. The main thrust of Dr. Smith's argument appears in his conclusion:

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45. *Faith and Nurture,* pp. 75-76. Internal quotations are from William C. Bower, *Religion and the Good Life* (New York, 1933), pp. 45, 217, and his *The Living Bible* (New York, 1936), p. 28.

46. *Faith and Nurture,* p. 76.

47. *Loc. cit.*

48. The topics of Chapter Three, "Man in Christian Perspective."

49. John Dewey, "Religion and Our Schools," *The Hibbert Journal,* VI (1907-1908), pp. 796-809 (as cited in *Faith and Nurture,* p. 175).

This survey of experimentalist thought serves thus to bring out two things. . . . First, it shows that the religion implicit in progressive democratic education is decisively at variance with that type of religious faith which underlies the doctrine of Christian nurture. Insofar, therefore, as the religious faith of experimentalism has penetrated the theory of Christian nurture it has served to distort and emasculate it. . . . [I]t can be seen that one basic source of the secularization of liberal Protestant nurture is modern educational philosophy. Second, this survey reveals the fact that a paramount question now presents itself to the American people in respect of the relation of Hebrew-Christian faith to the public school. The question is not, as many have supposed, Shall the public school teach a religion? For, according to our survey, religion of a kind is already in the state school. It is that sort which we have called anthropocentric religion, and which Dewey in 1908 implied in the phrase, 'the positive creed of life implicit in democracy and science.' . . . Thus the paramount question is this: What kind of religion shall the public school teach—the religion of the churches or the religion of humanistic experimentalism? Sooner or later this must become the focal point of a crucial battle. On its outcome largely hangs the fate of democratic culture in America.[50]

It was as if to say that the choice is between two ways, the way of an ancient sophist, or the way of an ancient prophet. For Protagoras, "Man is the measure of all things; of things that are, that they are; of things that are not, that they are not"; whereas Jeremiah confessed, "I know, O Lord, that the way of man is not in himself, that it is not in man who walks to direct his steps."[51]

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*Postscript*

To conclude this article here leaves for a sequel the discussion of two major themes of *Faith and Nurture* which were also topics for later articles and lectures by Shelton Smith. One of these themes is represented by the title of his article on "The Supremacy of Christ in Christian Nurture."[52] The topic was dealt with partially in *Faith and Nurture* but developed more fully in one of a series of lectures given at Eden Theological Seminary and Pacific School of Religion in 1942 and again at Austin Presbyterian Seminary in 1947.[53] The

50. *Faith and Nurture,* pp. 201-202.

51. Jeremiah 10:23, R.S.V.

52. *Religion in Life,* XII, No. 1 (Winter 1942-43), pp. 31-40.

53. See Chapter Four, "Faith in the Divine Initiative." The lectures were on the general topic, "Faith and Nurture in Contemporary Protestant Thought." Lecture titles were, "The Dilemma of the Progressive Movement in Protestant Nurture," "Christian Nurture and Human Existence," "The Place of Christ in Christian Nurture," "The Church: Community of Faith and Nurture." The first two lectures correspond in part to Chapters One, Three, and Six of *Faith and Nurture.*

other main theme is represented by the chapter in *Faith and Nurture* on "The Church: Community of Christian Nurture," and also by one of the seminary lectures with the same title. Much later, in 1954, before the Presbyterian Assembly's Training School in Richmond, Virginia, Dr. Smith gave a series of nine lectures on "The Christian Faith and Its Communication," with the doctrine of the Church as the organizing motif of the series. When these themes are examined in a subsequent article, notice may be taken also of some of the response to *Faith and Nurture,* as registered in letters, reviews, and books. In the meantime, a closing word will serve to put a temporary lid on this portion of these articles:

*Faith and Nurture* is not only the pivotal book of its time for religious education; it is also in at least three ways an important contribution to what was to become Shelton Smith's major academic discipline, American religious thought. In the first place, it offers a distinctive analysis of the genesis and development of nineteenth-century American liberal theology. Secondly, it illuminates progressive religious education as a significant strand in twentieth-century American liberalism. Thirdly, it was a major literary step toward Professor Smith's later career as dean of historians of American religious thought. Indeed, it may be thought of as an earnest of his later books, which pursue further his long-time concerns represented in this first book: his *Changing Conceptions of Original Sin: A Study in American Theology Since 1750*;[54] the two definitive volumes, prepared with Robert T. Handy and Lefferts A. Loetscher, *American Christianity: An Historical Interpretation with Representative Documents*;[55] and the forthcoming Library of Protestant Thought volume on *Horace Bushnell*.[56] May there be more to come!

54. Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955.

55. Charles Scribner's Sons, Volume I, 1607-1820, published 1960; Volume II, 1820-1960, published 1963.

56. To be published by Oxford University Press.

# The Call to Salvation

Some Perspectives for Contemporary Preaching.

Thor Hall

The first lecture of this series presented what could be called "the two-nature theory of preaching." It consisted of a twofold perspective on the preaching event: one, an empirical, factual, "common" interpretation, which sees preaching as having the nature of a human event, participating in the limitations of human reason, being part and parcel of human finiteness and creatureliness; the other, a religious, spiritual, "faithful" interpretation, which understands preaching as having the meaning of a divine event, participating in—and representing an extension of—the redemptive act of God in Christ. I called the one perspective empirical and factual in order to indicate that it does represent a valid and necessary approach to the understanding of the preaching event, and I called the other perspective religious and "faithful" so as to indicate both that it is different from the first perspective and that it represents a theological interpretation of the preaching event. We shall need both perspectives in order to understand what preaching really is, but we need also to keep these perspectives separate and distinct, so that we can keep from confusing the human and the divine as they both play a part in our preaching.

In this lecture I shall pursue the theological perspective and speak of preaching as it is understood by most Christians, as "God's Word through human words." The topic is formulated from this perspective. It sees preaching as having to do with salvation. Yet my concern is not so much with the content of salvation as with the way we present this message. The purpose is not to compete with the theologian in the interpretation of the meaning of the doctrines involved, but to stay consistently within the limits of homiletics, discussing the principles involved in the preaching of salvation. But as I said, the discussion of these principles will be approached from a *theological* perspective rather than an empirical or practical one.

There can be no doubt in the mind of evangelical Protestants that the task of preaching involves not only the proclamation of an objective saving event manifest once-and-for-all in Christ Jesus, but also the "gospel call," the invitation to receive this salvation as the ground

[This is the second of two lectures on "The Preaching of Salvation," delivered at the Divinity School Seminars, January 21 and 24, 1964.]

for a new relationship to God primarily, and to fellow man and surrounding nature secondarily, on the part of the individual. There are several important Scriptural traditions supporting this double aspect of the preaching task. Let me mention just two.

In Luke 24: 44ff, the evangelist has recorded a story relating to the post-resurrection commissioning of the disciples as apostles of Christ to the whole world. The actual commissioning formula refers quite clearly to the task of preaching, and its description of the content of preaching contains a double set of concepts, two of which point to the once-for-all event of the Christ, while the other two refer to the existential appropriation of this event by the individual believer:

> Then he opened their minds to understand the Scriptures, and said to them: 'Thus it is written, that the Christ should *suffer* and on the third day *rise* from the dead, and that *repentance* and *forgiveness* of sins should be preached in his name to all nations, beginning from Jerusalem. You are witnesses of these things.' (Luke 24: 45-48, italics added)

Another reference to the same double focus of the preaching task is found in 2 Corinthians 5, where Paul develops his doctrine of "the ministry of reconciliation." In the course of the discussion, Paul makes clear that this ministry includes both a "message" and an "appeal" or, in our terminology here, a "proclamation" and a "call":

> All this is from God, who through Christ reconciled us to himself and gave us a ministry of reconciliation; that is, God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself, not counting their trespasses against them, and entrusting to us the *message* of reconciliation. So we are *ambassadors* for Christ, God making his *appeal* through us. We *beseech* you on behalf of Christ, be reconciled to God. (2 Cor. 5: 18-20, italics added)

Historically and traditionally, this double-sidedness in the preaching of salvation has represented the real significance and the inner strength of the evangelical Protestant ministry. Not only have preachers found themselves standing at the crossroads of life, pointing in the direction of the cross, attempting to call attention to the saving drama, enacted on that cruel, off-the-broad-way stage; they have been at their best when, in the contemporaneity of their historical setting, they found themselves standing on the main square of human concerns, actually *offering* the saving grace on behalf of Christ, to any and all, for free.

Pure proclamation, the kerygmatic cry, *can* conceivably become an impersonal and "official" function. It can become so engrossed in the objective event that it lacks the understanding of its personal appropriation. Preaching *can* easily degenerate into an exercise in story-telling; it can become so intent upon pointing to the one decisive

event in the salvation history of the world that it forgets that salvation is a very present reality, and that the preaching and hearing of it is itself involved in the grand scheme of salvation. He is the *true* evangelical preacher who knows that salvation is an act of God, but who also recognizes that in the event of preaching this salvation is near and real. He can *proclaim* salvation with conviction and clarity, and he can issue the *call* to salvation with integrity and assurance; and if there is anything we should desire to see more of in contemporary preaching, it is conviction and clarity, integrity and assurance.

Let me transport your thoughts, however, from this positive consideration of the double direction of preaching, to a more realistic appraisal of the homiletical aspects of the call to salvation. If it can be said that this more subjective-existential approach to preaching represents the genius of evangelical Protestantism, it is also true to say that this genius constitutes a grave temptation to any proud possessor of it. For when the preaching event is said to participate in the reality and continuity of the redemptive event, the preacher will easily come to consider it the decisive event in the life of the individual believer. He may even come to think of it as the only event that really matters. And when this happens, the "witness," who originally found his fulfillment in pointing *away from* himself to Him whose Word he witnessed to, becomes pre-occupied with himself and turns away from his task in life to ponder over his own scrapbooks and prepare to write his autobiography. The dangers and temptations are *legio* for those who preach the gospel, even without this inborn propensity to pride and presumptuousness which is involved in understanding preaching as the extension of the saving event itself. It does not take particularly sharp eyesight to find manifestations of such presumptuousness in the history of the church. The surprising thing, of course, is that the log is so well settled in our own eye, even while we are searching for the speck in our brother's.

If you can hold on to this metaphor another moment, I can formulate the main purpose of this paper in reference to it. I desire, quite simply, to uncover a few of the "logs" that are lodged in our own eyes in connection with our preaching, particularly in the "call" to salvation or the "appeal" for reconciliation. If anything, this lecture is a confessional statement, representing both a confession of sin and a confession of faith. I do not desire to judge or to hurt. I am only anxious that we should understand the preaching task in all its magnitude and its awfulness. And for that reason I am willing to lay myself open before you, seeking only the recommendation of your conscience.

I

First, then, I am obliged to say that, as Protestant ministers, we shall need to watch out for a tendency to want to control the grace of God. In this direct and somewhat uncouth formulation it is immediately obvious, at least to evangelical Protestants, that such a tendency or desire would be both preposterous and absurd. Our first reaction is quite naturally that no Protestant minister would ever fall into such an elementary error. Protestantism, as an historical fact, actually arose out of a reaction to such and similar errors on the part of the Roman Church. The Reformation affirmed, with conviction and vigor, that no human being, be it priest or saint, king or judge, could make claims to the status of a necessary and indispensable intermediary between the individual believer and the Lord Almighty. The believer needs no other mediator than Christ; and Christ is available among men of faith through the Word and the Spirit without respect to status or calling, position or rank. No human priesthood or mediation is essential to membership in the Kingdom of God. The Kingdom is established by God's decree; whoever hears the decree and enters into the Kingdom by faith becomes a citizen in direct obedience to its King. This is 'the priesthood of all believers,' a doctrine of many facets, but none so clear-cut as that which says: No man ever controls the grace of God for another.

But *we* do not claim such a position, do we? One wonders.

One wonders, for example, when we preach about the church rather than preach the gospel; or when we urge upon people the realization of the values of church membership and church activities rather than lead them into the first fact of spiritual existence, the spiritual communion with Christ in the faith, if we are not actually setting up the church—in an innocent and tacit kind of way—as a necessary intermediary, or at least a useful guarantor, for the personal assurance that we are acceptable to God. Why is it that the traditional doctrine of the "invisible" church is again brought to the forefront in certain Protestant circles? Might it be because we have come to feel that it is essentially *wrong* to make the "visible" church, however necessary and important it is as the incarnation of the Kingdom of God, significant and meaningful in itself? Or why, on the other hand, is it that so many people express an understanding for and a desire to belong to the visible fellowship of the church, but have no corresponding understanding for or desire to belong in a personal way to God? Might it be that we have slipped back into the pre-Reformation concept of the church as having the keys to the Kingdom, not now as much in a negative sense, saying that there is no salvation

outside the church, but more positively, letting it be known that we consider those who belong to the church "right" in their relationship to the Kingdom? I am merely asking, but the questions are serious.

Yet even more serious considerations belong under this heading. I am thinking of the attitude, so generally exhibited by us ministers, which seems to presuppose that only that which we see and know to happen in a preaching situation is really and truly taking place. This attitude takes all sorts of expressions: An evangelist identifies the "decision for Christ" with stepping down to the front of the auditorium where he—the evangelist—will pray with the inquirers. A minister asks his members who desire to recommit themselves to Christ to come forward and shake his—the minister's—hand. A songleader asks the people who really mean what they are singing to stand in the congregation and join in his chorus. A radio announcer lets the people know that the way to assure that the blessing they have received will really stay with them is to write a note—and include a note—to the preacher at such and such an address. There is no doubt that most of these activities can be defended and rationalized as psychologically or organizationally necessary and in many other ways desirable and valuable, but the main question in this connection is the theological one: Are we giving people occasion to believe that the grace of God is dependent upon the visible church for its operation, on the ordained minister for its channelling, and on the believer's relationship to the visible church and the ordained minister for its appropriation? In that case, are we not actually setting up the church as the *primary* fact in the religious experience of a believer, relegating the personal relationship to Christ to a place *secondary,* consequential, or derivative in comparison to the relationship to the church?

The basic question, penetrating this whole situation and making it a transparent, ready to be projected by the light of truth, is this: Do we believe in the primacy of the free grace of God, or do we in any way limit the operation and efficacy of grace to where we as ministers, or the visible church as a channel, have made ourselves indispensable as mediators?

In a sense, this alternative is not, of course, a clear-cut either/or. There is a certain sense in which the preacher *is* seen to be indispensable. There is a curious—and dangerous—dialectic involved in the preacher's place within the economy of redemption. As St. Paul sees it:

> How are men to call upon him in whom they have not believed? And how are they to believe in him of whom they have never heard? And how are they to hear without a preacher? (Romans 10: 14)

Is this not proof enough that the gospel of Christ *is* mediated to the world by the preacher, and that he, therefore, has a necessary role to play in the salvation of souls? Certainly. But now the question is, what *kind of role?* Let us read on in Paul's description (his *deductio salutis,* you might say):

> How are they to hear without a preacher? And how can men preach unless they are sent? As it is written, 'How beautiful are the feet of those who preach good news.' . . . So, faith comes from what is heard, and what is heard comes by the preaching of Christ. (Romans 10: 15-17)

Does this not say that the indispensability of the preacher is that of a servant, a messenger, "one sent," but that it gives him no ground to claim that the message itself is within his control?

Let me sum up this point by stating as clearly as I can what may be called "the dialectic of preaching," namely the dialectic of greatness and humility in the role of the preacher: Our call to preach the gospel is a call to proclaim the good news, to spread the Word, to sow the seed, to call to repentance and invite to salvation. But the good news is not our property, and the salvation we invite to is not ours to dispense. The preacher brings a message and proclaims a Word which is fundamental and invaluable in the salvation history of the world and of the individual soul to which he addresses himself; but when the Word is brought and the message is delivered, he should be willing to step aside and be forgotten. He should never point to himself as a necessary link between the Savior and the soul. He is to call people into the experience of salvation, but he does not control this experience. Of course not! He is the servant of the Word, not the master of it!

## II

There is a second concern that I am eager to put before you here regarding the preaching of a call to salvation, namely the tendency to focus attention on the subjective elements of the experience of salvation and forget that salvation, *all* salvation, whether cosmic or individual, in the Christian way of looking at it, springs from the one and only source of salvation, Jesus Christ, the Savior. Again I am seeking to formulate in language something which is more of an implicit orientation in our time than an open and confessed pattern. But the tendency is there clearly enough.

There is a strong and recurring emphasis in the church of this day on the need for a "redemptive" ministry. We must make our message a "redemptive" word, we say; the community of the church must become a "redemptive" community. We listen, and the words

sound true. But when one listens a little longer and asks oneself what the *meaning* of this "redemptive" ministry might be, the impression is strong and convicting that it simply means a ministry *patterned after* Christ's redemptive ministry. In our interpersonal relationships and in situations of social tension, we are to speak and act in the style of speaking and acting exhibited by Christ in similar situations. The "ministry of reconciliation" becomes nothing but *our* trying to be reconciling among people, as Christ also was. Thus the Christian ministry is conceived of in terms of *discipleship* rather than *apostleship*. And what is its message? Here is a recent example:

> It is in the interpersonal relationship between mutually accepting individuals within the community of the church that the experience of the forgiveness of God becomes real and meaningful to individuals.

Without being unfair to those who seek new ways to express old facts, the question nevertheless forces itself upon us: Are we not desperately trying to invent a redemptive word *of our own* instead of witnessing to the redemptive Word spoken and acted once-for-all in Christ Jesus, *the* Redeemer? Instead of calling individuals into the experience of divine redemption as a very definitive act accomplished by God on our behalf, an experience from which there will flow a new style of life which might be described as "redemptive" and "forgiving," are we not simply trying to lead people into practicing the principles of redemptiveness and forgiveness and thus become their own redeemers? If the call to salvation takes on this kind of task, does it not inevitably lead to subjectivistic moralism, emphasizing that redemption means simply to learn how to live redemptively? If redemption is identified as a learning process, what is there to guard us from subjectivistic mysticism, more intent upon establishing some subjective ground for the assurance of salvation *within* us than on appropriating by faith and trust the objective saving act of God accomplished in Christ *without* us? If redemption is reduced from objective fact to subjective possibility, is not faith at the same time reduced to subjectivistic futurism, which in the present will take the form of agnosticism or even skepticism?

Or, similarly, do not those who have reacted to the individualism of an earlier evangelicalism, and who reformulate the message of redemption in terms of "communal catharsis," *i.e.* deliverance from fear and anxiety by the experience of the communal spirit of acceptance within the true fellowship, show essentially the same orientation, attempting to substitute a new and more "existential" focal point for faith in personal salvation instead of the traditional orientation around

the cross of Christ and the personal appropriation of the work of the One who died and who rose to live for ever? Principally speaking: Ought forgiveness and redemption to be made into general principles of interpersonal acceptance and goodwill without *first* being explained in terms of Christ's objective gift to us?

Again I am asking questions rather than suggesting answers; but asking such questions is agonizing enough, especially since the tendencies one is questioning represent some of the most serious attempts to make the redemptive purposes of God relevant to life in the twentieth century. It is imperative, nevertheless, that such questions be raised among us, for if the attempt to make the gospel relevant rests on the presupposition that its distinctive features must necessarily be compromised, then the result may well be that the "scandal" of the gospel is reduced, but the gospel itself has been scandalized. And no individual, no group, no era, is better served by a preaching which presents a sensible gospel in a relevant form—but a gospel which is distorted.

Now, "distorted" is, of course, a strong word, and one should not throw it around without great care and responsible purposes. There is, however, clear evidence in our time even of such open distortion of the Christian gospel. I am thinking of the extreme, subjectivistic fideism which represents nothing but a belief in faith or a trust in prayer: The "call to salvation" in such circles is in reality only a call to assume a certain attitude to life. This attitude has been found to have significant influence on one's state of mind, one's general happiness and health, as well as one's success in life and one's influence for good. And so it is most assuredly a useful approach to life, one which each man should seek for himself: Try prayer! Use your faith! You will be surprised to find what difference worship makes!

In this kind of preaching we are obviously not just dealing with *tendencies* toward subjectivism; this is religion "turned in upon itself," faith engaged in devoted navel-staring. We shall need to unveil its true nature as being diametrically opposite to true Christian faith, having—in fact—no resemblance to this faith at all. The faith of a Christian is not turned in upon itself; it is directed toward God Almighty. The Christian faith does not focus the attention on what man himself does or the way he contributes to his salvation; it rests its eye on what God has done, what He does, and what He promises to do. Its orientation is not around its own value or upon what man himself can accomplish with its help, but rather around Christ, in whom God accomplished His saving purposes for mankind without

man's help, and who is even now present and at work in the world and in the man of faith.

On the background of this understanding of the Christian faith we find that the true "gospel call," the evangelical "call to salvation," does not merely stop with the reminder that man *needs* to be saved. Such a message could be brought by any man, within any faith. Nor does this Christian message consist simply in pointing man in the direction of a possible way to salvation. The genius of the Christian faith is its glad affirmation that salvation is sure; its foundation is already laid; the work is already accomplished. The call to salvation takes the form of a clear apostolic testimony to Christ, and Christ alone, as the foundation for our salvation, and the invitation is issued to all and everyone on behalf of God himself: Return to him who is your salvation; make him your own in faith! Here is salvation preached as a *fact,* and not merely as a possibility. Here is redemption offered as a very present gift and experience, and not merely as a promise and a hope.

Thus we find that even that aspect of the total message of salvation which we have called the "subjective" aspect, that facet of our preaching which concerns itself with bringing our hearer to the experience of all "the benefits of his death and passion," has "objective" orientation. The evangelical preacher does not for a moment take his eye off the ground and source of salvation: In all he does he preaches Christ, the Savior of the world, *our* Savior; Christ *pro nobis* objectively; Christ *in nobis* subjectively.

## III

I shall mention only one more concern which is of central importance for our understanding of the task of preaching the "call to salvation," namely the need for re-establishing the evangelical Protestant understanding of faith. Faith is quite consistently preached as the Christian "way" to salvation, "justification by faith and not by works" being the most familiar formula among all Protestants. But this compressed phrase, "justification by faith and not by works," indicates itself the one great problem involved in much contemporary understanding of faith. The tendency is there, and more than implicitly so, to regard faith as a different kind of work, *i.e.* as an *acceptable* kind of human activity relating to salvation, as over against the *unacceptable* kind. Just looking at the phrase itself, one does not really sense the dramatic distinction between faith and works, a distinction which traditionally made these concepts useful as descriptions of two qualitatively different religious commitments. Setting them up

as alternative "ways of salvation," one of which is the true way, while the other is the false way, does not in itself preclude the possibility that both are essentially and actually conceived of in very similar ways.

There is, on the one hand, the possibility that faith and works can both be regarded as ways by which the believer fulfills the requirement for salvation and places himself in the category of being acceptable to God. Thus, in spite of the fact that evangelical Christianity confesses that only faith is acceptable, while works are unacceptable, one might still think of faith as a way by which man qualifies himself for divine grace to be given him. There is, on the other hand, the possibility that faith and works may both be seen as responses by which the believer seeks to express the commitment which he has made in the encounter with God. The fearful seeker after righteousness, who feels the commands of God lie heavily upon his heart, and who seeks in all things to do God's will and work off the guilt of past mistakes, is himself a believer of sorts. He believes in God, in the right of God to challenge his life, and in the ultimate responsibility of man living under the rule of God. And he responds with the best he has, his commitment to do God's will. The humble hearer of the gospel, who has heard the gospel of God's righteousness as manifested in Christ, and who knows this message to be the ground of a new life and a promise of an eternal future, also responds with the best that his life contains at the moment, sorrow for sin, repentance, willingness to accept the Lordship of Christ, "faith." Traditionally these two types of response or commitment have been described as "the faith of a servant" and "the faith of a son," but this does not really preclude the possibility that, conceived in the way described here, works and faith may serve to fulfill essentially the same function in the believer's relationship to God: Both may be seen as requirements to be fulfilled by man in order for God to respond in grace, or they may be seen as expressions by which man responds to the experience of an encounter with God. In both cases there is the danger that the qualitative distinction of faith and works, as representing diametrically opposite types of God/man relationships, will be lost.

If you find this point a bit confusing, it may comfort you to know that it was made that way for a purpose. The moral of the story is quite simply this: We need to sharpen up our concepts. Faith is not really to be spoken of as man's "way" to salvation at all; for in so doing one is still caught in the old understanding of salvation as the result of some human qualification. The "new way" of salvation, that which is presented as the "gospel" and which took the place of the old cove-

nant of works, is a covenant of *grace,* a way of salvation by which God comes to man where he is, in spite of his sin, enclosing him—even in his rebellion and open opposition to God—in grace long before he even has faith. The right expression of the Protestant gospel, then, is found in the full phrase of our tradition, "justification *by grace,* through faith." The new way of salvation is the *way of grace,* and the true nature of grace is that it is unqualified, unsolicited, unearned. One cannot deserve grace, for what one deserves is not grace. One cannot even qualify for one's reception of grace, for grace—according to its own nature—prevenes every qualification and every reception; grace actually creates its own qualifications and fulfills all of its requirements within itself.

What, finally, will this concept of grace do to our understanding of personal faith? First, it will make the preaching of faith as a *requirement* for salvation obsolete. And that is good! Secondly, it will make the dogmatic stress on the delimitation and formulation of a *"right faith"* impossible. And that is equally good! Thirdly, it will throw us back to the necessity of re-discovering the nature of faith as pure passivity, sheer receptivity, and simple responsiveness to God's saving grace. And that is good indeed! For it is here that contemporary man is in most desperate need of help. He needs to know what it is to let go of himself, to let his sin as well as his sanctity be swallowed up in the grace, mercy, and love of God. Our task as preachers is to call him into such an experience, an experience of losing himself in finding the salvation which is offered him as a *gift,* free, present, uncontrolled.

We do indeed have a Word to contemporary man!

# Ambiguity and Faith

Orval Wintermute

Our Gospel for Passion Sunday (John 8:46-59) provides us with a classic sample of Johannine literature, and as such it speaks on many different levels. In our effort to understand it, however, let us begin by considering the most obvious meaning of the text.

In the simplest terms it is a story of a debate between Jesus and the Jews. Yet *debate* is much too mild a word to convey the force of the strife depicted here. It was not the sort of intellectual dialogue that might be overheard in the halls of our Divinity School or read from the pages of *Response*. Rather it was more akin to the no-holds-barred, serious type of encounter that is taking place in the courtroom at Hillsboro, or among our Christian brethren who strive to bear witness in the face of a foreign, totalitarian state which is hostile to the Gospel. The stakes were high. The security of the Jews was being threatened. There was not the slightest doubt about their "existential commitment"; they were ready to stone the man who opposed their "way of life".

Jesus spoke boldly—he called them liars to their face. Jesus spoke openly—he told them that the Father would glorify him. Jesus spoke authoritatively—he told them that if they would keep his word they would not see death. But in the end, Jesus hid himself, and the Gospel was driven underground. This is the treatment our Lord received. Shall we expect the servants to fare better than their master? Let this text speak to us as a consolation for tired and unheard preachers. Let us cherish it as our own tract for hard times.

One of the most helpful insights to be gained from this passage is the clear instruction that the Gospel has always been ambiguous. This is the insight which is most urgently needed here in North Carolina today. You men who go out to serve churches in what impious men have termed the "Bible Belt" are most fortunate. You will inherit churches filled with good people, but often they are people in serious danger of relying too heavily upon the obvious certainties which all men of good will believe and too little upon the strength of faith. Generations of preachers have done their job well. They have made the New Testament clear and simple, but tragically they

have made it appear quite unambiguous as well. It is perfectly obvious to people in this part of the country that Jesus should have gone to Calvary, but it is not at all clear that we should risk destroying the local church by seating Negroes. It is perfectly obvious that Jesus was right when he entered the temple and violated the rights of private property by overturning the tables of the money changers, but it is not at all clear that university professors have the right to trespass against private property in his name. Amen and amen, it is not clear that university professors have this right, but the truth which our text teaches is the fact that right ways were never clear.

Jesus spoke, and good people were threatened. Their obvious security as children of Abraham and hence as children of God was challenged. They were threatened by a man who had no higher claim to certainty than the strange assurance that the Father would glorify him. He called the good people liars, and the good people sought to stone him, so he hid.

When a truly secular man reads this scripture, even in the twentieth century, it is still not obvious that Jesus was right and the good people wrong. To the secular man all of Jesus' talk about being glorified is meaningless; the promise that one who keeps the word of Jesus will not see death is absurd; and the claim that "before Abraham was, I am" is sheer madness.

Fortunately, however, the author of the Fourth Gospel does not leave us there, since anyone who wishes to come to terms with this writer must soon realize that every sentence, every phrase, was written in the light of a powerful resurrection faith. And that is the way it must be read. When we return to our text with faith in a resurrected Lord, then it is only natural that he should speak of his glorification, since the Father did glorify him. It is now reasonable that this man who defeated death would have authority to assure his followers that they would not see death. Nor is it any longer madness for an exalted Lord who stands at the right hand of God to say, "Before Abraham was, I am." Faith alone makes the meaningless meaningful, the absurd reasonable, and the ambiguous clear.

By faith we can see even more subtle nuances of meaning in our text. It becomes clear to us that Jesus was thinking in terms of two kingdoms: the kingdom of truth, which is God's, and the kingdom of the lie, which is Satan's. Jesus' opponents, by contrast, were thinking of two peoples: the Jews, God's own people, and the Gentiles, those who had no place among the elect. Jesus told the Jews that they could not belong to God because they were liars. They replied that Jesus

could not belong to God because he was a Samaritan. By faith we know that it was Jesus who saw the matter aright.

Through faith in Jesus' resurrection, even the slightest symbol used in John may take on meaning. Jesus told his opponents that those who kept his word would not see death, and as the Jews replied they revealed their own bankrupt faith by claiming that Abraham and all the prophets were dead. The Jews said that, about the very source of their own confidence—all dead. Jesus never made that claim. In fact, the synoptics report one occasion when Jesus argued strongly that the patriarchs were yet alive.

This is a sample of the way in which faith changes things, the way in which it makes things clear. But lest we lose in this clarity our parable for modern times, we should never forget that it was not quite so clear for Jesus. Our Lord himself was forced to live by a resurrection faith—before the resurrection. And a small part of a similar role survives for us today.

Jesus was superior to the Jews in many ways, but one way to describe the difference is to contrast with his their source of *certainty.* In ambiguous times, the Jews found their certainty of being sons of God in the obvious, unambiguous life of Abraham and the nation which descended from him in a clear and obvious fashion. In ambiguous times Jesus knew his certainty of being the son of God through a miraculous faith, a faith which must always appear to outsiders to be a bit ambiguous, a sort of pre-resurrection resurrection faith.

I have said that we too inherit a part of this role. Strengthened by the resurrection faith, we have courage to live by faith. Our acceptance of faith strengthens our faith, and yet we remain, all of us, far weaker men than Saint Paul, still trapped by the same ambiguity which he knew. "For now we see in a mirror dimly . . ."

When the members of the faculty hasten to support those among us who have run afoul of the law, ministers, seminary students, and laymen alike may wonder how we can be so *certain* that the action of our colleagues was right. The answer is that we are not certain. If we were *certain,* I would be encouraging you with all my might to follow exactly the same pattern of action tomorrow. You must understand that we are not applauding their *certainty,* for even they realize the ambiguity of their actions. We rejoice rather in their *faith.* In an age when men seek comfort, security, and certainty, we yearn for heroes of faith. When we find them, whatever their particular witness may be, our own faith is strengthened—and our commitment.

## *The Dean's Discourse*

This will have been a year of conferences *in extremis*. Before departing for the General Conference in Pittsburgh, at which I am honored to be a delegate by election of the North Carolina Conference, I am disposed to offer a few words relative to some affairs affecting some faculty of Duke University and, in particular, two members of the Divinity School faculty found guilty of trespass in connection with sit-in demonstrations at Chapel Hill.

One can always raise questions concerning the wisdom of particular demonstrations. I am hereinafter reproducing a statement prepared as a letter to the editor of a Durham paper and appearing over my name, April 13, 1964. I simply add that I was not advised of the decision of the men prior to the sit-in demonstrations in question, but am fully informed of all circumstances and events following the fact. There is no doubt in my mind that the conditions of trespass were not fulfilled in this case, and reasonable doubt should have been sufficient to have assured acquittal. The juries determined otherwise in four out of five cases.

To my surprise the editor of the REVIEW requested the right to publish a sermon entitled, "He Was Reckoned Among Transgressors", delivered in Duke Chapel, Sunday, April 19. This sermon may somewhat more fully elaborate the grounds of my reflections upon the issues at stake both here and in the country at large.

My published letter appeared as follows:

"The history of America strongly suggests that laws are good laws when they are vehicles of 'liberty and justice for all'. When existing laws become inadequate vehicles of justice for all segments of society, they must be changed or complemented by laws that are better vehicles. Again, when existing laws, such as the trespass laws, are invoked so as to frustrate equality of human rights in the use of public facilities, then justice itself is outraged and a change of legal structure is required to assure justice.

"The shape of our time requires a change of our legal structure to make it a better vehicle of 'liberty and justice for all'. Obstruction here is the plainest hypocrisy. When change is inflexibly resisted by a majority to the disadvantage of a minority, the change will come either by the enlightenment of the majority or by revolution. Both the pressures of the minority and the irresistible moral force of Justice itself will enforce a change.

"In a democracy it would be hoped that change would come

through the moral enlightenment of the majority. If it does not, there is oppression; and democracy verges upon bankruptcy. On the other hand, if democracy is morally informed, it will secure change by laws and avoid either being party to oppression or victim of revolution.

"What we lately witnessed at Hillsboro is, however ambiguously, the encounter of the irresistible moral force of Justice with the apparently immovable inertia of social custom enforced by the trespass law. The question whether the trespass law was violated at Chapel Hill is secondary to the question whether the trespass law shall be allowed to cover for and obscure an abridgment of fundamental (and Constitutional) human rights.

"That the trespass law was violated was the verdict of the juries at Hillsboro. That the enforcement of the trespass law by punitive justice will ensure respect for the law may surely be doubted. Inflexible resistance to change, or refusal to provide laws that ensure human rights under law, will continue to excite both the righteous indignation of the morally enlightened and the unrest of the oppressed.

"Ignorantly to villify moral enlightenment, as did *The Durham Sun* editorial (entitled 'Lying Martyrs') on March 19, is to subvert and obstruct the only source of wholesome self-reformation in a democracy. Likewise, to enforce the existing law by punitive justice without providing for juster laws is the self-destroying function and awful destiny of a society that refuses to change. This was the real and agonizing burden of the sentences at Hillsboro.

"Before us now is the fateful question whether new 'civil rights' legislation will relieve the tension between the cry for equal justice and a system of law and custom that cannot and, seemingly, will not ensure it. Laws that entrench or protect inequality before the law will be changed either by the moral enlightenment of the majority or by revolution. Such is both the dynamics of society and the dynamics of the Moral Order.

"Positive laws conserve social order only when they are vehicles of equal justice for all. In this respect and in this measure, their sanctity is their utility. It follows that no positive law is an absolute, although legal 'positivists' take it as if it were. For the Christian, no positive law is an absolute, and among other reasons, because it is always an imperfect vehicle of Divine Justice. Judged by the New Testament, the Christian cannot, therefore, always evade the

dilemma implied in the Petrine resolution: 'We must obey God rather than man.'

"This highlights the dilemma of both the professors and the court at Hillsboro. Neither, I think, really believes that the trespass law is an absolute if its application abridges fundamental human rights. So the professors are committed to a 'higher law' that presently does not exist, and the court to a law that *exists* but is a wholly deficient vehicle of justice. Neither professors nor judge really has any alternative and no resolution of their dilemma because the existing legal structure is inadequate as a vehicle for the justice that is sought by both but is presently outraged."

Robert E. Cushman

# LOOKS at BOOKS

*Jesus and Christian Origins: A Commentary on Modern Viewpoints.* Hugh Anderson. Oxford. 1964. Pp. i-xii, 1-368. $7.

Professor Anderson has given to his work the subtitle of a commentary. And a first-rate commentary it is. Written in a forceful style, which is sometimes even eloquent, it is marked by clarity of presentation and a comprehensive grasp of the pertinent literature. Above all, the charity of spirit with which Dr. Anderson describes various views at no point blunts his critical austerity and acumen. The result is a volume which fulfills its purpose most admirably. I know of no other work which offers so balanced a picture of and so sure a way through the maze of recent discussion on its theme.

That theme is, possibly, the most burning in recent scholarly discussion of the New Testament. Anderson rightly recognizes that when we take up the subject of the beginnings of Christianity, Jesus Christ himself "is the great converging point" (p. 16), and that the bridging of the gulf between Jesus and the Church becomes for us the primary task. This is so because the liberal quest of the nineteenth century drove a wedge between the historical Jesus and the Christ of the *kerygma.* "The impression we now get in retrospect is that, having differentiated between the man Jesus *and* the Christ, and having envisaged the need to choose between Jesus *or* the Christ, the nineteenth-century scholars voted wholeheartedly for Jesus. In our own century the vote has swung. There has been something of a landslide away from the historical Jesus to the Christ of the Church's kerygma, the Christ of the Church's faith, as the center of theological interest" (p. 18). It is with this landslide that the bulk of Dr. Anderson's work is concerned.

The first chapter describes how the landslide, a premonition of which we find in Kähler, was given impetus by the work of Schweitzer on *The Quest of the Historical Jesus.* Schweitzer did not reject the historical critical method of the nineteenth century, but insisted that it was not carried through rigorously enough. But Schweitzer's own presentation of Christ is marked by *Schwärmerei:* he was compelled to turn away from the historical Jesus, as an alien, and to rest merely in the Spirit which he embodied. His successors, Werner and Buri, carried Schweitzer's position to its logical conclusion and pleaded for the interpretation of Christianity as a mere philosophy. Jesus became for them an embarrassment. Barth and Bultmann found him also, if not a dispensable embarrassment, an awkward enigma. Both became suspicious of any attempt at getting to the facts which lie behind the text of Scripture, and reveal an indifference to the "pastness" of Jesus. His meaning in the present, not his actuality in the past, became important. In all this Barth and Bultmann were emboldened by, or rather found added justification in, certain contemporary forces—form-criticism, which seemed to reduce Jesus, in any case, to an insubstantial shadow; a general reaction against historicism led by Dilthey, Weber, Collingwood and others, which emphasized the importance of subjectivity; and, finally, the *religionsgeschichtliche Schule,* which tended to see in Jesus, not so much a tangible, historical figure as another Mystery-figure. All things seemed to conspire to make it clear to Barth and Bultmann that it is not necessary for faith to see a recognizable, human, Galilean face nor to

hear a familiar Galilean voice. Anderson states all this in a most satisfactory way, and his criticisms of Barth and Bultmann are telling.

The flight from history was not without its opponents. Anderson shows how the quest of the historical Jesus has been continued in Germany in the work of Stauffer, in America in the Chicago school, the sociological-historical emphasis of which is sympathetically treated, and in British scholarship, which like most things British has pursued the middle way (sometimes a muddled way). Anderson recognizes the strength and weakness of historicism as represented in all these directions. He particularly notes, however, that British scholarship as exemplified by T. W. Manson and others, in its concentration on the life of Jesus, has neglected the Resurrection (is this true of earlier British scholars, like the Cambridge three?) and has been unable, because of this, to face the complexity of the Gospel tradition, where all is seen in the light of the Resurrection and, therefore, transformed, so that event and meaning become intertwined.

The recognition that the life of Jesus is not directly presented in the Gospels but only in terms of the Resurrection, which has transformed it for the disciples, made acute the problem of the relation between the Jesus of History and the Christ of Faith. T. W. Manson and other British and American scholars were partly right in asserting that the Gospels were testimony to Jesus, not primarily to the Faith of the Church (pp. 91ff.), but they had simplified the matter excessively. And John Knox reacted rightly against such a simplification by insisting that it is only in and through the Church that Jesus can be known at all. But Anderson insists that Knox is in danger of losing Jesus in the community. However much Jesus and his Church are one, Jesus is Head of the Church, his work stands finished over against the Church (pp. 111ff.) ; the latter must never be allowed to usurp the place of Christ himself. After dealing with the reaction against historicism in Knox, Anderson turns to Jeremias, R. H. Fuller and Cullmann, all of whom seek to retain the significance of the historical Jesus, while seeking to recognize the degree to which there was a continuity between Jesus and the Church's faith in him. Anderson accepts Barr's lexicographical criticism of Cullmann, but points out that Cullmann's eschatological interpretation of the New Testament does not rest merely or even mainly on lexicographical data. This has recently been reaffirmed by Cullmann himself.

Following on all this rich fare, Anderson sets out the factors leading to the New Quest. He introduces this by a very illuminating comparison of T. W. Manson's *Teaching of Jesus* and Bornkamm's *Jesus of Nazareth:* the former concentrated on the self-consciousness of Jesus, which was assumed to be ascertainable by the historical-critical method; the latter avoids all discussion of this, all texts suggesting a Messianic awareness or the Unique Sonship of Jesus being regarded as part of the confession of the Church, not pointers to Jesus himself. Bornkamm concentrates on the ethical teaching of Jesus, the parables, but, like Manson and Van Unnik, whose work Anderson draws upon appreciatively, the German scholar also holds that the interpretation put upon Jesus by the *kerygma* is already inherent in Jesus' own words (p. 167). This is not enough for Anderson. He welcomes the theocentricity of Bornkamm and his rejection of any preoccupation with what Jesus himself thought, with his personality. But he urges that the New Quest, as revealed in J. M. Robinson and Bornkamm, does justice to Jesus as the Word bearer but not to Jesus himself as the Word made flesh (pp. 174ff.). He finds Fuchs for this reason more congenial than Bornkamm, because Fuchs does deal with the conduct and not merely with the words of Jesus (p. 179). Hospitable as Anderson is to the New Quest, he is uneasy about what he calls "the merger of historical research and existential openness" that he finds in it (pp. 182ff.). He does not

think that the New Quest has provided the solution to the problem of the relation between "faith and history".

Does Anderson, then, merely lead us to a dead end? He assures us that this is not so. Having issued his *caveat* about the New Quest, he makes a rebound to the figure who first set going the landslide with which he has been dealing—Kähler. He takes seriously Kähler's affirmation that the Gospels are first and foremost Easter confessions of faith. The clue to their understanding is the Resurrection. "Between Jesus and the primitive Christian community stand the decisive events of his death and Resurrection" (p. 184). From this page on Anderson's work is far more than a commentary: it becomes a statement of his own understanding of the Resurrection and of the Earthly Suffering and Heavenly Glory of Christ. He continues his exhaustive treatment of the views of other scholars but puts forth his own understanding of the data. He deals with the divergences between the various Gospels—Matthew and Mark recording Galilean and Luke Jerusalem appearances of the Risen Lord. The various treatments of the Resurrection are surveyed—the slanderous, naturalistic, spiritualistic, psychic, and psychological. Bultmann's view that the Risen Christ is simply the preached Christ is rejected (though appreciatively, pp. 2-6). Bultmann's Risen Jesus remains unclear. Following Van Unnik, Anderson insists that the Risen Christ of the Church's faith and the historical Jesus are continuous. This he urges in a treatment of 1 Cor. 15:3-8 and the various resurrection accounts in the Gospels. The Resurrection sets forth "the form of the past" (here Anderson endorses Tillich's Theory of Restitution), the fulfilment of God's purpose in Christ, and a call to discipleship and mission. This means that continuity with Jesus is preserved in the Resurrection. And, finally, in chapter VI, Anderson surveys the majority of the New Testament documents to show how the lineaments of the obedience of Jesus are everywhere traceable. Behind and in the Resurrection the suffering figure emerges clearly: the Resurrection takes us back to Jesus Himself.

Such a hurried survey of Anderson's thesis cannot do justice to his work. There is so much in it with which to agree that this review might well end without a note of criticism. There are only a few points where questions might be asked. The treatment of Reitzenstein (pp. 40ff.) might have been still more radical, especially in view of the recent work by Colpe. Without verifying Dodd's article on the Framework of Mark, one is tempted to ask whether at any point he writes of a "*document*" giving a kerygmatic outline: was not the outline a commonplace of preaching as Dodd understood it (see p. 81)? Anderson deals more kindly than it deserves, perhaps, with Lohmeyer's theory of a Galilean Christianity. The Resurrection is all that the author asserts, but perhaps emphasis should also have been placed upon it as "an experience of forgiveness". And, finally, the volume, as I am sure Dr. Anderson accepts, still leaves the question it poses tantalizingly awkward. He has rejected the "*Dass*" of Bultmann as inadequate: has Dr. Anderson's fear of "historicism" led him to settle for "just a little more" than the "*Dass*" and not allowed him to be more bold in asserting, still more clearly, the lineaments of the face that meets us in the Gospel and the echo—and sometimes the tones—of that voice? When he has so courageously seized the nettle of recent New Testament scholarship, such a question is ungracious. This review must end on a note of unqualified gratitude.

But perhaps, since this Review is likely to be handled by many of my former colleagues and students, whom I delight to recall, the editor may allow me to use the very last lines to greet them all through these pages—*eis tên emên anamnêsin.*

W. D. Davies
Union Theological Seminary

*Buddhism and Christianity, Some Bridges of Understanding.* Winston L. King. Westminster. 1962. 240 pp. $5.

More than once I have heard Billy Graham (on my car radio) refer to the Buddha and his message of salvation in terms which indicated not only the desperate need for a book such as this but also how close the problems it discusses are to the work of the parish minister. It is primarily for those with some knowledge of Buddhist history and thought (here restricted to Southern, or Theravadin, Buddhism), but even for the uninformed it would be rewarding to read in that it represents Professor King's thoughtful grappling with questions basic to all concerned Christians.

King states that "the approach hopefully espoused here is that of sympathetic interpenetration," and his study reflects the two years spent as visiting professor at the International Institute for Advanced Buddhist Studies in Rangoon. He approaches from the point of view of comparative theology such topics as the nature of deity in Christianity and Buddhism, Christian and Buddhist love, the problem of guilt, prayer and meditation, and grace and faith.

The very freshness and independence of the author's approach, which are meritorious, will evoke both agreement and dissent from the reader. In the negative vein, for instance, in chapter II, "God in Four Parts," King attempts to isolate from Buddhist doctrine equivalents of the biblical God, yet my desire to sympathize with his findings was not strengthened by his statement (p. 54): "Thus with the two exceptions of an initial creation and a final climactic Kingdom of God, dharma-karma seems almost to equal God in its governance of the universe." It is obvious that King would be the first to recognize limitations inherent in his approach, however, and he is to be complimented, both for his honesty, and for this contribution to the building of bridges of understanding.

—David G. Bradley.

*Constructive Aspects of Anxiety.* Edited by Seward Hiltner and Karl Menninger. Abingdon. 1963. 173 pp. $3.50.

This excellent little volume deals with that which many consider to be the dominant symptom of this age. It would, of course, be extremely parochial to consider anxiety a twentieth-century exclusive. Rather, contemporary man is able to ask more searching questions and draw upon psychiatric and theological resources to propose more meaningful answers than previous generations. Anxiety may well be that which serves to measure a man: What is the context in which his experiences of anxiety appear; what meanings does he assign to his experiences; what is the quality of the responses he makes to it?

This book is based upon six papers presented at the 1960 Gallahue Conference at the Menninger Foundation and a seventh paper plus an epilogue written after the Conference. The chapters make uniformly solid contributions and succeed to a remarkable degree in drawing together psychiatric and theological interpretations. Consistently held throughout, with variations, is the understanding of anxiety as the signal which reminds the person of his helplessness without love and protection. Particularly outstanding are Hiltner's chapter on theological theories of anxiety and their relation to psychiatric theories, Albert Outler's chapter on anxiety and grace in the Augustinian perspective, and a most significant chapter by Paul W. Pruyser written after the conference which makes a distinction between affective and cognitive approaches to an understanding of anxiety, thereby bringing into focus contrasting psychiatric and theological analyses. In this context, the creative aspects of anxiety are related, generally, to the cognitive effects and the destructive aspects of anxiety to the emotions or affects. Other chapters survey Freudian and psychiatric theories of anxiety and the positive aspects of anx-

ious desire and anxious striving within Christian thought.

Proper balance is maintained between clinical and speculative data but, regrettably, the solid contribution of experimental psychology is overlooked. One looks in vain for empirical research data and the conclusions of learning theorists. Nevertheless, this is a valuable resource book that deserves a place in the minister's library, although ministers who own Rollo May's *The Meaning of Anxiety* may wish merely to update and supplement that book with notes from this one.—R. A. Goodling.

*The Later Heidegger and Theology.* Edited by James M. Robinson and John B. Cobb, Jr. Harper. 1963. xii, 212 pp.

This book is the first volume of a series called *New Frontiers in Theology,* which is supposed to cover discussions between German and American theologians. The dust jacket explains the purpose as follows: "This new publishing project gives promise of transforming the role of American theology in world-wide Christian thought. Up to now, because of the time-lag in translation, American theology has had to assimilate frozen conclusions received from Europe. By arranging direct conversations between the Continent and America, the editors are enabling Americans to make greater contributions in the development of theological thought."

The title of the first volume, *The Later Heidegger and Theology,* gives a fair idea of its contents. It should be noted, however, that the later Heidegger has never contributed a specific publication on the issue discussed. Thus the volume represents merely the attempt of a number of younger theologians to assess the value of the philosophy of the later Heidegger for theology.

The matrix of the thought around which this symposium is organized is provided by Heinrich Ott in an essay entitled "What is Systematic Theology?" In 1959 Ott published a book on the later Heidegger, *Denken und Sein.* The theological discussion preceding its appearance and the debate it triggered, together with an ample exposition of important facets of the later Heidegger's thought, are reviewed by James M. Robinson (pp. 3-76). Ott's essay, which he presented at a meeting of theologians where Heidegger himself was present, follows. In the next part of the book called "American Discussion" three American theologians, Arnold B. Come, Carl Michalson and Schubert M. Ogden critically analyze the views Ott expounds in his essay. In a concluding part John B. Cobb, Jr., the co-editor of the book, critically reviews the significance of the preceding discussion relative to the question: "Is the Later Heidegger Relevant for Theology?" Heinrich Ott responds to it all with concluding comments.

The appearance of the volume is significant as a harbinger of a "new wave" of theological thought. In recent decades demythologizing raised the question of the place of outmoded images in the Christian message. The so-called New Quest of the Historical Jesus pressed the issue of the history of the person to which these images refer. Now the inquiry seems to turn toward the One to whom this person witnessed: God. Ott suggests that we must take a new look at the nature of theology as a whole: "If the hermeneutical problem has been proposed for discussion with new urgency in our time, then this brings up for discussion again the nature of theology itself." (p. 79) We ask anew how we can best understand the specific nature of theology. Whereas exegesis is "primarily concerned with the text as such" (p. 81), systematic theology is the "reflection upon the hermeneutical in theology as a whole." (p. 82) It is in a systematic reflection that a decision is made as to the object of theological thought: "The Christian does not 'believe' in a plurality of things, does not hold as true various saving facts. . . . Faith is a

single and indivisible act, and correspondingly the subject matter, the 'object' of faith is a single indivisible reality, namely God himself." (p. 90) The research of theology is to be determined by the understanding of the oneness of God.

The specific purpose of Ott's essay, however, is to show that a concept of systematic theology is possible which "corresponds precisely to Heidegger's thinking." (p. 109) Heidegger supposedly proves that a kind of thinking is possible that is neither metaphysics nor science and yet quite proper thinking. "Metaphysics (and with it all subjectivistic, objectifying, especially scientific thinking that grows out of it) confines itself to the beings. It thinks them as beings by formulating them in concepts and thus, as it were, fixating them." (p. 107) "Primal thinking" is the phrase that captures best what Ott has in mind. It corresponds to the thinking of the poet.

The systematic theology Ott is trying to introduce is succinctly characterized by Michalson: "It is based neither upon the *being* of God, which is the Barthian trend, nor upon *hermeneutic* as the analysis of human existence, but upon *hermeneutic* as the analysis of being." (p. 140) Michalson feels that Ott is wrong and pleads for a systematic theology that takes "the shape not of an ontological but of an historical hermeneutic." (p. 156)

Arnold B. Come raises a point in the debate which in my opinion should have been more seriously considered. For Heidegger, "Being unveils itself. The being of beings happens in the primal thinking of man. Between being and thinking-man there is an unbroken continuity and identity, no matter how being transcends men. In a similar fashion, Schleiermacher sees the revelation of God as identical with man's sense of dependence. And Bultmann sees revelation taking its primary form in man's new self-understanding. So, rightly or wrongly, Schleiermacher has been accused of pantheism, and Bultmann of reducing theology to anthropology" (p. 130). If the nature of theology is to be examined anew the concern for the oneness of God must be expanded to include the question of the being of God and his relationship to man. Instead of turning to this problem in his final comments in any significant way Ott analyses the hermeneutical significance of the church. The oneness of God and the way the church conceives of it is still a "safe" subject, however, as compared with the fundamental hermeneutical questions raised by Schleiermacher and Bultmann. The nature of theological thought does not completely depend upon the relationship of the theologian to God's self-revelation. The personal equation cannot be eliminated in theological understanding. I doubt that the later Heidegger can illuminate the significance of the personal equation any more than the earlier Heidegger. Even so, the primal thinking involved needs to be examined in every generation anew.

Michalson reports: "The discussion that followed the oral delivery of Ott's paper was so preoccupied with reference to being that Heidegger himself took the floor to ask, 'What has all this to do with Jesus Christ?' He was not being pious. He was suggesting that for a theologian there may be only one thing worse than forgetfulness of being, and that is forgetfulness of history" (p. 146). I do not pretend to know exactly what Heidegger intended to say by this remark. He hardly could have meant to suggest that the theologian dare not ask the question of being. Perhaps he intended to indicate that he was not confronted with a meaningful discussion of being as it relates to Jesus Christ. Regardless of how the philosopher feels about it, however, the theologian can escape examining the ontological structure of man as little as he can avoid pondering the historical dimension of his faith. The next step in the hermeneutical debate about the nature of theology should be a more careful examination of this on-

tological structure.—Frederick Herzog.

*The Meaning of the Qumrân Scrolls for the Bible with special attention to the Book of Isaiah.* William Hugh Brownlee. Oxford. 1964. $7.50.

It is difficult for one who has only once met Professor Brownlee to present his latest book to the readers of this Review, who know him far better. They will recognize their teacher, and perhaps all that need be said is that he has published a book. If his former works were of too technical a nature for them, this one is aimed (he says) at the non-specialist.

But though the most effective review that history knows was the Angel's "Take, read!" to St. Augustine, that much no longer satisfies the canons of the modern Book Review, and we must go further. Books on the Dead Sea Scrolls are not rare, so why another? The answer lies in showing where this one differs from others available. The title is already revealing and, if we may neglect two chapters "The Meaning of the Scrolls for the New Testament" and "The Teacher of Righteousness and the Uniqueness of Christ", we can characterize the book as devoted to a study of facets of Old Testament study for which the Scrolls are or should be relevant—not all facets but a large number, with examples chosen from Brownlee's own work and from that of others to illustrate the sort of help that the Scrolls can give scholarship in understanding the original meaning of the Hebrew Bible and the history of its interpretation.

In geography Brownlee shows how these new texts contribute towards the identification of Biblical sites, and even may correct the Biblical tradition at certain points (p. 54). As for the canon, he shows how, if this branch of pre-Christian Judaism represented by the Qumrân sect had any idea of canonicity, it is one hard to define; we can probably only say which books were most influential among them. Certainly we cannot detect any objective criteria for establishing whether a book was canonical at Qumrân.

One of the two longer chapters in the first part discusses the new light shed on the Old Testament text. The Scrolls sometimes give us better and theologically different readings for Old Testament passages, but that is not their main contribution. It can be now demonstrated that for certain Pentateuchal and Historical books two or more Hebrew recensions once existed, the Septuagint being a translation of a different Hebrew text from that now current, rather than an exegetically modified paraphrase. Often this tradition is now attested at a far earlier date than the Massoretic, and the relative authenticity of these two recensions becomes an urgent question.

In discussing the Prophets Brownlee presents to a wider audience some of the results of his work on the text of the *Commentary on Habakkuk,* which was found at the same time as the Isaiah Scroll. In general, although in the Prophets the Scrolls offer divergent readings, we cannot speak of differences of recension between the ancient witnesses as we could for the earlier books. Significantly, in the one case (Jeremiah) where such divergence occurs, Qumrân attests that both recensions were known there. In discussing the last section of the Old Testament, the Writings, Brownlee illustrates, among other things, how the Psalter sometimes is found with differences in order and contents (which suggests the existence of three separate recensions of the Psalter), and how the dates of Qumrân Psalm Scrolls may contribute to the question of the date of the latest Biblical Psalms. The Book of Daniel (or rather the *Prayer of Nabonidus*) is called upon to demonstrate Qumrân's most certain contribution to Higher Criticism. It was long suspected that the tale of Nebuchadnezzar's madness bore some relationship to Nabonidus' voluntary exile

at Tema: now a Qumrân apocryphon either preserves or reflects the postulated earlier form of the tale.

Another substantial chapter discusses how the non-Biblical documents from Qumrân also improve our understanding of the OT. One example shows how historical Midrash was composed, whereby early stories were retold in the light of new theological principles, or in order to obviate difficulties in the account. Other examples show how the history of Israel's theology can be better understood: the clear Essene systems of modified dualism and of an eschatological trio of Prophet, Priestly Messiah and Kingly Messiah, help us to detect their own antecedents in post-exilic parts of the OT, as well as their development and modification in the New.

The second part of the book, "*The Significance of the Complete Isaiah Scroll*," represents a more novel undertaking among books about the Scrolls. Brownlee takes a second century B.C. Roll of Isaiah from the First Cave to be discovered at Qumrân and illustrates, from it and the ancient versions, how in some places a more original form of the text can be recovered (and how English translations as represented by RSV have been or should be modified) and how in other places we may detect the sectarians of Qumrân interpreting the text of Isaiah, sometimes even modifying it in the light of their own theological system.

This is the more interesting section to the reviewer. Others will have to say whether the author has managed to explain things enough for his non-technical audience. This reviewer would merely comment that, in view of the audience, only widely accepted examples should have been used. Brownlee has long worked on the textual significance of this Scroll; while some of his own proposals have been widely accepted others are still disputable; and one may wonder whether anyone is advantaged by the presentation of the latter in this form? This is of course the fault of the pioneer, and very understandable: sometimes the footnotes begin to appeal to articles in the less widely used languages, and then one suspects that Brownlee has forgotten his stated audience and is arguing with his colleagues! But after this *caveat,* read on, and certainly your understanding of Isaiah will be enriched. Even when the meaning for which Brownlee pleads be not granted, you will often get an interesting lesson in Biblical theology for your pains. . . . —John Strugnell.

*The Earliest Records of Jesus.* Francis Wright Beare. Abingdon. 1963. 254 pp. $6.50.

Dr. Beare is well known as the Professor of New Testament Studies in Trinity College, Toronto. This volume is of unusual character, designed as a companion to the popular synoptic harmony of Buck-Cross. It consists of a practical analysis and brief commentary on the successive sections of text in the harmony. The commentary is a guide to the sense of the gospel text rather than a theological interpretation. The book has been written by an excellent Greek scholar for the non-Greek student, to exhibit clearly the synoptic relationships, the gospel characteristics, and the literary distinctions of Matthew and Mark and Luke.

Scholarly interest attaches especially to the short Introduction, which expresses or implies certain critical positions. For example, Beare insists (as do most others) that the gospels were "undoubtedly composed in Greek," and that there is "no sound basis for the hypothesis that they are translations of Aramaic originals." His references to dating are less clear and less sure. The date for Mark, as the earliest of these gospels, is the traditional A.D. 70. But Matthew, he judges, may be about A.D. 100, while Luke-Acts could be "as late as"

150. The recently published Bodmer papyrus of Luke written about A.D. 200 in upper Egypt would tend to support the usual dating before A.D. 100.

Special interest in the history versus theology debate is aroused when Beare affirms that it is "impossible . . . to discover a 'Jesus of history' underneath the Christ of the Church's faith"; and that such would be "of no great use". "There is no Jesus known to history except . . . the Christ, the Son of God." Yet on the same page we may read that for "biographical or historical value" these writings "are of priceless significance". "The writers proclaim the gospel message by telling the story of Jesus." In Mark "Jesus is a man of action" in "a document of martyrdom". Luke (*sic* Dante) is "the scribe of the gentleness of Christ". Professor Beare's resolution of such divergent viewpoints is suggested, however, when he announces that "for the Church, there was no distinction between the Jesus . . . on earth, and the Lord . . . from heaven." And for us, today?—Kenneth W. Clark.

*John Wesley's English: A Study of His Literary Style.* George Lawton. Allen & Unwin, 1962. 320 pp. 30s (about $5).

Our understanding of John Wesley's contribution to the life and thought of the church has been greatly aided during the last thirty years by many special studies, including a few which have dealt with some aspects of his use of the English language. None has previously appeared, however, based on such a meticulous examination of his vocabulary. In preparation for it a miniature concordance of Wesley's *Works* was prepared, and good use has been made of this material.

Wesley was interested in words as such, as well as in words as the tools of his calling. Mr. Lawton discusses him as a lexicographer, as a letter-writer, as author and publisher, and as a preacher. His literary craftsmanship is analyzed. There are chapters on Wesley's theory and practice in the choice of words, the use of adjectives, of figures of speech, of scriptural idiom, of colloquialism, of aphorisms. Mr. Lawton's exhaustive work makes it quite clear that although Wesley's remarkable command of language was bent to his supreme task of evangelism by voice and by pen, it was by no means so plain nor so parsimonious as most people have maintained—not excepting Wesley himself.

This is a very erudite work, and in such a mass of detail an occasional error is almost inevitable. I was somewhat surprised, however, to find here also the common misquotation of one of Wesley's favorite phrases. Mr. Lawton says (p. 17): "Many times Wesley alludes to himself as a 'brand plucked from the burning'. This double-entendre recalls his rescue from the fire at Epworth Rectory as a child and his conversion." One reference is given, where in fact Wesley correctly uses the phraseology of the King James Version for this quotation from Zechariah 3:2, "Is not this a brand plucked out of the fire?" So far as I can remember or trace Wesley sometimes uses "burning", sometimes "fire", but invariably "out of", not "from"—as on that memorable occasion on 26th November, 1753, when he composed his own epitaph. A small point, but it was apparently of some importance to Wesley, who was frequently meticulous in his choice of words. This is a minor flaw indeed, however, in a volume which is essential reading for the serious student of Wesley, especially for the literary critic, and has much of value for all who want to improve their understanding of Wesley's personality and message or, like him, to discover the most effective means of propagating the gospel.—Frank Baker.

*The History of American Methodism.* Edited by Emory Stevens Bucke. Abingdon. 1964. Pp. xviii, 721; x, 750, x, 669. $27.50.

The production of this three-volume

set is another major event in Methodist publishing, and offers what will undoubtedly be regarded as an essential work for anyone who wishes both to know and to understand the varied history of American Methodism over the past two centuries. It is quite impossible to convey an adequate summary of its contents or of its varied worth in the space allotted for this review, which was originally three times as long and had still only begun to survey the territory and to scratch the surface here and there in order to uncover some of the treasures buried therein.

Something like this has been needed for over a century, and the need has become progressively more urgent. To say that it is here perfectly filled would be more than the truth, but to call it a magnificent attempt is less than the truth. The editorial board set out "to produce honest history and at the same time maintain a level of interest that will be meaningful to the general reader", and in this they have certainly succeeded. Each writer was urged to be scrupulously careful in checking and presenting documents, to make no guesses, and to stick to his history rather than to his hobby-horse. The editorial planning was almost all that could be desired. It is, however, a composite work, and suffers from the weakness as well as the strength inevitable in such a history. While it is true that "many hands make light work" (and that experts can shed light unsuspected by the general historian) it is also sadly true that "too many cooks spoil the broth."

This broth is far from spoiled. Over forty writers (not all Methodists) were employed on the undertaking, but this is not one too many. Most of these were responsible for one of the major chapters, though some of the chapters were sub-divided, and some writers prepared more than one section. The general effect is of an organized series of independent monographs, averaging about 25,000 words each, and ranging as high as 35,000. A few are brilliant, some are slightly dull, but all are competent.

The work is in five chronological divisions: "The Colonial Period, 1736-1785", "A New Church in a New Nation, 1785-1844", "A Divided Church in a Divided Nation, 1844-76", "A Flourishing Church in a Prospering Nation, 1876-1919", and "A Maturing Church in a Maturing Nation, 1919-1960". Of these the first is by far the smallest, comprising 12% of the whole, and the third by far the largest (28%), while the two parts devoted to the last ninety years occupy about 38% of the whole work.

Each of the five parts is introduced not only by a neat line-drawing symbolizing its mood, but by a brief essay setting the stage by means of a summary of the historical, religious, cultural, social, and political background and cross-currents of the period under review. Although each author of these literary chairman's remarks has apparently been allowed to take his own line (and each introduction does in fact follow a slightly different pattern) the standard is always high and the emphasis uniformly on the theme implicit in the title for that part. The plan followed within each part is also chronological, though only rigidly so in the first. As Methodism expands and becomes more complex it becomes the more necessary to study themes rather than periods, and the editorial board has sometimes accepted (or perhaps planned) the discussion of a theme far beyond the chronological limits laid down by the appropriate period.

Of the individual contributions it is debatable whether in a brief review like this anything at all should be said. Merely to list the titles and the authors and to add a grade such as A, B, or possibly C (there are no D's) would fill more than the remainder of the allotted space. I will venture to name a handful only, without any claim that they are the best, and with no implied criticism of the rest. Our own Stuart Henry is one of the non-Methodists

represented, offering an attractively written survey of the founding of Georgia, the mixed reception of the Wesleys there, and the wider evangelism of George Whitefield. The chapter on "Methodism and the Revolution" by Coen G. Pierson is one of the best, presenting in crisp English the fruits of extensive research thoroughly digested. "The Message of Early American Methodism" by Leland Scott is both enlightening and entertaining. Bishop Nolan B. Harmon writes with wit and wisdom on the history of church organization. The story of the Methodist Episcopal Church after the Civil War is brilliantly told by Walter W. Benjamin, whose section on "The Age of Methodist Affluence" is especially entertaining. The longest monograph is by Robert Moats Miller of the University of North Carolina, a masterly summary of "Methodism and American Society, 1900-1939". One of the shortest is an assessment by Jaroslav J. Pelikan of "Methodism's Contribution to America". (P.S. Mr. Editor, please assure my many friends whose work I have not specifically mentioned that I nevertheless enjoyed and value it. I do hope they won't strike my name from their prayer-lists!)

Only one appendix is supplied, a too-brief sketch of American Methodist hymnody. Many others probably suggested themselves to the editorial board, such as summary tables of Methodist statistics or of General Conferences, but the urgent needs at least have been supplied in an adequate bibliography and a full index in each of the three volumes, and necessary footnotes placed where they should be placed—in the public eye at the foot of the page rather than buried in an unmarked grave.

The *History* has been greatly enriched by carefully chosen illustrations, and although it would have been pleasant to have had more and to have found them associated with the appropriate text rather than gathered into a section in the middle of each volume, we must not be unreasonable or greedy, realizing that this would have increased the price by several dollars. It is indeed one of those happy Methodist miracles that these three volumes have been so carefully prepared and so efficiently produced at so low a price, and for this not only our own country and our own generation must remain grateful, but others over the seas and over the years.—Frank Baker.

*Ethics in a Christian Context.* Paul Lehmann. Harper and Row. 1963. 384 pp. $5.

When Professor Paul Lehmann contributed an essay on "The Foundation and Pattern of Christian Behavior" to *Christian Faith and Social Action,* now ten years ago, he gave promise of producing a much more comprehensive and systematic account of "contextual" ethics. *Ethics in a Christian Context* is, in part, that larger statement. It is intended by the author that this work will be supplemented by additional volumes detailing the process and issue of Christian decision-making as this is undertaken from an "indicative" rather than "imperative" moral posture.

One finds it very difficult to say, with much precision, what constitutes the message of this book. This is partly accounted for by the limitations imposed upon the length of this review. But it is also the case because of the sometimes forced and often turgid literary style of the work itself. The volume is concerned primarily with ethical methodology, and the need for cogent and lucid exposition of the text is therefore the more critical.

But what of the content of the volume? Principally, Lehmann is concerned to set the question of Christian conduct within the context of Christian faith. How this is to be accomplished constitutes the major concern of the essay. "Christian ethics . . .

is oriented toward revelation and not toward morality" (p. 45). In this assertion, it is suggested that the problem of Christian ethics is "not *knowing* that one is to do the will of God but *doing* the will of God which one knows" (p. 75). How does one "know" what that will is and what a believer in Jesus Christ and a member of his church is to do? The answer seems to be, rather more formal than material, that one relates behavior and belief through participation in the body of Christ, the *koinonia,* which is that community in which "witness to revelation and *response* . . . in the Spirit coincide" (p. 51).

The *koinonia* is thus the "Christian context" and it is here that one "comes in sight of and finds oneself involved in what God is doing in the world. What God is doing in the world is setting up and carrying out the conditions for what it takes to keep human life human" (p. 124). How does one apprehend God's activity which determines what he (the Christian person) is to do in the world? "Such knowledge comes by insight, not by calculation" (p. 141). The same epistemological position supports also Lehmann's definition of the character of Christian conduct: "In this new order behavior is bereft of every prudential calculation, every motivational concern. Instead, it is endowed with that purity of heart which, in Kierkegaard's phrase, 'is to will one thing', and in Jesus' phrase is 'to see God'" (p. 123). Or, again, the believer is one whose conduct is characterized by "behavior expressive of confidence and hope as against anxiety and despair, of behaving with abandon rather than with calculation. . . ." (p. 120).

There is no doubt that Professor Lehmann is the foremost American advocate of this view of Christian ethics. But what he has to say in this book is strongly reminiscent of a strain in German theology, now long and illustrious, dating at least from Schleiermacher to Barth and Bonhoeffer. The rather complete rejection not only of ethical absolutes (which, so far as I am aware, are no longer serious options for most modern moralists) but also of general ethical principles and the entire range of moral and philosophical theology comes, therefore, as no great surprise. What is cause for some wonder is the considerably less than satisfactory fashion in which the author deals with and dismisses these resources as useless and meaningless contributions to Christian ethical inquiry. Indeed, the presupposition upon which this summary rejection is premised is itself open to serious question: can one say, except at the most profound risk, that God's work in the world is either limited to or even chiefly concerned with the Christian *koinonia,* and is that work nowhere else apparent than in this fellowship?

A corollary question may be raised at another level of ethical discourse: has the development of such a "koinonia ethics" contributed to a real solution to the problem of a double moral standard for Christian and nonbeliever or have the exclusive claims made on behalf of the *koinonia* served to make more intensely separable these moral postures? Further, we are left in this book without instruction as to "what" we are to do after we learn "that" we are to do God's will. It is surely uncertain that we can properly defer assessment of this volume, with respect to such questions, until subsequent writing shows how this methodology works itself out in the (frequently) gutty and sweaty details of concrete action.

There is no doubt that in providing us with his mature reflections upon these important questions Professor Lehmann has provided us with insightful and critical commentary far beyond the scope of this review to report or comment upon, and for this we are grateful. What is chiefly to be regretted is that his statement will, in the long run of things, likely serve intramurally polemical rather than constructive goals, and that the gulfs between revelation and reason, faith and order,

indicative and imperative, value and duty, Christian and non-Christian, and all the rest, are not bridged but made only wider and more turbulent.—Harmon L. Smith.

*Teaching Our Faith in God.* L. Harold DeWolf. Abingdon. 1963. 179 pp. $3.75.

This eminent Methodist professor of theology, veteran also of more than forty years of teaching children, youth, and adults in Sunday school, holds Christian education to be central in the life and work of the church. He believes strongly, moreover, that Christian education and theology need each other. Theology needs the service of Christian education in clarifying its language and teaching its message. Christian education as surely needs theology: for better understanding of the Christian message in its current and relevant expression, but also for guidance as to human nature, the nurturing church, and the goals and methods of Christian teaching. This book offers such guidance in the form of an examination of basic Christian doctrines both for their content and for their implications for Christian education.

This does not imply a content-centered education, however, nor yet a life-centered, group-centered, or even church-centered (party labels all)—rather, the comprehension of these inadequate approaches in a higher perspective. "The central and all-inclusive task of Christian education," says Dr. DeWolf, "is teaching our faith in God" (p. 23). Examining New Testament meanings of "faith"—faithfulness, trust, total commitment, believing, doctrine believed—he sees the goal of Christian education as establishing and nurturing persons "in faithful relationship to God. The true purpose of the teacher is not merely to implant a body of doctrines in the pupil's mind, nor even to win his acceptance of them as true. It is to win the total commitment of his life to God in grateful, obedient, trusting service." But this "*commitment* of faith is possible only when the pupil has heard the *messa*ge of faith" (p. 28); hence the responsibility of the church to know and communicate its message clearly. This work of Christian education is itself fundamentally an expression of faith in God, more especially in God as Holy Spirit (pp. 23, 37).

The major part of the book is a presentation of the Christian faith, with emphasis on the doctrine of the Trinity as a needed theological corrective of distortions, as a summary of the Biblical message, and as a guide for Christian teaching through the ages and today. Briefer treatments follow on the doctrines of man, the Church, and the mission of the Church in the world. Laymen should find this a helpful theological guide, with the brief but illuminating Biblical, historical, and current references and keen insights into meanings for Christian education. Ministers and theologs may welcome the theological review and value the educational insights even more.

DeWolf insists that theology not leave to educational psychology alone the determination of sequence of instruction (content to be taught at various age levels). The whole Christian faith is relevant to and should be shared with each age, even little children. Before ideas or words are intelligible, the realities they represent may be, and may be communicated in nonverbal, nonideational ways. Acquaintance with God is more basic than ideas about God: "It would be an absurd presumption to try instructing anyone, of any age, about God if we could not believe that God himself had spoken to the student before us" (p. 48). There remain, of course, appropriately different ways of presenting the whole Christian message for different ages; and the author's further suggestions are theologically and pedagogically helpful.

Professor DeWolf's work is clear, well-organized and outlined, and a

warmly authentic expression of Christian faith. It tends more than we prefer, but less than we expected, toward the natural theology, theistic arguments, moral law, optimism about man, and under-emphasis on revelation, of the philosophy of personal idealism; but it is balanced, central, irenic—possibly too much so for realism about sinful resistance to God and Christian faith, yet possibly justified by the author's experience with the Teacher who overcomes such resistance. It is gratifying that the "Advanced Studies" for Methodist adults in June will feature this fine book.—McMurry S. Richey.

*Harper's Bible Commentary.* William Neil. Harper and Row, 1962. 544 pp. $5.95.

Is it fair to the author or to the prospective reader for a reviewer to comment on a book which he has not read *in toto*? I hope so, because thus far I have not worked through all the 544 pages of this volume. Yet I want to review it so appreciatively that you will buy it.

William Neil, a sound biblical scholar, has written a smoothly flowing and continuously interesting commentary on both Testaments, including the Apocrypha for good measure. It is primarily a homiletical exposition, for the man in the pew as well as the man in the pulpit. Neil has this to say of his commentary:

> The reader of this commentary will therefore find none of the usual separate essays on topics such as biblical chronology or the synoptic problem, nor indeed detailed treatment of vexed questions of authorship, variant readings and so on. Instead he will find an attempt to provide a running commentary from *Genesis* to *Revelations* which is based on the assumption that the biblical writers were primarily theologians and not anthropologists, scientists or even historians, that the Old and New Testaments are part of one and the same revelation and that they cannot be understood apart from one another (p. 6).

There is no attempt to give equal value to every verse or passage. The exposition of the Ten Commandments covers twelve pages, while the Sermon on the Mount is elucidated in three. Seven pages are sufficient for the Psalms! But Neil writes more *on* Philemon than Paul did *to* Philemon in the original letter. He puts the weight where he thinks it should go. Why not? It's his book.

The subject slogans at the heads of some pages hand us sermonic topics: Murderers All (Gen. 4:1-5); A Wanderer's Way (Eccles.); No Compromise (Dan. 1-3); The Birthpangs of the Church (Acts); The Angry Letter (2 Cor. 10:1-13:14); The Epilogue to the Divine Drama (Rev.).

This is an exciting volume written in a disciplined and stimulating style which maintains and develops one's interest.—James T. Cleland.

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