

5.24.37
Library of The Theological Seminary

PRINCETON · NEW JERSEY



PRESENTED BY

Mrs. Huston Dixon

B52344

.M613

1884

20

A. W. Meyer
Commentary on the N. T.
CRITICAL AND EXEGETICAL

HANDBOOK

TO

THE GENERAL EPISTLES

OF

JAMES, PETER, JOHN, AND JUDE.

BY

✓
JOH. ED. HUTHER, TH.D.,

PASTOR AT WITTENFÖRDEN BEI SCHWERIN.

TRANSLATED FROM THE THIRD EDITION OF THE GERMAN

BY


REV. PATON J. GLOAG, D.D., D. B. CROOM, M.A.,
AND REV. CLARKE H. IRWIN, M.A.

WITH A PREFACE AND SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES TO THE
AMERICAN EDITION

BY TIMOTHY DWIGHT,

PRESIDENT OF YALE UNIVERSITY.

NEW YORK:
FUNK & WAGNALLS, PUBLISHERS,
18 & 20 ASTOR PLACE.
1887.



19

COPYRIGHT, 1887,
By FUNK & WAGNALLS.

PREFACE BY THE AMERICAN EDITOR.

THE commentaries included within the present volume of Meyer's Critical and Exegetical Hand-Book were prepared by his coadjutor, Dr. J. E. Huther. The English translation was made from the latest editions of the several commentaries which were published before Dr. Huther's death. Since his death, a fourth edition of the Commentary on the Epistle of James has appeared in Germany (in 1882), with some additions by Dr. Willibald Beyschlag, who has carefully revised the work. To this volume of Beyschlag, some references have been made in the Additional Notes of the American Editor. A fifth edition of the Commentary on the Epistles of Peter and Jude has been prepared under the editorship of Ernst Kühl, but has not as yet been received. That Huther was the equal of Meyer in those qualities and gifts which make the great exegete, will not be claimed by any competent scholar; but that he was a worthy associate in the work of which Meyer wrote so large a portion, is proved by the ability with which he discharged the duty assigned to him, and by the favorable reception which his commentaries have met with on the part of all who have used them.

The Additional Notes of the American Editor have been prepared in accordance with the same principles and purpose with those which governed him in the preparation of the notes added to the other volumes of Meyer's Commentary of which he has had editorial care. They have been placed at the end of the volume; and the reader's attention is invited to them with the hope, on the writer's part, that some help and some suggestions of value may be found in them in connection with the study of the several epistles.

It is scarcely necessary to remind the reader, that, in the references to the N. T. Grammars of Winer and Buttmann, the numbers following the letters E. T. designate the pages of the translations of those works by Professor J. Henry Thayer. The letters A. V., R. V., and A. R. V., refer respectively to the Authorized English Version of the New Testament, the Revised Version, and the American Appendix to the latter.

In giving this last volume of Meyer's work, of which he has had editorial charge, to the public, in this American edition, the editor would dedicate his part of it, as he has done in the case of each of the earlier volumes, to the students whom he has met for so many years, and with so much pleasure, in the lecture-rooms of the Divinity School of Yale University.

TIMOTHY DWIGHT.

NEW HAVEN, April 15, 1867.

[NEW HAVEN, Nov. 16, 1867. — The Notes of the American Editor of this volume, and all his editorial work connected with it, were completed, as the date of the Preface may indicate, in the spring of the present year. By reason of unavoidable delays in the manner of printing, the publication of the volume has been deferred until the autumn. In the mean time, the fifth edition of Huther's Commentary on the Epistles of Peter and Jude, prepared by Köhl, has appeared in Germany, and has been received in this country. The work of Huther, so far as the First Epistle of Peter is concerned, has been thoroughly revised: and, in many cases, changes have been introduced, and different views from those of Huther expressed. In the case of the other two Epistles, there is, in comparison, much less of new matter calling for special notice. The American Editor has added to his own Notes on First Peter a considerable number of statements giving Köhl's views, which statements will be found enclosed in brackets. These additions, which were all that under the circumstances could well be made, will be sufficient, it is hoped, to acquaint the reader in some measure with the new edition.]

AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO THE COMMENTARY ON JAMES.

IN the new revision of this Commentary, the following works have been chiefly examined: H. Bouman, *Comment. perpet. in Jac. Ep.*, ed. 1863, the exposition of the Epistle by Lange (second edition, 1866) in Lange's *Bibelwerk*, and the third edition of De Wette's exposition edited by Brückner. Whilst in the first of these works a deep and thorough examination of the thoughts of the Epistle is wanting, the work of Lange is too defective in exegetical carefulness, which alone can lead to sure results. In order to comprehend the Epistle historically, Lange proceeds from the most arbitrary hypotheses, which often mislead him into very rash, and sometimes strange, explanations. It is to be regretted, that, with all his spiritual feeling and acuteness, he has not been able to put a proper bridle upon his imagination. The second edition of De Wette's Handbook, containing the exposition of the Epistles of Peter, Jude, and James, had been previously prepared by Brückner. When, in the preface to the third edition, he says that he has subjected this portion of the Handbook to a thorough revision, and, as far as possible, has made the necessary additions and corrections, this assertion is completely justified by the work. Although the remarks of Brückner are condensed, yet they are highly deserving of attention, being the result of a true exegetical insight. It were to be wished that Brückner had been less trammelled by "the duty to preserve the work of De Wette as much as possible uncurtailed." Of the recent examinations on the relation of the Pauline view of justification to that of James, I will only here mention the familiar dissertation of Hengstenberg: "The Epistle of James," in Nos. 91-94 of the *Evangelical Church Magazine*, 1866; and the explanation of Jas. ii. 24-26, by Philipp, in his *Dogmatics*, vol. i. pp. 297-315. Both, without assenting to my explanation, agree with me in this, that there is no essential difference between the doctrines of Paul and James. Hengstenberg arrives at this result by supposing, on the assumption of a justification gradually developed, that James speaks of a different stage

†

of justification from that of Paul; whilst Philippi attributes to *δικαιοῦν*, with James, another meaning than that which it has with Paul. I can approve neither of the one method nor of the other; not of the former, because by it the idea of justification is altered in a most serious manner; nor of the latter, because it is wanting in linguistic correctness, and, moreover, thoughts are by it given which are wholly unimportant. I will not here resume the controversy with Frank, to which I felt constrained in the publication of the second edition; only remarking, that, after a careful examination, I have not been able to alter my earlier expressed view of James's doctrine of justification, the less so as it had not its origin from dogmatic prepossession, but was demanded by exegetical conviction. Moreover, I am no less convinced than formerly, that, in the deductions made by me, nothing is contained which contradicts the doctrine of the church regarding justification. — With regard to the question whether the author of this Epistle, the brother of the Lord, is or is not identical with the Apostle James, I have not been able to change my earlier convictions. If, in more recent times, the opposite view has been occasionally maintained, this is either in the way of simple assertion, or on grounds which proceed from unjustified suppositions. This present edition will show that I have exercised as impartial a criticism as possible with regard to my own views, as well as with regard to the views of others.

The quotations from Rauch and Gunkel refer to their reviews of this commentary published before the second edition; the one is found in No. 20 of the *Theol. Literaturblatt* of the *Allgem. Kirchenzeitung* of the year 1858; and the other in the *Göttingen gel. Anz.*, parts 109–112 of the year 1859. I have occasionally quoted Cremer's *Biblischtbeol. Wörterbuch des neutest. Gräcität.* The more I know of the value of this work, the more I regret that it does not answer to its title, inasmuch as those words are only treated which the author considers to be the expressions of spiritual, moral, and religious life. A distinction is here made which can only with difficulty be maintained. I have quoted Winer's *Grammar*, not only according to the sixth, but also according to the seventh edition, edited by Lünemann.

I again close this preface with the hope that my labor may help to make the truly apostolic spirit of the Epistle of James more valued, and to render its ethical teaching more useful to the Church.

AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO THE COMMENTARY ON PETER.

IN revising this Commentary on the Epistles of Peter for the present fourth edition, the work which I had chiefly to consider and subject to a careful examination was the Exposition of the Epistles by Von Hofmann. This accordingly I did. Von Hofmann often seeks to surmount the exegetical difficulties presented in the epistles by a *new* exposition, and, of course, no exception can be taken to this; but it is to be regretted that the interpretations are not unfrequently of so artificial a nature that they cannot stand the test of an unprejudiced examination, and are consequently little calculated to promote the true understanding of the text.

As regards the origin of the Second Epistle, my renewed investigations have produced no result other than that which I had formerly obtained. I can only repeat what I said in the preface to the third edition of this Commentary: "If I should be blamed for giving, in this edition also, no decisive and final answer to the question as to the origin of Second Peter, I will say, at the outset, that it seems to me more correct to pronounce a *non liquet* than to cut the knot by arbitrary assertions and acute appearances of argument."

Although this Commentary on the whole has preserved its former character, yet it has been subjected to many changes in particulars, which I hope may be regarded as improvements.

I would only add, that, in the critical remarks, it is principally Tischendorf's Recension that has been kept in view. Tisch. 7 refers to the *editio septima critica minor*, 1859; Tisch. 8, to his *editio octava major*, 1869. Where the two editions agree in a reading, Tisch. simply is put.

J. ED. HUTHER.

WITTENFÖRDEN, *May*, 1877.

THE EPISTLE OF JAMES.

INTRODUCTION.

SEC. 1. — JAMES.

THE author of this Epistle designates himself in the inscription 'Ιάκωβος, Θεοῦ καὶ κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ δούλος, and thus announces himself to be, though not an apostle in the narrower sense of the term, yet a man of apostolic dignity. From this, as well as from the attitude which he takes up toward the circle of readers to whom he has directed his Epistle (ταῖς δώδεκα φυλαῖς ταῖς ἐν τῇ διασπορᾷ), it is evident that no other James can be meant than he who, at an early period in the Acts of the Apostles, appears as the head of the church at Jerusalem (Acts xii. 17, xv. 13 ff., xxi. 18); whom Paul calls ὁ ἀδελφὸς τοῦ κυρίου (Gal. i. 19), and reckons among the στυλοὶς (Gal. ii. 9), and whom Jude, the author of the last Catholic Epistle, designates as his brother (Jude 1); the same who in tradition received the name ὁ δίκαιος (Hegesippus in Eusebius, *Hist. Eccl.* ii. 23, iv. 22), who was regarded even by the Jews as an ἀνὴρ δικαίωτατος (Joseph., *Antiq.* xx. 3, 1), to whom a higher dignity than that of the apostles is attributed in the Clementines, and who, according to the narrative of Josephus, suffered martyrdom about the year 63; according to that of Hegesippus (Euseb. ii. 23), not long before the destruction of Jerusalem.¹

As regards the question whether this James is to be considered as identical with the Apostle James the son of Alphaeus, as is maintained

¹ No certain decision can be come to on this difference, especially as the narrative of Hegesippus (comp. Lange's *Komment.*, Einleitung, p. 13 f.) bears unmistakable mythical traces; and in the relation of Josephus: παράγων εἰς αὐτὸ (τὸν ἀδελφὸν Ἰησοῦ, τοῦ λεγομένου Χρισ-

τοῦ, Ἰάκωβος ὄνομα αὐτῷ καὶ) τινὰς (ἐτέρους) . . . παρέδωκε λευθησομένους, the genuineness of the bracketed words is at least doubtful; Clericus, Lardner, Credner, assert their spuriousness.

in recent times by Lange, Bouman, Hengstenberg, Philippi, and others, or as a different person, the data given in the N. T. are more favorable to the idea of non-identity than to the opposite opinion. 1. When mention is made in the N. T. of the ἀδελφοί of Jesus, they are represented as a circle different from that of the apostles. Thus they are already in John ii. 12 distinguished from the μαθηταῖς of Jesus; the same distinction is also made after the choice of the twelve apostles (Matt. xii. 46; Mark iii. 21, 31; Luke viii. 19; John vii. 3), and in such a manner that neither in these passages nor in those where the Jews mention the brethren of Jesus (Matt. xiii. 55; Mark vi. 3)¹ is there the slightest indication that one or several of them belonged to the apostolic circle: rather, their conduct toward Jesus is characterized as different from that of the apostles; and, indeed, it is expressly said of them that *they* did not believe on Him (John vii. 5). Also after the ascension of Christ, when His brethren had become believers, and had attached themselves to the apostles, they are expressly, and in the same simple manner as before, distinguished from the Twelve (Acts i. 14; 1 Cor. ix. 5). 2. In no passage of the N. T. is it indicated that the ἀδελφοί of the Lord were not His brothers, in the usual meaning of the word, but His cousins; and, on the other hand, James the son of Alphaeus is never reckoned as a brother of Jesus, nor is there any trace of a relationship between him and the Lord. Certainly the Mary mentioned in John xix. 25 (ἡ τοῦ Κλωπᾶ) was the mother of the sons of Alphaeus (Matt. xxvii. 56; Mark xv. 40), as Ἀλφάιος and Κλωπᾶς are only different forms of the same name (אלפי); but from that passage it does not follow that this Mary was a sister of the mother of Jesus (see Meyer *in loc.*). 3. According to the lists of the apostles, only one of the sons of Alphaeus, namely James, was the apostle of the Lord. Although the Apostle Lebbaeus (Matt. x. 3), whom Mark calls Thaddaeus (Mark iii. 18), is the same with Ἰούδας Ἰακώβου in Luke (Luke vi. 15; Acts i. 13), yet he was *not* a brother of James; for, on the one hand, if this were the case he would have been called so by Matthew, who expressly places the brothers among the apostles together; and, on the other hand, ἀδελφός is not to be supplied to the genitive Ἰακώβου in Luke, — contrary to all analogy, —

¹ According to the *Receptus*, the names of the brothers of Jesus are James, Joses, Judas, and Simon. Instead of Ἰωσήs in Matthew, Lachmann, and Tischendorf have adopted, according to preponderating authority, Ἰωσήφ;

in Mark they, however, read Ἰωσήτος; yet here also the Codex Sinaiticus has Ἰωσήφ. It remains doubtful which is the correct name. Comp. Meyer on the passage in Matthew.

but *υἱός* (see Introduction to *Commentary on Jude*, sec. 1). According to Matt. xxvii. 26 and Mark xv. 40, Alphaeus, besides James, had only *one* other son, Joses. If the apostles Judas and Simon were also his sons, his wife Mary in the above passages would have been also called their mother, especially as Joses was not an apostle. From all these data, then, the brothers of the Lord, James, Judas, and Simon, are not to be considered as identical with the apostles bearing the same names.

4. There are, however, two passages, Gal. i. 19 and 1 Cor. xv. 7, which appear to lead to a different conclusion. In the first passage *εἰ μὴ* appears to indicate, as many interpreters assume, that Paul, by the addition for the sake of historical exactness, remarks that besides the Apostle Peter he saw also the Apostle James. But on this supposition we cannot see why he should designate him yet more exactly as *τὸν ἀδελφὸν τοῦ Κυρίου*, since the other Apostle James was at that time dead. The addition of this surname indicates a distinction of *this* James from the apostle. Now *εἰ μὴ* does certainly refer not only to *ὄκκ εἶδον* (Fritzsche, *Ad Matth.*, p. 482; Neander, *Winer*), but to the whole preceding clause; still, considering the position which James occupied, Paul might regard him, and indeed was bound to regard him, as standing in such a close relation to the real apostles that he might use *εἰ μὴ* without including him among them.¹ It is evident that Paul did not reckon James among the original apostles, since in Gal. ii. he names him and Cephas and John together, not as apostles, but as *οἱ δοκοῦντες εἶναι τι, οἱ δοκοῦντες στυλοὶ εἶναι*.²—In the other passage, 1 Cor. xv. 7, the word *πᾶσιν* may be added by Paul, with reference to James formerly named, in the sense: “afterwards Christ appeared to James, and then—not to him only, but—to all the apostles,” from which it would follow that James belonged to the

¹ Meyer (*in loc.*) supposes that James is here reckoned by Paul among the apostles in the wider sense of the term. But it is also possible that the words *εἰ μὴ, κ.τ.λ.*, are not to be understood as a limitation to the thought before expressed, *ἕτερον δέ, κ.τ.λ.*, but as a remark added to it, by which Paul would lay stress upon the fact that besides Peter he has also seen James, the brother of the Lord, thus the man who possessed not only an apostolic dignity, but to whom the opponents of Paul directly appealed.

² That James is reckoned by Paul among

the *στυλοὶς*, has certainly been adduced as an argument for the opposite opinion: but that Paul does not reckon those named as *στυλοὶς* because they were *apostles*, is undeniable; and that only apostles could be considered as *στυλοὶς*, is an unwarranted assumption. Bouman thinks that a *mere private person* could not attain to such an importance; but he overlooks the fact that James, as the most prominent of the *brothers of the Lord*, who are named alongside of the apostles, was more than a mere private person.

apostles. But this reference is not *necessary*, as *πᾶσιν* may as well be added in order simply to give prominence to the fact that *all* the apostles, without exception, had seen the Lord.¹ 5. All the other reasons for the identity, which are taken from the N. T., as adduced by Lange, are too subjective in character to be considered as conclusive: as, for example, that Luke in Acts xii. 17 would have felt himself obliged to notice that the James mentioned by him here, and farther on, is not the same with the James whom he had called an apostle in Acts i. 13;² that only an *apostle* could have written such an epistle, and have attained to that consequence which James possessed in the Church;³ and that it is improbable that, besides the apostles James, Judas, and Simon, there should be three of the brothers of Jesus bearing the same names.⁴

The testimonies of the post-apostolic age are much too uncertain to decide the controversy; for whilst Clemens Alexandrinus (Euseb., *Hist. Eccl.*, ii. 1: *δύο δὲ γεγόνασιν Ἰακώβου εἰς ὃ δίκαιος . . . ἕτερος δὲ ὁ . . . κατατομηθείς*) and Jerome declare for the hypothesis of identity, the Apostolic Constitutions (ii. 55, vi. 12, 14; in the latter passage, after the enumeration of the twelve apostles, there are yet named: *Ἰακωβός τε ὁ τοῦ κυρίου ἀδελφός καὶ Ἱεροσόλυμων ἐπίσκοπος καὶ Παῦλος ὁ τῶν ἐθνῶν διδάσκαλος*) and Eusebius (commentary on Isa. xvii. 5 in Montfaucon, *Coll. Nova Patr.*, ii. p. 422; *Hist. Eccl.*, i. 12, vii. 19) definitely distinguish the brother of the Lord from the apostles. The statement of Hegesippus (in Euseb., iv. 22), to which Credner appeals

¹ Otherwise Meyer (*in loc.*), who here also understands the expression *ἀπόστολοι* in the wider sense, which certainly receives a justification from the fact that the original apostles had before been designated by Paul as *οἱ δώδεκα*.

² Against this it is to be affirmed, that Luke might certainly assume such an acquaintance on the part of his readers with the circumstances, that in speaking of James in Jerusalem he did not deem it necessary to remark which James he meant. He even names Philip (viii. 5) without saying whether he was the apostle or the deacon. Bleek (*Eint. in N. T.*, p. 545) explains the matter differently; that, as the Acts of the Apostles is not to be considered an independent work of Luke, we may suppose that he retained the simple designation James as he found it in his document, without making any remark on the relation of this

James to Jesus, and to James the son of Alphaeus.

³ The important position of James in Jerusalem was not founded on the apostolate, as that office points rather to missionary activity than to an episcopal superintendence of a church.

⁴ This similarity ceases to be remarkable when we consider how frequently the same names are given to different persons in the N. T.; we have only to adduce the names Mary, Simon, Joseph, Judas, etc. On the supposition of the identity of these three apostles with the three brothers of Jesus, then in the passages Matt. xii. 46 (Mark iii. 31; Luke viii. 19) and John vii. 3, 5, only *one* brother of the Lord, James (or Joseph), could be referred to, particularly as sisters could not be included in the idea of brothers, as Lange, it is true, thinks is the case in Acts i. 13, 14.

against, and Kern and Lange for, the identity, is not in favor of it;¹ also the extract of Jerome from the Hebrew gospel cannot with certainty be quoted for it (Hieron., *De Vir. Illustrib.*, chap. ii.); and still less the passage in the Clementine Homilies, xi. 35, where the words τῷ λεχθέντι ἀδελφῷ τοῦ κυρίου μου annexed to Ἰακώβω admit of the explanation that the designation ἀδελφ. τ. κύρ. was his familiar surname. The opinions of the later Church Fathers are evidently of no weight either for or against the identity.

On the assumption of identity, the word ἀδελφός cannot be understood in its usual sense. The opinion obtaining most favor since the time of Jerome is that the so-called ἀδελφοί were the *cousins* of Jesus, namely, the sons of the sister of His mother, who was also called Mary, and was the wife of Clopas (= Alphaeus). This view is supported by the interpretation of John xix. 25, according to which the words Μαρία ἡ τοῦ Κλωπᾶ are taken in apposition to the preceding ἡ ἀδελφὴ τῆς μητρὸς αὐτοῦ; and so the passage is explained by Theodoret: ἀδελφὸς τοῦ κυρίου ἐκαλεῖτο μέν, οὐκ ἦν δὲ φύσει . . . τοῦ Κλωπᾶ μὲν ἦν υἱός, τοῦ δὲ κυρίου ἀνεψιός· μητέρα γὰρ εἶχε τὴν ἀδελφὴν τῆς τοῦ κυρίου μητέρος. The correct interpretation of that passage removes all

¹ The passage is: μετὰ τὸ μαρτυρῆσαι Ἰακώβον τὸν δίκαιον, ὡς καὶ ὁ κύριος ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ, πάλιν ὁ ἐκ θείου αὐτοῦ Συμεῶν ὁ τοῦ Κλωπᾶ καθίσταται ἐπίσκοπος· ὃν προέθεντο πάντες ὄντα ἀνεψιὸν τοῦ κυρίου δευτερον. In this passage the translation of αὐτοῦ, of πάλιν, and of δευτερον is doubtful. Kern and Lange refer αὐτοῦ to ὁ κύριος, connect πάλιν directly with ὁ ἐκ θείου αὐτοῦ, and refer δευτερον to ἀνεψιὸν τοῦ κυρίου. But αὐτοῦ may, as Credner remarks, also refer to Ἰακώβον, and πάλιν be connected with καθίσταται ἐπίσκοπος, and δευτερον with ὃν προέθεντο. If αὐτοῦ is referred to Ἰακώβον, then James is designated as the *real* brother of Jesus, since in another passage (Euseb., *Hist. Eccl.*, iii. 22) Simeon the son of Clopas is called by Hegesippus the son of the uncle of Jesus; if, on the other hand, it is referred to ὁ κύριος, nothing is said regarding the relationship of James to Jesus: it thus depends on the interpretation of πάλιν and δευτερον. It cannot be denied that πάλιν is more naturally connected with καθίσταται ἐπίσκοπος than with the words which immediately follow, as in that case it would clearly mean that Simeon became bishop a second

time; but δευτερον may at least as well be connected with ὃν προέθεντο (in the sense: "whom all appointed the second bishop") as with ὃντα ἀνεψ. τ. κυρίου. — Thus, then, the explanation of Credner is not inferior to that of Kern and Lange, but rather appears to be the more probable, as Hegesippus elsewhere designates James simply as the brother of the Lord, and never indicates that he was an apostle; rather in the words: διαδέχεται δὲ τὴν ἐκκλησίαν μετὰ τῶν ἀποστόλων ὁ ἀδελφὸς τοῦ κυρίου Ἰακώβος, ὁ ὀνομασθεὶς ὑπὸ πάντων δίκαιος . . . Ἐπει πολλοὶ Ἰακώβοι ἐκαλοῦντο, he seems at least to distinguish him from the apostles. According to Hegesippus, Clopas was a brother of Joseph (Euseb., iii. 4), and thus Simeon as the son of Clopas was ἀνεψιὸς τοῦ κυρίου. Whether this is correct, must indeed remain uncertain; it finds no support in the N. T., as there the sons of Clopas (= Alphaeus) are only James and Joseph. From these remarks it follows how unjustifiable is the assertion of Lange: "We learn from Hegesippus that James the brother of the Lord was a brother of Simeon, and that both were the sons of Clopas."

ground for this opinion. Accordingly Lange (in Herzog's *Real-Encyclopædie*, and repeated in his *Commentary*, Introduction, p. 10), instead of this view, has advanced the theory, that as Clopas, according to Hegesippus, was a brother of Joseph, the so-called *brethren* of Jesus were properly His *step-cousins*, but after the early death of Clopas were adopted by Joseph, and so actually became the brothers of Jesus. But this opinion is destitute of foundation; for even although the narrative of Hegesippus is correct, yet tradition is silent concerning the early death of Clopas and the adoption of his children by Joseph, and as little "does history know that the sons of Alphaeus formed *one* household with the mother of Jesus, and were *prominent* members of it," as Lange maintains. By the denial of identity, ἀδελφός is to be understood in its proper sense. Thiersch (*Krit. d. neu. test. Schriften*, pp. 361, 430 ff.) adopts the opinion contained, according to his conjecture, in the Gospel of the Hebrews, and already advanced by Origen (on Matt. xiii.), that the *brothers of Jesus* were the children of Joseph by a former marriage; but against this Wiesinger rightly insists on the fact that this opinion of Origen "was by no means prevalent in his time." It owed its origin apparently to a delicacy to deny the perpetual virginity of Mary, as Thiersch confesses that "it is not to him a matter of indifference whether the mother of the Lord remained ἀει παρθένος." The evangelists, however, have not this feeling, for otherwise Matthew and Luke would not have said of Mary: ἔτεκε τὸν υἱὸν αὐτῆς τὸν πρωτότοκον, which points to the birth of later children not only as a possible, but as an actual fact. If it were otherwise, there would be some indication in the N. T. that Joseph was a *widower* when he married Mary, or that the ἀδελφοὶ Ἰησοῦ were not her children. According to the N. T., the brothers of Jesus, to whom James belonged, are the children of Mary born in wedlock with Joseph after the birth of Jesus; as is correctly recognized by Herder, Credner, Meyer, de Wette, Wiesinger, Stier, Bleek, and others.

In what the Evangelists relate of the brothers of Jesus, James is not particularly distinguished. Accordingly we are not to consider his conduct as different from that of the rest. Although closely related by birth to Jesus, His brothers did not recognize His higher dignity, so that Jesus with reference to them said οὐχ ἔστι προφήτης ἄτιμος, εἰ μὴ ἐν τῇ πατρίδι αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ αὐτοῦ (Matt. xiii. 56). Lange incorrectly infers from John ii. 12, where the brothers of Jesus are first mentioned, that "even at the commencement of the ministry of Jesus they were spiritually related (that is, by faith) to the disciples;" for at that time the brothers had not attached themselves to the *disciples*, but went with them from Cana to Capernaum that they

might accompany Mary. At a later period we find them separated from the disciples (see Mark iii. 21; Matt. xii. 46; Luke viii. 19);¹ they go with Mary to the house where Jesus is, because, thinking that He was mad, they wished to bring Him home with them, which was evidently no sign of their faith, but rather of their unbelief.² After the miracle of the loaves, when the feast of tabernacles was at hand, they are with Jesus in Galilee; but that even at this period they did not believe on Him, is expressly asserted by John (vii. 5). Only after the ascension do we find them as disciples of the Lord in close fellowship with the apostles. We are not informed when this change took place; but from the fact that Jesus on the cross resigned His mother, as one forsaken, to the care of John, we may conjecture that even then they did not believe. It is probable that our Lord's appearance after His resurrection to James (1 Cor. xv. 5) decided his belief, and that his conversion drew his brothers along with him, as may be inferred from the force of his character. So Bleek, *Einkl. in d. N. T.*, p. 546. James at an early period obtained in the church of Jerusalem such a position that he appears as its head (about A.D. 44); yet this position is not that of a bishop in distinction from presbyters, but he was one of the presbyters (Acts xv. 22, 23), whose loftier dignity was not derived from any special official authority, but only from his personality. In the conference at Jerusalem (in the year 50, Acts xv.), James not only took an important part, but his voice gave the decision. We cannot call his advice, in accordance with which the definite resolution was arrived at, a compromise; for the question whether believers among the Gentiles were obliged to be circumcised could only be affirmed or denied. James decided the question in the negative; grounding his opinion not on his own experience, nor on the communications of Paul and Barnabas, but on the divine act narrated by Peter, wherein he recognized the commencement of the fulfilment of the definite *λόγοι τῶν προφητῶν*. When he imposed upon the Gentile Christians *ἀπέχεσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλισθημάτων τῶν εἰδώλων καὶ τῆς πορνείας καὶ τοῦ πνικτοῦ καὶ τοῦ αἵματος*, he does so, not in the same sense as that in which the Judaizers im-

¹ This event, according to the united testimony of the Synoptists, occurred after the choice of the Twelve; Mark makes it to follow directly upon it. *Ἰν ἔλεγον γάρ*, ver. 21, Lange finds an "artifice" on the part of those belonging to Jesus to rescue Him from the death which threatened Him (!). — Meyer supplies to *ἐξῆλθον*, "from Nazareth;" but it is probable that the family at this time dwelt

no longer in Nazareth, but in Capernaum; for in Mark vi. 3 the inhabitants of Nazareth say *only of the sisters*, but not of His mother and brothers, that they dwelt with them (comp. also Matt. xiii. 55).

² Lange also, it is true, finds in the demand of the brothers a sign of unbelief, but of the unbelief of an enthusiasm which had not yet risen to self-sacrifice!

posed on them the observance of the law; and when as a reason he appeals to the reading of Moses every sabbath in the synagogues even of Gentile cities, he intimates that he wished to draw *the* boundary to the freedom of the Gentile Christians, within which they must keep themselves if it were to be possible for the Jewish Christians to live in brotherly fellowship with them. That James not only recognizes Gentile Christianity, but also the *ἀποστολή* of Paul, is apparent from Gal. ii. 7 ff.; yet it does not follow that he entered entirely into Paul's views. According to Gal. ii. 12, the persons there called *τινὲς ἀπὸ Ἰακώβου* were offended because Peter and the other Jews did eat *μετὰ τῶν ἐθνῶν*. We are not told in the narrative of Paul that these did not come directly from James, but only from Jerusalem; at least, that they had not been sent by James, or that they had expressed themselves more strongly than the views of James warranted. The influence which they exerted on Peter, and even on Barnabas and the other Jewish Christians at Antioch, would rather seem to indicate that their words were regarded as those of James, who, when he declared himself against *συνεσθίειν μετὰ τῶν ἐθνῶν*,¹ did not contradict his view expressed in the convention at Jerusalem. It is clear from Acts xxi. 17-26 that James attached great importance to the point that every *ἀποστασία* of the Jews from Moses should be avoided, and that the Gentile Christians should remain by that fourfold *ἀπέχεσθαι*; he even demanded from Paul a proof that he had not ceased to observe the law (*τὸν νόμον φυλάσσειν*). From the fact that Paul complied with this demand, it follows not only that he was not hostilely opposed to the view of James, but that he respected it, and recognized in it nothing essentially opposed to his own principles. He could not have done so had James insisted on the observance of the law in the same sense as did the Judaizing Christians, against whom Paul so often and so decidedly contended. According to James, the law was not a necessary means of justification along with and in addition to faith, but the rule of life appointed by God to the people of Israel, according to which *believing* Israel has to conform in the *free obedience of faith*. Thus James was and continued to be in his faith in Christ a true *Jew*, without, however, denying that Christianity was not only the glorification of Judaism, but also that by it the blessing promised to

¹ If Paul by *τὰ ἔθνη* (Gal. ii. 12) means not Gentiles, but, as is certainly the usual view, Gentile Christians, we must suppose, with Wieseler (*Komm. über d. Br. an d. Gal.*), that the Gentile Christians at Antioch no longer kept the rules established at Jerusalem,

otherwise Peter would have had no reason to separate himself from them at their meals. — Yet it is doubtful if we are justified in assuming this, as the presupposed fact is not in the least indicated by Paul.

Israel was imparted to the Gentiles without their being subject to the law of Israel.¹ The position of James toward the Mosaic law was accordingly different from that of Paul. For, whilst the latter was conscious that in Christ he was dead to the law (*μὴ ὦν ὑπὸ νόμον*, 1 Cor. ix. 20), so that he felt himself at liberty to be *ὡς Ἰουδαῖος* to the Jews but *ὡς ἀνόμος* to the *ἀνόμοις*, though always *ἐννόμος Χριστῷ*, the former esteemed it to be a sacred duty in Christ to observe the law which God had given to His people through Moses.² In this legal obedience James showed such a strict conscientiousness, that even by the Jews he received the name of "the Just." And considering this his peculiar character, it is not at all to be wondered at that the Judaistic Christians leant chiefly on him, and that Judaistic tradition imparted additional features to his portrait, by which he appeared as the ideal of Jewish holiness. According to the description of Hegesippus (Euseb., *Hist. Eccl.*, ii. 23), he was by birth a Nazarite, he led an ascetic life, he never anointed with oil nor used the bath, he never wore woollen but linen clothes, he was permitted to enter into the sanctuary, and he prayed constantly on his knees for the forgiveness of the people, and continued in his devotions so long that his knees became hard as camels'. This description may contain a few genuine traits, yet, as will be generally

¹ Weiss is wrong when he maintains (In the dissertation "James and Paul" in the *Deutsche Ztschr. f. christl. Wissenschaft*, 5th year, 1854, No. 51) that James was a stranger to the distinction between the fulfilment of the law from a motive of duty and from the impulse of a new principle, and that in this he was in opposition to Paul; that while, according to the latter, the law leads to sin and death; according to the view of James it produces righteousness and deliverance from death; and that he cherishes the idea, supposed by Weiss to be contained in the O. T., that he only can be declared righteous by God who is actually perfectly righteous. In opposition to the first two positions it is to be urged, that James in chap. ii. speaks not of the O. T. law as such, but of the N. T. *νόμος τῆς ἐλευθερίας*; and against the third position, that the O. T. recognizes distinctly a *forgiveness* of sins, as well as that James regards *δικαιοῦσθαι ἐξ ἔργων* as a work of *grace*, since he does not deny the existence of sin among true believers, and in

ii. 11 presupposes that it is only possible to stand in the judgment inasmuch as that judgment is *merciful*. It is to be observed that Weiss advances the same view of James in his *Bibl. Theologie*.

² Paul and James before their conversion to Christ certainly occupied different positions with regard to the law. The former regarded it—conformably to his Pharisaism—as the means of procuring righteousness, and accordingly in his strivings he experienced it as a *ζυγός* which weighed him down: James, on the other hand, was certainly one of those pious persons to whom, in the faith of the covenant which God made with His people, the law, as the witness of this covenant, was the word of divine love, and therefore in it he had found his joy and consolation (comp. Pa. cxix. 92, xlx. 8-11). Paul found his peace, when he recognized himself in Christ free from the law; James, when he experienced in Christ strength to obey the law.

admitted, it cannot be acquitted of "suspicious exaggeration" (Lange). The statements of the Ebionites proceed farther; in the Clementines, James is raised above all the apostles, and exalted to the episcopacy of all Christendom; indeed, according to Epiphanius (*Haeres.*, xxx. 16), his ascension to heaven was a matter of narration; and Epiphanius himself thinks that he not only went yearly into the holy of holies, but that he also wore the diadem of the high priest.

SEC. 2.—THE READERS OF THE EPISTLE.

The contents of the Epistle prove that it was addressed to *Christians*. Not only does the author—who by the designation *κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ δούλος* plainly announces himself to be a Christian—address his readers throughout as his "brethren" (also as his "beloved brethren"), but in several places he distinctly affirms that they stand with him on the same ground of faith; in chap. i. 18 he says that God has begotten them (*ἡμᾶς*) by the word of truth; in chap. ii. 1 he reminds them of their *πίστις τοῦ κυρίου Ἰ. Χριστοῦ τῆς δόξης*; in chap. ii. 7 he speaks of the goodly name (that is, the name of Jesus Christ) which was invoked upon them; in chap. v. 7 he exhorts them to patience, pointing out to them the nearness of the coming of the Lord; and in chap. ii. 16 ff. he evidently supposes that they had one and the same faith with himself. Add to this, that if the author as a *δούλος* of Christ had written to *non-Christians*, his Epistle could only have had the intention of leading them to faith in Christ; but of such an intention there is not the slightest trace found in the Epistle, so that Bouman is completely unjustified when he says: *vult haec esse epistola estque revera christianae religionis schola propaedeutica*. Certainly the designation of the readers, found in the inscription of the Epistle as *αἱ δώδεκα φυλαὶ αἱ ἐν τῇ διασπορᾷ*, appears at variance with this view, as such a designation properly applies to *Jews* dispersed among the Gentiles beyond the boundaries of Palestine. By this name cannot be meant *Christians in general* (Hengstenberg), inasmuch as they are the spiritual Israel (in contrast to *ὁ Ἰσραὴλ κατὰ σάρκα*, 1 Cor. x. 18; comp. Gal. vi. 16), and still less the *Gentile Christians* (Philippi), because it stamps the nationality too distinctly (much more than the expression *ἐκλεκτοὶ παρεπίδημοι διασπορῆς*, 1 Pet. i. 1), particularly as nothing is added pointing beyond the limits of nationality. The apparent contradiction is solved by the consideration of the view of James; according to which the Christians to whom he wrote not only

had not ceased to be Jews, but it was precisely those Jews who believed in the Messiah promised to them and manifested in Jesus who were the true Jews, so that he regarded *believing* Israel as the true people of God, on whom he could therefore without scruple confer the name *αἱ δώδεκα φυλαί*,¹ pointing to the fathers to whom the promises were made; and, besides, it is not to be forgotten that the sharp distinction between Christianity springing up in Judaism, and Judaism called to Christianity, did not at first arise, but was only gradually developed by subsequent historical relations. Yet it is not—on account of the above adduced reasons—to be inferred, as Bouman and Lange assume, that the Epistle was not only written to the converted, but also to the unconverted Jews.² The destination of the Epistle to Jewish Christians follows from chap. ii. 2, where the place of assembly of the congregations is called *συναγωγή*; from ii. 19, where monotheism is prominently brought forward; from v. 12, where swearing according to forms customary among the Jews is forbidden; and from v. 14, where the custom of anointing with oil is mentioned. But, besides, all the ethical faults which the author reproves are of such a nature that they have their root in the carnal Jewish disposition (Wiesinger, Schaff, Thiersch, and others).³—The indolent reliance, prevailing in the congregations, on a faith without works, cannot be adduced as a feature opposed to the Jewish character; for in its nature it is nothing else than the pharisaical confidence on the superiority over all other nations, granted by God through the law to the people of Israel. As the Jews thought that in their law they had a guaranty for their salvation without the actual practice of the law (comp. Rom. ii. 17 ff.), so these Christians trusted to their faith, though defective in works.⁴ That in later times the Jews also placed a false

¹ The solution is unsatisfactory, that "James writes to the Jews with whom he has access as a servant of Jesus Christ, and on whom as such he has influence."

² It is true that the author directly addresses the *rich*, who were hostilely disposed to the Christians; but it does not follow from this that the Epistle was in any proper sense directed to them; it is rather to be explained from the liveliness with which he writes. The author sees those who had exposed the readers of his Epistle in a twofold manner to temptation (*πειρασμός*) as present before him, and therefore for the sake of his readers he ad-

dresses them directly; as also the prophets often did in their denunciations against the enemies of Israel.

³ When Brückner thinks that the description of the readers as *αἱ δώδεκα φυλαί* does not require that they were merely Jewish Christians, but only that they who came over to them from the Gentiles must have submitted to the ordinances of the Jewish national life, it is to be observed that *circumcised* Gentiles were no longer regarded as Gentiles, but as Jews.

⁴ "What James had in view is simply a Jewish orthodoxy which asserted itself among

confidence on their knowledge of God, Justin testifies when he says: *οἱ λέγουσιν, ὅτι κἄν ἁμαρτωλοὶ ὡσι, Θεὸν δὲ γινώσκουσιν, οὐ μὴ λογιῶνται αὐτοῖς ἁμαρτίαν* (*Dial.*, p. 370, ed. col.). — It is true, it is not prominently mentioned in the Epistle, that the readers were solicitous about a scrupulous observance of the rites of the Mosaic law; but a false estimate of an external *θρησκεία* was, according to i. 22 ff., not wanting among them, with which also was united, as among the Jews, a fanatical zeal (*ὀργή*). — The condition of these Jewish-Christian congregations, as described in the Epistle, was as follows: They were exposed to manifold temptations (*πειρασμοὶ ποικίλοις*), whilst their members as poor (*ταπεινοί, πτωχοί*) by reason of their faith (chap. ii. 5, 6) were oppressed by the rich. But they did not bear these persecutions with that patience which assures the true Christian of the crown of life: on the contrary, these persecutions gave rise to an inward temptation, the blame of which, however, they sought not in themselves, in their *ἐπιθυμία*, but in God. Instead of praying in faith for the wisdom which was lacking to them, they gave way to doubt, which placed them in opposition to the principle of Christian life. Whilst they considered their *ταπεινότης* as a disgrace, they looked with envy at the glitter of earthly glory, and preferred the friendship of the world to that of God; in consequence of which, even in their religious assemblies, they flattered the rich, whilst they looked down upon the poor. This worldly spirit, conducive to the friendship of the world, was likewise the occasion of bitter strife among them, in which they murmured against each other, and in passionate zeal contended with violent words. These contentions were not “theological discussions” (Reuss) or “doctrinal dissensions” (Schmid), for the Epistle points to none of these; but concerned practical life, especially the Christian’s demeanor in the world.¹ As the Jews imagined that it belonged to them to be the ruling people of the world, to whom all the glory of the world belonged, so also many in these congregations wished to possess, even on the earth, in a worldly form, the glory promised to Christians; and therefore they quarrelled with “the brethren of low degree,” who, on their part, were carried along in passionate wrath against those of a

the Jewish Christians in the form of a dead, unfruitful faith in God and the Messiah” (Thiersch).

¹ The observation of Reuss (§ 144) is misleading: “The supremacy of systems and philosophy of faith was to the simple-minded

and unphilosophical author as much opposed as the supremacy of money and fine clothes;” since the *λαλεῖν* against which James contends has nothing to do with “systems and philosophy.”

proud disposition. In serving the world they certainly did not wish to cease to be Christians; but they thought to be certain of justification (*δικαιοῦσθαι*) on account of their faith, although that faith was to them something entirely external, which produced among them a fanatical zeal (as the law among the Jews), but not that *work* of faith which consisted, on the one hand, in *τηρεῖν ἑαυτὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ κόσμου*, and, on the other, in the practice of compassionate love. Yet all were not estranged in this manner from the Christian life; there were still among them disciples of the Lord who were and wished to be *ταπεινοί*: yet worldliness was so prevalent in the midst of them, that even they suffered from it. Hence the admonitory and warning nature of the Epistle to all, yet so that it is addressed chiefly sometimes to the one party and sometimes to the other, and is in its tone now mild and now severe. All, however, are addressed as *ἀδελφοί*, except the *rich*, who are distinctly stated as those who stand not inside, but outside, of the congregations to whom the Epistle was addressed. These faults in the congregations were the occasion which induced James to compose his Epistle. The Epistle itself is opposed to the opinion of Lange, that its occasion can only be understood when it is recognized that the Jewish Christians were infected by the fanaticism of the Jews, in which the revolutionary impulse of independence and revenge was united with enthusiastic apocalyptic and chiliastic hopes, and which was excited by the antagonism of the Gentile world to Judaism; in the Epistle, only in an arbitrary manner can references and allusions to these "*historical conditions*" be maintained.

The churches to which the Epistle is addressed are, according to the inscription, outside of Palestine, chiefly in Syria and the far East, whilst in the West there were hardly any Jewish-Christian churches; yet it is possible that the author also included, by the expression employed, the churches in Palestine only outside of Jerusalem (Guericke).

SEC. 3.—CONTENTS AND CHARACTER OF THE EPISTLE.

The Epistle commences with a reference to the *πειρασμοί* which the readers had to endure, exhorting them to esteem them as reasons for joy, to prove their patience under them, to ask in faith for the wisdom which was lacking to them, to which a warning against doubt is annexed. To the *rich* the judgment of God is announced; whilst to the lowly, who endure patiently, the crown of life is promised (i. 1-12). Directly upon this follows the warning not to refer the internal temptations which arose

from their own lusts (*ἐπιθυμία*) to God; as from God, on the contrary, cometh every *good* gift, especially the new birth by the word of truth (i. 13-18). To this is annexed the exhortation to be swift to hear, slow to speak, and slow to wrath. This exhortation forms the basis for the following amplifications. The first, "swift to hear," is more precisely defined: to receive with meekness the word which is able to save the soul, in such a way as there shall be no failure in the doing of the word by works of compassionate love, and by preserving one's self from the world (i. 19-27). With special reference to the flattery of the rich and the despising of the poor occurring in their assemblies, the sin of respect of persons is brought before the readers, and pressed upon them: that whosoever shall transgress the law in *one* point, he is guilty of all, and that to the unmerciful a judgment without mercy will be meted out (ii. 1-13); whereupon it is strongly affirmed that it is foolish to trust to a faith which without works is in itself dead. Such a faith does not profit; for by works a man is justified, and not by faith only, as also the examples of Abraham and Rahab show (ii. 14-26).—Without any transition, an earnest warning follows against the vain desire of teaching, which evidently refers to "slow to speak, slow to wrath." The warning is founded on the difficulty, indeed the impossibility, of bridling the tongue. Heavenly wisdom is then commended, in contrast to the wisdom of this world, which is full of bitter envy (iii. 1-18). The author severely reprimands his readers for their strifes arising from the love of the world; and exhorts them to humble themselves before God, and not to judge one another (iv. 1-12). He then turns to those who, in the pride of possession, forget their dependence on God, points out to them the fleeting nature of human life, subjoins a severe apostrophe against the rich, to whom he announces the certain judgment of God (iv. 13-v. 6), and, pointing to the Old-Testament examples, exhorts his readers to a persevering patience in love, as the coming of the Lord is at hand (v. 7-11). After a short warning against idle swearing (v. 12), the author gives advice as to how the sick are to behave themselves, exhorting them to mutual confession of sin, and, referring to the example of Elias, to mutual intercession; he then concludes the Epistle by stating the blessing which arises from the conversion of a sinner (v. 13-20).¹

¹ On the train of thought in the Epistle, see The Connection of the Epistle of James, by Pfeiffer, in *Theol. Stud. u. Kritiken*, 1850, Part I. In this dissertation the importance of

1. 19 for the construction of the Epistle is correctly recognized; only the two members *βραδὺς εἰς τὸ λαλῆσαι* and *βραδὺς εἰς ὀργήν* are too much separated from each other, and ac-

This Epistle was not addressed to a single church, but to a circle of churches (namely, to the Jewish-Christian churches outside of Palestine or of Jerusalem), on which account, when received into the canon, it was classed among the so-called *ἐπιστολαῖς καθολικαῖς*, by which, however, nothing is determined concerning its peculiar design.¹ For, even although the seven catholic Epistles received this name with reference to the already existing collection of the Pauline Epistles, yet the opinion of Kern (*Commentary*, Introduction), that the collection of these epistles under that name indicates an *internal* relationship with reference to the doctrine and tendency of Paul, is not justified. As an encyclical epistle, the Epistle of James considers only congregational, but not personal, relations. With regard to its contents, it is decidedly *ethical*, not dogmatic, and that not merely because it treats only of the ethical faults in the congregations referred to, but also because it contemplates Christianity only according to its ethical side.² It is peculiar to this Epistle, that the gospel—the word of truth by which God effects the new birth, and of which it is said that it is able to save the soul—is designated *νόμος*. This *νόμος*, more exactly characterized as *τέλειος ὁ τῆς ἐλευθερίας*, is certainly distinguished from the O. T. *νόμος*, which only commands, without communicating the power of free obedience; but, at the same time, in this very designation the conviction is expressed of the closest connection between Judaism and Christianity, whilst the same *νόμος βασιλικός*, which forms the essence of the law in the O. T. economy, is stated as the summary of this N. T. *νόμος*. Taking these two points together, it follows, according to the view of the author, that, on the one hand, the Christian by means of *πίστις*, which is implanted in his mind by the word of truth, has stepped into a new relation with God (and in so far Christianity is a new creation); and, on the other hand, the chief point of Christianity consists in this, that in it such a *ποίησις* is possible, by which a man is *μακάριος*, and may be assured of future *σωτηρία* (and in so far Christianity is glorified Judaism). Hence the author can ascribe no importance to a *πίστις* which is without *εργα*, and hence it is natural to

ordingly the commencement of a third division of the Epistle is placed at iii. 13, where, however, the reference to the *ἀρχή* in the preceding paragraph is evident.

¹ Concerning the name *ἐπιστολαὶ καθολικαί*, see Introductions to the N. T. The most probable opinion is, that *καθολικός* is synonymous with *ἐγκύκλιος*. The reason why 1 and

² John are included is that they belonged to the First Epistle, and were appended to it. See also Herzog's *Real-Encyklopädie*, article "Katholische Briefe."

² Also "the mystical element" (Brückner, Gunkel) is not wanting, as appears from i. 18; but this is only indicated in a passing manner, without James further entering upon

him to place all the importance on the *ἔργα*, that is, on the works which proceed from faith; yet he does this neither in the sense that man by his *ἔργα* is placed in this new relation to God, for it is only *in* this relation that he can do these works, nor yet in the sense that by them he can *merit σωτηρία* or *δικαιοῦσθαι* in the judgment (*ἐν τῷ κρίνεσθαι*), for James does not deny that the believer continues a sinner, and that therefore he can only be acquitted in judgment by the *mercy* of God. — The reticence on christological points is another peculiarity of this Epistle. Yet there is not wanting in it a decidedly Christian impress. This is seen in two ways: First, ethical exhortations are enforced — though not, as is often the case in other N. T. Epistles, by a reference to the specific points of Christ's salvation — by a reference both to the saving act of regeneration by the gospel, and to the advent of the Lord, so that, as the foundation of the Christian ethical life subjectively considered is *πίστις*, so objectively it is the redemption of God in Christ. Secondly, the same dignity is attributed to Christ in this Epistle as in the other writings of the N. T. This is seen from the fact that the author calls himself a *δοῦλος* of God and of the *Lord* Jesus Christ. It is here to be observed, that God and Christ are placed in juxtaposition, and that the same name is given to Christ as to God, namely *κύριος*, by which He is placed on an equality with God, and specifically distinguished from man. The circumstance that the author directly unites the divine judgment with the coming of the Lord, indeed designates the Lord Himself as the Judge, also points to this higher dignity of Christ. See Dorner, *Lehre von der Person Christi*, 2d ed., part i. p. 94 ff.; Kern, *Komment.*, p. 40; Schmid, *Bibl. Theol.*, part ii. § 57, 1. Nor are christological points wanting in the Epistle; though the fact that they are more repressed than is the case elsewhere in the N. T., and that specific acts of redemption, as the incarnation of Christ, His death, His resurrection, etc., are entirely omitted, forms a peculiarity of this Epistle which distinguishes it from all the other writings of the N. T. The view of the author is directed less to the past than to the future, as this corresponds to his design, which aimed at the practical bearing of Christianity; see i. 12, ii. 5, 14, iii. 1, v. 1, 7, 9. See, on the contents of the Epistle, Weiss, *Bibl. Theol. des N. T.*, pp. 196–219. — It is undeniable that there is a connection between this Epistle and Christ's Sermon on the Mount; Kern calls it a counterpart of the same, and Schmid (*Bibl. Theol.*, ii. § 60) says that James had it for his model. Yet this is not to be understood as if the Sermon on the Mount, as transmitted by Matthew, was influential for the conception of this Epistle: it is not even proved that the author was acquainted with that writing; and not only do we find in

each of these two writings many references which are foreign to the other, but also where they coincide there is a difference of expression in the same thoughts. The relationship consists rather in the fact that the ethical view of Christianity, as seen in the Epistle, is in perfect accordance with the thoughts expressed by Christ in the Sermon on the Mount, as well as in His other discourses, and which, before they were reduced to writing, were in their original form vividly impressed on the Church by oral tradition. Imbued with the moral spirit of Christianity announced in these words of Jesus, the author of the Epistle regards Christianity chiefly as a moral life, so that even the person of Christ, in a certain measure, steps into the background; just as Christ Himself, where He treats of the ethical life, is comparatively silent with reference to His own person. The parallel passages from the Sermon on the Mount are the following: chap. i. 2, Matt. v. 10-12; chap. i. 4 (*ἵνα ἦτε τέλειοι*), Matt. v. 48; chap. i. 5, v. 15 ff., Matt. vii. 7 ff.; chap. i. 9, Matt. v. 3; chap. i. 20, Matt. v. 22; chap. ii. 13, Matt. vi. 14, 15, v. 7; chap. ii. 14 ff., Matt. vii. 21 ff.; chap. iii. 17, 18, Matt. v. 9; chap. iv. 4, Matt. vi. 24; chap. iv. 10, Matt. v. 3, 4; chap. iv. 11, Matt. vii. 1 f.; chap. v. 2, Matt. vi. 19; chap. v. 10, Matt. v. 12; chap. v. 12, Matt. v. 33 ff. There are also parallel passages from the other discourses of Jesus: chap. i. 14, Matt. xv. 19; chap. iv. 12, Matt. x. 28. Compare also the places where the rich are denounced, with Luke vi. 24 ff. — But as these parallel passages do not prove the use of the synoptical Gospels, so neither is a use of the Pauline Epistles demonstrated.¹ The few places where the author coincides with the First Epistle of Peter are to be explained from an acquaintance of Peter with this Epistle. On the other hand, it is worthy of remark, that not only is there frequent reference to the expressions and historical examples of the O. T., but that the idea “of the contrast, running through the spirit of Israel, between the externally fortunate but reprobate friendship of the world, and the externally suffering but blessed friendship of God.” (Reuss), pervades this Epistle. — Several passages are evidently founded on corresponding passages in the Apocrypha of the O. T.

As, on the one hand, the Epistle is a letter of comfort and exhortation for the believing brethren, so, on the other hand, it is a polemical writing; but its polemics are directed not against dogmatic errors, but ethical perversions. Only one passage, chap. ii. 14-26, appears to combat a definite doctrine, and that the doctrine of justification of the Apostle Paul. But

¹ Incorrectly, Hengstenberg thinks that chap. i. 2, 3, refers to Rom. v. 3; chap. i. 25, ii. 12, to Gal. iv. 5; and chap. i. 22, to Rom. ii. 13.

whatever view may be taken of this, the polemics are here introduced for the sake of ethical Christian life, namely, only with the object of showing that Christians are not indolently to trust to a *πίστις* without works, but are to prove a living faith by good works, so that the proposition *ἐξ ἔργων δίκαιοῦται ἄνθρωπος, καὶ οὐκ ἐκ πίστεως μόνον*, is by no means employed to confute the Pauline principle, *οὐ δίκαιοῦται ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἔργων νόμου, ἐὰν μὴ διὰ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*, in the application in which Paul made the assertion. Here, then, as everywhere, we see that the author is a man whose attention is entirely directed to practical life, and who, both for himself and for others, has in view, as the aim of all striving, a *τελειότης* which consists in the perfect agreement of the life with the divine will, which the law in itself was incapable of producing, but which to the Christian is rendered possible, because God, according to His will, has by faith implanted His law as an inner principle of life, and therefore is to be aimed at with all earnestness.

In recent times, the peculiar tendency of this Epistle has often been designated as that of a Jewish Christianity. It is true that there is not the slightest trace of an agreement with the view expressed in Acts xv. 1: *ἐὰν μὴ περιτέμνησθε τῷ ἔθει Μωϊσέως οὐ δύνασθε σωθῆναι*; neither is circumcision, nor the ritual observances of the Mosaic law, anywhere mentioned; but the supposition of the unity of the Old and New Testament law which lies at the foundation of the Epistle, as well as the peculiar importance assigned to *ποίησις τοῦ ἔργου*, with the reticence on the christological points of salvation, point certainly to a Jewish-Christian author, who occupies a different position to the law from that of the Apostle Paul. So far, there is nothing to object to in this designation; only it must not be forgotten, that, apart from the heretical forms into which Jewish Christianity degenerated, it might assume, and did assume, special forms different from that presented in this Epistle. If, in later Jewish-Christian literature, there are many traces of a relationship with the tendency of this Epistle, yet there is to be recognized in this fact not less the definite influence of the person of the author than its Jewish-Christian spirit.

As regards the *style and form of expression*, the language is not only fresh and vivid, the immediate outflow of a deep and earnest spirit, but at the same time sententious and rich in graphic figure. Gnome follows after gnome, and the discourse hastens from one similitude to another: so that the diction often passes into the poetical, and in some parts is like that of the O. T. prophets. We do not find logical connection, like that in St. Paul; but the thoughts arrange themselves in single groups, which are strongly marked off from one another. We everywhere see that the author

has his object clearly in sight, and puts it forth with graphic concreteness. "As mild language is suited to tender feeling, so strong feelings produce strong language. Especially, the style acquires emphasis and majesty by the climax of thoughts and words ever regularly and rhetorically arrived at, and by the constantly occurring antithesis," Kern (*Commentary*, p. 37 f.). — Also the mode of representation in the Epistle is peculiar: "The writer ever goes at once *in res medias*, and with the first sentence which begins a section (usually an interrogative or imperative one) says out at once, fully and entirely, that which he has in his heart; so that in almost every case the first words of each section might serve as a title for it. The further development of the thought, then, is regressive, explaining and grounding the preceding sentence, and concludes with a comprehensive sentence, recapitulating that with which he began" (Wiesinger).

SEC. 4. — THE AUTHENTICITY OF THE EPISTLE.

According to the inscription, the Epistle is written by James, who styles himself *δοῦλος* of God and of the Lord Jesus Christ; but this designation is neither in favor of nor against the apostolate of the author. Still, it is evident from the whole contents of the Epistle, addressed to the Jewish-Christian churches of the Diaspora, that no other James is meant than "the brother of the Lord," who is not identical with the Apostle James (see sec. 1). Eusebius expresses himself uncertainly concerning its authenticity; he reckons it among the Antilegomena (*Hist. Eccl.*, iii. 25), and says of it: *ιστίον ὡς νοθεύεται μὲν*, that not many of the ancients have mentioned it, but that nevertheless it is publicly read in most of the churches (*Hist. Eccl.*, ii. 23). Of the ancient fathers, Origen is the first who expressly cites it (tom. xix. *In Joan.*: *ὡς ἐν τῇ φερομένῃ Ἰακώβου ἐπιστολῇ ἀνέγνωμεν*); in the Latin version of Rufinus, passages are often quoted from the Epistle as the words of the Apostle James (ed. de la Rue, vol. ii., Hom. viii., *In Exod.*, p. 158: "*sed et Apostolus Jacobus dicit*," comp. pp. 139, 191, 644, 671, 815). The Epistle is not mentioned in the writings of Clemens Alexandrinus, Irenaeus, and Tertullian; yet, according to Eusebius (*Hist. Eccl.*, vi. 14), it was known and commented on by Clemens Alexandrinus. Dionysius Alexandrinus expressly mentions it; and Jerome (*Catalog.*, c. iii.) directly calls James the Lord's brother, the author of the Epistle, yet with the remark: *quae et ipsa ab alio quodam sub nomine ejus edita asseritur*. It is of special importance, that this Epistle is found in the old Syriac version, the Peshito, in which are wanting the four smaller Catholic Epistles

and the Apocalypse. Guericke (*Einkl.*, p. 442) with truth remarks, "that this testimony is of the greater importance, as the country from which the Peshito proceeded closely bordered on that from which the Epistle originated, and as that testimony was also repeated and believed in by the Syriac Church of the following age." The early existence of the Epistle appears by many similarities to single passages in the earliest writings. The agreement which subsists between some passages of First Peter and this Epistle is undeniable: compare 1 Pet. i. 6, 7, with Jas. i. 2, 3; 1 Pet. ii. 1 with Jas. i. 21; 1 Pet. iv. 8 with Jas. v. 20; and 1 Pet. v. 5-9 with Jas. iv. 6, 7, 10. (See author's *Comm. on First Peter*, Introd., sec. 2.) That Clemens Romanus, in his *Epist. ad Corinth.*, chaps. x., xii., xvii., xxxviii., alludes to corresponding passages in this Epistle, is not so certain as Kern (in his Commentary), Guericke, Wiesinger, and others assume: for, that Clemens in chap. x. adduces, among the pious men of the Old Testament, Abraham, referring to Gen. xv. 6, is not surprising, also the words *ὁ φίλος προσαγορευθεὶς* do not prove an acquaintance with the Epistle, as Abraham was already so called by Philo; his offering of Isaac is indeed mentioned, but not as an *ἔργον* on account of which he was justified. Similarly with reference to the mention of Rahab, of whom it is said in chap. xii.: *διὰ πίστιν καὶ φιλοξενίαν ἐσώθη Ῥαάβ, ἡ πόρνη*, whereupon follows the history.¹ Still less is the connection between chap. xvii. and Jas. v. 10, 11. It seems more certain that Jas. iii. 13 lies at the foundation of the words in chap. xxxviii.: *ὁ σοφὸς ἐνδεικνύσθω τὴν σοφίαν αὐτοῦ μὴ ἐν λόγοις ἀλλ' ἐν ἔργοις ἀγαθοῖς*. Some similarities to the Epistle likewise occur in Hermas: thus III. *Simil.* 8: *nomen ejus negaverunt, quod super eos erat invocatum* (comp. Jas. ii. 7); yet here the discourse is not concerning the rich and an invective upon them. Further, the passages II. *Mand.* xii. 5: *ἐὰν οὖν ἀντιστῆς αὐτὸν (τὸν διάβολον), νικηθεὶς φεύζεται* (comp. Jas. iv. 7); and II. *Mand.* xii. 6: *φοβήθητι τὸν κύριον, τὸν δυνάμενον σῶσαι καὶ ἀπολέσαι* (comp. Jas. iv. 12). Of greater importance than this coincidence in single expressions, is the fact that, with Hermas, a view generally predominates which agrees in many respects with that of the Epistle: Christianity is also with him mostly considered in its ethical sense; the christological points step into the background; the distinction of rich and poor is strongly emphasized; and in the exhortation to prayer, *πίστις* is expressly insisted on, and *δυσψυχία* (II. *Mand.* 9) is warned against; so that an acquaintance of the author of this writing with the Epistle can scarcely be denied. Also the

¹ Even Guericke admits that this passage of the example of Rahab, according to its actual contents, is a reminiscence rather of Heb. xi.

31 than of Jas. ii. 25. But it is possible that Clemens had neither the one passage nor the other in view.

Clementine Homilies, apart from their speculative contents, exhibit an acquaintance with the tendency of this Epistle. Kern has collected a great number of parallel passages, yet it cannot be denied that in individual cases both the connection and the expression of thought are different. In Irenaeus (*Adv. Haer.*, iv. 16, 2) the union of the words: *Abraham credidit Deo et reputatum est illi ad justitiam*, with those which directly follow: *et amicus Dei vocatus est*, points to Jas. ii. 23; also, in Clemens Alex., *Strom.*, vi. p. 696, ed. Sylb., a similarity to Jas. ii. 8 can scarcely be denied; whilst the designation of Abraham in Tertullian (*Adv. Judaeos*, cap. 2) as *amicus Dei* proves nothing. Cyrill of Jerusalem (*Catech.*, iv. c. 33) reckons all the seven Catholic Epistles among the canonical writings; and since his time the Epistle has been unhesitatingly reckoned an apostolic writing belonging to the canon.¹

According to the above data, a certain dubiety undoubtedly prevailed in tradition, which, however, proves nothing against the authenticity, as it is easily accounted for from the peculiar nature of the Epistle. For, on the one hand, James the Lord's brother had, it is true, obtained an apostolic importance, so that Paul numbered him among the pillars of the church; yet he was not an apostle, and the more closely the Jewish-Christian churches attached themselves to him, so the more estranged must he have become to the other churches; and, on the other hand, the Epistle was directed *only* to the Jewish-Christian churches, and the more these, by holding to the original type, distinguished and separated themselves from the other churches, the more difficult must it have been to regard an epistle directed to them as the common property of the Church, especially as it appeared to contain a contradiction to the doctrine of the Apostle Paul. These circumstances, as Thiersch (*Krit.*, p. 359 f.) and Wiesinger have rightly remarked, would hinder the universal recognition of the Epistle; but the more this was the case, so much the more valuable are those testimonies of antiquity, although isolated, in favor of its genuineness.

Whilst, in the Middle Ages, the canonicity of the Epistle was not questioned, in the sixteenth century objections to it of various kinds were advanced. It is well known that Luther did not regard the Epistle as apostolical. In his preface to it (1522) he thus expresses his opinion: "In my opinion, it was some good pious man who got hold of and put on paper some sayings of the disciples of the apostles, or perhaps another has made notes from his preaching." In the preface to the

¹ Only Theodorus Mopsuestius is said to have rejected it, according to the statement of Leontius Bysantius (*Contra Nest. et Eut.*, iii. 14).

N. T. (1522) he calls the Epistle, compared with the *best* books of the N. T. (which he names as the Gospel and First Epistle of John, the Pauline Epistles, particularly the Romans, the Galatians, and the Ephesians, and First Peter), "a right strawy Epistle, for it has in it no true evangelical character." In his sermons on the Epistles of Peter (1523), Luther says that one may discern that the Epistle of James is "no genuine apostolical epistle;" and in his *Kirchenpostille* (delivered in the summers of 1527 and 1528), he again says that it "was neither written by an apostle, nor has it the true apostolic ring, nor does it agree with the pure doctrine" (Luther's *Works*, edited by Plochmann, vol. VIII. p. 268). So also, in a sermon on the day of Epiphany, he says, "James and Jude, many think, are not writings of the apostles." The reasons with which Luther supports his depreciatory judgment of the Epistle, and which he gives in his preface to it, are the following: (1) That it "proclaims the righteousness of works, in flat contradiction to Paul and all other scripture;" it is true "a gloss (or explanation) of such righteousness of works may be found; but that the Epistle adduces the saying of Moses (Rom. iv. 3), which speaks only of Abraham's faith and not of his works, in favor of works, cannot be defended." (2) That it "makes no mention of the sufferings, the resurrection, and the Spirit of Christ." Besides, he objects to the Epistle, that this James does nothing more than urge men to the law and its works, and "confusedly passes from one subject to another."¹ Assuming that some passages are borrowed from First Peter, and that chap. iv. 5 is from Gal. v. 17, he comes to the conclusion, that as James was put to death by Herod before Peter, he could not be the author of the Epistle, but that the real author must have lived long after Peter and Paul.²—With the opinion of Luther agree the *Magdeburg*

¹ Also in the *Table-Talk* (Plochmann's edition, vol. lxii. p. 127) the same opinion is expressed: "Many have endeavored and labored to reconcile the Epistle of James with Paul. Philip Melancthon refers to it in his *Apology*, but not with earnestness; for 'faith justifies,' and 'faith does not justify,' are plain contradictions. Whoever can reconcile them, on him will I put on my cap (*Barett*), and allow him to call me a fool." This saying, as well as the expression in the *Kirchenpostille*, proves that Luther, even in his later years, continued firm to the opinion expressed in his preface to the

Epistle of 1522, and in his preface to the N. T. of the same year; although in the later editions of the N. T. the whole conclusion, in which he treats of the distinction between the books of the N. T., is omitted (see Plochmann, vol. lxiii. p. 114).

² This opinion of Luther, that the supposed author is James the son of Zebedee, is surprising, as in the tradition of the Church of his own and of the preceding time, not James the son of Zebedee, but James the son of Alphaeus, was regarded as the author; yet in some MSS. of the Peshito it is ascribed to the former.

Centuries, Hunnius, Althamer, and others; and also Wetstein.¹ On the other hand, with evident reference to this opinion, Calvin defends the Epistle. In his introduction to his commentary he says: *Quia nullam ejus (epistolae) repudiandae satis justam causam video, libenter eam sine controversia amplector*: he repudiates the assertion that the Epistle contradicts the Apostle Paul; against the reason, *quod parcius in praedicanda Christi gratia videtur, quam apostolo conveniat*, he asserts: *Non est ab omnibus exigendum, ut idem argumentum tractent*; and he then gives his own judgment: *Nihil continet Christi apostolo indignum; multiplici vero doctrina scatet, cujus utilitas ad omnes Christianae vitae partes late patet*. On the other hand, the Epistle did not remain unattacked even in the Catholic Church; not only Erasmus, but also Cajetan (on account of the unapostolic salutation, chap. i. 1), expressed doubts of its apostolic origin. But neither these doubts, nor the attacks of Luther, deprived the Epistle of its ecclesiastical authority: on the contrary, it was regarded in the Protestant not less than in the Catholic Church, as the work of the Apostle James the younger, who was considered as identical with "the Lord's brother."—Afterwards Faber (*Observatt. in Ep. Jac.*, Coburg, 1770), Bolten (*Uebers. der neut. Briefe*), Schmidt (*Einkl. ins N. T.*), and Bertholdt advanced the untenable opinion, that the Epistle of James was originally written in Aramaic, and afterwards translated by another into Greek. De Wette, in his Introduction to the New Testament, asserted that the composition of this Epistle by the Lord's brother—whom he also regarded as the same with James the son of Alphaeus—was doubtful. De Wette advances the following reasons for his doubts: (1) That we cannot see what should have induced James to write to all the Jewish Christians in the world; (2) that the *misplaced* contradiction to Paul seems unworthy of James; (3) that, if ii. 25 is to be regarded as a reference to Heb. xi. 31, this would betray an author of a later day; and (4) lastly, that it is incomprehensible that James should have attained to such a use of the Greek language. If De Wette at a later period somewhat modified his opinion, still he remained true to his doubts, which he did not deny even in his *Exeget. Handbuch*. Against these reasons it is to be observed: 1. The occasion

¹ Wetstein's opinion is as follows: Meam sententiam nemini obtrudam, tantum dicam, me epistolam Jacobi non existimare esse scriptum apostolicum, ob hanc rationem: primo, quia directe contra Paulum et omnem scriptu-

ram operibus justificationem tribuit; denique, Jacobus ipse ita confundit omnia ac permiscet, ut mihi vir bonus aliquis ac simplex fuisse videatur, qui arreptis quibusdam dictis discipulorum apostolicorum ea in chartam conjecerit.

of the writing is clearly to be recognized from the Epistle itself, namely, the ethical faults in the churches referred to; that only the Jewish Christians in Palestine had separate churches for themselves, is an unfounded assumption of De Wette. 2. The opinion of a contradiction to Paul is destitute of all sure exegetical reasons; see explanation of ii. 14 ff. 3. It cannot be proved that the example of Rahab is taken from the Epistle to the Hebrews. 4. It cannot be perceived why James should be less skilled in the Greek language than must be assumed from this Epistle. — When De Wette in his *Exeget. Handbuch* thinks that the author has appropriated to himself from Paul (out of his Epistles) the free moral spirit, but not his contemplative believing view, and that it is very doubtful whether he ever *reached* such a standpoint, it is to be observed that such subjective suppositions form no sure basis for criticism. — Schleiermacher (in his *Introduction to the N. T.*, edited by Wolde) judges of the Epistle even more unfavorably than De Wette. He not only agrees with Luther that the author “is confused,” and is destitute “of the true evangelical character,” but he also objects that the transitions are “either ornate and artificial, or awkward;” that the artificial character of the diction shows that the author was a stranger to the Greek language; that much therein is bombast. Schleiermacher, indeed, acknowledges that the Epistle is addressed to Jewish Christians; that possibly, in the section ii. 14–26, “no reference to the Pauline theory lies at the foundation;” that, if the writing is to be placed in the canonical period of the apostolic writings, it must be put at an early period, as there is no reference to the relation between the Jewish and the Gentile Christians; that it indicates a view of Christianity out of which afterwards Ebionite Christianity may have arisen. But on the other hand, in opposition to these admissions, Schleiermacher thinks that if the Epistle belongs to the early period, it could not have been addressed to churches outside of Palestine; that we would expect it to have been written in Aramaic; that, considering the idea of Christianity which predominates in it (namely, that it is the fullest development of monotheism), we can with difficulty imagine that “this James was the same person who was the immediate disciple of Christ and the apostles, who afterwards became bishop of Jerusalem, and was so earnest (?) for the diffusion of Christianity among the Gentiles.” — Finally, Schleiermacher arrives at the conclusion that the Epistle is a later production and fabrication, i. e., not founded on fact, and not intended by its author for any particular circle of readers. The explanation of the origin and composition of the

Epistle which he most favored was, that "some one wrote it in the name of the Palestinian Apostle James, and collected reminiscences from his discourses, not in the happiest manner, and in a language which was not familiar to him." This criticism wants a sure ground to rest upon, as much as the criticism of De Wette. — Also the recent Tübingen school, in conformity with their view of the development of Christianity, have denied the authenticity of the Epistle. They place its origin in the period when the two antagonistic principles of Jewish Christianity and Paulinism already began to be reconciled, in order to be united together in Catholicism. Baur, both in his *Paulus* (p. 677 ff.) and in his *Christenthum der 3 ersten Jahrhunderte* (p. 96 f.), has attempted to prove that the Epistle belongs to a period when Jewish Christianity had already made an important concession in relinquishing the necessity of circumcision to Gentile Christianity, and that it proves itself to be a product of the post-Pauline period, in that it opposes *δικαιοῦσθαι ἐξ ἔργων* to the Pauline *δικαιοῦσθαι ἐκ πίστεως*, but, on the other hand, does not deny the influence of Paulinism; for, in accordance with the Pauline idea of making the law an inward thing, "it not only speaks of the commandment of love as a royal law, but also speaks of a law of liberty." — Schwegler (*Das nachapost. Zeitalter*, vol. i. p. 413 ff.) has attempted to justify this view of Baur by an examination of particulars. The following are the reasons which he assigns for the composition of the Epistle in the *post-apostolic* period: 1. Its want of individuality; 2. The want of acquaintance of Christian antiquity with it, and its late recognition as a canonical writing; 3. The form of a mild Ebionitism which pervades it; 4. The internal congregational relations presupposed; 5. Its acquaintance with the Pauline Epistles, the Epistle to the Hebrews, and the Gospel of the Hebrews. The *Ebionitical* character of the Epistle is proved, (1) from the name of James attached to it; (2) from the designation of the readers as the *δέδεκα φυλαί, κ.τ.λ.*, by which not the Jewish-Christian churches, but entire Christianity, is meant; (3) from the retention of the old Jewish name *συναγωγή* instead of *ἐκκλησία*; (4) from the statement of the Christian life as the fulfilling of the law, united with reticence upon the doctrine of the person of Christ; (5) from the relation of the Epistle to the *Shepherd* of Hermas, and the Clementine Homilies; (6) from the use of the Apocrypha; (7) from the polemic against the Pauline doctrine of justification; and (8) lastly, from the antagonism to the Gentile Christians, who under the name *πλούσιοι* are put in opposition to the Jewish Christians, i.e., to the *πτωχοίς*. The conciliating tendency seeking an

adjustment of the antagonism is alleged to be manifest, (1) from the antagonism of the rich and the poor being discussed with the design of paving the way for an approximation of these parties by influencing the former (the Gentile Christians, regarded as the rich) (!), and by bringing about a change of sentiment in them (toward the Jewish Christians, regarded as the poor); (2) from there being found in the Epistle a doctrinal approximation to the Pauline ideas and principles, particularly in the idea of the law as νόμος ἐλευθερίας, of Christianity as a new creation, of πίστις as “an internal and confident apprehension of the doctrine of salvation,” and even in the matter of justification itself; whilst to the Pauline doctrine is not plainly opposed the δικαίωσις ἐξ ἔργων, but the δικαίωσις ἐξ ἔργων, οἷς ἡ πίστις συνεργεῖ, or the δικαίωσις ἐκ πίστεως, ἣ τελειοῦται διὰ τῶν ἔργων; and (3) from the fact that by the words: σὺ πιστεύεις, ὅτι ὁ Θεὸς εἰς ἐστί· καλῶς ποιεῖς, the agreement of the Gentile-Christian and the Jewish-Christian tendencies in this principal and fundamental doctrine of Christianity is prominently brought forward. Schwegler has evidently most carefully searched out and employed all those points which can in any way be made to support his hypothesis; but it is perfectly clear that many of the points adduced by him are pure fictions, and that from others the most arbitrary inferences are drawn. The result is a view which is manifestly self-contradictory. Whilst Schwegler adopts the fancy that by the “rich” are meant the Gentile Christians, he subjoins to this the inference that the *Gentile-Christian* cause (i.e., the cause of the πλούσιοι) represents itself to the Ebionitic writer as “a proud conceit of wisdom,” as “loquacious controversy,” as “the love of the world and its lusts, covetousness, insolence, uncharitableness,” as “a false and perverted tendency,” and that “to attack on all sides these tendencies in their forms, disguises, and appearances, is the object of the Epistle;” but in spite of this, he says at the conclusion of the inquiry, “Thus, then, it is with a call to εἰρήνη that the author turns himself to the opposite Gentile-Christian faction; such is the watchword and leading practical thought of his Epistle.” The most glaring internal contradiction of such a criticism would not hinder us from placing the most arbitrary fiction in the place of history.¹ Ritschl (*D. Entst. der altkathol. Kirche*, p. 150 ff.) occupies a different position with reference to the Epistle from Schwegler.

¹ Reuss (§ 146, note) correctly observes: “The character of the Epistle given by the Tübingen criticism goes beyond every sure reason, when it places it far back into the second cen-

tury, and makes it grow from recent sources. That the πλούσιοι are the Pauline Christians, is a postulate of this criticism for which there is no proof. The numerous references to the

He asserts expressly that the similarities and points of contact between the Epistle and the Clementine Homilies are too vague to declare that, on account of them, the Epistle must be regarded as post-apostolic, or that a continuity of design in these writings can be discerned. He considers, indeed, that the Epistle belongs to the Jewish-Christian tendency, particularly on account of its polemic against the Pauline doctrine of justification; but it is a matter of surprise to him, that there is in it no reference to the principles according to which the intercourse of Jewish with Gentile Christians was arranged (namely, the compliance of the latter with the four prohibitions expressed in the decree of Jerusalem), and also that the view of the Epistle is pervaded by an element essentially Pauline (namely, by the idea of the new birth; but which is understood, in a manner entirely original, as an implantation of the law). Thus Ritschl is constrained to confess that the Epistle, viewed on every side, remains as a riddle in the development of the *oldest* Christianity. This unsatisfactory result points to the incorrectness of his suppositions. Ritschl does not only over-estimate the importance of the decree of Jerusalem in the view of James (he likewise overlooks the fact that James, in an Epistle addressed to *Jewish Christians*, had no occasion to refer to the necessity of keeping to the articles of that decree); but he is also wrong in deriving the ideas of the law and regeneration, contained in this Epistle, from Paul, — as if these ideas were not contained in Christianity itself. Ritschl also, as Schwegler, maintains that chap. ii. 14-26 is not designed to combat a perversion of Paul's doctrine, and in this he is correct: but he assumes too hastily that the polemic is directed against Paul. Ritschl's judgment on the Epistle contains the correct decision, that the reasons adduced by Schwegler do not contradict its authenticity. Kern had already, in a treatise in the year 1835 (*Tübinger Zeitschr.*), partially adduced the same arguments against the authenticity; but at a later period he regarded them as unsatisfactory, and asserted this in his commentary in the year 1838, — of which fact Schwegler, who often appeals to him, takes not the slightest notice. After a careful review of the historical relations, Kern, in his commentary, says not only that the Epistle bears internal evidence that it originated rather in the apostolic age than in any other period, but also that he cannot but consider it as the production of him to whom it is ascribed in the inscrip-

Pauline Epistles, the Epistle to the Hebrews, the Gospel of the Hebrews, Hermas, Philo, exist only in the imagination of the critic, and

cause the extreme simplicity and originality of this Epistle to be overlooked."

tion,—of James the Lord's brother, who is called, along with Peter and John, a pillar of the church, and under whose superintendence the church of Jerusalem was placed. Kern arrived at this conclusion, even although he regarded ii. 14-16 as a direct attack upon the Pauline doctrine of justification. But this opinion is at variance with the authenticity of the Epistle. For, how can it be supposed that James—after he had declared himself on the side of Paul in the transaction at Jerusalem (Acts xv.), or, if the narrative of Luke regarding that transaction cannot be reckoned as true, after he had given to Paul the right hand of *κοινωνία* (Gal. ii. 9)¹—could have argued, not against an objectionable application of the doctrine of Paul, but against that doctrine itself? Add to this, that such an attack, in a writing devoted to Jewish Christians, was certainly not necessary in their case. It is true Kern thinks that "James might consider it possible that his Epistle might come into the hands of Gentile Christians, with whom the Jewish Christians were at variance upon the doctrine:" but this is a mere arbitrary hypothesis; in the Epistle there is not the slightest indication that the author, in ii. 14, addresses others than those to whom he directed his Epistle. But if the polemic of the Epistle is not directed against the Pauline doctrine of justification, there are no reasons, either external or internal, which constrain us to deny that James was the author, and to consider it as the production of a later period. The late recognition of the Epistle, as has already been remarked, is sufficiently explained from the position of the author and his readers: the want of personal references; from the encyclical form of the Epistle; the frequent references to the Old Testament and to examples there represented, as well as to the Apocrypha; from the individuality of James; and, lastly, the facility in the use of the Greek language from the acquaintance with the Hellenistic idiom which prevailed in Palestine. The organization of the Church does not here appear such as was only appropriate to a later period; if Paul, in his first missionary journey, made it a point to establish the office of presbyters in the then existing Gentile churches (Acts xiv. 23), and if, at a still earlier period, such an office was formed at Jerusalem (Acts xi. 30), its existence in the Jewish-Christian churches, to which the Epistle is directed, cannot certainly be regarded as any thing surprising; and the

¹ Meyer, *in loco*, with truth observes: "According to the representation of vv. 7-9, the apostles recognized the twofold *divine call to apostleship*; but a merely external and forced

agreement, *without any acknowledgment of the principles of Paul*, would have been as little compatible with such a recognition as with the apostolic character generally."

function which is here attributed to the presbyters entirely corresponds to the relation in which they stood to individual members of the church. The opinion that chap. i. 15 refers to the Epistle to the Hebrews, and chap. v. 12 to the Gospel of the Hebrews,¹ is any thing but certain; and as little is a use of the Epistle to the Romans made out from chap. i. 2 (compared with Rom. v. 3), chap. i. 18 (compared with Rom. viii. 23), chap. i. 21 (compared with Rom. xiii. 12), chap. i. 22 (compared with Rom. ii. 13), chap. iv. 1 (compared with Rom. vii. 23), chap. iv. 4 (compared with Rom. viii. 7), chap. iv. 12 (compared with Rom. ii. 1), for the agreement is found here only in single expressions, which would as naturally present themselves to James as to Paul (comp. Brückner in De Wette's *Commentary*, p. 188 f.). It may certainly appear surprising, that in the Epistle the permanent importance for the readers of the Mosaic law, according to its ritual side, is not prominently brought forward, especially as James was such a careful observer of it; but this objection is completely removed when we consider that no doubt of that importance was supposed to exist among the readers. James here proceeds in the same manner as Christ, who, although He Himself observed the law of His nation, yet did not inculcate on His disciples so much the observance of its separate ritual enactments, as point out to them the way by which the law was observed in its innermost nature. Thus, then, there is no reason in the Epistle to assign its origin to the post-apostolic age, or to ascribe it to another author than to him who is named in the superscription. Reuss (sec. 146) with truth observes: "His official importance gave to James the right to come forward as the common leader of all the Christians of the circumcision; and what we know or conjecture of his religious disposition is strikingly in unison with the contents of this Epistle."

The authenticity of the Epistle, in spite of the supposition of a difference between the doctrine of justification of James and that of Paul, has in recent times been generally recognized.² Reuss, indeed, expresses

¹ In the Gospel of the Hebrews (see *Clement. Hom.*, iii. 55, xix. 2), the prohibition of oaths is as follows: ἔστω ὑμῶν τὸ ναὶ ναί, καὶ τὸ οὐ οὐ· τὸ γὰρ περισσὸν τούτων ἐκ τοῦ ποιηροῦ ἔστιν; the *second* clause is in accordance with Matt. v. 37, the first with Luke v. 12. But this only indicates a different form of expression in the tradition, not the use of a written record.

² For the same reasons as those of Luther,

the authenticity of the Epistle is denied by K. Strübel. In the *Zeitschr. f. d. luth. Theol.* of Rudelbach and Guericke, 1857; part II. p. 365, he says: "Let the Epistle of James be understood as you please, it is ever in contradiction to the whole Sacred Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, and therefore cannot be reckoned of canonical authority; with its well-meaning but otherwise completely unknown author, identical with none of the names of the

himself very cautiously, that the genuineness of the Epistle is not raised above all doubt because a definite ecclesiastical tradition does not exist; however, he grants that nothing can be inferred from this against its authenticity. Other critics and interpreters have, however, expressed themselves more decidedly in favor of the authenticity of the Epistle, agreeing with one another that the authorship is to be ascribed to James, "the Lord's brother," who stood at the head of the Church of Jerusalem, and only differing in this, whether he is *identical with* (so Hottinger, Schneckenburger, Theile, Guericke, Lange, Bouman, and others) or *different from* the Apostle James (so Credner, Kern, Neander, Thiersch, Schaff, Brückner, Wiesinger, Bleek, and others). — The *integrity* of the Epistle in its separate portions has never been doubted: only Rauch (Wiener and Engelhardt's *Neues krit. Journal der theolog. Lit.*, 1827, vol. vi. part 3) has thought that the conclusion, chap. v. 12–20, proceeds from another author; but the reasons which he assigns for this have already been refuted by Schneckenburger (*Tüb. Zeitsch. f. Theol.*, 1829, part 3), Kern (in his *Kommentar*), Hagenbach (*Winer's Krit. Journ.*, vi. 395 ff.), and Theile.

SEC. 5. — PLACE AND TIME OF WRITING.

The *place* of composition is not mentioned in the Epistle; but from the position which James occupied to the Church of Jerusalem, and from the fact that he has addressed his Epistle to the churches in the *Diaspora*, it cannot be doubted that this is Jerusalem. The supposition of Schwegler, that the actual place of composition was Rome, requires no refutation. It is more difficult to determine the *time* of composition. It is only certain that it must have been before the destruction of Jerusalem; but it is a matter of dispute whether it was written before or after the ever-memorable labors of Paul among the Gentiles, or, more precisely, whether it was written before or after the council at Jerusalem recorded in Acts xv.¹ If there is in the Epistle a reference to the Pauline doctrine of justification, —

N. T. persons, the capacity of teaching falls short of his good intention." So also, in a review of this commentary (1st edition) in the same magazine, 1860, part I. p. 162 ff., Kahnis (*D. luth. Dogmatik*, vol. i. pp. 533–536) agrees with the opinion of Luther on the contents of this Epistle, but does not express himself on its authenticity.

¹ Lange infers from the political circumstances which, according to his view, were the occasion of this Epistle, that it was composed "at the latest period of the life of James, perhaps about the year 62." For one who calls in question the supposition of Lange, this statement of time is destitute of all reason.

whether the attack be directed against the doctrine itself, or a perversion of it,—then it could only be written after that transaction; as Bleek, among others, assumes. But on the other supposition, both opinions are possible. Schneckenburger, Theile, Neander, Thiersch, Hofmann, Schaff, suppose it to be composed *before*, and Schmid and Wiesinger *after*, the council at Jerusalem.¹—The former opinion is the more probable; for after that time the Pauline proposition, that man is justified not ἐξ ἔργων, but only ἐκ πίστεως, was not only generally known, but so powerfully moved the spirits in Christendom, that it seems impossible to suppose that James could have in perfect ingenuousness asserted his principle: ἐξ ἔργων δικαιοῦται ἄνθρωπος, καὶ οὐκ ἐκ πίστεως μόνον, without putting himself in a definite relation to the doctrine of Paul, whether misunderstood or not. Wiesinger, for the later composition of the Epistle, appeals “to the form of the Christian life of the readers,” whilst, on the one hand, they are treated “as those who are mature in doctrine,” and, on the other hand, “the faults censured in their conduct are such as can only be understood on the supposition of a lengthened continuance of Christianity among the readers.” But, in opposition to this view, it is to be observed that a Christian church without such *maturity* as is indicated in i. 3, ii. 5, iii. 1, iv. 1, can hardly be imagined; and that in Jewish-Christian churches such faults as are here represented in the Epistle would arise at an early period from the unsubdued Jewish carnal disposition, especially as the transition to Christianity, particularly among the Jews, might easily occur without any actual internal transformation. The inquiry of Wiesinger: Where, outside of Palestine, before the apostolic council, shall we look for the Jewish-Christian churches which will satisfy the postulates of the Epistle? is of less importance, as it cannot be proved that Wiesinger is correct in his undemonstrated assertion, “that the Jewish-Christian church, precisely in the ten years after that council, both inside and outside of Jerusalem, obtained a *great accession* to their numbers.” That during this period it extended its limits is certainly to be granted, but it cannot be proved that at that period it first gained such an extension that James could only then write to ταῖς δώδεκα φυλαῖς ταῖς ἐν τῇ διασπορᾷ. On Wiesinger’s view, that James was acquainted with the Epistle to the Romans, but wrote ii. 14-26 without reference to

¹ Brückner, indeed, denying the assigned polemics, but supposing that the formulæ δικαιοῦσθαι ἐκ πίστεως, δικ. ἐξ ἔργων, were first brought into vogue by Paul, and then were used of an earlier existing habit of thought, which

James combats, comes to the conclusion that the Epistle indeed belongs to a comparatively early period of the apostolic age, but is not to be transferred to the earliest period of apostolic life.

the doctrine of Paul, James must bear the reproach of having at least acted very inconsiderately in using the Pauline mode of expression *known to him*, and in enunciating propositions which in form expressed the opposite of what Paul taught, with the design of saying something which had no reference to Paulinism, which contained neither an antithesis against it nor an agreement with it, and which was directed neither against Paul himself nor against Paul misunderstood. If the reasons assigned by Wiesinger for the later composition of the Epistle were convincing,—if, particularly, an acquaintance of James with Paul's mode of thought and expression, and especially of his doctrine of justification, followed from the points of similarity to the Epistle to the Romans, or from chap. ii. 14-26,—it would result from this, that James in his polemics had this in view, and that thus Wiesinger's denial of any reference to it is unjustifiable. If, then, we are not to involve ourselves in contradiction, we must in this denial maintain that the Epistle was composed before the apostolic council; and to this view nothing in the Epistle stands opposed.

Ἰακώβου ἐπιστολή.

In several codd. the superscription is more fully expressed, whilst to *ἐπιστολή* the word *καθολική* is added, and to Ἰακώβου the words *τοῦ ἀποστόλου*, also *τοῦ ἀγίου ἀποστόλου*, and in one *τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ Θεοῦ*.

CHAPTER I.

Ver 3. Instead of Rec. *τὸ δοκίμιον ὑμῶν τῆς πίστεως*, after A, B*, C, G, K, \aleph , etc., several vss. (Lachm., Tisch. 7), Buttm. reads, after B**, some min., etc., *τὸ δοκίμιον ὑμῶν* without *τῆς πίστεως*. The addition, *τῆς πίστεως*, it is true, is suspicious, as it may be derived from 1 Pet. i. 7 (De Wette); but the testimonies for its genuineness are too important to declare it spurious. Instead of *δοκίμιον*, there is also the reading *δοκιμειον*, and in three min. *δόκιμον*. — Ver. 7. Instead of *ὁ ἄνθρωπος*, Buttm. reads simply *ἄνθρωπος*, a reading which Tisch. 7 leaves entirely unnoticed. The same is also the case in respect of *ἀδελφός*, ver. 9; \aleph has the article in both places. — Ver. 11. B omits after *προσώπων* the demonstrative *αὐτοῦ*. Instead of *πορείαις*, A, 40, 89, 98, ed. Colinaei, read *πορίαίς*, a reading on which Theile rightly remarks: “*Familiari librariis τοῦ εἰ et ι permutationi debetur;*” there is no word *πορία* = *ἐμπορία* in the Greek language. Codex 30, *apud* Mill., reads *ἐμπορίαίς* evidently as an interpretation. The conjecture, *ἐμπορίαίς*, which has been proposed by Hammond, Castalio, and Junius, is arbitrary. — Ver. 12. Instead of *ἀνὴρ*, A, some min. and vss. read *ἄνθρωπος*; an unnecessary change. After *ἐπηγγέλατο* the Rec. has *ὁ κύριος*, after G, K, etc. (instead of which some min. and vss. read *ὁ Θεός*; C: *κύριος*), which, however, after A, B, \aleph , etc., is to be regarded as an insertion (Lachm., Tisch., De Wette, Wiesinger; on the other hand, Theile, Reiche, Bouman, Lange, consider *ὁ κύριος* as the correct reading). — Ver. 13. \aleph alone reads *ὑπό* instead of *ἀπό*. The article *τοῦ* before *Θεοῦ* is, according to almost all authorities, to be obliterated as spurious. — Ver. 19. Instead of the Rec. *ὥστε*, after G, K, several min. and vss., B, C (\aleph : *ἴστω*, corrected *ἴστε*), several min., Vulg., and other vss. read *ἴστε*; A: *ἴστε δέ*; Lach. has adopted the reading *ἴστε*; Tisch. now (7) reads *ὥστε*. Whilst Theile, Lange (*ἴστε δέ*), consider the reading *ἴστε* as the original, De Wette, Wiesinger, Reiche, Bouman, have rejected it from internal reasons; as, however, on a careful consideration (see exposition), no internal reasons exist *against* its genuineness, and the external testimonies are *for* it, it merits the preference. Instead of *ἔστω*, Rec., after G, K, etc. (Tisch. 7), Lachm. reads *ἔστω δέ*, after B, C, \aleph . Codex A has *καὶ ἔστω* (Lange). — Ver. 20. The Rec. *οὐ κατεργάζεται* (Tisch.), after C*, G, K, *et al.*; Lachm. has adopted *οὐκ ἐργάζεται*, after A, B, C***, \aleph , *et al.*; De Wette, Wiesinger, Bouman, consider the compound, and Lange the simple verb, as the correct reading. On the distinction of these modes of reading, see exposition. — Ver. 22. *μόνον*, which the Rec., after A, C, G, K, \aleph ,

many min., places before *ἀκροαταί*, stands after it in B, some min., etc.; so read Lachm. and Tisch. It is possible that the reading of the most of the codd. is a correction, because one united *μόνον*, according to its meaning, with *μή*; still, the Rec. must be regarded as the original reading from authorities. — Ver. 25. *Οὗτος*, which the Rec., after G, K, many min. and vss., has before *οὐκ ἀκροατής* (Tisch. 7), is wanting in A, B, C, S, etc.; Lachm. has omitted it; it is difficult to consider it genuine, for not only is the testimony of the most weighty authorities against it, but also the addition from the following *ούτος* is not difficult to be explained from the want of a connecting particle after *παραμείνας*; whilst De Wette hesitates, Wiesinger, Bouman, Lange, are for its retention. — Ver. 26. After *εἰ* a *δέ* is found in C (Lachm.), which, however, appears to be inserted only for the sake of a closer connection of the verse with the preceding. The words *ἐν ὑμῖν* after *εἶναι* are to be obliterated, after A, B, C, S, with Tisch., Lachm., Reiche, and others. — Ver. 27. Tisch., after C**, G, K, etc., has omitted the article *τῷ* before *Θεῷ*; the weightiest authorities, A, B, C*, S, corrected, etc., however, are in favor of its retention (Lachm.)

Ver. 1. Address and greeting. James calls himself a “servant of God, and of the Lord Jesus Christ.” Oecumenius, correctly: *Θεοῦ μὲν τοῦ πατρὸς, κυρίου δὲ τοῦ υἱοῦ*; some expositors have incorrectly taken *Θεοῦ καὶ κυρίου* together as applied to *Ἰησ. Χρ.* There is here no combination of the Old and New Testaments in this conjunction (against Lange). It is to be observed that in the apostolic addresses our Lord’s name is always given in full: *Ἰησοῦς Χριστός*. — *δοῦλος* is here an official appellation, which, however, belongs not only to the apostles, but to every possessor of an ecclesiastical office received from the Lord; comp. particularly Phil. i. 1: *Παῦλος καὶ Τιμόθεος, δοῦλοι Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*, and Jude 1. In this name the consciousness is expressed that the office is a service in which not our own will, nor the will of other men, but only of God or of Christ, is to be fulfilled.¹ — *ταῖς δώδεκα φυλαῖς ταῖς ἐν τῇ διασπορᾷ*. A designation of the people of Israel living outside of Palestine, and dispersed among the Gentiles. On *αἱ δώδεκα φυλαί* it is to be observed, that although this appellation of the people of Israel after the exile does not occur in the Apocrypha, yet the people who returned were still regarded as the twelve tribes (1 Esdr. vii. 8, 9); as the people of the twelve tribes are the covenant people, to whom the promises given to the patriarchs refer: from which it is to be explained, that in the N. T. the number *twelve* is particularly emphasized (Matt. xix. 28; Rev. vii. 4–8, xxi. 12), and that James designates by this name the people to whom the promise was fulfilled. On *τῇ διασπορᾷ*, see Deut. xxx. 4; Neh. i. 9; Ps. cxlvii. 2; 2 Macc. i. 27 (Jer. xv. 7); John vii. 35; Winer’s *Realwörterbuch*, article “Zerstreuung.” Whether this designation is to be understood in a literal or symbolical sense, see Introduction, sec. 2. Laurentius, Hornejus, Hottinger, Pott, Gebser, Kern, Schneckenburger, Neander, Guericke, Schmid (*Bibl. Theol.*), Wiesinger, and others correctly consider the Epistle as addressed to *Jewish Christians*; only it is to be observed that with the early composition of the Epistle

¹ Oecumenius: ὑπὲρ πάντων δὲ κοσμικῶν ἀξιώματι τοῦ κυρίου ἀπόστολοι τῷ δουλοῦ εἶναι Χριστοῦ καλλωπιζόμενοι, τοῦτο γνώρισμα ἑαυτῶν βούλου-

ται ποιεῖσθαι, καὶ λέγοντες καὶ ἐπιστέλλοντες καὶ διδάσκοντες.

these are not here to be considered as contrasted with the *Gentile Christians*. Had the author been conscious of such a contrast, it would have been elsewhere indicated in the Epistle itself. — *χαίρειν*. *sc. λέγει*; see 1 Macc. x. 18, 25, xv. 16; 2 Macc. i. 1; and in the N. T., Acts xv. 23, xxiii. 26 (2 John 11). It is to be observed that this very form of greeting, elsewhere not used in the N. T. Epistles, occurs in the writing proceeding from James, Acts xv. 23 (Kern); the pure Greek form of greeting is more fully: *χαίρειν καὶ ὑγαίνειν καὶ ἐν πράττειν*, 2 Macc. ix. 19.

Vv. 2-12. Exhortation in reference to the endurance of temptations.

Ver. 2. James begins with the hortative words: *πᾶσαν χάραν ἡγήσασθε*] *esteem it complete joy. πᾶσα χάρα, complete joy = nothing but joy*. Luther: "Esteem it pure joy." Many old expositors incorrectly explain *πᾶσα* = *μεγίστη, summum, perfectum gaudium*;¹ it is more correct to resolve the adjective here by the adverb *πάντως, ὅλως* (Carpzov), with which the explanation of Theile coincides: *rem revera omnique ex parte laetam*. The meaning is: the *πειρασμοί* are to you a joy which is *entire joy*, excluding all trouble. See Hom., *Od.*, xi. 507: *πᾶσαν ἀληθεινὴν μνηθῆσομαι*, i. e., "of Neoptolemus I will declare to thee the whole truth" (i. e., nothing but the truth, which excludes all falsehood). — *χαρά*, a metonymy = *gaudendi materia, res laeta*; see Luke ii. 10. — It is not improbable that James by this exhortation to joy refers to the *χαίρειν* in ver. 1; comp. vv. 5, 19 (Wiesinger). — The address *ἀδελφοί μου* (or *ἀδελφοί* alone, iv. 11, v. 7, 9, 19; also *ἀδελφοί μου ἀγαπητοί*, i. 16, 19, ii. 5), which is James's constant form, expresses the consciousness of fellowship, namely, the fellowship in nationality and belief (Paraeus), with the readers.² — *ὅταν πειρασμοῖς περιπέσῃτε ποικίλοις. περιπίπτειν* involvit (a) *notionem adversi*, (b) *notionem inviti atque inopinati* (Theile); it is synonymous with *ἐπιπίπτειν* (see Luke x. 30 compared with ver. 36),* but has a stronger meaning: *to fall into something, so that one is entirely surrounded by it*; thus in the classics it is particularly used of misfortune: *συμφοραῖς*, Plato, *Leg.*, ix. 877 e; *ζημίαις καὶ ἰνείδεσι*, Isocrates, i. 39. — By *πειρασμοί* are commonly here understood the *θλίψεις* which are prepared for Christians on account of their faith by an unbelieving world (comp. Luke viii. 13: *καὶ ἐν καιρῷ πειρασμοῦ ἀφίστανται*; in connection with Matt. xiii. 21: *γενομένης θλίψεως ἢ διωγμοῦ διὰ τὸν λόγον, εὐθὺς σκανδαλίζονται*); and undoubtedly James had these in view. Yet there is nothing in the context which necessitates us to such a limitation; rather the additional epithet *ποίκιλοι* justifies us to extend the idea, and to understand by it all the relations of life which might induce the Christian to withdraw from the faith, or to become wavering in it. When Lange explains *πειρασμοί* specially of "the allurements and threats by which the Gentiles on the one side, and the fanatical Jews on the other, and also the Ebionites, who were already in the field, sought to draw the readers to their side," he finds this particular statement on his erroneous view of the tendency of the Epistle. To refer the idea *only to inward temptations* (Pfeiffer), is the more erroneous, as it is even questionable whether James had these in view at all. — Ou

¹ Winer (p. 101 [E. T., p. 111]) explains *πᾶσα χαρά* as "all (full) joy." This would signify such a joy as wants nothing; which,

however, does not suit the context.

² Incorrectly, Semler: *Hoc uoquen praecipue de doctoribus intelligo*.

ποικίλοις, see 2 Cor. vi. 4 ff., xi. 23 ff. The adjective does not allude to the different sources from which the *πειρασμοί* sprung, but is to be referred to their manifold forms. In a far-fetched manner, Lange finds in *ποικίλοις*, according to its original meaning, "an allusion to the *manifold-dazzling glitter of colors* of the Jewish-Christian and Jewish temptations, in which they might even represent themselves as prophetic exhortations to zeal for the glory of God." — Inasmuch as the Christian has to rejoice not only in the *πειρασμοίς*, but on account of them, Oecumenius strikingly observes: *τὴν κατὰ Θεοῦ λύπην καὶ τοὺς πειρασμοὺς τούτους καὶ ἐπαινετοὺς οἶδε καὶ χαρὰς ἀξίους · δεσμὸς γὰρ οὗτοι εἰσὶν ἀβράγης, καὶ ἀβήσης ἀγαπῆς καὶ κατανύξεως . . . οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐκτὸς γυμνασίου οὔτε κοσμηκῶν οὔτε τῶν κατὰ Θεοῦ στεφάνων ἀξιωθῆναι.* With reference to joy in *θλίψεις*, see Matt. v. 11, 12; Acts iv. 23 ff., v. 41; Rom. v. 3; also Ecclus. ii. 1 ff.; particularly comp. the parallel passage 1 Pet. i. 6.

Ver. 3. *γινωσκοντες*. *Wilst ye may know* ("in the consciousness," De Wette). The participle, when closely connected with the imperative, participates in its meaning; see author on 2 Tim. ii. 23; comp. 1 Cor. xv. 58; Col. iii. 24, iv. 1; Heb. x. 34, and other passages. It is neither simply the imperative (Luther, "and know ye"), nor simply a confirmation, so that it may be rendered by *γινωσκετε γάρ* (Pott). — *ὅτι τὸ δοκίμιον ἡμῶν (τῆς πίστεως). τὸ δοκίμιον* (only here and in 1 Pet. i. 7) = *τὸ δοκιμῆιον*, is properly the means of proving: *quo quid exploratur* (Pott); *quo rei, quae sub examen vocatur, manifestatur sinceritas eaque probatur omne id intrinseca virtute possidere, quod extrinsecus specie ac nomine prae se fert* (Heiseu): thus = *κριτήριον*; so in Dionysius Halicarnassus, *Rhetor.* 11: *δεῖ δὲ ὡς περ κανόνα εἶναι καὶ στάθμην τινὰ καὶ δοκίμιον ὠρισμένον πρὸς ὃ τις ἀποθλέπων δυνήσεται τὴν κρίσιν ποιῆσθαι*; yet generally to the idea of proving is attached that of purification and verification. Theile = *probatum*; thus Herodian, ii. 10, 12: *δοκίμιον δὲ στρατιωτῶν κάματος ἀλλ' οὐ τρυφή*; and the LXX., Prov. xxvii. 21: *δοκίμιον ἀργυρίου καὶ χρυσῷ πύρωσις*; comp. Prov. xvii. 3; Ps. xii. 7; Ecclus. ii. 5. Many expositors, as Semler, Pott, Hottinger, Schneckenburger, Theile, Bouman, adhere to the import of *means*, whether of proof or of purification and verification,¹ whilst they understand thereby the above-mentioned *πειρασμοί*. In this case *τὸ δοκίμιον* stands for *τῷτὸ τὸ δοκίμιον* (Pott); but the necessity of supplying *τοῦτο* is decisive against this interpretation; besides, *δοκίμιον* in 1 Pet. i. 7 cannot have that meaning. In that passage *δοκίμιον* is = *the verification effected by proof*; see author *in loco*: and thus it is probable that this import is also here to be retained (Oecumenius = *τὸ κεκριμένον, τὸ δεδοκιμασμένον, τὸ καθαρὸν*); *τὸ δοκίμιον* then is = *δοκιμῆ* in Rom. x. 4. The distinction, that in that passage *δοκιμῆ* is designated as the *effect*, but in this as the *cause* of *ὑπομονή* is not against this view, for, as Tirinus well says: *duae res saepe sibi invicem sunt causa.*² Most expositors, both ancient and modern, however, explain *δοκίμιον* here by *exploratio*,

¹ Theile: Calamitates, quae natura sua virtutis *πειρασμοί*, eam sub examen discrimenque vocant, accedente demum hominis strenua opera ejusdem virtutis fiunt *δοκιμιον* eam purgantes, firmitates, commonstrantes.

² Wlesinger incorrectly maintains: "It is

an erroneous idea that verification (*τὸ δεδοκιμάσθαι*) produces *ὑπομονή* (so also Rauch in his *Review*); for the Christian always obtains more *ὑπομονή*, in which only he can reach the goal of perfection, not because he is tried, but because he stands the test and is thus verified."

probatio, proof in an active sense; thus Didymus, Bede, Calvin, Laurentius, Beza, Piscator, Paraeus, Serarius, Paes, Hornejus, Baumgarten, De Wette, Kern, Wiesinger, Lange, etc. Then is valid what Bede says in reference to Rom. v. 4: *Verborum differentia non sensuum in his sermonibus esse probatur Apostolorum*, since there *θλίψις*, here *proof* by *θλίψις*, is named as the cause of *ὑπομονή*. Though there is nothing against this idea, this explanation is wanting in linguistic accuracy.¹ The meaning is, in essentials, the same, whether we read *τῆς πίστεως* or not; for the *δοκίμιον* of Christians consists in nothing else than that of their faith, by which they are Christians. — *πίστις* is here not used objectively = *id cui fides habetur, ipsa Jesu Christi doctrina* (Pott), but subjectively, assured confidence in the gospel, whose contents are Jesus Christ, as the necessary foundation of Christian conduct. — *κατεργάζεται ὑπομονήν*]. *κατεργάζεσθαι* is distinguished from *ἐργάζεσθαι* in that it expresses the *actual accomplishment* (Meyer on Rom. i. 27). — *ὑπομονή* is faithful endurance (*μένειν*) under (*ὑπό*) the temptations (*πειρασμοῖς*). Baumgarten: "enduring constancy;" Theile: "steadfastness," *perseverantia, quod majus est quam patientia*.² The importance of *ὑπομονή* for Christians is evident from Matt. x. 22, xxiv. 13; comp. also Jas. v. 7 ff. On the connection of *ὑπομονή* with *ἐλπίς*, see Cremer under the words *ἐλπίς* and *ὑπομονή*.

Ver. 4. The verification of faith effected by the *πειρασμοί* produces *ὑπομονή*, and on this account temptations should be to the Christian an object of joy, as it depends on them that *ὑπομονή* is of the right kind. This is indicated in this verse.³ — *ἡ δὲ ὑπομονὴ ἔργον τέλειον ἐχέτω*. The emphasis is not placed on *ἔργον*, — that *ὑπομονή* has an *ἔργον* is understood of itself, — but on *τέλειον* (Wiesinger). James wishes that the *ἔργον* of *ὑπομονή* among Christians be *τέλειον*, in order that they may be *τέλειοι*: as he, moreover, strongly emphasizes *τέλειον εἶναι*. In explaining the thought, De Wette confounds the abstract (*ὑπομονή*) with the concrete (*ὁ ὑπομένων*), and understands by *ἔργον τέλειον* "the active virtue which the patient man must perfectly have." This explanation of De Wette agrees in essentials with the explanations of Erasmus, Calovius, Morus, Pott, Augusti, Gebser, Kern, Schneckenger, according to which *ἔργον τέλειον* is distinguished from *ὑπομονή*, and the moral activity which the Christian has to exercise with his *ὑπομονή* indicated. Thus Eras-

¹ Cremer (see *δοκίμιον*) is hardly right when he maintained that "the means of proof are not only, e.g., the touchstone itself, but also the trace of the metal left thereon, therefore τὸ δοκίμιον τῆς πίστεως (Jas. i. 3) is the result of the contact of *πίστις* with *πειρασμοῖς*;" for we are to consider the *πειρασμοί* not as a *touchstone*, but as a *test by fire*. However, Cremer explained the whole idea correctly by "the *verification of faith*." His remark on *δοκιμή* is to be noted: that in it we are not to distinguish between the active and passive signification; that it has rather a *reflex* sense, either the having proved true or the proving true.

² Cicero, *De Inv.*, ii. 54: *Patientia est bonae-*

tatis aut utilitatis causa rerum arduarum ac difficillium voluntaria ac diuturna perpersio; *perseverantia* est In ratione bene considerata stabilis et perpetua permansio. Schneckenger strikingly observes: Si submissionem (τὸ ὑπό . . .) urgeas, patientiam ac tolerantiam malorum, sive τὸ μένειν, constantiam et firmitatem, perseverantiam ac calamitatum ferendarum fortitudinem ab illecebris desciscendi inconcussam hoc vocabulo habebis expressam.

³ Oecumenius rightly observes: σκοπεῖ οὐκ εἶπε τὴν ὑπομονὴν ὀριστικῶς, ὅτι ἔργον τέλειον ἔχει, ἀλλὰ προστακτικῶς ἐχέτω' οὐ γὰρ προὔποκειμένην ἀρετὴν ἐξαγγέλλει, ἀλλὰ νῦν ἐγγυνομένην, ὡς χρὴ γίνεσθαι νομοθετεῖ.

mus: *quemadmodum in malis tolerandis fortis est et alacris, ita in bonis operibus exercendis sibi constet.* Pott: *perseverantiae fructus sit perfectum virtutis studium.* This interpretation is, however, incorrect; it not only gives rise to unjustifiable changes of meaning, as that of ὑπομονή into ὁ ὑπομένων, or of ἐχέτω into παρεχέτω (Pott), or into κρατεῖτω (Schulthess), but gives also a thought which with the following ἵνα, κ.τ.λ., would be tautological. Most expositors (even Brückner,¹ in opposition to De Wette) refer ἔργον τέλειον to ὑπομονή itself; ἔργον = work, *realization* (Wiesinger); comp. 1 Thess. i. 3: τὸ ἔργον τῆς πίστεως; for the ὑπομονή of the Christian is not only a *suffering*, but even more a *doing*. This doing is to be τέλειον, that is, not only, as many interpreters explain, *enduring to the end*,² but *complete*, and that not only in respect of its *internal condition*,—so that it is wanting in no essential points of true ὑπομονή—but also in respect of its *activity* (Lange³), so that it in no way yields to the πειρασμοῖς, which yielding occurs when a man by the temptations is determined to something which does not correspond with the principle of faith. Bouman: *Haec ὑπομονή consummatum opus habet, quando ita se gerit, in quo habitat, homo, ut universam per vitam et animum et linguam et pedes regat ac moderetur.* That ὑπομονή in this manner has an ἔργον τέλειον, is necessary, in order that Christians may be perfect and entire, which, as Christians, they should be. This James indicates in the following words: ἵνα ἦτε τέλειοι καὶ ὁλόκληροι. ἵνα is not here ἐκβατικῶς (which Baumgarten and Pott regard as possible), but τελικῶς, *in order that*. De Wette and Wiesinger incorrectly refer it to the future judgment.—τέλειοι and ὁλόκληροι are synonymous terms: τέλειος is properly “that which has attained its aim,” ὁλόκληρος “that which is complete in all its parts, is entire.” Both expressions are found in the LXX. as the translation of מׁׁׁׁ (Gen. vi. 9; Ezek. xv. 5); besides this verse, ὁλόκληρος in the N. T. only occurs in 1 Thess. v. 25 (ὁλοκληρία, Acts iii. 16).⁴ It is true that both τέλειος (in the LXX. and in the classics) and ὁλοκληρος (particularly in Philo, but not in the LXX.) are used with special reference to sacrifice; to which, however, there is here no allusion (against Kern). Still more arbitrary is the interpretation of Storr: *qui superiores e certamine discedebant.*—ἐν μηδενὶ λειπόμενοι]. The negative expression added for strengthening the two positive expressions; as in ver. 5: ἀπλῶς καὶ μὴ ὀνειδίζοντος, and in ver. 6: ἐν πίστει, μηδὲν διακρινόμενος. As regards the expression itself, ἐν μηδενὶ is not to be taken, with De Wette, as a supplement to λειπόμενοι, as the supplement to this verb is always in the genitive; therefore the expression has been correctly translated by Wiesinger and in this commentary, not by wanting nothing, but by wanting *in* nothing (which Lange

¹ “Nothing else can be meant than the perfect work of endurance, particularly as different stages of this are conceivable.”

² Luther: “Patience is to continue steadfast to the end.” Calvin: *Haec vera erit patientia, quae in finem usque durabit.* Similarly Jerome, Serarius, Salmero, Estius, Gomarus, Piscator, Paraeus, Hornejus, Carpzou, Semler, Houting, etc.

³ Lange here arbitrarily understands by

ἔργον τελειον specially: “the unreserved acknowledgment of their Gentile-Christian brethren, the open rupture with Jewish pride of faith and fanaticism.”

⁴ A limitation of this idea to *moral* perfection is not required by the context. Lange has the following strange remark: “The Jew was a symbolical κλῆρος of the household; as a Christian he was to become a real κλῆρος, and thus ὁλόκληρος.”

has overlooked). The question, however, occurs, can *λείπόμενοι* be explained as = *wanting*? This idea is not contained in the verb by itself, and therefore can hardly be attributed to it when it stands absolutely, as here. It is therefore safer to take *λείπεσθαι* in its usual meaning, and thus, with Lange, to explain *λείπόμενοι* by *coming short of*, namely, short of the goal marked out to the Christian. It is incorrect, with Pott, to say: *tota loquendi ratio ab iis qui cursu . . . relinquuntur et separantur* (so also Lösner, Krebs, Storr, Augusti); for although the verb in classical writers has often this reference, yet there is here no mention of a relation to others, and accordingly the appeal to Polybius, p. 1202, ed. Gronov.: *ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ῥωμαίους ἐννοίᾳ παρὰ πολὺ τὰ βέλτοσθ' αὐτοῦ λείπόμενος*, does not suit. According to the meaning here given, *λείπόμενοι* forms a strong contrast to *τέλειοι*.

Ver. 5. *εἰ δὲ τις ὑμῶν λείπεται σοφίας*, is chiefly connected with *ἐν μηδενὶ λείπόμενοι*. *εἰ* is not = *quoniam*, *quandoquidem* (Estius, Laurentius), but the thought is hypothetical; *εἰ τις* = *ὅστις*; see Wahl on the word *εἰ*. — *λείπεται σοφίας* is to be explained as *κτεάνων λειφθεὶς καὶ οἴλων*, in Pindar i. 2, 11, “with-out wealth and friends,” properly, “left behind of, or falling short of;” accordingly, *without wisdom*. Usually the meaning *wanting, lacking*, is given to *λείπομαι*, which, however, is not linguistically justified. James by *σοφία*, as Wiesinger correctly observes, does not mean “an arbitrary part of Christian perfection,” but the essential foundation of Christian conduct, *τὸ αἰτίον τοῦ τελείου ἔργου* (Oecumenius); for *σοφία* is here the *living* insight, rooted in the *πίστις*, i. e., the insight compelling to action in what is the Christian’s duty, both in whole and in its particular parts, especially in the *πειρασμοῖς* (ver. 2) (comp. the praise of wisdom in the Proverbs of Solomon, in the Wisdom of Solomon, and in the Book of Ecclesiasticus). Wisdom can only be given by God (*κύριος δίδωσι σοφίαν καὶ ὑπὸ προσωπον αὐτοῦ γνώσις καὶ σύνεσις*, Prov. ii. 6), and as a divine *χάρισμα* it has an impress definitely distinguishing it from the wisdom of the world; see chap. iii. 15, 17.¹ The connection does not constrain us, with Bouman and others, to conceive the idea of *σοφία* only in reference to the *πειρασμοί* (ver. 2), and to understand by it only the doctrine concerning the Christian conduct in the *πειρασμοῖς*, expressed in ver. 2,² or that conduct itself. The idea of *σοφία* is rather to be understood in its completeness (Theile, De Wette, Kern, Wiesinger). The reason why James here mentions it is because it was especially necessary to the Christian in his *πειρασμοῖς*; Brückner: “James thinks here of wisdom (in itself of a more general acceptation), inasmuch as it is necessary rightly to estimate and rightly to resist the trial, in order that it might not be converted into an internal temptation, instead of being the path to perfection.”³ — *αἰτείτω παρὰ, κ.τ.λ.*: the same construction in Matt. xx. 20; Acts iii. 2; 1 John v. 15. —

¹ The *Etymologicum magnum* thus gives the distinction between *σοφία* and *γνώσις*: *γνώσις μὲν ἐστὶ τὸ εἰδέναι τὰ ὄντα· σοφία δὲ καὶ τὸ τὰ ὄντα γινώσκειν, καὶ τὸ τὰ γνωστὰ πράττειν.*

² Calvin: *Sapientiae nomen ad circumstantiam praesentis loci restringo, ac si diceret: si haec doctrina ingenii vestri captu altior*

est, petite a Domino, ut vos Spiritu suo illuminet.

³ Lange, indeed, defends the explanation of Calvin, but he interprets the idea of *σοφία* differently from Calvin, defining it as “the right perception of the signs of the times, and of the christological fulfilment of the theocracy in the church as well as in the faith of individuals.”

τοῦ δίδοντος Θεοῦ, instead of τοῦ Θεοῦ τοῦ δίδοντος, as Codex A reads. By the selected order of the words here, not only is the idea of giving emphatically placed near to the request, but also the participle almost becomes an attributive adjective; God is indicated as the Giver absolutely. Accordingly — as Baumgarten, Gebser, and others, correctly remark — no definite object as τὴν σοφίαν (Bouman) is to be supplied. — πᾶσιν and ἀπλῶς are added as a more detailed statement; τοῖς αἰτοῦσιν is, from the context, to be supplied to πᾶσιν (Calvin, Estius, Piscator, Laurentius, etc.); or, better still, οἷς δίδωσι. The adverb ἀπλῶς, only here in the N. T., is either to be understood as an ethical additional statement of δίδοναι = ἐν ἀπλότῳ (Rom. xii. 8) (so Pott, Hottinger, Kern, Theile, Bouman, uncertainly Wiesinger), or = *simply, without further ceremony* (so De Wette).¹ In the latter case it is prominently brought forward that God in the giving had only this in view. It is incorrectly rendered *benigne* (Bede, Vorstius, and others), *affluenter* (Erasmus, Grotius, and others), or as equivalent to *συντόμως, καθάπαξ* (Hesychius). By μὴ ὀνειδίζοντας — as *kai* shows — ἀπλῶς is not more closely defined, but a new point in the mode of the divine giving is added, and so that He does not reproach him to whom He gives, does not abuse him. ὀνειδίζειν is generally taken in the more special sense of upbraiding (Luther: “and upbraideth no man”); for which the expression in Demosthenes is appealed to: τὸ τὰς ἰδίας ἐνεργεσίας ἵπουμιν ἡσκειν καὶ λέγειν μικροῦ δεῖν ὁμοίον ἔστι τῷ ὀνειδίζειν; still more surely does Plutarch, *De Aud.*, 33, speak for this meaning: πᾶσα ὀνειδίζομένη χάρις ἐπαχθῆς καὶ ἀχαρῆς; also in *Ecclus.* xviii. 18, xx. 15, xli. 22, the word appears to have this more special reference.² Still, there is no proof that James did not take it in its more general sense. Semler: *non tantum significat molestam commemorationem beneficiorem, sed etiam qualemcumque reprehensionem* (so also Schneckenburger, De Wette).³ It is incorrect to explain ὀνειδίζειν as equivalent to *aliquem ignominose cum repulsa dimittere* (Morus, Zachariae, Carpzov, Storr, Augusti, Stolz, Hottinger); the refusal of a petitioner may be considered as a *καταισχύνειν* of the same, but ὀνειδίζειν never occurs in this sense, not even in *Ecclus.* xx. 15. The reason why James subjoins the particular statement ἀπλῶς, κ.τ.λ., is by it to encourage to αἰτεῖν (Zwinglius: *ut mentes alliciat, ut ad hunc unum in omni necessitate adcurrant*); perhaps also with “a side glance to the rich” (ver. 10, chap. v. 9 ff.), who do not give ἀπλῶς, and when they do give, give only ὀνειδίζοντες (Wiesinger). — καὶ δοθήσεται αὐτῷ, impersonal: “it shall be given him;” namely, what he asks; here, wisdom. It is erroneous directly to supply ἡ σοφία to δοθήσεται as the subject (Lange), because James here evidently wishes to emphasize the relation of the giving to the

¹ Both of these explanations come essentially to the same thing, for “he that giveth with simplicity will simply give; it will be a pure, unmingled giving, *without any admixture*” (Stier). Lange, without reason, maintains that in this commentary ἀπλῶς will refer not to the giving, but to the gift.

² In this sense *exprobare* is used in Latin, e.g., Cicero, *De Amic.*: *Odiosum sane genus hominum officia exprobantia.*

³ Eustathius: ὀνειδίζειν οὐ μόνον τὸ ἐνεργεσίας ἀναφέρειν τοῖς ἐνεργημένοις . . . ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπλῶς ἀνοστά τινα καὶ ἐπίμομφα λέγειν. The assertion of Lange is unfounded, that James, according to this exposition, would utter an untenable sentiment, “because God, notwithstanding those who ask, often inflicts injuries on men.” Lange has not considered that the passage treats only of *asking*.

asking, and accordingly the object is suppressed; comp. on this thought particularly 1 Kings iii. 9-12 (2 Chron. i. 10-12).

Ver. 6. A more particular statement how prayer must be made: αἰτέω δὲ ἐν πίστει. With αἰτέω the αἰτέω in ver. 5 is resumed; δὲ indicates the carrying-out of the thought. — The prayer, if it is to be heard, must be a εὐχὴ τῆς πίστεως, chap. v. 15 (comp. Eccus. vii. 10: μὴ ὀλιγοψυχῆσης ἐν τῇ προσευχῇ σου). — ἐν πίστει: that is, in the confident assurance of being heard; on what this is founded, is not here expressed. The explanation of Calvin: "fides est quae Dei promissionibus freta nos impetrandi, quod petimus, certos reddit" (similarly Baumgarten), expresses what is in itself true, but is not here indicated by James. Some ancient commentators incorrectly supply to πίστει as a more definite statement Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ. — The object of the prayer (namely, τὴν σοφίαν) is not here named, where only the necessary condition of prayer is treated of. The remarks made by many expositors on the manner in which the Christian should ask for external good things are here inappropriate. — μηδὲν διακρινόμενος expresses the same idea as ἐν πίστει, only in a negative form; μηδὲν is here, as frequently, adverbial = on no account, nulla ratione. διακρινεσθαι is, according to N. T. usage, to doubt; compare, besides, Acts x. 20, xi. 12; particularly Matt. xxi. 21: ἐὰν ἔχητε πιστὴν, καὶ μὴ διακριθῆτε; Rom. iv. 20: οὐ διεκρίθη τῇ ἰπιστίᾳ; Rom. iv. 23; it is not = ἰπιστεῖν (Luke xxiv. 21), or ἀπειθεῖν (John iii. 36), but includes in it the essential character of ἰπιστία: while πιστις says "Yes" and ἰπιστία "No," διακρινεσθαι is the conjunction of "Yes" and "No," but so that "No" has the preponderance; it is that internal wavering which leans not to πιστις, but to ἰπιστία.¹ — The following words, ὁ γὰρ διακρινόμενος, κ.τ.λ., are annexed to the preceding διακρινόμενος, more clearly explaining it (in figurative language) with reference to the exhortation αἰτέω, κ.τ.λ.; but the reason of this exhortation is given in ver. 7. The first γὰρ, accordingly, has the meaning of namely, whereas the second has that of for. According to this interpretation, the relation of the thoughts expressed in vv. 6 and 7 is more correctly recognized than when we say that the first γὰρ assigns the reason why we should pray nothing doubting, but that this thought is only brought to a conclusion in ver. 7 (Wiesinger, and so in the earlier edition of this commentary, where it is said that the sentence taken together would read: ὁ γὰρ διακρινόμενος, οἰκῶς κλύδωνι . . . μὴ οἰέσθω, ὅτι λήμψεται τι, κ.τ.λ.). Lange incorrectly supposes that

¹ The deep-lying ground of it is pride, and so far Theophrastus is right in saying διακρινόμενος δὲ ὁ μεθ' ὑπεροψίας αἰτῶν, ὑβριστῆς ὁμολογούμενος, ὁ διακρινόμενος; whereas Oecumenius, in the words λέγων ἐν σεαυτῷ, ὅτι πῶς δυναμαὶ αἰτῆσαι τι παρα τοῦ κυρίου καὶ λαβεῖν, ἡμαρτηκῶς τοσαῦτα εἰς αὐτόν, brings out a point which belongs not to διακρινεσθαι, but to a yet weak faith. Comp. with this passage Hermas ii 9: "tolle a te dubitationem et nihil omnino dubites petens aliquid a Deo." As weak faith is to be distinguished from διακρινεσθαι, so also is the doubt, of which the believer is conscious as a trial. Calvin strikingly remarks:

"Fieri quidem non potest in hac carnis infirmitate, quin variis tentationibus agitemur, quae sunt veluti machinae ad labefactandam nostram fiduciam: Ita nemo reperietur, qui non sensu carnis suae vacillet ac trepidet. Sed oportet ejusmodi tentationes fide tandem superare, quemadmodum arbor, quae firmas radices fecit, quatitur quidem venti impulsu, sed non revellitur, quin potius suo loco stabilis manet." — Whilst the διακρινόμενος, according to the proper meaning of the term, will not believe, it is the longing of the tried to be confirmed in the faith.

the first γάρ has a more limited meaning, whilst it declares the διακρινόμενος as incapable of praying aright; whereas the second γάρ refers in a wider sense to the unbelieving condition of the man to God, and therefore is to be rendered by *also*. — εἰκε. Only here in the N. T. and in ver. 23. — κλύδων θαλάσσης. Only here in the N. T. and in Luke viii. 24 (κλύδ. τοῦ ὕδατος); usually κύμα. The verb κλυδωνιζεσθαι occurs in Eph. iv. 14; Isa. lvii. 20, LXX. The point of comparison is contained in the subjoined words: ἀνεμιζομένῳ καὶ ῥιπιζομένῳ. The verb ἀνεμιζεσθαι is entirely an ἄπαξ λεγ., occurring nowhere else, equivalent to ἀνεμουσθαι, found in classical language (see Hegesippus 6: ἕλδς ἠνεωμμένης) = *agitated*, i.e., agitated by the wind. The verb ῥιπιζειν (only here in N. T.) is also elsewhere used to denote the agitation or excitement of water by the wind.¹ Heisen incorrectly explains ῥιπιζεσθαι as equivalent to *caeleferi et accendi*; the word never has *this* meaning, although used of the kindling of fire.² The two expressions (which Lange incorrectly denies) are synonymous, and are placed together only for the sake of strengthening the idea. The opinion that ἀνεμιζ. refers to agitation coming from *without*, and ῥιπιζ. to agitation coming from *within* (Bengel), is without foundation; also the assertion that the former word denotes the *cause*, and the latter the *effect* (Theile, Wiesinger), is not entirely correct, as ἀνεμιζεσθαι itself expresses the effect. — By this image the mind of the doubter is characterized as unsteady and wavering, to which a calm and sure rest is wanting.³ Comp. Isa. lvii. 20, 21, LXX.: οἱ δὲ ἄδικοι κλυδωνισθήσονται καὶ ἀναπαισασθαι οὐ δυνήσονται, οὐκ ἔστι χαίρειν (ⲓⲛⲏⲩ) τοῖς ἄσεβειν.⁴

Ver. 7. μὴ γὰρ οἰέσθω. On γάρ, see ver. 6; it is neither the simple particle of transition (Pott), nor equivalent to *ergo* (Calviu), nor is it to be explained, with Winer (E. T. 558), according to its derivation from γε and ἄρα, by *thus indeed*, but is the reason for the exhortation in ver. 6; hence, *for*. — The warning: μὴ οἰέσθω, supposes the fancy of the doubter, that he will receive something from God in answer to prayer; similarly Matt. iii. 9: μὴ δοξήτε. — ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐκεῖνος refers back to ὁ διακρινόμενος. Although not in ἐκεῖνος (in itself), yet in the whole mode of expression, there is something disparaging. — By λήμψεται,⁵ instead of δοθήσεται (ver. 5), is not intended to be indicated, that the fault of not being heard lies not with God but with

¹ See Dio Chrysostom, xxxiii. p. 368 B. δῆμος ἄστατον κακόν καὶ θαλάσση πάνθ' ὅμοιον, ὑπ' ἄνεμον ῥιπιζεται; Philo, *De Mundo*: πρὸς ἄνεμον ῥιπιζεται το ὕδωρ.

² Theile correctly rejects this explanation, saying: "Hoc, quamquam undae spumantes ventis revera incalescunt Latinisque etiam ebullire aestusque dicuntur, longius tamen petulum est." — The verb ῥιπιζειν comes either from ῥιπις = (1) *foliis* (a bellows); *flabellum*, having the meaning both of kindling (the fire) and of fanning (for the sake of cooling); or from ῥιπη = vibration, which is also used of wind; thus ῥιπη Βορέας, *Il.*, xv. 171; ῥιπαι ἄνεμων, Sophocles, *Ant.* 137; also ῥιπή = storm, Pind. P. ix. 49. The original import of the

German verbs *schwingen*, *bewegen*, is thus entirely equivalent to ἀνεμιζειν.

³ "A doubtful petitioner offers not to God a steady hand or heart, so that God cannot deposit in it his gift" (Stier).

⁴ Lange supposes that James has used these expressions with a conscious reference to the O. T. symbols, according to which the sea is "the emblem of the national life, agitated hither and thither in pathological sympathies," whilst in his time "these waves of the sea" had already begun to roar.

⁵ The form λήμψεται, for which MS. authorities decide, is not classical Greek; the Ionic form is λάμψομαι.

man: rather, he receives not, because God gives not. — *τί* naturally refers to what the doubter asks; thus *scil. αἰτουμένον*. The definite object (wisdom) above spoken of is not here meant; for the particular thought is founded on a general declaration. By *κύριος* Christ is not to be understood, but, as in chap. iv. 10, v. 4, 10, according to O. T. usage, *God*. — The designation of God as the Lord naturally suggested itself to James, because he was here speaking of the power of God manifested in giving or not giving: it is not, as Lange thinks, chosen in order to characterize God as “Jehovah the living covenant-God, who has now fully manifested Himself in Christ.”

Ver. 8 contains neither the subject to *λήμψεται* (Baumgarten), nor is it to be understood as an exclamation = *vae homini inconstanti* (Pott). Many expositors consider *ἀνὴρ δίψυχος* as the subject and *ἀκατάστατος* the predicate, wanting the copula (Luther: “a doubter is unstable;” so Calvin, Schneckenburger, De Wette, Lange, and others); but according to this construction the idea *δίψυχος* falls too much into the background, and also the train of thought would be too unconnected. It is better to take both *ἀνὴρ δίψυχος* and *ἀκατάστατος*, κ.τ.λ., as in apposition to *ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἑκείνος*. It is true that the character of the doubter has already been given in ver. 6 by *ἔοικε*, κ.τ.λ., but, on the one hand, only figuratively, and, on the other hand, without giving prominence to his ethical character, which James now introduces in order strongly to confirm the thought expressed in ver. 7; which exposition is far from being “a feeble tautology” (Lange). Less stress is to be put on the want of the article (Schneckenburger, De Wette), as it would be here hardly suitable. Correctly Winer, p. 497 [E. T. 534]: “he, a double-minded man;” so also Wiesinger, Brückner, Bouman, and others. Only according to this construction is the full meaning given to the idea *δίψυχος*. The word is not to be taken merely as another expression for *διακρινόμενος* (Luther, Beza, Grotius, Cremer, and others; Luther directly renders it “a doubter”), but it characterizes the inward nature of the doubter. According to the mode in which *δισώματος*, *δικάρδιος*, *διγλωσσος*, and similar words are formed, *δίψυχος* (which occurs neither in the classics nor in the LXX. and the Apocrypha, but besides here only in chap. iv. 8, and the Church Fathers) properly denotes *having two souls*: it thus describes the doubter as a man who has, as it were, two souls contending against each other, one of which is turned to God, and one of which is turned away from God (thus to the world); who, accordingly, will be at the same time *φίλος τοῦ Θεοῦ* and *φίλος τοῦ κόσμου*, although *φιλία τοῦ κόσμου* is *ἐγθρα τοῦ Θεοῦ* (chap. iv. 6).¹ This double-mindedness (or, what is the same thing, division of soul) expresses the wavering to and fro, between *πίστις* and *ἀπιστία* generally, so particularly

¹ Oecumenius limits the idea too specifically to a care divided about the present and the future: *δίψυχον ἄνδρα τὸν ἀνεπέριστον, τὸν ἀστηρικτον λέγει, τὸν μῆτε πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα παγίως, μῆτε πρὸς τὰ παρόντα ἀσφαλῶς ἠδρασμένον, ἀλλὰ τῆδε κακεῖσε ἀγόμενον καὶ περιφερόμενον, καὶ ποτὲ μὲν τῶν μελλόντων, ποτὲ δὲ τῶν παρόντων ἀντεχόμενον*. In the classics, related ideas are *διάνδιχα μερμερίζειν*, Hom., *Il.*,

l. 189; and frequently, *διάνδιχα θυμὸν ἔχειν*, Hesiod, *O.*, 13; *ψυχῆ ἀνάρμοστος*, *Phaed.*, 93 c. (opp. *ψυχῆ ὁμοιοητικῆ*, Pl. *Resp.* viii. 554), etc. In the Hebrew, *וְלֵב בְּלֵב*, so in 1 Chron. xii. 33, where *וְלֵב בְּלֵב* is equivalent to *וְלֵב בְּלֵב*, ver. 38; that expression has another meaning in Ps. xii. 3.

also in prayer.¹—*διψυχον ειναι* is to be understood neither as the reason (Wiesinger) nor as the result (Lange), but as the characteristic nature, of *διακρίνεσθαι*.—The word *άνήρ* is here as in Matt. vii. 24; Ps. xxxii. 2, LXX. Lange thinks that James used it because the dangers of which he warns them are more especially the dangers which threaten the *men* among the Jews.—As a second apposition James adds: *ἀκατάστατος ἐν πασαις ταῖς ὁδοῖς αὐτοῦ*; for, where there is a want of unity in the internal life, it is also wanting in the external conduct. The *δίψυχος*, being actuated sometimes by one impulse and sometimes by another, is *unsteady* and *inconstant* in his intentions and actions (*ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς αὐτοῦ*; comp. Ps. xci. 11; Jer. xvi. 17; Prov. iii. 6, etc.); he walks not on *one* path, but, as it is said in Ecclus. ii. 12: *ἐπιβαίνει ἐπὶ δύο τρίβους*.² The word *ἀκατάστατος* is found only again in chap. iii. 8 and in the LXX. Isa. liv. 11, as the translation of *רָגַב*; the substantive *ἀκαταστασία* occurs in chap. iii. 16, besides in Luke and in the Epistles to the Corinthians.—The reason why the doubter is not heard is accordingly the disunion in which he is with himself, both in his internal and in his external life; God gives the heavenly gift of wisdom, which according to its nature is *ἀγνή*, only to him who *ἐν ὄλῃ τῇ ψυχῇ* (Matt. xxii. 37), has given to God an undivided disposition.

Vv. 9, 10. James subjoins to the idea that the doubter should not think that he should receive any thing, the exhortation to the lowly brother; *ἰε non solum apponendo, sed opponendo gravius hortatur* (Theile). At first view the natural sense is, with De Wette, Wiesinger, and most expositors, to take *ὁ ἀδελφός* as the general idea, which is specified by *ὁ ταπεινός* and *ὁ πλούσιος*. According to this view, *ταπεινός* is not equivalent to *ταπεινὸς τῇ καρδίᾳ*, Matt. xi. 29, but, in opposition to *πλούσιος*, must be taken in its *proper* sense: *afflictus*, particularly *poor*: on the other hand, *ὁ πλούσιος* is the *earthly rich*, equivalent to *opulentus*, *fortunatus*, *affluens rebus externis*. The *exaltation* (*τὸ ἕψος*), in which the brother of low degree is to glory, can naturally only be the *heavenly* dignity which the Christian by his faith in Christ possesses, and whose future completion is guaranteed to him by the promise of the Lord; and, corresponding to this, by *ταπεινώσις* is to be understood the lowliness, which “belongs to the rich man as a Christian through Christ” (Wiesinger), which is essentially the same with his exaltation. There is nothing against this idea in itself; the same *oxymoron* would be contained in the expression, were we to say, according to 1 Cor. vii. 22: “the *δοῦλος* rejoices in his *ἐλευθερία*, and the *ἐλεύθερος* in his *δοῦλεια*.” But the context is against this explanation, not only because the distinction of Christians into rich and poor would be here introduced quite unexpectedly; but also because vv. 2 and 12 show that the connection of the ideas in this section

¹ Therefore it is called, *Constitut. Ap.*, vii. 11: *μη γίνου διψυχος ἐν προσευχῇ εἰ ἔσται, ἦ οὐ*; and Clemens Romanus: *ταλαίπωροι οἱ διψυχοι, οἱ διατάζοντες τὴν ψυχὴν*; comp. Ecclus. i. 28: *μη προσέλθης αὐτῷ (κυρίῳ) ἐκ καρδίας δισση*.

² Schneckenburger incorrectly explains *ἀποκατάστατος* here of the *fate* of the doubter: “*parum constantiae experitur in omnibus, quae*

ipsi contingunt, sua culpa sorte varia conficitur,” and *ἔδος = fortuna*; also Heisen at least includes this idea: “*omnia vitae consilia ac facta quin et fata*.” This certainly is a possible explanation in itself, but it does not suit the context. The meaning attached to the word by Lange, “*seditionis disturber*,” cannot be proved to be correct by iii. 16.

is the reference to the *πειρασμοί* which Christians have to endure. Several expositors have assumed *this* reference in the idea *ταπεινός*; thus, among moderns, Theile, whilst to the explanation of Morus: *carens fortunis externis omninoque calamitosus*, he adds: *πειρασμών περιπεσών*, ver. 2; *δεδιωγμένος ἐνεκεν δικαιοσύνης*, Matt. v. 10; *πάσχων διὰ δικαιοσύνης*, 1 Pet. iii. 14; but by this the simple contrast between *ταπεινός* and *πλούσιος* is destroyed; for then *ὁ πλούσιος* must be taken as *the rich* Christian who had not suffered persecution, which would be evidently meaningless. If, on the other hand, the rich man who shares the lot of persecution with the poor is to be understood (as Laurentius explains it: *dives, sc. frater, qui ipse erat una cum paupere fratre in dispersione, direptionem bonorum suorum propter Christi evangelium passus*, similarly Erasmus, Hornejus, and others), such a reference is not to be found in the idea *ταπεινός* in itself; if one puts it into the idea *ταπεινώσις*, so that by this is to be understood the suffering condition of persecution in which the *πλούσιος* is placed, or by which he is threatened (Gebser: "he rejoices in his lowliness, into which he may be brought by persecution"), then there is no reason to find in *ταπεινός* the idea of *poverty* expressed. Thus, then, in *this* view the train of thought, referring it to *πειρασμοί*, becomes indistinct and confused; and yet this reference is required by the context. But also what directly follows is against the idea of considering the *πλούσιος* as well as the *ταπεινός* as a Christian (*ὑδελφός*); for, apart from the fact that such a rich man would require no such pressing intimation of the perishableness of riches as is contained in the following clauses, it is carefully to be observed that in the words *ὅτι . . . παρελεύσεται*, and in ver. 11: *οὕτω καὶ, κ.τ.λ.*, the subject is *ὁ πλούσιος* and not *ὁ πλοῦτος*, as that explanation would render necessary; Winer: *dives non habet, quo gloriatur, nisi ab humilitate sua, nam divitiarum mox periturae sunt*; so also De Wette, Theile, Wiesinger, and others. This change of the subject is evidently unjustifiable. James says, not of *riches*, but of the *rich man*, *παρελεύσεται, μαρανθήσεται*, which evidently is only valid of the rich man who forms a contrast to *ταπεινός ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ*. Brückner, in order to avoid the change of subject, explains it of "the rich man according to his external relations;" but this reference is not only arbitrarily introduced, but it weakens the train of thought. That such a bad sense should be given by the author to the idea *ὁ πλούσιος*, is evident both from chap. ii. 6, 7, where he represents the *πλούσιοι* as the persecutors of the Christians, and from chap. v. 1-6, where they are threatened with condemnation; besides, the word is elsewhere used in the Sacred Scriptures in a bad sense; comp. Luke vi. 24-26; Isa. liii. 9, where *רַשָׁעִים* is parallel with *רַשָׁעִים*; Eccus. xiii. 3: *πλούσιος ἠδίκησε . . . πτωχός ἠδικηται*; xvii. 18: *τί κοινωνήσει λύκος ἄνθρωπῳ; οὕτως ἁμαρτωλὸς πρὸς εὐσεβῆ . . . τίς εἰρήνη πλουσίῳ πρὸς πένητα*. If *ὁ πλούσιος* stands in relation of contrast to *ὁ ὑδελφός ὁ ταπεινός*, then the Christian condition cannot be understood by *ταπεινώσις*, or scarcely with Bouman: *animi, nihil sibi arrogantis, modestia*; but only the destruction described in the following words: *ὅτι, κ.τ.λ.*, into which the rich man on account of his pride has fallen; comp. Luke vi. 24-26.¹ The verb to be supplied is neither

¹ According to Lange, the expressions *ὁ ταπεινός* and *ὁ πλούσιος* are to be taken in a

prophetic-symbolical sense, so that the first "designates the Jewish Christian and the Jew

αἰσχυνέσθω (Oecumenius, Estius, and others) nor ταπεινούσθω, but καυχᾶσθω (comp. Winer, p. 548 [E. T. 622 f]). This certainly does not appear suitable, but the expression of James has its peculiar pointedness in this, that the ταπεινῶσις, to which the rich man is devoted, is indicated as the only object of his boasting.¹ To this irony (if it be called so) — which already the author of the commentary on the Lamentations in Jerome's works, and after him Lyra, Thomas, Beza, and others, have recognized in our passage — less objection is to be taken, as this was so natural to the deeply moral spirit of James, in opposition to the haughty self-confidence of the rich man opposed to the lowly Christian. — For a more exact explanation of these two verses, the following remarks may suffice. The connection of ver. 9 with the preceding is as follows: Let the brother of low degree glory amid his temptations in his exaltation (Gunkel). The idea καυχᾶσθαι is neither exhausted by *laetari*, ἀγαλλῆσθαι, 1 Pet. i. 6, Matt. v. 12 (Gebser), nor by *commemorare*, *praedicare* (Carpzov); it indicates rather glorying, proceeding from the confident assurance of superiority; Theile: *notio gloriandi involvit notas, 1 gaudendi, 2 confidentiae, 3 externe expressi.* — ὁ ἀδελφός, according to the above explanation, refers only to ὁ ταπεινός, not to ὁ πλούσιος, which rather forms the contrast set over against that idea. By ὁ ταπεινός is not indicated a kind of ἀδελφοί, but is the characteristic mark of true Christians. It is incorrect to take ταπεινός here as entirely equivalent to πῶχος; it goes beyond the idea of πῶχος, indicating the Christian according to his entire lowly condition in the world, which also is not inapplicable to him who is perhaps rich in worldly wealth, especially as these riches have no true value for him. Comp. moreover, 1 Cor. i. 26: οὐ πολλοὶ δυνατοὶ, οὐ πολλοὶ εὐγενεῖς. Ταπεινός is the Christian, in so far as he is despised and persecuted by the world (τεταπεινωμένος καὶ κατασχυμμένος, Ps. lxxiv. 21; comp. 1 Cor. i. 27), is inwardly distressed (ἐν παντὶ θλιβόμενος, ἐξωθεν μαχαί, ἐσωθεν φόβοι, 2 Cor. vii. 5), and walks in humility before God; the opposite of all this is comprehended in πλούσιος. On ἕψος, Theile rightly remarks: *sublimitas . . . non solum jam praesens sed etiam adhuc futura cogitari potest = ζωὴ illa, quae in coelis perficienda in terris jam est.* Incorrectly, De Wette understands by this "present exaltation;" as little also does ἕψος indicate only "the steadfast courage of the Christian" (Augusti); and still less is it equivalent to *divitiae*, as Pott thinks, who finds only the thought here expressed: ὁ ταπεινός *dives sibi vultatur.* — By ἐν is not to be understood the condition in which (Schneckenburger), but, according to the prevailing linguistic usage of the N. T., the object upon which, the glorying is to take place; comp. Rom. v. 3. — The words ὅτι ὡς ἄνθος χόρτου παρελεύσεται announce wherein the ταπεινῶσις of the rich consists. As regards the construction, it forms one simple sentence.

absolutely in their low oppressed theocratic condition as contrasted with the heathen world and the secular power, or still more exactly the theocrat, inasmuch as he deeply feels his condition;" the second, "again, designates the Jew and the Jewish Christian, inasmuch as he sees the hopeless situation of the Jewish

people in a brilliant light, inasmuch as he is not only rich in the consciousness of his Jewish prerogatives, but also in chiliastic and visionary expectation," etc. This interpretation requires no refutation.

¹ A similar connection is found in Phil. iii. 19: ἡ δόξα ἐν τῇ αἰσχύνῃ αὐτῶν.

Baumgarten incorrectly construes *παρελύεται* with *ὁ πλούσιος*, and considers *ὅτι ὡς ἄνθος χόρτου*, sc. *ἐστὶ*, as a parenthesis, by which an epigrammatic sharpness is conveyed to the preceding sentence. The figure, which is further drawn out in ver. 11, is of frequent occurrence in the O. T., whilst with the quickly fading grass and its flower is not only man generally (comp. Job xiv. 2: *ὡσπερ ἄνθος ἀνθίσαν ἐξέπεσεν*; Ps. ciii. 15: *ἄνθρωπος ὡσεὶ χόρτος . . . ὡσεὶ ἄνθος τοῦ ἀγροῦ οὕτως ἐξανθήσει*; Isa. xl. 6, 7: *πᾶσα σὺρξ χόρτος, καὶ πᾶσα δόξα ἀνθρώπων ὡς ἄνθος χόρτου*; *ἐξηράνθη ὁ χόρτος καὶ τὸ ἄνθος ἐξέπεσε*; comp. 1 Pet. i. 24), but also specially, as here *the ungodly*¹ (comp. Ps. xxxvii. 2: *ὡσεὶ χόρτος ταχὺ ἀποξηρανθήσονται, καὶ ὡσεὶ λάχανα χλόης ταχὺ ἀποπεσοῦνται*; see also Ps. xc. 6), compared. — *ἄνθος* is here, not as in Isa. xi. 1, LXX. translation of *צִיָּן* = *germen, surculus* (Hottinger), but *the flower*; however, the combination *רָצַח* is not found in Hebrew; in Isa. xl. 7 it is *רַחֲשָׁה* *רָצַח*. *Παρέρχεσθαι*, in the meaning of destruction, often occurs in the N. T. (so also in the Hebrew *רָצַח*); also in the classics: Soph., *Trach.* 69: *τὸν παρελθόντ' ἄροτον*.

Ver. 11. A further expansion of the image. The aorists *ἀνέτειλε*, *ἐξήρανε*, etc., do not precisely stand for the present (Grotius, Piscator, Hottinger, and others), but represent the occurrence in a concrete manner as a fact which has taken place, by which the description gains in vividness (comp. Isa. xl. 7), which is still more vividly portrayed by the simple succession of finite verbs. See Winer, p. 248 [E. T. 277] and p. 417 [E. T. 470]; A. Buttmann, p. 175 [E. T. 202]. It is only confusing to convert *ἀνέτειλε . . . ἐξήρανε* into *ἀνατείλας* or *ἐν ἀνατέλλῃ . . . ἐξήρανε*. — By the word *καύσων* is often, in the LXX. (comp., besides, Ezek. xvii. 10, xix. 12; Hos. xiii. 15; Jer. xviii. 17; Jon. iv. 8; where *ἀνεμος* or *πνεῦμα* is added, particularly Job xxvii. 21; Hos. xii. 1), meant the hot east wind (*דְּרָק*), which, blowing over the steppes of Arabia, is very dry and scorching to vegetation (see Winer's *Reallexicon*: word, Wind); here, however, as in Isa. xlix. 10 (*דְּרָק* closely united with *שָׂרָפָה*), Ecclus. xviii. 16 (comp. also Ecclus. xliii. 3, where it is said of the sun: *καὶ ἐναντίον καύματος αὐτοῦ τίς ὑποστήσεται*, Matt. xx. 12, Luke xii. 55, it has the meaning "*heat, burnings*" (against Grotius, Pott, Hottinger, Kern, Schneckenburger, Winer, Wahl, Lange, Bouman, and others), as the parching effect is attributed not to the *καύσων*, as something different from the sun, but to the sun itself.² It is arbitrary to explain it as if it were written: *ἠγέρθη γὰρ, ἅμα τὰ ἀνατείλαι τὸν ἥλιον, ὁ καύσων*; as Gebser says: "the burning wind rising with the sun is the image." Laurentius incorrectly understands by the sun "Christ," and by the rising of the sun "the day of the Lord;" thus the whole is an image of the judgment destroying the rich, yet so that the individual parts are to be retained in their appropriate meaning.³ — *καὶ ἐξήρανε*, κ.τ.λ. The same expressions in Isa. xl. 7. — *ἐκπίπτειν*, i. e.,

¹ Lange observes: "This is not here the image of the ungodly, but is to be understood as a historical figure with reference to the decay of the O. T. glory!"

² Neither the article before *καύσωνι*, nor the observation that, "with the rising of the sun and the development of its heat the végo-

tion is not forthwith imperilled," forms a valid reason against this explanation (against Lange).

³ That "with the sun of a finished revelation was developing the hot wind of the law, which scorched the glory of Israel" (Lange), is a remark which is here the more inappro-

not simply the withering (Isa. xxviii. 1, 4, LXX.), but the actual falling-off of the flower, is a consequence of the blighting of the plant. — *ἡ εὐπρέπεια*, the opposite of *ἀπρέπεια*, is used in the classics chiefly of external appearance; in the N. T. it is an *ἀπ. λεγ.* — τὸ πρόσωπον = 𐤀𐤓𐤁, Ps. civ. 30; comp. Luke xii. 56; Matt. xvi. 3: species *externa*. αὐτοῦ refers, not as the first αὐτοῦ, to τὸν χόρτον, but to τὸ ἄνθος, on which the emphasis rests (comp. ver. 10, De Wette, Wiesinger, Bouman).¹ — οὐτω, thus quickly, thus entirely (Wiesinger); καί is not purely superfluous (Wiesinger), but, referring back to the image, heightens the comparison. — ὁ πλούσιος . . . μαρανθήσεται. It is to be observed that here also ὁ πλούσιος, and not ὁ πλοῦτος, is the subject. *μαραίνεσθαι*, in the N. T. an *ἀπ. λεγ.*, is found in the LXX. as the translation of 𐤒𐤃, Job xv. 30; in the same meaning in the Wisdom of Solomon ii. 8. The figurative expression is explained by what goes before. — ἐν ταῖς πορείαις αὐτοῦ; not “on his journeys” (Laurentius, Piscator, Herder), also not “on his journeyings of fortune” (Lange); but = ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς αὐτοῦ, ver. 8 (comp. Prov. ii. 8, LXX.). The prominent idea is that the rich man, overtaken by judgment, perishes in the midst of his doings and pursuits, as the flower in the midst of its blossoming falleth a victim to the scorching heat of the sun. Luther’s translation: “in his possession,” is explained from the false reading *πορίας*. See critical notes.

Ver. 12. Whilst the rich man is condemned in the judgment, the ἀδελφὸς ὁ ταπεινός, who suffers the *πειρασμόν* proceeding from the rich man, is blessed. This blessedness forms the conclusion of the series of thought begun at ver. 2. Το μακάριος ἄνῆρ (see Ps. i. 1, and frequently in O. T.), not ἔστω but ἐστὶ is to be supplied. No special emphasis is to be put on ἄνῆρ; comp. vv. 8, 20; incorrectly Thomas: *Beatus vir, non mollis vel effoeminatus, sed vir*; and not less incorrectly Lange, who explains ἄνῆρ here as he does in ver. 8. — ὃς ὑπομένει *πειρασμόν* is not = ὃς *πειρασμοῖς περιπίπτει* ὅτι ὃς *πειρασμὸν πύσχει* (Hottinger); comp. ver. 3; it is the man who does not succumb to the temptations which he has to endure. Laurentius: *aliud est ferre crucem, aliud perferre*. To supply ὅταν *περιπέσῃ* (Wiesinger) is unnecessary. — The following sentence beginning with ὅτι adduces the reason of the μακαρισμός: *for being approved, he will receive the crown of life*. By *δόκιμος γενόμενος* is given not so much the *condition* as the *cause*, why he that endureth temptation will receive the crown of life; the being approved is the consequence of *ὑπομένειν πειρασμόν*. — *δόκιμος* is not, with Krebs, Lösner, Augusti, Pott, and others, to be referred as a figurative expression to the trial preceding the contests of athletes; but if a conscious figurative reference is to be assumed at all (which De Wette, Brückner, and Wiesinger not without reason consider as doubtful), it is to be referred to the purification of metals by fire (Hornejus, Gebser, Schneckenburger, Theile, and others).² In τὸν στέφανον

appropriate, as according to it the sun and the hot wind are indicated as two different powers opposed to each other.

¹ Lange, on the other hand, observes “that a fallen flower is still to lose its beauty” cannot be imagined; but is it then to be imagined that the grass when it is withered, and the

flower has fallen from it, is still to lose its beauty?

² Lange asserts that this figurative reference is so far incorrect, as “that figure presupposes the idea of refining, which, although contained in the trial or proof, is not identical with it;” but the identity is not maintained.

της ζωῆς ("not the crown which is peculiar to eternal life, i.e., which is imparted to it," Gunkel), *της ζωῆς* is not the genitive of possession (Lange), but of apposition: *ζωῆς*, i.e., *the eternal blessed life*, is itself the crown of glory with which he that endures is adorned; comp. Rev. ii. 10; 1 Pet. v. 4; 2 Tim. iv. 8. It is at least doubtful if there is here any allusion to the reward of the victor in the Greek games, — which is maintained by Zwingli, Michaelis, Hensler, Pott, De Wette, Wiesinger, and others, and contested by Semler, Augusti, Schneckenburger, Hottinger, Theile, Brückner, and others, — as even among the *Jews*, without any reference to a contest, a crown or diadem is regarded as the symbol of peculiar honor: comp. besides Ps. xxi. 4 (Brückner), especially Wisdom of Solomon v. 16, 17: *δίκαιοι εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα ζῶσι . . . λήψονται τὸ βασιλεῖον τῆς εὐπρεπείας καὶ τὸ διαδήμα τοῦ κάλλους ἐκ χειρὸς κυρίου*. With Paul, on the other hand, such an allusion frequently occurs. The certainty of receiving this crown of glory is founded on the divine promise: *ὃν ἐπηγγέλατο (ὁ κύριος) τοῖς ἀγαπῶσιν αὐτόν*. If *ὁ κύριος* is the correct reading, we are to understand not Christ (Baumgarten, Schneckenburger), but God (Gebser, Theile, Wiesinger). — The expression *τοῖς ἀγαπῶσιν αὐτόν* (comp. Ps. xcvi. 10, cxlv. 20; Rom. viii. 28, etc.) intimates that *ὑπομένειν πειρασμόν* is a proof and testimony of love to God, and is accordingly a proof how careful James was to designate love as the essence of true faith (so also Lange); therefore the repetition of the same addition in chap. ii. 5. On the whole passage, comp. particularly 2 Tim. iv. 8.

Ver. 13. *Τὸ ὅς ὑπομένει πειρασμόν* James opposes *ὅς πειράζεται*;¹ whilst the former gains *ζωή*, the end to which the latter approaches is *θανάτος* (ver. 15). — First James disclaims a vain justification of the latter, and then describes the process of *πειράζεσθαι*. The vain justification is introduced with the direct words of the *πειραζόμενος*: *ὅτι ἀπὸ Θεοῦ πειράζομαι*, and then disclaimed by the expression: *ὁ Θεὸς ἀπειραστος ἐστὶ κακῶν, κ.τ.λ.* — By the direct transition from the preceding to this verse, it is supposed that by the *πειραζόμενος* spoken about, in contrast to *ὅς ὑπομένει πειρασμόν* (ver. 12), is to be understood the person who does not endure the temptation, and consequently is not *proved* by it, but who succumbs under it, whilst he suffers himself to be enticed to falling away — to sin. Pott: *qui tentatione vincitur, ad peccandum vincitur*, Theile: *agit Jacobus de turpi tentatione per tristem (tentationem)*; so also Ols-hausen, Schneckenburger, Kern, and others. This connection is denied by others; thus Calvin says: *de alio tentationes genere disserit*; and Wiesinger in the strongest manner: "This appears as the design of the apostle: to distinguish as much as possible those *πειρασμούς* and this *πειράζεσθαι*, to place the latter as totally different from the former." But the close connection with the preceding constrains us to the opinion that James has considered both in reference to each other, the *πειρασμοί* occasioning the *πειράζεσθαι* which takes place when *ἐπιθυμία* is excited by it.² It is arbitrary to take the verb *πειρά-*

¹ When Lange meets this with the question, "How could any one endure the temptation without having first been tempted?" he only shows that he does not understand the explanation here given.

² It is to be observed that James designates the trials, on which he thinks in *ὅταν πειρασμοῖς περιεσθῆτε*, ver. 3, as *πειρασμοί*. It may be said that they are not this in themselves, but only in so far as the Christian is yet a sinner,

ζεσθαι in the clause : μηδεὶς πειραζόμενος, in another sense than in the following clause : ἀπὸ Θεοῦ πειράζομαι, as Hottinger asserts : *hic verbum πειράζεσθαι bis dicitur sensu diversi ; priori loco simpliciter : adversa pati ; posteriori : malis sollicitari ad defectionem* (similarly Grotius, Semler ; also Lange) ; for, according to this interpretation, the excuse, ὅτι, κ.τ.λ., would not correspond to the supposition contained in μηδεὶς πειραζόμενος. In justification of this view, Matt. viii. 30 cannot be appealed to, where the same word (νεκρόν) is used in the same sentence in different meanings, namely, in a proper and figurative meaning, as here the relation is entirely different. — Some expositors (Pott, Schneckenburger, and others), without reason, paraphrase λεγέτω by “*cogitet, sibi persuadeat.*” Since the words which immediately follow are introduced in the direct form, it is better to retain the usual meaning of λέγειν, by which it is in itself evident that the external speaking presupposes an internal, on which it is here natural to think. — James makes the πειραζόμενος thus briefly express the excuse by which he would justify himself : ὅτι ἀπὸ Θεοῦ πειράζομαι, by which he transfers the guilt from himself to God.¹ ὅτι is the form of quotation frequently occurring in the N. T., except with Paul. ἀπὸ Θεοῦ is emphatically placed first. ἀπό is not equivalent to ὑπό ; the former points to the more distant, the latter to the nearest cause, though by later writers ἀπό with passive verbs is sometimes used as equivalent to ὑπό. Here, however, the usual signification of ἀπό is to be retained, for the πειραζόμενος, introduced as directly speaking, would certainly not stigmatize God as the *direct* tempter (comp. Matt. iv. 1). See Winer, p. 332 [E. T. 371]. James does not with these words refer to any particular doctrine of religion and philosophy, perhaps to the doctrine of the Pharisees and Essenes on εἰμαρμένη (Bull, Ittig, Schneckenburger, and others), or the doctrine of Simon Magus (Calovius), but only considers generally the peculiar bias of the natural man to charge God somehow with the blame of πειράζεσθαι, recognizable in the answer of Adam to the question of God.² — James grounds the rejection of the idea contained in μηδεὶς . . . λεγέτω that the πειράζεσθαι proceeds from God, by a sentence comprising two members : ὁ γὰρ Θεὸς . . . οὐδένα. The word ἀπειράστος, an ἅπαξ λεγ. in the N. T., has in classical Greek — in which, however, the form, ἀπείρατος (ἀπείρητος) almost always occurs — either the passive meaning *untempted*, — that is, what is not tempted or proved, — or the active

and can thus be enticed by them into sin ; when this happens, then the πειράζεσθαι, of which James here speaks, takes place. Stier : “That there is a necessity for our all being tested and approved through trial, springs from our sin ; the tempting element in our trial, the evil in it, springs therefore from that and not from God.”

¹ He might find a justification of this in the fact that πειρασμοὶ actually spring from God. See Meyer on Matt. vi. 13, and on 1 Cor. x. 13. Lange introduces inappropriate matter, maintaining in favor of the concrete relations supposed by him, that the Jews and Judaizing Christians with this word would justify their

fanaticism against the Gentiles, particularly their separation from the Gentile Christians, as an affair of God (for his glory) !

² Many expressions in Greek authors show how natural this is to man ; comp. *Il.* τ. 86 ; ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ αἰτιὸς εἰμι ἀλλὰ Ζεὺς, καὶ μοῖρα ; Plaut., *Aulul.*, iv. 10, 7 : Deus impulsor mihi fuit ; Terent., *Eunuch.*, v. 2, 86 : Quid, si hoc voluit quispiam Deus ? — Such an excuse suggested itself to the Jews the more as it appeared justified by the language of the O. T. Comp. Exod. xx. 16. On the contrary, Philo (*Quod. deter. pot.*, 177 D) remarks : οὐ ὡς ἔνιοι τῶν ἀσεβῶν, τὸν Θεὸν αἰτιὸν τῶν κακῶν φῆσι Μωϋσῆς. Still more fully in Schneckenburger.

meaning: he who has made no trial, equivalent to *inexperienced*. Some expositors take the word in the second meaning; thus Schulthess: *in Deum nulla malorum experientia*; De Wette, Brückner, and others.¹ But, on account of the close connection with *πειράζειν*, the word has here, as most expositors assume, an ethical meaning. Yet it is incorrect to explain it actively, with Luther (God is not a tempter to evil; Vulgate: *intentator*), because this clause would then be tautological with the following. It is rather to be taken passively: *untempted of evil*, by which the idea passes from *tentatus* to that of *tentabilis*; Winer, p. 175 [E. T. 194]. By the Church Fathers God is often named simply *ὁ ἀπειραστος*; so Ignat. *Ad. Philipp.*: *τί πειράζεις τὸν ἀπειραστον*; Photius, *Contra Manich.*, iv. p. 225: *πειράζειν ἐπιχειρήσαι τὸν ἀπειραστον*. By this predicate the holiness of God, which is raised above all temptation to evil, is indicated, and is the motive likewise to the following thought.²—*κακῶν* is not masculine, but neuter; not *misery* (Oecumenius), but *evil*.³—*πειράζει δὲ αὐτὸς οὐδένα* expresses the consequence of the preceding and the pointed contrast to *ἀπὸ Θεοῦ πειράζομαι*. *πειράζει* is placed first for the sake of emphasis. By *αὐτὸς*, which most interpreters pass over, is brought forward not God's action in contrast to "being tempted" (Theile: *ipse quoque non tentat idem ille Deus, qui tentari nequit*; Wiesinger: "He, self-active;" so also Lange), but shows that the *πειράζειν* indeed takes place, but from another cause (*ἡ ἴδια ἐπιθυμία*) than from God. The meaning of the whole verse is as follows: Let no man, when he is tempted (inwardly enticed) to evil, say, From God I am tempted: for God suffers no temptation; but (*δέ*) as to the temptation, *He* (God) tempteth no man: but every man is tempted, etc.⁴ As regards the apparent contradiction of this with other passages of the Holy Scriptures, where the sins of men are referred to God as their reason (Gen. xxii. 1; Deut. viii. 2, etc.), Calvin correctly remarks: *Quum Scriptura excoecationem vel obdurationem cordis tribuit Deo, neque illi initium assignat, neque facit mali auctorem, ut culpam sustinere debeat. In his autem duobus solum Jacobus insisit.*

Ver. 14. That "*πειράζεσθαι* proceeds not from God," is the thought of ver. 13. Whence comes it, then? The answer is given in this verse:

¹ Buttmann, p. 148 [E. T. 170], contests this meaning, which rather belongs to the word *ἀπειρος*. But passages, as Hom. *II. ad Ven.* v. 133: *ἀδνήτην μ' ἀγάγων καὶ ἀπειρήτην φιλόητος*; Theognis, 772: *πολλοὶ ἀπειρήτοι δόξαν ἔχουσ' ἀγαθῶν*, show that *ἀπειρατος* actually has that meaning.

² Lange maintains, in reference to the interpretation given above, that in this commentary *ἀπειρ. κακ.* is explained as equivalent to "God has no experience of evil," and that it is said that the passive construction: "not tempted," "not temptable," is against grammatical usage and the connection! In a very strange manner he thinks it is here designed to strengthen the warning: *Let no man say*; for this *saying*, like all fanaticism, was a tempting God, and therefore vain and impious,

because God does not suffer himself to be tempted.

³ Inapposite uniting of various explanations by Theile and Morus: *ἀπειρ. κακ.* dicitur, partim quoniam nullae miseriae possunt evenire Deo, partim quoniam per eas non potest inclinari ad peccandum, ad cupiditatem aliquam exercendam; Deus igitur est expertus miseriae omnis atque etiam peccati vel pravae cupiditatis, et quia est, neque tentatur a malis ipse, neque alium tentat.

⁴ The passage in Ecclus. xv. 11, 12, 20, is especially to be compared: *μη εἶπης ὅτι διὰ κυριον ἀπέστην, μη εἶπης ὅτι αὐτὸς με ἐπλάγησεν. Οὐκ ἐνετείλατο οὐδενὶ ἀσεβεῖν καὶ οὐκ ἔδωκεν ἄνεσιν οὐδενὶ ἀμαρτάνειν*. See also 1 Cor. x. 13.

"Every man is tempted when he is drawn out and allured by his own lust." The words ὑπὸ τῆς ἰδ. ἐπιθυμίας belong not to *πειράζεται* (Theile, Wiesinger), but to *ἐξελλόμενος καὶ δελεαζόμενος* (Luther, Baumgarten, Semler, Knapp, Grashof, Hottinger, De Wette, Brückner, Lange, and others), as otherwise these ideas would drag too much, and would receive their closer reference only by supplying something, as ὑπ' αὐτῆς (Wiesinger). James will describe *πειράζεσθαι* according to its process; he therefore places the idea first, and then gives in what follows how it occurs: consequently the construction *πειράζεται . . . ἐξελλόμενος* requires not to be altered into *πειραζόμενος . . . ἐξελλύεται* (Schneckenburger). — *πειραζόμενος*, as is evident from what goes before, is to be supplied to *ἐκαστος*; it corresponds to *οὐδένα*, ver. 13. The attribute *ἰδίας* is emphatic, expressing the contrast to *αὐτός* in ver. 13. It is brought prominently forward because *ἐπιθυμία* has its ground not in God, but belongs to man. — By *ἐπιθυμία* is not denoted "innocent sensuousness," but it occurs here, as *everywhere* in the N. T. (except where its specific object is named, as in Luke xxii. 15; Phil. i. 23; 1 Thess. ii. 17), even without the addition of *κακή, σαρκική*, or some similar adjectives, *in sensu malo*; yet it is not to be understood as *original sin*: "the sinful tendency, the same as Paul calls *ἁμαρτία* in Rom. vii. 7" (Hofmann, *Schriftbew.*, i. p. 469; Wiesinger); rather *ἐπιθυμία* here is the same as in Rom. vii. 7, namely, lust for the forbidden action springing from original sin (which Paul designates as the *ἁμαρτία* which *χωρὶς νόμον* is "νεκρά," but by the commandment revives, and *πάναν ἐπιθυμίαν κατεργάζεται*). So, also, Brückner.¹ — James does not here speak of the origin and development of sin in general, but he wishes to mention, in contrast to ὑπὸ Θεοῦ *πειράζομαι*, by what sinful man is tempted to the definite act of sin, so that he had no occasion to refer to original sin. — With regard to the form of expression, Pott correctly says: *ἐπιθυμία, ἁμαρτία et θάνατος personarum vim habent; inaginem meretricis suppeditant voces συλλαβεῖν, τικτεῖν, ἀποκτεῖν, nec non et ἐξέλκειν atque δελεάζειν*. The two words *ἐξέλκειν* and *δελεάζειν* sind *verba e re venatoria et piscatoria in rem amatoriam et inde in nostrum tropum translata* (Schneckenburger); this at least is valid of *δελεάζειν*. The meaning: *protrahere in littus* (Pott, and also De Wette), does not here lie at the root of the idea *ἐξέλκειν* (ἄπαξ λεγ. in N. T.), for then it would require to be placed after *δελεάζειν* (as also Wieseler, Brückner, and Lange observe). Schulthess more correctly explains it: *elicere bestias ex tuto ubi latent in locum hamis retibusque expositum*; but it is probable that James had not the original figure so definitely before his eyes. Many interpreters (Menochius, Grotius, Laurentius, Pott, Hottinger, Baum-

¹ According to Hofmann's explanation, the form of expression of James would be diametrically opposed to that of Paul; for what Paul calls *ἁμαρτία*, James would call *ἐπιθυμία*; and what Paul calls *ἐπιθυμία*, James would call *ἁμαρτία*! And how objectionable is it to say, with Wiesinger: *ἐπιθυμία*, when stirred up, produces those *ἐπιθυμίας σαρκός* in Gal. v. 16, 24, that *ἐπιθυμεῖν* and that *ἐπιθυμία* in Rom. vii. 7, 8. It is also incorrect, with Lange, to understand by *ἰδία ἐπιθ.* "original sin itself in its concrete activity," or "the folly which the

individual encounters externally, over against which the lust belonging to him is objectively placed," and to determine the same more definitely as the totality of those "glittering, variegated, visionary expectations which seductively met both the Jews and the Jewish Christians, which had sprung from the matter of the chilastic, world-lusting, spiritual pride." James does not here speak of *ἐπιθυμία* as attacking an individual from outside, but *only* of that which is within him.

garten, Theile, and others) supply a *bono* to ἐξέλκ. and *ad malum* to δειλεύζ., or something similar; yet incorrectly, as the idea is rather that ἐπιθυμία as a harlot entices man, that is, his *will*, to herself; the ἐξ in ἐξέλκ. is thus to be explained, that man, enticed by the allurements of ἐπιθυμία, is enticed to forsake his former position (as the place where he remained hitherto concealed); Schneckenburger: *Statu quasi suo et loco se extrahi et dimoveri ipse patitur*. It is incorrect to explain ἐξέλκειν as equivalent to προσέλκειν, or as an intensified form instead of ἔλκειν.¹ The being taken captive by ἐπιθυμία is indicated by δειλεάζόμενος.² δειλείζειν, in the N. T. used here only and in 2 Pet. ii. 2, 14, 18, is also, among classical writers, used figuratively only in *sensu malo*.³

Ver. 15. Continuing the image used in ver. 14, James in this verse describes what is the fruit which proceeds from δειλεύεσθαι ὑπὸ τῆς ἰδίας ἐπιθυμίας: *Lust having conceived* (i. e., become pregnant) *bringeth forth sin, and sin when it is completed bringeth forth death*. The object of this representation is not to give a doctrine of sin, — its origin and its end, — but by indicating the *fruit* of πειράζεσθαι, to demonstrate that it is not from God. By εἶτα the *result* of πειράζεσθαι, namely *τίκτει ἁμαρτίαν*, is indicated as directly following upon it; συλλαβοῦσα forms the transition to it, which occurs by ἐπιθυμία taking the will of man captive; it, as it were, becomes pregnant, so that it bears sin. — συλλαβοῦσα *τίκτει* corresponds to the Hebrew וַתֵּלֶךְ וַתְּהַרְוֶה, which is uniformly in the LXX. translated by συλλαβοῦσα ἔτεκε (Gen. iv. 5, 17, xxx. 17, and other passages). By ἁμαρτία *without* the article, the fruit of ἐπιθυμία, according to its quality, is indicated in an entirely general manner. Sin born by lust again carries in itself its own fruit (κῆγμα), which, having come to completion (ἀποτελεσθεῖσα), is brought forth out of itself (ἀποκτεῖ). According to De Wette, by ἁμαρτία in the first clause is to be understood “the resolution or *internal act*,” but in the second clause (ἡ ἁμαρτία ἀποτελεσθεῖσα), “sin accomplished in the *external act*,” thus acts of sin. This, however, is incorrect, as — (1) by ἡ δὲ ἁμαρτία the ἁμαρτία already mentioned is again taken up, and therefore must have the same meaning; and (2) ἀποτελεῖν ἁμαρτίαν cannot mean “sin accomplished.”⁴ Wiesinger, with regard to *τίκτει ἁμαρτίαν*, correctly observes: “ἁμαρτία is sin, but whether the internal or external act is not stated;” yet ἀποτελεσθεῖσα added in the following clause shows that James considered ἁμαρτία as something gradually developed, for ἀποτελεῖν is not equivalent to *τίκτειν* (so that ἀποτελεσθεῖσα would be = *τεχθεῖσα*, Baumgarten: “sin brought or produced into the world in such a manner”), but *completed*:

¹ See Athenaeus, i. 3, c. 8: διὰ τὴν ὁμιλίαν τοὺς ἱραστὰς προσελκύσασθαι. Ael., *N. An.*, vi. 31: ὑπὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐλκόμενος.

² Lange: “To draw off and to allure: German, *Ablocken* and *Anlocken*; the man is first drawn out from his inward self-control and fortress, and then attracted (drawn to) by the allurements of the harlot.”

³ Comp. particularly, Plato, *Tim.*, lix. 6: ἡδονὴ μεγίστων κακῶν δέλεαρ; Plut., *De Ser. Nupt. Vind.*: τὸ γλυκὺ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ὡσπερ δέλεαρ ἐξέλκειν (ἀνθρώπους).

⁴ De Wette incorrectly appeals to the ex-

pression ἀποτελεῖν ἐπιθυμίαν in Plato, *Gorg.*, p. 503 D, and τελεῖν τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν, as there ἐπιθυμία and ἁμαρτία are not similar, but different ideas. When Wiesinger, against the explanation of De Wette, says that συλλαβοῦσα indicates that “the will consents to the demand of the desire, which is the resolution or internal act,” it is, on the contrary, to be observed that these two are by no means identical, as the resolution is an act of the will, and thus is actually sin, whilst by συλλαβοῦσα is indicated a point preceding *τίκτειν ἁμαρτίαν*.

thus ἡ ἀμ. ἀποτ. = "sin which has attained to its complete development." It is not entirely corresponding to the idea of James, when Calvin (with whom most recent critics — Kern, Schneckenburger, Theile, Wiesinger, and others — agree) explains it as "the entire sinful life" (*non unum aliquod opus perpetratum, sed cursus peccandi completus, vita impia et scelerata*). As James considers ἀμαρτία itself personified, it is ἀποτελεσθεῖσα when it has grown to such fulness of power that it rules man's whole life. According to this idea, it is indeed correct when several interpreters explain ἀποτελ. by *adulta*; thus Bouman: *Peccatum, quum ad adultam pervenit aetatem*; yet, linguistically, this explanation is not to be justified, as ἀποτελεῖσθαι is not equivalent to *adolescere*. The explanation given in the earlier edition of this commentary, that by ἀμαρτία is meant the *act* of sin, is erroneous, because such a limitation of the general idea is not indicated; on this account it is not correct to think on ἐπιθυμία and ἀμαρτία as a single definite lust and sin. — Brückner considers the addition of ἀποτελεσθεῖσα is made only "in order that ἀμαρτία, which was at first represented as a child, might again be represented as a mother." This, however, is incorrect: the origin and growth (or, more correctly, the completion) of sin by no means occur "in reality together at one moment;" sin bears death, which it carried in itself at the first, only when it is not interrupted in its development by a higher life-power, but has attained to its complete form. — By θάνατος, by which James indicates the fruit of *completed* sin according to its nature, is to be understood, not only *temporary* death (Pott: *Homines peccando mortales factos esse omnes consentiunt N. T. scriptores*), but, as the opposite of the ζωή which God has promised, and will give to them who love Him, *eternal* death; see Rom. vi. 23: τὰ ὑψώνια τῆς ἀμαρτίας, θάνατος • τὸ δὲ χάρισμα Θεοῦ, ζωὴ αἰώνιος. If, therefore, nothing but θάνατος is the end to which πειράζεσθαι conducts, this cannot possibly have its reason in God, who works ζωή, and therefore it is absurd to say ἀπὸ Θεοῦ πειράζουσαι (ver. 13). — The expression ἀποκνίει (only here and in ver. 18 in the N. T.) is distinguished from τίκτει only in this, that it indicates more definitely that ἀμαρτία from the beginning is pregnant with θάνατος. By the explanation: *meretur mortem* (Bede, Laurentius, and others), a relation is introduced foreign to the context. On the mode of writing ἀποκνίει and ἀποκνίει, see Winer, p. 80 (E. T. 88); Schirlitz, p. 184 f.

Ver. 16 introduces the statement which follows as one particularly important. Not only the exhortation; μὴ πλανᾶσθε, but also the added address: ἀδελφοί μου ἀγαπητοί, shows how important this observation appeared to the author. A *new* line of thought, unconnected with the preceding, does not indeed begin with this verse; μὴ πλανᾶσθε must not therefore be considered, with Hornejus, Gebser, and others, only as the concluding formula to what goes before. Theile correctly observes: *Ubi antecedentia respicit, nunquam finit cohortationem, sed ita interpositum est, ut continuet ac firmet, nunc illustrando, nunc cavendo*. The same formula is found in 1 Cor. vi. 9, xv. 33; Gal. vi. 7 (similarly 1 John iii. 7); in all those places it precedes a thought certain to the Christian conscience, by which a preceding expression is confirmed in opposition to a false opinion: this is also the case here. Grotius inserts an entirely foreign reference when he says, *hoc vult: ne putate vestrum*

studium sufficere sine precibus; see Luke xviii. 1. There is here no reference whatever to prayer.

Ver. 17. The sentiment in this verse, introduced by ver. 16, is designed for the complete rejection of ἀπὸ Θεοῦ περιάζομαι; the *good* comes from God, therefore περιάζεσθαι cannot come from God. The idea of the *good* is indicated by two synonymous expressions: δόσις ἀγαθῆ and δῶρημα τέλειον. By δόσις, which has here not an active, as in Phil. iv. 5 (Bouman, Lange), but a passive signification (as frequently in classical Greek and in the Apocrypha), and by δῶρημα, the same thing is indicated — in contrast to ἰδία ἐπιθυμία, ver. 14 — as something given and presented, which thus proceeds not from man himself. By δῶρημα τέλειον the idea already contained in δόσις ἀγαθῆ is heightened, δῶρημα more definitely indicating the gift (δόσις) as a *free present* (which Gunkel incorrectly denies; see Rom. v. 16, where δῶρημα is parallel with χάρισμα), and τέλειον the idea of the good (ἀγαθῆ) as *morally perfect*.¹ It is arbitrary to refer the two expressions to *different* gifts, and by δόσις to understand the gifts of the kingdom of nature or of the present life, and by δῶρημα those of the kingdom of grace or of the future life. Also ἀγαθῆ is not, with Didymus, to be restricted to the idea of the useful. Several interpreters (Raphelius, Stolz, Rosenmüller, Bengel, Augusti, Pott, Hottinger, and others) put an exclusive force on πᾶς, as if it were = *non nisi*, “nothing but;” but the thought is weakened thereby. James designs to say not only — in contrast to the derivation of περιάζεσθαι from God — that *only* good (thus not evil) gifts come from Him, but likewise that good gifts all come only from God (thus from none else) (Stier); πᾶς is accordingly to be taken in its usual meaning; but ἀγαθῆ and τέλειον are to be emphasized. Schneckenburger arbitrarily explains it as if James had written: πᾶσα δόσις καὶ πᾶν δῶρημα ἄνωθεν καταβαῖνον τέλειον ἐστι.² — ἄνωθεν = οὐράνωθεν (Acts xiv. 17, xxvi. 13; ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, John vi. 32, 33), is put first for the sake of emphasis. — ἐστι καταβαῖνον are not, with Wolf, Bengel, Kern, Bouman, and others, to be separated, so that ἐστι is to be joined to ἄνωθεν, and καταβαῖνον is added as an epexegetis; but to be united, and are put instead of καταβαίνει, only that by the participle the quality of the verbal idea is more brought out; see chap. iii. 15; so also Wiesinger and A. Buttmann, p. 266 (E. T. 310); Winer, p. 311 (E. T. 350), and Schirlitz, p. 317, on the other hand, regard the expression as entirely equivalent to καταβαίνει. — The expression καταβαῖνον is explained from ἄνωθεν. The explanation of Laurentius: *non cadens, sed descendens, quia ordinariè bona sua dona dat*, is far-fetched. — ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς τῶν φῶτων, an epexegetis to the preceding. By τὰ φῶτα is to be understood neither spiritual light, whether knowledge (Hornejus), or joy (Michaelis), or goodness, wisdom (Wolf: *Omnis perfectio, bonitas, sapientia et prosperitas*), or something similar, nor the spirits of light (*Schol. ap. Matt.*: ἦτοι τᾶν

¹ Whilst De Wette finds the emphasis only in the adjectives, Theile correctly remarks: Et substantiva et adjectiva differunt ita, ut posterius priore sit definitivus ideoque majus. So also Wiesinger and Brückner. Lange by δῶρ. τελ. understands “the gift of God completed in

Christianity;” and by δόσ. ἀγ. “every thing which served to prepare this completed gift, especially in the old covenant.”

² On the accidental hexameter which the words πᾶσα . . . τέλειον form, see Winer, p. 564 (E. T. 798).

ἀγγελικῶν δυνάμεων· ἢ τῶν πεφωτισμένων ἀνθρώπων; Lange: "The whole series of organs of revelation from Abraham to Christ, as the representatives of all good spirits"). Nor is there here any allusion to the Urim and Thummim of the high priest (Heisen); but by it are meant, as almost all modern expositors recognize, *the heavenly bodies* (see LXX. Ps. cxxxv. (cxxxvi.) 7; Jer. iv. 23) = φωστῆρες, LXX., Gen. i. 14. God is designated as the πατὴρ of these, because He is their Creator and Preserver. This designation, for which Job xxxviii. 28 cannot be appealed to, is surprising, as it is without analogy either in the O. or N. T. (otherwise with profane writers and Philo). It has, however, its ground in this, that James considers the light of the heavenly bodies as a reflection of the essential light of God. Since God is the Father of light, the symbol of the holy ones (Wiesinger), so He Himself must be light, and thus nothing dark (consequently not πειράζεσθαι), but rather only all that is light, can proceed from Him. As the Father of lights, God, however, outshines these: their light is changing; His, on the contrary, is without change. The following words: *with whom there is no variation nor shadow (in consequence) of change*, express this idea; i.e., whilst with the stars a παραλλαγή or τροπῆς ὑποσκίασμα occurs, there is nothing similar to this with God.¹ According to Grotius, with whom various expositors agree, these expressions are *termini technici* of astronomy. But, in opposition to this, it is to be observed that παραλλαγή never occurs as an astronomical term (see Gebser *in loco*), and the astronomical signification of τροπή = *solstitium*, solstice (τροπαὶ θεριναὶ and χειμεριναὶ; comp. Wisd. vii. 18: τροπῶν ἀλλαγῆς), is not here suitable, as the sun is not mentioned specially, nor is an ὑποσκίασμα effected by the solstice. James here uses not the language of astronomy, but that of ordinary life (Wiesinger). — παραλλαγή is to be understood quite generally, *variation*. James adds to this general idea, in order to bring prominently forward that the essential light of God is not, as is the case with the stars, obscured by any thing, the more definite idea τροπῆς ὑποσκίασμα. ὑποσκίασμα has not an active (De Wette: "casting a shadow"), but a passive signification, *being shaded* (so Brückner); and τροπῆς assigns the reason (ὑποσκίασμα quae oritur e τροπῇ, Schneckenburger): thus the shadowing of the stars, which is effected by *their changeable position*:² for that James has founded his idea in a change in the stars themselves, is not probable.³ Luther's translation: "the change of light and darkness" (similarly, Stolz: "changing obscuration"), is only justified if it were said τροπή ὑποσκίασματος. Deviating entirely from the above explanation, the Greek interpreters take

¹ Flatt (*Spicil. observat. ad ep. Jacobi*): Auctor siderum nitidorum ipsis etiam nitidior et uitoris, nullis unquam tenebris interrupti, majori constantia fulgens. Similarly it is said of Wisdom: ἐστὶ γὰρ αὐτῆ εὐπρεπεστέρα ἡλιου, καὶ ὑπὲρ πᾶσαν ἀστρων θέσιν, φωτὶ συγκρινομένη ὑπὸσκιεταὶ προτέρα, Wisdom of Solomon, vii. 29.

² Incorrectly, Lange explains the expression, "of the obscuration of the earth effected by the diurnal phenomenal revolution of the sun, moon, and stars." And the proper idea

which James has in view is, according to Lange, that God "makes no revolution with the Old Testament which would cast a night-shadow on the New, nor does he suffer the New Testament to cast a night-shadow on the Old"!

³ Without reason, Baumgarten, Schneckenburger, and others assume that James here alludes to the astrological superstitions of the Jews.

ἀποσκίασμα = ἴχνος; Oecumenius: ἀντὶ τοῦ· οὐδὲ μέχρις ὑπονοίας τινὸς ὑποβολή; Suidas: ἀντὶ τοῦ· ἀλλοιώσεως καὶ μεταβολῆς ἴχνος· καὶ ὁμοίωμα φαντασίας; and following them several recent writers; Morus: *ne tantillum mutationes*; Rosenmüller: no shadow of change; so Hensler and others. But in this signification ἀποσκίασμα never elsewhere occurs; also the here essential idea of obscurity (Bengel: ἀποσκίασμα, *opponitur luminibus*) would be lost. — The form ἐνι (besides here in the N. T., in 1 Cor. vi. 5; Gal. iii. 28; Col. iii. 11) is not, with Buttmann, ii. 375; Winer, p. 74 (E. T. 80); Schirlitz, 171, and others, to be taken as a peculiar form of ἐν, but is the abbreviation of ἐνεστι (A. Buttmann, p. 64 [E. T. 72]); comp. 1 Cor. vi. 5: οὐκ ἐνι ἐν ὑμῖν σοφός οὐδὲ εἰς (see Meyer *in loco*). ἐνι, however, is not, with Pott, to be explained as precisely equivalent with ἴσταν, yet the meaning of the preposition ἐν is so weakened, as the verb could be construed with any other preposition, as here with the preposition παρά, which here, as frequently in the N. T., stands for “what spiritually belongs to another, is in another’s possession.”¹

Ver. 18. Most interpreters subordinate the thought contained in this verse to the preceding, regarding it either as an *example* (Laurentius: *loquitur Ap. in his verbis de generatione spirituali ut sit quasi exemplum aliquod istorum donorum spiritualium, quae sunt desuper*) or as a *confirmation* and a *proof* (thus Gebser, Kern, Wiesinger, Bouman; also Lange):² on the contrary, according to Theile and De Wette,³ its relation is that of co-ordination. But in both explanations the peculiar significance which this verse has in the context is mistaken. It is to be recognized as a *principal thought*, not only because the succeeding exhortations flow from it, but also because the preceding development only comes to its close in it; whilst only in *βουληθεῖς ἀπεκήρην ἡμῶς* is not only the assertion ἀπὸ Θεοῦ πειράζομαι completely refuted, but also all the earlier-mentioned assertions have their sure foundation. It is accordingly not a confirmation of ver. 17, but rather a *special inference* from the *general* idea of that verse. — *βουληθεῖς ἀπεκήρην ἡμῶς*]. The verb itself testifies that here the discourse is of the new birth, and not of natural birth, for ἀποκύειν is synonymous with γεννᾶν; but the man *γεγεννημένος ἐκ Θεοῦ* (1 John iii. 9; see also 1 Pet. i. 23) is not man in himself, but man born again. Unsatisfactorily Pott explains ἀποκύειν = *facere, efficere*, since by this the specific idea of the verb, that the foundation of the life of him who is born again lies in God, and that he is *θείας φύσεως κοινωνός* (2 Pet. i. 4), is lost. — ἡμῶς; not *us* as men, nor *us* as *Jewish* Christians, but *us* as Christians. — The verse emphatically commences with *βουληθεῖς*, by which is expressed not a contrast to the merit of human works (Bede: *non nostris, sed beneficio suae voluntatis*; similarly Calvin, Hornejus, Grotius, etc.), nor to “the Jewish claims of righteousness” (Lange), but it is designed prominently to bring forward the thought that the new birth rests on the divine *will*, — the work is that which God has peculiarly *willed*. But if this be the case, how can

¹ Demosthenes, *De Cor.*, p. 318, 13: εἰ δ' οὖν ἐστὶ καὶ παρ' ἐμοί τις ἐμπειρία τοιαύτη.

² Lange strangely designates the new birth as the effect of the δῶρημα τέλειον which came down from heaven.

³ Theile: Deus, luminum pater, *etiam* parens est generationis nostrae. De Wette: In place of all good gifts, the gracious gift of the Christian salvation is *likewise* mentioned as a proof that God can be no tempter.

πειράζεσθαι proceed from Him? Without sufficient reason, Bengel, Kern, Schneckenburger, Wiesinger, and others put the additional idea of *love* in βουληθείς.¹ — λόγῳ ἀληθείας]. The instrument of ἀποκυῆσαι is the λογος ἀληθείας, that is, the gospel,² which is so called because “ἀληθεία in its entire reality is inherent in it” (Harless on Eph. i. 13). The words: εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἡμῶς ἀπαρχὴν τινα τῶν αὐτοῦ κτισμάτων, express the aim of this new birth, by which is not indicated what Christians, as those who are born of God, ought to *become*, but what they *are*, according to the intention of God.³ By τινα added to ἀπαρχὴν the mode of expression is indicated as figurative; for, as Calvin correctly remarks, *τινα similitudinis est nota, nos quodammodo esse primitias* (so also Gebser, Hottinger, Kern, Wiesinger, and others). Also Bengel recognizes this, but he puts therein a false reference, observing: *QUAEDAM habet MODESTIAM, nam primitiae proprie et absolute est Christus*. Still more incorrect is it, with Lange, to explain τινα, that James considered the angels of God as a different kind of first-fruits of creation. Laurentius correctly says: ἀπαρχὴ *allusio est ad ritum legalem in Vetum Testamentum de consecratione primogenitorum, frugum, jumentorum et hominum* (so also Calvin, Hornejus, Wiesinger, and others; unsatisfactorily De Wette: “chosen and holy”). The word has here, as everywhere in the O. T., and predominantly among the classics, a religious signification, namely, “*the first-fruits dedicated to God*”; so that James by this expression indicates Christians, as a fruit dedicated to the service of God. But ἡμῶς emphatically repeated shows that James does not here state the nature of Christians generally, but what the position is which he and those Christians occupy who, according to Rom. viii. 23, possess τὴν ἀπαρχὴν τοῦ πνεύματος (see Meyer *in loco*). They are a kind of first-fruits of God’s creatures, because they, as being born of God, are dedicated to God *first* among all His creatures. The glorification, which is destined for the whole world, was first imparted to Christians then living.⁴ In the N. T. ἀπαρχὴ is sometimes so used that the religious signification steps into the background (thus in 1 Cor. xv. 20, 23; Rom. viii. 23, xvi. 5; 1 Cor. xvi. 15; otherwise in Rom. xi. 16 and Rev. xiv. 5); and accordingly several expositors explain the expression of James as equivalent to οἱ πρῶτοι τῶν

¹ Bengel: voluntate amantissima. Schneckenburger: non merum volendi actum sed benignam et benigna voluntate ortam volitionem exprimit. The view of Oecumenius is evidently entirely perverted: τὸ βουληθείς εἶπεν, ἐπιστομίζων τοὺς αὐτομάτως ὑποστήναι τὸδε τὸ πᾶν ληροῦντας.

² If the want of the article should constrain us to translate λόγος ἀληθείας, “a word of truth,” that is, a word whose nature is truth (see Meyer on 2 Cor. vi. 7), yet by this word of truth here the gospel can only be understood; but it is more probable that the article is omitted because λόγος ἀληθείας, as an idea definite in itself, did not require the article to designate it.

³ According to Lange’s supposition, “this teleological mode of expression is chosen in

order to indicate that the *Jews* should *become* what *Christians* already *are*.” This is purely arbitrary, as such a distinction is not indicated in the very slightest degree.

⁴ It is, however, also possible that James by ἡμᾶς has had in view, not the distinction between the then-existing and the later Christians, but only the distinction between Christians and the other creatures, since Christians of all ages form the ἀπαρχὴ τῶν κτισμάτων, until the commencement of the world’s glorification. Lange with truth brings forward the idea that if Christians are ἀπαρχὴ, they are sureties for the future glorification of the world; but that the first believers of Israel in their unity are sureties for the future conversion of the nation, is an introduced idea which is not indicated by James.

κτισμάτων αὐτοῦ. But against this is, on the one hand, the added *τινα*, and on the other hand, the existing necessity of conceiving as added to κτισμάτων an attribute, as *νέων* or *καίνων*, since the expression τὰ κτίσματα Θεοῦ is not taken by itself, those who are born again, but generally, *the creatures of God*. It is still more arbitrary to take *ὑπαρχή* as equivalent to *πρῶτοι*, in the sense of *τιμώτατοι* (Oecumenius; Morus: *omnium creaturarum carissimi et dignissimi*; the favorites among His creatures), and then to refer the verse to the dignity of man generally, as the scholiast explains: *τὴν ὀρωμένην κτίσιν φησὶν, ἧς τιμώτερον τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἔδειξεν*.¹ By αὐτοῦ (Lachmann and Buttmann, αὐτοῦ; Tischendorf, *ἐαυτοῦ*), emphatically added, the creatures are indicated as God's property.

Ver. 19. To ver. 18 is annexed at first the exhortation to *hear*, and then in ver. 22 the more extended exhortation, not only to be hearers, but also doers of the word. By the reading *ὥστε*, the connection with the preceding is evidently expressed, *ὥστε* being with the following imperative, as in I Cor. iii. 21; Phil. ii. 12 = *itaque, therefore*. This reading is, however, suspicious, as not only predominant authorities declare for the reading *ἴστε*, but also *ἴστε* might be easily changed into *ὥστε*, in order to mark the thoughts in this verse as an inference from ver. 18. It is true the *δέ* after *ἔστω*, conjoined with this reading (in B and C), appears to be harsh; but it may be explained from this, that the sentence *ἔστω . . . ταχὺς εἰς τὸ ἀκούσαι, κ.τ.λ.*, is introduced as being almost a proverbial expression. The reading of A: *ἔστε δὲ . . . καὶ ἔστω*, appears to be a correction, in order to unite this verse more closely with the preceding. *ἴστε* may be either indicative (comp. Heb. xii. 17; usually *οἴδατε*) or imperative; it is at all events to be referred, not to what goes before,² but to what follows, as otherwise *τοῦτο*, or something similar, by which it would be referred back to ver. 18, would require to be added. Semler explains it as an indicative, paraphrasing it: *non ignoratis istud carmen*; Eccles. v. 11: *γίνου ταχὺς ἐν ἀκροῖσει σου, κ.τ.λ.* As, however, the sentence in question is here expressed in different words, so it is not to be assumed that James would here refer to that passage in Ecclesiasticus. It is thus better to consider *ἴστε* as an imperative, as it then corresponds to *μὴ πλανᾶσθε* (ver. 16), and serves strongly to impress the following sentence on the readers, in favor of which also is the address *ἀδελφοί μου ἀγαπητοί* added here as well as there; see also chap. ii. 5: *ἀκούσατε, ὡδ. μ. ἄγ.* — The sentence is entirely general: *let every man be swift to hear, slow to speak, slow to wrath*. Whilst Laurentius and others consider this as a *sententia generalis*, which stands in no internal connection with the preceding, but is pressed upon the readers in its entire generality, most interpreters supply to *ἀκούσαι*, from the preceding context, *τὸν λόγον ἀληθείας*; thus Estius, Gataker, Gomar, Piscator, Hornejus, Baumgarten, Rosenmüller, Pott, Hottinger, Gebser, De Wette, Wiesinger, and others; but this is arbitrary, particularly as *πᾶς ἄνθρωπος* points to the universality of the sentence. However, the

¹ Thus Schulthess: *Divino rationis et orationis munere, cujus ex tot animantium generibus atque naturis homo solus est particeps, principatum dignitatis ei datum cernimus.*

² De Wette explains it: "Ye know this, namely, that he has regenerated us;" but this, as he himself confesses, gives a wholly unsatisfactory sense.

intention of James is not to inculcate it on his readers in its general sense, but he wishes rather that they, as Christians, should apply it to their Christian conduct; so that for them ἀκούσαι certainly refers to λόγος τῆς ἀληθείας (Heisen, Schneckenburger,¹ Theile). ὑμῶν is therefore not to be supplied to πᾶς ἄνθρωπος, still we may say with Senler: *pertinet ad Christianos, quatenus sunt Christiani*; but the expression is, as part of the general sentence, likewise to be retained in its general meaning; but what holds good of all men, in a peculiar manner holds good of Christians. — The ideas ταχύς and βραδύς, in the N. T. only here (in Luke xxiv. 25, βραδύς has a different meaning), form a direct contrast.² By βραδύς εἰς ὀργήν added to the second clause, James announces what kind of speaking he means, namely, speaking ἐξ ὀργῆς.³ But from ver. 20 it is evident that by ὀργή — which, as Cremer correctly remarks, denotes not the passive affection, but active displeasure directed toward any one — is to be understood sinful and passionate zeal. βραδύς is to be taken in both clauses in the same sense, which — as is often the case with expressions in figurative language — goes beyond the literal and direct idea of the word, as Hornejus correctly explains it in reference to the *second* clause: *ita jubet tardos ad iram esse, ut ab eo nos prorsus retrahat*. Several expositors refer both clauses, others at least the second chiefly or alone, to the conduct toward God, with or without an express reference to ver. 13.⁴ But this is incorrect; the ὀργή to which James alludes is rather carnal zeal, which will censure its neighbor, whose fruit is not εἰρήνη, but ἀκαταστασία (chap. iii. 16). The warning is addressed to those Christians who misuse the gospel (the λόγος ἀληθείας) as the Pharisees did the law, not for their own sanctification, but for the gratification of their censoriousness and quarrelsome temper; see chap. iii. Although James with this exhortation has specially in view the conduct of Christians in their assemblies, yet λαλῆσαι must not be restricted to the idea of mere *teaching* (Bede, Hornejus, Hottinger, De Wette, Brückner, and others). λαλῆσαι is a more comprehensive term than διδάσκειν which is included in it.

Ver. 20 gives the reason of the exhortation βραδύς εἰς ὀργήν: *For the wrath of man works not the righteousness of God*. The preponderance of authorities

¹ Schneckenburger: quamvis de sensu dubitari nequeat, nempe de addiscendo λόγῳ ἀληθείας caveas tamen vocem hanc λόγον putes grammaticam subaudiendam; sed Jacobus regulam istam generalium . . . ita hic subnectit, ut eam ad rem christianam imprimis valere moneat.

² As in Philo, *De conf. ling.*, p. 327 B: βραδύς ὠφέλησαι, ταχύς βλάψαι (see *Dio O.*, 32).

³ The circumstance is in favor of this close connection of these two last clauses, that if λαλῆσαι is here taken in a wider sense (as Gunkel thinks), then a different signification must be given to βραδύς in the two clauses, as ὀργή here, as the following verse shows, must be taken in a bad sense. Lange thinks that James does not absolutely reject ὀργή; but whilst he understands by ὀργή eagerness of

passion to which one is led from eagerness in speaking by warmth, he evidently understands this as something to be entirely rejected. According to Bouman, the anger here is meant to which one is inflamed by the λαλεῖν of another.

⁴ On βραδ. εἰς τὸ λαλ., Bengel remarks: ut nil loquatur contra Deum, nec sinistre de Deo; and on ὀργή: ira sive impatientia erga Deum, iracundia erga proximum. Gebser explains ὀργή = anger, displeasure at God on account of the persecutions. Calvin also has this reference in view when he says: certe nemo unquam bonus erit Dei discipulus nisi qui silendo eum audiat; . . . non enim Deus nisi sedato animo audiri potest, as is evident from the note: (Jacobus) vult proterviam nostram corripere, ne . . . intempestive obstrepamus Deo.

decides against the reading *κατεργάζεται*, and in favor of *εργάζεται*. From the fact that *δικαιοσύνην* is twice in the N. T., namely Acts x. 35 and Heb. xi. 33, joined with the simple verb, it does not follow that *εργάζεται* is a later correction (against De Wette, Wiesinger), especially as *κατεργάζεσθαι* is also found united with abstract substantives, as in Rom. i. 27 with *τὴν ἀσχημοσύνην*, in Rom. ii. 9 with *τὸ κακόν*, and in Rom. vii. 18 with *τὸ καλόν*. With the reading *εργάζεται*, — and also with *κατεργάζεται*, when this latter, as is frequently the case (see especially Rom. ii. 9, 10), is synonymous with the former, — *δικαιοσύνη* is equivalent to *τὸ δίκαιον*, as is frequently the case in the O. and N. T.; see Acts x. 35 above referred to, and the frequently occurring phrase: *ποιεῖν τὴν δικαιοσύνην*, Gen. xviii. 19; Isa. lvi. 1; Matt. vi. 1; 1 John ii. 29, iii. 7, 10; Rev. xxii. 11. Θεοῦ is added in contrast to *ἀνθρώπος* for the sake of a more exact statement, so that *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ* is *the righteousness willed by God*¹ (similar to *τὸ δίκαιον ἐνώπιον τοῦ Θεοῦ*, Acts iv. 19; Luther: “The wrath of man works not that which is right before God”); so Beza, Hornejus, Wolf, Bengel, De Wette, Bouman, and others, correctly explain it. The opposite of *δικαιοσύνην Θεοῦ ἐργάζεσθαι* is *ἀμαρτίαν ἐργάζεσθαι*, chap. ii. 9 (comp. Matt. vii. 1: *ἐργαζ. τὴν ἀνομίαν*; 1 Macc. ix. 23: *ἐργαζ. τὴν ἀδικίαν*; also comp. Rom. ii. 10: *ἐργαζ. τὸ ἀγαθόν*; Gal. vi. 10). James was the more constrained to give prominence to this idea, as *ὀργή* itself and the words flowing from it were considered by the pharisaical disposition of Christians, against whom this warning is directed, and of whom it was said: *ζῆλον Θεοῦ ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ’ οὐ κατ’ ἐπίγνωσιν*, Rom. x. 2, as something that was pleasing to God. With the reading *κατεργάζεται* this verb may also be equivalent to effect, to bring about (as ver. 3). Gebser, Grashof, and others understand, in accordance with this view, by *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ*: “the condition of justification before God;” but, on the one hand, an unsuitable thought is expressed by this, and, on the other hand, a mode of expressing the idea *δικαιοσύνη τοῦ Θεοῦ*, peculiar to Paul, is without ceremony ascribed to James. But as little is it to be justified when Wiesinger, following Hofmann (*Schriftbew.* i., ed. 1, p. 548 f.), finds expressed in the words of James, that “one by wrathful zeal effects not *on others* the *δικ.* Θεοῦ, i. e., that state of righteousness in which God begets men by His word of truth.”² Though *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ* can denote the righteousness wrought by God, yet this idea is here unsuitable, since no man could entertain the opinion that his wrath could do what can only be effected by God. Also in this case James would only emphasize an impossibility of *ὀργή*, whereas he was required to bring prominently forward its rejection; moreover, *on others* is inserted into the text.³ The same

¹ It is true the expression *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ* occurs not elsewhere in this sense; but this can be the less an objection to it, as the relation in which the genitive Θεοῦ is placed to *δικαιοσύνη* is not entirely opposed to the genitive of relation, as is evident if we designate the *δικ.* Θεοῦ as that *δικαιοσύνη* which is actually so according to the determination of God.

² In the second edition (p. 628), Hofmann has indeed altered the words, but not the

thought, in the explanation given in the first edition. When he defines the distinction in the use of the idea *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ*, in Rom. i. 17 and here, to consist in this, that Paul speaks of justification, James of regeneration, the untenableness of his explanation is the more evident, for that *ὀργή* produces regeneration could occur to no one.

³ Contrary to the biblical use of language, Oecumenius explains the expression *δικαιοσύνη*

reasons are also decisive against the explanation of Brückner ("the wrath of man works not the righteousness which God accomplishes—this generally stated both in respect to the *άνήρ* and in respect to others on whom one strives to work"), in which a twofold reference is arbitrarily assumed. Brückner correctly rejects the explanation of Lange, that James speaks against "the delusion of wrath, which imagines to administer and accomplish in the world the righteousness of God especially against unbelievers," because there is no reference to this in the context; it is, moreover, linguistically unmaintainable, as *εργάζεσθαι* does not mean "to administer and accomplish."—*άνδρός* stands here as in vv. 8 and 12; it forms a contrast neither to the *child* (Thomas: *ira fortis et deliberate non dicit pueri, qui cito transit*), nor to the *woman* (Bengel: *sexus virilis maxime iram alit*), nor to *άνθρωπος*, ver. 19 (Lange).

Ver. 21. James infers (*δύ*) from the thought in ver. 20 the exhortation *έν πραύτητι δέξασθε τόν έμφυτον λόγον*, with evident reference to *άπεκύνθησεν ήμύς λόγον άληθείας* (ver. 18). He places before this exhortation the participial clause: *άποθέμενοι . . . κακίας*; *laying aside all filthiness and abundance of wickedness*, i. e., *all filthy and abundantly prevalent wickedness*. The word *ρυνπαρία* (*άπ. λεγ.* in the N. T.) is here figurative (synonymous with *άκαθαρσία* in Rom. vi. 19 and other places), as *ρυνπαρός* and *ρυνπαρεύω*, Rev. xxii. 11 (*ρυνπαρός* occurs in its literal sense in chap. ii. 2: *ρύπος* in 1 Pet. iii. 21). Several interpreters (Calvin, Rosenmüller, Baumgarten, Hornejus, Bouman, Lange, and others) take it here as standing alone, equivalent to *moral uncleanness* (see 2 Cor. vii. 1: *πύς μόλυσμός σαρκός και πνεύματος*), either generally "every immoral disposition," or specifically as *avaritia* (Storr), or *scortatio* (Laurentius), or *vitia intemperantiae, gulae et lasciviae* (Heisen), or "filth in a religious theocratical sense" (Lange); but it is better to join *ρυνπαρίαν* with *κακίας* (Theile, De Wette, Wiesinger, and others), so that the ethical judgment of the author on the *κακία* is thereby expressed (comp. Acts xv. 20; Rev. xvii. 4), equivalent to *πάσαν κακίαν ρυνπαρίαν*, or less exactly *ρυνπαίνουσαν τόν άνθρωπον* (*Schol. on Matt.*); only the idea is more strongly brought forward by the substantive than by the adjective. The word *περισσειά*, united to *ρυνπαρίαν* by the copulative *και* (not, as Schneckenburger thinks, exegetical; in the cited passages, John i. 16 and 1 Cor. iii. 5, the position of *και* is entirely different), foreign to classical Greek, has in the N. T. the signification *abundance*; properly, "abundance flowing over the measure," which Lange incorrectly renders "outflow, communication of life;" see Rom. v. 17; 2 Cor. viii. 2, x. 15. Nevertheless, the word has been here taken in a meaning corresponding to *ρυνπαρία*, and has been explained as = *περίσσωμα excrementum* (Beza, Piscator, Erasmus, Schmid, and others), or also *growth* (Lösner, Pott, Hottinger, Kern, Schneckenburger, De Wette). But both meanings are arbitrary. The defenders of the second explanation indeed appeal to the passage in Philo, *De Vict. Off.*

as equivalent to *ξίς έν ψυχή κατ' άξίαν έκάστω άπονεμητική*. Pott, wholly arbitrarily, refers the verse to the teachers of the Christian religion, paraphrasing it: *Iratus nequit docere religionem christianum prout fas est Deoque*

probat. — Several commentators (also Kern) to this verse cite Ecclus. i. 21: *ού δυνήσεται θυμός άδικος δικαιωθήναι*; but incorrectly, since *δικαιωθήναι* has an entirely different meaning from *κατεργάζεσθαι δικαιοσύνην Θεού*.

p. 854 B: περιτέυεσθε . . . τὰς περιττὰς φύσεις (*fortasse ἐμφύσεις*, De Wette) τοῦ ἡγεμονικῷ; but from this passage it does not follow that περισσεΐα can be explained *de ramis in vite vel arbore abundantibus falceque reseandis* (Lösner). It is equally unjustifiable when Küttner, Michaelis, Augusti, Gebser, Bouman, and others explain περισσεΐα κακίας as “κακία surviving from earlier times,” and thus take περισσεΐα as synonymous with περίσσευμα (Mark viii. 8). Against all these arbitrary views, Theile, Wiesinger, Brückner, correctly retain the word in the same sense which it has elsewhere in the N. T., so that περισσεΐα κακίας is *the abundance of κακία*, i. e., the abundantly existing κακία; only ἐν ὑμῖν is hardly to be supplied as if James had only his readers specially in view (Theile: *quod lectoribus peculiare erat*). — κακία is not here synonymous with πονηρία (1 Cor. v. 8) = *vitiositas* (Semler, Theile, and others), but according to the context, in contrast with ἐν πραύτητι, as in Eph. iv. 31, Col. iii. 8, Tit. iii. 3, 1 Pet. ii. 1, a more special idea, namely, the hostile disposition toward our neighbor which we call *malignity* (Cremer: *malevolence*, as *social faultiness*). Wiesinger inaccurately takes it as equivalent to ὀργή, as *that* is only one of the proofs of κακία; incorrectly, Rosenmüller = *morositas*.¹ On ὑποθέμενοι, comp. Eph. iv. 25; 1 Pet. ii. 1; Heb. xii. 1.² The participle precedes as a subordinate thought to δέξασθε, because in consequence of man's sinful nature room only can be made for the good by the rejection of the bad. Also, where similar sentences are co-ordinate, the exhortation to ὑποτίθεσθαι precedes; comp. Rom. xiii. 12, Eph. iv. 22, 23, and also the exhortation of Christ: μετανοεῖτε καὶ πιστεύετε, Mark i. 15. — In the positive exhortation: ἐν πραύτητι δεξασθε τὸν ἐμφύτον λόγον], ἐν πραύτητι emphatically precedes, in contrast to the κακία from which flows ὀργή. πραύτης (= πραότης) denotes a loving, gentle disposition toward our neighbor; comp. 1 Cor. iv. 21, 2 Tim. ii. 25, Tit. iii. 2, and other passages; the opposite is ὀργιλότης (Pape's *Gr. Wörterb.*); incorrectly, Calvin: *Hoc verbo significat modestiam et facilitatem mentis ad discendum compositae*. ἐν'πραύτητι does not therefore mean *docili animo* (Grotius, Rosenmüller, Hottinger), nor “with a modest disposition, which recognizes the good deeds of Christianity” (Gebser). Also ἐν πρ. δέξασθε is not a pregnant construction, as if the sense were: *monet . . . illo λόγῳ duce πραύτητα exerceant* (Schneckenburger); but James exhorts to the reception of the word ἐν πραύτητι, in contrast to those who hear the word in order to use it as a weapon of hatred (condemning others). — δέξασθε (opp. to λαλῆσαι, ver. 19) corresponds to ἀκοῦσαι, but expresses more than that, namely, “the inner reception, the taking hold of it with the heart;” comp. 1 Thess. i. 6. The object belonging to it: τὸν λόγον ἐμφύτον, can only be the same as what was called the λόγος ἀληθείας in

¹ Meyer's translation: *malice* (Rom. i. 29), *malicious disposition* (Col. iii. 8), would also not be entirely suitable, but too special. How Luther has understood the idea, cannot be determined from his translation *wickedness* (Bosheit); since he thus constantly renders κακία, it may be taken in a general or in a special sense; the word “badness” (*Schlechtigkeit*) does not occur with him.

² To the assertion of Lange, that ἀποθέμενοι is not to be rendered *putting off*, because the reference is not figuratively to the putting off of filthy garments, but *removing*; the passages Rom. xiii. 12 (ἀποθώμεθα . . . ἐνδυσώμεθα) and Eph. iv. 22, 24, and the etymology of the word, are opposed.

ver. 18 (Wiesinger); it is neither "the reason *innate* in man,"¹ nor the so-called *inner light* of the mystics, nor the gospel "in its subjective form of life" (Lange). The verb *δέχεσθαι* is opposed to these explanations. James designates the gospel a *λόγον ἐμφυτον*, inasmuch as it was no longer strange to the hearts of his readers as Christians; also because it was not merely transmitted (Hottinger: *ἐμφυτος* = *traditus*), but *implanted*.² The verb *δέξασθε* does not conflict with this, as the word by which the new birth is effected among Christians is to them ever proclaimed anew, and must by them be ever received anew, in order that the new life may be preserved and increased in them. It is therefore not necessary, against the use of language, to change the idea: *verbum quod implantatum* or *insertum est*, into *verbum quod implantatur* or *inseritur*, or to assume here a prolepsis, as is undoubtedly the case in 1 Cor. i. 8, Phil. iii. 21 (see Meyer *in loco*), and 1 Thess. iii. 13 (Lünemann *in loco*), and with Calvin to explain it: *ita suscipite ut vere inseratur* (similarly Semler, De Wette,³ and others). The mode in which the adjective is united with the substantive is opposed to a prolepsis, which would be only imaginable were it said: *τὸν λόγον ἐμφυτον ταῖς καρδίαις ὑμῶν*, or something similar. — For the strengthening of the exhortation expressed, James annexes to *τὸν ἐμφυτον λόγον* the clause *τὸν δυνάμενον σῶσαι τὰς ψυχὰς ὑμῶν*, by which, on the one hand, the value of the *λόγος* is prominently brought forward, and, on the other hand, is indicated what result ought to arise from the hearing of the word. By the verb *δυνάμενον*, not the freedom of the human will (Serrarius: *quod potest salvare, ut arbitrii libertas indicetur*), but the *power* of the word, is emphasized; it is, as Paul says, *δύναμις Θεοῦ εἰς σωτηρίαν πάντι τῷ πιστεύοντι* (Rom. i. 16). But if it has this power, man must receive it, and that in a right manner, so that it may prove its efficacy in him and save his soul. It is to be observed that James says this of his readers, whom he had previously designated as born again (ver. 18). Thus, according to James, Christians by the new birth do not as yet possess *σωτηρία* (the future salvation), but its obtainment is conditioned by their conduct. — Instead of *τὰς ψυχὰς ὑμῶν*, James might simply have written *ὑμῶς*, but Schneckenburger correctly warns: *Cave pro mera sumas circumscriptione personalis; animi enim proprie res agitur; see chap. v. 20.*

Ver. 22. The exhortations given in ver. 19 form the starting-point for what follows. The next section, to the end of chap. ii., is attached to the

¹ Oecumenius: *τὸν διακριτικὸν τοῦ βελτίονος καὶ τοῦ χειρόνος· καθ' ὃ καὶ λογικοὶ ἐσμέν καὶ λεγόμεθα; see Constit. Apost., viii. 12: νόμον δέδωκας ἐμφυτον.*

² Lange incorrectly explains the *ἐν ὑμῖν* to be supplied to *ἐμφυτον* "in and among you," referring it to 'he Jewish Christians and the Jews.

³ De Wette expresses himself doubtfully: "Either the adjective is used proleptically, or, which I prefer, it is the word implanted by the second birth; but by this also, on account of *δέξασθε*, a prolepsis occurs, 'receive the word

of truth, that it may grow in you by that new birth.'" But opposed to this, it is to be observed that the word is not implanted by the second birth, but that the second birth is the fruit of the implanted word. In conclusion De Wette remarks: "It must be taken rather as a reference to the whole of Christendom than to individuals: the word implanted in us Christians." But the individual is only a member of the Church by having the word of God implanted in him. Brückner has given the correct explanation.

thought ταχὺς εἰς τὸ ἀκοῦσαι, which is continued in δέξασθε τὸν ἐμφυτον λόγον. The word must be so heard and received that it produces a corresponding activity. James first expresses this thought briefly and definitely: "Be ye doers of the word, and not hearers only, deceiving your own selves." The verb γίνεσθε is neither intended to express the *successionem perpetuam horum exercitiorum* (Semler), nor to indicate that hitherto the readers had not been ποιηταὶ λόγου; this indication is contained in the whole exhortation, but not in the verb, which is to be translated not by *become*, but by *be*; comp. chap. iii. 1; Matt. vi. 16, x. 16, xxiv. 44; John xx. 27; Rom. xii. 16.¹ The particle δέ unites this verse with the preceding as its completion. The readers ought to be ποιηταὶ λόγου, namely, of the λόγος ἐμφυτος (ver. 21), or of the λόγος ἀληθείας (ver. 18), the gospel, inasmuch as it requires a definite Christian conduct, and on this account in ver. 25 is expressly called a νόμος. On ποιηταί, comp. Jas. iv. 11; 1 Macc. ii. 67; Rom. ii. 13 (John vii. 19: ποιεῖν τὸν νόμον); in the classical language, ὁ ποιητὴς νόμου is the lawgiver. Theile correctly observes: *Substantiva plus sonant quam participia*; the substantive expresses the enduring relation. — In the reading μὴ ἀκροαταὶ μόνον, μόνον is closely united with ἀκροαταί: not such who are *only* hearers. The word ἀκροατής, in classical Greek "an attentive hearer," occurs in the N. T. only here and in Rom. ii. 13, but both times without that additional meaning. On the thought, comp. besides Rom. ii. 13 (where the same contrast is expressed), Matt. vii. 21 ff.; Luke xi. 28; John xiii. 17. — παραλογιζόμενοι belongs to the subject contained in γίνεσθε (De Wette, Wiesinger), *deceiving your own selves*, and not as a more exact definition of ἀκροαταί, "hearers who deceive themselves" (Stolz, Gebser, Schneckenburger, Lange). The import of the word (besides here in the N. T. only in Col. ii. 4, in the O. T. Gen. xxix. 25, LXX.; synonymous expressions are found in ver. 26; Gal. vi. 3; 1 John i. 8) is *to draw false inferences, to deceive by sophistical reasoning*. The warning is directed against such who deceive themselves by sophisms on the utility of mere hearing.

Ver. 23. This exhortation is confirmed by a comparison. *Therefore*: ὅτι, which is not superfluous (Pott). This verse expresses the similitude; ver. 24 the *tertium comparationis*. A hearer, who is not a doer, is to be compared to a man who contemplates his bodily form in a glass. Hornejus, Rosenmüller, Semler, Pott, and others attach to the word κατανοεῖν the additional meaning of a *transitory* observation, against the etymology and the linguistic use of the word (comp. Luke xii. 24, 37; Acts vii. 31, 32, xi. 6). The point of transitoriness, or, more correctly, of transitory contemplation, is contained not in the verb, but in the situation, which in ver. 24 is prominently brought forward by καὶ ἀπελήλυθεν. On the rhetorical usage of again resuming the foregoing subject (which is here expressed by εἰ τις, κ.τ.λ.) by οὗτος, see Winer, p. 144 (E. T., 160); A. Buttmann, p. 262 (E. T., 347); on εἰκε,

¹ Meyer certainly explains the imperative γίνου, γίνεσθε, uniformly by "become thou," "become ye;" but this meaning is frequently retained in a manner more or less forced; comp. especially John xx. 27. The N. T.

usage, to consider γίνου as equivalent to ἴσθι, is explained from the fact that the Christian must yet ever more become that which he as a Christian is.

see ver. 6; ἀνδρί, as in ver. 8, and frequently with James.¹— τὸ πρόσωπον τῆς γενέσεως αὐτοῦ. By πρόσωπον is here meant not the whole form (Baumgarten, Hensler, Pott, Schneckenburger), but the *face*. By τῆς γενέσεως is “more plainly indicated the sphere of mere material perception, from which the comparison is taken, as distinguished from the ethical sphere of ἀκροῦσθαι” (Wiesinger). γένεσις denotes not so much the natural *life* as the natural *birth*, so that the phrase is to be interpreted: the *countenance which one possesses by his natural birth*. See Eustathius in *Od.*, ix. p. 663, 25.²— Whether αὐτοῦ belongs to the whole idea, or only to the genitive, is uncertain. Winer, p. 212, leaves it undecided; Wiesinger is for the first rendering; but the union here (as well as in Col. i. 13) with the genitive appears to be more natural.

Ver. 24. With this verse begins the explanation of the image given in ver. 25 (therefore γάρ), whilst κατανοεῖν τὸ πρόσωπον τ. γεν. αὐτοῦ is again resumed by κατενόησεν ἐαυτόν. By ἀπελήλυθεν the point of the mere transitoriness of the contemplation in the glass only before presupposed is brought forward, and by ἐπελάθετο the result of such a contemplation is added, by which the points of application, which James employs, are brought out. The emphasis lies on ἀπελήλυθεν and εὐθέως ἐπελάθετο. The form of representation is here the same as in ver. 11. It is not a particular instance which may occur (Wiesinger), but a general statement which is here introduced in the form of a single incident, as the contemplating one's self in the glass is always only a temporary and not a permanent state. The hearing of the word answers to κατανοεῖν; the averting of the mind from what is heard, to ἀπέρχεσθαι; and the being unconcerned about what is heard, by which the realization of the word in the life is prevented, to εὐθέως ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι. James can only think on man according to his ethical condition in relation to the demands of the divine will, as corresponding to πρόσωπον τ. γ. or ἐαυτόν in the application. It is true that he does not definitely state this; but from this it does not follow that James, overlooking all other considerations, has had only in view generally the *contents* of the word, because the comparison of the word with a glass, which gives to him who looks in it to see *his own image*, would be without meaning.³ On the use of the perfect (ἀπελήλυθεν) between the aorists, see Winer, p. 243 f. (E. T., 278).— On ὅποιος ἦν, Wiesinger correctly remarks, “namely, in the glass.”

Ver. 25 does not give the simple application of the image, but rather describes, with reference to the foregoing image, the right hearer, and says of him that he is μακάριος ἐν τῇ ποιήσει αὐτοῦ. In this description the three

¹ The remark of Paes, approved of by Lange, is curious: *virī obiter tantum solent specula intueri, muliebri autem est, curiose se ad speculum componere.*

² Lange argues against this explanation, whilst, mingling in a most confused manner the image employed with the thing itself, he explains πρόσωπον as “the image of the inner man's appearance according to his sinful condition.”

³ According to most interpreters, “the de-

pravity of the natural man” is chiefly to be thought on; but this is not entirely suitable, as James addresses Christians who as such are no longer natural men. In a wholly arbitrary manner is the reference inserted by some in κατενόησεν to spots which disfigure the face. Wolf: *de tralattia speculi inspectione loquitur Apostolus; tallis vero efficit, ut maculas non perspicias atque adeo de his abstergendis non cogites; similarly Pott and others.*

points named in ver. 24 are carefully observed: παρακύψας εἰς, κ.τ.λ., answers to κατενόησεν (ἐν ἐσόπτρῳ), παραμείνας τοῦ ἀπελήλυθεν, and οὐκ ἀκροατῆς ἐπιλημοῦνός τοι ἐπελάθετο. The sentence consists of a simple combination of subject and predicate; γενόμενος is not to be resolved into the finite verb γίνεται (Pott). The predicate commences, after the subject is summed up, in οὗτος with μακάριος. — This is also the case with the *textus receptus*, where a οὗτος is put before οὐκ ἀκροατῆς; for, since with this reading the first οὗτος is simply resumed by the second οὗτος (before μακάριος), equivalent to *hic, inquam*, the words οὐκ ἀκροατῆς . . . ἔργου only serve to give a more exact designation of the subject, παρακύψας . . . καὶ παραμείνας being thus more clearly defined. Thus these words begin not the apodosis or principal sentence, as if James would here, in contrast to ver. 24, show that the right hearing and appropriation leads to the doing, (and thereby) to the blessedness of doing (against Wiesinger). Were this his object, he would have been obliged to put the finite verb instead of the participle γενόμενος, and a καὶ after ἔργου. The subject is accordingly: *but whosoever looks into the perfect law of liberty and continueth therein, being not a forgetful hearer, but a doer of the work, this man.* — The aorist participles are explained from the close connection of this verse with the preceding, where the same tense was used. There is no copulative καὶ before the participial clause οὐκ ἀκροατῆς, κ.τ.λ., because the doing of the law is the necessary consequence of the *continued* looking into it, and it would otherwise have the appearance as if παρακύπτειν and παραμένειν could take place without ποιεῖν following.¹ The verb παρακύπτειν (properly, bending one's self near an object in order to view it more exactly, Luke xxiv. 12; John xx. 5, 11; 1 Pet. i. 12; Eccles. xiv. 23, xxi. 23) refers back, indeed, to κατανοεῖν, but is a stronger idea. James has fittingly chosen this verb as *verbum ad imaginem speculi humi aut mensae impositi adaptatum* (Schneckenburger; see also Theile, Wiesinger). Luther inaccurately translates it: *looketh through*. As the accent is on παρα, the verb παραμείνας is used afterwards. By εἰς is expressed not only the direction *to* something, but the intensity of the look into the inner nature of the law. παραμείνας (not *continueth therein*, as Luther translates it, but *thereat*) is added to παρακύψας, — without the article, because the two points are to be considered as most closely connected, — indicating the continued consideration of the νόμος, from which action necessarily follows. Schneckenburger incorrectly gives to the verb παραμένειν here (appealing to Acts xiv. 22; Gal. iii. 10; Heb. viii. 9) the meaning to “*observe the law;*” but the subject treated of here is not the observance, but “*the appropriation which leads to action*” (Wiesinger), or “*the remaining in the yielding of one's self to the object by contemplating it*” (Lange). By νόμος τέλειος ὁ τῆς ἐλευθερίας² is meant neither the O. T. law, nor *lex naturalis* (Schulthess), but λόγος ἀληθείας (ver. 18), thus the gospel, inasmuch as it

¹ Lange agrees in essentials with this explanation, but he thinks that by it “the full energy of the idea is not preserved;” it should rather have been said that “the παρακύψας and παραμείνας, as such, is ποιητῆς ἔργου γενόμενος;” but the looking in and continuing are evidently in themselves not identical with the

doing of which James speaks, however necessarily the latter results from the former.

² Kern incorrectly maintains that this expression is formed according to the Pauline phraseology: νόμος τοῦ πνεύματος τῆς ζωῆς ἐν Χρ. Ἰησοῦ, Rom. viii. 2; νόμος τῆς πίστεως, Rom. iii. 27; νόμος Χριστοῦ, Gal. vi. 2; as if

places before the Christian — by reason of redemption — the rule of his life. This evangelical νόμος, indeed, resembles the O. T. νόμος in expressing no other will of God, but differs from it in that it only is the νόμος τῆς ἐλευθερίας, the νόμος τέλειος. It not only confronts man as enjoining, but, resting on the love of God, it creates the new life from which joyful obedience springs forth voluntarily and unconstrained; it gives ἐλευθερία, which the O. T. νόμος was not able to give, and thus proves itself as the perfect law in contrast to the imperfect law of the Old Covenant. It is true that even in the O. T. the sweetness of the law was subject of praise (Ps. xix. 8-11), but the life-giving power belonged to the law only in an imperfect manner, because the covenant on which it rested was as yet only one of promise and not of fulfilment. It is accordingly incorrect to explain the additional attribute as if James considered the O. T. law, according to the Pauline manner, as a ζυγὸς δουλείας (Gal. v. 1), for of this there is no trace.¹ Many expositors understand by νόμος τέλειος, κ.τ.λ., the gospel, as the joyful message of salvation, or the *doctrina evangelii*, or simply *gratia evangelii*, namely, in contrast to the O. T. economy; which, however, corresponds neither to the language of James nor to his mode of contemplation. — In the additional participial sentence, the ideas ἀκροατῆς ἐπιλησμονῆς and ποιητῆς ἔργου are opposed to each other. ἀκροατῆς ἐπιλησμονῆς (the word, foreign to classical Greek, is in the N. T. a ἄπ. λεγ.; it is found in Eccles. xi. 27; among classical writers; ἐπιλήσμη, ἐπιλησμοσύνη) is = ἀκρ. ἐπιλήσιων, a hearer to whom forgetfulness belongs. To ποιητῆς, ἔργου is attached in order to make still more prominent the idea of activity, which indeed is already contained in ποιητῆς. The singular does not properly stand for the plural (Grotius: *effector eorum operum, quae evangelica lex exigit*), but “is designed to import that it here results in something, in the doing of work” (Wiesinger). Those ideas, which appear not to correspond, yet form a true antithesis, since the law is inoperative on the forgetful hearer, but incites him who is an attentive hearer to a corresponding activity of life. James says of him who is thus described: *he (οὗτος) is blessed in his deed. ποιῆσις* in N. T. ἄπ. λεγ., in Eccles. xix. 20: *ποιῆσις νόμου*. The preposition ἐν is not to be exchanged with διὰ, for by ἐν the internal connection of doing and blessedness is marked; Brückner: “the blessing innate in such doing is meant.” *ἔσται* is therefore not to be referred to the future life; but it is by it announced what is even here directly connected with the *ποιῆσις*; James, however, certainly considered this μακαριότης as permanent. The thought here expressed refers to the last words of ver. 21, completing them, showing that the λόγος has the effect there stated (σῶσαι τὰς ψυχάς) in him who so embraces it that it leads him to *ποιῆσις*.²

James must have borrowed the designation of what was to him the cardinal point of Christian life from another, and could not himself originate it.

¹ It is to be observed that even in the so-called apostolic council at Jerusalem James did not, as Peter, call the law a ζυγός.

² Laurentius adds to the last words of the verse: “Sc. non ex merito ipsius operis, sed

ex promissione gratuita;” but this is a caution foreign to the context. Lange inappropriately intermingles ideas when he reckons to this *ποιῆσις* particularly confession, and thinks that James above all things indicated that the Jews should confess Christ, and that the Jewish Christians should fully acknowledge their Christian brethren from the Gentiles.

Ver. 26. Whilst James — in contrast to the hearers who fail in proof by works — will describe the true *θηρησκεία* (ver. 27), he first refers to the false *θηρησκεία* of those who — slothful in action — are *ταχεῖς εἰς τὸ λαλήσαι* (ver. 19). *If any one thinks to serve God, not bridding his tongue, but deceiving his heart, his worship is vain.* — *εἰ τις δοκεῖ*]. *δοκεῖ* here denotes (as in Matt. vi. 7, xxiv. 44; 1 Cor. iii. 18; otherwise in 1 Cor. vii. 40) the *false* opinion which one has of something; it is not = *videtur* (Calvin, Gataker, Theile, and others); Luther correctly translates: “if any one imagines.” — *θηρησκος εἶναι*]. *θηρησκος*, which elsewhere occurs neither in the N. T. nor in the classics (the substantive besides here and in ver. 27, in the N. T. in Col. ii. 18 and Acts xxvi. 5), is not equivalent to *εὐσέβεια*, inasmuch as it refers to *external* worship, the manifestation of *εὐσέβεια*, without, however, having in itself the secondary idea of *mere* externality. Incorrectly Theile = *religiosus singulatim cuius nimia, nimis externa est religio, supersticiosus*. In an arbitrary manner Schneckenburger infers from the adjectives *καθαρὰ καὶ ὑμῖαντος* (ver. 27) that it is here said of *θηρησκεία*, *quam in accurata lustrationem observatione constantem putabant Judaei ac Iudaeochristiani*,¹ of which there is no trace in the whole Epistle. The following words: *μὴ χαλιναγωγῶν τὴν γλῶσσαν αὐτοῦ*, indicate in what the *θηρησκεία* of the readers consisted. It is incorrect, with Rosenmüller, Theile, and others, to supply *exempli causa*, and, as most interpreters do, to resolve the participle by *although*; James will blame those who reckon zeal in speaking as a sign of *θηρησκεία*.² The verb *χαλιναγωγεῖν*, in the N. T. only in James, is also found in classical language only in the later classics; comp. the expression in Plato, *De Legg.* ii.: *ἀχάλινον κεκτημένοι τὸ στόμα.* — By the second participial sentence: *ἀλλὰ ὑπατῶν καρδίαν αὐτοῦ*, James expresses his judgment — already indicated by the expression *μὴ χαλιναγωγῶν* — on the opinion of serving God by *λαλεῖν ἐν ὀργῇ*. Pott correctly: *sc. eo quod nimiam docendi licentiam et linguae extemperantiam pro vera θηρησκεία habet*. The clause belongs not to the apodosis (Schneckenburger), but, as in form so in meaning, is closely connected with the preceding participle. The expression *ὑπατῶν καρδίαν αὐτοῦ* corresponds to *παραλογίζεσθαι ἐαντῶν* (ver. 22), but is a stronger form, although it does not indicate only the consequence resulting from zeal (Lange).³ Erasmus incorrectly explains *ὑπατῶν* by *sinere aberrare*. The apodosis, which emphatically begins with *τούτου*, declares that such a *θηρησκεία* is not only without fruit (Baumgarten), but without actual contents, is thus foolish and vain, corresponding to the thought: *ὀργῇ δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ οὐ (κατ)εργάζεται* (ver. 20).

Ver. 27. Το *θηρησκεία μάταιος* is opposed *θηρησκεία καθαρὰ καὶ ὑμῖαντος παρὰ τῷ*

¹ Some Catholic interpreters, Salmero, Paes, and others, refer the expression to the observance of the so-called *consilia Christi*, particularly to voluntary circumcision for the sake of the kingdom of heaven.

² Rauch also thinks that “the participles must certainly be resolved by *although* ;” but by this explanation all indication is wanting of that on which those blamed by James rest *θηρησκεία*; also what follows (ver. 27), where the nature of true *θηρησκεία* is given, forms no

appropriate antithesis to this verse. Brückner explains it: “Whoever seeks worship in striving by teaching to work on others;” here the participle is correctly resolved, but the full meaning is not given to the verb. Correctly, Lange: “Those who, by their fanatical zeal, wanted to make good their pretensions of being the true soldiers of God.”

³ Comp. *Test. Napht.*, III. p. 665: *μὴ σπουδάσετε . . . ἐν λόγοις κενοῖς ὑπατῶν τὰς ψυχὰς ὑμῶν.*

Θεῷ]. καθαρός and ἁμίαντος are synonymous expressions (Pott, Theile, and others); the second word does not add any *new* idea to the first. Some expositors (Baungarten, Bengel, Knapp, Wiesinger) arbitrarily refer the first word to what is internal, and the second to what is external. The second word ἁμίαντος (which occurs only here and in Heb. vii. 26, xiii. 4; 1 Pet. i. 4), corresponding to its connection with μαίново, μίσμα, brings more vividly forward purity as a being free from that by which the holy is defiled. The purity of true θρησκεία is, by the words παρὰ τῷ Θεῷ, κ.τ.λ., marked as absolute. παρά, in the judgment of, equivalent to ἐνώπιον, as in 1 Pet. ii. 20; comp. Winer, p. 352 (E. T., 395); Schirlitz, p. 340. That by this "the attitude of a servant before the face of the commanding lord" (Lange) is indicated, is a pure fiction. To τῷ Θεῷ is emphatically added καὶ πατρί, by which the relation of God, which the author has chiefly in view, is expressed: that of love. God, by reason of His love, can only esteem that worship as pure which is the expression of love. The contents of pure worship is given in the following infinitive clauses, according to its positive and negative side; still James evidently does not intend to give an exhaustive definition, but he merely brings forward—in reference to the wants of his readers—two chief points. Hermas, I. 2, Mand. 8, gives a description of these two sides of worship, comprehending as much as possible all particulars. The first point is: *the visiting of the widows and the fatherless in their affliction*, as a manifestation of compassionate love. If it is said that the particular here stands for the universal (the *species pro genere*, Hottinger, Theile, and others); yet it is to be observed that elsewhere in the Holy Scriptures compassion is adduced as the most direct proof of love. The verb ἐπισκέπτεσθαι here, as in Matt. xxv. 36, 43, Jer. xxiii. 2, Zech. xi. 16, Eccles. vii. 35, refers to the *visiting* of the suffering, in order to help them. By the explanation: "to be careful of them" (Lange), the view of a concrete instance is introduced; ὀρφανοὶ are placed first, in close connection with πατρί,¹ as God in Ps. lxxviii. 6 is expressly called ὁ πατήρ τῶν ὀρφανῶν; see also Eccles. iv. 10: γίνου ὀρφανοὺς ὡς πατήρ.—The words ἐν τῇ θλίψει αὐτῶν are not an idle addition, but mark the condition in which the orphans and widows are found, to show the necessity and object of ἐπισκέπτεσθαι.—In the second infinitive clause, which is added with rhetorical emphasis, ὑσυνδετῶς,² to the first, ἄσπιλον stands first as the chief idea. The same expression is in 1 Tim. vi. 14; 2 Pet. iii. 14 (in its proper sense, 1 Pet. i. 19). The addition ἀπὸ τοῦ κόσμου, more exactly defining ἄσπιλον τηρεῖν, is neither dependent merely on τηρεῖν (Ps. xii. 8, cxli. 9) nor merely on ἄσπιλον, but on the combined idea. The sense is: to preserve himself from the world (ἀπό = ἐκ, John xvii. 15; comp. also the form προσέχειν ἀπό, Matt. xvi. 12), so that he is not polluted by it (so also Lange). By κόσμος not merely earthly things, so far as they tempt to sin

¹ The combination ὀρφανοὶ καὶ χήραι is found only here in the N. T.; it often occurs in the O. T. and Apocrypha, where sometimes ὀρφανοὶ and sometimes χήραι are named first.

² The asyndeton is thus explained, that James considered the visiting of the orphans,

etc., as keeping one's self unspotted from the world, being in contradiction with the peculiar charms of the world. Lange observes: "The two clauses are not simply co-ordinate, but the second is the reverse side or sequence of the first, its pure antithesis."

(Schneckenburger), nor merely sinful lusts (Hottinger), nor *δημώδης καὶ σαρφε-
τὸς ὄχλος, ὁ κατὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας τῆς ἀπάτης αὐτοῦ φθειρόμενος* (Oecumenius; according
to Laurentius and others, the *homines mundani atque impij*), are to be under-
stood; but the idea *κόσμος* comprehends all these together; it denotes the
whole earthly creation, so far as it is cut off from fellowship with God and
stands under the dominion of *ἄρχων τοῦ κόσμου* (1 John v. 19), thus especially
the men who serve it in and with their sinful lusts; but, also, all earthly
possessions by which sinful lust is excited, and to which it not only conforms
itself, but converts them into the instruments of its activity. — Christians
by means of their divine birth, effected by the word of truth (ver. 18), are
indeed taken out of the *κόσμος*, they are no longer members of it; but on
the other hand, both by the sin which is still in them (chap. iii. 2), and by
their external intercourse, they stand in connection with the world, on which
account they have to preserve themselves from its contaminating influence.
This preservation, as it is a work of God (John xvii. 15), so it is likewise a
work of man (1 Tim. v. 22), and therefore a task which believers must
continually strive to perform.

CHAPTER II.

Ver. 2. The genuineness of the article *τὴν* before *συναγωγὴν* (Rec., after A, G, K, **8**, corr. Tisch.) is, since B, C, **8**, pr. omit it (Lach.), at least doubtful. — Ver. 3. Instead of the Rec. *καὶ ἐπιβλέψητε*, after A, G, **8**, several vss., Oecumenius, Bede (Lach.), Tisch. has, after B, C, K, etc., adopted *ἐπιβλέψητε δέ*; which reading is the original, cannot be determined. The *αὐτῶ* of the Rec. (after G, K) is already rightly omitted by Griesb.; A, B, C, **8**, etc., do not have it; it was inserted for the completion of the expression (against Reiche). In the second clause of the verse, the Rec., after C**, G, K, **8**, reads *στῆθι ἐκεῖ ἢ κάθου ὦδε*; in A, C*, *ὦδε* is wanting (Lach., Tisch.); B reads *στῆθι ἢ κάθου ἐκεῖ*. The latter reading is recommended by the sharper contrast of *στῆθι* to the preceding *κάθου*; but it is also possible that in this lies the reason of its origin; if *ἐκεῖ* belongs to *στῆθι*, *ὦδε* after *κάθου* could be easily inserted, partly from the preceding *κάθου ὦδε καλῶς*, partly to introduce the antithesis to *ἐκεῖ*; but, on the other hand, the original *ὦδε* might also be omitted as superfluous (on account of the following *ὑπὸ τὸ ὑποκ.*). Nothing can with certainty be decided. For the addition of *μου* before *τῶν ποδῶν*, adopted by Lach., only A and the Vulg. chiefly speak. Almost all other authorities are against it. — Ver. 4. According to the Rec., this verse commences with *καὶ οὐ διεκριθῆτε* (thus G, K, etc., Tisch. 7); in A, B**, C, **8**, many min. and vss., *καί* is wanting (Lach., Tisch. 2); *οὐ* is also wanting in the original text of B. The omission of *καί* may, indeed, be more easily explained than its insertion, on account of which Reiche and Bouman consider it as genuine; but the most important authorities are against it; the reading in B is to be considered as a correction (Buttmann). — Ver. 5. *τοῦ κόσμου (τούτου)* is a reading evidently explanatory (against Reiche, Bouman), instead of *τῷ κόσμῳ*, whose genuineness is, moreover, attested by A*, B, C*, **8**; the same also with the reading *ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ*. — Ver. 10. Instead of the reading *τηρήσει . . . πταίσει*, attested almost only by G, K, the conjunctives *τηρήσῃ . . . πταίσῃ* are to be read, with Lach. and Tisch. (against Reiche and Bouman). — Ver. 11. The Rec. *εἰ δὲ οὐ μοιχεύσεις, φονεύσεις δέ*, found only in K, several min., Theoph., Tisch., and Lach. read the present *μοιχεύεις, φονεύεις*; thus A, C, **8**; according to Tisch., also B; but, according to Buttm., B has *μοιχεύεις, φονεύσεις*. Reiche and Bouman retain the Rec. as the original reading. — Ver. 13. The Rec. *ἀνίλειος* (after G, etc.) is, after A, B, K, **8**, very many min., Oecumenius, to be changed with the certainly entirely unusual form *ἀνέλειος* (Lach., Buttm., Tisch.). In the mode of writing this word, there is, however, great variation, the forms *ἀνήλειος, ἀνίλειος, ἀνέλειος, ἀνήλειος, ἀνήλιος* occurring in different MSS. It is surprising that no MS. has the classical form *ἀνηληής* or *ἀνελεής*. According to the Rec., *κατακαυχᾶται* is connected with the preceding by *καί*, which, however, is found only in min. A, some min, etc., have, instead of it, after *κατακ.*, the particle *δέ* (Lach., ed. min.), which, however, appears only to have been inserted to avoid the asyndeton. There are many variations of *κατακαυχᾶται*. A has

κατακαυχάσθω, C** κατακαύχασθε, readings which owe their origin to the difficulty of the thought. — Instead of ἔλεος (after κατακαυχῶται), Rec., after A, B (ed. Mai), N, etc. (Lach., Tisch., Buttm.), C, G, K, and B (*apud* Bentley), and many min., have the form ἔλεον, a nominative form which occurs, indeed, in the classics, but not in the N. T. — Ver. 14. Instead of the Rec. *τι τὸ ὄφελος*, attested by A, C**, G, K, N, almost all min., Theoph., Oecumenius, Lach. has adopted *τί ὄφελος*, after B, C. On the distinction, see exposition. Whether, after the Rec., we are to read, with Tisch., *λέγῃ τις*, or, with Lach., *τις λέγῃ*, cannot with certainty be decided; B, G, K, N, attest the former, A, C, the latter reading; yet the latter appears to be a correction. — Ver. 15. After *ἐάν*, the particle *δέ* is omitted in B, N; since its later insertion is not easy to be explained, the Rec. is to be retained as the correct reading. After *λειπόμενοι*, Lach. (after A, G, etc.) reads *ῶσιν*, which, however, is a later addition. — Ver. 16. Also here Lach., after B, C**, has omitted the article *τό* before *ὄφελος*. — Ver. 17. Instead of the Rec. *ἔργα ἔχη, ἔχη ἔργα* is to be read, with Griesb., Lach., Tisch., etc., after almost all authorities. — Ver. 18. The Rec. *ἐκ τῶν ἔργων* is attested by too few authorities (G, K, some min.) to be considered as genuine; Griesb. has consequently correctly adopted *χωρὶς τῶν ἔργ.*, attested by A, B, C, N, etc. Almost all recent critics and interpreters, also Bouman, retain *χωρὶς* as the original reading; Reiche and Philippi certainly judge otherwise. With the reading *ἐκ* falls also the pronoun *σου* after *ἔργων*, which Lach. and Tisch. have correctly omitted; it is wanting in A, B, N, several min., vss., etc., whilst C, G, K, etc., have it. Also after *τὴν πίστιν*, Tisch. (after B, C, N, etc.) has rightly omitted the pronoun *μου* (A, G, K, Lach.); it appears to be added in order to bring more prominently forward the contrast to the first *τὴν πίστιν σου*. — Ver. 19. The Rec. is *ὁ Θεὸς εἰς ἔστι*; so G. In the most important MSS., however, *εἰς* stands first; so in A, B, C, N; in favor of this reading is also the line of thought; yet the difference is found that *ἔστιν* in A, N, precedes (Lach.), and in B, C, follows, *ὁ Θεός* (Tisch.); which reading is the original cannot be decided, yet the former appears to be a correction. B omits *ὁ* before *Θεός*. — Ver. 20. Instead of the Rec. *νεκρά*, after A, C**, G, K, N, several min., vss., Theoph., Oecumenius, Lach. and Tisch. have adopted *ἄργῃ*, after B, C*, etc., which is preferred by Wiesinger, Brückner, Lange; whereas Reiche and Bouman prefer the Rec. It is possible, that, in order to avoid the frequent repetition of *νεκρά* (see vv. 17, 26), the word *ἄργῃ* = *ἀεργῃ*, as corresponding to *χωρὶς τῶν ἔργων*, was substituted; but it is also possible that the reference to that verse occasioned the displacement of *ἄργῃ*; it is difficult to arrive at a sure decision. — Ver. 24. The particle *τοῖνυν* after *ὁρᾶτε* is already correctly omitted by Griesbach, being wanting in A, B, C, N, etc. — Ver. 25. Instead of *ἄγγέλους*, C, G, etc., have *κατασκοπούς*, which, however, is evidently borrowed from Heb. xi. 31.

Ver. 1. In close connection with the thought contained in chap. i. 27, that true worship consists in the exhibition of compassionate love, James proceeds to reprove a practice of his readers, consisting in a partial respect to the rich and a depreciation of the poor, which formed the most glaring contrast to that love. — After the impressive address *ἀδελφοί μου*, he first expresses the exhortation with reference to that conduct, that their faith should not be combined with a partial respect of persons. Schneckenburger regards the clause as interrogative, remarking: *interrogationis formam sensus gravitas flagitat et contextus* (so also Kern); incorrectly, for although the

interrogation with *μή* may not always require a negative answer, yet it is only used when the interrogator, with every inclination to regard something as true, yet can scarcely believe that it is actually the case; comp. Winer, p. 453 f. (E. T., 510 f.); Schirlitz, p. 366. This is inadmissible here, as the fact mentioned in what follows, the *προσωποληψία* of the readers, was undoubtedly true. *μή . . . ἔχετε* is thus imperative, as i. 16, iii. 1.—The plural *προσωποληψίας* is used because the author thinks on individual concrete instances in which the general fault manifested itself;¹ comp. Col. iii. 22; 2 Pet. iii. 12. For the explanation of *προσωποληψία* (only here and in Rom. ii. 11; Eph. vi. 9; Col. iii. 35), foreign to classical Greek, see Matt. xxii. 16; Luke xx. 21; Gal. ii. 6 (see Meyer *in loc.*); from the O. T., Lev. xix. 15; Deut. i. 17, and other places (the verb *προσωποληπτέω*, Jas. ii. 9; the adjective, Acts x. 34). The phrase *ἐν προσωποληψίαις ἔχειν τ. πίστιν* is not, with Pott, to be explained according to such expressions as *ἔχειν τινα ἐν ὀργῇ, ἐν αἰτίαις, ἔχειν ἐν ἐπιγνώσει* (Rom. i. 28), for James intends not to reproach his readers that they have a partial faith, or that they convert faith into the object of partiality, but that they hold not themselves in their faith free from *προσωποληψία*. Also *ἔχειν* does not stand for *κατέχειν*, whether in the meaning *prohibere* or *detinere* (Grotius: *detinere velut captivam et inefficacem*); but *ἔχειν ἐν* expresses the relation of internal connection thus: *Have not your faith, so that it is as it were enclosed in προσωποληψίας, i. e., combined with it.* Thus was it with the readers, who in their very religious assemblies made a distinction of persons according to their external relations.—De Wette's opinion is incorrect, that *πίστιν ἔχειν* here is to be understood of "the management of the concerns of faith."—Faith is more exactly described as *ἡ πίστις τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τῆς δόξης*]. Most expositors² take *τοῦ κυρίου* as a genitive of object, and make *τῆς δόξης*, as a second genitive (besides *ἡμῶν*), dependent on *κυρίου*; thus: "the faith in our Lord of glory, Jesus Christ." Neither the appellation of Christ as the Lord of glory (comp. 1 Cor. ii. 8; Ps. xxix. 3: *ὁ Θεὸς τῆς δόξης*), nor the dependence of two genitives (*ἡμῶν* and *τῆς δόξης*) on one substantive (*κυρίου*), see Winer, p. 172 (E. T., 191), has any thing against it; yet this construction cannot be held to be correct, because the name *Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*, which follows *τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν*, so entirely completes the idea that a second genitive can no longer depend on *κυρίου*; if James had intended such a combination, he would have written either *τῆν πίστιν Ἰησ. Χριστοῦ, τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν τῆς δόξης*, or *τ. π. τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν τῆς δόξης, Ἰησ. Χριστοῦ*.³ It is evidently an entire mistake to construct *τῆς δόξης* with *προσωποληψίας*, whether it be taken as = *opinio* (Calvin: *dum opum vel bonorum opinio nostros oculos perstringit, veritas suppressitur*) or = *gloria* (Heisen: *quod honorem attinet*). Some expositors make *τῆς δόξης* depend on *Χριστοῦ*; thus Laurentius, who explains it the *Christus gloriae = gloriosus*;

¹ Hornejus: "Multiplex illud malum in vita est."

² Particularly Schneckenger, Kern, De Wette, Brückner, Wiesinger.

³ The genitive, indeed, not unfrequently is separated from the word which governs it;

see Phil. ii. 10; Rom. ix. 21; and Winer, p. 172 (E. T., 238); but, in that case, the intervening word is never in apposition with the preceding idea, with which it is completely concluded.

so also Bouman; also Lange: "the Messiah exalted in His glory above Judaistic expectations." Decisive against this construction are — (1) the close connection of Ἰησοῦ and Χριστοῦ, as, when those two names are so directly united as here, Χριστοῦ is purely *nomen proprium*; (2) the N. T. mode of expression does not admit of a more exact statement of being after Χριστοῦ by a genitive dependent on it; also in this case the article τοῦ before Χριστοῦ would not be wanting. In this commentary hitherto (former editions), τῆς δόξης was explained as a genitive of the object dependent on τὴν πίστιν, and τοῦ κυρίου ἡμ. Ἰ. Χρ. as the genitive of the subject, in the sense: "faith in the glory springing from our Lord Jesus Christ, — founded on Him," namely, τὴν μέλλουσαν δόξαν ἀποκαλεσθῆναι εἰς ἡμᾶς, Rom. viii. 18. This construction, although grammatically possible, is unmistakably harsh. It seems simpler, with Bengel, to regard τῆς δόξης as in apposition with Ἰησοῦ Χρ.; still the idea δόξης is too indefinite. The passages cited by Bengel, Luke ii. 32, Eph. i. 17, 1 Pet. iv. 14, Isa. xl. 5, are of another kind, and cannot be adduced in justification of that explanation. Perhaps it is most correct to unite τῆς δόξης as a genitive of quality, not with Χριστοῦ only, but with the whole expression τοῦ κυρ. ἡμ. Ἰησ. Χρ., by which δόξα is indicated as the quality of our Lord Jesus Christ which belongs to Him, the exalted One. Similar expressions are ὁ οἰκονόμος (Luke xvi. 8), ὁ κριτής (Luke xviii. 6), τῆς οὐκίας. At all events, τῆς δόξης is added in order to mark the contrast between the προσωποληψία paid to passing riches and the faith in Jesus Christ.

Vv. 2, 3. In these verses the conduct of the readers, which occasioned the exhortation of James (ver. 1), is described; hence the confirming γάρ. Both verses together form the protasis, on which ver. 4 follows as the apodosis; whilst they in form appear by their connection with δέ (according to the *Rec.* by καί) as co-ordinate sentences, in thought ver. 2 is subordinate to ver. 3; ver. 2 assigning the circumstances under which the conduct described in ver. 3 occurred. — Hammond, Homberg, Baumgarten, Michaelis, and Herder assign even ver. 4 to the protasis; but incorrectly, as in that case the conjunctive would be required in that verse as in vv. 2, 3. As regards the matter itself, the fault is not directed against the rulers of the congregation, — the presbyters and deacons (Grotius, Pott, Schulthess, Hottinger), — but, as the address ἀδελφοί μου (ver. 1) shows, it is entirely general. It was not the custom in the time of James for the deacons to point out places to those who entered their assemblies (*Constit. Apost.*, ii. 56, 58). — The instance (ἰάν) which James states is, as regards the matter, not a hypothetical assumption, but a fact; and certainly not to be regarded as a solitary instance which only once took place, but as something which often occurred, that even in their religious assemblies the rich were treated with distinction, and the poor with disdain. It is not surprising that James in the description employed the aorist, since he generally uses that tense to represent that which is habitually repeated as a single fact which has taken place; see chap. i. 11, 24. — The words εἰς τὴν συναγωγὴν ὑμῶν show that it is an entrance into the religious assemblies of the congregation that is here spoken of. It cannot be inferred from the usual signification of the word συναγωγή, that a Jewish synagogue is here meant (Semler, Schueckenburger,

Bouman); opposed to this is *ύμῶν*; besides, the Christians would certainly not have the right to show seats to those who entered into such a place of worship; but, on the other hand, by *συναγωγή* here is not to be understood the *religious assembly* (De Wette). The whole description, both *εἰσέλθῃ* and the pointing out of seats, shows that *συναγωγή* denotes the *place* where the Christian congregation assembled for worship.¹ That James calls this by *the* word which was appropriate for Jewish places of worship, cannot be regarded in *his* mouth as any thing surprising. Hammond, Baumgarten, Storr, Herder, and others most arbitrarily understand by *συναγωγή* the judicial assemblies of the congregation and their elders. According to Lange, the name of the Jewish place of worship is here a symbol "of the religious fellowship of the entire Jewish Christian dispersion;" this opinion is not less unjustifiable than the view connected with it, that "a literal understanding of what follows cannot be thought of." — The rich man is here described as *ἀνὴρ χρυσοδακτύλιος ἐν ἐσθῆτι λαμπρᾷ*, and the poor man as *πτωχὸς ἐν ῥηπαρᾷ ἐσθῆτι*, the difference between them being represented to the eye in their clothing. — *χρυσοδακτύλιος*], a purely ἄπ. λεγ. = *χρυσόχειρ* (Lucian, *In Tim.*: *πόρφυροι καὶ χρυσόχειρες περιέρχονται*; *In Nigrin.*: *τῶν δακτυλίων πλήθος ἔχων*). On *λαμπρός*, used of clothes, see, on the one hand, Luke xxiii. 11 (comp. with Matt. xxvii. 28), and, on the other hand, Rev. xv. 6. Raphelius: *Nullum certum colorem declarat, sed splendidum, clarum, nitidum seu rubrum seu album sit, seu alius generis*. The counterpart of the *ἐσθῆς λαμπρᾷ* is the *ἐσθ. ῥηπαρά* of the poor man. — *ῥηπαρός*] in its proper meaning only here in N. T.; in Zech. iii. 3, 4, it is also used of garments. Are Christians or non-Christians meant by these incomers? Most expositors consider them to be Christians only, whether they belonged to the congregation or came there as *ξένοι* (guests). But the following reasons decide against this view: 1. They are distinguished by James from the brethren addressed, and are not indicated as brethren, which yet, particularly in reference to the poor (ver. 5), would readily have suggested itself as a strong confirmation of their fault. 2. In vv. 6, 7, the rich are evidently opposed to Christians (*ύμῶν, ύμᾶς, ἐφ' ύμᾶς*), and reprimanded for their conduct towards Christians (not merely toward the poor), which, if rich Christians had been guilty of it, would certainly have been indicated as an offence against *their Christian calling*. That those who were not Christians might and did come into the Christian religious assemblies, is a well-known fact; see 1 Cor. xiv. 22, 23. The view of Weiss,² that the rich man was not a Christian, but that the poor man was a Christian, is supported by no feature in the description; in *that case* James would certainly have indicated the dissimilarity of relation; then "must ver. 5 ff. bring it forward as the gravest offence, that the brother chosen by God is sliighted for the sake of the rich who were not Christians" (Wiesinger).³

¹ The word *συναγωγή* occurs in the N. T. in both meanings; usually it designates the religious *place of meeting of the Jews*; but that it also denotes the *assembly*, Acts xiii. 43 shows; see also Rev. ii. 9. In the Apocrypha of the O. T., it has only the last meaning, and,

indeed, in a general sense; see Wahl, *Clav. Apocryph.*, *συναγωγή*.

² *Deutsch. Zeitschrift f. christl. Wissensch.*, etc., 1854, No. 51.

³ Lange considers the mode of expression symbolical: by the rich man is meant the

Ver. 3 describes the conduct of the church toward the two incomers. Many ancient expositors understand this as a figurative representation of the preference which was generally given in the congregation to the rich; this is arbitrary. The whole description points rather to something which James has actually in view; but in reprimanding this, he condemns partiality generally, which certainly showed itself in many other ways. By the descriptive words *ἐπιβλέψητε . . . τὴν λαμπράν*, which precede *εἶπητε* (in reference to the poor there is only *εἶπητε*), is indicated in a lively manner the admiring look at the external glitter; *ἐπιβλέπειν*, *emphatice sumendum est* (Pott); the rich man is characteristically described as *ὁ φορῶν τὴν ἐσθ. τ. λαμπράν*; the splendid garment is that which attracts the eye, the character of the man is entirely overlooked; *φορεῖν*, a secondary form of *φέρειν*, is also in Matt. xi. 8 used of garments; by the article before *λαμπράν* this idea is strengthened as the chief idea. — The contrast is sharply expressed in the different address to the one and to the other; already they are distinguished from one another by *σὺ . . . σύ*, and then *κάθου* and *σῆθι*, *ὡδε* and *ἐκεῖ*, *καλῶς* and *ὑπὸ τὸ ὑποπόδιόν μου*, are opposed. The form *κάθου* (instead of *κάθησο*) is foreign to classical Greek; see Winer, p. 75 (E. T., 81). — *καλῶς* refers to comfort (Wiesinger); it is not = *honorifice* (Wahl); and still less is it to be resolved into “Be so good as” (Storr). A place is pointed out to the rich man, where he can be comfortably seated; whilst to the poor man it is said, *Stand* there. The second clause, separated from the first by *ἦ*, is not a special address, but the two clauses form *one* saying, whilst after *ἦ* a thought is to be supplied, as “If thou wilt rather sit;” by the addition of these words the depreciation of the poor is yet more strongly marked. — *ὑπὸ τὸ ὑποπόδιον*] means not *under*, but *below, my footstool* (Wiesinger), by which the floor is pointed out as the fitting place for the poor to sit (Bouman). “The expression involves contempt: as it were, under one’s feet. Not *on* the footstool” (Lange). The word *ὑποπόδιον* (not *unicum*, as Wiesinger asserts) belongs only to the later classics. Often in N. T., and also in LXX.

Ver. 4 forms the apodosis to vv. 2 and 3, and rebukes what is blamable in the conduct described. Expositors greatly differ in the explanation of this verse, according as they explain the verb *διεκρίθητε*, and understand *οὐ* as a pure negation, or as an interrogative particle. It is best to take *διεκρίθητε*, in form indeed passive, in meaning as the aorist middle, as in Matt. xxi. 21, Mark xi. 23, Rom. iv. 20, and to give to the verb here the same meaning which it has constantly in the usage of the N. T.; so that it denotes the doubt, which consists in the assertion of thoughts at variance with faith; see on chap. i. 6. But then the sentence must be taken as interrogative: *Did you not then doubt among yourselves?* i.e., Have ye not fallen into a contradiction with your faith (ver. 1), according to which external glory and riches are nothing, whilst ye by your conduct have attached a value to them? To this question the second is added, to which the preceding *οὐ* is also to be referred:

Jewish Christian, who, as wearing a gold ring, boasts of his covenant rights; and by the poor man is meant the Gentile Christian. Accord-

ing to Hengstenberg, the meaning is precisely the reverse. Both opinions are unjustified.

and became ye not (thus) judges of evil thoughts? This second question indicates the direct consequence of διακρίνεσθαι. James calls them κριταί, because in their conduct they expressed their judgment on the rich and poor. The genitive διαλογισμῶν πονηρῶν is not the genitive of object,¹ but of quality. διαλογισμοί is here, as predominantly in the N. T., in *malam partem* (see especially Luke v. 21, 22), thoughts of *doubt and unbelief*; the bad meaning is here heightened by πονηρῶν.

Other explanations are as follow:—

(1) διακρίνεσθαι = *separare*: then the sentence is interrogative; ἐν ἑαυτοῖς = ἐν ἀλλήλοις (Gebser, Schulthess, Semler, Erasmus Schmid, etc.); the verb being either passive: “Nonne inter vos ipsos estis discreti ac separati?” or middle: “Nonne vos discernitis inter vos ipsos?” “Do you not separate, divide yourselves among yourselves?” (Lange).

(2) διακρίνεσθαι = *discrimen facere*. (a) The verb *active*—(a) *Interrogative*: “Nonne discrimen fecistis apud vos ipsos?” (Laurentius, Grotius, Wolf, Hottinger, Knapp). In this explanation, ἐν ἑαυτοῖς = ἐν ἀλλήλοις; Schneckenburger, however, explains ἐν ἑαυτοῖς = *in animis vestris*; but then the meaning *discrimen facere* would pass into an act of the judgment “*statuere*.” (β) *Negative*: “Then partly ye would not have distinguished (according to a sound judgment) among yourselves, and partly also ye would have judged after an evil manner of thinking (thus an error of the understanding and of the heart)” (Grashof).—(b) The verb *passive*: “Dupliciter peccatis, primo: inter vos ipsos non estis discriminati h. e. cessat piorum et impiorum differentia” (Oeder).

(3) διακρίνεσθαι = *judicare*. (a) The verb *active*—(a) *Interrogative*: “Nonne judicastis, deliberastis ipsi?” “Are ye not yourselves persuaded how wrong this is?” (Augusti). (β) *Negative*: “Non discrevistis justa dubitatione, considerantia et aestimatione, quid tribuendum esset pauperi potius vel certe non minus, quam diviti” (Bengel). Luther combines this rendering with that under 2: “And ye do not well consider, but ye become judges, and make an evil distinction.” Here also comes in the explanation of Oecumenius: τὸ διακριτικὸν ὑμῶν διεφθείρατε, μηδεμίαν συζήτησιν ποιήσαντες πότερον τιμητέον . . . ἀλλ’ οὕτως, ἀδιακρίτως, καὶ ἐν προσωποληψίᾳ τὸν μὲν ἐτιμῆσατε . . . τὸν δὲ ἠτιμῆσατε.—(b) The verb *passive*—(a) *interrogative*: “Nonne vos in conscientiis dijudicati h. e. convicti estis?” Paræus; so also Bouman: “Nonne igitur in vestris ipsorum jam iudicati estis animis?” (β) *Negative*: “Et dijudicati inter vos ipsos non estis ut judicastis secundum prava ratiocinia vestra” (Heisen). Differently Cajetanus: “Haec faciendo non estis iudicati in vestibus et divitiis et paupertate;” laying the chief stress on ἐν ἑαυτοῖς.

(4) διακρίνεσθαι = *dubitare*, to entertain doubts. (a) *Interrogative*: “Et non dubitastis apud vosmet ipsos? et facti estis iniqui iudices?” “Should you not yourselves have entertained doubts? Should you actually have passed evil-minded judgments?” (Theile). (b) *Negative*: “Non dubitastis apud animum, ne subit quidem haec cogitatio, id factum forte malum esse, certo apud vos statuistis id jure ac bene fieri.”

All these explanations are untenable, because they proceed upon a meaning of διακρίνεσθαι foreign to the usage of the N. T. Besides, several require

¹ Elsner: “Iniquas istas cogitationes approbas; Bengel: “Judices approbatores, ma-

larum cogitationum i. e. divitum, foris splendendum, sed malls cogitationibus sentientium.”

arbitrary completions, and many do not correspond to the context. Brückner, De Wette, and Wiesinger have also here correctly maintained the meaning to *doubt*. De Wette: "Have you not then become doubtful in your faith?" Wiesinger: "Have you not forsaken the law of faith, which recognizes only one true riches?" With the reading of B (omitting *οὐ*) the thought is the same; the interrogative (*οὐ*), however, serves for the heightening of the thought, the readers themselves being thereby charged to pronounce the judgment. The *καί* of the *Receptus* stands as in Mark x. 26, Luke x. 29, 1 Cor. v. 2, with the question suddenly introduced. Or, since in the N. T. no other passage is found where *καί* is placed before a question forming the apodosis of a protasis beginning with *ἐάν* (on 2 Cor. ii. 2, see Meyer), it is to be explained from the fact that one would make ver. 4 a part of the protasis; see above.

Ver. 5. With this verse the proof of the reprehensibility of the conduct found fault with commences: James showing that the conduct toward the poor is in contradiction with the mercy of God directed to the poor, and that the conduct toward the rich is in contradiction with their conduct toward Christians. The impressive exhortation to attention precedes *ἀκούσατε* with the address *ἀδελφοί μου ἀγαπητοί*; see chap. i. 16, 19. The proof itself (as in ver. 4) is expressed in a lively manner in the form of a question: *Has not God chosen those who are the poor of the world (i.e., accounted as such) to be rich in faith, and heirs of the kingdom which He has promised to them that love Him?*—The verb *ἐξελέξατο* is to be retained in its usual acceptation, in that which it has in 1 Cor. i. 27. Wiesinger, without sufficient reason, will understand it here as equivalent to "God has so highly honored the poor;" and Lange incorrectly maintains that "the word here rather signifies calling with reference to ethical good behavior to the divine revelation."—The correct reading: *τοὺς πτωχοὺς τῷ κόσμῳ*, is to be explained in the same manner as the expressions *ἀστειὸς τῷ Θεῷ*, Acts vii. 20, and *δυνατὰ τῷ Θεῷ*, 2 Cor. x. 4 (see Meyer on these passages, and Winer, p. 190 (E. T., 201); Al. Buttmann, p. 156 [E. T., 179]). The world esteems those as poor who possess no visible earthly riches. Wiesinger prefers to explain the dative as the dative of reference, thus "poor in respect of the world;" yet the former explanation, which also Brückner and Lange adopt, in which *ὁ Θεός* and *τῷ κόσμῳ* form a sharp contrast, is more appropriate, and more in correspondence with the meaning of the word *κόσμος* with James. In the *Receptus*, *πτωχοὺς τοῦ κόσμου*, the genitive is to be understood as in the expression *τὰ μωρὰ τοῦ κόσμου*, etc., 1 Cor. i. 27; see Meyer *in loco*.—*πλουσίους ἐν πίστει*] is not in apposition with *τοὺς πτωχοὺς* (Luther, Baumgarten, Semler, Hottinger, Gebser, Bouman, Lange, and others),¹ but the completion of *ἐξελέξατο*, stating to what God has chosen the poor (Beza, Wolf, Morus, Knapp, Storr, Schneckenburger, Kern, Theile, De Wette, Wiesinger, and others); see 2 Cor. iii. 6.—By *ἐν πίστει*, as in the expression *πλούσιος ἐν ἐλέει*, Eph. ii. 4 (see 1 Cor. i. 5;

¹ If *πλουσίους* is taken as in apposition, then here riches in faith forms the reason of the choice; but by this the keenness of the thought

contained in the oxymoron is entirely blunted; it is also arbitrary to separate the two ideas *πλουσίους* and *κληρονόμους* united by *καί*.

2 Cor. ix. 11; 1 Tim. vi. 18), the object is not stated wherein they are rich (Luther: "who are rich in the faith"), but the sphere within which riches is imparted to them; similarly Wiesinger explains it: "rich in their position as believers." James wished primarily to mark the contrast that the *poor* are appointed to be *rich*, namely, so far as they are believers; the context gives the more exact statement of their riches: riches in the possessions of the heavenly kingdom is meant; this the following clause indicates. — Calvin: *non qui fidei magnitudine abundant, sed quos Deus variis Spiritus sui donis locupletavit, quae fide percipimus*.¹ — The expression ἡ βασιλεία occurs also elsewhere, without the addition of τοῦ Θεοῦ or similar terms, as a designation of the kingdom of God; e.g., Matt. xiii. 38. No stress rests on the article τῆς (= ἐκείνης), as the relative ἧς referred to it. The relative clause serves not for a more definite statement of the idea βασιλεία, as if by it *this* βασιλεία was to be distinguished from another, but the statement ἐξελ. . . κληρονόμους τ. βασιλείας is confirmed, as a kingdom founded on the promise of God. — From the expressions κληρονόμος and ἐπηγγείλατο of the relative clause, it is evident that James considered here βασιλεία as the future perfected kingdom of God, not "the joint participation in the *νιοθεσία* of the Jews" (Lange). On ἧς ἐπηγγείλατο, κ.τ.λ., see the remark on i. 12. The addition of this clause shows that with James faith and love to God are most closely connected. — James puts τοὺς πτωχοὺς, to whom οἱ πλούσιοι are opposed, as the object of ἐξελέξατο. He accordingly (the article is not to be overlooked) divides men into these two classes, the poor and the rich, and designates, not the latter, but the former, as those whom God has chosen and appointed to be rich in faith,² namely, to be heirs of the kingdom; not as if *all* the poor received the κληρονομία, but his meaning is that those whom God has chosen belong to *this* class, whereas those belonging to the class of the rich had not been chosen. James did not require to point out the truth of this statement: the Christians to whom he wrote were a living testimony of it, for they all belonged to that class; and although some among them were πλούσιοι, yet, on the one hand, what Christ says in Matt. xix. 23–26 holds good, and, on the other hand, 1 Cor. i. 26–28 is to be compared. — With this divine choice the conduct of his readers stood in direct contradiction when they treated a poor man — thus one who belonged to the class of those chosen by God — contemptuously, and that on account of his poverty. What directly follows expresses this contradiction.

Ver. 6. ὑμεῖς δέ], contrast to Θεός. — ἠτιμάσατε], contrast to ἐξελέξατο. The aorist is used with reference to the case stated in vv. 2, 3, which is certainly of a general character (Wiesinger).³ — τὸν πτωχόν, not = *pauperem* ILLUM,

¹ Kern: ἐν πίστει indicates that it is faith itself which makes the Christian *inwardly* rich.

² It is to be observed that ἐξελέξατο does not here refer only to πλουσίους, as if πιστῆς were to be considered as the condition on which the πτωχοὶ were chosen to be *rich*, but to the combined expression πλουσίους ἐν πίστει, so that also πιστῆς is to be considered as an effect

of the divine choice. The same view lies at the foundation of what Paul in 1 Cor. i. 30 (see Meyer *in loco*) and elsewhere often expresses.

³ According to Lange, the aorist is used to point to "the historical fact in which Judaizing Jewish Christians have already taken part with the Jews, namely, the dishonoring of the Gentile Christians."

but, to be understood generally, the *poor man as such*. That we are here specially to think on the *Christian* poor, is an incorrect supposition. — With *οὐχ οἱ πλούσιοι*] James turns to the rich as the class opposed to the poor, in order to point out from another side than he had already done the reprehensibility of the conduct denounced. Already from this opposition it is intimated that not the Christian rich, but the rich generally, — not exactly only “the rich Gentiles or the Romans” (Hengstenberg), — are meant. This is also evident from what is said of them, and by which their conduct is designated as hostile to Christians (*ὑμῶν*) who belong to the poor.¹ *καταδυναστεύειν*] only here and in Acts x. 33, frequently in the LXX. and Apocrypha (see particularly Wisd. of Sol. ii. 20), means “to use power *against* any to his hurt.” Related ideas are *κατακυριεύειν* and *κατεξουσιάζειν*, Matt. xx. 25. This exercise of power against the Christians might take place in various ways; what follows: *καὶ αὐτοὶ ἔλκονσιν ὑμᾶς εἰς κριτήρια*, mentions one chief mode. — *καὶ αὐτοί*] emphatically put first — *even they* (Theile). — *ἔλκειν*] indicates the violence of the conduct (so in the classics). The courts of judgment (*κριτήρια*, as in 1 Cor. vi. 2, 4) may be both Gentile and Jewish; certainly not Christian. It is arbitrary, and not corresponding to the expression *ἔλκειν*, to think here on a process *quibus pauperes PROPTER DEBITA in judiciis vexabant* (Hornejus; also De Wette and others). — Since James so strongly contrasts *αὐτοί* and *ὑμᾶς*, the former cannot possibly be regarded as a part of the latter.

Ver. 7. The description of the conduct of the rich is still continued; they not only do violence to Christians, but they even revile the holy name of Christ. *Do they not (even) blaspheme that fair name which has been called upon you?* The pronoun *αὐτοί* is put here as in ver. 6: incorrectly, Theile = *hi potissimum*. — The expression *τὸ ὄνομα ἐπικαλεῖται ἐπι τινα*] is borrowed from the O. T., where it often occurs, and in the sense that one becomes the property of him whose name is called upon him; particularly it is said of Israel that the name of God was called upon them.² Accordingly, by the name which is called upon Christians is not meant the Christian name (Hensler: *nomen fratrum et sororum*), also not the name *πτωχοί*, but the name of Him only to whom they as Christians belong — the name of Christ (De Wette, Wiesinger, Bouman, Lange, and others); from which, however, it does not follow (as Wiesinger correctly observes) that James here alludes to the name *Χριστιανοί*. — By the addition of the attribute *καλόν* the shamefulfulness of *βλασφημεῖν* is still more strongly marked. — In support of the hypothesis that the rich are Christians, many expositors (also Brückner and Wiesinger) here arbitrarily explain *βλασφημεῖν* of indirect blasphemy, i. e., of such as takes place not by words, but by works; but *βλασφημεῖν* is never thus used in the Holy Scriptures; not one of the passages which Wiesinger cites proves that for which he adduces them; *βλασφημεῖν* always denotes blasphemy by word.³ — This word also proves that the rich who are not Christians are

¹ If James had the Christian rich in view, he certainly would not have omitted to point to the contrast between their conduct to the poor and their Christian calling.

² See Deut. xxviii. 10 (where instead of *ἐπι*

the dative is put); 2 Chron. vii. 14; Jer. xiv. 9, xv. 16; Amos ix. 12; see also Gen. xlviii. 16; Isa. iv. 1.

³ Were it here asserted that the blaspheming of the name of God or of Christ was

here meant (thus also Lange, who, however, will understand particularly the Judaists); which is also evident, because James otherwise would rather have written τὸ ἐπικληθὲν ἐφ' οὐτούς instead of τὸ ἐπικλ. ἐφ' ὑμῶς. — By the thought in this verse James indicates that Christians, by showing partiality to the rich, not only acted foolishly, but were guilty of a violation of the respect due to the name of Christ.

Vv. 8, 9. With these verses James meets the attempt which his readers might perhaps make to justify their conduct toward the rich with the law of love; whilst he, granting to them that the fulfilment of that law is something excellent, designates προσωποληπτειν directly as a transgression of the law. This explanation, which among ancient expositors, particularly Calvin, Cornelius a Lapide, Laurentius, Hornejus, and among the moderns Hottinger, Theile, Wiesinger, have recognized as the correct one, is justified both by the particle μέντοι and by the phrase καλῶς ποιεῖτε. — μέντοι has in the N. T., where besides the Gospel of John it only elsewhere occurs in 2 Tim. ii. 19 and Jude 8, always the meaning *yet, nevertheless*; but this meaning is not here suitable, as ver. 8 contains no contrast to what goes before.¹ It is therefore to be retained in its original classical meaning, *assuredly, certainly*, and points out that James grants something to his readers, having, however, in view the contrast which he expresses in the following εἰ δὲ, κ.τ.λ.² This is also indicated by the expression καλῶς ποιεῖτε (see ver. 19), which is evidently too feeble for an earnest enforcement of the law of love. Wiesinger correctly observes that the hypothetical dilemma carries in itself unmistakably an ironical character.³ James calls the law ἀγαπήσεις, κ.τ.λ., which is cited from Lev. xix. 18, νόμον βασιλικόν, because it is the most excellent of all laws, *ceterarum legum quasi regina* (Knapp; so also Theile, Wiesinger, De Wette, Bouman, and others), inasmuch as all other laws are contained in it; see Rom. xiii. 8-10; Gal. v. 14 (1 Tim. i. 5; Matt. xxii. 39). It is far-fetched to explain the attribute βασιλικόν, because it was given by God the great King (Raphælius, Wetstein, Wolf, Baumgarten), or by Christ (Grotius), or because it applies to kings (Michaelis), or *quia reges facit* (Thomas); Lange combines all these explanations); also Calvin's remark is to be rejected as too artificial: *regia lex dicitur, ut VIA REGIA, plana scilicet, recta et æquabilis, qui sinuosis diverticulis vel ambagibus tacite opponitur*. — νόμος is here (see also ver. 9), as in Jer. xxxi. 33 (Heb. viii. 10, x. 16), used of a single commandment, instead of ἐντολή (which Lange wrongly denies). The expres-

occasioned by the wicked works of Jews or Christians, this would be indicated not by the active verb, but by the passive with δια; see Rom. ii. 24; Tit. ii. 5; 2 Pet. ii. 2; Isa. lii. 5. Moreover, even then blasphemy (namely, of the Gentiles) could only be expressed by words.

¹ Brückner finds the contrast in love being the reverse of partiality; but μέντοι does not simply express the opposite, but the adversative meaning of the particle in the N. T. is of this nature, that it only occurs when the sharp contrast to an "although" is to be filled

up or expressed; it is arbitrary to explain it as equivalent to "on the contrary."

² Some interpreters explain μέντοι here, contrary to linguistic usage, as equivalent to *igitur*.

³ When De Wette, against this explanation, says: "How could those blamed appeal to this law for their partiality?" it is to be observed that they seek thereby to justify only their conduct to the rich, by which certainly they leave their conduct to the poor unjustified.

sion *τελεῖν νόμον* is found only here and in Rom. ii. 27; it is a stronger expression than *τηρεῖν νόμον* (ver. 10). — *κατὰ τὴν γραφήν*] is not to be combined with *βασιλικόν*, nor is the mode of *τελεῖν* thereby stated, but it is the simple formula of citation.

Ver. 9 is in sharp contrast to ver. 8, calling the conduct of his readers, in opposition to their pretext, by its true name, and designating it directly as *sin*. The verb *προσωποληπτειν* is a complete *ἄπ. λεγ.*; James uses this word with reference to the exhortation in ver. 1. On *ἁμαρτίαν ἐργάζεσθαι*, see Matt. vii. 23; Acts x. 35; Heb. xi. 33. Theile: *gravius fere est quam ἁμαρτίαν ποιεῖν, ἁμαρτάνειν*. For the sake of heightening this judgment, James adds the participial sentence *ἐλεγχόμενοι, κ.τ.λ.*: *being convicted by the law as transgressors*. If the *προσωποληπτοῦντες* appealed to a law, it is precisely the law by which they are convinced as transgressors, so that they are without excuse. By *ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου* is meant not a single commandment, neither the above-mentioned law of love, nor specially a commandment forbidding respect of persons, as Deut. xvi. 19 (Lange), but the law generally; so also *παραβάται* is general: not as transgressors of *one* commandment, but of the law generally.

Ver. 10. Confirmation of the last expressed thought: *For whosoever kept the whole law, and yet sinned in one (commandment), he is guilty of all (commandments)*. The conjunctives *τηρήσῃ, πταίσῃ*, certified by authorities, are not to be considered as an error of the scribe (as Winer, 5th ed., p. 356, was inclined to assume); but the particle *ἄν* is here, as frequently as in the N. T., contrary to classical usage in hypothetical sentences, omitted when *ὅστις* stands, because "the universality was already sufficiently indicated by the pronoun" (Buttmann, p. 197 [E. T., 229]).¹ *ἄνθρώπῳ* is not, with Schulthess, to be supplied to *ἐν ἐνί*, but *νόμῳ*; with Theile, De Wette, Wiesinger, Lange, and others, "from the preceding collective idea *νόμος*." The following *πάντων* forbids us, with Schneckenburger and Kern, to understand *ἐνί* as neuter. It is in entire conformity with the character of the thought as a general sentence to take *ἐνί* quite generally, and not, with Theophylact, Oecumenius (*τοῦτο περὶ ἀγάπης εἶρηκέ*), *Schol. Matthæi*, p. 188 (*ἐν ἐνί πταίσειν ἐστὶ, τὸ μὴ τελείαν εἶχειν ἀγάπην*), and some recent critics (Semler: *in HANC unam et primam*), to refer it to a definite commandment, particularly to that of love.² By this general sentence James seeks to confirm the thought that respect of persons includes in itself the transgression of the whole law, although it appears to be directed only against a single commandment. — The word *πταίειν* is found in the N. T. only in a figurative sense; the construction with *ἐν* is only in this place; in chap. iii. 2 the reference of *ἐν* is different. By *γέγονεν πάντων* (*sc. νόμῳ*) *ἐνοχος*, James declares the transgressor of *one* commandment to be guilty of the transgression of all. — *ἐνοχος*] is here, as in 1 Cor. xi. 27, used with the genitive of the thing against which one sins, in the guilt of

¹ Winer, p. 275 (E. T., 308), explains the omission of *ἄν*, because in the writer's conception the case is altogether definite; but then the future indicative would be put; also the case here stated, namely, that one may transgress *one* commandment and yet keep the

whole law, is a case which cannot be imagined.

² Still more arbitrarily, Grotius, Morus, Stolz, and Jaspar limit the general expressions *ἐνί* and *πάντων* to such commandment, to the transgression of which the punishment of death is assigned.

which one is thus involved.¹ The same thought is also found in the rabbinical writings.²

Ver. 11. The truth of the above thought is founded on the fact that *all* commandments proceed from *one* lawgiver. — ὁ γὰρ εἰπὼν· μὴ μοιχεύσης, εἶπεν καὶ μὴ φονεύσης]. Baumgarten finds the reason why James adduces these two commandments, μὴ μοιχεύσης and μὴ φονεύσης, in this, because “the transgression of these two was punished with death;” Wiesinger, on the other hand, because “μοιχεύειν was never laid to the charge of the readers, whereas μὴ φονεύσης had the command of love as its essence;” and Lange, because “to the Israelite the prohibition of adultery was likewise the prohibition of apostasy to heathenism, and the prohibition of murder was likewise that of uncharitableness towards our neighbor.” But the reason is rather because these two commandments are the first of those which refer to our duties to our neighbor (thus Brückner). That μὴ μοιχεύσης precedes the other, has its reason in ancient tradition; see on both points Mark x. 19; Luke xviii. 20; Rom. xiii. 9 (see Meyer *in loc.*); Philo, *De Decal.*, xii. 24, 32. With the words that follow: εἰ δὲ οὐ μοιχεύεις, κ.τ.λ., James draws the inference from the preceding. The negative οὐ after εἰ with the indicative is not surprising in the N. T. usage, the less so as here only a part of the conditional sentence is denied; see Winer, p. 423 ff. (E. T., 479); Al. Buttmann, p. 296 ff. (E. T., 346 f.).³ With the apodosis γεγονός παραβάτης νόμον, James refers to ver. 9; consequently not ἔνοχος, as in ver. 10, but παραβάτης is put. — The reason of the judgment here expressed is contained in ὁ εἰπὼν . . . εἶπε καὶ. Since the law is the expression of the will of Him who gave it, the transgression of a single portion is disobedience to the one will, and consequently a transgression of the whole law.⁴ James might, indeed, have confirmed the idea by the internal connection of all commands, and by pointing out that the transgression of *one* commandment reveals a want which makes the fulfilment of the other commandments impossible;⁵ but as he does not do so, these considerations are not to be arbitrarily introduced into his words.

¹ The punishment with ἔνοχος is usually in the genitive, with Matt. xxvi. 66, Mark iii. 29, xiv. 46; yet also in the dative, Matt. v. 21. In classical language, the thing against which one sins is, with ἔνοχος only in the dative, whilst the crime itself of which the man is guilty, as well as the punishment which he has to suffer, is added in the genitive.

² e.g., *Cod. Talm. Schabbath*, fol. lxx. 2; R. Johanan: Quodsi faciat omnia, unum vero omittat, omnium est singulorum reus; see Wolf. Köster (*Stud. u. Krit.*, 1862, 1) to this passage cites the corresponding expression of Livy (*Hist.*, xxxiv. 3) referring to the lawgiver: unam tollendo legem ceterae infirmitur.

³ According to Buttmann, the negative οὐ here, even according to classic usage, is the more necessary, “when to the negative predicate another, still in the protasis, is immedi-

ately so appended with an adversative particle that the entire emphasis falls upon this second part” (E. T., 346). It is indeed said in Thuc. i. 32: εἰ μὴ μετὰ κακίας, δόξης δὲ μᾶλλον ἀμαρτίᾳ . . . ἐναντία τολμῶμεν; but here the relation is different, as the contrast δόξης, κ.τ.λ., could be left out without injury to the thought, which is evidently not the case with James.

⁴ Bengel: unus est, qui totam legem tulit; cujus voluntatem qui una in re violant, totam violant.

⁵ Augustine, in his Epistle to Jerome on this passage (*Opera Hieronym.*, Francf., iv. p. 154 ff.), says: Unde fiet omnium reus, si in uno offendat, qui totam legem servaverit? An forte quia plenitudo legis charitas est, qua Deus proximusque diligitur, in quibus praeceptis charitatis tota lex pendet et prophetae, merito fit reus omnium, qui contra illam fecit, in qua pendent omnia? Nemo autem peccat, nisi

Ver. 12. To what has hitherto been said, the general exhortation is annexed: *So speak ye, and so do, as they that shall be judged by the law of liberty.* A new section does not here begin, as Wetstein, Semler, and others assume; but with this and the following verse the course of thought commenced at ver. 1 is concluded; not until ver. 14 does the thought take a new turn. The connection with what has gone before is to be thus explained, that ver. 13 evidently points to the respect of persons with regard to the poor, and refers to chap. i. 27. — οὐτως] “is not to be referred to what precedes, but to the following ὡς, thus: so as is necessary for those who,” etc.; thus in former editions. But by this explanation the thought is too abruptly introduced; therefore it would be more correct to refer οὐτως to what precedes (οὐτως, i. e., according to the rule stated in ver. 10 f., Brückner), and to take ὡς not as an explication, but as “a confirmation” (Lange). — James takes up not only the doing (ποιεῖτε), but also the speaking (λαλεῖτε), to which not only the conduct of his readers, specified in ver. 2 ff., but their sinful volubility of tongue, generally led; see i. 19, iii. 1–12. The repetition of οὕτω serves for the heightening of the thought; διὰ here is the same as in Rom. ii. 12; see also John xii. 48, v. 45; correctly, Wiesinger: “the law is a means because a measure;” incorrectly, Kern: *vi ac jure leges*. The νόμος ἐλευθερίας is also here not the gospel, as the publication of the grace of God, or the Christian religion (Semler, Pott, Gebser), also not specially the νόμος βασιλικός mentioned in ver. 7 as a single command, but it is the same as is mentioned in chap. i. 25.¹ The demand which James here expresses is that Christians, as such, who shall be judged by the νόμος ἐλευθερίας, must regulate by it the whole course of their lives. From what has directly gone before, one might infer that James wishes particularly to warn against the pretext combated in ver. 10, but ver. 13 shows that he has rather in view the want of compassionate love, forming the heart and pulse of the νόμος ἐλευθερίας, which was renounced by his readers in their ἀτιμᾶζειν τὸν πτωχόν (ver. 6).

Ver. 13 refers back to chap. i. 27, and concludes the section, appending to διὰ νόμον ἐλ. κρίνεσθαι a closer definition: *for the judgment is unmerciful against those who exercise no mercy; mercy rejoices against judgment.* — That which in the judgment passes sentence on Christians, who shall be judged διὰ νόμον ἐλευθερίας, is thus mercy. Against the unmerciful the judgment will be unmerciful. On the form ἀνέλεος, see critical notes; in Rom. i. 31 it is ἀνελεήμων; thus also in LXX., Prov. v. 9, xi. 17. Luther incorrectly translates it: “it will pass an unmerciful judgment;” ἀνέλεος is not an attribute,

adversus illam faciendo. — Ticinus thus well expresses the unity of the law: *lex tota est quasi una vestis, quae tota violatur, si vel unam ex ea partem demus; quasi harmonia, quae tota corrumpitur, si vel unica vox dissonet; and Gataker: quasi catena aurea, quae tota rupta est, si unicum nexum abrumpas.* What Gunkel says is indeed correct: “The solidarity consists in this, that God has given with the equal obligation the one as well as the other

commandment;” but the point of equal obligation is not here brought forward by James.

¹ Kern: “James, by the expression διὰ ν. ἐλ., reminds them that the νόμος for Christians is indeed according to form a new one, being converted into a willing impulse, but that it does not on this account cease, according to its nature, to be the rule of moral action, and thus also of judgment.”

but a predicate. — Many expositors incorrectly explain *ἐλεος* = *ἀγάπη*; the former is a species of the latter, although James puts the chief stress upon it; see chap. i. 27. — The concluding sentence is subjoined *ἄσυνδέτως*; see chap. iii. 2, iv. 12. “*Asyndeton dicti pondus auget.*” In the verb *κατακαυχᾶται* (only here and in chap. iii. 14 and Rom. xi. 18), *κατα*, on which the genitive *κρίσεως* depends, expresses the opposite tendency. *Κρίσις* according to its nature threatens to condemn the sinner (thus the believing Christian does not cease to be a sinner), but mercy has the joyful confidence (*καυχᾶται*) that it will overcome the threatening power of judgment.¹ — By a conversion of the abstract idea *ἐλεος* into the concrete, “the merciful man,” the peculiar impress is taken from the expression, and a lax interpretation is introduced. On the sentiment, see Matt. v. 7; Prov. xvii. 5; Tob. iv. 7–11. Several expositors (Calvin, Cappellus, Wolf, Laurentius, Baumgarten, Bengel) incorrectly supply the genitive *θεοῦ* to *ἐλεος*, by which a thought is introduced entirely foreign to the context.

Ver. 14. After James, proceeding from the exhortation to receive the word (*τὸν . . . λόγον τὸν δυνάμενον σῶσαι τὰς ψυχάς*) in meekness, had enforced the necessity not only to be hearers but also doers of the same, and with reference to the respect of persons practised by the readers had designated the exercise of compassionate love as true *θηρσκειά*, he now, in close connection with the preceding, opposes the opinion that *πίστις* which has no works (*χωρὶς ἔργων*) can save (*σῶσαι*). The section from ver. 14 to ver. 26 treats of this; for the correct understanding of which it is to be held fast that James considers *πίστις* as the necessary ground of *σωτηρία*, which is evident from chap. i. 18–21, but of course that *πίστις* which is not without works. In combating the above delusion, James adopts his characteristic mode of first stating in clear and well-defined language the fundamental thought on which all the rest depends, and he does so by the introduction of brief interrogative sentences which reject that false opinion. He commences with the words *τί τὸ ὄφελος*; see ver. 16 and 1 Cor. xv. 32. The article is not superfluous: *What is the use which arises from it, if, etc.*; without the article (according to B and C) it means: *What kind of use is it = what use is it?* thus frequently with the classics. With regard to the construction with *εἰάν*, see Matt. xvi. 26; 1 Cor. xiii. 3. The following words: *εἰάν πίστιν λέγει τις εἶχειν*, show that James had in view one who trusts for *σωτηρία*, because he has faith, although works are wanting to him. Many expositors place the emphasis on *λέγει*, as if it was thereby indicated that this assertion was a mere *pretext*, the person introduced as speaking not in reality possessing faith. Gataker: *emphasis hic est in voce DICENDI; intelligit istos fidem quidem jactare, non tamen habere*; similarly Vorstius, Piscator, Wolf, Baumgarten, Pott, Gebser, Hottinger, Kern, Wiesinger, Stier, Lange, Philippi (*Glaubensl.*, i. p. 298 ff.); also De Wette translates *λέγει* by “*pretends.*” This is incorrect, for the sequel does not give the lie to this *λέγειν*, but, on the contrary, it is

¹ The explanation of Wiesinger, that James intends to say “that mercy has nothing to fear, rather that she confounds the terrors of the judgment by her confidence with which she is

assured of grace beforehand, and glories in it,” is not entirely suitable, inasmuch as an objective idea (*κρίσις*) is thus converted into a subjective (the terrors of the judgment).

granted that the man may have faith without having works. Besides, it is self-evident that James did not require to say that a faith, which one has not, cannot save him. That it is not simply said *ἐν πίστιν τις ἔχη*, is explained from James's lively mode of representation, by which he introduces his opponent as appealing to his *πίστις*.¹ It is also incorrect to emphasize the want of the article before *πίστιν* (Schneckenburger: *recte articulo caret* = to have faith, *quum revera non habeat τὴν πίστιν*, ver. 1; *ita omissio articuli jam quodammodo scriptoris iudicium est*). The article is here wanting, as is often the case in the N. T. where the word expresses something definite in itself (thus Brückner), particularly when it is to be brought forward according to its quality. Also *πίστιν* must not be precisely explained as = *ΝΥΔΑ notitia*, or hardly = *ΝΥΔΑ professio*; for those whom James combats could not possibly think that they by their faith possessed only the so-called theoretical faith, but rather they considered it the whole and complete faith. Also this faith was not defective in point of confidence, which Lange should not have denied, for they thought to be saved thereby; although this was not true confidence, but an *empty reliance* on Christ;² they indeed believed, but they did not receive Christ in themselves as a principle of a new life; the object of their faith remained to them purely external, and thus they wanted those works which spring from living faith.³ — *ἔργα δε μὴ ἔχη*]. *ἔργα* is here indeed entirely general, but according to the context *those* works are meant which are proofs of living faith, by which the *νόμος ἐλευθερίας* is fulfilled on the ground of *πίστις*. — After *ἔχη* a simple comma (Gebser) is not to be put, but a note of interrogation; the verse contains two questions, the second interrogative sentence *μὴ δύναται, κ.τ.λ.*, confirming the judgment contained in the first, that it profits nothing to have faith without works. Some expositors incorrectly put a special emphasis on the article before *πίστις* (Bede: *fides ILLA, quam vos habere dicitis*; or, *that* faith which has no works; so also Lange). The article here has not *vim pronominis demonstrativi*, but is used because there is a resumption of the previous idea (*πίστις*); see chap. i. 3 and iv. 15. It is also incorrect to supply out of what goes before the more precise definition of faith: *quae non habetur revera sed dicitur tantummodo et jactatur* (Theile), or to supply *μόνη* (Pott), or to understand by *πίστις* here bare *notitia*. Recourse has been had to these explanations, because it was thought that James otherwise denied to faith its saving power, which is not to be assumed. But the force of *αὐτὸν* has been overlooked. If this pronoun be taken into consideration, it is evident that James does not affirm generally that faith cannot save, but that it cannot save *him* whose faith,

¹ λέγει is the more appropriate, as a faith without works, as James indicates in ver. 18, is something which cannot be proved, of which he who possesses it can only give information by λέγειν.

² It was otherwise with them than with those Christians who indeed considered the teaching of the gospel as true, and did not doubt to be saved, but who rested their hopes not on Christ as the object of faith, but on their

supposed righteousness, i.e., on their good works; for James entirely denies good works to them, and never indicates that they appealed to their supposed good conduct.

³ For the view here rejected, an appeal is incorrectly made to ver. 19, as those thought to have in their faith the guaranty of their σωτηρία, whilst their faith only produced φρίσσειν to the demons.

on which he trusts, is destitute of works; for *αὐτόν* refers back to the subject *τις*, that is, to the person whom James has introduced as speaking. — *σῶσαι*], as in i. 21, is used here of the attainment of *future* salvation; the expression is explained from the fact that eternal condemnation belongs to sinful man as such, and thus requires a *deliverance* in order to be saved. The idea *σωτηρία* generally signifies in the N. T. the *future* salvation; see besides other passages, particularly 1 Thess. v. 8, where *σωτηρία* is designated as the object of *ἐλπὶς*. Certainly the present state of salvation of Christians may also be called *σωτηρία*, but it is evident from the connection with what precedes that James has not that in view, but the complete salvation (against Lange).

Vv. 15, 16. James illustrates the idea that faith is dependent for its proof on works, otherwise if these are wanting it is dead and profits nothing, by an example of compassion, which also, if without the corresponding works, is dead and can profit nothing. The representation of this similitude has the same form as the description of the case mentioned in vv. 2 and 3: first, the statement of the circumstances, and then of the conduct. The particle *δέ* (Lachmann, Tischendorf) is not merely transitional (*metabasis*, Wiesinger), but is to be explained from the fact that in this verse the argument against the opponent brought forward commences (Schneckenburger, De Wette). — Those requiring help are by the name *ἀδελφὸς ἢ ἀδελφὴ* characterized as members of the Christian community, in order to bring out more strongly the obligation to active assistance. — By the words *γυμνοὶ . . . τροφῆς* their destitute condition is described. There is no need to interpret *γυμνός* by *male vestitus* (Laurentius, Wolf, Baumgarten, Gebser, Hottinger, Schneckenburger, De Wette, Theile, Wiesinger); it is rather *nudus*, *naked*, but is certainly also so used when there is no absolute nakedness, but when the clothing can hardly be considered as clothing. On *λειπόμενοι*, see chap. i. 4, 5. — *ἐφῆμερος*] in the N. T. *ἅπ. λεγ.*, is neither = *diurnus* (Morus: *quod in unum diem sufficit*) nor = *hodiernus* (Hottinger); but *ἡ ἐφῆμερος τροφή* is = *ἡ καθ' ἡμέραν ἀναγκαῖα τροφή* (Pott, Gebser, Schneckenburger, Wiesinger).

Ver. 16 describes the conduct towards those requiring help. — *τις ἐξ ὑμῶν*] is to be taken generally, and is not, with Grotius, to be limited to those *qui fidem creditis sufficere ad salutem*. — The address: *ὑπάγετε ἐν εἰρήνῃ*] expresses a friendly wish at departure; similar to *πορεύεσθε ἐν εἰρήνῃ*, Acts xvi. 36; Judg. xviii. 6. *ὑπάγειν εἰς εἰρήνην* (Mark v. 34; Luke vii. 50, and other places) is somewhat different, where *εἰρήνη* and *ὑπάγειν* are not yet conceived as united. — With *θερμαίνεσθε* with reference to *γυμνοὶ*, warning by clothing is specially to be thought of (see Job xxxi. 30; Hag. i. 6); but it is inaccurate to explain the verb itself as equivalent to *vestiri* (Laurentius, Baumgarten, Pott, Bengel, Gebser, Hottinger, Theile). — *θερμαίνεσθε* and *χορτάζεσθε* are not imperatives of the passive, and to be taken in an optative sense (Hottinger: *utinam aliquis beneficens vobis vestimenta largiatur*; similarly, Grotius, Morus, Theile), but imperatives of the middle: *Warm yourselves, satisfy yourselves*; only thus does the contrast appear pointed and definite; that they are not properly to be considered as commanding, but as exhorting, is of itself evident. The plural *μή ὥστε δέ* is explained from *ἐξ ὑμῶν; τὰ*

ἐπιτήδεια (ἄπ. λεγ.) = τὰ ἀναγκαῖα;¹ the things necessary for the support of the body, namely, clothing and food. The question τί τὸ ὄφελος; brings forward that such a sympathy which is χωρὶς ἔργων profits nothing, has no efficacy; to this neither *egentibus* (Hottinger) nor *dicentibus* (Gomar, Baumgarten, Semler) is to be supplied.

Ver. 17. Application of the similitude. The verse forms *one* sentence, of which ἡ πίστις is the subject, and νεκρὰ ἐστὶν is the predicate; neither after πίστις (Pott) nor after ἔργα (Michaelis) is a colon to be put. After ἐλγῃ the idea *continually* (Baumgarten) is not to be supplied. πίστις has here the same meaning as in ver. 14. — From the fact that James calls faith *dead* if it has not works, it is evident that by these works is not meant something which must be added to faith, but something which grows out of faith; the ἔργα here treated of are works of faith, in which are the germs of faith. νεκρά is here not to be explained by *operibus destituta*, but as *inanima*, equivalent to a dead body;² correctly, De Wette: “*dead*, that is, without the power of life; thus not *primarily* to be referred to its effects, but to be understood as its internal nature;” however, James thus designates a faith without works to prove that it οὐ δύναται σώσαι and οὐδὲν ὠφελεῖται. — The more precise statement καθ’ αὐτήν has been variously understood. Grotius considers it as simply pleonastic; some critics separate it from νεκρά and take κατὰ = against (Möller = καθ’ αὐτῆς, i. e., *sibi nec ipsi repugnat*; Augusti: *contra semet ipsam*); others unite it with πίστις (Kuapp = *fides sola*; Baumgarten: “in so far as faith is alone”). But καθ’ αὐτῆς belongs evidently, as its position shows, to νεκρά (De Wette, Schneckenburger, Wiesinger, Lange). It is thus emphatically stated that a faith without works is not only dead in reference to something else, but dead in reference to itself. It serves for the intensification of the idea νεκρά, yet not so that by it the existence of a πίστις without works was denied (against Schneckenburger).

Ver. 18. The words ἀλλ’ ἐρεῖ τις, with which this verse begins, apparently introduce an objection, as in 1 Cor. xv. 35; by which under τις a certain one is to be considered as an opponent of the thought above expressed, who with σύ addresses James, and by κἀγὼ denotes himself. But against this explanation the sentiment itself is opposed; for as James reproaches those against whom he argues, that they have indeed faith but not works, he could not possibly put into the mouth of his opponent, that the same had works, but he (James) had faith. The opinion of Pott, that σὺ . . . κἀγὼ = ἄλλος καὶ ἄλλος, cannot be justified (so also Bouman: *hic . . . ille*). By that explanation it would require to be said: σὺ ἔργα ἔχεις, κἀγὼ πίστιν ἔχω, namely, in the sense: If *thou* place all stress on works, *I* am not the less entitled to place all stress on faith. Kern attempts to remove the difficulty by taking the first

¹ Gloss.: τὰ πρὸς τροφήν ἀρμόδια; Suidas: ἀφορμαὶ εἰς τὸν βίον; see Herod., II. 174; Thuc., II. 23; Cicero, *Off.* I. 8; “*necessaria vitæ præsidia*.”

² The comparison of faith without works to a dead body is found among the old interpreters in such a manner that it formed a controversy

between Catholic and Protestant interpreters; whilst Lorius says: “*mortuum corpus verum corpus est, ut sine operibus et charitate fides*,” Laurentius remarks: “*sicut homo mortuus non est verus homo, ita nec fides mortua vera fides*.”

sentence: *ὃ πιστὴν ἔχεις*, as a hypothetical protasis, and the second, on the other hand, *κἀγὼ ἔργα ἔχω*, as the apodosis, and explains it: "If thou hast faith, so have I also works, because, as thou sayest, faith and works cannot be separated." But to this explanation is opposed not only the fact that James has not, in what has gone before, properly expressed the inseparableness of faith and works, but has only presupposed it; but also that the opponent should appeal to *works*, whilst James considers him as a person who has no works.¹ With these difficulties it is not to be wondered at that almost all expositors have decided for the view that *ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ τις* is not here to be taken as the form of an objection, and that by *τις* not an opponent of James is meant, but a "*vir sapiens et intelligens*," to whom James assigns the part of carrying on the argument in his stead against his opponent. Wiesinger: "*ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ τις* cannot here be possibly taken, as in 1 Cor. xv. 35, Rom. ix. 19, as an objection, for, as *ὃ πιστὴν ἔχεις* already shows, the person introduced as speaking is on the side of James, and like him combats faith without works." Accordingly, with *σύ* the same opponent is addressed whom James had hitherto in view, and with *κἀγὼ* the person called *τις* designates himself as agreeing with James. But against this explanation there are many objections. 1. It cannot be denied that the words *ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ τις* have most decidedly the character of an objection. 2. If they are not so understood, then *ἀλλ'* is not only an interruption, but inexplicable; Hottinger, indeed, maintains: *ἀλλά hic non adversativum esse per se patet*; but who will agree with him in this? De Wette assumes that by *ἀλλά* here is expressed not primarily the contrast with what immediately precedes, but with the error already combated. Wiesinger has, however, correctly rejected this opinion, which is the less to be justified "as the error has not yet been *per se* expressed." *ἀλλά* must at all events be referred to what directly precedes. According to Schneckenburger, it refers *ad negationem, quam notitio νεκρός involvit, quasi dictum foret: ista fides non est fides, SED dicat aliquis*; but that *πιστις*, if it has not works, is not *πίστις* at all, is so little the opinion of James that he ascribes a *πιστεύειν* to the devils (ver. 19); *νεκρά* is here arbitrarily explained as = *nulla*, and not less arbitrarily is it observed on *πιστὴν ἔχεις*: "*interlocutor ad hominis errorem descendens fidem, quam profitetur, eum habere SUMIT*," since James does not the least indicate that the words *ὃ πιστὴν ἔχεις* are to be understood in the sense: "I will even assume that thou hast faith." The opinion of several critics, that *ἀλλά* is here (= *quin etiam*) "a correction of the preceding judgment, heightening it" (Wiesinger), and indicates "that the opinion that a faith without works is dead is here surpassed" (Gunkel), is of no avail, as the opinion contained in this verse on faith without works is evidently not, as Brückner falsely thinks, stronger than that which is expressed in ver. 17 with *νεκρά ἐστίν*.² Accordingly, all attempts at the

¹ The explanation of Knapp, that the first words are interrogative: "tunc quia ipse fide cares, propterea eam contemnis?" and to which the answer is then given: "immo vero plus habeo, quam quantum tu et habes et postulas, fidem videlicet cum factis conjunctam,"

is correctly relinquished by himself, as it is too artificial to be considered as correct.

² Wiesinger observes: "The person introduced as speaking not only confirms what was said before, but goes beyond it; not only that such a faith is dead, but that it cannot even

explanation of ἀλλά do not attain their object.¹ 3. With this explanation it is entirely uncertain how far the speech of τις extends, and where James again resumes; and accordingly the greatest uncertainty here occurs among expositors. 4. Lastly, it cannot be perceived why James should express his own opinion in the person of another who is designated by the entirely indefinite term τις. Wiesinger and most expositors do not touch on this point at all. Baumgarten thinks that James speaks here in the words of a stranger, in order the better and the more freely to convey the notion of erroneousness in severer terms. But this is a pure fiction; that James did not shrink from expressing himself freely and strongly, the whole Epistle is a proof.² These objections are too important to permit us in spite of them to rest on the above explanation. But, on the other hand, the difficulties which arise if ἀλλ' ἐρεῖ τις is taken as a form of objection appear to be invincible. They are only so, however, when it is assumed that the person introduced with σύ as speaking means James, and with κἀγώ himself. But this assumption is by no means necessary. Since James introduces τις as speaking, so both words σύ and κἀγώ can be understood as well from the standpoint of James as from that of the speaker; that is to say, that with σύ the opponent with whom James argues, and against whom he asserts that πιστις without works is dead, is meant, and with ἐγώ James himself. The meaning, then, is as follows: But some might say in answer to what I have just stated, defending thee,³ thou (who hast not the works) hast faith, and I, on the other hand (who affirm that faith without works is dead), have works;⁴ my one-sided insisting on works is no more right than thy one-sided insisting on faith. By this explanation, which has nothing linguistically against it, not only is the nature of ἀλλ' ἐρεῖ τις preserved, but it expresses a thought entirely suited to the context, whilst the following words give the answer by which this objection is decidedly repelled. This answer is in form not directed to the person introduced as speaking, but to the opponent with whom only James has properly to do, and whom he in his lively style can

prove its existence without works: *it is nothing.*" But with these last words Wiesinger inserts a thought into the words which they by no means contain, the same thought which, according to Schneckenburger, is contained in νεκρά ἐστι.

¹ The pointing ἀλλ, ἐρεῖ τις, συ κ.τ.λ (Schmithes, Gebser, Rauch), does in no way remove the difficulty, and has also this against it, that the closely-united formula ἀλλ' ἐρεῖ τις is thus disunited.

² Lange thinks to remove the difficulty by ascribing to the words "a grand prophetic character," whilst by τις is meant "the Gentile-Christian world," which has proved "by its works of faith that it has had the true faith, whereas Ebionism, with its want of consistency in Christian works of love, has proved that its orthodoxy was not a living faith." But, apart from the arbitrariness of this interpretation, ἀλλά is by it referred not to the preceding dec-

laration, but falsely to the erroneous opinion of τις (ver. 14).

³ The view of Stier, that by the speaker a Pharisaical Jew is to be understood, who takes occasion from the inoperative faith of Christians to mock the Christian faith in general, has been rightly rejected by Wiesinger. If James had meant by τις a Jew, he would have called him such.

⁴ This is a form of expression which frequently occurs. Thus, if one speaks with Charles, and says to him: Heury says *thou* hast found the book which I have lost. Brückner, indeed, thinks that this example is not appropriate, but he does not give his reasons for saying so. Lange calls the explanation here given artificial, but he does not say in what its artificial character consists. The objections which Lange brings against it are founded on his having read erroneously *defending himself* instead of *defending thee*.

now the more directly address, as the objection made was the expression of his soul. The meaning of this answer is as follows: Hast thou actually, as that person says, faith, — if this is to be of use it must manifest itself, but this without works is impossible; thou canst not even show thy faith without works: as for myself, who have works, these are a proof that faith is not wanting, for without faith I could do no works. On *δειξον*, Schneckenburger correctly remarks: *vide ne verbo tribuas significationem EXHIBENDI ET MANIFESTANDI (PER VITAM), sed retine primam et simplicem COMPROBARI quasi ante judicem.* — τὴν πίστιν σου is said because the opponent ascribed faith to himself (ver. 14); thus “the faith which thou sayest thou hast” (Wiesinger). — With the reading of the *Rec.*, ἐκ τ. ἔργων (instead of χωρὶς τῶν ἔργων), the words are to be taken as ironical (so also Lange), as the supposition is that works are wanting to him. — With these words not faith generally, but living faith which saves, is denied to the opponent; if the same is not proved by works, it is dead. — In what James says of himself, ἔργα are the works which proceed from faith, as these could not otherwise authenticate it. It is to be observed that in the first clause τὴν πίστιν, and in the second ἐκ τῶν ἔργων, stand first, because these ideas are the points on which the whole turns.

Ver. 19. James shows, in the faith of demons, with whom it produces trembling, how little faith without works effects salvation. With *σύ πιστεύεις*, which is not, with Lachmann and Tischendorf, to be taken as a question, it is granted to the opponent that he possesses faith. From the fact that what is specifically Christian is not named as the object of faith, it is not to be inferred, with Calvin, that in this entire section not the *Christian* faith (*de fide*) is spoken of, but only *de vulgari Dei notitia*. Expositors correctly assume that this one article of faith is only adduced as an example. The selection of precisely this article on the unity of God is not to be explained because “the Jewish Christians were particularly proud of it, so that it kept them back from fully surrendering themselves to the Christian faith” (Lange), but because it distinguished revealed religion from all heathenism. However much the position of the individual words vary (see critical notes), yet the unity of God appears in all as the chief idea; comp. particularly, Deut. vi. 4; Neh. ix. 6; Isa. xlv. 6, xlv. 6; Matt. xxiii. 9; Mark xii. 29, 32; Rom. iii. 30; 1 Cor. viii. 4, 6; and, in this Epistle, chap. iv. 12. In *Hermas*, i. 2, *Mand.* 1, it is said: *πρῶτον πάντων πιστεύουσιν, ὅτι εἰς ἐστὶν ὁ Θεός.* — De Wette, with whom Philippi coincides, thinks that by the construction with *ὅτι* the faith which the opponent has is characterized as merely *theoretical*; but it is, on the other hand, to be observed, that a construction with *εἰς* or *ἐν* here, where the unity of God is to be adduced, could hardly have been used (so also Brückner). — James grants, by the words *καλῶς ποιεῖς*, that this faith is something in itself entirely good (see ver. 8). Several expositors, as Calvin, Semler, Hottinger, Schneckenburger, Theile, Wiesinger, Bouman, find in the expression a trace of irony, which others, as Laurentius, Baumgarten, Grotius, Pott, Gebser, De Wette, deny. Though not in the statement by itself, yet in the whole expression there is something ironical (Lange, Brückner), which, in the combination of *πιστεύουσιν καὶ φρίσσουν* (as

Wieseler remarks), rises to sarcasm. This sarcasm is, moreover, to be recognized in demons being placed in opposition to the opponent. — *καί* before τὰ δαιμόνια is not to be explained by ἀλλὰ καί (Pott), or *atqui* (Theile); by the insertion of a contrary reference the peculiar severity of the expression is only weakened. That James, in his reference to the *unity* of God, mentions the demons, is in accordance with the view that the heathen divinities are demons; comp. LXX. Deut. xxxii. 17; Ps. xcv. 5, cv. 37; 1 Cor. x. 20; and Meyer *in loco*: As these are the occasion of polytheism, so they are hostilely opposed to the *one* God; but, in their usurped lordship over the heathen world, they tremble before the one God, who will again rescue the world and *judge* them. It is wholly arbitrary to take τὰ δαιμόνια = *daemoniaci* (Wetstein), or to think on the demons in the possessed (Semler, Gebser, Schneckenburger). Pott incorrectly paraphrases the *καί* between πιστεύουσιν and φρίσσοσι by καὶ ὁμως; the simple copulative meaning of the word need not here be altered. φρίσσειν, an ἄπ. λεγ., is used particularly of the hair standing on end (Job iv. 15), and is therefore a stronger expression than δεδοικέναι and τρέμειν.

Ver. 20 introduces the following proof from Scripture, that faith without works is dead, and accordingly cannot have δικαιούσθαι as its consequence. The question θήλεις δὲ γινῶναι expresses the confident assurance of victory over the opponent; the address ὦ ἄνθρωπε κενέ, deep indignation at him. κενός does not here indicate intellectual defect (Baumgarten = stupid, incapable of thinking; Pott = short-sighted), but the want of true intrinsic worth, in opposition to the imaginary wealth which the opponent fancies he possesses in his dead faith. The word is only here used in the N. T. of persons. The ὦ, placed first, which is frequently used in reproof, — see Matt. xvii. 17; Luke xxiv. 25; Rom. ix. 20 (Winer, p. 165 [E. T., 183]), — intensifies the censure. The thought is essentially the same whether νεκρά or ἄργή is read. — ἄργός], equivalent to *idle, vain*, that which profits and effects nothing,¹ is also used of a capital sum which lies idle, and therefore bears no interest, thus is a dead capital. Not because ἄργή “deserves the preference with a view to the sense” (Wiesinger), but only because it is difficult to consider it as a gloss, is it to be considered — against the authorities which testify for νεκρά (see critical note) — as the original reading. — As χωρίς τῶν ἔργων stands here instead of εὖν μὴ ἔργα ἔχη (ver. 17), the article ἡ is not to be supplied before χωρίς (against Beza, Baumgarten, and others).

Ver. 21. The testimony to which James first appeals is what happened to Abraham. The reference to Abraham is completely explained from his historical importance, and which is also indicated by ὁ πατὴρ ἡμῶν. — ἡμῶν] because both James and his readers belonged to the nation of Israel sprung from Abraham. By the question with οὐ the thought is characterized as such to which all — thus all the opponents — must assent: *Was not Abraham our father justified by works?* The participial sentence which follows declares what works procured for him justification: *when he offered Isaac his son upon*

¹ It is inaccurate to take ἄργός as equivalent to ἀκαρπός (Frank: unproductive); as *this* indicates the condition, *that*, on the contrary,

the conduct of the subject. They are united together not as identical, but only as related, ideas, in 2 Pet. i. 8.

the altar? — The reference to the doctrine of the Apostle Paul, and especially to his declaration in Rom. iv. 1 ff., has misled expositors into many arbitrary explanations of this verse, and particularly of the word *ἐδικαιώθη*. In order to have a sure foundation for interpretation, two things are to be examined, — (1) the context, and (2) the linguistic usage. (1) As regards the context, the question treated in this whole section is, How the Christian is saved;¹ comp. the question in ver. 14: *μη δύναται ἡ πίστις σώσαι αὐτόν*; and the connection of that section with the preceding, where the discourse is about the divine judgment (ver. 12: *κρίνεσθαι*; ver. 13: *ἡ κρίσις*). As James appeals to Abraham for his assertion that faith *without works* cannot save, it is evident that by *ἐδικαιώθη* he cannot mean something which happened to Abraham from himself, but only something which happened to him from God; so that the meaning cannot be “Abraham justified himself by his works,” but only that “God justified him on the ground of his works.”² (2) As regards the linguistic usage, *δικαιοῦν* corresponds to the Hebrew קִיְרָה, which, as a *judicial* term, has the meaning: *to declare one קִיְרָה by an acquittal from guilt*, and is opposed to עֲשֶׂה (LXX.: *καταγινώσκειν, καταδικάζειν*) = *to declare one עֲשֶׂה by a sentence of condemnation*; comp. Exod. xxiii. 7; Deut. xxv. 1; 1 Kings viii. 32; 2 Chron. vi. 23; Prov. xvii. 15; Isa. v. 23, l. 8, liii. 11; in the Apocrypha, comp. Ecclus. x. 29, xiii. 22, xxiii. 11, xxxiv. 5, xlii. 2. *δικαιοῦν* has also the same meaning in the N. T., where, especially (besides the passages treating of the Pauline doctrine of justification), Matt. xii. 37, Rom. ii. 13, Luke xviii. 14 are to be compared. This judicial meaning of the word is here to be retained. It is true, as *δικαιοῦν* (similarly the English word “to justify”) occurs not only in the judicial sense, but, also more generally, as also קִיְרָה, in the sense “set forth as righteous”³ (comp. Matt. xi. 19; Luke vii. 29; Rom. iii. 4; 1 Tim. iii. 16), the passage has been explained: “Abraham has been proved righteous,” or, “has proved himself righteous” (so already Calvin, and, in recent times, Philippi). But this explanation is unsuitable, since, according to this view, justification did not happen to Abraham from God (as must be conceived according to the context), but from his works; thus it was Abraham who

¹ Philippi erroneously maintains that the question here treated is to prove that faith has to manifest itself by works if it is to be regarded as true faith. But James designates the faith of his opponents as *νεκρά*, not merely because it has no works, but because it cannot effect the *σωτηρία* which they expected from it.

² Correctly, Wiesinger: “In *ἐδικαιώθη* the passive sense is decidedly to be retained, and, indeed, *a Deo* . . .; not of the human judgment is the discourse here and in ver. 23, but of the divine; as it treats of the proposition in ver. 14, that only an active faith can save.” This is the more to be maintained, as the thought, that faith has to justify itself *before men* as living, is so void of importance that James could not lay such stress upon it.

³ This is the prevailing meaning of קִיְרָה, which is differently modified according to the different circumstances to which it is referred. It is chiefly used of a judicial sentence, whether of God or of a human judge, by which one is declared קִיְרָה; yet it also occurs in another reference, namely, of every agency which causes one to appear as righteous, whether that agency is exercised by the person in question or by others. The N. T. *δικαιοῦν* corresponds to this usage. Strictly taken, it is accordingly not correct to translate *δικαιοῦν* by “proved to be righteous,” or “approved to be righteous,” as the ideas *proving* and *approving*, according to their proper and strict meaning, are not contained in it. Comp., however, the excellent treatment of the word in Cremer's dictionary.

justified himself by his works, i.e., proved himself to be righteous.¹ If we hold fast to the judicial meaning, then it is to be observed that, in the conception of the word, *neither any thing about the disposition of him who is the object of the declaration of righteousness, nor about the ground of justification* (whether it rests in the judge or in the conduct of him who is justified), is indicated. For this reason the explanation of Wiesinger: *a Deo justus agnitus*, is incorrect, as the idea of a *ratifying recognition* of the already existing condition is not contained in the word. As little is it to be vindicated when Hofmann thinks that *δικαιοῦσθαι* here imports: "to become a *δικαίος*, inasmuch as he then answered to the will of God relating to him;" for, on the one hand, by this a meaning (namely, being made a righteous person) is ascribed to the word which it has not; and, on the other hand, no one can make himself a righteous person by his works, but only can prove himself to be such.² James says nothing else than that Abraham *was declared righteous* (by God) *ἐξ ἔργων*. By *ἐξ ἔργων* the reason is specified, on Abraham's part, on account of which a declaration of righteousness was granted to him. By these works are to be understood not *all* the works which Abraham has done, nor his whole pious life, but, as the clause *ἀνερέγκας Ἰσαὰκ, κ.τ.λ.*, shows, *the actual offering of his son Isaac on the altar*. The plural *ἐξ ἔργων* is used because the category, at first entirely general, is specified which here comes into consideration. It may appear surprising that James here should emphasize precisely that offering as the reason of the declaration of righteousness, since in the O. T. narrative (Gen. xxii.) a *δικαιοῦσθαι* of Abraham is not mentioned. What James has in view is not "the judgment of God there; Gen. xxii. 12 comp. with ver. 16 ff." (Wiesinger); for in these words, which, moreover, only serve as an introduction to the declaration which follows, nothing is addressed to Abraham, but only it is testified of him that God in his action has recognized his fear of God. Not in this, but only in what God addresses to him on account of it, because He has recognized him as a God-fearing man, can James have found the declaration of Abraham's right-

¹ Philippi explains the words: Abraham was justified *before men* by works, *as a justified man before God by faith*. But here there are evidently introduced into the idea *δικαιοῦσθαι* a series of more precise statements which are not contained in it. The explanation of Brückner is simpler, who considers *ἐδικαιώθη* to indicate: "that moral righteousness which displays itself on the ground of the activity of faith;" but also this interpretation is not to be considered correct for the reasons above stated. The unsuitableness of this and similar interpretations is particularly evident from ver. 24. It is also to be observed, that in these explanations the passive is converted into the middle voice. In the O. T., it is true, the hithpael of *קָרַץ* is translated in the LXX. by the preterite passive of *δικαιοῦν* (see Gen. xlii. 16); but in the N. T. the passive of this verb never occurs in this meaning: the middle import is here

rather expressed by the active with the reflex pronoun; comp. Luke x. 29, xvi. 15.

² The following explanations are also incorrect: "he was loved as a righteous man" (Grotius); "he was made a partaker of the favor of God and of all the blessings springing from it." (Thelle); "his justification was ratified by man" (Baumgarten). The translation: "he was pardoned" (Pott), is inaccurate, because the idea of pardon always supposes a crime, which *δικαιοῦν* does not. Also the explanation of Lange is arbitrary: *δικαιοῦν*, in the N. T. deeper sense, denotes that "God declares righteousness in the *theoretical forum* before the *theoretical congregation* conceived as permanent;" for how can the precise statement be contained in the simple verbal idea, *before whom* the declaration of righteousness was made?

eousness. This is the bestowal of the promise (vv. 16–18) by which it is expressly said, “because thou hast done this thing” (ver. 16), and “because thou hast obeyed my voice” (ver. 18); by which is definitely brought forward that the promise was granted on account of his obedience — that is, on account of his works. What importance, with regard to the promise, the obedience of Abraham had in the eyes of God, is clearly brought out from Gen. xxvi. 5, where God ratifies this same promise with Isaac in these words: “Because that Abraham obeyed my voice and kept my charge, my commandments, my statutes, and my laws;” and not less is it to be observed when it is said in Eccclus. xliv. 20: ὃς συνετήρησεν νόμον ὑψίστου . . . καὶ ἐν περιουσίᾳ εὐρέθη πιστός· οὐκ αὐτοῦ ἐν ὄρκῳ ἔστησεν αὐτῷ, κ.τ.λ. It is true that the same promise was made to Abraham at an earlier period, and that before he had done any thing (Gen. xii. 2, 3); but the difference is, that after the offering of his son it was imparted to him as an *inalienable blessing on account of this action*, and that *at the close of his theocratic historical life*. In this James could rightly recognize a formal declaration of Abraham’s righteousness on the part of God. — On the construction ἐδικαιώθη ἐκ, comp. Matt. xii. 37: ἐκ τῶν λόγων σου δικαιοθήσῃ, where the λόγοι are reckoned as that on the ground of which acquittal (or condemnation) takes place. — The words: ἀνεγένεας . . . ἐπὶ τὸ θυσιαστήριον] are not, with Luther, to be translated: “when he had sacrificed his son upon the altar;” for ἀναφέρειν joined with ἐπὶ, with the accusative, is not to *sacrifice*, but to *bring as a sacrifice to the altar* (comp. 1 Pet. ii. 24); it is therefore incorrect to supply the idea *will* (Estius: *cum obtulisset = offere voluisset*). Hottinger falsely explains ἐπὶ τ. θυσ. = *before* the altar. To the name Ἰσαάκ is emphatically added τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ; comp. Gen. xxii. 16.

Ver. 22. The direct inference from the preceding. Since the necessity of *faith* to the attainment of salvation was not contested by those with whom James disputed, but only the necessity of *works*; and since James (ver. 21) had adduced the example of Abraham to prove that only a faith which is not ἀργή and χωρὶς τῶν ἔργων profits: in this verse it can only be intended to represent how important to Abraham were his *works*, but not how important to him was his faith. This thought is thus clearly and evidently expressed in the second hemistich: καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἔργων, κ.τ.λ. On the other hand, the first hemistich: ὅτι ἡ πίστις συνήργει τοῖς ἔργοις αὐτοῦ, has been generally understood by expositors as if the necessity of *faith* was intended to be brought forward. In this meaning Bengel says: *duo commata, quorum in priore, si illud, FIDES, in altero OPERIBUS cum accentu pronuntiaveris, sententia liquido percipitur, qua exprimitur, quid utraque pars alteri conferat*. According to this, James would have expressed in the first hemistich, that *faith* was not wanting to Abraham, that rather it was this from which his works sprung, that accordingly Abraham was justified ἐξ ἔργων, because they were works of *faith*. The same explanation is given by Erasmus, Tremellus, Beza, Baumgarten, Gebser, Pott, Kern, and others; also by Hofmann and Wiesinger. But the context is against it, as *this* thought does not follow as a consequence from ver. 21. Those expositors have accordingly understood the passage more correctly who find in the words in question the meaning that the πίστις of Abraham was not *dead* but *operative*; Estius: *operosa fuit, non otiosa, non mortua* (so

Calvin, Laurentius, Hornejus, and others), although their interpretation is inaccurate in particulars. — *συνήργει*]. If *συνεργεῖν* is taken in its strictly literal sense: “to be a *συνεργός*, to labor or to work along with” (1 Cor. xvi. 16; 2 Cor. vi. 1), and is translated: “faith wrought with his works,” the idea of James (according to the usage of the word *συνεργεῖν* in this meaning) would be, that whilst works wrought, faith participated in their work.¹ But this thought does not correspond with the context, and is, moreover, not in itself to be vindicated, since faith and works are not two principles working along with one another. — Kern, with whom De Wette coincides, takes *ταῖς ἔργοις* as the dative of reference, and explains it: “faith wrought to his works, i.e., was the operative principle for the production of works.” This gives, indeed, a suitable enough thought, but linguistic usage is against the explanation; besides, it is not the case that “*συν* has only a vague reference, or, to speak more correctly, no reference at all” (Hofmann). On this account other interpreters, as Hofmann, Wiesinger, Brückner, also Philippi, correctly take *συνεργεῖν* here in the meaning of: to *help* (Rom. viii. 28; 1 Macc xii. 1). The support which faith gave to works is to be found in this, that as it operates to their production, so also to their accomplishment in correspondence with the will of God.² By this explanation a special emphasis is placed on the expression *συνήργει*, it being thereby brought prominently forward that the faith of Abraham was not *ἀργός* (*ἄ-εργος*), but exercised an activity, namely, the activity mentioned as helpful to works. Against Lange’s explanation: “faith manifested itself operatively at one with the works,” besides not being linguistically justified, Brückner rightly remarks that here the discourse is not concerning a co-operation of these two points. — The *second hemistich* is not in antithesis with the first, but constitutes its complement; whilst the faith of Abraham aided his works, faith itself received by works its completion. — *ἐτελειώθη*] is by many interpreters understood as declarative; Gomarus: *FIDES est causa, OPERA effectus; causa autem non perficitur a suo effectu, sed perfecta DECLARATUR, ut fructus boni arborem bonam NON EFFICIUNT, sed INDICANT*. The same explanation is adopted by Calvin, Laurentius, Baumgarten, Gebser, Bengel, Philippi,³ and others. Also Wiesinger indicates the same meaning with the remark: “faith could not be *proved* complete if it were not already so in itself, for the complete work presupposes the complete faith;” but *τελειῶσθαι* does not

¹ In the first edition of this commentary it is said: “Faith was the *συνεργός* of his works — that is, it operated not by itself, but with his works. James will here make prominent that with Abraham both were combined, the emphasis, however, according to the context, being placed on *ταῖς ἔργοις*.” This explanation, which has found favor with von Oettingen and Rauch, is, however, not tenable, as, on the one hand, linguistic usage is against it, and on the other hand, it was not insisted on by James that the faith of Abraham wrought not alone, but that it was no inactive (inoperative) faith.

² The explanation of Hofmann (with whom Wiesinger and Brückner coincide): “that his action would not have been what is represented in an act of willing obedience, unless faith had assisted to its performance,” has this against it, that the principal thought would not thereby be expressed, but must be added. Philippi, correctly: Abraham’s faith was no inert faith, but was helpful to his works, namely, to their production and accomplishment; i.e., it assisted him to the performance of good works.

³ Philippi incorrectly appeals for this meaning to 1 John ii. 5, and to *ἔσθε* in Luke vi. 35.

signify to be *proved*, but to be *completed*.¹ Certainly the meaning of James cannot be, that faith hitherto incomplete was completed by works, as something which was externally added to faith, since faith is the impulse to the works; but as little is it his meaning, that faith is already complete (*τέλειος*) before works, and is by works only *proved* or *demonstrated* to be so; but faith and works are in his view so closely connected, that faith only when it produces works or by works (*ἐξ ἔργων*) becomes ever more completely that which it should be according to its nature and destination, and in so far only by works attains to its completion; for as the power of love grows and is completed by the practice of works of love, so does faith grow and is completed by the practice of works in which it manifests itself.² Thus was Abraham's faith only completed when he stood the severest test, and brought his son as an offering upon the altar.³

Ver. 23. Since what was said of Abraham in the preceding appears to conflict with the Scripture, Gen. xv. 6, James was obliged to solve this apparent contradiction; therefore he adds to what he has said: *and (thus) the scripture was fulfilled which says, But Abraham believed God, and it was reckoned to him for righteousness; and he was called a friend of God.* Most expositors (also von Oettingen) explain *πληροῖν* by *comprobare*, confirmed, and find here the thought expressed, that by Abraham being justified *ἐξ ἔργων*, the scripture: "that faith was reckoned to Abraham for righteousness," received its confirmation. But in this explanation of the word *πληροῖν* there is an arbitrary weakening of the idea. *πληροῖν* signifies neither in the N. T. nor in classical usage: "to confirm," but always "to fulfil" (see Cremer); with regard to a saying, the realization of the thought expressed in it by an action following is indicated by *πληροῦν*, whether that saying be in the form of a prediction or not. This meaning of the verb is also here to be recognized, and indeed so much the more as James uses *the* formula

¹ Also Hofmann's explanation: "The *τελείωσις* of his faith consisted not in this, that it attained from incompleteness to completeness, but in this, that by the action, in which it proved itself, it attained to its complete formation—to its historical accomplishment," cannot be reckoned as appropriate, because *τελειοῦσθαι* never means "to be completely formed," if by this expression a becoming complete is not intended. Lange agrees with the above remark, only he introduces something strange when he says: "Abraham by his faith-offering attained typically and ideally the *τελείωσις*, which the Jewish Christians were to attain by the full proof of Christian brotherly love out of faith, and which with them all Israel was to attain."

² Luther (in his introduction to First Peter, published by Irmischer, vol. lxx. p. 223 f.) says of the fruits of faith: "Although they belong to our neighbor, that he may be profited thereby, yet the fruit is not external—faith *becomes stronger thereby*. It is an entirely different

strength than that of the body, for this decays and is consumed; but this spiritual strength, the more one uses and exercise it, the stronger it becomes; it decays when one does not exercise it." See also the appropriate remarks of Hengstenberg (*Evangel. Kircheng.*, 1866, p. 1124 ff.).

³ When it is objected against this explanation, that faith must already have been perfect in order to produce the perfect work, it is to be observed, that it is in the nature of living faith always to be becoming stronger, in and with the production of works, and thus to perfect itself in its nature more and more. Brückner, indeed, grants that the practice of works, has a strengthening reflex efficacy on faith, but observes that by this cannot be meant that faith was not before already sufficient to justify Abraham. But to this it is to be observed, that James does not derive the justification (meant by him) of Abraham from his faith preceding works, but from his faith made perfect by works.

with which not only in the N. T. but also in the O. T. (1 Kings ii. 27; 2 Chron. xxxvi. 22; 1 Macc. ii. 55) generally the fulfilment of a proper prediction, and always the real proof of an earlier spoken thought, is expressed. — The scripture which was fulfilled is Gen. xv. 6, where it is said not only that Abraham believed Jehovah, but that He (Jehovah) reckoned it to him for righteousness. James (as also Paul in Rom. iv. 3; Gal. iii. 6; see also 1 Macc. ii. 52) cites the passage according to the LXX., where the passive *ελογίσθη* is used instead of the active *ἠεσθη*; whilst he only deviates from the Greek text in this, that he (as also Paul in Rom. iv. 3) uses *ἐπίστευσεν* *δέ* instead of *καὶ ἐπίστευσεν*; it is to be observed that in the corresponding passage, Ps. cvi. 31, the passive *ἠεσθη* is also in the Hebrew. — Instead of the expression used in these passages, the form: *תְּהִי לְךָ צְדָקָה לְפָנַי יְהוָה*, is also found in the O. T. Deut. xxiv. 13 and vi. 25 (where the LXX. incorrectly translate *צְדָקָה* by *ἐλεημοσύνη*). The contrary of this is indicated by the expression: *לֹא קָלַלְתָּ לְךָ*, Prov. xxvii. 14. — All these expressions import a judgment which God pronounces to Himself on a definite conduct of man, by which He either reckons it for righteousness or for a curse; with Abraham it was his faith on account of which God declared him a righteous person. — But in what does James see the fulfilment of this scripture, that testifies this judgment of God on believing Abraham? Evidently in what he had already said, namely, that Abraham *ἐξ ἔργων ἐδικαιώθη*, and which he indicates by what follows: *καὶ φίλος Θεοῦ ἐκλήθη*; for these words — since they belong not to the scripture — are co-ordinate not with *καὶ ἐλογίσθη*, but with *καὶ ἐπληρώθη*, κ.τ.λ. It is true God regarded Abraham as His φίλος (*φίλος Θεοῦ* is not, as Hofmann and Philippi think, God's friend who loved God, but *God's friend whom God loved*¹) the instant he reckoned his faith to him for righteousness; but he was *called* so at a later period, namely, only at the time that he was *declared* righteous by God on account of his *works*. The expressions *ελογίσθη αὐτῷ εἰς δικαιοσύνην* and *ἐδικαιώθη* are not regarded by James as equivalent, but according to his representation the former was imparted to Abraham *purely* on account of his faith (*ἐπίστευσεν*), but the *latter* only when his faith was completed by works, thus on account of his works (*ἐξ ἔργων*), so that thereby that scripture was fulfilled. It is true this scripture is abstractly no promise; but as it notifies facts which point to later actions in which they received their full accomplishment, James might consider it as a word of promise which was fulfilled by the occurrence of these later actions.² — The appellation of Abraham as a φίλος Θεοῦ is not indeed found in the LXX.; but in 2 Chron. xx. 7, Jehoshaphat calls him in his prayer *ἡγαπημένος σου* (LXX.: *ὁ ἡγαπημένος σου*), and in Isa. xli. 8 God Himself calls him *ἡγαπημένος σου* (LXX.: *ὁ ἡγαπημένος σου*); comp. also *Ges. Asar.*, v. 11: *διὸ Ἀβραὰμ τὸν ἡγαπημένον ὑπὸ σοῦ*; also it was not unusual for the Jews to call him φίλος Θεοῦ; to Gen. xviii. 17, the LXX. have added to *ἀπὸ Ἀβραάμ* the words *τοῦ παιδός μου*, for

¹ Lange comprehends both; but at all events, according to the context, the reference given above is to be recognized as the prevailing one.

² Namely: the faith with which Abraham received the promise of God points to the later

obedience, and the divine reckoning of his faith for righteousness points to the declaration of righteousness imparted to him by God at a later period after proof of his obedience.

which Philo puts τοῦ φίλου μου. It is evident from what has preceded, that we cannot, with Grotius, Hornejus, Pott, and others, explain ἐκλήθη = factus est, fuit.

REMARK. — When De Wette explains πληροῦν by realized, this is so far inappropriate, as πληροῦν does not directly refer to the fact itself, but to the saying of scripture, and as neither of πιστεύειν of Abraham, nor of ἐλογίσθη αὐτῷ εἰς δικ., can it be said that it “was something not yet wholly real, but the full realization of which occurred only at a later period.” For although both point to a later period, yet there was in them something which had actually taken place, as Lange correctly adduces. Hofmann also gave an incorrect reference to the word, explaining it: “In the offering of Isaac it was proved that God had rightly estimated the faith of Abraham when He counted it for righteousness;” for, on the one hand, there was no need of a proof that God had rightly estimated something, of which there is no indication in James, and, on the other hand, πληροῦν has not the meaning of confirming or proving.¹ In opposition to the explanation of Philippi: “the scriptural expression concerning Abraham’s justification by faith was, because His justification by faith is in itself a thing invisible as it were, an unfulfilled prophecy, until it became visible through proof by works,” it is, apart from the unjustifiable insertion of “as it were,” to be observed that Abraham’s act of obedience, happening at a later period, confirmed indeed his faith (thus that ἐπίστευσεν τῷ Θεῷ), but not the righteousness adjudged to him on account of his faith (that ἐλογίσθη αὐτῷ εἰς δικ.), and accordingly ἐπληρώθη would be suitable only for the first half of the scriptural expression. It is peculiar that, according to the explanation of Philippi, the same meaning: “to be proved,” is in essence ascribed to the three words—δικαιούσθαι, τελειούσθαι, πληροῦσθαι.

Ver. 24. An inference universally valid from the adduced example of Abraham: “Ye see that by works a man is justified (declared righteous), and not by faith alone.” — ὁρᾶτε] is not imperative (Erasmus, Grotius), but indicative; Griesbach, Schott, Schulthess, incorrectly understand the sentence as a question, which it is as little as in ver. 22. — ἐξ ἔργων] is emphatically placed first, because the chief stress is upon it. — δικαιούται] has the same meaning as in ver. 21. James thus infers from the foregoing that the declaration of man’s righteousness proceeds ἐξ ἔργων, and, with special reference to his opponents, he adds: οὐκ ἐκ πίστεως μόνου.² The chief emphasis is on μόνου; for as little as James in ver. 14 has not said that faith cannot save (σῶσαι), so little will he here say that a man is not justified ἐκ πίστεως (rather πίστις is

¹ Also in Brückner’s explanation: “Both the fact that Abraham believed God, and that his faith was reckoned to him by God for righteousness, was confirmed and proved in the offering of Isaac, leading to this that Abraham ἐξ ἔργων ἐδικαιώθη,” the idea πληροῦν receives not its right meaning. Lange has here in essentials adopted the correct meaning.

² Philippi, according to his explanation of ἐδικαιώθη, ver. 21, must find here the thought expressed, that “faith alone without works

cannot prove a man before men to be a believer, and justified by faith;” but this thought is in fact so self-evident, that James would not have thought it necessary to state it as a consequence from the history of Abraham. The idea opposed to ἐξ ἔργων should not be ἐκ πίστεως, but must be ἐκ λόγων (comp. λέγειν, ver. 14); moreover, the simple δικαιούται ἄνθρωπος cannot possibly denote: “a man is justified as a believer whom God, on account of his faith, has justified.”

to him the presupposition, without which the attainment of salvation cannot be conceived, as without it the *ἔργα, ἐξ ὧν δικαιούται ἄνθρωπος* are impossible); but that the faith which justifies must not be *χωρὶς τῶν ἔργων. μόνον* is therefore not to be united with *οὐκ* (Theile: *appositionis lege explenda est oratio: non solum fide, sed etiam operibus . . . nempe cum fide conjungendis*), but with *πίστεως* (Theophylact, Grotius, Knapp, Hottinger, Wiesinger, and others); comp. 1 Cor. xii. 31; 2 Cor. xi. 23; Gal. i. 23; Phil. i. 26. The declaration of righteousness, which James intends, is not that by which the believer on account of his faith receives the forgiveness of his sins, but, as is evident from the connection of the whole section, that which occurs to the believer, who has proved his living faith by his works, at the judgment (*ἐν τῇ κρίσει, ἐν τῷ κρίνεσθαι*), and by which he receives *σωτηρία* (ver. 14). When James, in reference to this, appeals to what happened to Abraham, there is nothing unsuitable, for why should not that which God has done in a definite instance be regarded as a type and testimony of what He shall do at the future judgment? Moreover, this is completely appropriate, since to Abraham, by the address to him after the offering of Isaac, the promise which was before made to his faith, was *rendered unchangeably firm at the close of his theocratic life*. The present *δικαιούται* is explained, because the thought was to be expressed as a universal sentence.¹

Ver. 25. To the example of Abraham, that of Rahab is added: *But was not in like manner Rahab the harlot justified by works?* The form of the sentence is the same as in ver. 21. — *ὁμοίως δὲ καί*] does not signify “even so” (as Frommann explains it in the *Stud. u. Krit.*, 1833, p. 97), but by *ὁμοίως* the *similarity* of what Rahab became a partaker with what happened to Abraham is brought forward, whilst by *δέ* the *diversity* of the relation is indicated. This diversity is noted by the addition *ἡ πόρνη*. Rahab, namely, was a *πόρνη*; nevertheless, on account of the works which she did (namely, her works of faith), she was declared righteous. Thus, by the addition of this example, the truth that a man is justified *ἐξ ἔργων* is yet further confirmed.²

¹ See remarks by the author in the April number of the *Erlang. Zeitschrift für Protest.* Frank, in his reply (in the same, p. 220), combating the reference of *δικαιούται* to the final judgment, says “If there was in the life of Abraham a justification by works, which may be considered as the type and testimony of the final acquittal, so there occurs also in the life of Christians such acts of justification by works, that they may also be regarded as a testimony and type of their future justification before the judgment-seat of God.” To this it is to be replied, that *such* an act of justification is here treated of by which the accounting of his faith for righteousness already imparted to the believer comes to its termination, as was here the case with Abraham. But this act, as concerns Christian believers, occurs not in their earthly life, but only at the judgment. Philipp also incorrectly says that the reference to the

judgment is not indicated, since it is sufficiently indicated by the whole context; see remarks on ver. 14.

² Bede assigns as a reason why Rahab is here adduced as an example “ne quis objiceret Abrahamum ejusque fidem excelsiorem esse, quam et quis christianus imitatione eam adsequi possit.” Grotius thinks. “Abrahami exemplum Hebraeis ad Christum conversis sufficere debebat, sed quia etiam alienigenis scribit, adjunxit exemplum feminæ extraneæ” (similarly Hofmann); and Schneckemburger observes: “novum addit exemplum e sexu muliebri sumtum” All these meanings are, however, arbitrary, as there is no indication of them in the words before us. This holds also good against Lange, according to whose opinion Rahab is here to be considered “as a representative of the Gentile Christians in their works of faith.”

The article ἡ is not, as some expositors think, demonstrative *illa*; and πορνῆ means neither *mulier cibaria vendens*, nor *caupona vel hospita* (Lyranus, Grotius), nor *idololatra* (Rosenmüller). — ὑποδεξαμένη τοῖς ἀγγέλοις, κ.τ.λ.]. This participial sentence mentions the ἔργα on account of which Rahab was justified. The correctness of the assertion, that Rahab was justified on account of her works, consists in this: that, according to the narrative contained in Josh. ii. and vi., life was on account of them granted to her, she was formally delivered from that punishment which befell Jericho; see Josh. vi. 24. Thus James could with right appeal for the truth of what was said in ver. 24 to this fact, since also the future declaration of righteousness will be an acquittal from punishment. — In Heb. xi. 31 the deliverance of Rahab is ascribed to her πίστις, but so that her action is likewise mentioned as the demonstration of it. Theile explains ὑποδεξαμένη = *clam excepit*; but Wiesinger correctly observes: "The secondary meaning *clam* is not contained in the word, but in the circumstances;" see Luke x. 38, xix. 6; Acts xvii. 7. In the Epistle to the Hebrews the simple verb δεξαμένη is used, and the ἀγγελοι¹ are there more exactly designated as κατάσκοποι. ἐκβάλλειν is not simply *emittere* (Schneckenburger), but has the secondary meaning of force = *thrust out*, comp. Luke viii. 54; John ii. 15; Acts ix. 40. It denotes the pressing haste with which she urged the messengers to go out of the house. ἐτέρῃ ὁδῷ], i. e., by another way than from that by which they entered the house, namely, διὰ τῆς θυρίδος, Josh. ii. 15. For the local dative, see Winer, p. 196 (E. T., 219).

Ver. 26 is added as a reason (γάρ), primarily indeed, to what directly goes before (ἐξ ἔργων ἐδικαιώθη), but thereby likewise to the universal sentiment contained in ver. 24. James here repeats the same judgment which he has already expressed (ver. 17) on πίστις χωρὶς τῶν ἔργων; yet heightens it by the comparison with σῶμα χωρὶς πνεύματος: *for as the body without the spirit is dead, so also faith without works is dead.* — τὸ σῶμα χωρὶς πνεύματος]. By σῶμα is to be understood the human body, and by πνεῦμα the vital principle animating it, by which it lives; whether James has contemplated πνεῦμα definitely as the intellectual spirit of man (as "the principle of the morally determined and God-derived life peculiar to man"), or generally as the breath of life proceeding from God (see Gen. vi. 17, LXX.: πῶσα σὰρξ ἐν ἡ ἐστὶ πνεῦμα ζωῆς; Rev. xi. 11, xiii. 15), remains uncertain. With the body without the spirit, which is νεκρός, James compares (οὕτως is not "the sign of assurance = even so certainly," Baumgarten) faith without works (the article τῶν denotes works as those which belong to πίστις, its corresponding works), which is also νεκρός. This comparison appears so far incongruous, as the relation of ἔργα to πίστις does not correspond with that of πνεῦμα to the σῶμα, since ἔργα are the fruit, and not the source, of πίστις.² Therefore some interpreters have by ἔργα understood not works themselves, but love (Theile), or "the innermost life of faith in its outwardly operative and visible manifestation" (Frank); but such an exchange of ideas is not to be justified. Al-

¹ Lange strangely supposes that James has chosen this expression "in allusion to the fact that the Gentiles of his time were ready to receive the messengers of the gospel."

² Lange denies the apparent incongruity, because "the spirit also, in virtue of its actuality, effects the *higher* visibility of the body!"

ready some of the older expositors, as Gomar, Piscator, Laurentius, Wolf, and others, and recently Philippi (Theile is undecided), explain πνεῦμα = breath. This, however, is even linguistically objectionable, as πνεῦμα in the N. T. occurs in the meaning of breath proceeding out of the mouth only in 2 Thess. ii. 8, a passage in accordance with the O. T.; but also in sense this explanation is not justified, for although "the breath is the proof of the existence of life in the body" (Philippi), yet the ideas breath and works have too great disparity between them to be parallelized with each other. It is more natural, with De Wette, Kern, Hofmann, Wiesinger, and Weiss, to assume that James intends not to compare the single members with each other (σῶμα with πίστις, and πνεῦμα with ἔργους), but to make prominent that a faith which is χωρὶς τῶν ἔργων, is thereby proved to be like to the body, in which the πνεῦμα, the source of life, is wanting — which is thus only a dead body. With this sentence, in which the idea expressed in ver. 17 is strongly confirmed, James closes this section, as from this it is self-evident that faith without works cannot effect justification for man, and consequently not σωτηρία, and therefore profits nothing (ver. 14).

1. The doctrine of James in this section is, according to expression, in opposition with that of the Apostle Paul (James: ἐξ ἔργων δίκαιοῦται ἄνθρωπος καὶ οὐκ ἐκ πίστεως μόνον; Paul, Gal. ii. 16: οὐ δίκαιοῦται ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἔργων νόμου, ἐν μὴ διὰ πίστεως; James asks: Ἀβραῆμ οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων ἐδικαιώθη; Paul, in Rom. iv. 2, says: εἰ Ἀβραῆμ ἐξ ἔργων ἐδικαιώθη, ἐχρεὶ καύχημα, ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὸν Θεόν). It is asked whether also the sentiment of the one contradicts that of the other. Until the time of Luther, the conviction prevailed that the two agreed in thought. This is maintained in recent times by Neander, Thiersch, Hofmann, Wiesinger, Lange, Hengstenberg, Philippi, and others. Luther, on the contrary, was of opinion that the doctrine of James decidedly contradicted that of Paul; and the same view has been expressed in recent times by De Wette, Kern, Baur, Schwegler, and others, also Rauch. There is a middle view, that there is indeed a diversity of doctrine between Paul and James, but that this does not exclude a higher unity; thus Schmid, Weizsäcker (Reuter's *Repert.*, Oct. 1855), Lechler, and others. — Already Theophylact, Oecumenius, Bede, have, for the sake of harmonizing the difference, asserted that the ἔργα of James are different from those of which Paul speaks; Paul intends *opera legis* (Oecumenius: τὰ κατὰ νομὸν σαββατισμῶν καὶ περιτομῆς καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἀγισμῶν); James, on the contrary, *opera fidei* (Oecumenius: ἔργα τὰ πίστιν βεβαιοῦντα). This is indeed true. Paul has to do with Judaizing opponents who maintained the necessity of circumcision, and consequently of all legal works; but James, with such Christians who trusted to simple πίστις, and thought that this would secure their salvation, although destitute of corresponding works. Paul had thus to prove that ἔργα τοῦ νόμου were *not necessary*; James, that ἔργα τῆς πίστεως were *necessary*. Nevertheless, this recognition of the different relations does not suffice to an actual harmonizing of the difference; for it has with truth been maintained that, according to the doctrinal system of Paul, a justifying efficacy is denied not only to works of law, but also to works of faith, since these last do not precede but follow justification. — Accordingly a different meaning of the term πίστις has been adopted, and it has been maintained that by πίστις χωρὶς ἔργων James understands only *bare speculation* (Oecumenius: ἡ ἀπλὴ συγκατάθεσις), the *frigida et nuda notitia*,

or indeed even the *falsa professio fidei*. This is certainly not entirely suitable, though Paul does not know by name a *πίστις νεκρά*. But although it were correct, yet the recognition of this distinction does not suffice to reconcile the difference; for Wieseler is decidedly right when, against Schmid, Olshausen, Neander, and others, he remarks, that it is one thing to say, *To be justified by faith which is proved by works*, and another thing, *To be justified by works in which faith is proved*. Already by Calvin, Calovius, Gerhard, and others, and in recent times particularly by Hofmann, Wiesinger, Brückner, Lange, Philippi, and others, the wished-for reconciliation has been attempted to be brought about, by ascribing a different meaning to the word *δικαιοῦσθαι* in James from what it has in Paul; that James speaks not *de actu*, but *de statu justificationis*. But either thereby a meaning is assigned to the word which it never has, or there results from it in James an idea inappropriate to the connection; see exposition of the verses in question. Hengstenberg (*Brief des Jakobus*, in the *Evang. Kircheng.*, 1866, No. 91-94) correctly maintains that *δικαιοῦσθαι* has with Paul and James the same meaning; but when he attempts to prove the agreement of the two modes of expression by the supposition that, as there are different stages of faith, so there are different stages of justification, and that James speaks of a more perfect justification than Paul in the passages in question, this cannot be admitted, since it contradicts the nature of divine justification to conceive it as advancing from an imperfect to a more and more perfect stage. Even the justification at the last judgment is in itself not more perfect than that by which God in this life absolves the believer from his sins; the distinction consisting only in this, that by the former he obtains salvation as a present blessing, and that in all its fulness, which by the latter was conferred on him as a blessing yet future.¹

The exposition given in the above pages has shown that the idea of the word *δικαιοῦσθαι* with James is none other than what it is with Paul, but that by it James has in view the justification that places believers at the last judgment in the full enjoyment of salvation, whereas Paul denotes by it the justification that puts believers already in this world in a gracious relation toward God. Only on this supposition does James say what he designs to say; for if *δικαιοῦσθαι* (so also *σώζειν*, ver. 14) refers to the judgment of God still in the future for believers, the proof that it has *ἔργα* for its essential condition effectually hits the opponent who thought to be able to obtain *σωτηρία* by an operative faith. — That the doctrine of James so understood is in agreement with that of Paul, follows from the following remarks:—(1) James here evidently says nothing against the Pauline doctrine of justification, since his *ἐξ ἔργων* does not refer to being placed in a new relation to God, of which there is no mention. The inquiry, by what this is conditioned, is not discussed by James in his Epistle at all; yet it is to be observed that to him the foundation of the Christian life is *πίστις*, and that he designates the new birth (chap. i. 18) as a work of God, which only takes

¹ It is incorrect when Hengstenberg says: "If by faith is understood genuine living faith, and by works genuine works proceeding from faith, justification by faith and justification by works can be taught without contradiction;" since the justification of which Paul speaks is the reason and not the consequence of works of faith: on which account even Riggenbach ("On Justification," etc., in the *Stud. u. Krit.*,

1868, Part II.) has not been able to approve of this assertion of Hengstenberg. It is also no less incorrect when Hengstenberg, in spite of *ἐξ ἔργων . . . οὐκ ἐκ πίστεως μόνον*, ver. 24, thinks that "in James also faith alone is represented as justifying," since James does not give the name of justification to God's act of grace which is effectual in man only through faith.

place through the will of God, and indeed so that God implants the word of truth in man. That James in this asserts something which is not in contradiction, but in agreement with Paul's doctrine of justification, requires no proof. (2) The doctrine of Paul concerning the future judgment of believers does not conflict with what James says of *δικαιοῦσθαι*, although he does not use that expression in reference to it (except in Rom. ii. 13). It is to be observed, that Paul very definitely distinguishes the justifying act of God, by which the forgiveness of sins is adjudged to the believer for the sake of Christ, from the judicial act of God by which *σωτηρία* will either be adjudged or denied to the justified. Justification (so called by Paul) is conditioned on the part of man only by *πίστις*; the future *σωτηρία* will only be adjudged to him in whom *πίστις* has proved itself to be a working principle. As, on the one hand, it is incorrect to affirm that, according to Paul, he only is justified by *πίστις* with whom it does not remain inactive; so, on the other hand, it is incorrect to think that according to him no reference is taken of *ἔργα* in the judgment of God.¹ Wiesinger, in proof that Paul denies the *justifying* (the word taken in his sense) efficacy of an inoperative faith, adduces the passages, Rom. viii. 4, 13, xiii. 8-10; 1 Cor. vi. 7-11, 13; Gal. v. 6, 19-21; Eph. ii. 8-10; Col. i. 10; Tit. ii. 14; but it is, on the contrary, to be observed that in none of these passages (except Eph. ii. 8, in the words *ἔστε σεσωσμένοι διὰ τῆς πίστεως*) is the discourse of being justified (*δικαιοῦσθαι*, in the sense of Paul). All these passages, however, prove that Paul makes the attainment of *σωτηρία*, or the *future* inheritance of the kingdom of God, conditioned on the *ἔργον* of the justified. It is to be observed that in Gal. v. 6, *πίστις δὲ ἀγápης ἐνεργουμένη* does not (as is almost universally assumed) refer to *δικαιοῦσθαι*, but to *ἀπεκδέχεσθαι ἐλπίδα δικαιοσύνης*, thus to the *hope* of those who are *σεσωσμένοι διὰ τῆς πίστεως*. Further, in 1 Cor. vi. 11, the Christians, to whom Paul says *ἀπελούσασθε, ἡγιάσθητε, ἐδικαιώθητε*,² are exhorted to consider that the *ἀδικοὶ* shall not inherit the *βασίλειά Θεοῦ*; also, in Gal. v. 25, it is indicated that the *ζῆν πνεύματι*, which is peculiar to believers, must also be a *στοιχεῖν πνεύματι*; and lastly, Paul, in 2 Cor. v. 10, says expressly that *we* all (that is, Christians who as such are *δικαιωθέντες*) must appear before the judgment-seat of Christ, *ἵνα κομισθῆται ἕκαστος τὰ διὰ τοῦ σώματος πρὸς ἃ ἔπραξεν, εἴτε ἀγαθόν, εἴτε κακόν*. From these passages, which might be greatly multiplied, it is not to be denied that Paul, as he definitely excludes every co-operation of human works in justification,³ so he no

¹ By this it is not intended to be denied that Paul often combines the two acts as *one* act of divine salvation, and also that he frequently refers the final salvation (not less than justification) purely to the *grace* of God. The problem is rather this, that, on the one hand, the final salvation is represented as a pure act of God's grace, but, on the other hand, the final judgment is as definitely represented as an act carried into effect *κατὰ τὰ ἔργα*; as by Paul, so in the Scriptures generally. The solution of this problem, however, belongs not to our present subject.

² By *ἡγιάσθητε* and *ἐδικαιώθητε* a change of man's disposition is not in itself designated, but the change of his relation to God effected by God. Meyer *in loco* incorrectly gives to the word *δικαιοῦσθαι* a meaning (namely, "to be made righteous") which it has elsewhere

neither with Paul nor in any other passage of the N. T.

³ Even with the recognition of this undeniable fact, Paul's doctrine of justification by faith is not always understood in strict precision. This is particularly the case when it is said, that according to Paul faith justifies, so far as it is a principle of new life; whereas it is rather the case that, according to him, *faith is a principle of new life, because it justifies*. Only when this is misunderstood can it be said, on the supposition that Paul and James understand by *δικαιοῦν* the *same* divine act, that between them there is no *fundamental* but only an *inessential* contrast. See remarks of the author in the *Erl. Zeitschr.*, April number, 1882, p. 214 f., where among other things it is said: "The reason of justification is not the ethical nature of faith, but solely and entirely

less definitely represents the future salvation as conditioned by the practice of *ἔργα τῆς πίστεως* (see Hengstenberg, *Evangel. Kirchenztg.*, 1866, p. 1119 ff.).¹ But if this is the case, then in reference to this point there occurs a difference between Paul and James, not in *thought*, but only in *expression*; namely, Paul denotes by the word *δικαιοῦν* that declaration of righteousness or acquittal by God, by which the believer is placed in a new filial relation to God; whilst James means that declaration of righteousness or acquittal by God, by which he who is born again as a child of God receives the *σωτηρία* imparted at the judgment: but with both *δικαιοῦν* means "to declare righteous," "to acquit," but not "to prove one righteous," or "to convert him into a righteous man." So, also, in what both say concerning Abraham, there is no difference in sentiment; the only difference is that *ἐλογίσθη αὐτῷ εἰς δικαιοσύνην* and *ἐδικαιώθη* are considered by James as two points, whilst Paul considers the second to be equivalent to the first.

2. If from what has been said it follows that the doctrine of James is not in contradiction with that of Paul, then every reason for the opinion that James wrote his Epistle with reference to Paul falls to the ground. The employment of the same expressions by both is indeed surprising, but it is to be observed that these expressions have their origin neither in Paul nor in James, but already occur in the O. T. Paul uses the expressions *δικαιούσθαι*, *δικαιοσύνη*, *δικαίωσις*, chiefly in a relation foreign to the O. T., to which, however, he was led by the words *ἐλογίσθη εἰς δικαιοσύνην*. James, on the contrary, uses them not in the application peculiar to Paul, but in the manner in which they are used in the O. T. Also the reference to Abraham by James is not to be explained on the ground that Paul confirms his doctrine of justification by what happened to Abraham; for, since James designed to appeal for his assertion to an O. T. type, it was entirely natural that his glance should first fall on Abraham; also the distinction is to be observed, that James used Abraham only as an example, whereas Paul, as Schleiermacher correctly observes, "referred to him his entire peculiar system of doctrine, whilst he would trace back to him the special covenant of the people with God." — From all this it follows that James neither designed an attack upon the Pauline doctrine itself, for in this case he would have been obliged to demonstrate the necessity of *ἔργα νόμον*, nor also an attack upon a misunderstanding of it, for then he would have been obliged to show that his readers could only regard themselves as *δικαιωθέντες*, when their faith was to them an impulse to the practice of good works;² rather the Pauline doctrine was unknown to him, since otherwise he would necessarily have conformed to Paul's mode of representation. By this likewise the opinion is confirmed, that the composition of the Epistle belongs not to the later, but to the earlier apostolic times; see on this Sec. 4 of the Introduction, and the treatise of Weiss mentioned above; also his *Bibl. Theol.* p. 124 f.

the merit of Christ, or Christ Himself with whom faith, that is, faith in Christ, places us in connection. We are not justified *for the sake* of faith, but *through* faith (*διὰ τῆς πίστεως*) *for the sake* of Christ: thus it holds good for the justification which is by faith alone, that every reference to works is entirely excluded."

¹ The objection of Philippi, that the declaration of righteousness in the judgment takes place not *ἐκ τῶν ἔργων*, but only *κατὰ τὰ ἔργα*,

is contradicted by the word of Christ, Matt. xii. 37.

² How the deductions of James are to be directed against a misunderstanding of the Pauline doctrine, if *δικαιούσθαι* has with him the meaning of "to be proved," is in fact not to be understood, so much the less as the justifying power of faith assuredly does not depend on its being proved by works *before men*.

CHAPTER III.

Ver. 3. Instead of the Rec. *ιδού*, found only in some min., Griesbach has, after C, many min., etc., adopted *ιδε*; however, *εἰ δέ* is to be read, with Lachm., Tisch., Wiesinger, De Wette, and others, after A, B, G, K, \aleph , many min., vss., etc. Not only does the preponderating weight of authorities testify for this, but also its difficulty. — Instead of *πρὸς τὸ πείθεσθαι*, Lachm. and Tisch. (approved by De Wette, Wiesinger, not by Bouman) have adopted *εἰς τὸ π.* (so B, C, \aleph). — Lachm. has retained the Rec. *αὐτοὺς ἡμῖν*, after B, G, K, \aleph , etc.; Tisch., on the contrary, reads *ἡμῖν αὐτοὺς*, after A, C. — Ver. 4. Instead of *σκληρῶν ἀνεμων* (A, G, etc.), Lachm. and Tisch. read *ἀνεμων σκληρῶν*, after B, C, K, \aleph , which, according to authorities, is to be considered as the correct reading. — Ver. 5. Lachm. and Tisch. 7 read *μεγάλα ἀνχεῖ* (A, C*) instead of the Rec. *μεγαλανχεῖ* (Tisch. 2); attested by B, C**, G, K, \aleph , almost all min. — Whether we are to read, with the Rec., *ὀλίγον πῦρ*, or, with Lachm. and Tisch., *ἡλικον πῦρ*, cannot with certainty be decided by authorities, since A*, C*, G, K, etc., are in favor of the former, and A**, B, C, \aleph , of the latter reading. The latter reading, however, merits the preference, as it is not to be understood how *ὀλίγον*, suitable for the thought, should be exchanged for the difficult reading *ἡλικον*; without sufficient reason, Kern, Theile, Wiesinger, Bouman,¹ would retain the reading of the Rec. — Ver. 6. Before the second *ἡ γλώσσα* the Rec., after several min., etc., has *οὕτως*, which already Griesbach considered suspicious, and, after A, B, C, K, \aleph , etc., is according to Lachm. and Tisch. to be erased; it was evidently inserted in order to lighten the difficult construction; also De Wette, Wiesinger, Bouman, and others consider it spurious; Reiche decides otherwise. — After *γενέσεως*, \aleph only has *ἡμῶν*, which is evidently an interpretation. — There is great variation with regard to the sequence of the words *δύναται ἀνθρώπων δαμάσαι* (thus the Rec. after G; retained by Tisch.); B, C, etc., read *δαμάσαι δύναται ἀνθρώπων* (Lachm.), and A, K, \aleph , etc., read *δύναται δαμάσαι ἀνθρώπων*. It is evidently indifferent for the sense. — Instead of the Rec. *ἀκατάσχετον* after C, G, K, etc., probably should be read, with Lachm. and Tisch., *ἀκατιστατον*, after A, B, \aleph , etc. (approved by Wiesinger and Lange, rejected by Reiche and Bouman). — Ver. 9. The Rec. *τὸν Θεόν* after G, K, etc., is to be changed for the better attested reading *τὸν κύριον*, after A, B, C, \aleph , etc., Lachm., Tisch.: the alteration is easily accounted for.² — Ver. 12. According to the Rec. the last clause begins with *οὕτως*, after C**, G, K, \aleph , some min. and vss., which already Griesbach considered suspicious; it is, according to the testimony of A, B, C, to be erased as an insertion. — The words which follow in the Rec. (after G, K, etc.) are *οὐδέμια πηγὴ ἄλυκὸν καὶ γλυκὸ ποιῆσαι*

¹ Bouman thinks that *ἡλικον* arose from the following *ἡλικην*; but it is more correct to assume that even on this account it was changed for the easily understood *ὀλιγον*.

² Bouman erroneously thinks that *Θεόν* was changed for *κύριον* in order that a mention of Christ might once take place.

ὕδωρ. This reading, whose spuriousness was already recognized by Griesbach, is, as a correction for the sake of explanation, to be changed for οὔτε ἄλκων γλυκὺ ποιῆσαι ὕδωρ; attested by A, B, C, etc., and adopted by Griesbach, Lachm., Tisch., and others. \aleph reads οὐδέ. — Ver. 13. Whether after ἐν ὑμῖν a comma is to be placed, see Lachm. and Buttm., or, with Tisch. and the Rec., a note of interrogation, with the explanation of the verse. — Ver. 14. Instead of ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ, \aleph has the plural ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις. — In the same MS. τῆς ἀληθείας instead of after ψεύδεσθε stands after κατακαυχῶσθε. — Ver. 16. After ἐκεῖ, \aleph has inserted καί. — Ver. 17. The καί of the Rec. between ἀδιάκριτος and ἀνυπόκριτος is, according to A, B, C, \aleph , etc., to be erased as an insertion; so also in ver. 18 the article τῆς before δίκαιοσύνης, according to A, B, C, G, K, \aleph , etc.

With chap. iii. James passes to the treatment of a new theme, to which the conduct of the Christians, to whom this Epistle was directed, likewise gave occasion. It is that which was already indicated by βραδύς εἰς τὸ λαλῆσαι in chap. i. 17, and by μὴ χαλιναγωγῶν γλώσσαν αὐτοῦ in chap. i. 26. The more unfruitful faith was in works corresponding to it (especially the works of compassionate love), the more did “the loquacious teaching and ruling of others” (Wiesinger) prevail. Words had taken the place of works. This section, which is closely united with the preceding, treats of this; yet without “any hidden indication contained in it that it was the doctrine of faith which was an object of controversy” (De Wette); for in the whole Epistle there is not the slightest indication of controversies in the churches in question. The fault refers to the same with which Paul in Rom. ii. 17 ff. blames the Jews, only that with these Christians πίστις, which was to them something entirely external, took the place of νόμος. The moral relation was essentially the same. The warning (as in chap. ii. 1) stands first, and the reason assigned for it follows: “*Be not in great numbers teachers, my brethren, considering that we will receive a heavier judgment.*” Calvin, Piscator, Laurentius, Baumgarten, and others arbitrarily refer this warning to the unauthorized judging and condemning of each other; by this explanation the idea διδάσκαλοι does not receive its proper meaning. On the other hand, we are not to think of persons rushing into the proper *munus docendi* (Bede, Semler, Pott, Gebser, Hottinger, Schneckenburger, and others), but on the free teaching in the congregation which was not yet joined to a particular office, but appertained to every one who felt himself called to it. — πολλοὶ belongs not to γίνεσθε (πολλοὶ γίνεσθαι = *multiplicari*, Gen. vi. 1; Schneckenburger), but is either the subject (De Wette, Wiesinger, Bouman) or forms the predicate united with διδάσκαλοι. In the first case, however, γινέσθωσαν would more naturally stand instead of γίνεσθε; also from the second construction a more important thought arises; therefore it is to be explained: “Be not many teachers,” that is: “Be not a multitude of teachers” (Lange). It is inaccurate to explain πολλοὶ = πάντες (Grotius); it is false to explain it = *nimii in docendo* (Baumgarten: “be not excessive, vigorous judges”). The verb γίνεσθε has here the same meaning as in chap. i. 22 — With εἰδότες, κ.τ.λ., James points to the reason of μὴ . . . γίνεσθε; yet εἰδότες being closely joined to the imperative is itself hortatory: *considering*. In the phrase κρῖμα λαμβάνειν, κρῖμα has in the N. T. usage undoubtedly the

meaning *condemnation*; comp. Matt. xxiii. 13 (Mark xii. 40; Luke xx. 47); Rom. xiii. 2; but also elsewhere the word occurs in the N. T. almost entirely in this meaning, which Lange incorrectly denies (see Cremer). Because James includes himself, many expositors have been induced to take *κρίμα* here as *vox media* (so also Lange), but it is to be considered that James does not use this expression as if the sentence of condemnation could not be removed (see chap. ii. 13); only this is evident to him, that the severer (*μείζων*) the condemnation, so much the more difficult is it to be delivered from its execution. The comparative *μείζων* (not = *too great*, Pott) is explained from a comparison with others who are not teachers.

Ver. 2. The reason (*γάρ*) of the preceding; yet not so much of the warning: *μὴ . . . γίνεσθε* (Schneckenburger), — this is conditioned by *εἰδότες, κ.τ.λ.*, — as rather of the thought *μείζων κρίμα ληψόμεθα*; namely, so that the first clause refers only to *κρίμα ληψόμεθα*, and only that which follows to the idea *μείζων*; whilst in the expression *εἰ τις, κ.τ.λ.*, the idea is contained, that as *οὐ πταίειν ἐν λόγῳ* conditions *τελειότης*, sinful man is thus not in a position to bridle the tongue. Brückner incorrectly considers the clause *εἰ τις, κ.τ.λ.*, as the explanatory reason of the directly preceding sentence: “we all offend frequently, for whosoever offends not in word, he only preserves himself from *πολλὰ πταίειν*.” — The words *πολλὰ πταίουμεν ἅπαντες* are to be taken in their widest sense (Wiesinger, Brückner); by *ἅπαντες* (a stronger form than *πάντες*) neither the *διδάσκαλοι* simply are meant, nor is it = *plerique* (Grotius), and *πταίειν* points not expressly to *errores, qui docentibus obvenire possint* (Grotius), or to “speech which is used in teaching” (De Wette), but it comprehends all and every moral error of whatever kind it may be.¹ — *πολλά* is adverbial, as in Matt. ix. 14. — To this first thought that which follows is annexed *ἀσυνδέτως*. — *εἰ τις*; see chap. i. 5, 23, 26 = *οστις*. — *ἐν λόγῳ* is not to be limited to teaching proper (Pott = *ἐν διδασκαλίᾳ*), but is equivalent to *ἐν τῷ λαλήσαι*, chap. i. 19; *ἐν* denotes the sphere within which the *οὐ πταίειν* occurs; otherwise in chap. ii. 10. On *οὐ* after *εἰ*, see on chap. ii. 11. — To *οὗτος τέλειος ἀνὴρ, ἐστι* is to be supplied; *οὗτος* is emphatic; what follows *δυνατὸς, κ.τ.λ.*, is in apposition to *τέλ. ἀνὴρ*; the word *ἀνὴρ* is used here as in chap. i. 8. — The meaning is: Whosoever offends (sins) not in speech, and thus is able to bridle his *tongue*, proves himself thereby to be a perfect man who is able to rule also *the whole body*, that is, all the other members, so that it is subject to his will. James here places the body in opposition to the man “as a relative independent power which offers moral resistance to the will of the Ego” (Wiesinger), which it is his task to bridle. The *καρδία*, indeed, is the fountain of evil deeds (Matt. xv. 19), but the lust which is rooted therein has so thoroughly appropriated *the members* of man, and as it were fixed its dwelling in them (Rom. vii. 23), that they appear as lusty subjects, and may be represented as such in lively concrete language. By such explanations as *ἄλλο τὸ σῶμα*, equivalent to “the whole connection of the actions and changes of man” (Baumgarten), or = *reliquae peccandi illecebrae* (Pott), or = *tota vita*

¹ Brückner correctly asserts, against De Wette, that the subject in *ἅπαντες* has experienced an extension, and that the circumstance

that in what follows *ἐν λόγῳ πταίειν* is particularly brought forward, requires for *πταίειν* here a more universal meaning

(Schneckenburger), the idea lying at the foundation does not receive its full meaning. Even the remark of De Wette, that τὸ σῶμα denotes "not only all organs proper, but even the affections," is not to be retained; on which account Brückner adds: "the latter only in so far as they are expressed by the former." The explanation of Lange is also arbitrary, that the body here denotes the organ and *symbol* of all other modes of human action, with the exception of speech. Laurentius rightly observes: *nihil obstat, quo minus per totum corpus intelligamus caetera corporis nostri membra: manus, pedes, etc.*

Vv. 3, 4. Two comparisons by which the thought εἰ τις ἐν λόγῳ, κ.τ.λ., is illustrated and confirmed. It is incorrect when it is assumed that "James, with vv. 3 and 4, will primarily explain and establish by examples the importance, maintained in ver. 2, of power over a little thing, as the tongue, for the government of the whole" (Wiesinger), and that the *tertium comparationis* is "a little thing does much" (Gunkel); for neither in ver. 2 is the smallness of the tongue mentioned, nor in ver. 3 is the smallness of the bridle brought forward. The examples adduced, which are closely attached to the preceding, are rather designed to prove how by the mastery of the tongue that of the whole body is possible; it is, James will say, even as one rules the horse by the guidance of the bridle, and the ship by the guidance of the helm. Only in the second image does the smallness of that by which the steersman rules the great ship appear to James as something important, so that he dwells upon this point in what follows (so also Lange).

Ver. 3. *But if we put bridles in the mouths of horses, we turn also their whole body.* The clause καὶ ἄλον, κ.τ.λ., forms the apodosis to the protasis beginning with εἰ (Pott, Wiesinger, Brückner, Lange, Bouman). Many expositors incorrectly attach this clause to the protasis, whereby Theile regards ver. 5 as the apodosis belonging to it, whilst others supply a thought as the apodosis; according to De Wette, this thought is, that "the tongue is not so easily tamed as a horse," which is wholly unsuitable.¹—The particle δέ is not, with Theile, to be explained as closely connecting this verse to the following,² for here and in ver. 4 nothing else than a contrast to ver. 2 is to be expressed; it is rather used here even as in chap. ii. 15, simply distinguishing the case adduced for comparison from that for the sake of which it is introduced (Wiesinger). By τῶν ἵππων standing first, the view is at once directed to the object by which the sentiment expressed is to be illustrated (comp. ver 4). The genitive depends not on τοὺς χαλινοὺς (Theile, Lange, and others), but on τὰ στόματα (Oecumenius, Hornejus, Pott, Gebser; Bouman wavers), for on this word the emphasis rests. τοὺς χαλινοὺς points back to χαλῶαγωγῆσαι, ver. 2, by which apparently this image was suggested to James. — On the phrase: εἰς τὰ στόματα βάλλειν, comp. in Aelian: χαλιῶν ἵππων ἐμβάλλειν. — The words εἰς τὸ πείθεσθαι ἡμῖν αὐτοὺς are for the purpose of ac-

¹ Bede supplies: "quanto amplius decet, ut nobis ipsis frenum continentiae in ora mittamus;" Lorinus: "si hoc in equis contingit, simile quid oportet circa linguam procurari;" Hottinger: "eodem modo qui linguam coercere potest, toti corpori facile moderabitur."

² Theile says: "Ita a difficultate linguam moderandi transitus fit ad necessitatem: in memoriam vocatur, exigua saepe esse, quibus ingenta moveantur non solum in bonam (vv. 3, 4), sed maxime etiam in malam partem."

centuating the governing of the horse by the bridle put into its mouth. The apodosis *καὶ ὄλον τὸ σῶμα, κ.τ.λ.*, corresponds to *χαλιναγωγῆσαι καὶ ὄλον τὸ σῶμα, ver. 2.* — *μετάγειν*, in the N. T. only here and in ver. 4, is = *circum-agere*. The *tertium comparationis* lies in *εἰς τὰ στόματα*; for, as Bengel correctly remarks: *in ore lingua est*, and *ὄν πταλεῖν ἐν λόγῳ*, is identical with the bridling of the tongue in the mouth.

Ver. 4. The second comparison is emphatically indicated by *ἰδοῦ. καί* is either *also* or *even so*. Wiesinger prefers the second meaning, which certainly gives to the thought a peculiar emphasis. The participles *ὄντα . . . ἐλαννόμενα* are to be resolved by *although*. Both participial sentences bring forward the difficulty of guiding the ship, in order to cause the power of the small helm to be recognized. It is possible that in the second clause: *καὶ . . . ἐλαννόμενα*, there is an allusion to the lusts moving man (Bede: *venti validi . . . ipsi appetitus sunt mentium*), or “to the temptations (*πειρασμοί*) of the world, coming from without” (Lange). — *σκληρός* is also used of the wind in Prov. xxvii. 16 (so also Aelian, *De Animal.* v. 13, ix. 14; Dio Chrysostom, iii. p. 44 C). — The verb *μετάγεται* united with *τὰ πλοῖα* is the same as in ver. 3. The words *ὑπὸ ἐλαχίστου πηδαλίου* mention by what this guidance takes place. On *ὑπό*, see chap. i. 14. By the addition of *ἐλαχίστου* a new point is introduced which is retained in what follows. The superlative is for the purpose of bringing more strongly forward the smallness of the *πηδάλιον* in contrast to the *great ship* (*τηλικαῦτα ὄντα*). The counterpart is the *little tongue* (ver. 5). — The addition: *whithersoever the desire of the steersman willeth*, is not superfluous; it expresses — in opposition to *ὑπὸ ἀνέμων ἐλαννόμενα* — the free mastery of him who steers the ship, which he exercises over it by means of the helm, and corresponds to *εἰς τὸ πειθεσθαι, κ.τ.λ.*, ver. 3. — *ὄπου* (instead of *ὅποι*, which does not occur in the N. T.) is found also in the classics united with verbs of motion, particularly with *τιθέναι*, but also with *βαίνειν*.¹ By *ὄρη* is not to be understood the external impulse, or “the pressure which the steersman exercises” (Erasmus, Semler, Augusti, Stolz, Pott, Theile, Wiesinger), also not “the course of the navigator kept in action by the helm” (Lange); by both of these interpretations a meaning is imposed upon the word foreign to it. It rather indicates, as in Acts xiv. 5 (see Meier *in loco*), *the eager will, the desire of something*;² thus Bede, Calvin, Grotius, Baumgarten, Gebser, De Wette, and others. — The participle *ὁ ἐθύνων* indicates him who sits at the helm and directs the ship; it is thus not = *ὁ ἐθύντηρ* (Grotius, Pott, Schneckenburger). Luther correctly translates it according to its meaning: “whither he wills who governs it.”³

Ver. 5. Application of the comparison, particularly of the second illustration, *μικρόν* pointing back to *ἐλαχίστου*. — *μεγαλαρχεῖν*, which expresses the contrast to *μικρόν*, is not = *μεγῶλα ἐργάζεσθαι* (Oecumenius, Theophylact, Calvin, Laurentius, Pott, Bouman, and others), for the idea of *doing* is precisely not contained in the word, but it denotes proud conduct in word and behavior, which has for supposition the performance of great things, and is

¹ Sophocles, *Trach.* 40: *κεῖνος ὄπου βέβηκεν*.

² In Plato, *Phil.* p. 35 D, it is used as synonymous with *ἐπιθυμία*.

³ For corresponding passages from the classics, see in Wetstein, Gebser, Theile; particularly Aristotle, *Quaest. Mechan.* ii. 5.

always used in a bad sense. This certainly does not appear to suit *οὕτως*, as in the preceding the discourse is not about talking, on which account Lange prefers the reading *μεγάλα ἀρχεῖ*; but also this expression = "boasteth great things," does not exclude, but includes, that secondary meaning, for why would not James otherwise have written simply *μεγάλα ποιεῖ*? But *οὕτως* is so far not unsuitable, as the performance of great things — as they are spoken of in the foregoing — forms the reason of the boasting of the tongue. On a mere *inanis jactatio* it is not natural here to think. This first clause already points to what follows, where the *destructive* power of the tongue is described. This description begins with a figure: "*What a fire kindles what a forest.*" In justification of the reading *ἡλικον* (instead of *ὀλιγον*), De Wette (with whom Brückner agrees), translating *ἡλικον πῦρ*: "what a *great* fire," observes, "that the burning of the forest is contemplated in its whole extent." But the verb *ἀνάπτει*, as Wiesinger correctly observes, is opposed to this explanation; also this clause forms the transition from the foregoing to what follows, and therefore must still contain the reference to *μικρόν*, which certainly is afterwards laid aside. This does not, however, constrain us to the rejection of the reading *ἡλικον* (against Wiesinger and Bouman), since this word, which indeed chiefly emphasizes greatness, can also be used to give prominence to smallness; see Pape. The older expositors, according to its meaning, correctly explained the *quantus* of the Vulgate by *quantulus*; thus Cajetan., Paes, and others; the same explanation by Lange. If Brückner thinks that it is not appropriate to take *ἡλικον* here in this signification, owing to the following *ἡλικην*, it is on the contrary, to be observed that precisely the opposition of the same word in a different signification is entirely in accordance with the liveliness of the sentiment. — On the use of *ἡλικος* in the interrogative explanatory sense, see A. Buttmann, p. 217 (E. T., 253). Erasmus, Laurentius, Grotius, Baumgarten, Augusti, explain the word *ὕλη* by *materia, lignorum congeries*, as it has in Ecclus. xxviii. 10 the signification of *fuel*; but the image is evidently much more lively and graphic when *ὕλη* is retained in its usual meaning: *forest*.¹

Ver. 6. Application of the image: *Also the tongue is a fire, the world of unrighteousness; the tongue sets itself among our members, as that which defileth the whole body and kindleth the wheel (of life) revolving from birth, and is kindled of hell.* As a (little) fire setteth a forest in conflagration, so also the tongue kindleth the whole life of man. Such is the destructive power of the tongue, that whosoever knows how to bridle it may with truth be called a perfect man (ver. 2). — Several interpreters divide the first clause: *καὶ ἡ γλῶσσα πῦρ, ὁ κόσμος τῆς ἀδικίας*, into two corresponding parts, supplying the idea *ὕλη* to *ὁ κόσμος τῆς ἀδικίας*; thus Morus: *igni respondet lingua, materiae seu silvae respondet mundus improbus*. Manifestly wholly arbitrary; rather the words *ὁ κόσμος τῆς ἀδικίας* form an apposition to *ἡ γλῶσσα*, by which the power of the tongue similar to destructive fire is explained. *κόσμος* has here the same meaning as in LXX., Prov. xvii. 6: *ὄλος κόσμος τῶν χρημάτων*;² thus the mul-

¹ Corresponding descriptions in Homer, *Il.* xi. 155. Pindar, *Pyth.* iii. 66; see also Ecclus. xi. 32. Phllo, *De Migr. Abrah.* 407 A. In

Stobaeus it is said: "*Parva facula cacumen Idae incendi potest.*"

² It is to be observed that the LXX. often

titude comprehending the individual: consequently *ὁ κόσμος τῆς ἀδικίας* is the *fulness of unrighteousness*. The tongue is so called because, as the organ of *ὀργή*, it includes a fulness (not exactly the sum total) of unrighteousness which from it pervades the other members (*ὅλον τὸ σῶμα*). Calvin correctly, according to the sense: *acsi vocaret mare vel abyssum* (Luther, inaccurately: "a world full of wickedness"). This is the explanation of most expositors. Bouman correctly explains the definite article: *famosus iste mundus iniquitatis*. The following are other explanations: (1) Oecumenius takes *κόσμος* = *ornament*, and explains: *ἡ γλῶσσα κοσμεῖ τὴν ἀδικίαν διὰ τῆς τῶν ῥητόρων εὐγλώττου δεινότητος*; similarly Wetstein, Semler, Elsner, Rosenmüller, Storr, Lange¹ (Wahl is doubtful). But *κόσμος* never signifies in an active sense that which puts an ornament on another, but always the ornament itself, that where-with a person adorns himself (or another). (2) Bretschneider likewise takes the word as equivalent to ornament, but supplies *ὡς*, and explains: *ut ornatus (mulierum) inhonestus sc. inquinat mentes, sic lingua deprehenditur inter corporis membra id quod totum corpus inquinat*; yet evidently more arbitrarily than the foregoing explanation. (3) Theile retains the usual meaning of the word *world*, and explains: *lingua (est ignis), mundus (vero est) improbitatis*, i.e., *improbitate plenus, nimirum ob illam ipsam lingue vim*; but apart from the inadmissible supplements rendered necessary, and the harshness contained in this combination of the genitive, this explanation is to be rejected, because by it the words would contain an assertion on the nature of the world, instead of on the nature of the tongue. (4) Estius, indeed, is right in his comprehension of the idea, but he arbitrarily understands it as causative: *quia (lingua) peccata omnigena parit*; so also Herder: "the mainspring and the cause of all unrighteousness." Gebser introduces something foreign into the explanation, taking *κόσμος* = the wicked world. Clericus, Hammond, Eichhorn, Kuinoel, and Hottinger, without any sufficient reason, think that the words are to be expunged from the text as spurious. — Whilst almost all expositors refer *ὁ κόσμος τῆς ἀδικίας* to what precedes (to which, according to the reading of the Rec. which has *οὕτως* before the following *ἡ γλῶσσα*, it necessarily belongs), Tisch. has put a point after *πῦρ* but not after *ἀδικίας*;² and Neander translates: "As a world full of unrighteousness, the tongue is among our members;" so also Lange construes it. But this construction is not only difficult, but isolates too much the first thought *ἡ γλῶσσα πῦρ*, which only has a correct meaning when it is closely connected with what follows. — The new clause accordingly begins with *ἡ γλῶσσα*, and *καθίσταται* has its necessary supplement in what follows: *ἡ σπιλοῦσα, κ.τ.λ. — καθίσταται* can neither here nor in chap. iv. 4 mean *it stands*: the perfect only has this meaning, but not the present; it means: *it sets itself, it appears* (Wiesinger).

translate the Hebrew כֹּסֶם by *κόσμος*; see Gen. ii. 1; Deut. iv. 19, xvii. 3; Isa. xlvii. 21, xl. 26.

¹ Lange, indeed, grants that *κόσμος* is not an active idea, but he yet thinks that we must return to the original signification of the word, and he then explains it: "the tongue is the form of the world, worldliness, or worldly

culture, because it is that which sophistically, etc., gives to unrighteousness its worldly . . . and even splendid form." But is not the idea so explained taken in an active sense?

² Lachmann and Buttmann have, by leaving out the punctuation, left the pointing to the expositor.

Also the explanations are false: "it is so placed" (Pott); *collocata est* (Beza, Piscator, Schneckenburger); "it becomes (such)" (De Wette, appealing to Rom. v. 19), and "it rules" (Lange, appealing to Heb. viii. 3). Theile arbitrarily completes the idea: *haud raro*. The words which follow mention how the tongue appears among the members — *as that which defileth the whole body*. The idea *σπιλοῦν*, to which certainly *πῦρ* is not suited, is suggested by the apposition *ὁ κόσμος τῆς ἀδικίας*. Only with the following participle does James carry on the image of fire; it is artificial to assume in *σπιλοῦν* a reference to it. Bengel: *maculans, ut ignis per fumum*; comp. on this passage Eccles. v. 5. Neither the double *καί* (for how often the several *καί* succeed each other in a simple copulative sense!) nor the omission of the article before the two participles (comp. chap. iv. 11, 14) proves that the participles which follow *καί φλογίζουσα* and *καί φλογιζομένη* are subordinated to *σπιλοῦσα* (Wiesinger). This construction could only be considered as correct if the two participles analyzed the idea *σπιλοῦσα ὄλ. τ. σῶμα* into its individual parts or confirmed it; but neither of these is the case here; they rather add to this idea two new points. The object *τὸν τροχὸν τῆς γενέσεως*, belonging to *φλογίζουσα*, has found very different explanations. The word *τροχός*, according to its etymology, denotes something *running*, and, although used of other rotatory orbs, as particularly of the potter's wheel, it is especially used as a designation of a *wheel*, 1 Kings vii. 30 ff.; Ezek. i. 15, 19, 20. The word *γένεσις* can here be only in the same sense as in chap. i. 23; the compound idea: *the wheel of birth*, i. e., "the wheel revolving from birth," is a figurative designation of human life.¹ Thus Gebser in particular correctly explains it: "the wheel which is set in motion from our birth, i. e., a poetical description of life;" so also Brückner and Bouman. The explanations of Oecumenius,² Calvin, Laurentius, Hornejus, Pott, Neander, amount to the same thing. Also Estius, Grotius, Carpzov, Michaelis, understand life, only deriving this idea in a different manner. They explain *τροχός* (for which Grotius would read *τρόχος*) = *cursus*, *γένεσις* = *natura*, and *cursus naturae* = *vita*; by this explanation, however, the figurative nature of the expression suffers. Wiesinger (with whom Rauch agrees), deviating from this explanation, prefers to understand by it the whole body (*ὅλον τὸ σῶμα*), *τροχός* denoting either the *wheel* (by which, then, *τροχός τ. γεν.* would be the revolving wheel of existence, of life, namely, of that to which the tongue belongs), or (which Wiesinger prefers) the *circumference* (thus *τροχ. τ. γεν.* would be the circumference of being, i. e., the circumference belonging to the tongue from birth, native to it). But, on the one hand, it is not to be supposed that James, after using the *ordinary* expression *ὅλον τὸ σῶμα*, should express the *same thing figuratively* without the least indication of the identity of meaning; and, on the other hand, it is opposed to the *first* interpretation that the *body* is not to be represented as a *wheel*, and to the *second* that *τροχός* is taken in a sense which it never has, for it never means the *circumference*, but at the most the *round* border which encloses something. Other expositors go beyond the restriction of the expression to the life of the individual, —

¹ Comp. Anacreon, *Od.* iv. 7: *τροχὸς ἄρματος γὰρ οἷα βίωτος τρεχει κυλισθείς.*

² *τροχός* ὁ βίος ὡς εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀνελιπτόμενος.

which is evidently required by the foregoing ὅλον τὸ σῶμα,—either, with Wolf, appealing to the Hebrew תִּלְוֵהוּ לְגַלְגַל, explaining it: *indesinens subessio hominum aliorum post alios nascentium* (thus Lambert, Bos, Alberti, Augusti, Stäudlin),¹ or taking τροχός = κύκλος, γένεσις = κτίσις, and accordingly τροχ. τ. γενέσεως = “the circle of creation;” thus De Wette, and among the earlier interpreters Beza (in the edition of 1565), Crusius, Coccejus. All these ideas are foreign to the context. If the first explanation drags something “foreign” into it, the second bears besides “a monstrous character” (Wiesinger). Still less is the explanation of Lange to be justified: “the wheel of the development of life, primarily of the Jewish nation, and then further of all mankind,” since γένεσις never denotes *development of life*.

The following are other explanations which are refuted by their arbitrariness and rarity: (1) that of Semler, who explains it *ordo generandi*, according to the expression occurring in Plutarch: ποταμὸν τῆς γενέσεως ἐνδὲλεχῶς; (2) that of Bengel: “rota sive sphaera superior est ipsa natura humana rationalis; gehenna vero est pars profundior cor; lingua in medio ex inferioribus inflammatur et superiora inflammat;” (3) that of Meyer (*Observatt. ad Ep. Jacobi*), who takes the expression = *sanguinis orbis seu circulato*; lastly, (4) that of Kypke, who assumes that the *rota poenalis* is figuratively meant, *cujus radiis illigabantur rei*, and that accordingly φλογίζειν τὸν τροχ. τ. γενέσεως means: *augere vitae hujus cruciatus*.

The verb φλογίζειν is in the N. T. ἄπ. λεγ.; in the LXX. it is found in Exod. ix. 24; Num. xxi. 14; Ps. xcvi. 3, and other places. The figurative expression, which refers back to πῦρ, indicates the fatal effect which the tongue, from which the pollution of the whole body proceeds, exercises on the life of man, whilst it pervades the same by its passionate heat. James so presents it, that being ὁ κόσμος τῆς ἀδικίας, and thus concentrating in itself (or in word) a fulness of unrighteousness, it forms, as it were, the axle round which the wheel of life moves, and by which it is set on fire. Morus incorrectly understands φλογίζειν “*de damnis, quae lingua dat;*” but the discourse is not concerning the injury which man suffers, but concerning his moral conduct; still less corresponding is the explanation of Michaelis, according to which φλογίζειν = to inflame, and that in the words of James the thought is contained: “*lingua saepe alii excitantur, ut insano studio mala ingrediantur.*” The representation that the tongue defiles the whole body and sets the life on fire is, as Wiesinger correctly remarks, not to be justified by the remark that all sins have their foundation in the sins of the tongue, but rests on the observation that ὀργή, before it manifests itself in other ways, first and foremost appears in word, and thus the tongue is its most direct organ.² The second participial sentence states whence the tongue receives

¹ Already the Syriac version translates: “*incendit proventus generationum nostrarum, quae currunt sicut rotae.*”

² The view that James considered the tongue as the source of *all* sin is erroneous, since he, however prominently he brings forward the

destructive power of the tongue, yet never asserts this. The restriction to ὀργή is justified by the Epistle itself. See I. 19, 20, 26, II. 9, 10, 13 (the opposite ἐν πρᾶντητι σοφίας), 14, etc. According to this, in this edition the text in some places has been rectified.

this destructive power (φλογίζειν), by which also the idea that it is κόσμος τῆς ἀδικίας finds its justification. The participle φλογιζομένη is to be retained in the sense of the *present*; it has neither the meaning of the *perfect*, as if the tongue had been only once set on fire by γεέννα, nor is it, with Grotius, Mill, Benson, Semler, Storr, Rosenmüller, to be taken as *future*, and to be referred to future punishment. The expression γεέννα, except in the Synoptics, is only found here; in Matt. v. 22, xviii. 9, Mark ix. 47, it is used for a more exact description of the genitive τοῦ πυρός. The thought that the tongue is set on fire of hell is not to be explained away either by *ex inferno* being paraphrased by Theile by *igne diabolico*, and this by *igne foedissimo ac funestissimo*; or by being explained with Morus: *tantus est ille ignis, ut ex geennae igne VIDEATUR esse incensus*. James means that as ἐπιθυμία (or more precisely ὀργή), whose most direct organ is the tongue, has its origin from the devil, it is thus from hell (see ver. 15). Also in the O. T. the injurious effects of the tongue are described; see Ps. lii. 4, cxx. 3, 4, Prov. xvi. 27, and other passages (Ecclus. v. 13 ff., xxviii. 11 ff.); yet in all these passages the discourse is only on the evil which is inflicted by it on others, or on the punishment which befalls the man who misuses it. This peculiar thought of James has its counterpart in no passage of the O. T.

Vv. 7, 8. In these verses the untamable power of the tongue is adduced. The particle γάρ here indicates neither simply the transition (Pott), nor is it to be referred to μεγαλανυχῆ (Wiesinger), separated from it by vv. 5, 6, nor only to the last thought, φλογιζομένη, κ.τ.λ. (Lange); but it is used as a logical particle, whilst the truth expressed in these verses substantiates the judgment contained in vv. 5, 6. The relation of these two verses to each other is, that ver. 8 contains the principal thought, and ver. 7, on the other hand, a thought subordinate to it, which is only added in order to make that thought more emphatic. The meaning is: Whereas man tames all animals, yet he cannot tame the tongue. By φύσις is to be understood not the genus (Augusti, Gebser, Bretschneider, Schneckenburger), but the *qualitas naturalis*, and in such a manner that James has in view not the relation of the *individual* man to the *individual* beast, but the relation of *human nature* to *animal nature* in general, however this may differ in the different kinds of animals. The totality of beasts is expressed by four classes, which are arranged in pairs, namely, *quadrupeds and birds, creeping beasts and fishes*. — θηρία are not “beasts generally” (Pott), nor specially “wild beasts” (Erasmus, Vatablus, Piscator, Baumgarten, Theile, Bouman). — τὰ ἔρπετά are neither terrestrial animals generally (Pott, Hottinger), nor only serpents (Luther, Calvin, Grotius, and others), but it is used here in the same meaning as in Gen. i. 24, 25 (LXX. ἔρπετά, as the translation of שָׂרָפָה); see Acts x. 12; Rom. i. 23. — ἐνώλια (ἄπ. λεγ.) denotes either fish simply, or likewise all worms living in the water; Luther incorrectly translates it “sea wonders,” and Stier “sea monsters.” There is here the same classification as in Gen. ix. 2 in the LXX. (which may have been before the mind of James).¹ The dominion of human nature over the brute creation is expressed by the verb

¹ τὰ θηρία τῆς γῆς, τὰ πετεινά τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, τὰ κινούμενα ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, οἱ ἰχθύεις τῆς θαλάσσης.

δαμάζειν (i.e., so to subdue, that what is subdued submits to the will of the subduer), because it supposes the subjection of something resisting (see Mark v. 4). That James only thought on *wild* animals does not follow from this. The perfect δαμάσται is added to the present δαμάζεται in order to represent the present taming as that which had already taken place in the past. It is incorrect to resolve δαμάζεται into δαμάζεσθαι δύναται (Hottinger, Schneckenburger), for it treats not only of the possibility, but of the actuality. — τῇ φύσει τ. ἄνθρ. is not the dat. *commodi*, but the dative used with the passive, instead of the construction with ὑπό. φύσις has the same meaning as before; accordingly not *ingenii solertia* (Hornejus, Hottinger, Schneckenburger).

Ver. 8. The chief thought is marked by δέ, as a contrast to the foregoing. With τὴν γλῶσσαν is meant not the tongue of *others* (Estius, Grotius, Hornejus, Baumgarten), but one's *own* tongue (according to Lange, both are indicated, the last primarily). The remark of Bengel is also unsuitable: *nemo alius, vix ipse quisque*. The words οὐδεις δύναται ἀνθρώπων δαμάζειν (or more correctly, after B, C: οὐδεις δαμάσαι δύναται ἀνθρώπων, because the accent is on δαμάσαι) are to be understood in all their sharpness; the weakening completion of the *Schol.* in Matthaei: ἐνκόλως δηλαδὴ καὶ ἀνευ πόνου, is false. By this thought, what was said in ver. 2 now receives its full light. The moral earnestness of the author urges him at the close to the exclamation: ἀκατάστατον κακόν, κ.τ.λ.; hence the independent form of this addition (see Winer, p. 471 [E. T., 532]). By ἀκατάστατον (*unsteady, restless*, see chap. i. 8) the unrest of the passions is indicated, not simply with reference to what follows, *unsteadfastness* (De Wette).¹ This reading is to be preferred to that of the Rec. ἀκατάσχετον (not to be tamed), "because it adds a new idea after οὐδεις δαμάσαι δυν. ἄνθρ." (Wiesinger). — The image of the poisonous serpent lies at the foundation of the second exclamation: μεστὴ τοῦ θανατηφόρου; comp. Ps. cxl. 4.

Vv. 9, 10, are closely connected with the foregoing; but not as if "the unsteadfastness of the tongue is further described" (De Wette), nor as if the duplicity of the tongue is added as a new point (Lange), but for the purpose of prominently showing how the tongue, although it praises God, yet proves itself to be an ἀκατάστατον κάκον, μεστὴ τοῦ θανατ. It is to be observed that this expression, as the first person plural shows, refers to Christians among whom the εὐλογεῖν τὸν κύριον occurs. James does not hesitate to include himself, knowing that naturally he was entirely the same as others.² James first places beside each other, by a simple copulative conjunction, the two contradictory acts which man performs by the tongue, namely, the εὐλογεῖν τὸν κύριον and the καταρᾶσθαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. The preposition ἐν is instrumental, as in Luke xxii. 29 and elsewhere. By the repetition of ἐν αὐτῇ in

¹ Comp. Hermas, *Past. ii. Mand. 2*: πονηρὸν πνευμά ἐστιν ἡ καταλαλία, καὶ ἀκατάστατον δαιμόνιον.

² Lange finds a difficulty in James including himself, "which is to be solved either by taking the second clause as a question expressive of surprise, or by hearing James speak as

the representative of his people in the name of the guilty people." But both suppositions are equally impossible; the context contradicts the first, and the fact that James could have no reason to consider himself as the representative of the Jewish people contradicts the second.

the second clause, the antithesis is yet more strongly marked. *εὐλογεῖν* and *καταρῶσθαι* are correlate expressions, since the former, as the translation of the Hebrew בָּרַךְ, has properly the meaning "to bless;" in reference to God, as here, it means *laudibus celebrare*, to praise; comp. Ps. cxlv. 21, and other passages. — The combination of *τὸν κύριον καὶ πατέρα* (instead of the Rec. *τὸν Θεὸν κ. π.*) as a designation of God (for by *κύριος* is not here to be understood Christ) is unusual; comp. chap. i. 27. This twofold name designates God on the side of His power and on the side of His love (comp. Matt. xi. 25). — In the second clause the important description: *τοὺς καθ' ὁμοίωσιν Θεοῦ γεγυότας*, is annexed to *τοὺς ἀνθρώπους*, by which the contradiction of the action described still more pointedly appears. The thought and expression agree with Gen. i. 26. Also, according to this, sinful man is still a being created after the image of God. Were the expression merely to be referred to what man originally was, but which he has ceased to be, the point of James's saying would be broken. Bengel correctly observes: *remanet nobilitas INDELE-VILIS*. Benson, Pott, Gebser, and Semler arbitrarily restrict the contents of this verse to the conduct of those who set themselves up as teachers.¹

Ver. 10. First a repetition of the saying in brief expressive combination, by which the accent is placed on *αὐτοῦ*. With the words *οὐ χρὴ ταῦτα οὕτως γίνεσθαι*, James adds the condemnation of the conduct described. — The impersonal verb *χρῆ* is in the N. T. *ἅπ. λεγ.*; the usual word is *δεῖ*, from which it does not differ in meaning. — *ταῦτα οὕτως*]. The union of these two words serves for the sharpening of the idea; *ταῦτα* designates the contents; *οὕτως*, the form of the action; incorrectly, Bengel: *ταῦτα bona; οὕτω adjunctis malis*.

Ver. 11. Illustration of the unnaturalness of the conduct mentioned by an image taken from nature: *Does the fountain from the same hole send forth the sweet and the bitter? — ἡ πηγὴ*]. The article is not here for the sake of liveliness (Schneckenburger: *articulus fontem quasi ante oculos pingui*), but is used because *πηγὴ* is generically considered. — *ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς ὀπής*]. *ὀπή*, the hollow, Heb. xi. 38, Exod. xxxiii. 22, Obad. ver. 3, is here the hole from which the water of the fountain streams forth. *ἡ πηγὴ* refers to man; *ἡ ὀπή*, to the mouth. The chief accent is on *αὐτῆς*, which points back to *ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ στόματος*, ver. 10. — *βρῦειν*, an *ἅπ. λεγ.*, properly to sprout forth, then to overflow, is here used transitively, *to cause to flow forth*. — *τὸ γλυκὺ* and *τὸ πικρὸν* indicate, indeed, the two different kinds of *water*, yet linguistically *τὸ ἕδωρ* is not to be supplied; the former refers to *εὐλογεῖν*, and the latter to *καταρῶσθαι*. With this verse James says only that happens not in nature, which occurs in the case of man, out of whose mouth proceed blessing and cursing. The following verse first expresses the impossibility.

Ver. 12. This verse shows, by examples taken from nature, that from *one* principle opposite things cannot be produced, but that any cause can only bring forth that which corresponds to its nature. Semler incorrectly paraphrases the first question: *μὴ δύναται σκῆ ἐλαίας ποιῆσαι: an fieri potest, ut*

¹ Semler's view is very strange: "hi inter publicas Del laudes, etiam execrationes et tristia omnia praeibant in Romanis!" It is equally a mistake when Lange refers the ex-

pression chiefly to Christians, and specially to Jewish Christians, "in whom the likeness of God, that is, the actuality and visibility of the image, has re-appeared."

ficus, cujus est DULCIS natura, producat AMARAS oleas; for that here the contrast of sweet and bitter (which only the last clause of the verse resumes) is not designed to be expressed, is evident from what immediately follows: ἡ ἀμπελος σῦκα, where James would otherwise have mentioned the olive instead of the vine. The idea is, rather, that nothing can bring forth that which is not corresponding to its nature.¹ Consequently the opinion of De Wette, that here *thistles* (according to Matt. vii. 16), or something similar, instead of ἀμπελος, would be more appropriate, is incorrect. — To the question follows as its conclusion the negative clause: οὔτε ἄλυκόν γλυκὺ ποιῆσαι ὕδωρ, which is so construed as if the former sentence, not only in meaning, but also in form, was a negative one; οὔτε (N: οὐδέ) and the omission of δύναται are thus to be explained.² — ἄλυκόν is the subject, and γλυκὺ ὕδωρ the object; ποιῆσαι is used in the same signification as before; thus: *Nor can bitter bring forth sweet water.* The opposite ideas ἄλυκόν and γλυκὺ are emphatically placed beside each other. James hereby indicates, that if from *one* mouth the bitter (namely, the κατάρρα) and also the sweet (namely, the εὐλογία) proceed, this is not only morally reprehensible, to which ver. 10 points, but is something *impossible*; accordingly, the person who curses man, who is made after the image of God, cannot also bless (praise) God, and that thus, if the mouth yet express both, the εὐλογεῖν can only be mere seeming and hypocrisy (Lange).³

Ver. 13. With this verse apparently begins a new section, which, however, stands in close connection with the warning in ver. 1, whilst the true wisdom is here contrasted with the false wisdom of which the readers boasted, and by which they considered themselves qualified to teach. Also here in the words, *τις σοφὸς καὶ ἐπιστήμων ἐν ὑμῖν*, the chief point is again placed at the beginning. These words are usually understood as a direct question (Tischendorf and Winer, p. 152 [E. T., 169]); on the other hand, Lachmann has only placed a comma after ὑμῖν, which is approved by Al. Buttman (p. 217 [E. T., 252]); an *inversio structuræ* then here takes place; whilst “the direct interrogative form, owing to the construction which follows, passed naturally over into the meaning of the kindred relative clause.” Certainly in the N. T. the direct question is frequently used instead of the indirect, indeed instead of the relative pronoun; also in the usual meaning “the disruption of the clauses, as well as the asyndetic transition to δεῖξάτω without any subject,” is surprising. But, on the other hand, the discourse

¹ Comp. Arrian, *Epikt.* ii. 20: πῶς γὰρ δύναται ἀμπελος μὴ ἀμπελικῶς κενεῖσθαι ἀλλ’ ἐλαϊκῶς, ἢ ἐλαία πάλιν μὴ ἐλαϊκῶς ἀλλ’ ἀμπελικῶς; ἀμύχανον, ἀδιανόητον; comp. also Plut., *De Tranq. An.* p. 472 E.

² Buttman (p. 315 [E. T., 367]), following Lachmann, *praef.* p. xlviv., assumes a corruption of the passage.

³ Gunkel incorrectly thinks that ver. 12 only discloses the unnaturalness of the conduct denounced in ver. 10, for μὴ δύναται evidently expresses *impossibility*. It is also to be observed, that in the last clause of ver. 12

ἄλυκόν (ὕδωρ) is considered as the fountain which cannot bring forth γλυκὺ ὕδωρ, and accordingly points to the bitter disposition, from which only that which is bitter (namely, the bitter κατάρρα), but not that which is sweet (namely, the εὐλογία), can proceed. Lange correctly observes, “that the multiplying of examples has the effect of illustrating the general application of the law of life here laid down;” but he strangely supposes that “the individual examples have a symbolical meaning;” the fig-tree, the symbol of a luxurious natural life; the olive, the symbols of spiritual life, etc.

by the direct question evidently gains in liveliness, as it is, moreover, peculiar to the diction of James; see, however, *Ecclus. vi. 34*, to which Schneckenburger appeals in support of the incorrect opinion that *τις* is here the indefinite pronoun. — *σοφός καὶ ἐπιστήμων*]. The same combination of these two words is found in *Deut. i. 13, iv. 6, LXX.*, as the translation of the Hebrew *יָדָן וְדָן*; comp. also *Hos. xiv. 9*. If James here considered these two synonymous ideas as different, *σοφός* is to be referred to the general, and *ἐπιστήμων* to the particular. Wiesinger refers the former to the intelligence, and the latter to the practical insight into the correct judgment of any given case; others differently. — That whosoever is actually wise is to show it by action, is the chief thought of the following sentence. The construction of *δείξω* with *ἐκ* and the object following on it, reminds us of *chap. ii. 18: δείξω ἐκ τῶν ἔργων μου τὴν πίστιν*, but the relation is not entirely the same. In that passage *πίστις* is the invisible, which is to manifest itself as the visible by *ἔργα*; but here both *ἡ καλῆ ἀναστροφή* and *τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ* are visible; the former is the general, the latter is the particular, which as individual special manifestations proceed from it. The verb *δείκνυμι* means here, as there, not to *prove* or *demonstrate*, but to *show*. The addition *ἐν πραύτητι* — which is to be connected neither with *τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ* nor with *τῆς καλῆς ἀναστροφῆς*, forming *one* idea, but belongs to *δείξω*, more exactly defined by *ἐκ τῆς . . . αὐτοῦ* — has the principal accent, as *πραύτης σοφίας*, i. e., the meekness springing from wisdom, and therefore peculiar to it (opposite of *ὀργή*), is the necessary condition under which the showing forth of works out of a good conversation alone is possible. The mode in which the individual ideas of the sentence are united together is certainly somewhat surprising, but it is explainable from the fact that James placed together all the points which occurred to him as briefly as possible. James might have put *τὴν σοφίαν αὐτοῦ* as the object belonging to *δείξω*; but instead of this he puts *τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ*, in conformity with the importance which works have to him, in which as faith (*ii. 10*) so also wisdom manifests itself. He then makes the idea *σοφία* to follow in the adverbial addition *ἐν πραύτητι σοφίας*. The sentence might also be divided by a point after *ἀναστροφῆς*; then the first clause would mean: *let him show it out of a good conversation*; and the second clause might either be taken as an addition dependent on *δείξω* (so Neander: “works performed in meekness suitable to wisdom”), or a verb would have to be supplied. However, the detachment of the second clause decides against this construction. *ὡς σοφῶ* is not, with Schneckenburger, Theile, Wiesinger, to be supplied to *αὐτοῦ*, as the reference to wisdom is contained in the additional clause; but also *αὐτοῦ* must not be referred to *σοφός* (his works, that is, of the wise man), but it refers to the subject contained in *δείξω* (thus Lange and Brückner). The whole idea *πραύτης σοφίας* is neither to be resolved into *πραεὶα σοφία* (Beza, Grotius, Baumgarten, Semler, Gebser, Hottinger, Schneckenburger), nor into *πραύτης σοφῆ* (Laurentius), but to be explained: “the meekness which is proper to wisdom, and proceeds from it” (Wiesinger), or “in which *σοφία* evidences itself” (Lange).¹ With the emphasis on *πραύτης*

¹ Luther inaccurately translates the passage: “who shows with his good conversation his works in meekness and wisdom.”

James passes on to *βραδὺς εἰς ὄργην* (chap. i. 29), of which what follows is a further explication.

Ver. 14. As meekness belongs to wisdom, so he who has in his heart *ζήλος πικρός* and *ἐριθεία* boasts of wisdom without any right. As this was the case with his readers, James now directly addresses them: *εἰ δὲ . . . ἔχετε*]. To *ζήλος*, *zeal*, — which is here, as frequently, used in a bad sense, — is added the adjective *πικρός* for the sake of strengthening it, perhaps with reference to vv. 11 and 12 (Grotius, Pott, Gebser). — *ἐριθεία* has in the N. T. the meaning controversial spirit, or, more definitely, *partisanship*; comp. Rom. ii. 8; 2 Cor. xii. 20 (see Meyer on both passages); Gal. v. 20; Phil. i. 17, ii. 3; in 2 Cor. xii. 20 and Gal. v. 20, *ζῆλοι* and *θυμοί* are united together as plurals. — *ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ ὑμῶν*], in contrast with the *word* of his readers, boasting of their wisdom. — In the apodosis: *μὴ κατακαυχᾶσθε καὶ ψεύδεσθε κατὰ τῆς ἀληθείας*, neither the first nor the second verb is to be converted into a participle; certainly *κατὰ* in the first verb refers to *κατὰ τῆς ἀληθ.*, and so far already contains the idea of lying, but James designed prominently to bring forward this, and therefore he adds *καὶ ψεύδεσθε το κατακαυχᾶσθε*. On *κατακαυχᾶσθε*, comp. chap. ii. 13 (see Winer, p. 417 [E. T., 470, note 3]). In *κατακαυχᾶσθε* the reference is to others, in *ψεύδεσθε* to one's own conscience (Lange). In order to avoid the tautology in *ψεύδεσθε* and *κατὰ τ. ἀληθείας*, Wiesinger understands by *ἀληθεία* "truth in an objective Christian sense — the Christian truth, by the possession of which they fancied themselves σοφοί."¹ But, on the contrary, it is to be considered that that which, logically considered, appears as mere tautology, receives another import, when not only the understanding but also the disposition is recognized as a factor of the construction; so it is here.²

Ver. 15. The character of the *σοφία* from which bitter zeal and partisanship proceed. — *οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτὴ ἡ σοφία*]. *αὐτὴ* is not to be separated from *ἡ σοφία*, but forms along with it the subject. Luther incorrectly translates: "for this is not the wisdom," etc. By *αὐτὴ ἡ σοφία* is meant that wisdom by which man has *ζῆλον πικρόν* in his heart, or that from which it springs; the predicate to it is: *οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνωθεν κατερχομένη*. — *οὐκ ἔστιν* emphatically precedes, and the participle takes the place of an adjective (De Wette, Wiesinger, Winer, p. 313 [E. T., 350]). Gebser, Pott, Schneckenburger, incorrectly explain *ἔστιν κατερχομένη* = *κατέρχεται*. On the idea *ἄνωθεν κατερχ.*, comp. chap. i. 17. — As an *ungodly* wisdom it is characterized by three adjectives which form a climax: *ἐπίγειος, ψυχικὴ, δαμονιώδης*. — *ἐπίγειος* expresses the sharpest contrast to *ἄνωθεν κατερχομένη*, that wisdom being designated as such which belongs not to heaven, but to *earth*. That it is *sinful* ("taking root in a whole life of sin," Kern, Wiesinger) is not yet expressed. James calls it *ψυχικὴ*, inasmuch as it belongs not to the *πνεῦμα*, but, in contrast to it, to the earthly life of the soul; see Meyer on 1 Cor. ii. 14, and author's explanation of Jude 19. These two first ideas are abstractly not of an ethical character, but they become so by being considered in contrast to the heavenly and the

¹ According to Lange, the theocratic truth is to be understood which the Jewish zealots professed to protect.

² Compare, moreover, Isocrates, *De Pace*, p. 165: *διαψεύδεσθαι τῆς ἀληθείας*.

spiritual. It is otherwise with the third idea: *δαμονιώδης*. This word (*ἄπ. λεγ.*) = *devilish*, betokens both the origin and the nature, and is to be taken not in a figurative, but in its literal sense; comp. ver. 6, chap. iv. 7; incorrectly, Hottinger: *impuro genio magis quam homine digna*.¹

Ver. 16. Reason of the judgment expressed in ver. 15. With the introductory words: *ὅπου γὰρ ζήλος καὶ ἐριθεία*, James points back to ver. 14; with the following words: *ἐκεῖ, κ.τ.λ.*, he names the fruit of *ζήλος* and *ἐριθεία*; these are *ἀκαταστασία* and *πάν φαῦλον πῦγμα*; *ἀκαταστασία* is uproar, disorder.² An uproarious, disorderly nature proceeds not from God: *οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀκαταστασίας ὁ Θεός, ἀλλ' εἰρήνης*, 1 Cor. xiv. 33. — To this special idea, which is particularly brought forward on account of the condition of those to whom James writes, the general idea: *every evil deed*, is added, in order to lay stress on the fact that zeal and partisanship bring along with them the corruption of the whole moral life. Of a wisdom which effects this, that must naturally hold good which is said of it in ver. 15. — The supposition of Kern,³ to which De Wette assents, that the here presupposed controversies between Jewish and Gentile Christians are alluded to, is properly rejected by Brückner.

Ver. 17. The character of the true wisdom, which (in contrast to ver. 15) is designated as *ἡ ἀνωθεν σοφία*. Comp. with this expression, Prov. ii. 6; Wisd. of Sol. vii. 25, 26; Philo, *De Profug.*, p. 571: *σοφία ἀνωθεν ὁμυρηθεῖσα ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ; De Nom. Mut.*: *οὐράνιος σοφία. — πρῶτον μὲν ἀγνή ἐστίν*]. By *πρῶτον μὲν* this characteristic is distinguished from the rest, which are introduced by *ἔπειτα*, because it belongs to its nature, "designates its *internal quality*" (Kern). It is *ἀγνή*, i. e., *καθαρὰ καὶ ἀνπαρὸς, μηδενὸς τῶν σαρκικῶν ἀντεχομένη* (Oecumenius); thus free from all impurity. Lange explains *ἀγνή* by *consecrated*, incorrectly according to N. T. usage; even in the classics, the reference to the gods sufficiently often steps into the background. — In the series of characteristics following after *ἔπειτα*, which describe *σοφία* according to its *manifestations* (Kern), the first three are named which indicate the contrasts to *ζήλος* and *ἐριθεία*: *εἰρηνική, peaceful* (comp. *εἰρηνοποιός*, Matt. v. 9): *ἐπιεικής, fair, mild*; see on 1 Tim. iii. 3 (not = *yielding*): *ἐνπειθής, ἄπ. λεγ.* (opposite *ἀπειθής*, Tit. iii. 5): *easy to persuade*, that is, *pliant*, not contending in party strife. — Then follows *μεστὴ ἐλέους καὶ καρπῶν ἀγαθῶν*, by which it is described as rich in active love: *ἐλέους* is particularly mentioned, because compassion is the most direct proof of love; comp. chap. i. 27, ii. 13; *καρπῶν ἀγαθῶν* forms the contrast to *πάν φαῦλον πῦγμα*. — The series closes with two words — united by similarity of sound — *ἀδύκριτος, ἀνυπόκριτος*, which express the contrast to every thing of an uncertain and hypocritical nature. *ἀδύκριτος* is differently explained according to the different meanings of the root *διακρίνεσθαι*: Luther renders it *impartial*; Lorinus, Hornejus, Grotius ("sine partitione, nempe ini-

¹ The explanation of Hornejus contains arbitrary statements: "*terrena, quia avaritiæ dedita est, quæ operibus terrenis inhæret; animalis, quia ad animi lubricitates accomodat; daemoniaca, quod ambitioni et superbiæ servit, quæ propria diaboli vitia sunt;*" and equally so that of Lange, who finds here characterized "Judaistic and Ebionite zealotism,"

and refers *ἐπιγ.* to "the chilastic claims to the dominion of the earth." Without any justification, Schwegler finds here an allusion to the wisdom of the Gnostics.

² Comp. Prov. xxvi. 28; *στόμα ἄστεγον ποιεῖ ἀκαταστασίας.*

³ *Tüb. Zeitschr.*, 1835, ii. 59.

qua"), Baumgarten, Estius, Schulthess, Hottinger, Kern, Schneckenburger, Lange ("not separatistic, not sectarian"), and others understand it in the same sense; Beza explains it by "*quae non discernit homines;*" similarly Gebser *undivided*, that is, those who have the true wisdom do not separate from each other; the explanation of Pott: *pacificus*, agrees with this; the Vulgate, on the other hand, renders it *non judicans*; and Semler: *nec temere judicans de aliis Christianis, qui suo more vivunt*. It is best to start from the meaning of *διακρίνεσθαι* as it occurs in the N. T., to *doubt*, and accordingly, with De Wette and Wiesinger, to take *ἀδιάκριτος* = *expers omnis cujuscunque ambiguitatis et dubitationis* (similarly Wetstein = *non duplex*).¹ *ἀνυπόκριτος* is *unhypocritical, upright*; see Rom. xii. 9; 2 Cor. vi. 6. — These two characteristics are also added with special reference to the state of things among the readers. On *ἀδιάκριτος*, see chap. i. 6–8, ii. 4; on *ἀνυπόκριτος*, chap. i. 22, 26, ii. 1. — All the characteristics are attributed to true wisdom from the effects which it produces among those who are partakers of it; since it *makes* them pure, peaceable, etc.; the virtues of which it is the source belong to it.

Ver. 18. As in ver. 16 the fruit of *ζῆλος*, and thus of false wisdom on which it is founded, is named, so in this verse is the fruit of true wisdom, which is *εἰρηνική*. — *καρπὸς δικαιοσύνης . . . σπείρεται* is a pregnant expression for: *the seed, which yields the fruit of righteousness, is sown* (Wiesinger, Bouman, Lange). *δικαιοσύνη* is not justification (Gebser, Schneckenburger), but *righteousness or uprightness*. The genitive is that of apposition, and announces wherein the *καρπὸς* consists. This *καρπὸς δικαιοσύνης* forms the antithesis to *ἀκαταστασία καὶ πᾶν φάλλον πύγμα*, ver. 16. *δικαιοσύνη* is by various expositors incorrectly referred to the future life. — *σπείρεται* is to be retained in its literal meaning, from which there is no reason to depart, when the pregnant form of the expression is kept in view. Brückner converts the idea without justification into that of dispersing, i. e., of profuse spending; Pott falsely explains *σπείρεται* by *δεῖ σπείρεσθαι*. The sower is not to be considered as God (Brückner), for from the whole context the discourse is not concerning the conduct of God, but of the Christian. The addition *ἐν εἰρήνῃ* is not to be combined with *καρπὸς δικαιοσύνης* (Rauch) or with *δικαιοσύνης* (Kern: righteousness before God, which manifests itself in peace with God) as one idea, but it belongs to the verb, and announces the condition by which only the seed sown yields the fruits of righteousness; it is in antithesis to *ζῆλος καὶ ἐριθεία*, ver. 16. — De Wette incorrectly takes *ἐν εἰρήνῃ* = *εἰς εἰρήνην*, in hope of peace. — *τοῖς ποιοῦσιν εἰρήνην* (= *εἰρηνοποιοῖς*, Matt. v. 9) is either the *dativus actionis* (Wiesinger, De Wette, formerly in this commentary; Lange uncertainly) announcing who are the sowers, or *dativus commodi* (Brückner, Bouman) announcing for whose use the *καρπὸς δικ.* is sown; in the latter case the *ποιούντες εἰρήνην* are likewise to be considered as sowers (De Wette considers it possible that the *dativus commodi* may by its importance have supplanted

¹ The same signification is also adopted by Neander, when he says, having man in view: "James requires inner unity of soul, assured conviction, so that the soul be not driven to and fro by extraneous considerations, and by

conflicting doubts. James's meaning is hardly to be described in one word. The notion of impartiality or simplicity is most in accordance with it."

ὑπὸ τῶν, κ.τ.λ.). The latter explanation is more corresponding to the context, as it is already indicated in *ἐν εἰρήνῃ σπείρεται* that the sowing can only be by such as are in possession of *σοφία εἰρηνική*, and it was particularly brought forward that the righteousness springing from the seed is only imparted to those who make peace. Accordingly, the meaning of the sententious expression is: that the seed of righteousness sown in peace yields righteousness only to the peaceable. This explanation agrees in essentials with that of Wiesinger and Bouman, also of Lange, who, however, blends with it something foreign to it, and thinks on the future harvest of righteousness. Deviating from this, De Wette renders it: "The fruit (conduct, moral action) of righteousness is in hope of peace, as the seed of the heavenly harvest sown by them who practise peace." Brückner: "The fruit (the produce) of righteousness is in peace dispersed (namely, by God) for them who practise peace." Kern: "That which springs up for the peaceable as the fruit of their sowing, that is, of their peaceful conduct, is righteousness before God, which manifests itself in peace with God."

CHAPTER IV.

Ver. 1. Before *μάχαι, πόθεν* is to be repeated, after A, B, C, **κ**, etc. (Lachm., Tisch.). — Ver. 2. After *καὶ πολεμείτε, οὐκ ἔχετε* is to be read, according to almost all testimonies (A, B, G, K, etc.); only a few min. insert *δέ* (the reading of Rec.); several others (C, **κ**, etc.) read *καὶ οὐκ ἔχετε*; recommended by Griesbach, guaranteed by Reiche; the insertion of the particle is explained from endeavoring more closely to connect the following with what goes before. — Ver. 4. Instead of the Rec. *μοιχοὶ καὶ μοιχαλίδες*, after G, K, etc., A, B, several vss., Bede, have only *μοιχαλίδες* (Lachm., Tisch.); **κ**, pr., read only *μοιχαλίδες*, but corrected *μοιχοὶ καὶ μοιχαλ.* Theile, Lange, Brückner (also Reiche) correctly consider the simple feminine as the original reading; otherwise De Wette, Bouman, and others. — Tisch. 7 remarks: "*loco identidem considerato non possum quin teneam etiamnum lectionem jam in ed. anni 1841 a me defensam*;" see on this the exposition. **κ** has a *τούτου* after *κόσμου*, and instead of the genitive *τοῦ Θεοῦ* the dative *τῷ Θεῷ*. — Ver. 5. On the pointing of this verse, see exposition. — Instead of the Rec. *κατέκρησεν*, after G, K, all min., vss., Theophylact, Oecumenius, Bede (Tisch.), Lachm. has, after A, B, **κ**, etc., adopted *κατόκισεν*. — Ver. 7. A, B, **κ**, very many min., etc., have, after *ἀντίστητε*, the particle *δέ* (Lachm.), which is wanting in G, K, many min., etc. (Rec., Tisch.); probably the *δέ* was omitted to give to the sentence an independent form; so also Lange; Bouman otherwise: "*δέ fulciendae orationis causa inculcatum est*." — Ver. 10. The article *τοῦ* is to be omitted before *κυρίου*, according to the testimony of A, B, K, **κ**, etc. — Ver. 11. Instead of *καὶ κρίνων*, Rec. after G, K (Reiche, Bouman), etc., is, with Lachm. and Tisch., to be read *ἡ κρίνων*, according to the testimony of A, B, several min., vss., etc. — Ver. 12. After A, B, **κ**, many min., almost all vss., the words *καὶ κρίτης* are, with Griesb., Lachm., Tisch., etc., to be added to *ὁ νομοθέτης*; they are wanting in the Rec. (after G, K, etc.); so also, according to the testimony of almost all authorities, the particle *δέ* is to be added after *σύ*. — Instead of the Rec. *ὅς κρίνεις*, after G, K, etc. (Bouman), *ὁ κρίνων* is, with Lachm. and Tisch., to be read, after A, B, **κ**, several min.; also recommended by Griesbach; and instead of the Rec. *τὸν ἕτερον*, likewise with the same editors, *τὸν πλῆσιον* is to be read, after A, B, **κ**, etc. — Ver. 13. The Elz. ed. reads *σήμερον ἡ ἀβριον* (thus in B, **κ**, Lachm.); but A, G, K, very many min., etc., have the reading adopted by Tisch.: *σῆμ. καὶ ἀβριον*, which must be considered genuine, as *ἡ* appears to be a correction for the sake of simplification. — The Rec. (ed. Steph.) has the conjunctives *πορευσώμεθα, ποιήσωμεν, ἔμπορευσώμεθα, κερδήσωμεν*, after G, K, several min., etc. In A the two first verbs are in the conjunctive; in **κ**, only the first verb, the others in the indicative; B, very many min., Vulg., and other vss., have only the indicative; so Lachm. and Tisch. The conjunctive appears to be a correction. — *ἔνα*, following *ἐνιαυτόν*, is omitted by Lachm.; the omission is, however, too slightly attested by B, **κ**, Vulg., etc., and, besides, is easily explained as the statement of time here expressed by *ἔνα* appeared unsuitable. — Ver. 14. Before *τῆς ἀβριον* Tisch. reads, after G, K, **κ**, the article *τό* (Rec.);

Lachm., after A, *τά*; Buttmann, after B, has omitted the article; he has also omitted the words *γάρ* and *ἡ* after *ποία*, according to his statement after B (which Tisch. has not remarked), so that his reading is: *οἰτινες οὐκ ἐπίστασθε τῆς αὔριον ποία ζωὴ ὑμῶν*; see exposition. — After *ἀτμίς* Lachm., according to A, Vulg., has omitted the particle *γάρ*; it is, however, probably genuine, and only removed from the text as interrupting the sense. — Instead of the Rec. *ἐστίν* (after G, etc.), which is defended by Reiche and Bouman, Lachm. and Tisch. have rightly adopted *ἔστε*; attested by A, B, K, very many min.; the change into *ἐστίν* is easily explained. In \aleph the words *ἀτμίς γάρ ἔστε* are entirely wanting. — The Rec. *ἔπειτα δέ* is a correction of the more difficult *ἔπειτα καί*, attested by A, B, K, \aleph , etc.; G has *ἔπειτα δὲ καί*. — Ver. 15. Buttmann reads *θῆλη* instead of *θελήση*, against the testimony of all authorities. — The indicative *ζήσωμεν . . . ποιήσωμεν* (Lachm., Tisch., after A, B, \aleph , etc.) is to be preferred to the Rec. *ζήσωμεν . . . ποιήσωμεν* (after G, K, etc.), not only according to authorities, but on account of the thought (Wiesinger, Lange). In some MSS. and vss. *ζήσωμεν . . . ποιήσωμεν* is found; this reading is incorrectly defended by Fritzsche (*Leipz. Lit. Z.*, and Winer and Engelhardt's *Neues Krit. Journ.*, V., 1826), Theile, Reiche, Bouman, and others; Winer, p. 256 (E. T., 357), prefers to read both times the conjunctive; see exposition. — Ver. 16. Instead of *καυχᾶσθε*, \aleph alone has *κατακαυχᾶσθε*. — Instead of the form *ἀλαζονείαις* (B**, K, Lachm., Tisch., 2, Buttm.), Tisch. 7 has adopted the form *ἀλαζονίαις* (A, B*, G).

Ver. 1. The section beginning with this verse is in close connection with what goes before, pointing to the internal reason of the disorders in the congregations referred to. The sudden transition is to be observed from the sentiment directly before expressed, that righteousness prospers only in *peace*, to the impressive question: *πόθεν πόλεμοι, κ.τ.λ.*, an answer to which follows in a second question "appealing to the conscience of the readers" (Wiesinger). — *πόλεμοι . . . μάχαι*]. Synonymous terms, only to be distinguished by the first denoting the general condition, and by the second the single phenomena (Wiesinger, Lange, Bouman: *πόλεμος* = *vehementior dimicatio*, *μάχη* = *minus aperta concertatio*); correctly, Laurentius: *non loquitur apostolus de bellis et caedibus, sed de mutuis dissidiis, litibus, jurgiis et contentionibus*. Several expositors, as Pott, Schulthess, Schneckenburger, arbitrarily limit these *πόλεμοι* to contentions between teachers; according to De Wette and Wiesinger, contentions concerning *meum* and *tuum* are to be understood; but in what follows the *object* is not stated, but the *cause* of the contentions and dissensions among the readers.¹ — The repetition of *πόθεν* is explained from the liveliness of the emotion with which James speaks. — *ἐν ὑμῖν*, among you. — The demonstrative *οὐκ ἐντεῦθεν* emphatically points to what follows; Bouman: *graphica rei significatae est informatio, qua primum intento tanquam digito monstrantur, deinde diserte nominantur ai ἡδοναί*; Michaelis incorrectly assumes this as a separate question = *οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου τούτου*, John xviii. 36. By *ἐκ τῶν ἡδονῶν ὑμῶν* the internal reason of these dissensions is disclosed. *ἡδοναί* is here by metonymy = *ἐπιθυμῖαι*; they are lusts directed to earthly riches; not "a life of sensual indulgence as realized lusts" (Lange). — *τῶν*

¹ According to Lange, James has in view all the hostile dissensions of the Jewish people (Pharisees, Sadducees, Essenes, Alexandrians,

Samaritans) and of the Jewish Christians (Nazarenes, Ebionites, etc.).

στρατευομένων ἐν τοῖς μέλεσιν ἡμῶν]. The lusts have their seat — as it were, their *encampment* (Wiesinger) — in the members (see on chap. iii. 2);¹ they, however, do not rest there, but according to their nature wage war (*στρατεύονται*). Estius (with whom Bouanar agrees) incorrectly explains it: *cupiditates, tanquam milites, membris vestris, ut armis utuntur ad opera peccati*, by which ἐν is falsely understood. Calovius, Baumgarten, and De Wette, after 1 Pet. ii. 11 and Rom. vii. 23, supply κατὰ τῆς ψυχῆς or τοῦ νοοῦ; but if James had meant the fight of the lusts against the soul or the reason, he would have more plainly expressed it. Gebser, Schneckenburger, Lange, and others (Brückner comprehends both) understand it of the strife of the desires against each other; but this is evidently a foreign thought. According to Wiesinger, “the strife arises and is carried on because the ἐπιθυμῆν has as its opponent an οὐκ ἔχειν . . . οὐ δύνασθαι ἐπιτυχεῖν, against which it contends.” But it is better to refer the στρατεύεσθαι to every thing which hinders the gratification of the desires. As in what follows ἐπιθυμῆτε refers to αἱ ἡδοναί, and φονεύετε καὶ ζηλοῦτε to the idea στρατεύεσθαι, James appears chiefly to have intended the opposing strivings of others against which the ἡδοναί contend. From this internal war arose the πόλεμοι καὶ μάχα.²

Ver. 2 describes in a lively manner the origin of these external strifes. The stages are ἐπιθυμῆτε . . . φονεύετε καὶ ζηλοῦτε . . . μάχεσθε καὶ πολεμῆτε; the second succeeds the first because it is without result, and the third the second for the same reason. — ἐπιθυμῆτε here in a bad sense referring to τῶν ἡδονῶν, ver. 1. It is evident that the object to be thought on is worldly possessions; James does not mention the object, because he only required to express “the covetous impulse” (De Wette). It is unsatisfactory to think only on the desires of individuals. James rather describes the conduct of the churches to whom he writes; these, discontented with their low position in the world, longed after earthly power to which, as the church of God, they thought they had a claim. This striving made them consider persecution as a reproach; on the contrary, James exhorts them to count it as a joy (chap. i. 2). This also produced among them that respect of persons toward the rich of the world, for which James blames them. This was also the source of internal division; the affluent in the church despising the poor instead of imparting to them of their wealth, and only striving after an increase of their riches; whilst the poor grudged the rich their possessions, and accused them of being the children of the world. Thus in these churches occurred the same strife which prevailed among the Jews, and was the source of factions among them. — By καὶ οὐκ ἔχετε, the uselessness of ἐπιθυμῆν is expressed, and also the motive to φονεῦεν καὶ ζηλοῦν is assigned; it is unnecessary here, with Gebser, Hottinger, De Wette, to explain ἔχειν = to receive; it rather means: to *have*, to *possess*. The meaning is: From the desire follows not the possession, namely, of what is desired. — φονεύετε καὶ ζηλοῦτε]. As here the external

¹ Incorrectly, Laurentius: “Per membra hic intellige non tantum externa membra, sed et internos animi affectus.” Still more strangely Lange explains τὰ μέλη as “the members of individuals and the members of the people.”

² Comp. Plato, *Phaedr.* xv.: καὶ γὰρ πόλεμους καὶ στάσεις καὶ μάχας οὐδὲν ἄλλο παρέχει ἢ τὸ σῶμα καὶ αἱ τούτου ἐπιθυμῆαι; consult also Cicero, *De Fin. Bon.* l. 13.

action is not yet described, but the internal disposition, *φονεύειν* cannot here be taken in its literal meaning, as Winer (p. 417 [E. T., 470]), Lange, Bouman, think. Many expositors, as Carpzov, Pott, Morus, Augusti, Gebser, Schneckenburger, and others, explain it adverbially: "even to murder and killing;" but the position of the words contradicts this explanation; if the idea *ζηλοῦτε* was to be strengthened by *φονεύετε*, it must be placed first. Other expositors, as Erasmus, Calvin, Beza, Piscator, Hornejus, Laurentius, Benson, Schulthess, Hottinger, and others, solve the difficulty by the conjectural reading *φθονεῖτε*; but this reading has not the slightest support in authorities. Nothing remains, as Wiesinger correctly remarks, except to explain *φονεύειν* here, with Estius, Calovius, also De Wette (who, however, wavers), according to 1 John iii. 15, of internal hatred,¹ and "to justify this word by the boldness of the expression prevailing in this passage; comp. *πόλεμοι καὶ μάχαι, στρατεύεσθαι, μοιχοί* (more correctly *μοιχαλίδες*)," Wiesinger. It is true that then an anti-climax would seem to occur; but this is only in appearance, as in point of fact *ζηλοῦν* (hostile zeal already ready to break out in word and action) presupposes internal *φονεύειν*.²—*καὶ οὐ δύνασθε ἐπιτυχεῖν*, namely, that for which you hate and envy. The consequences of this are *πόλεμοι*, therefore James closes with *μίχεσθε καὶ πολεμεῖτε*, in which likewise the answer to the question *πόθεν πόλεμοι, πόθεν μάχαι* is contained (Wiesinger). With *οὐκ ἔχετε*, which does not stand in the same relation to *μίχεσθε, κ.τ.λ.*, as *καὶ οὐ δύνασθε ἐπιτυχεῖν* does to *φον. κ. ζηλ.*,³ James resumes the foregoing *οὐκ ἔχετε* and *οὐ δύνασθε ἐπιτυχεῖν*, in order to assign the reason of this "not having," etc.; the reason is *διὰ τὸ μὴ αἰτεῖσθαι ἡμᾶς*, thus the want of prayer.⁴ That prayer for earthly things is heard, is not an opinion peculiar to James, but a divine promise; in which only this is to be observed, that the prayer must be not *κακῶς αἰτεῖσθαι*; see the following verse.

Ver. 3. James apparently again resumes the last expression, whilst he now grants *αἰτεῖτε* to his readers; but as he designates this their asking as *κακῶς αἰτεῖσθαι*, he does not consider it as an actual prayer, so that the foregoing declaration is nevertheless true. It is therefore inaccurate to resolve *αἰτεῖτε* into "or even if you ask."⁵—On the interchange of middle and active

¹ Stier in his exposition remarks: "James means hatred, but he speaks of killing and murdering, namely, in a spiritual sense, in order to designate hatred as an attack on one's neighbor;" his translation: "ye *smite*" (instead of Luther's: "ye hate"), is not, however, justified by this.

² The explanation of Oecumenius is peculiar, but not to be justified: *φονεύειν φησὶ τοὺς τὴν ἑαυτῶν ψυχὴν ἀποκτινύντας ταῖς τολμηραῖς ταύταις ἐπιχειρήσεσι, δι' ἃς καὶ ὁ πρὸς τὴν εὐσέβειαν αὐτοῖς πόλεμος.*

³ Accordingly, not a comma is to be put after *πολεμεῖτε*, but a full stop; thus Tischendorf and Lachmann. Stier incorrectly explains it: "it thus remains at the close as at the beginning, Ye have not."

⁴ In this passage the exposition of Lange

reaches almost the climax of arbitrariness. He here assumes a fourfold gradation—(1) desiring; (2) murdering and envying; (3) fighting and warring; (4) asking and not receiving; and corresponding to these—(1) not having; (2) not receiving; (3) an increased not having; (4) an increased not receiving. The first stage denotes Judaism full of chilastic worldly-mindedness up to the time of the N. T.; the second, the attitude of the Jews toward the Christians; the third, the Jewish war; and the fourth, Judaism after the destruction of Jerusalem.

⁵ Semler very strangely paraphrases it: "scio, quosdam vel publicis precibus (et execrationibus, iii. 9) eam in rem parcere, mala omnia precari imperatori et magistratui Romano."

forms, see Winer, p. 229 (E. T., 256.) The middle form naturally suggested itself in ver. 2, prayer for others being not the point under consideration; but in the next clause, as James wished to lay stress on the active side — of prayer in antithesis to λαμβάνειν — he used the active form. “*Egotistical praying for one’s self*” (Lange) is incorrectly understood by the middle. — καὶ οὐ λαμβάνετε emphasizes the uselessness of their asking, the reason of which is assigned by the following: *δύοτι κακῶς αἰτεῖσθε. κακῶς* finds its explanation in the following *ἐνα*; your prayer is therefore evil, because it has no other object than *δαπανᾶν ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς*. Incorrectly, Gebser: “for your prayer must implore only for true heavenly blessings.” The discourse is here rather of the temporal condition; this, James observes, continues with you a poor and depressed one, because ye ask for a better one only in order to be able to indulge your lusts. — *δαπανᾶν, to expend, spend* (Mark v. 26); here, in a bad sense, *to squander, to lavish*. Suidas: *λαμπρῶς ζῆν καὶ σπαθᾶν*; the object to the transitive verb is “that for which you pray.” *ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ἰμῶν*, not *with*, but *in*, your lusts. Wahl incorrectly explains *δαπανᾶν ἐν = sumtum ponere in aliqua re, i. e., τιθέναι τὰ χρήματα ἐν τινι*; this meaning combines *δαπανᾶν* with *εἰς*. The sense is not “for the gratification of your lusts” (Baumgarten), but *governed by your lusts*.

Ver. 4. *μοιχαλίδες*. The Rec. *μοιχοὶ καὶ μοιχαλίδες* has not only the most important authorities against it, but is also easily explained, because the term was taken in its literal sense, which is expressly done by Augusti, Jachmann, and Winer. The context, however, proves that the literal meaning is not here to be retained. If the idea is used in a *figurative* sense, according to the view which prevails in Ps. lxxiii. 27 (Isa. lvii. 3 ff.; Ezek. xxiii. 27), Hos. ii. 2, 4, and other passages of the O. T. (comp. also Matt. xii. 39, xvi. 4; as also 2 Cor. xi. 2; Rev. ii. 22), and as the context requires, then every reason for a distinction of sex ceases. Theile, Lange, Brückner, have therefore correctly declared for the reading *μοιχαλίδες*. Theile’s opinion: *non minus recte singuli homines scorta dicuntur, quam totum genus atque universa aliqua gens scortum*, is so far inappropriate, as the expression *μοιχαλίδες* used “of individuals in the Church of God is certainly singular” (Wieseler); it is here to be referred not to individuals, but to the *churches* to whom James writes (not “the Jewish factions into which Judaism was sundered,” Lange); so also Brückner. These, according to the conduct described by James, had fallen away from God, and therefore James, full of moral indignation, addresses them with these certainly severe words. — *οὐκ οἴδατε, ὅτι* points the readers to their own conduct. — *ἡ φιλία τοῦ κόσμου*. By *κόσμος* expositors understand either worldly goods (Pott, Gebser, Hottinger, Schneckenburger, Theile, Wiesinger) or worldly desires (Didymus, Laurentius), or both of these together (De Wette, Stier); and by *ἡ φιλία τοῦ κόσμου*, the inclination of the heart diverted toward worldly things. But it is more correct to take *κόσμος* in the same sense as in chap. i. 27 (see explanation of that passage), and to understand *ἡ φιλία τοῦ κόσμου* of reciprocal friendship; yet so that active conduct toward the world here predominates. The Christian who aims at worldly glory conforms himself (contrary to the admonition in Rom. xii. 2) to the world, attaching himself to its pursuits, and

is thus inclined to it with his heart, his endeavor at the same time being to be esteemed and not despised by the world. The explanation of Piscator: *amicitia cum impiis*, is in essentials correct. The term *φιλία* (ἀπ. λεγ. in N. T.) does not suit the usual explanation.¹—*ἐχθρα τοῦ Θεοῦ* expresses as *φιλία τοῦ κόσμου* a reciprocal relation; yet here also the active reference predominates, on account of which most expositors explain it directly by *ἐχθρα εἰς Θεόν* (Rom. viii. 7), although Pott gives also the explanation: *ad ejusmodi agendi rationem nos abripit, quae Deo displicet, nosque privat amore divino*. Lachmann, following the translation of the Vulgate: *inimica*, has adopted the reading *ἐχθρὰ*, by which, however, the peculiar force which consists in the opposition of the two substantives is removed. — From the judgment here expressed concerning the *φιλία τοῦ κόσμου*, James infers the sentiment that follows: οὖν, *therefore*. — ὅς ἂν οὖν βουληθῆ, κ.τ.λ. By the usual explanation of *φιλία τ. κόσμου*, and of the corresponding *φίλος τοῦ κόσμου, βουληθῆ* is at all events disconcerting. Whilst some expositors urge that by it *designed and conscious intention* is designated (Baumgarten), and others oppose it to the actual deed,² and find the idea expressed that even *the simple inclination* to the love of the world (De Wette: “whosoever has perchance willed to love the world”) effects *ἐχθρα τοῦ Θεοῦ*,³ Schneckenburger, on the contrary, says: *verbi βουληθῆ cave premas vin*. With each of these explanations the expression retains something strange, which also is not removed by distinguishing, with Lange, the “formal” and the “material intention,” and understanding *βουληθῆ* only of the latter. But it is different as soon as *κόσμος* is considered not as an aggregate of things but of persons, since then *φιλία*, as above remarked, consists in a reciprocity. The meaning is: Whosoever, although a Christian, giving himself up to the pursuits of the world, will live in friendship with it, and thus will not be despised but esteemed and loved by it, has directed to it his wish (*βουληθῆ*),⁴— *he* (thereby) *is constituted an enemy of God*; *ἐχθρὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ* is likewise used in the sense of reciprocal relation, although here the passive meaning predominates. — *καθίσταται* has here the same meaning as in chap. iii. 6 (so also Lange); it is generally rendered incorrectly = *ἔσι*; inaccurately by Theile = *fit, sistitur*; by Schneckenburger = *stands there as*; by Bouman = *constituitur divino in judicio*.

Vv. 5, 6. The views of expositors differ widely in the interpretation of these verses. At first sight the words following *λέγει* appear to be a quotation from the O. T. which James has in view. That of the older, and some of the more recent, expositors assume this to be the case, although they differ from each other, some combining *πρὸς φθόνον* directly with *λέγει*, but others

¹ According to Lange, the friendship with the world consisted “in the chiliaistic desire of the enjoyment of a worldly glory which was only colored with hierarchical piety.”

² Laurentius states this opposition in the most definite terms: “non si tantum est inimicus Dei, qui est ipso opere amicus mundi, sed etiam ille, qui cum non possit, vult tamen . . . et sic voluntate implet, quod ipso opere non potest.”

³ Similarly also Wiesinger: “James brings under the same judgment not only the decided and expressed love to the world, but even the inclination to step into such a relation to the world.”

⁴ In essentials Estius correctly says: “Terribilis valde sententia adversus eos qui suas actiones et studia componunt ad gratiam humanam. Hoc enim vere est esse amicum hujus seculi.”

including it in the quotation. Against this explanation, however, is the circumstance that the words supposed to be here quoted nowhere occur in the O. T. Such a passage has accordingly been sought for, where a similar thought is expressed, but almost every expositor has fixed upon a different passage. Many expositors seek to remove the difficulty by supposing that James does not here quote any single definite passage, but only a sentiment contained in the O. T. generally, or in several of its expressions. Opposed to this idea, however, is, first, the uncertainty whether James will confirm by it the statement contained in what precedes or in what follows; and secondly, the formula of quotation pointing to a definite passage, particularly as λέγει is not = λαλεῖ. But, moreover, the clause *μειζονα δὲ δίδωσιν χάριν* is against the view here indicated, since these words cannot be reckoned as part of the quotation, because James only afterwards quotes the O. T. passage from which they are derived; but, also, they cannot be considered as a statement of James not belonging to the quotation, because δέ closely connects them to what directly precedes.

REMARK. — The various O. T. passages which have been conjectured are as follows: Gen. iv. 7 (Rauch); Gen. vi. 3, 5 (Grotius); Gen. viii. 21 (Beza, Ernest Schmid); Num. xi. 29 (Witsius); Ps. xxxvii. 1 and lxxiii. 3 (Lange); Ps. cxix. 20 ff. (Clericus); Prov. xxi. 10 (Michaelis); Song of Solomon viii. 6 (Coccejus); from the Apocryphal Wisdom of Solomon vi. 12 (Wetstein), and others. Benson supposes that James has in view the N. T. passage, Matt. vi. 24; Stäudlin, that he has in view that passage and also Gal. v. 17; Storr, the latter passage only; and Bengel, 1 Pet. ii. 1 ff. Semler thinks that the passage is here cited from the "Testimony of the Twelve Patriarchs;" and Gabler, that the words are borrowed from a lost prophetic book. In recent times, Engelhardt (Remarks on Jas. iv. 5, 6, in the *Ztschr. f. d. Luth. Theol.*, by Delitzsch and Guericke, 1869, Part II.) has expressed the opinion that Isa. lxiii. 8–11, Ps. cxxxii. 12, 13, and Hos. i. 2, 15, form the groundwork of these words of James. Wolf, Heinsius, and Zachariae refer the words to the thoughts contained in what follows; Theile, De Wette, Brückner (also first edition of this commentary), to the thoughts contained in what precedes, — that the friendship of the world is enmity with God.

If the words *πρὸς φθόνον ἐπιποθεῖ, κ.τ.λ.*, do not form the quotation belonging to *ἡ γραφὴ λέγει*, it is to be assumed that James here already had in view the scripture adduced after *διὸ λέγει* in ver. 6, but that he did not yet state it, because the sentiment expressed in those words obtruded itself upon him in confirmation of *οὐ κενῶς* (Wiesinger). *πρὸς φθόνον* cannot, as Gebser and others suppose, be united with *λέγει*; for if one takes it to be equivalent to *de invidia* or *contra invidiam*, there is this against it, that in what goes before there is no mention of *envy*; or if it is taken adverbially, then it appears as an appendage dragging after *οὐ κενῶς*, which would be added the more unsuitably, because, as De Wette correctly remarks, it cannot be perceived what meaning can be attached to the assurance that the scripture does not speak *enviously*. Most expositors rightly refer it to *ἐπιποθεῖ*, which, without the addition, would be too bare; it is added to this idea as an adverbial and more exact statement = *in an envious, jealous manner*, for the sake of strengthening it. It is linguistically incorrect to explain *πρὸς φθόνον ἐπιποθεῖν* = *ἐπιθυμεῖν*

κατὰ φθόνον, Gal. v. 17 (thus Luther: "the spirit lusteth against envy;" Bengel, Stier; also Lange: "the spirit longeth over against and in opposition to envy"), since πρὸς, although it may be used in a hostile relation (Luke xxiii. 12; Acts vi. 1), yet does not *in itself* express a hostile reference. The explanation of many ancient and some recent expositors (Bede, Calvin, Beza, Grotius, Hottinger, Gabler, Bouman, and others), taking πρὸς φθόνον = *ad invidiam*, is also unsuitable; for, on the one hand, ἐπιποθεῖν is not = *proclivem esse*, and, on the other hand, it is contradicted by the connection in which there is not the slightest allusion to *envy*. With the correct explanation of πρὸς φθόνον, τὸ πνεῦμα ὃ κατέκτισεν (κατέκτισεν) ἐν ὑμῖν is either subjective, "the Spirit of God," or objective, "the spirit of man." In the first case ἐπιποθεῖ has no object. De Wette, Brückner (so also Schneckenburger and some of the other expositors) supply ἡμῶς as the object. Engelhardt, on the contrary, will supply no object, thinking "the supposed translation of the verb $\aleph\aleph$ is conclusive against an object;" but $\aleph\aleph$ requires an object no less than ἐπιποθεῖν, as it is, as well as the other, a relative (not an absolute) verb. By this interpretation ἐν ἡμῖν is to be understood of Christians, in whom the Holy Spirit (according to Engelhardt: "by the covenant of baptism") has taken up His abode. In the second case, the subject is not expressed. Wiesinger supplies ὁ Θεός. There is no difficulty in this completion, the less so as the preceding ἡ γραφή, which, in connection with λέγει, is personified (comp. Gal. iii. 8, προιδούσα ἡ γραφή), points to God, with whom it is, as it were, identified. This second explanation would deserve the preference before the first, as it is not apparent why James here, instead of simply *God*, should name *the Holy Spirit*, whom he has not elsewhere mentioned in his whole Epistle, and because the specification of an object belonging to ἐπιποθεῖ, which is essentially required for the thought, can scarcely be wanting. Certainly, in this second interpretation, ὃ κατέκτισεν ἐν ἡμῖν added to πνεῦμα is difficult, not so much on account of the formation of the expression, as because this addition appears to be a very unimportant remark. But it is otherwise with the reading κατέκτισεν, as then the relative clause marks "the right of propriety as the ground of explanation of envious love" (Wiesinger). According to this view, the passage is to be explained: *Or think you that the scripture says in vain — (rather God) enviously desires the spirit which He has made to dwell in us, but He gives the greater grace — wherefore it says, etc.* — It is yet to be remarked that δοκεῖν has the same meaning as in chap. i. 26; κενῶς, that is, without contents, corresponding to the truth; comp. κενοὶ λόγοι, Eph. v. 6 (Plato, *Lach.* 196b). The adverbial import of πρὸς φθόνον is justified by the usage of the Greek language; see Pape's *Wörterb.*: the word πρὸς; Winer, p. 378 (E. T., 425); Buttmann, p. 292 f. (E. T., 340). The verb ἐπιποθεῖν is also elsewhere in the N. T. construed with the accusative. The idea that God cherishes an "envious and loving longing" (Wiesinger) after the spirit of man, corresponds to the circle of ideas in the O. T., from which also the preceding *μουχαλιδες* is to be explained.

REMARK. — The principal objections of Engelhardt — that the two members of the 5th and 6th verses are not in congruity, and that the scripture adduced in

ver. 6 does not prove the thought expressed in ver. 4 — are solved by the observation that the friendship of the world, in which man opposes himself to the will of God, is pride, and that those to whom God gives grace are none other than the humble, who disdain to be the arrogant friends of the world. It is erroneous when Engelhardt denies that an emphasis rests on *οὐ κενῶς*, so that the grammatical construction forbids to make the idea *πρὸς φθόνον, κ.τ.λ.*, intervene as a contrast to *κενῶς*; the asyndeton form is, besides, wholly suitable to James's mode of expression; moreover, Engelhardt on his part finds himself constrained to supply a transitional thought before *μείζονα δὲ δίδωσιν*. That James does not quote the scripture intended by him directly after the first *λέγει*, but defers it because he wished to emphasize that it was not vain and empty, may well surprise us, but it is to be explained from the liveliness peculiar to James. Moreover, in Rom. xi. 2-4, although not in the same, yet in a similar manner, the passage quoted is separated from the form of quotation: *τί λέγει ἡ γραφή*, and in such a manner that the formula itself is taken up again by an *ἀλλά*, referring to the intervening remark, before the intended passage. When Engelhardt thinks that the words in consideration are to be recognized as the quotation, because they are words which do not elsewhere occur in James, apart from this being any thing but conclusive, it is, on the contrary, to be observed that *πνεῦμα* understood of the human spirit already occurs in chap. ii. 26, and that the words *πρὸς φθόνον ἐπιποθεῖν* do not occur in the passages of the O. T. which James, according to Engelhardt's opinion, had in view.

Ver. 6. The words *μείζονα δὲ δίδωσιν χάριν* are explained from the fact that James already had in his view the passage of the O. T., afterwards quoted, from which these words are taken. The subject is the same as in the former sentence. The comparative does not express the comparison with the blessings which the world gives (Bede: *majorem gratiam dat quam amicitia mundi*; thus also Tirinus, Gebser, Pott, Winer, Schneckenburger, Kern), or after which those: *invidi atque arrogantes, quos reprehendit*, Jas. v. 2-4 (Bouman), longed for; also it does not indicate "the greater measure of the comforting and satisfying Spirit as related to the longing Spirit" (Lange: "but he gives grace greater than the longing"), but "*μείζονα* suggests a comparison with a case in which there is no *πρὸς φθόνον ἐπιποθ.*" (Wiesinger, so also De Wette); incorrectly Bengel: *eo majorem, quo longius recesseris ab invidia*. — *διό* = *therefore, because it is so* (De Wette). *ἡ γραφή* is to be supplied to *λέγει*. Kern incorrectly takes *λέγει* impersonally: *it is said*. The passage is Prov. iii. 34, and is verbally quoted according to the LXX., except that here, as also in 1 Pet. v. 5, *ὁ Θεός* is put instead of *κύριος*. The *ὑπερήφανοι* are those who, whilst they in striving after high things (*τὰ ὑψηλὰ φρονοῦντες*, Rom. xii. 16) will be the friends of the world, are not ready to bear the reproach of Christ. That these are *ἐχθροὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ*, the scripture confirms by *ἀντιτάσσεται*. — Opposed to these are the *ταπεινοί*, that is, *the lowly*, those who *τοῖς ταπεινοῖς συναπαγόμενοι*, Rom. xii. 16, seek not the friendship of the world, but humbly bear the cross of Christ. That these are *φίλοι τοῦ Θεοῦ* the Scripture confirms by *δίδωσιν χάριν*.¹ Comp. Eccles. iii. 19, 20.

¹ The difficulty of the passage has induced some expositors to have recourse to arbitrary emendations; thus Erasmus and Grotius ex-

plain the words from *διό λέγει* to *χάριν* as a gloss from 1 Pet. v. 5. Hottinger (with whom Reiche agrees), on the contrary, is inclined to

Ver. 7. From the sentiment expressed in the preceding, James infers (ὄν) several exhortations expressive of the duty of humility. — ὑποτάγητε οὖν τῷ Θεῷ]. The exhortation is addressed to the ὑπερήφανοι: because God ἀντιτάσσεται them, they are to ὑποτάσσειν to God. In Schneckenburger's explanation: *plena obedientia vos Deo committite, ut sitis δούλοι Θεοῦ, obedientia is incorrectly emphasized. Calvin's is better: subjectio ista, quam commendat, HUMILITATIS est; neque enim generaliter hortatur, ut pareamus Deo, sed requirit SUBMISSIONEM.*¹ — ἀντίστητε δὲ τῷ διαβόλῳ]. This exhortation is closely joined to the preceding; submission to God means resistance to the devil. This requirement was so much the more appropriate, as the readers wished to be the friends of the κόσμος, whose ἄρχων is the devil. — καὶ φεύξεται ἀφ' ὑμῶν]. Comp. Hermas, i. 2, Mand. 12 (ed. Hefele, p. 380): δύναται ὁ διάβολος παλαίσει, καταπαλαίσει δὲ οὐ δύναται. ἐὰν οὖν ἀντίστης αὐτῷ, νικηθεὶς φεύξεται ἀπὸ σοῦ καταχρημμένος. Calvin: *Quamvis continuos insultus repetat, semper tamen exclusus discedit.* — καὶ after the imperative commencing the apodosis; so also in Matt. vii. 7 and frequently. 1 Pet. v. 5–9 is to be compared with this passage, where upon the quotation of the same O. T. passage follow exhortations to humility before God, and to resistance to the devil.

Ver. 8. In contrast to the last exhortation and promise is the exhortation ἐγγίσατε τῷ Θεῷ, united in a similar manner with a promise. Whilst the devil is to be kept at a distance by resistance, we are to draw nigh to God. “ἐγγίσειν is not to be limited to prayer, but is to be understood generally of man's turning to God” (Wiesinger). Comp. on ἐγγίσειν, Isa. xxix. 13; Heb. vii. 19. — καὶ ἐγγεῖ ὑμῖν, corresponding to the preceding φεύξεται ἀφ' ὑμῶν. Similar expressions in 2 Chron. xv. 2; Isa. lvii. 15; Zech. i. 3. — But in order to draw nigh to God, conversion from the former nature is necessary; therefore καθαρῖσατε χεῖρας . . . ἄγνισατε καρδίας. The cleansing of the hands consists in withdrawing them from evil and in employing them in good works; the sanctification of the heart, in contending with impure desires, and in the cultivation of a holy disposition. The external and the internal must correspond; comp. Ps. xxiv. 4: ἄθως χερσὶ καὶ καθαρὸς τῇ καρδίᾳ. Pott erroneously supposes the first expression to be a symbolical designation of μετάνοια, and denies its reference to the *externa vitae integritas* (Carpzov). The reason why James names the *hands* is not only because they are the principal *organa operandi*, but also because that he, with ἐγγίσειν τῷ Θεῷ, does not think exclusively on prayer; see 1 Tim. ii. 8. On ἄγνισατε καρδίας, comp. 1 Pet. i. 22; 1 John iii. 3. — ἁμαρτωλοὶ . . . δίψυχοι]. This address, designating the present condition of the addressed, shows the necessity of μετάνοια; ἁμαρτωλοί, because instead of God, who chose them for His possession, they serve the lusts

erase the words from μερίζονα to λέγει, and to insert a δὲ between ὁ and Θεός. Also Lücke, according to Gebser, considered those words a kind of gloss and error librarii τοῦ ἡ γραφῆ λέγει and τοῖς ταπ. διδ., ver. 6, and that the context is to be thus construed: πρὸς φθόνον . . . ἐν ὑμῖν ἢ δοκεῖτε ὅτι κενῶς ἢ γρ. λέγει: ὁ Θεός ὑπερήφανοις, κ.τ.λ.

¹ On account of its strangeness, we give

here Semler's remarks on this passage: “Jacobus, Paulus, Petrus, Judas, uno quasi ore id confirmant, opus esse, ut Romanis et sic Deo se subjiciant” (in which Lange finds no fault were it only said: “ut Deo et sic Romanis”); and afterwards: “τῷ διαβόλῳ, qui per πνεῦμα φθόνου vos suscitavit adversus magistratum Romanum;” similarly also, of course, Lange.

(ἡδοναῖς, ver. 1) of the κόσμος, corresponding to μοιχαλίδες, ver. 4; δίψυχοι, because they would at the same time be Christians. De Wette's explanation is too weak: *ye undecided* (between God and the world); Schneckenburger's remark: *hic sensu latiore sumendum quam, i. 8, is incorrect, for διακρίνεσθαι* there has its reason in the Christian giving his heart to the world instead of to God; see *Test. Aser.*, iii. p. 691: οἱ διπρόσωποι οὐ Θεῷ ἀλλὰ ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις αὐτῶν δουλεύουσι. — Calvin correctly remarks: *non duo hominum genera designat, sed eosdem vocat peccatores et duplices animo.*¹

Ver. 9. The μετάνοια required in ver. 8 does not take place without grief and mourning for guilt. The consciousness of the latter is the road to the former; therefore the summons now to this mourning: *ταλαιπωρήσατε καὶ πενθήσατε καὶ κλαύσατε*. The repetition of καὶ is an expression of emotion; *ταλαιπωρεῖν*, in the N. T. ἄπ. λεγ. (the adjective in Rom. vii. 24; Rev. iii. 17; the substantive in chap. v. 1; Rom. iii. 16), literally, *to suffer external hardships*, as in Mic. ii. 4, is here used of the internal condition: *to feel unhappy, wretched*, as the adjective in Rom. vii. 27. Estius, Gagnejus, Grotius, erroneously refer it to bodily castigations: *affligite vosmet ipsos jejuniis et aliis corporis σκληραγωγίαις* (Grotius); similarly Hottinger: *sensum miseriae CLARIS INDICIIS PRODITE*; falsely also Beza: *reprehendit ἀναληγσίαν in adversis*. — *πενθήσατε καὶ κλαύσατε*, the same combination in Neh. viii. 9; 2 Sam. xix. 1; and in the N. T., Mark xvi. 10; Luke vi. 25; Rev. xviii. 15, 19; *wail and weep*. Grotius incorrectly explains *πενθήσατε = lugubrem habitum induite, saccum et cilicia*; there is not the slightest indication that James had in view the external signs of mourning in dress and the like. If the foregoing exhortations point to a change of the lusts and joy of worldly life into godly mourning (τὴν κατὰ Θεὸν λύπην, 2 Cor. vii. 10), this is still more definitely expressed in what follows, by which James passes from the outward manifestation (γέλως . . . πένθος) to the internal state (χαρὰ . . . κατήφεια). — *κατήφεια* ἄπ. λεγ. (the adj., Wisd. of Sol. xvii. 4), literally, *the casting-down of the eyes*, here indicates internal shame.² Compare with this the picture of the publican in Luke xviii. 13.

Ver. 10. Conclusion — carrying with it an O. T. coloring — of the exhortation, in which what has hitherto been said is summed up. — *ταπεινώθητε ἐνώπιον κυρίου*]. *ταπεινώθητε* in reference to *ταπεινοῖς, κ.τ.λ.*, ver. 6. — *κυρίου*, i. e., Θεοῦ (comp. ver. 7), not Χριστοῦ (Grotius). — *ἐνώπιον* not = *ὑπό* (1 Pet. v. 6: *ταπεινώθητε ὑπὸ τὴν . . . χεῖρα τοῦ Θεοῦ*), but expresses that the self-abasement is to take place in consciousness of the presence of God, who gives grace only to the humble.³ — *καὶ ὑψώσει ὑμᾶς* is to be referred both to the present concealed and to the future manifested glory of the humble Christian (comp. chap. i. 9). The contrasted ideas *ταπεινοῦν* and *ὑψοῦν* often occur; see in the O. T., Job v. 11; Ezek. xxi. 26; in the N. T., Matt. xxiii. 12; Luke xiv. 11; 1 Pet. v. 6, and other places.

¹ Kern: As James considers man in reference to the divine grace as the *receiver*, so, on the other hand, he takes into account the free self-activity of man as the condition by which a relation of unity of man with God takes place.

² In Plutarch, *Them.* 9, it is used synonymously with *δυσθυμία*.

³ Comp. Eccles. ii. 17: οἱ φοβούμενοι κύριον . . . ἐνώπιον αὐτοῦ ταπεινώσουσι τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν.

Ver. 11. Without any indication of a connection with the preceding, James passes to a new exhortation, which, however, is so far closely attached to the preceding, inasmuch as humiliation before God carries with itself humility toward our brethren. From the fact that this exhortation, although decidedly earnest, has yet undeniably a milder character than the former, and that James uses here the address *ἀδελφοί*, whereas before it was *μοιχαλίδες, ἁμαρτωλοί, δίψυχοι*,¹ it is to be inferred that James now addresses, at least primarily, those who by the worldly ways of others felt induced to do those things against which he here exhorts them. — *μὴ καταλαλεῖτε ἀλλήλων*]. *καταλαλεῖν* only here and in 1 Pet. ii. 12, iii. 16 (the substantive in 2 Cor. xii. 30; the adjective in Rom. i. 30; 1 Pet. ii. 1), to speak in a hostile manner against one; Luther, “to slander.” *ἀλλήλων*, against each other. Estius, Semler, Pott, Gebser, Hottinger, incorrectly restrict the exhortation to teachers.² — *ὁ καταλαλῶν, κ.τ.λ.*, assigns the reason of the exhortation. The two ideas *καταλαλῶν* and *κρίνων* are indeed closely connected, but are not equivalent, since *καταλαλεῖν* presupposes *κρίνειν*; they are here indicated as distinct ideas by *ἢ*. — By the addition *ἀδελφοῦ* not only is the reprehensibility of *καταλαλεῖν* emphasized (Schneckenburger: jam hoc vocabulo, quantum peccatur *καταλαλαίς*, submonet), but also the reason is given for the sentiment here expressed *καταλαλεῖ νόμον*. By *αὐτοῦ* added to *τὸν ἀδελφόν* this is brought out more strongly, whilst also the brotherly union is more distinctly marked than by the simple *ἀδελφοῦ*; incorrectly Bengel: *fraterna aequalitas laeditur obtrectando; sed MAGIS judicando*. — *καταλαλεῖ νόμον καὶ κρίνει νόμον*]. By *νόμος* the same law is here meant as in chap. i. 25, ii. 9, etc.: the law of Christian life which according to its contents is none other than the law of love, to which *ἀδελφοῦ* and *τὸν ἀδελφόν αὐτοῦ* already point. By reviling and condemning one's brother, the law of love itself is reviled and condemned, whilst it is thereby disclaimed as not lawfully existing, and, as may be added, its tendency to save and not to destroy is condemned (Lange). The explanation of De Wette, that there is here a kind of play of words, in which is contained *only* the idea of contempt and disregard of the law, is unsatisfactory.³ Grotius, Baumgarten, Hottinger, quite erroneously understand by *νόμος* the Christian doctrine, and find therein expressed the sentiment, that whosoever imposes upon his neighbor arbitrary commandments designates the Christian doctrine as defective, and in so far sets himself up as its judge.⁴ — With the following words: *εἰ δὲ νόμον κρίνεις, κ.τ.λ.*, the fur-

¹ Lange incorrectly observes that there is no reason to see here a transition from one class to another. But it is not here maintained that James has in view a sharply exclusive distinction of different classes of his readers.

² Wiesinger correctly says that we are not here to think of a contest between Jewish and Gentile Christians; Lange incorrectly asserts that the primary reference here is to the internal divisions of Judaism.

³ The opinion of Stier is mistaken: “Whoever improperly and officiously notes and deals with the sins of other men, throws blame

thereby upon the law of God, as if it were not sufficient; for he acts as if he supposed it necessary to come to the help of the law.”

⁴ Lange, in accordance with his view, supposes the reference to be to the Jewish ceremonial law, although he does not explain *νόμος* as equivalent to doctrine. Also Bouman thinks that James has here in view the *judicia de aliena conscientia*; but James does not indicate that among his readers disputes took place *de sabbati veneratione, de licito vel illicito ciborum usu*, etc. Augustine here arbitrarily assumes an attack upon the *Gentile Christians*.

ther consequence is added: *but if thou judgest the law, thou art not a doer of the law, but a judge.* — The particle *δέ* serves to carry on the thought: *οὐκ ἐλ ποιητῆς νόμου*, i.e., thou thereby departest from the attitude which becomes thee; for the law is given to man that he might *do* it, but whosoever thinks he has right against the law, cannot be a doer of it, and consequently assumes a position which does not belong to him (Wiesinger), which position is, as the sequel says, *ἀλλὰ κριτῆς*. Baumgarten, Gebser, Neander, Wiesinger, Lange, and others supply the genitive *νόμου* to *κριτῆς*; incorrectly, for (1) this would make this sentence and the one preceding it tautological; (2) it dilutes the idea *κριτῆς* in its contrast to *ποιητῆς νόμου*; and (3) the sequel which is added to this idea *κριτῆς*, adverts not to the judging of the law, but to the judging of the man. The meaning is: Whosoever judges the law constitutes himself a judge, giving a law according to which he judges or pronounces sentence upon his neighbor. But this is not the province of man. The following verse tells the reason why it is not so.

Ver. 12. *One is the lawgiver and judge, (namely) He who can rescue (save) and destroy.* The chief accents lies on *εἰς*, in opposition to men who presume to be judges. — *ὁ νομοθέτης καὶ κριτῆς*]. The idea *νομοθέτης* is here introduced, because the judging belongs only to Him who has *given* the law, and is adduced against those who by judging their neighbor act as lawgivers, whereas their duty is to obey the given law.¹ — *ὁ δυνάμενος σώσαι καὶ ἀπολέσαι* serves for a more precise statement of the subject *εἰς* (so also Brückner, Lange, Bouman); it mentions who this One is, and in such a manner that it is also announced why He, and He only, can be *νομοθέτης καὶ κριτῆς*. Schneckenburger correctly observes: *ὁ δυνάμενος . . . articulus appositionis signum, ad subjectum εἰς pertinentis grammaticæ*; but incorrectly adds: *ita autem ut, quoad sensum, melius in propriam resolvatur sententiam*. Not only grammatically, but also according to the sense, *ὁ δυνάμενος*, etc., is to be most closely united to *εἰς*; therefore also Luther's translation: "there is one Lawgiver who is able to save and to condemn," is incorrect.² — *ὁ δυνάμενος* is not, with Schneckenburger, to be resolved into *ὃ ἔξεστι*, but is to be retained in its literal meaning. Bengel correctly remarks: *nostrum non est judicare; praesertim cum exequi non POSSIMUS.* — On *σώσαι*, see chap. ii. 14; on *ἀπο-*

Correctly, Laurentius: "Is qui detrahit proximo, detrahit legi, quia lex prohibet omnem detractionem, sed et judicat idem legem, quia hoc ipso quod contra prohibitionem legis detrahit, judicat quasi, legem non recte prohibuisse."

¹ The explanation of Morus is false: "legislator et judex est una eademque persona;" and Theile infers from this something entirely foreign: "unus est legislator . . . idem utriusque legis auctor: et aevioris mosaicae et liberallioris christianae . . . Isque etiam judex . . . et legitimus et idoneus, Idque et utriusque legis et eorum qui alterutram sequuntur:" of all which there is here no mention.

² Most expositors, in the interpretation of this passage, have failed in precision, being satisfied with giving only its general meaning. They appear for the most part to regard *ὁ δυνάμενος*, κ. τ. λ., as an attribute of *ὁ νομοθέτης* (the Rec. omits *καὶ κριτῆς*); thus De Wette translates it: "One is the lawgiver and judge, who is able to save and to destroy." Wiesinger gives here only a paraphrase which is wanting in definiteness: "Judging us and our brethren belongs to Him alone (namely, to Him who as lawgiver is not under, but above the law), and He proves His exclusive right by His power to save and to destroy, with which he confirms His judicial sentence."

λέσαι, particularly Matt. x. 28. — *οὐδὲ τις εἶ* expresses the insignificance of man, in contrast to *ὁ δυνάμενος, κ.τ.λ.* (Schneckenburger), thus: "Thou who hast no power to save and to destroy;" comp. Matt. x. 28. — The same question in Rom. xiv. 4, ix. 20.¹ — *ὁ κρίνων*]. Schneckenburger: "*thou, appos. ad pron. σύ; qui articuli hanc vim nescierunt, loco participii posuerunt ὃς κρίνεις.*" — *τὸν πλησίον*, without the personal pronoun, as in Mark xii. 33; Rom. xiii. 10, xv. 2. The Rec. *τὸν ἕτερον* perhaps arose from Rom. ii. 1.

Ver. 13. The apostrophe commencing with this verse, and continued until chap. v. 6, has a character plainly distinguished from other portions of the Epistle — (1) by *ἄγε νῦν* repeated; (2) those addressed are neither directly designated as *ἀδελφοί*, as is elsewhere the case with James (with the single exception of chap. iv. 1 ff.), nor are yet characterized as members of the Christian Church; (3) only their forgetfulness of God is described, and their judgment is announced, without any call being added to desist from their practice and be converted; so that this apostrophe contains not the slightest exhortation to repentance, as is the case with those addressed in ver. 8 as *ἀμυρτωλοὶ* and *δίψυχοι*. All this is a sufficient proof that James has in view, as Oecumenius, Bede, Semler, Pott, Hottinger, and others have correctly remarked (differently Gebser, Schneckenburger, De Wette, Wiesinger; Theile considers that Jewish Christians and Jews are here addressed), not so much the members of the church, as rather *the rich* (*οἱ πλούσιοι*, chap. v. 1), of whom it is already said in chap. ii. 6, 7, that they oppress the Christians and blaspheme the name of Christ, and who are already, in chap. i. 10, opposed to "the brother of low degree." The severe language against them in an epistle directed to Christians is sufficiently explained from the fact that with many among them, as follows from ver. 1 ff., the same forgetfulness of God had gained ground. Also the first section (vv. 13-17) is of such a nature that the fault therein expressed affected many of the readers not less than the arrogant Jews.² In this section, those addressed are at first characterized only according to their presumptuous security in their striving after earthly gain. — *ἄγε νῦν*]. *ἄγε*, occurring in the N. T. only here and in chap. v. 1, is a *summons*, which also, with classical writers, is joined with the plural (Winer, p. 458 [E. T., 516]). — *νῦν* serves not only for strengthening (De Wette, Wiesinger), but likewise for connection with what goes before. As in what follows there is no summons to *do* any thing, some expositors suppose that *ἄγε νῦν* is designed only to excite attention; Grotius: *jam ego ad vos*; so also Pott, Theile: *age, audite vos*. Others supply a thought; thus Schulthess: *πῶς ποιεῖτε*, or *μὴ καλῶς ποιεῖτε*, and the like. De Wette thinks that the summons to lay aside the fault is indirectly contained in the reproof. Wiesinger suggests ver. 16 as the

¹ Yet is the *σύ* here to be understood in definite antithesis to another, namely to God, on which account also *δέ* is added. It has therefore a more independent meaning than in the passages adduced from the Epistle to the Romans. In this there is reason for the editors Lachmann, Tischendorf, and Buttmann here placing a

comma after *εἶ*, but not in those other passages.

² Lange agrees with this in essentials, affirming that this section was principally addressed to the Jews; whereby he certainly proceeds from the erroneous supposition that the Epistle was directed to the Jews generally by the hands of the Jewish Christians.

material for the designed imperative clause. It is more correct to assume that James has already here in view the imperative clause in chap. v. 1, — κλάυσατε . . . ἐπὶ ταῖς ταλαιπωρίας ὑμῶν, κ.τ.λ., — placed after ἄγε νῦν again resumed; thus Gebser, Hottinger, Schneckenburger; similarly Lange, according to whom ἄγε νῦν “refers to the announcement of the judgment, which comes out quite clear in chap. v. 1, but is here darkly and menacingly alluded to.” — οἱ λεγοντες]. *Ye who say.* λέγειν is to be retained in its usual signification; comp. chap. ii. 14. Theile, without reason, explains it: *qui non solum cogitare soletis sed etiam dicere audetis.* — σήμερον καὶ αὔριον announces the precise duration of the intended journey — not *when* it should commence, but *how long* it should endure. With this explanation there is no difficulty in καί; otherwise ἢ (as the Rec. reads) must stand. In καί there lies a greater confidence (Theile), as according to it a definite plan is fixed upon also for the morrow. According to Wiesinger, different instances are here taken together, as in 2 Cor. xiii. 1 (so already Bengel: *unus dicit hodie, idem aliusve cras, ut commodum est*); according to this, καί would have to be explained: “and relatively” (see Meyer on that passage); but the indefiniteness contained therein does not suit the certainty with which these people speak. Lange’s meaning is unjustified: “that αὔριον is used for the undefined future subsequent to to-day.” — πορευόμεθα]. The indicative *we shall journey* expresses the certain confidence more strongly than the conjunctive *let us journey*; see critical remarks. — εἰς τήνδε τὴν πόλιν]. Luther: *into this and that city.* This explanation is also in Winer, ed. 6, p. 146 (E. T., ed. 7, 162), who adduces for it τήνδε τὴν ἡμέραν in Plutarch, *Symp.* i. 6. 1; but Al. Buttman (p. 90 [E. T., 103]), on the other hand, correctly asserts that the pronoun in that passage, as everywhere among Greek authors, has its full demonstrative meaning, and that therefore it must be understood in James in the same sense; thus Schirlitz (p. 222) observes that the pronoun is here used *δεικτικῶς*; see also Lünemann’s remark in Winer, ed. 7, p. 153 (E. T., 162); still it is not to be explained, with Schneckenburger: *in hanc urbem, quae in conspectu quasi sita est*: but, with Theile: *certa fingitur, quae vero verie eligi potest.* Those introduced as speaking mean each time a definite city; but as this differs with different persons, James could only indicate it in an indefinite manner, and he does so by the pronoun by which each time a definite city is pointed to; thus into the city which the traveller had chosen as his aim. By πορεύεσθαι εἰς τ. πολ. is indicated not merely the going into the city, but also the journey to the city in which they would remain. — καὶ ποιήσομεν, κ.τ.λ.]. *We will spend there a year*; ποιεῖν with a designation of time, as in Acts xv. 33, xx. 3, and other places; in the O. T., Prov. xiii. 23; see also Nicarch., *Epigr.* 35 (Jacobs’ ed.): ἐν ταύτῃ πεποίηκα πολὺν χρόνον. Luther incorrectly translates it: “and will continue there a year:”¹ for ἐνιαυτὸν ἕνα is not the accusative of duration, but the proper objective accusative. The reading ἕνα fittingly expresses the confidence with which those introduced as speaking measure out their time

¹ Stier, correctly: “will spend there a year.” The opinion of Lange, that “ποιεῖν along with a definition of time may likewise have indicated

that the time in question is busily employed,” is contradicted by 2 Cor. xi. 25.

beforehand, but not "their restless and unsteady conduct" (Lange). — *καὶ ἐμπορευσόμεθα καὶ κερδήσομεν*]. Bengel: *καὶ frequens; polysyndeton exprimit libidinem animi securi.* — *ἐμπορεύεσθαι = to traffic*; the final aim is designated by *κερδήσομεν*. That aim is worldly gain, which, in carnal security, is recognized as certain to be realized, so that it cannot fail. Kern correctly remarks: "Traffic is introduced only *by way of example*, as characterizing man's doings with reference to the *earthly* life as contrasted with the life in God."¹

Ver. 14. James opposes to carnal security the uncertainty of the future and the transitoriness of life. — *οἵτινες = ut qui*; correctly Wiesinger: "Ye who are of such a character that," etc. — *οὐκ ἐπίστασθε τὸ (τὰ) τῆς αὔριον* indicates the ignorance of what the next day will bring forth; comp. Prov. iii. 28, xxvii. 1: *μὴ καυχῶ τὸ εἰς αὔριον, οὐ γὰρ γνώσκεις τί τέξεται ἡ ἐπιούσα*: thus whether life will still last. What follows shows that James had this chiefly in view. — *ποία γὰρ ἡ ζωὴ ὑμῶν*]. *γὰρ* gives an explanation of *οὐκ ἐπίστασθε*. — *ποία*, as in 1 Pet. ii. 20, *how constituted?* with the subsidiary meaning of nothingness. By the reading adopted by Buttman: *οἵτινες οὐκ ἐπίστασθε τῆς αὔριον ποία ζωὴ ὑμῶν*, the genitive *τῆς αὔριον* is dependent on *ποία ζωὴ*; thus, "Ye know not how your life of to-morrow is circumstanced." This idea is evidently feebler than the usual reading, for it is supposed that they yet live on the following day, which according to the other reading is denoted as doubtful. — *ἀτμίς γὰρ ἔστω, κ.τ.λ.*]. *γὰρ* refers to the idea lying at the foundation of the preceding question, that life is entirely nothing. — *ἀτμίς* (in the N. T. only here and in Acts ii. 19, in an O. T. quotation), literally *breath*; thus in Wisd. of Sol. vii. 25, synonymous with *ἀπόρροια*, has in the O. T. and the Apocrypha chiefly the meaning of *smoke*; thus Gen. xix. 28: *ἀτμίς καμίνου*; so also Ecclus. xxii. 24; Ezek. viii. 11: *ἀτμίς τοῦ θυμιάματος*; Ecclus. xxiv. 15: *λαμβάνου ἀτμίς*; see also Joel iii. 3; Ecclus. xliii. 4; in the classics it also occurs in the meaning of *vapor*. According to biblical usage, it is here to be taken in the first meaning (smoke); thus Lange; Luther translates it by *vapor*; De Wette and Wiesinger, by *steam*. — *ἔστω* is stronger than the Rec. *ἔστι*; not only their life, but also *they themselves* are designated as a smoke; as in chap. i. 10 it is also said of the *πλοῦσιος*, that he shall fade away as the flower of the grass. — By *ἡ πρὸς ὀλίγον . . . ἀφανιζομένη*, the nature of the smoke is stated. — *πρὸς ὀλίγον = for a little time*; *ὀλίγον* is neuter. — *καὶ* is to be explained: as it appears, so it also afterwards vanishes. In the corresponding passages, Job viii. 9, Ps. cii. 12, cxliv. 4, the transitoriness of life is represented not under the image of *ἀτμίς* (Wiesinger), but of a shadow; differently in Ps. cii. 4.

Ver. 15. After the reason has been given in ver. 14 why it was wrong to speak as in ver. 13, this verse tells us how we ought to speak. — *ἀντὶ τοῦ λέγειν ὑμῶς* is closely connected with *οἱ λέγοντες*, ver. 13, so that ver. 14 forms a parenthesis: *Ye who say, To-day, etc., instead of saying, ἐὰν ὁ κύριος, κ.τ.λ.* — According to the reading *ζησομεν καὶ ποιήσομεν* (instead of the Rec. *ζήσωμεν καὶ ποιήσωμεν*)

¹ Lange indeed assents to this; but he thinks that the apostle, with a prophet's glance, evidently describes beforehand the fundamental

trait of the diabolically excited worldliness of his people, as it afterwards became more and more developed.

it is most natural to refer *καὶ ζήσωμεν* not to the protasis (as Tischendorf punctuates it), but to the apodosis (Lachmann and Buttmann; so also Wiesinger and Lange); for, first, it is grammatically more correct¹ to make only the conjunctive *θελήσῃ* dependent on *εἰν*, and to take the two indicatives together; and, secondly, from this construction the striking thought results, that not only the doing, but also the life, as the condition of the doing, is dependent on the will of God: it is accordingly to be translated: *If the Lord will, we shall both live and do this or that.* Correctly, Wiesinger: "It appears to be more suitable to the sense to take *εἰν ὁ κ. θελ.* as a single condition, and not to complete it by a second." On the other hand, most expositors retain the reading of the Rec., but they construe it differently. De Wette refers *καὶ ζήσωμεν* to the protasis, and takes the second *καὶ* as belonging to the apodosis: "If the Lord will and we live, we shall," etc.; so also Erasmus, Luther, Calvin, Hornejus, Pott, and in general most expositors (also Winer, see critical remarks; on the contrary, Al. Buttmann, p. 311 (E. T., 362), prefers the indicative). Schneckenburger, indeed, refers *καὶ ζήσωμεν* to the protasis, but he connects it more closely with *εἰν θελήσῃ*: *si Deo placet ut vivamus tum faciemus* (similarly Grotius and Hottinger), which, however, cannot be linguistically justified. Bornemann (in Winer and Engelhardt's *N. Krit. Journ.*, vi., 1827) commences the apodosis with *καὶ ζήσωμεν*, and explains it: "Let us seek our sustenance." — Winer correctly observes that this explanation (which Brückner erroneously ascribes to this commentary) lacks simplicity, and is not supported by biblical usage.² Bouman and others (see critical notes) refer *ζήσωμεν* naturally to the protasis, and *ποιήσωμεν* to the apodosis. The meaning which this reading, unsupported by authorities, gives, appears to be suitable, but yet is not correct, for it would be more correct to have said: *εἰν ζήσωμεν καὶ ὁ κύριος θελήσῃ.* — The indicative is to be preferred to the conjunctive in the apodosis, as a reciprocal call to definite action corresponds less with the context than the resolution to do something.

Ver. 16 expresses the conduct of those addressed in contrast to ver. 15; and in such a manner that the judgment upon that conduct is also expressed. — *νῦν δέ*, here, as frequently, where the reality in opposition to what is set before a person is emphasized; see 1 Cor. v. 11, xiv. 6. — *καυχᾶσθε ἐν ταῖς ἀλαζονείαις ὑμῶν.* By *ἀλαζονεία* is to be understood the arrogant self-reliance on the duration of earthly prosperity; see explanation of 1 John ii. 16. De Wette inaccurately explains it by *bragging*; Theile, by *arroganter facta, dicta*; Schneckenburger, by *pertness*; Wiesinger, by "those arrogant expressions affecting complete independence;" Lange, by "vain and arrogant self-exaltation;" and others differently. The plural is used, because such haughtiness manifests itself differently under different circumstances. — *ἐν*, here used differently than in chap. i. 9: the *ἀλαζονεῖαι* are not the object but the reason of the boasting, that from which it proceeds (against Wiesinger),

¹ The indicative future after *εἰν* is only found with absolute certainty in Luke xix. 40. See Al. Buttmann, p. 192 (E. T., 222).

² The opinion which Winer, in ed. 5, p. 331 f. has expressed, that perhaps no apodosis is to

be assumed, James only intending to say that we should always resolve never to speak decidedly, he has in later editions correctly relinquished.

and *καυχᾶσθαι* is designated from the standpoint of James: that haughty and presumptuous language in ver. 13; comp. Prov. xxvii. 1. — With the following words: *πῶσα καύχησις, κ.τ.λ.*, James definitely expresses his reprobation. — *τοιαύτη*]. Not every boasting in itself (chap. i. 9), but every boasting which proceeds from *ἄλαζονεία*, which is founded in it, and connected with it, is *wicked*.

Ver. 17. With the general sentence: *Whosoever knoweth to do good and doeth it not, to him it is sin*, James concludes what he has hitherto said. — *οὖν* is used in the sense of conclusion, but indicates that the concluding thought is the result of what has gone before. — *καλὸν ποιεῖν* belong together, dependent on *εἰδῶτι*; not “whosoever knows the good that is to be done,” which would be to take *ποιεῖν* as an exegetical infinitive. Wiesinger correctly remarks: “*καλόν* is not the idea of good, in which case the article would be put, but that which is fair, in contrast to an action which in its moral nature is *πονηρόν*.” That the discourse is concerning a sin of omission as such, to which this sentence is commonly referred (Bengel, Jachmann, and others), is rightly contested by De Wette and Wiesinger.¹ — *ἡμαρτία αὐτῷ ἐστίν*. De Wette: “In the sense of reckoning; John xv. 22; Luke xii. 47 f.” (so already Estius, also Schneckenburger, Wiesinger, and others). — *αὐτῷ* is here put, as frequently in the N. T., especially after the participle; comp. Matt. v. 40; see Al. Buttmann, p. 125 (E. T., 143). With regard to the connection in which this sentence stands with the preceding, most expositors understand it as enforcing that to which James has formerly exhorted his readers, and refer *εἰδῶτι* to the knowledge which they have now received by the word of James. But against this is the objection, that if this expression be referred to all the previous exhortations (Estius: *jam de omnibus satis vos admonui, vobis bene nota sunt*), this would not be its proper place, because later on more exhortations follow; but if it is only referred to the last remark (Grotius: *moniti estis a me, ignorantiam non potestis obtendere, si quid posthac tale dixeritis, gravior erit culpa*; so also Pott, Theile, De Wette, Wiesinger), we cannot see why James should have added such a remark to this exhortation, as it would be equally suitable to any other. It is accordingly better to refer *εἰδῶτι* to the already existing knowledge of the subject just treated of; namely, the uncertainty of human life is something so manifest, that those who notwithstanding talk in their presumption as if it did not exist, as if their life were not dependent on God, contrary to their own knowledge, do not that which is seemly, but that which is unseemly, and therefore this is so much the more sin unto them.²

¹ “Since *καλόν* is the antithesis of *πονηρόν*, and not some positive good as beneficence, the defect of which is not *πονηρόν*, as De Wette correctly remarks, *μὴ ποιοῦντι* does not merely signify a sin of omission, but the omission of *καλόν* is necessarily a doing of *πονηρόν*.”

² When Lange, in arguing against this ex-

planation, maintains that the word refers to the better knowledge of the readers, of evangelical behavior in general, the definite connection of thought, in which here the general sentence is placed, is not properly considered by him.

CHAPTER V.

Ver. 4. Instead of *εισεληλύθασιν* the form *εισελήλυθαν* is, with Tisch. and Lachm., to be preferred (on this form see Ph. Buttm., *Ausführl. Gr. Gr.*, § 87, 8, Note 5, and Winer, p. 70 f. [E. T., 93]). — Ver. 5. The *ὡς* of the Rec. (after G, K, etc.) before *ἐν ἡμέρᾳ* is, according to the testimonies of A, B, \aleph , to be regarded as an explanatory addition, and, with Lachm. and Tisch., *τὸ* be left out; so also Wiesinger, Lange, Brückner; Reiche and Bouman, however, judge otherwise. — Ver. 7. The Rec. after the second *ἕως* has the particle *ἄν* (so in \aleph and many min.). Tisch. has omitted it, as, according to his statement, it is not found in A, B, G, K, etc.; Lachm. has retained it (according to Tischendorf's note: *ex errore*); so also Buttmann, who adduces no authority for its omission. Already Griesbach regarded *ἄν* as suspicious. Lachm. and Tisch. have omitted *ἕτερον*; it is in A, G, K, etc., but is wanting in B, \aleph , etc.; its addition is easily explained, particularly as in the LXX. it is never wanting with *πρώιμος καὶ ὄψιμος*. — Ver. 9. The address *ἀδελφοί*, in A, B, etc. (Lachm. Tisch.), stands before, in G, \aleph , etc. (Rec.), after *κατ' ἀλλήλων*; in K, etc., it is entirely wanting. Instead of *κατακριθῆτε* the simple verb *κριθῆτε* is, with Griesbach, Scholz, Lachm., Tisch., to be read, according to almost all authorities; so also the article *ὁ* before *κριτής* (which in the Rec. is wanting, against almost all authorities) is to be adopted. — Ver. 10. The address according to the Rec. is *ἀδελφοί μου* (G, K, \aleph , etc.); in A, B, etc., *μου* is wanting (Lachm. Tisch.); its correct position is after *λάβετε*, not after *κακοπαθείας*. — Instead of *κακοπαθείας*, \aleph alone reads *καλοκαγαθίας*. — Before *τῷ ὀνόματι*, B, \aleph , etc., have the preposition *ἐν* (Lachm.): a correction apparently for the sake of simplification. — \aleph alone omits *τῷ*. — Ver. 11. It is difficult to decide whether we are to read, with the Rec. and Tisch., *ὑπομένοντας* (G, K, etc.), or, with Lachm. and Wiesinger, *ὑπομείναντας* (A, B, \aleph , etc.); yet the reading of the Rec. appears to have arisen from an endeavor to generalize the reference of the idea: Bouman certainly judges otherwise. — The Rec. *εἰδετε*, after B* (*teste Majo*), K, \aleph , etc., Oecumenius (Lachm.), is as a correction to be changed for the more difficult reading *ἴδετε*, attested by A, B, G, etc. (Tisch.). — After *ἔστιν* the Rec. has *ὁ κύριος*, according to A, B (in B, however, the article is wanting), \aleph , several min., vss., etc. (Lachm.); Griesbach regarded it as suspicious, and Tisch. has omitted it, after C, K, many min., etc.; the omission can easily be explained from the fact that *κυρίου* directly precedes (so also Lange; Bouman wavers). — Ver. 12. The reading *εἰς ὑπόκρισιν* (Ed. Steph., after G, K, etc.) has probably arisen from the original *ἐπὶ κρίσιν*, these two words being taken as one, and then a preposition placed before them. — Ver. 14. The *αὐτόν* after *ἀλείψαντες* is wanting in B; it was omitted as being self-evident. — Lachm. and Tisch. have, after A and some min., left out the article *τοῦ* before *κυρίου*; yet G, K, \aleph , many min., etc., attest its genuineness; in B also *κυρίου* is wanting; nevertheless Buttmann has received it, but without the article. — Ver. 16. The reading of the Rec. is *ἐξομολογήσθε ἀλλήλους τὰ*

παραπτώματα, καὶ εὐχεσθε, κ.τ.λ. (Tisch.); instead of which A, B read ἐξομολογήσθε οὖν ἀλλήλοις τὰς ἁμαρτίας καὶ προσεύχεσθε, κ.τ.λ. (Lachm.); for οὖν also K, N, several min., Vulg., etc., testify: accordingly οὖν is to be considered as genuine; yet precisely this οὖν might mislead one to find in this verse an extension of the thought going before, and on this account to change the new expressions with the preceding, and thus, instead of παραπτώματα, to put again ἁμαρτίας, and instead of εὐχεσθε, for which also N testifies, to put again προσεύχεσθε, whereas the opposite change cannot be well explained. — Ver. 18. The Rec. ὑπέτὼν ἔδωκεν is found in B, G, K, almost all min., etc. (Tisch.); A, on the contrary, has ἔδωκεν ὑπέτὼν (Lachm.); so also N, but with τὼν before ὑπέτὼν. It is possible that this change was occasioned by the following ἐβλάστησεν τὸν καρπὸν. — Ver. 19. Tisch. has omitted the pronoun μου after ἀδελφοί, yet the most important authorities, A, B, K, N, etc., attest its genuineness. — N alone has, instead of the simple τῆς ἀληθείας, the combination τῆς οδοῦ τῆς ἀληθείας. — Ver. 20. The reading γνωσθετε in B is occasioned by the address ἀδελφοί. Instead of the Rec. ψυχὴν, after G, K, many min. (Tisch.), Lachm., and Buttm. have adopted ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ. This αὐτοῦ is found in A, N, some min., vss., etc. B has it, probably by an error of the scribe, not after ψυχὴν, but after θανάτου. — B has as subscription Ἰακώβου; A, Ἰακώβου ἐπιστολῇ; others differently.

Ver. 1. That here the same persons are meant as in chap. iv. 13, and not others, has already been observed on that passage: by ἄγε νῦν, the ἄγε νῦν of that passage is again resumed.¹ — οἱ πλούσιοι]. See chap. i. 10, ii. 6, 7; the expression is not to be taken in a symbolical, but in its literal, meaning (against Lange). — κλαύσατε ὀλολύζοντες, κ.τ.λ.]. κλαύσατε is not here to be understood, as in chap. iv. 9, of the tears of repentance (Estius, Hornejus, Laurentius, De Wette, and others), for there is no intimation of a call to repentance. Correctly, Calvin: *falluntur qui Jacobum hic exhortari ad poenitentiam divites putant; mihi simplex magis denuntiatio iudicii Dei videtur, qua eos terrere voluit absque spe veniæ.*² James already sees the judgment coming upon the rich, therefore the call κλαύσατε; that for which they should weep are the *ταλαιπωρία* which threatened them.³ — The *imperative* is not here used instead of the future (Semler: *stilo prophetico imperat, ut rem certissimam demonstret*, FLEBITIS; Schneckenburger: *aoristus imperativi rem mox certoque eventuram designat*), but is to be retained in its full force. The imperative expresses not what they will do, but what they shall even now do, because their *ταλαιπωρία* are nigh. The union of the imperative κλαύσατε with the participle ὀλολύζοντες is not an imitation of the frequent combination of the finite verb with the infinite absolute of the same verb in the Hebrew

¹ Whilst De Wette, Wiesinger, and others understand by the rich here addressed Christians, Stier has correctly recognized that such are here addressed "who are outside of the Christian Church," namely, those already mentioned in chap. ii. 6, 7, who practise violence on you, the confessors of the Lord of glory. His remark is also striking: "To them James predicts as a prophet, and entirely in the style of the old prophets, the impending judgment."

² Wiesinger indeed concedes the point to

Calvin, but only in words; for "the design of James, as in the case of the prophets of the O. T., is certainly nothing else than that of moving them by such a threat if possible yet to turn." If James has this design in these words, he has certainly not indicated it.

³ That James by this intends the end of the Roman Empire (Hengstenberg), is proved neither from the Epistle of Peter, nor from Rev. xviii., nor from any other indications in this Epistle.

(Schneckenburger), since here *two different* verbs are united together (De Wette, Wiesinger); also *δολύζειν* has not the same meaning as *κλαίειν*, but, as expressive of a more vehement affection, is added for the sake of strength. *δολύζειν* frequently in the O. T., Isa. xiii. 6, xiv. 31, xv. 3 (*δολύζετε μετὰ κλαυθμοῦ*), and in other places, and indeed chiefly used in reference to the impending divine judgment (Isa. xiii. 6: *δολύζετε, ἐγγὺς γὰρ ἡμέρα κυρίου*). Calvin: *est quidem et suus poenitentiae luctus, sed qui mixtus consolatione, non ad ululatum usque procedit.* — *ἐπι ταῖς ταλαιπωρίαις ὑμῶν*]. For your miseries, i. e., the miseries destined for you, namely, the miseries of the judgment; see ver. 3: *ἐν ἐσχάταις ἡμέραις*; ver. 7: *ἡ παρουσία τοῦ κυρίου*. Thomas Aquinas, Grotius, Mill, Benson, Michaelis, Stier, Lange, Bouman, refer this to the then impending destruction of Jerusalem; they are so far right, as the destruction of Jerusalem and the last judgment had not as yet been distinguished in representation;¹ but it is incorrect to refer it to the *judgment* itself, rather than to the *miseries which will precede the advent of Christ*; or, with Hottinger, to find here only a description of the inconstancy of prosperity. — *ταῖς ἐπερχομέναις*, not *sc. ὑμῖν* (Luther: your misery which will come upon you; so also De Wette, Lange, and others), but *the impending, already threatening miseries*; comp. Eph. ii. 7.

Ver. 2. Description of the judgment destroying all riches: *ὁ πλοῦτος ὑμῶν σέσηπεν*. In a prophetic manner the future is described as having already taken place (Hottinger, Schneckenburger, De Wette, Wiesinger, Bouman, and others). By *πλοῦτος* is not here — as Estius, Raphelius, Wolf, Semler, Gebser, Bouman, on account of *σέσηπεν* think — to be understood such things (fruit, etc.) as undergo literal rotteness, but is to be understood generally; and *σέσηπε* as a *figurative* expression denotes generally the destruction to which riches are abandoned. The explanation of Calvin is incorrect: *hic immensa divitum rapacitas perstringitur, dum supprimunt, quicquid undecunque possunt ad se trahere, ut inutiliter in arca computrescat* (similarly Hornejus, Laurentius, Grotius, Bengel, Theile²); James “does not here intend to give the natural result of covetousness, and thus the reason of the judgment, but the effect of the judgment breaking forth” (Wiesinger).³ James describes the reason from ver. 4 and onwards. — The verb *σῆπω*, to *cause to rot*, in the passive and second perfect to *corrupt*, is in the N T. *ἀπ. λεγ.*, but often occurs in the LXX.; comp. Job xxxiii. 21, xl. 7; as here in a general sense (= *φθείρεσθαι*) it is found in Ecclus. xiv. 19. — *καὶ τὰ ἱμάτια ὑμῶν, κ.τ.λ.* The general idea *πλοῦτος* is here and in what follows specialized. — *σητόβρωτος*,

¹ Wiesinger: “The question whether James thought on the destruction of Jerusalem, or on the advent of Messiah, is an anachronism; for to him both of these events occur together.”

² Theile, who takes the preterite in its literal sense, thus explains the passage: “divitiae a vobis concervatae perierunt nulla vestra aliorumque utilitate . . . atque ideo vos coram iudice perdet. Ita causa additur istarum calamitatum perferendi, gravi oppositione eorum quae per absurda et impia ipsorum avaritia

jam facta sunt eorumque, quae pro justa Dei retributione adhuc fiunt.”

³ In agreement with his explanation of *πλούσιοι*, Lange understands also *πλοῦτος* in a symbolical sense, namely, the externalized Judaistic righteousness — “connected, of course, with worldly prosperity.” His assertion is also incorrect, that here not the last judgment, but “the natural immanent judgments of sinners” are meant.

moth-eaten, in the N. T. ἄπ. λεγ., does not occur in the classics, but in Job xiii. 20, LXX.: ὡσπερ ἰμίτιον σητόβρωτον; comp. Isa. li. 8. σκωληκόβρωτος in Acts xii. 23 is similarly formed.

Ver. 3. Continuation of the description of the judgment: ὁ χρυσὸς ὑμῶν καὶ ὁ ἀργυρὸς, a further specification of riches. κατίωται, in the N. T. ἄπ. λεγ. (Ecclus. xii. 10), equivalent to the simple verb, only in a stronger signification. Correctly, Hornejus: *loquitur populariter, nam aurum proprie aeruginem non contrahit*; so in the Epistle of Jeremiah 11, where it is said of gold and silver images: οὐ διασώζονται ἀπὸ ἰοῦ; see also in the same, ver. 23. With too minute accuracy, Bretschneider justifies the use of the verb here, that we are to think on gold and silver vessels which are alloyed with *copper* (similarly Bouman). It is no less incorrect, with Pott, to weaken the idea κατίωται, that it is to be understood only of *amisso auri et argenti splendore, de mutato auri colore ex flavo in viridem*; against this is ὁ ἰός directly following. Wiesinger thinks that because κατίωται is here used figuratively, it is a matter of indifference that rust does not affect gold; but the ideas must suit each other in the figurative expression. The verb is rather here to be justified by the fact that since rust settles on metals generally, James in his vivid concrete description did not scrupulously take into consideration the difference of metals, which, however, is not to be reckoned, with De Wette, as a "poetical exaggeration."¹—καὶ ὁ ἰὸς αὐτῶν (namely, τοῦ χρυσοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀργύρου), εἰς μαρτύριον ὑμῖν ἔσται. Most expositors agree with the explanation of Oecumenius: καταμαρτυρήσει ὑμῶν, ἐλέγχων τὸ ὑμετάδοτον ὑμῶν; accordingly, "The rust which has collected on your unused gold and silver will testify to your hardness, and that to your injury = κατ' ὑμῶν." But since the preceding κατίωται describes the judgment overtaking earthly glory, ἰός can only be understood with reference to it; correctly, Wiesinger: "the rust is a witness of their own destruction; in the destruction of their treasures they see depicted their own."² Augusti superficially explains it: "will convince you that all riches are transitory." After their riches are destroyed, the judgment seizes upon themselves; therefore καὶ φάγεται τὰς σάρκας ὑμῶν. The subject is ὁ ἰός, "the corroding rust seizes also them, and will eat their flesh" (Wiesinger). The figurative expression, although bold and peculiar, is not unsuitable, since ἰός is considered as an effect of judgment. φάγεται is not the present (Schneckenburger), but in the LXX. and N. T. the ordinary future for ἔδεται; see Buttman, *Ausf. Gr. Sprach.*, § 114 (E. T., 58), under ἐσθίω; Winer, p. 82 (E. T., 89). The object τὰς σάρκας ὑμῶν belonging to φάγεται is neither = ὑμᾶς (Baumgarten), nor yet in itself indicates "bloated bodies" (Augusti, Pott: *corpora lautis cibis bene pasta*); also Schneckenburger lays too much stress on the expression, explaining it: *emphatice, quum ejusmodi homines nihil sint nisi σάρξ*. According to usage, αἱ σάρκες denotes the fleshy parts of the body, therefore the plural is also used with reference to one indi-

¹ Lange strangely thinks that it is here intended to bring out the unnatural fact that the princes of Israel are become rebellious and companions of thieves: "It is as unnatural for gold and silver to be eaten up with rust,

as for the glory of Israel to be as corrupted as the glory of other nations corrupts, which may be compared to base metals."

² Stier incorrectly understands by rust "the gullt of sin which cleaves to mammon."

vidual; comp. 2 Kings ix. 36: *καταφάγονται οἱ κύνες τὰς σάρκας* 'Ιεζάβελ; further, Lev. xxvi. 29; Judith xvi. 17; Rev. xix. 18, 21; in definite distinction from bones, Mic. iii. 2, 3. It is to be remarked that in almost all these passages the same verb is united with the noun.¹ The context shows that what is spoken of is not "the consuming of the body by care and want" (Erasmus, Semler, Jaspær, Morus, Hottinger, Bouman), but the punishment of the divine judgment (Calvin, Grotius, Pott, Schneckenburger, De Wette, Wiesinger, and others). The words *ὡς πῦρ* may be united either with what goes before or with what follows. Most expositors prefer the first combination; yet already A, the Syriac version (where *ὡς* is wanting), and Oecumenius in his commentary put a stop after *ἰμῶν*. Grotius, Knapp, and Wiesinger, considering this construction as correct, accordingly explain it: *tanquam ignem opes istas congessetis*; Wiesinger states as a reason for this, that without the union with *ὡς πῦρ* the words *ἐθησαυρίσατε, κ.τ.λ.*, give too feeble a meaning. But this is not the case, since the chief stress rests on *ἐν ἐσχάταις ἡμέραις* (so also Lange); also James could not well reckon riches as a fire of judgment. Besides, in the O. T. the judgment is frequently represented as a devouring consuming fire, which was sufficient to suggest to James to add *ὡς πῦρ* to *φάγεται*.² The sentiment is: After the judgment has overtaken the wealth of the rich, it will attack themselves. Kern gives the sentiment in an unsatisfactory manner: "The destruction of that which was every thing to the rich will punish him with torturing sorrow, as if fire devoured his flesh." That the *ταλαιπωρίαι* already draw near is said in ver. 1, and James by the words *ἐθησαυρίσατε ἐν ἐσχάταις ἡμέραις* indicates that the judgment is close at hand, so that *this time* is the *last days* directly preceding the judgment; accordingly, the heaping-up of treasure appears as something so much the more wicked. Estius, Calvin, Laurentius, and others incorrectly supply to the verb the word *ὄργην* in accordance with Rom. ii. 5 (comp. Prov. i. 18). The object to be supplied to *θησαυρίζεν*, which is often used absolutely (comp. Luke xii. 21; 2 Cor. xii. 14; Ps. xxxviii. 7), is contained in the verb itself, and also follows from what has preceded. The preposition *ἐν* is not used instead of *εἰς*, and *ἐσχαταὶ ἡμέραι* are not the last days of life (Wolf: *accumulavistis divitias extremæ vitæ parti provisuri*; Morus: *cumulastis opes sub finem vitæ vestræ*), but the last times which precede the advent of Christ (ver. 7), not merely the final national judgment (Lange). Jachmann most erroneously takes the sentence as interrogative: Have ye collected your (*spiritual*) treasures on the day (i.e., for the day) of judgment, in order to exhibit them?

Ver. 4. Description of the sins of the rich to the end of ver. 6, by reason

¹ Although *σάρκες* in itself indicates only flesh according to its separate parts, yet the expression is here chosen in order to name in a concrete manner that which is carefully nourished by the rich. According to Lange, *αἱ σάρκες* are "the externals of religious, civil, and individual life;" and the thought of James is that "the rotten filth described as rust in its last stage transforms itself in the fire of a revolutionary movement!"

² See Ps. xxi. 10, LXX.: *καταφάγεται αὐτοὺς πῦρ*; Isa. x. 16, 17, xxx. 27 (*ἡ ὄργη τοῦ θυμοῦ ὡς πῦρ ἔδεται*); Ezek. xv. 7; Amos v. 6. Pott: "Aerugo describitur, quasi invadat membra divitum, eaque quasi, ut metallum, arrodatur atque consumatur et quidem . . . ὡς πῦρ, tanquam flamma membra quasi circumlabens carnemque lento dolore depascens."

of which they become liable to the judgment. The first sin mentioned is their *injustice toward those who work for them*. — *ἰδοῦ*, an interjection often occurring in the N. T. to draw attention to the object in question. — *τῶν ἐργατῶν*, emphatically put first; comp. the proverb: *ἄξιος ὁ ἐργάτης τοῦ μισθοῦ αὐτοῦ* (1 Tim. v. 18). *τῶν ἀμησόντων* (*ἰμῶν* = *θερίζειν*, in the N. T. *ἄπ. λεγ.*) *τὰς χώρας ἰμῶν*; *χώρα* = *fields*, as in Luke xii. 16; John iv. 35. — In the following words, expositors conjoin *ἄφ' ἰμῶν* with *ἀπεστερημένους*;¹ whilst they either explain *ἀπό* = *ὑπό*, or, as Wiesinger, retaining the distinction of the prepositions, observes, that “not the direct origin, but the proceeding of the act of robbery from them, is indicated” (comp. Winer, p. 332 (E. T., 464); Al. Buttmann, p. 280 [E. T., 326]). But it would be more suitable to join *ἄφ' ἰμῶν* to *κράζει* (so also Lange); the kept-back hire crieth from the place where it is.² The chief stress is put on *ὁ ἀπεστερημένος*; the same kind of conjunction as in chap. iv. 14. The injury of our neighbor, by diminished payment or withholding of the wages due to him, was expressly forbidden in the law.³ — *κράζει*. Calvin: *vindictam quasi alto clamore exposcit*; comp. Gen. iv. 10. — In the following words it is stated that the cry has been heard by God.⁴ By the designation of God as *κύριον σαβαώθ*, His power as the Lord of the heavenly hosts is emphasized; the reference occurring in the O. T. likewise to the earthly hosts is here evidently not admissible (against Lange); it is the transference of the Hebrew *יהוה יהוה*, often occurring in the LXX., particularly in Isaiah; in other places the LXX. have *κύριος παντοκράτωρ*, 2 Sam. v. 10, vii. 27, or *κύριος τῶν δυνάμεων*, Ps. xxiv. 10. — James, in his graphic style, instead of the general word “laborer,” mentions specially the *reapers*, not on account of their multitude (De Wette), but because their laborious work in the sweat of their brow most strongly represents the work which is worthy of wages. Thus Calvin not incorrectly observes: *quid est indignius quam eos, qui panem ex suo labore nobis suppeditant, inedia et fame conficere?* It is more remote to explain it thus: “because selfish hard-heartedness is here most sharply stated, when even the joy of the harvest does not induce them to give to the poor their hard-earned portion” (Brückner).⁵

Ver. 5. A second sin of the rich, namely, their *luxurious and gluttonous life*, which forms a sharp contrast to the toilsome life of the laborers. — *ἐτρωθήσατε . . . ἐσπαταλήσατε*, synonymous terms: *τρυφᾶν*, in the N. T. *ἄπ. λεγ.*, in the LXX., Neh. ix. 25; Isa. lxvi. 11 (Isa. lvii. 4). *σπαταλᾶν*, only here

¹ ἀποστερέω, to keep back. Plato, *Gorg.* 519c; so also LXX. Mal. iii. 5; Eccles. xxxiv. 27.

² Comp. Gen. iv. 10: *φωνὴ αἵματος . . . βοᾷ . . . ἐκ τῆς γῆς*; Exod. ii. 23: *ἀνέβη ἡ βοή αὐτῶν πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐργῶν*.

³ Comp. Lev. xix. 13; Dent. xxiv. 14; Jer. xxii. 13; particularly also Mal. iii. 5: *ἔσομαι μάρτυς ταχὺς ἐπὶ . . . τοὺς ἀποστεροῦντας μισθὸν μισθωτοῦ*; comp. also Job xxxi. 38, 39; Tob. iv. 14; Eccles. xxxiv. 27 (*ἐκχέων αἶμα ὁ ἀποστερῶν μισθὸν μισθίου*).

⁴ Comp. on this expression, particularly Ps. xviii. 7; Isa. v. 9: *ἠκούσθη εἰς τὰ ὦτα κυρίου σαβαώθ ταῦτα*; besides Gen. xviii. 21, xix. 13; Exod. ii. 23 f., iii. 9, xxii. 22 f.; 2 Sam. xxii. 7, and other passages.

⁵ Here also Lange comes in with his symbolical interpretation, understanding by the harvest “the time when the theocratic seed of God in Israel has ripened unto the harvest of God,” and by the reapers “the apostles and first Christians.”

and in 1 Tim. v. 6; in the LXX., Ezek. xvi. 49; Amos vi. 4, and other places. Hottinger thus states the distinction between them: *τροφῆν deliciarum est et exquisitae voluptatis; σπαταλῶν luxuriae atque prodigalitatibus*; comp. the description of the rich man in Luke xvi. 19. These and the following verbs are in the aorist, not "because the conduct of the rich is described as viewed from the day of judgment" (first edition of this commentary; similarly also Wiesinger), for "this does not suit the present *ἀντιτάσσεται*" (Gunkel), but because James will mark the present conduct as a constant occurrence. The addition *ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς* forms a sharp contrast to the preceding *εἰς τὰ ὤτα κυρίου σαβαώθ*. Whilst the Lord *in heaven* hears the complaints of the unjustly oppressed, the rich *on earth* enjoy their lusts, undisturbed by the wrath of God, which shall be revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men (Rom. i. 18). — *ἰθρέψατε τὰς καρδίας ὑμῶν* does not add a new idea to the preceding, but brings forward the fact that the rich in their luxurious living find the satisfaction of the desires of their heart. Luther's translation: "Ye have pastured your heart," does not sufficiently correspond to the idea *τρέφειν*; something bad is evidently denoted by it. Since *τρέφειν* is literally "to make firm, thick," it is best here to render it by "to satiate." Other expositors translate it by "to fatten;" Lange, by "to make fat." *τὰς καρδίας* is equivalent neither to *τὰ σώματα ὑμῶν* nor to *ὑμᾶς*; comp. Acts xiv. 17, and Meyer on that passage;¹ Winer, p. 141 (E. T., 156). *ἐν ἡμέρᾳ σφαγῆς* corresponds to the preceding *ἐν ἐσχάταις ἡμέραις*. These last times are designated by James with reference to the rich as *ἡμέρα σφαγῆς*, the day of slaughter, because the sentence of death, which they have incurred, will be directly executed upon them at the approach of the *παρουσία* of Christ (comp. ver. 7) and the judgment; so also Wiesinger, Brückner, Lange, only the latter arbitrarily understands by the day of slaughter, the day of Israel's judgment, comprehending the time from the death of Christ to the destruction of Jerusalem. This designation of the day of judgment is also found in the O. T., particularly Jer. xii. 3, LXX.: *ἀγνισον αὐτοὺς εἰς ἡμέραν σφαγῆς αὐτῶν*; xxv. 34. By the reading *ὡς* before *ἐν ἡμέρᾳ σφ.* a comparison occurs, namely, with the beasts who are to be slaughtered, so that Pott after *ὡς* directly supplies *θρέμματα*. De Wette explains it: "Ye have pastured your hearts as in the day of slaughter; i. e., according to the comparison with beasts, who on the day on which they are to be slaughtered feed carelessly and devour greedily;" so also Bouman. But the idea "carelessly and greedily" is introduced; also the comparison is unsuitable, since beasts on the day of slaughter do not eat more greedily than on other days. Other expositors, as Wolf, Augusti, Hottinger, and others, take *ἐν* as equivalent to *εἰς*; Hottinger: *corpora vestra aluistis, tanquam pecora, quae saginari solent ad mactationem*; but this change of prepositions is arbitrary. Several expositors, as Calvin, Beza, Grotius, Laurentius, Bengel, and others, understand by *ἡμέρα σφαγῆς* the day of sacrifice; Calvin: *addit similitudinem, sicut, etc., quia solebant in sacrificiis solemnibus liberalius vesci quam pro quotidiano more*;

¹ Meyer: "The heart is filled with food, the pleasant feeling of satisfaction, is in the inasmuch as the sensation of being filled, heart."

the meaning then is: *tota vita vestra est quasi perpetuum epulum ac festum continuum* (Laurentius); but that expression never elsewhere occurs in this signification. Had James thought on the sacrificial feast or the like, he would have expressed it more definitely; besides, by this explanation the reference to the judgment is entirely wanting, and only the luxurious life is described; but this contradicts the character of the whole section, for if James, from ver. 4 onwards, assigns the reason of *ταλαιπωρία*, he does this not without an earnest pointing to the judgment and its nearness.

Ver. 6. The third sin, *the persecution of the just*, by which the ungodliness of their disposition is most strongly indicated. By *δικαιος* is not meant Christ (Oecumenius,¹ Bede, Grotius, Lange), for, on the one hand, there is nothing in the context to indicate this, and, on the other hand, the present *ἀντιτάσσεται* is opposed to it; also, if this were the case, the perfect must be put instead of the aorist, as here only one deed is mentioned, not, as before, a repetition of deeds. Wiesinger, in an unsatisfactory manner, explains *τὸν δίκαιον* by *the innocent*. Not merely the unjust conduct of the *πλούσιοι* founded on covetousness is here intended to be described, but the reason of persecution is implied in the expression *τὸν δίκαιον* itself; comp. Wisd. of Sol. ii. 12–20; as also 1 John iii. 12. The singular is to be taken collectively, and the expression absolutely, as in ver. 16. Several expositors assume that the verbs *κατεδικάσατε*, *ἐφονεύσατε*, are not meant in their literal sense; but evidently without reason. *κατεδικάσατε* shows that here primarily judges are meant; yet the accusers, if these are to be distinguished from them, are not to be considered as excluded, since their accusation points to nothing else than to a sentence of condemnation.² The asyndeton sharpens the climax, which is contained in the addition of the second verb to the first. Bouman directs attention to the parononasia between *κατεδικάσατε* and *δίκαιον*. — *οὐκ ἀντιτάσσεται* opposes the calm patience of the just to the violence of the wicked: *he doth not resist* (comp. Acts xviii. 6; Rom. xiii. 4; Jas. iv. 6). Schneckenburger: *οὐκ ἀντι. sine copula et pronomine penderose additur*. The present is explained from the fact that in what goes before not a single instance, but the continued conduct of the rich is described, and opposed to this is placed the similarly continued conduct of the *δίκαιοι*. Lange, by the reference of *τὸν δίκαιον* to Christ, misinterprets the force of the present, arbitrarily attributing to the verb the meaning: “He stands no longer in your way; He does not stop you (in the way of death); He suffers you to fill up your measure.” — It is unnecessary to supply in thought *ὅς* or *γάρ*; also *οὐκ ἀντιτάσσεται* is not to be converted into *οὐ δύναται ἀντιτάσσεσθαι* (Pott). For the correct construction

¹ Oecumenius, indeed, says: *ἀναντιρρήτως τὸ, ἐφον. τ. δικ., ἐπὶ τὸν Χριστὶν ἀναφέρεται*; but he thinks that James likewise understands by this: *τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς τὰ ὅμοια παρὰ τῶν Ἰουδαίων παθόντας*; and he closes with the remark: *ἰσως δὲ καὶ προφητικῶς τὸ περὶ ἑαυτὸν ὑπεμφαίνει πάθος*.

² Wiesinger correctly observes that *φονεύειν* is here not to be explained according to Ecclus. κxxi. 21: *φονεύειν ἰὸν πλησίον ὁ ἀφαιρουμένος*

τὴν ἐμβίωσιν; but he maintains without reason that the death of the just is not to be considered as the direct design of the *πλούσιοι*, but only as the result of their oppressions. Also De Wette thinks that the killing is not to be understood literally, but of extreme violence, deprivation of liberty, and the like. This interpretation is, however, occasioned by the assumption that the rich are Christians.

there is no reason, with Bentley, for conjecturing *ὁ κύριος* instead of *οὐ*, or, with Benson, to take the sentence as interrogative, and to supply *ὁ κύριος*. The object of the addition of the clause is not so much the more strongly to mark the violent conduct of the rich, as rather by implication to point to the proximity of the vengeance of God, who interests Himself in the suffering just, as is definitely asserted in the previous verses. With this verse are to be compared, besides the already cited passage in *Wisd. of Sol. ii. 12-20*, particularly *Amos ii. 6, 7, v. 12* (*καταπατούντες δίκαιον*), *viii. 4*, which testify for the correctness of the explanation here given.

Ver. 7. Exhortation to the brethren to patient waiting, on to ver. 11. — *μακροθυμήσατε ὄν*]. *μακροθυμειν*; literally, to be long-suffering to those who do an injury; opposed to *ὀξυθυμειν*; see Meyer on *Col. i. 11*. On its distinction from *ὑπομένειν*, see on *2 Tim. iii. 11*; here the meaning appears to run into that of *ὑπομένειν*; comp. the following *μακροθυμῶν* and ver. 8; but it is here well put, in order to exclude the feeling of disquieting doubt; comp. *Heb. vi. 12, 15*. — *ὄν* refers to the preceding sentiment (also to that indicated in *οὐκ ἀντιτάσσεται ὑμῖν*), that the judgment is near (*De Wette, Wiesinger*).¹ — *ἀδελφοί*, contrast to the *πλούσιοι*. — Patience is to endure *ἕως τῆς παρουσίας τοῦ κυρίου*. On *ἕως* as a preposition, see *Winer, p. 418 (E. T., 470)*. As regards the meaning which *ἕως* here has, *Schneckenburger* correctly observes: *non tempus tantum sed rem quoque indicat, qua ἡ θλίψις μακροθύμως toleranda tollatur*. By *παρουσία τοῦ κυρίου*, according to constant Christian usage, is to be understood the advent of *Christ* (*Wiesinger, Brückner, Lange, Bouman*), not the coming of *God* (*Augusti, Theile, De Wette*); although *James* by *κύριος* chiefly designates *God*, yet he also uses this name for *Christ*, *chap. ii. 1*. — The exhortation is strengthened by the reference to the patient waiting of the husbandman (the same figure in *Ecclus. vi. 19*). As he waits (*ἐκδέχεται*) for the precious fruit of the earth, being patient with reference to it, until it has received the early and latter rain, so should the Christian *patiently* wait for the precious fruit of his labor, for which he hopes. The *καρπός* is designated as *τιμίος*, because it is its preciousness which occasions the *μακροθυμία*. By *μακροθυμῶν ἐπ' αὐτῷ, ἐκδέχεται*² is more definitely stated, since that verb does not necessarily include in itself the idea here intended. On *ἐπ' αὐτῷ* = in reference to the *καρπας*, comp. *Luke xviii. 7*. — *ὁ γεωργός* is not the subject of *λάβῃ* (*Luther*), but *ο καρπός* (*Stier*). — The question whether we are here to read *ἕως* with or without *ἄν* (see critical remarks) cannot be answered from the usage of the *N. T.*; see *Matt. x. 11*, and, on the other hand, *Luke xii. 59*. According to *Tischendorf*, the authorities are decisive for the omission of *ἄν*. See *Al. Buttmann, p. 198 f. (E. T., 230 f.)*.³ — (*ἕτερον*) *πρώιμον καὶ ὄψιμον*, the autumnal and spring rains; see *Deut. xi. 14*; *Jer. v. 26*; *Joel ii. 23*; *Zech. x. 1*: not “the morning and the evening rain” (*Luther*); see *Winer's Realwörterb. under “Witterung.”*³

¹ *Schneckenburger* correctly observes: “ad iudici divini propinquitatem respicit;” but the remark is erroneous: “neque eam infitias, si quis pariter versui hunc jungat, ita ut exemplo τῆς μακροθυμίας ad eandem animi lenitatem usque servaudam excitentur.”

² It is peculiar that in the parallel sentences, *Exod. xv. 16*; *Jer. xxiii. 20*, at first *ἕως* stands and then *ἕως ἄν*.

³ In a peculiar manner *Oecumenius* allegorizing says: *πρώιμος ἕτερός, ἡ ἐν νεότητι μετὰ δακρυῶν μετάνοια ὄψιμος, ἡ ἐν τῇ γῆρα*.

Ver. 8. Resumption and completion of the exhortation. The *καί* after *μακροθυμήσατε* is explained from the reference to *ὁ γεωργός*. — By the asyndeton addition *στηρίξατε τὰς καρδίας ὑμῶν*, the conduct which is the condition of *μακροθυμία* is emphasized. Not weak, but strong hearts are able to cherish *μακροθυμίαν*; on this expression, comp. 1 Thess. iii. 13; 1 Pet. v. 10. The strengthening is indeed, on the one hand, an affair of God; but, on the other hand, it depends on the man himself, just like every thing else that is obtained by the man surrendering himself to the love of God working in him. — *ὅτι ἡ παρουσία, κ.τ.λ.*] Calvin: *Ne quis objiceret, nimium differri liberationis tempus, occurrit dicens, prope instare Dominum, vel (quod idem est) ejus adventum appropinquasse.* — On the expression, comp. especially 1 Pet. iv. 7.

Ver. 9. To the preceding exhortation a new one is added: *μὴ στενάζετε, ἀδελφοί, κατ' ἀλλήλων*, since with impatience in affliction a sinful irritability of the sufferers toward each other is easily conjoined. *στενάζειν κατὰ* is to be understood neither of *invidia alienis bonis ingemiscente* (Grotius), nor of *impatia mutuis lamentationibus augenda*; it rather denotes the *genitus accusatorius* (Estius, Calvin, and others), without, however, necessarily supposing a *provocatio ultionis divinae malorumque imprecatio* (Theile, and similarly Calvin, Morus, Gebser, Hottinger, Lange, and others) united with it. Augusti incorrectly renders it: "Give no occasion to one another for sighing." — From *κατ' ἀλλήλων* it does not follow that the *πλούσιοι* (ver. 1 ff.) belong to the Christian Church (against De Wette and Wiesinger); the reference here is rather to the conduct of Christians toward each other under the oppressions to which they were exposed by the *πλούσιοι*.¹ — Since *στενάζειν κατὰ* involves the judging of our brother, and is opposed to that love of which Paul says: *μακροθυμεί, χρηστεύεται, . . . οὐ πυροξίνεται, οὐ λογιζεται τὸ κακόν . . . πάντα ὑπομένει*, James adds the admonition *ἵνα μὴ κριθήτε* (comp. Matt. vii. 1), and then, for the purpose of strengthening the warning, points to the nearness of the Judge. The *κριτής* is none other than the Lord, whose *παρουσία* is at hand. As His nearness should comfort Christians in their distress, so it should likewise restrain them from the renunciation of love to one another (comp. chap. ii. 13). Incorrectly Theile: *non tam, qui impatientius ferentes certo puniat (quamquam nec hoc abesse potest), quam: qui vos ulciscatur, ut igitur ne opus quidem sit ista tam periculosa impatientia* (so also De Wette); for *ὁ κριτής* evidently points back to *ἵνα μὴ κριθήτε*.² — On *πρὸ τῶν θυρῶν ἑστηκεν*, i. e., *he stands already before the door*, on the point of entering, see Matt. xxiv. 33; Mark xiii. 29 (Acts v. 23).

Vv. 10, 11. Old Testament examples adduced for the sake of strengthening the exhortation to patience. — *ὑπόδειγμα λάβετε*]. *ὑπόδειγμα* (instead of the classical *παράδειγμα*) here, as frequently in the N. T. and LXX., *an example*,

¹ Hornejus: "Quos ad manifestas et gravissimas improborum injurias fortiter ferendas incitabat, eos nunc hortatur, ut etiam in minoribus illis offensis, quae inter pios ipsos saepe subnascentur, vel condonandis vel dissimulandis prompti sint. Contingit enim, ut qui hostium et improborum maximas saepe contumelias et injurias aequo animo tolerant, fra-

trum tamen offensas multo leviores non facile ferant."

² Wiesinger, indeed, recognizes that the statement is added as a warning; but yet he thinks that the chief idea is: "Ye may with perfect calmness leave the judgment to Him" (so also Lange).

a pattern, in sense equivalent to *ὑπόγραμμα*, 1 Pet. ii. 21; *τύπος*, 2 Thess. iii. 9 (*εἰς τὸ μιμῆσθαι*). — *τῆς κακοπαθείας καὶ τῆς μακροθυμίας*]. *κακοπάθεια*, in the N. T. *ἀπ. λεγ.*, is not synonymous with *μακροθυμία* = *vezationum patientia* (Hottinger), but denotes *suffering, affliction*, synonymous with *ξυμφοραί*, Thuc. vii. 77; in 2 Macc. ii. 26, 27, it is used in a somewhat attenuated sense. Schneckenburger arbitrarily combines it with the following words into one idea = *τῆς ἐν κακοπαθείᾳ μακροθυμίας*; by this combination the point of *κακοπάθεια* is weakened. On the sentiment, see Matt. v. 12. — By the relative clause *οἱ ἐλάλησαν (ἐν) τῷ ὀνόματι κυρίου*, belonging to *τοὺς προφῆτας*, is indicated that the prophets, as servants of God, stand opposed to the world, even as believing Christians do. The dative *τῷ ὀνόματι* (see critical remark) is not to be explained, with Meyer (see on Matt. vii. 22), “by means of the name, i. e., that the name of the Lord satisfied their religious consciousness and was the object of their confession;” but, as is commonly understood = *ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι κυρίου* (Wiesinger: *jussu et autoritate*; De Wette: “by virtue of the name”); this is evident from the fact that the Hebrew *יְהוָה שְׁמֵךְ בְּרַךְ* is translated in the LXX. not only by *ἐν (τῷ) ὀν. κυρίου* (Dan. ix. 6) or by *ἐπὶ τῷ ὀν.* (Jer. xx. 9), but also by *λαλεῖν τῷ ὀνόματι κυρίου* (Jer. xlv. 16).¹

Ver. 11 assigns a new reason for the exhortation: *Behold, we count happy them who endure*; the *μακαρίζειν* of them is founded on the consciousness that God does not leave them unrewarded (Matt. v. 12), which is clearly manifested in the life of Job, on which account James, in conclusion, refers to him. By the reading *τοὺς ὑπομένοντας* the idea is to be taken quite generally; whereas by the better attested reading *τοὺς ὑπομείναντας* it is to be limited to sufferers of the past time; the latter is more in conformity with the context (Wiesinger). The “restricted reference” to *τοὺς προφῆτας* (Grotius, Baumgarten, Pott, Hottinger, Theile) is not to be justified. — *τὴν ὑπομονὴν ἴδωβ ἠκούσατε*]. *ὑπομονή* is not = *perpersio* (Storr), but the patience which Job displayed both in his afflictions, and in his replies to the contradictions of his friends; Tob. ii. 12-15 (Vulg.; the text in the Greek ed., Tisch. reads differently) refers to the same example; also in Ezek. xiv. 14, 20, Job is mentioned as a righteous man along with Noah and Daniel. — *ἠκούσατε* may refer specially to the reading in the synagogue, but may be understood generally. — *καὶ τὸ τέλος κυρίου* is, according to the connection given above, to be referred to and explained of the issue in which the sufferings of Job terminated: *finem, quem a Domino habuit*; so that *κυρίου* is the genit. subj. or *causae* (2 Cor. xi. 26); thus most expositors explain it. Others, as Augustin, Bede, Lyra, Estius, Thomas, Pareus, Wetstein, Lange, assume that by *τέλος κυρίου* the death of Christ is to be understood. Against this is not only the concluding clause, but also the context, which points to the end to which the pious sufferer is brought by the mercy of God, and on account of which he is accounted happy; apart altogether from the improbability

¹ Also in union with other verbs the LXX. translate *שְׁמֵךְ* sometimes by the simple dative; thus Exod. xxxiii. 19, xxxiv. 5: *καλεῖν τῷ ὀνόματι*; Jer. xii. 16: *δμνύειν τῷ ὀν. μου*; see also Isa. xii. 25, xliii. 7, xlv. 4. — Though this usage

were not decisive, yet it would be most natural to explain the dative *τῷ ὀνόματι* = *through the name*, by which the name of the Lord would be conceived as the objective power by which the prophets were induced to speak.

that James should connect the example of Christ immediately with that of Job.¹ — With the reading *εἶδετε* this can only be understood of “indirect seeing, namely, of clear perception by hearing” (De Wette). The better attested reading, however, is *ἴδετε*, and it can only be regarded as an oversight that Wiesinger translates this *ἴδετε* by “*audiendo cognovistis*,” as it is not the indicative, but the imperative. The imperative is here certainly surprising, and was on that account changed into the indicate. Tischendorf has connected *ἴδετε* with what goes before, and then it is to be explained: *Ye have heard of the patience of Job, look also at the end which the Lord gave*. The connection with what follows would, however, be more suitable: *Ye have heard of the patience of Job and the end which the Lord gave: see* (i.e., recognize from this) *that the Lord is πολὺσπλαγχνος and οἰκτιρῶν*. Such an imperative, introduced *ἀσυνδέτως*, is not foreign to the style of James; comp. chap. i. 16, 19. With the *Receptus*, and also with the union of *ἴδετε* with τὸ τέλος κυρίου, *ὅτι* is not a particle of proof = *for* (De Wette, Wiesinger, Lange), since in the preceding words no thought is expressed which would be confirmed by this clause;² but an objective particle *that*: a twofold object is joined to the verb, the second definitely bringing forward the point indicated in the first; arbitrarily Theile translates it *and certainly*. — The subject to *ἔστιν* is at all events ὁ κύριος, which, according to the most important authorities, is to be retained as genuine. — πολὺσπλαγχνος is a complete ἄπ. λεγ. “coined after the Hebrew מְרַחֵם” (Wiesinger), which the LXX. translate πολυέλεος, see Exod. xxxiv. 6, etc.; in Eph. iv. 32, 1 Pet. iii. 8, is the related expression εὐσπλαγχνος. — οἰκτιρῶν, in the N. T. only here and in Luke vi. 36 (comp. Col. iii. 12: σπλάγχνα οἰκτιρῶν), frequently in O. T.; comp. with this passage, particularly Exod. xxxiv. 6; Ps. ciii. 8; and Ecclus. ii. 7 ff. — The reference to the mercy of God was to impress the readers, in their sufferings, with the hope that the reward of their patience would not fail them, and to encourage them to steadfast endurance.

Ver. 12. The warning contained in this verse against swearing is in no other connection with the preceding than what lay in the conduct of the readers. The Epistle of James was occasioned by manifold faults in the churches, and therefore he could not conclude without referring to the inconsiderate swearing prevalent among them. It is as little indicated that he refers to the warning against abuse of the tongue (chap. iii.; Hornejus) as that this swearing arose from impatience, against which the preceding verses are directed (against Gataker, Wiesinger). How important this warning was to the author, the words *πρὸ πάντων δέ* show, by which it is indicated that it, of all other exhortations, is to be specially taken to heart. James assigns the reason of this in the words *ἵνα μὴ ὑπὸ κρίσιν πέσητε*. — The warning *μὴ ὀμνύετε* is more exactly stated in the words *μῆτε τὸν οὐρανόν, μῆτε*

¹ In a most unsatisfactory manner Lange seeks to justify this, by observing that James “did thus connect the example of Abraham with that of Rahab.” It is evidently inappropriate to place together Job as “the great sufferer of the Old Testament,” with Christ as “the great sufferer of the New Testament.”

² In a peculiar but highly arbitrary manner, Lange refers *ὅτι* to what directly precedes, uniting it with τὸ τέλος κυρίου in the sense that it is thereby specified what Christ was able to effect in entering upon His sufferings.

τὴν γῆν, μήτε ἄλλον τινὰ ὄρκον. It is to be noticed that swearing *by the name of God* is not mentioned. This is not, as Rauch along with others maintains, to be considered as included in the last member of the clause, but James with μήτε ἄλλον τινὰ ὄρκον has in view only similar formulæ as the above, of which several are mentioned in Matt. v. 35, 36. Had James intended to forbid swearing by the name of God, he would most certainly have expressly mentioned it; for not only is it commanded in the O. T. law, in contradistinction to other oaths (Deut. vi. 13, x. 20; Ps. lxxiii. 12), but also in the prophets it is announced as a token of the future turning of men to God (Isa. lxxv. 16; Jer. xii. 16, xxiii. 7, 8). The omission of *this oath* shows that James in this warning has in view only the abuse, common among the Jews generally and also among his readers, of introducing in the common everyday affairs of life, instead of the simple yea or nay, such asseverations as those here mentioned; so that we are not justified in deducing from his words an absolute prohibition of swearing in general,¹ as has been done by many expositors of our Epistle, and especially by Oecumenius, Bede, Erasmus, Gebser, Hottinger, Theile, De Wette, Neander (comp. also Meyer on Matt. v. 33 ff.); whereas Calvin, Estius, Hornejus, Laurentius, Grotius, Pott, Baumgarten, Michaelis, Storr, Morus, Schneckenburger, Kern, Wiesinger, Bouman, Lange,² and others, refer James's prohibition to light and trifling oaths. The use of oaths by heaven, etc., arises, on the one hand, from forgetting that *every* oath, in its deeper significance, is a swearing by God; and, on the other hand, from a depreciation of the *simple* word, thus from a frivolity which is in direct contrast to the earnestness of the Christian disposition. The construction of ὀμνύειν with the accusative τὸν οὐρανόν, etc., is in accordance with classical usage, whereas the construction with ἐν and εἰς (in Matt.) is according to Hebraistic usage. — To the prohibition James opposes the command with the words ἦτω δὲ ὑμῶν τὸ ναὶ ναὶ καὶ τὸ οὐ εὐ, which do not express a new exhortation (Schneckenburger), but the contrast to ὀμνύειν τὸν οὐρανόν, etc. Most expositors (Theophylact, Oecumenius, Zwingli, Calvin, Hornejus, Grotius, Bengel, Gebser, Schneckenburger, Kern, Stier, and others) find here a command to *truthfulness* expressed; but incorrectly, as in the foregoing μὴ ὀμνύετε a reference to the contrast between truth and falsehood is not in question at all. De Wette correctly explains it: "let your yea be (a simple) yea, and your nay (a simple) nay" (so also

¹ Rauch says: "One should give honor to the truth, and freely and without prejudice recognize that according to the clear words of the text here, as in Matt. v. 34 ff., a general and unconditional prohibition of all oaths is expressed." To this it is replied that honor is given to the truth when one is not taken by *appearance*, but seeks without prejudice to comprehend the *actual meaning*. In opposition to the view that Christ by the prohibition of oaths, in Matt. v. 33 ff., has in view the *ideal* condition of the church, Wiesinger with justice observes: "It can no longer be said, in reference to our passage, that only an

ideal requirement is expressed calculated for entirely different circumstances than those which were in reality, for there can be no doubt that James demands for his requirement complete practice under the actual and not the ideal circumstances of his readers."

² Lange by this understands more exactly: "conspiracy, which is a swearing accompanied by hypothetical imprecations or the giving of a pledge." Moreover, his view of the design of the Epistle misled him to find the reason of this prohibition in Jewish zeal to enter into conspiracies.

Estius, Piscator, Hottinger, Neander, Wiesinger, and others; comp. Al. Buttman, p. 142 [E. T., 163].¹ Not the sentiment itself, but its form only is different from Matt. v. 37 (see Tholuck and Meyer *in loco*).—The form ἤτω (1 Cor. xvi. 22; Ps. civ. 31, LXX.) instead of ἔστω is found in classical Greek only once in Plato, *Rep.*, ii. p. 361 (see Buttman, *Ausführl. Gr.*, § 108, Remark 15 (E. T., 49); Winer, p. 73 [E. T., 79]).—*ἵνα μὴ ὑπὸ κρίσειν πέσητε* assigns the reason why one should not swear, but should be satisfied with the simple yea or nay. According to its meaning, the expression is equivalent to *ἵνα μὴ κριθῆτε*, ver. 9. There is nothing strange in *πίπτειν ὑπό*. Comp. 2 Sam. xxii. 39; Ps. xviii. 39. By *κρίσις* is to be understood *judicium condemnatorium*. The swearing forbidden by James subjects to the judgment, because it is founded on and in every instance promotes frivolity.

Ver. 13. *If one among you suffers, let him pray; if one is of good courage, let him sing psalms.* This exhortation stands in no assignable connection with what goes before. The sufferings to which ver. 7 ff. refer are those of persecution; but *κακοπαθεῖν* has here an entirely general meaning. On account of the following *εὐθυμεῖ*, many expositors (Beza, Semler, Rosenmüller, Hottinger) incorrectly explain *κακοπαθεῖν* = “to be dejected” (Vulgate: *tristatur quis*). It rather means *to be unfortunate, to suffer*, in which *aegritudo animi* is certainly to be considered as included. Pott incorrectly takes it as equivalent to the following *ἀσθενεῖν*, which is only a particular kind of *κακοπαθεῖν*.—*προσεύχεσθαι* denotes prayer generally; there is no reason to limit it here to petition.—*ψάλλειν*, literally, to touch, used particularly of stringed instruments; in the LXX. the translation of לָּלַח and לָּלַח = *to sing psalms*; comp. particularly 1 Cor. xiv. 15. Both joy and sorrow should be the occasion of prayer to the Christian. The form of the sentence is the same as in 1 Cor. vii. 18, 27. Meyer: “The protases do not convey a question, being in the rhetorically emphatic form of the hypothetical indicative;” see Winer, p. 152 (E. T., 169), p. 255 (E. T., 285), p. 478 (E. T., 541).²

Ver. 14. From the general *κακοπαθεῖν* a particular instance, that of sickness, is selected. *ἀσθενεῖν* = *aegrotare*, as in Matt. x. 8, Luke iv. 40, and many other passages; the opposite: *ὑγιαίνειν*.—By *ἀσθενεῖ τις* James hardly means *any* sick person, but only such a person who under the burden of bodily suffering also suffers spiritually, being thereby tempted in his faith. The sick man is to call to himself the presbyters of the congregation. *προσκαλεσάσθω*, in the middle expresses only the reference *to himself*; not that the call is by others, which is here taken for granted.—*τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους τῆς ἐκκλησίας*, *the presbyters of the congregation*, namely, to which the sick man belongs. It is arbitrary to explain *τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους* as *unum ex presbyteris* (Estius, Hammond, Laurentius, Wolf); the *whole* body is meant (Wiesinger), as the article shows; not some of its members, as Theile considers possible. The follow-

¹ Lange would unite the two points together; and he is so far not in the wrong, as James presupposes truthfulness.

² Lachmann has after the sentence containing the hypothesis put a mark of interrogation.

Al. Buttman, p. 195 (E. T., 226), rightly declares this to be unnecessary, but has in his edition of the N. T. adopted the same punctuation.

ing words: *καὶ προσευξάσθωσαν, κ.τ.λ.*, express the object for which the presbyters are to come; they are to pray over him, anointing him in the name of the Lord. The prayer is the chief point, "as also ver. 15 teaches: *ἡ εὐχὴ τ. πίστεως, κ.τ.λ.*" (Wiesinger); the anointing is the act accompanying the prayer. *ἐπ' αὐτόν* is generally inaccurately explained as equivalent to *pro eo, pro salute ejus*; *ἐπί* with the accusative expresses figuratively the reference to something, similarly as the German *über* with the accusative; thus *κλαίειν ἐπί τινα*, Luke xxiii. 28. How far the author thought on a local reference, he who prayeth bending over the sick, or stretching forth his hands over him, cannot be determined; see Acts xix. 13. — With the prayer is to be conjoined the anointing of the sick, for what purpose James does not state. According to Mark vi. 13, the disciples in their miracles of healing applied it, when at the command of Jesus they traversed the Jewish land; but the reason of their doing so is not given, nor at a later period is there any mention of it in the miracles of the apostles.¹ Probably James mentions the anointing with oil only in conformity with the general custom of employing oil for the refreshing, strengthening, and healing of the body,² since he refers the miracle not to the anointing, but to the prayer, and, presupposing its use, directs that the presbyters should unite prayer with it, and that they should perform it *ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι (τοῦ) κυρίου*, that is, in a believing and trustful mention of the name of Christ (less probably of God). That *ἐν τῷ ὀν. κυρ.* cannot mean *jussu et auctoritate Christi* is evident, because there is no express command of Christ to employ it. Gebser incorrectly unites this particular with *προσευξάσθωσαν*; Schneckenburger with both verbs; it belongs only to *ἀλείψαντες* (De Wette, Wiesinger). The question why the presbyters should do this is not to be answered, with Schneckenburger: *quia τὸ χάρισμα ἰαμάτων* (1 Cor. xii. 9) *cum iis communicatum erat*; for, on the one hand, it is an arbitrary supposition that the presbyters possessed that *χάρισμα*, and, on the other hand, there is here no mention of it; incorrectly also Pott: *quia uti omnino prudentissimi eligebantur, sic forte etiam artis medicæ peritissimi erant*. Bengel has given the true explanation: *qui dum orant, non multo minus est, quam si tota oraret ecclesia*; and Neander: "the presbyters as organs acting in the name of the church."³

Ver. 15 mentions the result of the prayer conjoined with the anointing. — *καὶ ἡ εὐχὴ τῆς πίστεως*]. That the prayer of the presbyters must proceed from faith was not asserted in the preceding, but was evidently presupposed; it is now directly characterized as such. *τῆς πίστεως* is gen. subj.: *the prayer which faith offers*; inaccurately Schneckenburger: *preces fide plenæ. πίστις*

¹ Meyer *in loco* considers this anointing, as also the application of spittle on the part of Jesus Himelef, as a conductor of the supernatural healing power, analogous to the laying-on of hands. But in this the distinction is too little observed, that according to general custom oil, but not spittle, and the laying-on of hands, was applied to the sick.

² See Herzog's *Real-Encycl.* on Oel, Oelung, Salbe.

³ It is well known that the Catholic Church, besides Mark vi. 13, specially appeals to this passage in support of the sacrament of extreme unction. Chemnitz, in his *Examen Conc. Trid.*, has already thoroughly shown with what incorrectness they have done so. Even Cajetan and Baronius doubt whether James here treats of that sacrament, as he does not speak of the sick unto death, but of the sick generally. See Herzog's *Real-Encycl.* on the word Oelung.

is used here in the same signification as in chap. i. 16; it is sure confidence in the Lord, in reference to the case in question. Grotius, Gomarus, Schneckenburger, Theile, and others define the prayer more closely, as that of the presbyters *and of the sick man*. On the other hand, Wiesinger refers ἡ εὐχὴ τ. π. το προσευξάσθωσαν, accordingly the intercession of the presbyters; so also De Wette. This is correct; it is, however, to be observed that James has certainly supposed as self-evident the prayer of the sick man who called the elders. The following words: σώσει τὸν κείμενοντα, state the effect of the prayer of the presbyters. — τὸν κείμενοντα takes up again ἰσθενεῖ τις. κείμεναι, in the N. T. except here only in Heb. xii. 3 in a figurative sense, has even with classical writers very commonly the meaning *to be sick*. — σώσει, equivalent to *will recover*. This meaning is required by reference to τὸν κείμενοντα, and to the context generally; the word occurs in the same signification in Matt. ix. 22; Mark v. 23; John xi. 12, and elsewhere. — By the following clause: καὶ ἐγερεῖ αὐτῶν ὁ κύριος, what is said is more exactly specified; the prayer of faith effects σώσει, by which the Lord (apparently Christ) on its account helps; ἐγείρειν, *to raise up from the sick-bed*, see Mark i. 31, etc.; not “to raise up from sickness” (Lange; “to cause him to recover,” De Wette); the word never occurs in this meaning in the N. T. — A particular case is added to the general. κὰν ἁμαρτίας ἢ πεποιηκώς]. κὰν is not, as is done by most expositors, but against linguistic usage,¹ to be resolved by *and if*, but by *even if* (so also Lange). By the sins here meant are such as formed the special reason of the sickness. Accordingly, the meaning is: even if he has drawn his sickness upon himself by special sins (unsatisfactorily, Lange: “if his sickness has become by them very severe”). By ἢ πεποιηκώς the effect of the sins is represented as existing. — The apodosis ἀφεθήσεται αὐτῷ expresses that even in this case the healing will not fail. The forgiveness of sins is here meant, which is confirmed by the removal of the special punishment produced by the particular sins. The explanation of Hammond is evidently entirely erroneous: *non tam a Deo, quam a Presbyteris, qui aegroti peccata ipsis confitenti . . . absolutionem dare tenentur*. As regards the construction of the sentence, κὰν πεποιηκώς may be joined to what goes before, and ἀφεθήσεται considered as an asyndeton addition: *and the Lord will raise him up, even if he has committed sins . . . (for) it will be forgiven him*. But the usual construction, according to which ἀφεθήσεται is simply the apodosis to κὰν, κ.τ.λ., is to be preferred on account of the close connection of ideas; thus: *even if he hath committed sins, it will be forgiven him*; by which the idea is included in ἀφεθήσεται αὐτῷ, that he will be healed of his sickness. — τὸ πεποιηκέναι is to be supplied from the preceding to ἀφεθήσεται (Bengel, Theile, Wiesinger). — The promise (σώσει . . . ἐγερεῖ) so positively expressed by James is founded on his confidence in the Lord, who hears believing intercession, so that it is not in vain. It is certainly surprising that James gives this assurance without any restriction. Although we cannot say, with Hottinger: *si certus et constans talium precum fuisset eventus, nemo unquam mortuus esset*, since the nature

¹ In no passage of the N. T., except perhaps Luke xlii, 9, is the καὶ in κὰν the simple copula uniting two sentences, but it has every-

where the meaning *though, even*. The N. T. usage is here in conformity with the classical; see Pape on the word κὰν.

of the condition, on which James makes the event dependent, is not considered; on the one hand, it is self-evident that true *πίστις* includes the humble *πλὴν οὐχ ὡς ἐγὼ θέλω ἀλλ' ὡς σύ* (Matt. xxvi. 39); and, on the other hand, it is to be observed that although James here evidently speaks of bodily sickness and its cure, yet he uses such expressions as point beyond the sphere of the corporeal to the spiritual, so that even when the result corresponds not to the expectation in reference to the bodily sickness, yet the prayer of faith does not remain unanswered in the higher sense.¹

Ver. 16 annexes a new thought to what has been said, which is, however, as the strongly attested *οὖν* shows, in close connection. From the special order James infers a general injunction, in which the intervening thought is to be conceived that the sick man confessed his sins to the presbyters for the purpose of their intercession; Christians generally are to practise the same duty of confession toward each other. It is incorrect, with Chrysostom (*De Sacerd.*; i., iii.) and several ancient and other expositors, to refer the injunction contained in this verse to the above-mentioned relation of the presbyters and the sick to each other, and accordingly to paraphrase it, with Pott: *ὑμεῖς ἀσθενοῦντες ἐξομολογεῖσθε τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις τὰ παραπτώματα ὑμῶν καὶ ὑμεῖς πρεσβύτεροι εὐχεσθε ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀσθενοῦντων*; for by this not only is violence done to the language, but also an intolerable tautology arises. *ἀλλήλοις* can only be referred to the relation of individual believers to each other, so that Cajetan correctly says: *nec hic est sermo de confessione sacramentali*. Some expositors incorrectly restrict the general expression *παραπτώματα* to such sins which one commits against another; Wolf: *de illis tantum peccatis sermo est, quae alter in alterum commisit, quorumque veniam ab altero poscit*; Bengel: *aegrotus et quisquis offendit, jubetur confiteri: offensus orare*. The passage treats not of human, but of the *divine* forgiveness; and thus of sins not as offences against our neighbor, but as violations of the law of God.²—*καὶ εὐχεσθε ὑπὲρ ἀλλήλων*]. To *ἐξομολόγησις*, intercession for one another is to be conjoined; indeed, the former takes place in order that the latter may follow. The contents of the prayer is naturally the divine forgiveness, but the aim to be attained thereby is *ὁπως ἰαθῆτε*. The word *ἰᾶσθαι* is in the N. T. used both literally and figuratively (Heb. xii. 13; 1 Pet. ii. 24). After the example of several expositors (Hottinger, De Wette, Wiesinger), the first meaning has hitherto in this commentary been ascribed to *ἰαθῆτε*, on account of the connection of this verse with what goes before; but since among *ἀλλήλοις* are certainly to be understood not only the sick, and James indicates by nothing that his injunction refers only to them, it is more correct to take *ἰαθῆτε* here, in its proper reference to *παραπτώματα*, in a figurative sense (Estius, Carpzov, Grotius, Gebser, and others); whether James likewise thought on a bodily healing taking place in the cases occurring (Schnecken-

¹ It must be designated as arbitrary when Lange understands this passage also as symbolical, and thus interprets it: "If any man as a Christian has been hurt, or become sick in his Christianity, let him seek healing from the presbyters, the kernel of the congregation.

Let these pray with and for him, and anoint him with the oil of the Spirit; such a course, wherever taken, will surely restore him, and his transgressions will be forgiven him."

² Lange primarily understands by this "the sins of the Judaeizing disposition."

burger, Kern), must remain undetermined. — It is to be remarked, that the prayer of the presbyters does not exclude the common intercession of the members of the church, and that the efficacy attributed to the latter is not less than that attributed to the former. — *πολὴν ἰσχύει δέησις δικαίου ἐνεργουμένη* is added by James for the purpose of strengthening the above exhortation; the *asyndeton* connection is with him not remarkable. The stress is on *πολὴν ἰσχύει*, consequently it stands first. *δικαίος*, equivalent to the Hebrew רַ'יָא, is, according to the Christian view of James, he who in faith performs the works of νόμος ἐλευθερίας. — With regard to *ἐνεργουμένη*, expositors have introduced much that is arbitrary. Most take the participle as an adjective belonging to *δέησις*, and then attempt to explain the expression *δέησις ἐνεργουμένη*. Oecumenius leaves the word itself unexplained, but he lays stress on the point that the prayer of the righteous is only then effectual when he, for whom it is offered, *συμπράττη διὰ κακώσεως πνευματικῆς* with the suppliant. Michaelis explains it: *preces agitante Spiritu sancto effusae*; Carpzov: *δέησις διὰ πίστεως ἐνεργουμένη*; Gebser understands prayer in which the suppliant himself works for the accomplishment of his wish; similarly Calvin: *tunc vere in actu est oratio, quum succurrere contendimus iis, qui laborant*. According to the usual explanation, *ἐνεργουμένη* is assumed to be synonymous with *ἐνεργῆς* or *ἐνεργός* (*ἐκτενῆς*, Luke xxii. 44; Acts xii. 5), “*strenuous*,” “*intentus*,” “*earnest*,” etc., and this qualification of the prayer of the righteous man is attached to *πολὴν ἰσχύει* as its condition; Luther: “if it is earnest” (so Wiesinger, and similarly Erasmus, Beza, Gataker, Hornejus, Grotius, Wolf, Baumgarten, Hottinger, Schneckenburger, Theile, Bouman, and others). This explanation, however, has not only, as Wiesinger confesses, N. T. usage against it, but this qualification cannot be taken as the condition of *πολὴν ἰσχύει*, but is rather the statement of the characteristic nature of the prayer of the righteous man. It would be more correct to adhere to the *verbal* meaning of the participle (so Pott, whose paraphrases, however: *πολὴν ἰσχύει [δύναται] ἐνεργεῖν*, or: *πολὴν ἰσχύει καὶ ἐνεργεῖ δέησις*, are arbitrary), and to explain it: the prayer of the righteous man availeth much, *whilst it works* (not: “if it applies itself to working,” De Wette), i. e., *in its working*. That it does work, is assumed; that, besides working, it *πολὴν ἰσχύει*, which James brings forward and confirms by the following example of Elias.¹

Vv. 17, 18. James, wishing to show in the example of Elias the power of prayer, observes beforehand on the objection that, owing to his peculiar greatness (see Ecclus. xlviii. 1–15), the example of Elias was inapplicable to ordinary men, that Ἐλίας ἄνθρωπος ἦν ὁμοιοπαθῆς ἡμῖν. — ἄνθρωπος is not here pleonastic (Schneckenburger), but denotes the point on which James insists, which is still more strengthened by ὁμοιοπαθῆς ἡμῖν. This idea contains no reference to the sufferings which Elias had to endure (Laurentius, Schneckenburger, Bouman), but signifies only *of like disposition and nature*; see Meyer on Acts xiv. 15; comp. also Wisd. of Sol. viii. 3, and Grimm on 4 Macc xii. 13. Lange inappropriately explains it “similarly conditioned.”

¹ Lange translates: “which is inwardly effectual (working),” and thinks that *ἐνεργεῖσθαι* expresses a *passive-active* working.

Gebser assumes a contrast to *δικαιος*, strangely explaining it: "having the same sentiments and passions as we; James inferred *how much more* will the prayer of a *δικαίου* avail." — The history, to which James refers, is contained in 1 Kings xvii. 1, xviii. 1, 41 ff. The account of James differs in two points from the O. T. narrative; first, the point on account of which James appeals to Elias, namely his twofold prayer, is not mentioned; and, secondly, it is stated that it began to rain in the third year. Both in 1 Kings xvii. 1 and in xviii. 41, Elias only announces what will take place; in the first passage, that it will not rain these years, and in the second passage, that it will soon rain. Neither in what Elias says of himself in 1 Kings xvii. 1: אֲשֶׁר עָבַרְתִּי לְפָנָיו, nor in what is related in 1 Kings xviii. 41, is it stated that Elias offered up such a prayer as James mentions; for although in ver. 42 Elias is represented as praying, yet it is not hinted that the rain took place in consequence of his prayer, since rather the promise of rain (ver. 1) preceded the prayer. Yet those statements, and particularly the word of Elias in 1 Kings xvii. 2: בִּי אִם-לִבִּי דַבַּרְיִ, are to be considered as the foundation of the statement of James, whether he followed a tradition (see Ecclus. xlvi. 2, 3) or a view peculiar to himself. — With regard to the second deviation, the same statement concerning the duration of the drought is found in Luke iv. 25 (see Meyer *in loco*), and in the Jalkut Schimoni on 1 Kings xvi., where it is said: *Anno xiii. Achabi james regnabit in Samaria per tres annos et dimidium anni*. It is certainly correct, as Benson remarks, that if the rain, according to the word of Elias, was stayed at the beginning of the rainy season, and it again began to rain in the third year at the end of the summer season, the drought would continue in all three and a half years; but according to the statement of James, the drought began with the prayer of Elias, and continued from that three and a half years. Accordingly, Wiesinger is wrong in finding in the remark of Benson a sufficient reconciliation of the difference.¹ — προσευχῇ προσήύξατο, the same construction as θανάτω ὑποθάνεισθε, Gen. ii. 17, LXX., as the Greek rendering of the Hebrew union of the infinite absolute with the finite tense, which the LXX. usually express by the union of the participle with the finite tense (see Winer, p. 317 f. [E. T., 355]). This addition of the substantive serves to bring out the verbal idea (De Wette), not to denote that the prayer of Elias was *earnest* (Schneckenburger, Wiesinger, Lange), but that nothing else than *his prayer* produced the long drought. — τοῦ μὴ βρέξαι, the genitive of design after προσήύξατο, because the contents of the prayer agreed with its object. This construction corresponds to the frequent use of *ἵνα* with verbs of asking in the N. T.; see Winer, p. 292 (E. T., 326). — βρέχειν is here used, as in the later classics, impersonally; otherwise in Matt. v. 45; Gen.

¹ It is otherwise with regard to Luke iv. 25, where the simple duration of time during which it would not rain is stated. James has erred in making the prayer of Elias mentioned by him precede this whole period; whereas what is mentioned in 1 Kings xvii. 1, is that it commenced after the summer during which

it had not rained. According to Lange, the reconciliation consists in this, that in 1 Kings xviii. only the duration of the real *famine* is stated, which did not begin until one year after the announcement of the drought; but there is no indication of this statement.

ii. 5, xix. 24. Baumgarten incorrectly supplies *ὁ Θεός* as the subject. — *καὶ οὐκ, κ.τ.λ.*, the result of the prayer. Schneckenburger: *quis non sentit pondus dictionis τοῦ μὴ βρέξαι, καὶ οὐκ ἔβρεξεν*; comp. Gen. i. 3, *fiat lux, et facta est lux.* — *ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς*, not *on the land*, i. e., Palestine (Grotius, Wolf, Baumgarten, Stolz, Lange, and others), but *on the earth* (Luther); comp. Luke iv. 25 (Gen. vii. 12).

Ver. 18. The second prayer of Elias, and its result. — *ὁ οὐρανὸς ἕτερον ἔδωκεν*, a popular form of expression; comp. Acts xiv. 17. — *καὶ ἡ γῆ, κ.τ.λ.*, contains not a further description, but added to mark more strongly the effect of the prayer: heaven and earth acted according to the prayer of Elias. — *ἐβλάστησεν*, properly an intransitive verb; so in Matt. xiii. 26; Mark iv. 27; Heb. ix. 4. The first aorist here, as frequently in the later classics, in a transitive signification; comp. Gen. i. 11, LXX. With respect to the form, see Winer, p. 77 (E. T., 84). — *τὸν καρπὸν αὐτῆς*; Schneckenburger: *fruges suas*, i. e., *quas ferre solet*.

Vv. 19, 20. To the exhortation to mutual confession and intercession is annexed "the reference to an important matter — the reclaiming of an erring soul" (Wiesinger). Ver. 19 forms the supposition; this is expressed in two co-ordinate sentences, of which the first is subordinate in thought to the second: "if any convert one who has erred from the truth." — *πλανηθῆ*, the passive aorist here, as frequently in the signification of the middle. — *ἀπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας*. With this is meant not a single practical aberration, but an alienation from the Christian principle of life, an inward apostasy from the *λόγος ἀληθείας* by which the Christian is begotten (Jas. i. 18), disclosing itself in a sinful course of life (so also Wiesinger, Brückner, Lange¹). — *καὶ ἐπιστρέψῃ, sc. ἐπὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν*; comp. Luke i. 16, 17.

Ver. 20 forms the apodosis. — *γινωσκέτω*]. The *τις* mentioned in the second half of the preceding verse is the subject — the converter and not the converted. The remarkableness of the repetition of the subject after *ὅτι* disappears, when it is considered that the idea to be taken to heart is expressed as a sentence which is universally valid.² Calvin rightly draws attention to the fact that the tendency of the verse is to excite zeal for the conversion of the erring. — The word *ἀμαρτωλόν* is to be retained in its general signification, and not to be referred simply to *τὸν πλανηθέντα ἀπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας*; it denotes the genus to which he that errs from the truth belongs as species. — *ἐκ πλάνης ὁδοῦ αὐτοῦ*, not = *ex erroris vita* (Schulthess); correctly, Luther: "from the error of his way." *πλάνη* states the nature of the way on which the *ἀμαρτωλός* walks, and forms the contrast to *ἀλήθεια*. — *σώσει ψυχὴν [αὐτοῦ] ἐκ θανάτου*, i. e., *he will save a (his) soul from the death to which otherwise it would have fallen a prey*. The future is here used because James "has in view the final result of such a saving deed" (Wiesinger). On *ψυχὴν*, comp. chap. i. 21; on the

¹ Arbitrarily, Lange defines the aberration more precisely "as an aberration into Judaistic and chiliastic doings and fanatical and scditions lusts."

² Wiesinger: "ὁ ἐπιστρέψας is not to be taken as equivalent to *he who*, in strict refer-

ence to the subject of *γινωσκέτω*, but expresses the general idea that every one who converts a sinner performs a great work; it is the general statement, under which he who is designated by *γινωσκέτω* subordinates his doing."

reading of the *Receptus Estius* remarks: *absolute posita emphasisin habet*. But probably *ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ* is the correct reading. *θάνατος*, eternal destruction, as in chap. i. 15. Lange strangely explains it as “the moral dissolution of the ontological life eternally self-generating itself.” — *καὶ καλύψει πλῆθος ἁμαρτιῶν* is to be understood not of the sins of the converter, who by his good work obtains forgiveness, whether on the part of God (*Zacharias, Ep. i., Ad Bonifac.*; *Bede, Erasmus, Bouman, and others*) or on the part of man (*Augusti: “his own offences will not be remembered”*), but of the sins of the converted (so most expositors). The words are an echo of *Prov. x. 12* (comp. *1 Pet. iv. 8*), although it is doubtful if *James* had this passage actually in view; especially *καλύπτει* here does not, as a strict translation of the Hebrew *כִּפֶּה*, — see *Neh. iii. 36* (LXX., ed. *Tisch. iv. 6*); *Ps. xxxii. 1, lxxxv. 3*, — signify to *forgive*, but the figurative expression is used by *James* in the sense that the sins of the converted are by the converter covered or concealed from the eyes of God, i.e., their forgiveness is effected. By *πλῆθος ἁμαρτιῶν* are meant not the sins which the *ἁμαρτωλός* would otherwise commit (*Jaspar: peccata adhuc patranda*), and which were now prevented by his conversion (*Pott: multa futura impediēt*), but the multitude of sins which he committed before his conversion.¹ Lange thinks: “this restriction misapprehends the progressive nature of guilt;” but how could sins which have *not* been committed be forgiven?² That the mention here is not of human, but of divine forgiveness, the close connection of the idea with the pre. *διὸ σώσει ψυχὴν ἐκ θανάτου* shows. Correctly, *Wiesinger: “καλύψει car. on further the σώσει ψυχὴν, and states the ground of this salvation.*

¹ *De Wette* takes objection to the strong expression *πλῆθος*, as he thinks that the reference here is only to *aberration*, and not to a vicious life; and on this account he will consider, along with this, the sins of those who stand in reciprocal action with him who has erred, and were or might have been injured and led astray by him; but without reason; especially *πλῆθος ἁμαρτιῶν* corresponds entirely to the idea *πλανηθῆναι ἀπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας*,

provided it be not arbitrarily weakened (so also *Brückner*).

² “In order to give prominence to the noble historical import of the Epistle, which has been only too much missed and neglected,” *Lange* maintains that *James* here, at the conclusion, invites the believing part of his people to engage in intercession and in “the work of salvation, that many individuals may be saved from death, and a multitude of sins might be atoned for.”

THE FIRST EPISTLE OF THE APOSTLE PETER.

INTRODUCTION.

SEC. 1. — THE APOSTLE PETER.

THE apostle's real name was *Σίμων* (according to another pronunciation *Συμεών*, Acts xv. 14; 2 Pet. i. 1). A native of Bethsaida on the Sea of Galilee (John i. 45), he dwelt afterwards in Capernaum (Luke iv. 31, 38), where he was married (cf. 1 Cor. ix. 5), and where his mother-in-law lived. In the tradition, his wife is called at one time Concordia, at another Perpetua, and is said (Clem. Alex., *Strom.* 7) to have suffered martyrdom before him. Along with his father Jonas (Matt. xvi. 17; called *Ἰωάννης* also, John i. 43, xxi. 15) and his brother Andrew, he was by occupation a fisherman on the Sea of Galilee. When the Baptist began his ministry at the Jordan, the two brothers resorted to him. On John's testimony Andrew, and through his instrumentality Peter, attached themselves to Jesus, who gave to the latter the name full of promise, Cephas. From that time forth Peter, and along with him Andrew, remained a disciple of Christ. After he had accompanied Jesus — as there is no reason to doubt — on the journeys recorded by John, chaps. ii. 2–iv. 43, we find him, it is true, again engaged in his earthly calling; but from this there is no reason for concluding that he had forsaken Jesus, who Himself was then living in Capernaum, Matt. iv. 13, 18. At that time he received his call to enter on the service of Christ. On the occasion of the miraculous draught of fishes he was impressed powerfully, and as he never before had been, by the revelation of his Master's glory; to his words: *ἐξελθε ἀπ' ἐμοῦ*, the reply is given: *ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν ἀνθρώπους ἔσῃ ζωγρῶν*.¹ Received afterwards into the

¹ That Luke (v. 1 ff.) and Matthew (iv. 18 ff.) relate the same fact, admits of no doubt; not only are the scenes and the persons identical, but the words in Matthew,

ποιήσω ὑμᾶς ἀλιεῖς ἀνθρώπων, agree in sense with those in Luke addressed specially to Peter. Neither is there any *inward* difference (cf. Meyer on Luke v. 1 ff.), for the

number of the apostles, he forthwith gained a prominent place among them. Not only was he one of the three who stood in most trusted fellowship with Jesus, but on himself pronouncing in his own name and in that of his fellows the decisive confession: *σὺ εἶ ὁ Χριστός, ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ* (cf. John vi. 67 ff.), Jesus confirmed the name formerly given to him, and added the promise: *ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ πέτρᾳ οἰκοδομήσω μου τὴν ἐκκλησίαν . . . καὶ δώσω σοὶ τὰς κλεῖς τῆς βασιλείας τῶν οὐρανῶν*. Thus a primacy was lent to him which is in harmony with the word of Christ later on: *στήριξον τοὺς ἀδελφούς σου* (Luke xxii. 32), and the charge of the Risen One: *βόσκε τὰ ἄρνια μου* (John xxi. 15-17). And for such a calling Peter was peculiarly fitted, by the energy prompting to decisive action, which formed an essential feature of his character; though not until his natural man had been purified and sanctified by the Spirit of the Lord. For, on the one hand, his resolute character betrayed him more than once into vaingloriousness, self-will, and unthinking zeal; and, on the other, he was wanting in the patience and even firmness which might have been expected from him who was surnamed the Rock. Whilst, too, he pressed on swiftly to the end he had in view, as if to take it by storm, confronted with danger he was seized of a sudden with faint-heartedness; his nature was suited more to quick action than to patient suffering. As proofs of this may be taken his walking on the sea and his sudden fear (Matt. xiv. 28-31), his rebuke of Christ (Matt. xvi. 22), his question as to the sufficient measure of forgiveness (Matt. xviii. 21), his inquiring what reward they, the disciples, would have, in that they had forsaken all for Christ's sake (Matt. xix. 27). In still more marked lines does the picture of his distinctive character stand out in the background of Christ's passion, when he first in vain self-confidence promises to the Lord that he would never forsake him, but would go with Him even unto death, and then on the Mount of Olives is unable to watch with Him; he wishes, thereupon, to save his Master with the sword, and follows Him even to the court of the high priest, but in sudden cowardice denies Him before the men-servants and maids, and as quickly, feeling the whole weight of his guilt, leaves the judgment-hall in tears. On account of these unquestionably serious vacillations in feeling and conduct, he nevertheless cannot be accused of indecision of character. If he showed himself weak on particular occasions,

"point" of Matthew's narrative is not the mere injunction and promise, as in Luke's it is not the "miracle of the draught of fishes," but the call to become fishers of men. Nor does Luke contradict himself, for what

is related in v. 8 does not prove that previous to this Peter had had no experience of miracles, since that which produced the impression on Peter — related by Luke — was not necessarily the *first* miracle he witnessed.

this was the result partly of his sanguine temperament, in which action instantaneously followed on excited feeling, and partly of his great self-confidence, into which he was betrayed by the consciousness of his own strength. The denial of Christ led to his inward purification; all the more that after His resurrection Christ revealed Himself to Peter first among the apostles. And so to the thrice-repeated question of the Lord, if he loved Him more than the others, he returned the answer, humble yet full of faith: "Lord, Thou knowest that I love Thee."

After the ascension of Christ, Peter appears standing at the head of the apostles, for it is at his advice that their number is again increased to twelve. After the descent of the Spirit, however, he becomes in reality the Rock, as Christ had ordained him; henceforth the direction and furtherance of the church rest chiefly in his hand. It was his sermon—the first apostolic sermon—by means of which, on the Day of Pentecost, three thousand were added to the church of God; and if afterwards he labored at first in connection with John, it was yet himself who was the real actor (Acts iii. 1, 4 ff., 11 ff.). He healed the lame man, addressed the people, and on both apostles being brought before the ecclesiastical authorities, it was he who was the speaker. He had to execute judgment on Ananias and Sapphira (Acts v. 1-10); and when the whole of the apostles were summoned to appear before the Sanhedrim, it is he, too, who in the name of all testifies for Christ. Again, in Samaria, whither he went along with John to continue the work begun by Philip, John appears beside him only as an accompanying fellow-worker.—During the time that the churches had rest after the conversion of Paul, Peter journeyed throughout the districts of Palestine bordering on the Mediterranean Sea; in Lydda he healed Aeneas (Acts ix. 32 ff.), and raised up Tabitha in Joppa (ix. 36 ff.).—In accordance with the position assigned to him by Christ, *he* was permitted by God to bring into the church the first-fruits of heathenism; for although Paul was destined to be the Apostle of the Gentiles, it was still Peter who should *first* preach the gospel to the heathen, and administer the ordinance of baptism, that thus also he might retain the primacy, and be the Rock of the Church.—During the persecution raised shortly before his death by Herod Agrippa I., Peter was cast into prison. After his miraculous release he quitted Jerusalem¹ for a time, but later on again returned thither. The

¹ We are not told where Peter went; Acts xli. 17 only says: ἐπορεύθη εἰς ἕτερον τόπον. The statement of several Fathers, that Peter then betook himself to Rome, and there

founded the Christian Church, has, without sufficient warrant, been accepted by Thiersch (*Die Kirche im apost. Zeitalter*, p. 96 ff.). This is decidedly opposed not only by the

last circumstance which the Acts of the Apostles relates of him is his justification of Paul at the so-called convention of apostles in Jerusalem.

The labors of Paul among the heathen, and the reception of believing Gentiles into the Christian Church, occasioned the first division amongst the Christians. What position did Peter then take up? After what he himself had witnessed at the conversion of Cornelius, he could not make common cause with the Judaistically-minded Christians; in the proceedings at Jerusalem, too, he placed himself decidedly on the side of Paul, and spoke against the subjugation of the heathen to the law. It was then, on Peter formally recognizing the grace given by the Lord to Paul, that an agreement was come to, that Paul and Barnabas should labor among the Gentiles, whilst he himself, along with John and James, should devote themselves to the Jews (Gal. ii. 9) — the field of missionary enterprise being in this way divided among them. — In thus limiting his activity to the Jewish people, Peter detracted in no way from his primacy; for this, which had never in any sense been absolute, remained intact, as is evident from the circumstance that Paul took especial care to assure himself of *Peter's* consent, and acknowledged his foremost position among the apostles (cf. Gal. ii. 7, 8).

That Peter, with all his recognition of Paul's principles, was wholly unfit to undertake the direction of missions to the Gentiles, is proved by his conduct at Antioch, for which he was called to account by Paul. He was not wanting, it is true, in a right perception of the relation in which the gospel stood to the law, so that without any misgivings he entered into complete fellowship with the Gentile Christians;¹ still, as regarded his own conduct, this perception was not vivid enough to preserve him from the hypocrisy which drew forth Paul's rebuke (Gal. ii. 12). For, when "certain came" to Antioch "from James," Peter withdrew himself from them, fearing those of the circumcision, doubtless because he did not wish to appear in the light

Epistle to the Romans, but also by the indefinite expression employed here. Ewald also (*Geschichte des Volkes Israel*, VI. p. 618 ff.) thinks "that the old legend as to Peter's sojourn in Rome during the reign of Claudius, and his meeting here with Simon the magician, was not altogether without foundation," but that the Christian Church in Rome had then already been established. — But it is not credible, either that if Peter had visited the church in Rome, Paul should not have made the slightest allusion to the fact in his Epistle to the Romans, or that

Peter should have gone to Rome with the intention of there, as in Samaria, opposing Simon; cf. Hofmann, p. 203 ff.

¹ As in Gal. ii. 2, 8, 9, 15, τὰ ἔθνη means not Gentile Christians, but Gentiles, Paul seems, by the expression in ver. 12, μετὰ τῶν ἔθνῶν συνῆσθαι, to have meant heathens also. But even if they were only Gentile Christians with whom Peter ate, it is not their Christianity, but their Gentile nationality and customs, as distinguishing them from the Jews, which Paul has here in his eye.

of a transgressor of the law. How dangerous his example was, became evident even then; and it is clear further that the Jewish Christians hostilely disposed to the heathen converts were only too ready to appeal to the example of Peter in their opposition to Paul. From this, however, it must not be concluded that there was any want of harmony in principle between Paul and Peter, and that by the *δεξιῶς ἔδωκαν ἐμοὶ καὶ Βαρνάβῃ κοινωνίας* is to be understood a mere "temporary truce," which they had concluded with each other in a purely external manner, and whilst holding fast their internal differences.¹

As to where and with what result Peter worked after Paul commenced his labors, all precise and reliable information is wanting; from 1 Cor. ix. 5 it follows only that he made missionary journeys to various regions. If by Babylon (chap. v. 13) that city itself and not Rome is to be understood, he must have been at the time our epistle was written in Babylon, whence by means of this letter he extended his influence to the churches of Asia Minor, which, in part at least, had been founded by Paul.

The account which the Fathers give of the life of the apostle is pervaded by many mythical traits. The more important his position, the more natural it was for a one-sided Judæo-Christianity, as well as for the Catholic Church, to draw by invention, intentional or unintentional, the picture of the apostle's labors in their own interests. Without any sifting of the legendary elements, Hieronymus describes the subsequent life of Peter in the following manner: "*Simon Petrus princeps apostolorum post episcopatum Antiochensis ecclesiae et praedicationem dispersionis eorum, qui de circumcissione crediderant, in Ponto, Galatia, Cappadocia, Asia et Bithynia secundo Claudii imperatoris anno ad expugnandum Simonum Magum, Romam pergit, ibique viginti quinque*

¹ The Tübingen school confessedly considers the first apostles, and Peter in particular, to have been narrow Judæists, and accordingly ascribes to them precisely those views which Paul so decidedly combats in those of his epistles which are undoubtedly genuine. Though compelled to admit that it was not the first apostles themselves who opposed Paul and his gospel at Corinth and elsewhere, Pfeleiderer (*Der Judaismus*, p. 299), nevertheless, maintains that they supported those who did so. He explains Peter's conduct in Antioch (p. 296) in this way, that the apostle, in order to please the heathen Christians, adopted there a mode of life freer

than was really permissible from his dogmatic standpoint. The fact, on the contrary, was that his mode of life was stricter than was consistent with his principles, for which reason Paul accused him of *ὑπόκρισις*. It is more than singular that Pfeleiderer should so entirely overlook the dishonor thus brought upon Paul by maintaining that the first apostles preached a *different* gospel from that which he taught. For how could Paul, without grossly violating his own conscience, accept the *δεξιὰ κοινωνίας* offered him by James, Peter, and John, if his *ἀνάθεμα ἔστω* (Gal. i. 7, 8) was applicable to each of them as the preacher of a *ἕτερον εὐαγγέλιον*?

annis cathedram sacerdotalem tenuit, usque ad ultimum annum Neronis, id est, decimum quartum. A quo et affixus cruci martyrio coronatus est, capite ad terram verso et in sublime pedibus elevatis, asserens se indignum, qui sic crucifigeretur ut dominus suus. Sepultus Romae in Vaticano juxta viam triumphalem totius orbis veneratione celebratur" (*De Scriptor. Eccl.*, cap. i., De Petro).

In this narrative the following particulars are mythical: (1) The episcopate of Peter in the church at Antioch; the saying, too, of Eusebius (*Chronicum ad Annum*, iii.), that Peter founded the church at Antioch, must be considered apocryphal, as contradicting Acts xi. 19-22. (2) His personal activity in the regions of Asia Minor; this is doubtless mentioned already by Origen as probable;¹ but it must be regarded simply as an inference from 1 Pet. i. 1, as even Windischmann (*Vindiciae Pet.*, § 112 f.) admits. (3) His journey to Rome for the purpose of combating Simon Magus² This story is based on a passage in Justin's *Apologia Maj.*, c. 26, which speaks of a statue in Rome with the following inscription: ΣΙΜΩΝΙ ΔΕΩ ΣΑΓΚΤΩ, which, however, has been discovered to be the dedication not to that Simon, but to the Sabine god Semo Sanctus. (4) The twenty-five years' residence of Peter in Rome (cf. on this Wieseler's *Chronol. des Apostol. Zeitalters*, p. 571 ff.). Perhaps also (5) the peculiar manner of his crucifixion, which has been recorded by Origen already (in Euseb., *H. E.*, iii. 1: ἀνεσκοποῖσθη κατὰ κεφαλῆς); the motive given for it by Hieronymus must certainly be looked upon as an arbitrary addition. As indisputable fact, there remains, in the first instance, only the martyrdom of the apostle, which is corroborated by the unanimous testimony of antiquity, and especially by John xxi. 19;³ the residence in Rome appears more open to doubt, still the reasons which can be urged against it are not sufficient to prove the purely legendary character of the tradition. Although Clemens Rom. (*Ep. ad*

¹ Euseb., *H. E.*, iii. 1: Πέτρος ἐν Πόντῳ, κ.τ.λ., κεκρυχέναι τοῖς ἐν διασπορᾷ Ἰουδαίοις εἶκεν.

² The stories about Peter and Simon M. in the Clementine *Homilies* are mere legendary formations. Even Ewald's opinion, that Peter, after his release, went to Rome for a short time, in order there to oppose Simon M.; that, on his return to Jerusalem, he had visited the districts in the north-east, and there founded the churches to which he later addressed this epistle,—is too destitute of secure historical foundation to be regarded as correct.

³ The explanation given in this verse of the prophecy contained in ver. 18 is indisputably correct. Mayerhoff is wrong in calling it in question (*Einkl. in d. Petr. Schriften*, p. 87) by applying Christ's words to Peter, not to the martyrdom he was about to suffer, but to the apostle himself, as destined to be the leader of the church: "He explains to Peter the necessity of a ministry of this kind, by pointing out to him that active support of the needy is a duty imposed by love to Christ." Meyer gives the right explanation of this passage. Cf. *in loc.*

Corinth., c. 5) does not say that Peter suffered martyrdom in Rome, yet Dionysius of Corinth (Euseb., *H. E.*, ii. 25), Irenaeus (*Adv. Haer.*, iii. 1), Tertullian (*Contra Marc.*, iv. 5, and *De Praescript. adv. Haeret.*, c. 36), and Origen (Euseb., *H. E.*, iii. 1) do; and so early as by the presbyter Cajus mention is made of the *τρόπαια* of the two apostles Peter and Paul. Doubtless these testimonies are mixed up with many inexact and inaccurate particulars; but this does not justify doubt as to the truth of the circumstance to which Ignatius seems to refer in the words: *οἱχ ὡς Πέτρος καὶ Παῦλος διατύσσομαι* (*Ep. ad Rom.*, c. 4). It is less certain that Peter was in Rome at the same time with Paul; nor, as Wieseler wrongly asserts, are all the witnesses of the second century who speak of the martyrdom of Peter in Rome guaranties for it. For, with the exception of the author of the *Praedicatio Pauli*, whose testimony is uncertain, not one of these witnesses speaks of a meeting and a conjoint labor of the two apostles in Rome, although all relate that both of them in Rome had a part in founding the church, and that they suffered martyrdom there. Even the circumstance mentioned by Dionysius of Corinth (Euseb., *H. E.*, ii. 25): *ἐμαρτύρησαν κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν*,¹ does not prove that at any previous time they had lived together; for this expression allows, as Wieseler himself grants, the possibility of a period of time — provided it be not too long — having elapsed between the deaths of the two apostles. “What remains, then, as the kernel of ecclesiastical tradition is this: that towards the end of his life Peter came to Rome, that he there labored for the propagation of the gospel, and that he suffered martyrdom under Nero” (Wiesinger; cf. also Bleek, *Introq. to N. T.*, p. 563 ff. [E. T., ii. 157 ff.]). As, then, the Epistle of Peter is addressed to Pauline churches (i.e., those churches which were either founded by Paul himself, or had sprung from such as had been so founded), and as Peter could hardly feel himself called upon during Paul’s lifetime to interfere with the latter’s field of missionary operations, it is not at all improbable that he suffered martyrdom later than Paul. This is supported by the circumstance that after Paul’s death, and then only, was the fitting time for him to labor in Rome. Had Peter been there earlier, some trace surely of his presence would have

¹ The words of Dionysius, *καὶ γὰρ ἄμφω καὶ εἰς τὴν ἡμετέραν Κόρινθον φυτεύσαντες ἡμᾶς ἐδίδαξαν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰς τὴν Ἰταλιαν ὁμόσε διδάξαντες ἐμαρτύρησαν κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν*, admit, on the whole, of but a doubtful inference, the more so that what is said here of Peter’s labor in Corinth appears to have arisen only from the fact that there was, at an early

period in Corinth, a party calling itself by Peter’s name. A legend such as this could originate all the more easily from the endeavor to bring the two apostles as near as possible to each other; the *κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν* may also have arisen from that endeavor.

been found in Paul's epistles written from Rome. If, then, Paul suffered martyrdom at the earliest in the year 64, the death of Peter must have taken place in the time between 65-67 A.D.¹

SEC. 2. — CONTENTS, AIM, AND CHARACTER OF THE EPISTLE.²

The *contents* of the epistle are in the order of thought as follows: First of all, thanksgiving to God for the hope of the eternal inheritance in heaven, of which the Christians had been made partakers, of which they can with joy be certain, although for a time here they have to suffer tribulation, and of which the glory is so great that the prophets diligently searched after it, and the angels desired to behold it. This is followed by a series of exhortations, which may be divided into *three* classes. The *first* class (i. 13-ii. 10) is linked on to the thought of the glory promised to the Christians, and has sanctification in general as its object. Foremost and as a starting-point stands the summons to a full hope of the future grace (τελείως ἐλπίζατε); then follows the exhortation to a holy walk (ἄγιοι γενήθητε) in the fear of God the impartial Judge, based on a conscious knowledge of the redemption wrought by the blood of Christ (i. 14-21); then, to a pure and unfeigned love of the brethren (ἀλλήλους ἀγαπήσατε), as became those who were born of incorruptible seed (i. 15-25); and lastly, laying aside all κακία, to desire the pure milk, and firmly cleaving to Christ, as living stones to build themselves

¹ According to Ewald, Peter suffered martyrdom before Paul; that is to say, during the persecutions of the Christians by Nero, A.D. 64, whilst Paul, having been released from his Roman captivity, was in Spain.

² The epistle is one of those termed already by Origen, the seven ἐπιστολαὶ καθολικαί; for the meaning of the designation, cf. *Introd. to the N. T.*, and Herzog's *Encyclopædie*, VII. p. 497 ff. The most probable view is this: that, when the Pauline Epistles were classified together as a whole, the other epistles of the N. T. canon were united together under the title of *catholic* epistles, because they were not addressed to individual churches or particular persons, but as circular letters to Christendom generally, or to a somewhat extensive system of churches, just as Origen termed the apostolic epistle, Acts xv. 22, an ἐπιστολὴ καθολικὴ. The objection may, doubt-

less, be raised to this view, that the Epistle to the Hebrews should be included among these, whilst Second and Third John should be excluded from them. But the addition of the former to the Pauline Epistles is explained by its having been believed to be by Paul; and the inclusion of the latter among the catholic epistles, by the circumstance that having, in later times only, come to be regarded as canonical, they were added on to the much more important First Epistle of John. Hofmann's opinion, "that the seven epistles have the above designation because they are writings neither arising from nor pertaining to any personal relation of the writer to those whom he addresses," is contradicted by the term itself, since the expression καθολικός contains not the slightest allusion to a relation subsisting between the writer and those to whom he writes.

up more and more to the spiritual house, in accordance with their calling as Christians (τὸ λογικὸν ἄδολον γάλα ἐπιποθήσατε . . . ὡς λίθοι ζῶντες οἰκοδομείσθε), ii. 1-10. — The *second* series of exhortations (ii. 11-iv. 6), which are of a special nature, is in connection with the position of the Christians in the world (παρακαλῶ ὡς παροίκους καὶ παρεπιδήμους . . . τὴν ἀναστροφὴν ὑμῶν ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν ἔχοντες, vv. 11, 12), and has reference — (1) To the relation to civil authorities (ii. 13-17); (2) To the particular relations of domestic life: (a) exhortation to the slaves (οἱ οἰκέται ὑποτασσόμενοι . . . τοῖς δεσπόταις, 18-25) to obedience towards their masters in patient endurance, even of unjust suffering, based on a reference to the sufferings of Christ; (b) exhortation to the women to be subject unto their husbands, and to a holy walk, with reference to the godly women of the O. T., especially Sarah, iii. 1-6; (c) exhortation to the men to a discreet treatment of their wives; (3) To the relation to the world persecuting the church; after a short exhortation to unity and love (ver. 8), the apostle exhorts not to return evil for evil (vv. 9-14); with meekness to give a reason for their own hope (ver. 15), and in the midst of suffering to give proof of faithful submission to the divine will (vv. 16, 17). These exhortations are based on a reference to Christ, who through suffering entered into His glory (vv. 18-22), and who by His death appeals to believers not to continue their former life, but to lead a new one, even though they should be reviled for it. Lastly, the apostle reminds his readers of the future judgment of Christ (iv. 1-6). — The *third* class of exhortations (iv. 7-v. 9) has special reference to life in the church, and is connected with the thought of the nearness of the end of all things (iv. 7). The several particulars to which prominence is given are: soberness unto prayer (ver. 7), ardent love towards each other (ver. 8), hospitality (ver. 9), a faithful administration of spiritual gifts for the general good (vv. 10, 11), joyful bearing of the sufferings of Christ (vv. 12-19). Hereupon follows an exhortation to the elders to guide the church in a right manner, reference being made to the reward which awaits them (v. 1-4); then a command to the younger to submit themselves to the elder (ver. 5); on this, admonitions to all to a humble behavior towards each other, and to humiliation before God (vv. 6, 7); lastly, a summons to watchfulness against the temptations of the Devil (vv. 8, 9). — The epistle *concludes* with the benediction and a doxology (vv. 10, 11), an observation on this epistle itself (ver. 12), and sundry commissions (vv. 13, 14).

The *aim* of this epistle is stated by the apostle himself (v. 12) in the words: ἔγραψα παρακαλῶν καὶ ἐπιμαρτυρῶν ταύτην εἶναι ἄληθῆ χάριν τοῦ Θεοῦ, εἰς ἣν ἐστήκατε. Accordingly he proposed a παρακαλῶν and an ἐπιμαρτυρῶν, both in

close connection with each other, as the immediate juxtaposition of the ideas shows. The occasion of them lay in this, that the readers, as professing Christians, had to endure severe afflictions through the slanders of the heathen. In view of the dangers lying therein, the apostle was careful, on the one hand, to exhort them to patience, by directing their minds to the future κληρονομία, as also to the continuance in holiness, and to a conduct towards each other and towards the heathen such as would lead the latter to see how groundless their slanders were; and, on the other hand, that his exhortation might not be without a firm basis, to assure them that a state of suffering was the true divine state of grace. Accordingly the epistle bears neither a polemical nor a doctrinal, but an entirely hortatory character. No doubt dogmatic ideas are interwoven in some passages; these, however, are never treated doctrinally, but are always made subservient to the purpose of exhortation.

REMARK. — Schott regards this epistle as, in the first instance, a *letter of consolation*, in which the readers are calmed and comforted, on the one hand, with respect “to the accusations of the heathen, that they, as matter of principle, denied a moral basis to social life;” and, on the other, as regards their fears, lest the fact of God’s permitting persecutions should be a proof to them that they were without the “complete moral certainty of their salvation in Christ.” In opposition to this, it is to be remarked that Peter uses παρακαλεῖν only in the sense of “to exhort,” and that even if the apostle, in the treatment of his subject, does introduce some words of comfort, the whole epistle cannot, on that account, be styled a letter of consolation, the less so that these very words are always made subservient to purposes of exhortation; cf. Weiss, *Die petrin. Frage*, p. 631 f. — Several interpreters assume from ἐπιμαρτυρῶν, κ.τ.λ., that Peter composed his hortatory epistles with the intention also of formally confirming the preaching of the gospel aforesaid addressed to his readers. Wiesinger says: “Peter, in his epistle to Pauline churches, has impressed the seal of his testimony on the gospel as preached by Paul.” Weiss, while questioning this, in that he does not consider the church to have been Pauline, nevertheless asserts that “the apostle wished, by his apostolic testimony, to confirm the preaching already delivered to the readers,” and for this reason precisely, “that it had not yet been proclaimed to them by an apostle.” But, although in i. 12, 25, we have it attested that the true gospel is preached unto them, and, in v. 12, that thus they are made partakers of the very grace of God, still this testimony is not made in such a form as to warrant the conclusion that the Apostle Peter considered it necessary to confirm, by his apostolic authority, the preaching by which the readers had been converted; nor does it imply that the readers had begun to doubt of its truth, because it had come to them

— directly or indirectly — from Paul, or even from one who was no apostle. The double testimony is rather to be explained simply thus: The apostle was desirous of preserving his readers from the danger to which they were exposed, by the trials that had befallen them, of entertaining doubts as to their state of grace, and of confirming them in the confident trust in the grace of which they had been made partakers, apart altogether from the person by whom the gospel had been preached to them. — Hofmann, while justly recognizing the hortatory character of the epistle, thinks that Peter's intention in it was "to secure the fruits of Paul's labors in a way possible only to the Apostle of the Circumcision." But in the epistle there is not the smallest hint of any such intention, nor is there any mention made of a difference between the Apostle of the Gentiles and the Apostle of the Circumcision. Besides, if such were his intention, it is impossible to understand how Peter could have written a hortatory epistle of such length. This same objection may be urged against Bleek's idea that the sole occasion of the epistle was the journey of Silvanus to Asia Minor. — Pfleiderer (as above, p. 419) correctly gives the design of the letter thus: "An exhortation to patience and perseverance under severe persecution from without, as also to a blameless life, by means of which the Christian Church might avoid every occasion for a justifiable persecution." — On Schwegler's hypothesis, that the letter was written with the design of effecting a compromise between the followers of Paul and those of Peter, see § 4, *Introd.* Ewald's view, that this circular letter was composed chiefly with the design "of teaching the true relation to all heathen, and heathen rulers," is refuted by the contents themselves, which go far beyond this.

The peculiar *character* of the epistle is due as much to the individuality of its author as to its own hortatory tendency; but not to this, that its author preached a Christianity different from that of the other apostles, that is to say, a narrow Jewish Christianity. The Christianity of Peter, in its *subjective* as in its *objective* side, is the same as that of Paul and John. As regards the *objective* side, there are no conceptions of the person of Christ here expressed lower than in the other books of the N. T. Weiss, who draws a distinction between the historical and the speculative methods of viewing the person of Christ in the N. T., is no doubt of opinion that only the former of these is to be found here, and that therefore Peter's conception is, in this respect, only a preliminary step to those of Paul and John. But although Peter does not speak of the pre-existence of Christ in so many words, yet the significance which, according to him, Christ had for the realization of the eternal purposes of God toward humanity (i. 2, 3, 7, 8, 10-12, 18-20, ii. 4-10, 21-25, iii. 18-iv. 6, iv. 13, 14, v. 4, 10), goes to prove that

he did not regard Christ "as a mere man," distinguished from other men only in that "He was anointed by God at His baptism with the Holy Spirit, and thus equipped for the office of Messiah." Besides, however, there are not wanting hints which point to a higher conception than this. If Christ be not called *ὕψος τοῦ Θεοῦ*, God is spoken of directly as *πατὴρ τοῦ κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ* (chap. i. 3, 2); and the name *κύριος*, which Peter, according to the O. T. usage, frequently applies to God, is by him attributed without any explanation to Christ also. Again, if the Trinity, to which reference is made in chap. i. 2, be only the economical Trinity, still in it Christ is placed in such a relation to God "as could absolutely never, and especially never in the domain of Old-Testament faith, be applied to a mere human instrument" (Jul. Köstlin). Still further, in chap. i. 20, *προεγνωσμένου πρὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου*, where even Weiss is forced to find an idea expressed beyond any that can be explained on the "historic principle," though it be true that here it is not—as Schumann (*Die Lehre v. d. Person Christi*, p. 449) assumes—the real, but only, in the first instance, the ideal pre-existence that is affirmed, yet this very ideal pre-existence undeniably points beyond the simple humanity of Christ. It is, too, a mere makeshift for Weiss to assert that the idea was formed in Peter's mind, from the circumstance only, that Christ had already been predicted by the prophets, for *πρὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου* plainly goes far beyond this. And lastly, even if Weiss's interpretation of *τὸ . . . πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ*, chap. i. 11 (see *Comment.*, in *loc.*), were admissible, it would also follow, from the very fact that Peter spoke of the working of God's Spirit in the prophets, according to its indwelling in Christ, that he had a conception of Christ's nature higher than any Weiss would allow him to have had.

Peter's estimate also of the *work of Christ*, as of His *person*, is in no way different from that of the other apostles. For him, too, it is the death and resurrection of Christ which lays the foundation of man's salvation, the communication of the Spirit of the glorified Christ by which that salvation is appropriated by man, and the second coming of Christ by which it is completed. No doubt Weiss thinks that Peter attributes to the blood of Christ a redemptive, but not an expiatory, power, and that certainly the idea of sacrifice is foreign to him, if that of substitution be not; but this opinion can be justified only by a misconception of the particular points in the passages in question (i. 18, 19, ii. 24, iii. 18).

With respect to the *subjective* side of Christianity, Peter has in reference to it also no peculiar teaching. According to him, it is again faith which is made the condition of a participation in the salvation of Christ; cf. i. 5, 7,

8, 9, 21, ii. 7 (iv. 13), v. 9. True, the *πίστις* of Peter is not characterized as specifically Christian by any adjunct such as *εἰς Χριστόν*; but that none other than a faith on Christ can be meant is evident, partly from the reference to the redeeming death of Christ which pervades the whole epistle, and partly from the circumstance, that when God is spoken of as the object of faith (i. 21), the phrase: *τὸν ἐγείραντα αὐτὸν (Χριστὸν) ἐκ νεκρῶν καὶ δόξαν αὐτῷ δόντα* (comp. Rom. iv. 24), is added to *Θεόν* by way of nearer definition. It can with no justification be asserted that faith according to Peter is, on the one hand, only the *trust in God* based on the *miracle* of the resurrection, and on the other simply the *recognition* of the Messianic dignity of Christ, and that accordingly he does not, like Paul, make reference to the atonement accomplished by the blood of Christ. For, precisely because Peter regards the death of Christ as the ground of salvation, it is plainly impossible that he should think of this faith by which redemption is obtained, without reference to the death of Christ and its effects. Weiss, though he admits that this faith, according to the view taken of it not merely by Paul and John, but also by Peter, introduces into real community of life with Christ, does so only under this restriction, that Peter's conception is based entirely on the utterances of Christ, and has not as yet been worked into didactic shape; as if the living faith were not necessarily conscious of community of life with Christ, and as if the matter contained in an epistle written with the view of imparting instruction must of necessity be brought into didactic form. If, according to Peter, the life of faith be, from its earliest commencement, a life of obedience, there is taught in this nothing different from what Paul more than once affirms (Rom. vi. 17, xv. 18, xvi. 19, 20; 2 Cor. x. 15); but that Peter "makes the idea of obedience so prominent, that faith as the fundamental condition of the possession of salvation *retires completely into the background*" (Weiss), is an unfounded assertion. — Since, then, the epistle is written with the design *παρακαλεῖν* the Christians, who were *enduring affliction* for their faith's sake, the reference to a future and complete salvation — *κληρονομία, σωτηρία, δόξα, χάρις ζωῆς* — forms, along with the exhortation to a pious Christian walk of life, a chief feature in it, and it is therefore quite natural that the *ἐλπίς* should appear as the centre of its apostolic *παράκλησις* (chap. i. 3, 13, 21, iii. 5, 9, 15, iv. 13, v. 1, 4, 10). But although it is peculiar to Peter to gaze on the future completion of salvation with a hope that stretched away beyond the present possession of it, yet we must not on that account seek to draw a distinction between him as *the apostle of hope*, and Paul as *the apostle of faith*, and still less, with Weiss, attribute to him a different conception of doctrine in that, whilst according to Paul hope

is only a single constituent of faith, Peter saw in faith only “the *preliminary step to hope.*”

REMARK. — Whilst Weiss considers the doctrinal conception in the epistle as a preliminary step to Paulinism, Pfleiderer, on the other hand, characterizes it as “a Paulinism popularized, and thereby rendered weak and insipid.” In reference to this, the following remarks must be made: (1) Pfleiderer indeed admits that the emphasis laid on the death of Christ as the means of our redemption is a genuinely Pauline feature; at the same time, however, he is of opinion that the death of Christ must be taken here as referring not, as with Paul, to the expiation of the guilt of sin, but only to the removal of a life of sin, and that its *redemptory* effects can only be considered as morally communicated, in order that it may, as a powerful example, bring about the resolution to an obedient imitation of Christ. But this is clearly incorrect, for it is apparent, from an unprejudiced perusal of the passages in question, that redemption from the guilt of sin is viewed as the primary effect of Christ’s death, though there is undoubtedly also reference to its final aim in delivering from the power of sin. How can redemption from a life of sin be conceived of without the forgiveness of sin? The very expression *ῥαντισμὸς αἵματος* 'I. X. (i. 2) is a proof that our author regarded the forgiveness of sin as the effect of the blood of Christ. The idea that man must earn pardon for himself by his own obedient following of Christ is totally foreign to this epistle. (2) If Pfleiderer asserts that here we have faith presented in an aspect different from that of Paul, inasmuch as its object is not Christ, the historical Redeemer from sin, but Christ, the glorified One, it must be urged, in reply, that Christian faith, in the nature of it, has reference at once to the abased and to the exalted Christ, — to the former because He is exalted, to the latter in that He was made low, — and, that, in this passage also, between Paul and the writer of this epistle there was no difference, and could be none. (3) In opposition to Pfleiderer’s assertion, that *obedience* also has, for each of the two, a different import, inasmuch as, while Paul considers moral obedience to be the fruit of faith, the author of this epistle looks on morality as a particular element of faith itself, it must be remarked, that, if obedience be the fruit of faith, it must, in germ, be contained in faith, that is, be an element of faith. (4) With respect to the *πνεῦμα*, Pfleiderer admits that it is for both, in *every* way, the life-principle of Christianity; only he finds it worthy of notice, that, in this epistle, the communication of the Spirit is not made to stand in any way connected with baptism. But it is clearly a quite unjustifiable demand, that this relation should find expression in the single passage in which reference is made to baptism. — No doubt it cannot be denied that the several particulars of Christian faith, knowledge, and life have received from Paul a fuller development, and, as a consequence, a clearer definition, than in our epistle; but this can be accounted for as much by the

individuality of the two apostles as by the purely hortatory character of this epistle, and is no evidence of the correctness of Pfleiderer's view. — Hofmann justly remarks: "The epistle contains nothing by which its author can be recognized as the advocate of an . . . insipid Paulinism, and nothing either which betrays his dependence on Pauline forms of thought."

The peculiar character of the epistle, by which it is distinguished from the writings of Paul and John, has its origin not in any doctrinal difference, but on the one hand in the individuality of its author, and on the other in its own practical design. Peter does not mean to *teach*, he is anxious rather to *exhort* in accordance with his practical mind,¹ as far removed from the dialectic bent of Paul as from the intuitive of John. — The epistle bears further a characteristic impress in the O. T. modes of thought and expression peculiar to it.² In none of the writings of the N. T. do we find, comparatively speaking, so numerous quotations from and references to the O. T. (comp. chap. i. 16, 24, 25, ii. 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 22-24, iii. 10-12, 13, 14, iv. 8, 17, 18, v. 5, 7). But more than this, the author lives and moves so much in O. T. conceptions, that he expresses his thoughts by preference in O. T. language. When he wishes to set forth the dignity of the Christian Church, or to make reference to the future salvation of believers, or to exhort to a walk becoming Christians, he does so for the most part in the manner peculiar to the O. T. Even when he speaks of the death of Christ as the ground of salvation, it is in O. T. language that he lays stress on its significance. And all this without so much as hinting at the specific difference between the O. and N. T. So that all the ideas, more especially, which are in Paul rooted in the clear consciousness of the difference between the two economies: *δικαιῶσθαι ἐκ τῆς πίστεως, υἰοθεσία*, the relation of affection between God and Christians as His children,³ etc., occupy here an entirely subordinate position. Nevertheless, the tone of the *whole* epistle is decidedly Christian, not only in that it is inspired by that Spirit to which Christ referred when He said to James and John: "Know ye not what spirit ye

¹ Strangely enough, Hofmann takes offence at what is here said, although he himself describes "Peter's mind as one which directly apprehended the duty of the moment, as the moment presented it, and set about fulfilling it by word and deed without circumlocution or hesitation," — proof evidently of a practical mind.

² According to Hofmann, it is not the con-

ception, but the manner of expression, that is that of the O. T.; but is not expression determined by conception?

³ This, too, Hofmann questions, assigning as his reason ch. i. 17; but the expression Father is applied to God in the O. T. also (Isa. lxiii. 16; Jer. xxxi. 9), without the relation of child being conceived in the same way as it is by Paul.

are of ?" but because there is to be found in it no trace of Mosaic legality, or of the national narrowness peculiar to the Jewish people. The Christian church is a *γένος ἐκλεκτόν* just in that it is Christian, and not in any way because the greater part of it belongs to the nation of Israel, "into which the others have only been ingrafted." The Mosaic law is not so much as mentioned, nor does the expression *νόμος* once occur. No doubt it is strongly insisted upon that Christians should live a *holy* life; but the obligation is deduced not from any law, but from the fact that they are redeemed from their *ματαία ἀναστροφή* by the *τίμον αἶμα* of Christ, and are born again of seed incorruptible, while, as the means through which they are to procure their sanctification, the *πνεῦμα* is mentioned, not the legal letter (a *γράμμα*). From this it follows that the name "Apostle of the Circumcision" (Weiss), given to Peter, is inappropriate, if it be understood in a sense different from that in Gal. ii. 7, 8. It can nowhere be proved from his epistle that circumcision had for Peter any significance whatever for the Christian life. Rather is he penetrated by O. T. ideas only in so far as they obtain their true fulfilment in Christianity, and no allusion whatever is made to *those* of them which had already found their realization in Christ. — Further, the epistle bears a peculiar character from the traces in it which prove the author to have been an eye-witness and an ear-witness of Christ. Not only does the apostle style himself *μάρτυς τῶν τοῦ Χριστοῦ παθημάτων*, but the way in which he discourses of the sufferings and glory of Christ is a proof that he speaks from a personal experience, the power of which he himself had directly felt. Nor this alone. Oftentimes in his expressions the very words he had heard from Christ are re-echoed, and hence the many points of accord, especially with the discourses of Christ as these are contained in the synoptic Gospels; cf. chap. i. 4 with Matt. xxv. 34; i. 8 with John xx. 23; i. 10 ff. with Luke x. 24; i. 13 with Luke xii. 35; ii. 12 with Matt. v. 10; ii. 17 with Matt. xxii. 21; iii. 13-15 with Matt. x. 28; and v. 10, 11, iv. 13, 14, with Matt. v. 12; v. 3 with Matt. xx. 25, 26; v. 6 with Matt. xxiii. 12.¹

Lastly, the epistle shows an unmistakable kinship with various writings of the N. T. Did this consist merely in the occurrence here and there of single cognate thoughts, conceptions, or expressions, there would still be no

¹ Hofmann, indeed, disputes that there is here any allusion to the words of Christ; he admits, however, that it is possible that "the expression used by our Lord, Matt. v. 16, was present to the mind of the apostle when writing ii. 12;" and he says: "The *ὄν οὐκ*

ιδόντες ἀγαπᾶτε shows clearly enough that it is written by one who has seen the Lord." Hofmann is wrong in denying that the words *μάρτυς τῶν τοῦ Χριστοῦ παθημάτων*, v. 1, bear the meaning here presupposed. See Hofmann *in loc.*

proof of interdependence. In the whole of the N. T. writings there is contained a gospel substantially one and the same, and there must have prevailed in the intercourse of believers with one another—every allowance being made for diversity in the individual—a common mode of thought and expression, which had its origin chiefly in the writings of the O. T. But the affinity which is apparent between the Epistle of Peter and several of the Epistles of Paul and the Epistle of James, goes far beyond this. Among Paul's writings there are several passages in the Epistles to the Romans and Ephesians to which Peter's epistle stands in a relation of dependence. Almost all the thoughts in Rom. xii. and xiii. are to be found repeated in the Epistle of Peter,—only here they are scattered throughout the whole letter; and not detached thoughts alone, but whole trains of thought, in which there is a similarity of expression even in what is of secondary moment; cf. from Rom. xii., ver. 1 with 1 Pet. ii. 5, ver. 2 with i. 14, vv. 3–8 with iv. 10, ver. 9 with i. 22, ver. 10 with ii. 17, ver. 13 with iv. 9, more especially vv. 14–19 with iii. 8–12; and from chap. xiii., vv. 1–7 with ii. 13, 14 (see on this Weiss, p. 406 ff.). But echoes of other passages in Romans are to be found: cf. Pet. i. 21 with Rom. iv. 24; Pet. ii. 24 with Rom. vi. 18; Pet. iii. 22 with Rom. viii. 34; Pet. iv. 1, 2, with Rom. vi. 7 (here it is not the clauses only which correspond: *ὁ παθὼν, κ.τ.λ.*, and *ὁ ἀποθανῶν, κ.τ.λ.*, but the subsequent thought of Peter: *εἰς τὸ μηκέτι ἀνθρώπων, κ.τ.λ.*, answers to the previous idea of Paul: *τοῦ μηκέτι δουλεύειν, κ.τ.λ.*); Pet. v. 1 with Rom. viii. 18; particularly striking is the agreement between Pet. ii. 6 and Rom. ix. 33 (x. 11).—The kinship between the Epistle of Peter and that to the Ephesians is based not on single passages only, but at the same time on the composition of the two writings. If our epistle be in superscription and introduction similar to the epistles of Paul, it bears a peculiar resemblance to that to the Ephesians, inasmuch as the thanks expressed in the latter have reference not to the particular circumstances of a special church, but to the common salvation of which the Christians had been made partakers; the formula of thanksgiving, too, is in both literally the same: *εὐλογητὸς ὁ Θεός, κ.τ.λ.* (thus 2 Cor.). The contents, too, of the epistles present many points of similarity both in the general exhortations to a walk in love towards each other, humility, and meekness, and a renunciation of their former heathenish life in fleshly passions and lusts, and in the special exhortations with respect to domestic relations; further, in the summons to resist the devil; and lastly, in the concluding wish of peace. The following particular passages may be compared with each other: Pet. i. 1 (*ἐκλεκτοῖς . . . κατὰ πρόγνωσιν Θεοῦ . . . ἐν ἀγιασμῷ πνεύματος*) and Eph. i. 4 (*ἐξελέξατο ἡμᾶς . . .*

πρὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου, εἶναι ἡμ. ἁγίους); Pet. i. 5 and Eph. i. 19; Pet. i. 14 and Eph. ii. 3; Pet. i. 18 and Eph. iv. 17; Pet. ii. 4, 5, and Eph. ii. 20-22; Pet. ii. 18 and Eph. vi. 5; Pet. iii. 1 and Eph. v. 22; Pet. iii. 18 (προσάγειν) and Eph. ii. 18, iii. 12 (προσαγωγή); Pet. iii. 22 and Eph. i. 20, 21; Pet. v. 8, 9, and Eph. vi. 10 ff. It is also worthy of special remark, that in both epistles the goal of the Christian is indicated by the word *κληρονομία*, and that in both the angel world is represented as standing in a relation to Christ's work of redemption; cf. Pet. i. 12 and Eph. iii. 10; Peter seems to make reference also to Eph. iv. 8-10.

The similarity between particular passages of Peter's epistle and Paul's other epistles is not of such a nature as to warrant the conclusion that there is a dependence of the former on the latter. If, e.g., Pet. iii. 2, etc., and 1 Tim. ii. 9 treat of the ornaments of women, and the order in which the particular objects are brought forward be in both cases the same, this may doubtless be a merely accidental circumstance. Besides, the nomenclature varies. — On the other hand, the agreement between particular passages in the epistles of James and Peter is of such a kind that it cannot be regarded as accidental; see Pet. i. 6, 7, and Jas. i. 2, 3 (comp. ἀγαλλίσθε and χάραν ἠγήσασθε; λυπηθέντες ἐν ποικίλοις πειρασμοῖς and ὅταν πειρασμοῖς περιπέσητε ποικίλοις, and in both passages the identical τὸ δοκίμιον ὑμῶν τῆς πίστεως); further, Pet. ii. 1 and Jas. i. 21 (there: ὑποθέμενοι πᾶσαν κακίαν; here: ὑποθέμενοι πᾶσαν βυπαρίαν καὶ περισσεῖαν κακίας; there: τὸ λογικὸν ἄδολον γύλα ἐπιποθήσατε; here, the not very dissimilar thought: δεξασθε τὸν ἐμφυτον λόγον; there, the aim: ἵνα ἐν αὐτῷ αὐξήθητε εἰς σωτηρίαν; here, the similar thought in the participial clause: τὸν δυνάμενον σῶσαι τὰς ψυχὰς ὑμῶν); lastly, Pet. v. 5-9 and Jas. iv. 6, 7, 10, where in both passages there is the same quotation from the O. T., then the exhortation to humble submission to God, and thereon the summons to withstand the devil; besides this, Pet. v. 6 is almost identical with Jas. iv. 10.¹

The dependence of Peter's epistle on the writings already mentioned, whilst it is acknowledged by almost all interpreters (in recent times more especially by Wiesinger, Schott, and Hofmann; in like manner, too, by Ewald, Reuss, Bleek; Guericke's opinion is doubtful), is denied by Mayerhoff, Rauch, and Brückner. Brückner, while admitting that there still remains the general impression of so many echoes, which always seems to point back to the dependence of Peter's epistles, is nevertheless of opinion

¹ Although several of the citations from the epistles to the Romans and Ephesians, and from that of James, might lead to the supposition that the passages in question in

Peter's epistle are not dependent on them (cf. Hofmann, p. 206 ff.), yet, as is fully recognized by Hofmann, that in no way alters the matter itself.

that the similarity can be explained simply from the circumstance that cognate ideas in the minds of the apostles called for cognate terms, especially if there be taken into account the power of primitive Christian tradition on early Christian style, and the prevalent modes of expression which had arisen out of conceptions formed under the influence of the Old Covenant. This result, however, he obtains in the following way: He resolves the similar thoughts into their several elements; and having directed special attention to these, he lays particular stress on the differences he discovers. This process of separation is of necessity misleading, and if it be not employed, the similarity is so great that there can be no doubt as to the dependence of the one composition on the other. Weiss has demonstrated this at full length with respect to the relation between the Epistle of Peter and those to the Romans (chaps. xii. and xiii.) and Ephesians. He is wrong, however, when he says that the dependence is on the side of Paul, and not on that of Peter. With regard to Rom. xii. and xiii., it must be remembered — (1) That it is entirely improbable that Paul should, quite contrary to his usual custom, have been at the trouble to collect the thoughts here arranged from an epistle where they occur in a quite different connection; whilst there is in itself nothing improbable in the supposition, — if he were acquainted with the Epistle to the Romans, and more especially the above chapters, — that Peter wrote under the influence of Paul's expression in the different passages of his epistle, where the course of his own thoughts suggested to him the same ideas. (2) That the views of Weiss necessarily lead to a depreciation of the literary capability of Paul. Weiss himself says that Paul's dependence on Peter caused him to place in chap. xii. 6, 7, *διακονία*, in the narrower sense, which is "evidently jarring," between the three spiritual gifts; to introduce in ver. 11, "without any purpose," the exhortation *τῆ ἐλπίδι χαίροντες*; to put the thought in ver. 15 in the *wrong place*; and in ver. 16 to interpolate the idea quite inappropriately.¹ As to the Epistle to the Ephesians, it must be remarked — (1) That no foreign influence can be recognized in it, when compared with the other Pauline epistles. Its dissimilarity is to be explained from its own individual tendency as a circular letter. (2) That the special peculiarities by which this epistle is distinguished from the other

¹ Since Weiss himself uses the expressions above quoted, the accusation that he detracts from Paul's independence is certainly not without justification. If he complain that even in this commentary regard is not paid to "the general considerations" (pp. 403-406

in *Der Petrin. Lehrbegriff*), we must observe, in reply, that general possibilities do not issue in much, more especially when concrete circumstances prevent that being regarded as a reality which is in itself possible.

letters of Paul, even from that to the Colossians, have nothing whatsoever in common with the Epistle of Peter. In addition to this, let it be noted that the independence of Paul, which is apparent in every one of his epistles, stands in sharpest contradiction with the assumption that the apostle was indebted to those passages in Peter's epistle; whilst, on the other hand, the leaning which Peter had to the O. T. and to the words of Christ, shows that to allow his mode of expression to be shaped by the influence of another was in no way opposed to the peculiar character of his mind, but entirely in harmony with it, as part of a nature "easily determined, receptive, and peculiarly open to personal impressions" (Schott).

REMARK. — Weiss, in his essay entitled *Die Petrinische Frage*, written for the purpose of defending his views on the dependence of the epistles to the Romans and Ephesians against objections raised to them, substantially repeats what he had formerly said, and hardly adduces any thing new. In denying that there subsists any relation of dependence between Rom. vi. 7 and Pet. iv. 12, and between Rom. vi. 2, 18, and Pet. ii. 24, Weiss overlooks the fact that the resemblance rests not alone on the two expressions *ὁ ἀποθανών* and *ὁ παθὼν σαρκί*, and that his interpretation of *ταῖς ἁμαρτίαις ἀπογενόμενοι* is an erroneous one. A more minute examination of the several clauses of chaps. xii. and xiii. of Romans can result merely in the conclusion that it is not in itself impossible that this epistle was conceived under the influence of Peter's letter. But the priority of the latter is not thereby proved. The hortatory design of this epistle explains why it is that Peter has confined himself to these two chapters, and why in his composition are to be found none "of the developments of Christian doctrinal conceptions peculiar to Paul." Besides, it must be noted that although Peter says nothing of the relation of the *νόμος* and the *ἔργα τοῦ νόμου*, he is completely at one with Paul in the fundamental conception that sinful man can obtain salvation only through faith in Christ. — With respect to the affinity between the Epistle of Peter and that to the Ephesians, Weiss himself admits that "evidence for the originality of the Petrine passages can be adduced with still less strictness from a comparison of details." Weiss wrongly affirms that the Epistle to the Ephesians is related to that of Peter precisely in those very points which distinguish it from the rest of Paul's writings. For the peculiar and distinctive character of the Epistle to the Ephesians does not consist only in that it is a circular letter (an assertion which, however, is decidedly denied by many critics, and particularly by Meyer; see his commentary, *Einl.*, § 1), and that its commencement is of an import more general than that of the other Pauline epistles, but more especially in the whole diction, which, in the rich fulness of its expression, bears an impress different from the rest of the apostle's writings. That this peculiarity, however, cannot be traced to a

knowledge, on the apostle's part, of Peter's epistle, needs not to be proved. When Weiss finds it a characteristic of the Epistle to the Ephesians, that its "ethical exhortation culminates in advices for the several stations of life," he must have forgotten that exactly the same is the case with the Epistle to the Colossians, which plainly was not written under the influence of Peter's epistle.

The dependence of this epistle on Paul and James is not, as Schott assumes, to be attributed to Peter's intention to show the agreement of his doctrine with that of these two men. For it is precisely their doctrinal peculiarities which are not echoed in the related passages; and altogether a doctrinal intent is nowhere discernible. It must therefore be assumed that Peter, from his familiarity with these epistles, was so penetrated by their prevailing modes of thought and expression, and the connection of their ideas, that recollections of these, although not unconsciously, still involuntarily,¹ became interwoven with his style. Such reminiscences, too, would press themselves upon his mind the more readily in the case of the Epistle to the Ephesians, that it was addressed to the same churches in Asia Minor which Peter felt himself urged to confirm and strengthen in their state of grace.²

With all this dependence, however, the epistle has still its peculiar impress different from that of the epistles of Paul and James. Although it abounds in conceptions which are common to all the apostles, there are yet to be found in it not only particular expressions and terms, but also many ideas, which are foreign to the other writings of the N. T. Thus it is distinctive of this epistle, that the work of salvation is characterized as something after which the prophets searched, and into which the angels desired to look (i. 10-12); that the Christians are called *πίστοι καὶ παρεπίδημοι* (ii. 11); that the exhortation to a holy walk is based on this, that thereby

¹ Schott's opinion is far-fetched, that Peter's continual references to the Pauline epistles arose from his tender anxiety lest he should add to "the disquiet and apprehension of his readers by giving any direct expression to his apostolic individuality, unknown as it was to them." He thinks, that, for this reason, Peter had, "without mentioning his intention, unnoticed, and, as it were, by chance, here and there, sometimes more distinctly, and sometimes less so, allowed his readers to hear the well-known voice of their real pastor."

² Hofmann goes too far in maintaining that Peter "purposely" connected his epistle with that to the Ephesians, making the opening passages of the former thus similar to those of the latter, "in order, that, from the commencement, his heathen readers must perceive his intention, and recognize the harmony subsisting between that which was written by the Apostle of the Circumcision and that formerly penned by the Apostle of the Heathen." This assertion arises from the mistaken views which Hofmann has formed as to the design of the epistle.

the heathen would recognize the groundlessness of their accusations (ii. 12, iii. 16); and that the endurance of wrong is termed a *χάρις*. Further, peculiar to this epistle are: the exhibition of Christ's sufferings as a type of their own sufferings for the faith's sake (ii. 21 ff.); the idea that Christ has preached to the spirits in prison (iii. 19, iv. 6); the consolation drawn from the similarity of the affliction of the Christian brethren (v. 9); Sarah, in her subjection to Abraham, held up to women as an example (iii. 6); the comparison drawn between baptism and the flood, and the designation of the former as *συνειδήσεως ἁγαθῆς ἐπερώτημα* (iii. 21); the thought that the sufferings of Christ form the beginning of judgment (iv. 12); the exhortation to the elders (v. 1-3); the term *ἀρχιποιμήν* as (v. 4) applied to Christ, etc. It cannot justly be urged against this epistle, that it is wanting in logical development of thought. Since the epistle bears a hortatory character, there is nothing to excite surprise when the author makes a transition from more general to more special precepts, and again from more special to more general, and when he, as the spirit moves him, builds now one exhortation, now another, on this or on that fact of redemption, finding here again occasion for fresh admonitions. But that with all this there is no want of a definite train of thought, is proved by the above summary of contents. The style does not abound in aphorisms, like that of the discourses of Jesus and the Epistle of James, but is distinguished by thoughts connected by means of participles, relative pronouns, copulative particles, as in the Pauline epistles. A peculiarity, too, is to be found in the frequent condensation of several conceptions into a substantival or adjectival idea by means of the definite article (chap. i. 3, 5, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, etc.); further, the frequent use of the particle *ὡς* (chap. i. 14, 19, ii. 1, 5, 16, iv. 10, 11, 15, 16, v. 3); lastly, the construction of the participle, both with an imperative either preceding (i. 13, 14, 22, ii. 1, 4, 16) or following it (i. 18, 23, ii. 1, 2, 5, 7), as also its employment in an absolute and independent way, without being joined to a particular finite verb (ii. 18, iii. 1, 7, 9, 16, iv. 8).

Whilst De Wette looks on the epistle as hardly worthy of an apostle, others praise, and rightly too, the freshness and vividness of its style,¹ its "richness in Christian doctrine," and the "noble artlessness which feels itself satisfied and blessed in the simple and believing reception, and calm and quiet possession, of the facts of a divinely given salvation" (Schott).

¹ Grotius: "Habet haec epistola τὸ σφοδρὸν, conveniens ingenio principis apostolorum." Bengel: "Mirabilis est gravitas et

alacritas Petrii sermonis lectorem suavissime retinens."

SEC. 3. — THE READERS OF THE EPISTLE; THE TIME AND PLACE OF ITS COMPOSITION.

Whilst the epistle itself gives no precise information as to who the readers addressed are, its superscription shows them to have been Christians in Asia Minor, more especially those in Pontus, Galatia, Cappadocia, Asia (by which term proconsular Asia is to be understood), and Bithynia; that is to say, the Christians in regions where Paul and his companions, according to his epistles and the Acts of the Apostles, had first preached the gospel and founded the Christian Church. — In ancient times the prevalent view was that the epistle was addressed to *Jewish Christians*. This opinion was entertained by Eusebius, Didymus, Epiphanius, Hieronymus, Oecumenius, Theophylactus; and among more recent authors, by Erasmus, Calvin, Grotius, Bengel, Augusti, Hug, Bertholdt, Pott, and others. Several interpreters, like Wolf, Gerhard, Jachmann, etc., have modified this view, in so far that they hold the epistle to have been written *principally* (*principaliter*) no doubt for Jewish Christians, but in a *certain* sense (*quodammodo*) for Gentile Christians also (*fidei interna ac loci externa unitate illis conjunctos*). This is the position taken up by Weiss. He assumes that the majority of church-members were Jewish Christians, and that these were regarded by Peter as the real body of the congregations; for this reason, and not thinking of the admixture of heathen which had everywhere taken place, the apostle addresses the Jewish Christians *only*. Weiss's view is very closely bound up with his opinion, that the churches in question had already been founded before the missionary journey of Paul to Asia Minor, by Jews of that region who had been converted at Jerusalem on the day of Pentecost or subsequently to it. This assertion, however, is not only without any foundation whatsoever in history, but is opposed to all that is told us of the Apostle Paul's labors in Asia Minor, in his epistles and in the Acts of the Apostles, inasmuch as there is in neither the smallest hint that when he commenced his work there, a Christian church was in existence anywhere in that land. It is surely inconceivable that Paul should have pursued his missionary work in that region without in any way taking notice of the church already established there, and all the more so if that church had by that time risen to such importance as to draw on itself the persecuting hate of the *heathen*. — The proofs adduced by Weiss, that the epistle was addressed to Jewish-Christian churches, are as follow: 1. The designation of the readers in the superscription of the letter; 2. The style of expression so strongly based on the O. T.; 3. The occurrence of several passages, namely,

chaps. i. 14, 18, ii. 9, 10, iii. 6, iv. 3, which point apparently to Gentile but in reality to Jewish Christians as readers. The *first* proof falls to the ground when the expression *ἐκλεκτοὶ παρεπίδημοι διασπορᾶς Πόντου, κ.τ.λ.*, is correctly understood (see Comment. to i. 1). With regard to the *second* proof, however, it must be noted that the references to the O. T. were for Gentile Christians (who of course cannot be conceived of without some acquaintance with the O. T.) not less intelligible than for Jewish Christians. Paul himself makes frequent enough allusion to the O. T. in his epistles addressed to Gentile Christians (cf., e.g., 1 Cor. i. 19, 31, ii. 9, 16, iii. 19, 20, etc.).¹—With respect to the third proof, the previous condition of the readers in the passages quoted is not in appearance only, but as a matter of fact, characterized as heathenish, and that not positively simply, but negatively also. For in these verses there is not the faintest intimation that the readers before their conversion had stood, as Israelites, in the covenant relation to God to which Paul invariably makes reference when he speaks to Jews or of them. The whole character of the epistle speaks not *against*, but much more *in favor of*, the assumption that the churches here addressed, at least the larger part of them, were composed not of Jewish but of Gentile Christians. In favor, too, of this view, is the circumstance that these same churches are represented as suffering persecution, not at the hands of the Jews, but of the heathen; which goes to show that the latter did not regard these Christians merely as a sect within Judaism, as would naturally have been the case had they been formerly Jews, or for the most part Jews. The persecuting zeal of the heathen was directed against it only when Christianity began to draw its professors no longer from Judaism chiefly, but from heathendom; and it was not Jewish but Gentile Christian churches which were the objects of detestation. Justly, then, did Augustine (*Contra Faustum*, xii. 89) already, and Cassiodorus (*De Instit. Div. Lit.*, ii. p. 516), later on, Luther and Wetstein, and in recent times Steiger, De Wette,

¹ Weiss wrongly tries (*Die Petrin. Frage*, p. 623) to neutralize the evidential value of this remark, by saying "that it does not touch the very pith of his argument, which consists in this, that Peter expressly quotes the O. T., as Paul does, only in i. 16, ii. 6." For, on the one hand, Paul, too, employs O. T. expressions and phrases without adding *γέγραπται* or the like, e.g., in the passage above quoted, 1 Cor. ii. 16. On the other hand, the O. T. expressions employed by Peter without

the formula of quotation are of such a kind as to have been intelligible to the Christians as such, irrespective of whether they formerly had been heathens or Jews; nor do they by any means "presuppose so intimate a knowledge of the O. T. as is conceivable only in those who had formerly been Jews." With regard to their acquaintance with the O. T., cf. Meyer on Rom. vii. 1, where Paul speaks of the Christians, without exception, as *γνώσκοντες νόμον*.

Brückner, Mayerhoff, Wiesinger, Schott, Hofmann, as also Neander, Guericke, Reuss, Lechler, Schaff, Jul. Köstlin, Bleek, and others, pronounce in favor of the opinion that the churches in question must be held to have been composed of Gentile Christians. The hypothesis of Benson, Michaelis, Credner, and some others, that this epistle is designed for such Gentile Christians as had before their conversion to Christianity been "proselytes of the gate," is evidently a purely arbitrary one.

As to their *condition*, we gather from the epistle for the most part only, that the churches were at that time exposed to many persecutions at the hands of the heathen, which, however, consisted more in contumelies and revilings than in actual ill-treatment. That these manifold persecutions were instituted by the state, cannot, with Hug, Mayerhoff, and Neander, be concluded from the expressions *ἰπολογία* and *κακοποιός* in iii. 15, 16. Schott's conjecture, that they were connected with those which arose under Nero, is refuted on the one hand by their character as described in the epistle, and on the other by the testimony of history, which confines the Neronian persecution solely to Rome. A too gloomy picture of the moral condition of the readers must not be drawn from the exhortations given to them relative to the persecutions, although it is not incredible that the shortcomings brought here and there to light by the persecutions may have induced the apostle to compose this epistle; open blame is nevertheless not expressed. Nor is there any thing to indicate that the church was disturbed by heretical tendencies, or opposing parties of Jewish and Gentile Christians. — The notion that Peter was personally acquainted with his readers, is opposed as much by the want of any personal relations on his part to his readers, as by the distinction he makes between himself and those who had proclaimed the gospel to them.

Only one passage (v. 13) has reference to the *place* where the epistle was composed. From the circumstance that Peter sends greetings from the church (not from his wife) in Babylon, it may correctly be inferred that during the composition of the epistle he was in that city. But whether by Babylon is to be understood the Babylon properly so called, on the banks of the Euphrates, or Rome rather, the capital of the world, is a question by no means settled as yet (cf. on this the remarks on the passage). It is not at all improbable in itself that Peter was for a time in Babylon proper, and labored there as an apostle, the less so that from of old, in that very city, there were large Jewish communities, which stood in intimate connection with Jerusalem.

In order to settle more precisely *the time of the composition*, it must be

observed principally: (1) That the epistle is directed to Pauline churches; (2) That it presupposes the acquaintance of its author with the Epistle to the Ephesians. If these two points, above proved to be correct, are established, the epistle can neither, as Weiss assumes, have been composed at the beginning of Paul's third missionary journey, nor, as Brückner conjectures, at the end of it; its origin must be relegated, rather, to a later date. Assuming that the Epistle to the Ephesians was written by Paul during his captivity at Rome, Wieseler would place the composition of our epistle in the latter part of that captivity. But the following facts militate against this: on the one hand, that the persecutions of the Christians in the provinces of Asia Minor, which occasioned this letter of Peter, are mentioned neither in the Epistle to the Ephesians nor in that to the Colossians; and, on the other, that in the former there is no reference to those false teachers whose appearance these epistles presuppose. Peter, too, if he had composed his epistle at that time, would certainly not have left the imprisonment of Paul unnoticed, the more especially that he was writing to a Pauline church. The letter can have been composed, then, only after the two-years' imprisonment of Paul in Rome. Ewald and Hofmann are of opinion that it was written immediately after his release from captivity. But it is more than improbable that an epistle addressed to a Pauline church was composed when Paul was still alive and engaged in work. If such had been the case, Peter would certainly not have omitted to specify the relation in which he stood to Paul, and the motive which induced him to write to a Pauline church, since by so doing he was evidently encroaching by his apostolic labors on the missionary territory of Paul.¹ Accordingly, it must be assumed that the epistle was not written until after Paul had been removed by martyrdom from the field of apostolic labor, and withal at a time when this fact had become known to the churches, otherwise Peter could not have passed it over in silence. We must agree, then, with those critics who place the composition of the epistle in the closing years of Peter's lifetime, at the earliest in the year 66 (as Reuss, Bleek, Wiesinger, Schott). If Peter died under Nero, that is, about the year 67 A.D., the period which extends from the Neronian persecution of the Christians and the death of Paul — especially as he suffered martyrdom soon after the conflagration in Rome, 64 A.D. — to the time

¹ Hofmann's remark is singular: That those only were guilty of an *interference* who attempted to turn away from Paul the Gentile-Christian churches founded by him, and that

Peter would only have been guilty of an *encroachment* if he had aimed at forming a number of Gentile-Christian churches.

when this epistle was composed, is long enough to allow of it seeming natural that Peter in his epistle should leave those two events unnoticed.¹

All that we learn from the epistle as to the circumstances in which the churches in question were placed, and, in particular, respecting the persecutions to which they were exposed, is in harmony with this date. For although the Christians had to suffer persecution even during the time of Paul's missionary labors (cf. 1 Thess. i. 6, ii. 14; 2 Thess. i. 4, etc.), yet this was by no means so generally the case — a statement Hofmann unjustly calls in question — as our epistle seems to presuppose, but took place for the most part then only when the heathen were instigated by the Jews (Acts xvii. 5, xviii. 12), or by particular individuals to whose interests Christianity was opposed (cf. Acts xvi. 16 ff., xix. 23 ff.). And albeit Tacitus records that the Christians, even so early as the burning of Rome, were the *odium humani generis* and *per flagitia invidi*, they could have begun to be so only after Christianity had shown itself a power capable of advancing on heathendom and convulsing it. This it became only in consequence of Paul's missionary labor; and Weiss is not justified in taking advantage of the fact to support his views as to the early date of composition. On the other hand, the epistle shows that, at the time of its origin, the hostility of the Gentiles towards Christianity had not risen to such a height that the heathen authorities sought to suppress that religion as a *religio nova* fraught with danger to the state, but had confined itself as yet to slanders and the like, to which the heathen population were incited for the reasons given in chap. iv. All this, in like manner, harmonizes with the date above mentioned. Weiss concludes that the epistle belongs to a time considerably earlier, from the following circumstances: "that these sufferings were for

¹ The opposite view (Hofmann's), that the epistle was written between the autumn of the year 63 and that of 64, is based on assumptions, the correctness of which cannot be proved. Hofmann supposes, that, immediately after Paul's release, Peter undertook the journey from Jerusalem to Rome, passing through Asia Minor by way of Ephesus, withal "in order that he might restrain those whose enmity towards Paul threatened to produce a dissension which would have been specially injurious to the church of the world's capital;" further, that during this journey he became acquainted with the Epistle to the Ephesians, with which he "purposely" con-

nected his own; and that he took Mark, who was with him when he composed his epistle, away with him from Ephesus, "because that of all the Jewish converts who, without belonging to the company of the Apostle of the Gentiles, were preaching Christ in Rome at the time of Paul's imprisonment, he was, perhaps, the only one whose conduct towards Peter was influenced by love instead of by jealousy and enmity;" that, immediately upon his arrival at Rome, he wrote his epistle. All these suppositions are purely fictitious, nor can the slightest trace of them be found in the Epistle of Peter.

the Christians still something new, at which they wondered;" and "that to the heathen it was a thing novel and strange that the Christians should renounce their vicious life;" and from this also, that "the apostle still expresses the naïve (!) hope that the heathen, on becoming better acquainted with the holy walk of the Christians, would cease from their enmity, as having arisen from ignorance." The conclusion, however, is unwarranted, the more so that, on the views above expressed as to the origin of the churches of Asia Minor and the date of the epistle's composition, the time during which the churches had existed was even shorter than on the theory supported by Weiss; according to the latter, they had already been in existence for about twenty years; according to the former, for only about fifteen. Under these circumstances, which he has omitted to take into account, Weiss can naturally draw nothing favorable to his own opinions from the expression occurring in chap. ii. 2: ἀργιέννητα βρέφη. The mention, too, of the νεώτεροι, in contrast to the πρεσβύτεροι (chap. v. 5), is not evidence that the epistle was composed at an earlier date, for there is no proof that such νεώτεροι were no longer to be found in the churches of Asia Minor, say, ten years after the time mentioned by Weiss. But the chief reason which Weiss adduces as proof that the churches in question were not Gentile-Christian, but Judæo-Christian communities which had already been in existence before the apostolic career of Paul, and that Peter's epistle had been written before the literary labors of the former had commenced, is his own affirmation, that the doctrinal system of Peter's epistle "is preparatory to that of Paul." This assertion, in itself erroneous and opposed to the real state of the case (cf. more particularly Jul. Köstlin, *Einheit und Mannigfaltigkeit in d. neutest. Lehre*, in the *Jahrb. für deutsche Theologie*, 1858), can be brought as evidence of the early composition of the epistle the less that it in no way admits of proof that Paul became acquainted with the opinions of Peter by means only of this epistle, and that Peter afterwards renounced his own system for that of Paul. From the presence of Silvanus and Mark with Peter at the time he composed this epistle, nothing with any exactitude can be concluded, since the former is mentioned in Acts xviii. 5 as the companion of Paul; the latter, although he was in Rome (Col. iv. 10) during Paul's first imprisonment, and during the second (2 Tim. iv. 11) in Asia Minor, may have been with Peter at any other time.

SEC. 4. — AUTHENTICITY OF THE EPISTLE.

The epistle is one of the writings of the N. T., the authenticity of which is most clearly established from antiquity. Although in the works of the Apostolic Fathers, Clemens Romanus, Barnabas, and Ignatius, there are no formal citations from the epistle, but only echoes of it, the direct reference of which cannot with certainty be established, still, on the other hand, it is undeniable, not only that it is mentioned in the so-called Second Epistle of Peter, but that Polycarp also quotes verbatim several passages from it, thus justifying the remark of Eusebius (*H. E.*, iv. 14), that Polycarp had already made use of it; we have it likewise on the testimony of Eusebius, that Papias did the same in his work, *λογίων κυριακῶν ἐξηγήσεις*. Irenaeus, Tertullian, Clemens Alex., Origen, Cyprian, quote passages from the epistle with direct reference to it by name, and that without the smallest hint that there had ever a doubt been entertained as to its genuineness. It is found also in the older *Peschito*, which contains only the three catholic epistles. Eusebius justly, then, numbers it with the Homologumena. In the so-called Muratorian Canon our epistle is doubtless not definitely quoted, but the passage to which reference is made is not of such a nature that it can be used to impugn the authenticity of the epistle.¹ The words of Leontius of

¹ The passage runs thus: "Epistola sane Judae et superscripti Johannis duas in catholica habentur. Et sapientia ab amicis Salomonis in honorem ipsius scripta. Apocalypsis etiam Johannis et Petri tantum recipimus, quam quidem ex nostris legi ecclesia nolunt." — Hug, who looks upon the whole document as a translation from the Greek, puts a full stop after *Johannis*, and connects the words *Apocalypsis etiam Johannis* with what precedes; he regards *tantum* as a misunderstood translation of *μόνην*, and *quam quidem* (or *quidam*) = *ἡς παρ᾽ ἑξ ἑαυτῶν*. Guericke agrees with Hug, only with this difference, that, instead of *ἡς παρ᾽ ἑξ ἑαυτῶν*, he considers *ἦν τινες* to be the original text. — Wieseler likewise unites the first words with the preceding passage, and then reads *quem quidam*, so that the sense is: "Of Peter also we accept as much (as of John, who was previously mentioned, i.e., two epistles and an Apocalypse), which two amongst us

would not allow to be read in the Church." — Dietlein's conjecture and explanation is still simpler (*Die Kath. Briefe*, Th. I. p. 47). According to it, instead of *Apocalypsis*, there should be *Apocalypses*, and the passage would be translated: "Furthermore, of Apocalypses we accept only those of John and Peter, which (latter) some amongst us would not allow to be read in the church." — Thiersch's change of *tantum* into *unam epistolam*, and of the words *quam quidem* into *alteram quidam*, is rather too bold. According to Hofmann, the epistle is not alluded to in the Fragment; he, like Hug, accepts an original Greek document, and takes the first half of the passage to say of the Epistle of Jude, and of the two, as stated in the superscription, by John (consequently the first is not included, for it has no superscription), that they are valued in the Church as utterances of wisdom written by friends of Solomon (i.e., Christ) to his honor; in

Byzantium do not prove that Theodoret of Mopsuestia disbelieved in its genuineness (*Contr. Nestor. et Eutychn.*, iii. 14), on which Theodorus: "*ob quam causam, ut arbitror, ipsam epistolam Jacobi et alias deinceps aliorum catholicas abrogat et antiquat.*" The fact, however, that the Paulicians, according to the testimony of Petrus Siculus (*Hist. Manich.*, p. 17), rejected it, plainly does not affect the question.

In more recent times, Cludius (*Ürsichten des Christenthums*) was the first to deny the epistle's genuineness — on grounds, however, entirely insufficient, the weightiest of them being, that in thought and expression it bears a too great similarity to the Pauline epistles ever to have been composed by Peter. This is what brought Eichhorn to the hypothesis that the epistle was written by some one who had *for a long time* been connected with Paul, and had consequently adopted his current ideas and phrases. But as this cannot be applicable to Peter, and yet as all worth must not be denied to ecclesiastical tradition, Eichhorn goes farther, and concludes that Peter supplied the material, but that *Mark* worked it up into the epistle before us.¹ Bertholdt, while justly rejecting this hypothesis, has defended the opinion hinted at already by Hieronymus, and more definitely expressed by Baronius, that the epistle was not originally written in Greek (but in Aramaic; according to Baronius, in Hebrew), and translated by an interpreter (Baronius holds by Mark, Bertholdt by Silvanus) into Greek. But this hypothesis is not less arbitrary than that of Eichhorn; for, on the one hand, it is an assertion incapable of proof that Peter could not have been familiar with the Greek language; and, on the other, as much the entire diction of the epistle as the harmony with the corresponding passages in the epistles of Paul and James, and the whole matter of quotation from the O. T., are evidence against any other than a Greek original. De Wette speaks with some vacillation as to the genuineness.² He recognizes, indeed, the weight of the external testimony, and thinks it would be hazardous in the face of it to

the second part of the passage he understands the writer to say: We so far accept the revelations both of John and Peter, as, indeed, some of us will not allow them to be read in the Church.

¹ Ewald's assertion is no less arbitrary, that Peter, not being able to speak and write Greek fluently, employed Silvanus to write the epistle.

² Reuss, too (*Gesch. d. heil. Schriften N. T.*), while, no doubt, recognizing that

the tradition of the Church, from the earliest times, unanimously pronounces Peter to be the author, still thinks that there is much in the epistle (more especially its dependence on the Pauline epistles already mentioned, without any understanding of the system of Paul) which appears strange as coming from Peter. He himself, however, attempts to refute his own objections, though without being able to make up his mind to acknowledge decidedly the authenticity of the epistle.

condemn the epistle as spurious; yet still he is of opinion that its character is evidence rather *against* than *for* its genuineness, — especially on account of its want of distinctive features, and the reminiscences of the epistles already repeatedly mentioned. In reply, it must be urged that the epistle is in no wise wanting in individual impress, and that the writings referred to, if Peter had read and become familiar with them, might have left such an impression on him that echoes of them should be discernible without this in any way interfering with a free and independent development of thought, or standing in contradiction to the personal and apostolic character of the composition. That the Tübingen school should hold this epistle to be spurious, was of course to be expected from its views respecting the apostolic and post-apostolic age.¹ The reasons which Schwegler urges against the genuineness are the following: (1) The want of any definite external occasion, and the general character of its contents and aim. — But such a want is not apparent, and the general character is to be explained, partly by the fact that the apostle was personally unacquainted with the members of the church, and partly by the designation of the epistle as a circular letter. (2) The want of any literary or theological character bearing the impress of individuality. — It has, however, been shown in § 2, that in the epistle there is no want of individuality; but that this must necessarily be as sharply defined as in Paul and John, is an unwarrantable demand. (3) The want of any inner connection of thought. — But the tendency of the epistle is opposed to any such “firm, definite progression of thought” as Schwegler demands, and as is to be found in the Pauline epistles. (4) It was impossible that Peter, while laboring in the far East at a time and in a region destitute of any means of literary communication, could have had in his hand the later epistles of Paul — supposing these to be genuine — so short a time after their composition. — But in Peter’s epistle there are no echoes of the latest of Paul’s epistles. It cannot be denied that between the composition of this epistle and that to the Ephesians, a period of time elapsed sufficiently long to allow of the possibility of Peter’s having become acquainted with the latter; nor will it be disputed that even before his residence in Babylon Peter might have known it. (5) The impossibility — on the assumption of its having been composed in Babylon — of harmonizing the Neronian persecution, presupposed in the epistle, with the martyrdom of Peter in Rome during that persecution. — But the supposition that the per-

¹ Pfleiderer’s opinion, that the Apostle Peter was in favor of a Judaic Christianity, whilst the epistle expresses a feeble and

insipid Paulinism peculiar to later times (see on this § 2, p. 16 f.), must necessarily lead him to deny the authenticity also.

secution here referred to was the Neronian finds no support in the epistle; nor is it by any means a necessary assumption for "the friends of the conservative school of historians, and a positive criticism," that the persecution referred to be the Neronian. — For his theory that the epistle was written in post-apostolic times, and withal under Trajan, Schwegler chiefly depends (here Pfeleiderer agrees with him) on this, that the persecution presupposed in the epistle is not the Neronian, but the Trajanian; and for the truth of his assertion he brings the following proofs: (1) The calm, unimpassioned tone of the epistle, as contrasted with the impression which the Neronian persecution made upon the Christians. (2) Under Nero the Christians were persecuted, inasmuch as they were accused of participation in fire-raising, that is to say, on account of a definite crime; but at the time of this letter they suffered persecution as Christians (*ὡς χριστιανοί*), on whom suspicion was sought to be thrown on account of their general behavior (*ὡς κακοποιοί*). (3) It is incapable of proof, and incredible, that the Neronian persecution extended beyond Rome. (4) The epistle takes for granted investigations, with regular trial and under legal forms; whilst the Neronian persecution was a tumultuary act of popular law. (5) The position of Christianity in Asia Minor, presupposed in the epistle, corresponds with the description of it given in Pliny's letter to Trajan. — Of all these, however, this *one point* alone must be conceded, that the persecution referred to cannot be regarded as due directly to the burning of Rome — all the other assertions being based simply on arbitrary assumptions or on false interpretations.¹ It is also entirely out of place for Schwegler to understand the formula of salutation (v. 12) symbolically, so as to find in it the expression of the later church tradition "as to the presence of Peter in Rome, along with his *ἑμπνευστῆς* Mark," and to assert that v. 2 points to an ecclesiastico-political constitution (!) which had overspread the whole of Christendom, and to the

¹ In opposition to Schwegler, it must be remarked: (1) The passionless tone would remain equally admirable in the Trajanian persecution as under that of Nero; any other style would have been hardly becoming an apostle. (2) From the first, and not under Trajan alone, the Christians had to suffer from the very fact of their being Christians. (3) Although the persecution of Nero, i.e., the one which he himself instituted, did not extend beyond Rome, still, in his day, the Christians might, through the hatred of

the people, have had to endure persecution in the provinces as well. (4) No mention is made in our epistle of any judicial persecution of the Christians according to legal form. (5) The description given in Pliny's letter does not prove that the persecution mentioned here was that under Trajan; in the latter, the Christians were *punished formally with death*; whilst there is nothing in our epistle to show that such took place in the former.

sway of hierarchical tendencies (!) which had already forced their way into it. Schwegler sees the real design of the epistle expressed in the passage v. 12, according to which "it is simply the attempt on the part of one of Paul's followers to reconcile the two opposing schools of Peter and Paul, by putting into the mouth of Peter, as testimony to the orthodoxy of his fellow-apostle Paul, a somewhat Petrine-colored presentation of the Pauline system." Schwegler seeks to establish this hypothesis, which even Pfeiderer calls in question, thus: that, on the one hand, in the epistle are to be found "almost all the chief conceptions and fundamental ideas" of Paul; on the other, the latter's doctrine of justification is wanting, and thoughts, views, and expressions occur which are peculiar to Petrinism. It is not to be denied that Schwegler, in carrying out his idea, has sought out every point which could in any way be used in its favor; his labor, however, has been in vain — the untenableness of the hypothesis being too apparent. For if the maintenance of the churches in the gospel preached to them be a matter obviously near to the apostle's heart, yet in its whole composition there is no justification for the assertion that the epistle has for its aim a *conciliatory* design which is nowhere apparent in it. How strange that the matter of chief moment should be, not the exhortations of which the epistle is composed, but something entirely different — nowhere expressed in it, not even in ver. 5! How can a Paulinism be conceived of from which the very pith is wanting, the doctrine of justification by faith, with its characteristic terminology: *δικαιοσύνη* and *δικαιῶσθαι*? Precisely the absence of this doctrine, and the other points which Schwegler brings forward as evidence of a Petrine coloring, show that the epistle cannot have been composed by one who belonged to the school of Paul, but must be the production of Peter, or of one of his disciples.¹ Lastly, opposed to Schwegler's hypothesis as to the post-apostolic origin of the epistle, is the circumstance that it is hardly conceivable how a forger should have attempted to palm off on *definitely formed churches*, some *fifty* years after his death, a letter professing to have been written by Peter, in which they are comforted in their *present* affliction; and that he should have been so successful, that the fraud was detected by no one in the churches (comp. against Schwegler, in particular Brückner, *Introd.*, § 5a). — Although the characteristic traits which Krummacher

¹ Namely, the great stress laid on *καλὰ ἔργα*, on *ἀγαθὴ ἀναστροφή*, on *ἀγάπη* (!), on *ἀγαθοποιεῖν*, on *ἐλπίς*, as a dogmatic fundamental idea synonymous with *πίστις*; the symbolizing of the Jewish temple and sacri-

ficial services; the conception of Christians as the true Messianic people; the introduction into the new covenant of the idea of the O. T. priesthood; the expression *διασπορά* in the superscription.

(*Evangel. Kirchenzeitung*, 1829, No. 49), and after him Guericke, brings as proof of the genuineness, namely, "the manner of exhortation, so human and evangelical, so strong and gentle; the urgent directions to steadfastness of faith in lowliness and patience, with reference to the example and the glory of Christ; the urgent appeal to more watchfulness and sobriety, the higher their calling as believers; the repeated summonses to humility; the way in which the general aim is kept in view; the clearness, precision, and emphatic character of the style,"—these characteristic features, although in themselves they do not prove Peter to have been the author of the epistle, still show that it breathes an apostolic spirit such as is not peculiar to post-apostolic writings, and that in its inward structure there is nothing to justify a doubt as to its genuineness.

Πέτρου ἐπιστολὴ α.

Instead of this superscription, which A, C, \aleph have, B reads Πέτρου α'; in some min., it is Πέτρου καθολικῆ πρώτῃ ἐπιστολῇ, and, in G, ἐπιστολὴ καθολικῆ α' τοῦ ἁγίου καὶ πανευφύμου ἁποστόλου Πέτρου.

CHAPTER I.

Ver. 6. *εἰ δέον ἐστὶ*. Tisch. omits *ἐστὶ*; it is wanting also in B, \aleph , Clem., etc.; Lachm. has retained it; the most of the codd. (A, C, K, L, P, etc.) read it, indeed; but it is more easy to explain how it was afterwards added than how it was left out later. — *λυπηθέντες*. The reading *λυπηθέντας*, in L, \aleph , and several min., is probably only an error in copying. — Ver. 7. *πολυτιμώτερον*, adopted by Griesb. already, instead of *πολὸν τιμώτερον* in K, etc. Instead of *τιμὴν καὶ δόξαν* (Rec., according to K, L, P, etc.), Lachm. and Tisch. read *δόξαν καὶ τιμὴν*, which is supported by A, B, C, \aleph , many min., several vss., etc. — Ver. 8. *εἰδότες*. Rec., after A, K, L, P, etc., Copt., Clem., Theoph., etc.; Lachm. and Tisch., following B, C, \aleph , 27, etc., Syr., Aeth., etc., read *ιδόντες*; as both readings give a fitting sense, and as both are attested by high authorities, it cannot with certainty be decided which is the original. Brückner and Hofmann are in favor of *ιδόντες*, Schott of *εἰδότες*, Wiesinger uncertain. — Ver. 9. After *πίστεως*, Tisch. 7, following B, several min., Clem., Aeth., etc., omits *ὑμῶν*, attested though it be by most of the authorities (A, C, K, L, P, \aleph , *al.*, etc.); Tisch. 8 has retained. Although it may be superfluous for the meaning, yet its omission is not justified. — Vv. 10, 11. Instead of *ἐξηρεύνησαν* and *ἐρευνῶντες*, Tisch., following A, B, has adopted *ἐξηραύνησαν*, and, after B*, *ἐραυνῶντες*. — Ver. 11. B omits *Χριστοῦ*, which must be regarded as a correction. — Ver. 12. Instead of the Received *ἡμῖν δέ* (K, *al.*, Copt., etc.), Griesb., Scholz, Lachm., Tisch., have rightly adopted the reading *ὑμῖν δέ*, attested by A, B, C, L, P, \aleph , *al.*, Vulg., etc.¹ *ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ*. Rec., after C, K, L, P, \aleph , etc., Copt., Theoph., etc. (Tisch. 8); Lachm. and Tisch. 7 omit *ἐν*, after A, B, *al.*, Slav., Vulg., Cypr., Didym., etc. Possibly *ἐν* was interpolated on account of the usage prevalent elsewhere in the N. T. — Ver. 16. Tisch. 7 reads, after *γέγραπται: ὅτι ἅγιοι ἔσεσθε, ὅτι*; on the other hand, Tisch. 8 omits *ὅτι* before *ἅγιοι*, and has, after *ἔσεσθε: διότι*. With the preponderance of authorities, *ἅγιοι ἔσεσθε, ὅτι* is to be read; almost B alone is in favor of *ὅτι* before *ἅγιοι*; and, for *διότι*, only \aleph . — *γένεσθε*. Rec., after K, P, etc. Lachm. and Tisch. rightly read *ἔσεσθε* after A, B, C, \aleph , *al.*, Vulg., Clem., Syr.; *γένεσθε*

¹ Buttman has retained the Rec. *ἡμῖν δέ* after B as he asserts. De Wette holds the Rec. to be the original reading, it being natural that the apostle should include himself, and

οἷς rather than *ἡμῖν* would be expected after *ὑμῖν*; Brückner justly gives preference to the opposing testimony.

is a correction after the preceding γενήθητε. In the LXX., *ἔσεσθε* stands. — In A, B*, \aleph , Clem., Cyr., *εἶμι* is wanting after *ἄγιος*; Lachm. and Tisch. have justly omitted it. — Ver. 20. Lachm. and Tisch. rightly read, instead of *ἐπ' ἐσχάτων* (Rec., after K, L, P, etc.), *ἐπ' ἐσχάτου* (A, B, C, \aleph , *al.*, Copt., Syr., utr., etc.). — Instead of *ὑμῖς*, A and several min. have *ἡμῖς*, which, however, must be considered as a correction. — Ver. 21. *πιστεύοντας*]. Rec., according to C, K, L, P, \aleph , etc., several vss., Theoph., Oec.; still the reading *πιστός* might be preferred as the more difficult, with Lachm. and Tisch., after A, B, especially as *πιστὸς εἰς* does not occur elsewhere in the N. T.; Wiesinger and Schott also consider *πιστός* the original reading, whilst Hofmann gives the preference to the Rec. — Ver. 22. The Rec. has the words *διὰ πνεύματος* after *ἀληθείας*, following K, L, P, Theoph., etc., which Griesb. already considers suspicious; Lachm. and Tisch. have justly omitted them, following A, B, C, \aleph , many min., etc. — Lachm. and Tisch. read *ἐκ καρδίας* (A, B, Vulg.); the Rec. is *ἐκ καθαρῶς καρδίας* (C, K, L, P, \aleph , *al.*, nearly all the vss., etc.); *καθαρῶς* is certainly very suspicious, since its addition is more easily explained than its omission; cf. 1 Tim. i. 5; 2 Tim. ii. 22; on the other hand, however, see Rom. vi. 17. Hofmann assumes that *καθαρῶς* is omitted only by mistake. — Ver. 23. The words *εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα*, following in the Rec. after *μένοντος*, which, in A, B, C, \aleph , and other authorities, are wanting, were justly omitted already by Griesb. — Ver. 24. Lachm. omits *ὡς* before *χόρτος*, after A, several min., Syr., etc. Most of the witnesses are in favor of *ὡς*, the omission of which is to be regarded as a correction after the text of the LXX. — *δόξα αὐτῆς*, after A, B, C, K, L, P, etc., instead of the Rec., to be found almost only in min., Rec.: *δόξα ἀνθρώπου*. In \aleph , pr. m., is to be found the reading, *ἡ δόξα αὐτοῦ*. After *τὸ ἄνθος*, the Rec. has *αὐτοῦ*, retained by Tisch. 7, after C, K, L, P, etc., Vulg., Copt. Lachm. and Tisch. 8 have omitted it after A, B, \aleph , etc.; it is certainly suspicious, since it may have been interpolated as an explanation; on the other hand, its omission may be a correction after Isa. xl. 7, LXX.

Vv. 1, 2. The superscription, while corresponding in fundamental plan with those of the Pauline epistles, has nevertheless a peculiar character of its own. — *Πετρος*]. As Paul in his epistles calls himself not by his original name *Σαῦλος*, so Peter designates himself not by his original name *Σίμων*, but by that given him by Christ, which “may be regarded as his apostolic, his official, name” (Schott); otherwise in 2 Pet.: *Συμεὼν Πέτρος*. — An addition such as *διὰ θελήματος Θεοῦ*, or the like, of which Paul oftentimes, though not always, makes use in the superscriptions of his epistles, was unnecessary for Peter. — Peter designates his readers by the words: *ἐκλεκτοῖς παρεπίδημοις διασπορῶς Πόντου, κ.τ.λ.*; he calls the Christians to whom he writes — for that his epistle is addressed to Christians cannot be doubted — “*elect strangers*,” and withal, those who belong to the *διασπορά* throughout Pontus, etc. *ἐκλεκτοὶ* the Christians are named, inasmuch as God had chosen them to be His own, in order that they might be made partakers of the *κληρονομία* (ver. 4) reserved for them in heaven; cf. chap. ii. 9: *ὑμεῖς γένος ἐκλεκτόν*. — *παρεπίδημος* is he who dwells in a land of which he is not a native (where his home is not); in the LXX. it is given as the rendering of *בְּשֵׁלֶט*, Gen. xxiii. 4; Ps xxxix. 12 (in other passages *בְּשֵׁלֶט* is translated by *πάρουκος*; cf. Exod. xii. 45; Lev. xxii. 10, xxv. 23, 47, etc.); in the Apocrypha *παρεπίδημος* does not occur; in the N. T., besides in this passage, it is to be found in chap. ii. 11; Heb. xi

13. — If account be taken of vv. 4, 17 (ὁ τῆς παροικίας ἡμῶν χρόνος), and particularly of chap. ii. 11, it cannot be doubted that Peter styled his readers *παρεπίδημοι*, because during their present life upon earth they, as Christians, were not in their true home, which is the *κληρονομία . . . τετηρημένη ἐν οὐρανοῖς*. The expression is understood in this sense by the more modern writers, in particular by Steiger, Brückner, Wiesinger, Weiss, Luthardt (Reuter's *Repertor.*, 1855, Nov.), Schott, Hofmann, etc.¹ It is incorrect to refer the word here to an earthly home, that is, Palestine, as is done by De Wette, and in like manner by Weizsäcker (in Reuter's *Repert.*, 1858, No. 3).²

REMARK. — In the O. T., תושב occurs in its strict signification in Gen. xxiii. 4; Exod. xii. 45; Lev. xxii. 10, xxv. 47 (LXX., *παροικος*). In Lev. xxv. 23, the Israelites are called גרים ותושבים in a peculiar connection; God says that such they are *with Him* (עִמָּךְ, cf. Gen. xxiii. 4), in that the land wherein they should dwell belongs to *Him*. The same idea is to be found in Ps. xxxix. 12, where the Psalmist bases his request for hearing on this, that he is גר and תושב *with God* (עִמָּךְ), as were his fathers; for although in vv. 5-7 the shortness of human life is made specially prominent, yet there is nothing to show, that, in ver. 12, there is any reference to this. On the other hand, in 1 Chron. xxix. (xxx.) 15, David, in prayer to God, speaks of himself and his people as גרים and תושבים, because they have no abiding rest on earth (כִּצְלַח בְּיַמֵּינוּ וְאֵין בְּקִפּוֹה (עַל-חֲזָרְךָ וְאֵין בְּקִפּוֹה); here it is not the preposition עִמָּךְ, but לְפָנֶיךָ, which is used. In the passage Ps. cxix. 19, the relation in which the Psalmist speaks of himself as a stranger is not expressed בְּחֲזָרְךָ, ver. 54; he calls his earthly life בְּגִיטֵנוּ, as Jacob in Gen. xlvii. 9, which points evidently enough to the circumstance that the Israelites were not without the consciousness that their real home lay beyond this earthly life; cf. on this, Heb. xi. 13; 14, and Delitzsch *in loc.*

Whilst the expression *ἐκλεκτοῖς παρεπίδημοῖς* — wherein not *ἐκλεκτοῖς* (Hofmann) but *παρεπίδημοῖς* is the substantival idea — is applicable to all Christians, the following words: *διασπορᾶς Πόντου, κ.τ.λ.*, specify those Christians to whom the epistle is addressed (cf. the superscriptions of the Pauline epistles). — *διασπορά*, strictly an abstract idea, denotes, according to Jewish usage: "Israel living scattered among the heathen," — that is, it is a complex of concrete ideas, 2 Macc. i. 27; John vii. 35; cf. Meyer *in loc.*; Winer, *Bibl.*

¹ It is inexact to interpret *παρεπίδημοι* simply by "*pilgrims of earth*;" Steinmeyer, on the other hand (*Disquisition in Ep. Petr. I. prooemium*), rightly observes: "Quum mansio in terra sempiterna permittatur nemini, in universos omnes vox quadaret, nec in eos solos, qui per evangelium vocati sunt;" but when Steinmeyer adds: "Quare censemur, *παρεπίδ.* . . . significare . . . in mundo viventes, cujus esse desierint, cui ipsi sint perosi," he thus gives an improper application to the word, the more so that the conception *κόσμος*, in an ethical sense, is foreign to the Epistle of Peter. Weiss weakens the idea by saying: "The Christian is in so far a stranger on the earth

as he is aware of the inheritance reserved for him in heaven; this *knowledge* the unbeliever cannot have, and accordingly he cannot *feel* himself a stranger on earth." It is not the *knowing* and *feeling*, but the *really being*, which is of consequence.

² It is still more erroneous to suppose, as Reuss does (*Gesch. der h. Schriften N. T.*, § 147, note), that the readers are here termed *παρεπίδ.*, "because they are looked upon as ׀רִי גַ proselytes, i.e., Israelites according to faith, not according to the form of worship." This view, however, is opposed to the *usus loquendi*, since *παρεπίδημοι* nowhere denotes proselytes.

Realwörterb., see under “*Zerstreuung*.”¹ The question is now: Is the word to be taken as applying only to the Jewish nation? From of old the question has, by many interpreters, been answered in the affirmative (Didymus, Oecumenius, Eusebius, Calvin, Beza, De Wette, Weiss, etc.), and therefrom the conclusion has been drawn that the readers of the epistle were Jewish Christians.² But the character of the epistle is opposed to this view (cf. *Introd.*, § 3). Since the Apostle Peter regarded Christians as the true Israel, of which the Israel of the O. T. was only the type (ii. 9), there is nothing to prevent the expression being applied, as many interpreters hold,³ to the Christians, and withal to those who dwelt outside of Canaan. No doubt *this land* had not for the N. T. Church the same significance which it possessed for that of the O. T., still it was the scene of Christ’s labors, and in Jerusalem was the mother church of all Christendom.⁴ Some interpreters, like Aretius, Schott, Hofmann, leave entirely out of view the local reference of the word, and take it as applying to the whole of Christendom *ecclesia dispersa in toto orbe*, in so far as the latter represents “a concrete corporeal centre around which the members of the church were locally united,” and “has its point of union in that Christ who is seated at the right hand of God” (Schott).⁵ Against this, however, it must be urged that Peter, if he had wished the word *διασπορά* to have been understood in a sense so entirely different from the established usage, would in some way or other have indicated this. — It is entirely erroneous to suppose⁶ that in the expression used by Peter the readers are designated as heathen Christians, or even⁷ as *aforetime proselytes*. The one correct interpretation is, that in the superscription those readers only are described as “Christians, who constituted the people of God living, scattered throughout the regions mentioned, who, in consequence of their election, had become strangers in the world, but who had their inheritance and home in heaven, whither they were journeying” (Wiesinger). The reason why Peter employed this term with reference to his readers lies in the design of the epistle; he speaks of them as *ἐκλεκτοί*, in order that in their present condition of suffering he might assure them of their state of grace

¹ The LXX. translate נְדָרָה (as a collective noun), Deut. xxx. 4, Neh. i. 9, by *διασπορά*, and as inexactly and even incorrectly וְזֵינָה, Jer. xxxiv. 17; כְּזָרָה, Jer. xv. 7; נְצִירֵי שְׂרָאֵל, Isa. xlix. 6.

² Taken in this way, the genit. *διασπορᾶς* must be interpreted as genit. partit., thus: the members of the *διασπορά* who have become Christians (*ἐκλεκτοὶ παρεπίδημοι*). Weiszäcker is altogether mistaken (Reuter’s *Repert.*, 1858, No. 3) in his opinion that the reference is to “the Christians who, in as far as they dwell among the dispersed Jewish communities, are members of the Diaspora.”

³ Brückner, Wiesinger, Wieseler too; Rettberg in *Ersch-Gruber*, see under “Petrus,” and others.

⁴ It is worthy of note that Paul also considers the Christian Church to be the Israel

κατὰ πνεῦμα, that he looks upon the converted heathen as the branches ingrafted into Israel, that he was ever anxious to keep up the connection between the heathen Christian churches and the mother church in Jerusalem, and that he distinctly terms the Church triumphant ἡ ἄνω Ἱερουσαλήμ.

⁵ Schott, however, grants that “Peter considers Jerusalem and the mother church in Jerusalem typically as the ideal centre for all believers under the New Covenant.”

⁶ With Augustine (*Contra Faustum*, xxii. 89), Procopius (*In Jes.*, xv. 20), Cassiodorus (*De instil. div. litt.*, ii. p. 516), Luther, Gualther, and others, and, among more recent authors, Steiger.

⁷ With Credner (*Einkl.*, p. 638), Neudecker (*Einkl.*, p. 677).

as *παρεπιδήμοι*, that they might know that they belonged to the home of believers in heaven. But it is at least open to doubt whether in *διασποράς* there is any reference to the present want of direct union around Christ (Schott). — Πόντου, Γαλατίας, κ.τ.λ. The provinces of Asia Minor are named chiefly in a westerly direction, Galatia westward from Pontus, then the enumeration continues with Cappadocia lying south from Galatia, that is to say, in the east, and goes from thence westward towards Asia, after which Bithynia is mentioned, the eastern boundary of the northern part of Asia Minor. So that Bengel is not so far wrong (as opposed to Wiesinger) when he says: *Quinque provincias nominat eo ordine, quo occurrerant scribenti ex oriente*. If in Asia, besides Caria, Lydia, and Mysia, Phrygia also (Ptolem., v. 2) be included, and in Galatia the lands of Pamphylia, Pisidia, and a part of Lycaonia, — which, however, is improbable, — the provinces mentioned by Peter will embrace almost the whole of Asia Minor. — In the N. T. there is no mention of the founding of the Christian churches in Pontus, Cappadocia, and Bithynia. — Ver. 2. *κατὰ πρόγνωσιν, κ.τ.λ.* The three adjuncts, beginning with different prepositions, are not to be taken with *ἀπόστολος*, as Cyrillus (*De recta fide*), Oecumen., Kahnis (*Lehre v. Abendm.*, p. 65), and others think, but with *ἐκλεκτοῖς παρεπιδήμοις*, pointing out as they do the origin, the means, and the end of the condition in which the readers as *ἐκλεκτοὶ παρεπιδήμοι* were. It is further incorrect to limit, as is prevalently done, their reference simply to the term *ἐκλεκτοῖς*,¹ and to find in them a more particular definition of the method of the divine election. Steinmeyer, in violation of the grammatical construction, gives a different reference to each of the three adjuncts joining *κατὰ πρόγν.* with *ἐκλεκτοῖς*, *ἐν ἀγιασμῶ* with *παρεπιδήμοις*, and *εἰς ὑπακ.* with *ἀγιασμῶ*. But inasmuch as the ideas *ἐκλεκτοῖς παρεπιδήμοις* stand in closest connection, the two prepositions *κατὰ* and *ἐν* must apply equally to them. *κατὰ* states that the *ἐκλεκτοὶ παρεπιδήμοι* are such *in virtue of* the *πρόγνωσις Θεοῦ*; *κατὰ* denotes “the origin, and gives the pattern according to which” (so, too, Wiesinger). *πρόγνωσις* is translated generally by the commentators as predestination;² this is no doubt inexact, still it must be observed that in the N. T. *πρόγνωσις* stands always in such a connection as to show that it expresses an idea akin to that of predestination, but without the idea of knowing or of taking cognizance being lost. It is the perceiving of God by means of which the object is determined, as that which He perceives it to be. Cf. Meyer on Rom. viii. 29: “It is God’s being aware in His plan, in virtue of which, before the subjects are destined by Him to sal-

¹ Hofmann supports this application as against that to *παρεπιδήμοις*, “because the state of being a stranger, even though taken spiritually, is not a condition to which the prepositional determinations are suited.” Hofmann does not state the ground of this assertion; as the idea of being a stranger is identical with that of being a Christian, these are very well adapted to *ἐκλεκτοῖς παρεπιδήμοις*. The mere circumstance that the question here is not one of a nearer definition of election, but

of the condition in which the readers were, is opposed to a connection with *ἐκλεκτοῖς*. Cf. 1 Cor. i. 1, where *δια θελήματος* stands connected with *κλητός ἀπόστολος Ἰησ. Χρ.*, and not with *κλητός*; see 2 Cor. i. 1.

² *Lyranna, praedestinationio*; Erasmus, *praefinitio*; Beza, *antegressum decretum s. propositum Dei*; Luther, *the foreseeing of God*; Gerhard, *πρόθεσις juxta quam facta est electio*; de Wette, *βουλή or προορισμός*.

vation, He knows who are to be so destined by Him." It is incorrect, therefore, to understand the word as denoting simply foreknowledge;¹ this leads to a Pelagianizing interpretation, and is met by Augustine's phrase: *eligendos facit Deus, non invenit*. Estius translates πρόγνωσις at once by *praedilectio*: other interpreters, as Bengel, Wiesinger, Schott, would include the idea of love, at least, in that of foreknowledge; but although it must be granted that the πρόγνωσις of God here spoken of cannot be conceived of without His love, it must not be overlooked that the idea of love is not made prominent.² Hofmann says: "πρόγνωσις is — precognition; here, therefore, a work of God the Father, which consists in this, that He makes beforehand those whom He has chosen, objects of a knowledge, as the akin and homogeneous are known, that is, of an approving knowledge." — πατρός is added to Θεοῦ; the apostle has already in his mind the following πνεύματος and Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, in order thereby to emphasize more definitely the threefold basis of election. Bengel: *Mysterium Trinitatis et oeconomia salutis nostrae innuitur hoc versu. — ἐν ἁγιασμῷ πνεύματος*. It seems simplest and most natural to interpret, with Luther and most others, "through the sanctifying of the Spirit," — that is, taking ἁγιασμός actively, and ἐν as denoting the instrumentality. The only difficulty in the way is, that ἁγιασμός, a word foreign to classical Greek, and occurring but seldom in the Apocrypha, has constantly the neutral signification, "sanctification;"³ cf. Meyer on Rom. vi. 19. Now, since the word, as far as the form is concerned, admits of both meanings,⁴ it is certainly permissible to assume that here — deviating from the general *usus loquendi* — it may have an active signification, as perhaps also in 2 Thess. ii. 13. If

¹ The word has not this signification in the N. T.; it has it, however, in the Book of Judith, ix. 6 and xl. 19. — The verb προγιγνώσκειν has the meaning of simple foreknowledge in Acts xxvi. 5 and 2 Pet. iii. 17 (so, too, Book of Wisd. vi. 13, viii. 8, xviii. 6); the sense is different in Rom. viii. 29, xi. 2, and 1 Pet. i. 10.

² Schott's assertion, that "γιγνώσκειν is always a cognizance of this kind, since he who is cognizant gives himself up in his inmost nature to the object in question, so as again to take it up into his being and to appropriate it to himself," — further, that "the perceiving of God creates its own objects, and consequently is a προγιγνώσκειν," and that accordingly neither death nor sin can be the objects of God's foreknowledge, — contradicts itself by the clearest statements of Scripture: cf. Deut. ix. 24, xxxi. 27; Matt. xxii. 13; Luke xvi. 15; John v. 42; 1 Cor. iii. 20, etc.

³ Cf. Rom. vi. 19, where it is contrasted with ἀνομία; 1 Cor. i. 30, where it is connected with δικαιοσύνη, 1 Tim. ii. 15 with ἀγάπη, and 1 Thess. iv. 4 with τιμῆ; 1 Thess. iv. 7, where it stands in antithesis to ἀκαθάρσια; and Heb. xii. 14, where, like εἰρήνην (cf. 1 Tim. vi. 11: διακε δικαιοσύνην), it depends on διώκετε; in 1 Thess. iv. 3 also it has the meaning referred

to. If it be here taken in an active sense, and ἑμῶν be the objective genitive, the subject is wanting; but if ἑμῶν be the subjective genitive, then it is the object which is wanting. Lünemann's interpretation accordingly: "that you sanctify yourselves," is unwarranted. ἁγιασμός can only be artificially interpreted by "sanctifying" in the passages quoted. A striking example of this is Hofmann's interpretation of 1 Thess. iv. 4. Only in 2 Thess. ii. 13, where the expression, as here, is: ἐν ἁγιασμῷ πνεύματος, does the active meaning seem to correspond better than the neuter with the thought. There is no foundation whatever for the opinion of Crömer, cf. *s. v.*, that — whilst in the Apocrypha the word never has an active signification, but is either "sanctuary" (thus also in the LXX. Ezek. xlv. 4 and Amos ii. 11) or "sanctity" — it is in the N. T. for the most part "sanctifying." — Schott very justly calls in question the active signification of the word; but when, not content with the rendering "sanctification," he interprets: "the condition of holiness being increasingly realized," he confuses the conception by references which are simply imported.

⁴ Cf. Buttman, *Ausführl. griech. Sprachl.* § 119, 20.

the preposition *ἐν* be taken as equal to "through," there results an appropriate progression of thought from origin (*κατά*) to means (*ἐν*), and further to end (*εἰς*). If, however, the usage establish a hard and fast rule, the interpretation must be: "the holiness wrought by the (Holy) Spirit," so that the genitive as gen. auct. has a signification similar to that in the expression *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ*;¹ in this interpretation *ἐν* may equally have an instrumental force. No doubt, many interpreters deny that *ἐν* can here be equal to *διὰ*, since the election is not accomplished by means of the Holy Spirit. But this ground gives way if the three nearer definitions refer not to the election, — as a divine activity, — and so not to the *ἐκλεκτοῖς* alone, but to the state into which the readers had been introduced by the choice of God, that is, to the *ἐκλεκτοῖς παρεπιδήμοις*. It is incorrect to attribute to *ἐν* here a final signification; Beza: *ad sanctificationem*; De Wette: *εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἐν ἁγιασμῷ*; the conception of purpose begins only with the subsequent *εἰς*. — The explanation, that *ἐν ἁγ. πν.* points out the sphere (or the limitations) within which the readers are *ἐκλ. παρεπ.* (formerly supported in this commentary), is wanting in the necessary clearness of thought. — *εἰς ὑπακοὴν καὶ ῥαντισμὸν αἵματος Ἰησοῦ Χρ.* The third adjunct to *ἐκλ. παρεπίδ.*, giving the end towards which this condition is directed. The preposition *εἰς* is not to be connected with *ἁγιασμός* (De Wette, Steinmeyer); for although such a construction be grammatically possible, the reference to the Trinity goes to show that these words must be taken as a third adjunct, co-ordinate with the two preceding clauses. Besides, if there were two parts only, the conjunction *καὶ* would hardly be wanting. *ὑπακοή* is to be construed neither with *Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*, whether taken as a subjective genitive (Beza: *designatur nostrae sanctificationis subjectum, nempe Christus Jesus qui patri fuit obediens ad mortem*, where *εἰς* is arbitrarily rendered by *διὰ*), nor, with Hofmann and Schott, as an objective genitive: "obedience towards Christ" (for then this genitive would stand in a relation other than to *αἵματος*),² nor with *αἵματος*. *ὑπακοή* must be taken here absolutely, as in ver. 14; cf. Rom. vi. 16. With regard to the meaning of *ὑπακοή*, many interpreters understand by it faith in Christ; so Luther, Gerhard, Vorstius, Heidegger, Bengel, Wiesinger, Hofmann, etc.: others, on the contrary, take it to signify "moral obedience;" so Pott, De Wette, Schott, etc. Many of the former, however, insist that by it a faith is meant "which of itself includes a conduct corresponding to it" (Hofmann), whilst by the latter it is emphasized that that moral obedience is meant which

¹ The idea of holiness is here by no means inappropriate, since the readers would not be *ἐκλεκτοὶ παρεπιδήμοι* if they had not become *ἅγιοι* through the Holy Spirit. It is this *ἅγιον εἶναι* which is here expressed by *ἁγιασμός*. Also in 2 Thess. ii. 13, there is no urgent reason for departing from this signification of the word. Hofmann erroneously appeals to 2 Macc. xiv. 36; cf. Cremer, s. v.

² Hofmann thinks that since *ῥαντισμὸς αἵματος* forms one conception, and *ὑπακοή* can be accompanied by an objective genitive, *Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*, being the subjective genitive to *αἵμα-*

τος, might at the same time be objective genitive to *ὑπακοή*. In opposition to this, we observe (1) that it is self-contradictory to say that *ῥαντ. αἵματος* forms one conception, and that *Ἰησοῦ Χρ.* is dependent on *αἵματος*; and (2) that it is grammatically inadmissible to take the same genitive as being at once subjective and objective genitive. — This much only is correct, that the nearer definition, which must be supplied to *ὑπακοή*, has, in sense, to be borrowed from the subsequent genitive *Ἰησοῦ Χρ.*

springs from faith, so that both interpretations are substantially in accord. It may then be said that *ὑπακοή* is the life of man conformed in faith and walk to the will of the Lord, which the *ἐκλεκτοὶ παρεπίδημοι* as such must realize; so that there is no reason why the idea should be limited towards the one side or the other; cf. 1 John iii. 23. The second particular: *καὶ ῥαντισμὸν αἵματος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*, is closely linked on to *ὑπακοή*. Some commentators have held that the O. T. type on which this expression is based was the paschal lamb.¹ Others think that the ceremonial of the great day of atonement is meant.² Wrongly, however; for although in both cases blood was employed, neither the blood of the paschal lamb nor that of the offering of atonement was used to sprinkle the people. With the former the posts were tinged; with the latter the sacred vessels were sprinkled. Steinmeyer is wrong in tracing the expression to the sprinkling with water (Lev. xix.) of him who had been defiled through contact with a corpse, from the fact that the LXX. have *ῥαντισμός* only in this passage. For, apart from the artificialness of the explanation which Steinmeyer³ thus feels himself compelled to adopt, the reference to the water of sprinkling is inapt, since mention is made here of a *sprinkling of blood*, and *not of water*. A sprinkling of the *people with blood* took place only on the occasion of the *sacrifice of the covenant*.⁴ The O. T. type on which the expression is founded is no other than the making of the covenant related in Exod. xxiv. 8, to which even Gerhard had made reference, and as, in more recent times, has been acknowledged by Brückner, Wiesinger, Weiss, Schott. This is clear from Heb. ix. 19 (*λαβὼν τὸ αἶμα τῶν μόσχων . . . πάντα τὸν λαὸν ἐῤῥάντισε*) and xii. 24, where *αἶμα ῥαντισμοῦ*, i. e., "the blood by means of the sprinkling of which the ratification of the covenant took place," is connected with the immediately preceding *καὶ διαθήκης νέας μεσίτης*. Accordingly, by *ῥαντισμὸς αἵματος Ἰησ. Χρ.* is to be understood the ratification of the covenant relation grounded on the death of Christ, with those thereto ordained; the reference here, however, being not to the commencement, but to the continuance of that relation. For by

¹ Thus Beda: "aspersi sanguine Christi potestatem Satanae vitant, sicut Israel per agni sanguinem Aegypti dominatum declinavit;" Aretius, etc.

² Thus Pott, Augusti, Steiger, Usteri, etc.

³ Since Steinmeyer, from the fact that the LXX. translate the Hebrew *נִרְסָה מִיָּד* (which is not, in his view, equal to "water of purification," but to "water of impurity") by *ὑδωρ ῥαντισμοῦ*, concludes that *ῥαντισμός* does not simply mean *aspersio*, but *ea aspersio, cuius ratio, causa, effectus verbis נִרְסָה מִיָּד* descripta sunt,—that is, since that water was tanquam mortis instar, quum in ipsius mortis communionem ita redigeret immundos, ut reducerentur inde in munditiam vitae, ejusmodi aspersio quae in naturam sparsae aquae trahit, atque virtute ipsius sparsos penitus imbuat, he explains *ῥαντισμ. αἶμ. Ἰ. Χρ.* as a sprinkling with

the blood of Christ, qua in mortis salvatoris nostri communionem trahamur.

⁴ When Wiesinger remarks: "But in Heb. xi. 22, *ἐῤῥαντισμένοι τὰς καρδίας ἀπὸ συνειδή. πονηρᾶς* is based on the typical sacrifice of the great day of atonement, although *ἐῤῥαντισμένοι* is transferred here to persons, and *ἀπὸ* points to a cleansing and freeing from the consciousness of guilt," we cannot in this agree with him; nor do either Lünemann or Delitzsch see here any reference to the great sacrifice of atonement. The former explains the expression "on the analogy of the sprinkling with blood by which the first Levitical priests were consecrated;" while the latter quotes by way of explanation the passage Heb. xii. 24, where he terms the *αἶμα ῥαντισμοῦ* the antitype of the blood with which Moses sprinkled the people at the institution and consecration of the covenant.

this expression the apostle does not intend to remind his readers of the end God had in view in their election, but to set before them what the purpose of their election is, which, like the *ὑπακοή*, should therefore be realized in them as the elect strangers. They are then *ἐκλεκτοὶ παρεπίδημοι*, in order that they may constantly render obedience to Christ, and in Him constantly possess the forgiveness of sins.¹—The *καί* standing between *ὑπακοήν* and *βαπτισμῶν* is taken by Steinmeyer as an explicative; he explains: “*in obedientiam, atque in eam praesertim, ut aspergamini sanguine Christi h. e. ut vos in mortis Jesu Christi communionem trahi patiamini.*” Incorrectly: “inasmuch as the active idea of obedience can never be explained by the passive being sprinkled” (Wiesinger); and the introduction of the idea *πατι* is arbitrary.—It is further to be observed that the readers are, by the expression last used: *βαπτ. αἵματος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*, here for the first time characterized directly as Christians, all the previous designations having been equally applicable to the children of Israel; a circumstance which shows clearly enough that Peter regards the Christian Church as the true Israel, and that without making it in any way dependent on national connection.—As regards the lexicology, it must be remarked that in classical Greek *βαπτισμός* never occurs, and *βαπτίζειν* only in later writers: the usual word is *βαίνειν*, e.g., Euripides, *Iphig. in Aul.*, 1589: *ἤς αἵματι βωμῶν βαίνειτ' ἄρδην τῆς Θεοῦ*; in the LXX. both verbal forms: *βαπτισμός*, only in Num. xix., in a somewhat inexact translation, however.—*χάρις ὑμῖν καὶ εἰρήνη πληθυνθείη*. The distinction between *χάρις* and *εἰρήνη* is thus drawn by Gerhard: “*gratia distinguitur tanquam FRUCTUS et EFFECTUS a sua CAUSA.*” In harmony with this, *χάρις* is regarded by the interpreters for the most part as “the subjective in God” (Meyer on Rom. i. 7); but Paul’s use of *ἀπό* and the subsequent *πληθυνθείη* show that by *χάρις* in forms of greeting, is to be understood the gifts which flow from it (the manifestation of grace). *εἰρήνη* specifies this gift more closely according to its nature (see on 1 Tim. i. 2).² *πληθυνθείη*]. Luther: “ye have peace and grace, but not yet to the full;” on the salutation form in the N. T., besides here only in 2 Pet. i. 2 and Jude 2; in O. T. in Dan. iii. 31, LXX.: *εἰρήνη ὑμῖν πληθυνθείη*.³

Vv. 3-12. Praise to God for the grace of which the Christians had been made the partakers. The prominence which the apostle gives to *ἀναγεννᾶν εἰς ἐλπίδα ζωᾶν*, as also his designation of them as *ἐκλεκτοὶ παρεπίδημοι*, is occasioned by the present state of suffering in which his readers were, and above which he is desirous of raising them.

¹ Hofmann is accordingly wrong in maintaining that “what is here meant has taken place once for all for the readers, and is not continually to be done.” Nor does this altogether accord with his own interpretation, when he says, “the readers are chosen to become obedient to Christ, and partakers of His propitiation for sin.” The Christian, on being received into communion with Christ, has been sprinkled with His blood, but still he requires a continual cleansing, and this he receives, if he walk in the light; cf. 1 John i. 7.

² When Schott, in order to preserve the objectiveness of *εἰρήνη*, erroneously understands it to mean “the state of matters which to those who are in it occasions inwardly no want or unrest, and externally no harm or disturbance,” it must be urged in opposition that the inwardness of a possession does not in any way affect its objectiveness.

³ Cf. Schoettgen: *Horae Hebr. et Talm.*, on this passage.

Ver. 3. *εὐλογητός ὁ Θεός καὶ πατὴρ τοῦ κυρ. ἡμ. Ἰ. Χριστοῦ.* The same formula occurs in 2 Cor. i. 3; Eph. i. 3. — *εὐλογητός*, not: “worthy of praise,” but: “praised;” in the LXX. the translation of רָבָה; in the N. T. the word *εὐλογητός* used only with reference to God. *εἶη* and not *ἐστίν* is probably to be supplied, as is done by most commentators, cf. Meyer on Eph. i. 1; Winer, p. 545 (E. T., 586) (Schott; Buttm., p. 120 [E. T., 137]), at least from the fact that in the doxologies introduced by means of relatives, *ἐστίν* is to be found (cf. Rom. i. 25; also 1 Pet. iv. 11), it cannot be concluded that the indicative is to be supplied in an ascription of praise quite differently constructed, cf. LXX. Job i. 21. The adjunct *καὶ πατὴρ, κ.τ.λ., τοῦ Θεός* is explainable as a natural expression of the Christian consciousness. It is possible “that the whole formula of doxology has its origin in the liturgical usage, so to speak, in the primitive Christian Church” (Weiss, p. 401). — *ὁ κατὰ τὸ πολὺ αὐτοῦ ἔλεος ἀναγεννήσας ἡμῶς.* The participial clause states the reason why God is to be praised. *πολὺ* gives prominence to the riches of the divine mercy, Eph. ii. 4: *πλούσιος ὢν ἐν ἔλεει.* *κατὰ* is used here in the same sense as in ver. 2. *ἀναγεννήσας* has its nearer definition in the subsequent *εἰς ἐλπίδα ζῶσαν.* De Wette joins these intimately connected ideas in a somewhat too loose way, when he thus interprets: “who hath awakened us to repentance and faith, and thereby at the same time to a hope.” Similarly Wiesinger, who takes *ἀναγεννήσας* as a self-contained idea, and connects *εἰς ἐλπίδα* with it, in *this* sense, “that in the idea of regeneration this particular determination of it is brought into prominence, that it is a new birth to living hope, i. e., as born again we have attained unto a lively hope;” thus Schott. This view, however, refutes itself, because it necessitates unjustifiable supplements. More in harmony with the expression is Brückner’s interpretation, according to which *εἰς* denotes the aim of the new birth (“the hope is conceived of as the aim of him by whom the readers have been begotten again;” thus Morus, already: *Deus nos in melius mutavit, cur? ut sperare possimus*). But if the attainment of *σωτηρία* be conceived as the aim and end of the new birth, the hopes directed to it cannot be so, all the less that this hope forms an essential element of the new life itself. The verb *ἀναγεννᾶν* is here taken not as an absolute, but as a relative, idea, its supplement lying in *εἰς ἐλπ. ζ.* (so also Steinmeyer, Weiss, Hofmann). The *ἐλπίς ζῶσα* is then to be thought of as *the life* into which the mercy of God has raised or begotten the believer from the death of hopelessness (Eph. ii. 12: *ἐν τῷ καιρῷ ἐκείνῳ χωρὶς Χριστοῦ . . . ἐλπίδα μὴ ἔχοντες*); the connection is the same as in Gal. iv. 24, where the simple *γεννᾶν* is also construed with *εἰς*.¹ This view is justified, not only by the close connection of *εἰς* with the idea *ἀναγεννᾶν*, but also by the corresponding adj. *ζῶσαν.* In this there is no

¹ Against this interpretation Schott urges: that *ἀναγεννᾶν* does not mean “to awaken,” that “a death of despair” is not alluded to, that neither *ἐλπίς* nor *ἐλπίς ζῶσα* denotes “a life of hope.” These reasons are insignificant, for (1) the expression “awakened” is not employed in order to give the full meaning of *ἀναγεννᾶν*; (2) even on the opposite interpre-

tation their former condition may be considered as a hopeless one, and can undoubtedly be regarded as a death; and (3) it cannot be denied that hope is life. In opposition to Schott’s assertion, that *ἀναγεννᾶν* is *everywhere* a self-contained idea, it is to be noted that the word occurs in the N. T. only here and in ver. 23.

weakening of the idea *ἀναγεννῆν* (in opposition to Wiesinger), for *ἐλπίς* need not be conceived as representing *one single* side of the Christian life, but under it may be understood the whole Christian life in its relation to the future *σωτηρία*. It is incorrect to take *ἐλπίς* here in the objective sense, as: object of hope; Aretius: *res, quae spei subjectae sunt, h. e. vita aeterna*; Bengel: *haereditas coelestis*, so also Hottinger, Hensler, etc. It is used rather in the subjective sense to denote the inward condition of life. — The expression *ζῶσα* has been variously translated by the commentators; thus Beza explains it as: *perennis*; Aretius: *solida*; Piscator: *vivifica*; Gualther: *spes viva certitudinem salutis significat*; Heidegger: *ζῶσα: quia et fructus vitae edūt, et spes vitae est et permanet; quia non languida, infirma est, sed παρρησίαν et πεποιθήσιν habet et perpetua simul semperque exhilarans est, neque unquam intermoritur, sed semper renovatur et refocillatur*; in the first edition of this commentary; “the hope of the Christian is pervaded by life, carrying with it in undying power the certainty of fulfilment (Rom. v. 5), and making the heart joyful and happy;” it “has life in itself, and gives life, and at the same time has life as its object” (De Wette). Taken strictly, *ζῶσα* characterizes the hope as one which has life in itself, and is therefore operative. All else may as a matter of fact be connected with it, but is not contained in the word itself (Weiss, p. 92); more especially, too, the idea that it has the certainty of its own realization (Hofmann); cf. i. 23: *λόγος ζῶν*; ii. 4, 5: *λίθος ζῶν*. Gerhard incorrectly interprets *ἐλπίς* by *fides, sive fiducialis meriti Christi apprehensio quae est regenerationis nostrae causa formalis*. For apart from the fact that Peter is not here speaking of regeneration at all, *ἐλπίς* and *πίστις* are in themselves separate ideas, which cannot be arbitrarily substituted for one another. It is erroneous also, with Luther, Calvin, and others, to resolve *ἐλπίς ζῶσα* into *ἐλπίς ζωῆς*; *ζῶσα* denotes not the end, but the nature of the hope. — *δὲ ἀναστάσεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐκ νεκρῶν* is not to be joined with *ζῶσαν*,¹ but with *ἀναγεννήσας*, more nearly defined by *εἰς . . . ζῶσαν*;² for *ζῶσαν* does not define a particular kind of hope, but only gives special prominence to an element already contained in the idea *ἐλπίς*. The resurrection of Christ is the means by which God has begotten us again to the living hope. It is the fact which forms the living ground of Christian hope. Wiesinger joins *δὲ ἀναστ.* somewhat too loosely with *ἀναγ.*, explaining as he does: “He hath begotten us again, and thus in virtue of the resurrection of Jesus Christ hath aided us to living hope.” — As *ζῶσαν* corresponds to the term *ἀναγεννήσας*, so does *ἀνάστασις* in the most exact manner to both of these ideas. By the resurrection of Christ the believer also is risen to life. It must be remarked, the prepositions *κατά, ἐν, εἰς*, ver. 2, are used to correspond with *κατά, εἰς, διὰ*; cf. ver. 5, the use of the prepositions: *ἐν, διὰ, εἰς*.

Ver. 4. *εἰς κληρονομίαν*, co-ordinate with the conception *ἐλπίδα*; it is never-

¹ Oecum., Luth., Bengel, Lorinus, Steiger, De Wette, Hofmann.

² Calvin, Gerhard, Knapp, Weiss, p. 299, Schott, Brückner. Schott and Brückner, while accepting the construction above indicated,

apply it, in accordance with their interpretation of *ἀναγ. εἰς ἐλπίδα, δὲ ἀνάστασεως*, both to regeneration and the hope therewith connected, which, however, they term “a single homogeneous fact.”

theless not dependent on it, but on *ἀναγεννήσας*, although it denotes the objective blessing to which the *ἐλπίς* has regard. It is added by way of apposition, in order to describe more nearly the substance of the hope with respect to its aim. — *κληρονομία* means, no doubt, in the O. and N. T. (Matt. xxi. 38; Luke xii. 13) sometimes *inheritance*; but more frequently it has the signification of *possession*. In the O. T. it often serves to denote the land of Canaan and its separate parts, promised and apportioned to the people of Israel (Deut. xii. 9; Lam. v. 2; Josh. xiii. 14, and other passages): ἡ γῆ, ἦν κύριος ὁ Θεός σου δίδωσι σοι ἐν κλήρῳ, Deut. xxiv. 2, or ἦν . . . δίδωσι σοι κληρονομίαι. In the N. T., and so here also, by the term is to be understood the completed *βασιλεία τοῦ Θεοῦ* with all its possessions, as the antitype of the land of Canaan (cf. in particular, Heb. ix. 15). As this use of the word is not based on the signification "inheritance," it cannot be maintained, with Wiesinger (Schott agreeing with him), that *κληρονομία* stands here with reference to *ἀναγεννήσας*, "to designate that of which the Christians as *children of God* have expectations."¹ The following words: *ἄφθαρτον καὶ ἀμίαντον καὶ ἀμόραντον*, state the gloriousness of the *κληρονομία*.² *ἄφθαρτος* (cf. chap. iii. 4), opposite of *φθαρτός* (ver. 18 equal to *ἀπολλύμενος*, ver. 7), cf. ver. 23; Rom. i. 23; 1 Cor. ix. 25, xv. 53, 54; "not subject to the *φθορά*." *ἀμίαντος* (Jas. i. 27; Heb. vii. 26), "undefiled, undefilable." *ἀμόραντος* ἂπ. λεγ. (*ἀμαράντινος* is similar, chap. v. 4), "unfading;" in the last expression prominence is given to the *imperishable beauty* of the *κληρονομία*. Steinmeyer's opinion is incorrect, that *ἀμίαντος* has nearly the same meaning as *πολύτιμος* and *τίμιος*, ver. 19. — It is not to be assumed that Peter alludes to the character "of the earthly *κληρονομία* (Weiss, p. 74) of the people of Israel," especially as there is nothing in the expressions *ἀμόραντος* and *ἄφθαρτος* which can without artificial straining admit of such a reference.³ — *τετηρημένην ἐν οὐρανοῖς εἰς ὑμᾶς*]. The apostle, having up to this time spoken generally, makes a transition, and addresses his readers directly: *ἀναγενν. ἡμᾶς*; he thereby assures them that that *κληρονομία* is a possession intended and reserved for them. For the conception here expressed, cf. especially Col. i. 5, and Meyer *in loc*. The perf. *τετηρημένην* (Luth., inexactly: "which is kept") stands here with reference to the *nearness* of the time when their *κληρονομία* will be allotted to believers; ver. 5: *ἐτοίμην ἀποκαλυφθῆναι*.⁴

Ver. 5. As the basis of the thought: *τετηρημένην . . . εἰς ὑμᾶς*, the apostle subjoins to *ὑμᾶς* the additional *τοὺς ἐν δυνάμει φρουρουμένους . . . εἰς σωτηρίαν*, by

¹ No doubt Rom. viii. 17 might be appealed to in support of this interpretation, yet it would be unwarrantable to maintain that the idea there expressed belongs also to Peter. It must also be observed that even Paul, where he makes use of the term *κληρονομία*, never alludes to that idea, — a circumstance which has its reason in the current usage of the word.

² Calvin, inaccurately: "tria epitheta quae sequuntur ad *gratiae Dei* amplificationem posita sunt."

³ In *ἀμίαντος*, Weiss sees an allusion to the pollution of Judæa by the people of Israel

itself or its enemies (Jer. ii. 7; Lev. xviii. 23; Num. xxxv. 34; Ezek. xxxvi. 17; Ps. lxxix. 1, where the LXX. has *μυαίνειν*); and in *ἀμόραντος* to the scorching of the country by the simoom. Weiss thinks that *ἄφθαρτος* may allude to the *φθεῖρειν τὴν γῆν*, Isa. xxiv. 3; still he himself does not consider this probable.

⁴ Hofmann, in disputing this by saying that the perf. partic. is not explained by the nearness of the time when the believers will be in possession of the inheritance, calls in question an assertion which is nowhere here made.

which is expressed not the condition on which the readers might hope for the heavenly κληρονομία, but the reason why they possess expectations of it. The chief emphasis lies not on ἐν δυνάμει Θεοῦ (Schott), but on φρουρουμένους . . . εἰς σωτηρίαν, inasmuch as the former expression serves only to define the φρουρεῖσθαι more precisely. Gerhard incorrectly makes the accusative depend on ἀναγεννήσας. The prep. ἐν (as distinguished from the following διὰ) points out the δύναμις Θεοῦ as the *causa efficiens* (Gerhard), so that Luther's: "out of God's power" is in sense correct; the φρουρεῖσθαι is based on the δύν. Θεοῦ. Steinmeyer wrongly explains, referring to Gal. iii. 23, the δύναμις Θεοῦ as the φρουρά within which the Christians as believers (διὰ πίστεως equal to πιστεύοντες!) are kept, *velut sub vetere T. lex carcerum instar exstitit, in quibus oi ὑπὸ νόμον ὄντες custodiebantur*. To assume an antithesis between the δύν. Θεοῦ and the law in explanation of this passage, is entirely unjustifiable. By δύν. Θεοῦ is not to be understood, with De Wette and Weiss (p. 189), the Holy Spirit; He is never in any passage of the N. T. (not even in Luke i. 35) designated by these words. The means by which the power of God effects the preservation is the πίστις,¹ the ultimate origin of which, nevertheless, is also the gracious will of God. — On φρουρουμένους, Vorstius rightly remarks: *notatur tuis custodia, quae praesidium habet adjunctum.*² The word by which the apostle even here makes reference to the subsequent ἐν ποικίλοις πειρασμοῖς, ver. 6, has its nearer definition in the following εἰς σωτηρίαν ἐτοίμην ἀποκαλυφθῆναι, which by Calvin (*haec duo membra appositive lego, ut posterius sit prioris expositio, rem unam duobus modis exprimit*), Steiger, and others is joined to ἀναγεννήσας as a co-ordinate adjunct to εἰς κληρονομίαν. It is preferable to connect them with φρουρουμένους; the more so that κληρονομία, "with its predicates, so fully characterizes the object of hope, that εἰς σωτηρίαν, κ.τ.λ., would add nothing further" (Wiesinger). The introduction of ὑμᾶς, too, is decidedly opposed to the former construction. There is nothing to support the connection with πίστεως, in which σωτηρία would be regarded as the object of faith. According to the correct construction, the verbal conception is more nearly defined by the addition of the origin, means, and end, cf. vv. 2, 3.³ The word σωτηρία is here — as the conjoined ἐτοίμη ἀποκαλυφθῆναι shows — a positive conception; namely: the salvation effected and completed by Christ, not simply a negative idea, "deliverance from ἀπόλεια" (Weiss, p. 79). It does

¹ πίστις implies the entire and full Christian faith; not simply confidence in God (Weiss), nor the mere "confident assurance of the salvation which is ready to be revealed" (Hofmann); these are single elements which it includes, but which do not exhaust the idea. According to Schott, the apostle has omitted the article, in order to emphasize the fact that he means "that faith which, as to its inmost nature, is not dependent on sight" (1).

² Aretius rightly observes: "militare est vocabulum φρουρά: praesidium. Pii igitur, dum sunt in periculis, scient totidem eis divinitus parata esse praesidia: millia millium custodiunt eos. Finis est salus." Bengel also

aply says: "haereditas servata est; haeredes custodiuntur, neque illa his, neque hi deerunt illi."

³ Schott justly calls attention to the relation of φρουρουμένους to τετηρημένην: "If the reserving of the inheritance for Christians is not to be fruitless, it must be accompanied by a . . . preserving of them on earth for that inheritance." He states the difference between the two expressions thus: "As regards the inheritance, it is only necessary that its existence should not cease. Christians, on the other hand, must be guarded and preserved from influences endangering their state of salvation."

not follow from the circumstance that *κληρονομία* and *σωτηρία* are synonymous terms, that the former is "only the negative side of the completed salvation." — The verb *ἀποκαλυφθῆναι* is here, as elsewhere, used to denote the disclosure of what is already in existence (with God, *ἐν οὐρανοῖς*, ver. 4), but as yet hidden. *ἐτοιμος* is here, like *μέλλων* often, joined with the inf. pass. (see Gal. iii. 23). On the use of the inf. aor. in this connection, see Winer, p. 311 f. [E. T., 332]; *μέλλων*, nevertheless, has a less strong force. The *future* salvation lies ready to be revealed, that is to say: *ἐν καιρῷ ἐσχάτῳ*, by which is denoted the time when the world's history will be closed (not "the relatively last; Bengel: *In comparatione temporum V. T.*; but absolutely the last time *ἐν ἀποκαλύψει* 'I. Chr., ver. 7." Wiesinger).¹ When this time will be, the apostle does not say; but his whole manner of expression indicates that in hope it floated before his vision as one near at hand; cf. chap. iv. 7.

Ver. 6. *ἐν ᾧ ἀγαλλιάσθε*]. The verb expresses the liveliness of the Christian joy, equivalent to *exult*; it is stronger than *χαίρειν*, with which it is sometimes connected (chap. iv. 13; Matt. v. 12; Rev. xix. 7).² — *ἐν ᾧ* refers either to the preceding thought, that the salvation is ready to be revealed,³ or to *καιρῷ ἐσχάτῳ*.⁴ In the first construction *ἀγαλλ.* — in form as in meaning — is *praesens*, and denotes the present joy of the Christians over their future salvation (*ἐν ᾧ*: over which, cf. chap. iv. 4).⁵ In the second construction a double interpretation is possible, inasmuch as *ἐν ᾧ* may denote either the object or the time of the joy; in the first case the sense is: the *καιρὸς ἐσχάτος* is for you an object of joy, because in it the salvation will be revealed; in the second case the sense is: *in* that last time ye shall rejoice (so Wiesinger and Hofmann); here the object of joy is doubtless not named, but it may be easily supplied, and the want of it therefore cannot be urged against this view (as opposed to Brückner). The last of these different views deserves the preference, both on account of the subsequent *ὀλίγον ἄρτι . . . λυπηθέντες*, which forms a distinct antithesis to *ἀγαλλιάσθε*, and of the idea peculiar to the epistle, that in the present time the Christian has to *suffer* rather than to exult, and only in the future can he expect the full joy; — and the prevalent manner of conjunction, too, precisely in this section of the epistle, by which what follows is linked directly on to the word immediately preceding, cf. vv. 5, 8, 10, shows that *ἐν ᾧ* applies to *καιρῷ ἐσχάτῳ*. In this combination, however, it is more natural to take *ἐν* in the same sense as in that which it

¹ Schott unjustifiably supposes that the want of the article indicates that "the *σωτηρία* would take place at a time which, from this very fact, must be regarded as the last."

² Steinmeyer, whilst combating the opinion that *ἀγαλλ.* has a stronger force than *χαίρειν*, correctly describes the *ἀγαλλίασις* as "affectio fervidior animi hilaris," but *χαρά* unwarrantably as "*perpetua illa cordis laetitia, quae neque augeri queat neque imminui.*"

³ Calvin: "Articulus *in quo* refert totum illud complexum de spe salutis in coelo repositae;" so also Estius, Grotius, Calov, Steiger,

Jachmann, De Wette, Brückner, Steinmeyer, Schott; similarly Gerhard, who, however, applies it to all that precedes: *ἀναγεννήσας*, etc.

⁴ Oecum., Erasmus, Luther, Wiesinger, etc.

⁵ Brückner explains *ἐν ᾧ* as above stated, but he understands *ἀγαλλιάσθε* in a future sense, "of that which shall most surely come to pass;" this interpretation is undoubtedly inappropriate, inasmuch as the present assurance of the future salvation, stated in ver. 5, may now indeed be an object of rejoicing, but will not be so then, when that future salvation itself is attained.

has before *καιρῶς*, rather than in another.¹—Doubtless the present *ἀγαλλιᾶσθε* will then have a future force; but this occasions no difficulty, there being nothing uncommon in such a use of the present (cf. also Winer, p. 249 [E. T., 265 f.]).—The present tense strongly emphasizes the certainty of the future joy, rays of which fall even on the present life.²—*ὀλιγον ἄρτι*]. *ὀλιγον* not of measure (Steiger), but of time, chap. v. 10, where it forms the antithesis to *αἰώνιος*; cf. Rev. xvii. 10; *ἄρτι* denotes present time. The juxtaposition of the two words is explainable by the apostle's hope that the *καιρὸς ἔσχατος* would soon begin.—*εἰ δέον ἐστὶ*, not an affirmative (Bengel), but a hypothetical parenthesis: *si res ita ferat*: if it must be so, that is, according to divine decree; cf. chap. iii. 17.³—*λυπηθέντες ἐν ποικίλοις πειρασμοῖς*]. The aorist with *ἄρτι* has reference to the future joy: "after that ye have now for a short time been made sorrowful." "It signifies the inward sadness, in consequence of outward experiences" (Wiesinger).—*Particula ἐν non solum est χρονική, sed etiam αἰτιολογική* (Gerhard). Both meanings pass over into each other, so that *ἐν* is not to be interpreted as synonymous with *διὰ*.—*πειρασμοί* are the events by which the faith of the Christian is proved or also tempted; here, specially the persecutions which he is called upon to endure at the hands of the unbelieving world: cf. Jas. i. 2; Acts xx. 19. By the addition of the adjective, the manifold nature of their different kinds is pointed out.

REMARK.—When Schott, in opposition to the interpretation here given, maintains the purely present force of *ἀγαλλ.* on the ground that "it must be the apostle's object to commend, by way of exhortation, the readers for their present state of mind," it is to be remarked, (1) That the apostle here gives utterance to no exhortation; and (2) That the apostle might perfectly well direct his readers to the certainty of the future joy, in order to strengthen them for the patient endurance of their present condition of suffering. It is perfectly arbitrary to assert with Schott, that, by *ἄρτι*, the present trials, as transitory, are contrasted with the present joy, as enduring, as also to maintain, "that, by the aorist *λυπηθέντες*, the suffering is reduced to the idea of an ever-changing variety of individual momentary incidents, which, in virtue of the uniform joy, may always lie behind the Christian surmounted" (!). Schott insists again, without reason, that *εἰ δέον [ἐστὶ]* cannot be taken as referring to the divine decree, in that it is "impossible to make the accomplished concrete fact of the *λυπηθῆναι* hypothetical with respect to the will of God;" for it is not clear why Peter should not characterize the *λυπηθῆναι ἐν ποικ. πειρασμοῖς* as something hypothetical

¹ Schott's assertion, that, as a rule, *ἀγαλλ.* is connected by *ἐν* with its object, is erroneous. In the N. T. the passage, John v. 35, at the most, can be quoted in support of this construction; whilst in Luke x. 21, *ἐν* accompanies the simple indication of time. In Luke i. 47, *ἀγαλλ.* is construed with *ἐπί* c. dat.; John viii. 56, with *ἵνα*.

² It is altogether inappropriate to interpret *ἀγαλλιᾶσθε*, with Augustine, as an imperative, the exhortations begu only in ver. 13.

³ Incorrectly Steinmeyer: "Qui per pergrinationis spatium, quamdiu necessarium est, contristati estis." The older Protestant commentators, more especially, sometimes employ this passage to combat the arbitrary seeking after suffering; thus Luther says: "It is not to be our own works which we choose, but we must await what God lays upon us and sends, so that we go and follow, therefore thou mayest not thyself run after them."

here, where he does not as yet enter more particularly into the concrete facts. Nor can it be assumed that *εἰ δέον* (*ἔστι*) is added in order to remind the readers that the *ποικίλοι πειρασμοί* should, in reality, occasion no sadness, the less so that thus the intimately connected *λυπηθέντες ἐν ποικ. πειρασμοῖς* are torn asunder.

Ver. 7. *ἵνα* states the aim of the *λυπηθῆναι ἐν . . . πειρασμοῖς*, in order to console the readers with respect to it, "that the approvedness of your faith may be found more precious than (that) of gold, which perisheth, yet it is tried by fire, to (your) praise, and glory, and honor at the revelation of Jesus Christ." — *δοκίμιον* here, as in Jas. i. 3 (cf. *in loco*), equal to *δοκιμή*, the approvedness as the result of the trial (Rom. v. 3, 4; 2 Cor. ii. 9, ix. 13; Phil. ii. 22).¹ The strict signification "medium of proof" is inappropriate, inasmuch as the aim of the *λυπηθῆναι ἐν πειρασμοῖς* cannot be stated as the glorification of these *πειρασμοί*, but as only that of faith in its approvedness (in opposition to Steinmeyer). Unsuitable, too, is the interpretation "trial" (Brückner, Wiesinger), τὸ δοκίμιον τῆς πίστεως being taken for ἡ πίστις δοκιμαζομένη, inasmuch as it is not the trial of the faith, but the faith being tried that is to be compared with the gold. This substitution of ideas is not justifiable, inasmuch as the process applied to an object cannot be put for the object itself to which it is applied. Only if *δοκίμιον* denote a quality of faith, can a substitution of this kind take place. *δοκίμιον* must be taken as "approvedness," and by approvedness of faith, the "approved," or rather "the faith approving itself."²

REMARK. — What Schott had formerly alleged with respect to *δοκίμιον* is repeated by Hofmann, only by him it is carried further. By a highly artificial interpretation of Ps. xii. 7, LXX., and by the application of the rule established by him, "that the neuter of the adjective does not stand in the place of an abstract attributive, but expresses the condition of something as a concrete reality, and, in conjunction with a genitive, denotes the object thereby named in this its condition," Hofmann makes out that it is here affirmed that "at the revelation of Christ, it will be found that the faith of the readers has been subjected to purification, and is, in consequence, free from dross." This whole interpretation is a pure matter of fancy; for *δοκίμιον* — a circumstance which both Schott and Hofmann have left unnoticed — is not an adjective, but a real substantive, for *δοκιμειον*. — Cremer explains: "δοκ. is not the touchstone only, in and for itself, but the trace left behind on it by the metal; therefore τὸ δοκ. τῆς

¹ *δοκιμή* in the N. T. has either an active or a passive signification; in the former it means "the trial which leads to approvedness," as in 2 Cor. viii. 2; in the latter, "the approvedness effected by trial," as in the passages quoted; or, better still, "a distinction must be drawn between a present and a perfect force, in that *δοκιμή* has a reflexive sense; either, then, the having approved itself, or the approving itself," Cremer, *s.v.*

² Brückner raises the following objections to this interpretation: (1) That *δοκιμιον* can linguistically only be understood as means of proof, trial; and (2) That the part. pres.,

standing in opposition to *χρυσιον* (*δοκιμαζομενον*), does not presuppose the purification of the gold to have already taken place, and that, consequently, the *πίστις δοκιμαζομένη* only can be considered as compared with *χρυσιον δοκιμαζόμενον*. But against this it must be observed that *δοκιμιον* has only the signification of "means of proof," not of trial; and (3) That in the above interpretation it is not the already approved faith, but that faith which is being approved, or approving itself in tribulation, which is contrasted with gold which is being tried.

πιστεως is that which results from the contact of πίστις with πειρασμοίς, that by which faith is recognized as genuine, equal to the proof of faith." But, in opposition to this, it must be remarked that fire, and not touchstone, is here conceived as the means of testing.

— πολυτιμότερον, κ.τ.λ., is by most interpreters closely connected with εὔρεθῆ; by others, again (Wolf, Pott, Steinmeyer, Wiesinger, Hofmann), separated from it, and considered as in apposition to τὸ δοκίμιον ἰμ. τ. πιστ. The following facts, however, are decisive against the latter construction: (1) That — as Wiesinger admits — this appositional clause expresses "something understood of itself." (2) That the intention here is not to make an observation on faith, but to state what is the design of sorrow, namely, that the faith which is approving itself may be found to be one πολύτιμος. (3) That thus εὔρεθῆ would be deprived of any nearer definition, in that the subsequent εἰς has reference, not to εὔρεθῆ alone, but to the whole idea expressed. Yet it cannot well dispense with a nearer definition (in opposition to Hofmann). — The genitive χρυσίου is, as almost all the interpreters take it, to be joined in sense directly with the comparative: "than the gold," so that the δοκίμιον of the faith is compared with the gold. Some commentators, like Beza, Grotius, Vorstius, Steinmeyer, Hofmann, assume an ellipsis (cf. Winer, p. 230 [E. T., 235]), supplying before χρυσίου the words ἢ τὸ δοκίμιον. In opposition it may be urged, however, not precisely "that this is cumbrous" (Brückner), but that the point of comparison is not properly the approval of faith, but the faith in the act of approving itself. Whilst comparing the faith with the gold, the apostle places the former above the latter; the reason of this he states in the attribute τοῦ ἀπολλυμένου connected with χρυσίου, by which reference is made to the imperishable nature of faith. To this first attribute he subjoins the second: διὰ πυρὸς δὲ δοκιμαζομένου, in order to name here also the medium of proving, to which the πειρασμοί, with respect to faith, correspond. Accordingly Wiesinger and Steinmeyer are wrong in asserting that in the interpretation here given the attribute τοῦ ἀπολλυμένου is inappropriate. — ἀπολλύμενος: φθαρτός, cf. vv. 18, 23; also John vi. 27. For the position of the adjective with art. after an anarthrous subst., see Winer, p. 131 f. (E. T., 139). — διὰ πυρὸς δὲ δοκιμαζομένου. The particle δὲ seems to place this second adjunct in antithesis to the first (ἀπολλυμένου) (thus De Wette: "which is perishable, and yet is proved by fire;") so also Hofmann). But opposed to this view is the circumstance that the trial and purification of what is perishable is by no means anything to occasion surprise; it is therefore more correct to find the purpose of the adjunct in this, that by it the idea of the δοκιμάζεσθαι is brought prominently forward. Vorstius remarks to the point: *aurum igni committitur non ad iteritum, sed ad gloriam, sic fides cruci ad gloriam subjicitur.* — For this comparison, see Job xxiii. 10; Prov. xvii. 3; Zech. xiii. 9. — εὔρεθῆ εἰς ἔπαινον καὶ δόξαν καὶ τιμὴν]. The verb εὔρεθῆναι, "to be found to be," is more significant than εἶναι (cf. Winer, p. 572 f. [E. T., 616]), and has reference to the judicial investigation on the last day of judgment. The words following form an adjunct to the whole preceding thought: *ἵνα . . . εὔρεθῆ.* Beza, rightly: *hic agitur de ipsorum electorum laude, etc.*; thus:

“to your praise, glory, and honor.” Schott quite arbitrarily interprets *ἐπαινος* as in itself: “the judicial recognition” (as opposed to this, cf. Phil. i. 11, iv. 8); *τιμὴ*: “the moral estimation of the person arising therefrom” (as opposed to this, cf. 1 Pet. iii. 7), and *δόξα*: “the form of glory” (as opposed to this, cf. Gal. i. 5; Phil. i. 11). Steinmeyer incorrectly applies the words not to the persons, but to their faith. *δόξα* and *τιμὴ* in the N. T. stand frequently together; in connection with *ἐπαινος*, here only. The juxtaposition of these synonymous expressions serves to give prominence to the one idea of honorable recognition common to them all. Standing as *δόξα* does between *ἐπαινος* and *τιμὴ*, it cannot signify “the allotment of the possession of glory” (Wiesinger), but it is “glory, praise.”—*ἐν ἀποκάλυψει Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*; not *through*, but *at*, the revelation of Jesus Christ, that is, on the day of His return, which is at once the *ἀποκάλυψις δικαιοκρισίας τοῦ Θεοῦ* (Rom. ii. 5) and the *ἀποκάλυψις τῶν οὐρῶν τοῦ Θεοῦ* (Rom. viii. 19).

Ver. 8. The longing of the believers is directed to the *ἀποκάλυψις Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*, He being the object of their love and joy. This thought is subjoined to what precedes in two relative clauses, in order that thereby the apostle may advert to the glory of the future salvation.—*ὃν οὐκ εἰδότες ἀγαπᾶτε*, “whom, although ye know Him not (that is, according to the flesh, or in His earthly personality), ye love.” The object of *εἰδότες* is easily supplied from *ὃν*, according to the usage in Greek. The reading *ιδόντες* expresses substantially the same thought.—Since *ἀγάπη*, properly speaking, presupposes personal acquaintance, the clause *οὐκ εἰδότες* is significantly added, in order to set forth prominently that the relation to Christ is a higher than any based on a knowledge after the flesh.—In the clause following—co-ordinate with this—the thought is carried further, the apostle’s glance being again directed to the future appearance of Christ.—*εἰς ὃν ἄρτι μὴ ὀρῶντες πιστεύοντες δὲ ἀγαλλιῶσθε*. As regards the construction, *εἰς ὃν* can hardly be taken with *ἀγαλλιῶσθε*, the participles *ὀρῶντες* and *πιστεύοντες* thus standing absolutely (Fronmüller), but, as most interpreters are agreed, must be construed with *πιστεύοντες*. The more precise determination of the thought must depend on whether *ἀγαλλιῶσθε* is, with De Wette, Brückner, Winer, Steinmeyer, Weiss, Schott, to be taken as referring to present, or, with Wiesinger and Hofmann, to future joy. In the first case, *ἀγαλλιῶσθε* is joined in the closest manner with *πιστεύοντες*, and *ἄρτι* only with *μὴ ὀρῶντες* (De Wette: “and in Him, though now seeing Him not, yet believing ye exult”); in the second, *εἰς ὃν . . . πιστεύοντες δέ* is to be taken as the condition of the *ἀγαλλιῶσθε*, and *ἄρτι* to be joined with *πιστεύοντες* (Wiesinger: “on whom for the present believing, — although without seeing, — ye exult”). In support of the first view, it may be advanced, that thus *ἀγαλλιῶσθε* corresponds more exactly to *ἀγαπᾶτε*, and that *μὴ ὀρῶντες* forms a more natural antithesis to *ἀγαλλιῶσθε* than to *πιστεύοντες*; for the second, that it is precisely one of the peculiarities characteristic of this epistle, that it sets forth the present condition of believers as one chiefly of suffering, which only at the *ἀποκάλυψις* of the Lord will be changed into one of joy; that the more precise definition: *χαρὰ ἀνεκλαλήτω καὶ δεδοξασμένη*, as also the subsequent *κομιζόμενοι*, have reference to the future; that the *ἄρτι* seems to involve the thought: “now ye see Him not, but then ye

see Him, and shall rejoice in beholding Him;" and lastly, that the apostle, iv. 13, expressly ascribes the ἀγαλλιώσθαι to the future. On these grounds the second view is preferable to the first. The present ἀγαλλιάσθε need excite the less surprise, that the future joy is one not only surely pledged to the Christian, but which its certainty makes already present. It may, indeed, be supposed that ἀγαλλιάσθε must be conceived as in the same relation to time with ἀγαπάτε; yet, according to the sense, it is not the ἀγαλλιάσθαι, but the πιστεύειν, which forms the second characteristic of the Christian life annexed to ἀγαπᾶν. It is not, however, the case, that on account of the present πιστεύοντες, ἀγαλλ. also must be taken with a present signification (Schott), since love and faith are the *present ground* of the joy beginning indeed now, but perfected only in the future. The particle of time ἄρτι applies not only to μὴ ὁρῶντες, but likewise to πιστεύοντες δέ; the sense of μὴ ὁρῶντες πιστεύοντες δέ is not this, that although they now do not see, yet still believe—the not seeing and the believing do not form an antithesis, they belong to each other; but this, that the Christians do not indeed see, but believe. On the distinction between οὐκ εἰδότες and μὴ ὁρῶντες, see Winer, p. 452 (E. T., 485).—Χαρὰ ἀνεκκλήτῳ καὶ δεδοξασμένῳ serves to intensify ἀγαλλιάσθε. ἀνεκκλήτος, ἄπ. λεγ., "unspeakable," is either "what cannot be expressed in words" (thus ἀλυλητος, Rom. viii. 26), or "what cannot be exhausted by words."¹ δεδοξασμένη, according to Weiss, means: "the joy which already bears within it the glory, in which the future glory comes into play even in the Christian's earthly life;" similarly, Steinmeyer: "*hominis fidelis laetitia jam exstat deoξασμένη, quoniam δόξαν ejus futuram praesentem habet ac sentit*;" but on this interpretation relations are introduced which in and for itself the word does not possess. δεδοξασμένος means simply "glorified;" χαρὰ δεδοξασου. is accordingly the joy which has attained unto perfected glory; but "the imperfect joy of the Christian here (Wiesinger, Hofmann), and not the joy of the world, which as of sense and transitory is a joy ἐν αἰμαίᾳ" (Fronmüller), is to be regarded as its antithesis; so that this expression also seems to show that ἀγαλλιάσθε is to be understood of the future exultation.

Ver. 9. κομιζόμενοι τὸ τέλος, κ.τ.λ., gives the reason of that joy; the participle links itself simply on to ἀγαλλιάσθε, "*inasmuch as ye obtain*," etc., and supplies confirmation that what is here spoken of is not present but future joy. It is arbitrary to interpret, with De Wette and Brückner: "*inasmuch as ye are destined to obtain*;" or with Steiger: "*inasmuch as even now in foretaste ye obtain*." Joined with the future present ἀγαλλιάσθε, the participle must also be in the present.² Cf. with this passage, more especially chap.

¹ Steinmeyer gives an unjustifiable application to the word, by saying: "Meminerimus τῶν ποικίλων περρασμῶν. Si quidem plurimae illae tentationes totidem laetitiae causas afferunt, sine dubio ἡ χαρὰ eodem sensu ἀνεκκλήτους exstat, quo περρασμοὶ nequeunt enumerari."

² Winer, in the 5th ed. (p. 403), gives the same interpretation as De Wette; in the 6th (p. 306) and the 7th (p. 330 [E. T., 351 f.]), on the other hand: "as receiving (they are that

already in the assurance of faith)." Schott: "Since ye are about to, or on the way to, *gather in* (!) like a harvest the end of your faith." Schott is clearly wrong when he asserts that if the apostle had had the future joy in his mind, he must have written κομισάμενοι on account of the δεδοξασμένη, "because the attaining of the end of salvation, which is still in the act of being accomplished, could not be placed parallel with the final glorification which has

v. 4. — κομίζειν: “obtain” (cf. chap. v. 4), is in the N. T. frequently used of the obtaining of what will be assigned to man at the last judgment; 2 Pet. ii. 13; 2 Cor. v. 10; Eph. vi. 8; Col. iii. 25. Steinmeyer incorrectly explains the word: *secum portare*. — τὸ τέλος, not “the reward” = μισθός (Beza, Vorstius, etc.), neither is it “the reward of victory” (Hofmann);¹ but it is the end of faith, that to which it is directed; see Cremer, s. v. — τῆς πίστεως ὑμῶν refers back to πιστεύοντες, ver. 8. — σωτηρίαν ψυχῶν. The salvation is indeed one already present; but here is meant the Christians’ completed salvation, of which they shall be partakers, ἐν καιρῷ ἐσχάτῳ (ver. 5). — On ψυχῶν, Bengel remarks: ANIMA *praecipue salvatur: corpus in resurrectione participat*; cf. Jas. i. 21; John xii. 25; Luke xxi. 19.

Vv. 10–12. The design of this paragraph is not to prove the truth of the apostolic doctrine by its agreement with that of the prophets (Gerhard), but to bring prominently before the glory of the σωτηρία before spoken of, by presenting it as the object of prophetic search. Calvin: “*salutis hujus pretium inde commendat, quod in eam toto studio intente fuerunt prophetae.*” Wiesinger also; in such a way, however, that he holds the real tendency to be this, that the readers should recognize themselves as “those favored ones who, by the preaching of the gospel, had been made partakers of the salvation foretold in the O. T.” Schott thinks that here the position of the Christians is compared very favorably with that of the prophets, since the latter had to cling to a bare word referring to an indefinite time; the former, on the other hand, have in their possession of salvation the pledge of a blessed future — indeed, in a certain sense even possess it. — But how much is here introduced!

Ver. 10. *περὶ ἧς σωτηρίας ἐξεζήτησαν καὶ ἐξηρεύνησαν προφῆται*]. The σωτηρία, to which the search of the prophets was directed, is, as the connection: *περὶ ἧς σωτ.*, shows, the previously mentioned σωτηρία ψυχῶν, which is the τέλος of faith. Wiesinger and Schott extend the idea so as to include within it the present salvation. This is correct thus far, that the future salvation is only the completion of the present; but it is precisely to the completion that the apostle’s glance is directed. De Wette is wrong in understanding by σωτηρία “the work of salvation.” — Both verbs express the earnest search. ἐξερευνᾶν is in the N. T. ἀπ. λεγ. (LXX., 1 Sam. xxiii. 23: עָרַן; 1 Chron. xix. 3: רָרַן). The prefixed ἐκ serves to intensify the idea, without hinting that the prophets selected the right time *from* among different periods (Steiger); see the other passages in the N. T. where the verb ἐκζητεῖν occurs. The aim of their search is more precisely defined in ver. 11. Luther’s translation is inexact: “*after which salvation;*” *περὶ* means rather: *in respect to, with regard to.* — Calvin justly remarks: *quum dicit prophetas sciscitatos esse et sedulo inquisivisse, hoc ad eorum scripta aut doctrinam non pertinet, sed ad PRIVATUM DESIDERIUM quo quisque aestuavit.* A distinction is here drawn between the individual activity put forth on the basis of the revelation of which they had been

already taken place,” since there is nothing unreasonable in the idea that the joy of the Christians is glorified when they receive the end of their salvation.

¹ The expression κομίζειν indeed shows that Peter pictured to himself the τέλος of faith as a trophy, but not that τέλος literally means “trophy.”

made partakers, and that revelation itself (Wiesinger, Schott, Hofmann).¹ To *προφήται* is subjoined the nearer definition: *οἱ περὶ τῆς εἰς ὑμᾶς χάριτος προφητεύσαντες*, by which some prophets are not distinguished from others, as Hofmann thinks, but all are characterized according to their function.²—*ἡ εἰς ὑμᾶς χάρις*, either from the prophets' standpoint: "destined for you" (De Wette, Brückner), or from that of the apostles: "the grace of which ye have been made partakers" (Wiesinger, Schott). The first is the preferable view. *χάρις* is not to be taken as identical with *σωτηρία* (as opposed to Wiesinger), but the difference in expression points to a distinction in idea. *χάρις* denotes both the present and the future, *σωτηρία* only the future. Hofmann attaches particular importance to the fact that *ὑμᾶς* and not *ἡμᾶς* is here used; assuming that by *ὑμᾶς* the readers must be understood to be *heathen Christians*. This is, however, incorrect, since Peter nowhere in his epistle makes a distinction between heathen and Jewish Christians; by *ὑμᾶς* the readers are addressed not as heathen Christians, but as Christians in general; cf. also vv. 3, 4: *ἀναγεννήσας ἡμᾶς . . . τετηρημένους εἰς ὑμᾶς*.

Ver. 11 stands in close grammatical connection with the preceding, *ἐρευνῶντες* being conjoined with the *verba finita* of ver. 10; what follows states the object of the *ἐρευνᾶν*.—*εἰς τίνα ἢ ποῖον καιρὸν*]. *τίνα* refers to the time itself, *ποῖον* to its character.³ Steinmeyer (appealing without justification to Rom. iv. 13) explains *ἡ* incorrectly: *vel potius; vel, ut rectius dicam*.—*ἐδήλουν*, not "referred to" (Luth.; or *significaret, Vulg.*), but "revealed," as Heb. ix. 8, xii. 17, etc. Vorstius supplies: *gratiam illam exstíturam, de qua et ipsi vaticinabantur*; this is incorrect. *εἰς . . . καιρὸν* is conjoined rather directly—though not as its real object, but as a secondary determination—with *ἐδήλουν*. An object is not to be supplied (neither *ταῦτα* nor *τὴν χάριν ταύτην*, Steiger), as *ἐδήλουν* is in intimate union with the participle *προυαυτηρόμενον* (De Wette, Brückner, Wiesinger, Schott), by which "at once the act of *δηλοῦν* and its object are exactly determined" (De Wette).—*τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ*]. By this the revealing subject is mentioned: the prophets only expressed what the Spirit within them communicated to them; "the *τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς* is to be taken as a special act of *ἐδήλουν*" (Wiesinger), cf. besides, Matt. xxii. 43 and 2 Pet. i. 21.⁴—This Spirit is characterized as the *τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ Χριστοῦ*, not in that it bears witness of Christ (Bengel: *Spiritus Christi: testans de Christo*; thus also Grotius, Augustine, Jachmann), for *Χριστοῦ* is the sub-

¹ Steinmeyer denies this distinction, and says, interpreting *τίνα ἢ ποῖον καιρὸν*, ver. 11, by "de sola inde indole temporis:" "neminem latebit, eos saepenumero de crescente piorum hominum desiderio nec non de aucta improborum protervitate verba fecisse; . . . ecce τα σημεῖα τοῦ μελλοντος καιροῦ, quae indagata praedicarunt." According to this, *ἐκζητεῖν* and *ἐξερευνᾶν* would be *indagata praedicare* (!).

² Bengel: "Articulus hic praetermissus grandem facit orationem, nam audirem a determinata individuorum consideratione ad ipsum genus spectandum traducit; sic ver. 12: *angeli*."

³ Bengel: "in quod vel quale tempus; quod innuit tempus per se, quasi dicas aeram suis numeris notatam: quale dicit tempus ex eventibus variis noscendum."

⁴ Hofmann is indeed not mistaken in saying that *τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς πν. Χρ.* is a designation of the Spirit working prophetic knowledge in the prophets, and not of a constant indwelling of it,—only it must be observed that the expression here employed says nothing as to how or in what manner the Spirit dwelt in the prophets.

jective and not the objective genitive, but because it is the Spirit "which Christ has and gives" (Wiesinger); see Rom. viii. 8. The expression is to be explained from the apostle's conviction of the pre-existence of Christ, and is here used in reference strictly to the *προμαρτυρούμενον τὰ εἰς Χριστὸν παθήματα*, κ.τ.λ., directly conjoined with it. Barnabas, chap. v.: *prophetae ab ipso habentes donum in illum prophetarunt.*

REMARK. — By far the greater number of the interpreters rightly see, in the term here applied to the Spirit, a testimony to the real pre-existence of Christ. Not so De Wette, who finds in it merely the expression of the view "that the work of redemption is the same in both the O. and N. T., and that the Spirit of God at work in the former is identical with the Spirit of Christ;" and Weiss (pp. 247-249), who explains the name thus: That the Spirit which was at work in the prophets was the same as "that which Christ received at His baptism, and since then has possessed;" similarly Schmid also (*Bibl. Theol.*, p. 163), "the Spirit of God, which, in after time, worked in the person of Christ." Weiss seeks to prove, indeed, that "Christ had, in the pre-existent Messianic Spirit, an ideal, or, in a certain sense, a real pre-existence;" but, in this way, reflex ideas are attributed to the apostles, which certainly lay far from their mind. Besides, Weiss himself admits, that, in 1 Cor. x. 4, 9, reference is made to the pre-existent Christ; but it cannot be concluded, from Acts ii. 36, that Peter did not believe it. Schott, too, in his interpretation, does not abstain from introducing many results of modern thought, when he designates τὸ πν. Χρ. here as the Spirit "of the Mediator continually approaching the consummation of salvation (!), but as yet supernaturally concealed in God." Steinmeyer does not touch the question of the pre-existence of Christ; he finds an adequate explanation of the expression in the remark of Bengel, although he takes *Χριστοῦ* as a subject. gen.

— *προμαρτυρούμενον*]. This verb compos. occurs nowhere else in the N. T., and in none of the classical writers; the simplex means properly: "to call to witness;" then, "to swear to, to attest;" *προμαρτυρέσθαι* is therefore: "to attest beforehand."¹—The object of *ἐδήλων . . . προμαρτ.* is τὰ εἰς Χριστὸν παθήματα καὶ τὰς μετὰ ταῦτα δοξας]. On this Luther remarks, that it can be understood of both kinds of suffering, of those which Christ Himself bore, as well as of those which we endure. The majority of interpreters conceive the reference to be to the former: Oecumenius, Theophyl., Erasmus, Grotius, Aretius, Piscator (cf. Luke xxiv. 26), Vorstius, Hensler, Stolz, Hottinger, Knapp, Steiger, De Wette, Brückner, Steinmeyer, Wiesinger, Weiss, Luthardt, Schott, Frommüller, Hofmann, etc.; but not so Calvin: *non tractat Petr. quod Christo sit proprium, sed de universali ecclesiae statu disserit*; Bolten and Clericus explain it of the sufferings of the Christians; the same position is taken up in the first edition of this commentary. Since the main tendency

¹ Schott justly remarks that *δηλοῦν* and *προμαρτυρέσθαι* are not identical with *προφητεῦν*, but that they denote the "action of the Spirit," by means of which "He communicated to the prophets the prophecies after which they were to inquire." But he is evidently mistaken

when he asserts that this identification takes place in the above interpretation.—Nor is Schott warranted in supposing that in *προμαρτ.* the apostle emphatically shows that the manner of communication "was a revelation in the form of *speech*, and not an inward vision."²

of the paragraph, vv. 10-12, is to give special prominence to the glorious nature of the believers' *σωτηρία*, the latter view is favored by the connection of thought. But, on the other hand, there is nothing opposed to the assumption, that the apostle here mentions the facts on which the *σωτηρία* is founded, as the substance of the testimony of the Spirit of God in the prophets. The expression *τὰ εἰς Χριστὸν παθήματα* too, which must be interpreted to the analogy of *τῆς εἰς ἡμᾶς χάριτος*, goes to show that by it are to be understood the sufferings which were ordained or appointed to Christ (Wiesinger). — On the plural *τῶς . . . δόξας*, Bengel says: *Plurale: gloria resurrectionis, gloria ascensionis, gloria judicii extremi et regni coelestis*; thus also Grotius, De Wette, Steiger, Wiesinger, Weiss, Schott. But it might be more correct to explain the plural in this way, that as the one suffering of Christ comprehends in it a plurality of sufferings, so does His *δόξα* a plurality of glories. Hofmann: “by *παθήματα* is to be understood the manifold afflictions in which the one suffering of Christ consisted, while the manifold glorifyings which go to make up His glory are included under *δόξαι*.”¹ Besides, it must be noted that the suffering of Christ is always designated by the plural *παθήματα* (with the exception of Heb. ii. 9, where we have: *τὸ πῦθμα τοῦ θανάτου*), but His glory always by the singular *δόξα*. — As the *παθήματα* and *δόξαι* of Christ are the object of *ἐδόξω προμαρτυρούμενον*, so by *καιρός*, to which the *ἐρευνᾶν* of the prophets was directed, the time is referred to when this salvation would actually be accomplished. For this reason, then, *ἐξηρῆνθησαν*, ver. 10, cannot again be repeated in *ἐρευνῶντες* (Wiesinger, Schott), as if the *εἰς τίνα . . . καιρὸν* referred directly to the appearance of the *σωτηρία*; the apostle's thought is rather this, that in their search as to the time of the sufferings, etc., of Christ, the prophets had before their eyes, as that with respect to which they sought to obtain knowledge, the *σωτηρία* of which believers were to be made partakers.

REMARK. — Definite corroboration of the ideas here expressed is to be found in the Book of Daniel, chap. xii. 4, 9, 10, 13. The fundamental presupposition is that the “when” of the fulfilment was unknown to the prophets; according to ver. 12, all that was revealed to them was that it would take place only in the times to come. De Wette asserts too much when he says that searching as to the time cannot be predicated of the genuine prophets of ancient Judaism, but of Daniel only, who pondered over the seventy years of Jeremiah. But although the words of Daniel may have given occasion for the apostle's statement, still that statement is not incapable of justification. If the apostles searched as to the time when the promises of Christ would receive accomplishment, why should it not be presupposed that similarly the prophets, too, inquired into that which the *πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ* testified beforehand to them, more especially as to the *καιρός* of its fulfilment?

Ver. 12. *οἷς ἀπεκαλύφθη* is linked on by way of explanation to *ἐρευνῶντες*: “to whom it was revealed,” i.e., “in that it was revealed to them.” This is

¹ Hofmann's opinion, that Peter had chiefly in his mind the passages in Isa. xlix. 6, 7, liii.

15, arises from the fact that he applies *ἡμᾶς* specially to the Gentiles.

to be taken neither as an antithesis to the searching, nor as the result of it, but as an element accompanying—and stimulating—it; see Wiesinger and Schott *in loc.* — *ὅτι οὐχ ἑαυτοῖς ὑμῶν (ἡμῶν) δὲ διηκόνουν αὐτά*]. *ὅτι* is not causal here (Luther: “for;” so also Luthardt and Hofmann). Opposed to this is the circumstance that if *ὅτι, κ.τ.λ.*, be taken as a parenthesis, and the *ἃ νῦν ἀνηγγέλη, κ.τ.λ.*, following be joined with *ἀπεκαλύφθη* (Hofmann), this sentence is strangely broken up; if, on the other hand, *ἃ νῦν, κ.τ.λ.*, be united with what immediately precedes (Luther), *ἀπεκαλύφθη* is plainly much too bald. Nor can it be denied that *ὅτι* naturally connects itself with *ἀπεκαλύφθη*, and *ἃ νῦν* is joined with *διηκόνουν αὐτά*. *ὅτι* states, then, not the reason, but the contents of what was revealed to the prophets.¹ — *διακονεῖν*, both in the N. T. and in the classics, is frequently a transitive verb joined with the accusative, and that in such a way that the accusative denotes either the result of the *διακονεῖν*, or the thing to which the service is directed (iv. 10). Here, where *αὐτά* is the accusative dependent on *διηκόνουν*, the latter is the case; for that which is announced to the Christians is not the result of the prophets’ ministrations, but that to which they were directed. That “they did their part in bringing to pass by their ministration the salvation which is now preached” (Wiesinger, and Schott also), is a thought in no way hinted at here, and in which “*did their part*” is a purely arbitrary addition. The ministration of the prophets consisted not in the bringing to pass of the salvation, but in the proclaiming of that which was revealed to them (Brückner); and this is what is conveyed by *αὐτά*. — They exercised this ministration, *οὐχ, etc.*, “not for their, rather for your (our) benefit,” i.e., in such a way that its application was to you (us), not to themselves. — On *δέ* after the negation, as distinguished from *ὐλλά*, cf. Winer, p. 411 (E. T., 442 f.).² The difference in the reading *ὑμῶν* or *ἡμῶν* does not essentially affect the meaning, since by *ὑμῶν*, though the readers of the epistle are indeed addressed in the first instance, all the rest of the Christians are naturally thought of as included. Still, the idea expressed in the *ὑμῶν* or *ἡμῶν δέ* is not without difficulty. Taken strictly, the *οὐχ ἑαυτοῖς* alone was known to the prophets — and along with this likewise, that it was for *others*, i.e., for those who lived at the time of its fulfilment. But as these others are the Christians, the apostle directly opposes *ὑμῶν δε* to *οὐχ ἑαυτοῖς* — that is, inserts

¹ Luthardt interprets: “for there the object was a future one, from which the veil had to be removed by single acts of God; here, it is a present one, which accordingly the messengers simply proclaim, in the power of the now ever present Spirit of God;” how much is imported here! Steinmeyer admits that *ὅτι* is not to be taken *αιτιολογικῶς*, but denies at the same time that it states the argumentum *τῆς ἀποκαλύψεως*; he assumes an inversion, which is to be resolved thus: *οἷς ἀπεκαλύφθη (sc. ταῦτα, namely τὰ παθ. κ. δόξαι Χρ.) οὐχ ἑαυτοῖς, ἀλλ’ ὅτι ὑμῶν διηκόνουν αὐτά*, and then interprets: h. e. quibus manifestata sunt, non in ipsorum commodum, sed quia nobis ea minis-

trare jussu erant. But is *ὅτι* then not still *αιτιολογικῶς*? And on what ground should an inversion so very harsh be adopted?

² Schott’s singular assertion, that “*οὐ . . . δέ* does not cancel *ἑαυτοῖς* simply, and put *ὑμῶν* in its place, but that *δε* adds only something new to the preceding *which remains standing*” (In spite of the *οὐ!*), is based on a misconception of what is said by Hartung, *Partikellehre*, I. 171, to which Schott appeals. “Others than those addressed are not excluded; the latter only are indicated as those for whom the prophecy was intended;” thus Hofmann, too, incorrectly.

the definite for the indefinite. — Wiesinger, Schott, Brückner, join *αὐτά* closely with the *ἃ* which follows: “the same as that which now is proclaimed to you;” this is, however, incorrect. *αὐτά* is nowhere in the N. T. construed thus with a relative to which it is antecedent; it applies rather to what has been formerly mentioned; here, therefore, doubtless to that of which the *πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ* testified beforehand to the prophets, and what they prophesied of the *χάρις*, of which the readers had been made partakers. It is less fitting to limit the reference to the *τὰ εἰς Χριστὸν παθήματα, ἃ, κ.τ.λ.*, being joined to it in a somewhat loose way. — It is entirely arbitrary for Hofmann to assert that “Peter does not speak of any prophecies in general, but of the written records in which were contained the prediction of the prophets, who had foretold the extension of grace to the Gentile world,” — there is nothing here to lead to the supposition that the apostle makes any reference to written records, — and predictions with regard to the heathen. — By means of the following *ἃ νῦν ἀνηγγέλη, κ.τ.λ.*, the apostle insists that what the prophets foretold is that which is now proclaimed to the readers; *νῦν* emphasizes the present, in which the facts of salvation are proclaimed as having already taken place, as contradistinguished from the time when they were predicted as future. — *διὰ τῶν εὐαγγελισαμένων ὑμᾶς (ἐν) πνεύματι ἁγίῳ*]. For the construction of the verb *εὐαγγελίσσασθαι*, c. acc., cf. Gal. i. 9; Winer, p. 209 (E. T., 223). — If the reading: *ἐν πν.* be adopted, the Holy Spirit is conceived of as the power, as it were, encompassing and swaying them; if the other reading, as the moving and impelling cause. Like prophecy (ver. 11), the preaching of the gospel proceeds from the illumination and impulse of the Holy Spirit. — *ἀποσταλέντι ἀπ’ οὐρανοῦ* refers to the events of Pentecost; since then the Holy Spirit has His abode and is at work in the church.¹ Though the same Spirit was already in the prophets, ver. 11, He had not yet at that time been sent from heaven. Who the individuals were who had preached the gospel to the readers, Peter does not say. No doubt the form of the apostle’s expression does not compel us to think of him as excluded from the *τῶν εὐαγγελ.*; yet it is very probable that Peter, had he intended to include himself, would somehow have given this to be understood. — *εἰς ἃ ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἄγγελοι παρακύψαι*]. The relative *ἃ* clearly goes back to *ἃ νῦν ἀνηγγέλη*. It is arbitrary to understand (with Schott) by that which the angels desired to see, “the nature and origin of the moral transformation wrought by the proclamation of the gospel;” or, with Hofmann, to give it this reference, “that Christ has died, and been glorified in such a way that now He can and should be preached to the heathen as having died and been glorified for them;” it includes not only the *παθήματα* and *δόξαι* of Christ (Wiesinger), but the whole contents of the message of salvation (Brückner), which, as it is a testimony to the facts of redemption, is also a preaching of the *σωτηρία* founded on them,

¹ Weiss’s assertion (*Die Petrin. Frage*, above mentioned, p. 642), that, “if there be here an allusion to the outpouring of the Spirit on the day of Pentecost, Paul could not have belonged to those who had preached the gospel to the readers,” is without foundation, as it is

not said here that the *εὐαγγελισάμενοι ὑμᾶς* belonged to those who received the Holy Spirit at Pentecost, but only that they preached in that Spirit, which was sent from heaven at Pentecost; and this applies to Paul no less than to the other apostles, etc.

which is *ἑτοίμη ἀποκαλυφθῆναι ἐν καιρῷ ἐσχάτῳ* (ver. 5), and which the believers will obtain (ver. 9).¹ — *ἐπιθυμοῦσι* must not be taken as an aorist,² for the question is not as to what the angels did at the time of the prophets, but as to what they are *now* doing. That after which they long is the *παρακίψαι εἰς αὐτά*. On the inf. aor. after *ἐπιθυμοῦσιν*, see Winer, p. 310 f. (E. T., 331). — *παρακίπτειν*, properly, “to bend to the side so as to examine a thing,” means when joined with *εἰς* not only “to look towards,” but “to look into any thing,” and that in order to obtain a more accurate knowledge of the object in question.³ The *παρά* of the verb indicates that the angels stand outside the work of redemption, inasmuch as it is not for them, but for man (cf. Heb. ii. 16). The addition of this clause brings prominently forward the idea, not that the work of salvation is a mystery, — concealed even from the angels, — but that that which has been proclaimed to the readers is something so glorious that even the angels had a wish and a longing to see what was its fashion, and what the course of its development (cf. Eph. iii. 10). Nor is it implied in *ἐπιθυμοῦσι* that “the angels cannot attain to a knowledge of the economy of salvation” (Schott). It is more than doubtful whether there be here any reference to Exod. xxv. 20, as several interpreters assume.⁴

The first group of exhortations extends from ver. 13 to the end of the chapter. — Ver. 13. First exhortation, which forms the basis of those which follow. The *τελοῖως ἐλπίζειν* is the foundation upon which the whole moral-religious life of the Christian must be raised. — *διὰ ἀναζωσίμενοι τὰς ὀσφύας τῆς διανοίας ὑμῶν*. *διό* does not refer back to any *single* thought in what precedes, certainly not to the glory of the *σωτηρία* touched upon in vv. 10 ff. (Calvin: *ex magnitudine et excellentia gratiae deducit exhortationem*), still less to the thought expressed vv. 5–9: “that the Christian goes through trial towards a glorious destiny” (De Wette), but to the whole of the foregoing lines of thought (Schott), which, however, have their point of convergence in this, that unto the Christian begotten again *εἰς ἐλπίδα ζώσαν*, the *σωτηρία* is appointed as the *τέλος τῆς πίστεως* (similarly Brückner). — *ἀναζωσίμενοι τὰς ὀσφύας*, a figurative expression taken from the runners (and others) who tucked up their dress, so as to prosecute their work with less hinderance. *ἀναζώννυμι*, ἄπ. λεγ. (Prov. xxxi. 17; LXX., ed. *Van Ess*, xxix. 17), means to tuck up; Luther, incorrectly: “therefore *so* gird yourselves” (thus Wiesinger also translates, although he justly says: “The figure taken from the tucking up of a long undergarment denotes preparedness for something,”

¹ The Vulg. translates *εἰς ἃ* by “in quem” (i.e., in Spiritum sanctum).

² Irenaeus, *C. Haer.* iv. 67; Oecumenius: *ὦν τὴν γνώσιν καὶ ἐκβασιν καὶ αὐτοὶ οἱ ἄγγελοι ἐπεθύμησαν*.

³ Although Hofmann may not be wrong in asserting that *παρακίπτειν* is used also to denote a cursory glance at any thing (cf. Dem. iv. 24, in Pape, *s.v.*), yet, in connection with *εἰς*, it is chiefly employed in cases where a more accurate knowledge is implied; precisely

as Pape also interprets *παρακίπτειν*, “to stand beside a thing, and to bend down so as to see it more distinctly;” cf. further, *Ecclus.* xxi. 23 (xiv. 23), and in the N. T. besides, *Jas.* i. 25, also *John* xx. 11 (*Luke* xxiv. 12; *John* xx. 5).

⁴ Beza: “alludit Ap. ad duos illos Cherubim opercula Arcae insistentes, conversis in ipsam arcam oculis.” Piscator: “videtur respicere ad Cherubim super arcam foederis, tanquam ad tyrum.”

etc.); cf. the passages, Luke xii. 35 and Eph. vi. 14 (in both passages, however, *περιζώννυμι*). The figure is the more appropriate, that the Christian is a *παρεπίδημος*, on his way to the future *κληρονομία*. The figurative *τὰς δούσας* finds its own explanation in the exegetical genitive *τῆς διανοίας ὑμῶν*. Aretius interprets incorrectly: *lumbi mentis, i. e., ipsa recta ratio renati hominis recte judicans de negotio pietatis*; *διάνοια* means here, as in Col. i. 21, the "disposition of mind." The meaning of the phrase applies not only to deliverance from evil desires,¹ but to all and every needful preparation of spirit for the fulfilling of the exhortations following; "it is the figure of spiritual preparedness and activity" (De Wette). The aorist participle points to this spiritual preparedness as the preliminary condition of *ἐλπίζειν* (Schott). — *νήφοντες*]. Cf. chap. iv. 7, v. 8 (1 Thess. v. 6, 8; 2 Tim. iv. 5). Calvin, correctly: *non temperantiam solum in cibo et potu commendat, sed spirituales potius sobrietatem, quum sensus omnes nostros continemus, ne se hujus mundi illecebris inebrient*; similarly most interpreters. Otherwise, however, Weiss (p. 95 f.), who supposes an antithesis between *ἀναζωσάμενοι* and *νήφοντες*, inasmuch as the former is opposed "to want of courage and apathy," the latter to "unnatural overstraining and excitement," and "unhealthy exaltation." But no such antithetical relation is (as little as there is in chap. v. 8 and 1 Thess. v. 6, 8, between *γρηγορεῖν* and *νήφειν*) here anywhere hinted at, nor is there any thing in the whole epistle to lead us to suppose that Peter considered it necessary "to warn his hearers against the extravagant enthusiasm of a Messianic glory." Rather in *νήφοντες* is prominence given to an important element in the *ἀναζώσασθαι*, without which a *τελείως ἐλπίζειν* cannot exist, namely, the clearness and soberness of mind with which the goal of hope, and the way leading thither, is kept in view. — *τελείως ἐλπίσατε ἐπὶ τὴν φερομένην, κ.τ.λ.*] *τελείως, ἄπ. λεγ.*, belongs not to *νήφοντες* (Oecumenius, Benson, Semler, Mayerhoff, Hofmann), but to *ἐλπίσατε*;² it shows emphatically that the hope should be perfect, undivided, unchangeable ("without doubt or faint-heartedness, with full surrender of soul" (De Wette); Wiesinger adds further: "excluding all ungodly substance and worldly desire, and including the *μὴ συσχηματ.*, ver. 14;" and Schott: "with reference also to the moral conduct of earnest sanctification"). Weiss (p. 93) finds the *τελειότης* of hope in this, that it does not allow itself to be overcome by suffering — but of suffering there is here no mention. Erasmus, Grotius, Bengel, take it unsatisfactorily, only *ratione temporis, i. e., "ad finem usque."* — *ἐλπίζειν*, frequently with *εἰς, ἐν, ἐπί*, c. dat., is construed with *ἐπί* cum accus. only here and in 1 Tim. v. 5; it means "to place his hope on something." The object connected with it by means of *ἐπί* is not the proper object of hope; the latter stands in the accusative, or is expressed by a verb, either in the infin. or with *ὄτι*; but it is that from which the fulfilment of hope is expected.³ If, as here, *ἐπί* be construed with the accusative, the disposition

¹ Gerbard: "Quamvis passionum et cupiditatum carnalium refrenatio praescribitur."

² The reasons which Hofmann brings forward for the combination of *τελείως* with *νήφοντες* are not by any means conclusive; for as the chief accent lies on *ἐλπίσατε*, a strength-

ening of this expression by *τελείως* is entirely appropriate, whilst *νήφοντες* requires no such support. The position of the word, too, is in favor of the connection with *ἐλπίσατε*.

³ The expression "to hope for something," confidently to expect it, may lead to the sup-

of mind with respect to the object is expressed; whilst if it be taken with the dative, the object is presented to us as the basis of hope, that on which it is founded. — ἐπὶ τὴν φερομένην ὑμῖν χάριν ἐν ἀποκαλύψει Ἰησ. Χριστοῦ]. Several commentators interpret so that the sense runs: “place your hope on the grace which has been shown you by the revelation of Jesus Christ;” thus Erasmus, Luther, Calov, Bengel, Gerhard, Steiger, etc.; according to this, φερομένην is the ἀντίστροφον of κομίζεσθαι (i.e., “which has been already offered or communicated to you”), χάρις, “the forgiveness of sins effected by Christ,” and ἀποκάλυψις Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, “the revelation of Christ which has already taken place.” In the more exact definition of the term ἀποκάλυψις, these interpreters again diverge from one another; whilst Luther, Calov, Steiger, and others hold it to be “the revelation which has taken place in the gospel;” Bengel, etc., on the other hand, understand it of “the incarnation of Christ.” Erasmus gives both: *sentit de mysterio evangelii divulgato per quod Christus innotuit, seu de adventu Christi*. Steiger, in support of the first view, appeals to Luke ii. 32; Rom. xvi. 25; Gal. i. 16; Eph. i. 17; 2 Cor. xii. 1; Eph. iii. 3; but all these passages do not furnish the proof desired. In no passage is the revelation of the gospel called the ἀποκάλυψις Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ. But the other view is opposed by the N. T. *usus loquendi*, according to which ἀποκ. always denotes the future coming of Christ only. It must also be held to be unwarrantable to interpret ἐν ἀποκ. Ἰησ. Χρ. here in a different sense from that given shortly before in ver. 7 (and chap. iv. 13). — Not less opposed to the former interpretation is the present participle φερομένην, since the present may not arbitrarily be taken in the sense of the preterite, but must be looked upon as a realization of the future. Steiger is no doubt right in holding that ἡ φερ. ὑμ. χάρις “does not speak of the object of hoping, but the ground on which hope is built.” But from this it does not follow that by the phrase “something already accomplished” must be understood, for why should the Christian not be able to set his hopes of salvation on the grace which in the future will be offered to him at and with the return of Christ? Piscator incorrectly explains χάρις: *coelestis felicitas et gloria, quam Deus nobis ex gratia daturus est*. Aretius, again, is right: *benevolentia Dei, qua nos amplectitur in filio*: the grace of God from which the Christian has to expect the *coelestis felicitas*. — With φερομένην, cf. Heb. ix. 16. φέρειν: “to bring, to present” (not “to bring nearer,” Schott), points here to the free grace of God. That is, then: “place your hope on the grace which will be brought to you at (in and with) the revelation (the second coming) of Christ.” It is rightly interpreted by Oecumenius, Calvin (who errs in this only, that he takes ἐν for εἰς, i.e., *usque ad adventum Christi*), Beza, Grotius, Estius, Semler, Pott, De Wette, etc.

position that this meaning is expressed by ἐλπίζειν ἐπὶ τι. In the N. T. this is usually rendered by ἀπεκδέχεσθαι. Even in the construction with εἰς the thing accompanying it is not the object of hope, cf. John v. 45; 2 Cor. i. 10; only in Eccles. ii. 9 is the object of ἐλπίζειν construed with εἰς (ἐλπίζατε εἰς ἀγαθὰ καὶ εἰς εὐφροσύνην). Hofmann wrongly at-

taches importance to whether εἰς is followed by a person or a thing, asserting that in the latter case the thing is the object; for it is quite as possible to set one's hope on a thing as on a person. Cremer rightly quotes this passage as one of those in which ἐλπίζειν has the meaning of “settling one's hope on something.”

REMARK. — The more recent interpreters take up different positions with respect to the view here presented. Wiesinger, Brückner, Schott, Fronmüller, Hofmann, agree with the interpretation of ἀποκάλυψις, but are opposed to that of ἐλπίζειν ἐπί. Weiss and Zöckler (*De vi ac notione voc. ἐλπίζω in N. T.*, 1856, p. 15 ff.), on the other hand, are against the latter, but in favor of the former. — As regards ἐλπίζω, Zöckler: *Ea est vis praepositionis ἐπί c. acc. constructae, ut finem designet s. localem s. temporalem s. causalem, in quem tendat actus verbi. Qui tamen finis s. terminus sperandi ita discernendus est a simplici OBJECTO sperandi, ut hoc significet rem, quam sibi obtinere speret subjectum, finis vero ille simul auctor sit, e quo pendeat vel satisfacere votis sperantis, vel deesse*; ¹ in support of which he justly quotes, in addition to this verse, 1 Tim. v. 5 (to which Wiesinger appeals without any justification), and a not inconsiderable number of passages from the LXX.; cf. Weiss also (p. 36 f.). De Wette interprets ἐλπίζειν correctly, but thinks, that, inasmuch as the σωτηρία is conceived as a χάρις, it is at once the ground and the object of the hope. With this Brückner agrees, finding, “in this intermingling, a part of the peculiarity of the thought;” whilst, on the other hand, Weiss sees in it only a makeshift conveying no clear idea at all. With regard to the term ἀποκάλυψις, Weiss explains it as: *manifestatio Christi, quae fit in verbo evangelii in hac vita* (Gerhard). But this interpretation is decidedly opposed to the N. T. usage; in no passage is the revelation of which, by the gospel, we become partakers described as an ἀποκάλυψις Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, although ἀποκαλύπτειν is used of the different kinds of revealing. The reference to the gospel is an evident importation. Weiss raises two objections to the correct view — (1) “It is, as a matter of fact, impossible that the Christian should set his hope on the grace that is to be brought at the revelation of Christ.” But why should this be impossible? How often does it happen that the individual bases his hope for the fulfilment of his wish on an event as yet future, but which he is assured will happen! (2) “That the second coming of Christ is not a revelation of grace at all, but of just judgment.” But the latter in no way excludes the former; and how could the Christian contemplate the second coming of Christ with calm, yes, even with joy, if there were no grace?

Ver. 14. Second exhortation (extending to ver. 21). — ὡς τέκνα ὑπακοῆς does not belong to what precedes (Hofmann), but serves to introduce the new exhortation.² — ὡς does not here introduce a comparison (as ii. 2, 5, iii. 7), but marks the essential quality of the subject. Lorinus correctly remarks on ii. 14: *constat hujusmodi particulas saepe nihil minuire, sed rei veritatem magis exprimere*; it corresponds to our “as,” i. e., as becomes you who should be τέκνα ὑπακοῆς. — ὑπακοή is used here as absolutely as in ver. 2, and has the same signification as there. The spirit which pervades the life of believers is the spirit of obedience, and therefore they should be τέκνα ὑπακοῆς. According to the analogy of similar compounds in the N. T., as τέκνα φωτός, Eph. v. 8; its opposite, τέκνα κατάρας, 2 Pet. ii. 14; τέκνα τῆς ὀργῆς,

¹ This interpretation is correct. The only point under dispute is “simul.”

² Hofmann connects not only these words, but the subsequent participial clause also: μὴ συσχηματιζόμενοι, κ. τ. λ., with what precedes. This, however, is opposed, on the one hand,

by the correspondence which exists between τέκνα ὑπακοῆς and the subsequent exhortations; and, on the other hand, by ἀλλά, ver. 15, which is in antithesis to μὴ συσχηματιζόμενοι, and therefore not to be separated from it, as though it commenced a new paragraph.

Eph. ii. 3; particularly *υιοὶ τῆς ἀπειθείας*, Eph. ii. 2,—the expression *τέκνα ὑπακοῆς* may be explained so as that *τέκνα* shall denote only the relation in which the persons in question stand to the idea of the accompanying genitive; cf. Winer, p. 223 f. (E. T., 238); Buttmann, p. 141; Meyer on Eph. ii. 2 (thus Grotius, Jachmann, etc.; Frommüller too). De Wette, Brückner, Schott, Weiss, too, most probably, p. 172, take *τέκνα* as the “children of God,” and *ὑπακοῆς* as the genitive of character (as Luke xvi. 8: *ὁ οἰκόνομος τῆς ἀδικίας*; xviii. 6: *ὁ κριτὴς τῆς ἀδικίας*). But as it is in ver. 17 that mention is first made of the sonship relation of the Christian, it remains at least doubtful whether the apostle had in this expression that relation in view; at any rate the emphasis here lies not on *τέκνα*, but on *ὑπακοῆς*. — *μὴ συσχηματιζόμενοι*. *μὴ* occurs here on account of the imperative cast of the whole sentence. Neither *γενήθητε* (Bengel) nor any other similar word is to be supplied to the part., inasmuch as it does not correspond to the *ἅγιοι γενήθητε*, but to the *κατὰ τὸν κατέσταντα ὑμᾶς ἅγιον* (Wiesinger); there is here no “departure from the construction” (De Wette). The word *συσχηματίζεσθαι*, occurring in the N. T. only here and in Rom. xii. 2, and nowhere but in later Greek, means: “to form his *σχῆμα* like that of another:”¹ it has reference not to the outward conduct merely, but to the whole outward and inward conformation of life, as the connection with the following words shows: *ταῖς πρότερον ἐν τῇ ἀγνοίᾳ ὑμῶν ἐπιθυμίαις*. The *ἐπιθυμῖαι*, i. e., the *sinful* desires (not “the satisfied lusts, or a life of pleasure,” as De Wette understands), which formerly held sway in them, are the *σχῆμα*, according to which they are not to fashion themselves in their new life.² Luther’s translation is inexact: “take not up your former position, when ye in your ignorance lived according to your lusts.” The *ἐπιθυμῖαι* are more precisely characterized as formerly belonging to them *ἐν ἀγνοίᾳ*; *ἐν* specifies not merely the *time* (Calvin: *tempus ignorantiae vocat, antequam in fidem Christi vocati essent*), but likewise the *origin* (Wiesinger). *ἀγνοια* is used here as in Acts xvii. 30, Eph. iv. 18, ignorance in divine things, and is to be understood, if not exactly of idolatry, at least of heathenism, which is far from the knowledge of the living God and of His will. Paul, in Rom. i. 18 ff., shows how the obscuring of the consciousness of God is the source of moral corruption.

REMARK. — In answer to Weiss, who can see in this passage no proof that the readers were Gentile Christians, Wiesinger justly remarks, Schott and Brückner agreeing with him: “The *ἀγνοια* of which the Jews (Acts iii. 17; Rom. x. 3) are accused, or which Paul attributes to himself, 1 Tim. i. 13 (the same applies to Luke xxiii. 34; John viii. 19), is of quite a different kind; not

¹ When, in objection to this, Hofmann urges that *συσχηματίζεσθαι* should here be interpreted not according to Rom. xii. 2, but on the principle of the expression, *συσχ. τοῖς λεγομένοις*, — “so to conduct one’s self as to give adequate expression to the words used,” — he does not consider that in this verse the verb has the same force as in Rom. xii. 2, for it means, “to conform your *σχῆμα* to that which your words express.”

² Schott terms this interpretation “inexact;” for “it is not the lusts themselves, but the mode of life which is essentially characterized by these lusts, according to which they are not to fashion themselves;” but does theu *ἐπιθυμῖαι* mean “the mode of life”? Besides, Schott himself says that the thought is not altogether correctly expressed.

an *ἀγνοια* of the moral demands of the law, but the misapprehension of the purpose of salvation manifesting itself also through the law." If Weiss, on the other hand, insists (*Die Petr. Frage*, p. 624) that the invectives of Christ most plainly teach how, in the Jewish conception of the law, at that time its deeper moral demands were misapprehended; it must, as opposed to him, be observed that Christ's attack was specially directed against the Pharisaic conception of it, and can in no way be applied to the people of Israel as such. Paul, in describing them, expressly allows to the Jews, Rom. ii. 17 ff., the *γινώσκειν τὸ θέλημα*; and an *ἀγνοια*, in the absolute sense here implied, is nowhere cast up to them.—The O. T. distinction between "sins of weakness (*בְּשִׁנְיָהּ*, LXX.: *κατ' ἀγνοίαν, ἐν ἀγνοίᾳ*) and insolent sins of disobedience" (*בְּיָד רָכָה*) (Weiss, p. 175) does not apply here.

Vv. 15, 16. *ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν καλέσαντα ὑμᾶς ἄγιον*]. Steiger: "this positive instruction, instead of forming a participial clause of its own, like the preceding (negative), is in animated discourse at once merged into the principal clause;" there is, accordingly, nothing to be supplied; still Oecumenius explains, in sense, correctly: *ἀλλὰ νῦν γοῦν, λέγει, τῷ καλέσαντι συσχηματιζόμενοι, ἀγίῳ ὄντι, κ.τ.λ.*—*ἄγιον* is here a substantive, to which the participle *καλ.* is added as nearer definition (cf. 2 Pet. ii. 1), and that by way of strengthening the exhortation ("as ye are bound to do, since He hath called you"). The behavior of those called must correspond with the nature of Him who has called them. Schott rightly remarks that the *καλεῖν* must here be taken as "an effectual calling," by which the readers are delivered from their state of estrangement from God, and introduced into one of fellowship with Him. *καὶ αὐτοὶ ἄγιοι ἐν πάσῃ ἀναστροφῇ γενήθητε*]. *καὶ αὐτοὶ* forms the antithesis to *τὸν ἄγιον*; Schott, incorrectly: "as against what God has, on His part, by His calling, done to you and made you."—*ἐν πάσῃ ἀναστροφῇ*, not: in (your) *whole* (De Wette), but in (your) *every* walk.¹—*γενήθητε* denotes not the *becoming*, but the *being*; Luther, correctly: "like Him . . . be ye also holy."²—Ver. 16. *διότι γέγραπται*]. *διότι*, i.e., *διὰ τοῦτο ὅτι*, "*for this reason because*," indicates the reason for the preceding exhortation, and not simply for the use of the word *ἄγιον* (De Wette). The apostle goes back to the command given to Israel, as to the reason why the Christians, called as they were by the God of holiness, should be holy in their every walk. The holiness of God laid Israel under the obligation to be holy, since God had chosen them to be His people; the same is the case, as Peter suggests by *καλέσαντα ὑμᾶς*, with the N. T. church of believers, the true Israel, on whom, though doubtless in a form adapted to them, for this reason the commandments of the O. C. are still binding. Schott justly observes that the passage quoted by Peter is not

¹ For it must be observed that in the case of a collective expression, *πᾶς* is accompanied by the article when the totality is conceived of as forming *one* whole; the article is wanting when it is considered as composed of many; e. g., *πᾶς ὁ λαός* means "the whole people," but *πᾶς λαός*, "all people;" when not "every people," in which case the collective expression is the special idea.

² Wiesinger asks why? The reasons are, (1) because both in the LXX. and Apocrypha of the O. T., as also in the N. T., instead of the imper. of *εἶναι*, which is but rarely used, there is very generally the imper. aorist of *γίνομαι*, in the LXX. translation of *יְהִי, יִהְיֶה* (cf. specially Ps. lxxix. 26); (2) because the exhortation "*be* holy" is more suited to the condition of Christians than "*become* holy."

meant to establish the duty of holiness in itself, but to show that the fact of belonging to God involves as a matter of duty the necessity of a holy walk. The expression, which the apostle quotes, occurs more than once in the book of Leviticus, xi. 44, xix. 2, xx. 7, 26.

Ver. 17. From here to the end of the verse the preceding exhortation is continued; the connection is shown by the copula *καί*. — *καί εἰ πατέρα ἐπικαλείσθε*, corresponding to the *ὡς τέκνα ὑπακοῆς*, ver. 14. *εἰ* is here: "*particula non conditionalis, sed assertiva, non dubitantis, sed rem notam praesupponentis*" (Calvin). The form of the sentence is, however, hypothetical; the sense is: "if you act thus and thus, as ye are indeed now doing." By this form the language is made more impressive than it would have been by a simple causative particle. — *ἐπικαλεῖσθαι*, as *medium*, means to "call upon" (for the meaning "to name," as Wiesinger, De Wette, Brückner take it, is supported in the classics only by a doubtful passage in Dio Cass. lxxvii. 7). *πατέρα* is the accusative of more precise definition (thus Hofmann also); Luther: "since ye call on Him *the* (i.e., as, *ὡς*) Father." The sense is: "if ye look on Him as *Father* who, etc., and ye acknowledge yourselves as His children."¹ It is to be noticed that the *ἐπικαλείσθε* corresponds to the *καλέσονται*, v. 15; God has *called* believers, — and they answer with the call to Him, in which they name Him *Father*. This *mutual* relationship lays the Christians under obligations to be *holy* as He is *holy*.² — *τὸν ἀπροσωπολήπτως κρίνοντα τὸ ἐκάστου ἔργον*, a circumlocution for God full of significance, instead of the simple *τὸν Θεόν*, corresponding to the *ἅγιον*, ver. 15. — *ἀπροσωπολήπτως*, a *ἀπ. λεγ.*, formed on the noun *προσωπολήπτης* (Acts x. 34), which is composed of *πρόσωπον* and *λαμβάνειν*; see Meyer on Gal. ii. 6. — The present *κρίνοντα* indicates that impartial judgment is a characteristic function of God. The apostle mentions *τὸ ἔργον* as that according to which the judgment of God is determined; in this connection the plural is generally found (Rom. ii. 6); by the singular the whole conduct of man (outwardly and inwardly) is conceived as a work of his life. — *ἐκάστου*, not without emphasis. It implies that the Christian also — a son of God though he be — will, like all others, be judged according to his work; it is arbitrary to limit the application of the general term *ἐκάστου* to Christians only (Schott); there is no thought here of the distinction between Jew and Gentile (Bengel). — The term *judge*, as applied to God, stands in a peculiar contrast to *πατέρα*. The Christian, while conscious of the love of God shed abroad in his heart (Rom. v. 5), must still never forget that God *judges* the evil, that His love is a *holy* love, and that *sonship* involves obligation of obedience towards a *just* God. — *ἐν φόβῳ τὸν . . . ἀναστράφητε*, corresponding to the *ἄγιοι ἐν πάσῃ ἀνοστραφῇ γενήθητε*, ver. 15; the feeling which harmonizes with the thought of the impartial judge is the *φόβος*; thus Peter places *φόβος* first by way of emphasis. *φόβος* is here, indeed, not the *slavish* fear which cannot co-exist with love (see 1 John iv. 18), no more

¹ It is possible, and as Gerhard and Weiss (p. 172) think probable, that Peter here alludes to the Lord's Prayer.

² Schott rightly remarks that *ἐπικαλεῖσθαι* is based on the same common relationship as

in the preceding verses; but here it is not considered as established by God, but as realized in practice by the readers, i.e., as subjectively known and acknowledged by them.

is it the *reverence* which an inferior feels for a superior (Grotius, Bolten, etc.); but it is the *holy awe* of a judge who condemns the evil; the opposite of thoughtless security. Calvin: *timor securitati opponitur*; cf. chap. ii. 17; 2 Cor. vii. 1; Phil. ii. 12.¹ — τὸν τῆς παροικίας ὑμῶν χρόνον specifies the duration of the walk ἐν φόβῳ; παροικία: “the sojourn in a foreign country;” in its strict sense, Acts xiii. 17 (Ezra viii. 34, LXX.); here applied to the earthly life of the Christian, inasmuch as their κληρονομία is in heaven, ver. 4. This expression serves to give point to the exhortation expressed, hinting as it does at the possibility of coming short of the home; cf. chap. ii. 11.

Ver. 18. The apostle strengthens his exhortation by reminding his readers of the redemption wrought out for them by the death of Christ. It is an assumption too far-fetched to suppose that this verse serves to show “the causal connection between the protasis and the apodosis of ver. 17” (Schott). — εἰδότες, not “since ye know,” but “considering,” “reflecting;” Gerhard: *expendentes*; cf. 2 Tim. ii. 23 and my commentary on the passage. — ὄτι οὐ]. The negation is placed foremost in order the more to give prominence to the position. — φθαρτοῖς, ἀργυρίῳ ἢ χρυσίῳ]. φθαρτοῖς is not an adjective here (Luther: “with perishable silver and gold”), but a *substantive*: “with perishable things;” see Winer, p. 491 (E. T., 527). — Benson thinks that by ἀργυρίῳ ἢ χρυσίῳ the apostle alludes to the custom of paying money as a sign of reconciliation, according to Exod. xxx. 12-16; Num. iii. 44-51, xviii. 16; this is possible, but not probable. — ἐλυτρώθητε is here used in its strict signification of, to ransom, or redeem by a λύτρον (cf. Matt. xx. 28), as in Tit. ii. 14, whilst in Luke xxiv. 21 this definite application is lost sight of; with the thought, cf. 1 Cor. vi. 20. The ransom is stated in the following verse. — ἐκ τῆς ματαίας ὑμῶν ἀναστροφῆς]. Cf. ver. 14. μάταιος, “empty, without real contents,” does not occur in an ethical sense in the classics; LXX. Isa. xxxii. 6 translation of מַטְאִים is not to be limited specially to the idolatry of the heathen (Carpzov, Benson, etc.), still less to the ceremonial service of the Jews (Grotius).² — πατροπαράδοτον belongs to the whole idea preceding: ματαίας ὑμῶν ἀναστροφῆς (see Winer, p. 489 [E. T., 525]). Aretius explains it by *innata nobis natura*; but this is not appropriate to ἀναστροφῆς; correctly, Erasmus: *quam ex Patrum traditione acceperatis*; Steiger: “by upbringing, instruction, and example” (thus also De Wette-Brückner, Wiesinger, Weiss, Schott). This attribute emphatically shows that the ματαία ἀναστροφή is peculiar, not to the individual only, but to the whole race, and has been from the earliest times, and consequently is so completely

¹ Weiss (p. 170) thinks that the passage, Rom. viii. 15, proves Paul's fundamental views of Christian life to have been different from those of Peter; this opinion, however, is sufficiently contradicted by Weiss himself, who admits that in 2 Cor. vii. 1, “Paul mentions the fear of God as a *peculiar mark* of the Christian's life, and that he often speaks of a fear of Christ.” — Schott insists, in the first place, that φόβος be understood absolutely (without special reference to God as the judge)

as the consciousness of liability to err, but afterwards more precisely defines the expression as that fear which is anxious that nothing should happen which might cause God, as the *righteous judge*, to refuse the inheritance to him who hopes to attain it.

² Although ματαία ἀναστροφή πατροπαράδοτος does not necessarily apply to the *heathen* (Schott), yet the expression more aptly characterizes their mode of life than the Jewish.

master of the individual that he cannot free himself from it. — There is here no “special reference to Judæo-Christian readers” (Weiss, p. 181).

Ver. 19. *ἀλλὰ τιμίῳ αἵματι*. *τιμίῳ* forms the antithesis to *φθαρτοῖς*, in so far as the perishable is destitute of true worth. — *αἵματι* refers not only to the death, but to the bloody death, of Christ; cf. Heb. ix. 22. — *ὡς . . . ἄμνοῦ ἁμόμων καὶ ἄσπιλον Χριστοῦ*. *ὡς . . . ἄσπιλον* is in antecedent apposition to *Χριστοῦ* (Wiesinger, De Wette-Brückner), as in chap. iii. 7, where likewise *ὡς ἰσθνεστέρω σκεύει* is in similar apposition to *τῷ γυναικείῳ* (*sc.* *σκεύει*). It is incorrect to supply, with Steiger, Schott, and others, “*αἵματι*” before *ἄμνοῦ*, taking *Χριστοῦ* either as an explanatory adjunct (Steiger), or connecting it directly with *αἵματι* (Schott, Hofmann). — *ὡς* is also here not merely comparative, as, among others, Schott and Hofmann hold, maintaining that “by *ἄμνοῦ* only an actual lamb is meant,” but it emphasizes that Christ is a blameless and spotless lamb (Gerhard, De Wette-Brückner).¹ — *ἄμνος* is, as Brückner also assumes, to be understood of a *sacrificial lamb*. This is clear both from the connection — since the ransom by the *αἷμα* of Christ (Lev. xvii. 11) is here in question — and from the attributes *ἁμωμος* and *ἄσπιλος*, of which the former is used in the O. T. expressly to denote the faultlessness of animals taken for sacrifice (ⲠⲫⲢ, LXX. : *ἁμωμος*), — to this class lambs also belonged. The precise designation, *a lamb*, was probably suggested to Peter by Isa. liii. 7 (cf. chap. ii. 22 ff.); from this it must not, however, be inferred, with Weiss (p. 227 ff.) and Schott, that there is nowhere here any reference to the idea of sacrifice. For although the passage in Isaiah compares the servant of God to a lamb simply on account of the patience he exhibited in the midst of his sufferings, still it is based so wholly on the idea of sacrifice, and the sufferings of Christ are so expressly presented as propitiatory, that it is easily explainable how, with this passage applied to Him, Christ could have been thought of precisely as a *sacrificial lamb*. Doubtless it is not Peter’s intention to give special prominence to the fact that Christ is the *sacrificial lamb* designated by Isaiah’s prophecy; for in that case the definite article would not have been wanting (cf. John i. 29, and Meyer *in loc.*); but alluding to the above passage, Peter styles Him generally a *lamb*, — which, however, he conceives as a *sacrificial lamb*. There is no direct allusion (Wiesinger) here to the paschal lamb (De Wette-Brückner, Schott); the want of the article forbids it. Hofmann, though he has justly recognized this, still firmly holds by the reference to the paschal lamb; only in thus far, however, that he terms the slaying of it “the occurrence” which “was here present to the apostle’s mind.”² But the fact that the blood of this

¹ If *ὡς* be taken as instituting a comparison, there then arises the singular thought, that the blood of Christ is as precious as that of a lamb without blemish. Hofmann, indeed, avoids this conclusion by supplying to *ὡς* not *τιμίῳ αἵματι*, but *αἵματι* only, and observes that the shedding of blood *alone* (not the shedding of precious blood) is compared to the slaying of a spotless lamb; but there is not the slightest justification for thus separating *τιμίῳ* from

αἵματι. The apostle would in some way have indicated it by prefixing at least a simple *αἵματι* to *ἄμνοῦ*.

² Hofmann says: “The meaning is not that the same was done to Christ as to the paschal lamb, but the recollection of the paschal lamb explains only how Peter came to compare the shedding of Christ’s blood with the shedding of the blood of a spotless lamb.” — As to whether the paschal lamb should be

lamb did not serve to ransom Israel out of Egypt, but to preserve them from the destroying angel, is opposed to any such allusion. Further, it must not be left unnoticed that in the N. T. the paschal lamb is always styled τὸ πάσχα; and in the passage treating of it in Exod. xii. in the LXX., the expression πρόβατον only, and never ἄμνος, is employed. — The adjunct: ὡς . . . ἀσπίλον, serves to specify particularly the blood of Christ as *sacrificial*, and not merely to give a nearer definition of its preciousness (the τίμιον), inasmuch as, “according to Petrine conceptions, it is precisely the *innocence* (denoted here by the two attributes) and the *patience* (conveyed by ἄμνος) which give to the suffering its τιμή” (as opposed to Weiss, p. 281 f.). The *preciousness* of the blood lies in this, that it is the blood of Christ; its *redemptive power* in this, that He shed it as a *sacrificial lamb without blemish and fault*.¹ — With ἄμωμος, cf. in addition to Lev. xxii. 18 ff., especially Heb. ix. 14. — ἀσπίλος is not to be found in the LXX., and in the N. T. only metaphorically; the two expressions here conjoined are a reproduction of the לֹא-לֵב-כִּזְבִּים וְיָד-יָחִיד, Lev. xxii. 18 ff. (Wiesinger). All the commentators construe Χριστοῦ with what precedes, Hofmann only excepted, who separates it therefrom, and connects it with what follows, taking Χριστοῦ προεγνωσμένου, κ.τ.λ., as an absolute genitive (i.e., “in that . . . Christ . . . was foreordained,” etc.). But this construction does not specify by whose blood the redemption was accomplished, nor does it give a clear logical connection between the thought of the participial and that of the principal clause.

REMARK. — It must be observed, that whilst the power of propitiation, i.e., of blotting out sin, is attributed to the blood of the sacrifice, Lev. xvi. 11, the blood of Christ is here specified as the means by which we are redeemed from the ματαία ἀναστροφή. From this, it must not be concluded, with Weiss (p. 279), that the blood of Christ is not regarded here as the blood of offering, inasmuch “as the sacrifice can have an expiatory, but not a redemptory, worth;” for the two are in no way opposed to each other. The expiation is nothing different from the redemption, i.e., ransom from the guilt by the blood freely shed. The redemption, however, which is here spoken of, though, doubtless, not identical with expiation, is yet a necessary condition of it, — a circumstance which Pfleiderer also fails to observe, when he says that the passage has reference only “to the putting away of a life of sin, to moral improvement, not to expiation of the guilt of sin.”

Ver. 20. προεγνωσμένου μὲν is indeed not simply and at once *preordinatus* (Beza), but the foreknowledge of God is, with respect to the salvation He was to bring about, essentially a providing; cf. ver. 2: πρόγνωσις. In regard to Christ it was provided (προεγνωσμένου refers not directly to ἡμοῦ, but to

considered as a sacrificial lamb (Kell on Gen. xli.) or not, is a matter of dispute, which cannot be decided here.

¹ Schott, in opposition to this, asserts: “This blood can *redeem* because it is that of the divine Mediator (Χριστός), but it is *valuable* in that it is the blood of an innocent

Saint.” This is, however, erroneous, since this blood has power to redeem only, because Christ shed it as a sacrifice for propitiation. But it is not clear why this blood should not even have its full worth from the fact that it is the blood of the Mediator.

Χριστοῦ) that He should appear (φανερωθέντος δέ) as a sacrificial lamb to redeem the world by His blood. The passage does not say that Christ would have appeared even though sin had never entered. — πρὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου, a frequent designation of antemundane eternity, John xvii. 24; Eph. i. 4. This nearer definition specifies the sending of Christ as having originated in the eternal counsels of God, in order thus to give point to the exhortation contained in ver. 17. — φανερωθέντος δέ here of the first appearing of Christ, which in this passage is represented as an emerging from the obscurity in which He was (chap. v. 4, of His second coming); it is incorrect to refer φανερωθέντος to the obscurity of the divine counsels (as formerly in this commentary), since φανερωθέντος applies as much as προεγνωσμένον to the person of Christ. Between the πρόγνωσις and the φανέρωσις lies the προφητεία, ver. 10. Rightly interpreted, φανερωθέντος testifies to the pre-existence of Christ.¹ The sequence of the aorist participle on the participle προεγνωσμένον is to be explained from this, that by φανερωθέντος an historical fact is mentioned. — ἐπ' ἔσχατον τῶν χρόνων]. ἔσχατον: a substantival use of it, "at the end of the times." This ἔσχατον of the times is here conceived as the whole period extending from the first appearance of Christ to His second coming; in like manner Heb. i. 1; otherwise 2 Pet. iii. 3, where by ἔσχατον is meant the time as yet future, immediately preceding the second coming of Christ; in like manner 1 Pet. i. 5.² — Note the antithesis: πρὸ καταβ. κ. and ἐπ' ἔσχατον τ. χρ.: beginning and end united in Christ. — δὲ ὑμῶς refers in the first instance to the readers, but embraces at the same time all ἐκλεκτοί. Believers are the aim of all God's schemes of salvation; what an appeal to them to walk ἐν φόβῳ τὸν τῆς παροικίας χρόνον! There is as little here to indicate any reference to the heathen (Hofmann) as there was in εἰς ὑμῶς, ver. 10.

Ver. 21. τοὺς δὲ αὐτοῦ (i.e., Χριστοῦ) πιστεύοντας (or πιστοὺς) εἰς Θεόν]. τοὺς: the same clausal connection as in vv. 4 and 5. — The construction πιστεύειν εἰς is very frequent in the N. T., especially in John; Christ is for the most part named as the object; God, as here, in John xii. 44, xiv. 1. — This adjunct, by giving prominence to the fact that the readers are brought to faith in God by Christ, confirms the thought previously expressed δὲ ὑμῶς.³ Nor should it ever have been denied that by it the readers may be recognized as having been heathens formerly. — τὸν ἐγειράτα αὐτὸν ἐκ νεκρῶν καὶ δόξαν αὐτῷ δόντα,⁴ not subjoined aimlessly as an accidental predicate applied by the apostle to God; but, closely linked on to Θεόν, the words serve to describe

¹ Schmid rightly says (*Bibl. Theol.*, II. p. 165): "προεγνωσμένον does not deny the actual pre-existence, because Χριστοῦ includes a designation which is not yet realized in the actual pre-existence, but will be so only in virtue of the φανερωθῆναι."

² It is indeed correct that, as Schott says, the end of the times is so, through the manifestation of Christ; but it is an arbitrary assertion to say that ἐπι serves to give more prominence and precision to this thought.

³ Hofmann: "The assertion that Christ was foreordained and made manifest for their

sake is actually justified in this, that they have faith in God through Him."

⁴ Weiss (p. 243) lays stress on δόντα in order to prove the low plane of Peter's conception of the person of Christ; yet Christ also says, in the Gospel of John, that God had given him ζῶή, κρίσις, ἐξουσία πάσης σαρκός, δόξα, etc. Paul, too, asserts that God exalted Christ, and gifted Him (ἐχαρίσατο) with the ὄνομα τὸ ὑπὲρ πάντων ὀνομα; there is a similar passage, too, in Hebrews, that God has appointed or made Him κληρόνομος πάντων.

Θεόν more nearly as *the object of the Christian faith*. The conviction that God has raised and glorified Christ the Crucified belongs essentially to the Christian faith in God; with the first half of this clause, cf. Rom. iv. 24, viii. 11; 2 Cor. iv. 14; Gal. i. 1; with the second, John xvii. 5, 22; and with the whole thought, Eph. i. 20; Acts ii. 32 f. This adjunct, defining Θεον more nearly, is not meant to declare "how far Christ by His revelation has produced faith in God" (Wiesinger),—the whole structure of the clause is opposed to this,—but what is the faith to which through Christ the readers have attained.—ὥστε, not *ἵνα* (Oecumenius, Luther: "in order that;" thus also the Syr., Vulg., Beza, etc.), nor is it *itaque*, as if a "δεῖ" or a "χρή" were to be supplied to εἶναι (Aretius); but "*so that*," it denotes the fruit which faith in God, who raised up Christ from the dead, has brought forth in the readers, which supplies the confirmation that Christ has appeared for their sake (δὲ αὐτοῦς). — τὴν πίστιν ὑμῶν καὶ ἐλπίδα εἶναι εἰς Θεόν]. Most interpreters translate: "so that your faith and your hope are directed to God;" Weiss, on the other hand (p. 43), Brückner, Schott, Frommüller, Hofmann, take it: "so that your faith is at the same time hope toward God." The position of the words seems to favor this last translation, since the genitive ὑμῶν stands between the two substantives, whilst otherwise either ὑμῶν τὴν πίστιν καὶ ἐλπίδα (or τὴν ὑμῶν πίστιν.), (cf. Rom. i. 20; Phil. i. 25; 1 Thess. ii. 12), or τὴν π. κ. ἐλπ. ὑμῶν (cf. Phil. i. 20; 1 Thess. iii. 7), would have been expected;—but this is not decisive, inasmuch as in Eph. iii. 5 τοῖς ἁγίοις ἀποστόλοις αὐτοῦ καὶ προφήταις occurs. On the other hand, the connection of thought gives the preference to *the latter* view; for, in the former case, not only is it noticeable that "the result is exactly the same as that denoted by τοὺς πιστοῦς" (Weiss), but in it ἐλπίδα seems to be nothing more than an accidental appendage, whilst in reality it is the point aimed at in the whole deduction; that is to say, the truth and livingness of faith (in the resurrection and glorification of Christ) are manifested in this, that it is also a hope; cf. vv. 3, 6, 9, 13.¹ Schott is wrong in thinking that εἰς Θεόν has reference not only to ἐλπίδα, but at the same time to τὴν πίστιν; for though by πίστις here only πίστις εἰς Θεόν can be understood, yet it is grammatically impossible to connect the final εἰς Θεόν, which is closely linked on to ἐλπίδα, likewise with τὴν πίστιν ὑμῶν.—The object of hope is specified in the words τὸν ἐγειραντα αὐτὸν, κ.τ.λ.; it is the resurrection and attainment of the δόξα which is given to Christ; cf. Rom. viii. 11, 17.

Ver. 22. From ver. 22 to ver. 25 the third exhortation,² and its subject is love one of another. Gerhard incorrectly joins this verse with verse 17, and regards vv. 18–21 as a parenthesis.—ταῦς ψυχὰς ὑμῶν ἡγνικότες]. The par-

¹ Weiss is wrong in saying that, according to Peter's view, faith is but the preparatory step to hope, since it rather includes the latter.

² Hofmann, without any sufficient reason, supposes the third exhortation to begin with ver. 18, although the amplifications contained in vv. 18–21 serve eminently to inculcate the preceding exhortation. The expression εἰδότες can be joined either with a preceding or a sub-

sequent idea; yet it must be observed that in the N. T. the first combination is more frequent than the second, and that in the latter case εἰδότες is always accompanied by a particle, by which it is marked as the first word of a subsequent set of phrases; Hofmann altogether overlooks this. Here undoubtedly καὶ would have been prefixed to εἰδότες.

tiple does not here express the accomplished act as the basis of the exhortation, as if it were: "after that ye, or since ye, have purified" (Bengel, Wiesinger), but it stands closely linked on to the imperative, and denotes the duty which must ever be fulfilled (hence the perf.) if the *ἀγαπῶν* is to be realized (De Wette-Brückner, Schott, Frommüller);¹ Luther, inexactly: "make chaste . . . and," etc. — *ἀγνίζειν*, a religious idea denoting in the first instance the outward, and afterwards the inward consecration and sanctifying also (cf. John xi. 55; Acts xxi. 24, 26, xxiv. 18); in passages too, as here, where it expresses moral cleansing from all impurity (here more especially from selfishness), it does not lose its religious significance; cf. Jas. iv. 8; 1 John iii. 3.² — *ἐν τῇ ὑπακοῇ τῆς ἀληθείας*. *ἡ ἀλήθεια* is the truth revealed and expressed in the gospel in all its fulness.³ — *ὑπακοή*, not "faith" (Wiesinger), but "obedience." The genitive is not the gen. subj.: "the obedience which the truth begets," but the gen. obj.: "obedience to the truth." This *ὑπακοή*, however, consists in *believing* what the truth proclaims, and in *performing* what it requires (thus Weiss also). — The preposition *ἐν* exhibits *ὑπακοή* as the element in which the Christian must move in order to procure the sanctification of his soul. — If the reading *διὰ πνεύματος* be adopted, the *πνεῦμα* is not the *human* spirit, but the *Spirit of God*; Luther, incorrectly: that the apostle here means to observe that the word of God must not only be heard and read, but be laid hold of *with the heart*. — *εἰς φιλαδέλφια ἀνυπόκριτον* does not belong to the *ἀγαπήσατε* following, either as denoting the *terminus* of love, and the sense being: *diligite vos in fraternam caritatem*, i. e., *in unum corpus fraternae caritatis*; or as *διὰ* (Oecumenius), and thus pointing out the "agency by which;" nor, finally, is it ecbatic: *ita ut omnibus manifestum fiat, vos esse invicem fratres* (Gerhard); — but it is to be taken in conjunction with *ἡγνικότες*, and specifies the aim towards which the *ἀγνίζειν* is to be directed. Sanctification towards love, by the putting away of all selfishness, must ever precede love itself. — *φιλαδέλφια*, love of the brethren peculiar to Christians: cf. 2 Pet. i. 7; Rom. xii. 9, 10; 1 Thess. iv. 9. — With *ἀνυπόκριτος*, cf. 1 John iii. 18, where true unfeigned love is described. — *ἐκ (καθαρῶς) καρδίας* is not to be joined with what precedes, — it being thus a somewhat cumbrous adjunct, — but with what follows, setting forth in relief an essential element of love; with the expression *ἐκ καρδίας*, cf. Rom. vi. 17; Matt. xviii. 35 (*ὑπὸ τῶν καρδιῶν ὑμῶν*); on the Rec. *ἐκ καθαρῶς καρδίας*, see 1 Tim.

¹ Hofmann declares himself opposed to both of these interpretations, or rather he seeks to unite them after a fashion, by assuming that the participial clause partakes of the imperative tone of the principal clause. He likewise characterizes personal purification, presupposed by that love which is ever and anon manifested, as that which should have been accomplished once for all (as if it were possible to command that something should have taken place); he then adds that he who has not yet dedicated his soul to brotherly love must do so still (!).

² Schott leaves this religious reference en-

tirely unnoticed. He states that the original meaning of the word *ἀγνός* "is that purity of mind which regards one thing only as the foundation and aim of all practical life, — the truly moral." Cremer, too, thinks that although originally it had the religious sense "to dedicate," it is (John xi. 55, Acts xxi. 24, 26, xxiv. 18, excepted) as a term. techn. foreign to the N. T., and is here only equal to "to purify," "to cleanse" ("without the secondary meaning "to dedicate").

³ Calvin's limitation of the idea is arbitrary: "veritatem accipit pro regula, quam nobis Dominus in evangelio praescribit."

i. 5.¹—*ἀλλήλους ἀγαπήσατε ἐκτενῶς*]. *ἀγαπᾶν* is not to be limited, as Wiesinger proposes, “to the manifestation of love in act;” the passages, chap. iv. 8, 1 John iii. 18, do not justify this limitation.—*ἐκτενῶς*, “with strained energies;” it denotes here “the persevering intensity of love” (in like manner, Weiss, p. 336; Frommüller, Hofmann); Luther translates “ardently;” Schott without any reason asserts that in all the N. T. passages the word is used *only* in the *temporal* sense of duration, and therefore is so to be taken here; Luke xxii. 24, Acts xii. 5, xxvi. 7, 1 Pet. iv. 8, are evidence not *for*, but *against*, Schott’s assertion. The chief emphasis lies not on *ἀγαπήσατε*, but on *ἐκ* (*καθαρᾶς*) *καρδίας* and *ἐκτενῶς*.

Ver. 23. *ἀναγεγεννημένοι* gives the ground of the preceding exhortation, by referring to the regeneration from incorruptible seed already accomplished, which, as it alone renders the *ἀγαπᾶν ἐκτενῶς* possible, also demands it. Luther: “as those who are born afresh;” cf. 1 John iv. 7, v. 1. This regeneration is described, as to the origin of it, by the words which follow, and withal in such a way that here, as in ver. 18, the position is strengthened by placing the negation first.—*οὐκ ἐκ σπορᾶς φθαρτῆς, ἀλλὰ ἀφθάρτου*]. *σπορά*, strictly, “the sowing, the begetting,” is not here used with this active force (Aretius: *satio incorrupta h. e. regeneratio ad vitam aeternam*. Frommüller: “the energizing principle of the Holy Spirit”), but it is “seed,” because, as De Wette says, the epithet suggests the idea of a substance. By *σπορᾶ φθαρτῆ* is to be understood not the *semen frugum*, but the *semen humanum* (De Wette, Wiesinger, Weiss, Schott, Hofmann); cf. John i. 13.—The question arises, in what relation do *ἐκ σπορᾶς ἀφθάρτου* and *διὰ λόγου* stand to one another? The direct connection of the figurative expression (*σπορά*) with the literal (*λόγος*), and the correspondence which evidently exists between *ἀφθάρτου* and *ζῶντος κ. μένοντος*, do not allow of the two ideas being considered as different, nor of *σπορά* being taken to denote the “Holy Spirit” (De Wette-Brückner). On the other hand, the difference of the prepositions points to a distinction to which, from the fact that *σπορά* is a figurative, *λόγος* a real appellative (Gerhard, Weiss, Schott),² justice has not yet been done. The use of the two prepositions is to be understood by supposing a different relation of the same thing (of the *λόγος*) to the regeneration; in *ἐξ* we have its point of departure, and not merely its “originating cause” (Hofmann);³ we have

¹ This participial clause joins itself naturally with what precedes, and is not, with Hofmann, to be taken with what follows (chap. ii. 1); *ἀποθέμενοι*, as *ὄν* shows, begins a new sentence. The connection proposed by Hofmann would give rise to a very clumsy phraseology. Were it true that regeneration has nothing to do with brotherly love, then of course neither has it any thing to do with the laying aside of those lusts which are opposed to love, spoken of in chap. ii. 1. Hofmann says, indeed, that chap. ii. 1 describes the contraries of *ἀπλότης* (childlike simplicity), not of *φιλαδελφία*; but is not the opposite of the one the opposite of the other also? The constriction in Rom. xiii. 11 ff. is only in

appearance similar to that which Hofmann understands as occurring here.

² Weiss is of opinion that, as an explanation of the metaphor, *διὰ* only can be employed with *λόγος*, (not *ἐκ*, which belongs exclusively to the figure. This is, however, incorrect; *διὰ* would doubtless not have been suited to *σπορά*, but *ἐκ* might very well have been used with *λόγον* (cf. John iii. 5), indeed, *must* have been so if the *λόγος* itself were regarded as *σπορά*. The two prepositions express, each of them, a different relation.

³ Also in the passages quoted by Hofmann, John i. 13, iii. 5; Matt. i. 18,—*ἐκ* indicates more than a mere causal action.

the word of God looked upon as the principle implanted in man working newness of life (*ὁ λόγος ἔμφυτος*, Jas. i. 21); *διὰ*, on the other hand, points to the outward instrumentality by which the new life is effected. — *διὰ λόγου ζῶντος Θεοῦ καὶ μένοντος* refers back to ver. 22: *ἐν τῇ ὑπακοῇ τῆς ἀληθ.*; the Christian is laid under obligation to continued sanctification *ἐν ὑπ. τ. ἀλ.*, inasmuch as he has been begotten again to newness of being, by the word of God, i.e., the word of truth. — *λόγος Θεοῦ* is every word of divine revelation; here especially the word which, originating in God, proclaims Christ, i.e., the gospel. Schwenkfeld erroneously understands by it the Johannine *Logos*, which, indeed, even Didymus had considered possible. — On the construction of the adj. *ζῶντος* and *μένοντος*, Calvin says: *possumus legere tam sermonem viventem Dei, quam Dei viventis*; he himself prefers the second combination; thus also Vulg., Oecun., Beza, Hensler, Jachmann, etc. Most interpreters give preference, and with justice, to the *first*, for which are decisive both the contents of the following verses, in which the emphasis is laid, not on the abiding nature of God, but of the word of God, and the position of the words — otherwise *ζῶντος*, on account of the subsequent *καὶ μένοντος*, must have stood after *Θεοῦ*. The superaddition of *μένοντος* arises from the circumstance that this attribute is deduced from the previous one, and is brought in so as to prepare the way for the passage of Scripture (ver. 25: *μένει*) (De Wette).¹ The characteristics specified by these attributes are applicable to the word of God, not in its form, but in its inner substance. It is *living* in essence as in effect; and it is *enduring*, not only in that its results are eternal, but because itself never perishes. If the subjoined *εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα* be spurious, then without it the *μένειν* must not be limited to the *present* life.²

Vv. 24, 25. Quotation from Isa. xl. 6, 8, slightly altered from the LXX. in order to confirm the eternal endurance of the word by a passage from the Old Testament.³ — *διότι*, as in ver. 16; the passage here quoted not only confirms the idea *μένοντος*, but it gives the reason why the new birth has taken place through the living and abiding word of God (so, too, Hofm.). The reason is this, that it may be a birth into life that passes not away. — *πᾶσα σὰρξ*, i.e., *πᾶς ἄνθρωπος*; *CARO fragilitatem naturae indicat* (Aretius); not "all creature existence," embracing both stones and plants, etc. (Schott), for of a plant it cannot be said that it is *ὡς χόρτος*. — *ὡς χόρτος* is to be found

¹ Hofmann strangely enough explains the position of *Θεοῦ* by assuming it to be placed as an apposition between the two predicates to which it serves as basis; he accordingly thinks the words should be written thus: *διὰ λόγου ζῶντος, Θεοῦ, καὶ μένοντος* (!).

² The word, as the revelation of the Spirit, is eternal, although changeable, according to its form; to the word also applies what Paul says (1 Cor. xv. 54): "this corruptible shall put on incorruption, and this mortal shall put on immortality." Luther admirably says: "The word is an eternal, divine power. For although voice and speech pass away, the kernel remains, i.e., the understanding, the

truth which the voice contained. Just as, when I put to my lips a cup which contains wine, I drink the wine, although I thrust not the cup down my throat. Thus it is with the word which the voice utters; it drops into the heart, and becomes living, although the voice remains outside and passes away. Therefore it is indeed a divine power, it is God Himself."

³ The context in no way indicates that the apostle had particularly desired to make emphatic "that natural *nationalities*, with all their glory, form but a tie for these earthly periods of time" (Schott).

neither in the Hebrew text nor in the LXX. — *καὶ πᾶσα δόξα αὐτῆς*; instead of *αὐτῆς*, the LXX. have *ἀνθρώπων*; in Hebrew, *יְהוָה*. Incorrectly, Vorstius: *Ap. nomine carnis et gloriae ejus intelligit praecipue legem Mosis et doctrinas hominum*; Calvin, again rightly: *omne id quod in rebus humanis magnificum dicitur*. — *ἐξηράνθη ὁ χόρτος, κ.τ.λ.*, gives the point of comparison, that wherein the *σῶμα* and its *δόξα* resemble the *χόρτος* and its *ἀνθος*; but it does not emphatically assert that “the relation of the flesh to its glory in point of nothingness is quite the same as that of the grass in its bloom” (Schott). — *καὶ τὸ ἀνθος αὐτοῦ ἐξέπεσε*]. *αὐτοῦ*, if it be the true reading, is an addition made by Peter, for it is to be found neither in the LXX. nor in the Hebrew text. By the preterites *ἐξηράνθη* and *ἐξέπεσε* the transitoriness is more strongly marked; cf. Jas. i. 11, v. 2. — Ver. 25. Instead of *κυρίου*, the LXX. have *τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡμῶν, יהוה אלהינו*. *κυρίου* can hardly have been written on purpose by Peter “because he had in his mind Christ’s word” (Luthardt). James refers to the same passage here cited by Peter, without, however, quoting it *verbatim*. — In the following words the apostle makes the application: *τοῦτο δὲ ἐστίν*]. *τοῦτο* is not used “substantively, as the predicate of the sentence, equal to that is, namely, eternally abiding word of God is, the word of God preached among you” (Schott); but it refers back simply to the preceding *τὸ ῥῆμα κυρίου*, and is equivalent to, “this word, of which it is said that it remaineth forever, is the word which has been preached among you.” — *τὸ ῥῆμα τὸ εὐαγγελισθέν*]. Periphrasis for the gospel. In the O. T. it denotes the word of promise, here the gospel. Peter identifies them with each other, as indeed in their inmost nature they are one, containing the one eternal purpose of God for the redemption of the world, distinguished only according to different degrees of development. — *εἰς ὑμᾶς*, i.e., *ὑμῖν*; in the expression here used, however, the reference to the hearers comes more distinctly into prominence (cf. 1 Thess. ii. 9, and Lünemann *in loc.*). — In the last words Peter has spoken of the gospel preached to the churches to which he writes, as the word of God, by which his readers are begotten again of the incorruptible seed of divine life, so that as such, in obedience to the truth thus communicated to them, they must sanctify themselves to unfeigned love of the brethren.

CHAPTER II.

Ver. 1. Instead of *ὑποκρίσεις*, B reads *ὑπόκρισιν*; correction after the preceding *δόλον*, with which it is in signification closely linked on. In like manner the reading *πίσαν καταλαλίαν*, \aleph (pr. m.), for *πίσας καταλαλίας*, is to be taken as an alteration. In A, some vss., *πίσας* is wanting before *καταλαλίας*; it could easily have fallen aside, inasmuch as the two preceding words are without adjectives. — Ver. 2. After *αύξηθήτε*, most codd. (A, B, C, K, P, \aleph , al.), etc., read: *εἰς σωτηρίαν* (accepted by Griesb., Scholz, Lachm., Tisch.). The adjunct is wanting in the Rec. (after L, and several min.); it may be omitted, inasmuch as an adjunct of this kind is not necessary to the words, *ἐν αὐτῷ αύξηθήτε*. Ver. 3. The Rec. *εἶπερ*, after C, K, L, P, al., Vulg. (*si tamen*), is retained by Tisch. 7; on the other hand, Tisch. 8 and Lachm. have adopted the simple *εἰ*. This is supported by A, B, \aleph (m. pr. C has corrected *εἶπερ*), Cyr., Clem. The Rec. seems to have made the alteration for the sake of the sense. — Ver. 5. Instead of *οἰκοδομείσθε* (Tisch. 7), A**, C, \aleph , several min., Vulg., Cyr. read *ἐποικοδομείσθε* (Tisch. 8), which, however, seems to be a correction after Eph. ii. 20. — Lachm. and Tisch. 8 read the prep. *εἰς* between *οἶκος πνευματικός* and *ἱεράτευμα ἅγιον*, after A, B, C, \aleph , 5, al., several vss., and K, V. The common reading is supported by K, L, P, many min., Vulg., other versions, Clem., etc.; Tisch. 7 has retained it; De Wette, Wiesinger, Schott, Reiche, have in like manner declared themselves in favor of the Rec.; De Wette speaks of the interpolation of *εἰς*, "as facilitating a transition, otherwise abrupt, to another conception;" on the other hand, Brückner and Hofmann prefer the other reading, which is attested by weightier witnesses. The *εἰς* may be omitted, inasmuch as the thought might seem inappropriate that an *οἶκος* should be built up to an *ἱεράτευμα*. — *τῷ* before *Θεῷ* is doubtful; for it, are L, P, etc.; against, A, B, C, \aleph , al. Lachm. and Tisch. have doubtless correctly omitted it. — Ver. 6. *διότι*, with Griesb., Scholz, Lachm., Tisch., etc., according to almost all the authorities, instead of the Rec. *διὸ καὶ*, which is to be found only in min. and in Orig. — *ἐν τῇ γραφῇ*]. Rec., after K, L, P, several min., etc.; Tisch. reads, after A, B, \aleph , 38, 73, *ἐν γραφῇ*; Lachm. has adopted *ἡ γραφή*, which is found in C, several min., Vulg., Hier., Aug. This last reading seems, however, to be only a correction, in order to avoid the difficulty which lies in connecting the verb *περιέχει* with *ἐν (τῇ) γραφῇ*. — Instead of *ἐπ' αὐτῷ*, \aleph (pr. m.) has *ἐπ' αὐτον*, which is not supported by other witnesses. — Ver. 7. Instead of the *ἀπειθοῦσιν* of the Rec., after A, K, L, P, etc. (Tisch. 7, Lachm., Buttm.), Tisch. 8, after B, C, \aleph , al., has adopted *ἀπιστοῦσιν*. Perhaps the Rec. is a correction after ver. 8. — *λίθον*]. Rec., after C**, K, L, P, \aleph (pr. m.), al., Thph. — Retained by Tisch.; in its stead Lachm. has *λίθος*; this reading is found in A, B, C*, several min., Oec. Since in Greek it is by no means uncommon that the substantive is often put

in the same case as the relative which it precedes, *λίθον* need occasion no surprise; as, in addition to this, *λίθον* is found in the LXX., *λίθος* seems to have been the original reading, which became changed into *λίθον*, following the LXX. and the common usage in Greek. — The words *λίθος . . . γωνίας καί* are wanting in the Syr. ver.; Grotius, Mill, Semler, Hottinger, therefore consider them spurious, for which, nevertheless, sufficient justification is wanting. — Ver. 11. *ὑπέχθησαί*. Rec., after B, K, **κ**, several min., vss., and K, V; retained by Lachm. and Tisch., whilst A, C, L, P, several min., read *ὑπέχθηθε*, which Buttm. has adopted; see on this the commentary; Lachm. adds *ὑμῶς*, after the Vulg., as Tisch. remarks, “*ex errore de C.*” — Ver. 12. Instead of *ἐποπτεύσαντες*, Rec., after A, K, L, P, al., *ἐποπτεύοντες* must be read, with Lachm. and Tisch., after B, C, **κ**, al., Thph., Oec.; on account of the *δοξάσωσι* following, the present could easily have been changed into the aorist. — Ver. 13. *ὑποτάγητε οὖν*. Lachm. and Tisch. **σ** omit *οὖν*, after A, B, C, **κ**, al., Didy., Cassiod.; *οὖν* (Tisch. 7) is supported only by K, L, P, many min., etc.; it is possible that *οὖν* was interpolated in order to obtain a firmer connection of thought. In Cod. **κ** (pr. m.) *ἀνθρωπίνῃ* is wanting, but is supported by almost all witnesses. — Ver. 14. The Rec., following C and several min., retains *μέν* after *ἐκδικησιν*, which had been rightly rejected already by Griesbach. — Ver. 18. **κ** has after *δεσπόταις* the pron. *ὑμῶν*. — Ver. 19. — Different adjuncts to *χάρις* are found in different codd., as *Θεοῦ, Θεῶ, παρὰ Θεῶ, παρὰ τῷ Θεῶ*, which have been all interpolated later, in order to define the idea more precisely. — Several min. and C have, instead of *συνειδήσιν Θεοῦ*: *συνειδήσιν ἀγαθῆν*; in A* both readings are combined: *συνειδήσιν Θεοῦ ἀγαθῆν*. — Ver. 20. The Rec. has *τοῦτο χάρις*; this reading Tisch. 8 has retained, as he asserts, following B, C, K, L, P, **κ**, etc.; on the other hand, Lachm., Buttm., Tisch. 7, read *τοῦτο γὰρ χάρις*, after A. According to Buttm., this reading is found also in B (**κ**?). — Ver. 21. The codices vary between the Rec. (ed. Elzev.) *ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν, ὑμῖν*, which is found in A, B, C, **κ**, several min., Oec., Amb., etc. (Lachm., Tisch. 8); *ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν, ὑμῖν* in K, L, P, al., Slav., Vulg., Cyr., etc. (Scholz, Tisch. 7, Reiche), and *ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν, ἡμῖν*, in several min., etc. (Rec.). Tisch. remarks: *Nil probabilius quam ἡμῖν ὑμῖν in causa fuisse, cur bis ab aliis ὑμῖν ab aliis ἡμῖν scriberetur. Quod tota oratio ad lectores incitandos instituta est, id emendatori magis ὑμῖν quam ἡμῖν commendabat.* According to almost all the authorities, *ὑμῖν* is the original reading; it is possible that, in accordance with it, *ἡμῶν* was changed into *ὑμῶν*; it is also possible that the application of *Χρ. ἐπαθεν* to the readers alone seemed inappropriate to the copyist, and that he changed *ὑμῶν* into *ἡμῶν*. Wiesinger, Schott, and Hofm. hold *ἡμῶν*, and Brückner *ὑμῶν*, to be the original reading; the weightiest authorities decide for *ὑμῶν*. — **κ** reads *ὑπέθανεν* instead of *ἐπαθεν*, supported by general testimony, and in ver. 23, *ἐλοιδοῖται* (pr. m.) instead of *ἀντελοιδοῖται*. — Ver. 24. The *αὐτοῦ* after *μῶλωπι* (Rec.) is supported only by L, P, **κ** (pr. m.), 40, al., Thph., Oec., whilst A, B, C, K, have it not; Lachm. has accordingly omitted it, whilst Tisch., on the other hand, has retained it. Although *αὐτοῦ* is in itself the more difficult, still, on account of the preponderating evidence against it, it can hardly be regarded as the original reading; its addition can be explained also partly from the endeavor to form this relative clause as similarly as possible to the preceding *ὅς . . . αὐτός*, partly from the circumstance that it is to be found in Isa. liii. 5, LXX.; although Tisch. says: *οὐ . . . αὐτοῦ emendatori deberi incredibile est; nec magis credibile αὐτοῦ ex LXX. inlatum esse servato inepte οὐ*. Wiesinger, Brückner, Schott, Hofm., hold *αὐτοῦ* to be original. — Ver. 25. *πλανώμενα*] Rec., after C, K, L, P, etc., Thph., Oec.; on the other hand, Lachm. and Tisch., following A, B, **κ**,

etc., Tol., Harl., Fulg., have adopted *πλανώμενοι*, which is probably the original reading; the change into *πλανώμενα* was very natural, on account of the *πρόβατα* immediately preceding.

Vv. 1, 2. *ἀποθέμενοι οὖν . . . ἐπιποθήσατε*]. The admonition which commences here stands, as *οὖν* shows, in close connection with what precedes. In ver. 22 the apostle had exhorted to unfeigned love one of another, which love he shows to be conditioned by *ἀγνίζειν ἐν τῇ ὑπακοῇ τῆς ἀληθείας*, and grounded on *ἀναγεγεννημένοι εἶναι*; from this deducing the *ἀποτίθεσθαι πᾶσαν κακίαν*, κ.τ.λ., he now exhorts *ἐπιποθεῖν τὸ λογικὸν γάλα*. The apostle's intention, explaining at once the connection of this with the foregoing admonition, and the relation in which the thought of the participial clause *ἀποθέμενοι* stands to that of the imperative *ἐπιποθήσατε*, is that the Christians should show themselves *τέκνα ὑπακοῆς* (i. 14), not each for himself, but united together, an *οἶκος πνευματικός* (ver. 5), *γένος ἐκλεκτόν*, κ.τ.λ. (ver. 9). Schott acknowledges this reference (unjustifiably denied by Hofmann) to the unity of the church; it explains why the apostle mentions those sins only which stand in direct antagonism to the *φίλαδελφία ἀνυπόκριτος* (i. 22). The participle *ἀποθέμενοι* stands to *ἐπιποθήσατε* in the same relation as *ἀναζωσώμενοι* to *ἐλπίζατε* in chap. i. 13; it is therefore not equal to *postquam deposuistis*, but expresses the continued purification of the Christian; comp. Eph. iv. 22; Heb. xii. 1; specially also Col. iii. 8; and for the whole passage, Jas. i. 21. — *πᾶσαν κακίαν*, κ.τ.λ.]. Calvin: *non est integra omnium enumeratio quae deponi a nobis oportet, sed cum de veteri homine disputant Apostoli, quaedam vitia praeponunt in exemplum, quibus illius ingenium designant.* *κακία* means here, as in Col. iii. 8, not generally, "wickedness," but specially "malice," *nocendi cupiditas* (Hemming). *πᾶσαν* denotes the whole compass of the idea: "every kind of malice." The same is implied by the plural form in the words following *ὑποκρίσεις*, etc.; in *πᾶσας καταλαλίας* both are combined. The same and similar ideas to those here expressed are to be found conjoined elsewhere in the N. T.; comp. Rom. i. 29, 30. "The admonitions which follow are in essential connection with this comprehensive exhortation; comp. chap. ii. 22 ff.; especially chaps. iii. 8 ff., iv. 8 ff., v. 2 ff." (Wiesinger). For the force of the separate terms, comp. lexicon.¹ — *καταλαλία* occurs only here and in 2 Cor. xii. 20; in the classics the verb is to be found, never the subst. — Ver. 2. *ὡς ἄρτιγεννητα βρέφη* is not to be connected with *ἀποθέμενοι*, but with what follows. It does not mark the *childlike nature* of the Christians, but, in view of the goal of manhood yet afar off, is meant (referring to i. 23: *ἀναγεγεννημένοι*) to designate the readers as those who had but recently been born again.² In Bengel's interpretation: *denotatur prima aetas ecclesiae* N. T., a false reference is given to the expression. The particle *ὡς* is here also not used with a comparative force only; comp. chap. i. 14. — *τὸ λογικὸν ἄδολον γάλα ἐπιποθήσατε*]. *γάλα* is not here contrasted with *βρῶμα*, as in

¹ Augustin: "*malitia maculo delectatur alieno; invidia bono cruciatur alieno; dolus duplicat cor; adulationis duplicat linguam; delectatio vulnerat famam.*"

² It must be observed that the expression was used by the Jews also to designate the proselytes; corroborating passages in Wetstein in *loe*.

1 Cor. iii. 2, or with *σπεριὰ τροφή*, as in Heb. v. 12; but it denotes the word of God, in that it by its indwelling strength nourishes the soul of man. The term *γάλα*, as applied by the apostle, is to be explained simply from the reference to *ἀρτιγέννητα βρέφη* (Wiesinger, Schott, Hofmann). This view results quite naturally from the comparison with chap. i. 22, 23. If Peter had intended to convey any other meaning, he would have indicated it so as to have been understood.¹ — *λογικόν* does not state an attribute of evangelical doctrine: “rational;” Gualther: *quod tradit rationem vere credendi et vivendi*, not even in the sense that this (with Smaleius in Calov.) might be inferred: *nihil credendum esse quod ratione adversetur*; but it is added in order to mark the figurative nature of the expression *γάλα* (to which it stands related similarly as in chap. i. 13: *τῆς δαν. ἴμ. το τὰς ὀσφάκας*), so that by it *this* milk is characterized as a *spiritual* nourishment. Luther: “spiritual, what is drawn in by the soul, what the heart must seek;” thus, too, Wiesinger, Schott, Brückner, Fronmüller, Hofmann. It has here the same signification as in Rom. xii. 1, where it does not mean “rational” as contrasted with what is external (De Wette). The interpretation on which *λογικόν γάλα* is taken as equal to *γάλα τοῦ λόγου*, *lac verbale*, is opposed to the *usus loquendi* (it is supported by Beza, Gerhard, Calov., Hornejus, Bengel, Wolf, and others). Nor less so is the suggestion of Weiss (p. 187), that by “*λογικόν* is to be understood that which proceeds from the *λογος* (i.e., Word);” thus *γάλα λογικόν* would be the *verbal* milk of doctrine.² The second adjective: *ἄδολον* (*ἄπ. λεγ.*), strictly “*without guile*,” then “*pure, unadulterated*,” is not meant to give prominence to the idea that the Christians should strive to obtain the pure gospel, unadulterated by heretical doctrines of man, but it specifies purity as a quality belonging to the gospel (Wiesinger, Schott).³ It is, besides, applicable, strictly speaking, not to the figurative *γάλα*, but only to the word of God thereby denoted (Schott).⁴ — *ἐπιποθήσατε* expresses a strong, lively desire, Phil. ii. 26. Wolf: *Ap. alludit ad infantes, quos sponte sua et impetu quodam naturali in lac maternum ferri constat*. The conjecture of Grotius: *ἐπιποτίζετε*, is quite unnecessary. — *ἵνα ἐν αὐτῷ αὐξηθῆτε*. *ἵνα*, not *ἐκβατικῶς*, but *τελικῶς*; it states the purpose of the *ἐπιποθήσατε*. *ἐν* is more significant than *διὰ*, equivalent to “*in its power*.” The verb *αὐξηθῆτε*, used in connection with *ἀρτιγενν. βρέφη*, denotes the ever further development and strengthening of the new life. Although the aim which the apostle has in

¹ Calvin understands *γάλα* to mean: “*vitæ ratio quæ novam genituram sapiat*;” Hemming: “*consentanea simplici infantie vivendi ratio*;” Cornelius a Lapide: “*symbolum candoris, sinceritatis et benevolentiae*.” All these interpretations are contradicted by the fact that *γάλα* is not a *condition of life*, but *means of nourishment*. It is altogether arbitrary to explain *γάλα* to be the Lord’s Supper (Estius, Turrianus, Salmeron), or as meaning Christ as the incarnate Logos (Clemens Al. in *Pædag.*, l. c. 6; Augustin in *Tract.* iii., in 1 *Ep. John*); Weiss, too, is mistaken, when he says: “The nourishment of the new-born child of

God is Christ Himself, who is preached and revealed in the word.”

² Besides, how does this agree with Weiss’s opinion, that *γάλα* means Christ Himself? The *verbal Christ* ?!

³ Wolf: “*lac ædolon ideo appellari puto, ut indicetur, operam dandam esse, ne illud traditionibus humanis per καπηλεύοντας τὸν λόγον, 2 Cor. ii. 17, corruptum hauriatur*.”

⁴ Hofmann rightly observes: “What tends to the Christian’s growth may be compared to the pure milk which makes the child to thrive at its mother’s breast, and therefore it is termed τὸ λογικόν ἄδολον γάλα.”

view in his exhortation is to mark the destination of Christians to be an *οίκος πνευματικός*, still it is incorrect to affirm that *αύξηθητε* has reference, not to the growth of the individual, but (with Schott) only to the transforming of the church as such, "to the conception of a building which is being carried up higher and higher to its completion." Apart from the fact that *αύξανεσθαι* plainly refers back to *ἀρτιγ. βρέφη*, and is not equivalent to "to be built up," it must be remarked that the church can become what it should be, only by individual members growing up each of them ever more and more to the *ἀνὴρ τέλειος*. — *εἰς σωτηρίαν*, omitted in the Rec., states the final aim of all Christian growth. Schott's explanation, that by *σωτηρία* "the final glorious transfiguration of the church" is meant, is only a consequence of his erroneous and one-sided reference of the apostle's exhortation to the church as such.

Ver. 3. *εἰ (εἶπερ) ἐγένεσασθε, ὅτι, κ.τ.λ.*]. Based on the Old Testament passage, Ps. xxxiv. 9: *γεύσασθε καὶ ἴδετε, ὅτι χρῆστος ὁ κύριος*; the words *καὶ ἴδετε* are omitted, not being suitable to the figure *γάλα*. — *εἰ* is here, as in ver. 17, hypothetical indeed: "if," but it does not express a doubt; thus Gerhard correctly explains *εἶπερ: non est dubitantis, sed supponentis, quod factum sit*. Comp. Rom. viii. 9; 2 Thess. i. 6. — *γένομαι* is used here of inward experience, comp. Heb. vi. 4, 5; it alludes to the figurative *γάλα*, inasmuch as the Christian tastes, as it were, of the kindness of the Lord in the spiritual milk tendered to him. The apostle takes for granted that the Christians had already made inward experience of the goodness of their Lord (*κύριος*; in the Psalms, *God*; here, *Christ*), not merely in the instruction which preceded baptism, or in baptism itself (Lorinus), or *cum fidem evangelii susceperunt* (Hornejus), but generally during their life as Christians; as the new-born child, not once only, but ever anew, refreshes itself on the nourishment offered by a mother's love. With such experience, it is natural that believers should ever afresh be eager for the spiritual nourishment, in the imparting of which the *χρηστότης* of the Lord is manifested: *nam gustus provocat appetitum* (Lorinus).¹ — *ὅτι*, not equal to *quam* (Grotius), but "*that*." — *χρηστός*, "*kind, gracious*," not exactly *suavis* (Grotius: *ut a gustu sumta translatio melius procedat*); in this sense it would be more applicable to *γάλα* than to *κύριος*. — Several interpreters assume that in *χρηστός* Peter plays upon the word *Χριστός*; but this is more than improbable.

V. 4, 5. The structure of this new exhortation is similar to that of the previous sentence, to which it belongs in thought, externally (*ὄν*) as internally, inasmuch as the imperative (*οἰκοδομεῖσθε*) is preceded by a participle (*προσερχόμενοι*), and an adjunct introduced by *ὡς*, defining the subject more nearly. — Starting from *ὁ κύριος* the apostle says: *πρὸς ὃν προσερχόμενοι*]. *προσερχεσθαι* (elsewhere in the N. T. always construed with the dative) denotes the going spiritually to the Lord; the Christian does indeed already live in

¹ Schott insists "that the apostle is not here anxious about the readers' desire in general for the word, but that such desire should be combined with the purpose of finally attaining salvation." But is there anywhere a desire after the word of God without such intent?

Nothing in the context indicates that that in which the *χρηστότης* of the Lord is manifested is "those rare moments of heavenly joy in which this life is a foretaste of eternal glory" (Schott).

union with Christ, but this does not exclude the necessity of becoming united ever more completely with Him (thus also Hofmann).¹ Luther, incorrectly: "to whom ye have come," as if it were the part. praet.; Hierneus well puts it: *non actum inchoatum, sed continuatum designat.* — λίθον ζώντα, in apposition to ὄν; it is not necessary to supply ὡς (Wolf). What follows shows that the apostle had in his mind the stone mentioned in the prophecies, Ps. cxviii. 22 and Isa. xxviii. 16 (cf. Matt. xxi. 42; Acts iv. 11; Rom. ix. 33). The want of the article points to the fact that the apostle was more concerned to lay stress on the attribute expressed in λίθος ζών, than to draw attention to the fact that in these passages of the O. T. Christ is the promised λίθος. In using this term, Peter had already in view the subsequent οικοδομεισθε. The church is the temple of God, the individual Christians are the stones from which it is built; but Christ is the foundation-stone on which it rests. In order that the church may become ever more completed as a temple, it is necessary that the Christians should unite themselves ever more closely with Christ. The apostle enlarges on this thought with reference to those predictions. — The explanatory adjective is added, as in ver. 2, to the figurative λίθον; and by it, on the one hand, the expression is marked as figurative, *ne quis tropum nesciret* (Bullinger); and, on the other, the nature peculiar to this stone is indicated. ζώντα is to be taken here as in John vi. 51 and similar passages. Flacius, correctly: *dicitur Christus lapis vivus, non tamen passive, quod in semet vitam habeat, sed etiam active, quia nos mortuos vivificat.*² — ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπων μὲν ἀποδοκιμασμένον, a nearer definition, according to Ps. cxviii. 22. What is there said specially of the builders, is here applied generally to mankind, in order that a perfect antithesis may be obtained to the παρὰ δὲ Θεῷ. The want of the article τῶν does not warrant a toning-down of the interpretation to mean "by men," i. e., by some or by many men (Hofmann). The thought is general and comprehensive; the article is wanting in order to emphasize the character of those by whom Christ is rejected, as compared with God (Schott). Believers are here regarded "as an exception" (Steiger). — παρὰ δὲ Θεῷ ἐκλεκτὸν, ἐντιμον, after Isa. xxviii. 16; Peter has, however, selected two attributes only; that is to say, he passes over the characteristics of the stone itself, and its relation to the building, giving prominence only to its value in the sight of God" (Steiger). Both adjectives form the antithesis to ἀποδοκ.; ἐκλεκτός is neither equal to *eximius* (Hemming) nor to *προεγνωσμένος* (Steiger); but "elect," i. e.,

¹ The single passage, 1 Macc. ii. 16, by no means proves that προσέρχεται πρὸς has in itself a stronger force than προσέρχ. cum dat. (as against Hofmann). According to Schott, by προσέρχ. is meant: "not the individual Christian's deepening experience of community of life with Christ, but only the conduct of the believer, by which, as a member of the church, he gives himself up to the Lord as present in His church, in fact to the church itself!"

² De Wette (as opposed to Clericus and Steiger) is right in refusing to see here any

reference to the conception of the *saxum vivum* as opposed to broken stones (Virg., *Aen.*, i. 171; Ovid., *Metam.*, xiv. 741). Inappropriate is Schott's opinion, "that ζών indicates that by the self-unfolding (!) of His divinely human life, Christ causes the church to grow up from Himself the foundation stone." Hofmann would erroneously exclude the second of the above-mentioned ideas from the λίθον ζώντα, although it is clearly indicated by the very fact that, through connection with the stone, Christians themselves become living stones.

chosen as the object of love; cf. 1 Tim. v. 21. — *παρὰ Θεῶν*, not *a Deo* (Vulg.), but *ἐνώπιον τοῦ Θεοῦ*, *coram Deo*, *Deo iudice*, “with God.” Worthy of note is the “antagonism between the human judgment and the divine” (Wiesinger), the former given effect to in the crucifixion, the latter in the glorification of Christ. — Ver. 5. *καὶ αὐτοὶ ὡς λίθοι ζῶντες οἰκοδομείσθη*]. *καὶ αὐτοὶ* places the Christians side by side with Christ (Wiesinger inappropriately takes *αὐτοὶ* as also applying to the verb *οἰκοδομ.*). As He is a living stone, so are they also living stones, i.e., through Him. The explanation: *cum lapidibus comparantur homines, qui, quoniam vivunt, vivi lapides nominantur* (Carpzov, Morus), is inadequate. Further, *ὡς λίθοι ζῶντες* states the qualities which the readers already possessed, not those which they were to obtain only through the *οἰκοδομείσθαι* (Schott); that unto which they should be built is stated in what follows. — *οἰκοδομείσθε* is, according to the structure of the sentence, not indicative¹ but imperative.² The objection that the verses following are declarative, may be quite as well used for the imperative force of that which precedes them.³ If vv. 4, 5, serve as the basis of the foregoing exhortation, this turn of the thought would also be expressed. Several interpreters (as Luther and Steiger) incorrectly regard the verbal form as middle; it is passive; “be ye built up,” i.e., “let yourself be built up,” i.e., by Christ, as the foregoing *πρὸς ὃν προσερχόμενοι* shows. Corresponding with the reading *ἐποικοδομείσθε super illam*, i.e., *Christum*, is generally understood; an unnecessary supplement; the thought is: *that* (not *on which*) the Christians should let themselves be built up, to that, namely, which the following words state. — *οἶκος πνευματικός εἰς ἱεράτευμα ἁγίων*]. In the Rec. without *εἰς* the two conceptions are co-ordinate, both stating the end of the *οἰκοδομείσθαι*: “to the spiritual house, to the holy priesthood;” but if the reading *οἶκ. πν. εἰς ἱεράτ. ἁγ.* be adopted, then “*ἱεράτ. ἁγ.* is the further result of the being built up to the spiritual house” (Brückner). Hofmann holds that *οἶκος πν.* is in apposition to the subject contained in *οἰκοδομείσθε*, and that *εἰς ἱεράτευμα ἁγ.* alone is directly dependent on *οἰκοδομείσθε*; the former view is, however, more expressive, inasmuch as it prominently shows that the Christians should be built up to a spiritual house. *οἶκος πν.* contains the expression of the passive, *ἱεράτ. ἁγ.*, on the other hand, that of the active relation of the church to God (Wiesinger, Schott, Brückner). The dissimilarity of the two ideas seems to be opposed to the reading *εἰς*, since an *οἶκος* cannot be transformed into a *ἱεράτευμα*; but this difficulty disappears if it be considered that the house here spoken of is built of *living* stones. It is clearly not the case that *εἰς* serves only to *facilitate* an otherwise abrupt transition to a new idea (De Wette, Wiesinger). — *οἶκος* means, in the first instance, “house,” and not “temple;” nor does the attribute *πνευματικός* mark it as a temple. We must either hold

¹ Hornejus, Bengel, Gerhard, etc.; more recently, Wiesinger, Weiss, Hofmann.

² Beza, Aretius, Hottinger, Steiger, De Wette-Brückner, Luthardt, Schott, etc.

³ The structure of the clause is in favor of the imperative, inasmuch as it is thus brought into conformity with the imperative preceding. When Hofmann asserts that the sentence must

necessarily be indicative in form, “because the words subjoined to *χρηστὸς ὁ κύριος* must state that to which the goodness of Christ brings them,” he does so without reason, for the clause may also state that to which they should allow the goodness of Christ to lead them.

by the conception "house" (Luthardt, Hofmann),¹ or assume that by the house Peter thought of the temple. The latter view deserves the preference on account of the close connection with what follows: comp. the passages 1 Cor. iii. 16, 17; 2 Cor. vi. 16; 1 Pet. iv. 17. — πνευματικός is the house raised from "living stones," in contradistinction to the temple built from dead ones, inasmuch as their life is rooted in the Spirit of God, and bears His nature on it.² — ἱεράτευμα is here not the "office of priest" (2 Macc. ii. 17), but the "priesthood" (comp. Gerhard: *coetus s. collegium sacerdotum*); comp. ver. 9; Exod. xix. 6; "not instead of ἱερεῖς ἄγιοι, but including the essential idea of a community" (De Wette). It has unjustly been maintained that if the reading εἰς be adopted, ἱεράτευμα must be understood of the priestly office. ἅγιον subjoined to ἱεράτευμα does not mark a characteristic of the ἱεράτευμα of the New as distinguishing it from that of the Old Testament, but one which belongs essentially to the ἱεράτευμα (of course "as ordained by God," Hofmann) as such. Here, too, there lies in the connection of thought a special emphasis on ἅγιον, inasmuch as without sanctification the priestly calling cannot be truly fulfilled. — ἀνεύγκαι πνευματικῆς θυσίας is closely conjoined both in form (see Winer, p. 298 f. [E. T., 317]) and purport with what precedes, pointing out as it does the function of the ἱεράτευμα. This consists, as under the Old Covenant, in offering sacrifice. The word ἀναφέρειν, which is never used by Paul, has not indeed in the classics, but in the LXX., in the Epistle to the Hebrews, and in the Epistle of James, the meaning "to sacrifice;" strictly speaking, "to bring the offering to the altar." — The θυσίαι which the N. T. priesthood, i.e., the Christian Church in all its members, has to offer, are called πνευματικαί, because they have their origin in the πνεῦμα, and bear on them its nature and essence.³ Cf. with this Rom. xii. 1; Heb. xiii. 15, 16. — εὐπροσδεκτοὺς τῷ Θεῷ]. εὐπρόσδεκτος (Rom. xv. 16), equivalent to εὐάρεστος (Rom. xii. 1, xiv. 18; Phil. iv. 18, and other passages). — διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ belongs not to οἰκοδομησθε (Beda), but either to εὐπροσδ. τ. Θεῷ (Luther: *per Christum fit, ut et mea opera a Deo aestimentur, quia alias non culmo digna haberet*; Bengel, Steiger, Wiesinger, Hofmann, etc.), or to ἀνεύγκαι (Grotius, Aretius, De Wette, Weiss, etc.).⁴ No doubt Heb. xiii. 15 might be appealed to in support of the latter construction; but in favor of the former are, (1) That the ἀνεύγκαι as a priestly function stands in such close connection with ἱεράτευμα ἅγ., that it seems out of place

¹ Luthardt: "οἶκος is not equal to ναός; nor in the context is a temple alluded to, for the emphasis lies on πνευματικός. οἶκος is chosen because of οἰκοδομησθε: be ye built as a spiritual house! To this is joined, 'to an holy priesthood.'"

² Schott finds the antithesis therein, that in the O. T. temple "the indwelling of God was confined to the holy of holies, and visible to the eye" (?); whilst, on the contrary, in the Christian Church there is "a real and direct indwelling of God."

³ Calvin says in what they consist: "Inter hostias spirituales primum locum obtinet

generalis nostri oblatio, neque enim offerre quicquam possumus Deo, donec illi nos ipsos in sacrificium obtulerimus, quod fit nostri abnegatione; sequuntur postea preces et gratiarum actiones, elemosynae et omnia pietatis exercitia."

⁴ Brückner and Schott think it is correct to connect διὰ Ἰ. Χρ. not with ἀνεύγκαι only, but with the *entire* thought; but it is self-understood that in the first combination, not the mere ἀναφέρειν, but the ἀναφέρειν πνευματικῆς θυσίας, κ.τ.λ., must be considered as effected by Christ.

to suppose a medium (διὰ Ἰησ. Χρ.) in addition; and (2) With ἀνεύγκαι πνευμ. θυσίας the idea is substantially completed, εὐπροσδ. being a mere adjunct, to which therefore διὰ Ἰ. Χρ. also belongs.

REMARK. — In this description of the Christians' calling, the apostle's first object is not to state the difference between the church of the Old and that of the New Covenant, but to show distinctly that in the latter there is and should have been fulfilled what had aforetime indeed been promised to the former, but had appeared in her only in a typical and unsatisfactory way. The points of difference are distinctly set forth. Israel had a house of God; the Christian Church is called to be *itself* that house of God. That house was built of *inanimate* stones, this of *living* stones; it is a *spiritual* house. Israel was to be a holy priesthood, but it was so only in the particular priesthood introduced into the church; the Christian Church is called to be a *ιεράτευμα ἅγιον* in this sense, that *each individual in it is called upon to perform the office of priest*. The sacrifices which the priests in Israel had to offer were beasts and the like; those of the Christians are, on the other hand, *spiritual* sacrifices, through Christ, well-pleasing to God. — The idea of a universal priesthood, here expressed, is opposed not only to the catholic doctrine of a particular priesthood, but to all teaching with regard to the office of the administration of word and sacrament which in any way ascribes to its possessors an importance in the church, resting on divine mandate, and *necessary* for the communication of salvation (i.e., priestly importance).

Ver. 6 gives the ground for the exhortation contained in vv. 4, 5, by a quotation of the passage, Isa. xxviii. 16, to which reference was already made in ver. 4. — *δοῦτε*. cf. i. 24. — *περιέχει ἐν τῇ γραφῇ*: an uncommon construction, yet not without parallel; see Joseph., *Antl.*, xi. 7: *βούλομαι γίνεσθαι πάντα, καθὼς ἐν αὐτῇ* (i.e., *ἐπιστολῇ*) *περιέχει*; indeed, *περιέχειν* is more than once used to denote the contents of a writing, see Acts xxiii. 25; Joseph., *Antl.*, xi. 9: *καὶ ἡ μὲν ἐπιστολὴ ταῦτα περιείχεν*. Either *ἡ περιοχὴ* (or *ὁ τόπος*) must, with Wahl, be supplied here as subject; or, better, *περιέχει* must be taken impersonally as equal to *continetur*; cf. Winer, p. 237 [E. T., 252]; Buttmann, p. 126 [E. T., 144]. — The words of the passage in the O. T. (Isa. xxviii. 16) are quoted neither literally from the LXX. nor exactly according to the Hebrew text. In the LXX. it is: *ἰδοῦ, ἐγὼ ἐμβάλλω εἰς τὰ θεμέλια Σιών* (instead of which we have here, exactly as in Rom. ix. 33: *ἰδοῦ, τίθημι ἐν Σιών*) *λίθον πολυτελῆ* (this adjunct. here omitted) *ἐκλεκτὸν ἀκρογωνιαῖον* (these two words here transposed) *ἐντιμον εἰς τὰ θεμέλια αὐτῆς* (the last two words *εἰς . . . αὐτῆς* here left out) *καὶ ὁ πιστεύων* (ἐὼ' αὐτῷ added) *οὐ μὴ κατασχνθῆ* (Rom. ix. 33: *καὶ πῶς ὁ πιστεύων ἐπ' αὐτῷ οὐ κατασχνθήσεται*). Whatever may be understood by the stone in Zion, whether the theocracy, or the temple, or the house of David, or the promise given to David, 2 Sam. vii. 12, 16 (Hofmann), this passage, which certainly has a Messianic character, — inasmuch as the thought expressed in it should find, and has found, its fulfilment in Christ, — is not here only, but by Paul and the Rabbis (see Vitranga, *Ad. Jes.*, I. p. 217), taken to refer directly to the Messiah, who also, according to Delitzsch (cf. *in loc.*), is directly meant by the stone ("this stone is the true seed of

David, manifested in Christ"). Luther, following Oecumenius and Theophylactus, assumes that Christ is called λίθος ἀκρογων. because He has united Jew and Gentile together, and out of both collected the one church; this Calvin, not entirely without reason, calls a *subtilius philosophari*. In the words: καὶ ὁ πιστεύων, κ.τ.λ., πιστεύων corresponds to προσερχόμενοι, ver. 4. οὐ μὴ καταισχυνῆθῃ does not refer to the glory which consists for the believer in this, "that he, as a λίθος ζῶν, will form part of the οἶκος πν." (Wiesinger), but to "the final glory of salvation which is the aim of the present πιστεύειν" (Schott); cf. ver. 2: εἰς σωτηρίαν.¹

Ver. 7. ὑμῖν οὖν ἡ τιμὴ τοῖς πιστεύουσιν]. Conclusion, with special reference to the readers, ὑμῖν, drawn from ver. 6 (οὖν), and in the first instance from the second half of the O. T. quotation, for τοῖς πιστεύουσιν evidently stands related to ὁ πιστεύων ἐπ' αὐτῷ, hence the definite article. On the position of τοῖς πιστ., cf. Winer, p. 511 [E. T., 549]; only, with Winer, it must not be interpreted: "as believers, i. e. if ye are believers," but, "ye who are believers."—From the fact that ἡ τιμὴ echoes ἐντιμον, it must not be concluded that ἡ τιμὴ here is the worth which the stone possesses, and that the meaning is: "the worth which the stone has, it has for you who believe" (Wiesinger). The clause would then have read, perhaps: ὑμῖν οὖν ὁ λίθος ἐστὶ ἡ τιμὴ, or the like. ἡ τιμὴ stands rather in antithesis to καταισχυνῆθαι, and takes up positively what had been expressed negatively in the verse immediately preceding. Gerhard: *vobis, qui per fidem tanquam lapides vivi super eum aedificamini, est honor coram Deo* (so, too, De Wette-Brückner, Weiss, Schott); ὑμῖν, sc. ἐστὶ: "yours therefore is the honor;" the article is not without significance here; the honor, namely, which in that word is awarded to believers (Steiger).—τοῖς πιστεύουσιν: an explanatory adjunct placed by way of emphasis at the end.—ἀπειθοῦσι [ἀπιστοῦσιν] δέ: antithesis to τοῖς πιστεύουσιν; ἀπειθεῖν denotes not only the simple *not* believing, but the resistance against belief; thus also ἀπιστοῦσιν here, if it be the true reading. Bengel wrongly explains the dative by: *quod atinet*; it is the *dat. incommodi* (Steiger, De Wette, etc.). The words: λίθος (λίθον) . . . γωνίας, are borrowed literally from Ps. cxviii. 22, after the LXX. What is fatal for unbelievers in the fact that the stone is become the corner-stone (κεφ. γων. equals λιθ. ἀκρογ.) is stated in the following words, which are taken from Isa. viii. 14: וְלֹא־בָנִין יִצְיֹר כְּבִשׁוּל.² In a manner similar, though not quite identical, these passages of the O. T. are woven together by Paul in Rom. ix. 33. The words do not denote the subjective conduct of the unbelievers (according to Luther, the occasion of stumbling or offence which they find in the preaching of the cross), but the objective destruction which they bring upon themselves by their unbelief (Steiger, De Wette-Brückner, Wiesinger, Schott, Fronmüller); cf. Luke xx. 17, 18, where the *corner-stone* is also characterized as a *stone of destruction* for unbelievers. It is therefore without any foundation that Hofmann asserts "the thought that, to the disobedient, Christ is become the corner-stone

¹ Hofmann is wrong in asserting that it is here said "that οὐ μὴ καταισχυνῆθῃ is meant to call back to mind the εἰς σωτηρίαν in ver. 2."

² Schott rightly observes that κεφαλὴ γωνίας,

as the corner-stone, must not be understood, with Gerhard and Steiger, as one on which one stumbles and falls. This is not contained in the idea, corner-stone, in itself.

seems impossible," if *ἀπειθοῦσιν* be taken as the *dat. incommodi*. So that it is in no way necessary to accept a construction so uncommon as that adopted by Hofmann, who considers the two clauses: *ἴμιν . . . οἰκοδομοῦντες* to be, with an omitted *ὧν*, in apposition to the following *οὔτος*, looking on *ἡ τιμὴ* as a kind of personal designation of the stone, and separating the three following expressions: *εἰς κεφ. γων., λιθ. προκόμμ.,* and *πέτρα σκανδ.* in such a way as to refer the first to believers, and the other two to unbelievers, although no such division is anywhere hinted at.

Ver. 8. *οἱ προσκόπτουσι* links itself on to *ἀπειθοῦσι, κ.τ.λ.*: "that is, to those who," etc., not to what follows, as if *εἰσι* were to be supplied: "they who stumble are those who are," etc. — *προσκόπτειν* has here the same meaning as that contained in the last words, but the turn of the thought is different; there, it is shown what Christ is become to the unbelievers, namely, the ground of their destruction; here, on the contrary, that they are really overtaken by this destruction; Lorinus explains *προσκόπτουσι* incorrectly: *verbo offenduntur et scandalizantur, id blasphemant et male de illo loquuntur.* — *τῷ λόγῳ ἀπειθοῦντες*]. It is better to connect *τῷ λόγῳ* with *ἀπειθοῦντες* than with *προσκόπτουσι* (either: "who at the word are offended," or: "who by the word suffer hurt"). For, on the one hand, the leading idea *προσκ.* would be weakened by its connection with *λόγῳ*; and, on the other, the nearer definition requisite is supplied of itself from what precedes; it would, too, be inappropriate "that *λογος* should of a sudden take the place of Christ, who in ver. 7 is, as *λίθος*, the object of *προσκ.*" (Brückner). Wolf: *quæ impingunt, nempe: in lapidem illum angularem, verbo non credentes: quo ipso et offensio ipsa et ejus causa indicatur.* — *εἰς ὃ και ἐτεθησαν*]. *εἰς ὃ* not equal to *ἐφ' ᾧ*, "on account of which;" nor is it equal to *εἰς ὃν* (*sc. λόγον* or *λίθον*); Luther: "on which they are placed;" or, similarly, Bolten: "they stumble at that, on which they should have been laid" (he makes *εἰς ὃ* refer to the omitted object of *προσκ.*), but it points rather to the end of *ἐτεθησαν*.¹ — *τιθημι* is here, as frequently in the N. T., "to appoint, *constituere*" (cf. 1 Thess. v. 9). It is clear from the connection of this verse with the preceding, that *εἰς ὃ* does not go back to ver. 5 (Gerhard: *in hoc positi sunt, videlicet, ut ipsi quoque in hunc lapidem fide aedificarentur*). It may be referred either to *ἀπειθεῖν* (Calvin, Beza, Piscator, and others) or to *προσκοπεῖν* and *ἀπειθεῖν* (Estius, Pott, De Wette, Usteri, Hofmann, Wiesinger,² etc.), or, more correctly, to *προσκοπεῖν*

¹ The application to the *Word* or to *Christ* occurs already in the older commentators; thus Beda says: "in hoc positi sunt, i. e., per naturam facti sunt homines, ut credant Deo et ejus voluntati obtemperent;" and Nicol. de Lyræ, applying it specially to the Jews: "illis data fuit lex, ut disponderentur ad Christum secundum quod dicitur Gal. iii. lex paedagogus noster fuit in Christo; et ipsi pro majore parte remanserunt increduli."

² Different interpreters seek in various ways to soften the harshness of the idea here presented. Thus Estius, by explaining *ἐτέθησαν* only of the permission of God; Pott, by paraphrasing the idea thus: "their lot seemed

to bring this with it;" Wiesinger, by asserting that "the passage here speaks of the action of God as a matter of history, not of His eternal decrees." But what justifies any such softening down? While Hofmann, in the first edition of his *Schriftbeweis*, I., p. 210, says precisely, "that God has ordained them to this, that they should not become obedient to His word, but should stumble at it and fall over it;" in the second edition, I., p. 237, it appears that the meaning only is, "that the evil which befalls them in the very fact of their not believing, is ordained by God to those who do not obey His message of salvation, as a punishment of their disposition of

(Grotius, Hammond, Benson, Hensler, Steiger, Weiss), since on the latter (not on *ἀπειθεῖν*) the chief emphasis of the thought lies, and *εἰς ὃ, κ.τ.λ.*, applies to that which is predicated of the subject, that is, of the *ἀπειθοῦντες*, but not to the characteristic according to which the subject is designated. The *προσκόπτειν* it is to which they, the *ἀπειθοῦντες*, were already appointed, and withal on account of their unbelief, as appears from the *τῷ λόγῳ ἀπειθ.* This interpretation alone is in harmony with the connection of thought, for it is simply the *πιστεύοντες* and *ἀπειθοῦντες*, together with the blessing and curse which they respectively obtain, that are here contrasted, without any reference being made to the precise ground of faith and unbelief.¹—Following the construction of ver. 7 adopted by him, Hofmann takes *οἱ προσκόπτουσιν* not as an adjunct referring to what precedes, but as protasis to the subsequent *εἰς ὃ*, which, according to him, contains the apodosis expressed in the form of an exclamation. This interpretation falls with that of ver. 7. Besides, it gives rise to a construction entirely abnormal, and of which there is no other example in the N. T., either as regards the relative pronoun,² or the method here resorted to, of connecting apodosis with protasis. The words are added by the apostle in order to show that the being put to shame of unbelievers, takes place according to divine determination and direction. Oecumenius³ is not justified by the context in laying special stress on the personal guilt of unbelief; or Aretius, in answering the question: *quis autem illos sic posuit? by non Deus certe, sed Satan tales posuit.*

Ver. 9. *ὁμοίως δέ*]. The apostle returns again to his readers, contrasting them with the unbelievers (not “with the people of Israel,” as Weiss thinks) he had just spoken of. The nature of believers, as such, is described by the same predicates which were originally applied to the O. T. church of God (cf. Exod. xix. 5, 6), but have found their accomplishment only in that of the N. T. Schott justly remarks that “what in ver. 5 had been expressed in the form of an exhortation, is here predicated of the Christians as an

mind.” Schott agrees with this view. But in it the idea of *ἐτέθησαν* in relation to *ἀπειθοῦντες* is arbitrarily weakened; since Schott expressly says that unbelievers, by their own state of mind, “appoint themselves to unbelief,” he can look on unbelief only in so far as the result of a divine decree, that God has determined faith to be impossible with a carnal disposition. But a limitation of this kind is here all the more inappropriate, that Peter in the passage makes no allusion to the disposition which lies at the foundation of unbelief. Hofmann, in his commentary, says: “it is the word which is preached to them that they refuse to obey; but, by the very fact of their doing so, they stumble at Christ and fall over Him, as over a stone that lies in the way. Both are one and the same thing, named from different sides; the one time from what they do, the other from what is done to them.” Yet these are two different things; the one the cause, the other the effect.

¹ Vorstius, correctly: “Increduli sunt designati vel constituti ad hoc, ut poenam sive exitium sibi accersant sua incredulitate.”

² Hofmann, indeed, appeals to Matt. xxvi. 50; but the interpretation of this passage is so doubtful that it cannot be relied upon; cf. the various interpretations in Meyer on this passage; in Winer, p. 157 (E. T., 167); in Buttmann, p. 217.

³ Οὐχ ὡς ἀπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ εἰς τοῦτο ἀφωρισμένοι, εἰρηται· οὐδεμία γὰρ αἰτία ἀπωλείας παρὰ τοῦ πάντας ἀνθρώπων θέλοντος σωθῆναι βραβεύεται· ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἑαυτοῖς σκευὴ κατηρκόσιν ὄργης καὶ ἡ ἀπειθεῖα ἐπηκολούθησε, καὶ εἰς ἣν παρεσκευάσαν ἑαυτοὺς τόξιν ἐτέθησαν. Thus also Didymus: “ad non credendum a semetipsis sunt positi;” and Hornejus: “constituti ad impingendum et non credendum ideo dicuntur, quia cum credere sermoni Dei nollent, sed ultro eum repellerent, deserti a Deo sunt et ipsius permissione traditi ut non crederent et impingerent.”

already present condition.” — *γένος ἐκλεκτόν*, after Isa. xliii. 20 (רַבְרָבִים, LXX. : *γένος μου τὸ ἐκλεκτόν*); cf. also Deut. vii. 6 ff.; Isa. xliii. 10, xlv. 1, 2, xlv. 4, etc. This first designation sets forth that the Christians, in virtue of God’s love, have been elected to be a people which no longer belongs to this world; cf. chap. i. 1. — *βασιλειον ἱεράτευμα*, after Exod. xix. 6, LXX. (in Hebrew מַמְלֶכֶת כֹּהֲנִים, “a kingdom of priests”); most interpreters take it as simple combination of the two ideas: “kings and priests.” Still, it is more correct to regard *ἱεράτευμα* as the principal idea (cf. ver. 3), and *βασιλειον* as a more precise definition: “a royal priesthood.” Several commentators explain: “a priesthood possessing a royal character,” inasmuch as it not only offers up sacrifices (ver. 5), but exercises sway (over the world); cf. Rev. i. 6, v. 10 (Wiesinger). Weiss (p. 125), on the other hand: “a priesthood serving Jehovah the King, just as we speak of the royal household.” Since all the other predicates express the belonging to God, the second explanation deserves the preference, only it must be modified so far as to include in *βασιλ.* not only the relation of *service*, but that also of *belonging* to and participation in the glory of the King founded thereon. Schott is not justified in assuming that Peter did not intend to convey the force of the Greek, but that of the Hebrew expression, מַמְלֶכֶת כֹּהֲנִים, namely: “a kingdom which consists of priests.” It is inadequate to understand, with Hofmann, by the term: “a priesthood of princely honors,” or *βασιλειον* as equal to, *magnificus, splendidus* (Aretius, Hottinger, etc.), or to find in it the expression of the highest freedom¹ (subject only to God) (De Wette). — *ἔθνος ἅγιον* in like manner after Exod. xix. 6, LXX. (גוֹי קָדוֹשׁ). — *λαὸς εἰς περιποίησιν*]. Corresponding passages in the O. T. are Deut. vii. 6 (עַם קָדוֹשׁ), Mal. iii. 17 (קָדוֹשׁ), and especially Isa. xliii. 21, LXX. : *λαὸν μου ὃν περιποιήσασαμην τὰς ἀρετὰς μου διηγεῖσθαι* (עַם-וְיִצְרָחֵל לִי תִהְיֶה לְתִיבְכֶם). The words following show that the apostle had this last passage chiefly in his mind: still it must be noted that this idea is contained already in Exod. xix. 5 (*λαὸς περιούσιος*). *περιποίησις* is strictly the *acquiring* (Heb. x. 39); here, what is *acquired, possession*; neither *destinatus* (Vorstius) nor *positus* (Calovius) is to be supplied to *εἰς*, they would not correspond with the sense; *εἰς* is here to be explained from Mal. iii. 17, LXX. : *ἔσονται μοι . . . εἰς περιποίησιν*; *οὐ εἶναι εἰς*, cf. Winer, p. 173 (E. T., 183 f.); in sense it is equivalent to *λαὸς περιούσιος*, Tit. ii. 14. Schott attributes to this expression an eschatological reference, explaining: “a people destined for appropriation, for acquisition;” this is incorrect, for, understood thus, it would fall out of all analogy with the other expressions. The apostle does not here state to what the Christian Church is destined, but what she already is; “her complete liberation from all cosmic powers is not,” as Brückner justly remarks, “an acquiring on God’s side, but only the final redemption of those whom He already possesses.” Schott’s assertion, that in the N. T. *περιποίησις* has always an eschatological reference, is opposed by Eph. i. 14; cf. Meyer *in loc.* — Although a difference of idea

¹ Clemens Al. interprets: “regale, quoniam ad regnum vocati sumus et sumus Christi sacerdotium autem propter oblationem quae

fit orationibus et doctrinis, quibus adquiruntur animae, quae afferuntur Deo.”

founded on the etymologies of *γένος*, *ἔθνος*, *λαός* is not to be pressed; ¹ yet it must be observed that by these expressions, as also by *ἱερατευμα*, Christians are spoken of as a community united together in itself, and although diverse as to natural descent, they, as belonging to God (and all the names employed by the apostle point to this), form *one* people, from the fact that God has joined them to Himself. — *ὁπως τὰς ἀρετὰς ἐξαγγελίητε τοῦ, κ. τ. λ.*] *ὁπως* connects itself, after Isa. xliii. 21, in the first instance with what immediately goes before, in such a way, however, that the preceding ideas point towards it as their end. — *τὰς ἀρετὰς*; thus the LXX. translate *הַהֲלָלָה* in the above-mentioned passage (in general, in the LXX., *ἀρετή* occurs only as the translation of *הַלְלָה*, Hab. iii. 3, Zech. vi. 13; *ἀρεται* as the translation of *הַלְלָה*, Isa. xlii. 8, 12, xliii. 21, and of *הַלְלָה*, Isa. lxiii. 7); accordingly the Alexandrine translators understand by *הַלְלָה* and *הַלְלָה* in the passages in question, not the “glory or praise” of God, but the object of the glory, that is, the excellence or the glorious attributes of God. Peter took the word, in this meaning of it, from them. ² — *ἐξαγγελίητε*]. Cf. Isa. xlii. 12, LXX.: *τὰς ἀρετὰς αὐτοῦ ἐν ταῖς νήσοις ἀπαγγελοῦσι; ἐξαγγέλλειν*; strictly, *iis qui foris sunt nunciare quae intus fiunt* (Xen., *Anab.*, ii. 4, 21), is employed for the most part without this definite application; in the LXX. the translation of *בְּרַב*; in the N. T. in this passage only; it is possible that Peter thought of the word here in its original force (Bengel, Wiesinger). — *τοῦ ἐκ σκότους ὑμᾶς καλέσαντος*, i. e., *Θεοῦ*, not *Χριστοῦ*; *καλεῖν* is almost uniformly attributed to God. — *σκοτους*, not equivalent to *miseria* (Wahl), but is used to designate the whole unhappy condition of sin and lying in which the natural and unregenerate man is (cf. Col. i. 13); here employed, no doubt, with special reference to the former heathenism of the readers. — *εἰς τὸ θαυμαστὸν αὐτοῦ φῶς*]. To render *φῶς* by *cognitio melior* (Wahl), is arbitrarily to weaken the force of the word; it is rather the complete opposite of *σκότος*, and denotes the absolutely holy and blessed nature — as *αὐτοῦ* shows — *of God*. The Christian is translated from darkness to the light of God, so that he participates in this light, and is illumined by it. ³ Schott incorrectly understands by *σκότος*: “heathen

¹ Steiger draws the following distinction: “*γενος* is the race, people of like descent; *ἔθνος*, a people of like customs; *λαός*, people as the mass.” Schott thinks that *ἔθνος* includes within it a reference to the intellectual and moral characteristics of the people, and that *λαός* points to its being gathered together under one Lord. In this urging of distinctions — which are not even correctly drawn — is to be found the reason why Schott exchanges the Greek expression *βασιλ. ἱεράτευμα* for the Hebrew, because *ἱεράτευμα* is not analogous to the other three designations, whilst *βασιλεια* is so, as a national community. — Peter certainly, in selecting these expressions, did not reflect on the original distinction of the ideas, but made use of them simply as they were presented to him in the O. T.

² It is arbitrary to understand the word to mean only this or that attribute of God; nor must the meaning, as is done by Gerhard, be limited to the “virtutes Dei, quae in opere gratuita vocationis et in toto negotio salutis nostrae relucunt.” Schott’s interpretation is linguistically incorrect: *αἱ ἀρεται* equal to *τὰ μεγαλεῖα τ. Θ.* (Acts ii. 11), “the great deeds of God.” Cornelius a Lapide entirely misses the point in explaining: “virtutes, quas Christus in nobis operatur, humilitatem, caritatem,” etc.; and Salmeron: “virtutes Christi, quas in diebus carnis suae exhibuit.”

³ Wiesinger disputes this interpretation, holding that what is meant is “that light which has appeared to the world in Christ;” but is not this light the light of God? — Certainly *φῶς* is here not i. q. *Χριστός*. According to De Wette, *αὐτοῦ* designates the light as the

humanity left to itself," and by τὸ . . . αὐτοῦ φῶς: "the church;" the church lives in God's light, but it is not the light of God. — καλεῖν is here applied, as it is by Paul, to the effectual, successful calling of God. — θαναμαστόν (cf. Matt. xxi. 42) denotes the inconceivable glory of the φῶς Θεοῦ.

Ver. 10. A reference to Hos. ii. 25, linking itself on to the end of the preceding verse, in which the former and present conditions of the readers are contrasted. This difference the verse emphasizes by means of a simple antithesis. The passage in Hosea runs: יְרַע-אֱלֹהִים הִקְרָךְ לֹא-תָאֵר הַקְּרָךְ וְיִקְרָא לְךָ אֶת-שֵׁם יְהוָה, LXX.: ἀγαπήσω τὴν οὐκ ἠγαπημένην καὶ ἔρω τῷ οὐ λαῷ μου· λαός μου εἰ σύ (the Cod. Alex. and the Ed. Aldina have at the commencement the additional words: ἐλεήσω τὴν οὐκ ἠλημένην). — οἱ ποτὲ οὐ λαός]. Grotius, Steiger, Weiss, incorrectly supply: Θεοῦ. λαός is here used absolutely (Bengel: *ne populus quidem, nedum Dei populus*). οὐ belongs not to ἦτε to be supplied, but is closely connected with λαός, equivalent to "no-people." In like manner οὐκ ἠλημένοι as equal to "not-obtained mercy." "The meaning is not that they once were not what they now are, but that they were the opposite of it" (Wiesinger). But οὐ . . . λαός is a people who, in their separation from God, are without that unity of life in which alone they can be considered by Him as a people; or, more simply, who do not serve God who is the true King of every people; cf. Deut. xxxii. 21, and Keil *in loc.* De Wette is hardly satisfactory: "they were not a people, inasmuch as they were without the principle of all true nationality, the real knowledge of God," etc.; now they are a *people*, even a people of God, inasmuch as they not only serve God, but are received also by God into community of life with Himself. — οἱ οὐκ ἠλημένοι, νῦν δὲ ἐληθέντες]. The part. perf. denotes their former and ended condition. Standing as it does here not as a verb, but as a substantive, like οὐ . . . λαός, it cannot be taken as a plusquam-perf. part. (in opposition to Hofmann). The aorist part. points, on the other hand, to the fact of pardon having been extended: "once not in possession of mercy, but now having become partakers of it" (Winer, p. 322¹ [E. T., 343]).

work of God, and consequently a different thing from the φῶς which He is Himself.

¹ In the original passage these words apply to Israel; but from this it does not follow that Peter writes to Jewish Christians. For if Paul — as he clearly does — applies the passage (Rom. ix. 25) to the calling of the heathen, then Peter surely, with equal right, could use it with reference to the heathen converts. They had been, in its full sense, that which God says to Israel, יְרַע-אֱלֹהִים; and they had become that to which He would again make Israel, *His people*. It must be observed, however, that God in that passage addresses Israel as יְרַע-אֱלֹהִים, only because it had forsaken Him and given itself up to the worship of Baal, and consequently incurred punishment. Apart from this, Israel had always remained the people of God. — If only Jewish converts were meant here, then Peter would

assume that they in their Judaism had been idolaters, which is absolutely impossible, or at least Peter must then have said why they, who as Israelites were the people of God, could not in their former state be regarded as such. Accordingly, οὐ λαός is here in no way applicable to Israel, but only to the heathen; and it is not (as Weiss maintains, p. 119) purely arbitrary to apply the passage, in opposition to its original sense, to heathen Christians. Whilst Brückner says only that the words cannot serve to prove the readers to have been Jews formerly, Wiesinger rightly and most decidedly denies the possibility of applying them to Jewish converts; so, too, Schott. — Weiss's assertion is by no means justified by his insisting (*Die Petr. Frage*, p. 626) that nothing tenable has been brought forward against it.

Vv. 11, 12. A new exhortation: the central thought is expressed in the beginning of ver. 12. The apostle, after describing its peculiarly lofty dignity, considers the Christian Church in its relation to the non-Christian world, and shows how believers must prove themselves blameless before it by right conduct in the different relations of human life. The condition necessary for this is stated in ver. 11. — Ἀγαπητοί]. This form of address expresses the affectionate, impressive earnestness of the following exhortation. — παρακαλῶ (*sc.* ὑμῶς) ὡς παροίκους καὶ παρεπίδημους]. Cf. Ps. xxxix. 13, LXX. — ὡς, as in i. 14. — πάροικος, cf. i. 17, in its strict sense; Acts vii. 6, 29, equal to *inquilinus*, he who dwells in a town (or land) where he has no civil rights; cf. Luke xxiv. 18. In Eph. ii. 19 it stands as synonymous with ξένος, of the relation of the heathen to the kingdom of God. — παρεπίδημος, cf. i. 1. The home of the believer is heaven, on earth he is a stranger. Calvin: *sic eos appellat, non quia a patria exularent, ac dissipati essent in diversis regionibus, sed quia filii Dei, ubicunque terrarum agent, mundi sunt hospites*; cf. Heb. xi. 13–15. A distinction between the two words is not to be pressed here; the same idea is expressed by two words, in order to emphasize it the more strongly. Luther inexactly translates παρεπίδημοι by “pilgrims.” — Even if ἀπέχεσθαι be the true reading, the words ὡς παροίκους, κ.τ.λ., must be connected with παρακαλῶ (as opposed to De Wette-Brückner, Wiesinger), for they show in what character Peter now regarded his readers (Hofmann)¹ in relation to the following exhortations, and have reference not simply to the admonition ἀπέχεσθαι; as Weiss also (p. 45) rightly remarks. Probably, however, ἀπέχεσθε is the original reading, and was changed into the infinitive in order to make the connection with παρακαλῶ more close. ἀπέχεσθαι presents the negative aspect of sanctification, as chap. ii. 1: ἀποθέμενοι. — τῶν σαρκικῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν: similar expressions in Gal. v. 10; Eph. ii. 3; 2 Pet. ii. 18. The ἐπιθυμίαι are σαρκικαί, because they have their seat in the σάρξ. Wiesinger improperly says that “the lusts which manifest themselves outwardly” are here meant, for *all* ἐπιθυμίαι tend to, and do, manifest themselves outwardly, if there be no ἀπέχεσθαι. Schott assumes, without reason, that the ἐπιθυμίαι are here considered “as something *outside* of the Christian community, and manifesting itself only to the surrounding heathen population;” they are indeed peculiar to the unbelieving world; but the Christian, too, has them still in his σάρξ, though he can and should prevent them from having a determining power over him, inasmuch as in the world over which they rule he is a πάροικος καὶ παρεπίδημος.² This sequence of thought lies plainly indicated in the close connection of the exhortation with what precedes (as opposed to Hofmann). — αἵτινες στρατεύονται κατὰ τῆς ψυχῆς is not a definition of the σαρκικαί, but as αἵτινες, equal to “as those which,” shows, explains the nature of the ἐπιθυμίαι σαρκικαί, thus giving the reason of the exhortation. — στρατεύειν

¹ In the former exhortations Peter had regarded them as τέκνα ὑπακοῆς, as such who call on God as Father, as regenerate.

² Calvin interprets: “carnis desideria intelligit, non tantum crassos et cum pecudibus communes appetitus, sed omnes animae nos-

trae affectus, ad quos natura ferimur et ducimur.” This goes too far, as it would demand the destruction not alone of the striving against the Spirit, natural to man in his sinful condition, but of the entire life of the soul. Cf. Gal. v. 17.

is not "to lay siege to" (Steiger), but "to war," "fight against," as in Jas. iv. 1 (Rom. vii. 23: ἀντιστρατεύεσθαι). — ψυχή has here its usual meaning; it is neither *vita et salus animae* (Hornejus, Grotius), nor *ratio* (Pott: *libidines, quae nos impellunt ad peragenda ea, quae rationi contraria sunt*); nor does it mean: "the new man" (Gerhard: *totus homo novus ac interior, quatenus est per Spiritum s. renovatus*), nor: the soul, "in so far as it is penetrated by the Holy Spirit" (Steiger), nor: "life as determined by the new Ego" (Schott); but it is here simply, in contradistinction to σῶμα, the spiritual substance of man of which Peter says that it must be sanctified (chap. i. 22), and its σωτηρία is the end of faith (chap. i. 9); thus also De Wette-Brückner, Wiesinger, Hofmann, Frommüller. In the natural man the ψυχή is under the power of the ἐπιθυμιαί σαρκικαί (which according to Jas. iv. 1 have their dwelling ἐν τοῖς μέλεσιν; cf. also Rom. vii. 23); in him who is regenerate, it is delivered from them, yet the ἐπιθυμιαί seek to bring it again into subjection, so that it may fail of its σωτηρία; — in this consists the στρατεύεσθαι κατὰ τῆς ψυχῆς. — Ver. 12. τὴν ἀναστροφὴν ὑμῶν (chap. i. 15, 17) ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν ἔχοντες καλῆν]. ἐν τοῖς ἔθν.: "among the Gentiles;" for the churches to whom Peter wrote were in Gentile lands. — ἔχοντες καλῆν; Luther, inexactly: "lead a good mode of life;" καλῆν is a predicate: "having your mode of life good (as one good);" cf. chap. iv. 8. — ἔχοντες (antithesis to ἀπέχεσθε, ver. 11) is not here put for the imperative, but is a participle subordinate to the finite verb; if ἀπέχεσθαι be read, there is here, as in Eph. iv. 2, Col. iii. 16, an irregularity in the construction by which the idea contained in the participle is significantly made prominent. — ἵνα ἐν ᾧ καταλαλοῦσιν, κ.τ.λ., "that in the matter in which they revile you as evil-doers they may, on the ground of the good works they themselves have beheld, glorify God," i.e., in order that the matter which was made the ground of their evil speaking, may by your good works become to them the ground of giving glory to God. — ἵνα states the purpose; not for ὥστε; ἐν ᾧ is not ἐν ᾧ χρόνῳ, as in Mark ii. 19 (Pott, Hensler), for the καταλαλεῖν and the δοξάζειν cannot be simultaneous; nor is it *pro eo quod* (Beza), such a construction has no grammatical justification; but ἐν specifies here, as in verb. affect., the occasioning object (cf. chap. iv. 4), and the relative refers to a demonstrative to be supplied, which stands in the same relation to δοξάζωσι as ἐν ᾧ το καταλαλοῦσιν. It is not then τοῦτο, but ἐν τοῦτω, which is to be supplied (Steiger, De Wette, Wiesinger, Hofmann). If τοῦτο were to be supplied it would be dependent on ἵποπτεύσαντες; but such a construction is opposed by the circumstance that it is not this participle, but δοξάζωσι, which forms the antithesis to καταλαλοῦσι. The participle is interposed here absolutely (as in Eph. iii. 4: ἀναγινώσκοντες), and ἐκ τῶν καλῶν ἔργων is connected with δοξάζωσι, the sense being: "on account of your good works." Steiger specifies the κατὰ ἔργα as that which occasions the καταλαλεῖν, — and later the σοξάζειν τὸν Θεόν, — but the subsequent ἐκ τῶν καλῶν ἔργων does not agree with this; De Wette gives: "the whole tenor of life;" the connection with what precedes might suggest the ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν σαρκ. ἐπιθυμιῶν;¹ but it is simpler,

¹ So formerly in this commentary, with the observation: "Of this ἀπέχεσθαι Peter says (chap. iv. 3, 4), that it seemed strange to the

heathen; for it is precisely this abstinence which gives the Christian life its peculiar character, and distinguishes it from that of

with Hofmann, to understand by it generally the *Christian profession*. — With *κακοποιίαι*, cf. ver. 14, iv. 15; John xviii. 30. Brückner, Wiesinger, Weiss (p. 367), justly reject the opinion of Hug, Neander, etc., that *κακοποιός* here, in harmony with the passage in Suetonius, *Vit. Ner.*, c. 16: *Christiani genus hominum superstitionis novae et MALIFICAE*, is equivalent to “state criminal.” In the mouth of a heathen the word would signify a criminal, though not exactly a vicious man; one who had been guilty of such crimes as theft, murder, and the like (cf. iv. 15), which are punished by the state¹ (cf. ver. 14). — *ἐκ τῶν καλῶν ἔργων*]. The *καλὰ ἔργα*, in the practice of which the *ἀναστροφὴ καλῆ* of the Christians consists, are here presented as the motive by which, when they see them, the heathen are to be induced to substitute the glorifying of God for their evil speaking; as the Christians too, on their part, are often exhorted to holiness of life, that thus they may overcome the opposition of the Gentiles; cf. chap. iii. 2. Hofmann incorrectly interprets *ἐκ τ. καλ. ἔργων ἐποπτεύοντες*: “if the heathen judge of your Christianity by your good works;” for *ἐποπτεύειν* does not mean “to judge of.” With *ἐκ τ. καλ. ἔργων . . . δοξάσωσι τ. Θεόν*, comp. Christ’s words, Matt. v. 16, which, as Weiss not without reason assumes, may have here been present to the apostle’s mind. — *ἐποπτεύοντες* “goes back in thought to the *καλὰ ἔργα*, in harmony with the linguistic parallel in iii. 2 and the grammatical parallel in Eph. iii. 4” (De Wette). It makes no essential difference in the sense, whether the present or, with the Rec., the aorist be read (see critical remarks). The word occurs only here and in iii. 2, where it is used with the accusative of the object (for the subst. *ἐπόπτῃς*, see 2 Pet. i. 16). It expresses the idea of seeing with one’s own eyes, more strongly than the simple *ὄραν*. There is no reference here to the use of the word as applied to those who were initiated into the third grade of the Eleusinian mysteries. — *ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ἐπισκοπῆς*]. *ἐπισκοπή* is in the LXX. a translation of *הַרְבֵּה*, the visitation of God, whether it be to bless (Job x. 12) or to chastise (Isa. x. 3); *ἡμέρα ἐπισκοπῆς* is therefore the time when God gives salvation, or the time when He punishes, be it in the general sense (Beda: *dies extremi iudicii*), or more specially with reference either to the Christians or the heathen. — The connection of thought seems to point decisively to that time as meant when the *καταλαλοῦντες* shall be brought to repentance and faith, that is, to “the gracious visitation of the heathen” (Steiger); as *ὁ καιρὸς τῆς ἐπισκοπῆς σου*, Luke xix. 44, is used with regard to the Jews. This interpretation is to be found already in the Fathers and in many later commentators, as Nicol. de Lyra, Erasm., Hem-

the heathen. It became the ground of evil report for this reason, that immoral motives were supposed to be concealed behind it; and this was all the more natural that the Christian had necessarily to place himself in opposition to many of the ordinances of heathen life, and that from a Gentile point of view his obedience to the will of God must have appeared a violation of the law. This prejudice could not be better overcome than by the practice of good works; hence, *τὴν ἀναστρ. ὑμ. . . .*

καλῆν, and the reference to it in *ἐκ τ. καλ. ἔργων*.”

¹ Schott’s assumption, “that it was the burning of Rome that first increased the universal hatred and aversion of the Christians to a special accusation of criminal and immoral principles,” is unwarranted. He attempts to justify it only by charging Tacitus with an error in the account he gives of the accusations brought by Nero against the Christians.

ming, Vorstius, Beza, Steiger, De Wette, Wiesinger, Hofmann, etc. On the other hand, Oecumenius, Wolf, Bengel, etc., apply the ἐπισκοπή not to God, but understand by it the ἐξέτασις of the Christians at the hands of the heathen. But for this there is absolutely no ground. Luther's interpretation, "when it shall be brought to light," is wrong; it is equivalent to that of Gerhard: *simplicissime accipitur de visitatione illa divina, qua Deus piorum, innocentiam variis modis in lucem producit.* — Akin to this is the view held by some of the scholastics, that ἐπισκοπή is to be understood of the trial of the Christians by affliction; see Lorinus *in loc.*

REMARK. — At variance with this explanation is that given by Schott, who interprets the passage in this way: "In order that the heathen may glorify God in the day of judgment, from this that (by the fact that) they slander you as evil-doers in consequence of your good works, of which they are witnesses." The idea that the undeserved calumnies of the heathen serve at last to the glorification of God, is in itself right and appropriate as a basis for the exhortation given in the context. The resolution, too, of ἐν ᾧ into ἐν τούτῳ, ὅτι, has grammatically nothing against it; Meyer even allows it to be possible in Rom. ii. 1; cf. Heb. ii. 18, where Lünemann has recourse to a like construction, though with a somewhat inadequate explanation. Still, more than one objection may be urged against this interpretation: (1) A reference is given to δοξάζειν different from what is contained in καταλαλεῖν, inasmuch as it is taken, as in 1 Cor. vi. 20, in the sense of "by action;" (2) δοξάζειν must be thought of as something which the heathen bring about "without knowing or willing" it, whereas the apostle does not let fall a hint of any such nearer definition; (3) δοξάζειν can only in a loose sense be conceived of as an act of the heathen; it is simply the result of what they do (of their καταλαλεῖν); and (4) In comparing these words with those of Christ (Matt. v. 16): ὅπως ἴδωσιν ὑμῶν τὰ καλὰ ἔργα καὶ δοξάσωσι τὸν πατέρα ὑμῶν τὸν ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς, the thought cannot be got rid of that Peter had this passage here in his mind. Schott's objection, that "δοξάζειν τὸν Θεόν is a strange and, specially here, a doubly inappropriate expression for conversion to Christianity, whilst the connection of the verb thus taken with ἐξ, as equal to 'in consequence of,' is a hard and inelegant construction," amounts to very little, since in the acceptance of the passage which he calls in question the verb is by no means made to bear any such meaning.

Vv. 13, 14. The apostle now goes on to name the different relations of life, ordained of God, in which the Christian should show his holy walk. First of all, an exhortation to obey those in authority. — ὑποτάγητε: the aor. pass. is used here, as it often is, with a middle, not a passive — as Wiesinger thinks — force. It is not: "be made subject," but "make yourselves subject" (cf. ταπεινώθητε, chap. v. 6).¹ The more liable liberty in Christ was to be misunderstood by the heathen, and even to be abused by the Christians themselves, the more important it was that the latter should have inculcated

¹ Winer is wrong in attributing (p. 245 [E. T., 261]) a passive signification to this ταπεινώθητε, as also to προσεκλήθη, in Acts v.

36, but is right in ascribing it to παρεδόθητε, Rom. vi. 17.

upon them as one of their principal duties this *ὑποτάσσεσθαι* (ver. 18, chap. iii. 1) in all circumstances of life. — *πάση ἀνθρωπίνῃ κτίσει*: *κτίσις* is here, in accordance with the signification peculiar to the verb *κτίζειν*: “to establish, to set up,” the *ordinance*, or *institution* (“an ordinance resting on a particular arrangement,” Hofmann). In connection with the attribute *ἀνθρωπίνῃ*, this expression seems to denote an ordinance or institution established by men (so most expositors, and formerly in this commentary). But it must be noted that *κτίζειν* (and its derivatives) are never applied to human, but only to divine agency; besides, the demand that they should submit themselves to every human ordinance would be asking too much. It is therefore preferable to understand, with Hofmann, by the term, an ordinance (of God) applying to human relations (“regulating the social life of man”).¹ By the subsequent *εἴτε . . . εἴτε*, the expression is referred in the first instance to the magistracy; but this does not justify the interpretation of it as equal directly to “authority,” or even persons in authority (Gerhard: *concretive et personaliter*: *homines, qui magistratum gerunt*). That Peter’s exposition of the idea had direct reference to persons in authority, is to be explained from the circumstance that the institution possessed reality only in the existence of those individuals.² At variance with this view is De Wette’s (following Erasmus, Estius, Pott) interpretation of the expression: “to every human creature, i.e., to all men.” Not only, however, the singular circumlocution: *κτίσις ἀνθρωπίνῃ* for *ἀνθρωπος* (for which De Wette wrongly quotes Mark xvi. 15, and Col. i. 23), but the very idea that Christians should be subject to all men, — and in support of it no appeal can be made either to chap. v. 5, or to the following exhortation: *πάντας τηρήσατε*, — is decisive against this view.³ The fact that Peter places the general term *πάσῃ κτίσις* first, is explained most naturally in this way: that it was his intention to speak not of the magistracy merely, but also of the other institutions of human life. — The motive for the submission here demanded is given by *δὲ κύριον*, i.e., *Χριστόν* (not *Θεόν*, as Schott thinks), which must be taken to mean: “because such is the will of the Lord,” or, with Hofmann: “out of consideration due to Christ, to whom the opposite would bring dishonor.” The latter, however, is the less likely interpretation. Still less natural is it to say, with Wiesinger, that this adjunct points to the *θεῖον* in ordinances under which human life is passed. Incorrectly Huss: *propter imitationem Dei*, i.e., *Christi*. — In the enumeration which follows, the apostle is guided by the historical conditions of his time. It must be remarked that *ὑποτάσσεσθαι* is

¹ This view avoids the certainly arbitrary interpretation given, for example, by Flavius, who applies the expression specially to life connected with the state. He says: “*dieltur humana ordinatio ideo quia politiae mundi non sunt speciali verbo Dei formatae, ut vera religio, sed magis ab hominibus ipsorumque industria ordinatae.*”

² It is arbitrary to regard *κτίσις* (with Luther, Osiander, etc.) as meaning the laws given by the magistrates.

³ Brückner endeavors, indeed, to defend De Wette’s interpretation: yet he decides to understand the expression in question as “*every ordinance of human civil society*,” and solves the difficulty presented by the adjective *ἀνθρωπίνῃ* (comp. with Rom. xiii. 1) by remarking that “the ordinances of national life which have been developed historically and by human means possess a divine element in them.”

inculcated not only with regard to the institutions of the state, but to the persons in whom these are embodied, and this quite unconditionally. Even in cases where obedience, according to the principle laid down in Acts iv. 19, is to be refused, the duty of the *υποτάσσεσθαι* must not be infringed upon. — *εἴτε βασιλεῖ*]. *βασιλεύς* is here the name given to the Roman emperor; cf. Joseph., *De Bello Jud.*, v. 13, § 6. Bengel: *Caesari, erant enim provinciae romanae, in quas mittebat Petrus.* — *ὡς ὑπερέχοντι*: *ὡς* here also assigns the reason; *ὑπερέχειν* expresses, as in Rom. xiii. 1, simply the idea of sovereign power; *non est comparatio cum aliis magistratibus* (Calvin). In the Roman Empire the emperor was not merely the highest ruler, but properly speaking the *only* one, all the other authorities being simply the organs through which he exercised his sway. — Ver. 14. *εἴτε ἡγεμόσων*]. *ἡγεμόνες praesides provinciarum, qui a Caesare mittebantur in provincias* (Gerh.). — *ὡς δὲ αὐτοῦ*, etc.: *δὲ αὐτοῦ* does not, as Gerh., Aretius, and others take it, refer to *κύριον*, but to *βασιλεῖ*. The *ἡγεμ.*, although *ὑπερέχοντες* too, are so not in the same absolute sense as the *βασιλεύς*. They are so in relation to their subordinates, but not to the *βασιλεύς*. — *εἰς ἐκδίκησιν κακοποιῶν, ἐπαινοῦν δὲ ἀγαθοποιῶν* is joined grammatically to *πεμπομένοις*, not to *ὑπερέχοντι* also (Hofm., Schott); yet, from the fact that the *ἡγεμόνες* are sent by the *βασιλεὺς εἰς ἐκδίκησιν*, κ.τ.λ., it is implied that the latter, too, has an office with respect to *ἐκδίκησις*, κ.τ.λ.¹ — Oecumenius arbitrarily narrows the thought when he says: *ἔδειξε καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ Πέτρος τίσι καὶ ποίοις ἀρχοῦσιν ὑποτάσσεσθαι δεῖ, ὅτι τοῖς τὸ δίκαιον ἐκδικοῦσιν.* The apostle insists rather, *without reserve*, on submission to the *ἡγεμόνες*, because (not *if*) they are sent by the emperor to administer justice.² — *ἐκδίκησις*, here, as often, “*punishment*”; *ἐπαινος*, not precisely “*reward*,” but “*laudatory recognition*.” — *ἀγαθοποιός* is to be found only in later authors, in N. T. *ἄπ. λεγ.* The subs. occurs chap. iv. 19.

Ver. 15. *ὅτι* gives the ground of the exhortation: *ὑποτάγητε*, κ.τ.λ. — *οὕτως ἐστὶν τὸ θέλημα τοῦ Θεοῦ*: with *οὕτως*; cf. Winer, p. 434 (E. T., 465), Buttm., p. 115 (E. T., 131): “*of such a nature is the will of God.*” Schott gives the sense correctly: “*In this wise is it with the will of God.*” The position of the words is opposed to a connection of *οὕτως* with *ἀγαθοποιούντας* (Wiesinger, Hofmann). — *ἀγαθοποιούντας*; *sc.*, *ὑμῶς*; *ἀγαθοποιεῖν*, in Mark iii. 4; Acts xiv. 17, the word has reference to deeds of benevolence. Here, on the other hand, it is used in a general sense: to do good, with special reference to the fulfilment of the duties towards those in authority. — *φομοῦν τὴν τῶν ἀφρόνων ἀνθρώπων ἀγνωσίαν*; *φομοῦν* (cf. 1 Tim. v. 18) here in the cognate sense of *to put to silence*, Wiesinger; “*the ἀγνωσία* is here conceived of as speaking; cf. v. 12: *καταλαλοῦσι ὑμ. ὡς κακοποιῶν.*” — *ἀγνωσία* (except here, only in 1 Cor. xv. 34) is the self-caused lack of any comprehension of the Christian life. Because

¹ Hofmann is consequently wrong in asserting that in this connection “the duty of submission to him who makes over the exercise of his power to others is derived from and based alone on his possession of that power, whilst submission to those to whom that power has been entrusted originated in, and is

founded on, the moral purpose for which that is done.”

² Calvin very aptly puts it: “*Objici possit; reges et alios magistratus saepe sua potentia abuti; respondeo, tyrannos et similes non facere suo abusu, quia maneat semper firma Dei ordinatio.*”

they are without this, they in their foolishness (hence *ἁφρόνων ἀνθρώπων*) imagine that its characteristic is 'not *ἀγαθοποιεῖν*, but *κακοποιεῖν*. Beda incorrectly limits *οἱ ἄφρονες ἄνθρωποι* to those persons in authority; but the reference is rather quite general to the *καταλαλοῦντες*, ver. 12.

Ver. 16. *ὡς ἐλεύθεροι* is not, as Lachm., Jachmann, Steiger, Frommüller think, to be joined with what follows (ver. 17),¹ but with a preceding thought; either with *ἀγαθοποιῶντας* (Beda, Luther, Calvin, Wiesinger, Hofm.), or with *ὑποτάγητε* (Chrys., Oecum., Gerhard, Bengel, De Wette, Schott, etc.). The latter of these connections deserves the preference, not because in the former a change of construction would take place, but because the special point to be brought out here was, that the freedom of the Christians was to be manifested in submission to (heathen) authorities. What follows shows this, inasmuch as those Christians who had not attained unto true freedom might easily be led to justify their opposition to those in power on the ground of the liberty which belonged to them in Christ. *ὡς ἐλεύθεροι* states the position which the Christians are to take up inwardly towards the authorities; their subjection is not that of *δοῦλοι*, since they recognize them as a divine ordinance for the attainment of moral ends.²— *καὶ μὴ ὡς ἐπικάλυμμα ἔχοντες τῆς κακίας τὴν ἐλευθερίαν*]. *καὶ* is exegetical: "and that," since what follows defines the idea *ἐλεύθεροι* first negatively and then positively. — *ὡς* belongs not to *ἐπικάλυμμα*, but to *ἔχοντες*: "and that not as those who have." — *ἐπικάλυμμα* is the more remote, *τὴν ἐλευθερίαν* the proximate, object of *ἔχοντες*: "who have the *ἐλευθερία* as the *ἐπικάλυμμα* τ. κακ." — *ἐπικάλυμμα*, *ἅπ. λεγ.*; for its original meaning, cf. Exod. xxvi. 14, LXX.; here used metaphorically (cf. Kypke, *in loc.*). The sense is: "not as those to whom their freedom serves as a covering for their *κακία*" (cf. 2 Pet. ii. 19; Gal. v. 13), i.e., who seek to conceal their wickedness by boasting of their Christian freedom. This is the exact reverse of the Pharisaism of those who seek to conceal the wickedness of the heart by an outward conformity to the law. — *ἀλλ' ὡς δοῦλοι Θεοῦ* expresses positively the nature of the truly free. True liberty consists in the *δουλεία Θεοῦ* (Rom. vi. 16, ff.); it refers back to the *τὸ θέλημα τοῦ Θεοῦ*, and further still to *διὰ κύριον*.

Ver. 17. Four hortatory clauses suggested to Peter by the term *ἀγαθοποιῶντας*; in the last he returns, by way of conclusion, to the principal theme. In the first three there is a climax.³ — *πάντας τιμῆσατε*: *πάντας* must not, with

¹ Hofmann justly says: "We cannot think of joining ver. 16 with ver. 17, for its contents would not suit *πάντας τιμῆσατε*, — even should it be connected with this only (Frommüller), which is quite impossible, — not to speak of *τὴν ἀδελφότητα οὐ τὸν Θεὸν φοβεῖσθε*."

² It is not probable that Peter here refers, as Weiss (p. 349) thinks, to the words of Christ (Matt. xvii. 27), since they apply to circumstances altogether different from those mentioned here; see Meyer *in loc.*

³ To distribute these four exhortations over "the two provinces of life, the natural and civil, and the spiritual and ecclesiastical com-

munities" (Schott), is warranted neither by what precedes nor by any thing the clauses themselves contain. — Hofmann, who denies the climax, determines the relation of the four maxims to each other in a highly artificial manner. He holds that the second sentence is in antithesis to the first, and the fourth to the third; that the first is akin to the fourth, and the second to the third; that in the first stress is laid on *πάντας*, whilst in the second, on the other hand, it lies not on *ἀδελφότητα*, but on *ἀγαπάτε*, and that in the first antithesis it is the *first* member that is emphatic, in the second it is the *last*.

Bengel, be limited to those *quibus honos debetur*, Rom. xiii. 7,¹ nor to those who belong to the same state (Schott); it expresses totality without any exception. — *τιμᾶν* is not equivalent to *ὑποτάσσεσθαι* (De Wette); but neither is it equal to *civiliter tractare* (Bengel); the former is too strong, the latter too weak; it is the opposite, positively stated, of *καταφρονεῖν*, and means: to recognize the worth (*τιμῆ*) which any one possesses, and to act on the recognition (Brückner, Weiss, Wiesinger, Schott). This exhortation is all the more important for the Christian, that his consciousness of his own dignity can easily betray him into a depreciation of others. It refers to the *τιμῆ* which is due to man as man, and not first in respect of any particular position he may hold.² — *τὴν ἀδελφότητα ἀγαπάτε*]. *ἀδελφότης*, also in chap. v. 9, corresponding to our "brotherhood," i.e., the totality of the Christian brethren, cf. *ἱεράτευμα*, vv. 5, 9. The apparent contradiction of Matt. v. 44, here presented, where love to enemies is also enjoined, is to be explained on the following principle: that the *ἀγάπη* is differently conditioned, according as it has different objects. In perfect harmony with its inmost nature, it can exist only between Christians, for only among them is there community of life in God; cf. chap. i. 22. Pott interprets *ἀγαπᾶν* here superficially by "entertain good-will to." — *τὸν Θεὸν φοβεῖσθε*: cf. chap. i. 17; a command not only of the Old, but of the New Testament, inasmuch as a lowly awe before the holy God is an essential feature of the filial relation to God. — *τὸν βασιλέα τιμᾶτε*]. Reiteration of the command (ver. 13) as a conclusion to the whole passage; cf. Prov. xxiv. 21, *φοβοῦ τὸν Θεὸν, νιῆ, καὶ βασιλέα*. — *τιμᾶτε* has here the same meaning as previously: "show to the king *the* respect which pertains to him as king;" what that is, the apostle has explained in ver. 13. Hornejus³ incorrectly thinks that in the conjunction of the last two commands, he can here discover an indication of the limits by which obedience to the king is bounded. — The difference in the tenses of the imperative, in the first exhortation the imperat. aor., in the three others the imperat. pres., is to be regarded as accidental, rather than as in any way arising from the substance of the command.⁴

Ver. 18. An exhortation to the slaves, extending from this verse to the end of the chapter. — *οἱ οἰκέται*. *οἰκέτης*, properly speaking, "a domestic," a milder expression for *δοῦλος*. It is improbable that Peter employed this term in order to include the freedmen who had remained in the master's house (Steiger). — *οἱ οἰκ.* is vocative; nor is chap. i. 3 (as Steiger thinks) opposed to this. — *ὑποτασσόμενοι*]. It is quite arbitrary to supply *ἕτε* (Oecumenius, etc.), or to assert that the participle is used here instead of the imperative. The participle rather shows that the exhortation is conceived

¹ In like manner, Hornejus: "non de omnibus absolute loquitur, quasi omnes homines etiam pessimi honorandi sint, sed de iis, quibus honor propter potestatem quam habent, competit."

² Flacius: "unicuique suum locum et debita officia exhibete."

³ Explicat Petr. quomodo Caesari parendum

sit, nempe ut Dei interim timori nihil derogetur.

⁴ Hofmann's view is purely arbitrary: "that in the foremost clause the aorist is put because, in the first place, and chiefly, it is required to honor all; and after this, that the Christian should love his brethren in Christ." Nor can it be at all supported by Wiener's remarks, p. 294 (E. T., 314).

of as dependent on a thought already expressed; not on ver. 17 (De Wette), but on ver. 13, which vv. 11 and 12 serve to introduce; ὑποτάγητε . . . κύριον, the institution of the household implied in the relation of servant to master, is comprehended in the general term πᾶσα ἀνθρῶπ. κτίσις.—ἐν παντὶ φόβῳ]. φόβος (*vid.* i. 17) is stronger than *reverentia*; it denotes the shrinking from transgressing the master's will, based on the consciousness of subjection; cf. Eph. vi. 5.¹ Doubtless this shrinking is in the case of the Christian based on the fear of God; but the word φόβος does not directly mean such fear, as Weiss (p. 169) holds and seeks to prove, especially from the circumstance that Peter in chap. iii. 6, 14, condemns the fear of man, forgetting, however, that this fear too may be of different kinds; cf. *in loco*.—παντι is intensive. πῶς φόβος is *every kind of fear*; a fear wanting in nothing that goes to make up true fear.—τοῖς δεσπόταις]. Cf. 1 Tim. vi. 1; Tit. ii. 9, equals τοῖς κυριοῖς, Eph. vi. 5; Col. iii. 22.—οὐ μόνον τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς καὶ ἐπιεικεῖσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς σκολιῶσι]. The moral conduct of the servant, which consists in ὑποτάσσεσθαι towards the master, must remain unchanged, whatever the character of the latter may be; the chief emphasis, however, rests here on ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς σκ.—ἀγαθοὶ here is equal to "*kind*;" for ἐπιεικής, cf. 1 Tim. iii. 3; it does not mean "*yielding*" (Fronmüller), but, properly speaking, one who "*acts with propriety*," then "*gentle*."—σκολιός, literally "*crooked*," "*bent*," the opposite of *straight*, denotes metaphorically the *perverse* disposition; Phil. ii. 15, synonymous with *δυσπραμμένος*; in Prov. xxviii. 18, ὁ σκολιῶς ἰδοῖς πορευόμενος forms the antithesis to ὁ πορευόμενος δικαίως (cf. Luke iii. 5). It has the same force in the classics (Athen., xv. p. 695; σκολιῶ φρονεῖν, opp. to εὐθεῶ φρονεῖν). It denotes, therefore, such masters as conduct themselves, not in a right, but in a *perverse* manner, towards their servants—are hard and unjust to them; Luther's "*capricious*" is inexact.²

Ver. 19. τοῦτο γὰρ χάρις, εἰ]. The ground of the exhortation. τοῦτο refers to the clause beginning with εἰ.—χάρις has not the special meaning "*grace*" here, as if it were to be explained, either with the older commentators, *gratiam concilians*; or as if by it were to be understood "*the gift of grace*" (Steiger: "*it is to be regarded as grace, if one can suffer for the sake of God*;" so, too, Schott), or "*the condition of grace*" (Wiesinger: "*in the ὑπομένειν is manifested the actual condition of grace*"); for this expression is not parallel with κλέος, ver. 12: and how can a summons be issued in a manner so direct, to the performance of a duty, by representing it either as a gift of grace or a proof of a state of grace? Besides, Wiesinger alters the term "*grace*" into "*sign of grace*."—Some commentators, on account of ver. 20, explain χάρις as synonymous with κλέος, but without any linguistic justification.³ In profane Greek, χάρις denotes either the *charm* or the *loveliness*, or also the *favor* which one person has for another (to which are linked on the meanings, expressions of good-will and thanks). Both senses

¹ Thus, too, in substance, Schott: "Fear in general, as it is determined by the circumstances here mentioned."

² That Peter made special reference to heathen masters, lies in the nature of the cir-

cumstances, but is not to be concluded from the adjunct. σκολιός (as opposed to Schott).

³ Thus already Oecumenius (Calvin: "idem valet nomen gratiae quod laudis; qui patienter ferunt injurias, illa laude digni sunt.")

are to be found in the Scriptures.¹ If the first signification be adopted, the enduring of the adversity of which Peter here speaks is characterized as something lovely; and so Cremer (see under *χάρις*, p. 576) seems to take it. But it is more natural to hold by the second sense, and to explain “*this is favor*,” as equal to “*this causes favor*.” Several interpreters explain *χάρις* as equal directly to “*delight*,” substituting for the substantive the adjective “*well-pleasing*,” and supplying *παρὰ τῷ Θεῷ* from ver. 20. Thus Gerhard: *hoc est Deo gratum et acceptum*; De Wette: “*Favor with God, i.e., well-pleasing before God*;” so, too, Hofmann. But both of these are open to objection. Hofmann no doubt gives as the ground of his supplement: “*that the slave who lived up to the apostle’s injunction has to look for the approval of none*.” This is, however, surely an unjustifiable assertion. It is not clear why Peter did not add the words supplied if he had them in his mind; *χάρις* and *κλέος* in ver. 20 are therefore—in consideration of vv. 12 and 15—to be taken quite generally. The following clause indicates a good behavior, by which the *καταλαλία* of the heathen is to be put to silence. *εἰ δὲ συνέδησαν Θεοῦ ὑποφέρει, κ.τ.λ.*] *εἰ* refers back to *τοῦτο*; *διὰ συνέδησαν Θεοῦ* is placed first by way of emphasis. *συνείδησις Θεοῦ* is neither “*God’s knowledge of us*” (Morus: *quia Deus conscius est tuarum miseriarum*; similarly Froumüller: “*on account of the knowledge shared by God, since God knows all*”), nor is it “*conscientiousness before God*” (Stolz); but *Θεοῦ* is the object. genit. (cf. 1 Cor. viii. 7; Heb. x. 2), therefore the meaning is: the (duty-compelling) consciousness of God.² A metonymy does not require to be assumed (Grotius: *per metonymiam objecti dicitur conscientia ejus, quod quis Deo debet*). Steiger introduces what is foreign to it when he extends the idea so as to include the conscious knowledge of the divine recompense. In *διὰ συνειδ. Θεοῦ* is expressed substantially the same thought as in *ὡς Θεοῦ δούλοι*, ver. 16, and *διὰ τ. κύριων*, ver. 13; *διὰ τὴν συνέδησαν* without *Θεοῦ* is to be found in Rom. xiii. 5.—*ὑποφέρει τις λύπας*]. *ὑποφέρειν*: “*to bear the burden put on one*;” the opposite of succumbing under a burden, cf. 1 Cor. x. 13; 2 Tim. iii. 11; nevertheless, the apostle seems here to have in mind more the antithesis to being provoked to anger and stubbornness (Hofmann).—*λύπαι*, here, outward afflictions.—*πάσῃων ἀδίκως*, “*whilst (not although) he suffers wrong (from the master, i.e., undeserved on the part of the slave)*.”—It is not suffering itself, but *patient endurance* in the midst of *undeserved suffering*, and that *διὰ συνέδησαν Θεοῦ*, which Peter calls a *χάρις*.—This thought, general in itself, is here applied to the relation of servant to master.

Ver. 20. *ποῖον γὰρ κλέος*]. Gerhard: *interrogatio respondet h. l. negationi*; this interrogation brings out the nothingness, or at least the little value, of the object in question; cf. Jas. iv. 14; Luke vi. 32.—*κλέος*, not *sc. ἐνώπιον τοῦ Θεοῦ* (Pott), but quite generally, for the thought “*refers back to the point of view, stated in vv. 12-15, from which this exhortation is given*” (Wie-

¹ *χάρις* has the first meaning (Ps. xlv. 3; Prov. i. 9, x. 32, etc.; also Eccius. vii. 19, etc.; in the N. T., Luke iv. 22; Col. iv. 6, etc.). The second signification (Prov. xxii. 1, etc.; in the N. T., Luke i. 30, ii. 52; Acts ii. 47,

etc.). Cf. besides, Cremer and Wahl: *Clavis libr. V. T. apocryphi*.

² Calov: “*quia conscius est, id Deum velle et Deo gratum esse*.” So, too, De Wette, Schott, etc.

singer). — *εἰ ἁμαρτάνοντες καὶ κολαφίζομενοι ὑπομενεῖτε*]. The two participles stand in the closest connection with each other, so that *ἁμαρτάνειν* is to be conceived as the cause of the *κολαφίζεσθαι*. Luther's translation is accordingly correct: "if ye suffer punishment on account of your evil deeds;" the only fault to be found with this is, that it weakens the force of the idea *ὑπομένειν*. — *ὑπομένειν* is synonymous with *ὑποφέρειν*; the sense is: "it is no glory to show patience in the suffering of deserved punishment." The view of De Wette, that Peter referred only "to the reluctant, dull endurance of a criminal who cannot escape his punishment," misses the apostle's meaning, and is correctly rejected by Brückner and Wiesinger. Steiger remarks justly: "that, when any one endures patiently deserved punishment, he is only performing a duty binding on him by every law of right and authority." *ὑπομενεῖτε* is in the future with reference to the standpoint of the exhortation (Wiesinger). — *κολαφίζειν*: *apud LXX. non occurrit, in N. T. generaliter pro plagis ac percussionibus*. Matt. xxvi. 67; 1 Cor. iv. 11; 2 Cor. xii. 7 (Gerh.); the strict signification is "to give blows with the fist, or slaps on the ear." Bengel: *roena servorum eaque subita*. — *ἀλλ' εἰ ἀγαθοποιῶντες καὶ πάσχοντες ὑπομενεῖτε*]. The interpretation of Erasmus: *si quum beneficiatis et TAMEN affligamini, suffertis*, is incorrect, for between *ἀγαθοπ.* and *πάσχ.* there exists the same relationship as between *ἁμαρτάνοντες* and *κολαφίζομενοι*;¹ Luther, correctly: "if ye suffer on account of good-doing;" cf. iii. 17. — *τοῦτο γὰρ χάρις παρὰ Θεῷ* before these words — *γὰρ* is the correct reading — the apodosis taken out of *ποῖον κλέος*, "this is true praise," must be added to what precedes, and these words form the basis of an argument in which *τοῦτο* refers to *εἰ ἀγαθοποιῶντες . . . ὑπομενεῖτε*. The meaning is: because this in God's sight is a *χάρις* (not equal to "in the judgment of God," cf. Luke ii. 52), therefore it is a *κλέος*.

Ver. 21 gives the ground of the exhortation to bear undeserved suffering patiently, by a reference to the sufferings of Christ. — *εἰς τοῦτο γὰρ ἐκλήθητε*. *εἰς τοῦτο* refers to *εἰ ἀγαθοποιῶντες . . . ὑπομενεῖτε*. Many interpreters incorrectly make it apply only to *suffering* as such; but, as Hemming rightly remarks: *omnes pii vocati sunt, ut patienter injuriam ferant*. — The construction with *εἰς* occurs frequently; cf. Col. iii. 15; 2 Thess. ii. 14. — In harmony with the connection, *οἱ οἰκέται* is to be thought of as the subject to *ἐκλήθητε*; accordingly it is the slaves in the first instance, not the Christians in general, who are addressed (as in chap. iii. 9, 14, 17); but as this *κληθῆναι* applies to them not as slaves but as believers, it holds true at the same time of all Christians. — *ὅτι καὶ Χριστὸς ἔπαθεν ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν*]. *ὅτι*: such suffering is part of a Christian's calling, *for Christ also suffered*: *ἔπαθεν* is here the emphatic word; and with it *καὶ* also must be joined (which Frommüller erroneously interprets by "even"). Wiesinger incorrectly takes *καὶ* with *ἔπαθεν*

¹ Nor is this relation sufficiently perceived by Schott in his explanation: "If they show patience under ill-treatment which accompanies good conduct." In urging against the interpretation given, that "if *ἀγαθοποιεῖν* apply to the labor of servants, then, that

which the slave suffers is not caused by his actions," Hofmann has failed to observe (1) that the context does not render the idea of servants' work only necessary; (2) that the well-doing of the Christian was not always in harmony with heathen views (cf. chap. iv. 4).

ἵπὲρ ἡμῶν in this sense, that, as Christ suffered for us, "so we should endure affliction for Him, for His sake, and for His honor and glory in the world," thus introducing a thought foreign to the context. The obligation to suffer under which we who are Christ's people are laid, from the very fact that Christ also *suffered*, is for us all the greater that the sufferings of Christ were ἵπὲρ ἡμῶν (not ἀνθ' ἡμῶν, but "for our advantage"), and therefore such as enable us to follow the example which He has left us in His sufferings. Inasmuch as ἵπὲρ ἡμῶν implies that Christ suffered not for His own sins, but for ours, we are no doubt justified in recognizing these sufferings as undeserved, but not in concluding, with Hofmann, that ἵπὲρ ἡμῶν is meant to mark *only* the undeservedness of Christ's sufferings. — ἡμῖν ὑπολιμπάνων ὑπογραμμῶν]. ὑπολιμπάνω, ἄπ. λεγ. Another form of ὑπολείπω (used of the leaving behind at death, Judith viii. 7). Bengel: *in abitu ad patrem. ὑπογραμμῶς* (ἄπ. λεγ.): *specimen, quod imitentur, ut pictores novitiis exemplaria dant, ad quae inter pingendum respiciant*: equivalent in sense to ὑπόδειγμα, John xiii. 15 (τύπος; 2 Thess. iii. 9). It is not Christ's life in general that is here presented by way of example, but the patience which He showed in the midst of undeserved sufferings.¹ The participle is connected with ἔπαθεν ἵπ. ἡμ. as giving the nearer definition of the latter: He thus suffered, as in doing so to leave you an example, withal to the end that, etc.² — ἵνα ἐπακολουθήσητε τοῖς ἰχνεσιν αὐτοῦ]. *Sicut prior metaphora a pictoribus et scriptoribus, ita haec posterior petita est a viae duce* (Gerhard); with ἐπακολ. cf. 1 Tim. v. 10, 24. — ἰχνος, besides here, in Rom. iv. 12 (στοιχεῖν τοῖς ἰχνεσι) and 2 Cor. xii. 18 (περιπατεῖν τοῖς ἰχνεσι).

Ver. 22. The first feature in the exemplary nature of Christ's sufferings: His innocence. — After Isa. liii. 9, LXX.: ἀνομίαν οὐκ ἐποίησε, οὐδὲ δόλον ἐν τῷ στόματι αὐτοῦ (Cod. Alex., οὐδὲ εὐρέθη δόλος ἐν τῷ στ. αὐτοῦ). Gerhard: *nec verbo nec facto unquam peccavit*. The second half of the sentence expresses truth in speech. With δόλος, cf. chap. ii. 1; John i. 48. For the difference between εὐρίσκεισθαι and εἶναι, cf. Winer, p. 572 (E. T., 616).

Ver. 23. The second feature: the patience of Christ in His sufferings. A reference, however slight, to Isa. liii. 7, cannot but be recognized. — ὃς λοιδορούμενος οὐκ ἀντελοιδορεῖ, πάσχων οὐκ ἠπέιλει]. De Wette and Wiesinger rightly draw attention to the climax between λοιδορ. and πάσχων, ἀντελοιδ. and ἠπέιλει; λοιδορία omnis generis injuriae verbales; παθήματα omnis generis injuriae reales (Gerhard). — ἀντιλοιδ. ἄπ. λεγ.; cf. ἀντιμετρέω, Luke vi. 38. — ἠπέιλει is here used of threat of vengeful recompense. The announcements of divine judgment on unbelievers, to which Christ more than once gave expression, are of a different nature, and cannot be considered as an ἀπειλεῖν, in the sense in which that word is here used. Comp. with this passage the exhor-

¹ Wherever Scripture presents Christ as an example, it does so almost always with reference to His self-abasement in suffering and death (Phll. ii. 5; John xiii. 15, xv. 12; 1 John iii. 16; Heb. xii. 2). Only in 1 John ii. 6 is Christ presented as an example in the more general sense.

² Hofmann wrongly asserts that "ἵνα stauds

only in place of an infinitive clause, as after ἐντολή (John xiii. 34), βουλή (Acts xxvii. 42)," inasmuch as "ὑπογραμμῶς is no more than a *direction* to do likewise." But this interpretation of ὑπογραμμῶς is erroneous, and therefore ἵνα ἐπακολουθήσητε cannot be resolved into an infinitive clause.

tation of the apostle, chap. iii. 9. — *παρεδίδον δὲ τῷ κρίνοντι δικαίως*]. *παρεδίδον* not in a reflexive sense: "He committed Himself" (Winer, p. 549 [E. T., 590]; De Wette),¹ neither is *causam suam* (Gerhard, etc.) nor *κρίσιν* (from *κρίνοντι*) to be supplied; the supplement is rather *λοιδοροῦσθαι* and *πίσχειν* (Wiesinger, Schott). Luther's translation is good: "He left it to Him."² — Didymus arbitrarily understands *παρεδίδον* of Christ's prayer for His enemies;³ the meaning is rather, that Christ left it to the God who judges justly, to determine what should be the consequences of the injustice done to Him on those who wrought it. That His desire was only that they should be punished, is not contained in *παρεδίδον* (similarly Hofmann). Consequently the reference formerly made in this commentary to Jer. xi. 20, xx. 12, as illustrative of the passage, is erroneous. With *τῷ δικαίως κρίνοντι*, cf. chap. i. 17: *τὸν ἄπροσωπολήπτως κρίνοντα*, "a direct designation of God, whose just judgment is the outcome of His being" (Wiesinger).

Ver. 24. A further expansion of the *ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν*, ver. 21. — *ὃς τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἡμῶν αὐτὸς ἀνήνεγκεν*, κ.τ.λ.: "*Who himself bore our sins on His body to the tree.*" — *ὃς*, the third relative clause, though a climax too, cannot fail to be recognized here: He suffered innocently, — patiently (not requiting evil for evil), — vicariously, for us, still it must not be asserted that this third clause predicates any thing of Christ in which He can be an example for us (Hofmann); the thought here expressed itself contradicts this assertion. — The phraseology of this verse arose from a reference to the passage in Isa. liii., and the actual fulfilment of the prophecy herein contained. The words of that chapter which were chiefly present to the mind of the apostle are those of ver. 12, LXX., *καὶ αὐτὸς ἁμαρτίας πολλῶν ἀνήνεγκε* (𐤀𐤒𐤓); cf. also ver. 11: *καὶ τὰς ἁμαρτίας αὐτῶν αὐτὸς ἀνοίσει* (𐤀𐤒𐤓), and ver. 4: *ὁστος τ. ἁμαρτίας ἡμῶν φέρει* (𐤀𐤒𐤓). The Hebrew 𐤀𐤒𐤓 with the accus. of the idea of sin, therefore "to bear sin," is equivalent to, "to suffer the punishment for sin," either one's own or that of another. Now, as *ἀνήνεγκε* is in the above-quoted passage a translation of 𐤀𐤒𐤓, its meaning is: "He suffered the punishment for the sins of many."⁴ — This suffering of punishment is, in the case of

¹ In Mark iv. 29, too, to which De Wette appeals, *παρεδιδόναι* has no reflexive force; see Meyer on this passage.

² The Vulg. strangely translates, "tradebat judicant se *injuste*;" according to which Lorinus interprets: "tradidit se Christus sponte propriaque voluntate tum Judæis, tum Pilato ad mortem oblatum." Cyprian (*De Bono Patientiæ*) and Paulinus (*Ep.* 2) quotes the passage as it stands in the Vulg. Augustin (*Tract. in John* xxi.) and Fulgentius (*Ad Trasimarch.*, lib. I.), on the other hand, have *juste*.

³ From the fact that Christ's prayer is not mentioned here, De Wette unwarrantably concludes that it was unknown to the writer of the epistle.

⁴ It admits of no doubt that 𐤀𐤒𐤓 in connection with 𐤀𐤒𐤓 or 𐤀𐤒𐤓 has the meaning

above given; cf. Lev. xix. 17, xx. 19, xxiv. 15; Num. v. 31, xiv. 34; Ezek. iv. 5, xiv. 10, xvi. 58, xxiii. 35, etc. (Lam. v. 7, 𐤀𐤒𐤓); generally, indeed, the LXX. translate this 𐤀𐤒𐤓 by *λαμβάνειν*, but also by *κομίζειν* and *ἀποφέρειν*; in the passage quoted, Isa. liii. 4, by *φέρειν*; in Num. xiv. 33, as in Isa. liii. 12, by *ἀναφέρειν*. This proves how unwarranted Hofmann (*Schriftbeweis*, II., 1, p. 485, 2d ed.) is in saying, "that in view of the Greek translation of Isa. liii. 11, 12, it is arbitrary to assume that *ἀναφέρειν* means simply 'to carry.'" Of course every one knows that in and of itself *ἀναφέρειν* does not mean "to carry;" but from this it does not follow that the LXX. did not use it in this sense in the phrase above alluded to, the more so that they attribute to the word no meaning opposed to its classical usage; cf. Thuc. iii. 18, *κινδύνας ἀναφέρ.*;

the Servant of God, of such a nature that by it those whose the sin is, and for whom He endures the punishment, become free from that punishment; it is therefore a vicarious suffering.¹ Since, then, Peter plainly had this passage in his mind, the thought here expressed can be no other than this: that Christ in our stead has suffered the punishment we have merited through our sins, and so has borne our sins. But with this the subsequent ἐπὶ τὸ ξύλον, which means not "on the tree," but "on to the tree," does not seem to harmonize. Consequently it has been proposed to take ἀναφέρειν in the sense which it has in the phrase: ἀναφέρειν τι ἐπὶ τὸ θυσιαστήριον (cf. Jas. ii. 21; Lev. xiv. 20; 2 Chron. xxxv. 16; Bar. i. 10; 1 Macc. iv. 53); cf. ver. 5, where τὸ ξύλον would be conceived as the altar.² But against this interpretation, besides the fact that ἀναφέρ. is thus here taken in a sense different from that which it has in Isa. liii., there are the following objections: (1) That in no other passage of the N. T. is the cross of Christ represented as the altar on which He is offered;³ (2) That neither in the O. T. nor in the N. T. is *sin* anywhere spoken of as the offering which is brought up to the altar.⁴ ἐπὶ τὸ ξύλον might be explained by assuming a pregnant construction, as in the Versio Syr., which runs: *bajularit omnia peccata nostra eaque sustulit in corpore suo ad crucem*,⁵ that is: "bearing our sins He ascended the cross." But the assumption of such a construction is not necessary, since ἀναφέρειν can quite well be taken to mean "carrying up," without depriving the word of the signification which it has in the passage in Isaiah, since "carrying up" implies "carrying." In no other way did

Pol. i. 30, φθόνους καὶ διαβολὰς ἀναφέρ., see Pape, *s.v.* ἀναφέρω, and Delitzsch, *Komment. z. Br. an die Hebr.*, p. 442. — Doubtless אָפֶרֶת אֶת־חַטֹּאתֵינוּ (Lev. x. 17) is said of the priests bearing away sin (making atonement), but there the LXX. translate אָפֶרֶת by ἀφαιρεῖν. Plainly there can here be no allusion to the meaning "to forgive sin."

¹ Weiss is inaccurate when he asserts (p. 265) that the passages, Lev. xix. 17; Num. xiv. 33; Lam. v. 7; Ezek. xviii. 19, 20, allude to a vicarious suffering. These passages, indeed, speak of a bearing of the punishment which the sins of others have caused; but this is suffering *with*, not instead of, others, without those who have done the sin being freed from its punishment.

² Gerhard: "Crux Christi fuit sublimē illud altare, in quod Christus se ipsum in sacrificium oblaturus ascendit, sicut V. Testamenti sacrificia altari imponebantur.

³ Schott, whilst admitting the above, asserts "that it will hardly be contradicted that in all the passages which speak of Christ's death on the cross as a sacrifice, the cross must be presupposed to be that which served as altar." This is decidedly to be contradicted, the more so that the animal sacrificed suffered death not *upon*, but *before*, the altar.

⁴ If ἀναφέρειν be here taken as equivalent to "to offer sacrifice," as in Heb. vii. 27, not only would the thought — which Delitzsch (p. 440) terms a corrupt one — arise, "per semet ipsum immolavit peccata nostra," but ἐπὶ το ξυλον would then have to be interpreted, "on the cross." Luther: "who Himself offered in sacrifice our sins on His body on the tree." — Here, too, Schott admits what is said above, but seeks to destroy its force as a proof, by claiming for ἀναφέρειν the sense, "to present or bring up in offering," at the same time supplying — as it seems — as the object of offering, the body of Christ, which the expression of the apostle in no way justifies.

⁵ Schott brings the baseless accusation against the circumlocution of the Syr. translation, "that in it *peccata* is to be taken differently in the first clause from the second;" in the former, as equivalent to "the punishment of our sin;" in the latter, as "the sin itself;" for *peccata* has the same meaning in both members, although the bearing of the sins consists in the suffering of the punishment for them. Comp. Num. xiv. 33, where in the expression ἀνοίσουσι τὴν πορνείαν ὑμῶν, the word πορνεία has by no means the meaning "punishment for fornication," although ἀναφέρειν τὴν πορνείαν means as much as "to suffer the punishment for fornication."

Christ bear our sins up on to the cross than by suffering the punishment for our sins in the crucifixion, and thereby delivering us from the punishment. The apostle lays special stress on the idea of substitution here contained, by the addition of *αὐτός*, which, as in Isa. liii. 11, stands by way of emphasis next to *ἡμῶν*; but by *ἐν τῷ σώματι αὐτοῦ* — not “in,”¹ but “on His body” — we are reminded that His body it was on which the punishment was accomplished, inasmuch as it was nailed to the cross, and died thereon. It is quite possible that this adjunct, as Wiesinger assumes, is meant at the same time to serve the purpose of expressing the greatness of that love which moved Christ to give His body to the death for our sins; but that there is in it any special reference to the sacramental words of the Lord (Weiss, p. 273), is a conjecture which has nothing to support it. The addition of *ἐπὶ τὸ ξύλον* is explained by the fact itself, since it is precisely Christ's death on the cross that has redeemed us from the guilt and power of our sins. Peter also uses the expression *τὸ ξύλον* to denote the cross, in his sermons, Acts v. 30, x. 39. It had its origin in the Old-Testament phraseology *יָזַב*, rendered *ξύλον* by LXX., denoting the pole on which the bodies of executed criminals were sometimes suspended; cf. Deut. xxi. 22, 23; Josh. x. 26. Certainly in this way attention is drawn to the shame of the punishment which Christ suffered; but it is at least doubtful, since there is no reference to it in any way, whether Peter, like Paul in Gal. iii. 13, used the expression with regard to the curse pronounced in Deut. xxi. 22 (as Weiss, p. 267, emphatically denies, and Schott as emphatically asserts). Bengel is entirely mistaken in thinking, that by the adjunct *ἐπὶ τὸ ξύλον* the apostle alludes to the punishment of slaves (*ligno, cruce, furca, plecti soliti erant servi*).

REMARK 1. — The interpretation of many of the commentators is wanting in the necessary precision, inasmuch as the two senses, which *ἀναφέρειν* has in the different phrases, *ἀναφέρειν τὰς ἁμαρτίας* and *ἀναφέρειν τι ἐπὶ τ. θυσιαστήριον*, are mixed up with each other. Vitringa (*Vix uno verbo ἔμφασις vocis ἀναφέρειν exprimi potest. Nota ferre et offere. Primo dicere voluit Petrus, Christum portasse peccata nostra, in quantum illa ipsi erant imposita. Secundo ita tulisse peccata nostra, ut ea secum obtulerit in altari*), while drawing, indeed, a distinction between the two meanings, thinks that Peter had both of them in his mind, which of course is impossible. — Hofmann explains *ἀναφέρειν . . . ἐπὶ τὸ ξύλον* on the analogy of the phrase, *ἀναφέρειν τι ἐπὶ τὸ θυσιαστήριον*, without, however, understanding the cross as the altar; the meaning then would be: “He lifted up His body on to the cross, thereby bearing up thither our sins, that is to say, *atoning* for our sins.” Although Hofmann admits that Peter had in his mind the passage in Isaiah, he nevertheless denies that *ἀνήνεγκε* has here the same meaning as there. In his *Schriftbeweis*, 1st ed., he gives a similar interpretation, only that there he says: “He took up our sins with Him, and so *took them away from us*.” He, however, justly adds that *ἀναφέρειν* has the same meaning here as in Heb. ix. 28. Wiesinger has adopted this interpretation, as also, in substance, Delitzsch, *Hebraerbrief*, p. 442 f. In the 2d edition of the *Schriftbeweis*, Hofmann has withdrawn this explanation; but,

¹ So, too, Schott, who interprets *ἐν τῷ σώματι* as equal to “in His earthly bodily life” (!).

on the other hand, he erroneously asserts that ἀναφέρειν here is “the ἀναφέρειν of Heb. vii. 27.” — Schott justly combats Hofmann’s view, that the sufferings of Christ for our sins consisted essentially only in *what befell Him* as the result of our sins, and maintains, in opposition to it, the substitution of Christ. His own interpretation, however, of our passage is equally inadmissible, since he attributes to ἀναφέρειν the meaning, “to bring up or present in offering,” yet adding to the idea of “offering” an object other than ἁμαρτίας, which stands with ἀνήνεγκεν, thus giving to the *one* word two quite different references. Schott makes σῶμα Χριστοῦ the object of “offering,” taking it out of the supplementary clause, ἐν τῷ σώματι αὐτοῦ; but this he is the less justified in doing, that he explains these words by “in His earthly corporeal life.” — This is not the place to enter fully into Schott’s conception of the propitiation wrought by Christ’s death on the cross. Though it contains many points worthy of notice, it is of much too artificial a nature ever to be considered a just representation of the views of the apostle. — Luthardt interprets: “He bore His body away from the earth up to God. No doubt it was not an altar to which Christ brought His body up; but the peculiarity lies precisely in this, that His body should at the same time hang on the accursed tree.” “Away from the earth to God,” is evidently an addition; and had Peter wished to emphasize the cross as the *accursed* tree, he would have added τῆς καταραῆς.¹

REMARK 2. — This interpretation agrees substantially with that given by De Wette-Brückner and Weiss; yet De Wette’s reference to Col. ii. 14 is inappropriate, inasmuch as that passage has a character entirely different, both in thought and expression, from the one here under consideration. Weiss is wanting in accuracy when he says that “Christ ascended the cross, and *there* bore the punishment of our sins,” since already in the sufferings which preceded the crucifixion, the bearing of our sins took place. — Nor can it be conceded to these commentators, that the *idea of sacrifice* was absent from the conception of the apostle. Its existence is erroneously disputed also in Isa. liii., in spite of the Ⲕⲱⲛ, ver. 10. No doubt prominence is given, in the first instance, to the idea of *substitution*; but Weiss ought not to have denied that this thought is connected in the mind of the prophet, as in that of the apostle, with the idea of sacrifice, especially as he himself says that the idea of substitution is that upon which the sin-offering is based (Lev. xvii. 11). And was there any other substitutionary bearing of sin than in the sacrifice? It must not, however, be concluded that *each* word in the expression, and especially ἐπὶ τὸ ξύλον, must have a particular reference to the idea of sacrifice.

ἵνα ταῖς ἁμαρτίαις ἀπογενόμενοι]. Oecumenius: ἀπογενόμενοι· ἀντὶ τοῦ, ἀποθνήσκοντες; cf. Rom. vi. 2, 11 (Gal. ii. 19). Bengel’s rendering: γίνεσθαι τινὸς fieri alicujus dicitur servus, ἀπὸ dicit sejunctionem; Germ. “to become without,” which Weiss (p. 284) supports, is inappropriate here, since ἀπογίγνεσθαι in this sense is construed with the genitive. For the dative, see Winer, p. 398 (E. T., 427 f.). ταῖς ἁμαρτίαις corresponds to the foregoing τῶν ἁμαρτίων. The use of the aor. part. shows that the being dead unto sin is the

¹ Pfleiderer (p. 422) is entirely unwarranted in maintaining the sense to be: “That Christ, by His death on the cross, took away, removed our sins, so that they no longer surround our

life,” and “that by this removal is meant, that we free our moral life and conduct from sin” (!).

condition into which we are introduced by the fact that Christ τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἡμῶν αὐτὸς ἀνήνεγκεν, κ.τ.λ. The actions of the Christians should correspond with this condition; this the apostle expresses by *ἵνα . . . τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ ζήσωμεν*; cf. Rom. vi. — *δικαιοσύνη* means here not “justification or righteousness, as a condition of him whose sins are forgiven,” but it is the opposite of *ἁμαρτία*, “righteousness which consists in obedience towards God and in the fulfilling of His will.” The clause, introduced here by the final particle *ἵνα* (as in i. 18), does not give the primary aim of Christ’s substitutionary death, that, namely, of reconciliation; but further the design, that of making free from the power of sin. Weiss (p. 285) is wrong in thinking that Peter “did not here conceive the redemption as already completed in principle by the blood of Christ,” but “accomplished in a purely physiological way, by the impression produced by the preaching of His death and the incitement to imitation which¹ it gave.” Thus Pfeiderer also. The refutation of this is to be found in what follows. — οὐ τῷ μῶλωπι (αὐτοῦ) ἰάθητε]. Isa. liii. 5, LXX.: return to the direct form of address: μῶλωπι is, properly speaking, marks left by scourging (Sir. xxviii. 17, πληγῆ μύστιγος ποιεῖ μῶλωπας); therefore, taken strictly, the expression has reference to the flagellation of Christ only; but here it stands as a *pars pro toto* (Steiger) to denote the whole of Christ’s sufferings, of which His death was the culminating point. — By ἰάθητε the apostle declares, that, through the suffering of Christ (of course by the instrumentality of faith), the Christians are translated from the sickness of a sinful nature into the health of a life of righteousness.

Ver. 25. ἦτε γὰρ ὡς πρόβατα πλανώμενοι]. This explanatory clause (γάρ) points back, as the continuance in it of the direct address (ἰάθητε . . . ἦτε) shows, in the first instance, to the statement immediately preceding οὐ τῷ μῶλωπι ἰάθητε, but at the same time also to the thought *ἵνα . . . τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ ζήσωμεν*, to which that assertion is subservient. For the foregoing figure a new one is substituted, after Isa. liii. 6: LXX. πάντες ὡς πρόβατα ἐπλανήθημεν; if πλανώμενοι be the correct reading, then from it the nearer definition of πρόβατα is to be supplied, the sheep are to be thought of as those which have no shepherd (Matt. ix. 36: ὡσεὶ πρόβατα μὴ ἔχοντα ποιμένα; comp. Num. xxvii. 17; 1 Kings xxii. 17). — For the figure describing the state of man separated in his sin from God, comp. Matt. xviii. 12, 13; Luke xv. 4 ff. — ἀλλ’ ἐπιστρέφητε νῦν]. ἐπιστρέφητε is, in harmony with the uniform usage of Scripture, to be taken not in a passive (Wiesinger, Schott), but in a middle sense: “ye have turned yourselves.”² Luther translates: “but ye are now turned.” The word ἐπιστρέφειν means to turn one’s self away from (ἀπό, ἐκ), towards

¹ In his *Lehrbuch der Bibl. Theol.* (p. 172), Weiss only says: “It follows from ii. 24, that the being released from sin is certainly a consequence, but only the indirect consequence, of the death of Christ. Because it has released us from the guilt of our former sins, the further consequence will be, that henceforward we will renounce those sins which He vicariously expiated.”

² Schott’s counter-remark: “The question

is not here what they did, but what in Christ was imparted to them,” has all the less weight, that conversion, though the personal act of the Christian, must still be regarded as effected by Christ. Hofmann maintains, without the slightest right to do so, that in this passage the chief emphasis lies on the readers’ own act, though at the same time he correctly understands ἐπιστρέφητε in a middle sense.

something (*ἐπί, πρὸς, εἰς*), (sometimes equal to: to turn round); but it is not implied in the word itself, that the individual has formerly been in that place towards which he has now turned round, and whither he is going (therefore, in Gal. iv. 9, *πάλιν* is expressly added). Weiss (p. 122) is therefore wrong when from this very word he tries to prove that by *ποιμὴν* God, and not Christ, is to be understood, although the term sometimes includes in it the secondary idea of "back;" cf. 2 Pet. ii. 21, 22. — *ἐπὶ τὸν ποιμένα καὶ ἐπίσκοπον τῶν ψυχῶν ὑμῶν*]. Cf. especially Ezek. xxxiv. 11, 12, 16, LXX.: *ἐγὼ ἐκζητήσω τὰ πρόβατά μου καὶ ἐπισκέψομαι αὐτά, ὡσπερ ζητεῖ ὁ ποιμὴν τὸ ποίμνιον αὐτοῦ . . . τὸ πλανώμενον ἀποστρέψω*; besides, with *ποιμὴν*, Ps. xxiii. 1; Isa. xl. 11. From the fact that in these passages God is spoken of as the shepherd, it must not be concluded, with Weiss, that *ποιμὴν καὶ ἐπίσκοπος* refers not to Christ, but to God. For not only has God, calling Himself a shepherd, promised a *shepherd* (Ezek. xxxiv. 24, LXX.: *ἀναστήσω ἐπ' αὐτοὺς ποιμένα ἓνα . . . τὸν δούλον μου Δαυὶδ*, xxxvii. 24), but Christ, too, speaks of Himself as the good Shepherd; and Peter himself, in chap. v. 4, calls Him *ἀρχιποιμὴν*. In comparison with these passages, chap. v. 2 is plainly of no account. All interpreters — except Weiss — rightly understand the expressions here used as applying to Christ. The designation *ἐπίσκοπος* would all the more naturally occur to the apostle, as it was, like *ποιμὴν*, the name of the presidents of the churches who were, so to speak, the representatives of the One Shepherd and Bishop, the Head of the whole Church. — *τῶν ψυχῶν ὑμῶν* belongs, as the omission of the article before *ἐπίσκοπον* shows, to both words; with the expression, cf. chap. i. 9, 22.

CHAPTER III.

Ver. 1. *αἱ γυναῖκες*]. Rec., after C, K, L, P, etc. (Tisch. 7); Lachm. and Tisch. 8 omit *αἱ*, after A, B; *αἱ* omitted perhaps in order to mark the vocative. — Almost all authorities (as also \aleph), even Griesb., along with Lachm. and Tisch., support the reading *κερδηθήσονται*, instead of *κερδηθήσονται*. The future conjunct., occurring only in later writers (see Winer, p. 72 [E. T., 89]), is to be found only in min.; it is put here because of *ἵνα*; superfluously, however, as *ἵνα* in the N. T. is often construed cum. ind., John xvii. 2; Rev. xxii. 14. — Ver. 3. *ἐμπλοκῆς τριχῶν καὶ περιθέσεως*]. Lachm. substitutes *ἐμπλοκῆς ἢ περιθέσεως*, in C. — The most important authorities, however, support the usual reading (Tisch.) — Ver. 4. *πράεος καὶ ἡσυχίου*]. Rec., after A, C, L, K, P, \aleph , most min., Clem., Thph., etc. — Lachm.: *ἡσυχίου καὶ πράεος*, in B, Vulg., Copt., etc. Instead of *πράεος*, Tisch. reads *πράεως*, cf. A. Buttmann, p. 23. — Ver. 5. Millius, without sufficient reason, regards the words, *αἱ ἐλπίζουσαι ἐπὶ τὸν Θεόν*, as spurious, because they are not in the vss. Aethiop. — However, according to A, B, C, etc., and Lachm. and Tisch., *εἰς* should probably be read for *ἐπί*. The article *τού*, which is found almost only in min., must be deleted (Lachm., Tisch.), so that the original text probably runs: *αἱ ἐλπίζουσαι εἰς Θεόν*. \aleph reads *αἱ ἐλπ.*, ἐπὶ τὸν Θεόν, after the word *ἐαντάς*. — Ver. 6. *ὑπήκουσε*]. Lachm.: *ὑπήκουεν* is insufficiently attested by B, Vulg. — Ver. 7. The Rec. *συγκληρονόμοις* (Tisch.) is found in several min. (3, 7, 8, etc.), in Vulg., Syr., Aeth., Arm., Arr., in Thph., Oec., Aug., etc.; it is doubtful if in B.¹ In \aleph we find at first hand, *συγκληρονόμους*, and, as correction, *συγκληρονόμοις* (according to Buttm.). In A, C, K, L, P, many min., several versions, and Hier., on the other hand, we find the nominative, *συγκληρονόμοι* (Lachm.). The opinion of critics as to which is the original reading, is much divided; almost all commentators prefer the Rec.; so, too, Reiche; whilst Hofm. holds an opposite view. According to the handwriting, the nominative appears clearly to be the better-attested reading; but for this, see the commentary on the verse. — A, C**, \aleph , several min., Hier., add the adjective *ποικίλης* τοῦ *χάριτος*, which is probably taken from chap. iv. 10, but which Hofm. nevertheless considers genuine. — Instead of Rec. *ἐκκόπτεσθαι*, after C**, K, L, several min., and Theoph. (Tisch. 7), Lachm. and Tisch. 8 read, after A, B, \aleph , etc., *ἐγκόπτεσθαι* (Tisch. 8, *ἐνκ.*), which Hofmann also considers the original reading. Both readings occur in Oec. It cannot be decided with certainty. Buttm., following B, has accepted the dative *ταῖς προσευχαῖς*, in place of the accus. *τῶν προσευχῶν*. Grammatically no objection can be raised (“so that no hinderance be given to your prayers”); but as this reading is only found in B, it can hardly be considered the original

¹ Birch has given as the reading of B: *συγκληρονόμοι*, but has been accused of error by Majus. Buttmann, in his edition, reads *συγκληρονόμοι*, and gives this also as the read-

ing of B. On the other hand, in his Recensus lect., Cod. \aleph , he gives *συγκληρονόμοις* as the reading adopted by him.

one. — Ver. 8. *ταπεινόφρονες*]. After A, B, C, \aleph , etc., Syr., Erp., etc.; accepted even by Griesb. and Scholz, instead of the *φιλόφρονες* of K, and several min. In some Cod. both words are placed side by side, which may, according to Hofmann, be taken as the original reading. — Ver. 9. According to almost all authorities, A, B, C, K, \aleph , al., Syr., utr. Copt., etc., as also Lachm. and Tisch., *ειδότες* should be deleted. — Ver. 10. The Rec. gives the pronoun *αὐτοῦ* after *γλώσσαν* (K, L, P, \aleph , etc.); in A, B, C, and several min., it is wanting here, as also after *χείλη*; Lachm. and Tisch. have accordingly omitted it in both passages. — Ver. 11. After *ἐκκλινάτω*, several Codd., A, B, C*, have the particle *δέ* (Lachm., Tisch. 7), which in the Rec. is wanting after C**, K, L, P, \aleph , etc. (Tisch. 8). The omission seems to be a correction. — Ver. 12. *οἱ ὀφθαλμοί*]. The article is wanting in A, B, C*, K, L, P, \aleph , etc., omitted by Scholz, Lachm., Tisch.; Griesb., too, regards *οἱ* as doubtful. In the original passage (Ps. xxxiv. 16, LXX., it is wanting. — Ver. 13. *ζηλωταί*]. After A, B, C, \aleph , al. (Lachm., Tisch. 8), instead of the Rec., *μιμηταί* in K, L, P, several min., Oec. (Tisch.). *μιμηταί* appears to be a correction. *τοῦ αγαθοῦ* having been taken as masc., and *ζηλωταί* not being suitable thereto, *μιμηταί*, following such passages as Eph. v. 1, 1 Thess. i. 6, very naturally presented itself; De Wette, Wiesinger, Reiche, Hofmann, prefer *μιμηταί*; Brückner and Schott, *ζηλωταί*. Instead of *ἐὰν . . . γένησθε*, B reads: *εἰ . . . γένοισθε*, as Buttm. notes, without, however, receiving it into the text. — Ver. 14. Instead of *ἀλλ' εἰ*, in A and several min.: *εἰ δέ*. — *μηδὲ παραχθῆτε*, omitted in B, L, 43, but yet received into the text by Buttm. — Ver. 15. *τὸν Θεοῦ*]. Rec., after K, L, P, several min., Thph., Oec. Instead of this, Lachm. and Tisch. read *τὸν Χριστόν* (considered by Griesb. to be probably the genuine reading); attested by A, B, C, \aleph , 7, al., Syr., utr. Copt., etc., Clem., Fulgent. The alteration to *τὸν Θεόν* is explained by Isa. viii. 13. — After *ἐτοιμοί*, the Rec. adds *δέ*; according to Tisch.'s statement, it stands in A, K, etc., but not in B, C, \aleph , etc.; Buttm. affirms that it is also to be found in B; Tisch. 7 has retained it; Lachm. and Tisch. 8 have not. — In place of *αἰτοῦντι*, \aleph has the correction: *ἀπαιτοῦντι*. — A, B, C, \aleph , 5, al., Copt., Syr., etc., have *ἀλλά* before *μετά*, which Lachm. and Tisch. have justly accepted; it may be considered as the original, not only from the testimony of the authorities (it is wanting only in K, L, P, some min., and versions, in Oec., Beda), but also as being the more difficult reading. — Ver. 16. The reading which is best attested by the authorities is: *ἐν ᾧ καταλαλοῦσι ὑμῶν ὡς κακοποιῶν*, as in A, C, K, \aleph , etc. Instead of the indicative, Rec. has the conjunctive: *καταλαλῶσιν*. B, on the other hand, simply has *κατολοῦσθε*, which Tisch. has accepted; he is, however, hardly justified in doing so, as it is too insufficiently attested, and appears rather to be a correction for the purpose of making the passage less difficult (cf. Schott and Hofmann). — Ver. 17. *εἰ θέλοι*]. Justly accepted even by Griesb., instead of the Rec. *εἰ θέλει*. — Ver. 18. *ἡμῶν*, following upon *ἁμαρτιῶν*, in C**, al., Syr., Arr., etc., has been accepted by Lachm. in his small edition; it appears to have been inserted in consideration of *ἵνα ὑμᾶς προσαγάγῃ τ. Θ.* — Instead of the Rec. *ἐπαθε*, in B, K, L, P, pl., Thph., Oec., Aug. (Tisch. 7), A, C, \aleph , 5, al., Cypr., Didym., several versions (Lachm., Tisch. 8) have *ἀπέθανε*; De Wette-Brückner explain *ἀπέθανε* to be a gloss, after Rom. v. 6, vi. 10; Heb. iv. 27; to this Wiesinger agrees; it is, however, possible that *ἐπαθεν* arose from chap. ii. 21, as Hofm. also thinks. According to Tisch., the reading of the Codd., A, C*, G, before the verb, is: *ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν vel ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν*; \aleph has *ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν*; but whether this addition be genuine, cannot with certainty be decided; it may equally well have been left out as superfluous, as added in order to give prominence to the peculiar significance of

the death of Christ. — Instead of *ἡμῶς* (A, C, K, L, al., pl., several versions, etc., Lachm., Tisch. 8), B and several min. have *ὕμῶς* (Tisch. 7); insufficiently attested. In the original handwriting, *κ* has neither *ἡμῶς* nor *ὕμῶς*; in the correction, *ἡμῶς*. In B, τῷ Θεῷ, after *προσαγγή*, is wanting, for which reason Butt. has omitted it. — *πνεύματι*]. Accepted even by Griesb., instead of Rec. τῷ πνεύματι. — Ver. 20. ἀπεδέχετο]. Undoubtedly the correct rendering, instead of the ἀπαξ ἐξεδέχετο, which is hardly supported by any authority. Tisch. remarks: *videtur ex conjectura Erasmi fluxisse, qui sic edidit inde ab ed. 2. — ὀλίγα*]. Rec., after C, K, L, P, many min., Thph., Oec. (Griesb., Scholz); Lachm. and Tisch., on the other hand, following A, B, *κ*, al., Vulg., Orig., etc., have accepted ὀλίγα. ὀλίγα seems to be a correction, because of the subsequent ψυχαί. — Ver. 21. ὁ]. Rightly accepted by Griesb., instead of the reading *φ* in the ed. Elz. — In K, many min., Thph., etc., the opening words — evidently as a correction for the sake of simplification — are thus transposed: *δ ἀντίτυπον νῦν ὑμῶς σώζει*. — Instead of the *ἡμῶς* in the Rec. (C, K, L, Copt., etc., Thph., Oec.), Lachm. and Tisch. have adopted *ὕμῶς* (A, B, P, *κ*, several vss., and Fathers); doubtless rightly, as the change to *ὕμῶς* can be explained on the principle that the more general *ἡμῶς* seemed better suited to the context. Reiche prefers *ἡμῶς*. — Ver. 22. According to almost all authorities, the article τοῦ stands before Θεοῦ (Rec., Lachm., Tisch. 7); Tisch. 8, however, following B and *κ*, has dropped it.

Ver. 1. From here to ver. 6, an exhortation to wives. — *ὁμοίως* not simply *particula transeundi* (Pott); on account of the subsequent *ὑποτασσομέναι* it stands related rather to the exhortation contained in what precedes; the participle here as in chap. ii. 18. — *αἱ γυναῖκες*. Form of address, like *οἱ οἰκέται* (as opposed to Steiger); *vid.*, ὑμῶν, ver. 2; τῶν γυναικῶν (instead of ὑμῶν) is used here, not because the thought is a general one (De Wette, Wiesinger), nor “because Peter means to say that the heathen men should be won over by their *own* wives” (Schott), but because the apostle wishes clearly to point out how the *wives* too may be able to advance the kingdom of God. The words are addressed generally to *all* Christian wives, though, as the sequel shows, with special reference to those who have unbelieving husbands. — *ὑποτασσομέναι τοῖς ἰδίοις ἀνδράσιν*]. *ἰδίοις* is used here, not by way of contradistinction (*Glossa interl.: suis viris, non adulteris*, or according to Calvin: *ut Ap. castitatis uxores admoneat avocetque a suspectis obsequiis virorum aliorum*; so, too, Frommüller), but only to express the idea of belonging together, more strongly than the simple pronoun; cf. also Winer, p. 145 f. (E. T., 153 f.). — With the thought here expressed, cf. Eph. v. 22–24; Col. iii. 18; 1 Tim. ii. 9. It is self-evident, — although many interpreters have discussed the question at considerable length, — that the subjection of the wife to the husband is of quite a different kind from that of the slave to the master. The apostle, however, does not go into the subject further, but contents himself with simply emphasizing that point.¹ — *ἵνα καὶ εἰ τινες ἀπειθοῦσι τῷ λόγῳ*]. *καὶ εἰ*, i. e., “even then when,” supposes not only a possible,

¹ For similar remarks of the ancients, see in Steiger; that of the humorist Philemon (in a Fragment, ver. 123) is particularly signifi-

cant: ἀγαθὸς γυναικὸς ἐστίν, ὃ Νικοστράτη, μὴ κρείττον' εἶναι τ' ἀνδρὸς, ἀλλ' ὑπήκοον.

but a particularly unfavorable case; that is to say, when men who are joined to Christian wives oppose the *λόγος*, even then may such be gained over by the Christian walk of their wives;¹ *τινες* must be conceived as referring to heathen men with Christian wives. — With *τῷ λόγῳ*, cf. chap. ii. 8. — The expression *ἀπειθεῖν* denotes here, as in chap. ii. 7, not a simple negation only (Pott: *ad religionem christianam nondum accessisse*), but an opposition to. — *διὰ τῆς τῶν γυναικῶν ἀναστροφῆς: ἐαυτῶν* must be supplied to *γυναικῶν*; it is not wives in general who are here meant, but only the wives of heathen husbands. — *ἀναστροφή*; quite generally: the Christian walk of women, with special reference, however, to their relation to their husbands; it is precisely obedience that most easily wins the heart. — *ἀνευ λόγου*: Huss, incorrectly: *sine verbo praedicationis publicae* (so, too, Frömmüller); the words are used here to emphasize more strongly *διὰ τῆς . . . ἀναστροφῆς*, and must be held to refer to the conduct of wives (De Wette, Wiesinger). Schott wrongly unites *ἀνευ λόγου* with the preceding *τῆς . . . ἀναστροφῆς* into one idea; Peter could never have meant to say that the walk of women should be a *silent one*. The apostle's thought is this: If the husbands oppose the Word, the wives should all the more diligently seek to preserve a Christian walk, in order by it to win over their husbands, even without words, i. e., "without preaching and exhortation on their part" (De Wette). Oecumenius incorrectly refers these words to the conduct of husbands in the sense: *cessanti omni verbo et contradicione*. — *κερδήθησονται*: that is to say, for the faith, and by it for the kingdom of God; cf. 1 Cor. ix. 19 ff.; so, too, Schott indeed, who, however, unjustifiably thinks that the apostle's meaning is, that the *preservation of the marriage relation* is the primary object which is to be attained by the good behavior of the wives. On the indic. with *ἵνα*, cf. Winer, p. 269 ff. (E. T., 287 ff.).

Ver. 2. *ἐποπτεύσαντες τὴν ἐν φόβῳ ἀγνῆν ἀναστροφὴν ὑμῶν*: for *ἐποπτ.*, cf. chap. ii. 12. The participial clause here serves as a further explanation of the preceding *διὰ, κ.τ.λ.* — *ἀγνός*: "chaste," in the full extent of the word, not only in contradistinction to *πορνεία* proper, but to whatsoever violates the moral relation of the subjection of the wife to her husband. This *ἀγνεία* is determined by *ἐν φόβῳ* (not equal to, *in timore Dei conservato*: *Glossa interl.*; Grotius too, Bengel, Jachmann, Weiss, Frömmüller, etc., understand by *φόβος* here the "fear of God"), as connected in the closest possible way with the *shrinking* from every violation of duty towards the husband;² cf. chap. ii. 18.

Ver. 3. *ὣν ἔστω*]. The genitive *ὣν* does not depend on a *κόσμος* to be supplied from the predicate *ὁ ἐξῴθεν . . . κόσμος* (De Wette, Wiesinger,

¹ Hofmann maintains that if the protasis be thus understood, the apodosis is not suited to it, "inasmuch as no other case could be supposed in which the husband could be won, without words, by the conduct of his wife, than that of his being disobedient to the Word," and that the difficulty can only be removed if *εἰ τινες* be interpreted as equal to *οἰτινες*. But the difficulty Hofmann alludes

to clearly still remains, though in fact it has no existence if only the idea *ἀπειθοῦσι* receive the precision it is entitled to.

² Schott unwarrantably maintains that in this interpretation it is not *ἀναστροφή* which is more precisely defined by the homogeneous adjectival expression *ἐν φόβῳ ἀγνῆ*, but *ἀγνῆ ἀναστρ.* by *ἐν φόβῳ*.

Schott, Hofmann); such a construction, arbitrary in itself, is here entirely inadmissible on account of the remoteness of the predicate, from which the idea wanting is to be taken. The genitive is rather ruled by *ἔστω. εἶναι τινος* expresses, as usual, the relation of belonging to; the sense is therefore: 'whose business let it be,' i.e., who have to occupy themselves with.¹ — *οὐχ ὁ ἐξωθεν*, κ.τ.λ. As often in our epistle, the negative preceding the positive. — *ὁ ἐξωθεν* is closely joined together with *κόσμος*. The genitives which stand between, and are dependent on *κοσμος*, serve to determine the idea more precisely, their position immediately after *ὁ ἐξωθεν* is explained from the intention of the writer to lay special emphasis on them, since it belongs to women to take pleasure in adorning themselves in this wise. The whole expression is to be interpreted thus: "outward adornment wrought by the plaiting of hair, the wearing of gold, or the putting on of apparel." — *ἐμπλοκή, ἂν λεγ* (in the passage specially to be compared with this, 1 Tim. ii. 9, *τλέγματι* is used), not "the plaits," but "the plaiting;" it is an active idea, like *περιθεσις* and *ἐνδυσις*; "these verbalia describe the vain occupation of worldly women" (Wies.); *χρύσια* are golden ornaments generally. — The last two members of the clause, united by *ἤ*, are connected with the first by *καί*, because they have reference to things which are put on the body.

Ver. 4. As antithesis to what precedes, *ἀλλ' ὁ ἐσωθεν κόσμος* would have been expected; instead of this, however, the author at once states in what that adornment does consist. — *ὁ κρυπτός τῆς καρδίας ἄνθρωπος* does not mean the *virtutes christ. quas Spir. s. per regenerationem in homine operatur* (Gerhard; so, too, Wiesinger and Frommüller), for here there is no mention either of the Holy Ghost or of regeneration. It denotes simply the *inner* man, in contradistinction to the *outward* man (so, too, De Wette, Brückner, Weiss, Schott, Hofmann); *κρυπτός*, antithesis to *ἐξωθεν*, ver. 3; cf. *ὁ ἐσω ἄνθρ.*, Rom. vii. 22; Eph. iii. 16; *ὁ ἐσωθεν*, sc. *ἄνθρ.*, 2 Cor. iv. 16; cf., too, such expressions as: *τὸ κρυπτὸν τῆς καρδίας*, 1 Cor. xiv. 25, and *τὸ κρυπτὸν τῶν ἄνθρ.*, Rom. ii. 16. The apostle selected the expression *κρυπτός* as a contrast to the conspicuous adornment formerly spoken of. *τῆς καρδίας* is not gen. *qualitatis* (Schott); *καρδία* itself denotes no quality; it is the genitive of apposition subjoined, in that *καρδία* is the seat of the feeling and the disposition. — *ἐν τῷ ἀφθάρτῳ*. *τὸ ἀφθαρτον*, substantive (like *φθαρτῖα*, chap. i. 18), "the imperishable" (incorrectly, Hofmann: *ἐν τῷ ἀφθάρτῳ*, sc. *κόσμῳ*), in contrast to the perishable ornaments above mentioned. The prepos. *ἐν* points out the sphere in which the inner hidden man should move. If *ὧν ὁ κόσμος ἔστω* be supplied after *ἀλλά*, then "ἐν is to be joined with it, so as to show in what, and with what, this their inward hidden man should be their ornament" (Schott; so, too, Hofmann). — *τοῦ πρᾶεος καὶ ἡσυχίου πνευματος*, a more exact definition of the *ἀφθαρτον*; it

¹ When Hofmann would advance against this construction, that the affirmative subject (ver 4) is not suitable to it, "since it may be said of the hidden man of the heart, that it should be the woman's adornment, but not that it should be her business, for she herself that hidden man," it must be observed in

reply that it is not *ὁ κρυπτός . . . ἄνθρωπος* in itself, but *ὁ κρυπτός . . . ἄνθρωπος ἐν τῷ ἀφθάρτῳ*, κ. τ. λ., which is to be taken as that which should be characteristic of women; as Hofmann also in his expositions says: "The adornment of women is not indicated by the simple, but by the compound expression."

denotes not the πν. ἅγιον of God, but the spirit of man. The *meek* and *quiet* spirit (here emphasized with special reference to ὑποτασσόμενοι, ver. 1) is that "imperishable," in which the hidden life of woman should exist and move.¹ ὁ ἐστιν ἐνώπιον τοῦ Θεοῦ πολυτελής]. ὁ does not apply to the whole (Grotius), nor to τῷ ἀφθάρτῳ (Bengel, Pott, Steiger, Schott), since it is self-evident that the ἀφθαρτον is in God's eyes πολυτελής. It is to be taken with the immediately preceding πνεύματος (De Wette, Wiesinger). Such a πνεῦμα is, in the judgment of God (1 Tim. ii. 3), πολυτελής (Mark xiv. 3; 1 Tim. ii. 9), whilst outward adornment, worthless to the divine mind, possesses a value only in the eyes of men.²

Vv. 5, 6. οὕτω γάρ, ground for the exhortation: ὡν ἔστω, etc., by the example of the saintly women of the O. T. οὕτω refers back to what precedes. — ποτὲ καὶ αἱ ἄγιαί γυναῖκες]. ποτέ, i.e., in the time of the Old Covenant. — ἄγιαί: because they belonged to the chosen people of God (Schott), and their life was sanctified and consecrated to God in faith. — αἱ ἐλπίζουσαι εἰς (ἐπὶ Θεοῦ]. Cf. 1 Tim. v. 5. This nearer definition is subjoined not only because hope in God, i.e., in the fulfilment of His promises, was the characteristic mark of the piety of these holy women, rooted as it was in faith, but specially "to explain why it did not, and could not, occur to them, ever to delight in empty show" (Hofmann).³ — With ἐκόσμου ἐναντίας, cf. 1 Tim. ii. 9. — ὑποτασσόμεναι τοῖς ἀνδράσιν is linked on to ἐκόσμου ἐναντίας, showing wherein lay the proof that they had adorned themselves with the meek and quiet spirit. There is but *one* (De Wette) characteristic indeed here mentioned; but, according to the connection, it is the chief manifestation of that spirit. It is incorrect to resolve (as was formerly done in the commentary) the participle into: "from this fact, that." — Ver. 6. ὡς Σάρρα ὑπήκουσε τῷ Ἀβραάμ]. A simple comparison of the contents of the two passages is a sufficient refutation of De Wette's supposition that, in the words before us, there is a reference to Heb. xi. 11. — ὡς: *particula allegandi exemplum*: Bengel. Sarah is mentioned, because, as the wife of Abraham and ancestress of the people of Israel, she had especial significance in the history of redemption.⁴—

¹ The two expressions, *πραῦς* and *ἡσύχιος*, must not be sharply distinguished; *πραῦτης* stands contrasted specially with *ὀργη* (Jas. i. 20, 21) or *ζήλος* (Jas. iii. 13, 14), synonymous with *ἐπεικεῖα* (2 Cor. x. 1), *μακροθυμία* (Col. iii. 12), *ὑπομονή* (1 Tim. vi. 11), etc.; it is peculiar to him who does not allow himself to be provoked to wrath. *ἡσυχία* is related to *ἀκαταστασία*; a *ἡσύχιος* is he who is peaceable and does not care for noisy life. Bengel interprets *mansuetus* (*πραῦς*), "qui non turbat;" *tranquillus* (*ἡσύχιος*), "qui turbas aliorum fert placide;" the contrary would be more correct.

² Luther: "A woman should be thus disposed as not to care for adornment. Else when people turn their minds to adornment, they never give it up; that is their way and their nature; therefore a Christian woman should despise it. But if her husband wish it,

or there be some other good reason for adorning herself, then she is right to do so." Calvin, too, rightly observes: "Non quemvis cultum reprehendere voluit Petrus, sed morbum vanitatis, quo mulieres laborant."

³ According to Schott, this addition is meant to express that "the complete development of the Christian Church, to which they belonged, was *only as yet* an object of hope;" but this introduces a reference which the words do not contain.

⁴ Schott applies ὡς to that which directly precedes, in *this* sense: that "the conduct of the holy women was regulated only according to the standard of Sarah." Hofmann *thus*: that Sarah "is mentioned as a shining example of the conduct of holy women." Both are wrong, since neither is alluded to by ὡς.

ὑπήκουσε refers not merely to the single case which the apostle had particularly before his mind, but denotes the habitual behavior of Sarah towards Abraham: the aor. is used here as in Gal. iv. 8 (De Wette, Wiesinger, Schott). — κύριον αὐτὸν καλοῦσα]. She showed herself submissive to the will of Abraham in this, that she called him κύριος. The allusion is here to Gen. xviii. 12 (cf. also 1 Sam. i. 8, LXX.). — ἥς ἐγενήθητε τέκνα]. Lorinus: *non successione generis, sed imitatione fidei*; Pott incorrectly explains the aorist by the future (ἔσεσθε); the translation, too, of the Vulg., *estis*, is inexact; Luther is right: “*whose daughters ye are become*.” As Paul calls the believing heathen, on account of their faith, children of Abraham, so Peter here styles the women who had become Christians, children of Sarah. — ἀγαθοποιῶσαι does not belong to ὑποτασσόμεναι, as if ὡς Σάρρα . . . τέκνα were a parenthesis (Bengel, Ernesti, etc.), but to ἐγενήθητε, not, however, as stating *how* they become (Weiss, p. 110 f.)¹ or “*have become*” children of Sarah (to the first interpretation the aorist ἐγενήθητε is opposed, to the latter the pres. partic.), but as showing the mark by which they proved themselves children of Sarah. It may be resolved into “*since*,” or “*that is to say if*,” etc. It is grammatically incorrect to see in ἀγαθοποιῶσαι the result of ἥς ἐγενήθητε τέκνα, and to explain: “*in this way have they become the children of Sarah, that they are now in accordance therewith ἀγαθοποιῶσαι and μὴ φοβούμεναι*” (Schott). By ἀγαθοποιεῖν is to be understood here not specially benevolence (Oecum.);² the word denotes rather the whole moral activity of Christian life in its fullest extent, although here, as the connection shows, with particular reference to the marriage relation. — καὶ μὴ φοβούμεναι μηδεμίαν πτόησιν]. πτόησις equals φόβος (Pollux, v. 122: συστολή, θόρυβος, ταραχή), in the N. T. ἅπ. λεγ. (Luke xxi. 9, xxxvii. 9, the verb πτοηθέντες is connected with ἐμφοβοὶ γενόμενοι); it denotes not the object causing fear, but the fear itself which is felt; and it can be looked on either objectively as a power threatening man, or laying hold of him (as, Prov. iii. 25, LXX.: καὶ οὐ φοβηθήσῃ πτόησιν ἐπελθοῦσαν; 1 Macc. iii. 25: ἡ πτόησις ἐπιπίπτει ἐπὶ τὰ ἔθνη; the synonymous terms φόβος, τρόμος, are used also in a like manner), or taken in a sense purely subjective. Most commentators understand πτόησις here in the first of these senses, only they do not take the conception strictly by itself, but identify it with that which causes fear; in the first edition of this commentary, the second meaning is attributed to πτόησις: φοβεῖσθαι πτόησιν equal to φοβεῖσθαι φόβον: “*to experience fear*” (Mark iv. 41; Luke ii. 9; cf. Winer, p. 210 f. [E. T., 223]); but this explanation is opposed by the fact “*that in such a connection the substantive must be taken not in idea only, but in form also from the verb*” (Brückner). The idea here is quite as universal as in ἀγαθοπ.; and accordingly it must be conceived as the fear generally which the enmity of the

¹ It must be held, with Wiesinger, Brückner, and Schott, in opposition to Weiss and Fronmüller, that it is more natural to take these words as applying to Gentile-Christian rather than to Jewish-Christian readers. For inasmuch as the latter, before their conversion, were already τέκνα τῆς Σάρρας, some allusion must have been made to their not having been

so in a *right* manner, and as they now had become. It does not follow from John viii. 39 (as Weiss thinks) that an allusion of this kind was unnecessary.

² Μετὰ τοῦ εὐκόσμου καὶ πρέποντος Χριστιανοῦ κόσμου καὶ ἐλεήμονας αὐτὰς εἶναι παραιεῖ, μηδὲν ὑποβλεπόμενας τὸν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν αὐτῶν διὰ τοῦτο ἔκλογισμὸν.

unbelieving world occasions to believers; still, according to the connection, the apostle had doubtless in his mind more particularly the conduct of heathen men towards their Christian wives. — Luther's translation is inexact: "if ye . . . are not so fearful." The rendering of Stephanus is incorrect, *s. v.*, *πίσησις*: *jubentur mulieris officium facere* ETIAM, CUM *nullus eas metus constringit*, *i. e.*, *sponte et ultro*.

Ver. 7. *οἱ ἄνδρες ὁμοίως*]. *ὁμοίως*, with the participle following, refers back, as in ver. 1, to *ὑποτάγητε πάση ἄνθρ. κτίσει*, with which the exhortation begins (Hofmann); though there is no *ὑποτασσόμενοι* (cf. ii. 18, iii. 1), there lies something corresponding to it in the fact that the wife on her part possesses a *τιμή* to be acknowledged by the husband. Pott erroneously renders *ὁμοίως* by *vicissim*, "on the other hand;" nor is it, as De Wette thinks probable, to be expanded: "in like manner, ye men also, hear my exhortation." — *συννοικούντες*]. *συννοικεῖν* (*ἄπ. λεγ.*) is not a *euphemismus de tori conjugalibus consuetudine* (Hieronym., *Contra Jovian.*, lib. 1. c. 4; Augustin., *In Ps. cxlvi.*, etc.); the reference is rather to life together at home. — *κατὰ γνώσιν*]. As *γνώσις* is here anarthrous, it is wrong to understand *γνώσις* as referring directly to "Christian recognition of the relation of wife to husband" (Brückner, Schott); *κατὰ γνώσιν* is rather an adverbial expression, in which *γνώσις* is to be understood generally, as Wiesinger correctly remarks: "according to recognition, *i. e.*, so that home life must be regulated by knowledge and understanding" (so also Hofmann). Similar adverbial expressions, formed by a conjunction of *κατὰ* with an anarthrous subst., occur frequently both in classical and N. T. Greek. It is evident from the context that *κατὰ γνώσιν* has here special reference to the marriage relation; but from this it does not follow that the interpretation, "*in a judicious, discerning manner*," or Luther's "with reason," is incorrect (in opposition to Brückner and Schott). De Wette is completely mistaken in rendering *γνώσις* by "that knowledge of men and self, in fact, that inward discernment, which is the condition of all moderation," as is Bengel also directly by *moderatio*.¹ — *ὡς ὑσθενεστέρῳ σκευεῖ τῷ γυναικείῳ* is erroneously connected by Luther and others with *ἀπονέμονται*; it belongs, however, to *συννοικούντες*, which requires a nearer definition. — The word *σκεῦος* is used to designate the wife in 1 Thess. iv. 4 (see Lünemann *in loc.*) with reference to the husband; the same meaning, though with various applications, is here attributed to it by many interpreters.² But this view is incorrect, for *τῷ γυναικείῳ*, *sc. σκευεῖ*, is subjoined by way of explanation, and the comparative *ὑσθ.* shows that the husband also is thought of as *σκεῦος*. *σκεῦος* must be taken here in its specific meaning of a utensil (or instrument) serving a particular purpose, and is accordingly to be understood as specially applicable to man, in so far as the latter is used by God

¹ Oecumenius understands this exhortation in connection with ver. 6, as having a special application to the household: *οἱ ἄνδρες . . . συννοικούντες· τουτέστιν: αἰσθησὶν λαμβάνοντες τῆς τοῦ θήλεος κομφόρητος καὶ τοῦ εὐπαραφόρου ἐν πᾶσι, καὶ εἰς μικροψυχίαν εὐολίσθου, μακρόθυμοι γίνεσθε πρὸς αὐτάς, μὴ λόγον ἀπαιτοῦντες*

πικρῶς τῶν κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν αὐτῶν εἰς ταμειῖαν παρακατεθένων.

² Beza: "Est femina vas, *i. e.*, comes et adjutrix viro ad fideliter coram Deo transigendam vitam adjuncta." Bengel: "Denotat hoc sexum et totum ingenium temperamentumque foemineum."

for the accomplishment of His will (cf. Acts ix. 15). It is inaccurate, nor can it be justified by Rom. ix. 21 ff., to take the word in the general sense of "creation" (so Wiesinger, and formerly in this commentary). Hofmann understands *σκεύος* here as referring both to the husband and the wife, inasmuch as "in a life united in marriage, one part is destined to be and to accomplish something for the other;" but the reference to this mutual relation is purely arbitrary.¹—*ὁσθενεστέρω*]. Bengel: *Comparativus, etiam vir habet infirmitatem*; in like manner Steiger: "the less weak is called upon to assist the more weak" (thus also Fronmüller). This view is, however, incorrect; it is the husband rather as the stronger *σκεύος*—there is no reference made here to his weakness—who is here contrasted with the wife as the weaker (De Wette, Wiesinger, Schott, Hofmann). And, because he is such a *σκεύος*, it is demanded of him that he live with his wife *κατὰ γνώσιν*; *ὡς* here also states the reason: because the wife is a *σκ. ὁσθενεστέρον*, it is accordingly incumbent on the man to behave towards her *κατὰ γνώσιν*. Schott erroneously sees in *κατὰ γνώσιν* the determining reason why the man should treat her as a *σκ. ὁσθ.*; but this can the less be maintained, that *κ. γν.* cannot signify "because he recognizes her as such," but states the manner of the *συννοικεῖν*.—*ὁσθενεστέρω σκεύει* stands in apposition to *τῷ γυναικεῖς*, *sc. σκεύει*, and is put first by way of emphasis.—*γυναικεῖος*, *ἅπ. λεγ.*, Lev. xviii. 22; Deut. xxii. 5, LXX.; Esth. ii. 11, 17.—*ἀπονέμοντες τιμῆν*, "in that ye show honor (respect) to them;" *ἀπονέμειν* in the N. T. *ἅπ. λεγ.*—The participle is not coordinate with the foregoing (*συννοικούντες*), but subordinate to it, since it brings prominently forward one of the chief ways in which the preceding exhortation may be carried into effect. The thought here must not be arbitrarily limited to any special relation (*e. g.*, to that of maintenance or of continence, etc.). The husband should, in every relation, show the respect due to his wife.—*ὡς καὶ συγκληρονόμοις (-οι) χάριτος ζωῆς* serves as ground of the exhortation; if the reading be *συγκληρονόμοις*, the reference is to the wives; if *συγκληρονόμοι*, to the husbands (in opposition to Pott, who somewhat singularly interprets as equal to *εἰσι γὰρ συγκληρονόμοι*, *sc. αἱ γυναῖκες*). The dative is more in harmony with the structure of the sentence and the thought, and therefore is to be preferred to the nom. supported by the authorities; although the nom. may be defended on the ground that husbands, as *συγκλ.* of their wives, should in turn regard the latter as their *συγκλ.* But since this last is really the point of importance, it can hardly be assumed that the apostle would only have hinted at it, without openly giving expression to it.²—*καὶ συγκληρονόμοις*, De Wette-Brückner explain, "as (those who) also

¹ Schott arbitrarily asserts that the creature is here termed *σκεύος*, "as a vessel which is destined to receive into itself, as its real contents, the realization of the divine will." Even though a vessel containing something can be termed a *σκεύος*, it does not follow that *σκεύος* must be understood as meaning this and nothing else.

² In the second edition of this Commentary it was said: "Why should not the apostle

base his exhortation to the men to honor their wives, by reminding them (the men) that they are called to inherit the *χάρις ζωῆς* along with their wives?" Reiche says: "scilicet quia *absurdum* (!) esset, sic argumentari." Brückner maintains that meaning to be "altogether inappropriate and foreign to the purpose of the address." These assertions, however, can by no means be accepted, since the consciousness of being a fellow-heir of salvation with

(like yourselves) (are) fellow-heirs (*one with another*).” The reference here attributed to *συν*—simply on account of *καί*—is inappropriate, since it is a thought entirely foreign to the context, that the wives are heirs *with each other*. If the reading *συγκληρονόμοις* be adopted, *συν* applies to the husbands, equivalent to “*with you*;” *καί* may stand with reference to the foregoing *ἀσθενεστέρω*, adding a second particular to it (Schott); or it may also serve simply to intensify *συν*, since, strictly speaking, it is redundant.¹ If, however, *συγκληρονόμοι* be read, *καί* is to be taken in the latter way, and is not to be explained thus: “by *ἀπονέμοντες* something further is enjoined, which goes beyond the . . . *κατὰ γνώσιν*” (Hofmann); for *συννοικούντες κατὰ γνώσιν* stands imperatively, whilst *συγκληρονόμοι* does not say what the husbands should be, but what they are. With the idea *κληρονόμοι*, cf. chap. i. 4; the expression *συγκληρ.*, Rom. viii. 17; Eph. iii. 6; Heb. xi. 9.—*χάριτος ζωῆς*]. *ζωῆς* states in what the *χάρις*, of which they are and will be *κληρονόμοι*, consists. It is erroneous to resolve the expression into *χάρις ζωσα* (Erasmus) or *χάρις ζωοποιούσα* (Grotius). Hofmann, assuming *συγκληρονόμοι ποιίλης χάριτος ζωῆς* to be the true reading, gives an interpretation different from the above: “as such who, with their wives, share a life of manifold grace, i.e., of those divine favors which are experienced in common in every marriage by believers and unbelievers.” In this way, however, justice is done to neither of the ideas, nor is it pointed out what the favors in married life referred to are.²—*εἰς τὸ μὴ ἐγκόπτεσθαι* (Rec. *ἐκκόπτεσθαι*) *τὴς προσευχῆς ὑμῶν*]. *ἐγκόπτεν*, strictly, *incidere*, then *intercidere*, from which arises the further meaning *impedire*;³ *ἐκκόπτεν*, pr. *excidere*, whence *stirpitis delere*;⁴ the idea of the latter word is stronger than that of the former, but the thought in both readings remains substantially the same, since both expressions denote the ceasing of prayer. Wiesinger incorrectly understands the meaning of the term *ἐγκόπτ.* to be: “prayer in the mean time there still is, but the way is closed to it.” In like manner De Wette, following Bretschneider: *ne viam praecludatis precibus vestris*, remarks: “Prayer is by sin hindered from mounting up to the throne of God;” and such is in substance Hofmann’s view.⁵ This idea would, however, have been more definitely expressed.

any one may very well lead to a recognition of the *τιμή* which he possesses. Nor is there any thing improbable in the circumstance itself, that the apostle, whilst basing the exhortation *συννοικεῖν κατὰ γνώσιν* on the position of the women, should ground the *ἀπονέμειν τιμὴν* on the position of the men.—Schott passes too lightly over the whole question.

¹ On the redundancy of *καί* in comparisons, see Winer, p. 390 (E. T., 548); but this use of it cannot be appealed to, since *ὡς* here is not a comparative particle. Wiesinger thinks that *συν* perhaps contains the reference to a community to which man and wife equally belong; but what this was, would have been indicated by the context, as Eph. iii. 6; such, however, is not the case here. To the expression “strictly,” Reiche adds a ?, without ever

thinking that, since the same idea is expressed by *καί* and *συν*, one of the two must be redundant, and that “strictly” is only meant to show that *καί* is in so far not purely redundant, that it serves to strengthen the idea expressed by *συν*.

² There is no warrant for the opinion that the apostle’s exhortation must apply also to such husbands as have unbelieving wives, since a case so special might well have been passed over. If the apostle had wished to make reference to this, he would in some way have alluded to it; cf. ver. 1 ff.

³ Hes. *ἐμποδίζειν, διακωλύειν*.

⁴ Cf. Job xix. 10, LXX.: *ἐξέκοψε δὲ ὡσπερ δένδρον τὴν ἐλπίδα μου*.

⁵ In this interpretation the reference to the coming of prayer to God is a simple importa-

The apostle does not say that the *power* and the *hearing* of prayer are hindered, but that the prayer itself is (this also in opposition to Reiche). In harmony with the connection of this last clause, by τὰς προσευχὰς ὑμῶν is to be understood either the joint prayer of married persons (Weiss, p. 352),¹ or the prayers which those here addressed offer up, as the husbands of their wives (or, further, as heads of households). Depreciation of the wife, in spite of union with respect to the κληρονομία, necessarily excludes prayer from married life.² Schott: "Where the husband does not recognize that the union of natural life in marriage is also union in the state of grace, there can naturally be no expression of the spiritual and Christian fellowship of marriage, no prayer in common."

Ver. 8. Exhortations of a general character follow, without regard to the various conditions of men, yet in connection with chap. ii. 11 ff. They deal with the relations of the Christians towards each other, and towards those who are inimically disposed to them. — τὸ δὲ τέλος, here adverbially: "finally, lastly;" in the classics τέλος δέ occurs frequently.³ — πάντες, emphatically, in contrast to what preceded: slaves and masters, husbands and wives. — ἔστε or some such word is usually supplied here; it is more correct, however, to consider the following adjectives, etc., as standing in a dependence similar to that of the participles formerly; only that the apostle has in his mind, instead of the particular ὑποτάγητε, κ.τ.λ., in ii. 13, the more general exhortation to obedience toward God. — ὁμόφρονες, in the N. T. ἅπ. λεγ. (Theognis, 81, ὁμόφρονα θυμὸν ἔχοντες); frequently τὸ αὐτὸ φρονεῖν, Rom. xii. 16, xv. 5; 2 Cor. xiii. 11; Phil. ii. 2; similar expressions, 1 Cor. i. 10; Eph. iv. 3; Phil. iii. 16; Luther: "like-minded." — συμπαθεῖς, "sympathizing," in N. T. ἅπ. λεγ.; the verb, Heb. iv. 15, x. 34; for the explanation, comp. Rom. xii. 15. Oecumenius explains: συμπάθεια· ὁ πρὸς τοὺς κακῶς πάσχοντας ὡς καὶ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῖς ἔλεος; where, however, it is incorrect to limit the application to suffering only. Bengel: ὁμόφρ.: mente, συμπαθεῖς: affectu in rebus secundis et adversis. — φιλάδελφοι, "brotherly," Luther; also ἅπ. λεγ.; the substantive occurs in chap. i. 22. — εὐσπλαγχνοὶ to be found, besides here, in Eph. iv. 32, "compassionate;" in classical Greek: qui robustis est visceribus, as in Hippocr., p. 89 C; and figuratively equal to ἐνκάριος, ἀνδρείος; in the sense of compassionate it does not occur in the classics. — ταπεινόφρονες]. ἅπ. λεγ.: the ταπεινοφροσύνη (humility) as

tion. Hofmann adds to the interpretation, that "the sighs of the wife bar the road to the husband's prayers, by accusing him to God before his prayer, thus rendered worthless, reaches Him." But this is a thought altogether foreign to the context.

¹ Although in ver. 7 it is the husbands who are addressed, still, as the verse treats of their behavior towards their wives, ὑμῶν can well apply to both.

² Hieronymus, Oecumenius, etc., apply the words, according to 1 Cor. vii. 3, "ad honorem impertendum uxoribus a viris, qui sit abstinentia a congressu, ut orationi vacare possint" (Lorinus), which is connected with the false

interpretation of συνοικούντες; Nicol. de Lyra says more correctly: "cum vir et uxor non sunt bene concordēs, minus possunt orationi vacare." The Scholion in Matthaei, p. 199, is inadequate: ὁ γὰρ περὶ τὴν οἰκίαν θρυβὸς τῶν κατὰ Θεὸν ἔργων ἐμπόδιον.

³ Pott explains erroneously, by appeal to 1 Tim. i. 5: "Pro κατὰ δὲ τὸ τέλος summa cohortationum mearum jam eo redit" (in like manner Erasmus, Grotius, Wolf, Steiger, etc.). Oecumenius marks the transition very well thus: τὴν χρὴ ἰδιολογεῖσθαι; ἀπλῶς πᾶσι φημι· τοῦτο γὰρ τέλος καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο ὁ σκοπὸς ἐφορᾷ τῆς σωτηρίας.

well before God (Acts xx. 19) as towards our neighbor (chap. v. 5, Phil. ii. 3, where it is joined with *σπλάγχνα οἰκτιρμοῦ*); here, with the latter reference. — Calvin: *humilitas praecipuum conservandae amicitiae vinculum*. Hofmann justly questions whether “*ὑποτάσσομαι*, the leading idea of the series of exhortations which here comes to a close, is, as it were, echoed in *ταπεινόςφρ.*” (Wiesinger). For a panegyric on humility, see Lorinus *in loc.* In the classics *ταπεινόςφρων* means “mean-spirited and faint-hearted.” The word *φιλόφρονες* (spurious here) is explained by Gerhard: *qui student facere ea quae alteri amica sunt et grata*. The first three expressions show the loving relation in which Christians stand to each other; the last two (or three), the conduct of Christians towards all without distinction (Hofmann).

Ver. 9. Behavior towards the hostile world. *μὴ ἀποδιόντες κακὸν ἀντὶ κακοῦ*]. The same phrase occurs, Rom. xii. 17; 1 Thess. v. 15: comp. Matt. v. 43 ff. — *ἡ λοιδορίαν ἀντὶ λοιδορίας*: comp. chap. ii. 23.¹ — *τοῦναντίον δὲ εὐλογοῦντες*, i. e., in return for *κακόν* and *λοιδορία*; *εὐλογεῖν* in the N. T., when used of man, is equal to *bona apprecari*, opposed to *καταρῆσθαι*; cf. Matt. v. 44; Luke vi. 28; Rom. xii. 14; 1 Cor. iv. 12; Jas. iii. 9. Taken in this sense (Wiesinger, Brückner, Hofmann),² it expresses simply the opposite of the preceding *λοιδορίαν ἀντὶ λοιδορίας*. It is more in harmony with the context, however, to understand it as referring equally to *κακὸν ἀντὶ κακοῦ*; in which case it will have a wider sense, and be equivalent to “wishing well and showing kindness by word and deed” (Fronmüller). This is supported by the subsequent *εὐλογίαν*; nor does the N. T. usage stand in the way, in so far as in 2 Cor. ix. 5, 6, at least, *εὐλογία* denotes something accomplished by human action, though Hofmann strangely seeks to lessen its force by understanding it of “a personal greeting.” — *ὅτι εἰς τοῦτο ἐκλήθητε*: comp. chap. ii. 21. — *ἵνα εὐλογίαν κληρονομήσητε*.] From chap. ii. 21 it is natural to take *εἰς τοῦτο* as referring to what precedes (*εὐλογοῦντες*) (Oecumenius, Grotius, Calvin, Steiger, De Wette-Brückner, Fronmüller, Reiche, Hofmann, etc.); in which case *ἵνα* would belong either to *εὐλογοῦντες*, *ὅτι . . . ἐκλήθητε* thus forming a parenthesis, or to *ἐκλήθητε*. But in the first case the close connection of the clauses is broken, whilst in the second the somewhat inadequate idea arises, that we are called upon to bless, *in order that* we ourselves may obtain a blessing. It is therefore better to take *εἰς τοῦτο* with the subsequent *ἵνα* (Luther, Beza, Bengel, Wiesinger, Schott, etc.); comp. chap. iv. 6; John xviii. 37; Rom. xiv. 9. The consciousness that we, as Christians, are called to obtain a blessing, should be an incitement to us to bring blessing to others; the more so, that otherwise we shall fall short of the blessing to which we are called. On *εὐλογίαν* Bengel rightly remarks: *benedictionem aeternam, cujus primitias jam nunc pii habent*. If *εἰδότες* before *ὅτι* be the correct reading, it must be taken as in chap. i. 18.

¹ Nicol. de Lyra: “Non reddentes malum pro malo in *factis* injuriis, nec maledictam pro maledicta in *verbis* contentiosis.”

² Schott no doubt insists that the blessing of man is accomplished in word only and not in deed; but he does not say whether it means a wish expressed in prayer (*bona apprecari*),

or whether any operation through the word is to be understood, for he renders *εὐλογεῖν* by “to bestow good in word.” If the former be implied, then it is wrong to say “that God’s blessing is in truth accompanied by deeds, but man’s must stop short at the word.” If the second, then man’s blessing is also in deed.

Vv. 10-12. Quoted from Ps. xxxiv. 13-17, LXX., and strengthening the foregoing exhortations by a reference to the divine judgment. In the original the first clause forms an interrogation, to which the following clauses, in the second person imperative, give the answer. — ὁ γὰρ θέλων ζωὴν ἀγαπᾶν, καὶ ἰδεῖν ἡμέρας ἀγαθὰς]. The translation of the LXX., an inexact reproduction of the Hebrew,¹ runs: τίς ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος ὁ θέλων ζωὴν, ἀγαπᾶν ἡμέρας ἀγαθὰς; Peter's deviation from it by the conjunction of θέλων ἀγαπᾶν is striking. — θέλων is not used adverbially here, equivalent to "fain;" but neither must another conception be substituted for ἀγαπᾶν; De Wette: "he who will *show*² love for life" (i.e., a yearning desire after it). The idea "show," besides being an arbitrary introduction, is inappropriate, inasmuch as it is love of life itself, and not the showing of it, that is here in question. Wiesinger is more happy: "He who is really in earnest as to the love of life." θέλων is then to be explained on the principle that love of ζωὴ, no less than the possession of it, is conditioned by a certain course of conduct on the part of man. Bengel, appealing to Eccles. ii. 17, interprets still better: *qui vult ita vivere, ut ipsum non taedeat vitae*; i.e., *who will have life so that he can love it*; so, too, Schott; similarly Hofmann, only that the latter unnecessarily understands ἀγαπᾶν to mean simply "to enjoy a thing." — καὶ ἰδεῖν ἡμέρας ἀγαθὰς: with ἰδεῖν in this connection, comp. Luke ii. 26; Heb. xi. 5; John iii. 3. — The passage in the Psalms has evidently reference to earthly happiness; according to De Wette, on the other hand, the apostle had the future and eternal life in view here; this, however, is not the case, for in the passage before us the reference is likewise to the *present* life (Wiesinger, Schott, and Brückner), only it must be observed that for the believer happiness in this life consists in something different from that of the man of the world; to the former, days of suffering also may be *ἡμέραι ἀγαθαί*. If this be correct, γὰρ cannot refer to the thought immediately preceding, but only "to the whole exhortation, vv. 8, 9" (Wiesinger, Schott). — πανσάτω, κ.τ.λ.]. The LXX., keeping to the Hebrew original, here and in what follows preserve the second person. — παύειν, "to cause to cease, to hold back;" in classical Greek never joined with ὑπό; the subsequent genitive τοῦ μὴ λαλῆσαι stands in conformity with the use of the verb among the Greeks; comp. Winer, p. 305 (E. T., 325 f.). — κακόν has a wider range than δόλος; there is no ground for limiting the application of the term here *simply* to words of reprimand (De Wette). With δόλος, comp. chap. ii. 1, 22. — Ver. 11. ἐκκλινάτω δέ, κ.τ.λ.]. ἐκκλίνειν ὑπό; comp. Rom. xvi. 17. The same thought in the same words, Ps. xxxvii. 27; comp. further, Isa. i. 16, 17; Rom. xii. 9. — δέ, if it be genuine, serves to bring into prominence the

¹ In the original Hebrew the passage is: —

כִּי-הָאֵשׁ הִחַפֵּץ חַיִּים
אֲהַב לְרֵאוֹת טוֹב.

² Similarly already the *Glossa interl.*: "qui vult ostendere, se dilectionem habere." — Lortius thinks that the combination of the two words serves to intensify the idea. "si recte dicitur quis concupiscere, desiderare

(Ps. cxviii. 20), quidni velle, quod est verbum generale, amare? Innuit duplicatio non solum vehementiam desiderii amorisve, sed infirmitatem quoque carnis revocantis subinde voluntatem, ne ita velit acriter et assiduo." But in Ps. cxviii. (Vulg., "concupivit anima mea desiderare justificationes tuas") the connection is different from here.

new idea, distinct from the preceding. — *ζητησάτω, κ.τ.λ.*: *διώκειν* (comp. 1 Tim. vi. 11, etc.), stronger than *ζητεῖν* (comp. Matt. vi. 33; Col. iii. 1). — The first half contains the general thought, the second emphasizes one more special. Although the exhortations of the apostle refer more particularly to the conduct of Christians towards their persecutors, yet they are not confined to this, but go beyond it (in opposition to Schott). — Ver. 12. *ὄτι ὀφθαλμοὶ κυρίου, κ.τ.λ.*] *ὄτι* is inserted by the apostle in order to mark more precisely the connection of thought. The exhortations are founded on a reference to the manner of God's dealings. On the first hemistich Bengel remarks: *inde vitam habent et dies bonos*. The apostle omits the words *τοῦ ἐξολοθρεῦσαι ἐκ γῆς τὸ μνημόσυνον αὐτῶν* in the Psalm, added to *πρόσωπον . . . κακά* (not because, as De Wette thinks, he considered them too strong), and thus deprives the last member of the verse of a nearer definition. Calvin, Grotius, Beza, De Wettè, accordingly take the *ἐπί* of this member in a sense different from that which it has in the first, namely, as conveying the idea of "punishment," equivalent to "against;" this, however, is arbitrary. Hensler, Augusti, and Steiger find in all three members the expression of "attentive observation" only; but this view — itself, according to the thought, inadequate — is opposed by the particle *δέ*, which indicates rather a contrast, and is not to be translated, with Hensler, by "but also." If, now, the antithesis be not contained in *ἐπί*, it can be sought for only in *πρόσωπον*, which, though in itself doubtless a *vox media* (comp. Num. vi. 25, 26; Ps. iv. 7), is nevertheless in this passage of the Psalms to be thought of as one full of wrath, and, as such, was present to the mind of the apostle. Strictly speaking, indeed, this should have been expressed; but not necessarily so, since the antithesis between this and the preceding member of the verse makes it sufficiently apparent. A similar interpretation is given by Wiesinger, Brückner, and Schott.

Ver. 13 serves further to emphasize the exhortation to well-doing, and at the same time introduces the following paragraph, in which Peter calls upon the Christians to suffer persecutions patiently. — *καί* unites what follows with what precedes. A new reason, the truth of which is attested by the thought contained in ver. 12, is added in ver. 13 to the argument advanced for the preceding exhortation of ver. 12. The sense is: Do good, for to the good God is gracious, with the wicked He is angry; and those who do good, for this very reason none can harm. — *τίς ὁ κακῶσων ὑμᾶς*: an impressive and passionate question (stronger than a simple negative), in which must be noted the form *ὁ κακῶσων*, sc. *ἐστὶ* instead of *κακῶσει*, as also the sharp contrast between *κακοῦν* and the subsequent *ἀγαθοῦ*. "Do harm," as a rendering of *κακοῦν* (Wiesinger, De Wette), is too weak. The word is used for the most part of *ill-treatment* (Acts vii. 6, 19, xii. 1, xviii. 10), and denotes here, with reference to the preceding *κακά*, such evil-doing as is really harmful for him who suffers it. It is possible that the apostle had in his mind Isa. l. 9, LXX. : *ἰδοὺ κύριος κύριος βοηθήσει μοι, τίς κακῶσει με*. The interrogative form expresses the sure confidence of the apostle, that to those who do good, no one either will or can do harm. Steiger's interpretation is too pointless: "and indeed who then will seek to do you harm, as

you imagine, if you really," etc.;¹ for the reservation must be added that every proverb has this peculiarity, that it is not without exception (Benson), or that the statement in the *oratio popularis* must not be taken too strictly. The strong and consoling expression of an unshaken faith is thus reduced to a somewhat empty commonplace.²—*ἐν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ζηλωταὶ γένησθε*]. τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ was taken by some of the older interpreters (Lorin., Aret., etc.) to be the genitive masc., probably on account of the article (as distinguished from the anarthrous ἀγαθόν, ver. 11). Weiss also thinks that by it Christ perhaps may be understood. Most commentators, however, correctly regard it as the neuter; comp. ver. 11. The article is put, inasmuch as in this term all the single virtues, formerly mentioned, are included; it stands first by way of emphasis.—*ζηλωταί*; comp. 1 Cor. xiv. 12; Tit. ii. 14. If the reading *μμηταί* be adopted, its connection with the neuter is somewhat singular, still the verb *μμεῖσθαι* does occur with names of things; comp. Heb. xiii. 7; 3 John 11.

Ver. 14. *ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ πάσχετε*]. *ἀλλά* expresses the antithesis to the negation contained in the preceding question: "*but even though you should suffer*;" cf. Winer, p. 275 (E. T., 367); a species of restriction which, however, is not intended to weaken the force of the foregoing thought. No doubt the possibility of suffering is admitted, yet in such a way that the Christian is considered blessed on account of that suffering. *πάσχειν* is not identical with *κακοῦσθαι*, but, as Bengel rightly remarks, *levius verbum quam κακοῦσθαι*. Every Christian has a *πάσχειν*, but he need never fear a *κακοῦσθαι*.³—*διὰ δικαιοσύνην* recalls Matt. v. 10. *δικαιοσύνη* is here (cf. chap. ii. 24) synonymous with τὸ ἀγαθόν and ἡ ἀγαθὴ ἐν Χριστῷ ἀναστροφή, ver. 16.—*μακάριοι*: sc. *ἐστέ*. Even suffering itself contributes to your blessedness.—*τὸν δὲ φόβον*, κ.τ.λ.]. These and the words which begin the following verse are "a free use" (Schott) of the passage, Isa. viii. 12, 13, LXX.: τὸν δὲ φόβον αὐτοῦ (i.e., τοῦ λαοῦ) οὐ μὴ φοβηθῆτε, οὐδὲ μὴ παραχθῆτε κύριον αὐτὸν ἀγύισατε. The thought here is not quite the same, the sense of the Old-Testament passage being: do not share the terror of the people, and do not be moved by what alarms them. If φόβος be here taken *objectively*, then φόβος αὐτῶν is "the fear ema-

¹ Gualther's paraphrase is not less insipid: "Quis est, scilicet tam impudens et iniquus, qui vos affligat, si beneficentiae sitis aemulatores?" Wiesinger's interpretation also is inappropriate: "If ye follow my exhortations, it is to be hoped," etc.—The words do not hint that "the trials which the readers had endured were not altogether undeserved on their part" (Wiesinger).

² Schott's interpretation, according to which *κακοῦν* is "to make evil-doers in the judgment of God," is altogether wide of the mark. Although *κακοῦν*,—corresponding to the Hebrew *קָדַם*,—as applied to a judge, may mean, "to condemn," or properly, "to declare a person a *κακός*," it does not follow therefrom that it may also have the meaning of "causing God to declare a person a *κακός*."

³ These words also are wrongly explained by Schott, since he takes *ἀλλά* as quickly denying the previous statement, and introducing a new turn of thought, separates *εἰ καὶ* from each other, and connects *καὶ* with *πάσχετε* in the sense of "even." For the first, Schott appeals to Hartung's *Partikell.*, II., p. 37; for the second, to Hartung, I., p. 140, note; but without any right to do so. For, as to the former, he overlooks that *ἀλλά* here follows on a sentence *negative* in meaning; and as to the latter, that *καὶ* has here a position, in which a separation of it from *εἰ* could not for a moment be thought of. The apostle would have expressed the idea: "if for righteousness' sake you should have to experience (not only not happiness and blessing, but) even suffering," by *εἰ διὰ δικαιοσύνην καὶ πάσχετε*.

nating from them," or "the fear which they excite" (De Wette, Brückner); cf. Ps. xci. 5: *οὐ φοβηθήσῃ ἀπὸ φόβου νεκτερινοῦ*; cf. also in this chapter ver. 6. If, on the other hand, it be taken in a *subjective* sense, then *αὐτῶν* is equal to "of them," therefore: "do not fear with the fear of them, i.e., do not be afraid of them" (Schott and Hofmann also). In both cases the meaning is substantially the same. Wiesinger is inaccurate when he takes *φόβος* subjectively, and interprets *αὐτῶν* as De Wette does.

Ver. 15. *κύριον δὲ τὸν Χριστόν*]. *κύριον*, in Isaiah equivalent to *τὸν Θεόν*; a substitution of this kind is frequently found in the N. T., where reference is made to passages in the O. T., and can be easily explained on the principle that a consciousness distinctively Christian was asserting itself; "*κύριον* is placed first, as antithesis to *αὐτῶν*" (Wiesinger). Schott denies that *κύριον* stands in apposition to *τὸν Χριστόν*, holding that *κύριον* is to be taken rather as a predicate of the object, equivalent to "*as Lord*;" for this reason, that *κύριος* stands here without the article, and that the simple conjunction of *κύριος* and *Χριστός* does not occur. But against the first objection the expression *κύριος ὁ Θεός* may be urged, and against the second the verse Luke ii. 11. It is more natural, and at the same time more in harmony with the passage in the O. T., to connect *κύριος* directly with *τὸν Χριστόν*: "*but . . . the Lord, the Messiah*." — *ἀγιάσατε*, in antithesis to *φοβηθήτε* and *ταραχθήτε*; "*hold, i.e., honor, fear as holy*" (De Wette); the sanctifying comprehends within it the fear of God; cf. Isa. viii. 18, xxix. 23; it thus forms the contrast to the fear of man; where the former is, the latter must give way. — *ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις ὑμῶν* added by the apostle in order to mark the inward nature of the *ἀγιάζειν*. — *ἐτοιμοί*]. Whether *δέ* be the original reading or not, this clause is undoubtedly intimately connected in thought with that which precedes it. Without *δέ* this being ready is conceived as a proof of the *ἀγιάζειν* Χρ.; with *δέ* the thought is this, that the *ἀγιάζειν* Χρ., κ.τ.λ., which banishes all fear of man, should not exclude the *ἀπολογία* before men (De Wette, Wiesinger). Hofmann takes the particle here as equal to "rather;" but against this is the fact that here *κύριον . . . ὑμῶν* would have to be taken as a simple parenthesis, inasmuch as *δέ* would refer only to what precedes, and a second antithesis would then be added to the already antithetical *κύριον δὲ*, κ.τ.λ. — *αἰεὶ πρὸς ἀπολογίαν παντὶ τῷ*, κ.τ.λ.]. *ἐτοιμος πρὸς*, cf. Tit. iii. 1. — "The injunction exempts neither time (*αἰεὶ*) nor person (*παντὶ*)" (Steiger). — To limit its application to a judicial examination is arbitrary, and militates against *παντί*. — *ἀπολογία* not equal to *satisfactio* (Vulg.), but here rather *quævis responsio, qua ratio fidei* (more correctly *spei*) *nostræ redditur* (Vorstius; Phil. i. 7, 16; Acts xxvi. 2). — *παντὶ τῷ αἰτοῦντι*, κ.τ.λ.]. The dative depending on *ἀπολογία*, cf. 1 Cor. ix. 3; for *αἰτέω* with double accusative, cf. Winer, p. 212 f. (E. T., 227). *λόγον αἰτεῖν*, "*to demand account of*," only here, cf. chap. iv. 5; Rom. xiv. 12. — *περὶ τῆς ἐν ὑμῖν ἐλπίδος*]. *περὶ*: as to its nature and ground. — *ἐλπὶς* not equivalent to *πίστις* (Calvin: *spes hic per synecdochen pro fide capitur*), but the hope of the Christian looking, on the ground of faith, into the future salvation.¹ — *ἀλλὰ μετὰ πρᾶντητος καὶ φόβου*]. If *ἀλλά* be the

¹ That this "account" had special reference to the removal of the suspicion that the king-

dom of Christ was of this world, is nowhere alluded to in the context (De Wette, Schott).

true reading, as there can hardly be any doubt it is, it will serve to make more sharply prominent the way and manner in which the *ἀπολογία* should be conducted; De Wette: "as it were: *but remember.*"—*μετά*, to be connected not with *ἔτοιμοι*, but with *ἀπολογίαν*; *πραΐτητος* opposed to passionate zeal. *φόβον* is to be applied directly neither to God (Aretius: *reverentia et timor Dei*; thus Weiss also, p. 169), nor to men before whom testimony is to be borne (according to some, the civil authorities); but it denotes the being afraid—based, of course, on the fear of God—of every unseemly kind of *ἀπολογία*, and stands especially opposed to all arrogant self-confidence (Wiesinger).

Ver. 16. *συνείδησιν ἔχοντες ἀγαθὴν*]. These words are taken by several interpreters (Bengel, Steiger, De Wette, etc.) with *ἀγιάσατε*, ver. 14, as coordinate with *ἔτοιμοι*; Wiesinger construes them with *ἔτοιμοι*, as subordinate to it. The latter is to be preferred, for *συνείδ. ἔχ.* denotes "the point essentially important, to being ever prepared to give an answer in a right manner" (Wiesinger). But it is better still to assume that it—like *μετὰ πραΐτητος*—belongs in a loose way to *ἀπολογίαν*, equivalent to "*with good conscience,*" i. e., in that your walk does not give the lie to your confession.¹ Calvin says correctly: *quia parum auctoritatis habet sermo absque vita.*—*ἵνα ἐν ᾧ, κ.τ.λ.*]. The construction is here the same as in chap. ii. 12; see the exposition of this passage, where, too, Schott's interpretation of *ἐν ᾧ*, equal to "in this, that," is considered. The conjunctive of the Rec. *καταλαλώσω* would represent the case as possible, equal to "*in which they may possibly slander you.*"—*ἵνα*, as a final particle, refers to the whole preceding thought, especially to *συνείδ. ἔχ. ἀγαθὴν.*—*καταισχυνθῶσιν*]. Comp. 2 Cor. vii. 14: "*that they may be put to shame,*" i. e., since their slanders are openly proved to be lies.—*οἱ ἐπηρεύζοντες, κ.τ.λ.*]. The subject stands, by way of emphasis, at the end of the sentence. *ἐπηρεύζειν*, "to revile," Matt. v. 44; Luke vi. 28. Hensler distinguishes, without any ground, the *ἐπηρεύζοντες* from the *καταλαλῶντες*, as different persons; the former he considers to be the accusers of the Christians, who bring the slanders of others before the judge.—*ὑμῶν τὴν ἀγαθὴν ἐν Χριστῷ ἀναστροφὴν*, i. e., "*the good life which you lead in Christ* (i. e., as Christians)."

Ver. 17. *κρείττον γάρ*]. *γάρ* gives the ground of the exhortation contained in *συνείδ. ἔχ. ἀγ.*; the explanation of this *κρείττον* is contained in chap. ii. 19 ff.—*ἀγαθοποιῶντας . . . πάσχοντες*]. The connection between these two ideas is the same as that between *ἀγαθοποιῶντες καὶ πάσχοντες*, chap. ii. 20, the principles giving not simply the special circumstances, as Hofmann asserts, but the reason of the suffering; this Schott denies as regards the first member: *ἀγαθοποιῶντας*.²—The parenthetical clause: *εἰ θέλοι τὸ θέλημα τοῦ Θεοῦ*, belongs

And Schott is hardly justified in giving the apostle's exhortations special application "to the divinely ordained ordinances of natural social life."

¹ Hofmann says, "that it should not be joined with *ἀπολογία*, for the meaning is, that they should do that whereunto they must be prepared with eagerness, and a good conscience which they should bring to it." To this it is

to be replied, that the *ἀπολογία* itself is precisely the thing for which they are to be ready. It is evidently arbitrary "to supplement an imperative (which?) to *ἀλλά*, and to connect *συνείδησιν ἔχοντες ἀγ.* with it."

² It must, indeed, be noted that those sufferings which the believers, as such, have to endure from the unbelieving world, overtake them because of their *ἀγαθοποιεῖν*; Christians

to *πάσχειν*; the optative denotes the possibility: "if such should be the will of God." — On the pleonasm: *θέλοι τὸ θέλημα*, see Winer, p. 562 (E. T., 604). The thought here is not quite the same as that of chap. ii. 20. There, chief stress is laid on *ὑπομένειν*, to which no special prominence is here given. But, as in the former case the exhortation is enforced by reference to Christ, i.e., to His sufferings, so is it here also, in the following paragraph on to the end of the chapter, only that in this passage the typical character of His sufferings is less emphasized, whilst the exaltation which followed them is brought specially forward.

Ver. 18. First, mention of the death of Christ by way of giving the reason. — *ὅτι καὶ Χριστὸς ἅπαξ περὶ ἡμαρτιῶν ἔπαθε (ἠπέθανε)*]. *ὅτι* is connected with the idea immediately preceding, and gives the ground of the *κρεῖττον; καὶ Χριστὸς* (as in chap. ii. 21) places the sufferings which the Christians have to bear, as *ἀγαθοποιούντες*, side by side with the sufferings of Christ, *περὶ ἡμαρτιῶν*, so that *καὶ* must be taken as referring not to *ἔπαθε (ἠπέθανε)* only (as is done by most commentators, among them De Wette), but, as the position of the words (*περὶ ἡμαρτ. before ἔπαθε*) clearly shows, to *περὶ ἡμαρτιῶν ἔπαθε (ἠπέθανε)* (Wiesinger, Brückner, Schott). Hofmann's application of it to the whole "statement here with respect to Christ" is open to objection, from the fact that in what follows there are elements introduced which go too far beyond the comparison here instituted. Christ's sufferings were on account of sin, and such also should be the sufferings of the Christians.¹ This does not preclude the possibility of His sufferings having had a significance different from what theirs can have. This peculiar significance of Christ's sufferings is marked by *δίκαιος ὑπερ ἁδίκων*, or, as Schott holds, by *ἅπαξ*. *ἅπαξ* gives prominence to the fact that in relation to His subsequent life (*θανατοθεΐς . . . ζωοποιηθεΐς*) Christ's suffering took place but once, as in Heb. ix. 27, 28 (Hofmann: "once it took place that He died the death He did die, and what followed thereon forms, as what is enduring, a contrast to what passed over but once"); doubtless not without implying the secondary idea, that the sufferings of Christians take place only once also, and come to an end with this life.² — *περὶ ἡμαρτιῶν*, which states yet more indefinitely the purpose of

who, though confessing Christ, at the same time live entirely like the children of the world, are well liked by the world.

¹ The subsequent *δίκαιος* proves that the sins for which Christ suffered were not His own sins; thus also the believer's sufferings should not arise out of his own sins, he should not suffer as a *κακοποιῶν*, but as an *ἀγαθοποιῶν*. Rejecting this application, Hofmann finds the point of comparison in this, "that we should let the sins which those who do us wrong commit, be to us the cause of sufferings to us" (?).

² Oecumenius finds in *ἅπαξ* an allusion to *τὸ τοῦ παθόντος δραστήριόν τι καὶ δυνατόν*, or to the *brevity* also of the sufferings. Gerhard unites all three elements by saying: "ut ostendat (Ap.) passionis Christi brevitatem et

perfectionem sacrificii et ut doceat Christum non amplius passioni fore obnoxium." — According to Pott, it is also meant to express the contrast to the frequent repetition of the O. T. sacrifices, — an application entirely foreign to the context. According to Schott, *ἅπαξ* indicates that Christ suffered once for all, so that any further suffering of the same kind is neither necessary nor possible. This is no doubt correct; but it does not follow that Peter — whose words combine the typical and specifically peculiar significance of the sufferings of Christ — should not have had in his mind the application of *ἅπαξ* to believers, as above stated. It is with *ἅπαξ* as with *περὶ ἡμαρτιῶν*; it is impossible for believers to suffer *περὶ ἡμαρτιῶν* in the same sense that Christ suffered *περὶ ἡμαρτιῶν*.

Christ's sufferings, "on account of sin," finds a more precise definition in what follows. — *δικαιος ὑπὲρ ἁδίκων*, "as the just for the unjust;" comp. Rom. v. 6: *ὑπέρ*, equivalent to *in commodum*, is not in itself, indeed, equal to *ἀντί*; but the contrast here drawn between *δικαιος* and *ἁδίκων* suggests that in the general relation, the more special one of substitution is implied (Weiss, p. 261); comp. chap. ii. 21. The omission of the article is due to the fact that the apostle holds it of importance to mark the character of the one as of the other. — *ἵνα ἡμῖς προσάγῃ τῷ Θεῷ* gives the purpose of *ἔπαθεν* (*ἀπέθανε*), which latter is more closely defined by that which immediately precedes and follows; *προσάγειν* does not mean "to sacrifice" (Luther, Vulg.: *ut nos offerret Deo*), neither "to reconcile;" but "to bring to," i.e., "to bring into communion with God," which goes still beyond the idea of reconciliation; the latter presupposes Christ's death for us; the former, the life of Him who died for us. Weiss maintains, without sufficient reason (p. 260), that the word here points to the idea of the Christian's priesthood (chap. ii. 5). The verb occurs here only; the substantive *προσαγωγή*, Rom. v. 2; Eph. ii. 18, iii. 12.¹ — *θανατωθεῖς μὲν σαρκί, ζωοποιηθεῖς δὲ πνεύματι*]. This adjunct does not belong to *ἔπαθεν* (De Wette), but to *προσαγωγή* (Wiesinger); it is subjoined, in order to show prominently how the *προσάγειν* can take place through Christ; the chief stress is laid on the second member. According to Schott, both participles are to be considered as "an exposition of *ἅπαξ*;" this assumption is contradicted, on the one hand, by the distance between them and the latter word; and, on the other, that they must necessarily be attached to a verb. — The antithesis between the two members of this sentence is strongly marked by *μὲν . . . δέ*. The datives *σαρκί, πνεύματι*, state with reference to what the verbal conceptions *θανατωθεῖς, ζωοποιηθεῖς*, hold good; "they serve to mark the sphere to which the general predicate is to be thought of as restricted" (Winer); comp. 1 Cor. vii. 34: *ἀγία καὶ σώματι καὶ πνεύματι*; Col. ii. 5; *τῇ σαρκὶ ἔπιεμ, τῷ πνεύματι σὺν ὑμῖν εἶμι*. Schott explains — somewhat ambiguously — the datives "as general more precise adverbial definitions," which state "what is of determinative importance in both facts," and "the nature of the actual condition produced by them." — *πνεύματι* is by some understood instrumentally; incorrectly, for *σαρκί* cannot be taken thus; the two members of the clause correspond so exactly in form, that the dative in the one could not be explained differently from the dative in the other, as Wiesinger, Weiss, von Zeszchwitz, Brückner, Schott, and Fronmüller justly acknowledge. — *σαρκὶ . . . πνεύματι*; this antithesis occurs frequently in the N. T.; with reference to the person of Christ, besides in this passage, in Rom. i. 3: *κατὰ σάρκα . . . κατὰ πνεῦμα ἀγιοσύνης*, and 1 Tim. iii. 16: *ἐν σαρκὶ . . . ἐν πνεύματι* (cf. also chap. iv. 6). — The antithesis of the two conceptions proves it to be erroneous to assign to the one term a sphere different from that of the other, and to suppose *σάρξ* to mean the body of Christ, and *πνεῦμα* the Spirit of God. *Antithesis clare ostendit quod dicatur in alia quidem sui parte aut vitæ ratione*

¹ It is certainly very doubtful whether the purpose also of the death of Christ, here stated, "admits of application to us," in that "it should likewise be our object, by the

manner in which we endure undeserved sufferings, to bring those by whom we are wronged to bethink themselves, and to lead them to a knowledge of Christ" (Hofmann).

mortificatus, in alia autem vivificatus (Flacius). It must be observed that both are here used as *general* conceptions (Hofmann), without a pronoun to mark them as designations applicable only to Christ; for which reason *σάρξ* cannot relate exclusively to the human, and *πνεῦμα* to the divine nature of Christ.¹ As *general* conceptions (that is, as applicable not to Christ alone, but to human nature generally), *σάρξ* and *πνεῦμα* must, however, not be identified with *σῶμα* and *ψυχή*.² For *σάρξ* is *that* side of human nature in virtue of which man belongs to the earth, is therefore an earthly creature, and accordingly perishable like every thing earthly; and *πνεῦμα*, on the other hand, is *that* side of his nature by which he belongs to a supernatural sphere of existence, is not a mere creature of earth, and is accordingly destined also to an imperishable existence.³ — Wiesinger (with whom Zezschwitz agrees) deviates from this interpretation thus far only, that he understands *πνεῦμα*, not as belonging to the *nature* of man, “but as that principle of union with God which is bestowed upon man at regeneration.” This deviation may arise from the reluctance to attribute a *πνεῦμα* to man as such (also in his sinful condition); as, however, according to Peter, the souls of the departed are *πνεύματα* (ver. 19), it is thus presupposed that an unregenerate man also possesses a *πνεῦμα* during his earthly existence. It must also be observed that *σάρξ* and *πνεῦμα* are here not *ethical* antitheses, but are contrasted with each other as *natural* distinctions. — *θανατωθεῖς . . . ζωοποιηθεῖς*. *θανατώ* incorrectly interpreted by Wahl here, as in other passages of the N. T., by *capitis damno, morti addico*; for although it may sometimes occur in this sense in the classics, still in the N. T. it means only *to kill*. By *θανατωθεῖς σαρκί*, then, the apostle says of Christ, that He was put to death in His *earthly* human nature (which He along with all the rest of mankind possessed),⁴ i. e., at the hand of man by the crucifixion. — *ζωοποιέω* does not

¹ Accordingly, interpretations like those of Calvin are incorrect: “*caro hic pro externo homine capitur, spiritus pro divina potentia, qua Christus victor a morte emersit*; Beza: “*πνεύματι, i. e., per divinitatem in ipso corporaliter habitantem, equal to ἐκ δυνάμεως Θεοῦ*,” 2 Cor. xiii. 4; Oecumenius: *θανατωθεῖς μὲν τῆ φύσει τῆς σαρκός, τούτεστι τῆ ἀνθρωπίνῃ, ἀναστὰς δὲ τῆ δυνάμει τῆς θεότητος*. It is equally incorrect, with Weiss (p. 252), to understand *σάρξ* as meaning “the human nature of Christ” (instead of which he no doubt also says: “the *earthly* human nature of Christ”), and *πνεῦμα* as meaning “the pre-existent divine *πνεῦμα* communicated at baptism to the man Jesus” (which, as Weiss maintains, constitutes, according to Peter, the divine nature of Christ). Weiss, for the sole purpose of representing the apostle’s doctrinal conception as still in a very undeveloped state, imputes to Peter a view of the person of Christ which—as he himself says—is possessed of “a duality which somewhat endangers the unity of His person.” Nor has Wichelhaus hit the true explanation when he says: “Peter here con-

siders Christ as, on the one hand, a true man in body and soul, liable to all suffering . . . ; and, on the other hand, in so far as He was anointed by the Holy Ghost.”

² *σάρξ* and *σῶμα* are proved to be two distinct conceptions by the fact that, after the resurrection, man will have a *σῶμα*, but no *σάρξ*. The difference between *πνεῦμα* and *ψυχή* is clear, from passages such as Matt. vi. 25. If in other passages *πνεῦμα* be used as synonymous with *ψυχή* (comp., e. g., John xii. 27 with John xiii. 21), this is explained by the two-sidedness of the human soul.

³ To Weiss’s remark, that Peter terms that side of human nature by which man is rendered capable of religious life *ψυχή*, it must be replied that the *ψυχή* possesses such capacity for this very reason, that even under the power of the *σάρξ* it has never ceased to be spiritual. In place of *πνεύματι, ψυχῇ* would not be at all appropriate here, in the first place, because *ψυχή* forms no antithesis to *σάρξ*, and then because the idea of what is celestial, peculiar to *πνεῦμα*, would not find expression in it.

⁴ Schott is wrong in maintaining that the an-

mean "to preserve alive," as several commentators explain, e.g., Bellarmin (*De Christo*, lib. iv. cap. 13), Hottinger, Steiger, and Güder, — this idea, in the Old as in the New Testament, being expressed by ζωογονεῖν and other words (see Zezschwitz on this passage); but "to make alive" (De Wette, Wiesinger, Weiss, Zezschwitz, Schott, Köhler,¹ Hofmann, and others); it often applies to the raising-up of the dead; cf. John v. 21; Rom. iv. 17; 1 Cor. xv. 22, etc. In this sense alone does ζωοποιηθεῖς answer the preceding θανατωθεῖς. Bengel: *vivificatio ex antitheto ad mortificationem resolvi debet*. The latter idea assumes the anterior condition to have been one of death, whilst the former — in contradiction to θανατ. — would presuppose one of life. Christ then, according to the apostle, entered into the actual state of death, that is, in so far as the σάρξ pertained to Him, so that His life in the flesh came to an end;² but from death He was brought back again to life, that is, was raised up, as far as the πνεῦμα pertained to Him, so that the new life was purely pneumatical. But the new life began by His re-uniting Himself as πνεῦμα to His σῶμα, so that thus this σῶμα itself became pneumatical.³ — According to Bengel, with whom Schmid (*Bibl. Theol.*), Lechler, and Fronmüller agree (comp. also Hahn, *Neutest. Theol.*, i. 440), ζωοποιηθεῖς does not refer to the resurrection of Christ, but to His deliverance from the weakness of the flesh, effected by His death, and, based upon this, his transition to a higher life (which was followed by the resurrection).⁴ Against this, however; is to be observed: (1) That the going of His πνεῦμα to the Father, connected with His death (Luke xxiii. 46), is, as little as His ascension, spoken of in Scripture as "a becoming quickened;" (2) That as in θανατωθεῖς the whole man Christ is meant, the same must be the case in ζωοποιηθεῖς; and (3) That this view is based on what follows, which, however, if rightly interpreted, by no means renders it necessary. Buddeus is therefore entirely right when he says: *vivificatio animae corporisque conjunctionem denotat*.⁵

tithesis to what is here said should be, "that Christ was quickened according to His glorified human nature;" the antithesis to "earthly," however, is not "glorified," but "celestial."

¹ "Zur Lehre von Christi Höllenfahrt," in the *Zeitschrift für luth. Theol u. Kirche*, by Delitzsch and Guericke, 1864, H. 4.

² Schott substantially agrees with this interpretation, but thinks that the above expression does not say decidedly enough that "this was an entire cessation of His life." However, this "entire" is saying too much, since σαρκι evidently points to a limitation.

³ Hofmann says, not quite accurately (*Schriftbeweis*, II. 1, p. 473): "The antithesis θανατ., κ. τ. λ., denotes the end of life in the flesh, and the commencement of life in the spirit." For spiritual life was in Christ during His life in the flesh, and after it, before His resurrection. At His death He committed His πνεῦμα to His Father; it was therefore in Him before, and continued to live after His death. — Hofmann remarks correctly, how-

ever: "As it was the Christ living in the flesh who, by being put to death, ceased to be any longer in that bodily life in which from His birth He had existed, so His quickening of that which was dead is a restoration of a spiritual nature to a bodily life."

⁴ Bengel: "Simul atque per mortificationem involucro infirmitatis in carne solutus erat, statim vitæ solvi nesciæ virtus modis novis et multis expeditissimis sese exserere coepit. Hanc vivificationem necessario celeriter subsecuta est excitatio corporis ex morte et resurrectione et sepulchro." — Schmid: "The πνεῦμα is a principle which He possessed in a special manner, . . . this, in consequence of death, is set free from the trammels of sensuous bodily nature, it now enters upon its full rights, and develops in its fulness that ζωή which was in Him."

⁵ Schott explains, indeed, ζωοποιηθεῖς rightly in itself, but he objects to the identification of ζωοποίησις with ἀνάστασις, and thinks that the former is the fundamental condition of

Ver. 19. With this verse a new paragraph — extending to ver. 22 inclusive — begins, closely connected by *ἐν ᾧ* (i. e., *πνεύματι*) with what precedes, and in which reference is made to the glory of Him who was quickened according to the Spirit. It may appear singular that in this passage Peter should make mention of those who were unbelieving in the days of Noah, and of baptism as the antitype of the water of the deluge; but this may be explained from the circumstance that he looks on the deluge as a type of the approaching judgment. It must be observed, that it is not so much the condemnation of the unbelieving, as the salvation of believers, that the apostle has here in his mind. — *ἐν ᾧ καὶ, κ.τ.λ.*: “in which (spirit) He also went and preached unto the spirits in prison (to them), which sometime were unbelieving when,” etc. The close connection of these words with what immediately precedes — by *ἐν ᾧ, sc. πνεύματι* — favors the view that *ἐκήρυξε* refers to an act of Christ which, as the *ζωοποιηθεὶς πνεύματι*, He performed after His death, and that with reference to the spirits *ἐν φυλακῇ* of the unbelievers who had perished in the deluge. This is the view of the oldest Fathers of the Greek and Latin Church, as also of the greater number of later and modern theologians. Augustin, however, opposed it, and considered *ἐκήρυξεν* as referring to a preaching by Christ *ἐν πνεύματι* long before His incarnation, in the days of Noah, to the people of that generation, upon which the judgment of the deluge came because of their unbelief.¹ This view, after being adopted by several theologians of the Middle Ages, became prevalent in the Reformed Church. In recent times, it has been defended more especially by Schweizer, Wichelhaus, Besser, and Hofmann. The chief arguments which those who maintain it advance in opposition to that first mentioned, are the following: (1) The idea that Christ preached to the spirits *ἐν φυλακῇ* would be an isolated one occurring nowhere else in Scripture; and, further, preaching such as this, if conceived as judicial, would have been entirely useless, whilst, looked on as a proclamation of salvation, it would stand in contradiction to the uniform teaching of Scripture regarding the state of man after death. To this, however, it must be replied, that isolated ideas are to be found expressed here and there in Scripture, and that the reconciliation of the idea of a salvation offered to the spirits *ἐν φυλακῇ* with the other doctrines of Scripture, can at most be termed a problem difficult of solution; nor must it be forgotten that the eschatological doctrines comprehend within them very many problems. (2) This view does not correspond with the tendency of the entire passage from ver. 17 to ver. 22, and therefore does not fit into the train of thought. But this assertion is to the point only if those who make it have themselves correctly understood the tendency of the passage, which in this instance

the latter, which is the “side of the resurrection concealed and as yet hidden in the depths” (?). But where does the apostle make any allusion to any such distinction between two sides in the resurrection of Christ?

¹ It must be observed that whilst Hofmann considers the preaching of Christ as having

taken place through Noah, Schweizer most decidedly disputes this, and is of the opinion that it was addressed to Noah himself as well as to his contemporaries. In support of this, he very rightly appeals to the fact that Noah is not here — as 2 Pct. ii. 5 — termed a *κῆρυξ*. But he does not say by whom this preaching must be considered to have taken place.

they have not done. (3) It cannot be understood how Peter comes so suddenly to speak of the spirits in prison. But, in reply, it may be urged, with at least equal justification, that it is not easy to understand how Peter comes so suddenly to speak of an act of Christ *before* His incarnation. (4) The want of the article before *ἀπειθήσασι* compels us to translate this participle not: "which sometime were unbelieving," but: "when they sometime were unbelieving." This, however, is not the case, since the participle, added with adjectival force to a substantive, is often enough joined to the latter without an article. If Peter had put the words *πορευθείς ἐκήρυξε* before *τοῖς . . . πνεύμασι*, no difficulty would have presented itself in the translation under dispute ("the sometime unbelieving spirits in prison"). The translation to which preference is given is grammatically untenable.¹— Finally, appeal has been made to the fact that *καί* is placed after *ἐν ᾧ*, indeed even to *ἐν ᾧ* itself; but a correct explanation offers no justification for so doing. Besides the close connection of the relative clause with that immediately preceding, the following points favor the interpretation attacked: (1) The correspondence of the *πνεύματι* to be supplied to *ἐν ᾧ*, with the subsequent *πνεύμασιν*; (2) *πορευθείς*, which must be taken in the same sense as the *πορευθείς* in ver. 22; (3) The fact that *ποτέ* does not stand with *ἐκήρυξε*, but in ver. 20 with *ἀπειθήσασιν*, which shows that the *ἀπειθεῖν* took place previous to the *κηρύσσειν*; and, lastly, (4) The circumstance that had Peter closed his sentence with *ἐκήρυξεν*, it could have occurred to no one that Peter was here speaking of a preaching of Christ which took place in a time long gone by. — *ἐν ᾧ* is not equivalent to *διό* (*αἰτιολογικῶς* with reference to *ἔπαθε*, Theophylact); but whilst *ᾧ* refers back to *πνεύματι*, *ἐν ᾧ* states in what condition Christ accomplished that which is mentioned in what follows,— He accomplished it not *ἐν σαρκί* (for after the *σῶρξ* He was put to death), but *ἐν πνεύματι* (for after the *πνεῦμα* He was made alive). *ἐν* stands here in a position similar to that which it holds in Rom. viii. 8, where, however, *σῶρξ* and *πνεῦμα* form an ethical antithesis, which here is not the case. Hofmann wrongly attributes to *ἐν* here an "instrumental force" equivalent to "by means of;" he is induced to do so solely by his explanation of the *πνεύματι* to be supplied. Although it is evident that *πνεύματι* here must be taken in no sense different from that of the foregoing *πνεύματι*, Hofmann nevertheless holds it to be identical with the *πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ* mentioned in chap. i. 11, while he himself says that the *πνεύματι* subjoined to *ζωοποιηθείς* cannot be understood of the Holy Ghost.²— Peter says, then,

¹ Hofmann, indeed, says that since the expression is not *τοῖς ἀπειθήσασι*, the translation should not be: "those spirits in durance, which sometime were disobedient;" but he grants that, from a grammatical point of view, it remains doubtful "whether *ποτέ* signifies the past as related to the time of Christ's preaching, or the past as regards the present of the writer."

² Hofmann says that the accusation made against him, that he effaces the distinction

between *πνεῦμα* as a term used to designate the precise nature of Christ, and *πνεῦμα* as the third Person in the Trinity, is the result of that confusion of ideas by which "in the Spirit" and "as a Spirit" are understood to mean the same thing. But it must be replied that rather is the identification of two different ideas, contained in his interpretation, the result of the confusion of ideas, leading him as it does to hide the difference by defining *πνεῦμα* as "the Spirit of Christ's life."

that Christ, in the Spirit according to which He was made alive, preached to the spirits *ἐν φυλακῇ*, which cannot be understood to mean any thing else than that He did it as a πνεῦμα (in His pneumatical condition). Frommüller erroneously interprets: "in the existence-form of a spirit separated from the body;" for the quickened Christ lives not as a simple spirit, but is in possession of a glorified spiritual body. — *καὶ τοῖς ἐν φυλακῇ πνεύμασι πορευθεῖς ἐκήρυξεν*]. By τὰ . . . πνεύματα are to be understood, neither angels (Heb. i. 14)¹ nor "men living upon the earth" (as Wichelhaus explains), but the souls of men already dead, as in Heb. xii. 23, which in Rev. vi. 9, xx. 4, Wisd. iii. 1, are called ψυχαί. *ἐν φυλακῇ* designates not only the place, but denotes also the condition in which the πνεύματα are. Hofmann wrongly — because in opposition to the uniform usage in the N. T. — denies all local reference to the expression, and would therefore translate *ἐν φυλακῇ* by "in durance." The meaning is, that the πνεύματα were in prison as prisoners.² The expression occurs in the N. T. with the article and without it, and its more precise force here is clear from the passages, Rev. xx. 7; 2 Pet. ii. 4; Jude 6. It does not denote generally the kingdom of the dead (Lactant. *Inst.*, I. 7, c. 21: *omnes [animae] in una communique custodia detinentur*), but that part of it which serves as abode for the souls of the ungodly until the day of judgment.³ The dative depends, indeed, on ἐκήρυξεν, not on πορευθεῖς; but the addition of the latter word gives prominence to the fact that Christ went to those spirits, and preached to them in that place where they were. Hofmann is not altogether wrong when, in support of his own view of the passage, he says: "the operation of the spirit of Christ, by which Noah was made the organ of His proclamation, might be termed a 'going and preaching' on the part of Christ" (comp. especially the passage, Eph. ii. 17: *ἐλθὼν εὐηγγελίσαστο*; see Meyer *in loc.*, to which Hofmann might have appealed). But that πορευθεῖς cannot be so taken here, is shown by the πορευθεῖς in ver. 22, with which it must be identical in sense.⁴ ἐκήρυξε is the same verb as that so often used in the N. T. of the preaching (not the teaching) of Christ and His apostles. Usually it is accompanied by an object (τὸ εὐαγγέλιον, τὴν βασιλείαν τοῦ Θεοῦ, Χριστόν, or the like); but it is frequently, as here, used absolutely, cf. Matt. xi. 1; Mark i. 38, etc. — It cannot be concluded, with Zetzschwitz, from the connection of this relative clause with ζωοποιηθεῖς πνεύματι, that ζωοποίησιν *illam spiritualem quasi fundamentum fuisse concionis idemque argumentum*; nor does the word itself disclose

¹ Baur (*Tüb. Theol. Jahrb.* 1856, H. 2, p. 215) understands it to mean the ἄγγελοι ἀμαρτήσαντες, 2 Pet. ii. 4, who, according to Gen. vi. 1 ff., had fallen previous to the deluge. This interpretation is sufficiently contradicted by ver. 20.

² The interpretation of Wichelhaus — who by circumlocution explains τὰ ἐν φυλ. πνεύματα as equal to οἱ ἀπειθοῦντες τηρούμενοι, φρουρούμενοι εἰς ἡμέραν τοῦ κατακλυσμοῦ — is altogether erroneous.

³ Justin (*Dial. c. Tryph.*, c. 5): τὰς μὲν τῶν

εὐσεβῶν (ψυχὰς) ἐν κρείττονι που χάρι μένειν, τὰς δ' ἀδίκους καὶ πονηροὺς ἐν χεῖρονι τὸν τῆς κρίσεως ἐνδεχομένου χρόνον.

⁴ Luthardt so thoroughly recognizes the *vis* of this πορευθεῖς, that he says he should interpret the passage as Hofmann does, if the πορευθεῖς did not prevent him from doing so. Besides, it is certain that the coming of the Holy Spirit is at the same time a coming of Christ; but it must not be overlooked that in the N. T. it is nowhere indicated as being a coming of Christ ἐν πνεύματι.

either the contents or the purpose of that preaching; but since *Christ* is called the *κήρυξας* without the addition of any more precise qualification, it must be concluded that the contents and design of this *κήρυγμα* are in harmony with the *κήρυγμα* of Christ elsewhere. It is accordingly arbitrary, and in contradiction to Christ's significance for the work of redemption, to assume that this preaching consisted in the proclamation of the coming judgment (Flacius, Calov., Buddeus, Hollaz, Wolf, Aretius, Zezschwitz, Schott, etc.), and was a *praedicatio damnatoria*.¹ Wiesinger justly asks: "This *concio damnatoria*—what does it mean in general, what here especially?"—It is unjustifiable to deny, with some commentators; that the apostle regarded this *πορευθεὶς ἐκήρυξε* as an actual reality.²—*καί*, following *ἐν ᾧ*, must not be explained, as Schweizer does, in this way, that Peter, wishing to hold up Christ to his readers as a pattern of how they should conduct themselves under suffering, adduces two examples, vv. 19 ff., His death on the cross, and His preaching the whole structure of the clauses, as well as their contents, contradicts this. Nor can it be explained, as Hofmann assumes, "from the antithesis between us whom Christ wished to bring to God, and those who as spirits are in durance." This would hold good only if, in ver. 18, it were affirmed that Christ did the same to us as to those spirits, that is, preached to us. It is likewise incorrect to take *καί* as equivalent to "even" (Wiesinger, Frommüller); for a distinction between these spirits and others is nowhere hinted at. *καί* is put rather in order to show prominently that what is said in this verse coincides with the *ζωοποιηθεὶς πνεύματι* of ver. 18. Zezschwitz: *ut notio, quae in enunciatione ἐν ᾧ latet (ζωοπ. πνεύματι) urgeatur.*

Ver. 20. The words which begin this verse, *ἀπειθήσασίν ποτε*, characterize the spirits who are in prison according to their former conduct. The participle must not, with Wiesinger, be resolved into "although, notwithstanding the fact that they had been disobedient;" an adversative relation of this

¹ Hollaz: "Fuit praedicatio Christi in inferno non evangelica, quae hominibus tantum in regno gratiae annuntiatur, sed *legalis elenchthica*, terribilis eaque tum verbalis, qua ipsos aeterna supplicia promeritos esse convincit, tum realis, qua immanem terrorem illis incussit." This interpretation, which has its origin in dogmatic views, Zezschwitz seeks to found on exegesis by characterizing the idea of judgment as the leading conception of the whole passage, to which, however, the context gives no warrant, and also by maintaining that otherwise Peter would have used the word *εὐαγγελίζειν*, or a compound of *ἀγγέλλειν*. It is certainly correct when Schott and Köhler say that *κηρύσσειν* is not in itself equal to *εὐαγγελίζειν*; but it does not follow that it may not be applied to a message of salvation. It must be remembered that Christ's aim, even as a preacher of judgment, ever was the accomplishment of salvation, as he declared Luke xix. 10; John xii. 47.

² Thus Picus-Mirandola says: "Christus non veraciter et quantum ad realem praesentiam descendit ad inferos, sed solum quoad effectum." Cf., too, J. R. Lavater, *De Descensu Christi ad Inf.*, lib. I., c. 9.—Many interpreters unwarrantably weaken at least *ἐκήρυξε*, in so far as to make it synonymous with "showed Himself," or, at any rate, they say that the preaching of Christ was *potius realiter, quam verbaliter*. This the author of the article, "Die Höllenfabrt Christi," in the *Erlanger Zeitschrift für Protest.*, 1856, should not have sanctioned. Schott is not free from this arbitrary method of interpretation, in that he characterizes *κηρύσσειν* "as a bearing witness to one's self, not only in word, but also in deed," and calls "this bearing witness to and showing forth of Himself by Christ in the glory of His mediatorial person," a *concio damnatoria*.

kind must have been more plainly expressed ¹ — According to the uniform usage of the N. T., the word ἀπειθεῖν has here also the meaning of *unbelief* involving resistance; cf. chap. ii. 7, 8, iii. 1, iv. 17. The translation: “to be disobedient,” is too inexact, for the word forms the antithesis to πιστεῖν. — ὅτε ἀπεξεδέχετο, κ.τ.λ., serves not only to specify the time when these spirits were unbelieving, but also to mark the guilt of the ἀπειθεῖν. — ἀπεκδέχεσθαι, according to N. T. usage, equivalent to “*patient waiting*,” is here used absolutely, as in Rom. viii. 25 (comp. ἐκδέχεσθαι, Heb. x. 13; thus Schott also). The narrative itself shows the object to which this waiting of God’s long-suffering was directed. Its duration is not to be limited to the seven days mentioned in Gen. vii. 4 (De Wette), for this is in keeping neither with the ἀπεξεδέχετο ἢ . . . μακροθυμία, nor the subsequent κατασκευαζομένης κιβωτοῦ, but embraces the whole period of one hundred and twenty years mentioned in Gen. vi. 3. — The time specified by ὅτε, κ.τ.λ., is still more precisely defined in the subsequent ἐν ἡμέραις Νῶε and the κατασκευαζομένης κιβωτοῦ; in such a way, however, that these adjuncts contain a reference to the exhortation to repentance then given, for Noah was not, like the others, an unbeliever, but a believer, and the preparation of the ark gave unmistakable testimony to the approaching judgment. — “κιβωτός without the article, the expression used by the LXX. for תַּיִב, equal to ark, *arca*; comp. Matt. xxiv. 38; Luke xvii. 27; Heb. xi. 7” (Wiesinger).

REMARK 1. — Some of the interpreters who do not apply this passage to the *descensus ad inferos*, as Luther (in his *Auslegung der Ep. Petri*, 1523 (the Socinians, Vorstius, Amelius, Grotius, etc., explain ἐκήρυξε as referring to the preaching of the apostles, assuming that the unbelievers in the time of Noah are mentioned only as types of the unbelievers in apostolic times. τὰ ἐν φυλακῇ πνεύματα they understand to mean the heathen alone, or those along with the Jews. Amelius: πνεύμ. hic in genere denotant homines, quemadmodum paulo post ψυχαί ἐν φυλακῇ: in captivitate erant tum Judaei, sub jugo legis existentes, tum quoque gentiles, sub potestate diaboli jacentes. Illos omnes Christus liberavit; praedicationem verbi sui ad ipsos mittens et continuans et Apostolos divina virtute instruens.

REMARK 2. — Even interpreters who apply this passage to the *descensus ad inferos*, and understand ἐκήρυξε of the preaching of salvation,² are guilty of much arbitrariness, and especially in designating more precisely those to whom the preaching is addressed. Several of the Fathers, as Irenaeus, Tertullian, Hippolytus; many of the Scholastics; further, Zwingli, Calvin (in his Comment.),

¹ Hofman has now justly given up his former explanation: “without being obedient.” Walther’s interpretation is evidently entirely arbitrary: “to the spirits, i.e., the devils and the damned in general, particularly to those damned who,” etc. But neither is there a warrant for inserting οἶον (Bengel: “subaudi οἶον, i.e., exempli gratia, in diebus Noe; subjicitur generi species maxime insignis”).

² It must further be remarked, that several

commentators, Athanasius, Ambrosius, Erasmus, Calvin (in his *Instit.*, lib. II., 2, c. 16, § 9), understand Christ’s preaching as at once a *praedicationis salvifica* and *praed. damnatoria*. Calvin, however, does hold by the idea of κηρύσσειν, when he says: “Contextus vim mortis (Christi) inde amplificat, quod ad mortuos usque penetraverit, dum pie animae ejus visitationis, quam sollicitae expectaverant, praesentis aspectu sunt potitae; contra reprobus clarius patuit, se excludi ab omni salute.”

and others hold those to have been the pious, especially the pious of the O. T.¹ — Marcion thinks the *κήρυγμα* was addressed to those who, though in the O. T. termed ungodly, were actually better than the O. T. believers. — Clemens Al. supposes the *δίκαιοι κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν*, who, however, were still without faith and in the trammels of idolatry. — Several commentators assume that not all unbelievers in the days of Noah are meant, but those only who, at first indeed unbelieving, had still repented at the last moment when the flood came upon them; this is the view of Suarez, Estius, Bellarmin, Luther (*Zu der Erklärung der Genesis*, 1536, und *zu Hosea IV. 2, v. J.* 1545),² Peter Martyr, etc. Bengel says: *Probabile est, nonnullos ex tanta multitudine, veniente pluvia, resipuisse; cumque non credidissent, dum expectaret Deus, postea, cum . . . poena ingrueret, credere coepisse, quibus postea Christus eorumque similibus se praeconem gratiae praestiterit.* Wiesinger agrees with this interpretation, at least in so far that he assumes that the moral condition of the individual (at the time of the flood) was not in every case the same, but extremely varied; although, on the other hand, he finds fault with it on the ground “that, in contradiction to the context, it limits the *ἐκήρυξε* only to a part.” Schott remarks, as against Wiesinger, “that although some may in respect of moral condition have differed from the majority, or still have repented in the last moment, yet these were not among the spirits in durance who listened to Christ’s preaching.”

REMARK 3. — The view commonly accepted is that this preaching by Christ took place *before* His resurrection, whilst His body lay in the grave. Many even of the older dogmatists of the Lutheran Church, however, hold it to have been accomplished *after* His quickening, that is, in the time between this and His going forth from the grave. Quenstedt says: *Christus θεάνθρωπος totaque adeo persona (non igitur secundum animam tantum nec secundum corpus tantum) post redemptionem animae ac corporis ad istud damnatorum pov descendit; he fixes the time when this happened: illud momentum, quod intercessit inter ζωοποίησιν et ἀνάστασιν Christi stricte ita dictam.* Hollaz: *distinguendum inter resurrectionem externam et internam; illa est egressio e sepulcro et exterior coram hominibus manifestatio; haec est ipsa vivificatio;* so, too, Hutter, Baier, Buddeus, etc. In like manner, Schott: “In the new spiritual life which in that mysterious hour of midnight He had put on, and before appearing with it on the upper world by His resurrection, He descended.” — The verse does not indeed say that the *ἐκήρυξε* belongs to this very moment, but it does certainly point to the preaching having taken place after Christ’s restoration to life, as De Wette, Brückner, Wiesinger, Zezschwitz, have rightly acknowledged; for referring as *ἐν ᾧ* does to the *πνεύματι* connected with *ζωοποιηθείς*, it is arbitrary to find in *πορευθείς ἐκήρυξε* mention made of an act of Christ which took place after the *θανατωθείς* indeed, but yet before the *ζωοποιηθείς*. As, then, both expressions apply to Christ in His entire person, consisting of body and soul, what follows

¹ Calvin’s exposition is singular: he interprets *φυλακή* as equal to *specula vel ipse excubandi actus*; τὸ ἐν φυλ. πν. equals “the spirits of those who were on the watch-tower,” i.e., in the expectation of salvation, or also *in anxietas expectationis Christi*, and then continues: “Postquam (Ap.) dixit, Christi se mortuis manifestasse, mox addit: quum increduli fuissent oīum, quo significat nihil nocuisse sanctis Patribus quod impiorum mul-

titudine paene obruti fuerunt. Exemplum vero ex tota vetustate praec aliis illustre deligit, nempe cum diluvio submersus fuit mundus.” He removes the scruple, that the dative *ἀπεσθῆσασιν* is not in harmony with this explanation, by observing that the apostles sometimes employ one case in room of another.

² On Luther’s vacillation in interpreting this passage, see Köhler as above, and Schweizer as above, p. 7.

must not be conceived as an activity which He exercised in His spirit only and whilst separated from His body. In addition to this, if according to His intention His preaching was to be indeed a preaching of salvation, it must have had for its substance the work of redemption, completed only in the resurrection. Weiss (p. 232) objects that πνεῦμα is not equal to σῶμα πνευματικόν, and this is undoubtedly true; but it cannot prove any thing against the view that Christ as the Risen One, that is, in His glorified body, preached to the spirits in prison, inasmuch as in *this* body the Lord is no longer ἐν σαρκί, but entirely ἐν πνεύματι. — Thus the passage says nothing as to Christ's existence between His death and resurrection. If Acts ii. 31 presuppose the going of the dead Christ into Hades, the common dwelling-place of departed souls, *this descensus ad inferos* must not be identified with the one here mentioned, as also Wiesinger, Brückner, and Schott rightly observe; so that by drawing this distinction the disputed question, too, whether Christ descended into Hades, *quoad animam*, or *quoad animam et corpus*, finds its correct solution. It must further be added, that this passage gives no support whatever either to the doctrine of the *Form. concordiae*, that in Hades Christ "overcame the devil, destroyed the power of hell, and despoiled the devil of his might," or to that of the Catholic Church of the *limbus Patrum* and purgatory.

Connected with the words κατασκευαζομένης κιβωτοῦ are the thoughts which follow, in which stress is laid not so much on the judgment which overtook unbelievers in the flood, as on the deliverance of the few: εἰς ἣν ὀλίγοι. — διεσώθησαν δὲ ὕδατος]. The preposition διὰ is to be explained not as equal to ἐκ (Acts xxviii. 4: ὃν διασώθοντα ἐκ τῆς θαλάσσης), nor as if it were ἐν (*in medio aquarum*), nor equivalent to *non obstante aqua* (Gerhard), nor even as a preposition of time (*eo tempore, quo aquae inundaverant*); but is to be taken either locally or instrumentally. δὲ ὕδατος is then either "through the water," or equivalent to "by means of water." The former view (Bengel, Steiger, De Wette, Brückner, Wiesinger, formerly Hofmann also) seems to be confirmed by the *verbum compros.* διεσώθησαν. But διασώζειν, both in the LXX. and in the N. T. (cf. Matt. xiv. 36; Luke vii. 3, etc.), is often used as a strengthened form of σώζειν, without the peculiar force of διὰ being pressed. And thus it must be taken here, inasmuch as it contradicts the historical narrative in Genesis, to say that Noah and his family were saved by passing through the water. διὰ has accordingly here an instrumental force, so that δὲ ὕδατος indicates water as the medium through which the Noahites were delivered.¹ And this interpretation is alone in harmony with the context, inasmuch as the apostle in what follows gives special prominence to the fact that the N. T. deliverance is likewise effected by means of water. If water was the means of deliverance to Noah and those with him, "in so far as it bore those hidden within the ark, and thus preserved them from destruction, comp. Gen. vii. 17, 18" (Weiss, p. 313; thus also Wolf, Pott, Jachmann, Schott), this implies recourse to a pregnant construction, inasmuch as the

¹ Wiesinger has expressed himself in favor of the first version, but then remarks: "The writer conceives the water at the same time as the saving element." Froumüller, too, com-

bins both interpretations: "In which few souls sought shelter, and were saved through the water and by it;" this is evidently altogether unwarrantable.

apostle unites the two thoughts in one: "they were saved by going into the ark," and "they were saved δι' ὕδατος." Hofmann seeks to avoid the assumption of a pregnancy by explaining ἕδωρ here as the water "which began to overflow the earth," and which compelled Noah to enter with those belonging to him into the ark, in support of which he appeals to Gen. vii. 11, 13. But although these passages state that both the entering into the ark and the beginning of the deluge took place on the same day, still the latter event is not indicated as the motive of the former. According to the narrative in Genesis, it was the command of God which moved the Noahites to enter the ark, and as soon as they had done so, and God had closed the ark, the deluge commenced; cf. Gen. vii. 1, 16, 17. — Further, on Hofmann's interpretation water can be regarded only in a very loose sense as the medium of deliverance; nor would it be in keeping with the subsequent parallelism. It must be noted that ὕδατος is anarthrous, and although by the term no other water can be understood than that of the flood, yet Peter's object here is not to show that the same water which destroyed some served as the means of deliverance for others, but merely to state that the deliverance of Noah and those with him was effected by water, in order that this water then may be recognized as the type of the saving water of baptism (comp. Schott). — ὀλίγοι, τοῦτ' ἐστίν ὀκτῶ ψυχαί]. τοῦτ' ἐστίν, κ.τ.λ., justifies the use of the expression ὀλίγοι; so much stress is laid on this particular, very probably in order to point out, on the one hand, the great number of those who perished, and on the other, the proportion to be looked for at the final judgment.

Ver. 21. ὁ καὶ ὑμῶς (ἡμῶς) ἀντίτυπον νῦν σώζει βαπτισμα]. ὁ does not apply to the thought expressed in the previous verse, as Gerhard, who adopts the reading ψ , explains: *isti conservationi tanquam typo spiritualis conservationis baptismus velut αντίτυπον respondet* (in like manner Beza, Hornejus, Morus, Hottinger, Hensler, etc.), but it refers back to ὕδατος, and, withal, so that by it water generally is to be understood, and not that particular water through the medium of which the Noahites were saved; water saved them, and it is water by which you too are saved. The general term receives a more precise definition in the adjectival ἀντίτυπον, by means of which the water which now saves is contrasted as *antitype*¹ with the water which saved Noah and those with him. What this antitypical water is, is stated by the subjoined βάπτισμα, which as an apposition must be explained in the sense: "as baptism" (comp. Winer, p. 491 [E. T., 528]). Differently, Hofmann; he would take the apposition in the sense of "a baptism namely;" he says, "in the explanatory apposition the apostle substitutes the term 'baptism' for 'water,' without, by the anarthrous βάπτισμα, directly indicating Christian baptism. What kind of baptism he means is stated by the apposition, subjoined to βάπτισμα." On this it must be remarked, that βάπτισμα would certainly convey to the readers only the idea of a definite Christian baptism, and that the apposition following is not fitted to mark the term baptism, indefinite in itself, as the specifically Christian baptism, but only to point out in what way baptism possesses in itself the saving power attributed to it. — Without

² Raphellus: "τύπος res aliud quid praefigurans, ἀντίτυπος res illa praefigurata."

ἀντίτυπος has another meaning in Heb. ii. 24, where the τύπος is the ἀληθινόν.

any cogent reason, Steiger interprets βάπτισμα as equivalent to "baptismal water." The direct conjunction which takes place here ceases to occasion surprise, if it be considered that the typical character of the deluge, as regards baptism, consists not only in the sameness of the elements, but in the similarity of the relation of the water to those saved. If δι' ὑδάτος be rendered "through the water," an incongruity will arise, disturbing to the parallelism, and which attempts have been made to overcome by supplying intermediate ideas. According to De Wette, the antitypical character of baptism consists in this: "that in it the flesh must perish and, as it were, *be judged*; whilst, at the same time, through faith in the resurrection of Christ, pure spiritual life is attained, and the believer saved." By these and such like supplements, which the apostle himself in no way suggests, elements are introduced foreign to his conception.¹—The present σώζει is put here neither instead of the preterite nor the future; it denotes rather the effect which, from the moment of its accomplishment, baptism produces on the persons who submit to it. The latter resemble the Noahites whilst by means of water they were being preserved in the ark from destruction (ἀπόλειψαι).—The antithesis which exists between ἡμῶς and the preceding ὀλίγοι, indicates that the proportion saved by baptism to the unbelieving is but small. ὀλίγοι has accordingly a typical significance. It is more doubtful whether the same is the case with the ark; Oecumenius already saw in it the Church, whilst others regard it as a symbol of Jesus Christ.²—ὅτι σαρκὸς ἀποθεσεις ῥύπον, ἀλλά]. Apposition to βάπτισμα, which, however, does not state the nature of baptism generally, but only in what sense it effects σώζειν. This is stated first negatively, in order thereby to mark more distinctly the standpoint. Almost all commentators take σαρκίς as a genitive depending on ῥύπον, and preceding it only for the sake of emphasis. Bengel, on the other hand, joins it—as genit. subj.—directly with ἀπόθεσις: "carni adscribitur depositio sordium; ideo non dicitur: depositio sordium carnis." The sense would then be: baptism does not consist in this, "that the flesh lays aside its uncleanness." This explanation, corresponding as it does to the position of the words, is well suited to the idea ἀποθεσις, which does not necessarily presuppose the activity of the subject, but can be used when the subject is, strictly speaking, passive; comp. 2 Pet. i. 14, the only other passage in which the word occurs in the N. T. Hofmann is accordingly mistaken in asserting that "the laying aside of uncleanness cannot be regarded as an act of the flesh."—An antithetical allusion to the Jewish washings can hardly be here assumed (cf. Justin M., *Dial. c. Tryph.*, p. 331: τι γὰρ ὄφελος ἐκείνου τοῦ βαπτίσματος (the Jewish wash-

¹ Schott, indeed, justly remarks "that the antitypical nature of baptism, and therefore the typical nature of that to which baptism corresponds as antitype, consists precisely in what is asserted of both, namely, in their saving power and effect." He thinks, however, "that the antitypical nature of the water applies to what was essentially peculiar to the great flood." What this is he explains by saying that "the flood was a judgment which

destroyed mankind from the earth, so that from out of it only a small number, belonging to the church of believers, were saved;" that is, "it was a judgment of extirpation in such a way that it was the means of effecting a salvation."

² Thus Hemming: "Quemadmodum aqua per se non salvavit Noe, sed mediante arca, ita aqua baptismi per se non salvat, sed mediante arca, h. e. Christo Jesu."

ing), ὁ τὴν σάρκα καὶ μόνον τὸ σῶμα φαίδρύνει; βαπτίσθητε τὴν ψυχὴν).¹ — ἀλλὰ συνειδήσεως ἀγαθῆς ἐπερώτημα εἰς Θεόν]. The positive, as contrasted with the negative character of baptism. συνειδήσεως ἀγαθῆς can be either the subjective or the objective gen.² ἐπερώτημα, α ἄπ. λεγ. in the N. T. (in the O. T. only once, LXX., Dan. iv. 14, as a translation of עָרַבְתָּ), is used in classical Greek only in the sense of "question." Holding by this meaning, commentators have explained it as (1) the *question concerning a good conscience addressed to God*" (thus Wiesinger, who, however, prefers the translation "inquiry" to "question"), or (2) "the *question of a good conscience directed to God*" (Gerhard, Steiger, Besser). The first of these renderings is not in harmony with the nature of baptism, inasmuch as the person to be baptized already knows how the good conscience is to be obtained. From the second there results only an incomplete idea, necessitating arbitrary supplements.³ Now, as ἐπερωτᾶν, which doubtless means only "to ask a question," is used also of such questions as would obtain something from the person asked (Matt. xvi. 1; Ps. cxxxvii. 3, LXX.), the meaning has been assigned to ἐπερώτημα: "the inquiring desire," "the inquiring request." Some commentators here take συν. ἄγ. as a subj. gen., and interpret: "the request of a good conscience addressed to God" (thus Bengel, with whom Schmid, *Bibl. Theol. des N. T.*, p. 199, agrees: *salvat nos rogatio bonae conscientiae, i. e., rogatio, qua nos Deum compellamus cum bona conscientia, peccatis remissis et depositis*);⁴ but this also gives rise to an incomplete idea, inasmuch as the contents of the request are not stated. On this rendering of ἐπερώτημα, it is better to regard the gen. as an *object. gen.*, thus: "the request addressed to God for a good conscience:" Lutz, Lechler, Weiss, Weizsäcker (*Reuter's Repert.*, 1858, II. 3), Hofmann, Schott; Wiesinger, too, is inclined to agree.⁵ But to this also objections

¹ Augustin's opinion (*Contr. Faust.*, c. 12 et 13), with which Beda and others agree, is quite inappropriate. It is, that the apostle here alludes to the baptism of the heretics. Calvin's assertion, too, that this negative apposition emphasizes the fact that baptism, as an outward form, is of no use, introduces a foreign idea into the words of the apostle.

² This is denied, indeed, by several commentators, specially by Hofmann and Schott, because a good conscience does not precede, but is the fruit of, baptism. But this assertion presupposes the identification of the *good* conscience with that conscience which by Christ is reconciled with God, and is released from the feeling of guilt. For this, however, the N. T. phraseology gives no warrant. According to it, συνειδήσεις ἀγαθῆς rather means "the consciousness of pure intentions," or "the consciousness of sincerely willing that which is good" (Heb. xiii. 18, καλὴν συνειδήσιν ἔχομεν, ἐν πᾶσι καλῶς θέλοντες ἀναστρέφασθαι; cf. also 1 Pet. iii. 16; Acts xxiii. 1; 1 Tim. i. 5, 19, iii. 9). If baptism is really to bring a blessing to the person baptized, he must surely desire it with a good conscience.

³ Gerhard: "Quomodo deus erga baptismum affectus sit," etc.; Steiger: "For the salvation of which he who receives baptism would be assured;" Besser: "Art thou not my father? Am I not thy child?" The interpretation given in the *Erlanger Zeitschrift*, 1856, p. 293 ff., is evidently altogether erroneous: "The proof of the good conscience attained in baptism is the ἐπερώτημα εἰς Θεόν, i. e., the question, Am I not saved by my baptism from the judgment on an unbelieving world?" Apart from all else, the matter here treated of is not a question which is only put after baptism, since baptism itself is designated as the ἐπερώτημα.

⁴ To this interpretation of Bengel, Hofmann rightly objects "that ἐπερώτημα cannot well mean something which presupposes the reception of baptism;" but if the "peccatis remissis et depositis" be not looked upon as belonging to the idea of a good conscience, Hofmann's objection loses its validity.

⁵ The same view is to be found already in Seb. Schmidius, only that he regards ἐπερ. as meaning the *petitio* addressed to God by him who baptizes, and συν. ἄγ. as the gift which

which cannot be overlooked arise: (1) Although the reception of baptism be founded on the desire for a reconciled conscience, yet it does not follow that baptism itself can be described as the expression of this desire; (2) Taken thus, the proper meaning of *ἐπερώτημα* is entirely lost sight of; the word is used in a sense in which it occurs nowhere else,—a proceeding which is all the more open to question, that the apostle had certainly other words at his command wherewith to give the idea of request; (3) The object which the recipient of baptism requests, namely, “the reconciled conscience,” is inadequately expressed by *συνειδήσις ἀγαθή*, for here no stress is laid on the essential element, — the forgiveness of sin; lastly, (4) In this interpretation *εἰς Θεόν* is only of secondary importance, whilst the passages, chap. i. 21 and iii. 18, show that the chief emphasis lies on *εἰς Θεον*.¹— Even from early times interpreters have attempted to explain *ἐπερώτημα* in this passage, not according to common but according to juristic usage, taking it as equal to *σύμφωνον*, *stipulatio mutua*, contract (Luther: “covenant”), referring at the same time to the act of question and answer, which took place at baptism: *ἀποτάσσει τῷ Σατανᾷ; ἀποτάσσομαι· συντάσσει τῷ Χριστῷ; συντάσσομαι· abrenuntias? abrenuntio; credis? credo* (Tertull., *Lib. de Resurr. Carn.*: *anima non lavatione, sed responsione sancitur*). Aretius interprets: *Deus in baptismo nobis promittit, quod velit filiorum loco habere propter Christum; contra nos promittimus, nos serio victuros pie; hæc est mutua stipulatio*; this interpretation, however, is erroneous, as even in legal phraseology *ἐπερώτημα* does not mean a “reciprocal” contract. De Wette’s is likewise wrong: “by metonymy, because questions were addressed to the individual who took the vow, *ἐπερωτᾶσθαι* acquired the meaning *promittere, spondere*, and *ἐπερώτημα* that of *sponsio*;” for *ἐπερώτημα* is not derived from *ἐπερωτᾶσθαι*, but from *ἐπερωτᾶν*, and therefore never had or could have had the signification, “solemn pledge.” Further, it has been not unjustly remarked, in opposition to this view, according to which *συν. ἀγ.* is considered as an *object. gen.*, that it would have been better to have spoken of *ἀναστροφή ἀγαθή* as that which has to be vowed.² Brückner has substantially corrected De Wette by pointing out that in the language of the Byzantine lawyers *ἐπερωτᾶν* is used in the sense, “to conclude a treaty, a contract, *stipulari*,” taking *συν. ἀγ.* as a *subject. gen.* But his exposition suffers from an uncertain wavering, for he too declares *ἐπερώτημα* to be synonymous with “treaty,” indeed with “vow,” which is certainly not the case. The facts are these: a contract was concluded in the form of ques-

he implores for the person baptized; evidently this is entirely arbitrary.

¹ Hofmann, in support of the interpretation here called in question, appeals to the circumstance, “that the petition for the cleansing of the conscience from past sins forms the only suitable antithesis to the putting away of filth contracted outwardly.” But it must be remarked in opposition, that, however suitable this antithesis may appear in itself, it does not follow that the apostle had it in his mind in the way here stated. It is rather improbable that he had, since in this positive nearer defini-

tion of baptism its application to *cleansing* is in no way alluded to. — The explanation given in *Weissagung und Erfüllung*, II. p. 234, “the happiness of a good conscience asked of God,” he passes over in silence in his *Schriftbeweis*, II. 2. — The interpretation given by Winer in the 5th ed. of his *Gr.*: “The inquiry of a good conscience after God, i.e., the turning to God, the seeking Him,” does not occur in the subsequent editions, nor is there any justification for it.

² Estius, Beza, Grotius, Semler, Pott, Hensler, etc., interpret similarly to De Wette.

tion and answer: *spondesne? spondeo* (comp. Puchta, *Curs. der Institut.*, v. 3, p. 97); by the question, on the one side, the agreement was proposed; by the reply, on the other, it was concluded. *ἐπερώτημα* is, then, this question by which the conclusion of a contract began, not then the contract itself, and still less the pledge which was taken rather by him who replied. The questioner bound himself by his question to accept that which he who gave the reply promised. If, then, the designation of baptism as *συνειδήσεως ἄγ. ἐπερώτημα εἰς Θεόν* is to be explained from legal procedure, it can only be spoken of as such, inasmuch as the person baptized, by the reception of baptism, enters into a relation — as it were, of contract — with God, in which he submits in faith to God's promise of salvation. Nor can it be denied that this is really in harmony with the nature of baptism, more especially if it be considered that in the legal proceedings, connected with the conclusion of a contract, the respondent pronounced his *spondeo* in the expectation that the interrogator would fulfil the conditions previously stipulated, to which he had pledged himself. This explains the expression *συνειδήσεως ἀγαθῆς*, which points to the circumstance that the recipient of baptism, in submitting to it, has the honest purpose faithfully to fulfil the conditions under which the divine assent is given. This interpretation is distinguished from those above mentioned by its concrete precision. No doubt *ἐπερώτημα* in this juristic sense is to be found only in writings of a later date; but since this form of concluding a contract belonged to an earlier time, it may be assumed that the word had previously been in use thus in legal phraseology.¹ The adjunct: *δι' ἀναστάσεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*, by referring back to *ζωοποιηθεὶς δὲ πνεύματι*, brings the apostle again to his former train of thought. The words are not appended in a loose way to *ἐπερώτημα* for the purpose of stating how this is effected, as Grotius, Pott, Hensler, Zezschwitz, Hofmann, Schott, and others assume;² they are rather conjoined with the verb of the clause *σώσει*, inasmuch as they state that through which the *βάπτισμα* exercises its saving effect (De Wette, Wiesinger, Weiss). The former construction is the less justifiable, that it is more natural to unite the concluding adjunct with the leading idea than with the secondary thought which specifies the nature of baptism. It is still less appropriate to connect the words directly with *συνειδήσεως ἄγ.* (as against Frömmüller).

Ver. 22. *ὅς ἐστὶν ἐν δεξιᾷ τοῦ Θεοῦ*]. This brings to a close the whole train of thought with reference to Christ, from ver. 18 and onwards, inasmuch as to His sufferings, death, resurrection, and going to the spirits in prison, there

¹ After the explanation here given, it is evidently incorrect when Hofmann says that "*ἐπερώτημα* could only be the question addressed by him who closes an agreement, to the person who is to consent to it." The very opposite is the case. The question is not addressed from the former to the latter, but from the latter to the former; that is, then, not from God to the person baptized, but from the person baptized to God.

² 1 Kings xxii. 7: *ἔτι εἰς ἐστὶν ἀνὴρ εἰς τὸ*

ἐπερωτῆσαι δι' αὐτοῦ τὸν κύριον, has been appealed to in favor of this construction; erroneously, since *δι' αὐτοῦ* applies to a person. Between it, therefore, and *δι' ἀναστάσεως* no parallel can be drawn. — According to Hofmann, *διά* states that which the person baptized *appeals* to in support of his desire for the remission of sin. The passages, however, which he quotes (1 Cor. i. 10 and Rom. xii. 1) by no means prove that the prep. *διά* has this signification.

is now added, His sitting down at the right hand of God. This expression, which points out the present condition of the glorified Redeemer, occurs likewise in Rom. viii. 34, Col. viii. 1, and in other passages of the N. T. — *πορευθεὶς εἰς οὐρανὸν* corresponds to *πορευθεὶς*, ver. 19. — *ὑποταγέντων . . . δυνάμεων*, added in order to give prominence to the unlimited sway of Christ (Eph. i. 21, 22; Col. ii. 10; 1 Cor. xv. 27; Heb. ii. 8), extending even over all heavenly powers, whatever their name or office. — The expressions *ἐξουσίαι* and *δυνάμεις* are — with the exception of this passage — used only by Paul as names of angels (with *δυνάμεις*, cf. Ps. ciii. 21, clxviii. 2, LXX.); and in the same sequence. *ἄγγελοι* is not here the general term to which *ἐξουσίαι* and *δυνάμεις* (*καὶ . . . καὶ* equivalent to *cum . . . tum*) are subordinate, but the three conceptions are co-ordinate, and connected by the repeated copula. This is shown by Rom. viii. 38, where, instead of *ἐξουσίαι*, the name *ἀρχαί* is used. For the various names, comp. Meyer on Eph. i. 21; Col. i. 16. — *ὑποταγ.* expresses, not enforced, but voluntary subjection.

With regard to the relation of this whole passage to what precedes, *ὅτι καὶ Χριστὸς . . . ἔπαθεν* shows that in the first instance confirmation is given to the thought that it is better to suffer for well than for evil doing, by reference to the sufferings of Christ, similarly as is done in chap. ii. 21. But as the last-mentioned passage passes beyond the limits of the typical, — that is, first by the addition of *ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν τὸ ἔπαθεν*, and then by the statements of ver. 24, — the same takes place here. There, reference is made to the redeeming death of the abased Christ; here, to the living work of the glorified Christ. The chief separate points have already been stated. The allusion of baptism appears indeed to be a digression, yet it belongs essentially to the train of thought; for fater that mention had been made of Christ's work among the spirits in prison in His exalted condition, it was necessary to call attention likewise to His redeeming work on earth, the effects of which are communicated through baptism. That Peter speaks of *this* medium (not that of the word, etc.), is explained by his reference to the deluge as the type of the approaching judgment, and to the water by which Noah and those with him were saved, and which appeared as a *τύπος* of baptism.¹

¹ Since that which is stated in this paragraph does not keep within the limits of the typical, it may very well, in spite of Hof-

mann's assertion to the contrary, be described as a digression.

CHAPTER IV.

Ver. 1. *ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν*]. Rec. after A, K, L, P, \aleph (corr.; after m. pr., *ἀποθανόντος ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν*), al., is wanting in B, C, several min., Sahid, Vulg., Aug., Fulgent., etc.; omitted by Lachm. and Tisch. Perhaps it is inserted in order to complete the idea; Reiche considers *ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν* to be the original reading; so, too, Hofm. The Rec. has *ἐν σαρκί* before *πέπανται*, after K, several min., etc. In A, B, C, L, \aleph , etc., etc., the preposition is wanting. Even Griesb. recommends its omission; Lachm. and Tisch. omit *ἐν*. Buttm. has retained *ἐν*, as, according to his statement, it occurs in B. Wiesinger inclines to explain the reading *σαρκί* from what precedes; Reiche, on the other hand, explains *ἐν σαρκί* from what follows. The authorities, as well as the idea itself, decide for the omission of *ἐν*. — Ver. 3. *ἡμῖν*]. Rec. after C, K, L, P, al., Oec., Hier., can hardly be genuine; it is wanting in A, B, al., Syr., utr.; omitted by Lachm. and Tisch. Steiger's remark, that "it is pleasing to us to observe how the apostle does not think higher of his own former conduct than of that of the others," does not prove the genuineness of *ἡμῖν*. The reading *ὑμῖν*, too, in \aleph and several min., must be regarded as a correction; it lay to hand to insert a dative in order to complete the sentence. — Following K, L, P, several min., etc., the Rec. has *τοῦ βίου* after *χρόνος*, which is wanting in A, B, C, \aleph , etc., etc. Tittmann brackets it, Lachm. and Tisch. rightly omit it. — *βούλημα*]. After A, B, C, \aleph , etc. Clem., Theoph. (Lachm., Tisch.), instead of the Rec. *θέλημα*, which occurs only in K, L, P, several min., Oec. — The aorist *κατεργάσασθαι* is attested only by K, L, P, Oec.; it is accordingly better to read the perfect with Lachm. and Tisch., *κατειργάσθαι*, after A, B, C, \aleph , al., Clem. The change could easily have taken place from the fact that the aorist form of the word is the prevailing one in the N. T. (e.g., Rom. vii. 8; 1 Cor. v. 3; 2 Cor. vii. 11, etc.). — Ver. 5. Instead of *τῷ ἐτοίμως ἔχοντι κρίναι*, Buttm. reads, *τῷ ἐτοίμως κρίνοντι*, a reading which is attested only by B. — Ver. 7. *εἰς τὰς προσευχάς*]. The article *τὰς* is very suspicious; Lachm. has omitted it; Tisch. has now again adopted it, with the remark: *articulus non intellecta ea quam habet vi omittendus videbatur*. It is wanting in A, B, \aleph , and several min., and seems to be inserted here following chap. iii. 7. — Ver. 8. *πρὸ πάντων δέ*]. The omission of *δέ* in A, B, 13, Arm., Tol., etc., is a correction in order to connect the participle clause directly with the preceding verb. fin. — *ἡ ἀγάπη*]. Rec. after several min. and Theoph. — *ἡ*, however, is spurious, after A, B, K, L, P, \aleph , etc. Lachm. and Tisch. have omitted the article; Griesb. regards it as at least suspicious. — *καλύπτει*]. After A, B, K, al., Copt., Arm., etc., Clem. Rom., Syr., etc. (Lachm., Tisch., much recommended by Griesb.); instead of the Rec. *καλύψει*, after L, P, \aleph , which is easily explained from Jas. v. 20. — Ver. 9. *γογγυσμῶν*]. Rec., after K, L, P, Oec.; on the other hand, A, B, \aleph , al., m., Syr., Arm., Vulg., Cyr., etc., are in favor of the singular, adopted by Lachm. and Tisch.: *γογγυσμοῦ*. The plural from Phil. ii. 14. — Ver. 13.

κρθό]. Instead of the Rec. καθώς, rightly accepted by Griesb., after almost all authorities. — Ver. 14. τὸ τῆς δοξῆς]. Scholz and Lachm. add καὶ δυνάμειος, which occurs in A, P, 8 (τῆς δυν.), several min., etc. In B, K, L, many min., and Fathers, the adjunct is wanting; Tisch., too, has omitted it. It may quite as well have been omitted later as superfluous, as added by way of strengthening. — ἀναπαύεται]. Instead of this, A and several min. have ἐπαναπαύεται, after Luke x. 6; some other authorities read ἀναπέπνυται, after 2 Cor. vii. 13. — The genuineness of the words, κατὰ μὲν αὐτοὺς βλασφημεῖται, κατὰ δὲ υἱῶν δοξάζεται, is at least doubtful; it is supported by K, L, P, etc., Harl., Tol., etc., Thph., Oec., Cypr.; whilst it is opposed by A, B, 8, al., Syr., Aeth., Copt., etc., Tert., Ambr., Beda (Lachm. and Tisch.). Whilst De Wette and Wiesinger declare the adjunct to be suspicious, and Schott looks upon it as spurious, Hofm. considers it genuine, because, in his opinion, without it the proper connection of ver. 15 with what precedes would be wanting. — Ver. 15. Instead of ἀλλοτριεπισκοπος, Lachm., following B, writes ἀλλοτριεπισκοπος; on it Tisch. observes, *videtur elegantiae causa ejectum α*. — Ver. 16. ἐν τῷ ὀνοματι τούτῳ is the reading of A, B, 8, al., Syr., utr., Erp., Copt., etc., Cypr., Ephr., Oec. (Lachm., Tisch.). There is less evidence for the Rec. ἐν τῷ μέρει τούτῳ, which occurs in K, L, P, etc., and probably arose out of 2 Cor. iii. 10, ix. 3. — Ver. 17. Instead of ηῶν, A**, al., Aeth., Slav., Thph., etc., read ἡμῶν. — Ver. 19. ὡς πιστῶ κτιστῇ]. Rec. according to K, L, P, almost all min., several vss., and Fathers (Tisch. 7). Lachm. and Tisch. 8 have omitted ὡς, after A, B, 8, several min., Copt., Aeth., Arm., Vulg., Athan. It is difficult to decide which is the correct reading; ὡς may have been inserted, following Peter's habitual mode of expression; on the other hand, it may have been omitted in order to make πιστῶ κτιστῇ purely terminative. — αὐτῶν, after A, G, K, 8, etc., etc., is to be preferred to ἐαντῶν. — Instead of ἀγαθοποιία, which occurs in B, K, L, P, 8, pl., al., Theoph., Oec., and is accepted by Tisch., Lachm., after A, al., Vulg., etc., reads the plural ἀγαθοποιίας.

Ver. 1. Χριστοῦ ὃν παθόντος (ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν) σαρκί]. In these words the apostle returns to chap. iii. 18, in order to subjoin the following exhortation. — σαρκί is not "in the flesh" (Luther), but, "according to the flesh;" comp. iii. 18. This is made prominent because the believer's sufferings, too, under persecutions, touch the flesh only; comp. Matt. x. 28. παθόντος is not to be limited to the suffering of Christ before His death, but comprehends the latter also. It is, however, incorrect to understand, with Hofmann, παθόντος at once as identical with ἀποθανόντος, and in connection with σαρκί to explain: "that Christ by His life in the flesh submitted for our sake to a suffering which befell Him—that for our sake He allowed His life in the flesh to come to an end" (!). — καὶ ὑμεῖς τὴν αὐτὴν ἐννοιαν ὀπίσασθε]. καὶ with reference to Christ: "ye also:" the disciple must be like the master. It lies to hand to translate ἐννοια (besides here, only in Heb. iv. 12) as equivalent here to "disposition of mind" (De Wette; Weiss, p. 288); but ἐννοια means always "thought, consideration" (Wiesinger, Schott).¹ There is here also no reference to the mind of Christ in His sufferings. τὴν αὐτὴν ἐννοιαν refers back to the πάσχειν σαρκί of Christ

¹ Reiche erroneously appeals in support of this meaning, "disposition of mind," to the

passages in Prov. v. 2, xxiii. 19, LXX., and Wisd. ii. 14.

Himself, so that the sense is, that since Christ suffered according to the flesh, they too should not refuse the thought of like Him suffering according to (or on) the flesh. *ὅτι* gives the ground of the exhortation. Hofmann, Wiesinger, and Schott take *ὅτι* as explaining *τὴν αὐτ. ἐννοίαν*. Incorrectly; for the *πέπνυται ἁμαρτίας* will not admit of an application to Christ, inasmuch as the expression does not presuppose generally a former "relation to sin," but former sinning itself. — The verb *ὀπλίζεσθαι*, in the N. T. *ὑπ. λεγ.*, is in classical writers often construed with the accusative. (Soph. *Electra*, v. 991: *θράσος ὀπλίζεσθαι*); while applied to every kind of equipment, e.g., of ships, it here refers to the Christian's calling as one of conflict. — *ὅτι ὁ παθὼν ἐν σαρκὶ πέπνυται ἁμαρτίας*]. In Luther's translation: "for he who suffers on the flesh, he ceaseth from sin," the present is incorrectly substituted for the preterite tense: *ἐν σαρκί*; correctly: "on the flesh." Hofmann's rendering is wrong: "in the flesh," which, compared with the *ἐν σαρκί* preceding, would imply "that whilst Christ's life in the flesh ended with His suffering, our sufferings took place with continued life in the flesh" (!). The reading *σαρκί*, "according to the flesh," conveys the same idea; cf. Winer, 384 (E. T., 412). — *πέπνυται ἁμαρτίας*]. The mid. *παύομαι* is in the classics frequently joined with the genitive.¹ In this way *πέπνυται* here is explained by most interpreters as equivalent to: "he has ceased from sin, that is, he has given up sinning." The word may also be taken as the perf. pass. according to the construction *παύειν τινά τινος*, equivalent to: "to cause one to give up, to desist from a thing." *πέπνυται ἁμαρτίας* would then mean: "he has been brought to cease from sin, to sin no more" (Schott: "brought away from sinful conduct"). Hofmann erroneously asserts that "*παύειν τινά ἁμαρτίας* would in a quite general way mean: action such as brings it about that the individual is ended with sin;" that is to say, in the sense that his *relation* to sin is at an end.² For the genitive with *παύειν* denotes always a condition or an activity of him who is the object of *παύειν*. — It makes no essential difference in the thought, whether *παύειν* be taken here as a middle (Weiss) or as a passive (De Wette, Wiesinger). The idea: "through Christ *immunitatem nactus sum*," is expressed here neither in the one case nor in the other (Wiesinger). — The clause here has the form of a general statement, the meaning of which is, that by suffering as to the flesh a ceasing of sin is effected.³ This idea, in many respects a true one, may according to the connection be defined thus: he who suffered on account of sin, that is, on account of his opposition to sin, has in such wise broken with sin that it has no more power over him (Weiss). It is incorrect, with several of the earlier commentators, as also Schott, to understand *παθὼν* in

¹ e.g., *Il.* vii. 290: *πανσώμεθα μάχης*; *Herod.* i. 47: *τῆς μάχης ἐπαύσαντο*; *Herodian.* vii. 10, 16: *τῆς τε ὀργῆς ὁ δῆμος ἐπαύσατο*.

² Thus, too, Schott: "He who has experienced the *παθεῖν σαρκί* is delivered from his former *relation* to sin." But Schott admits that "a release from sin must be thought of, in so far as sin determined the conduct and made it *sinful*."

³ Genuinely catholic is the remark of Lorianus on *πεπ. ἁμαρτίας*: "Peccatorum nomine absolute posito gravia intelliguntur, quae vocamus mortalia; nam desinere atque quiescere a levibus et venialibus, eximium privilegium est, praeterque Deiparam definiere non possumus, au alii ulli concessum."

a spiritual sense, either of the being dead with Christ in baptism, according to Rom. vi. 7 (Schott), or of the putting to death of the old man (Gerhard).¹ Calvin.² Opposed to such an interpretation is the subjoined *σαρκί*, by which *τὴν παθῶν* here is expressly marked as identical with the *παθῶν* used with reference to Christ; and the apostle in no way hints that that *παθῶν* is employed in a spiritual sense. It is evidently entirely a mistake to understand by *ὁ παθῶν* Christ, as Fronmüller does, — *πέπ. ἁμαρτ.* being thus in no way appropriate (doubtless Jachmann explains: "because Christ hath removed sin for Himself, that is, hath shown that it is possible to be without sin" [!]); nor is it less so to assume, finally, with Steiger, that here "the apostle unites together the different persons, the head and the members in their unity," so that the clause would contain the double idea: "Christ suffering as to the body made us free from sin," and "we, by participating through faith in the sufferings of Christ, die unto sin." Hofmann, too, unjustifiably gives the clause the double reference — to Christ and to the Christian; to Christ, "in as far as He by His bodily death was finished with sin, which He took upon Himself for the purpose of atoning for it;" to the Christian, "in so far as he is spiritually dead whilst still alive in the body, and so is translated into a life in which he goes free from the guilt and slavery of sin." In these interpretations thoughts are supplied to which the context makes no allusion."³

Ver. 2. *εἰς τὸ μηκέτι, κ.τ.λ.*]. The words may be connected either with the exhortation *ὀπλίσασθε* or with *πέπαιται ἁμαρτίας*. De Wette, Brückner, Wiesinger, Schott, and Hofm. justly prefer the former connection, inasmuch as the infinitival clause expressive of a purpose stands related more naturally to the imperative, than to a subordinate clause containing a general statement (otherwise Zezschwitz and the former exposition in this commentary). Still it is incorrect to connect *εἰς* here with *ὀπλιζεσθαι*, as in the common phrase: *ὀπλιζεσθαι εἰς τὸ μάχεσθαι* (Schott). Had the apostle meant this, he could not have separated by a parenthesis words which so directly belong to each other; *εἰς* can only add the nearer definition of the aim to which *ὀπλιζ.* is directed. — *ἀνθρώπων ἐπιθυμίαις, ἀλλὰ θελήματι Θεοῦ*]. The datives are to be explained either as *τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ ζῆν*, chap. ii. 24 (Brückner, Wiesinger), or they express the pattern according to which (Hofm.); as in Acts xv. 1; Gal. v. 16, 25, etc.⁴ The latter view is to be preferred on account of the idea *τὸν . . . βιώσαι χρόνον*. "*ἀνθρώπων* and *Θεοῦ* are antitheses, as are also the manifold lusts of men, and the one uniform will of God" (Wiesinger). The notion that by *ἐπιθυμίαι* are to be understood the lusts, not of the readers, but of those only by whom they were surrounded (Schott, Hofm.), must be rejected as arbitrary. — *τὸν ἐπίλοιπον ἐν σαρκὶ βιώσαι χρόνον*]. With *ἐν σαρκί*, comp. 2 Cor. x. 3; Gal. ii. 20; Phil.

¹ "Qui carnem cum concupiscentiis suis in Christo et cum Christo crucifigit, ille peccare desinit."

² "Passio in carne significat nostri abnegationem."

³ Reiche regards the entire sentence as

spurious, because of the difficulty and indistinctness of the thought.

⁴ Gerh.: "Præcipit ut normam vitæ nostræ statuamus non hominum voluntatem, sed Dei voluntatem."

i. 22, 24. *σάρξ* expresses as little here as in ver. 1, an ethical conception; it denotes the earthly human nature to which the mortal body belongs. — The verb *βιοῦν* is *ἄπ. λεγ.* in the N. T. The form *βῶσαι* is to be found in the Attic writers, but it is less common than the 2d aor.: *βίωναι*. — *ἐπίλοιπος*, in like manner, *ἄπ. λεγ.*: “*the remaining time in the flesh*”; an idea similar to *ὁ τῆς παρουκίας χρόνος*, chap. i. 17. With the whole thought, comp. Rom. xii. 2.

Ver. 3. A fuller explanation is now given of the thought expressed in the previous verse, that the Christians should no longer live after the lusts of men, but according to the will of God; hence *γὰρ* — *ἄρκετος*: Matt vi. 34, x. 25; correctly Wiesinger: “the expression is here a *μείωσις*” Gerhard: *in eo quod ait “sufficit” est quidam asterismus sive liptotes, qua mitigat Ap. exprobrationis asperitatem*. Schott introduces a foreign application when he explains: “in it you have enough to repent of and to make amends for.” The construction as in Isocrates (in *Panegy.*): *ικανὸς γὰρ ὁ παρεληλυθὼς χρόνος, ἐν ᾧ τι τῶν δεινῶν οὐ γεγρονε*; comp. *ικανούσθω*, Ezek. xlv. 6, xlv. 9. *ἔστι* simply is to be supplied; not, with Steiger, “should be.” — *ὁ παρεληλυθὼς χρόνος* points back to *μηκέτι*; in contrast to *τὸν ἐπίλοιπον . . . χρόνον*. — *τὸ βούλημα τῶν ἐθνῶν κατεργασθαι*. The infinitive is, in free construction, dependent on *ἄρκετός*, as it also stands with *ἄρκει*; cf. Winer, p. 298 f. [E. T., 318 t.]. The inf. perf. is selected “to designate the former life of sin, which has once for all been brought to a close” (Schott). — *τῶν ἐθνῶν* is not evidence that the epistle was addressed to aforesaid Jews. When Jachmann says: “the apostle could never say of the heathen, that they lived according to the will of the heathen,” it must be observed, that if the readers were formerly heathen, the *βούλημα τῶν ἐθνῶν* was undoubtedly their own *βούλημα*, but that *ἐθνῶν* is explained by the fact that they were now heathen no longer (as opposed to Weiss). — *πεπορευμένοις* must be referred to *ὑμῖς*, to be supplied in thought to *κατεργάσθαι*. If the right reading be *ἡμῖν* after *ἄρκετός γὰρ*, Peter would include himself, and *ἡμᾶς* would have to be supplied. The Vulg. is indefinite: *his qui ambulaverunt*. Beza’s view is inappropriate, that Peter refers here not only to the readers of the epistle (whom he considers to have been Jewish Christians), but also to their ancestors, i. e., the former ten tribes of Israel. With *πορεύεσθαι ἐν*, cf. Luke i. 6; 2 Pet. ii. 10. — *ἀσελγείαις*, “*excesses of every kind*,” embracing specially unchastity; cf. Rom. xiii. 13; 2 Cor. xii. 21; Gal. v. 19; 3 Macc. ii. 26, etc.; Buddeus considers it to mean nothing else than *obscœnitās et stuprorum flagitiosa consuetudo*; Lucian has the expression: *ἀσελγέστεροι τῶν ὄνων*. — *ἐπιθυμίαις* in the plural denotes *fleshly lusts in themselves*; although not limited to sensual desires only, it yet includes these chiefly. — *οἰνοφλυγίαις*. *ἄπ. λεγ.* in the N. T.; the verb *οἰνοφλυγεῖν*, LXX., Deut. xxi. 20, Heb. סִכְרָוֹת ; Luther: “*intoxication*”; better, “*drunkenness*.”¹ — *κώμοις*, besides here, only in Rom. xiii. 13, Gal. v. 21, where, as here with *πότοις*, it is joined with *μέθαι*: *commissationes*, properly: “*carousals*”; cf. Pape, s. v. — *πότοις*. *ἄπ. λεγ.*; chiefly applied to social drinking

¹ Andronicus Rhodus, lib. *περὶ παθῶν*, p. 6: *οἰνοφλυγία ἐστὶν ἐπιθυμία οἴνου ἀπληστος*.

Philo (*V. M.*, 1, § 22) calls *οἰνοφλυγία* *αὐ ἀπληρωτος ἐπιθυμία*.

at the banquet.¹ — καὶ ἀθεμίτοις εἰδωλολατρείαις designates heathen idolatrous practices specially. ἀθέμιτος, in the N. T. occurring, besides in this passage, only in Acts x. 28, gives marked prominence to that in the nature of εἰδωλ. which is antagonistic to the divine law. Bengel: *quibus sanctissimum Dei jus violatur*.² This description is only applicable to such persons as were formerly heathen, not to the Jews; to the latter only in the days before the Assyrian and Babylonian captivities. Weiss (p. 113), in opposition to this, wrongly appeals to Rom. ii 17 ff.; for the reproach there made against the Jews bears an impress entirely different from the description here given; nor is the ἱεροσυλεῖν in that passage identical with the practice of idolatry. It is altogether arbitrary to take the expression εἰδωλολατρεία here in a wider sense, so as to exclude from it idolatry *proper*, and it is further opposed by the expression ἀθεμίτοις.

Ver. 4 ἐν ᾧ ξενίζονται]. Many interpreters apply ἐν ᾧ directly to the thought contained in the following clause: μὴ συντρέχόντων . . . ἀνάχουσιν; Pott: ἐν τούτῳ δε ξενίζ., ὅτι μὴ συντρέχετε; incorrectly, ἐν ᾧ is connected rather with what precedes. Still, it can hardly be right to explain, that as the perfects κατεργασθαι and πεπορευμένους point to the fact that they no longer live as they had lived, this was the matter of wonderment (De Wette, Wiesinger, Schott,³ and in this commentary). It is more natural to take it thus — ἐν ᾧ equivalent to “on the ground of this” (that is, because ye have thus lived), and the absolute genitive following as equal to “inasmuch as ye run not with them,” so that the sense is: “on account of this, that ye thus walked in times past, your countrymen think it strange when ye do so no longer” (Hofm.); with ἐν ᾧ, comp. John xvi. 30 and Meyer *in loc.* The genitive absolute assigns, as it frequently does, the occasioning cause (Winer, p. 195 [E T., 207]). The word ξενίζεσθαι (in its common meaning, equivalent to “to be a guest;” thus it is used frequently in the N. T.) here means: “to be amazed,” “to feel astonishment;” comp. ver. 12; Acts xvii. 20. — μὴ συντρέχόντων ἑμῶν]. “μὴ refers the matter to the amazement of the heathen.” συντρέχειν, Mark vi. 33 and Acts iii. 11: *to run together, confuere*; here, “to run in company with any one.” — εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν τῆς ἀσωτίας ἀνάχουσιν states the aim of the συντρ. With ἀσωτία, comp. Eph. v. 18; Tit. i. 6: “*lewd and dissolute conduct.*” The word ἀνάχουσις is to be found in Aelian, *De An.*, xvi. 15, used synonymously with ἐπικλυσίς, and *Script. Graec. Ap. Luper.* in Harpocr. with ὑπέρκλυσίς; it means, accordingly, “the overflowing.” This sense is to be kept hold of, and τρέχειν εἰς ἀσωτίας to be explained of the haste with which dissoluteness is allowed to break forth and to overflow. According to Hofm.,

¹ Appian, *B. C.*, I., p. 700: ὁ δὲ Σεπτῶριος . . . τὰ πολλὰ ἦν ἐπὶ τρυφῆς, γυναιξὶ καὶ κώμοις καὶ πότοις σχολάζων.

² Schott unjustifiably maintains that the εἰδωλολατρεία are termed ἀθεμίτοι not in themselves, but on account of the immoral, voluptuous ceremonies connected with them. The adject. is added because they form an antithesis, in the strictest sense, to God's holy prerogative. It is unwarrantable to assert

that εἰδωλολατρεία could only be termed ἀθέμιτος when practised by the Jews, not when by the heathen.

³ It is true that “a surprise calling forth displeasure” (Schott) is meant; but this does not lie in the word itself.

⁴ The object, to ξενίζεσθαι is either in the dative, as ver. 12 (*Polyb.* iii. 68. 9: ἐξενίζοντο τῷ τι συμβεβηκός εἶναι παρὰ τὴν προσδοκίαν), or is subjoined by means of διὰ τι or ἐπι τι.

it denotes the doings of those who are in haste to pour out from them their indwelling lasciviousness, so that it overflows and spreads in all directions. From the explanation of Strabo, iii. p. 206 A: λέγονται ἀνοχύσεις αὐτῶν πληρούμεναι τῇ θαλάττῃ κοίλαδες ἐν πλημμυρίσιν, it is unjustifiable to derive the meaning "sentina, mire" (second edition of this commentary), or "flood" (third edition), or "stream" (Schott).¹ — βλασφημοῦντες characterizes their amazement more nearly as one which prompts them to speak evil of those whose conduct causes them astonishment (not "Christianity," as Hofmann thinks). Schott justly remarks that "it is not the being struck with amazement in itself which is, strictly speaking, of significance here, but that definite form of it expressed by βλασφημοῦντες, placed last for the sake of emphasis."

Ver. 5 points to the judgment which awaits the evil-speaking heathen: οἱ ἀποδόσοῦσι λόγον]. ἀποδ. λόγον (Matt. xii. 36; Heb. xiii. 17; Acts xix. 40). Antithesis to αἰτεῖν λόγον, chap. iii. 15. — τῷ ἐτοίμως ἔχοντι, "that is, the Saviour risen, and seated at the right hand, chap. iii. 22," De Wette. — The expression: ἰτοίμως ἔχειν, "to be ready," with the exception of here, only in Acts xxi. 13; 2 Cor. xii. 14. — κρίναι ζῶντας καὶ νεκρούς]. As often in the N. T., of the last judgment, which by ἐτοίμ. ἔχ. is pointed out as near at hand; comp. ver. 7. ζῶντας καὶ νεκρούς does not denote some dead and some alive, but the aggregate of all, whether they be living or already dead when the day of judgment comes; comp. Acts x. 42; 2 Tim. iv. 1.² It is erroneous to understand by the quick and the dead the Christians only (Wichelhaus, Schott), or those who speak evil only. Peter, by naming Him to whom the evil-speakers shall render an account, the Judge of the quick and the dead, implies thereby that they are not to remain unpunished, whether they die before the day of judgment or not. And this as a testimony to the justice of God, should serve to comfort the Christians under the calumnies which they had to endure, and exhort them not to be led aside by them to a denial of their Christian walk. It must further be observed, that this passage adds the last to those elements of the glory of the exalted Saviour mentioned at the close of the last chapter, namely, the office of judge which He will execute at the end of the days.

Ver. 6. This verse, which has been explained in very diverse ways,³ is meant, as the γάρ following upon εἰς τοῦτο shows, to give the ground or the explanation of a statement going before. The question is: Which statement is it? The sound of the words serves to suggest that in νεκροῖς we have

¹ Hesych. and Suidas interpret ἀνάφυσος also by βλακεία, ἐκλυσις; thus Gerhard: "virium exolutio, mollities;" according to De Wette it means *profusio*, wantonness; but it is better to keep to the above signification.

² Gerhard: "Vivos, quos iudex veniens reperiet vivos, mortuos, quos ex sepulcris in vitam revocabit." Several commentators erroneously understand the words ζῶντας καὶ νεκρούς in a figurative sense; Joh. Huss: "vivos in gratia ad beatitudinem, mortuos in culpa ad damnationem;" Bened. Arias: "vivos

adhuc in carne illa Adami; mortuos in Christo."

³ Lorinus enumerates twelve different interpretations; nor does that complete the number. Many commentators are uncertain, and confess that they do not understand the true meaning of the verse; thus also, Luther, who even thinks it possible that the text has been corrupted. Reiche, too, is inclined to regard the passage as a gloss added by a later hand.

a resumption of the *νεκρούς* immediately preceding, and that what is said in this verse is to be regarded as the ground of the thought that judgment will be pronounced, not only upon the living, *but upon the dead also*. This assumption seems to be corroborated by the *καί* before *νεκρούς*. The fact — to which Peter appeals — on which this thought is based is expressed in *εὐαγγελίσθη*. But it is precisely this idea, that the gospel was preached to the dead, — to all the dead, — which has induced the interpreters to deviate from the explanation lying most naturally to hand. It is entirely unjustifiable, with Zezschwitz (thus Alethæus already, and Starkius in Wolf), to connect the verse with vv. 1 and 2, regard vv. 3–5 as a digression, and understand under *νεκρούς* the *Christians* who are already dead when the day of judgment arrives. *γάρ* certainly must refer back to ver. 5; according to Schott, it applies to the whole homogeneous statement of ver. 5; according to Bengel, to *τῷ ἐποίμῳ ἔχοντι*; in their opinion, likewise, *νεκρούς* is to be understood of *Christians* already dead. This determination of the expression, however, is arbitrary, as no mention is made in ver. 5 of the *Christians*.¹ It lies more to hand to take the *νεκρούς* as meaning the *evil-speakers* mentioned in ver. 5. On this interpretation, the apostle tells the *Christians* who were being evil spoken of, not to forget that those calumniators who died *before* the judgment would not on that account escape punishment. Still it is difficult to see why the apostle should give such special prominence to this, — more especially with the further remark, that the gospel was preached unto them, *ἵνα . . . ζῶσι*, κ.τ.λ. Wiesinger justly remarks: “that the author should so expressly accept the assumption of their death, does not well agree with the *ἐποίμῳ ἔχειν*, and not with the subsequent *πάντων δὲ τὸ τέλος ἤγγικε*.” — Hofmann, whilst correctly recognizing that by *νεκρούς* the apostle here does not denote *Christians* only, or *unbelievers* only, gives a closer definition of the term by applying it to those of the dead to whom, during their lifetime, the gospel had been preached. At the same time, however, he assumes that the thought here expressed “serves to confirm or explain the whole statement that the slanderers, without exception, whether living or dead, must render account to the Lord.” But, on the one hand, the apostle in no way alludes to the limitation of the idea here too supposed; and, on the other, it is incorrect to understand by *ζῶντας καὶ νεκρούς*, ver. 5, the calumniators only. If all arbitrariness is to be avoided, then *νεκρούς* must here be taken in the same wide sense as *νεκρούς* in ver. 5. Any limitation of the general idea is without justification, — indicated, as such is, neither by the want of the article before *νεκρούς*,² nor by the circumstance that the slanderers are the subject in ver. 5. Accordingly, it cannot be denied that the apostle gives expression to the thought that the gospel has been preached to all who are dead at the time when the last judgment arrives. With the

¹ It is evidently still farther-fetched to understand *νεκρούς* as meaning the believers of the O. T., as is done by several of the earlier commentators, — Bullinger, Aretius, etc.

² The phrases, *ἐγείρειν*, *ἐγείρεσθαι*, *ἀναστῆναι ἐκ νεκρῶν* (see Winer, p. 117 [E. T. 153]),

go to prove that the expression *νεκροί*, when applied to *all* the dead, has not necessarily the article prefixed to it. Elsewhere, too, *νεκροί* has no article: cf. Luke xvi. 30; Acts x. 42; Rom. xiv. 9.

view of chap. iii. 19, 20, which is in harmony with the words, this thought need occasion no stumbling. In that passage, it is true, the *ἐκήρυσεν* applies only to the spirits of those who perished in the flood. But they alone are mentioned there, not because the *κήρυγμα* was addressed exclusively to them, but because the apostle recognized in the deluge the type of baptism.¹ Accordingly, though there be a close connection of thought internally between what is here said and chap. iii. 19, 20, it is nevertheless erroneous, with Steiger, König, Güder, Wiesinger, Weiss, p. 228 f., to take *εὐηγγελίσθη* as applying only to those there named. — *εὐηγγελίσθη* is put here impersonally: “the gospel was proclaimed,” neither *ὁ Χριστός* nor *ἡ διδαχὴ τοῦ Χριστοῦ* (Bengel, Grotius, Pott, etc.), nor any thing similar, is to be supplied.

εἰς τοῦτο . . . ἵνα (comp. chap. iii. 9, John xviii. 37, and other passages) points to the design of the fact stated in *εὐηγγελίσθη*; on this the chief accent of the sentence lies. The apostle bases the thought, that the Lord stands ready to judge the dead also, not alone on the circumstance that the gospel has been preached to them too, but that it has been preached for the purpose which he states in what follows. This purpose is expressed in the sentence consisting of two members: *ἵνα κριθῶσιν μὲν κατὰ ἄνθρωπος σαρκί. ζῶσιν δὲ κατὰ Θεὸν πνεύματι*. According to the grammatical structure, *κριθῶσιν* and *ζῶσιν* are co-ordinate with each other, and both are equally dependent on *ἵνα*. In sense *ἵνα* applies; however, only to *ζῶσιν*, inasmuch as the first member must be regarded as a parenthesis. The construction here is similar to that which is frequently to be found in classical writers in clauses connected by *μὲν . . . δέ*.² This conjunction, as Hartung³ remarks, discloses the contrast. The aorist *κριθῶσιν* shows the judgment to be one which, at the commencement of the last judgment, is by their very death executed upon those who are then dead, and this quite independently of whether the gospel was preached to them before or after death. It is accordingly erroneous to understand this judgment (*κριθῶσιν*) to mean the judgment of repentance (Gerliard), or that of the flood (De Wette); it is the judgment of death, as nearly all expositors have rightly acknowledged. Hofmann, with only an appearance of rightness, asserts that the expression of the apostle can be appropriately applied only to those who did not suffer this judgment of death till after the gospel had been preached to them. The apostle could express himself thus as regards those also with whom this was not the case, all the more readily that they were not set free from the condition of death immediately on hearing the gospel preached, nor then even, when they had received it in faith. Accordingly, the interpretation is: “in order that they, after the flesh, indeed, judged by death, may live according to the spirit” (Wiesinger). The antithesis *σαρκί . . . πνεύματι* is here in the same sense as in chap. iii. 18. Güder’s opinion, that *σάρξ* here denotes the sinful bias which the dead possess, is unwarranted; nowhere in Scripture is *σάρξ* attributed to the already de-

¹ Erroneous is the opinion of several commentators (Pott, Jachmann, König, Grimm in *Theol. Studien und Kritiken*, 1835), that these only are named by way of example because they were specially ungodly.

² See Matthiae, *Ausf. Griech. Gr.*, 2d ed., p. 1262.

³ *Lehre v. d. Partikl.*, Part II., p. 406.

parted. — *κατὰ ἀνθρώπους* means neither “by men,” nor “according to the judgment of men;” but “according to the manner of men, as is peculiar to them.” — The second member, *ζῶσι δὲ κατὰ Θεὸν πνεύματι*, corresponds as to form entirely with the first clause, only that here the verb is present, because it mentions the future condition aimed at. *ζῆν* is antithetical to *κριθῆναι*, and denotes the eternal life which in the judgment is awarded to those who in faith have received the gospel. It is more nearly defined by *κατὰ Θεόν*, which (corresponding to the *κατὰ ἀνθρώπους*) can only mean, “according to the manner of God, as corresponds with the character of God.”¹ — This final clause states the purpose which this *εὐαγγελίζεσθαι* should serve; whether, and in how far, the object is attained, is not said.

Ver. 7. Here begins the third series of exhortations, which has special reference to life in the church, and is linked on to the thought of the nearness of the end of all things (see *Intro.*, § 2). — *πάντων δὲ τὸ τέλος ἤγγικεν*]. *δε* marks clearly the transition to another train of thought. It is accordingly incorrect to connect the clause with what precedes (*Hofmann*). *πάντων τὸ τέλος*, equal to “the end of all things,” refers back to the foregoing *εἰσίμως ἔχοντι κρίναι*; with the judgment comes the *τέλος*. *πάντων*, placed first by way of emphasis, is not masc. (*Hensler*: “the end of all men”) but neut.;² comp. 2 *Pet.* iii. 10, 11; with *τέλος*, *Matt.* xxiv. 6, 14. — *ἤγγικεν*]. Comp. *Rom.* xiii. 12; *Jas.* v. 8; *Phil.* iv. 5. That the apostle, without fixing the time or the hour of it, looked upon the advent of Christ and the end of the world, — in its condition hitherto, — therewith connected, as near at hand, must be simply admitted.³ — *σωφρονήσατε οὖν καὶ νήψατε*]. The first exhortation, grounded (*οὖν*) on the thought of the nearness of the end of the world. *σωφρ.*; *Vulg.*: *estote PRUDENTES*; in this sense the word is not in use in the *N. T.*; it means rather temperateness of spirit, i.e., the governing *omnium immoderatorum affectuum*; with the passage comp. 1 *Tim.* ii. 9; *Tit.* ii. 6,⁴ in contrast to the licentiousness of the heathen described in ver. 2 (*Wiesinger*). — *νήψατε*]. *Vulg.*: *vigilate*, inexactly; *νήφειν* has here the same meaning as in chap. i. 13. It is not enough to understand both expressions of abstinence from sensual indulgence. — *εἰς (τὰς) προσευχάς*, not *in orationibus* (*Vulg.*), for *εἰς* states the aim of the *σωφρ.* and *νήφειν*, but “unto prayer,” that is, so that you may always be in the right frame of mind for prayer. If *τὰς* be genuine, it is to be explained on the supposition that the apostle took the prayers of Christians for granted. — A mind excited by passions and lusts

¹ *Hofmann* interprets *κατὰ Θεόν* incorrectly by “because of God,” to which he adds the more precise definition, “since it is God who gives this life, so that it is therefore constituted accordingly.” — *Jachmann*’s view is very singular; he holds that *κατὰ Θεόν* means “with reference to their divine part;” nor, he thinks, should this occasion surprise, for, as the sensuous nature of man is in biblical language personified by ὁ ἀνθρώπος, so too his invisible, divine nature might be personified by ὁ Θεός.

² *Oecumenius* gives two interpretations: τὸ τέλος· ἀντι τοῦ, ἢ συμπληρωσις, ἢ συντελεῖα·

ἢ τέλος ἤγγικεναι τῶν πάντων προφητῶν· τοῦτο δὲ ἀληθεῖ λόγῳ, ὁ Χριστός, ἢ πάντων γὰρ τελείωσις, αὐτός ἐστιν. The second is evidently false.

³ According to *Schott*, ἤγγικεν means as much as: “not only is there nothing more between the Christian’s present state of salvation and the end, but the former is itself already the end, i.e., the beginning of the end.”

⁴ *Hemming*: “σωφροσύνη, equal to, affectuum et voluntatis harmonia.”

cannot pray. The plural points to repeated prayer (Schott). Schott, without any warrant, would understand by it the prayers of the Church only. — The fact that both ideas are synonymous, forbids any separation, with De Wette and Hofmann, of *σωφρονήσασθε* from *νήψασθε*, and the conjoining of *εις τ. προσευχάς* with the latter term only.

Ver. 8. *πρὸ πάντων δέ*]; cf. Jas. v. 12. — *τὴν εἰς ἑαυτοὺς* (i.e., *ἀλλήλους*) *ἀγάπην ἐκτενῆ ἔχοντες*. The second exhortation. The participle shows that this and the first exhortation belong closely together. Luther translates inaccurately: "have . . . a burning love." Love one to another, as the characteristic sign (John xiii. 35) of Christians, is presupposed; the apostle's exhortation is directed to this, that the love should be *ἐκτενής*.¹ — For *ἐκτενής*, cf. chap. i. 22. There is nothing to show that the apostle gave expression to this exhortation with special reference to the circumstance "that in the case of his readers brotherly love was united with danger and persecution" (Schott). — *ὅτι (ἡ) ἀγάπη καλύπτει πλῆθος ἁμαρτιῶν*]. A proverbial saying after Prov. x. 12: *שְׂנֵאָה תַעֲרַר מְדַנִּים וְעַל כָּל-פְּשָׁעִים תִּכְפֹּה אֲהַבָּה* (the second half is incorrectly translated by the LXX., *πάντας δὲ τοὺς μὴ φιλονεικούντας καλύπτει (φιλία)*: "Love covereth (maketh a covering over) all sins." The sense of the words is evident from the first half of the verse; whilst hatred stirs up strife and contention (by bringing the sins of others to the light of day), love, with forgiving gentleness, covers the sins of others (and thus works concord).² — In its original meaning, accordingly, the proverb has reference to what love does as regards the sins of others; love in its essential nature is forgiveness, and that not of some, but of many sins; 1 Cor. xiii. 5, 7; Matt. xviii. 21, 22. In this sense Estius, Luther, Calvin, Beza, Piscator, Steiger, Wiesinger, Weiss (p. 337 f.), Schott, Fronmüller, etc., have rightly interpreted the passage, which then, serving as the basis of the preceding exhortation,³ is intended to set forth the blessed influence of love on life in the church. Hofmann unjustly denies this (Beza: *caritatem mutuam commendat ex eo, quod innumerabilia peccata veluti sepeliat, ac proinde pacis ac concordiae sit faulrix et conservatrix*. Wiesinger: "Only by the forgiving, reconciling influence of love, can the destructive power of sin be kept away from church life"). Steiger (with whom Weiss and Fronmüller agree) explains: "the apostle recommends the Christians to *extend the limits of brotherly love* and to *strengthen themselves in it*, because true love covers a *multitude* of sins;" but this is not to the point, inasmuch as the covering of many sins is peculiar to the *ἀγάπη* itself, and constitutes the reason why it should be *ἐκτενής*. Several expositors (Grotius, etc.) understand the words to have the same meaning here as in Jas. v. 20 (see Comment., *in loc.*), that is, that love in effecting

¹ Bengel: "Amor jam praesupponitur, ut sit vehemens, praecipitur."

² As opposed to the view that Peter had this passage in his mind, De Wette asserts, that in "that case the apostle must have translated from the Hebrew the passage incorrectly rendered by the LXX. This, however, is in itself improbable, as he would then have written *πάσας τὰς ἁμαρτίας*, or rather, *πάντα*

τὰ ἀδικήματα (cf. Prov. xvii. 9)." But though it may be questioned whether Peter quoted directly from it, there can be no doubt, as even Brückner, Wiesinger, and Weiss admit, that the proverbial phrase arose out of that passage.

³ Hottinger: "ὅτι indicare videtur (better, *indicat*) incitamentum aliquod, quo christianis amor iste commendatur."

the sinner's conversion, procures the divine forgiveness for his many sins; but, on the one hand, "the apostle does not here regard his readers as erring brethren, of whom it might be the duty of some to convert the others" (Wiesinger); and, on the other, "there is here not the slightest indication that the expression is not to be understood directly of the covering of sins as such, but of reclaiming labors" (Weiss).—Oecumenius already (*ὁ μὲν γὰρ εἰς τὸν πλησίον ἔλεος, τὸν Θεὸν ἡμῖν ἰλεων ποιεῖ*), and after him many Catholic expositors (Salmeron, Cornelius a Lapide, Lorinus, etc.), and several Protestants also (the latter sometimes, whilst distinctly defending the Protestant principle against Catholic applications of the passage),¹ understand the maxim of the blessing which love brings to him who puts it into practice. But if Peter had wished to express a thought similar to that uttered by Christ, Matt. vi. 14, 15, he would assuredly not have made use of words such as these, which in the nature of them bear not upon personal sins, but on those of others.²

Ver. 9. In this and the following verses two manifestations of love are brought prominently forward, in which its *ministering* nature is revealed. First: *φιλόξενοι εἰς ἀλλήλους*]. Cf. Rom. xii. 13; Heb. xiii. 2; 3 John 5; 1 Tim. iii. 2, etc. The chief emphasis lies on the words which serve more closely to define the statement: *ἀνευ γογγυσμοῦ*, "without murmuring," i. e., murmuring at the trouble caused by the hospitality shown to brethren. The same thing is said in a more general way, Phil. ii. 14: *πάντα ποιεῖτε χωρὶς γογγυσμῶν καὶ διαλογισμῶν*; cf. 2 Cor. ix. 7: *μὴ ἐκ λύπης, ἢ ἐξ ἀνάγκης*.

Ver. 10. Second manifestation of love. It is presupposed that each one has received a *χάρισμα*: *ἕκαστος καθὼς ἔλαβε χάρισμα*]. *καθὼς*, not equal to *ὅς*, but *pro ratione qua, prouti* (Wahl), "according as."—*χάρισμα*, as in Rom. xii. 6; 1 Cor. xii. 4, 28; not an office in the church. Every man should, according to the kind of gift he has received (not according to the measure of it, *ἐν τούτῳ τῷ μέτρῳ, ἐν ᾧ ἔλαβε, vel ut Paulus: ὡς ὁ Θεὸς ἐμέρισε μέτρον χαρισμάτων*, Rom. xii. 3; Pott: "still less can *καθὼς* be referred to the manner of receiving;") Lorinus: *sicut GRATIS accepimus, ita gratis demus*), administer it for his brethren, *εἰς ἐαυτούς*, i. e., for their benefit, and therefore for that of the entire community. *διακονεῖν* (a transitive verb, as in chap. i. 12): *ocula emphatica; innuit Ap. quod propter dona illa nemo se debeat supra*

¹ Vorstius: "Intelligit Ap. caritatem in causa esse, ut non tantum proximi nostri peccata humaniter tegamus, verum etiam ut Deus nobis ex pacto gratuito nostra peccata condonet, non quod propter meritum seu dignitatem caritatis id fiat, sed quia caritas erga fratres conditio est, sine qua Deus nobis ignoscere non vult."

² De Wette gives a peculiar combination of the various interpretations: "As the love which is required of us is a *common* love, so the writer refers to the *common* sins still defacing the whole of Christian social life, but which, as single blemishes (!), are overshadowed, and made pardonable in God's eye, by the

light of that love which penetrates all; that is, in that this love produces mutual reconciliation and improvement." On this Brückner remarks, that what is true here is the thought that reciprocalness is a characteristic not of love only, but of all her actions, i. e., "He whose love covers the sins of others, sees in like manner his own sins covered by the love of others." But this makes "the interpretation only more artificial, and removes it still farther from the simple phraseology of our passage" (Weiss).—Clemens Al. and Bernhard of Clairvaux (*Sermo 23 in Cant.*) understand *ἀγάπη* to mean the love of Christ (!).

alios efferre, aut dominium in alios affectare, sed aliorum ministrum sese sponte constituere (Gerhard). — ὡς καλοὶ οἰκονόμοι ποικίλης χάριτος Θεοῦ]. With ὡς, cf. chap. i. 14: as is peculiar to the καλοῖς οἰκονόμοις, which, from their vocation, Christians should be. With οἰκονόμοι, cf. 1 Cor. iv. 1; Tit. i. 7. According to De Wette and Weiss, there is here an allusion to the parable of the talents, Matt. xxv. 14. — καλός, expression of irreproachable excellence; see 1 Tim. iv. 6; 2 Tim. ii. 3. The Lord of the Christians, as the οἰκονόμοι, is God; the goods which He intrusts to their stewardship are His ποικίλη χάρις; χάρις is here the sum of all that has fallen to the share of believers through the *grace* of God; the individual manifestations of it are the χαρίσματα, the homogeneous character of which is marked by the singular, and their variety by ποικίλη here subjoined with reference to the preceding καθὼς . . . χάρισμα.

Ver. 11. *Species duas generi subjicit* (Vorstius). From the general term χάρισμα, Peter selects two special functions for greater prominence. — εἰ τις λαλεῖ]. λαλεῖν is here the preaching in the church, which includes the προφητεύειν, διδάσκειν, and παρακαλεῖν, mentioned in Rom. xii. 6-8. Pott is inexact in paraphrasing εἰ τις λαλεῖ by εἰ τις ἔχει τὸ χάρισμα τοῦ λαλεῖν (so, too, Schott: "if any one have the gift and vocation to speak"), for λαλεῖν is not the gift, but the exercise of it. It is arbitrary to limit the application of the term to the official duties of the elders (Hemming: *si quis docendi munus in ecclesia sustinet*), for in the assemblies every one who possessed the necessary χάρισμα was at liberty to speak. — ὡς λόγια Θεοῦ]. λαλείτω ἂ λαλεῖ must be supplied; or, better still, with Wiesinger: λαλοῦντες; cf. ἕκαστος . . . διακονοῦντες above; λόγια — as in classical Greek, chiefly of oracular responses — is applied in the N. T. only to the utterances or revelations of God, either to those in the O. T., as in Acts vii. 38, Rom. iii. 2, or those in the N. T., as Heb. v. 12. The idea, prophecies, is too narrow. This exhortation presupposes that whoever speaks in the congregation gives utterance, not to his own thoughts, but to the revelations of God; and it demands that he should do so in a manner (ὡς) conformable to them. — εἰ τις διακονεῖ]. διακονεῖν must not be understood as applying to the official work of the appointed deacons only; it embraces *quaevis ministeria in ecclesia ab docendi officio distincta* (Gerhard; so, too, Wiesinger, who here cites Rom. xii. 8 and 1 Cor. xii. 28), but it refers specially to the care of the poor, the sick, and the strangers, either official, or according to the free-will of individual members of the church. — ὡς ἐξ ἰσχύος, κ.τ.λ., sc., διακονεῖτω, or better διακονοῦντες: "so ministering, as of," etc. Here, too, it is presumed that the person ministering is not wanting in that strength which God supplies, and the exhortation is, that he should exercise his ability in a way corresponding with the fact that he received the strength necessary thereto from God, and not as "of himself possessing it." χορηγεῖν, besides in this passage, occurs only in 2 Cor. ix. 10. (ἐπιχορηγεῖν is to be met with frequently, e.g., 2 Pet. i. 5). — ἵνα, as stating their purpose, refers back to the exhortations in vv. 10 and 11, with special reference to the determinative clauses introduced by ὡς. — ἐν πᾶσιν, "in all things" (Wiesinger), i.e., "in the practice of all the gifts, the exercise of

¹ Calvin: "Quia quicquid habemus ad ministrandum virtutis solus Ipse nobis suggerit."

which was connected with matters relating to the churches" (Schott); not equivalent to *ἐν πᾶσιν ἔθνεσιν* (Oec.), or "in you all" (De Wette: "as His true instruments"); cf. 1 Tim. iii. 11. — *δοξάζεται ὁ Θεός*, "in order that God may be glorified," i.e., that He obtain the praise, since it will be evident from your conduct that you as His *οἰκονόμοι* have received (*καθὼς ἔλαβε*) all things (*τὰ λόγια, τὴν ἰσχύν*) from Him. — *διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ* belongs to *δοξάζεται*, and points out that not the ability only, for the *λαλεῖν* and *διακονεῖν*, is communicated to the Christian through the agency of Christ,¹ but that all actual employment of it is effected by Christ. It is mistaken, with Hofmann, — who is not justified in appealing to Rom. xvi. 27 and Heb. xiii. 21 in support of his assertion, — to connect *διὰ Ἰ. Χρ.* with the following relative clause. Such a view is opposed not only to the natural construction, but to the thought, since God did not receive His *δόξα* and His *κράτος* first through Christ. — As a close, the doxology, *ψ*, may be referred either to *Θεός* (Oecumenius, Calvin, Bengel, De Wette, Brückner, Wiesinger, Weiss, Schott, Hofmann) or to *Ἰ. Χριστοῦ* (Grotius, Calov, Steiger). The first is the correct application, since *ὁ Θεός* is the subject of the clause and *ἡ δόξα* points back to *δοξάζεται*. Comp. chap. v. 11. The doxology states the reason of the *ἵνα δοξάζεται ὁ Θεός* (Schott); because God *is* (*ἐστίν*) the glory and the power, therefore the endeavors of the church should be directed to bring about a lively acknowledgment of this, to the praise of God. — Identical with this is the doxology, Rev. i. 6 (cf. also Rev. v. 13).

Ver. 12. Exhortation with reference to the sufferings under persecution. *ἀγαπητοί*. See chap. ii. 11. — *μὴ ξενίζεσθε*. Cf. ver. 4; Nicol. de Lyra translates incorrectly: *nolite a fide alienari*: Luther, correctly: "let it not astonish you." — *τῇ ἐν ὑμῖν πυρώσει*. The construction cum dat. occurs also in classical Greek; *πύρωσις*, besides in this passage, to be found only in Rev. xviii. 9, 18, where it is equal to *incendium*. The LXX. translate *קִנְיָא* and even *קִנְיָא* by *πυρώω*; the substantive, Prov. xxvii. 21, is an inexact translation of *קִנְיָא* in the sense of "refining furnace;" Oec., correctly: *πύρωσιν τὰς θλίψεις εἰπὼν, ἐνέφηνεν ὡς διὰ δοκιμασίαν ἐπάγονται αὐτοῖς αὐταί*. The word, however, does not in itself contain the reference to purification; this is introduced only in what follows.¹ — *ἐν ὑμῖν*. "Among, with you;" not equal to "affecting some in your midst" (De Wette), but "the readers are regarded as a totality, and the *πύρ.* as present in the midst of them" (Wiesinger). — The definite purpose of the *πύρωσις* is brought out in the subsequent words: *πρὸς πειρασμὸν ὑμῖν γινομένην*. *πειρασμός* here means the trial with intent to purify (elsewhere it has also the secondary signification of designed temptation to sin); cf. chap. i. 7. — *ὡς ξένου ὑμῖν συμβαίνοντος*. *ξένου* points back to *μὴ ξενίζεσθε*. Luther: "as though some *strange thing* happened unto you;" i.e., something strange to your destination, unsuited to it.²

Ver. 13. *ἀλλὰ . . . χαίρετε*. Antithesis to *ξενίζεσθε*; *non tantum mirari*

¹ Gualther: "Confert crucem igni, nos auro."

² Schott here again supposes that in consequence of persecutions the leaders had become perplexed as to the moral truth of their state

of salvation. This the context in no way justifies. What causes astonishment is rather the fact that the church belonging to the glorified Christ is exposed to the obloquy of the world.

vetat Petrus, sed gaudere etiam jubet (Calvin); the measure of the joy is indicated by καθὸ κοινωνεῖτε τοῖς τοῦ Χριστοῦ παθήμασι. — καθὸ, not equivalent to "that," nor to quando (Pott), but to quatenus, in quantum: cf. Rom. viii. 26, 2 Cor. viii. 12. — τὰ τοῦ Χριστοῦ παθήματα is inexactly interpreted by Vorstius as afflictiones Christi membris destinatae, nempe quas pii propter justitiam et evangelium Christi sustinent; they rather mean the sufferings which Christ Himself has endured. Of these the believers are partakers (κοινωνοὺσιν αὐτοῖς), for the world shows the same enmity to them as to Christ, since it is He who is hated in them; cf. my commentary to Col. i. 24, and Meyer to 2 Cor. i. 5, 7 (so, too, Wiesinger, Weiss, p. 293 f., Schott). Steiger¹ is wrong in thinking of the inward suffering endured by the Christian, whilst, by the power of Christ's death, he dies unto sin. — The object to be supplied in thought to χαίρετε is the πύρωσις previously mentioned by the apostle. — ἵνα και states the design of χαίρειν: the Christians are to rejoice now, in order that they may also (και lays stress on the future in relation to the present) rejoice ἐν τῇ ἀποκαλύψει, etc.; for this future joy is conditioned by that of the present, as the future partaking of the δοξα of Christ by the present sharing of His παθήμασι.² Schott unreasonably opposes, as "grammatical pedantry," the application of ἵνα to the preceding χαίρετε, for he remarks: "it is the sufferings themselves which hold out to us the future joy." But he omits to consider that the κοινωνεῖν τοῖς τ. Χρ. παθ. holds out future happiness to him only who finds his joy in it. Schott incorrectly appeals, in support of his construction, to John xi. 15. — It is not correct to explain, with Gerhard, etc., ἵνα, ἐκβατικῶς. — ἐν τῇ ἀποκαλύψει, κ.τ.λ.], not "because of," but "at" (Luther: "at the time of") the revelation; cf. chap. i. 17. The expression ἀποκάλ. τῆς δόξης Χριστοῦ (with which compare Matt. xxv. 31) is to be found only here. By it the apostle indicates that he who is now a partaker of the sufferings of Christ, and rejoices in them (Col. iii. 4), will one day be partaker of His glory, and in it rejoice everlastingly. ἀγαλλώμενοι is added to χαρῆτε by way of giving additional force to the idea (chap. i. 8; Matt. v. 12).³

Ver. 14. In order to strengthen the exhortation: μὴ ξενίζεσθε . . . ἀλλὰ χαίρετε, Peter adds the assurance: εἰ ὀνειδίξεσθε, κ.τ.λ.; cf. chap. iii. 14 and Matt. v. 11. — Pott, without any reason, explains εἰ by καίπερ. — ἐν ὀνόματι Χριστοῦ]. The explanation, propter confessionem Christi (De Wette), is inaccurate, for ὄνομα is not confessio; the meaning is the same as that in Mark ix. 41: ἐν ὀνόματι, ὅτι Χριστοῦ ἐστέ, thus: "because ye bear the name of Christ, and therefore belong to Him." Schott: "for the sake of your Christian name and Christian profession;" Steiger: "as servants of Christ." — μακάρτοι, sc.

¹ "The κοινωνεῖν τ. παθ. consists in the inward fellowship of the sufferings of Christ, in the participation in that strength which arises from the justifying confidence in their value, and which causes us even to die unto sin."

² Weiss (p. 291 ff.), while denying that Peter has the Pauline idea of community of life with Christ, supplements, as an interme-

diate thought, that participation in the sufferings of Christ is the necessary mark of the true disciples. But this is to give a much too superficial conception of the relation; and could Peter have thought it possible to be a disciple without community of life?

³ "Quia prius illud (gaudium) cum dolore et tristitia mixtum est, secundum cum exultatione conjungit" (Calvin).

ἔστε. — ὅτι τὸ τῆς δόξης (καὶ δυνάμεως) καὶ τὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ πνεῦμα]. δόξα: glory in its highest sense, heavenly, divine glory.¹ According to Greek usage, τὸ τῆς δόξης may be a circumlocution for ἡ δόξα;² but this form of expression does not occur elsewhere in the N. T. (Winer, p. 104 [E. T., 109]); nor is it easy to understand why the apostle should not simply have written ἡ δόξα. Accordingly, it is preferable to take τὸ with the subsequent πνεῦμα, and to assume an additional πνεῦμα (as is done by the greater number of commentators, De Wette, also Brückner, Wiesinger, Schott); the Spirit of glory is, then, the same as that which is also the Spirit of God (καὶ τὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ πν. subjoined epexegetically). But in consideration of *ὀνειδίξεσθε*, He is styled the Spirit of δόξα, i. e., to whom δόξα belongs (Calvin: *qui gloriam secum perpetuo conjunctam habet*; cf. Eph. i. 17), and who therefore also bestows it. τὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ is added in order to show that this Spirit of δόξα is none other than the Spirit of God Himself. It must be allowed, that, on this interpretation, there is an inexactness of expression, καὶ being evidently out of place.³ — Hofmann proposes, therefore, to supply to τὸ not πνεῦμα, but ὄνομα, from what precedes. But if Peter had had this thought in his mind, he would certainly have given definite expression to it; and it is self-evident, too, that on him who is reproached ἐν ὀνόματι Χριστοῦ, as a bearer of it, that name rests. — ἐφ' ὑμῶν ἀναπαύεται, after Isa. xi. 2, where the same expression is used of the πνεῦμα τ. Θεοῦ (in like manner ἐπαναπαύεσθαι, Num. xi. 25; 2 Kings ii. 15, LXX.; of εἰρήνην, Luke x. 6). The accus. ἐφ' ὑμῶν is to be explained as with *ἔμεινεν*, John i. 32; Wahl: *demissus in vos requiescit in vobis*; it points to the living operation of the Spirit on those upon whom He rests. The thought contained in these words gives the reason (ὅτι) of what has been said: not, however, the logical reason;⁴ but the actual reason, that is, inasmuch as this resting of the Spirit of δόξα, on those who are reproached ἐν ὀνόματι Χριστοῦ, is a sealing of their eternal δόξα. It is inappropriate to insert, with Calvin, a *nililominus*, so that the sense would be: in spite of that reproach, the Spirit of God still dwells in you; the more so that the reproach of unbelievers was called forth by the very fact that the life of the Christians was determined by the Spirit which rested upon them. — In the additional clause found in the Rec., and connected with what goes before: κατὰ μὲν αὐτοὺς βλασφημεῖται, κατὰ δὲ ὑμῶν δοξάζεται, the subject can hardly be πνεῦμα Θεοῦ taken from the explanatory clause immediately preceding, but is more probably ὄνομα Χριστοῦ from the previous clause, and on which the principal stress is laid. Schott wrongly thinks that this addition interrupts the connection of thought; but Hofmann is equally in error in holding the opposite opinion, that it is of necessity demanded by the γάρ, ver. 15; for γάρ may be equally well applied to the idea that the Spirit of God rests on those who

¹ Bengel erroneously understands δόξα *pro concreto*, and that, *ita ut sit appellatio Christi*, adding: "innuitur, Spiritum Christi eundem esse Spiritum Dei Patris."

² See Matth., *Ausf. Gr. Gram.*, 2d ed., § 234.

³ Cf. Plato, *Rep.*, viii. 565: *περι τὸ ἐν Ἀρκαδία τὸ πνεῦμα Διὸς ἱερόν*; cf. Winer, p. 125 (*E. T.*, 132).

⁴ Aretius: "crux, quam bonus fert pro Christo, indicat, quod Spir. Dei in illo quiescat;" similarly, too, Hofmann: "they should consider themselves happy that they are reproached for bearing the name of Christ; every such reproach reminds them of what, by bearing it, they are."

are reproached *ἐν ὀνόματι Χριστοῦ*, as to this, that the name of Christ is glorified *καθ' ὑμῶν*. Since the rendering of *κατά* by "with" (as formerly in this commentary), or by "on the part of" (Hofmann), cannot be supported,¹ the meaning "with regard to" (De Wette) must be maintained. The interpretation will then be: "by their . . . your conduct," or "according to their . . . your opinion."

Ver. 15. With reference to the assumption contained in what precedes — whether expressed in the clause *εἰ ὀνειδίξεσθε . . . ἀναπαύεται*, or in the doubtful adjunct *κατὰ δὲ ὑμῶν δοξάζεται* — the apostle by way of explanation adds the following warning: *μὴ γάρ τις ὑμῶν πασχέτω ὡς φονεὺς, κ.τ.λ.*]. The particle *γάρ* does not here assign a reason, it gives an explanation: "that is to say,"² "that is, let none of you suffer as a murderer;" *ὡς φονεὺς*, i. e., because he is a murderer. The two special conceptions, *φονεὺς* and *κλέπτης*, are followed by the more general *κακοποιός*, in order that every other kind of crime may be therein included. These three conceptions belong very closely to each other, for which reason *ὡς* is not repeated. On the other hand, the fourth conception, *ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος*, is, by the prefixed *ὡς*, distinguished from the others as entirely independent. Etymologically, this word denotes one who assumes to himself an oversight of other people's affairs with which he has nothing to do. The consciousness of a higher dignity could easily betray the Christian into such a presumption, which must make him all the more odious to strangers. Oecumenius takes the word as equivalent to *ὁ τὰ ἀλλότρια περιεργαζόμενος*; Calvin, Beza, etc., to *alieni cupidus, appetens*; Pott, to "a disturber of the public peace." But all these interpretations are not in harmony with the etymology of the word.

Ver. 16. Antithesis to the foregoing. — *εἰ δὲ ὡς Χριστιανός* (*sc. τὶς πάσχει*) *μὴ αἰσχυνέσθω*]. The name *Χριστιανός*, besides here, is to be found only in Acts xi. 26, where its origin is mentioned (cf. Meyer, *in loc.*), and Acts xxvi. 28. — *ὡς Χρ.*, i. e., because of his being a Christian, synonymous with *ἐν ὀνόματι Χριστοῦ*, ver. 14. Calvin: *non tam nomen quam causam respicit*. — *μὴ αἰσχυνέσθω*: "let him not consider it a disgrace;" cf. Rom. i. 16; 2 Tim. i. 8, 12. — *δοξάζεται δὲ τὸν Θεόν*; cf. Acts v. 41.³ — *ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι τούτῳ* goes back to *πάσχειν ὡς Χριστιανός*; De Wette regards it as synonymous with the reading: *ἐν τῷ μέρει τούτῳ*, 2 Cor. iii. 10, ix. 3: "in this matter," "in this respect;"⁴ *ὄνομα* can, however, be retained in its strict sense (Wiesinger), in which case it will mean the name *Χριστιανός*; *ἐν* will then designate this name as the reason of the *δοξάζειν* (see Winer, p. 362 [E. T., 387]). Hofmann, who gives

¹ Although Hofmann appeals for this signification to chap. iv. 6, still, in interpreting that passage, he himself takes *κατά* in a sense other than it is supposed to have here. — Pott uses the circumlocution *κατὰ τὴν γνώμην αὐτῶν* for *κατὰ αὐτούς*, whilst he explains *κατὰ δὲ ὑμῶν* by "quod autem ad vos attinet," i. e., "vestra autem agendi ratione," although *κατὰ* must have the same meaning in both clauses.

² Calvin: "Particula causalis hic supervacua non est, quum velit Ap. causam reddere, cur tantum ad societatem passionum Christi

hortatus sit fideles et simul per occasionem eos monere, ut iuste et innoxie vivant, ne justas sibi poenas arcessant propria culpa." — Erasmus rightly remarks: "non enim cruciatus martyrem facit, sed causa."

³ Bengel, Poterat Petr., antitheti vi., dicere: honori sibi ducit, sed honorem Deo resignandum esse docet.

⁴ Schott interprets *μέρος* artificially, as "that piece of life apportioned to Christians which consists in suffering."

the preference to the reading ἐν τῷ μέρει τούτῳ, "in this respect," refers the word to what follows, thus attributing to δοξαζέτω an application different from that of μὴ αἰσχυνέσθω. When, then, he states that the cause for praise arises from this circumstance, that the Christian's sufferings are appointed by God, he is introducing a thought in no way alluded to, and still less expressed, by the apostle.

Ver. 17. The apostle's exhortation, μὴ αἰσχυνέσθω, δοξαζέτω δέ, is based on a reference to the judgment which threatens the unbelieving. The connection of thought is the same here as in vv. 4 and 5. — Calvin, differently: *Nam haec necessitas totam Dei ecclesiam manet, ut — Dei manu castigetur: tanto igitur aequiori animo ferendae sunt pro Christo persecutiones.* But in this, as in the following verse, the chief stress is laid not so much on the first as on the second half. It is purely arbitrary for Pott to assert that ὅτι is superfluous. — ὅτι ὁ καιρὸς τοῦ ἀρξασθαι τὸ κρίμα]. Luther's translation, "it is time," is inexact. The article before καιρὸς must not be overlooked; thus, "for it is the time of the beginning of the judgment, that is, in which the judgment is beginning;" ἐστὶ is to be supplied; the genitive is directly dependent on ὁ καιρὸς (cf. Luke i. 57), and not "on καιρὸς taken out of the subject, ὁ καιρὸς" (Hofmann). By κρίμα is to be understood the definite judgment (τό), that is, the final judgment, which Peter, however, here thinks of, not in its last decisive act, but in its gradual development. It begins with the Christians (Matt. xxiv. 9 ff.) in the refining fire of affliction, ver. 12, and is completed in the sentence of condemnation pronounced on the unbelieving world at the advent of Christ. In opposition to the apostle's manner of expressing himself, Hofmann maintains that reference is here made *only* to the judgment of the unbelieving world, the beginning of which Peter recognized in the fact that God permitted it to persecute the Christians, to do unto them that which makes itself ripe for judgment (!). — ἀπὸ τοῦ οἴκου τοῦ Θεοῦ]. ἀπό is here pregnant: the judgment takes place first in the οἶκ. τοῦ Θεοῦ: thence it proceeds further on; with the construction ἀρχεσθαι ἀπό, cf. Acts i. 22, viii. 35, x. 37.¹ — οἶκος τοῦ Θεοῦ is the church of believers; 1 Tim. iii. 15 (chap. ii. 5, οἶκος πνευματικός). — εἰ δὲ πρῶτον ἀφ' ἡμῶν]. By these words the apostle passes over to the chief thought of the verse. Either τὸ κρίμα ἀρχεται may be supplied, and πρῶτον regarded as a pleonasm intensifying the idea ἀρχεται; or it may be assumed with De Wette, that the expression arose from a mingling of the two thoughts, εἰ δε ἀφ' ἡμῶν τὸ κρίμα ἀρχεται and εἰ δε πρῶτον ἡμεῖς κρινόμεθα. The first is more probable; πρῶτον presented itself to the apostle, because he wished to lay stress on the fact that the Christians had to suffer only the beginning of the judgment, not its close.² — ἀφ' ἡμῶν corresponds with the preceding οἶκ. τ. Θεοῦ. The sense is: If God does not exempt us, the members of His house (His family), from judgment, but permits it to take its

¹ Schott thinks that Peter really intended to write: "for the time is come that the judgment of the world must begin, but its beginning *must* be at the house of God." But why then did Peter not write as he intended? Schott introduces an idea into the second clause which Peter has in no way expressed.

² Schott's interpretation, that πρῶτον should be taken as a substantive (equal to "a first"), and that a general verb, expressive of what takes place, should be supplied out of ἀρχεσθαι (ἀπό being at the same time Zeugmatically repeated), contradicts itself by its artificialness.

beginning at us, how should the unbelievers be exempted? (cf. Luke xxiii. 31.) — *τί τὸ τέλος τῶν, κ.τ.λ., sc. ἔσται.* — τὸ τέλος, not “the reward,” but *the final term, the end*, to which the ἀπειθοῦντες τῷ εὐαγγ. (i.e., those who in hostility oppose the gospel of God) are going. Schott explains τὸ τέλος (antithetically to πρῶτον) as the final judgment itself, and the genitive τῶν ἀπειθοῦντων as a concise, nearer definition (“the part of the judgment which falls to the lot of the unbelievers”). But as little as πρῶτον means initiatory judgment, so little does τὸ τέλος final judgment. — On the interrogative form of the clause, Gerhard rightly remarks: *exaggeratio est in interrogatione*; cf. Luke xxiii. 31. The echo¹ in this verse of passages of the Old Testament, like Jer. xxv. 29, xlix. 12, Ezek. ix. 6, can the less fail to be recognized, that the words which follow are borrowed from the Old Testament.

Ver. 18. Strengthening of the foregoing thought by quotation of the O. T. passage, Prov. xi. 31, after the LXX., whose translation, however, is inexact (cf. Delitzsch, *in loc.*). — ὁ δίκαιος “is he who stands in a right relation to God” (Schott), that is, the believer who belongs to the οἰκ. τ. Θεοῦ; ὁ ἄσεβης καὶ ἁματωλός, the unbeliever (ὁ ἀπειθῶν τῷ τ. Θε. εὐαγγ.). μόλις σώζεται is not, with Gerhard, to be referred to the fact that for the pious *non nisi per multas tribulationes ingressus in regnum coeleste pateat*, but that it is difficult (μόλις, *scarcely, with great difficulty*) to stand in the judgment (ver. 17), and to attain σωτηρία. — ποῦ φανέται, “where will he appear?” that is, he will not stand, but will be annihilated. The same thought as in Ps. i. 5.

Ver. 19. The exhortation contained in this verse is closely connected with vv. 17 and 18, in such a way, however, “that it brings to a close the whole section which treats of suffering for the sake of Christ” (Hofmann); Hornejus: *clausula est qua totam exhortationem obsignat.* — ὥστε, as in Rom. vii. 4, and often elsewhere, with a finite verb following (Winer, p. 282 f. [E. T., 301]) “therefore.” — καὶ does not belong to οἱ πάσχοντες, equivalent to “those also who suffer,” with reference to those who do not suffer (Wiesinger, Hofmann), for there is no allusion in the context to any distinction between those who suffer because of their Christian profession and those who have not so to suffer,² but it is united with ὥστε, and applies to the verb, “and just for this reason” (cf. Winer, p. 408 [E. T., 438]). Incorrectly, Bengel: καὶ concessive cum participio ἰ. q. εἰ καὶ πάσχετε. — οἱ πάσχοντες, namely, the believers. — κατὰ τὸ θέλημα τοῦ Θεοῦ; that is, πρὸς πειρασμόν, ver. 12. Wiesinger: “looking back to ver. 17, inasmuch as they as Christians are overtaken by the judgment God pronounces on His house.” Besser incorrectly takes it as referring to their subjective behavior under suffering. — ὡς πιστῶ κτιστῇ παρατιθέσθωσαν, κ.τ.λ.]. Gerhard: ὡς exprimit causam, propter quam, hi qui patiuntur animas suas apud Deum deponere debeant, nimirum quia est earum creator et fidelis custos. If ὡς be the correct reading, then from the foregoing τοῦ Θεοῦ an αὐτῷ must be supplied, to which ὡς πιστῶ κτιστῇ applies. — κτιστῆς is not possessor (Calvin), but the creator; ὁ κτίσας, Rom. i. 25. It is used

¹ Calvin: “Hanc sententiam ex trita et perpetua Scripturae doctrina sumpsit Petrus; idque mihi probabilius est, quam quod alii putant, certum aliquem locum notari.”

² Schott explains καὶ by the contrast between “the individual sufferers” and “the church;” but nothing in the context alludes to this.

here in its strict sense, and not with reference to the new creation (Steiger, Schott, connect both together); cf. Acts iv. 24 ff.: "this prayer is an actual example of what is here demanded" (Weiss, p. 190). In the N. T. κτίστης is ἄπ. λεγ., in the O. T. it occurs frequently; Jud. ix. 12; 2 Macc. i. 24. πιστός: Oecumenius, equivalent to, ἀσφαλῆς καὶ ἀψευδῆς κατὰ τὰς ἐπαγγελίας αὐτοῦ, καὶ οὐκ ἐύσει ἡμῶς πειρασθῆναι ὑπὲρ ὃ δυνάμεθα; cf. 1 Cor. x. 13.— With παρατίθεσθαι, cf. Acts xiv. 23, xx. 32: "to commit to the protection of any one." — ἐν ἀγαθοποιίᾳ]. ἀγαθοποιία, ἄπ. λεγ.; the adjec., chap. ii. 14. This addition shows that the confident surrender to God is to be joined, not with careless indolence, but with the active practice of good. Oecumenius erroneously paraphrases the word by ταπεινοφροσύνη:

CHAPTER V.

Ver. 1. A, B, several min., read *οὖν* after *πρεσβυτέρους* (Lachm.); K, L, P, etc., Copt., Thph., etc., on the other hand, *τούς* (Rec., Tisch. 7); \aleph has both, i.e., *οὖν τούς*. This reading, accepted by Tisch. 8, is perhaps the original one; *οὖν* may have been omitted, because the subsequent exhortation does not appear to be a conclusion from what goes before. — Ver. 2. *ἐπισκοποῦντες* is wanting only in B, \aleph , 27, 29, Hier., etc.; it is adopted by Lachm. and Tisch. 7, and omitted by Tisch. 8. — After *ἐκουσίως*, A, P, \aleph , several min., vss., etc., Lachm. and Tisch. 8 have: *κατὰ Θεόν*. The words are wanting in the Rec. after B, K, L, etc., Oec., etc.; Tisch. 7 had omitted them; they are probably a later addition, in order to complete the idea. — *μηδὲ αἰσχροκερδῶς*. Rec., after B, K, P, \aleph , etc., Vulg., Copt., Thph., Beda (Lachm., Tisch. 8); Tisch. 7 reads, instead of *μηδέ, μή*, after A, L, 68, al., Syr., etc., Oec.; this, however, appears to be a mere alteration on account of the preceding *μή* and the subsequent *μηδέ*. — Ver. 3. Following B, Buttman has omitted the entire third verse; but as all authorities retain it, it cannot be regarded as spurious. — Ver. 5. *ὑποτασσομενοι*. Rec., according to K, L, P, etc., Thph., Oec.; is omitted in A, B, \aleph , 13, etc., several vss., etc. Lachm. and Tisch. are probably right in omitting it, as it appears to be a correction introduced in order to make the sense plainer, perhaps after Eph. v. 21. Wiesinger and Schott are against the Rec.; Reiche is in favor of it. — Instead of *ὁ Θεός*, Buttm. has, following B, adopted *Θεός* (without article). — Ver. 6. *ἐν καιρῷ*. In A, and the most of the vss., *ἐπισκοπῆς* follows here; adopted by Lachm., erroneously, however, as it is a later addition after chap. ii. 12. — Ver. 8. Following the most numerous and best authorities, Griesb. already has justly erased the *ὅτι* of the Rec. before *ὁ ἀντίδικος*. — *τίνα καταπιῖν*. Rec., after A, al., Vulg., Syr., Cyr., etc. (Tisch. 7); in its place K, L, P, \aleph , al., mult., Cop., etc., read *τινὰ καταπιεῖν* (Lachm.: *τινά*; Tisch. 8: *τίνα*); B has the inf. only, without *τινα*. The commentators (as also Reiche) prefer the Rec.; it appears, too, to be the more natural reading; but that very fact makes it suspicious. The reading of B is evidently a correction, as *τινα* seems to be inappropriate. — Ver. 9. B, \aleph , have the art. *τῷ* before *κόσμῳ* (Tisch. 8); in the Rec. it is omitted, after A, K, L, P, etc. (Tisch. 7). — Ver. 10. *ἡμῶς*. Rec., according to K, several min., Vulg., Syr., etc.; in place of it, the most important authorities, A, B, L, P, \aleph , very many min., and several vss., support *ὑμῶς*, which is accepted by Lachm. and Tisch., and rightly declared to be genuine by De Wette, Wiesinger, Schott, Reiche. The Codd., A, K, L, P, have the name *Ἰησοῦ* after *Χριστῷ* (Rec., Lachm., Tisch. 7); in B, \aleph , there is only *Χριστῷ* (Tisch. 8). The Rec. runs: *καταρτίσαι ὑμῶς, στήριξαι, σθενωσαι, θεμελιῶσαι*. Although these optatives convey an appropriate idea, still there is too little evidence for their genuineness; in the three last verbs, the optative occurs only in min., several vss., Thph., and Oec.; in the first verb it is found also in K, L, P. As, how-

ever, the future *καταρτίσει*, etc., occurs in almost all authorities, it is to be preferred. Erasmus reads *καταρτίσαι*, and then *σπεριζει*. In similar passages of the N. T., the optat. is *mostly* used (thus, undisputedly, in Rom. xv. 13; Heb. xiii. 21; 1 Thess. v. 23, etc.), and this explains how, in employing the future, a change could have been made to the optative; cf. 2 Cor. ix. 10; Phil. iv. 19. There is less force in the reason given for the use of the indicative, viz., that it is better suited to the subsequent doxology (Bengel), in opposition to which De Wette rightly refers to Heb. xiii. 21. — The pronoun *ὑμᾶς* is wanting in the A, B, \aleph , etc., and is omitted by Lachm. and Tisch.; its genuineness is at least doubtful; not less so is that of *θεμελιώσει*, which, however, Tisch. has retained, following K, L, P, \aleph , etc., whilst it is omitted in A, B, Vulg., etc. (Lachm.). — Ver. 11. *ἡ δόξα καὶ* does not occur in A, B, 23, Aeth., Vulg.; omitted by Lachm. and Tisch.; perhaps a later addition, after chap. iv. 11. — *τῶν αἰώνων* is erased by Tisch. 7, after B, 36, 99, Copt., Arm., but retained by Lachm. and Tisch. 8, who follow A, K, L, P, \aleph , the majority of min., several vss., etc. — Ver. 12. Lachm. omits the article *τοῦ* before *πιστοῦ*, appealing to B. Tisch., however, remarks on this: *errabat circa B*. The omission, for which certainly there is too little warrant, may be explained by the transcriber having construed *ὑμῖν* with *πιστοῦ*. According to Tisch., however, it is not certain whether B has the article or not; according to Buttm., it does not occur in B. — Instead of *ἐστήκατε* (Rec.), Lachm. and Tisch. 8, after A, B, \aleph , many min., etc., read *στήτε*. This reading would seem to be favored by the fact that it is the more difficult one, and that the Rec. may have arisen out of Rom. v. 2; but the idea itself decides in favor of *ἐστήκατε*, which is retained by Tisch. 7, following K, L, P, etc., Theoph., Oec. — The reading *ἐν ἡ* (instead of *εἰς ἡν*) in A is evidently a correction for the sake of simplicity. — Ver. 14. Instead of *Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ* (in Rec., K, L, P, \aleph , al., pler., Vulg., Copt., etc., Thph., Oec.), Lachm. and Tisch. have adopted *Χριστῷ* only (A, B, etc., Syr., Aeth., etc.). The final *ἀμήν* (Rec., in G, K, \aleph , etc.) is likewise wanting in A, B, etc., and is therefore omitted by Lachm. and Tisch. — The subsequent addition of *Ἰησοῦ* and *ἀμήν* is undoubtedly more easy of explanation than the subsequent omission of it.

Ver. 1. New exhortations in the first place to the *πρεσβύτεροι* and the *νεώτεροι* as far as ver. 5; then to all, without distinction, vv. 5-9. — *πρεσβυτέρους οὖν τοῖς ἐν ὑμῖν παρακαλῶ*. *πρεσβύτεροι* are the presidents of the congregations. The name is employed here probably not without reference to age ("the elders") (see ver. 5), though this is disputed by Hofmann, who, however, fails to give any reason for so doing. The article is wanting "because *πρεσβ.* is considered as definite of itself" (Wiesinger), and not "because Peter had not a more accurate knowledge of the constitution of the churches" (Schott). If the reading *οὖν* be adopted, these and the following exhortations connect themselves, as conclusions drawn from it, with the preceding conception *ἀγαθοποιία*, for the passages 1 Thess. iv. 1 and Matt. vii. 15 do not prove that *οὖν* expresses "only the continuance of the exhortation" (Hofmann). The reading *ἐν ὑμῖν*, without *τοῖς*, is opposed by the want of the article before *πρεσβυτέρους*. — *ὁ συμπρεσβύτερος καὶ, κ.τ.λ.*] Peter adds these designations of himself, in order thus to give the more weight to his *παρακαλεῖν*. He calls himself *συμπρεσβύτερος* because of his office. What the elders were for the individual congregations, that were the apostles for the

whole church, since they had the superintendence of the entire system of congregations.¹ By this name Peter, in humble love,² places himself on an equal footing with the elders proper.³ It is less natural to assume, with Hofmann, that in thus speaking of himself Peter "would emphasize the share he had in responsibility for the weal and woe of the congregations." — *καὶ μάρτυς τῶν τοῦ Χριστοῦ παθημάτων*]. By *τὰ τοῦ Χριστοῦ παθήματα* must not be understood the sufferings which the apostle had to undergo in following Christ, but those which Christ Himself endured; cf. chap. iv. 13. Yet Peter calls himself a *μάρτυς*, not only because he was an *eye-witness* of them (cf. Acts x. 39),⁴ but also because he *proclaimed* those sufferings which he himself had seen⁵ (cf. Acts i. 8, 22, xiii. 31). This he did, in the first place, by his words, but at the same time also by his sufferings (a fact which Hofmann should not have denied), in which he was a *κοινωνός τῶν τοῦ Χρ. παθημάτων* (chap. iv. 13) (Wiesinger, Schott). What follows seems also to refer to this.⁶ — De Wette thinks that whilst by "*συμπρέσβ*," Peter puts himself on an equality with the elders, he by the second designation places himself *above* them. But if this had been his intention, he would hardly have included both under the *one* article; the elders, too, were equally called to be *μάρτυρες τῶν Χρ. παθ.*, although Peter, as an eye-witness, occupied "a special position" (Brückner). — *ὁ καὶ τῆς μελλουσης . . . κοινωνός*]. Several of the older commentators incorrectly supply *τοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦ δόξης*; it is not merely the glory of Christ which is meant, but the *δόξα*, which, at the revelation of *that* glory, shall be revealed in all those who are His; cf. Rom. viii. 18; Col. iii. 4; 1 John iii. 2. — *κοινωνός* means simply the participation in that glory. Although it is not equivalent to *συγκοινωνός* (Phil. i. 7), still the apostle has in his soul the consciousness of being a fellow-sharer with those to whom he is speaking. — The particle *καί*, "also," unites the two ideas: *μαρτῆς τῶν . . . παθημάτων* and *κοινωνός τῆς . . . δόξης* together; because the apostle is the former, he will also be the latter. Yet this does not compel the adoption, with Hofmann, of the reading *ὁ* (equal to *δέ' ὁ*, "wherefore") instead of *ὁ*. Although *μάρτυς*, which is closely connected with *συμπρέσβυτερος*, has no article, it does not follow that *κοινωνός* can have none either. The N. T. usage is opposed to the interpretation of *ὁ* by *δέ' ὁ*, Gal. ii. 10; cf. Meyer, *in loc.*; cf. also Winer, p. 135 (E. T., 142).

Ver. 2. *ποιάνατε τὸ ἐν ὑμῖν ποίμνιον τοῦ Θεοῦ*]. The work of directing the church is often in the N. and O. T. represented by the figure of pasturing (cf. Acts xx. 28; John xxi. 16; Jer. xxiii. 1-4; Ezek. xxxiv. 2 ff.), and the church by that of a flock (Luke xii. 32). *τοῦ Θεοῦ* is added here very significantly. By it the flock is designated as belonging, not to the elders

¹ Hofmann: "The apostles were the overseers of the universal church of Christ; each of them, therefore, in so far shared in the administration of all the single congregations, inasmuch as these were in the universal church."

² Gualter: "nota humilitatem Petri qui minime jus primatus in se cognovit."

³ Bengel: "hortatio mutua inter aequales et collegas imprimis valet."

⁴ Aretius: "oculatus testis, qui praecipuis ejus aerumnis interfuit."

⁵ It cannot be denied, that, in accordance with its almost uniform usage in the N. T., the word *μαρτυς* possesses this secondary meaning (as opposed to Hofmann).

⁶ Wiesinger: "The antithesis *ὁ καὶ τῆς μελλ. ἀποκ. δόξης κοινωνός* presupposes the *κοινωνεῖν τοῖς τ. Χρ. παθ.*"

who tend it, but to God as His peculiar property. Luther takes a too narrow view of the idea of tending; he limits it to the preaching of the gospel. It applies rather to all and every thing that is done by the elders, for the welfare of the individual as well as for that of the entire congregation. τὸ ἐν ὑμῖν must not be separated from ποιμνιον, as if it were equal to *quantum in vobis est* (cf. Rom. i. 15), i.e., *intendite omnes nervos* (Calvin); it rather forms one idea with ποιμνιον. The greater number of commentators understand ἐν in a local sense, either in *vestris regionibus* (Pott), or "with you, within your reach" (Luther in the commentary, Hensler, De Wette, Besser, Schott,¹ etc.). Since ἐν ὑμῖν, as a more precise local definition, stands somewhat significantly, and "the churches only are the place where the elders are, and not *vice versa*" (Hofmann), ἐν ὑμῖν must, according to the analogy of κείσθαι ἐν τῷ, be interpreted "that which is committed to you" (Luther's translation, Bengel, Steiger), or "that which is placed under your care (hand)." ἐν ὑμῖν then serves to give point to the exhortation. — ἐπισκοποῦντες, cf. the critical notes. It must be observed, that ἐπισκοπ. is here placed in conjunction with ποιμανατε, as in chap. ii. 25: ποιμῆν and ἐπισκοπος. This participle, with the adverbs belonging to it, states what should be the character of the ποιμαίνειν.² The verb (which, except here, occurs only in Heb. xii. 15), equivalent to "to give heed," denotes the labors of the elders in caring for the congregation, but with the implied meaning of oversight. The still closer definition follows in three adjuncts, each of which consists of a negative and a positive member.³ — ἀναγκαστῶς (an expression foreign to Greek usage, and occurring only here, which Hofmann erroneously denies) and ἐκουσίως (this adverb occurs in the N. T., besides in this passage, only in Heb. x. 26; the adjective in Philem 14) are opposed to each other, in such a way that the former characterizes the work as undertaken from outward motives only, the latter as from inward. The same antithesis occurs in Philem. 14: κατὰ ἀνάγκην . . . κατὰ ἐκουσίον (similarly the antithesis of ἄκων and ἐκῶν, 1 Cor. ix. 17); with ἐκουσίως, cf. Exod xxxvi. 2. The position, etc., must be regarded as the outwardly inciting or compelling motive.⁴ — According to the Rec., ἐκουσίως is yet further strengthened by κατὰ Θεόν (cf. chap. iv. 6; 2 Cor. vii. 9, 10), equal to κατὰ τὸ θέλημα τοῦ Θεοῦ. — αἰσχροκερδῶς (the adverb occurs here only, the adjective 1 Tim iii. 8; Tit. i. 7; Tit. i. 11: αἰσχροῦ κέρδους χάριν); "the apostle places the impure motive side by side with the unwillingness

¹ Schott's opinion, that in ἐν ὑμῖν this antithesis to τοῦ Θεοῦ is expressed, "that the church, belonging to heaven, is yet at present in the bodily and visible vicinity of the elders, and surrounded by them," must be rejected as purely arbitrary. — Gerhard's interpretation: "qui vobiscum est, videlicet cum quo unum corpus, una ecclesia estis," brings out an idea which is in no way indicated by the apostle.

² It is doubtless correct that the adverbs do not simply define more nearly the term ἐπισκοποῦντες, in and for itself considered, but it is wrong to make them co-ordinate with this idea (as against Hofmann); closely joined with

ἐπισκοποῦντες, they, with this participle, are connected with ποιμαίνετε.

³ The thought is aptly given by Calvin: "Dum Pastores ad officium hortari vult, tria potissimum vitia uocat, quae plurimum obesse solent, pigritiam scilicet, lucri captandi cupiditatem et licentiam dominandi; primo vitio opponit alacritatem aut voluntarium studium, secundo liberalem affectum tertio moderationem ac modestiam."

⁴ Bengel is incorrect: "id valet et in suscipiendo et in gerendo munere;" to the former there is in this case no allusion.

of ἀναγκ." (Wiesinger). — προθυμως (in the N. T. the adverb occurs here only; more frequently the adjective and substantive) as antithesis to αἰσχροκερδῶς: "out of love to the thing itself;" Luther: "from the bottom of the heart."¹

Ver. 3. μηδ' ὡς κατακυριεύοντες τῶν κλήρων, i. e., "not as those, who," etc. With κατακυρ. cf. for meaning and expression Matt. xx. 25-28; 2 Cor. i. 24; it is not equal to κυριεύειν (Steiger), but the prefixed κατα intensifies the idea of κυριεύειν: "to exercise a sway, by which violence is offered to those who are under it."² — κλήρος, properly speaking, the lot, then that which is apportioned by lot, then, generally, that which is allotted or assigned to any one, whether it be an office, a possession, or any thing else. Here it is the congregation (τὸ ποιμνιον) that is to be understood; not as though κλήρος in itself meant the congregation, but the churches are thus designated, because they are assigned to the elders as a possession, in which to exercise their official duties. The plural is put, because different elders filled offices in different congregations (Calov, Steiger, De Wette, Wiesinger, Schott, etc.). Compare the passage in Acts xvii. 4, where it is said of those converted by Paul and Silas, προσεκληρώθησαν τῷ Παύλῳ καὶ τῷ Σίλῳ. It is incorrect to supply τοῦ Θεοῦ, as is done by Beza, etc., and to derive the expression from the O. T., where the congregation of Israel is termed the κλήρος (קְהִלָּה) of God, Deut. ix. 29, LXX. But it is equally incorrect when Hofmann applies κατακυριεύοντες, not to the πρεσβύτεροι, but to others, and, taking ὡς as instituting a comparison, understands κλήροι to signify "the estates belonging to some one himself," translating accordingly: "not as those who exercise rule over estates belonging to themselves" The apostle's idea thus would be, "the elders are not to treat the church as an object over which they exercise right of possession, and do with as they please." — How should the apostle have thought of bringing forward a comparison so far fetched? — and how arbitrary it appears to interpret ὡς differently in this passage from in chap. i. 14, ii. 2, 5, 11, 12, 13, etc., to allow the article τῶν to take the place of the possessive pronoun, and to attribute a meaning to κλήροι which it often has in profane Greek, but never either in the O. or in the N. T.!³ ἀλλὰ τύποι γινόμενοι τοῦ ποιμνίου]. The antithesis here is a different one from that in the passage quoted from Matt. The elders, as the leaders of the church, necessarily possess a kind of κυριοτης over it; but they are not to exercise this in a manner opposed to the character of Christian life in the church (which would be a κατακυριεύειν), but by being examples to the congregations, shining before them in every Christian virtue (1 Tim. iv. 12; Tit. ii. 7); cf. 2 Thess. iii. 9; Phil. iii. 17.

Ver. 4. Assurance of the future reward for the faithful fulfilment of the exhortation just given. — καὶ simply connects the result with the

¹ Hofmann: "With a joyous devotion, which excludes all secondary considerations, to the work which has to be done."

² Thus Hofmann interprets, correctly. He is mistaken, however, in maintaining that κατα here does not imply an hostile antithesis, since a violent rule is one by which he who is ruled over is injured in his rights.

³ The opinion of Oecumenius: κλήρον τὸ ἱερὸν σύστημα καλεῖ, ὡς περ καὶ νῦν ἡμεῖς (i. e., the priesthood), which many Catholic commentators have followed, requires no refutation; and as little does that of Dodwell, who understands κλήροι to mean church property.

exhortation (cf. Winer, p. 406 [E. T., 436 f.], and is not to be taken *αιτιολογικῶς* for *ἵνα*. — *φανερωθέντος τοῦ ἀρχιποιμένου*]. With *φανερ.* cf. Col. iii. 4; 1 John ii. 28; Christ is here termed *ἀρχιποιμὴν* (*ἄπ.* λεγ., chap. ii. 25: *ὁ ποιμὴν*; Heb. xiii. 20: *ὁ ποιμὴν ὁ μεγάλος*) as He “to whom the elders, with the flock they tend, are subject” (Hofmann). — *κομείσθε* (cf. chap. i. 9) *τὸν ἀμαράντινον τῆς δόξης στέφανον*]. The greater number of commentators consider *ἀμαράντινος* as equal to *ἀμάραντος* in chap. i. 4; but the direct derivation of the word from *μαραίνεισθαι* is hardly to be justified. It comes rather from the substantive *ἀμάραντος*, and therefore means, as Beza explains: *ex amaranto videlicet, cujus floris (inquit Plinius) summa natura in nomine est, sic appellato quoniam non marcescit*. Accordingly the figure present to the mind of the apostle was an amaranthine wreath; thus also Schott.¹ It is at least uncertain whether *στέφανος* here (as frequently in the writings of Paul) is thought of as a *wreath of victory* (thus the greater number of commentators), since among the Jews, also, wreaths of flowers and leaves were in use as tokens of honor and rejoicing (cf. Winer's *Bibl. Realwörterbuch*, s.v. *Kränze*). — *τῆς δόξης* is the genitive of apposition; cf. 2 Tim. iv. 8; Jas. i. 12; Rev. ii. 10: the *δόξα* is the unfading crown which they shall obtain.

Ver. 5. *ὁμοίως*; cf. chap. iii. 1, 7; here also *ὁμοίως* is not a mere particle of transition (Pott). The exhortation to humility expressed in this verse corresponds to those addressed to the elders, wherein they are admonished to submit themselves to the duties of their office with humility, and without seeking their own advantage. — *νεώτεροι ὑποτάγητε πρεσβυτέροις*]. Who are these *νεώτεροι*? Certainly not the whole of the members of the congregation (in contrast to the elders), as Beda, Estius, Pott, Wiesinger, etc., assume, but neither the younger members generally, nor such of them as were employed in many ministrations suitable neither for the elders nor the deacons. The first assumption (Luther, Calvin, Aretius, Gerhard, etc.) is opposed by the circumstance that *πρεσβυτέροις* here seems to have the same official signification as above in ver. 1 ff. If this be so, then it is plainly inconsistent to take the expression *νεώτεροι* as specifying only a particular time of life. The second (Weiss, p. 344 ff., Schott, Brückner), founded chiefly on Acts v. 6, 10, is contradicted by the fact that there is no historical testimony for the existence of an office such as it takes for granted. If *νεώτεροι* indicate only a particular time of life, then the like may be said of the accompanying *πρεσβυτέροις*. The difficulty which arises from the same name being employed first as an official title, and then to denote a particular age, is solved, in a measure at least, by supposing, that, since the word contained both references, the apostle might, as he proceeded in his exhortation, lose sight of the one in the other.² The special exhortation is followed by the general: *πάντες δὲ ἀλλήλους*]. If *ὑποτασσόμενοι* is to be

¹ Perhaps, however, Hofmann may be right when he supposes that *ἀμαράντινος* stands in the same relation to *ἀμάραντος* as *ἀληθινός* to *ἀληθής* and *ὕγιεινός* to *ὕγιής*, and that accordingly the word should be written *ἀμαραντινός*.

² The view that *πρεσβυτέροις* indicates an

office, but *νεώτεροι* a time of life (De Wette), is opposed by the circumstance that “it remains incomprehensible why the exhortation, which is surely meant to apply to the whole church, should be addressed to the younger members only” (Hofmann).

erased after *ἀλλήλοις*, the words may then be taken either with what precedes (Lach., *Gr. Ausg.*, Buttmann, Hofmann) or with what follows. In the first case, there is something fragmentary in the structure of the clause, while the second, adopted by almost all commentators (formerly also in this commentary), is opposed by the dative *ἀλλήλοις*, which is too easily passed over with the remark that it is the dative of reference, equivalent to "for each other," or "with reference to each other." All the passages which Winer (p. 202 [E. T., 215]) brings forward to prove that the dative is used of every thing with reference to which any thing takes place are of a different nature. *πάντες* denotes the whole of the members of the church, without distinction. — *τὴν ταπεινοφροσύνην ἐγκομβώσαθε*]. In interpreting the word *ἐγκομβώσαθε*, commentators have not unfrequently, but erroneously, started from the meaning of the substantive *ἐγκόμβωμα*,¹ understanding (certainly without justification) it to signify "a beautiful dress," and rendering: "adorn yourselves with humility;" thus Calvin, etc.; or else, whilst correctly explaining the word as the apron worn by slaves, they find in the verb itself the reference to humility in behavior; thus Grotius, Hornejus, Steiger, De Wette, etc.² — Rather, however, must that sense of the verb be retained which is to be had by deriving it from *κόμβος*, "a band;" to tie on, or fasten any thing by means of a *κομβος*, i. e., "a band." Since, now, it is used for the most part of the fastening of a garment, it lies to hand to take the expression here as having the same sense with *ἐνδύεσθαι* (cf. Col. iii. 12), yet so that the idea of making fast is more strongly brought out in the former than in the latter: "to clothe one's self firmly, wrap one's self round with *ταπεινοφρ.*;" Bengel: *induite vos et involvite, ut amictus humilitatis nulla vi vobis detrahi possit* (thus also Wiesinger, Schott). Other interpreters hold by the one or the other meaning only, i. e., either by that of clothing (Oecumenius: *ἐνείλησαθε καὶ περιβάλλεσθε*), or that of making fast (Luther: "hold fast by humility;" Erasmus: *humilitatem vobis fixam habete*). Similar exhortations to humility towards one another: Eph. iv. 2; Phil. ii. 3; Rom. xii. 16. The exhortation is strengthened by the quotation of the Old-Testament passage, Prov. iii. 34, after the LXX., where, however, *κύριος* stands instead of *ὁ Θεός*. The same quotation is to be found in Jas. iv. 6, where, as here, there is first of all the injunction to submit to God, and then that to resist the devil; cf. also Luke i. 51.

Ver. 6. Conclusion drawn from the Old-Testament passage, *ταπεινώθητε οὖν ὑπὸ, κ.τ.λ.*], see Jas. iv. 6; not "become humble," as Wiesinger interprets, on account of the passive (for if the meaning must be passive, in accordance with the form, it ought to be, "be made humble"), but, in a middle sense,

¹ Steph., s. v. *ἐγκομβώω*: illigo, involvo; Hesych: enim *ἐγκομβωθείς* exponit *δεθείς* et *ἐγκομβώωμαι* affert pro *ἐνείληται*. — *Ἐγκόμβωμα* vestimenti genus est; scribit enim Poil. 4, 119, *τῇ δὲ τῶν δουλῶν ἐξωμίδι προσκείσθαι καὶ ἱματιδίων τι λευκόν, quod ἐγκόμβωμα* s. *ἐπιβλημα* nominari.

² Hofmann holds by this reference (although he does not derive the meaning of the verb

from that of the substantive). He says that the verb of itself has that sense, since he who prepared himself for the duties of a servant girded himself with a garment fastened by means of a band. This conclusion would be established if *ἐγκομβοῦν* were used only of the putting on of a slave's apron, which, however, is not the case.

"*humble yourselves.*" Ver. 7 shows that this self-humbling here refers to the lowly and submissive bearing of afflictions (otherwise in Luke xiv. 11). — *τὴν κραταιῶν χεῖρα*]. Old-Testament expression denoting the power of God which rules and judges all; cf. Deut. iii. 24, LXX.; it does not refer here to the laying-on of afflictions only (De Wette), but to the being exalted out of them (so, too, Brückner); cf. Luke i. 51: ἐποίησε κράτος ἐν βραχίονι αὐτοῦ· διεσκόρπισεν ὑπερηφάνους . . . καὶ ὑψωσε ταπεινοῦς. The purpose of this subordination, *ἵνα ὑμᾶς ὑψώσῃ*, is the glory which follows upon the sufferings; *ἵνα* is not put ἐκβατικῶς (Pott), but τελικῶς. — ἐν καιρῷ]. Matt. xxiv. 45: "*tempore statuto*;" Erasmus: *ut vos extollat, cum erit opportunum, cum judicabit id vobis expedire vel in hoc saeculo, vel in die judicii*; this last is here the principal point of view.

Ver. 7 is closely connected with ver. 6; hence the participle. The idea and expression are taken from Ps. lv. 22, LXX. (ἐπιβρίψον ἐπὶ κύριον τὴν μέρμυίν σου καὶ αὐτός σε διαθρέψει), although somewhat altered; *πάσαν τὴν μέρμυιν ὑμῶν*:¹ "*your whole care*:" the singular unites all individual cares together into one uniform whole. Hofmann, without reason, assumes, that, in this passage, *μέρμυνα* does not mean care itself, but the object which is care. The context shows that the care specially meant here is that which is occasioned by the sufferings; cf. Matt. vi. 25; Phil. iv. 6. — *ὅτι αὐτῷ, κ. τ. λ.*], "*for He careth for you*;" the same construction of the verb with *περί* occurs frequently in the O. T., e. g., John x. 13; ἐπ' αὐτὸν, *ὅτι αὐτῷ*, "are intentionally brought together" (Wiesinger).

Ver. 8. *νήψατε* (chap. iv. 7), *γρηγορήσατε*, cf. 1 Thess. v. 6; placed in juxtaposition by *asyndeton* "in nervous conciseness, in virtue of which *ὅτι*, too, is omitted before *ὁ ἀντιδικός*" (Wiesinger). Temperance and watchfulness are specially necessary, in order to remain faithful amid all the temptations of suffering. The reason is given in what follows. — *ὁ ἀντίδικος ὑμῶν διάβολος*]. Hensler's explanation: "slandering opponents," requires no refutation. — *διάβολος* is a substantive, in explanatory apposition to *ὁ ἀντιδ.* *ἡμῶν*, which latter is used, in this passage only, to designate the devil (corresponding to the Hebrew *יָצֵב*, which, however, the LXX. always translate by *διάβολος*). The word denotes strictly *an opponent in a court of justice*; but it occurs also in a general sense as "*adversary.*" Schott would retain the original application, after Zech. iii. 1 ff., Rev. xii. 10, in that "the devil will, as it were, compel God to declare in condemnatory judgment that the Christians have forfeited salvation;" but there is no allusion to the divine judgment here, the *καταπινειν* is rather indicated as the aim of the devil. — *ὡς λέων ὠρόμενος*].² *ὠρέσθαι peculiariter dicitur ἐπὶ λιμῷ κλαιόντων λύκων, ἢ λέοντων, ἢ κυνῶν* (Hesych.), cf. Ps. civ. 21. — *περιπατεῖ* (Job i. 7, ii. 2) *ζητῶν τίνα καταπίῃ*]. *περιπατεῖν* and *ζητῶν* belong strictly to each other, so that the comparison with the lion applies to both (Steiger). The efforts of the devil are directed against Christians, who, as such, do not belong to him; as long as they remain

¹ Gerhard: "*μέρμυνα* significat eorum sollicitam et dublam, quae mentem in partes divisas velut dividit, a μερίζειν τὸν νοῦν."

² Augustin (Sermo 46, *De Divers.*, c. 11.): "*Christus leo propter fortitudinem, diabolus propter feritatem; ille leo ad vivendum, iste leo ad nocendum.*"

faithful to their Christian calling, he can do them no harm (1 John v. 18), therefore he is on the lookout *whom* (according to the reading: *τινα καταπιῆ*) he may devour, or if he may devour *any one* (according to the reading: *τινὰ καταπιεῖν*), by alluring to unfaithfulness.¹ — *καταπίνειν*, “devour,” denotes complete destruction. Chrysostom (Homil. 22, *Ad Popul. Antioch.*): *circuit quaerens, non quem mordeat vel frangat, sed quem devoret.*

Ver. 9. *ὡ ἀντίστητε στερεοὶ τῇ πίστει*, cf. Jas. iv. 7; Eph. vi. 11 ff. *τῇ πίστει* does not belong to *ἀντίστητε* (Bengel), but to *στερεοί*; not as the dat. instrum. (Beza, Hensler), but as the dative of nearer definition: “firm in the faith;” cf. Acts xvi. 5; Col. ii. 7; cf. Winer, p. 202 (E. T., 215). It is only a firm faith that can resist the devil. — *εἰδότες τὰ αὐτὰ τῶν παθῆμάτων . . . ἐπιτελεῖσθαι*]. Almost all interpreters assume that the construction here is that of the accus. c. inf. Hofmann, nevertheless, denies this, remarking that in the N. T. *εἰδότες* (in the sense of “knowing”) never takes the accus. c. inf., but always the particle *ὅτι*, and that when *εἰδότες* is followed by the accus. c. inf., it signifies “to understand how to do a thing.”² If this be correct, *ἐπιτελεῖσθαι* must have an active meaning, *τὰ αὐτὰ τῶν παθ.* be the accusative after it, and the dative *τῇ . . . ἀδελοφότητι* be dependent on *τὰ αὐτὰ*. Explaining *ἐπιτελεῖσθαι* on the analogy of the phrase *τὰ τοῦ γῆρας ἐπιτελεῖσθαι* (Xen., *Mem.*, iv. 8, 8), and seeing in *τὰ αὐτὰ* the idea of measure expressed, Hofmann translates, “knowing how to pay for your Christianity the same tribute of affliction as your brethren in the world.” This explanation cannot be accepted without hesitation. For, on the one hand, from the fact that in other parts of the N. T. *εἰδότες* does not take the accus. c. inf., it cannot be concluded that here it does not do so either, the more especially that the construction of the accus. c. inf. occurs comparatively rarely in the N. T.; and, on the other hand, the phrase, *τὰ . . . τῶν παθ. ἀποτελ.*, is not analogous with the expression, *τὰ τοῦ γῆρας ἐπιτελ.*, since in the former there is no conception corresponding to *τοῦ γῆρας*. Hofmann inserts, indeed, as such, the idea of the Christian calling; but it is purely imported, and nowhere hinted at in the text. Accordingly, *ἐπιτελεῖσθαι* — grammatically considered — *can* have a passive signification; not, indeed, equivalent to “are completed” (Thuc. vii. 2; Phil. i. 6, and other passages), for this idea would not be suitable here, but rather, “are being accomplished.”³ This idea is, in truth, not very appropriate either; it seems to be more fitting to take the verb in a middle sense, as equivalent to “are accomplishing themselves;” and to translate, “knowing (or, better, rather: considering) that the same sufferings are accomplishing themselves in the brethren.” This rendering is to be preferred to all others. The Vulg. translates *ἐπιτελ.* by *feri*: Luther, by “befall.” both are too inexact renderings of the sense.⁴ In the explanation above given, *τὰ αὐτὰ* is used as a substantive, as frequently happens with the neuter of adjectives (Winer,

¹ Hofmann irrelevantly remarks, that *ζητεῖν*, followed by an interrogative, means, to consider a thing; the word above is evidently stronger than that.

² Cf. the passages quoted by Hofmann: Mat. vii. 11; Luke xi. 13, xii. 36; Jas. iv. 17; Phil. iv. 12; 1 Tim. iii. 5; 2 Pet. ii. 9.

³ Thus Herod., i. 51, in connection with *τὰ ἐπιτασσόμενα*; Thuc. i. 138: *ἐπιτελεσαι ἃ ὑπέσχετο*.

⁴ The translation of Wichelhaus, “*to be laid upon*,” is entirely unjustifiable.

p. 220¹ [E. T., 234]), and is put here to emphasize the sameness of the sufferings (thus De Wette, Wiesinger); τῆ . . . ἀδελφότητι is to be taken as the more remote object; on no condition can the dative be understood as equivalent to ὑπό in passives. With the idea ἀδελφότητι, cf. chap. ii. 17. — The addition, ἐν κόσμῳ, alludes to the reason of the afflictions (Steiger). Wiesinger justly remarks: "in the world, the dominion of the Evil One, the Christian can and dare expect nothing else." Possibly it may contain at the same time a reference to the ἀδελφότης, which the Lord has already taken to Himself ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου. The thought that the brethren have to bear the same afflictions, serves to give strength in resisting the devil, since the consciousness of bearing similar afflictions in common with all Christian brethren encourages to patient endurance.

Vv. 10, 11. Promise of blessing, and doxology. — ὁ δὲ Θεός, placed by way of emphasis at the beginning. That which has gone before has told the readers what they should do; in contrast to this (δέ), the apostle now says what God will do (Schott); with the expression: Θεὸς πάσης χάριτος, cf. 2 Cor. i. 3: Θεὸς πᾶσης παρακλήσεως. God as the author of all grace; χάρις conceived as a possession. Like the whole promise of blessing, this very designation of God serves to comfort and strengthen the readers in their afflictions. — ὁ καλέσας ὑμᾶς, κ.τ.λ., cf. 1 Thess. ii. 12 (2 Thess. ii. 14); that is, to participation in His (God's) own δόξα. The participation is here thought of as future, although for believing Christians it is even now present in its beginning (2 Pet. i. 4). In this calling there is already contained the pledge of the promises that follow: καταρτίσει, κ.τ.λ. — ἐν Χριστῷ belongs to καλέσας, more nearly defined by υἱὸς εἰς, etc. (De Wette, Wiesinger, Schott), not to δοξᾶν (Hofmann). God possesses the glory not first in Christ, as Hofmann says, but He has had it from all eternity, although in Christ it is first revealed. Gerhard interprets incorrectly: *propter meritum Christi*. ἐν is by several interpreters inaccurately taken as equivalent to διὰ; but though ἐν denote instrumentality, this is of a more inward nature than that expressed by διὰ. The sense is: by God having brought you into union with Christ (thus also De Wette, Wiesinger, Schott). The connection of ἐν Χρ. with ὀλιγ. παθόντας following (Glossa interl.: *sicut membra in illo patientes*; Nicol. de Lyra) has nothing to commend it. — ὀλίγον παθόντας]. ὀλίγον, as in chap. i. 6: "a little while." — παθόντας is to be joined with καλέσας, κ.τ.λ. (Steiger, De Wette, Wiesinger), but in such a way that in sense it does not apply so much to καλέσας, as to the obtaining of the δόξα of God, since the aorist must not arbitrarily be interpreted as a present. Hofmann rightly observes: "Peter subjoins this aorist participle as if it had been preceded by εἰς τὸ δοξάζεσθαι."² Lachmann and Tischendorf (om. ὑμᾶς after καταρτίσει) have connected these words with what follows, as also the Vulg. translates: *modicum passos ipse perficiet* (so also Wichelhaus). Many, particularly among the older commentators, even retaining the ὑμᾶς, have adopted this construction; Luther:

¹ Hofmann erroneously appeals to Hartung's *Gr.*, II. p. 238, in support of the interpretation "the same measure of suffering."

² Schott's explanation, that "to the apostle

as he looks from the present, in so far as it already contains their completion, back on the present of actual reality, the sufferings appear as past," is inappropriate.

"The same will make you, that suffer a little while, fully prepared," etc. Opposed to this, however, is as much the fact that the *καταρτίζειν* does not take place *after* the afflictions only, but during them, as that the present affliction and the future glory belong closely together; cf. ver. 1. — If, as is highly probable, the *ὑμῶς* after *καταρτίσει* be spurious, it must be supplied out of the *ὑμῶς* that precedes. — *αὐτός* is placed emphatically: the God . . . , who hath called you, *He* will, etc., *the same* God; the calling already contains the guaranty for the *καταρτίζειν*, κ.τ.λ. — *καταρτίσει*, κ.τ.λ.]. *καταρτίζειν*, Luke vi. 40; 1 Cor. i. 10; Heb. xiii. 21; Luther rightly translates: "*fully prepare*;" Bengel: *ne remaneat in vobis defectus*. — *στηριζειν*, 2 Thess. ii. 17, iii. 3, and other passages. Bengel: *ne quid vos labefactet*. — *σθενοῦν*, ἄπ. λεγ. Bengel: *ut superetis vin omnem adversam*. — *θεμελιοῦν* (see the critical notes); in its proper sense, Matt. vii. 25; Luke vi. 48; figuratively: Eph. iii. 18 (*τεθεμελιωμενοι* synonymous with *ἐρριζωμένοι*); Col. i. 23 (synonymous with *ἐδραίοι*). — The future expresses the sure expectation that, as the apostle wishes, God will perfect, etc., the believers. — If *καταρτισταί* be read, this form must not be taken as the infinitive (Pott), but as the optative.¹ — The heaping-up of expressions connected by asyndeton is rhetorical, and arises from the natural impulse of an agitated heart to find full expression for its feelings. — Ver. 11. The same doxology as in chap. iv. 11. It sets the seal on the hope just expressed.

Vv. 12-14. Concluding remarks; first, ver. 12, as to the letter itself. — *διὰ Σιλουανῶ . . . ἔγραψα*]. There is no reason to doubt that this Silvanus is the well-known companion of the Apostle Paul. Whilst in the Acts he is named "Silas," Paul, like Peter, calls him "Silvanus." He was sent from the convention of apostles, along with Paul, Barnabas, and Judas Barsabas, as bearers of the epistle to Antioch. After this he accompanied Paul on his second missionary journey. He is not mentioned afterwards, nor is it known at what time he came to Peter. *διὰ . . . ἔγραψα* does not designate Silvanus either as the translator or the writer of the epistle, but simply as the bearer of it. *διὰ* has here the same sense as in the subscriptions of the Epistles to the Romans, the Corinthians, etc.; it is synonymous with *διὰ χειρὸς*, Acts xv. 23. — "It is evident that the choice of Silas for this (mediatory) mission was a particularly happy one, as he had been Paul's companion in former times, and had assisted him in founding the greater part of the churches here addressed" (Wieseler). — *ὑμῖν τοῦ πιστοῦ ἀδελφοῦ*]. *ὑμῖν* can be joined either with the following *ἔγραψα*, or with *πιστοῦ ἀδ.* If the latter combination be adopted (it is more simple if *τοῦ* be erased as spurious, but is also possible if *τοῦ* be retained; equivalent to "who is the faithful brother unto you"), the apposition indicates that an intimate relation subsisted between Silvanus and the churches to which Peter writes. The connection with *ἔγραψα*, however, is the more natural one, *ὑμῖν* being inserted between, as in Gal. vi. 11. — *ὁ πιστὸς ἀδελφός* is the name given to Silvanus, because generally he had proved faithful in the performance of every service for the church of Christ. There is no reason why the expression should be referred

¹ Erasmus, by first reading *καταρτισταί* and subsequent words as substantives: "*perficiet then σθηριζει, etc., understands this and the futura confirmatione, fundatione.*"

specially to his relation to the churches of Asia Minor only (as formerly in this commentary), or particularly to that in which he stood to Peter (Hofmann). Still, it is not improbable that Peter, by this designation, alludes to the confidence he has, that he will also prove faithful in the service which is now required of him. — The following words, *ὡς λογιζομαι*, may be applied either to the opinion just expressed on Silvanus (Brückner, Wiesinger, Schott, Wichelhaus), or to the subsequent *δι' ὀλίγων ἔγραψα* (Steiger, Hofmann). It is hardly possible to come to a definite conclusion. At any rate, *λογιζομαι* does not express an uncertain conjecture; cf. Rom. iii. 28, viii. 18; Heb. xi. 19. In the *first* case, by the confirmation which it contains of the opinion just uttered, it serves to strengthen the confidence of the churches in Silvanus; in the *second*, the apostle indicates that, considering the importance of his subject and the yearning of his heart, he looks on his letter as a short one.¹ This last appears the more probable. — *δι' ὀλίγων*, equal to *διὰ βραχέων*, Heb. xiii. 22: “in few words;” cf. Thucyd., iv. 95. — *ἔγραψα* refers to this epistle, which the apostle is on the point of closing, and not, as Erasmus, Grotius, etc., altogether unwarrantably assume, to a former one which has been lost;² cf. Philem. 19, 21. — *παρακαλῶν καὶ ἐπιμαρτυρῶν*]. Although by these two words the apostle indicates two distinct subjects, still these are not to be separated in such a way as to be applicable to *different* parts of the epistle (De Wette, Brückner);³ but the *παρακλήσις* and the *ἐπιμαρτύρησις* are throughout the whole letter closely bound up together. As the contents of the *ἐπιμαρτυρεῖν* are stated, but not those of the *παρακαλεῖν*, the chief stress is laid on the former, the latter (*παρακαλῶν*) being placed first, in order thereby to give prominence to the character of the *ἐπιμαρτύρησις*. Contrary to its common usage, De Wette interprets *ἐπιμαρτυρῶν*: *in addition to*, i. e., testifying in addition to the exhortation. *ἐπιμαρτυρεῖν* simply means: to bear witness to any thing (opp. *ἀντιμαρτυρεῖν*, see Pape and Cremer, *s. v.*: in the N. T. *ἀπ. λεγ.*; *ἐπιμαρτύρεσθαι* occurs in the LXX. and in the Apoc., but not *ἐπιμαρτυρεῖν*); Bengel is therefore wrong in interpreting: *testimonium jam per Paulum et Silam audierant pridem: Petrus INSUPER TESTATUR*; so, too, is Hofmann in saying that in *ἐπιμαρτυρεῖν* it is presupposed that the readers themselves already know and believe what Peter testifies. — *ταύτην εἶναι ἀληθῆ χάριν τοῦ Θεοῦ*]. Contents of the *ἐπιμαρτύρησις*: “*that this is the true grace of*

¹ Hofmann's opinion is purely arbitrary, “that since the individual churches received the epistle, intended as it was for so wide a circle, only in a transcription of a transcription, and had again to send it on, a modest remark, that he had not made his letter too long in order to venture to ask them to take this trouble, was not inappropriate.” Nothing alludes to the taking of any such trouble. — Frommüller's view is also incorrect. He thinks that *ὡς λογίζ.* should be taken with *δια Σιλων. ἔγρ.*, in the sense of, “I count upon your receiving this epistle by Silvanus,” — for there is no question here of the receiving of it.

² In this interpretation, *ὡς λογιζομαι* is applied to the writing of the former epistle. Erasmus: “per Silvanum . . . qui non dubito, quin epistolam bona fide reddiderit.” Similarly, Pott: “ante hac et, si recte meminī (‘if I remember aright!’) per Silv. epistolam vobis scripsit.” Differently, Wetstein: “Scripsit, ut ipse sentio et apud me, omnibus rite perpensis, statuo, ita etiam alios hortor, ut idem mecum profiteantur doctrinam Christi esse veram.”

³ “The first statement of the contents of the epistle applies to chap. i. 13-v. 9; the second, to i. 3-12; and one or two passages in the hortatory portion, as i. 18-20, 25, ii. 9 f., iii. 18, iv. 12 f.”

God;”¹ ταύτην does not refer to that of which the apostle has written, but its more precise definition follows in the subsequent relative clause. Peter accordingly sets forth, in conclusion, that his epistle testifies to the readers that *that* grace in which they already stood is the true grace, from which, therefore, they should not depart (cf. with this, chap. i. 12, 25, ii. 10, 25). No doubt this was the χάρις which had been brought to them by means of the preaching of Paul, but it does not follow that the purpose of Peter’s ἐπιμαρτύρησις was to set, for the readers, the seal on that preaching. It is not the preaching which is here in question, but the χάρις in which the readers stood, quite apart from the person through whose instrumentality it was brought to them. Had Peter intended to bear a testimony to Paul, he would surely have done so in clear terms; nor does any thing in the epistle allude to an uncertainty on the part of the readers as to whether Paul had preached the true gospel to them. χάρις is not *doctrina evangelii* (Gerhard); but neither is it “the state of grace” (De Wette), for with this the adjunct τοῦ Θεοῦ would not harmonize. But it denotes the objective divine grace, into the sphere of which the readers have entered by means of faith; cf. Rom. v. 2. — ἀληθῆ stands here as the leading conception, not with any polemical reference to an erroneous doctrine (for there is no trace of any such polemic in the epistle), but is intended by the apostle to mark in itself the truth and reality of this χάρις, in order that the readers may not be induced by the persecutions to abandon it. — εἰς ἣν ἐστήκατε: for this construction, cf. Winer, p. 386 f. (E. T., 414 f.). If the reading στήτε be adopted, this adjunct expresses the exhortation to continue in *that* grace. Here, however, the nearer definition necessary to ταύτην is wanting; for as the ἐπιμαρτύρησις is not something added on to the epistle (ἐγγραψα), ταύτην χάριν cannot be *the* grace of which I have written to you.

Ver. 13. Salutation. — The notion that ἡ . . . συνεκλεκτή denotes the apostle’s wife (Bengel, Mayerhoff, Jachmann, etc.) finds no support from 1 Cor. ix. 5; it is contradicted by the ἐν Βαβυλῶνι² inserted between. By far the greater number of commentators rightly consider it to mean: “*the church in Babylon*” (κ has the word ἐκκλησίᾳ after Βαβυλῶνι; Oec. and Vulg., *ecclesia*). According to Hofmann, ἐκκλησία is not to be supplied to συνεκλεκτή, “but the churches to which the apostle writes are, as such, ἐκλεκταί, and the church from which he sends greetings is, as such, a συνεκλεκτή, as she from whom the Apostle John sends salutations is an ἀδελφὴ ἐκλεκτή” (2 John 13). But in John’s Epistle, ver. 1, κυρία, and ver. 13, ἀδελφῆ, are put along with ἐκλεκτή; accordingly, it does not follow that συνεκλεκτή, without the additional idea ἐκκλησία, would of itself mean a church. The συν refers to the churches to which Peter sends the salutation of the former, cf. chap. i. 1.³

¹ Hofmann lays stress on the want of the article before χάριν, and therefore interprets: “that it is real grace of God, that that is in truth grace from God, wherein they have come to stand;” but if Peter had meant this, he would not have written ἀληθῆ, but ἀληθῶς. In this interpretation also the rule of assimilation is wrongly applied.

² According to several commentators, συνεκλ., though not meaning definitely Peter’s wife, yet refers to some other excellent woman of the church. Wolf even thinks it may be understood as a proper name.

³ It is far-fetched when Schott says that ἡ συνεκλ. ἢ ἐν Βαβ. is not written here, but ἡ ἐν Βαβ. συνεκλ., because the very fact of her be-

According to Eusebius (*H. E.*, c. 15), Papias already was of opinion that the name Babylon is here used figuratively, and that by it *Rome* is to be understood. The same view is adopted by Clemens Alex., Hieronymus, Oecumenius, Beda, Luther, and by most of the Catholic interpreters;¹ in more recent times, by Thiersch, Ewald, Hofmann, Wiesinger, Schott, etc. The principal reasons brought forward in support of this view are— (1) The tradition of the primitive Church, which speaks of the apostle's stay in Rome, but makes no mention of his having lived in Babylon; (2) The designation of Rome as Babylon in Revelation, chap. xiv. 8, xviii. 2, 10; (3) The banishment of the Jews from Babylon in the time of the Emperor Claudius, according to Joseph., *Ant.*, i. 18, c. 12. But these reasons are not conclusive, for— (1) The tradition has preserved altogether very imperfect and uncertain notices of the apostles; (2) In Revelation this designation is very naturally explained from the reference to O.-T. prophecy; (3) The account of Josephus does not lead us to understand that all the Jews were banished from Babylon and its vicinity (see Mayerhoff, p. 128 ff., and Wieseler, p. 557 f.).² Although De Wette's rejoinder, that "the allegorical designation is unnatural in a letter, especially in the salutation," may be going too far, still it is improbable that Peter, in simply conveying a greeting, would have made use of an allegorical name of a place, without ever hinting that the designation was not to be taken literally. This could admit of explanation only if, at the time the epistle was written, it had been customary among the Christians to speak of Rome as Babylon; and that it was so, we have no evidence. Accordingly, Erasmus, Calvin, Gerhard, Neander, De Wette-Brückner, Wieseler, Weiss, Bleek, Reuss, Fronmüller, etc., have justly declared themselves opposed to the allegorical interpretation. The view that by Babylon is meant the Babylon in Egypt mentioned by Strabo, i. 17 (Pearson, Calov, Vitringa, Wolf), has nothing to commend it, the less so that this Babylon was simply a military garrison.³— *καὶ Μάρκος ὁ υἱὸς μου*]. The correct interpretation of *υἱὸς μου* is given already by Oecumenius: *Μάρκον υἱόν, κατὰ πνεῦμα καλεῖ, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ σάρκα*. It is undoubtedly the well-known companion of Paul who is meant. Since, according to Acts, Peter was acquainted with his mother, it is probable that Mark was converted to Christianity by Peter. The idea that Peter here speaks of a son of his own after the flesh, named Mark (Bengel, Hottinger, Jachmann, etc.), could receive support only if *συνεκλεκτῇ* were used to designate the apostle's wife.

ing in Babylon (i.e., Rome) makes the church a *συνεκλεκτῇ*, i.e., the real associate of the churches who read the epistle; namely, in as far as thus reference is made to a like condition of suffering.

¹ Lorinus remarks: "Omnes quot quot legere interpretes catholici romanam intelligunt ecclesiam." Calvin says of this interpretation: "hoc commentum Papistae libenter arripiunt, ut videatur Petrus romanae ecclesiae prae-fuisse."

² Hofmann maintains that it is "Indiscov-

erable how Peter had come to know the two Pauline Epistles to the Romans and Ephesians," if he wrote his epistle in Babylon. But the composition of the epistle in Rome is not by any means proved by so uncertain an assertion.

³ It is clearly quite arbitrary when some scholars, like Capellus, Spanheim, and Semler, understand Babylon here as a name for Jerusalem, or even for the house where the apostles were assembled on the day of Pentecost.

Ver. 14. ὑσπάσασθε ἀλλήλους ἐν φιλήματι ἀγάπης]. Paul uses a similar expression, Rom. xvi. 16; 1 Cor. xvi. 20; 2 Cor. xiii. 12; 1 Thess. v. 26. The members of the church are by turns to greet one another (not each other in Peter's name) with the kiss of charity, thus testifying to their brotherly love for each other (see Meyer on 1 Cor. xvi. 26). Instead of the Pauline: ἐν ἀγίῳ φιλ., there is here: ἐν φιλ. ἀγάπης, "with the kiss of love," i.e., the kiss, which is the type and expression of Christian brotherly love. — The final benediction is likewise similar to those in the epistles of Paul; only that in these χάρις stands in the place of εἰρήνη (Eph. vi. 23, 24, both occur; cf. too, 3 John 15). By the addition of τοῖς ἐν Χρ., the πάντες are designated according to their nature as such, who live in union with Christ, and to whom, therefore, the benediction here pronounced belongs.

THE SECOND EPISTLE OF THE APOSTLE PETER.

INTRODUCTION.

SEC. 1. — OCCASION, CONTENTS, AND CHARACTER OF THE EPISTLE.

THE epistle on its own testimony professes to have been written by the Apostle Peter (chap. i. 1, 14, 16-18, iii. 1, 15), subsequent to his first epistle (chap. iii. 1; comp. also i. 16), and addressed to the same churches. Its occasion and aim are stated in chap. iii. 17, 18. The author is in anxiety as to the false teachers who were about to appear, — he nevertheless pictures them as actually present, — and therefore he wishes to warn his readers against them, that they might not be led astray, and exhorts them to grow in grace and in the knowledge of the Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. The false teachers against whom the epistle is directed are the Libertines (chap. ii.), and the deniers of the *parousia* of Christ, and the destruction of the world connected therewith (chap. iii.). It is commonly assumed that in chap. iii. the persons meant are the same as those described in chap. ii. But an identity of this kind is nowhere suggested; indeed, the way and the terms in which the *ἐμπαίκται* are introduced in chap. iii. seem rather to indicate that by the latter — although mention is also made of their sensual life (*κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας αὐτῶν ἐπιθυμίας πορευόμενοι*) — different individuals are intended from those portrayed in chap. ii. (Weiss). — De Wette's opinion, that the author had in his eye "vicious persons" simply, and not "false teachers," is erroneous, it being abundantly evident from vv. 18, 19, that the persons described in chap. ii. based their actions on a definite principle; moreover, they are expressly termed *ψευδοδιδασκαλοὶ*, ver. 1. It is also equally erroneous to take them to be Gnostics, properly so called, or more particularly, with Grotius, followers of Carpocrates. Bertholdt calls them Sadducee Christians, but this term is wanting in the necessary precision. Cf. my Introduction to Jude's Epistle.

The epistle falls into two principal divisions, each consisting of two parts. In the first part of the first division (chap. i. 1-11), the author reminds the Christians of the blessings, more especially the *ἐπαγγέλματα*, of which by the power of God they had been made partakers, linking on to this the exhortation to give abundant proof of the virtues which are the fruits of faith, — those especially in which he that is wanting is like unto one blind, and he only who possesses can enter into the eternal kingdom of Christ. — In the second part (chap. i. 12-21), the author, as the Apostle Peter, mentions first, what had induced him to give the exhortation at this particular time, and then refers his readers to the certainty of Christ's advent, confirmed as it was both by the divine words which himself had heard at the Saviour's transfiguration and by the prophecies of the Old Covenant. — In the first part of the second division (chap. ii.), the author portrays the immoral character of the Libertines. He begins by announcing their coming, future as yet; calls them deniers of the Lord who would seduce many, but would not escape punishment (vv. 1-3); then he proves the certainty of their punishment by the examples of the fallen angels, those who perished in the Flood, and the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah, not forgetting, however, in the last two cases to call to remembrance Noah and Lot, just men both, and therefrom to draw the conclusion as to the righteousness of God (vv. 4-9). In vv. 10-22 follows the more minute description of the sensual character of the false teachers. — The author commences the last part of this division by stating the design of this second epistle, and then goes on to mention the scoffers who would walk after their own lusts, and would deny the advent of the Lord (chap. iii. 1-4); this he follows up by a refutation of the arguments on which the denial is based, foretelling the coming destruction of the world by fire, and representing the apparent delay of the judgment as an act of divine patience (vv. 5-10); and to this he subjoins the exhortation to a holy walk in expectation of the new heaven and the new earth (vv. 11-13). — The epistle concludes with the mention of the Apostle Paul's epistles, coupled with the warning against wresting the difficult passages contained in them. Finally, the author gives forth exhortations by way of caution, in which he makes apparent the design of the epistle; on this follows the doxology.

The fundamental idea which runs through the whole epistle is that of the *ἐπίγνωσις Χριστοῦ*, which consists essentially in the acknowledgment of the *δύναμις καὶ παρουσία* of Christ. Advancement in this *ἐπίγνωσις*, as the ground and aim of the exercise of all Christian virtue, is the prominent feature of every exhortation. Hence the *τίμια ἐπαγγέλματα* are designated as that by

which *κοινωνία* with the divine nature is effected, and which must move the Christian to show all zeal in supplying the Christian virtues. The author is therefore at pains to prove the certain fulfilment of those promises, and to refute the sceptical doubts of the false teachers.

As regards its structure, the epistle has encountered much adverse criticism from the opponents of its authenticity. Mayerhoff reproaches it, more especially, with a clumsy and illogical development; but it cannot fail to be observed that there is a clear and firm line of thought, by which all particulars are joined together and form a well-arranged whole (cf. Brückner, *Einkl.*, § 1 a; Hofmann, p. 121 ff.). The thoughts which form the commencement of the epistle prepare the way for the warnings against the false teachers, and have as their aim the concluding exhortations which point back to the heresy. The prominence given to the thought that *τὰ πρὸς ζῶην καὶ εὐσεβειαν* are bestowed upon us (i. 3), and the exhortation to furnish the Christian virtues (i. 5-11), are all aimed at the false teachers, who would indulge in *ἀσελγείας*, and by whom the *ὁδὸς τῆς ἀληθείας* would be brought into disrepute (ii. 2); whilst the emphasis laid on the *ἐπαγγέλματα* (i. 4), as also the reference to the incidents of the transfiguration as a proof of the *δύναμις καὶ παρουσία* of Christ (i. 16-18), point to the prophetic announcement of the coming of the *ἐμπαίκτηι* who would deny the advent of the Saviour (iii. 3 ff.). Still, it is surprising that the whole of the second chapter may be omitted without the connection of thought being in any way injured thereby. For inasmuch as the *scoffers* are characterized as men who walk *κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας αὐτῶν ἐπιθυμίας*, the moral exhortations introduced in i. 3, 4, and to which iii. 12 has retrospect, may be applicable to them also; and although ii. 1 is closely connected with i. 19-21 by the words: *ἐγένοντο δὲ καὶ ψευδοπροφῆται ἐν τῷ λαῷ*, yet *μνησθῆναι τῶν προειρημένων ῥημάτων ὑπὸ τῶν ἁγίων προφητῶν* (iii. 2) can equally be joined with them. It may accordingly be conjectured that chap. ii. was afterwards added, either by the writer himself, or by some later hand; but, again, opposed to such a supposition is the circumstance that chap. ii. in no way disturbs the unity of the whole.

Besides several echoes of the Pauline Epistles and the First Epistle of Peter, this letter, as is well known, presents in the second chapter, and in one or two passages of the first and third, a striking resemblance to the Epistle of Jude, which cannot possibly be considered accidental. Rather must one of these epistles be regarded as the original, of which the author of the other made use. In former times the prevalent view was, that the Second Epistle of Peter was the original (thus Luther, Wolf, Semler, Storr, Pott, etc.); but afterwards the opposite opinion obtained most favor (thus

already Herder, Hug, Eichhorn, Credner, Neander, Mayerhoff, De Wette, Guericke); and in more recent times it has been supported by Reuss, Bleek, Arnaud, Wiesinger, Brückner, Weiss, and F. Philippi, — that is to say, not only by opponents of the authenticity of the Second Epistle of Peter, but by defenders of it also (Wiesinger, Brückner, Weiss). A different judgment, however, is passed by Thiersch, Dietlein, Stier, Luthardt, Schott, Steinfass, Fronmüller, Hofmann. Appeal is made chiefly to this circumstance, that at the time when the Epistle of Jude was composed, the false teachers were already present, while in Second Peter their appearance is looked upon as future, and is the subject of prophecy. But this, as Weiss has shown, is an argument only in appearance, and is in no way capable of proof. That the passages Jude 17 and 18 have no reference to 2 Pet. ii. 1-3 and iii. 2, 3, is plain from this, that had Jude seen in the appearance of the Libertines the fulfilment of the prediction contained in Second Peter, he would have styled them, not *ἐμπαῖκται*, κ.τ.λ., but rather *ψευδοδιδάσκαλοι*. For in Second Peter it is not the Libertines described in chap. ii. that are called *ἐμπαῖκται*, but the deniers of the *parousia* spoken of in chap. iii., whom Jude does not even mention. Nor is it easy to see why Jude, if in vv. 17 and 18 he really had in his mind the prophecy given by Peter, should not have directly said so, but should rather have spoken of the actual word of the actual Peter as *τὰ ῥήματα τὰ προειρημένα ὑπὸ τῶν ἀποστόλων τοῦ κυρίου*. In favor of the view that the Second Epistle of Peter is dependent on the Epistle of Jude, is the latter's entirely individual manner of thought and diction, which bears the distinct impress of originality;¹ whilst in Second Peter, on the other hand, there is apparent the endeavor to tone down the expression by simplification, addition, or omission. Further, the circumstance that the more the expression in Peter's second epistle coincides with that of Jude, the more does what is otherwise peculiar to the epistle tend to disappear.² And, finally, the absence of any tenable reason which might have induced

¹ Herder: "See what a thoroughly powerful epistle, like a fire-wheel running back into itself; take now that of Peter, what introduction he makes, how he tones down, omits, confirms," etc.; "Jude has always the most precise and the strongest expression." Even Schott grants, in opposition to Dietlein, "that the Epistle of Jude bears the impress of much greater literary originality on the part of the writer than that of Second Peter;" and that "it must be allowed to possess a by far

greater intellectual originality and pithiness."

² This Weiss brings very decidedly forward: "It plainly appears, that wherever in the parallel passages it strikingly coincides with that of Jude, the expression is to be found nowhere else in Second Peter; but wherever it deviates from that of Jude, or becomes entirely independent, it is at once in surprising conformity with the form of expression in this or the First Epistle of Peter."

Jude to collect together separate passages from a larger apostolic writing, in order to compose therefrom a new epistle, which, seeing that the former was already in existence, must have had the less significance that it omits from the delineation important particulars which are contained in Second Peter.¹

In discussing the question as to which is the original epistle, two points must be remembered: (1) "That in neither have we a slavish dependence or a mere copy, but that the correspondence of the one with the other is carried out with literary freedom and license" (Weiss); and (2) The circumstance that this question is not identical with that as to the authenticity of the Second Epistle of Peter; Wiesinger, Weiss, Brückner, defend its authenticity, although they question its priority. — The reasons which Schott adduces for the priority of the Epistle of Jude are simple assertions, which a closer examination by no means justifies, inasmuch as they are either plainly arbitrary, or presuppose artificial interpretations and pure inventions. Steinfass thinks, strangely enough, that to accept the originality of Jude's Epistle is somewhat hazardous for that composition itself, and not only for Second Peter, inasmuch as on the assumption he takes the repeated reference to the pseudo-Enoch to be an offence, many examples a redundancy, much conciseness restraint, and the whole arrangement pretty much confusion. Frommüller bases his argument for the priority of Second Peter specially on this, that it is inconceivable that Peter, the prince of the apostles, should have borrowed expressions, figures, and examples from one who was plainly less gifted than himself. Hofmann would completely settle the whole question by asserting that Peter composed his second epistle soon after his first; that is to say, *before* the destruction of Jerusalem, while Jude wrote *after* (ver. 5!) that event. But when, nevertheless quite superfluously, he by way of proof goes into particulars, he, on the one hand, bases his arguments on many unjustifiable assertions: as, for example, that Peter exhorts to a holy walk, but Jude to the aggressive maintenance of the Christian faith, or that Jude was dealing only with some unworthy members of the church in the present, whilst Peter had in view teachers who were to arise in the future; and, on the other hand, the proofs he adduces have also to be supported by erroneous interpretations, and judgments purely subjective. — If now, following the course of thought in the Epistle of Jude, we consider the individual passages in their relation to what is similar to them in

¹ When Luthardt thinks to explain this by observing "that Jude could certainly assume that his readers were acquainted with Second Peter, in which enough had already been said as to the *παρουσία*," he entirely overlooks the

fact that the latter epistle treats equally at length of the false teachers, and that consequently Jude might have left his entire letter unwritten.

Second Peter, these results are obtained: In the opening of his epistle, Jude introduces his opponents without any bias as *τινὲς ἄνθρωποι*, without even hinting that they are those whose appearance Peter had before predicted. The first description of them by *τὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡμῶν χάριτα μετατιθέντες εἰς ἀσέλγειαν* is peculiar to Jude. It is in no way probable that the expression *ἀσέλγεια* is taken from the passage 2 Pet. ii. 2. The following *δεσπότην ὑρνούμενοι* is found in Peter also, but to whom it originally belongs cannot be concluded from the nearer definitions connected therewith. The fact that the particular features by which Jude characterizes his opponents are to be found in 2 Pet. ii. 1-3, others being here added, however, and with a less original turn of expression, tends to show rather that the Epistle of Jude had exercised an influence on that of Peter than *vice versa* (Wiesinger). In the one epistle as in the other, the examples of divine judgment follow the first and special description of the adversaries. Yet these are not in both the same, and in Peter's epistle, in the second and third cases, there is added to the mention of the punishment of the ungodly a reference to the deliverance of the just, more especially of Noah and Lot. The order in which the examples of judgment are brought forward is, in Peter's composition, chronological, and in so far eminently natural; still the selection of the first is striking, since in Gen. vi. 2 ff. there is no mention made of a punishment of the angels. Now, as there is nothing in the connection of thought here which could have determined Peter to bring forward this example, he must have been moved to do so by something external to it, that is, by the influence which the Epistle of Jude had upon him. The order of examples of judgment in Jude is of so singular a nature, that so far from showing even the faintest trace of a dependence on Peter, it is rather on the assumption of any such quite incomprehensible. How could it ever have occurred to Jude, supposing he drew from Second Peter, to place the case of the unbelieving Israelites first, and to omit that of the Flood? Jude's manner of presentation is based on a conception so entirely original, that it cannot possibly have been suggested to him by that in Second Peter. It is difficult to see what could have moved Jude to avoid the two-sided character of Peter's examples, if it really lay before him: it was equally well suited to his purpose. Noticeable, also, is the latter's prevailing tendency to generalization. The last two examples adduced by Jude have reference to a quite definite sin, the *ἐκπορνείειν καὶ ἀπέρχεσθαι ὀπίσω σαρκὸς ἐτέρας*; Peter, on the other hand, deals only with the general distinction between godly and ungodly; and whilst Jude characterizes the conduct of the angels as it lay to his hand in the tradition, or in the Book of Enoch itself, Peter contents himself with the more general *ἀμαρτησάντων*, and avoids all distinct reference to that tradition. But whence had he, then, the *σειραίς ζόφου, κ.τ.λ.*, if he did not write under the influence of Jude's epistle? After the examples of judgment, there follows, in both epistles, the description of the Libertines, according to their sensual walk, and their despising and defamation of the

supernatural powers. Amidst much that is similar, there are, nevertheless, many points of disagreement, so that, in general, it may be open to dispute in which epistle the more original expression prevails. This is, however, not the case as regards the difference between Jude 9 and 2 Pet. ii. 11, for instead of Jude's concrete description according to apocryphal tradition, we have again in Peter, as in the mention of the angels formerly, an entirely general expression, which, however, must refer to something special. It has indeed been asserted (Schott, Hofmann) that Peter's expression finds its explanation in Zech. iii. 1: but if the apostle had this verse in view, he would have made more distinct reference to it; nor, again, could any reason be assigned why Jude should have alluded, not to the fact recorded in that passage, but to one entirely apocryphal. This also speaks decidedly in favor of the priority of Jude's epistle. Dietlein asserts with regard to Jude 10, as compared with 2 Pet. ii. 12, "that the higher degree of pure elaboration proves Jude to have been the reviser;" but this is unjustifiable, as even Steinfass admits. Wiesinger and Brückner rightly say, that here also, in the whole mode of expression, the priority of Jude's epistle is recognizable. — In Jude the woe follows, breaking in upon the text, and as the basis of it, the comparison of the Libertines with Cain, Balaam, and Korah. To this is added a more minute description of them in a series of figurative expressions, coupled with Enoch's prophecy of judgment. In the Epistle of Peter, subjoined to *φθαρήσονται*, ver. 12, is the reference to the reward of the *ἀδικία* of the Libertines, and on this a description of the *ἀδικία* itself, — the false teachers being then at the end classed along with Balaam. It is only after this that several figurative designations follow, which are based on their propagandist doings. The grouping is accordingly different in each of the epistles; and otherwise, with much that is coincident in detail, there are many divergences. The train of thought is in both epistles equally suited to the subject-matter, only it is somewhat strange that Jude, if he had the Epistle of Peter before him, should ever have thought of interrupting the connection of ideas here existing between vv. 12 and 13 by a woe. This paragraph clearly shows that the dependence of the one author on the other is not to be looked upon as of such a nature that the later changed, and arranged with designed elaboration, the writings of the earlier, but only, that in the description of the same object, the manner of presentation of the latter had wrought with manifold determination upon that of the former. The divergences which here occur are more easily explained on the assumption that the Epistle of Jude, and not that of Peter, was the earlier. Were it otherwise, it would certainly be difficult to understand how Jude left unnoticed not only the characteristic *ὀφθαλμοῦς ἔχοντες μεστῶς μοιχαλίδος*, but also the repeatedly recurring *δολεάζοντες*, and the references generally to the propagandist designs. With regard to this difference, that Jude speaks of Cain, Balaam, and Korah, whilst Peter mentions Balaam only, it is more natural to suppose that Peter, leaving the other two

unnoticed, refers simply to Balaam because the latter appeared to him a particularly fitting type of the Libertines (on account of their *πλεονεξία*, to which special prominence is given, and to which the *μισθοῦ* of Jude alludes; whilst in the case of the others there is no such distinctive trait), than to assume that Jude added the two other illustrations to that of Balaam which he had before him in the Epistle of Peter. The priority of Jude's epistle may be recognized in this also, that the somewhat striking expression *μισθοῦ* is, in the composition of Peter, supplemented by the explanatory, *ὅς μισθὸν ἀδικίας ἠγάπησεν*. Highly characteristic, too, is the relation of the two clauses Jude 12*a* and Pet. ii. 13*b*, especially in their corresponding expressions: *σπιλάδες* in Jude, and *σπίλοι καὶ μῶμοι* in Peter, and *ἐν ταῖς ἀγάπαις ἡμῶν* there, and *ἐν ταῖς ἀπάταις αὐτῶν* here. In spite of the different expressions, the influence of the one on the other is unmistakable; and it is equally plain that it was not Jude who wrote under the influence of Peter, but Peter under that of Jude. For, what could have induced Jude to substitute for the clear expression of Peter the uncommon *σπιλάδες*, — which, besides, has a different meaning, — and to change the much more general idea *ἀπάταις* into the special conception *ἀγάπαις*? Whatever may be thought of Weiss' opinion, that Peter allowed himself to be guided simply by the *sound* of the words, we must certainly agree with him when he says that "Schott's attempt to save the originality of Peter's epistle rests on the entirely untenable assumption that the Petrine passage has reference to the love-feasts." — His omission of the passage from Enoch, quoted by Jude, can be easily enough explained, inasmuch as it was Peter's predominating desire to allow what was apocryphal to recede, especially when by doing so no essential thought was omitted, and in chap. ii. 1, 2, distinct enough reference had been already made to the future judgment. But it is difficult to see what possible reason Jude could have had for inserting the passage from the Apocrypha in addition to what he found in Peter. — In what follows, each epistle goes its own way, and there are to be found but few traces of any influence of either on the other. Those few are as follows: (1) The *κατὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας αὐτῶν πορευόμενοι* in Jude 16, 17, and Pet. iii. 3, and the *ἐμπαῖκται* closely connected herewith. With regard to this last expression, it is more than improbable that Jude borrowed it from Peter's epistle, it being there applied to the deniers of the *παρουσία*, whom Jude does not even mention. Peter, on the other hand, might easily have adopted this designation from the Epistle of Jude as very applicable to those who called the advent in question, the more so that he had already spoken of the Libertines as *ψευδοδιδάσκαλοι*. Thus, too, is explained the addition from Jude's epistle of *κατὰ τὰς . . . πορευόμενοι*, which otherwise, as applied by Peter to a *special* heresy, is somewhat surprising. (2) The term *ὑπέρογκα*, Jude 16 and Pet. ii. 18; Jude employs it without any nearer definition, but Peter in relation to *ἐλευθερίαν ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι*. This, too, speaks for the priority of Jude's composition; for it is not conceivable that Jude, in adopting the expression,

would have left unnoticed its nearer definition presented by Peter; whilst, on the other hand, the latter might easily have borrowed it from Jude's epistle, as well suited to the end he had in view. — The result, then, of an unbiassed comparison can be no other than this, that the Second Epistle of Peter was composed under the influence of what Jude had written, and not *vice versa*. This has been proved by Brückner, Wiesinger, and Weiss in their investigations, which have in part been conducted with more attention to particular detail.

SEC. 2. — THE AUTHENTICITY OF THE EPISTLE.

Eusebius (*H. E.*, ii. 23, iii. 5) rightly includes this epistle among the Antilegomena, its genuineness having been called in question by many. Origen already expressly says (Eusebius, *H. E.*, vi. 23): Πέτρος . . . μίαν ἐπιστολὴν ὁμολογουμένην καταλέλοιπεν· ἔστω δὲ καὶ δευτέραν, ἀμφιβάλλεται γάρ. In spite of this verdict, Origen — only, however, in the writings which we possess in Latin translation — treats it as a genuine composition of the apostle, citing it several times; see *Homil. in Josuam* vii., *Homil. iv. in Levitic.*, *Homil. viii. in Numer.*, and *Comment. in Ep. ad Romanos* viii. 7. — If in his *Comment. in Ev. Johannis* he speak only of the First Epistle of Peter as catholic, saying, with reference to 1 Pet. iii. 18-20: περὶ τῆς ἐν φυλακῇ πορείας μετὰ πνεύματος παρὰ τῷ Πέτρῳ ἐν τῇ καθολικῇ ἐπιστολῇ, it can at most be concluded from this, only that he refused to apply that name to the second epistle, perhaps because it had not found general acceptance, but not that he himself had any doubts as to its genuineness. — Origen's contemporary, too, Firmilianus of Caesarea, seems to have known the epistle, and to have regarded it as genuine; for when, in his Epistle to Cyprian (*Epp. Cypr.*, ep. 75), he says that Peter and Paul have condemned the heretics *in suis epistolis*, this seems, as far as Peter is concerned, to be applicable to his second epistle only, as in the first there is no mention of any such persons. — It cannot be definitely asserted that Clemens Alexandrinus commented on this epistle in his *Hypotyposes*. According to Eusebius (*H. E.*, vi. 14): ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὑποτυπώσεσι ξυνέλοντα εἰπεῖν, πάσης τῆς ἐνδιαθήκου γραφῆς ἐπιτετημένας πεποιῆται διηγήσεις· μὴ δὲ τὰς ἀντιλεγόμενας παρελθῶν τὴν Ἰούδα λέγω καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς ἐπιστολάς· τὴν τε Βαρνάβα καὶ τὴν Πέτρου λεγομένην ἀποκάλυψιν καὶ τὴν πρὸς Ἑβραίους δὲ ἐπιστολὴν, κ.τ.λ., Clement commented on the whole of the N. T. writings, the Antilegomena included, and therefore Second Peter, which Eusebius designates as an ἐπιστολὴ ἀντίλεγε. To this, however, the remark of Cassiodorus is opposed (*De Instit. Div. Script.*, c. 8): *in epistolis canonicis Clemens Al., i.e., in ep. Petri prima, Joannis prima et secunda et Jacobi* (or

rather Judae) *quaedam attico sermone declaravit*, etc. — *Cum de reliquis epistolis canonicis magna nos cogitatio fatigaret, subito nobis codex Didymi . . . concessus est*, etc. But as Cassiodorus expressly says in the Praefatio: *ferunt itaque scripturas divinas V. et N. Testamenti ab ipso principio usque ad finem graeco sermone declarasse Clementem Alex.*, it may be concluded from this that he did not possess a complete copy of the *Hypotyposes*, but one only in which several epistles of the N. T., and among these Second Peter, were wanting. Whilst Brückner says that the remark of Cassiodorus is no certain refutation of the statement made by Eusebius, Weiss declares himself convinced that the epistle was not commented on by Clement. — Neither in the writings of Tertullian nor of Cyprian is there to be found any trace of an acquaintance with the epistle, though both of them know and quote First Peter. — The epistle does not stand in the older *Peshito*, nor is it mentioned in the *Muratorian Canon*. Previous to Clemens Al. it is sought for in vain in the apostolic and in the older Church Fathers. As to whether in these writers certain echoes of the epistle are to be found which point to an acquaintance with it, Guericke, even, expresses himself very doubtfully: “The allusions, in the case of some of the apostolic Fathers, are not quite certain; but, on the other hand, Justin M., Irenaeus, and Theophilus, do really *appear* to have made unmistakable reference to it.” Thiersch (p. 362, *D. A. Schr.*) denies still more decidedly a reference in the earlier Church Fathers to this epistle. “The two thoughts only,” says Thiersch, “‘that one day is with the Lord as a thousand years,’ and that ‘the end of the world will come as a conflagration,’ had at a very early period obtained general diffusion throughout the Church;” but he himself shows that these two ideas did not necessarily originate in this epistle. Most of the recent critics agree with Thiersch. Entirely opposed to this, however, is the judgment of Dietlein; he fancies he finds, not only in the three Fathers already mentioned, but in Polycarp, Ignatius, Clemens Romanus, Barnabas, and Hermes, not in some few passages merely, but “scattered in large numbers throughout the writings of each of them,” indisputable references to our epistle. In his endeavor to discover these, however, Dietlein has failed to observe that the writers of ecclesiastical antiquity all drew¹ from the same store of conceptions, expressions, and

¹ Even with regard to Philo, Dietlein says, “The coincidence between Philo and the N. T. and primitive ecclesiastical writers is by no means always fortuitous. — Both draw abundantly from the same storehouse of views and

expressions, only the use they make of these is very different.” — This remark is very just; but why does not Dietlein apply what he says as to Philo to the relation between the primitive Christian writers and those of the N. T. ?

phrases, and that a correspondence must necessarily take place, without the dependence of any one upon another following therefrom. By far the most of the passages in those apostolic Fathers to which Dietlein appeals attest only a community of conception and expression, but not a dependence on Second Peter, the less so that the harmony consists almost only in accidental phrases and the like, and not in such ideas as are peculiarly characteristic of our epistle; nor has Dietlein been able to show a single sentence in which there is an exact verbal agreement.

In the Epistle of Barnabas, the words, chap. xv., *ἡ ἡμέρα παρ' αὐτῷ* (that is, *κυρίῳ*) *χίλια ἔτη*, doubtless call up 2 Pet. iii. 8; but the thought to which they give expression is there *entirely different* from that here. Besides, it must be particularly observed — to this Thiersch calls attention — that the conception of the days of the Messiah as a Sabbath of a thousand years is found in the Mischnah, *Tractat. Sanhedrin*, 97b, in connection with Ps. xc. 4; as, also, that the authenticity of the Epistle of Barnabas is by no means so certain as Dietlein presupposes. — All the other passages in this epistle to which Dietlein appeals (especially in chaps. i. and ii., in the salutation and the conclusion of the epistle) show points of similarity only, which by no means prove the existence of definite references.¹ — So, too, with the passages from the Epistle of Clemens Romanus (chap. vii. init., comp. with 2 Pet. i. 12 and iii. 9; chap. viii., comp. with 2 Pet. iii. 9, 16, 17; chap. ix., comp. with 2 Pet. i. 17, etc.; chap. xi. with 2 Pet. ii. 6, 7, etc.), and from that of Polycarp (chap. iii., comp. with 2 Pet. iii. 15, 16; chap. vi. fin., and vii. init., with 2 Pet. iii. 2, etc.).² Had Polycarp

Is it because the application is in no way different? But, according to his own account, the material which the former drew directly from the latter was often applied in a very diverse manner; and though the difference here be not so great as in the above case, it is only natural it should be so, if the different circumstances be considered.

¹ When Barnabas, in the introduction to his epistle, thus states the purpose of it: *ἵνα μετὰ τῆς πίστεως τέλειαν ἔχητε καὶ τὴν γνώσιν*, this so entirely corresponds with the contents of the epistle that he certainly cannot have made Second Peter his guide; that he makes use of the verb *σπουδαζειν* is all the less objectionable, that the word is a very common one. The enumeration of the virtues (chap. ii.) is entirely different from that which occurs in 2 Pet. i. 5-8, and the words "magnum et

honestarum Dei aequitatum abundantiam sciens esse in vobis" have a very feeble similarity to τὰ μέγιστα ἡμῖν καὶ τίμια ἐπαγγέλματα δεδωρηται, 2 Pet. i. 4, especially as the connection of thought is of quite another kind.

² Dietlein finds specially in Clement a mass of references to Second Peter; but it is here precisely that the way in which he strains the most natural phrases and expressions becomes apparent. There is no foundation for the assertions that the expression *ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἔσμεν σκάμματι* (which the words *καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἡμῖν ἀγὼν ἐπικεῖται* follow) had its origin, by association of ideas (!), in the *ἐφ' ὅσον εἰμι ἐν τούτῳ τῷ σκηνώματι* of Peter; that Clement was stimulated by Peter to write the remarks in chap. vii. and xi.; that when he wished to account for the very special reverence in which Paul was held, he, in doing so, did not act

really been acquainted with Second Peter, and had he wished to refer to it, it is impossible to understand why he does not quote even *one* sentence from it literally, as he certainly does from First Peter. — Still less than that of the above-mentioned Fathers is the dependence of Ignatius on Second Peter capable of proof, even in a single passage. — As regards Justin Martyr, the earlier critics have traced back the expression in the *Dialog. cum Tryph.*, c. 89 (p. 308, Morelli's edition): *συνήκαμεν γὰρ τὸ εἰρημένον, ὅτι ἡμέρα κυρίου ὡς χίλια ἔτη, εἰς τοῦτο συνάγειν*, to 2 Pet. iii. 8 as their original source; but the words here have the same meaning as in the Epistle of Barnabas, and, besides, differ still more markedly from those of Second Peter. — Indeed, Justin himself seems to hint that the words are not taken from an apostolic writing, for he cites them as a saying not unknown to Trypho, whilst he expressly mentions the book of the N. T., from which a quotation immediately following is taken: *καὶ ἔπειτα* (i.e., "and then," i.e., "and further") *Ἰωάννης . . . ἐν ἀποκαλύψει . . . προεφήτευσεν*. — Subsequently, indeed, Justin designates the false teachers as *ψευδοδιδάσκαλοι* (a word which occurs, no doubt, in the N. T. only in Second Peter), and that, similarly as in 2 Pet. ii. 1, in connection with the false prophets among the Jews; but this need occasion no surprise, since in after times the name was not uncommon, and the application of it must have suggested itself at once to him in conversation with a Jew. — Nor in Hermas either is there any quotation, properly so called, from Second Peter. Still, appeal has been made to various expressions (in Vis. iii. 7, iv. 3) which no doubt may be traced back to that epistle; and yet more is this the case in Vis. vii. Whilst, however, Wiesinger admits the dependence on Second Peter, and Brückner is inclined to agree with him, Weiss remarks, that in the Greek text, now brought to light, the supposed references in Hermas lose every semblance of similarity. On the other hand, Hofmann maintains that in *Sim.* vi. c. 2 ff., the peculiar connection of *τροφή* with *ἀπάτη*, etc., as also the singular calculation, for how long a time pain would follow one day of luxurious living, can only be explained by a reference to Second Peter; and, further, that the vision of the seven virtues (*Sim.* iii. c. 8) could have had 2 Pet. i. 5-7 as a pattern. Both of these assertions are very questionable. — In Theophilus (*Ad Autol.*) it is two passages principally that recall our epistle; in the one it is said of the prophets (l. II. c. 11, ed. Wolfii, Hamb., 1724): *οἱ δὲ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἄνθρωποι πνευματοφόροι πνεύματος ἁγίου καὶ προφήται γενόμενοι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐμπνευσθέντες καὶ σοφισθέντες ἐγένοντο θεοδίδακτοι καὶ δισοί*

without reference to 2 Pet. iii. 15! By what right are expressions such as *ὑπακοή, μετάνοια, δικαιοσύνη, ταπεινοφροσύνη*, etc., stamped as peculiarly Petrine? — Dietlein attaches special importance, both to the fact that Polycarp mentions Paul, and to the manner in which he

does so, as also to his controversy with the heretics who denied the *ἀνάστασις*. Yet here, too, it is presupposed that similarities are due entirely to direct reference; and, moreover, no account whatever is taken of the relation in which Polycarp stood to Clement.

καὶ δίκαιοι; in the other (l. II. c. 1) with reference to the Logos: ἡ διάταξις τοῦ Θεοῦ τοῦτο ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος αὐτοῦ φαίνων ὡσπερ λύχνος ἐν οἰκῆματι συνεχομένῳ. The similarity of the former passage with 2 Pet. i. 21, and of the latter with 2 Pet. i. 18, is indisputable; but that the one had its origin in the other remains certainly doubtful, the points of difference being not less marked than those of agreement. The conception formed of the prophets is in both cases the same, no doubt, but it was also the view generally prevalent, and is found even in Philo; cf. the exposition of 2 Pet. i. 21; the manner of expression, too, is not a little different. As regards the other passages, it must be observed that there is agreement neither in the figure employed (ἐν οἰκῆματι συνεχομένῳ instead of ἐν ἀρχιμήρῳ τόπῳ), nor with respect to the object spoken of. — In Irenaeus the thought that one day is with the Lord as a thousand years is again found, and that in two passages (*Adv. Haeres.*, v. 23 and 28), but in neither of them is it hinted that the words are taken from an apostolic writing. If it had not its origin in some collection of proverbs then in circulation, it is very probable that Irenaeus borrowed it from Justin, since he too uses the expression: ἡμέρα κυρίου (ποσὶ παρὰ κυρίῳ). — Dietlein, indeed, thinks that instances of reference on Irenaeus' part to Second Peter may be richly accumulated, the more the finding of them is made an *object of study* (!). But Irenaeus nowhere mentions the epistle, nor does he anywhere make a quotation from it, — a circumstance more surprising in his case than in that of Polycarp, if he really knew the epistle, and considered it to be an apostolic writing. Cf. Brückner, *Einl.*, § 4.

The result of an unbiassed examination is, that in Ignatius there are to be found no references to Second Peter; in Clemens Rom., Barnabas, and Polycarp, none in any way probable; in Justin Martyr, Hermas, and Theophilus, none certain; and, further, that Irenaeus cannot be looked upon as a guaranty for the existence and authority of the epistle in the Church. If, then, the apostolic Fathers had already made use of this composition, more especially in the manner in which Dietlein holds that they did, it would be impossible to explain not only how the doubts, spoken of by Origen, arose, but also the circumstance that the epistle is mentioned neither by Tertullian nor by Cyprian. Dietlein's assertion, that the older Fathers of the Church, in making more frequent reference to the Pauline Epistles than to the Petrine, did, in doing so, but follow the hints which Peter himself gave in chap. iii. 15, 16, explains nothing: for, on the one hand, no such hint is contained in that passage; and, on the other, the first epistle must have shared the same fate as the second, which is not the case. — Thiersch, as already remarked, whilst admitting that it cannot be proved that any of the early Church Fathers made reference to Second Peter, at the same time

allows that none of the reasons which explain the subordinate position held by the Antilegomena as compared with the Homologoumena, are applicable to this epistle. He is therefore driven to account for the fact that this epistle was not included among the subjects of regular anagnosis, by saying that this was due to the fear lest a too-early disclosure — as made in his words of thunder (?) — of the evil, in its whole scope, would have had the effect of hastening on the outbreak of it, more especially at a time when all minds were being stirred to their very depths, as was the case when the canon of the Homologoumena was fixed. But this reason is in itself very improbable, for there could certainly have been no better weapon against the advancing evil than the word of an apostle, and especially of Peter. Thus, too, the reflection is cast upon Peter, that he was here wanting in true apostolic wisdom, inasmuch as he composed an epistle which could have no other than a disturbing influence. And what, then, is to be said of Jude, who made into a special epistle the sharpest passages, and those likely to exercise that influence most strongly!

The circumstance that the epistle is not mentioned by the earliest Fathers of the Church remains all the more surprising, when it is considered how important the polemic it contains against errors of the worst kind must have made it appear to them. Wiesinger thinks that the exception taken to it by Hieronymus on linguistic grounds (see below), as well as the dogmatic objections raised to it, would be less likely to recommend for use an epistle so special in its contents. But opposed to this is — (1) That if the churches to whom it is addressed did receive it from Peter, they would hardly have compared it in the matter of style with the first epistle; (2) That it affords no ground for dogmatic objection; (3) That the special character of its contents is precisely of such a nature as to promote its use, rather than to be an obstacle in the way of it. Weiss justly maintains that the question, how it can be explained that there are no certain traces of the epistle in the second century, is as yet unsolved, in that what has been urged in the way of solution by the defenders of the genuineness, is in a great measure arbitrary and insufficient.

After the time of Eusebius, the epistle was generally treated as canonical; yet Gregory of Nazianzum already says (*Carm.* 33, ver. 35): *καθολικῶν ἐπιστολῶν τινὲς μὲν ἐπὶ τὰ φάσιν, οἱ δὲ τρεῖς μόνως χρῆναι δέχεσθαι*; and Hieronymus (*S. de Script. Eccl.*, c. 1), who himself holds the genuineness of the epistle, remarks that its Petrine origin is denied by most, and withal *propter styli cum priore dissonantiam*. — Although it was not in the Peschito, Ephraem Syrus made no doubt as to its genuineness; meantime, and notwithstanding, doubt long

maintained itself in the Syrian Church, as may be seen from the words of Cosmas Indicopleustes (*Christ. Topographia*, lib. vi.): *παρὰ Σύροις δὲ εἰ μὴ αἱ τρεῖς μόναι αἱ προγεγραμμένοι οὐχ εὐρίσκονται, Ἰακώβου καὶ Πέτρου καὶ Ἰωάννου· αἱ ἄλλαι γὰρ οὔτε κείνται παρ' αὐτοῖς.*

In the Middle Ages all doubts were silenced, but at the time of the Reformation they immediately revived. Erasmus already said that, *juxta sensum humanum* he did not believe that the epistle was the composition of Peter; and Calvin is of opinion that there are several *probabiles conjecturae*, from which it can be concluded that the epistle is the work rather of some one other than Peter. — The older Lutheran dogmatists are not inclined to insist positively on its genuineness, on the ground that the church does not possess the power, *quod possit ex falsis scriptis facere vera, ex veris falsa, ex dubiis et incertis facere certa, canonica et legitima* (Chemnitz, *Ex. Conc. Trid.*, ed. 1615, Francof., p. 87 ff.). Although the later writers on dogmatics gradually obliterate, more and more, the distinction between homologoumena and antilegomena, and our epistle in ecclesiastical use is treated increasingly as a canonical writing, yet doubt did not wholly disappear. Indeed, since Semler it has grown to such an extent that Schwegler (*D. Nachapost. Zeitalt.*, Bd. 1, p. 491) feels warranted in saying: "From Calvin, Grotius, Scaliger, and Salmasius, to Semler, Neander, Credner, and De Wette, the voices of all competent authorities have united in doubting and rejecting it." — This is, however, saying too much, for there has never been any want of competent authorities to defend its genuineness. Still, the general voice had certainly become always more unfavorable to the epistle, — till in recent times new defenders of its authenticity appeared.¹ Many critics hold that genuine and spurious parts may be distinguished in the epistle; thus Berthold in his *Einl. z. N. T.*, and C. Ullmann in his work, *Der 2 Brief Petri kritisch untersucht*, Heidelb., 1821. The former regards the second chapter as spurious, the latter the third also. The first of these two views is refuted by the fact that not the second chapter alone, but likewise several passages of the third, bear a similarity to Jude's epistle; and against that of Ullmann are

¹ As defenders of its authenticity may be especially named, Nitzsche (*Ep. Petri posterior auctori suo imprimis contra Grotium vindicata*, Lips., 1785), C. C. Flatt (*Genuina secundae ep. Petri origo denuo defenditur*, Tub., 1806), J. C. W. Dahl (*De Authentia ep. Petri poster. et Judae*, Rost., 1807), F. Windischmann (*Vindiciae Petrinae*, Ratisb., 1836),

A. L. C. Heydenreich (*Ein Wort zur Verteidigung der Aechtheit des 2 Br. Petri*, Herborn, 1837), Guericke (who in his *Beiträge* had expressed doubts as to the authenticity); besides these Pott, Augusti, Hug, etc.; and in most recent times, Thiersch, Stier, Dietlein, Hofmann, Luthardt, Wiesinger, Schott, Weiss, Steinfass; Brückner is not quite decided.

the circumstances that the first chapter has by no means the character of a completed whole, while, as § 2 proves, there is a firm line of thought running through the epistle, and binding into a unity its several parts, from beginning to end.

In discussing the question of the authenticity of our epistle, it will be necessary to consider its relation to First Peter. If this latter be held to be spurious, there is of course no need of any further investigation; for, appealing as the second does to the first, it must share its fate. But since First Peter must be regarded as genuine, a comparison of it with our epistle is of the highest importance.

The doubts as to the authenticity of the second epistle, which result from a comparison of the two writings with each other, are founded not on a *dissonantia styli* only (Hieron.), but also on a diversity (although not a contradiction) in the mode of conception. No doubt those who call the authenticity in question have not unfrequently gone too far in the production of alleged differences, but that such do exist cannot be denied. Of these the following are the most important: The prominent feature in both epistles is, indeed, the *parousia* of Christ, but the manner in which it is spoken of is in each different: in the first epistle, the prevailing conception is the *ἐλπίς*; in the second, on the other hand, it is the *ἐπίγνωσις*,—the former expression not occurring in the second epistle, nor the latter in the first. In the first epistle, the day of the second advent is looked upon as imminent: in the second, mention is indeed made of a sudden, but not of the near arrival of that day; rather is it expressly indicated as *possible* that it would not come till farther on in the future. In the first epistle, the *chief stress* is laid on the glorification of believers which shall accompany the return of Christ; in the second epistle, prominence is principally given to the catastrophe which shall overtake the whole creation in connection with the advent, that is, to the destruction of the old world by fire, to give place to the new heaven and the new earth. In addition to this, the advent is in the first epistle designated by the word *ἀποκάλυψις*, and in the second by *παρουσία*.

The existence of this difference cannot, as opposed to Hofmann too, be called in question. Even if, as Wiesinger strongly urges, the passage iii. 14, 15, indicate that the *parousia* will be the glorification of believers, still the form under which this is represented as taking place is different from that of the first epistle. When Schott asserts that “the second epistle in no way, and least of all ‘expressly,’ alleges the possibility of a later realization of the *parousia*,” the statement loses its justification in presence of verse 8. Weiss’s objection, that by *ἐπίγνωσις* is not to be understood a “theoretical knowledge

perfecting the Christian life," is out of place here, for *ἐπίγνωσις* and *ἐλπίς* are certainly different ideas; and even if Weiss be correct in saying that the expectation of the near *parousia* is not abandoned in the second epistle, the difference in question would not be removed.

Whilst in the first epistle the saving truths of the death and resurrection of Christ form the basis of the *ἐλπίς* and of the Christian's moral life, in the second epistle these are nowhere mentioned. Nor in the latter epistle is there any trace to be found of the ideas peculiar to the former (cf. Introduction to the epistle). And, on the other hand, the conceptions characteristic of this epistle, as the view expressed in chap. i. 19; further, the idea of the *κοινωνία* with the divine nature secured by means of the *ἐπαγγέλματα*, and the belief that the world was framed by God, and would perish again by fire, — are nowhere hinted at in the first epistle.

These remarks, too, maintain their full force against the objections taken to them; for the question here is not as to how these differences (not contradictions) are to be explained, on the assumption of an identity of authorship, but as to the fact, which cannot be called in question, that they actually do exist. Is it beside the question for Schott, in reply to the remark that in the second epistle the *death and resurrection* of Christ are not mentioned, to adduce a mass of citations from it for the purpose of showing, what is no doubt true, that *the person* of Christ is very decidedly brought forward as the guaranty of a completed salvation, and the efficient origin of a holy walk; and all the more that, in proportion as the person of Christ is insisted upon, the stranger does it seem that an apostle like Peter should pass over those facts in silence?

As regards the *style and mode of expression* in both epistles, it should not be left unnoticed that Peter's literary character, as seen in his first epistle, is not, like that of Paul or John, so sharply defined and original that each of his productions reveals its authorship. And just as little must it be forgotten, that the first epistle in many passages recalls the epistles of Paul, that the second is, to no inconsiderable extent, dependent on Jude, and that consequently the peculiar character of Peter's style is difficult to determine, the more so that his writings are only of small extent.¹ Still many lin-

¹ In opposition to what is said above, Schott maintains not only that the Epistle of Jude is dependent on Second Peter, but also that Second Peter contains echoes of the Pauline Epistles. He thinks that *ισότιμος*, i. 1, arose

from Eph. ii. 19; *ἀποφυγόντες* . . . *φθορᾶς*, i. 4, from Rom. viii. 20 ff.; and the passage i. 12 ff. from Rom. xv. 14, etc. The epistle, further, is supposed to show a special dependence on the Pastoral Epistles, i. 3-11 being only an

guistic differences are to be found, which even in Hieronymus' time attracted attention, and which cannot be overlooked. It is not to be denied that the freshness of expression of the first epistle, and its richness in combinations of thought, are here wanting. Whilst in the first epistle one thought follows directly upon another in lively succession, the connection in the second epistle is not unfrequently effected by means of conjunctions which point back to what precedes, or by a formal resumption of what had previously been said; cf. chap. i. 8, 9, 10, 12, 15, iii. 7, 10, 12. And whilst, too, in the first epistle there is a richness and variety in the use of prepositions expressive of manifold relationships, a conspicuous uniformity in this respect prevails throughout the second epistle. Many peculiarities which are characteristic of the diction of the first epistle (cf. *Introd. to first epistle*, § 2), are foreign to the second. In the use also of several single expressions there is an established difference: *κύριος*, when used without more precise definition, is in the second epistle a designation of God, cf. chap. ii. 9 (11), iii. 8, 9, 10; in the first epistle, on the other hand, except in quotations from the O. T., it is used of Christ, cf. chap. ii. 3, 13. In the first epistle the name *Χριστός*, when not joined with *Ἰησοῦς*, is frequently treated as a proper name, cf. i. 11, 19, ii. 21, iii. 16, 18, iv. 1, 13, 14, v. 1; in the second epistle, on the other hand, *Χριστός* never occurs except in connection with *Ἰησοῦς*. And these divergences are all the more fitted to excite surprise, if, as Hofmann assumes, the second epistle was written very soon after the first.

1. The objection raised against the last remark, that the combination of *Χριστός* with *Ἰησοῦς* occurs also in the first epistle (*Weisinger, Schott, Brückner*), is without force, since this is not, and never could have been, denied. And it signifies equally little that, as Hofmann shows, in the second epistle (with the

adaptation of *Tit. ii. 12-14*, etc. Schott attaches particular importance to this, that leading and fundamental ideas in the epistle are employed in the same prominent manner only here and in the Pastoral Epistles, as *εὐσεβεία, εὐσεβής, ἀσεβής, σωτήρ, σώζειν, μαιίνω* with its family, *ἐπίγνωσις, βλασφημεῖν, ἐπαγγέλλομαι*; a dependence, too, on the Epistle to the Hebrews he considers hardly less evident.—All these assertions, however, are unwarranted. As a matter of course, there are ideas expressed in Second Peter which correspond to those contained in other epistles; but this arises from the oneness of the Christian faith, and is no

proof of a special reference to any of those epistles. As regards the individual leading and fundamental ideas of the Pastoral Epistles and of Second Peter, adduced by Schott, *ἀσεβεία* (*ἀσεβεία*) is to be found equally in the Epistle to the Romans; *σωτήρ* occurs in other N. T. writings; *σώζειν* is not used in Second Peter, and as little is *μαιίνω; ἐπίγνωσις* and *βλασφημεῖν* are terms which are to be found often enough in the N. T.; *ἐπαγγέλλομαι* in 2 Pet. ii. 19, has not the meaning which it has in First Timothy; the terms *εὐσεβής, εὐσεβεία* alone, are almost the only ones which are peculiar to these epistles.

exception of i. 1) Ἰησ. Χριστός also is never to be found alone, but always in connection with ὁ κύριος ἡμῶν, etc., since it cannot be denied that Χριστός is used by itself — often in the first, but never in the second epistle. — Of still less consequence are the remarks of Hofmann as to the use of κύριος. When Schott asserts that Χριστός, with or without the article, wherever it stands in the first epistle, denotes the Mediator as such, but that in the second epistle there is nothing to lead to the mention of the Mediator, it must be remarked in reply, that in the second epistle Christ is designated as the Mediator distinctly enough by the name σωτήρ.

2. Besides the differences here mentioned, Mayerhoff brings forward many others. In doing so, however, he has gone much too far. Thus, he lays stress on the fact that in the first epistle the exhortations are commenced concisely with the imperative; in the second, on the other hand, with a circumlocutory expression, e.g., i. 12, 13, 15, iii. 1, 2, 8. But in the first epistle, the latter manner of beginning could not occur, inasmuch as the apostle does not there remind his readers of what they had formerly heard from him, as he does in the second epistle; nor, in the second epistle, is the imperative without circumlocution by any means wanting. Further, Mayerhoff speaks of it as peculiar to the second epistle, that ἐν is inserted with a substantive, as in chap. i. 4; yet the same takes place in the first epistle. Of many of the phenomena which are supposed to be peculiar to the first epistle, Mayerhoff himself admits that they are to be found also in the second, only less frequently. To the assertion that in the two epistles the conception of the Christian religion is not the same, it must be replied, that the various expressions denote the different sides of the Christian life. As against Mayerhoff, cf. the discussions of Schott, Brückner, Weiss.

No doubt their diversity in thought may be traced to a difference in the tendency of the two epistles, nor is the diction either of the second by any means unjustifiable;¹ yet it does appear strange that, if Peter wrote this letter from the situation on which the second epistle is based, he should have done so in such a manner that it would present so many diversities in character from that of the first epistle. Nevertheless, there are between the two writings many points of coincidence which cannot be overlooked. In both attention is directed chiefly to the *parousia* of Christ, and to preparation for it by a holy walk. In both the readers are expressly shown that to be Christians, as they were, is to be in the right and true state of salvation, and they are exhorted at once to give proof of it by a

¹ It is only these two points, here distinctly expressed, which Hofmann brings forward in order to remove all objections, arising from

the different characters of the two epistles, to the view that both are the productions of the same author.

holy behavior, and to confirm themselves in it. Both epistles, further, have this in common, that they are strongly dependent on the O. T. (on this see Schott and Weiss). In the mode of expression, also, there are to be found many points of coincidence. Thus it may be noted that in i. 4 the ideas *καλεῖν* and *ἀρετή* are connected together in a manner which, though not identical with 1 Pet. ii. 9, is yet similar to it; that as in 1 Pet. i. 19, the adjectives *ἄμωμος* and *ἄσπιλος* stand together, so in 2 Pet. iii. 14, *ἄσπιλος* and *ἀμώμητος* are conjoined, with which also the expression, ii. 13: *σπίλοι καὶ μῶμοι*, corresponds; that the word *ἀπόθεσις* is to be found only in these two epistles. It is also worthy of remark that the introductions and the conclusions in both the epistles show an unmistakable likeness. The commencement points, in the case of each, to the future kingdom of God; 1 Pet. i. 4: *εἰς κληρονομίαν*; 2 Pet. i. 11: *εἰς τὴν αἰώνιον βασιλείαν Ἰησ. Χριστοῦ*; and as at the close of First Peter the purpose of the letter is stated by the *παρακαλῶν*, κ.τ.λ., v. 12, so in Second Peter the design of the composition is given by *φυλάσσεσθε . . . αὐξάνετε*, where the *φυλάσσεσθε . . . ἵνα μὴ ἐκπέσητε τοῦ ἰδίου στηριγμοῦ* corresponds in a particular manner with the *στηρίξαι* and the *ἐπιμαρτυρῶν*, *ταύτην εἶναι ἀληθὴ χάριν τοῦ Θεοῦ, εἰς ἣν ἐστήκατε*, in First Peter.

Like the opponents of the authenticity in bringing forward differences, its defenders have not unfrequently overstepped all bounds in the production of supposed points of coincidence. Of this Schott has been especially guilty. He goes so far as to say that even 2 Pet. i. 1 "is an armory from which all doubts concerning the Petrine origin of the second epistle are repelled," and everywhere, wherever in thought or conception any resemblance between the two epistles is to be seen, he seeks to show that the second makes reference to the first, without in any way distinguishing what in conception is Christian and common from what is characteristic and peculiar; and Brückner has accordingly justly protested against many of the arguments advanced by Schott. But even Weiss often goes too far, as when, with reference to the doctrine of redemption, he maintains that the ideas of calling and of election in 2 Peter (i. 10) seem to be synonymous as in 1 Peter, whilst the fact is, that no such combination occurs in the latter epistle; when he compares the *κοινωνία θείας φύσεως* (2 Pet. i. 4) with the thought that the calling is the motive to become like unto him who calls, after 1 Pet. i. 15; when he thinks that the *θεία δύναμις* of Christ, which gives all that is necessary for the new life, corresponds with the divine *δύναμις*, which preserves unto salvation (1 Pet. i. 5); further, when he lays stress on the fact that in both epistles, the *δικαιοσύνη* constitutes the central point of Christian moral life, whilst elsewhere also in the New Testament the essence of such life is often enough expressed by *δικαιοσύνη*; when he considers that the falling

a prey to *φθορά* (2 Pet. i. 4, ii. 12, 19) recalls the antithesis between *φθαρτόν* and *ἄφθαρτον* in the first epistle; when he states that in the second epistle (i. 7) the *φιλαδελφία* forms the climax of the Christian virtues in harmony with 1 Pet. i. 22, since there it is not *φιλαδελφία*, but *ἀγάπη* which is spoken of as the climax, and *φιλαδελφία* is also made prominent elsewhere in the N. T. With regard to the doctrinal phraseology, Weiss, in the first instance, adduces a number of points of divergence, and then lays stress on the fact that many, and in part striking, points of agreement are to be found. But here, again, Weiss goes too far; the most of the substantives, adjectives, and verbs which he brings forward as significant of the agreement of the two epistles, being in current use in N. T. language. As regards substantives, with the exception of *ἀρετή*, the term *γνώσις* (1 Pet. iii. 7 and 2 Pet. i. 5) only can be adduced as of importance, for *τιμῆ* and *δόξα* occur elsewhere together; in like manner *τέκνα*, in a metaphorical sense, is to be found elsewhere; it is plainly incorrect to say that *δύναμις* in 2 Pet. ii. 11 is used of angels as in 1 Pet. iii. 22; in the latter passage it denotes the angels themselves, but not so in the former. How the adjectives adduced by Weiss should ever have a special significance, it is not easy to see, used as they often enough are elsewhere. The same is the case with most of the verbs; *ἀναστρέφεται ἐν* and *αὐξάνειν ἐν* at most can be brought forward as of importance in this connection. And in referring to kindred expressions, Weiss again goes too far. The following at most are to be noted here as worthy of attention: *ἰσότης* in the second, and *πολύτιμος* in the first; *ἄθεσμος* there, *ἄθεμτος* here; the already mentioned *ἄσπιλος καὶ ἀμόμητος* in the first, and *ἄσπιλος καὶ ἄμωμος* in the second, but hardly *ἄκαταπαύστους ἁμαρτίας* and *πέπνται ἁμαρτίας*.

In spite of all points of accord, real and asserted, the verdict of Weiss comes only to this, that if these be taken into account, there will be an inclination to see in the divergences no hinderance to an identity of authorship; that the points of agreement are more than those of divergence; and that the old complaint as to the complete difference of style was founded on very great exaggeration. Similar, though more moderate, is the judgment of Brückner. Schott, however, expressly admits that the outward form of the second epistle as a whole shows, at first sight even, quite other features from those of the first epistle. The question as to how the undeniable difference in thought and expression is to be explained, has been variously answered. On the assumption of the authenticity of the epistle, it will not do to explain the difficulty by supposing that Peter wrote "in advanced old age, and when at the very gate of death" (Guericke), for the period between the composition of the first and the second epistles can have been, comparatively speaking, only a brief one, at most four years—

a time certainly too short to account for the difference. Hieronymus tries to make the dissimilarity of style intelligible by assuming that Peter made use of different interpreters for each of his epistles. But this hypothesis of the use of interpreters is without any valid reason, and, besides, is inadequate to the end it is meant to serve. It is certainly more correct to find the ground of the diversity in the different tendencies of the two epistles. The purpose of the first is to lay down to the readers their true course of conduct in the midst of the persecutions they had to suffer; that of the second, on the other hand, is to protect them against the heresies of the Libertines which threatened them.¹ These different tendencies must naturally lend to each of the epistles its own peculiar character. Yet even Schott admits that this alone is insufficient for the solution of the problem. Schott thinks it can be solved only in this way: that Peter in his first epistle, "for the sake of his readers — to whom he was unknown — and in his own interest, of set purpose kept his individuality assiduously in the background, and sought with the utmost possible fidelity all through the epistle to write in a manner to which the Gentile Christians and the Pauline churches were accustomed. For this reason he elaborated his first epistle with special care, even as to form; but after he had entered into near personal relations with his readers, he had not the same occasion as in the first epistle to keep his own individuality out of sight." This manner of answering the question under discussion, which Weiss justly calls "hyper-artificial," needs certainly no refutation. As, then, the difficulty is not to be removed either by separating, with Weiss, the two epistles by an interval of more than ten years, — for the assumption that the first epistle was written before the letters of the Apostle Paul to the churches of Asia Minor, is an untenable hypothesis, — it must be admitted, with Brückner and Weiss, on the supposition of the authenticity, that there is presented here a problem which has not yet been satisfactorily solved. And the difficulty is increased if it be considered that in the two epistles quite different conditions of the churches are presupposed; for, whilst in the first there is no trace of any dread of heretical trouble, there is wanting

¹ Hofmann thinks that the different tendencies of the two epistles are erroneously stated here. He holds that the first epistle contains "nothing as to what are usually termed persecutions of Christians," and that in the second epistle there is "no warning against teachers of false doctrine, to whom the readers were

exposed, or who already had appeared in their midst." Both assertions are false. To what is said above must be added only, that the two epistles, relating as they do to different circumstances, point to the exhortation to lead "an holy and godly life."

in the second all reference to persecutions to which the readers were exposed,—a circumstance which is not to be passed over so lightly as Hofmann does.

The shorter the time between the composition of the two epistles, the more surprising is this phenomenon; the longer, the easier is it of explanation. For Weiss, who assumes an interval of over ten years, there is here hardly any difficulty, more especially as he thinks that Peter, after the composition of the first epistle, was personally present in the churches, and in that case did not need to mention the persecutions which had induced him to compose his first letter. Brückner reserves for himself a way of escape from the difficulty caused by this and other surprising phenomena, by holding that as to the close of Peter's life the received tradition may be wrong. Schott, on the other hand, attaches no importance to these divergences, although in his opinion the first epistle was written in the year 65, and the second in the year 66. For he assumes, on the one hand, that when Peter wrote his second epistle the persecutions were past; and, on the other, that even in the first there are references to errors already present, which Peter, "from his tender and fine feeling of the delicate relation in which he stood to a Pauline church as yet in reality unknown to him," did not wish expressly to censure. Both assumptions are erroneous; for the persecutions which were the occasion of the first epistle are there clearly characterized as persecutions which, after they had arisen, continued (see *Introd. to Ep. 1*); and as regards the heresies supposed to have been in existence when the first epistle was composed, Weiss justly remarks: "There is nothing to be discovered in it, either of the connection with the heresy combated in the second epistle, which Brückner artificially brings out, nor of its clearly marked features, which Schott professes to have found." It is not in any way to be inferred from the First Epistle of Peter, as Schott asserts, "that it shows a greater spread and inward intensity of the evil combated in the Epistle to Timothy," or that 1 Pet. iv. 2-4 attests that "a comparatively large section of the readers was prepared, by a liberal concession to immorality in social life, to gain undisturbed security for themselves as professing Christians;" or that in iii. 18 ff., iv. 5, 6, 17, 18, it is hinted "that the spiritualistic explaining away of the resurrection of the flesh led the readers to deny also a final judicial decision connected with the return of Christ in the body." Schott, in what he here says, is moving, not on the ground of true exegesis, but in the region of the most arbitrary fiction.

The less success has attended all efforts to overcome the difficulties which, on the assumption of the authenticity, lie in the relation of the two epistles to each other, the more justifiable does doubt as to the authenticity appear. It has, no doubt, been asserted that a *falsarius* would have followed the first epistle so closely as to have avoided these differences;

but it is equally conceivable that a pseudonymous author could have written under the influence of Peter's epistle indeed, yet still in his own peculiar style, and without being anxiously careful lest the origin of his composition should thus be betrayed. On this assumption the existence both of similarity and divergence is explained. Several considerations have been urged against the authenticity of the epistle:—

1. The intention of the author to make himself known as the Apostle Peter. To this it may be replied, that, looked at from the situation in which the epistle was written, and which it presupposes (i. 13, 14), this so-called intention is neither unnatural, nor need it excite surprise. If Peter, conscious of his approaching death, felt himself impelled to write a last word to the churches with which he had before this become connected, reminding them of his former preaching, and warning them against doubts as to the second coming of Christ, it was certainly not out of place for him to mention himself, his relation to the churches, and more especially that event in his own life by which the glory of Christ was revealed to him in a manner so special. 2. The remark the author makes on the epistles of Paul and the other Scriptures. In itself, the fact is not strange that the epistle bears testimony to an acquaintance with the epistles of Paul, for that some of the latter were known to Peter is evident from the first epistle; nor do the words (chap. iii. 16) imply that the author possessed a *formally* completed collection of them. But the expression: *ὡς καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς γραφάς*, is certainly striking. For although it is arbitrary to understand by it the *whole* of the other books of the New Testament, yet the expression must have reference to writings which were already in general use in the churches. It is at least open to question whether this could have been said, in Peter's time, of writings of the New Testament. Several interpreters (Luthardt, Wiesinger) understand by the term the oldest writings; on this point see the exposition. 3. The use made of the Epistle of Jude. It is certainly going too far to brand this as a plagiarism (Reuss); nor can it be said that to make use of another's work was in itself unworthy of an apostle. Still, it is surprising that an apostle should have incorporated in his epistle, as to the substance of it, a non-apostolic letter.¹ De Wette's accusations are, however, unjust: that in Second Peter

¹ Weiss takes a too low estimate of the use made of Jude's epistle when he says: "Second Peter intentionally *seeks support* in the highly realistic and vivid description given by Jude of his opponents; and that, even apart

from this intentional connection, an expression may *involuntarily* here and there have presented itself to the author's pen from an epistle so important, and which he had probably just read."

the simple expression of Jude is partly changed by rhetorical and artificial circumlocution, partly disfigured and singularly superseded, and that a vacillating line of thought takes the place of one firm and definite. The circumlocutions and additions of Second Peter do not bear on them the character of artificialness. If alterations in the latter composition are to be found (cf. Jude 12, with 2 Pet. ii. 13; Jude 12, 13, with 2 Pet. ii. 17), these cannot be said to be distortions (or, according to Schwegler, confusion and misunderstanding); and if the original course of ideas be not firmly maintained owing to the introduction of new relations (cf. 2 Pet. ii. 5, 7-9), and a transposition be resorted to (cf. 2 Pet. ii. 13-17, comp. with Jude 11-13), yet the firmness of the line of thought does not in any way suffer thereby. Incorrect, too, is De Wette's assertion, that "the heretics combated in Second Peter are mere nonentities, and a spurious copy of the seducers in Jude;" as also that of Schwegler, that they are characterized not after life, not from direct knowledge of them, but according to the vague representation of tradition. Not, however, without weight is the circumstance on which De Wette lays stress, that the false teachers are represented at one time as about to appear in the future, at another as already present. Wiesinger rejects the view, that while in ii. 1-3 the future seducers are meant, ver. 10 ff. has reference to those already present; and assumes that the future *ἔσονται* applies only to the relation of these seducers *to the readers*, and their work among them. Weiss combats this assumption, and in opposition to it defends that rejected by Wiesinger. If it be conceivable that the Libertines already present are "the beginning of the end," and therefore not yet the *ψευδοδιδάσκαλοι*, ver. 1, still it must not fail to be observed that in the epistle itself no single word definitely points to any such distinction. Even less satisfactory is it to say, with Dietlein, that the first germs of opposition were already in existence; or, with Luthardt and Schott, to hold that if the author speaks of the false teachers as already present, he does so only in appearance, arising from the circumstance that he passes from the prediction to the description of them. It may perhaps be most correct to assume that the author, in the first instance, quotes the prophetic word in and for itself simply; and that he afterwards, in the description of the Libertines already in existence, hints that the predictions had begun to be fulfilled. Brückner seems to hold a similar opinion; only he unites this view with that of Wiesinger, and thus deprives it of its necessary clearness. — If the authenticity be rejected, the difficulty seems to disappear. It would then lie to hand to explain the vacillation by saying, that the author thought to combat the heresies of his time, with better result, by representing them

as already predicted by Peter, and by allowing himself, in the description of them, to be guided by a composition in which they were treated as actually in existence. But it can hardly be conceived that the author should fail to perceive how incongruous his conduct was. — Worthy of remark, further, is the endeavor of the author to obliterate all apocryphal traces to be found in Jude.¹ The total omission of these would have argued nothing against the Petrine authorship; but it is only the words of Enoch (Jude 14, 15) that are left out. The passage relating to the angels: *τοὺς μὴ τηρήσαντας . . . οἰκητήριον*, is — inasmuch as the case of the angels must not be omitted — changed into the more general: *ἀγγέλων ἀμαρτησάντων*, whilst the punishment that befell them is given in almost the same words. The reference to the apocryphal narrative of the contest between the Archangel Michael and the Devil is likewise not wholly destroyed, but only effaced, — a more general term being employed, which, however, causes the thought itself to lose its clearness and precision.²

4. The heretical denial of the second advent of Christ, and of the final judgment of the world connected therewith. Although, already in Paul's lifetime, many errors in the teaching as to the last things — as, for example, the denial of the resurrection — had begun to grow up, there is nothing in the other writings of the New Testament to show that the *parousia* of Christ was called in question; yet the denial of it is so naturally connected with that of the resurrection, that it could quite easily have found expression even while Peter was yet alive. On the other hand, it cannot be questioned that the reasons assigned by the false teachers (2 Pet. iii. 4) are such as seem to belong rather to a time later than that of the Apostle Peter, although the words by no means imply that the *parousia* had for *many* generations already been looked for in vain (Schwegler). And, further, there are the facts that the so-called Second Epistle of Clemens Romanus combats the same heresy, — although in an advanced

¹ Schwegler sees in this also a proof that the epistle was not written until the end of the second century, inasmuch as the dislike to quote apocryphal writings was still foreign even to an Irenaeus, a Clement, or an Origen. If importance must be attached to this, the epistle plainly cannot have been written till after the time of Origen, which is impossible.

² Wiesinger and Brückner think that Enoch's prediction of judgment was omitted only because there was no appropriate place

for it in the connection of thought in this epistle, and that the change in the two verses, 4 and 11, does not show a desire to efface what is apocryphal; that Peter only generalized the special fact mentioned by Jude, ver. 9, presupposing at the same time an acquaintance on the part of his readers with the apocryphal incident referred to. But does not such a presupposition contain what must appear unsuited to an apostle?

state of development, — and that one similar, at least, is mentioned in the Epistle of Polycarp.

5. The view expressed in this epistle as to the origin and the destruction of the world. The opinion of Mayerhoff and Neander, that this view “is in harmony neither with the practical, simple mind of Peter, nor with the N. T. development of doctrine,” reaches certainly too far; it can only be said that it does not find expression elsewhere in the New Testament. Yet the conception that the world arose into being out of the water by the word of God, points back to the history of creation in Genesis; and that of its destruction by fire, though not indeed expressed, has nevertheless the way prepared for it in passages of the O. T., such as Isa. xvi. 15, Dan. vii. 9 sq. (cf. 1 Cor. iii. 13; 2 Thess. i. 8), so that a more precise development of it by Peter is not inconceivable. In opposition to the appeal to the passage in the *Clementine Homilies*, xi. 24: λογισαμενος οτι τα πάντα το υδωρ ποιει, κ.τ.λ., Brückner remarks that it must not be overlooked that in Clement it is water, and in Peter God’s word, to which precedence is given.

When Credner thinks to prove the spuriousness of the epistle by saying that an apostle would never have made reference to one of the *mythical* additions in the Gospels like the narrative of Christ’s transfiguration; and Reuss, by asserting that “the apparent aim of the epistle is to defend the teaching as to the last things, according to the *Judæo-Christian* conception of it, and that as much against unbelief as against a *spiritualizing* interpretation,” — their views must be simply rejected. Not less unjustifiable is it, however, for Bleek to base his verdict of rejection on the circumstance that in i. 18 the mount of transfiguration is called τὸ ὄρος τὸ ἁγίων, inasmuch as the place is not even mentioned in the Gospels, or more nearly described.

If the numerous difficulties and doubts above mentioned do not render the authenticity of the epistle absolutely impossible, many of them are yet of such a nature that the spuriousness of the epistle appears to be hardly less probable than its genuineness, especially as the only positive evidence for the latter is the statement of the author himself, that he is the Apostle Peter. On the other hand, many reasons seem to speak against its pseudonymity. Guericke insists that the passages characteristic of the epistle are, “living, spiritual, and truly apostolic;” but, apart from the circumstance that, e.g., the want of any reference to the essential facts of salvation does seem strange in the case of the Apostle Peter, this in no way excludes the possibility of a non-apostolic origin. He further says that it is not apparent what purpose a *falsarius* could have had in writing; but this is refuted by

the epistle itself, which clearly enough states its design. Further, it has been remarked that the epistle, if it be written under a false name, is a palpable fraud, and to this its own moral character is opposed. But, in reply to this, the fact may be brought forward that men of earnest moral character have often thought more effectually to combat heresy by assuming a pseudonyme. Thiersch asserts that it was in the period which followed the labors of Paul, and preceded those of John, that that Libertinism made its appearance in the Pauline churches; but from this it does not follow that the heresy did not maintain itself for a considerable time, so that after Jude had already combated it in his epistle, a later attack on it would have been no longer timely.

Weiss, too, has attempted to prove the hypothesis of a pseudonyme untenable. He urges, in the first instance, that it is afflicted with an evil contradiction; for the author appears to play his rôle at one time cleverly, at another very awkwardly, inasmuch as, with all his endeavors to make himself pass for the apostle, he sometimes forgets his part, and thus betrays his pseudonymity; and, whilst the connection with Jude is made in full harmony with his design, it is carried out in direct opposition to it. Weiss in his remarks has omitted to observe, that, like many of the opponents of the authenticity too, he attributes to the author various intentions, which the words of the epistle in no way entitle him to do.¹ Again, Weiss seeks to show that, on the assumption of a pseudonymous author, there is no uniform purpose discoverable in the epistle. But as far as its purpose is concerned, it is irrelevant whether the epistle was composed by the apostle or not. If the three passages in the epistle—the polemic against the Libertines described according to the Epistle of Jude, that against the deniers of the *parousia*, and the recommendation of Paul's writings—form a united whole, it is not clear how they should do so less if they had an author other than Peter. Finally, Weiss seeks to show that no suitable time can be adduced for the composition of the epistle if it be pseudonymous. But this difficulty is not less than that which arises in specifying the time in the life of Peter when he wrote the epistle; and if it be difficult to show how a pseudony-

¹ The author is supposed to have forgotten his part, from this circumstance, that whilst in the beginning of it he does not name a special class of readers, *in order thus to hide the interpolation* of his epistle, he indirectly mentions them in iii. 1. But there is no proof that the author intentionally, and for pruden-

tial reasons, omitted to name the class of readers whom he addressed. The same holds good with regard to the assertion that he intentionally chose the prophetic form, ii. 1 ff. and iii. 3, in order that this epistle might contain *the prophecy* to which Jude in ver. 17 refers.

mous composition could have found acceptance in the church, it is not less hard to explain how a genuine composition of the Apostle Peter could have remained for so long a time unused in the service of the church. If, then, the grounds for and against the authenticity are thus evenly balanced, there is here presented a problem which is not yet solved, and which perhaps cannot be solved, so that the guardedness with which Brückner, Wiesinger also, and even Weiss, with all his inclination to regard the epistle as genuine, express themselves on the question, deserves only acknowledgment.

If the epistle be not genuine, the question arises *by whom, when, and where* it was written. — Mayerhoff seeks to show that it was composed by a Jewish Christian in Alexandria in the middle of the second century. That the author was a Jewish and not a Gentile Christian, the whole character of the epistle shows; but that he lived in Alexandria, cannot be concluded from the reasons brought forward by Mayerhoff.¹ The date, too, to which he assigns the composition of the epistle, is certainly too late, inasmuch as the description of the heretics contains no reference to Gnostic views properly so called. It would be more appropriate to look upon it as a production of the first century. — Schwegler considers Rome to have been the place, and the end of the second century, at the earliest, the time of the epistle's composition. In Rome, he thinks, endeavors were made, by carrying out a Petrinism and a Paulinism, to realize the idea of the Catholic Church. In Rome, therefore, it was that—like so many other writings which have reference to these two schools—this epistle was composed. Its object—an entirely conciliatory one—is this, as is evident from chap. iii. 15, 16, and i. 14, 16 ff., “to bring about from the standpoint of Petrinism a final and permanent peace between the opposing views of the followers of Peter and those of Paul.” In confirmation of this, Schwegler asserts that the peculiarities of the Petrine system are apparent throughout the epistle, whilst that which is specifically Pauline entirely recedes. But if a doubt arise even here as to how a so decided follower of Peter—who, according to

¹ These reasons are: (1) The standpoint of *γνώσις*, and the speculation as to how the world originated, and how it will be destroyed. But the *γνώσις* spoken of in our epistle is entirely different from the *γνώσις* of Alexandrine-Jewish speculation; and that the view here expressed as to the beginning—unjustly called a *speculation*—of the world, had its origin precisely in Egypt, is not proved. (2) The use made of the Epistle of Jude; but that

the latter was composed in Alexandria is at least very doubtful. (3) The coincidence between this epistle and the so-called Second Epistle of Clement of Rome, in opposing the same heretical tendency; but, as there is no proof that the quotation occurring in this epistle was taken from the *εὐαγγέλιον κατ' Αἰγυπτίους*, it is also doubtful whether this fragment had its origin in Egypt.

the view of Schwegler, must as such have necessarily stood in opposition to him—could have been the eulogist of Paul, it must excite most legitimate astonishment to see what are the reasons he brings forward in support of his view.¹ The evidence, too, which he leads for the late date of composition, possesses no value.² The chief point, the so-called conciliatory tendency of the epistle, is a pure hypothesis, which has no support in the epistle itself; for neither in the passages quoted by him, nor in any others, are the differences between Petrinism and Paulinism touched upon, much less adjusted or surmounted. No doubt Paul is spoken of in terms of praise; but, according to the connection of the passage, only for the purpose of warning the churches to which the epistle is addressed, lest they should be led astray by the heretics, who wrested and changed many statements of the apostle for their own purposes.³

¹ These reasons are: the employment of expressions peculiar to Judæo-Christian modes of thought: *εὐσέβεια, ἅγια ἀναστροφάι, ἀρετή, ἅγια ἐντολή, κ.τ.λ.* (but almost all these expressions are to be found in the N. T. writings, which, according to Schwegler, favor Paulinism); the high place given to the *λόγος προφητικὸς* (as if Paul had set little value on it); the countenance given to angelological mysticism (which he thinks is proved by chap. ii. 10, 11!); the demand for a tradition as a standard in the interpretation of Scripture (said to be contained in chap. i. 20!); *ὁ γένος κήρυξ δικαιοσύνης*, as applied to Noah; and the reference to the Gospel of the Hebrews (in support of which chap. i. 17 is quoted).

² Thus, when, among other things, Schwegler brings forward as a reason for this, the writer's acquaintance with such N. T. Scriptures as he supposes to have been composed

only after the middle of the second century, i. e., the Pastoral Epistles, the Gospels of John and of Mark. He concludes that the author was acquainted with the Pastoral Epistles from the fact that some expressions occur only in these, and in the epistles of Peter; as also with the Gospel of John, by asserting that the writer, in chap. i. 14, had the passage, John xxi., 18, 19, in his mind; and, finally, with the Gospel of Mark, by supposing that chap. i. 12-15 contains allusions to that gospel (!).

³ Heydenreich rightly observes: "For that (conciliatory) purpose, the little which chap. iii. says in passing of Paul would not have sufficed; if the writer had been chiefly anxious to show such a union, he would have adapted the construction and contents of the whole epistle to the conciliatory design."

Πέτρου ἐπιστολὴ β΄.

According to A and B, the Inscriptio is simply: Πέτρου β΄.

CHAPTER I.

Ver. 1. Συμεών]. B, several min., and vss. read, according to the usual form, Σιμών (Lachm.), which is evidently an alteration. — Ver. 3. After A, 8, etc., Tisch. 8 reads, τὰ πάντα, instead of the Rec. πάντα, according to almost all authorities (Lachm., Tisch. 7). — διὰ δόξης καὶ ἀρετῆς]. A, C, P, 8, many min., Copt., Arm., Vulg., etc., read, *ιδίᾳ δόξῃ καὶ ἀρετῇ*, which Griesb. thinks probable; accepted by Lachm. and Tisch., approved of by the modern commentators and Reiche; the Rec. in B (Buttm. has, however, put a ? to B), K, L, al., Thph., Oec., appears to be a correction. — Ver. 4. The Rec. is: τὰ μέγιστα ἡμῖν καὶ τίμα; this occurs only in some min., however much the position of the single words varies in the different Codd., etc. Buttmann has, following B: τὰ τίμα κ. μέγ. ἡμῖν; Lachm. and Tisch. 7, following C, read: τὰ μέγιστα καὶ τίμα ἡμῖν; so, too, A, only instead of ἡμῖν, ὑμῖν. Tisch. 8, following K, L, 8, and many min., has accepted τὰ τίμα ἡμῶν καὶ μέγιστα. It cannot be determined which reading is the original one. — ἐν κόσμῳ]. Rec., according to C, K, several min., Thph., Oec. (Tisch. 7); on the other hand, A, B, L, 8, etc., attest ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ (Lachm., Tisch. 8). — Ver. 5. αὐτὸ τοῦτο δέ]. Rec., sufficiently corroborated by B, C*, K, L, P, al., pl., Syr., Oec. — In C**, 8, several min., Thph., there is αὐτὸ δε τοῦτο. Lachm., according to A, reads αὐτοὶ δέ, which can only be considered a correction. Tischendorf has rightly retained the Rec. Schott arbitrarily supposes that the original reading might be: καὶ αὐτοὶ τοῦτο δέ. — Ver. 8. Instead of ὑπάρχοντα, which is attested by almost all authorities, Lachm., according to A, Vulg., etc., has accepted παρόντα, which probably arose from the subsequent πάρεσσι. — Ver. 9. ἀμαρτιῶν]. Rec., according to B, C, L, P, al., Thph., Oec. (Lachm.); in its place, Griesb., Scholz, Tisch., etc., according to A, K, 8, al., Damasc., have ἀμαρτημάτων, which most likely is the original reading; the alteration is easily explained by Heb. i. 3, as well as by ἀμάρτημα, being in the N. T. of rarer occurrence. — Ver. 10. σπουδάσατε βεβαίαν ὑμῶν τὴν κλήσιν καὶ ἐκλογὴν ποιῆσαί. Rec., according to B, C, K, L, P, al., pl., Theoph., Oec., etc. (Tisch.); in A, 8, several min., and many vss., the words *ἵνα διὰ τῶν καλῶν ὑμῶν ἔργων* are inserted between *σπουδάσατε* and *βεβαίαν* (evidently a later explanatory addition), in which the inf. is changed into temp. finit., *ποιήσατε* (Lachm.; in the small ed., *ποιήσατε*). — Ver. 12. οὐκ ἀμελήσω]. Rec., after K, L, al., Thph., Oec. (Griesb., Scholz); on the other hand, A, B, C, P, 8, al., Copt., Sahid., Vulg., etc., are in favor of *μελλήσω*, which is justly accepted by Lachm. and

Tisch., approved of by De Wette-Brückner, Wiesinger, and Schott, whilst Reiche prefers *οὐκ ἀμελήσω*, *ut modestius et urbanus*.—According to the testimony of B, C, K, L, 8, al., pl., several vss., etc., *ἀεὶ ὑμῶς* (Griesb., Scholz, Tisch.) should be put in place of the Rec. *ὑμῶς ἀεὶ*, following A, Vulg., etc. (Lachm.).—Ver. 17. Tisch. 7 reads, after B: *ὁ υἱὸς μου ὁ ἀγαπητὸς μου οὐτός ἐστιν*, and remarks, with reference to the Rec. *οὐτός ἐστιν ὁ υἱὸς μου ὁ ἀγαπητὸς* (after A, C, K, L, 8, etc., Lachm.): *at ita locis parall. omnib. quorum nullo οὐτ. ἐστ. postponitur neque Graec. ullus testis μου repetit.* Tisch. 8 has accepted the Rec.—Ver. 18. According to B, C*, etc., Tisch. 7 reads: *ἐν τῷ ἁγίῳ ὄρει*; but the Rec., *ἐν τῷ ὄρει τῷ ἁγίῳ* (Tisch. 8), is too strongly supported by A, C***, K, L, P, 8, al., Vulg., ever to be regarded as spurious.—Ver. 21. According to B, C, K, P, al., Copt., etc., Tisch. 7 has *ποτέ* after *προφητεία*, and Tisch. 8, following A, L, 8, etc., *ποτέ* before *προφητεία*; this order of words is the more natural, but for that very reason can hardly be considered the original one.—The Rec. *οἱ ἄγιοι Θεοῦ* occurs only in several min., some vss., Oec., Vulg.—A has *ἄγιοι τοῦ Θεοῦ* (Lachm.); K, L, 8, al., *ἄγιοι Θεοῦ* (Griesb., Scholz). Tisch. has adopted in its place, *ἀπὸ Θεοῦ*, according to B, al., Syr., Copt.; Wiesinger, Schott, and Steinfass prefer this reading; Brückner, too, inclines to it; no doubt it was the one which was most likely to give rise to alterations; still, it is too little supported by B, etc. Reiche considers *ἄγιοι Θεοῦ* to be the original reading.

Vv. 1, 2 *Συμεὼν Πέτρος*]. The form most in harmony with the Semitic language: *Συμεων*, as a name of Peter, is to be found, besides here, only in Acts xv. 14; otherwise, cf. Luke ii. 25, iii. 30; Rev. vii. 7; Acts xiii. 1. From the addition of the name itself, as little as from its form, can any thing be concluded as to the genuineness (in opposition to Dietlein, Schott, Steinfass) or the non-genuineness of the epistle. The two names *Σίμων Πέτρος* are directly conjoined also in Matt. xvi. 16; Luke v. 8, etc.; elsewhere, too, the apostle is called *Σίμων ὁ λεγόμενος Πέτρος*. The addition of *Συμεὼν* serves to mark the author as a Jewish Christian.¹—*δοῦλος καὶ ἀπόστολος Ἰ. Χρ.*, cf. Rom. i. 1; Tit. i. 1 (Phil. i. 1). *δοῦλος* expresses the more general, *ἀπόστολος* the more special official relation; cf. Meyer on Rom. i. 1; Schott unjustly denies that *δοῦλος* has reference to the official relation. According to De Wette, the author has here combined 1 Pet. i. 1 and Jude 1.—*τοῖς ἰσότημον ἡμῖν λαχοῦσι πίστιν*]. *ἰσότημος* is inexactly translated in the Vulgate by *coaequaliter*; it is not equivalent to *ἴσος* (Acts xi. 17: *ἰση δωρεά*), but means, “*having equal honor or worth.*” De Wette’s interpretation is as incorrect: “to those who have obtained the same right to participate in faith with us.” The use of the words *τιμῆ*, *τιμαω*, in Peter’s epistle, does not prove that the expression has here reference specially to the divine privileges of the kingdom (Dietlein). By this word the author gives it to be understood, that the faith of those to whom he writes, has the same worth as that of those whom he designates by *ἡμῖν*; both have received one and the same faith (as to its objective contents) (Brückner, Besser, Wiesinger); Hornejus:

¹ Bengel, assuming the authenticity of the epistle, observes not inaptly that Peter adds *Συμεὼν*, “extremo tempore admonens se ipsum

conditionis pristinae, antequam cognomen nactus erat.”

dicitur fides aequae pretiosa, non quod omnium credentium aequae magna sit, sed quod per fidem illam eadem mysteria et eadem beneficia divina nobis proponantur. — The connection shows that by *ἡμῖν* all Christians (De Wette) cannot be understood; the word must only refer either to Peter (Pott), or to the apostles (Bengel, Wolf, Brückner, Steinfass, Fronmüller), or to the Jewish Christians generally (Nic. de Lyra, Dietlein, Besser, Wiesinger, Schott, Hofm.); the last is the correct application (cf. Acts xi. 17, xv. 9–11). Wiesinger: “That the faith of the apostles should have a different value from that of those who through their preaching had become believers, is an idea totally foreign to the apostolic age.” — *λαχοῦσι* points out that faith is a gift of grace. Huss: *sicut sors non respicit personam, ita nec divina electio acceptatrix est personarum* (cf. Acts i. 17). — On the breviloquence of the expression, cf. Winer, p. 579 (E. T., 623). — *ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ τοῦ Θεοῦ, κ.τ.λ.*]. Luther translates: “in the righteousness, which our God gives,” thus *δικαιοσύνη* would here mean *that* gift of God’s grace which is the result of faith, whether it is to be understood of the state of justification (Schott), or the Christians’ manner of life conformed to the commandments of God (Brückner). If this view be adopted, however, *δικαιοσύνη* cannot be connected with *πίστω*, for though *ἐν* may be regarded as equal simply to *cum*, or be taken in the sense of, being furnished with (thus Brückner, formerly), it would always denote that *πίστις* is contained in *δικαιοσύνη*, which certainly does not correspond with the relation in which the two stand to each other; faith is not bestowed on the Christian in righteousness, but righteousness in faith. Hofmann joins *ἐν δικ.* directly with *πίστω*, and understands by *δικαιοσύνη* here: “the righteousness which makes Christ our Saviour; that in which the world has the propitiation for its sins.” This interpretation assumes that *Θεοῦ* is predicate to *Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ* (see below); besides, it is opposed by the circumstance that the context makes no allusion to any such nearer definition of the idea, whilst it is arbitrary to render *πίστω ἐν δικ.*: “that faith which trusts in the righteousness of Jesus Christ.” Schott, Steinfass, and now, too, Brückner, connect *δικ.* with *ἰσότημον*; the position of the words, however, is opposed to this, for were *ἐν δικ.* the closer definition of *ἰσότημον*, it must have been placed directly beside it. Besides, a somewhat obscure thought results from this combination. The simple addition of *ἐν δικ.* does not assert that the faith of the one has equal value with the faith of the other in this, that in both cases it effects a *δικαιοσύνη*. *δικαιοσύνη* is here not a gift, but an attribute of God, or a characteristic of His dealings. Still, the expression must not be taken as equivalent either to “kindness” (Eman. a Sa., Pott), or to “faithfulness,” as regards the promises given by Him (Beza, Piscator, Grotius); for although *δικαιοσύνη* may sometimes come near to the above meanings, it is never identical¹ with them; cf. Meyer on

¹ De Wette thinks that the author, in approximation to the Pauline views, may perhaps have understood the righteousness of God as bringing in righteousness, — or salvation, — or as redemptive righteousness, otherwise termed *grace*; and the righteousness of Christ, as that

love by which He undertook the work of salvation. But *δικ.* means neither grace nor love; and, besides, it is altogether arbitrary to give the expression a different meaning with respect to Christ from that which it has when applied to God.

Rom. iii. 25. Still less warrant is there for Dietlein's view, that righteousness is here "as a *kingdom*, the totality of the divine action and revelation in contrast to this world full of sin and of uncompensated evil." Wiesinger (and thus also Fronmüller) understand by *δικαιοσύνη*, "the righteousness of God and Christ, which has manifested itself in the propitiation for the sins of the world;" in opposition to which Brückner correctly remarks, that Christ's work of atonement is not an act of His righteousness; further, "the righteousness of God which demands the death of the sinner" (Fronmüller), may be considered as causing the death of Christ, but not as producing faith. *δικαιοσύνη*, in harmony with *ισότιμον*, is rather that righteousness of God—opposed to every kind of *προσοπωληψία*—according to which He bestows the same faith on all, without respect of persons (cf. Acts x. 34 f.). *ἐν* is in meaning akin to *διὰ*, but it brings out more distinctly than it, *in what* the obtaining of the *πίστις ἰσοτ.* is grounded. The author's thought is accordingly this: "in His righteousness, which makes no distinction between the one and the other, God has bestowed on you the same like precious faith as on us."¹—*τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡμ. καὶ σωτήρος Ἰ. Χρ.*] Many interpreters (Beza, Hemming, Gerhard, and more recently Schott and Hofmann) take *τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡμ.* and *σωτήρος* as a double attribute of Ἰησοῦ Χρ. Others (Wiesinger, Brückner, Fronmüller, Steinfass) separate the two expressions, and understand *τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡμῶν* of God the Father; and rightly so, although in the similar combination, ver. 11, iii. 18, there be but *one* subject. For *θεός* differs from *κύριος* in this, that it is never conjoined with *Χριστός* as a direct attribute, whilst *κύριος* is very often thus employed, as in the very next verse; see my commentary to Tit. ii. 13. There need be no hesitation in taking the article which stands before *Θεοῦ* with *σωτήρος* also, as a second subject,—a statement which Schott and Hofmann have wrongly called in question; cf. (Winer, p. 124 [E. T., 130]) Buttmann, p. 84 ff. (E. T., 97, 100). Dietlein, in his interpretation, adopts a middle course: "of our God and Saviour; and when I speak of God the Saviour, I mean the Saviour Jesus Christ." But only this much is correct here, that the close conjunction points to the *oneness* of God and Christ of which the author was assured.—Ver. 2. *χάρις . . . πληθυνθείη*, as in 1 Pet. i. 2. In this passage *ἐν ἐπίγνωσει τοῦ Θεοῦ κ. Ἰησοῦ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν* is added. Here, too, *ἐν* is not *cum*, but states in what the increase of grace has its origin, and by what it is effected (De Wette). This is the knowledge of God and Jesus, our Lord; cf. on this John xvii. 3; 2 Pet. ii. 20. Calvin: *Dei et Christi agnitionem simul connectit, quia rite non potest, nisi in Christo, Deus agnoscī.* Although the *ἐπίγνωσις* here spoken of includes in it *acknowledgment*, yet it is erroneous to distinguish between *ἐπίγνωσις* and *γνώσις*, by holding the former to be equivalent to *acknowledgment*; cf. the further discussions on the term *ἐπίγνωσις* in Wiesinger and Schott, which, however, especially in the case of the latter, are not without the mixing-up of thoughts foreign to the idea. It is wrong to interpret *ἐν* by *εις*; Aretius: *ut colant Deum, quemadmodum sese patefecit in Scripturis et ut coli vult.* According to

¹ Hofmann most unwarrantably maintains that, in this interpretation, *ἐν* is taken "in a sense which cannot be justified."

Dietlein, the thought intended to be expressed is that "grace and peace grow and increase from within the soul, outwards, and in thus growing they became ever more and more knowledge of the revealed God" (!).

Ver. 3. The first paragraph, extending as far as ver. 11, contains exhortations. The first of these is expressed in vv. 5-7, and to it vv. 3 and 4 serve as an introduction. — *ὥς*]. Lachmann connects *ὥς* directly with what precedes, and puts a full stop after *φθορᾶς* at the end of ver. 4; thus also Vulg., Beza, Erasmus, Hornejus, Grotius. This combination, however, is against the analogy of the N. T. epistles, in which the superscription closes with the benediction (in the Epistle to the Galatians alone a relative clause is subjoined, ending, however, with a doxology that marks the conclusion), and is also opposed to the contents of vv. 3, 4, which serve as the basis for ver. 5 (Wiesinger). Gerhard and others consider *ὥς* as equivalent to *καθὼς* (which Gerhard explains by *ἐπεὶ*, i.e., "postquam" vel "siquidem"), and supply *οὕτως* to ver. 5; arbitrarily: *ὥς* belongs much more to the genitive absolute (not pleonastically, Pott). The objective reason expressed in this phrase for the exhortation contained in ver. 5 is by *ὥς* characterized as a subjective motive; Winer: "convinced (considering) that the divine power," etc.; Dietlein: "in the consciousness that;" so, too, De Wette, and the more recent commentators generally; the construction in 1 Cor. iv. 18, 2 Cor. v. 20, is similar; cf. Matthiä, *Ausf. Gr.*, 1825, § 568, p. 1120. — *πάντα . . . δεδωρημένης*]. The Vulg. incorrectly: *quomodo omnia vobis divinae virtutis sunt, quae ad vitam et pietatem, donata est* (another reading is: *sunt*); and Luther: "since every thing of His divine power, that pertains unto life and godliness, is given us;" *δεδωρημένης* is here not passive, but middle (cf. Gen. xxx. 20, LXX.; Mark xv. 45), and *τῆς θ. δυνάμεως* does not depend on *πάντα*, but is the subject (thus all modern commentators). — According to the position of the words, *αὐτοῦ* refers back to *Ἰησ. τ. κυρίου ἡμῶν* (Calvin, Schott, Steinfass), and not to *θεοῦ*;¹ if it be applied to *θεοῦ* (De Wette-Brückner, Wiesinger), then *θείας* (which occurs here only and in ver. 4; Acts xvii. 29, *τὸ θεῖον*, as subst.) is pleonastic. Dietlein and Fronmüller refer *αὐτοῦ* to God and Jesus, which linguistically cannot be justified.² — *τὰ πρὸς ζωὴν καὶ εὐσέβειαν*]. The *ζωὴ καὶ εὐσέβεια* are not spoken of as the object, but *τὰ πρὸς ζωὴν, κ.τ.λ.* For the attainment of the former is conditioned by the Christian's conduct; but in order that it may be put within his reach, every thing is granted him which is *serviceable* to *ζωή* and *εὐσέβεια* (cf. Luke xix. 42: *τὰ πρὸς εἰρήνην σου*).
 * The difference between the two ideas is in itself clear; *ζωή*, "blessedness," indicates the condition: *εὐσέβεια*, "godliness" (except in Acts iii. 12, occurring only in the Pastoral Epistles and Second Peter), the conduct. Grotius incorrectly interprets *ζωή* as equivalent to *vita alterius seculi*, and *εὐσέβεια* as *pietas in hoc seculo*. Both together they form the antithesis to *ἡ ἐν κόσμῳ*

¹ Hofmann, indeed, applies it also to Christ, but by passing over ver. 2 to ver. 1, where, as already observed, he considers that it is not God and Christ, but Christ alone, who is referred to.

² The application to Jesus is also supported

by the fact, that otherwise this whole argument would contain no reference to Him; the application to both contains the correct idea, that the gift imparted by Jesus is the gift of God the Father.

ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ φθορά. πάντα is by way of emphasis placed first, in order to show distinctly that *every thing*, which is in any way serviceable to ζωὴ and εὐσέβ., has been given us by the divine *power* of the Lord. Hofmann is wrong in defining this πάντα as faith, hope, and charity, for this triad does not pertain πρὸς εὐσέβειαν, but is the εὐσέβεια itself. — διὰ τῆς ἐπιγνώσεως τοῦ καλέσαντος ἡμῶς states the medium through which the gift is communicated to us; with ἐπίγνωσις, cf. ver. 2. God is here designated as ὁ καλέσας ἡμῶς, since it is only by the knowledge of the God *who calls us* that the πάντα τὰ πρ. ζ., κ.τ.λ., are appropriated by us, — the calling being the actual proof of His love to us. The subject to καλεῖν is not Christ (Vorstius, Jachmann, Schott, etc.), but God (Aretius, Hemming, De Wette, Hofmann, etc.), as almost always in the N. T.¹ Of course καλεῖν does not mean the mere outward, but the inward, effectual calling. — ἰδίᾳ δόξῃ καὶ ἀρετῇ]. δόξα denotes the being, ἀρετὴ the activity; Bengel: *ad GLORIAM referuntur attributa Dei naturalia, ad VIRTUTEM ea, quae dicuntur moralia: intime unum sunt utraque.* It is arbitrary to understand δόξα as meaning: “that side the nature of the Almighty One that liveth, which is directed outwards,” and by ἀρετὴ: “the holy loving-kindness of God” (as opposed to Hofmann). — The nature of God represented as the instrumentality, as in Gal. i. 15: καλέσας διὰ τῆς χάριτος αὐτοῦ; cf., too, Rom. vi. 4. A wrong application is given to the words, if they be taken as referring to the miracles of Christ. It must be observed that this ἐπίγνωσις itself, too, is to be looked upon as wrought by Christ in us.

Ver. 4 must not, as a simple intervening clause, be enclosed in parentheses; for although ver. 5 is the principal clause standing related to the participial clause in ver. 3, still the latter is determined, in the thought of it, by ver. 4. — δὲ ὧν]. ὧν does not refer to the immediately preceding ἰδίᾳ δόξῃ κ. ἀρετῇ (Dietlein, Wiesinger, Brückner, this comment.), for it cannot be said that Christ has given us the ἐπαγγέλλματα through the δόξα κ. ἀρετῇ of His Father, but to πάντα τὰ πρὸς, κ.τ.λ. (Hofmann). Beza inaccurately interprets δὲ ὧν by *ex eo quod.* — τὰ τίματα ἡμῶν καὶ μέγιστα ἐπαγγέλλματα]. ἐπάγγελμα, besides here, occurs only in chap. iii. 13, where it is used in connection with the new heaven and new earth in the future. By it is to be understood, not the promises of the prophets of the O. C. fulfilled in Christ for us, nor those things promised us of which we are made partakers in Christ (Hornejus: *bona et beneficia omnia, quae Deus per Christum offert et exhibet omnibus, qui in ipsum credunt*; Wiesinger, Schott); but, according to ver. 12 ff., chap. iii. 4, ix. 13, the prophecies of the παρουσία of Christ and the future consummation of His kingdom, as contained in the gospel (Brückner).² Dietlein is wrong

¹ De Wette (with whom Brückner agrees) is accordingly wrong in supposing that τοῦ καλέσαντος ἡμ. stands in place of the simple πρὸν. αὐτοῦ, and is inserted because, by this circumlocution of the active subject, the address gains in matter and range. — Schott's remarks, in which he attempts to justify his assertion that τοῦ καλέσαντος applies to Christ, are only in so far correct, that καλεῖν might indeed be understood of an activity of Christ;

cf. Matt. ix. 13; Mark ii. 17; on the other hand, it is certain that ὁ καλέσας is never applied to Christ, but *always* to God.

² Schott's assertion, that ἐπαγγέλλματα, according to the form of the word, must mean “promised things,” is opposed by chap. iii. 13; but why the promises as such should not, as Wiesinger supposes, be the means of effecting the κοινωνία θείας φύσεως, it is difficult to understand.

in saying that ἐπαγγέλματα are not only promises of what is future, but announcements of what is present and eternal. He goes still farther astray when he substitutes for this idea the different one: "the granting of favors which proclaim themselves." The word ἐπαγγέλλειν (except in 1 Tim. ii. 10, vi. 21) has constantly in the N. T. the meaning "to promise," never simply "to proclaim." These promises are called "precious," not because they are "no mere empty words" (Schott), but because they promise that which is of the greatest value (Hofmann). The dative ἡμιν from its position should be connected more probably with τιμα than with δεδωρηται. — δεδωρηται is here also not passive (Dietlein), but middle (all modern interpreters). Gualther erroneously explains it: *donatae*, i.e., *impletae sunt*. What is here referred to is the communication, not the fulfilment, of the promises, which are a free gift of divine grace. — The subject to δεδώρ. is not ὁ καλέσας (as formerly in this commentary), but the same as that to the foregoing δεδωρημένης. — *ἵνα διὰ τούτων*]. Calvin, De Wette-Brückner, Hofmann, understand τούτων to refer to τὰ πρὸς ζωὴν, κ.τ.λ., as the leading thought; this construction Wiesinger justly calls "a distortion of the structure, justifiable only if all other references were impossible." Incorrect also is the application to δόξη καὶ ἀρετῇ (Bengel). From its position it can apply only to ἐπαγγέλματα (Dietlein, Wiesinger, Schott), and not in like manner to δόξη καὶ ἀρετῇ (Fronmüller). διὰ has here its proper signification, not equal to "because of them" (Jachmann), nor to "incited by them;" as elsewhere the gospel is spoken of as the objective means through which the divine life is communicated, so here the ἐπαγγέλματα, which, according to the conception of Second Peter, form the essential element of the gospel. — γένησθε θείας κοινωνοὶ φύσεως, not "that ye may become partakers," but "that ye might be," etc. (Wiesinger). The aorist shows that the author does not look upon the κοινωνία, which for the Christian is aimed at in the bestowal of the promises, as something entirely future (Vorstinus: *quorum vi tandem divinae naturae in illa beata immortalitate vos quoque participes efficiemini*), but as something of which he should even now be partaker.¹ The thought that man is intended to be partaker of the divine nature, or to be transfigured into the divine being, — which is accomplished in him through faith in the promises, — is, though in other terms, often enough expressed in the N. T. (Heb. xii. 10; 1 Pet. i. 23; John i. 12, 13, and many other passages). Hemming justly remarks: *vocat hic divinam naturam id quod divina praesentia efficit in nobis, i.e., conformitatem nostri cum Deo, seu imaginem Dei, quae in nobis reformatur per divinam praesentiam in nobis*. When Hofmann urges the expression φύσις against this view, because a distinction must be drawn between the φύσις of man and the personal life of man, the former remaining even in him who is regenerate always the same, until this σῶμα is changed from a σῶμα ψυχικόν to a σῶμα πνευματικόν, he fails to observe that it is not the human, but the divine φύσις that is here spoken of, and in God there can be no difference made between natural and

¹ Hornejus: "incipit ea in hac vita per gratiam, sed perficitur in altera per gloriam; si enim jam hic in ista imbecillitate divinae naturae consortes sumus per fidem, quanto

magis illic erimus per adspicium et si hic per gratiam id adipiscimur, quanto magis illic per gloriam, ubi Deus ipse erit omnia in omnibus."

personal life. The expression *φύσις* is here quite inappropriately pressed by Hofmann. As opposed to the mystic "deification," it must be remarked, with the older interpreters, that the expression *φύσις* conveys the thought, not so much of the *substantia*, as rather of the *qualitas*. Grotius' interpretation dilutes the idea: *ut fieretis imitatores divinae bonitatis*. The second person (*γένησθε*) serves to appropriate to the readers in particular that which belongs to all Christians (*ἡμῖν*).¹—*ἀποφυγόντες τῆς ἐν (τῷ) κόσμῳ ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ φθορᾶς*]. These words do not express the condition on which the Christian becomes partaker of the divine nature, but the negative element which is most intimately connected with the positive aim. Accordingly, the translation is incorrect: "if you escape" (Luther, Brückner); *ἀποφυγόντες* is to be translated "escaping, eluding;" the aor. part. is put because the verb is closely conjoined with the preceding aorist *γένησθε*. It is to be resolved into: "in order that ye might be partakers of the divine nature, in that ye escape the *φθορά*."² With *φθορά*, cf. chap. ii. 12, and especially Rom. viii. 21; Gal. vi. 8 (see Meyer on the last passage). By it is to be understood not simply perishableness, but more generally corruption. The term *φθορά* is here more nearly defined as *ἡ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ φθορά*, i. e., the corruption which dwells in the (unredeemed) world, and to which all thereto belonging is a prey. The further more precise definition: *ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ*, states that this *φθορά* has its origin in the evil lust, opposed to what is divine, which has its sway in the world (1 John ii. 16, 17).—*ἀποφ.*, here c. gen.; chap. ii. 18, 20, cum accus. constr.—The sequence of thought in vv. 3, 4, is: Christ hath granted us every thing that is serviceable to salvation and holiness, and that by the knowledge of God who hath called us by His glory; through it he has given us the most glorious promises, the design of which is the communication of the divine life.

Vv. 5, 6. *καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο δέ]. καὶ . . . δέ*, equivalent to "but also," "and also;" cf. Winer, p. 412 f. (E. T., 443); Buttman, p. 312 (E. T., 364). *καί* adds something new to what goes before; *δέ* brings out that what is added is to be distinguished from what precedes.³—Neither *περί* nor *κατὰ*

¹ Hofmann arbitrarily objects to this interpretation, that a change of persons could not take place in a clause expressive of a design; rather does it simply depend on the will of the writer, where he wishes it to take place. When the writer of a letter wishes to state the purpose of any thing which has been imparted to all, should he not in particular apply it to those to whom he addresses his letter?—Augustl strangely presses the change of persons by applying *ἡμῖν* to the Jews, *γένησθε* to the heathen converts, and understanding *θεία φύσις* of the divine descent of the Jews.

² Bengel: "haec fuga non tam ut officium nostrum, quam ut beneficium divinum, communionem cum Deo comitans, h. l. ponitur." Dietlein: "*ἀποφ.* contains no demand and condition, but only the other side of the fact: Ye have entered the kingdom of the divine

nature, therefore ye have left the kingdom of the worldly nature."—By transferring *γένησθε* to the future, Schott gives an erroneous (linguistically) interpretation of *ἀποφυγόντες* as future also: "Ye shall become partakers of the divine nature, as such who have (*shall have*) precisely thus escaped *τῆς . . . φθορᾶς*."

³ Hofmann, without any reason, ascribes two different meanings to *καί . . . δέ*, by saying, that "*καί . . . δέ* is either equal to 'but now,' or else to 'but also;' in the first case *καί* adds something further, which *δέ* points out to be something different, and must be added to what precedes by way of explanation; in the second case *δέ* adds something different, and *καί* intimates that it is added on to what precedes, which cannot do without it." *καί . . . δέ* has in itself always the same sig-

nor *πρός* is to be supplied to *αὐτὸ τοῦτο*, which stands here absolutely, equivalent to *δι' αὐτὸ τοῦτο*: "for this very reason," cf. Winer, p. 134 f. (E. T., 142), and refers back to the thought contained in *ὡς πάντα . . . δεδωρημένης*, and further developed in the clauses following: "since ye have been made partakers of all that, therefore," etc. Grotius: *Deus fecit quod suum est, vos quoque quod vestrum est faciete*. Dietlein takes *αὐτὸ τοῦτο* as a simple accusative dependent on *ἐπιχορηγήσατε* (thus also Steinfass); but this combination, which would make *τοῦτο* refer to the subsequent *ἐν τῇ π. ὑμ. τὴν ἀρετὴν*, or to *τ. ἀρετὴν* alone, is opposed by the *αὐτό* beside it, which looks back to what has gone before. Nor does Dietlein fail to see this, for he explains: "the announcements given are now to be produced in the form of Christian virtues;" this, however, results in a "straining" (Brückner) of the thought. — As regards the connection of clauses, the apodosis belonging to ver. 3 begins with ver. 5, not, however, in quite regular construction. Hofmann, on the other hand, holds that the apodosis conveying the exhortations begins already with *ἵνα* in ver. 4. He looks upon *ἵνα* as depending on *ἐπιχορηγήσατε*, and considers that the two participial clauses, *ἀποφυγόντες, κ.τ.λ.*, and *καὶ . . . παρεισενέγκαντες*, are to be closely connected with each other, and both together joined with the imperative; accordingly he translates: "Considering that His divine power hath given us all that is serviceable to life and godliness . . . ye should, in order thereby to become partakers of the divine nature, having escaped the corruption in the world occasioned by lust, but for that very reason giving all diligence, supply virtue in and with your faith." But opposed to this view is: (1) The intolerable cumbrousness of the construction; (2) The circumstance that although a dependent clause may precede the clause on which it depends, this may take place only when the clearness of the style does not thereby suffer, i.e., when the periods are so constructed that the dependent clause cannot, by any rule of language, be taken with a preceding clause, — but this is plainly not the case here; (3) The aorist *γένησθε*, instead of which the present would have been written; and finally, (4) The impossibility of here applying *διὰ τούτων* to any thing that goes before. This becomes the more obvious if the preceding secondary clause be considered as standing after the imperatival clause *ἐπιχορηγήσατε . . . ὑγάτην*. — *σπουδὴν πᾶσαν παρεισενέγκαντες*, cf. Jude 3: *πᾶσαν σπ. ποιούμενος* (Jos., *Arch.* xx. 9. 2: *εἰσφέρειν σπουδὴν*), *παρά* points out that believers on their side (De Wette, Wiesinger, Schott) should contribute their part, namely, the *σπουδή*, to what has here been given them. That *παρά* has not here the implied idea of secrecy, is self-evident; but it is also unjustifiable when Hofmann asserts that *παρεισφέρειν σπουδὴν* means "the application of diligence, which endeavors after something already given in a different manner." — *ἐπιχορηγήσατε ἐν τῇ πίστει ὑμῶν τὴν ἀρετὴν*. *ἐπιχορηγεῖν*, either "contribute," i.e., your contribution to the work of salvation (De Wette), or more probably, according to the use of the word elsewhere in the N. T. (2 Cor. ix. 10; Gal. iii. 5; cf. also 1 Pet. iv. 11), "to supply" (Brückner, Wiesinger,

nification; *δε* only emphasizes the new element added by *καί*, whether this be merely a differ-

ent one from what goes before, or altogether antithetical to it.

Hofmann); it is here placed as correlative to the term *δεδώρηται*, ver. 4, and denotes "the gift which the believer gives in return for the gift of God" (Wiesinger, although the meaning of the word does not quite justify him in doing so, adds: "or more accurately, by which he again presents to God his own gift in the fruit it has produced"). Dietlein's interpretation is erroneous: "to perform in dance." This meaning the word never has. Even *χορηγεῖν* sometimes means "to lead a dance," but not "to perform any thing in dance." The original meaning of *ἐπιχορ.* is: "to contribute to the expenses of a *χόρος*." Schott's assertion is arbitrary, "that *ἐπιχορηγεῖν* signifies a supplying of what is due to one in virtue of an official or honorary position." — Pott incorrectly explains the preposition *ἐν* by *διὰ*; De Wette inadequately by "*in, with, of that which is already present, and to which something else should be added.*" The sense is: "since you have *πίστις*, let it not be wanting in *ἀρετή*." It is not meant, that to the *πίστις*, as something different from it, *ἀρετή* should be added; but *ἀρετή* belongs to *πίστις*, and for this reason the Christian must put it into practice. The same relation is preserved in the members which follow.¹ *πίστις* is presupposed as the origin (Oecumenius: *θεμέλιος τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ κρηπὶς*) of all Christian virtues, and in the first instance of the *ἀρετή*, by which Oecumenius understands *τὰ ἔργα*; Gerhard: *generale nomen omnium operum et actionum bonarum*; Calvin: *honesta et bene composita vita*; it is best explained by *strenuus animae tonus ac vigor* (Bengel): "*moral efficiency*" (De Wette, Wiesinger, Schott, etc.).² — *ἐν δὲ τῇ ἀρετῇ τὴν γνῶσιν*. *ἡ γνῶσις* is not here *ἡ τῶν τοῦ Θεοῦ ἀποκρύφων μυστηρίων εἰδήσις* (Oecum.), nor is it "the knowledge of God which the Christians possess" (Dietl.); but as the matter in hand here is the practical proof of the Christian temper, it must be understood as denoting the perception of that which the Christian as such has to do in all relations of life, and of how he has to do it (Besser, Wiesinger, Schott, Hofmann; Brückner, in agreement with this: "discretion").³ — Ver 6 The three virtues here named are: the *ἐγκράτεια*, the *ὑπομονή*, and the *εὐσέβεια*. — *ἐγκράτεια*, besides here, in Acts xxiv. 25 and Gal. vi. 22 (Tit. i. 8: *ἐγκρατής*; 1 Cor. vii. 9, ix. 25: *ἐγκρατεύομαι*), denotes the control of one's own desires; *τὸ μηδενὶ ὑποσύρεσθαι πάθει* (Oecumenius); cf. on Tit. i. 8.⁴ Compare this with the passage in Jes. Sir., xviii. 30, where under the superscription *ἐγκράτεια ψυχῆς* there is the maxim: *ὀπίσω τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν σου μὴ πορεύου, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ὀρέξεων σου κώλυον*. — *ὑπομονή* is enduring patience in all temptations. Besser aptly recalls the proverb: *abstine, sustine*. — With

¹ Steinfass remarks: "*ἐν* conceives the accusatives as involute accusatives, and as elements of the previous datives;" this certainly is correct, but must be supplemented thus far, that the element of the preceding conception, expressed by the accusative, stands forth as a special grace, and thus becomes, as it were, the complement of it.

² Hofmann: "that disposition which shows itself in the doing of what is right and good."

³ Besser is undoubtedly right in trying to prove that Luther's "modesty" has another signification than that in which the word is at

present employed; still that expression does not altogether coincide with *γνώσις*, which Luther understands as meaning that "circumspectness" which knows how to maintain the *right moderation* in all things.

⁴ Hofmann unwarrantably disputes this interpretation by saying that *ἐγκρ.* is "that quality by which a person denies himself all that is unprofitable;" for the denying one's self that which is unprofitable, for which there is no desire, surely gives no proof whatever of *ἐγκράτεια*.

εὐσέβεια, comp. ver. 3; Dietlein, without sufficient justification, explains it here as "the godly awe and respect in the personal, domestic relations of life." If εὐσέβεια do not apply only to our relation to God (e.g., Dio Cass., xlviii. 5: διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφὸν εὐσέβειαν), the other object of it must in this case be definitely stated.

Ver. 7 adds φιλαδελφία and ἀγάπη to the virtues already named. These are to be distinguished thus, that the former applies specially to the Christian brethren, the latter to all — without distinction; 1 Thess. iii. 12: ἡ ἀγάπη εἰς ἀλλήλους καὶ εἰς πάντας (Gal. vi. 10); with φιλαδέλφια, cf. 1 Pet. i. 22. While the apostle calls the love which is extended to all ἀγάπη, he gives it to be understood that what he means is not the purely natural well-wishing, but Christian love springing from the Christian spirit. Dietlein, without sufficient reason, thinks that φιλαδέλφια is only the opposite of that which is forbidden in the eighth and ninth commandments, whilst the ἀγάπη is the complete antithesis to what is forbidden in the tenth commandment. In this way the conception φιλαδέλφια is unjustifiably disregarded, — a proceeding to which the language of Scripture gives the less sanction, that where love in all its depth and truth is spoken of, the word φιλεῖν is not unfrequently used; cf. John v. 20, xvi. 27, etc. — Although the different virtues here are not arranged according to definite logical order, yet the way in which they here belong to each other is not to be mistaken. Each of the virtues to be shown forth forms the complement of that which precedes, and thus gives rise to a firmly-linked chain of thought. ἀρετή supplies the complement of πίστις, for faith without virtue is wanting in moral character, and is in itself dead; that of ἀρετή is γνώσις, for the realizing of the moral volition is conditioned by comprehension of that which is needful in each separate case; that of γνώσις is ἐγκρατεία, for self-control must not be wanting to volition and comprehension; that of ἐγκρατεία is ὑπομονή, for there are outward as well as inward temptations to be withstood; that of ὑπομονή is εὐσέβεια, for only in trustful love to God has the ὑπομονή firm support; that of εὐσέβεια the φιλαδέλφια, for "he that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he has not seen?" (1 John iv. 20); that of φιλαδέλφια the ἀγάπη, for without the latter the former would degenerate into poor narrow-heartedness. Thus, in that the one virtue is the complement of the other, the latter produces the former of itself as its natural outcome; Bengel: *praesens quisque gradus subsequentem parit et facilem reddit, subsequens priorem temperat ac perficit.*¹

¹ According to Dietlein, the three first graces, including πίστις, correspond to the first table of the law, the three first petitions of the Lord's Prayer, the first article of the Creed, and to faith in the Pauline triad; the three following graces, to the first half of the second table of the law, the fourth petition in the Lord's Prayer, the second article of the Creed, and the second grace in the Pauline triad, the two last graces, to the second half of the second table of the law, the three last petitions of the Lord's Prayer, the third article of

the Creed, and the third grace of that triad. Certainly there is here a good deal that coincides, but this by no means warrants a consistent parallelism of all the individual points, which can only gain an appearance of correctness by an arbitrary narrowing or extending of the ideas and their applications. — It is worthy of remark, that the series begins with πίστις and ends with ἀγάπη; in that, then, ver. 11 points to the future, εἰπίς is added, so that the well-known triad is here alluded to (Schott).

Ver. 8. Reason for the foregoing exhortation. — ταῦτα, i. e., the virtues above mentioned. — γὰρ ὑμῖν ὑπάρχοντα καὶ πλεονάζοντα]. For ὑπάρχειν c. dat., cf. Acts iii. 6; πλεονάζοντα intensifies the idea ὑπάρχοντα; for πλεονάζειν, cf. my commentary to 1 Tim. i. 14; it means either “to be present in abundance,” strictly to exceed the measure (*abundare*), or “to become more, to increase (*creocere*).” Here the first of these two meanings seems to deserve the preference; though not so in the judgment of Brückner, Wiesinger, Schott, Steinfass, Hofmann. The participles may be resolved into “in that” “since” (Dietlein), or “if” (Brückner, Wiesinger, Schott); the latter is to be preferred, inasmuch as this verse refers back to the exhortation ver. 5, and in “ver. 9 the opposite is assumed as possible” (Brückner); thus: “for if these virtues exist in you, and that in rich measure;” Luther in his translation has combined the two translations. — οὐκ ἄργος οὐδὲ ἀκέρπος καθίστην]. ὑμῶς is to be supplied. Hornejus: λιποτης est, cum ait: non inertes neque infructuosos pro operosos et fructuosos; Dietlein: “the οὐκ and οὐδέ belong to the adjectives, not to καθίστην.” — For ἄργος, cf. 1 Tim. v. 13; Tit. i. 12; οὐκ ἄργος, equivalent to “active.” ἀκέρπος cannot mean only “without fruit,” but “barren” also; cf. Eph. v. 11 (as against Schott). — καθίστησι: the present is not put here for the future (Hornejus). According to Dietlein, Wiesinger, and Schott, καθίστημι should mean, “to cause to appear, to exhibit,” so that the sense would be: “he who possesses these virtues, he thereby appears as bringing forth fruit with regard to the ἐπίγνωσις τοῦ κυρίου Ἰ. Χρ.,” by which is meant that his knowledge manifests itself as an active one. This is, however, incorrect: for (1) A meaning is thereby attributed to καθίστημι which it never has, either in the classics or in the N. T. (not even in Jas. iii. 6, iv. 4, and Rom v. 19); it means “to set up,” but not to set forth, to exhibit, to manifest, etc. (2) It gives a meaning to εἰς such as that word has nowhere else, since the object with which it is to be taken is always to be thought of as the end, and that even in the more loose connection in which εἰς is equal to “with regard, with respect to.” (3) It is a somewhat idle, because a self-evident reflection, that if knowledge produce the above-named virtues, it thereby manifests itself as a knowledge that is not inactive.¹ It is also inaccurate to translate with Luther: “where such is present in abundance in you, it will let you be neither idle nor unfruitful in the knowledge,” etc., for εἰς is not equal to ἐν. The verb καθίστημι denotes, in connection with an adjective, reddere, to make into, to set one up as; cf. Pape, s. v.; and the preposition εἰς expresses the direction, so that the thought is: those virtues make you (or, more exactly, place you as) active and fruitful with regard to knowledge, i. e., by them you are advanced with regard to knowledge; cf. Col. i. 10: ἐν παντὶ ἔργῳ ἡμῶν καρποφοροῦντες καὶ ἀξιοῦμενοι εἰς τὴν ἐπίγνωσιν τοῦ Θεοῦ (cf. Meyer, in loc.); De Wette: “The author considers all these virtues only as steps to the knowledge of Jesus Christ; and this knowledge he regards not merely as theoretical, but as one to be obtained

¹ This third reason also contradicts Hofmann's interpretation, which he expresses thus: “The believer possesses the knowledge of Christ. If then, in aiming at it, he be

neither inactive nor unfruitful, he makes this aiming the rule of all his actions, but so that they should be its work, its fruit.”

practically, a living into Him, and, at the same time, perfect;" thus, too, Brückner, Fronmüller, Steinfass.

Ver. 9 gives in negative form an explanation of the preceding verses. — ὃ γὰρ μὴ πίερεσι ταῦτα, antithesis to ταῦτα . . . πλεονάζοντα, ver. 8. The possession of these graces furthers knowledge, for he who does not possess them is τυφλός, that is, in so far as he is, and remains, without the true knowledge of Jesus Christ. μὴ is explained thus, that the idea which lies at the basis is: "he who is so constituted, that he is without these virtues" (Hofmann), or so that he must be judged as being without them.¹ — τυφλός ἐστι, μυωπάζων]. μυωπάζειν (ἄπ. λεγ.) means, to be a μύωψ, i.e., one short-sighted:² accordingly μυωπάζων serves more nearly to define the term τυφλός as one who can see only what is near, not what is far off. Schott correctly explains μυωπάζων by "weak-sighted." The older commentators, following Oecumenius, for the most part take μυωπάζειν as synonymous with τυφλόττειν; thus Calvin, Hornejus, etc.; but the identification in meaning of these two terms cannot be justified, whilst it gives rise to an intolerable tautology. The translation of the Vulgate: *manu tentans* (similarly, Erasmus: *manu viam tentans*; Luther: "and gropes with the hand;" Calvin: *manu palpans*), has arisen probably from the gloss, ψηλαφῶν, perhaps with reference to Deut. xxviii. 28, 29; Isa. lix. 10. Wolf interprets the word, after Bochart (Hierozoic l. l. c. 4), by καμύβειν *oculos claudere*;³ but μυωπάζειν is not derived from μύειν τὰς ὄπας, but from μύωψ. A μύωψ, however, is not one who arbitrarily closes his eyes, but one who, from inability to see far enough, is obliged to blink with his eyes, in order to see a distant object. The same applies to Dietlein, who translates: "one who closes his eyes," by which he conceives a *voluntary* closing of the eyes, precisely that which is opposed to the meaning of the word. If, then, μυωπάζων mean a short-sighted person, the question arises: What is that near at hand which he sees, and that far off which he does not see? The first expression is generally understood as applying to earthly, and the second to heavenly things. Hofmann, on the other hand, explains: "he sees only what is present to him: that he is a member of the Christian Church; but how he has become so, that lies outside his horizon." Here, however, the first thought is purely imported, and the second has only an apparent justification in the clause which follows. — λήθην λαβών]. ἄπ. λεγ. equal to *oblitus*; Vulgate: *oblivionem accipiens*; cf. ὑπόμνησιν λαβών, 2 Tim. i. 5 (cf. Joseph., *Ant.* ii. vi. 9; Wetstein, Lösner, Krebs, *in loc.*); taken strictly, the translation is "having received the λήθη." Hofmann justly remarks: that this aoristic clause is not only co-ordinate with the preceding, but is added to it by way of explanation. He is wrong, however, when he thinks that it is intended to elucidate μυωπάζων. By it the author refers not to the *consequences* (Steinfass, and formerly here), but

¹ Schott unwarrantably maintains, on the interpretation of ver. 8 here adopted, that the translation must be, "he becomes blind."

² Aristotle interprets sec. 31: μυωπάζοντες: οἱ ἐκ γενετῆς τὰ μὲν ἐγγυς βλέποντες, τὰ δὲ ἐξ ἀποστάσεως οὐχ ὀρώντες· ἐναντία δὲ πάσχου-

σιν οἱ γερῶντες τοῖς μυωπάζουσιν· τὰ γὰρ ἐγγυς μὴ ὀρώντες τὰ πόρρωθεν βλέπουσιν.

³ Τυφλός μυωπάζων is dicitur, qui ideo caecus est, quia sponte claudit oculos, ut ne videat.

rather to the *reason* of the blindness, or, more strictly, short-sightedness, which manifests itself in the want of the Christian graces. Dietlein arbitrarily emphasizes this forgetting as a *voluntary* act. This is justified neither by the expression itself nor by the connection of thought. — τοῦ καθαρισμοῦ τῶν παλαι αὐτοῦ ἁμαρτημάτων, “the (accomplished) cleansing *from* the former sins;” not as Winer formerly, in the fifth edition, p. 214, conjectured: “the purification, i.e., the removal of sins;” cf. Heb. i. 3. As *πάλαι* shows, *καθαρ.* does not here mean a continuous (to be obtained by repentance perhaps, etc.), but a completed process. Not, however, the (ideal) *καθαρισμός* of sins for the whole world of sinners, accomplished through Christ's death on the cross; — *αὐτοῦ* is opposed to this; but the cleansing, i.e., forgiveness, procured by the individual in *baptism* (thus to Brückner, Schott, Hofmann; Wiesinger less aptly applies it to the calling), so that *πάλαι* denotes the time preceding baptism; cf. 1 Cor. vi. 11.

Ver. 10. Resumption of the exhortation. — *δὲ μᾶλλον*]. *διό* is usually taken as referring to the truth expressed in vv. 8, 9, and *μᾶλλον* interpreted as equal to “all the more.” The meaning is, then: that this truth should still more incite to zeal (thus Brückner, Wiesinger, Schott, etc.). Dietlein, on the other hand, takes *μᾶλλον* as “ushering in an antithesis,” equal to “rather;” thus also Hofmann. The former supplies the thought: “instead of following a virtueless endeavor after a so-called *ἐπίγνωσις*,” for which, however, in the context there is no warrant. The latter more correctly applies it to what immediately precedes, in this sense, “the readers should do the opposite of that which Peter calls a forgetting that they have received the pardon of sin.”¹ That the particle *μᾶλλον* frequently expresses an antithesis, cannot be denied; cf. 1 Cor. v. 2: but as little can it be questioned that it may serve to express intensification; cf. Meyer on 2 Cor. vii. 7. In this way both interpretations are possible. Still that which is usually given appears to be preferable, inasmuch as it seems more natural to apply the very significant thought of this verse to vv. 8, 9, than only to the subordinate idea immediately preceding. — *ἀδελφοί* makes the exhortation more urgent. — *σπουδάσατε . . . ποιῆσθαι*]. The exhortation here points back to ver. 5: *σπουδῆν π. παρεισενέγκ.* The relations of *κλήσις* and *ἐκλογή* are thus stated by Gerhard: *VOCATIO, qua in tempore ad regnum gratiae vocati estis; ELECTIO, qua ab aeterno ad regnum gloriae electi estis*; in like manner Wiesinger, Fronmüller, etc.; cf. Lünemann also on 1 Thess. i. 4. But *ἐκλογή* can also denote the election effected by the *κλήσις*, i.e., the separation of those who are called from the world, and the translation of them into the kingdom of God. And this latter view is supported not only by the position in which the two ideas stand to each other, but by the connection of thought (Grotius, Brückner, Schott, Hofmann);² for the summons *βεβαίαν ποιῆσθαι* can apply only to something which has been *realiter* accomplished in man,

¹ Hofmann interprets *διό* in harmony with his conception of ver. 2: “for this reason, because he only, who is possessed of the aforementioned graces, is capable of putting his knowledge into practice.”

² Grotius: “date operam, ut et vocatio quae vobis contigit per evangelium et electio eam secuta, qua facti estis Dei populus, ratae sint.”

not to the decree of God in itself unchangeable and eternal. For this reason Calvin feels himself compelled unwarrantably to paraphrase *σπουδ. βεβ. . . . ποιῆσθαι* by: *studete ut re ipsa testatum fiat, vos non frustra vocatos esse, imo electos.*¹—For *βεβαίαν*, cf. Heb. iii. 6, 14. The making sure takes place then, when the Christians, by a conduct such as is directed in vv. 5, 8, do their part to remain the called and elected people; the opposite of this is expressed in ver. 9. — The reading: *ἵνα διὰ τῶν καλῶν ἡμῶν ἔργων βεβ., κ.τ.λ.*, reproduces the thought in substance correctly. — *ταῦτα γὰρ ποιῶντες*. *ταῦτα* refers not to the foregoing virtues, as Hofmann thinks, but to that which immediately precedes; “the plural shows that the apostle considered this making sure a very many-sided act” (Dietlein). — *οὐ μὴ πταισῆτε ποτε*. *πταίνειν* means in Jas. ii. 10, iii. 2, “to offend” (Vulg.: *non peccabitis*); here as in Rom. xi. 11, “to forfeit salvation;” thus also Hofmann. It is unjustifiable to combine the two ideas (De Wette: “to fall, and so to fail of salvation”). The double negation *οὐ μὴ*, and the *ποτέ* placed at the end, strengthen the statement.

Ver. 11. *οὕτω γάρ*]. Resumption of the *ταῦτα ποιῶντες*; Dietlein’s interpretation is erroneous: “precisely when ye in all humility renounce every arrogant striving after distinction;” for there is no reference here to any such striving. — *πλουσίως ἐπιχορηγηθήσεται ὑμῖν ἡ εἰσόδος εἰς, κ.τ.λ.*]. The conjunction of *εἰσόδος* and *πλουσίως ἐπιχορηγηθήσεται* is surprising. It is incorrect to attribute to *πλουσίως* a meaning different from that which it always has (thus Grotius: *promptissimo Dei affectu*; Augusti: “in more than one way”). It is, however, also erroneous to make *πλουσ. ἐπιχορ.* apply not to *εἰσόδος* itself, but to the condition which is entered upon after the *εἰσόδος*, “the higher degree of blessedness” (De Wette).² *ἐπιχορ.* represents the entrance into the eternal kingdom of Christ as a gift; *πλουσίως* as a gift abundantly, in so far as that entrance is not in any way rendered difficult, or even hindered; the opposite is the *μόλις*, 1 Pet. iv. 18. Schott is not quite accurate in applying *πλουσίως* to the “secure certainty of the entrance.” Wiesinger adopts both the interpretation of Gerhard: *divites eritis in pnaemüs coetestibus*, and that of Bengel: *ut quasi cum triumpho intrare possitis*. Dietlein here inaptly brings in with *ἐπιχορηγ.* “the conception of a chorus in solemn procession.” It is to be noted that as *ἐπιχορηγήσατε*, ver. 5, points back to *δεδωρηται* in ver. 4, so does this *ἐπιχορηγηθήσεται* here to *ἐπιχορηγήσατε*. The Christian’s gift in return must correspond with the gift of God, and the return-gift of God again with that of the Christian.

Ver. 12. *διό*, not “therefore, because the whole duty consists precisely in the not forgetting” (Dietlein), for no expression was given to any such thought here, but “because to him alone,³ who in the supplying of virtues

¹ Besser too is wrong: “the apostle exhorts in these words, that what is stable with God, be also stable with us.”

² Steinfass. “This passage treats of the way, of the admission to it, and not of the blessedness which awaits the believer at the end of it.” He is right, only that it is not even

the way that is treated of, but merely the admission (or, more correctly, the entrance) to it.

³ Hofmann takes exception to this “only;” wrongly, for although the apostle merely says, “that he who would live up to his exhortations would undoubtedly find an entrance open to the everlasting kingdom of Christ,” still that

reaches an ever more complete knowledge of Christ, is an entrance into the everlasting kingdom of Christ ministered. — μελλήσω]. The same form elsewhere only in Matt. xxiv. 6; De Wette interprets it here: "I will *ever have a care*;" Schott translates: "I will always be in the position;" but there is nothing which renders necessary here a translation different from that in the other passage. Hofmann justly says that it is a circumlocution for the future of ὑπομνήσκω, as in Matt. for ἀκούειν, and that αἰεὶ must be joined with μελλήσω. — Luther, following the Rec. οὐκ ἔμελλήσω: "therefore I will not cease." — περὶ τούτων, i. e., of all that which has been already mentioned. It is not to be limited to any one thing; and therefore not, with De Wette, to "the kingdom of God and its future;" nor, with Wiesinger, to "the manifestation of faith in its fruits;" and still less can τούτων be understood, with Hofmann, of the virtues mentioned in vv. 5-7. In this verse the author promises his readers that he will αἰεὶ, i. e., at every time, as the opportunity presented itself (Hofmann in all probability incorrectly: "when I address you"), remind them of this. By what means, is not said; but that he does not refer to this epistle, is shown by the so strongly expressed future. — καίπερ εἰδότας]. Calvin: *Vos quidem, inquit, probe tenetis, quatenam sit evangelii veritas, neque vos quasi fluctuantes confirmo, sed in re tanta monitiones nunquam sint supervacuae: quare nunquam molestae esse debent. Simili excusatione utitur Paulus ad Rom., xv. 14.* Cf. also 1 John ii. 21; Jude 5. — καὶ ἐστηριγμένους ἐν τῇ παρουσίᾳ ἀληθείας, "and made firm, i. e., are firm in," etc.; not "although ye are supported, i. e., have won a firm position by standing on the present truth" (Dietlein). ἐν τῇ παρ. ἀληθ. is the complement of ἐστηρ., and states not the means by which, but the object in which, the readers have become firm. — παρουσία stands here in the same sense as τοῦ παρόντος (that is, εὐαγγελίου) εἰς ὑμᾶς, Col. i. 6.¹ De Wette, with not quite strict accuracy, interprets παρουσία as equal to παραδοθεῖσα, Jude 3. Vorstius, Bengel, etc., incorrectly take it as referring to the fulfilment in the gospel of the Old-Testament promises; and Schott, instead of to truth in an objective sense, "to the relation of fellowship with God, in which they stood as Christians."

Vv. 13, 14. δίκαιον δὲ ἡγοῦμαι]. "I consider it right and reasonable" (Dietlein: "as a duty"); cf. Phil. i. 7; ver. 14 states the reason. — ἐφ' ὅσον εἰμὶ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ σκηνώματι]. σκῆνωμα, like σκῆνος, 2 Cor. v. 1, "the tabernacle," a figurative designation of the human body; cf. Wisd. ix. 15: τὸ γεῶδες σκῆνος. There can hardly be here any direct reference to the nomadic life in tents (Hornejus). — διεγείρειν ὑμᾶς ἐν ὑπομνήσει, "to stir you up by reminding you, i. e., to encourage you." The same combination takes place in chap. iii. 1; διεγείρειν is to be found elsewhere only in the Gospels, and there in its strict signification. — ἐν ὑπομνήσει points back to ὑπομνήσκω in ver. 12, which, in the aim of it, διεγείρειν serves to define more nearly. In De Wette's opinion, these words are written with special reference to the advent of Christ; but there is nothing to indicate any such limitation of them. It cannot, with

is as much as to say that he who does not do so will not find that entrance; consequently the "only" is understood of itself.

¹ Steinfass says: "The antithesis to παρουσία is Peter's absence;" it is hardly probable that the writer thought of this antithesis.

Dietlein, be concluded that this letter is linked on to the First Epistle of Peter, from the circumstance that in 1 Pet. v. 8, 9, γρηγορήσατε is to be found followed by στερεοί. — Ver. 14. εἰδώς, “since I know,” gives the reason for the δικαίον ἠγούμαι, ver. 13. — ὅτι ταχὺν ἔστιν ἡ ἀποθῆσις τοῦ σκηνώματός μου]. The expression ἀποθῆσις is to be explained by “a mingling of the figure of a garment and that of a tent” (De Wette). — ταχὺν is taken by most commentators (as also by Wiesinger and Brückner) to mean “soon.” Accordingly some (De Wette, Fronmüller, and others) think that in the subsequent words the writer does not refer to the prediction of Christ contained in John xxi. 18 ff., but to a later revelation vouchsafed to Peter (such as is mentioned by Hegesippus, *De Excid. Jerosolym.*, iii. 2, and by Ambrose, *Ep.* 33); but Bengel already translated ταχὺν ἔστιν correctly by *repentina est*: observing: *Praesens, qui diu aegrotant, possunt aīos adhuc pascere. Cruz id Petro non erat permissura. Ideo prius agit, quod agendum erat.*¹ In chap. ii. 1 also, ταχὺς means “sudden, swift” (Vulg., *velox*), not “soon.” Peter says here that he will end his life by a sudden (i.e., violent) death; so too Steinfass, Schott, Hofmann; the adjective ταχὺν states, not the time, but the manner of the ἀποθῆσις. Accordingly the assumption of a later revelation has no foundation in this passage.² — The particle καὶ after καθὼς, for the most part left unnoticed, shows that the words καθὼς, κ.τ.λ., are added in confirmation of Peter’s certainty as to his sudden death, equivalent to “even as indeed.” With ἐδηλώσεν, cf. 1 Pet. i. 11.

Ver. 15. σπουδάσω δὲ καὶ, “but I will, moreover, also zealously take care, that.” καὶ connects this sentence with ver. 13; it belongs to σπουδάσω, not to what follows. — ἐκαστοτε]. ἅπ. λεγ., “on every occasion,” quotiescunque usus venerit (Bengel); it belongs to εἶεν, κ.τ.λ., and must not be connected with σπουδάσω. — εἶεν ἑαυτοῖς . . . ποιῆσθαι]. The construction of σπουδάσειν with the accus. cum inf. only here; εἶεν with the infinitive means, “to be able.” — τὴν μνήμην ποιῆσθαι, here only, “to call up the memory (recollection) of this,” that is, in you. similarly μνησθαι (Rom. i. 9; Eph. i. 16, etc.). — τούτων as in ver. 12. Dietlein, altogether arbitrarily, understands it of the memory of the history of Christ as He appeared in the flesh. — Peter promises to his readers, that as it was his intention in ver. 12 to remind them of the truths stated in vv. 3–11, he would also endeavor that after his death they should always be able to remember them. By what means he would do this, is in this passage as little stated as in the μελλήσω . . . ὑμῶς ὑπομνησκείν, ver. 12. The reference here is not to the first and second epistles;³ this in like manner is opposed by the future σπουδάσω. The words δὲ καὶ following on σπουδάσω seem to imply that the author would do something

¹ Besser: “The Lord had communicated to him that a quick and sudden putting-off of the tabernacle of the body awaited him.”

² Even if ταχὺν meant “soon,” it would not be necessary to understand this here; for as John xxi. 18 expressly says, ὅταν δὲ γεράσῃς, Peter could, if writing this epistle in his old age, appeal to those words of Christ as corroborating his expectation of a speedy death.

³ Dietlein: “Peter finds it necessary, in the first place, to stir up their remembrance during his lifetime, and secondly, to secure it for the time after his death; he wishes to provide for the latter also, at all times, i.e., he will not stop short at the epistle he has already written, but will make use of the present opportunity for writing a second.”

else besides the *ὑπομιμήσκειν*, whereby his readers after his death would be put in a position to remember what he had now written to them. This additional something may, however, be regarded as the *ἔχειν ὑμᾶς . . . τὴν τοιῶν μνήμην ποιεῖσθαι* itself in relation to *ὑμᾶς ὑπομιμήσκειν*; that is to say, the latter states what *he*, the former what *they*, should do. It is most probable that the author in *μελλήσω ὑπομιμήσκειν* and *σπουδάσω* expresses his intention of continuing for the future also to write to his readers as time and opportunity presented themselves. It is entirely arbitrary to take the promise as referring to copies of his letters (De Wette), or to the composition of the Gospel of Mark, which is supposed to have been done under Peter's superintendence (Michaelis, Pott, Frommüller, etc.), or to the appointing of faithful teachers, cf. 2 Tim. ii. 2.

Ver. 16. *οὐ γὰρ σεσοφισμένοις μύθοις ἐξακολουθήσαντες*]. *γὰρ* shows that this verse, in which allusion is made to the erroneous teachers, gives the reason for the *σπουδάσω*. The connection of thought is perfectly plain, so soon as it is observed that all that has gone before has been said in close relation to the "promises" (ver. 4). — *σεσοφισμένοις μύθοις*, Luther inexactly: "clever fables;" *σοφίζειν* means in 2 Tim. iii. 15, "to make wise;" this meaning is inappropriate here; in the classics it occurs in the sense, "to contrive cleverly;" thus Aristophanes, *Nub.* 543: *ἀεὶ καινὰς ἰδέας σοφίζουσαι*; accordingly *σεσοφ. μῦθοι* are "*cleverly contrived fables*:" Pott: *fabulae ad decipiendos hominum animos artificiosae excogitatae atque exornatae*; ¹ cf. chap. i. 3, *πλαστοὶ λόγοι*. The interpretation of Aretius is, on the other hand, incorrect: *fabulae falsam habentes sapientiae et veritatis speciem*. The expression *μῦθοι* is to be found in the N. T. only here and in the Pastoral Epistles. As the author makes no special allusion of the kind, it is at least doubtful if he refers to any *ἰεφίνιτε* myths; either those of the heathen with reference to the appearances of the gods upon earth (Oecumenius, Estius, Bengel, etc.), or to those of the Gnostics as to the emanation of the aeons (Dietlein), or to the Gnostic myth of the *Sophia* (Baur), or to the apocryphal legends of the birth and childhood of Christ, especially in the *Ev. Infantiae Jesu* (Jachmann), or to false myths as to Christ embellished in the spirit of the Jewish Messianic beliefs (Senler), or "apocryphal, didactic, and historical traditions, as these were appended by a later Judaism to the histories of the O. T., especially to the most ancient" (Schott, similarly Steinfass), or to the practice of heathen lawgivers, who, according to Josephus, appropriated to themselves the fables of popular belief, borrowing from them their accounts of the gods (Hofmann). The words express, indeed, an antithesis, but this is of an entirely general kind; either in order to bring out that the apostolic preachers are not like those

¹ Dietlein thinks that the expression *σεσοφισμένοις* contains a double reproach, i.e., not only by the termination *ζειν*, but also in as far as the word *σοφία* means what is bad; however, the termination *ζειν* is by no means always used in a bad sense, nor does *σοφία* in itself mean what is bad, except only in connection with *τοῦ κόσμου τούτου* (1 Cor. i. 20), *ἀνθρωπίνῃ* (1 Cor. ii. 13), etc. Besides, *σοφίζειν* is mostly

employed so as to contain the secondary meaning of cleverness (see Pape, *s.v.*); consequently Hofmann is wrong in rendering *σεσοφισμένοις* simply by "*conceived*," asserting that the word means nothing else. Cf. with our passage, Josephus, *Antiq.*, prooem. 4: *οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι νομοθετοῦσι τοῖς μύθοις ἐξακολουθήσαντες τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἀμαρτημάτων εἰς τοὺς θεοὺς τῷ λόγῳ τὴν αἰσχρὴν μετεθήσαν, κ.τ.λ.*

others who seek the support of myths,—perhaps with special reference to the false teachers alluded to in chaps. ii. and iii.,—or, what is less probable, in order to meet the reproaches of these teachers (Wiesinger), and the contrast serves to give the more prominence to the positive statement.—*ἐξακολουθήσαντες*]. The verb, besides here, only in chap. ii. 2 and 15. The preposition *ἐξ* does not precisely indicate the error (Bengel), but only the going forth from a particular point; in common usage, however, this secondary meaning often entirely recedes; cf. the passage below, quoted from Josephus, *Ant.*, prooem. § 4. By this negative statement the author denies not only that his message was based on myths, but that in it he followed a communication received from others (Schott).—*ἐγνωρίσαμεν ὑμῖν τὴν τοῦ κυρ. ἡμ. ἰ. Χρ. δύναμιν κ. παρουσίαν*]. Several interpreters understand this of the First Epistle of Peter; in which case the plural is surprising, for the author had already spoken of himself in the singular. Hofmann's objection to this view is, that although in his former epistle Peter refers to the power and coming of Christ, he did not first make it known to the readers. But the passages 1 Cor. xv. 1 and Gal. i. 11 show that *γνωρίζειν* may also be used of a proclamation, the substance of which had already been communicated to those to whom it was made. Many commentators take the words as referring to the whole preaching of the apostles, understanding *ὑμῖν*, not of the readers specially, but of the Gentile Christians generally; thus Wiesinger, and more decidedly Hofmann. It must be observed, however, in opposition to this, that *γενηθέντες* and the subsequent *ἡμεῖς ἠκούσαμεν* must refer to the same subject as *ἐγνωρίσαμεν*. The most probable explanation is, that the author, remembering that he was not the only witness of the transfiguration, passed from the singular to the plural, and in so doing made use of *ὑμῖν* in its extended sense.—*παρουσία* is not here the *nativitas Christi*, His human birth (Vatablus, Erasmus, Hornejus, Pott, Jachmann, etc.), nor "His presence during the time He appeared on earth" (Schmid); but, in harmony both with the N. T. usage (chap. iii. 4; Matt. xxiv. 3, 27; 1 Cor. xv. 23; 1 Thess. ii. 19, etc.) and the connection of thought (vv. 4, 17, iii. 4): the return of Christ to judgment (Estius, Semler, Knapp, Dietlein, De Wette-Brückner, Hofmann, and the more modern interpreters generally).¹ *δύναμις*, however, denotes the fulness of might of the glorified Lord, as it will be more especially revealed in His *παρουσία*. It is not correct to combine both ideas into one, and with Hornejus to explain, *potens adventus*; or with Bengel, *majestas praesentissima*.—*ἀλλ' ἐπόπται . . . μεγαλειότητος*]. An antithesis, affirmatively stated, to what goes before. *ἐπόπτης*, ἄπ. λεγ. (1 Pet. ii. 12, iii. 2: *ἐποπτεύω*), is the term. techn. for him who had reached the highest degree of initiation into the Eleusinian mysteries. Keeping to this, Bengel here interprets, *ad intima arcana admissi*; De Wette, too, thinks that the expression has here the secondary meaning of being initiated, of intinacy. It is no doubt chosen purposely with reference to the fact that the *μεγαλειότης* of Christ, which Peter and the other two disciples beheld, was a mystery

¹ Frommüller only interprets: "His appearing with miraculous powers in the flesh, along with His expected appearance in glory."

hidden from the others. Grotius, Pott, and others take it as synonymous with *αὐτόπτης*, Luke i. 2. The connection demands that *ἐπόπται γενηθέντες* should be referred to the fact of the transfiguration (ver. 17). Hofmann is wrong in supposing that Peter here thought of the appearance of the risen One and His ascension. The assertion is refuted not only by the close connection in which ver. 17 stands to this verse, but by the word *μεγαλειότης*, which in no sense is expressive only of "greatness." As the form in which Jesus showed Himself to His disciples after His resurrection was the same as that in which they had seen Him before it, they were not then in any way *ἐπόπται* of his *μεγαλειότης*; nor is there the slightest hint that there is here allusion to any fact other than that mentioned in the following verse. — *τῆς ἐκείνου μεγαλειότητος*, that is, the glory in which at His transfiguration Christ showed Himself to the three disciples. Incorrectly, Calvin: *exemplum unum prae aliis eligit memorabile, in quo Christus coelesti gloria ornatus conspicuam divinae magnificentiae speciem tribus discipulis praebuit*. The apostle rather regards the transfiguration glory of Christ as the type—and therefore the proof—of the glory of Christ at His *παρουσία*.

Ver. 17. *λαβὼν γάρ . . . δόξαν*]. *γάρ*, "that is;" explanation of the immediately preceding: *ἐπόπται γενηθέντες*. The participle does not require any such supplement as *ἦν* or *ἐτύχανε*, nor is it put instead of the finite verb. For the principal thought is, not that Christ was transfigured, but that Peter was a witness of this transfiguration, which was typical of the *δύναμις καὶ παρουσία* of Christ. The finite verb belonging to the participle *λαβὼν* is wanting. Its absence is most naturally accounted for by supposing that the addition of *φωνῆς ἐνεχθείσης, κ.τ.λ.*, caused the author to forget to notice that he had not written *ἔλαβε γάρ*. How after writing *λαβὼν* he intended to proceed, cannot be definitely said; what is wanting, however, must be supplied from that which goes before, not from what follows. Winer, p. 330 (E. T., 351), incorrectly supplies the necessary complement from ver. 18, since he says that Peter should have continued *ἡμᾶς εἶχε ταύτην τὴν φωνὴν ἀκούσαντας*, or in a similar manner. But it is still more arbitrary to borrow the supplement from ver. 19 (as is done by Dietlein and Schott). — *παρὰ θεοῦ πατρός*]. *πατήρ* is applied here to God in His relation to Christ, with reference to the subsequent *ὁ υἱός μου*. — *τιμὴν καὶ δόξαν*]. "Honor and glory," as in Rom. ii. 7, 10; *δόξα* denotes not the brightness of Christ's body at the transfiguration (Hornejus, Gerhard, etc.; Steinfass would understand *both* expressions of the shining figure of Christ). Hofmann is unwarranted in finding in *λαβὼν, κ.τ.λ.*, a confirmation of his opinion that it is the resurrection and ascension that are here referred to, inasmuch as God first conferred honor and glory upon Christ, by raising Him from the dead and exalting Him. To this it may be said that by every act of God which testified to His glory, Christ received *τιμὴν καὶ δόξα*, i. e., "honor and praise." — *φωνῆς ἐνεχθείσης αὐτῷ τοιαῦδε* states through what Christ received "honor and praise:" the expression *φωνὴ φέρεται τινι*, here only; Luke ix. 35, 36, *φωνὴ γίγνεται*; so also Mark i. 11; Luke iii. 22 (cf. John xii. 28, 30); *αὐτῷ*, the dative of direction, not "*in honorem ejus*" (Pott). — *ὑπὸ τῆς μεγαλοπρεποῦς δόξης*]. *ὑπὸ* is neither equivalent to "accompanied by" (Wahl), nor to "from . . . out of"

(Winer, fifth edition, p. 442 f.): the preposition, even where in local relations it inclines to these significations, always maintains firmly its original meaning, "under;" here, as generally in passives, it signifies "by;" thus, too, Winer, sixth edition, p. 330, seventh, 346 (E. T., 368): "when this voice was borne to Him by the sublime Majesty." ἡ μεγαλοπρεπῆς (ἄπ. λεγ.) δόξα means neither heaven nor the bright cloud (Matt. xvii. 5);¹ it is rather a designation of God Himself (Gerhard, De Wette-Brückner, Wiesinger, Frommüller, Hofmann); similarly as, in Matt. xxvi. 64, God is called by the abstract expression ἡ δύναμις. With μεγαλοπρεπῆς, cf. Deut. xxxiii. 26, LXX. — οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ υἱός μου ὁ ἀγαπητός]. So in Matthew; only with the addition αὐτοῦ ἀκούετε, and instead of εἰς ὄν: "ἐν ᾧ." In Mark ix. 7 and Luke ix. 35 (where, instead of ἀγαπητός, there is "ἐκλελεγμένος"), the words εἰς ὄν ἐγὼ εἰδόκησα are entirely wanting. The reading adopted by Tisch. 7: ὁ υἱός μου ὁ ἀγαπητός μου οὗτός ἐστι, corresponds to none of the accounts in the Gospels; cf. with it the O. T. quotation from Isa. xlii. 1 in Matthew (chap. xii. 18): ὁ παῖς μου . . . ὁ ἀγαπητός μου, εἰς ὃν εἰδόκησεν ἡ ψυχὴ μου. — The construction of εἰδοκεῖν with εἰς does not occur elsewhere in the N. T.; there is no warrant for the assertion that εἰς points "to the historical development of the plan of salvation" (!) (Dietlein).

Ver. 18. καὶ ταύτην . . . ἐνεχθεῖσαν; the author is anxious to show prominently that he has been an ear-witness of that divine voice, as well as an eye-witness of the μεγαλειότης of Christ. — ἐξ οὐρανοῦ ἐνεχθ. is added by way of emphasis, in order to lay stress on the fact that Christ received that testimony directly from heaven. — ἐν τῷ ὄρει τῷ ἁγίῳ]. From the epithet τῷ ἁγίῳ it must not, with Grotius, be concluded that the reference here is to the hill on which the temple stood, and that what is alluded to is not the transfiguration, but the incident recorded in John xii. 28. Without any reason, De Wette asserts that that epithet (instead of which Matt. xvii. 1 has ὑψηλόν) betrays a view of the case more highly colored with the belief in miracles than that of the apostles, and belonging to a later period; Calvin already gives the correct interpretation: *montem SANCTUM appellat, qua ratione terra sancta dicitur, in qua Mosi Deus apparuit; quocumque enim accedit Dominus, ut est fons omnis sanctitatis, praesentiae suae odore omnia sanctificat*. Dietlein: "the 'in the holy' is added, not to designate the mountain, but in order to distinguish it on account of this event;" so, too, Brückner and the modern commentators generally.

Ver. 19. καὶ ἔχομεν βεβαίωτερον τὸν προφητικὸν λόγον, "and we have as one more stable (surer) the word of prophecy." The second testimony for the glory of Christ in His second coming is "the word of prophecy." This Luther understands to mean the "gospel;" Griesbach: "New Testament prophecies;" Erasmus: "the heavenly testimony mentioned in ver. 18." But the connection with what follows shows that it is the Old-Testament promises which are here meant. On the singular Bengel rightly says: *Mosis, Esaiæ et*

¹ Schott, indeed, interprets ὑπό correctly, but yet thinks that τῆς μεγαλ. δόξης means the cloud; "not indeed the cloud in itself, but as

the manifestation which God gave of Himself" (!).

omnium prophetarum sermones unum sermonem sibi undequaque constantem faciunt; non jam singularia dicta Petrus profert, sed universum eorum testimonium complectitur; only that here reference is made specially to the promise with regard to the *δυναμις καὶ παρουσία* of Christ. — The expression *προφητικός*, besides here, only in Rom. xvi. 26: *γραφαὶ προφητικαί*. — The article *τόν* marks this as a definite prophecy, well known to the readers. With regard to it the author says: *ἔχομεν δεβαιοτέρων*; for the force of *βέβαιος*, cf. especially Rom. iv. 16; Heb. ii. 2, 9, 17; 2 Cor. i. 6. *βεβαιοτέρων* is neither to be connected directly with the object, nor is the comparative to be taken as synonymous with the positive or with the superlative. Luther, trebly inaccurate: “we have a stable prophetic word.” — How then is the comparative to be explained? Oecumenius says, by the relation in which the fulfilment stands to the promise, in this sense, that the truth of the latter is confirmed by the former, and that accordingly the prophetic word has now become more sure and stable than it was formerly (thus, too, Frommüller). But the promise here in question still awaits its fulfilment. De Wette’s view is more suitable. According to it, the comparative is put with reference to the event mentioned in vv. 17, 18, so that the thought would be, “and the prophetic word is more stable to us (*now*) from the fact that we saw and heard that” (thus, too, Schmidt, II., p. 213, Brückner, Dietlein, Schott)¹ Wiesinger combines this view with that of Oecumenius. There are objections to this view; De Wette himself raises them: (1) That any more precise allusion to this sense by a *νῦν* or an *ἐκ τούτου* is wanting; (2) That in what follows, the thought stated is neither held fast nor developed. These, however, are easily removed, when it is considered that there is no intention here of giving prominence to the point of time, and that in what follows the reference is precisely to the prophetic word confirmed by the above-mentioned fact; cf. Brückner. It is incorrect to take the comparative here as implying that the word of prophecy is placed higher than something else, for this could only be that event mentioned in vv. 16, 17.² But the very stress laid on it and on the *ἐπόπται γεννηθέντες τῆς ἐκείνου μεγαλειότητος*, is opposed to this view. How inappropriate would it be, if in comparison with it the word of prophecy should be brought prominently forward as more stable and sure! The nominative to *ἔχομεν* is not the apostles generally (against Hofmann), hardly either can it be Peter and his readers; but, as the close connection of this verse with what precedes shows, the subject to *ἔχομεν* is no other than that to *ἠκούσαμεν*. The author does not, indeed, here appeal to any of Christ’s own prophecies of His second coming. But this is to be explained, not by assuming that these were unknown to him, nor because “the rapid succession of the advent on the destruction of Jerusalem, foretold in them, had not taken place” (De Wette), but simply because the writer’s aim here was to point to the testimonies regarding Christ and what related to Him (and

¹ Hofmann, too, interprets thus, only that he looks upon the fact, by which the word of prophecy is made “more sure,” not as being Christ’s transfiguration, with the divine testimony, but His resurrection and ascension.

² Steinfass, indeed, thinks that the *μῦθοι* are referred to; Gerhard has already proved the incorrectness of this assumption.

thus not to those of Christ Himself) (thus, too, Brückner). — ὧ καλῶς ποιεῖτε προσέχοντες. “whereunto to take heed, ye do well,” as Heb. ii. 1: “to give heed to something with a believing heart.” The searching into the word of prophecy is only the consequence of this. The same construction of καλ. ποιεῖν cum part., Acts x. 33; Phil. iv. 14; 3 John 6.¹ — ὡς λύχνῳ φαίνοντι ἐν αὐχμηρῷ τόπῳ]. The comparative particle ὡς points to the nature and significance of the λόγος προφ.; it is in the sphere of spiritual life, the same as a λύχνος in the outward world of sense. — φαίνοντι, not *qui lucebat* (Bengel); it is rather the present, an attribute of λύχνῳ. αὐχμηρός (ἂπ. λεγ.), literally, “parched, dry,” then “dirty, dingy” (opposed to λαμπρός, Arist., *De Colorib.*)² It is used with the latter meaning here. αὐχμηρὸς τόπος has indeed been explained as a desert, or a “place overrun with wild scraggy wood” (Hofmann); but this would make sense only if the idea of darkness or night were added in thought (as by Steinfass), for which, however, there is still no warrant. — ἕως οὐ ἡμέρα διανύσῃ]. ἕως οὐ (generally construed with ἂν), c. conj. aorist, expresses the duration of the act until the arrival of a future event which is looked upon as possible; that is, “until the day breaks,” etc., not “until the day shall have dawned” (De Wette), cf. Matt. x. 11, 23, 39 ff. Some commentators (Bengel, etc., Schott, too, and Hofmann) join ἕως οὐ with φαίνοντι; incorrectly; it belongs rather to προσέχοντες, which in the context has the accent. Taken with φαίνοντι it would be a somewhat superfluous adjunct, if it be not at the same time applied, according to the thought, to προσέχοντες, as is done by Dietslein, though without any linguistic justification. — διονύζειν, ἂπ. λεγ., used frequently in the classics of the break of day, when the light shines *through* the darkness; Polyb. iii. 104; ἅμα τῷ διονύζειν. — καὶ φωσφόρος ἀνατείλη]. φωσφόρος, ἂπ. λεγ., is not meant to designate the sun (Hesychius, Knapp, etc.), but the morning star; many interpreters (Besser, etc.) incorrectly understand by it Christ. The adjunct καὶ φωσφόρος ἀνατείλη serves only further to complete the picture — that of the morning which precedes the full day. — ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις ὑμῶν belongs not to προσέχοντες (Schott), far removed from it, to which it would form a somewhat dragging supplement; nor is it to be taken with the subsequent τοῦτο πρῶτον γινώσκοντες (Hofmann). For, on the one hand, the observation that the reference here is to a heart knowledge, would have a meaning only if γινώσκοντες contained an exhortation to such knowledge; and, on the other, the position of the words is opposed to this connection. Consequently ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις can be joined only with the clause immediately preceding ἕως οὐ, κ.τ.λ. (De Wette-Brückner, Wiesinger, Fronmüller). As to the reference of the figure, commentators are much divided among themselves. De Wette understands αὐχμηρὸς τόπος of “the time previous to Christianity, which still continues for those who were not in the faith, and to whom the readers belonged.” But opposed to

¹ Joseph., *Ant.*, xi. 6, 12: οἷς (γράμμασι Ἀμάνου) ποιήσατε καλῶς μὴ προσέχοντες.

² Hofmann's entirely unwarranted assertion, “It is in vain to appeal to the fact, that in Aristotle αὐχμηρός occurs as antithesis to λαμπρός; the antithesis to λαμπρόν there is ἀλαμπές; on the other hand, αὐχμηρός, in its

original meaning of “dry,” is antithetical to στιλβόν;” is contradicted by the passage itself to which he appeals, and which runs thus: ποιεῖ δὲ διαφορὰν καὶ τὸ λαμπρόν ἢ στιλβόν εἶναι τὸ μιγνύμενον ἢ τούναντιον αὐχμηρὸν καὶ ἀλαμπές (Arist.: *περὶ χρωμάτων*; Becker, II. 793); and how should στιλβός mean “wet”?

this is the fact that in vv. 1, 12, the author speaks of his readers as believing Christians. Gerhard (with whom Brückner formerly concurred) takes the reference to be to the former condition of the readers, when as yet they did not believe. Against this, however, is the present δ καλῶς ποιεῖτε προσέχ. The only adequate meaning to attach to $\tau\acute{o}\pi\omicron\varsigma$ αἰχμ. is, the world in its present condition (Wiesinger, Brückner, in the third edition of De Wette's *Commentary*). The world is the dark place which is illumined only by the light of the divine (more precisely, the prophetic) word; therefore the Christians do well to give heed to this word, since otherwise they would be in darkness. In taking exception to this view, Hofmann says that it is "a mistake to identify the place where the light shines with that where those are for whom it is lit up." In his view the meaning should be, that to him who looks into the final future, to which the prophetic word points, this word will perform a service similar to that of a light in a pathless region at night, — this service, namely, "that the believer does not stand helplessly before the future, which lies before us like a confusion which is enveloped in night." But against this explanation it must be urged, that the figure employed by Peter would be appropriate only if the place in which the $\lambda\acute{\upsilon}\chi\nu\omicron\varsigma$ shines were compared with that in which the believers are, and that the reference to the uncertain future is purely imported. — The words $\xi\omega\varsigma$ οὐ, κ.τ.λ., show that for the believer another condition of matters will commence. The time when the day dawns in the hearts of the Christians, and the morning star arises, and when consequently they can do without the light, has been variously determined. According to Dorner, it is "a time within the development of the Christian life in the individual; that time, namely, when what is matter of history shall become living knowledge, influencing entirely the whole life."¹ But such a separation of the development of the Christian life of his readers into two periods can the less be assumed here, that the author would thus accuse them of still possessing a purely outward Christianity, and it can hardly be supposed that he should have considered the word of prophecy as unnecessary for the advanced Christian. Early commentators already correctly applied the words to the *parousia*. It is erroneous, however, to understand them of that event itself, for with the advent the morning passes into the perfect day. The point of time which Peter has in view is that immediately preceding the second coming, the time when the $\sigma\eta\mu\epsilon\acute{\iota}\omicron\nu$ of the Son of man appears (Matt. xxiv. 30), when believers are to lift up their heads because their $\acute{\alpha}\pi\omicron\lambda\acute{\upsilon}\tau\rho\omega\sigma\iota\varsigma$ draweth nigh (Luke xxi. 28), when accordingly the morning star which ushers in the day shall arise in their hearts; similarly, Wiesinger and Brückner.²

Ver. 20. $\tau\acute{o}\upsilon\tau\omicron$ $\pi\rho\acute{\omega}\tau\omicron\nu$ $\gamma\acute{\iota}\nu\omicron\sigma\kappa\omicron\nu\tau\epsilon\varsigma$]. $\tau\acute{o}\upsilon\tau\omicron$ refers not to any thing said before, but to the clause following: $\delta\tau\iota$, κ.τ.λ.; cf. chap. iii. 3. — $\pi\rho\acute{\omega}\tau\omicron\nu$, i q.,

¹ *Lehre v. d. Pers. Christi*, 2d ed. part I., p. 104.

² The difficulty of this verse is not diminished by the connection of the words $\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ τ. καρδ. ὑμ. with $\pi\rho\sigma\acute{\epsilon}\chi$, and of $\xi\omega\varsigma$ οὐ ἡ ἡμέρα, κ.τ.λ., with $\phi\alpha\acute{\iota}\nu\omicron\nu\tau\iota$ (Schott), since, if these words $\xi\omega\varsigma$ οὐ are not to be almost meaningless,

the question remains, what *that* morning is to which they refer. Schott, indeed, passes lightly over this difficulty by saying: "It is left to the reader to transfer this metaphor correctly to the dawn of the future day of perfect consummation."

πρῶτων πάντων, 1 Tim. ii. 1; erroneously, Bengel: *prius quam ego dico, anglicé*: "before that." — γινώσκοντες: "*whilst ye recognize, bring yourselves to the conscious knowledge that*" (De Wette); cf. Jas. i. 3; Heb. x. 34. Without any warrant Pott supplies *δε*, and takes the participle as equivalent to "*δεῖ γινώσκειν ὑμᾶς*;" the participle, as such, is rather to be joined closely to *καλ. ποιεῖτε προσέχ.* By *τοῦτο πρ. γιν.* the author directs the attention of his readers to the point to which they in their *προσέχουν* (ver. 19) should pay special attention; what that is, the words following say: *ὅτι πᾶσα προφητεία . . . γίνεται; πᾶσα . . . οὐ* is a Hebraism for *οὐδέμα*, cf. Rom. iii. 20; 1 Cor. i. 29, etc. *προφητεία γραφῆς* is undoubtedly to be understood of the prediction of the Old Testament, either the prophecy contained in Scripture, or that to which the Scripture gives expression. For the construction of *γίνεται* c. gen., cf. Winer, p. 184 (E. T., 195 f.); Buttm., p. 142 (E. T., 163); according to Buttmann, the genitive definition of the thing with *εἶναι* or *γίνεσθαι* frequently denotes a permanent attribute; thus here: prophecy is of such a kind that it, etc.; the more precise definition depends on the meaning of the words *ἰδίως ἐπιλύσεως*. Instead of *ἐπιλύσεως*, Grotius would read *ἐπηλύσεως*, and Heinsius, *ἐπελεύσεως*; so that the sense would be, the *προφητεία non est res proprii impetus s. instinctus*: but these changes have been justly rejected by Wolf already as arbitrary. Not less unwarranted is it to understand, with Hammond, *ἐπιλύσεις* originally *de emissione cursorum e carceribus*, deducing therefrom the thought: that the prophets *non a se, sed a Deo missi currerent*, or, with Clericus, *de solutione oris*, or, with Lakemacher, to derive *ἐπιλύσεις* from *ἐπιλευθῶ (ἐπέρχομαι)*, instead of from *ἐπιλύειν*, thus obtaining the idea: that prophecy is not *accessus proprie aut talis, quae virtute quadam mentis humanae propria et naturali proveniat et ad hominem quasi accedat* (cf. Wolf, *in loc.*). The notion that *ἐπιλύσεις* is equal to *dissolutio*¹ has been refuted already by Wolf. — *ἐπιλύσεις* means solution, explanation, interpretation; thus Mark iv. 34, *ἐπιλύειν*; Gen. xl. 8, Aquila, *ἐπιλυομενος* (רַלָּב), *ἐπιλύσεις* (רַלָּרַב); Gen. xli. 12, LXX., according to some codd., *τὰ ἐνύπνια ἡμῶν, ἰδὸν κατὰ τὸ ἐνύπνιον αὐτὸν ἐπέλυσει*; *Phil. De Vita Contempl.*, p. 901 A — Almost all expositors understand *ἐπιλύσεις* as the interpretation of the *προφητεία* made aforesaid; but *ἰδίας*, however, has been variously applied: (1) It has been taken to refer to the *προφητεία* itself; Werenfels (cf. Wolf): *προφητεία οὐκ ἔχει τὴν ἑαυτῆς ἐπιλύσαν*, that is, *οὐκ ἐπιλύει ἑαυτήν*; thus also Wahl, Dietlein, Brückner. The positive idea here to be supplied is: but "the interpretation is to be looked for only from God" (Brückner; Dietlein arbitrarily finds the further idea contained here, that prophecy must not be treated as allegory). (2) To the prophets themselves; Oecumenius: *ἰδέσαν (οἱ προφῆται) μὲν καὶ συνίεσαν τὸν καταπεμπομενον αὐτοῖς προφητικὸν λόγον, οὐ μέντοι καὶ τὴν ἐπιλύσει αὐτὸν ἐποιούντο* (similarly, Knapp, De Wette); and the thought to be supplied here is: the interpretation is then not an easy, but a difficult, matter (De Wette: "the author makes this remark in order to excuse the difficulty of the interpretation, and to take away the pretext for unbelief or scoffing"). (3) To the

¹ Hardt: "omnis promissio non est dissolutivus sed indissolubilis, immutabilis," etc.; similarly Storr, *Opp.* II. 391 ff.

readers or to man generally. This is the view most generally adopted; it is that of Beda, Erasmus, Luther, Aretius, Gerhard, Pott, Steiger, Schmid, Besser, Wiesinger, Schott, Hofmann, etc.; and the positive thought to be supplied is: only the Holy Spirit can expound the prediction (Luther: "act accordingly, and do not think that you can interpret Scripture according to your own reason or cunning; Peter has forbidden it; you are not to interpret; the Holy Spirit must interpret, or it must remain uninterpreted"). But opposed to all these interpretations is: (1) The necessity of supplying the positive thought which really contains the point of the remark, but to which the apostle does not give expression; (2) The connection of thought, according to which ver. 20 is subjoined as a confirmation of the *ὡ καλῶς ποιεῖτε προσέχοντες*. If the thought here expressed were intended to give a *caution* with respect to the *προσέχειν*, or to form, as Wiesinger says, a condition preliminary and necessary to it, this must in some way have been referred to. Besides, it must be noted that *εἶναι* or *γίνεσθαι*, c. gen., implies a relation of dependence, and in such a way that the genitive denotes that on which something else depends.¹ Now, it may, indeed, be said that the "understanding" of prophecy, but not that prophecy itself, depends on the interpretation of it. The rendering, "prophecy is not a matter of private interpretation" (or even, "it does not permit of private interpretation," Hofmann), takes too little account of the force of the genitive.² For these reasons *ἐπίλυσις* must necessarily be understood rather of an "interpretation" on which the *προφητεία* is based, on which it depends. But this is the explanation of the problematic future itself, or of the figure under which it presented itself to the prophets (thus, too, Gerlach and Frommüller).³ The passage above cited makes the matter clear. Gen. xl. 8: the words in which Joseph predicted to the prisoners what lay before them, form the *προφητεία*; this presupposes an *ἐπίλυσις*, interpretation, of the dream by Joseph, and of this Joseph says that it belongs to God. Thus, too, he speaks to Pharaoh: "the interpretation is not in me," Gen. xli. 15, 16; cf. Dan. chap. ii. — The thought accordingly is this: No prophecy of Scripture arises out of, or depends on, private (of him who utters the prophecy) interpretation of the future. Taken thus, the verse stands in close and correct connection both with what precedes, for it states

¹ Certainly, also, the above construction can merely express the relation of belonging to, as in Heb. xii. 11; but in that passage the ideas *παιδεία* and *χαρὰς* (*λυπηρῆς*) stand in an altogether different relation to each other, from that in which *προφητεία* here stands to *ἐπίλυσις*.

² Hofmann's remark is indeed very apodictic, that "the first of these counter reasons is null, and that accordingly the second is so too, because *τοῦτο πρῶτον γινώσκοντες* means a perception, which must be combined with the attending to the word of prophecy, . . . but a perception, the substance of which could only be expressed negatively, because meant only to *guard* the prophecy against an interpretation brought about by the conclusions of the

individual intellect;" but the objection to this is the same as that to the second counter reason above. If the author wished the *τοῦτο . . . γινώσκοντες* to be understood in the sense of *guarding against*, he would at least have added a *δε*. — It is not easy to understand why the author, if he had wished to express the thought which his words are supposed to contain, did not write, *ὅτι ἐπίλυσις προφητείας οὐ γίνεται ἐξ ἀνθρώπων*, or something similar.

³ Bengel's interpretation is similar: "*ἐπίλυσις* dicitur interpretatio, qua ipsi prophetae res antea plane clausas *aperire* mortalibus," only that here no definite distinction is drawn between *προφ.* and *ἐπίλυσις*.

why the λόγ. προφ. is βέβαιος *whereunto it is right to take heed*, as unto a light in a dark place (namely, because it is based on no human interpretation); and at the same time with what follows, which serves to explain and confirm the thought (inasmuch as it more precisely defines the idea, and by the positive statement confirms the negation).¹ Brückner incorrectly, therefore, objects to this interpretation, that although it may be in harmony with ver. 21, it cannot with propriety be connected with ver. 19; and if Brückner and Wiesinger further urge against it that it arbitrarily supplies the object of ἐπίλυσαι, it must be replied, that object is rather supplied of itself out of the connection with προφητεία. The present γίνεται alone seems to be inappropriate, but this may be explained by supposing that the thought is conceived in the form of a general statement; this Brückner has recognized, whilst Wiesinger leaves it unnoticed.²

Ver. 21. οὐ γὰρ θελήματι ἀνθρώπου]. These words correspond with the preceding ἰδίας ἐπιλ. οὐ γίνεται; “not from or by the will of a man;” cf. Jer. xxiii. 26, LXX.: ἕως ποτε ἔσται . . . ἐν τῷ προφητεύειν αὐτοὺς τὰ θελήματα τῆς καρδίας αὐτῶν. — ἠνέχθη ποτὲ προφητεία]. Vulg.: *allata est*, the verb as in vv. 17, 18 (cf. also 2 John 10). De Wette’s translation: “is delivered or uttered,” is inexact, inasmuch as the idea of a set discourse is not directly contained in the verb. Steinfass’s interpretation of προφ. is wrong from a linguistic point of view: “gift of prophecy.” — ποτέ belongs closely to the negative οὐ, equal to “never.” The sense of the clause is, “the cause in which προφητεία has its origin is not the free will of man, determining itself thereto.” — ἀλλ’ ὑπὸ πνεύματος ἁγίου φερόμενοι, κ.τ.λ.]. The form of this, which does not exactly correspond with that of the preceding clause, serves to bring into greater prominence the passivity of the prophets. — φερόμενοι: “borne along” (as by the wind, e.g., the ship was driven, Acts xxvii. 15, 17). The impelling power is the πνεῦμα ἁγιον. Joseph., *Ant.*, iv. 6, 5, says of Balaam: τῷ θεῷ πνεύματι . . . κεννημένος; cf. the expressions in the classics: θεοφορεῖσθαι, θεοφόρητος.³ — ἐλίλησαν]. Hornejus: *intellige tam voce, quam scripto*. “Men it was who spoke; but their speaking had the active reason of its origin, and its starting-point, in God” (Schott). — ἀπὸ Θεοῦ ἀνθρώποι]. In this expression, considered to be genuine, ἀπὸ Θεοῦ denotes the starting-point of the speaking: “men spoke from God.” The prophets are thus significantly called simply ἀνθρώποι, in reference to the ἀνθρώπων going before. They were but men; prophets they became only by the πνεῦμα Θεοῦ.⁴ The Rec. ἅγιοι Θεοῦ ἀνθρώποι is only a circumlocution for

¹ On the other hand, in the usual way of understanding this passage, ver. 21 is most inappropriately connected with ver. 20, since no explanation is given of the idea that the interpretation of the prophecy, because it is not the work of man, can only be expected from the Holy Spirit.

² Steinfass thinks that the author refers to Daniel, chap. xii., and that ἐπίλυσις means the answer given in ver. 12 to Daniel’s question in vet. 8, by which the indefinite statement of time is definitely fixed. This singular opinion

is, however, contradicted by the single expression *πάσα*.

³ Macrob. i. 23: “feruntur divino spiritu, non suo arbitrato, sed quo Deus propellit” Calvin correctly remarks: “impulsos fuisse dicit, non quod menti alienati fuerint (qualem in suis prophetis ἐθνουσιασμών fingunt gentiles), sed quia nihil a se ipsis ausi fuerint, tantum obedienter sequuti sunt Spiritum ducem.”

⁴ Into this verse also Dietlein inserts much that is foreign, by saying in explanation of it: “not only are man and God placed in antithe-

prophets, who are called *ἅγιοι ἄνθρ.* because they were in the service of God, inasmuch as they were the instruments of His *πνεῦμα ἁγίου*, cf. 1 Tim. vi. 11.

sis to each other, but over against the designs of man and the unreal world of human thoughts and conceptions (!) stands the Spirit of God, which so powerfully takes hold of the

prophets only because that which He teaches possesses historical reality, or else will do so in time."

CHAPTER II.

Ver. 2. *ἰσεργείαις*, according to almost all authorities, instead of the Rec. *ἀπωλείαις*, which only occurs in some min. — Ver. 4. *σειραῖς*]. Rec., after K, L, P, etc. (Tisch. 7); A, B, C. \aleph (Lachm., Tisch. 8), have *σειροῖς*, where it is uncertain whether this is to be regarded as an uncommon form for *σειραῖς* (perhaps by mistake), or another form for the more usual *σιροῖς* (Pape: “*σιρός*, written also *σειρός*: a pit, specially for preserving corn”). The lect. is peculiar in A and \aleph : *σειροῖς ζόφοις*, in which *σειροῖς* is evidently an adjective, equal to “hot.” Commentators take no notice of these various readings; Reiche rejects them; so, too, Hofmann, who says simply that the reading *σιροῖς* has no claim to attention. — In place of the Rec. *τετηρημένους* (in several min., Thph., Oec.), Griesb., Tittm., Tisch. (Reiche), have accepted *τηρουμένους*, after B, C*, K, L, P. — Lachmann reads: *κολαζομένους τηρεῖν* (A, C**, \aleph , etc., Syr., Erp., Copt., Vulg., etc.); this appears, however, to be taken from ver. 9; Tisch.: *fluxit e v. 9*. — Ver. 6. The word *καταστροφῆ* is wanting in B, C*, 27, al., Copt. — Ver. 8. *ὁ δίκαιος*]. Lachm. omits *ὁ*, after B, without sufficient reason. — Ver. 9. Tisch. 7 reads: *πειρασμοῦ* (Rec., according to almost all authorities); on the other hand, Tisch. 8 has *πειρασμῶν*, after \aleph , corr., and several min. Tischendorf’s observation on *πειρασμοῦ*: *quod multo magis usu venit*, does not justify the reading accepted by him in ed. 8. — Ver. 11. *παρὰ κυρίῳ*]. Rec., after B, C, K, L, P, \aleph , etc., Thph., Oec. (Tisch. 8). — Lachm. and Tisch. 7 are hardly correct in omitting it; it is wanting in A, al., Syr., Erp., Vulg., etc. — Ver. 12. Instead of *γεγεννημένα* (Rec., after A*, B, C, P, al., m., etc., Scholz, Lachm., Tisch. 7), A**, K, L, \aleph , al., read: *γεγεννημένα* (Tisch. 8). Whilst the Rec. has *φυσικά* before *γεγ.* (K, L, al., pl., Oec.), Lachm. and Tisch. have placed it *after γεγ.* (A, B, C, P, \aleph , al.), and rightly; the transposition is easily explained by assuming that it was thought necessary to connect *γεγεννημένα* directly with the *εἰς ἄλωσιν* belonging to it. Mill, without reason, regards *γεγενν.* as a scholion, which has come into the text by way of explanation of *φυσικά*. Dietlien considers the Rec. to be the original reading. — *καταφθάρησονται*]. Rec., after C**, K, L, etc., Thph., Oec. (Griesb., Scholz); on the other hand, A, B, C, P, \aleph (pr. m.), 7, al., Aeth., Arm., Syr., etc., support *καὶ φθάρησονται* (Lachm. and Tisch.). This reading is to be preferred: *καὶ* gives peculiar point to the idea; since this was overlooked, and *καὶ* only regarded as being in the way, it might easily have been changed into *κατα*. — Ver. 13. *ἀπίταις*]. Rec., after A*, C, K, L, P, \aleph , al., Copt., etc., Thph., Oec. (Griesb., Scholz, Tisch.). In its place, A**, B, Syr., Arr., Vulg., Ephr., etc., have *ἀγάταις*; approved of by Erasmus, Luther, Camerarius, Grotius, etc.; adopted into the text by Lachm.; though hardly justly, for in *one* passage (either here or Jude 12), *ἀπίταις*, as De Wette also thinks, is probably the original reading; if so, then rather here than in Jude, all the more that *ἑμῶν* (in Jude) may be adapted to *ἀγάταις*, but not so much *αὐτῶν*; B has *ἀγάταις* in both passages; C, on the other hand, *ἀπίταις*, which is explained by the one having

stood originally in the one passage, and the other in the other. Elsner, Wolf, Wetstein, Bengel, De Wette, and the modern commentators generally, are in favor of *ἀπάταις* in this passage; so, too, Reiche. — Ver. 14. The reading *μοιχαλίαις* in A, \aleph , several min., Copt., Vulg., etc., instead of *μοιχαλίδος*, can only be looked upon as a correction for the sake of simplification. — *ἀκαταπίστους*]. Rec., after C, K, L, P, \aleph , etc. (Griesb., Scholz, Tisch.); instead of which Lachmann reads *ἀκαταπίστους*, following A, B, a word which does not occur elsewhere, and which Reiche accordingly declares to be an error in transcription; Buttman, p. 57, thinks it is not unlikely that the original reading was *καταπίστους*, i.e., “polluted, defiled,” that then, by mistake, an *a*, perhaps taken from the previous *και*, had been added, out of which *ἀκαταπίστους* arose. The reading occurring in several min., *ἀκαταπίστου*, gives indeed an appropriate meaning, but cannot be regarded as original. — *πλεονεξίας*, the reading attested by A, B, C, K, L, P, \aleph , etc. (Griesb., Scholz, Lachm., Tisch.), instead of the Rec. *πλεονεξίας*, which is a mere correction. — Ver. 15. Tisch. 7 reads *καταλιπόντες*; Rec., after B***, C, K, L, P; Tisch. 8, on the contrary, has *καταλείποντες*, following A, B*, \aleph , etc. — Griesb. already has rightly omitted the article *τὴν* before *εὐθείαν*; it is opposed by almost all authorities. — Ver. 17. Instead of the Rec. *νεφέλαι* (L, etc., Thph., Oec.), Griesb. correctly has admitted *δμήλαι* into the text, following A, B, C, \aleph , etc.; so, too, Scholz, Tisch., Lachm. On the other hand, Dietlein, though without sufficient reason, considers the Rec., which is evidently taken from Jude 10, to be original; so, too, Reiche. — *εἰς αἰῶνα*, according to A, C, L, P, etc., Thph., Oec. — Lachm. and Tisch. have omitted it (following B, \aleph); it seems to have been added from Jude 13; Reiche, however, regards it as original. — Ver. 18. The prepos. *ἐν* before *ἄσελγ.* in the ed. Elz. occurs in a few min., Theoph., Oec., only. — *ὀλίγως*, accepted by Griesb. already, in place of the Rec. *ὀντως*, according to the testimony of A, B, al., Syr., utr., Copt., etc., Aug., Hier.; so, too, by Scholz, Lachm., Tisch. — *ἀποφεύγοντας*, after A, B, C, \aleph , many min., Syr., Arm., Vulg., etc. (Lachm., Tisch.), instead of the Rec. *ἀποφυγόντας*, according to K, L, P, etc. Reiche seeks to prove the originality of the Rec. from internal reasons, but these are insufficient; he prefers also *ὀντως* to *ὀλίγως*. — Ver. 19. Tisch. 7 has *τούτῳ καὶ* (Rec., according to A, C, K, L, P, etc.); on the other hand, Tisch. 8 has *τούτῳ*, and omits *καὶ*, following B, etc.; the greater number of authorities are in favor of the Rec. — Ver. 20. A, C, L, P, \aleph , etc., read *ἡμῶν* after *κυρίου* (Lachm., Tisch. 8); the Rec. omits *ἡμῶν*, according to B, K (Tisch. 7). — Ver. 21. *ἐπιστρέψαι*]. Rec., according to K, L, al., Thph., Oec. (Griesb., Scholz, Tisch. 7, De Wette, etc.); B, C, P, etc., read *ὑποστρέψαι* (Tisch. 8); A, \aleph , on the other hand, has *εἰς τὰ ὀπίσω ἀνακίμψαι ἀπό*. This latter reading is probably only an explanatory gloss; but whether *ἐπιστρ.* or *ὑποστρ.* be the original reading or not, it is difficult to decide with certainty; since the verb has not here the simple meaning of “turning back,” but of “turning back again to what has gone before,” a meaning in no way peculiar to the expression *ἐπιστρέφειν* itself, without any nearer definition, it lies to hand to look upon *ὑποστρέψαι* as a correction. Lachm. has adopted *εἰς τὰ ὀπίσω ὑποστρέψαι ἀπό*; but no codex has this reading. — Ver. 22. In A, B, \aleph (pr. m.), Sahid. (Lachm., Tisch.), *δέ* is wanting; it is probably added in order to connect ver. 22 more closely with ver. 21. — In the place of *κίλισμα* (A, K, L, P, \aleph , etc., Lachm.), B, C*, 29 (Tisch.), have the form *κυλισμόν*.

Ver. 1. From here onwards, a description of the false teachers, who were to arise in the church, and a warning against them. — *ἐγένοντο δὲ καὶ*

ψευδοπροφήται]. *δέ*: antithesis to what goes before. *καί*: "also," that is, besides the true prophets mentioned in chap. i. 21. The expression, *ψευδοπροφήτης*, already in the O. T. LXX., e.g., Jer. vi. 13, frequently in the N. T., not after the analogy of *ψευδολόγος*: "one who prophesies falsely," but "one who falsely gives himself out for a prophet," on the analogy of *ψευδάδελφος*, *ψευδαπίστολος*.—*ἐν τῷ λαῷ*, i.e., among the people of Israel. These words are in form a principal clause, but in thought a secondary clause: as there were false prophets in Israel, so will there be also among you, etc.—*ὡς καὶ . . . ψευδοδιδάσκαλοι*]. *ἔσονται* designates the *ψευδοδιδάσκαλοι* as such, who would arise only in the future. They are afterwards pictured as actually present; see on this, the Introd., § 2, p. 281. The expression *ψευδοδιδ.* is in the N. T. *ἔπ. λεγ.*; Wiesinger and Brückner interpret: "such as teach lies;" Dietlein and Frommüller: "*such as lyingly pretend to be teachers.*" The analogy of *ψευδοπροφ.*, with which it is here contrasted, makes the last the preferable interpretation (thus, too, Hofmann). Both result in the same sense (Schott); what the *ψευδοπροφήται* were in the O. T., the *ψευδοδιδάσκαλοι* are in the N. T.—*οἵτινες*, equivalent to *quippe qui*, "such as."—*παρεισάξουσιν*; cf. Jude 4: "to introduce by the side of," with the secondary idea of secrecy.¹—*αἰρέσεις ἀπωλείας*]. *αἰρέσεις*, according to N. T. usage, "party-divisions," cf. 1 Cor. xi. 19 (synonymous with *σχίσματα*); Gal. v. 20 (synonymous with *ἰδωσασαίαι*); also Tit. iii. 10, which have their origin in false doctrine; thus Brückner, Wiesinger, Schott, etc.; Hofmann, too, says that the word is to be taken in no sense different from that which it has elsewhere in the N. T., but then interprets it as equivalent to "particular systems of opinion," thus attributing to it a meaning which it has nowhere else. Others take *αἰρέσεις* here to mean "false doctrine, heresy" (Bengel, De Wette, Frommüller). This interpretation is better suited to the connection, and especially to the verb *παρεισάγειν*. In the N. T., doubtless, the word has not this meaning, yet Ignatius already uses it with this force. *ἀπωλείας* (which is not to be resolved into the adjct. "destructive") designates the heresies as those which lead to *ἀπώλεια*; cf. vv. 2, 3.—*καὶ τὸν ἀγοράσαντα . . . ἀπώλειαν*]. Winer (fifth edition, p. 399 f.) translates, "since they also, denying the Lord, draw upon themselves swift destruction;" but the conjunction of *καὶ* with *ἐπάγοντες*, so far removed from it by *τὸν ἀγοράσαντα*, κ.τ.λ., cannot be justified. Frommüller connects the member of the clause beginning with *καὶ* not with the relative clause *οἵτινες*, but with *ἔσονται ψευδοδιδάσκαλοι*. This construction was formerly supported in this commentary, with the remark, however, that a particular species of false doctrine was not, as Frommüller assumes, indicated here, but that the participial clause more nearly defined the *ψευδοδιδάσκαλοι*, *καὶ* being here put in the sense of "and withal:" this construction, however, is any thing but natural. The *καὶ* must undoubtedly be connected with the clause immediately preceding, though not as a simple copula, but in the sense of "also;" thus De Wette and Wie-

¹ Hofmann is wrong in asserting that in classical Greek *παρεισάγειν* has not the secondary meaning of secrecy; the verb occurs both

with this secondary meaning, and without it (see Pape, s.v.).

singer,¹ taking *καί* as an intensification, equivalent to "even:" "whilst they deny even the Lord who bought them." On the other hand, Hofmann does not admit any such intensification, and takes *καί* as equivalent to "also," in the sense of addition, and interprets: "with their particular systems they break up the unity of the church, which, however, they do not do without at the same time denying the Lord." But, on this interpretation, it is not clear why the author did not put the finite verb instead of the partic. *ἀρνούμενοι*; the thought, too, that they break up the unity of the church, is simply imported. The participle shows that this clause is meant to serve as an explanation or a more precise definition of what goes before. De Wette's view, accordingly, is to be preferred to that of Hofmann; it is, however, also possible that Schott is right in assuming an irregularity of the construction, in that the author, led astray by the participle *ἀρνούμενοι*, wrote the participle *ἐπάγοντες* instead of the finite verb *ἐπάξουσι*; in which case *καί* must be taken as a simple copula. — The participle *ἐπάγοντες* is connected in a loose fashion with what precedes, in the sense, "by which they," etc. The *ψευδοδιδασκαλοι* are more precisely characterized as *τὸν ἀγοράσαντα αὐτοὺς δεσπότην ἀρνούμενοι*; *ἀρνούμενοι*, cf. Jude 4; Bengel, correctly: *doctrina et operibus*. By *δεσπότην* Christ is here meant; the author speaks of Him thus, in order to lay stress on the fact that they deny that Christ is the Lord; *ἀγοράσαντα αὐτούς* is added by way of emphasis: they deny the Lord who "bought" them, i.e., procured them for Himself by paying the purchase price. This does not only serve to emphasize more strongly what is reprehensible in the *ἀρνεῖσθαι*, but points out also that they deny the act to which allusion is made, and by which He has become their Lord. With *ἀγοράζειν*, cf. 1 Cor. vi. 20, vii. 23; Rev. v. 9; the blood of Christ must be thought of as the purchase price. — *ἐπάγοντες ἑαυτοῖς ταχυνῆν ἀπώλειαν*]. With *ἐπάγ. ἑαυτοῖς*, cf. ver. 5, as also Acts v. 28. *ἑαυτοῖς* indicates that they prepare an *ἀπώλεια* not only for others (*αἰρέσεις ἀπωλείας*), but for themselves. — With *ταχυνῆν*, see chap. i. 14, not a *speedy ἀπώλεια*; Hornejus, correctly: *inopinatam et inexpectatam*; the destruction will come over them suddenly, and before they are aware of it (Schott, Frommüller, Hofmann).

Ver. 2. *καὶ πολλοὶ ἐξακολουθήσουσιν*]. The activity of these *ψευδοδιδασκαλοι* would not be without result; cf. 2 Tim. ii. 17. With *ἐξακολ.*, cf. chap. i. 16. — *αὐτῶν ταῖς ἀσελείαις*, i.e., their *ἀσελείαι* will serve as a rule to many, so that they give themselves up to them; cf. Jude 4. The connection of erroneous doctrine with sensual excesses is shown in vv. 18, 19. — *δι' οὗς . . . βλασφημηθήσεται*]. *δι' οὗς*, not "by whom" (Vulg., *per quas*), but "on account of whom;" they (either the *ψευδοδιδασκαλοι*, or those led astray by them, or both) by their *ἀσελείαι* give those who are not Christians occasion for *βλασφημία* against the *ὁδὸς τῆς ἀληθείας*; cf. 1 Tim. vi. 1; Rom. ii. 24. *ἡ ὁδὸς τῆς ἀληθείας* (Barnab. c.v.: *via veritatis*), a designation of Christianity or of the Christian religion (cf. on the expression *ὁδός*, Acts ix. 2, xix. 9, 23, xxii. 4, xxiv. 14, xvi. 17,

¹ Winer (6th ed., p. 314 [E. T., 441], 7th ed., p. 329) says: "Both participles, *ἀρν.* and *ἐπάγ.*, are connected with *παρειαξουσιν*; they are not, however, co-ordinate with each other, but

ἐπάγοντες is annexed to the clause *οἵτινες . . . ἀρνούμενοι*;" he does not state how *καί* is to be understood.

xviii. 25), in so far as it is the form of life in harmony with divine truth (not leading to the truth).

Ver. 3. *καὶ ἐν πλεονεξίᾳ*, i.e., as it were, encompassed by covetousness, living in it, governed by it; it is incorrect to translate *ἐν* by *διὰ*. *πλαστοῖς λόγοις*. *ἄπ. λέγ.*, i.e., "with deceitfully invented words,"¹ which are not in accordance with truth; incorrectly, Hofmann: "artfully contrived doctrines." — *ἡμῶς ἐμπορεύσονται*, "they will seek gain of you;" Gerhard: *quaestum ex vobis facient, ad quaestum suum vobis abutentur*; thus, too, Wiesinger, Schott, De Wette-Brückner; cf. also Wiener, p. 209 (E. T., 223); this meaning of the verb *c. acc.* in classical Greek is sufficiently assured.² The *πλαστοὶ λόγοι* are not, as Hofmann supposes, "to be thought of as the merchandise which they bring to the market, in order to be repaid for such instruction," but as the means by which they carry on the *ἐμπορεύεσθαι*. Steinfass translates *ἐμπορεύεσθαι* as equivalent to "to buy," and *ἡμῶς* as the direct object of purchase; thus Pott too: *vos sectae suae conciliare conantur*. It is undeniable that the object traded in may stand in the accusative (cf. Prov. iii. 14, LXX.), but the context here is opposed to this, partly on account of the *ἐν πλεονεξίᾳ*, partly because *this* thought is already contained in the preceding verse. Froumüller incorrectly renders the word by "to deceive." — By deceitful words as to Christian freedom, etc., they sought to delude others, and, in accordance with their covetous desires, to make gain of them; cf. vv. 13, 14, and Jude 16. — *οἷς τὸ κρίμα ἐκπαλαὶ οὐκ ἄργεῖ*. *οἷς*: dat. *incommodi*; refers to the subj. in *ἐμπορεύσονται*. *τὸ κρίμα* is the judgment of God ordering the *ἀπόλεια*. *ἐκπαλαὶ* is not to be combined with *τὸ κρίμα* into one idea, equal to *κρίμα ἐκπαλαὶ αὐτοῖς προγεγραμμένον*; cf. Jude 4 (Pott, De Wette); such a mode of combination is to be found nowhere in the N. T. It belongs rather to *οὐκ ἄργεῖ*. There is not, as De Wette insists, any contradiction involved in this connection, especially as *οὐκ ἄργεῖ* is a positive idea; strictly, "is not inactive, does not tarry;" the idea of *haste* is not implied in it (De Wette). *ἐκπαλαὶ* sets forth prominently that for a long time the judgment has, as it were, been approaching, that is, ever since it was given and pronounced; it is living, and will come in due time. It is possible that *ἐκπαλαὶ* refers to the judgments mentioned in ver. 4, formerly put into execution (Dietlein, Scott, Wiesinger), which, however, Hofmann disputes. — *καὶ ἡ ἀπόλεια αὐτῶν* (ver. 1) *οὐ νυστάζει*. *νυστάζειν*, strictly, "to nod;" then, *to slumber* (only elsewhere in Matt. xxv. 5; there, however, in its literal meaning), is used in the classics in a figurative sense; Plato, *De Repub.*, iii. 405 C: *μηδὲν δεῖσθαι νυστάζοντος δικαστοῦ*. Steinfass, inexactly, "to become sleepy."

Ver. 4. From here to ver. 6, three examples of divine judgment; cf. Jude 5 ff. — First example: the fallen angels, Jude 6. — *εἰ γάρ*. The apodosis is wanting; Gerhard supplies: *οὐδ' ἐκείνοις φείσεται*. In thought, if not

¹ Plato, *Apol. Socrat.*: *πλάττειν λόγους*; Artemidor., i. 23: *πλάσσειν δόκει . . . ἀγαθὸν ῥήτορσι . . . διὰ τὸ μη ὄντα ὡς ὄντα δεικνύειν τὰς τέχνας ταύτας*.

² Cf. Athenag., xiii. 569: *Ἀσπασία ἐνεπορεύετο πλήθην γυναικῶν*. Philo in *Flacc.*, p. 984:

ἐνεπορεύετο τὴν λήθην τῶν δικαστῶν. J. Chrysostom: *τὴν πενίαν τοῦ πλησίου ἐμπορεύεσθαι*. The translation of the Vulg. is inexact: "de vobis negotiabuntur;" as also that of Luther: "they will trade with you."

in form, the latter half of ver. 9 constitutes the apodosis (Winer, 529 f. (E. T., 569), De Wette-Brückner, Wiesinger, and the more modern writers generally). The irregularity of the construction is explained by the fact that the third example is dwelt on at much length. — ὁ Θεὸς ἀγγέλων ἁμαρτησάντων οὐκ ἐφείσατο]. The nature of the sin is not stated; otherwise in Jude.¹ What sin the apostle refers to, is only faintly hinted at by the circumstance that the example of the flood immediately follows. It is less likely (against Wiesinger) that ver. 20 contains any reference to it, for in that verse other sins are conjoined with the ὑπίσω σαρκὸς . . . πορεύσθαι. — ἀλλὰ σειραῖς ζῶφον . . . τηρουμένους, “but (when he) having cast (them) down into Tartarus, hath delivered them over to the chains of darkness, as being reserved unto the judgment.” σειραῖς ζῶφον is mostly taken in connection with ταρταρώσις (sc. δεδεμένους) (De Wette: “but cast them down into hell with chains of darkness”); but, since the added ζῶφον shows that the σειραῖ are designated as fetters, which belong to the darkness of Tartarus (not “fetters which consist in darkness” (Schott), nor “fetters by which they were banished into darkness,” as Hofmann explains), the enchaining could only have taken place there, and therefore (with Calov, Pott, Steinfass, Hofmann, Wahl, s.v., παραδίωμι) it is preferable to connect the words with παρέδωκεν (as opposed to De Wette, Brückner, Dietlein, Wiesinger, etc.).² — Instead of σειραῖς ζῶφου, Jude has δεσμοῖς αἰδίοις; ζῶφος is not Tartarus itself, but the darkness of Tartarus; the word is to be found only here and in Jude. — ταρταροῦν does not mean *tartaro adjudicare* (Crusius, *Hypomn.*, I., p. 154), but “to remove into Tartarus” (cf. Homer, *Il.*, viii. 13: ἦ μιν ἐλάν βίβω εἰς τάρταρον ἠερόεντα). The expression τάρταρος occurs nowhere else either in the N. T. or LXX. It is not equal to ἀδης, which is the general term for the dwelling-place of the dead. Nor does the author use it as synonymous with γέεννα, for that is “the place of final punishment, the hell-fire” (Fronmüller) but it is used to designate “the place of preliminary custody.” — παρέδωκεν here, as often, used with the implied idea of punishment. — εἰς κρίσιν τηρουμένους]. κρίσις is the final judgment (κρίσις μεγάλης ἡμέρας); “as those who are reserved for the judgment:” Luther, inexactly; “in order to reserve them.” — On the reading, παρέδωκεν εἰς κρίσιν κολαζομένους τηρεῖν, the infin. τηρεῖν is dependent on παρεδ., and κολαζ. states, not “the purpose for which, but the condition in which, they are reserved for judgment; the Vulg. therefore translates inexactly: *tradidit cruciandos, in judicium reservari*. Dietlein, in opposition to all reliable authorities, insists on reading, τετηρημένους, which, moreover, he incorrectly paraphrases, “as those who once should have been kept;” it must rather be, “as those who (until now) have been kept.”

Ver. 5. Second example: the flood. This is peculiar to the author of this epistle; cf. the corresponding section in Jude. καὶ ἀρχαῖον κόσμον οὐκ ἐφείσατο]. The clausal formation is the same as that in ver. 4. *Subaudienda*

¹ Fronmüller is wrong in asserting that the apostasy of Satan is meant here; it cannot be doubted that the sin meant here is the same as that of which Jude speaks, and it is not that apostasy; see my Comment. on Jude.

² When Brückner says: “the expression

becomes more drastic if the act of casting into Tartarus be completed only by the binding with chains,” this supports the construction to which he objects. Schott translates, altogether unwarrantably: “but has fastened them down into the depths with chains of darkness.”

est particula: ei (Gerhard). The words which follow on this tell in what the *οὐκ ἐφείσατο* consisted: *κατακλυσμὸν, κ.τ.λ.*; there is no mention here of a "destruction" (Schott) of the world. — *ἀρχ. κόσμος*, i.e., *mundus antediluvianus*. — *ἀλλ . . . ἐφύλαξε*]. The thought of the deliverance of the righteous is connected with that of the destruction of the ungodly; cf. ver. 7. — *ὄγδοον* belongs not to *κῆρυκα*,¹ but directly to *Νῶε*; Luther, correctly: Noah with seven others; cf. Winer, p. 234 (E. T., 249); Buttman, p. 26 (E. T., p. 30). There is nothing to show that the number eight has a mystical meaning here (Dietlein).² The mention of it naturally arose from the recollection of the event; at the same time, however, it marks the small number of the saved contrasted with that of those who perished (Bengel, Schott, etc.). Besides, Noah and those with him, as also Lot afterwards, are taken by the author as types of the *εὐσεβεις* (ver. 9), on whom the judgment of God will not come — *δικαιοσύνης κῆρυκα* is added as the reason of God's preservation (*ἐφύλαξε*) (thus, too, Wiesinger). By *δικαιοσύνη* is to be understood here, not the condition of being justified (Wiesinger), but a believing and godly bearing towards God; otherwise in Heb. xi. 7. — *κατακλυσμὸν*]. Matt. xxiv 38, 39; Gen. v. 17, LXX. Heb. לַיָּמֵי: the verb *κατακλύζειν*, chap. iii. 6. — *κόσμου ἀσεβῶν*, antithesis to *δικαιοσύνης κῆρυκα*; the world is thus named, inasmuch as it had become the dwelling-place of ungodly humanity. — *ἐπάξας*: on this form of the aorist, see Buttman, *Ausf. Gr.*, § 114, s.v. *ἄγω*.

REMARK. — With regard to its position, Dietlein insists that this verse is intimately connected with ver. 4, so that "the judgment of imprisonment on the angels must be considered as one and the same event with the Noachic flood;" that the judgment on the *ἀρχαῖος κόσμος*, vv. 4, 5, must be distinguished from the judgment of God within the *second* world (ver. 6); and that the latter only, not the former, must be regarded as the example, strictly so called; thus, too, Schott. But the whole structure and mode of expression of this section are opposed to any such division; for (1) The clauses are simply co-ordinate (as ver. 5 is joined to ver. 4, so is ver. 6 to ver. 5, merely by *καί*); (2) The *ἀρχαῖος κόσμος* is mentioned *only* here, not in ver. 4; (3) What is stated in ver. 6 is not brought prominently forward as an event taking place in the *new* world; (4) In the idea of the *κόσμος ἀσεβῶν*, the angels cannot be included, since the flood came on the ungodly *men* only; and it is arbitrary and strange to assume that the flood buried mankind "in the depths, and those spirits which in sin had taken up their abode with them" (Schott). It is arbitrary to regard the judgment on Sodom as the *only* proper example, since no other position is given to the judgments mentioned in vv. 4, 5, than to that in ver. 6. The chief reason for the division lies in ver. 9, which consists of two members, due, however, to the two foregoing examples. From the fact that only one of the members applies to ver. 4, it does not follow that there no special example can be intended; the less so that the leading idea is not "the deliverance of the righteous," but "the confinement of the ungodly." Equally little is proved by the repetition of the

¹ Heinsius, Lightfoot, and Schwegler in his *Nachapost. Zeitalter*, I. p. 515; cf., as opposed to him, Hilgenfeld, *Clement.*, p. 185.

² "Peter looked upon Noah as the bearer

of the eight, and saw in the church saved from the flood a holy eight, making a final close to the old world."

verb *οὐκ*, *ἐφείσατο*, which serves rather to mark off the *ἀρχαῖος κόσμος* from the *ἀγγελ. ἀμαρτ.*, not to unite them into *one* idea. Even Brückner has rejected the view of Dietlein and Schott. Hofmann, too, while questioning it, approaches it very closely when he says, "The judgment of the flood was also a judgment upon those spirits which had become involved in the sin and in the fate of the race of men then living."

Ver. 6. Third example: The overthrow of Sodom and Gomorrah; cf. Jude 7. — This verse also is still dependent on *εἰ*. Schott, without any adequate reason, asserts that the author "has even here forgotten the construction of his expression in the protasis with *εἰ*." — *πολεῖς Σοδῶμων καὶ Γουὸρβρας*]. The gen. as apposition. — *τεφρώσας*]. Suidas: equivalent to *ἐμπρήσας, σποδῶσας*: "by burning them to ashes, by reducing them to ashes." — *καταστροφῇ κατέκρινεν*, not equal to *eversione s. subversione damnarū*, i. e., *unditus evertendo punivit* (Gerhard, Dietlein, Schott), but *καταστροφῇ* is the dative of reference; see Buttman, p. 144; cf. *κατακρ θανάτω*, Matt. xx. 18; Pott, correctly: *in cineres redigens damnarū ad eversionem*; thus also Wahl, De Wette, Wiesinger, Steinfass, Frommüller, Hofmann; only it must be here remarked that *κατακρίνειν* includes within it the punishment, the putting into execution of the judgment of condemnation — which Hofmann, without reason, denies, cf. Rom. viii. 3. — It is incorrect to connect *καταστροφῇ* with *τεφρώσας* (Bengel). — *καταστροφή*, in the N. T. besides here, only in 2 Tim. ii. 14; there, however, in a figurative sense; the same word occurs in the narrative of the destruction of the cities of the plain, Gen. xix. 29, LXX. — *ὑπόδειγμα μελλόντων ἄσεβειν θεθεικῶς*]. Jude 7, with *ὑπόδειγμα*, not equal to "example," but to "type," cf. Jas. v. 10; Heb. iv. 11, etc. The perf. *θεθεικῶς* corresponds with the *προκεινται*, Jude 7; Hofmann, correctly: "God has made them, as the perf. shows, a lasting type of those who ever afterwards should live a godless life."¹

Ver. 7. Contrast to the divine justice in punishing, which is not to be found in Jude. Wiesinger: "The expansion of the thought, introduced by the mention antithetically of Noah, ver. 5, gains, by the co-ordination (*καὶ*) of the deliverance of Lot, independent value, and prepares the way for the double inference, ver. 9" — *καὶ* has not here an adversative force (Jachmann), but is simply the copulative particle. — *δικαίου Δῶτ*]. *δίκαιος* here like *δικαιοσύνη*, ver. 5. — *καταπονούμενον*, besides here, in Acts vii. 24 (2 Macc. viii. 2, where, however, it is doubtful whether the reading should be *καταπονούμενον* or *καταπατούμενον*); Pott, *Schol. Soph. in Trachin.*, v. 328, *verba: ἄλλ' εἰεν ὠδινοῦσα εχρονίτ per καταπονούμενη*. — *ὑπὸ τῆς . . . ἐβρύσατο*]. *ὑπὸ* belongs not to *ἐβρύσατο*, but to *καταπον.*; cf. Wiener, p. 346 (E. T., 369); — with *ἡ ἐν ἰσελγ. ἀναστροφή*, cf. 1 Pet. i. 17. — *ἀθέσμων*, besides here only in chap. iii. 17; *homines nefarii, qui nec jus nec fas curant* (Gerhard).

Ver. 8. Explanation of the *καταπονούμενον*. — *βλέμματι γὰρ καὶ ἀκοῇ* is to be joined neither with *δίκαιος* (Vulg.: *ad spectu et auditu justus erat*), nor with *ἐγκατοικῶν* (Gerhard), but with the finite verb; it was by seeing and hearing

¹ Hofmann attaches particular importance to the circumstance, that the judgment which

was effected by water was followed by another, which was effected by fire.

that Lot's soul suffered, and is added in order more strongly to emphasize Lot's painful position among the ungodly. — *ψυχὴν δίκαιαν ἀνόμοις ἔργοις ἐβασάνιζεν*, "he vexed his righteous soul by the ungodly works," i. e., his soul, because it was righteous, felt vexation at the evil which he was obliged to see and hear. "ἐβασάνιζεν serves to show that the pain at the sight of the sinful lives arose out of personal activity, out of inclination of the soul to the good, out of positive opposition to the evil" (Dietlein). The earlier interpreters have for the most part missed the correct idea; Calvin, Hornejus, Pott, De Wette, and the modern commentators generally, having interpreted correctly.¹

Ver. 9. This verse in thought, though not in form, constitutes the apodosis to the preceding clauses beginning with *ei*. The thought, however, is expressed in a more extended and general manner; the special application follows in ver. 10. — *οἶδε*]. Knowledge is conceived at the same time as a divine power. — *κύριος*, i. e., God, ver. 4. — *εὐσεβεῖς*, like Noah and Lot. — *ἐκ πειρασμοῦ ῥύεσθαι*, cf. 1 Pet. i. 6. — *ἄδίκους δέ*, like the fallen angels, etc. — *εἰς ἡμέραν κρίσεως κολαζομένους τηρεῖν*]. *κολαζ.* is not used here with a future force: *cruciandos* (Bengel, Calvin, Winer, who, in his fifth edition, p. 405, resolves the clause thus: *ἄδικ. τηρεῖ (ὥστε) κολαῖζειν*, and others) but it must be taken as a real present; it refers to the punishment which they suffer even before the last judgment unto which they are kept (*τηρεῖν*); cf. on ver. 4. Thus also Wiesinger, Schott, Brückner.

Ver. 10. Compare Jude 8. — *μίλιστα δε* in close connection to what immediately precedes. The author passes from the general, to those against whom this epistle is specially directed. Dietlein introduces a foreign reference when he says, "The apostle means the false teachers in contrast to such ungodly persons as did not base their ungodliness on theoretically developed error." — As in Jude, the false teachers are characterized in two respects. Whilst in vv. 1-3 they are spoken of as yet to appear, they are here described as already present. — *τοὺς ὀπίσω . . . παρενομένους*; cf. besides Jude 8 also 7, and the commentary on the passage. — *σαρκός* stands here without *ἐτέρας*, and must therefore be taken more generally. Buttmann (p. 160) wrongly translates *σάρξ* here by "lusts." — *ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ μασμοῦ*]. *μασμοῦ* is not to be resolved into an adjec.: *cupiditas foeda, impura* (Wahl);² but it is the objective genitive, and states that to which the *ἐπιθυμία* is directed (De Wette-Brückner, Wiesinger, Schott, etc.). — *μισμός, ἅπ. λεγ.*, equivalent to *pollutio*. According to Schott, *μισμός* is here used subjectively, "what to themselves is dishonoring to the human body, that they make the object of their wild lust." — *καὶ κυριοῦτος καταφρονῶντες*, cf. Jude 8, and the exposition. — *τολμηταί*]. The author drops the construction hitherto adopted, and begins a new clause; the word is a *ἅπ. λεγ.* equal to "insolent, daring;" Luther: "thürs-

¹ Cf. Xenophon, *Hist. Græc.*, I. 4, p. 407: *ὡστ' ἐνόους καὶ τῶν τυπτομένων, νομιμῶν δὲ ὄντων ἀνθρώπων, ἀδημονῆσαι τὰς ψυχὰς, ἰδόντας τὴν ἀσεβείαν*; only it must be observed that Lot was vexed at the godlessness in itself, not because he personally had to suffer by it.

² Hofmann also renders the idea by "impure desire, filthy lust," which, taking *μασμοῦ*

as an attributive genitive, he interprets more closely thus: "a lust which brings defilement with it, since it pollutes not only him who gratifies it, but him also on whom it is gratified;" but in this interpretation the two expressions, "impure lust" and "lust which pollutes," are erroneously taken as identical.

tig" (i. e., *bold*, from the root *tarr*; in old High German, *gaturstig*).¹ — *ἀθθά-
δεις*, to be found, besides here, only in Tit. i. 7. — Most modern expositors
understand the two words substantively; but as *ἀθθάδης* is strictly an adjunct,
it can here also be taken as such; thus Schott. It is improbable that they
form a passionate exclamation (Schott). They may be either connected in
a loose way as subject with *οὐ τρέμονσ.*, or they may be regarded as an ante-
cedent apposition to the subject of *τρέμονσι* (Hofmann). — *δόξας οὐ τρέμονσι
βλασφημοῦντες*]. For *δόξας* see Jude 8. The particip. stands here as in chap.
i. 19. Vulg., strangely: *sectas non metunt (introducere, facere) blasphemantes.*

Ver. 11. Compare Jude 9. What Jude says specially of the archangel
Michael is here more generally affirmed of angels. In this its generality the
thought is hardly intelligible; the necessary light is obtained only by com-
paring it with Jude (De Wette). If the priority of this epistle be assumed,
the thought here expressed must have reference to Zech. iii. 2 (thus Schott,
Steinfass, Hofmann). — *ἔπου* cannot stand here as assigning the reason, as it
sometimes does in the classics, since it refers back not to *τολμηται*, but to
δοξας οὐ, κ.τ.λ.; but neither is it equal to "whilst even, since even;" this use
can nowhere be established. It is meant rather to indicate the similarity of
the relationship (with respect to the *δοξαι*).² The adversative relationship
lies not in the particle, but in the thought. — *ἀγγελοι*, according to the parallel
passage, not *evil*, but *good*, angels. — *ισχύϊ καὶ δυνάμει μείζονες ὄντες*]. The com-
parative expresses the relation in which they stand either to the *τολμηται* or
to the *δοξαι*. The latter reference deserves the preference, since — and to
this Hofmann has called attention, *Schriftbew.* I., p. 460 — it is understood
of itself that angels are more powerful than men (Wiesinger, Schott, Stein-
fass). — *οὐ φερονσι . . . κρίσιν*]. *φερεν κρίσιν* (Jude: *ἐπιφέρειν κρίσιν*) does not
mean "to endure a judgment" (Iuth.), but "to pronounce a judgment." —
βλασφημόν, with an eye to *βλασφημοῦντες* — *κατ' αὐτῶν*; not *adversum se* (Vulg.),
but *αὐτῶν* goes back to *δόξας* (Calvin, Beza, Hornejus, Wolf, De Wette, and
all the more modern interpreters, with the exception of Fronmüller), by
which are to be understood here — as in Jude — the diabolical powers. The
opposite interpretation, according to which the meaning should be that the
wicked angels are not able to bear the judgment of God on their blasphemy
(Iuther, Fronmüller, etc.), is opposed not only to the language (*βλάσφημος
κρίσις* equal to *κρίσις βλασφημίας*) but to the context. — *παρὰ κυριῶν*]. These
words, the genuineness of which is doubtful, may not be explained with
Bengel: *apud Dominum . . . reverti, abstinent judicio*: for, as Hofmann
justly remarks, *παρὰ κυρ.* "belongs to that which is denied, and does not
explain why that does not happen which is denied." "The conception is,
that angels appear before God, and, before His throne, tell what evil spirits
are doing in the world." Cf. Winer, p. 369 (E. T., 395).

Ver. 12. Compare Jude 10. With all their similarity the two passages
are nevertheless very different. The characteristics are still further de-

¹ Cf. Pischon, *Erklär. der hauptsächl. ver-
alteten deutschen Wörter in der Luth. Bibelü-
bers.*, Berl., 1844, p. 7.

² It corresponds to "where" in passages

such as. "some laugh where others weep;"
thus here, these call where the angels *οὐ φερον-
σιν, κ.τ.λ.* It must not be interpreted, with
Hofmann, as equal to *καθ' ὧν*.

scribed in Jude 10, but here the punishment is promised to these men. — *οὗτοι δε*, antithesis to *ἀγγελοι*; the predicate belonging to it is *φθαρήσονται*. — *ὡς ἄλογα ζῶα . . . φθοράν*]. Parenthetical thought in close relation to *φθαρήσονται*; Grotius: *ita peribunt illi, sicut pereunt muta animantia*. — *γεγεννημένα φυσικά* can hardly be translated “born as *sensuous* beings to,” etc. (Wiesinger, and formerly in this commentary). *φυσικά* is meant rather to bring out that the irrational animals are, according to their *natural* constitution, born to *ἄλωσις*. Hofmann takes *φυσικά* as a second attribute added to *γεγεννημένα* by asyndeton, equal to “by nature determined to *ἄλωσις*,” etc. But the only objection to this is that *γεγεννημένα* alone cannot well be considered as a special attribute. As regards the sense, it makes no difference whether *φυσικά* be placed before (Rec.) or after *γεγενν*. — *εἰς ἄλωσιν καὶ φθοράν*]. According to Luther, a twofold rendering is possible: “First, those who take and strangle; second, who are to be taken, strangled, and slaughtered;” the latter is the only correct interpretation. The general interpretation is, “for taking and destroying;” Schott on the other hand translates, “for taking and *consuming*;” and Hofmann, in like manner, who holds that both are active ideas, “that they may be taken and *consumed*.” This interpretation of *φθορά*, however, is arbitrary, and all the more unwarranted, that in the subsequent *ἐν τῇ φθορᾷ αὐτῶν*, *φθορα* cannot have this special meaning. According to N. T. usage, what is meant by *φθορά* here is the destruction to which the beasts are destined; cf. Col. ii. 22. — *ἐν οἷς ἀγνοοῦσιν βλασφημοῦντες . . . φθαρήσονται*]. With regard to the construction, cf. Winer, p. 583 (E. T., 628). According to the usual interpretation, *ἐν οἷς* is dependent on *βλασφημοῦντες*, and is to be resolved into *ἐν τοῦτοις, ἃ ἀγνοοῦσιν, βλασφ.* (Winer decides in favor of this; so, too, Wiesinger, and Buttmann, p. 128 [E. T., 146]). But *ἐν οἷς* may also be dependent on *ἀγνοοῦσιν*, and be resolved, *ταῦτα, ἐν οἷς ἀγνοοῦσιν, βλασφημοῦντες*. There is no other instance to be found of the construction *βλασφημεῖν ἐν*, although *βλασφημεῖν εἰς* occurs frequently. Buttmann accordingly says that by *ἐν* here (not the object strictly speaking, but) “rather the sphere is denoted, within which the evil-speaking takes place;” nor is the combination of *ἀγνοεῖν* with *ἐν* common, “yet it is not without example in later writings.”¹ That *ἀγνοεῖν*, in the sense of it, may be joined with *ἐν*, is shown by the German expression, “to be ignorant *in* a matter.” Besides, in both constructions the sense is substantially the same. According to the connection with what precedes (ver. 10) and Jude 8 and 10, the *δοξαί* are to be understood as that which was unknown to them, and to which their slanders had reference. On account of this irrational evil-speaking, that will happen to them which is expressed in the words, *ἐν τῇ φθορᾷ αὐτῶν καὶ φθαρήσονται*. *φθορά* has been understood here to mean moral corruption; thus De Wette-Brückner, Steinfass, Fronmüller; erroneously, however, for the word must have the same meaning in this passage as it had formerly; then, in this case, *αὐτῶν* does not refer to the Libertines, but to the *ζῶα* before mentioned, and *καὶ* is to be explained from the comparison with these. They (the Libertines) whose *irrational* slander of that of which they are ignorant, makes

¹ It is to be found in *Test. XII. patr. in Fabricius cod. pseudepigr. V. T.*, p. 717.

them like unto the *irrational* brutes, will also suffer *φθορά*, like the latter, who by nature are destined thereto. Entirely different from this, however, is the interpretation given by Hofmann. He resolves *ἐν οἷς* into *ἐν τούτοις ἅ*, and takes *ἐν τούτοις* with *φθαρήσονται*; that which, without knowing it, they speak evil of, is, according to him, the things of sense; he understands *ἐν τῇ φθορᾷ αὐτῶν* to be in more definite and explanatory apposition to *ἐν τούτοις*, and *φθορά* actively, equivalent to "abuse." In his view, then, the idea here expressed is that the Libertines by abusing, after their lusts, the things of sense, believing them to have nothing in common with God, fall a prey to destruction. The objections to this interpretation are, first, that *ἐν οἷς* is not applied to any of the *verba* near it, but to the *remote φθαρήσονται*; secondly, that a meaning is attributed to the second *φθορά* different from that of the first, — the one is taken as equivalent to "consumption," the other to "abuse," — and that neither of these significations belongs in any way to the word; thirdly, that the reference to the things of sense is in no way alluded to in the context; fourthly, that *ἐν τῇ φθορᾷ* cannot possibly be in apposition to *ἐν τούτοις*; and lastly, that, on this interpretation, we should have had *ἀγνοοῦντες βλασφήμοι* instead of *ἀγνοοῦσιν βλασφημοῦντες*.¹

Ver. 13. *κοιμούμενοι μισθὸν ἀδικίας* is subjoined by way of explanation to what precedes.² — Cf. 1 Pet. i. 9. — *μισθὸν ἀδικίας* not equivalent to *μισθὸν ἀδικῶν* (Wolf), but "*the reward for unrighteousness.*" — *ἡδονὴν ἠγούμενοι*]. This and the following participles, as far as the end of ver. 14, are connected with what precedes, as descriptive of the *ἀδικία*; it is less probable that, as Hofmann assumes, a new period begins with *ἡδονὴν ἠγούμενοι* and ends with ver. 16. The three kinds of *ἀδικία* here spoken of are: 1, luxurious living; 2, fornication; 3, covetousness. De Wette: "*they who count it pleasure.*" — *τὴν ἐν ἡμέρᾳ τρυφήν*]. *ἐν ἡμέρᾳ* is by Oecumenius interpreted as equal to *καθ' ἡμέραν*, but this is not in accordance with the usage. Several interpreters (Benson, Morus, Frommüller, Hofmann) take *ἡμέρα* here as in contrast to the night. This, however, is inappropriate, for it is not easy to see why they should not regard the *τρυφή* in the night as a pleasure. Gerhard is better: *per τὴν ἡμέραν intelligitur praesentis vitae tempus*, Luther, "*temporal luxurious living*" (De Wette-Brückner, Wiesinger, Schott). It stands by way of contrast to the future, to which the fut. *κοιμούμενοι* refers. — *σπίλοι καὶ μῶμοι* is

¹ Schott agrees with Hofmann in regard to the application to things of sense, and to the interpretation of the meaning of the first *φθορά*, but differs from him in other points. He states the idea contained in the verse thus: "As irrational beasts, which . . . made to be taken and consumed . . . come to destruction, so these people shall perish; since they rail at those matters which they do not comprehend, they themselves shall perish in and with the destruction of those things against which they rail." This interpretation is quite as unwarrantable as that of Hofmann.

² Hofmann considers the reading *ἀδικούμενοι* — but little attested, however — instead of

κοιμούμενοι to be the original, because the more difficult one. Tisch. 8, on the other hand, says: "*ἀδικούμενοι, si aptum sensum praebere judicabitur, omnino praeferendum erit.*" Nescio an "*decepti circa μισθὸν ἀδικίας*" verti liceat. Hofmann interprets the accus. *μισθὸν* as an accus. of apposition, cf. 2 Cor. vi. 13, and then translates: "*evil happens to them as the reward of evil;*" but though *ἀδικεῖν* occurs in this wider signification, as in Luke x. 19, and often in Revelation, still *ἀδικία* never does. — Buttmann has accepted, not *ἀδικουμένοι*, as in B, but *κοιμούμενοι*.

either to be connected with what follows: "*ἡλο* as *σπ.* καὶ *μῶμοι* riot" (De Wette-Brückner, Wiesinger), or they are independent expressions of displeasure, like *τολμηταὶ ἀθύδιες* formerly in ver. 10, and *κατάρως τέκνα* afterwards (Schott, Fronmüller) subjoined to what precedes by way of apposition (Hofmann); the latter is most in harmony with the animated form of address. Instead of *σπίλοι*, Jude has *σπιδίδες*; *σπίλοι* (less commonly *σπίλοι*) is equivalent to "spots of dirt," cf. Eph. v. 27. — *μῶμοι*: *ἀπ. λεγ.*, commonly "blame, shame;" here "blemishes."¹ — *ἐντροφῶνες ἐν ταῖς ἀπάταις αὐτῶν*. *ἐντροφῶντες* points back to *τροφῆν*, and may not therefore be taken, with Hofmann, in the weakened meaning of, "to take delight in any thing," which it probably has in Isa. lv. 2, LXX.; it is not to be connected with the following *ὑμῖν* in the sense of: *illudere, ludibrio habere*, but means, as it commonly does, "to riot;" *ὑμῖν* belongs to *συννεωχούμενοι*. — *ἐν ταῖς ἀπάταις αὐτῶν* is explained from vv. 3 and 14; they practised deceit in this way, that they succeeded in procuring earthly advantage to themselves, by praising their vain wisdom (Wiesinger, Fronmüller); since *ἐντροφῶν* denotes the actual rioting, *ἐν ταῖς ἀπάταις αὐτῶν* cannot state the object of their *ἐντροφῶν*, that is, "the lies with which they practise deceit" (Hofmann; or, according to Schott: "their deceiving appearance of wisdom"). The opinion of Wolf and others, that *ἀπάται* means the love-feasts, inasmuch as they — in opposition to their real nature — are abused by these individuals to their own profit, requires no refutation. — *συννεωχούμενοι ὑμῖν* is subordinate to what precedes. They rioted in their deceits, that is to say, by enjoying themselves at the feasts of those among whom they had obtained an entrance by deceit. — Luther's translation is mistaken: "they make a show of your (*ὑμῶν* instead of *αὐτῶν*) alms (incorrect interpretation of *ἀγάπαις*), they revel with what is yours" (instead of "with you").

Ver. 14 has no parallel in Jude. — Description of the sensual lust of the eye of the false teachers. — *ὀφθαλμοὺς ἔχοντες μεστοὺς μοιχαλίδος*. The adulterous lust is depicted in their eyes; in the expression, *μεστοὺς μοιχαλίδος*, the lust after the *μοιχαλῖς*, revealing itself in the eyes, is designated as a being filled of the eye with it, since they look at nothing else but this. The interpretation of Hornejus is not to the point: *quasi dicat, tam libidinosos eos esse, ut in ipsorum oculis quasi adulterae habitent, seu ut adulteras semper in oculis ferant*. — Hofmann explains *μεστός τινος* by reference to Plato, *Sympos.* 194 B, here equivalent to "to be entirely engrossed, pre-occupied with something." — It is wrong to suppose (as Dietlein does) that it is here in any way stated that a female member of the house, into which they had forced themselves, had already fallen a victim to their seduction. Calvin even² had connected this verse closely with the preceding, as Schott and Hofmann do; but it is not easy to understand why the persons here described should have had adulter-

¹ Hofmann arbitrarily defines these expressions more precisely as "spots which defile the purity of the church, blemishes which attach to her, to her shame;" they are rather spoken of thus, because both defilement and shame cleave to them.

² Calvin: "Isti vos ac coetum vestrum foedis maculis aspergunt: nam dum epulantur vobiscum, simul luxuriantur in suis erroribus, amores meretricios et perditam incontinentiam oculis gestuque expriment."

ous desires only at the feasts. — καὶ ὑκαταπαύσους ἁμαρτίας, “not satiated, unsatisfied in sin,” i.e., eyes, in which is reflected the restless desire after ever fresh sin; in ἁμαρτία the reference is chiefly to sensual sins. — δειλιάζοντες, ver. 18, and Jas. i. 14: “to allure, to entice;” quasi pisces hamo captare (Beza). — ψυχὰς ἀσθηρίκτους]. ἀσθήρικτος (chap. iii. 16), not “wanton” (Luther), but in *fide et pietatis studio nondum satis fundatus et formatus* (Gerhard). — This idea is doubtless connected more closely with what precedes than with what follows (Hofmann), so that the sense is: they entice them, so as to satisfy their fleshly lusts on them. — καρδίαν . . . ἔχοντες]. Third vice:¹ covetousness. The construction of the verb γεγυμνασμένην, c. gen., occurs also in the classics:² “a heart practised in covetousness.” Calvin is quite unwarranted in interpreting πλεονεξία here by cupiditates, cf. ver. 3. — κατάρας τέκνα, cf. Eph. ii. 3; 2 Thess. ii. 3: “men, who have incurred the curse;” an expression of profoundest displeasure; similar to σπιλοι καὶ μῶμοι, ver. 13. It is doubtful whether it is to be connected with the preceding or with the subsequent passage; the first combination is preferable, because in it the language is more passionate. In the other case the construction, from ver. 10 med. onwards, might be taken thus, τολμηταὶ αἰθάρεις, as introducing the section down to τρυφήν, ver. 13; σπιλοι καὶ μῶμοι that from there to ἔχοντες, ver. 14; and κατάρας τέκνα that as far as παραφροσίαν, ver. 16.

Vv. 15, 16. Comparison with Balaam; cf. Jude 11. The comparisons with Cain and Korah are wanting here. — καταλιπόντες εἴθειαν ὁδὸν, κ.τ.λ., with εἴθ. ὁδ., cf. Acts xiii. 16; the words connect themselves closely with ἐπλανήθησαν, to which then the subsequent participial clause is added by way of a more precise definition. With ἐξακολουθ., cf. chap. i. 16, ii. 2. The conjunction of this verb with τῇ ὁδῷ is explained by the circumstance that ὁδός is here taken in a figurative sense: manner of life, conduct. — The form Βοσόρ, Heb. בּוֹסוֹר, arises from a peculiar pronunciation of ψ ; Grotius is wrong in regarding the word as the corrupted name of the country, ἠγυθῆ, Num. xxii. 5. Several commentators, Krebs, Vitranga, Wolf, Grotius, etc., assume that there is here an allusion to the counsel which Balaam gave to the Midianites to the corrupting of the Israelites (Num. xxxi. 16; Rev. ii. 14) (so, too, Dietlein); but, according to ver. 16, the reference is rather to the intended cursing of the people of Israel, to which certainly Balaam, for the sake of reward, was inclined; hence, ὅς μισθὸν ἀδικίας (see ver. 13) ἠγάπησεν. Although such inclination on his part is not definitely mentioned in Num. xxii. 1-20, still, judging from the narrative of the ass, it is to be presupposed; cf., too, Deut. xxiii. 5. Corroboration from the rabbinical writings, see Wetstein. — Ver. 16. ἐλεγξιν δε ἔσχεν ἰδίας παρανομίας, “but he received (suffered) rebuke (blame) for his trespass;” his παρανομία (not equivalent to *vesania* (Vulg.), but synonymous with ἀδικία) consisted in this,

¹ Hofmann erroneously says that this states “not a third, but a second characteristic of their nature, the avaritia, along with the luxuria;” for in the first half of this verse they are accused of something which is identical neither with luxuria nor with avaritia, and this even

if ὀφθαλμ. ἔχοντες be closely connected with the preceding passage.

² Philostratus, 2, 15: θαλάττης οὐπω γεγυμνασμενοι; 3, 1: Νέστορα πολέμον πολλῶν γεγυμν.; 10, 1: σοφίας ἤδη γεγυμνασμένον.

that he was willing, for the sake of the reward, if God permitted it, to curse Israel, and for this reason went to Balak. *ιδίως* stands here in place of the pers. pron. *αὐτοῦ*. Dietlein presses *ιδίως*, by translating, "belonging to him," and adds by way of explanation: "to him who must be looked upon as the prototype of the false prophets." Wiesinger, on the other hand, sees the significance of *ιδίως* in this, that "he who was a prophet to others, had to suffer rebuke of an ass for his own *παρανομ*." But neither the one nor the other is alluded to in the context. — That which follows states in what the *ἐλεγξίς* consisted. — *ὑποζέγιον*, properly: a beast that bears a yoke, here as in Matt. xxi. 5, designation of the ass. — *ἄφωνον*, in contrast to human speaking. — *ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ φωνῇ φθεγγόμενον* does not state the reason of the *ἐκώλυσε*, but emphasizes the miraculous nature of the occurrence (*ἄφωνον . . . φωνῇ*). — *ἐκώλυσε τὴν τοῦ προφήτου παραφρονίαν*]. Schott understands Balaam's *παραφρονία* to be his striking of the ass; Wiesinger: "his folly, in setting himself against the angel;" but it is more correct to understand by it the aforementioned *παρανομία*, which the angel opposed. Hofmann rightly observes: "The signification of the verb does not imply that it is left undone, but simply that opposition is offered to what is done or is intended to be done; cf. 1 Thess. ii. 16."¹ The word *παραφρονία*, "folly," *ἀπ. λεγ.* (the verb in 2 Cor. xi. 23), unusual in the classics also, instead of which *παροφροσύνη* or *παραφρόνησις*; see Winer, p. 90 (E. T., 95). — *τοῦ προφήτου* (cf. Num. xxiv. 4) stands in emphatic antithesis to *ὑποζέγιον ἄφωνον*.

Ver. 17. Description of the teachers of false doctrine from another point of view, in as far as by making a false show of freedom they seduce others to immorality. First, a double comparison, of which the second only occurs in Jude 12. — *οὗτοι εἰσι πηγαὶ ἄνδροι*]. The point of comparison lies in the deceptiveness of a *πηγή*, which is without water; it awakens an expectation which it does not fulfil (as a contrast, cf. Prov. x. 11; Isa. lviii. 11). — *πηγή* here (which Hofmann wrongly disputes) means, as in John iv. 6: a spring, well; *fontes enim proprie sic dicti non carent aqua* (Gerhard). — *καὶ ὀμίχλαι ὑπὸ λαίλαπος ἐλανόμεναι*]. *ὀμίχλη* properly mist, here clouds of mist, as the plural already goes to prove, as well as the fact that it is not the mist, but the misty clouds, which must be regarded as foretelling rain. — *λαίλαψ*, according to Aristotle (*Lib. De Mundo*), equal to *πνεῦμα βίαιον καὶ εἰλούμενον κάτωθεν ἄνω*; Mark iv. 37. The point of comparison is the same here as in the previous figure, only that by *ὑπὸ λαίλ. ἄλανν*, their want of consistency (not "their punishment") is more pointedly referred to.² — *οἷς . . . τετήρηται*, so, too, in Jude 13; it connects itself with *οὗτοι*, not with *ὀμίχλαι*, as Hofmann maintains, for how can this relative clause express "the dissolving of vapor into nothing"?

Ver. 18. Cf. Jude 16. — *ὑπέρογκα γὰρ ματαιώτητος φθεγγόμενοι*]. The *γάρ* does not serve to explain the figurative words, ver. 17 (as formerly in this

¹ Formerly in this commentary, *ἐκώλυσεν* was explained thus: that although Balaam's *παραφρονία* was not exactly prevented by the ass, still, by the conduct of the latter, a beginning was made to prevent it.

² Wiesinger inappropriately remarks: "However empty in itself the conduct of these

men may be, still for the Christian community it has the effect of a storm which cleanses it;" for their conduct is not compared to a storm, but to clouds of mist; nor is reference made to their effect on the Church, but to that of the storm on the clouds of mist.

commentary), for, as Hofmann justly says, "the description of their conduct contained in this verse goes far beyond those figurative statements as to their nature." It must be referred either, with Wiesinger, to the judgment expressed in ver. 17, — *οἷς . . . τετηρ.* being included, — or, as is done by Hofmann, to the relative clause only; the former is probably the more correct view.¹ — *ὑπέρογκος*, "swelling;" in the classics used also of style. *ματαιότης* gives the nature of the swelling, high-sounding speeches ("the proud words," Luther); Luther, aptly: "since there is nothing behind them." The word *φθεγγόμενοι* (besides in Acts iv. 18, to be found only here and in ver. 16) is here the more appropriate that it is used chiefly of loud speaking. — *δελείζουσιν*]. Cf. ver. 14. — *ἐν ἐπιθυμίαις σαρκὸς ἀσελγείαις*]. *ἐν* is commonly taken as equivalent to *διὰ*, and *ἀσελγ.* as an apposition to *ἐπιθ.*: "through the lusts of the flesh, through debauchery" (De Wette, Brückner, Wiesinger, probably Schott too); but thus there is a felt want of a *καί*, or of a second *ἐν*, and the *ἐπιθυμιαί* of the seducers, too, are not to be considered as the means of allurements. Hofmann explains: "by means of fleshly lusts, which they awaken in them, through acts of wantonness, the enjoyment of which they hold out to them;" but here relations are introduced to which the text makes no allusion. It is therefore better to take *ἐν ἐπιθυμίαις σ.* as designating the condition of the seducers, and *ἀσελγείαις* as the dat. instrum.: "in the lusts of the flesh (i.e., taken in them, governed by them) they allure by voluptuousness those who," etc.; Steinfass, correctly: "it is part of their *ἐπιθ. σαρκ.* that they seek to allure the members of the church;" he is wrong, however, when he explains the *ἀσελγείαις* as that to which they allure them. Luther translates wrongly: "through lasciviousness to fleshly lust;" *ἐν ἐπιθυμίαις* is not equal to *εἰς ἐπιθυμίας*. — *τοὺς ὀλίγως ἀποφεύγοντας*]. *ὀλίγως*, *ἄπ. λεγ.*, is hardly to be found elsewhere. It expresses both time and measure, and corresponds to the English, "*hardly, just*" (thus also Schott). Wiesinger and Hofmann understand it only of measure, equivalent to "little;" Hofmann understands it of space: "they are a little way escaped from those who walk in error." The pres. of the verb shows that they are, as it were, still in the act of flight from their former condition, and are not yet firmly established in the new; cf. ver. 14: *ψυχὰς ἀστηρίκτους*. — *τοὺς ἐν πλάνῃ ἀναστρεφόμενους* not an adjunct co-ordinate with what goes before; Luther: "and now walk in error;" but the accus. is dependent on *ἀποφεύγοντας*, and *οἱ ἐν πλάνῃ ἀναστρεφόμενοι* are those from whom the persons who are being seduced have separated themselves, those who are not Christians, especially the heathen, who lead a life *ἐν πλάνῃ* (Wiesinger, Schott, Brückner, Fronmüller, Hofmann); Steinfass incorrectly understands by the expression the *ψευδοδιδύσκαλοι*.

Ver. 19. *ἐλευθερίαν αὐτοῖς ἐπαγγελλόμενοι*]. Explanation of the *ὑπέρογκα ματ. φθεγγόμενοι*; the high speeches have as their contents the praise of liberty. — *ἐπαγγελλόμενοι*; they assure, promise, those who submit to their guidance that they will conduct them to true liberty. — *αὐτοὶ δοῦλοι ὑπάρχοντες τῆς φθορᾶς*]. A sharp antithesis to *ἐλευθ. ἐπαγγελλ.*: "*though they themselves are slaves of*

¹ Bengel: "Puteus et nubes aquam pollicentur; sic illi praegrandia factant, quasi

lumina ecclesiae; sed hi putel, hae nubes nil praebent; praegrandia illa sunt vaultatis."

φθορά." By φθορά moral corruption is generally understood, but elsewhere in the N. T. the word never has this meaning; it should rather be taken in the same sense as that which it has in ver. 12. In Rom. viii. 21 it denotes the opposite of δόξα, which Hofmann wrongly denies. Schott erroneously takes it to mean "the things of sense;" but these, though they be given up to φθορά, yet cannot be directly defined as φθορά itself.¹ The chief emphasis lies on δούλοι. The general statement, ὃ γὰρ τις ἠττηται, τοῦτω καὶ δεδούλωται, serves to show that the term is applied to them not without justification. The verb ἠττᾶσθαι (with the exception of in this passage and in ver. 20, to be found only in 2 Cor. xii. 13) is in classical Greek often used as a passive and construed with ὑπό, and, in harmony with its meaning, frequently with the genitive, and sometimes also with the dative. The latter is the case here: "to whom any one succumbs." The dat. with δεδούλωται expresses the relation of belonging to: to him he is made the slave, i. e., whose slave he is. Schott arbitrarily asserts that ἠττηται with the dat. brings out that the being overcome "is voluntary and desired on principle."

Ver. 20 gives an explanation (γάρ, equal to: namely) of the statement contained in ver. 19, that those there described are the δούλοι τῆς φθοράς, after that the general remark: ὃ . . . δεδούλωται has been applied to them. Almost all interpreters hold that in this verse the same persons are the subjects as in ver. 19; so that the ἀποφυγόντες refers to those with the description of whom the author has throughout the whole chapter been engaged. Bengel, Frommüller, Hofmann, are of a different opinion. They assume that ἀποφυγόντες refers to those who are led astray, and that the latter accordingly, and not the seducers, are to be regarded as the subject of the clause. In favor of this view may be urged the term ἀποφυγόντες, which seems to refer back to the ἀποφευγόντας in ver. 18. But, on the one hand, it is certainly unnatural to consider those to be the subjects here who are the objects in ver. 18, especially as ver. 19 has the same subject as ver. 18; and, on the other, it would be more than surprising if the apostle did not, from here onwards, continue the description of those of whom the whole chapter speaks, but should, all of a sudden, treat of entirely different persons,—and this without in any way hinting at the transition from the one to the other; in addition to this, there is the circumstance that ἠττωνται corresponds much too directly with ἠττηται.—εἰ γάρ]. The reality, as frequently, expressed hypothetically. Without any reason, Grotius would read "οἱ γάρ" instead of εἰ γάρ.—ἀποφυγόντες]. The participle is not to be resolved by "although," but by "after that."—τὰ μίσηματα τοῦ κόσμου]. τὰ μίσηματα, a form occurring only here; ver. 10: μαισμός.—τοῦ κόσμου, here in an ethical sense, as composed of those who walk (ver. 18) ἐν πλάνῃ, or, with Wiesinger: "as the dominion over which sin rules," "the defilements which belong to the world." Without sufficient reason, Hofmann takes τὰ μίσηματα τ. κ. in a personal sense, and thinks that it means, in the first instance, "those individuals who are the abomination and blemishes of

¹ Hofmann, appealing to 1 Cor. xv. 50, understands φθορά here also as meaning "the corruptible;" but in that passage the context

itself proves that the abstract idea is put in place of the concrete, which is not the case here.

the non-Christian world, and that *τούτοις δέ* refers to the *Christians* whom Peter designates as the *σπίλοι κ. μώμοι* of the church." But nothing in the context hints at this, and it is arbitrary to understand by *τούτοις* other *μιάσματα* than those designated by that word itself. — *ἐν ἐπιγνώσει τοῦ κυρίου . . . Χριστοῦ*, i.e., by their having come to the knowledge of Christ. — *τούτοις* (i.e., *μιάσμασι*) *δέ* *πάλιν ἐμπλακέντες ἤττωνται*]. *ἐμπλακέντες* is *valde emphaticum*; *ἐμπλέκεσθαι enim dicuntur, qui trices et laqueis implicantur* (Gerhard). The particle *δέ* places in antithesis either the two participles, *ἀποφυγόντες* and *πάλιν ἐμπλακέντες*, or the first participle and the finite verb *ἤττωνται*; the former construction is to be preferred as the more correct. — *ἔγεγονεν αὐτοῖς . . . τῶν πρώτων*]. The same words are to be found in Matt. xii. 45; Luke xi. 26; ¹ *τὰ πρώτα: the former condition*, in which they were before their conversion; *τὰ ἔσχατα: their subsequent condition*, into which they have come after their falling away, i.e., the condition of complete slavery to the *φοβρά*, from which there is no hope of redemption: with the thought, cf. Heb. x. 26, 27.

Ver. 21. *κρεῖττον γὰρ ἦν αὐτοῖς*]. The same use of the imperf. where we should employ the conjunct., Mark xiv. 21: *καλὸν ἦν αὐτῷ*; cf. on the constr. Winer, p. 265 (E. T., 282). — *μὴ ἐπεγνωκεῖναι τὴν ὁδὸν τῆς δικαιοσύνης*. *ἡ ὁδὸς τῆς δικαιοσ.* is not "the way to virtue," or "the way of salvation which leads to the moral condition of righteousness" (Schott), but a designation of Christianity in so far as a godly righteous life belongs to it; cf. ver. 2.² — *ἢ ἐπιγνοῦσιν*]. The dat. instead of the accus., dependent on *αὐτοῖς*; by an attraction not uncommon in Greek — *ἐπιστρέψαι* is to be taken here in the sense of "to turn back to the former things," cf. ver. 22, as in Mark xiii. 16; Luke xvii. 31, where it is connected with *εἰς τὰ ὀπίσω*; in Luke viii. 55, nevertheless, it is used in the same sense without adjunct; see critical remarks. — *ἐκ τῆς . . . ἐντολῆς*]. With *παραδοθεισης αὐτοῖς*, cf. Jude 3. — *ἡ ἅγια ἐντολή* is the law of the Christian life, cf. 1 Tim. vi. 14; here mentioned because the passage treats of the moral corruption of the false teachers.

Ver. 23. The two proverbial expressions which form the close bring out how contemptible is the conduct just described. — *συμβέβηκε αὐτοῖς*, "it has happened to them," "has befallen them." — *τὸ τῆς ἄληθοῦς παροιμίας*]. The same construction, Matt. xxi. 21: *τὸ τῆς σικκῆς; παροιμία* denotes a figurative speech or mode of expression generally. *ἄληθους* is added in order to bring out that the proverb has here too proved true; the author employs the singular *παροιμίας*, because the two proverbs following have one and the same meaning. — *κύων ἐπιστρέψας . . . ἐξέραμα*]. The verse of the O. T., Prov. xxvi. 11, LXX., runs: *ὡσπερ κύων ὅταν ἐπελθῇ ἐπὶ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἔμετον μισητὸς γενῆται, οὕτως ἄφρων τῇ ἑαυτοῦ κακίᾳ ἀναστρέψας ἐπὶ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἁμαρτίαν*; in spite of the similarity, it is yet doubtful whether the writer had this passage in his eye; probably he took this *παροιμία*, like that which follows, — which can be traced to no written source, — from popular tradition. — *ἐπιστρέψας* is not to be taken as

¹ There is a similar passage in *Past. Herm.* iii. 9: "quidam tamen ex his maculaverunt se, et projecti sunt de genere justorum et iterum redierunt ad statum pristinum, atque etiam deteriores quam prius evaserunt."

² In Steinfass's observation: "By the *δικαιοσύνης* of the *ὁδὸν δικαιοσύνης*, righteousness is understood as being not the end, but the wayfarer," the first is right, but the second wrong.

a verb fin., but the predicate is, after the manner of proverbial expression, joined without the copula to the noun (Winer, p. 331 [E. T., 353 f.]): "a dog that has returned to its *ἐξέραμα*" (ἄπ. λεγ.: "what has been vomited"). — ὅς λουσαμένη . . . βορβόρον]. *ἐπιστρέψασα* may be supplied from what precedes, but thus this second *παροιμία* would lose its independence; breviloquence is natural to proverbs (Winer, p. 547 [E. T., 588]); *εἰς*, according to the sense, points sufficiently to a verb of motion to be supplied: "a sow that has bathed itself, to the *κύλισμα βορβόρον*,"¹ — *κύλισμα* (ἄπ. λεγ.), equal to *κυλίστρα*: the place for wallowing. The genit. *βορβόρον* (ἄπ. λεγ.) shows the nature of the *κύλισμα* where the swine wallow; the other reading, *κυλισμόν*, indicates the act of wallowing. — Similar passages are to be found in the Rabbis. Cf. Pott *in loc.*

¹ Steinfass interprets erroneously: "A sow that was bathed, in order the better to wallow in the mire."

CHAPTER III.

Ver. 2. Instead of the Rec. *ἡμῶν*, the reading, according to almost all authorities (Lachm., Tisch.), should be, *ὑμῶν*. — Ver. 3. In place of *ἐπ' ἐσχάτου* in K, L, P, etc., Syr., utr., Oec., etc. (Griesb., Scholz), A, B, C**, *κ*, al., Sahid., Chrys., etc., read: *ἐσχάτων* (Lachm., Tisch.); the Rec. is probably a correction after Heb. i. 1; cf. also Jude 18. — *ἐν ἐμπαιγμονῇ* has been rightly adopted into the text by Griesb., Scholz, etc.; it is attested by A, B, C, P, *κ*, 27, etc., Syr., utr., Arr., etc. Its omission (in K, L, etc., Rec.) is easily explained by its having seemed superfluous on account of the subsequent *ἐμπαίκεται*. — Tisch. has placed *αὐτῶν* before *ἐπιθυμίας*, following A, *κ*, several min., Oec.; however, B, C, K, L, P, al., m., Theoph., etc., are in favor of placing it after *ἐπιθ*. (Griesb., Scholz, Lachm.). — Ver. 7. Instead of the Rec. *τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ*, after A, Vulg., Copt., etc. (Lachm., Buttm., Tisch. 8), C, L, *κ*, al., perm., Syr., utr., etc., read: *τῷ αὐτοῦ λόγῳ* (Griesb., Scholz, Tisch. 7). According to Buttm., the reading in B is uncertain. On internal grounds it is difficult to decide which is the original reading; Hofmann, however, declares the reading *αὐτῷ* to be absurd. — Ver. 9. *κύριος*, instead of the Rec. *ὁ κύριος*; the most important authorities omit the article. — *εἰς ἡμᾶς*]. Rec., K, L, etc.; instead of *ἡμῖς*, A, B, C, *κ*, etc., have *ὑμῖς*; and instead of *εἰς*, A, *κ*, etc., read *διὰ*. Tisch. 7 has adopted *εἰς ὑμῖς*, and Lachm. and Tisch. 8, *δι' ὑμᾶς*; the reading *εἰς ὑμῖς* is best attested. Reiche considers that of the Rec. to be the original reading: *ob testium majorem numerum (?) et quia hic modestius et convenientius erat, se ipsum includere*; the most of the modern commentators prefer *εἰς ὑμῖς*; Hofm., however, holds the Rec. to be the original reading. Semler looks upon all the three readings as mere interpretamenta. — Ver. 10. In B, C, Cyr., the article is wanting before *ἡμέρα*; Lachm. and Tisch. have omitted it. — After *κλέπτῃς* the Rec. has *ἐν νυκτί* (after C, K, L, etc.), already justly omitted by Griesb. as a later supplement from 1 Thess. v. 2 (so, too, Tisch.). — Before *οὐρανοὶ* the Rec., after A, B, C (Lachm., Tisch. 7), has the article *οἱ*; in K, L, *κ*, it is wanting (Tisch. 8). — In place of *λυθήσονται*, Rec., after A, K, L (Tisch. 7), Lachm. and Tisch. 8 have adopted the sing. *λυθήσεται*, following B, C, *κ*; perhaps it is a correction according to the common usage. — Instead of the Rec. *κατακάησεται* in A, L, etc., B, K, P, etc., read *ἐβρεθήσεται*; Lachm. and Tisch. have retained the Rec.; the latter observes (8): *dubium non est, quin ἐβρεθήσεται edere jubeamur, at hoc vix ac ne vix quidem potest sanum esse; οὐχ ἢ sive οὐκ ἐτι si praepositum esset, non haerendum esset*. The greater number of commentators have left unnoticed the reading *ἐβρεθήσεται*; not so Hofmann; Buttm. reads: *ἂ ἐν αὐτῇ ἔργα ἐβρεθήσεται*; but *ἂ* instead of *τά* occurs in no codex. Cod. C reads *ἀφανισθήσονται*. See further in the exposition. — Ver. 11. *τούτων οὖν*]. Rec., after A, K, L, *κ*, etc., Vulg., Thph., Oec. (Lachm., Tisch. 8); in its place B has *τουτων οὕτως*, and C *τουτων δε οὕτως*; Tisch. 7 had accepted the version of B. — Ver. 12. Instead of *τήκεται*, Lachm., following C, Vulg., etc., reads: *τακήσεται*; probably a correction, because of the preceding

future. — Ver. 13. γῆν καινὴν]. Rec., according to B, C, K, L, P, etc. (Lachm., Tisch. 7); in its place Tisch. 8 reads καινὴν γῆν, according to A, \aleph ; this appears to be a correction, after the preceding καινοὺς . . . οὐρανοῖς. — κατὰ τὸ ἐπάγγελμα]. Rec., according to B, C, K, L, P (Tisch. 7); instead of κατὰ, A, etc., read καί; and in place of ἐπάγγελμα, A, \aleph , etc., have: ἐπαγγέλματα; Lachm. has adopted καὶ τὰ ἐπαγγέλματα; and Tisch. 8: κατὰ τὰ ἐπαγγέλματα. — Ver. 15. According to A, B, C, K, P, \aleph , etc., instead of the Rec. αὐτῷ δοθείσαν (L, etc.), the reading should be, as in Lachm. and Tisch.: δοθείσαν αὐτῷ. — Ver. 16. After πάσαις, Tisch. 8, following K, L, P, \aleph , reads the article ταῖς; Tisch. 7 and Lachm. omit ταῖς, after A, B, C, al. — In place of the Rec. ἐν αἰς (Tisch. 8), after A, B, \aleph , Lachm. and Tisch. 7 read: ἐν οἰς; on this see the commentary. — Lachm. has retained the ἀμήν, which closes the epistle, according to A, C, K, L, P, \aleph , al.; Tisch., following B, has omitted it, remarking: *solet omnino a testibus plerisque addi ad finem epistolarum; ter tantum* (Rom., Gal., Jud.) *non satis auctoritatis est, ut omittatur ἀμήν. Pauci addunt ἀμήν 3 Joh.*

Ver. 1. Not the commencement of a new epistle (Grotius), but of a new section, directed against the deniers of the advent of Christ. — ταύτην ἤδη . . . ἐπιστολήν]. “This epistle I write to you, as already the second.” Pott: αὕτη ἡδη δευτέρα ἐστὶν ἐπιστολή, ἣν γράφω ὑμῖν. Frommüller incorrectly explains ἡδη by: “now being near my death.” The epistle first written is the so-called First Epistle of Peter. — ἐν αἰς applies both to this and the First Epistle of Peter (Winer, p. 134 [E. T., 142]). The prepos. ἐν does not stand here in place of διὰ (Gerhard), but refers to the contents. — διεγείρω . . . δάνοιαν, for the phrase: διεγείρειν ἐν ὑπομνήσει, cf. chap. i. 13. — ὑμῶν belongs to δάνοιαν. — εἰλικρινῆ, cf. Phil. i. 10.

Ver. 2. Cf. Jude 17; in Jude mention is not made of the apostles, but only of the prophets. — μνησθῆναι]. Infin. of purpose: “in order that ye may remember,” equivalent to εἰς τὸ μνησθῆναι (Vorstius). — τῶν προειρημένων ρημάτων ὑπὸ τῶν ἁγίων προφητῶν]. This applies evidently to the Old Testament prophets; and with especial reference to the prophecies which relate to the παρουσία of Christ (cf. ver. 4 and chap. i. 19).¹ The Vulg. wrongly translates: *ut memores sitis eorum quae praedixi verborum a sanctis prophetis (or sanctorum prophetarum)*. — καὶ τῆς τῶν ἀποστόλων ὑμῶν ἐντολῆς τοῦ κυρίου καὶ σωτήρος]. On the commonly accepted reading ἡμῶν, a double interpretation has been given; some, making ἡμῶν depend on ἐντολῆς, for the most part regard τῶν ἀποστόλων as in apposition to ἡμῶν, thus: “of our, the apostles’, command” (Luther: “the commandment of us, who are the apostles of the Lord;” thus, too, Calvin, Hornejus, Wolf, Pott, Dietlein, etc.); whilst Bengel more correctly takes ἡμῶν as in apposition to ἀποστόλων; as in Acts x. 41: μάρτυσι . . . ἡμῖν; for otherwise ἡμῶν must have stood before ἀποστόλων; cf. also 1 Cor. i. 18. Others, again, hold that ἡμῶν is dependent on ἀποστόλων; thus De Wette: “the commandment of our apostles of the Lord, i.e., of the apostles who have preached to us, and are sent from the Lord.”

¹ Of course τὰ προειρημένα ῥήματα does not mean “what has been said before,” but “the words aforetime spoken,” and Hofmann did

not require to insist upon it; the more so that the contrary is not asserted in the commentaries against which his argument is directed.

But against this interpretation is the circumstance, that, whilst he elsewhere in the epistle designates himself as an apostle, the author of the epistle would thus make a distinction between himself and the apostles.¹ On the true reading, *ἡμῶν*, the gen. *τοῦ κυρίου* does not, as was for the most part formerly assumed, depend on *ἀποστόλων*, but on *ἐντολῆς* (Brückner, Wiesinger, Schott, Steinfass); either in the sense: "the commandment . . . of the Lord of the apostles, i.e., the commandment of the Lord, which the apostles have proclaimed;" or "*τοῦ κυρίου* is added by way of supplement to *ἐντολ.*," and the expression is to be left as it stands originally: "*your command of the apostles, of the Lord, i.e., which the Lord has given*" (Brückner; thus also Wiesinger, Schott); the latter is to be preferred. No doubt the parallel passage in Jude runs: *ὑπὸ τῶν ἀποστόλων τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν*; but the whole epistle, and especially this passage of it, shows that the author of our epistle, even if he had Jude's composition before him, in no way bound himself slavishly to individual expressions in it. According to Wiesinger, Schott, Steinfass, by the *ἀπ. ἡμ.*, Paul and his fellow-laborers are meant; this, too, is more probable than that the apostle included himself among them. — By *ἐντολή* is here, as little as in chap. ii. 21, to be understood the gospel, or the Christian religion (or, as Dietlein thinks, "the announcement, i.e., the historical proclamation, of those predictions of the prophets, partly fulfilled, partly yet unfulfilled, which was intrusted to the apostles"); but *ἐντολή* means here, as it always does, the commandment; according to De Wette: "the commandment to guard against the false teachers," after 1 Tim. iv. 1 ff. But it is more appropriate, and more in harmony with the connection of thought, to understand by it the command to lead a Christian life, in expectation of the second coming of Christ (Wiesinger, Schott, Brückner); cf. chap. ii. 22, i. 5 ff., iii. 12.

Ver. 3. *τοῦτο πρῶτον γινώσκοντες*; cf. chap. i. 20. — *γινώσκοντες* refers in loose construction (instead of an accus.) to the subject contained in *μνησθῆναι*. — *ὅτι ἐλέουσνται, κ.τ.λ.*] Cf. Jude 18.² — *ἐν ἐμπαιγμῶνι* gives sharp prominence to the conduct of the *ἐμπαίκται*. The word is a *ἀπ. λεγ.*; Heb. xi. 36: *ἐμπαίγμος*; with the constr. *ἐρχεσθαι ἐν*, cf. 1 Cor. iv. 21. — *κατὰ τὰς . . . πορευόμενοι*; Jude 18 and 16; *ἰδίας* is added so as to strengthen the pronoun *αὐτῶν*.

Ver. 4. The scoffing words of the *ἐμπαίκται*. — *καὶ λέγοντες · πῶς ἐστιν ἡ ἐπαγγελία τῆς παρουσίας αὐτοῦ*]. The question *πῶς ἐστιν* expresses the negation; "*quasi dicunt: nusquam est, evanuit; denique vana est et mendax*;" cf. 1 Pet. iv. 18. The same form of speech with *πῶς ἐστιν*: Ps. xlii. 4, lxxix. 10; Mal. ii. 17; Luke viii. 25. — *αὐτοῦ*, i.e., *Christi, cujus nomen ex re ipsa satis poterat intelligi* (Grotius). Gerhard assumes that the scoffers did not mention the name of Christ per *ἔξουθενισμον*; thus also Wiesinger, Hofmann. According to the connection (ver. 2), the *ἐπαγγελία* meant is that of the O. T. (cf. chap.

¹ De Wette thinks, indeed, that here the non-apostolic writer has involuntarily betrayed himself; but, as Stier justly observes, it can indeed hardly be supposed that the writer should have "so grossly failed to keep up the part" which he had distinctly assumed.

² Hofmann unwarrantably assumes that by that, of which the writer would have his readers to be specially mindful, he does not mean only the contents of the sentence depending directly on *γινώσκοντες*, but still more than that.

i. 19 ff.¹). In what follows we have the thesis of the scoffers in opposition to the *ἐπαγγελία*, and the basis of it. The thesis is: πάντα οὕτως διαμένει ἀπ' ἀρχῆς κτίσεως; its basis is indicated by the words: ἀφ' ἧς (sc. ἡμερας) οἱ πατέρες ἐκοιμήθησαν. On the assumption that the ἀφ' ἧς οἱ πατ. ἐκοιμ., as used by the scoffers, means the period marking off the commencement of the διαμένει, and that ἀπ' ἀρχ. κτ. serves only as a more precise definition of it (Brückner, Schott), then by οἱ πατέρες must be understood "the ancestors, the first generations of the human race." But on this view, ἀφ' ἧς. κ.τ.λ., is an entirely superfluous determination (Wiesinger), nor would there thus be any indication of the ground on which the scoffers based their thesis; if, however, this be contained in ἀφ' ἧς, κ.τ.λ., the reference in οἱ πατέρες can be only either to the fathers of the Jewish people, to whom the *ἐπαγγελία* was given, cf. Heb. i. 1 (Wiesinger), or those of the generation to which the scoffers belong (De Wette, Thiersch, Fronmüller, Hofmann). Now, since the falling asleep of the fathers of Israel, before its fulfilment, could not well be brought as a proof that the promise was of none effect, inasmuch as it referred to a time beyond that in which they lived (cf. 1 Pet. i. 10 ff.), preference must be given to the second view. Wiesinger, indeed, says that the time of the composition of the epistle does not agree with this; but as the tarrying of the *παρουσία* had already been the occasion of wonder in the church, and Christianity, when this letter was composed, had now been in existence for at least thirty-five years, it is quite possible that even at *that time* those who held Libertine views could have supported their denial of the *parousia* by the fact that the expectation cherished by the early Christians had remained unrealized, thus calling forth the prophecy here made. At any rate, it is a point not to be overlooked, that the words here used are represented as to be spoken at a time then still in the future. Ver. 8, which otherwise would stand totally unconnected with ver. 4, also favors this view.² The connection of the two members of the verse is certainly a loose one, since on none of the interpretations does ἀφ' ἧς, κ.τ.λ., stand in close connection with διαμένει. The thought which has been somewhat inadequately expressed is: Since the fathers fell asleep, nothing has changed, — the promise has not been fulfilled, — a proof that every thing remains as it has been since the creation. With ἐκοιμήθησαν, cf. 1 Cor. vii. 39, xv. 6, and other passages. — οὕτως does not require any supplement properly so called: "the scoffers point, as it were, with the finger to the (sacred) *status quo* of the world" (Steinfass). — διαμένει does not mean "has remained," nor is it "will

¹ This Hofmann disputes, saying: "By the promise is not to be understood the Old Testament promise, nor by the future the future of Christ, since those who speak thus are members of the Christian church; but with respect to the Old Testament prophecy, they speak of Jehovah's coming, and, with respect to Christ's prophecy, of His own coming. ἡ ἐπαγγελία τῆς παρουσίας τοῦ κυρίου might comprehend the one as well as the other;" the context, however, is in favor of the interpretation which Hofmann disputes.

² Dietlein's interpretation is altogether wrong. According to it, οἱ πατέρες means: "One generation after another always standing in the relation of fathers to the race succeeding it." Peculiar, but certainly quite unjustifiable, is the opinion of Steinfass, that the scoffers, with reference to the promise contained in the Book of Enoch, understood οἱ πατέρες to mean "the prophetic, or more definitely, the eschatological patriarchs, beginning with Enoch, and extending down to Daniel."

remain," but the present expresses the continuous, uniform duration; *δια* strengthens the idea *μένειν*. — *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς κτίσεως*: "since creation took its beginning."

Ver. 5 Refutation of the assertion: *πάντα οὕτω διαμένει*, by the adducing the fact of the flood.¹ *λανθάνει γὰρ . . . θέλοντας*; *γὰρ* is not equivalent to *δέ*, but designates the thought which follows as the reason for their scoffing: "Thus they speak because;" cf. Winer, p. 423 [E. T., 453]. — *τοῦτο* belongs either to *λανθάνει* or to *θέλοντας*; in the first case it refers to what follows: *ὅτι, κ.τ.λ.*; in which case *θέλοντας* will mean: "willingly, on purpose" (Brückner, Wiesinger, Fronmüller, Hofmann; cf. Winer, p. 436 [E. T., 467]; Buttman, p. 322. Luther: "but they wilfully will not know"); in the second case *τοῦτο* refers to the contents of the preceding statement, and *θέλειν* means "to assert;" "*for, whilst they assert this, it is hidden from them that*" (Dietlein, Schott). The position both of *τοῦτο* separated from *ὅτι* by *θέλοντας*, and of *θέλοντας* separated by *τοῦτο* from *λανθάνει*, favors the second construction; that *θέλειν* can be used in the sense of "to assert," is clear from Herodian, v. 3, 11: *εἰκόνα τε ἡλίον ἀνέργαστον εἶναι θελοῦσαι*; the word marks the assertion as one based on self-willed arbitrariness, and as without any certain foundation. — *ὅτι οὐρανοὶ ἦσαν ἐκπαλαι*; *οἱ οὐρανοί*, the plural according to the common usage. — *ἐκπαλαι*; cf. chap. ii. 3, not, "of old, formerly," but, "from of old," i.e., *jam inde a primo rerum omnium initio* (Gerhard). — *ἦσαν* belongs in the first instance to *οὐρανοί*; yet the subsequent *γῆ* is to be taken as applying to it also. — *καὶ γῆ ἐξ ὕδατος καὶ δὲ ὕδατος συνεστῶσα*. *συνεστῶσα* expresses the idea of originating out of a combination; *συνίστημι* is often employed thus by the Greeks in the intransitive tenses, though the reference contained in *συν* sometimes disappears almost entirely. The prepositions *ἐξ* and *διὰ* must not be regarded as synonymous; *ἐξ* refers to the substance, *διὰ* to the means. A twofold significance is thus attributed to the water in the formation of the earth, which is also in harmony with the Mosaic account of the creation, where the original substance is distinctly spoken of as *ἕδωρ*, and in the formation of the earth, water is mentioned as the instrumental element (Brückner). There is, accordingly, no foundation for the assertion of De Wette, that the author conceived the origin of the world, according to Indo-Egyptian cosmogony, as a species of chemical product of water. Many interpreters, as Bengel, Wiesinger, Schott, Fronmüller, Hofmann, as also Winer, p. 390 [E. T., 419], explain *ἐξ ὕδατος* by saying that the earth arose out of the water "in which it lay buried." But this interpretation is refuted by the meaning of the verbal idea *συνεστῶσα*, which belongs to *ἐξ ὕδατος*; thus, too, an element would be introduced which would be of only secondary importance.² Although *συνεστῶσα* belongs grammatically only to

¹ Schott disputes this, and maintains that the scoffers appealed to the fact of the flood in support of their opinion, "in as far as it did not form a definite close of the earthly development of the world, by an annihilation of the world," and that now what the writer wished to bring forward against it was why that judgment of destruction was executed simply by

means of a flood, and consequently was not an absolute annihilation, but only a change of form; but how much here must be read between the lines, and to which no allusion is made.

² The interpretation of Hornejus shows to what eccentricities commentators sometimes have recourse: "*dicitur autem terra consistere*

γῆ, yet in thought it has been applied to οὐρανοὶ also; thus Brückner, Wiesinger, Schott, and in this commentary. This reference may be justified thus far, that οὐρανοὶ is understood of the second day's work of creation, the visible heavens; but it is necessary only if κόσμος (ver. 6) is to be taken as meaning the heavens and the earth. De Wette arbitrarily refers the preposition ἐξ only to the earth, and δια to the heavens; the latter in the sense of, "through the water, between the water." τῷ τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγῳ draws emphatic attention to the fact that the active cause of the creation of the world was the Word of God; to this τῷ τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγῳ, the τῷ αὐτοῦ λόγῳ, ver. 7, corresponds.

Ver. 6. δὲ ὧν, κ.τ.λ.]. The question is, To what has ὧν retrospect? The answer depends on the meaning attached to ὁ τότε κόσμος. To appearance this phrase must be regarded as identical with οὐρανοὶ καὶ γῆ, vv. 5 and 7 (vv. 10, 13); and in support of this view, appeal may be made also to the τότε as distinguished from νῦν, ver. 7. On this interpretation, accepted by most expositors (as also in this commentary), δὲ ὧν can refer only either to ἐξ ὕδατος and τῷ τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγῳ (Gerhard, Brückner, Besser, Wiesinger, in this commentary also), or to ὕδατος alone (Calvin, Pott, etc.),¹ — the plural being explained from the circumstance that the water was formerly spoken of both as substance and as medium. The objection to this explanation, however, is that in the account of the flood there is nothing to show that it caused the destruction both of the heaven and of the earth, and that the earth only, but not the heaven, was submerged; Hofmann accordingly understands by ὁ τότε κόσμος, "the world of living creatures," as Oecumenius already had done: τὸ ἠπάλετο μὴ πρὸς πάντα τὸν κόσμον ἀκουστέον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς μόνα τὰ ζῶα. On this view (where νῦν only, ver. 6, seems to cause difficulty) ὧν refers to οὐρανοὶ καὶ γῆ (Oecumenius, Beza, Wolf, Hornejus, Fronmüller, Steinfass, Hofmann).²

Ver. 7. οἱ δὲ οὐρανοὶ καὶ ἡ γῆ]. The νῦν, which applies also to ἡ γῆ, cannot, if by ὁ τότε κόσμος is to be understood the world of living beings, be taken as an antithesis to τότε, but it refers simply to the present continuance of heaven and earth. — τῷ αὐτῷ [αὐτοῦ] λόγῳ points back τῷ τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγῳ, ver. 5; if the reading αὐτοῦ be adopted, this adjunct gives expression to the thought that, like as the originating of the heavens and the earth was dependent on the Word of God, so also is their preservation to annihilation by fire. If, however, αὐτῷ be the true reading, the idea seems to be implied that the reservation of the heavens and the earth unto judgment is based already on the words of creation.³ Though this idea be surprising, it can certainly not,

ἐξ ὕδατος, i. e., ἐκτὸς ὕδατος seu πρὸς ὕδατα, extra aquam s. ad aquas: δι' ὕδατος, i. e., μετὰ s. ἐν μεσφ' ὕδατος cum aqua s. in media aqua." — The opinion of Steinfass, too, that "συνεστῶσα is to be limited to the creation and existence of human beings, animals, and vegetables," finds no justification in the words of the epistle.

¹ With this reference Burnet (*Archæol. Philos.*, p. 467) agrees, yet he incorrectly explains δι' ὧν by "eam ob causam," or "propter illam (aquam);" for he strangely assumes that

whilst the former world was "ex aqua et per aquam constituta," this constitutio perished by the flood, so that therefore the κόσμος that now is, is no longer "ex aqua et per aquam," but "aliter constitutus."

² Beda likewise applies ὧν to heaven and earth, but interprets (evidently erroneously) δια thus, that these are not the causa, but the objectum perditionis; i. e., δι' ὧν as equivalent to in quibus partibus aere et terra.

³ Dictielu: "The sense is this, that the same

with Hofmann, be said to be paradoxical. It is, however, also possible that αἰτῶ is only meant to show that the word by which this keeping of the heavens and the earth takes place, is the Word of God equally with that by which they were created. — *τεθησαυρισμένοι εἰσί*; “are stored up,” like a treasure, which is kept against a particular time, cf. Rom. ii. 5. Dietlein is of opinion that in the word the idea of use must be kept hold of; he defines it thus: “that heaven and earth are to serve as the material for punishment, in such a manner, however, that they at the same time perish themselves;” but this is justified neither by the reference (Rom. ii. 5), nor by the context. — *πυρὶ τηρουμένοι, κ.τ.λ.*] “In that they are reserved for the fire against the day,” etc.; *πυρὶ* is more appropriately joined with *τηρούμενοι* (Brückner, Frömmüller) than with *τεθησαυρισμένοι εἰσί* (Wiesinger, Schott, Hofmann); this last term does not require the adjunct, since in itself it corresponds to the ἦσαν . . . *συνεστῶσα*, and it is only in the second member of the sentence that mention can be made of the future destruction by fire; otherwise, too, *τηρούμενοι* would be somewhat superfluous. The thought alluded to in *πυρὶ τηρούμενοι* is further developed in ver. 10. Nowhere in the O. T. or N. T. is this idea so definitely expressed as here; yet from this it does not follow that it is to be traced to Greek, more particularly to the Stoic philosophy, or to Oriental mythology. The O. T. makes frequent reference to a future change in the present condition of the world (“Heaven and earth shall pass away,” Ps. ii. 26, 27), in connection with the appearance of God to judgment; cf. Isa. xxxiv. 4, li. 6; especially Isa. lxvi., where, in ver. 22, a new heaven and a new earth is expressly spoken of; thus, too, Job xiv. 12. Equally is it more than once set forth that God will come to judgment in the destroying fire, Isa. lxvi. 15, Dan. vii. 9, 10, etc.; how easily, then, from passages such as these could the conception which finds expression here arise,¹ the more especially that it was promised that the world would never again be destroyed by a flood, and the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah by fire appeared to be a type of the future judgment of the world. — Conceptions as to the world’s destruction similar to those in the O. T. are to be found in the N. T., Matt. v. 18 (24, 29), Heb. xii. 27; of fire accompanying the judgment, 1 Cor. iii. 13, 2 Thess. i. 8; of the new heaven and the new earth, Rev. xxi. 1. — *εἰς ἡμέραν . . . ἀνθρώπων*]. The final end against which heaven and earth remain reserved for fire; *ἀπώλεια*: the opposite of *σωτηρία*, cf. Phil. i. 28 (chap. ii. 3). — Dietlein erroneously understands *τῶν ἀσεβῶν ἀνθρώπων* as a designation of the whole of mankind, in that, with the exception of the converted, they are ungodly. To any such *exception* there is here no reference: the phrase has reference rather to the ungodly in contrast to the godly.

Ver. 8 refers to the reason given in *ἄφ’ ἧς*, ver. 4, on which the scoffers based their assertion; it points out that the delay, also, of the *parousia* is no proof that it will not take place. — *ἐν δὲ τούτῳ*; “this one thing,” as a specially

λόγος which created the world assigned also to the post-Noachic world its time and its judgment.”

¹ When Schott denies this, and asserts in

opposition that the passages Isa. lxvi. 15 ff., together with Mal iii. 1-3, iv. 1, are “the complete statements of that event,” surely no judicious expositor will agree with him.

important point. — *μὴ λανθάνετω ὑμᾶς*; “let it not be hid from you;” said with reference to ver. 5. — *ὅτι μία ἡμέρα, κ.τ.λ.*; a thought that echoes Ps. xc. 4. The words lay stress on the difference between the divine and the human reckoning of time. It does not designate God as being absolutely without limitations of time (*cui nihil est praeteritum, nihil futurum, sed omnia praesentia*; Aretius), for it is not the nature of God that is here in question, but God’s reckoning of time which He created along with the world, and the words only bring out that it is different from that of man.¹ For this purpose the words of the Psalms were not sufficient: *χίλια ἔτη ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς σου ὡς ἡ ἡμέρα ἢ ἐχθές*; and, therefore, on the basis of them, the author constructs a verse consisting of two members. — *παρὰ κυρίου*; “with God,” i.e., in God’s way of looking at things. Since, then, time has a different value in God’s eyes from that which it has in the eyes of men, the tarrying hitherto of the judgment, although it had been predicted as *at hand*, is no proof that the judgment will not actually come.²

Ver. 9. Explanation of the seeming delay in the fulfilment of the promise. — *οὐ βραδύνει κύριος τῆς ἐπαγγελίας*]. The genitive does not depend on *κύριος* (Steinfass), but on the verb, which here is not intransitive, as if *περί* (Hornejus), or *ἐνεκα* (Pott), or some such word were to be supplied, but transitive; although elsewhere it governs the accusative (Isa. xlv. 13, LXX.: *τὴν σωτηρίαν τὴν παρ’ ἐμοῦ οὐ βραδυνῶ*), it can, in the idea of it, be likewise construed with the genitive.³ — *βραδύνει* means not simply, “differre, to put off,” for the author admits a delay, but it contains in it the idea of tardiness (Gen. xliii. 10), which even holds out the prospect of a non-fulfilment; Gerhard: *discrimen est inter tardare et differre; is demum tardat, qui ultra debitum tempus, quod agendum est, differt*. Cf. with this passage, Hab. ii. 3 (Heb. x. 37) and Eccles. xxxii. 22 (in Luther’s translation, xxxv. 22), LXX.: *καὶ ὁ κύριος οὐ μὴ βραδύνῃ, οὐδὲ μὴ μακροθυμήσει*. — *κύριος* here, as in ver. 8, is God, not Christ, as Schott vainly tries to prove. — *ὡς τινὲς βραδύτητα ἡγοῦνται*; “as some consider it tardiness;” that is, that, contrary to expectation, the promise has not yet been fulfilled; Grotius: “*et propterea ipsam quoque rem promissam in dubium trahunt*.” *τινὲς* denotes not the scoffers, but members of the church weak in the faith. — *ἀλλὰ μακροθυμεῖ εἰς ὑμᾶς*]. *μακροθυμεῖν* c. ἐπί: Matt. xviii. 26, 29; Luke xviii. 7, etc.; c. πρὸς: 1 Thess. v. 14; c. εἰς only here: “with reference to you.” — *εἰς ὑμᾶς*; not: “towards mankind called of free grace” (Dietlein), nor towards the *heathen* (Schott), but in *ὑμᾶς* the readers are addressed to whom the epistle is written, the more general ref-

¹ Hofmann is consequently equally incorrect when he says that the passage in the Psalm asserts that “for God time is no time,” but here that “for Him it is neither short nor long.”

² The following thoughts are not expressed here, although they may be inferred from what is said: “In one single day of judgment God can punish the sin of centuries, and can adjust that great inequality which, by so long a duration, has been introduced into eternity” (Dietlein); and “In one day a mighty step

onwards may be taken, such as in a thousand years could hardly have been expected; and then again, if retarded by the will of God, the march of development will, for a thousand years, hardly move faster than otherwise it would have done in a single day” (Thiersch, p. 107).

³ To combine *τῆς ἐπαγγελίας* with the subsequent *ὡς τινὲς βραδύτητα ἡγοῦνται*, so as to make the genitive dependent on *βραδύτητα* (Hofmann), produces a very clumsy and artificial construction.

erence to the others being understood as a matter of course. The reason of the non-fulfilment hitherto lies in the long-suffering love of God; the nearer definition lies in the words which follow. — *μὴ βουλόμενος*]. The participle in an explanatory sense: “in that he is not willing.”¹ — *τινὰς ἀπολέσθαι*; *τινάς*, namely, such as still lead a sensual life. — *ἀλλὰ πάντας εἰς μετάνοιαν χωρεῖσαι*; *χωρεῖν* here similarly as in Matt. xv. 17² “but come to repentance,” or, perhaps more correctly, “enter into repentance;” not as Dietlein thinks: “take the decisive step to repentance;” Calvin would, quite incorrectly, take *χωρεῖν* either as equivalent to *recipere*, so that *κύριος* would be the subject, or as an intrans. verb equal to *colligi, aggregari*. — With the thought, cf. 1 Tim. ii. 4; Ezek. xviii. 23, xxxiii. 11.³

Ver. 10. *ἤξει δὲ (ἡ) ἡμέρα κυρίου ὡς κλεπτης*]. *ἤξει δὲ* stands first by way of emphasis, in contrast to what precedes: “but come will the day of the Lord.” These words express the certainty of the coming of the day of judgment, and *ὡς κλεπτης* its unexpected suddenness; cf. 1 Thess. v. 2 (Matt. xxiv. 43): *τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡμέρας*, ver. 12, shows that *κυρίου* is here also equivalent to *Θεοῦ* (not to *Χριστοῦ*; Schott). — *ἐν ᾗ (οἱ) οὐρανοὶ ροιζήδων παρελεύσονται*]. This relative clause states “the event of that day, which makes it essentially what it is” (Schott). *ροιζήδων*, *ἀπ. λεγ.*, equivalent to *μετὰ ροίζου*, is best taken in the sense peculiar to the word: “with rushing swiftness” (Wiesinger, Schott, Hofmann; Pape, *s.v.*); Oecumenius understands it of the crackling of the destroying fire; De Wette, on the other hand, of the crash of the falling together. With *παρελεύσονται*, cf. Matt. xxiv. 35, v. 18; Luke xvi. 17; Rev. xxi. 1. As to *how* the heavens shall pass away, see ver. 12. — *στοιχεῖα δὲ κανσοῦμενα λυθήσονται*]. *στοιχεῖα* cannot refer to the so-called four elements, “inasmuch as the dissolving of fire by means of fire is unthinkable” (Brückner), and it is arbitrary to limit the idea to three (Hornejus), or to two (Estius) elements; as now the position of the words shows that the expression has reference neither to the earth afterwards named, nor to the world as made up of heaven and earth (Pott: *elementa totius mundi tam coeli quam terrae*; thus, too, Brückner: “the primary substances of which the world, as an organism, is composed;” similarly, Wiesinger, Schott), it must be understood of the constituent elements of the heavens, corresponding to the expression: *αἱ δυνάμεις τῶν οὐρανῶν*, Isa. xxxiv. 4; Matt. xxiv. 29 (cf. Meyer, *in loc.*). This view is justified by the circumstance that in the preceding *οἱ οὐρανοὶ . . . παρελεύσονται* no mention has as yet been made of the destruction of heaven and earth by fire. At variance with this view, Hofmann

¹ According to Dietlein, *βούλεσθαι* expresses a “determination of the will;” *θέλειν*, “willing as a self-determination;” this is incorrect, *βούλεσθαι* rather means willing, arising with and from conscious reflection; *θέλειν*, on the other hand, is willing in general, arising also from direct inclination.

² *Aeschyl. Pers.*, v. 385: *εἰς γαῦν*; cf. Wahl, *s.v.*

³ In order to deprive this passage of all force against the doctrine of predestination,

Calvin remarks: “sed hic quaeri potest: si neminem Deus perire vult, cur tam multi pereunt? Respondeo, non de arcano Dei consilio hic fieri mentionem, quo destinati sunt reprobi in suum exitum: sed tantum de voluntate, quae nobis in evangelio patefit. Omnibus enim promiscue manum illic porrigit Deus, sed eos tantum apprehendit, ut ad se ducat, quos ante conditum mundum elegit;” Beza, Piscator, etc., also apply this passage to the electi only.

understands the expression *στοιχεῖα* here as a designation of the stars, arbitrarily asserting that *στοιχεῖα* "cannot be only original component parts, but must also be prominent points which dominate that by which they are surrounded,"—appealing to Justin (*Apolog.*, ii. c. 5, and *Dial. c. Tr.*, c. 23), who speaks of the stars as *στοιχεῖα οὐράνια*. To this view it may be objected, that the author could not picture to himself a burning of the stars, which appeared to him as fiery bodies; neither do any of the corresponding passages of Scripture allude to this. — The verb *καυσοῦσθαι* only here and in ver. 12, "to burn;" in the classics, "to suffer from heat;" the participle expresses the reason of the *λυθήσονται*: "will be dissolved by the burning." *λύειν*, in the sense of "to destroy, to bring to nothing," Eph. ii. 14; 1 John iii. 8, — very appropriate here if *στοιχεῖα* be the original elements. — *καὶ γῆ καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῇ ἔργα κατακαήσεται*. *τὰ ἔργα* are neither the wicked works of man (after 1 Cor. iii. 15), nor his works in general (Rosenmüller, Steinfass, Hofmann); the reference may be either to the *opera naturae et artis* (Bengel, Dietlein: "the manifold forms which appear on the earth's surface, in contrast to the earth as a whole;" thus also Brückner, Wiesinger, Schott, Frömmüller); or the expression may be synonymous with that which frequently occurs in the O. T.: *ἡ γῆ καὶ τὸ πλήρωμα αὐτῆς*, that is to say, the creations of God which belong to the earth, as they are related in the history of creation, cf. Rev. x. 6. Hofmann wrongly urges against this view, that on it *τὰ ἐν αὐτῇ* would be sufficient; for even though this be true, it does not follow that the addition of the word *ἔργα* would prove that it is "the works of men" that are here meant. With reference to the reading *εὐρεθήσεται*, instead of the Rec. *κατακαήσεται* (see critical remarks), Hofmann regards it as original, and considers the words *καὶ τὰ . . . εὐρεθήσεται* as an interrogative clause subjoined to the preceding affirmative clause. Of course an interrogative clause may be subjoined to an affirmative; but when Hofmann, in support of his interpretation, appeals to 1 Cor. v. 2, he fails to observe that the relation between the statement and the question there is entirely different from that which is supposed to exist here.

Vv. 11, 12. *τούτων οὖν πάντων λυομένων*]. *τούτων πάντων* refers to all the things before mentioned, and not only, as Hofmann thinks, to the immediately preceding *ἔργα*. As regards the reading *οὕτως*, instead of the Rec. *οὖν*, it is indeed not supported by the preponderance of authorities; it deserves, however, the preference because it (equivalent to "as has before been stated") is more significant than the reading *οὖν*. The present *λυομένων* is explained by Winer, p. 321 (E. T., 342): "since all this is in its nature destined to dissolution; the lot of dissolution is, as it were, already inherent in those things" (thus also Dietlein, De Wette-Brückner, Wiesinger); but it is more correct to find expressed in the present the certainty of the event, which is, no doubt, as yet future (similarly, Schott), especially as the passing away of all things, as it is formerly described, is in consequence not of their nature, but of the will of God as Judge. Hofmann denies, indeed, any reference to the future, remarking: the present participial clause brings out that this is the fate of the subject; but this fate is one which is realized only in the future. — *ποταπὸς δεῖ, κ.τ.λ.*]. As regards its arrangement, this

period, as far as the end of ver. 12, is divided by many into two portions, of which the first closes either with *ὑμῶς* (Pott, Meyer in his translation) or with *εἰσεβείαις* (Griesbach, Fronmüller), and forms a question to which the second half supplies the answer. But opposed to this construction is the word *ποταπούς*, which in the N. T. is never used as indirect interrogation, but always in exclamation. Consequently the whole forms *one* clause, which has a hortative sense (so, too, Hofmann),¹ and before which may be supplied, for the sake of clearness, "consider therefore." The sense is: "since all that passes away, consider what manner of persons you ought to be;" Gerhard: *quam pie, quam prudenter vos oportet conservari*; yet *ποταπούς* (in classical writers generally *ποδαπούς*) is not equivalent to *quantus* (Bretschneider, De Wette-Brückner), but to *qualis*. — *ἐν ἀγίαις ἀναστροφαῖς καὶ εἰσεβείαις*]. The plural marks the holy behavior and the piety in their different tendencies and forms of manifestation. These words may be taken either with what precedes (so most commentators) or with what follows (thus Steinfass); the latter is to be preferred, since the force of *ποταπούς* would only be weakened by this adjunct. — *προσδοκῶντας καὶ σπεύδοντας τὴν παρουσίαν τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡμέρας*; not "so that," but "since ye . . . in holy walk . . . look for." — Most of the earlier interpreters arbitrarily supply *εἰς* to *σπεύδοντας*; Vulg.: *expectantes et properantes in adventum*; Luther: "hasten to the day." Others attribute to the word the meaning, "to expect with longing," but this force it never has; in the passages quoted in support of it the word rather means, "to prosecute any thing with zeal," e.g., Pind., *Isthm.*, v. 22: *σπεύδειν ἄρετάν*; Isa. xvi. 5, LXX.: *σπ. δικαιοσύνην*; but then the object is always something which is effected by the action of the *σπεύδοντας*; the original signification of hastening, hurrying, is to be kept hold of here. That by which this hastening is to be accomplished is to be gathered from ver. 11, namely, by a holy walk and piety. The context nowhere hints that it is to be accomplished *only* by prayer² (Hofmann, following Bengel). — The expression, *τὴν παρουσίαν τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡμέρας*, occurs nowhere else; with *ἡ τ. Θεοῦ ἡμ.*, cf. ver. 10 and Tit. ii. 13; to *παρουσίαν* Steinfass arbitrarily supplies "τοῦ Χριστοῦ." — *δὲ ἦν οὐρανοῖ, κ.τ.λ.*]. A resumption of what is said in ver. 10. — *δὲ ἦν* may be referred either to *τὴν παρουσίαν* (Steinfass, Hofmann) or to *τῆς τ. Θ. ἡμέρας*; in both cases the sense remains substantially the same. It is to be taken neither as equivalent to *per* (like *διὰ*, c. gen.), nor in a temporal sense (Luther: "in which"); but it denotes here, as it always does, the *occasioning* cause, equal to "on account of" (Brückner, Wiesinger, Schott); cf. Winer, p. 373 [E. T., 400]). Dietlein translates correctly, but arbitrarily explains the phrase by "in whose honor as it were." — *πυρούμενοι*, cf. Eph. vi. 16; Dietlein falsely: "in that they will burn;" the part. is present, not future. — *τήκεται*; De Wette: "τήκεται must not be taken strictly as

¹ Hofmann, however, does not urge the N. T. usage of *ποταπούς* in favor of this construction, but "the want of purpose and coldness of dividing the thought into question and answer."

² De Wette gives substantially the correct

interpretation: "They hasten the coming of the day, in that by repentance and holiness they accomplish the work of salvation, and render the *μακροθυμία*, ver. 9, unnecessary;" and Wiesinger further adds: "and positively bring it on by their prayers" (Rev. xxii. 17).

meaning to be melted, as if στοιχ. were to be conceived of as a solid mass; it can be regarded as synonymous with λύεσθαι." The reference to Isa. xxxiv. 4, LXX.: καὶ τακίησονται πᾶσαι αἱ δυνάμεις τῶν οὐρανῶν (cf. Micah i. 4), cannot fail to be recognized.¹ Gerhard: *cum tota mundi machina, coelum, terra et omnia quae sunt in ea sint aliquando peritura, ideo ab inordinata mundi dilectione nostrum abstrahentes coelestium bonorum desiderio et amore flagremus.*

Ver. 13. καινοὺς δὲ οὐρανοὺς καὶ γῆν καινὴν]. This verse, which does not depend on δι' ἣν (Dietlein), but is joined in an independent manner to what goes before, forms the antithesis to the thought last expressed, and serves to strengthen the exhortation contained in vv. 11, 12. — By καινοὺς . . . καινὴν the heaven and the earth of the future are distinguished as to their character from those of the present, and prominence is given to their glorified condition; cf. 2 Cor. v. 17. — The same idea of a new heaven and a new earth is expressed in Rev. xxi. 1. — κατὰ τὸ ἐπάγγελμα αὐτοῦ, cf. Isa. lxv. 17, lxvi. 22. — αὐτοῦ, i.e., Θεοῦ; the O. T. promise, principally at least, is meant. προσδοκῶμεν, which looks back to προσδοκῶντας, ver. 12, significantly designates the new heaven and the new earth as the aim of the certain hope of believers. — ἐν οἷς δικαιοσύνη κατοικεῖ]. A similar thought is contained in Isa. lxv. 25; cf. also Rev. xxi. 3–27. Erasmus incorrectly refers ἐν οἷς to the subject contained in προσδοκῶμεν; it plainly goes back to καινοὺς οὐρ. κ. γῆν καιν. δικαιοσύνη, not equivalent to gloria et felicitas coelestis, utpote verae justitiae praemium (Vorstius), but the vera justitia itself, i.e., the holy conduct, completely in harmony with the divine will, of those who belong to the new heaven and the new earth.² Hofmann widens the idea too much, when he says that "δικαιοσύνη is to be understood not as applying only to the right conduct of men, but in the sense of integrity of nature generally."

Ver. 14. διὸ, ἀγαπητοί, ταῦτα προσδοκῶντες]. The participle does not give the explanation of the διὸ: "wherefore, because we expect this" (Wiesinger, Schott), but the waiting for it belongs to the exhortation (Dietlein, Brückner, Steinfass). — σπονδάσατε ἄσπιλοι . . . ἐν εἰρήνῃ; ἄσπιλοι, cf. 1 Pet. i. 19: ἀμώμητοι, besides here only in Phil. ii. 15, "unblamable" (Deut. xxxii. 5: τέκνα μώμητα); reverse of the false teachers: σπιλοι καὶ μῶμοι, chap. ii. 13. — αὐτῷ; not equal to ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, nor is it the dat. comm. (Schott); and as little: "with reference to him" (Hofmann); but: "according to His (i.e., God's) judgment." — εὐρεθῆναι refers not to the future time of the judgment, but to the present time of the expectation. — ἐν εἰρήνῃ]. This adjunct does not

¹ Although this passage does not finally settle the dispute, whether an entire destruction, an annihilation, or only a transformation of the state of the world is to be looked for, whether the world is to be destroyed by fire, quoad substantiam suam, or quoad qualitates suas, still it gives more support to the second than the first idea, since, in spite of the strong expressions which the writer makes use of, it is not decidedly stated that the world will be dissolved into nothing.

² In the Book of Enoch, also, similar con-

ceptions are to be found; chap. xc. 17: "and the former heavens, they shall pass away and be dissolved, and new heavens will appear;" chap. liv., 4, 5: "In that day will I cause mine elect to dwell in their midst, and I will change the heavens," etc.; "I will also change the earth," etc.; l. 5: "the earth shall rejoice, the righteous shall dwell therein, and the elect shall go and walk therein;" x. 17: "The earth shall be purified from all corruption, from all crime, from all punishment, and from all suffering."

belong to *προσδοκῶντες*, as Beza considers probable, but to *εἰρεθῆναι ἄσπιλοι*, κ.τ.λ.; it gives the life-element, in which the Christian must move (so, too, Brückner); cf. Ephes. i. 4: *ἐν ἀγάπῃ*; 1 Thess. iii. 13: *ἐν ἀγλωσύνῃ*, if he would be found an *ἄσπιλος*: *εἰρήνῃ* is here not "concord" (Pott, Augusti), nor is it "the good conscience," but peace, in the full meaning of the word; the addition is explained from ver. 15. Dietlein incorrectly takes *ἐν εἰρήνῃ* as the object to be supplied to *ἄσπιλοι καὶ ἀμώμητοι*, which are here used not as relative, but as absolute adjectives; at the same time, too, he limits *εἰρήνῃ*, in the conception of it, to "peace of the church, especially to peace in relation to the church authorities." Not less erroneous is it to regard, with Steinfass, *ἐν εἰρήνῃ* as the opposite "of all division between the Jewish and the Gentile elements." The interpretation of De Wette: "to your peace," equivalent to *εἰς εἰρήνῃν* (Beza: *vestro bono, clementem illum videlicet ac pacificum experturi*), cannot be justified on linguistic grounds.

Vv. 15, 16. *καὶ τὴν τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν μακροθυμίαν*]. See ver. 9: "the long-suffering of our Lord, which consists in this, that He still keeps back the last judgment." It is open to question whether *ὁ κύριος ἡμῶν* means God (De Wette, Dietlein, Fronmüller), or Christ (Wiesinger, Schott, Steinfass); what goes before favors the former (vv. 14, 12, 10, 9, 8), the N. T. usage the latter; in both cases the sense is substantially the same. — *σωτηρίαν ἠγγείσθε*; antithesis to *βραδυντῆτα ἡγούνται*, ver. 9: "the *μακροθυμία* of the Lord account for salvation," i.e., as something which has your salvation as its aim; that is, by your making such use of the time of grace, that the fruit of it is the *σωτηρία*. — *καθὼς καὶ ὁ ἀγαπητός ἡμῶν ἀδελφός Παῖλος, κ.τ.λ.*]. The reference here to Paul is evidently meant to emphasize the exhortation given; it is, however, more particularly occasioned by the circumstance that many persons had been guilty of wresting the apostle's words, and against this the apostle wishes to warn his readers. — *ὁ ἀγαπητός, κ.τ.λ.*, designates Paul not only as a friend, or a fellow-Christian, but as one with whom Peter feels himself most intimately connected in official relationship. Hofmann, on the other hand, presses the plural *ἡμῶν*, and thinks that by it the apostle, with a view to his Gentile readers, would unite the Jewish-Christians with himself, so as to show that the apostle of the Gentiles was a beloved brother to them as well as to him. The adjunct, *κατὰ τὴν δοθείσαν αὐτῷ σοφίαν*, acknowledges the wisdom which has been granted to him, of which also the utterances which the apostle especially has in his eye are the outcome. — *ἔγραψεν ὑμῖν*]. Which epistle or epistles are meant? According to Oecumenius, Lorinus, Grotius, etc., as also Dietlein and Besser, it is *the Epistle to the Romans*, on account of chap. ix. 22 (*ἦνεγκεν ἐν πολλῇ μακροθυμίᾳ*) and chap. ii. 4; according to Jachmann, *the Epistle to the Corinthians* (chiefly on account of 1 Ep. i. 7-9), in consideration of the words, *κατὰ . . . σοφίαν*; according to Estius, Bengel, Hornejus, Gerhard, etc., *the Epistle to the Hebrews*, on account of ix. 26 ff., x. 25, 37. These different opinions assume that *καθὼς* applies only to the last thought expressed in this verse. But there is no reason for any such limitation, since this exhortation is joined in the closest manner possible to that which precedes it in ver. 14. Wiesinger rightly rejects the supposition that *καθὼς ἔγραψε* refers still farther back, namely, to the whole

section relating to the *parousia* (De Wette, with whom Brückner agrees, and Schott). — Since the document to which the author alludes is, by *ἔγραψεν ὑμῖν*, indicated as one addressed to the same circle of readers as Second Peter, the reference here cannot be to the above-named epistles, nor yet to the Epistle to the Thessalonians (De Wette), but only to the Epistle to the Ephesians (Wiesinger, Schott, Hofmann: to this Steinfass adds the First Epistle to Timothy and the Epistle to the Colossians; Fronmüller, the last-named epistle and that to the Romans). In support of this may be urged the character of this epistle as a circular letter, and the echoes of it to be found in First Peter. It must also be observed, that although the precise thought expressed in the beginning of this verse is not to be found in that epistle, yet the epistle itself is certainly rich in ethical exhortations with reference to the Christian's hope of salvation.¹ It is plainly entirely arbitrary to assume, with Pott and Morus, that the apostle here refers to an epistle which we do not now possess.

Ver. 16. *ὡς καὶ ἐν πάσαις [ταῖς] ἐπιστολαῖς; sc. ἔγραψεν.* By this adjunct the epistle of Paul, referred to in *ἔγραψεν ὑμῖν*, is definitely distinguished from his other epistles; but what is true of the former is asserted also of the latter, i. e., that they contain the same exhortations, a statement, however, which is more precisely limited by *λαλῶν ἐν αὐταῖς περὶ τούτων*. The difference in the reading, that is, whether the article is to be put with *πάσαις* or not, is of trifling importance for the meaning, since it is unwarranted to suppose that *πάσαις ταῖς* marks the epistles of Paul as forming a *formally completed* collection (Wiesinger), — the article only showing that the epistles of Paul were already known as such. — *λαλῶν ἐν αὐταῖς περὶ τούτων*. *λαλῶν* is not for *ἐν αἷς λαλεῖ* (Pott), but it means: “*when in them* (i. e., in his epistles) *he speaks of these things*. — *περὶ τούτων* can only have the same reference as *καθώς*, ver. 15; that is, then, not strictly to the teaching as to the *parousia* as such, but chiefly “*to the exhortation given in ver. 14 f.*” (Wiesinger), and what is connected with it. — The remark in what follows alludes to that which occasioned the mention of Paul's epistles. — *ἐν οἷς* or *αἷς ἐστι δυνάμητά τινα*. It can hardly be decided which is the true reading, *οἷς* or *αἷς*. Schott thinks that for the sense it is immaterial, since, if *αἷς* be read, the *τινά* must be limited to the passages where Paul happens to speak *περὶ τούτων*; and if *ἐν οἷς* the reference can be to those things or questions not generally, but only in the way in which they are discussed by Paul. Reiche holds a different view; in his opinion, *ἐν οἷς* refers to those things in themselves, *ἐν αἷς* to the epistles generally; this can, however, hardly be correct, for it is scarcely conceivable that the author should let fall a remark closely conjoined with what had gone before, which departs so entirely from the connection of thought. Besides, *ἐν αἷς* deserves the preference not only on account of the

¹ Schott must be considered mistaken in appealing to this, that “it is precisely the Epistle to the Ephesians, ii. 11–iii. 12, which contains the most exact development of the idea expressed here in ver. 9 and ver. 15, that the divine direction of history, with a view to

the completion of salvation, has given the peculiar significance to the present time, to lead into the church the *heathen world*, which will be the subject of the future completion of salvation;” of all this absolutely nothing is here said.

external authorities, but because of the following: *ὡς τὰς λοιπὰς γραφάς* (Wiesinger, Brückner, Reiche, Hofmann; Schott otherwise). *τινά* is generally regarded as the subject, and *δυσνόητα* as the predicate belonging to it; the position of the words, however, decides that *δυσν. τινά* must be taken together as subject (Schott, Hofmann). By *δυσνόητα* must not be understood, with Schott, "the things which in themselves are opposed to the human mind," but the expressions in which Paul speaks of them; Steinfass correctly: "*τινά* are words, not objects;" for to the things the verb *στρεβλοῦσιν* is not suited. What the apostle meant can only be gathered from the connection; consequently, the reference here cannot be to utterances of the Apostle Paul with respect to the *parousia* itself (Schott), and therefore not to any statements of his, such as are to be found in 1 Thess. iv. 13 ff.; 1 Cor. xv. 12-58. Still less does the connection *appear* to justify the assumption that "the Pauline doctrine of freedom" (Wiesinger) is meant. Since, however, Paul's statements with regard to Christian freedom stand in close relation to the final completion of salvation, and the idea of it forms such a characteristic feature of Paul's teaching, which could only too easily be distorted by misunderstanding, it is certainly possible, indeed it is probable, that the author had it chiefly in mind in using this somewhat indefinite expression.¹ — *ἄ ἀμαθεῖς καὶ ἀστήρικτοι στρεβλοῦσιν; ἀμαθῆς, ἅπ. λεγ.*, according to De Wette, equivalent to "unteachable, with the implied idea of stubbornness and of unbelief." This is incorrect. *ἀμαθῆς* means only "ignorant;" no doubt the secondary idea given by De Wette may be connected with this (as in the passages quoted, Joseph., *Antiq.*, i. 4, 1, and iii. 14, 4), but here it is not to be presupposed, since the idea *ἀστήρικτος* connected with *ἀμαθῆς*, although denying strength of faith, does not deny faith itself; with *ἀστήρικτοι*, cf. chap. ii. 14. Most interpreters assume that the reference here is to the seducers, the Libertines and deniers of the *parousia* formerly mentioned; but as a designation of them, the expressions are too weak; chap. ii. 14, too, is opposed to this (Schott). — *στρεβλοῦν, ἅπ. λεγ.*, strictly: "to turn with the *στρέβλη*." Here it means: "to distort the words," i.e., to give them a sense other than they actually have; equivalent to *διαστρέφειν* (cf. Chrysostom on 2 Cor. x. 8: *οἱτοὶ πρὸς τὴς οἰκείας διέστρεψαν τὰ ῥήματα ἐννοίας*); the word is to be found in another figurative sense in 2 Sam. xxii. 27, LXX. — *ὡς καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς γραφάς*]. This addition is somewhat surprising, not only because all more precise statement of the *γραφαί* referred to is wanting, but because by it *στρεβλοῦν*, which formerly had reference only to the *δυσνόητά τινα* in the epistles of Paul, is here extended to entire writings; for, to interpret *γραφαί* by "passages of Scripture" (De Wette), is arbitrary. — It is very improbable that the reference is to the O. T. Scriptures (Wiesinger, Schott, Steinfass), since the author would certainly have defined them more nearly as

¹ According to Hofmann, it is passages such as Eph. ii. 5 f., Col. ii. 12, that are meant, "for with these and similar statements, the teaching of a Hymenaeus and a Philetus could be combined, — that the resurrection was already past, and that no other resurrection

than that which takes place in regeneration is to be looked for. — This doctrine, combined with the other, that the world of sense has nothing related to God, would produce that justification of immorality predicted in chap. ii."

such¹ (Brückner); probably, then, other writings are meant, which, at the time of the composition of this epistle, served, like the epistles of Paul, for the instruction and edification of the Christian churches; it is possible, therefore, that these included other writings of the N. T.; but that they were only such, cannot be proved. That the words presuppose a collection of N. T. writings, properly so called, is without any reason asserted by De Wette (Brückner). — πρὸς τὴν ἰδίαν αὐτῶν ἀπώλειαν]. *ιδίαν* serves to intensify *αὐτῶν*: *to their own destruction* (cf. chap. ii. 1). The wresting of Scripture has this consequence, inasmuch as they make use of the distorted expressions, in order to harden themselves in their fleshly lust.

Vv. 17, 18. Concluding exhortation and doxology. — *ὑμεῖς οὖν*]. Conclusion from what goes before. — *προγινώσκοντες*; *since ye know it beforehand*; i. e., that such false teachers as have been described will come; not “that the advent of Christ will take place,” nor “that the consequences of the *στρεβλοῦν* will be the *ἀπώλεια*” (Schott). — *φυλάσσεσθε, ἵνα μὴ*]. Since *φυλάσσεσθε* is nowhere else construed with *ἵνα μὴ, ἵνα, κ.τ.λ.*, is not to be taken as an objective clause, but as one expressive of purpose; “consequently, special emphasis lies on *φυλάσσεσθε*” (Schott). — *τῇ τῶν ἀθέσμων πλάνῃ συναπαχθέντες*]. The *ἀθεσμοὶ* (cf. chap. ii. 7) are the aforementioned *ἐμπαίκται* and Libertines. — *πλάνῃ* is not “seduction” (Dietlein: “leading astray of others”), for the word never has this meaning (not even in Eph. iv. 14); nor would the *συν* in the verb agree with this, but, as in chap. ii. 18: “moral-religious error;” with *συναπαχθέντες*, “carried away along with,” cf. Gal. ii. 13, and Meyer on Rom. xii. 16. — *ἐκπέσῃτε τοῦ ἰδίου στηριγμοῦ*]. With *ἐκπίπτειν*, cf. Gal. v. 4, and Meyer *in loc.* — *στηριγμός, ἂπ. λεγ.*, is the firm position which any one possesses (not “the fortress:” Luther); here, therefore, the firm position which the readers as believing Christians take up; cf. i. 12; antithesis to the *ἄμαθεις καὶ ἀστήρικτοι*, ver. 16. Dietlein explains the word quite arbitrarily of the “remaining at peace in the church.” — Ver. 18. *αὐξάνετε δέ*]. Antithesis to the *ἐκπέσῃτε*; the remaining in the firm position can take place only where the *αὐξάνειν* is not lacking. Calvin: “*ad profectum etiam hortatur, quia haec unica est perseverandi ratio, si assidue progredimur.*” Hofmann incorrectly connects this imperative with *φυλάσσεσθε*, to which it is supposed to be related as a further addition; this view is opposed by *δέ*. — *ἐν χάριτι καὶ γνώσει τοῦ κυρίου, κ.τ.λ.*, does not state “the means and the origin of the growing” (Schott), but that in which they should grow or increase; *αὐξάνειν*, without any nearer definition, would be too bald in presence of the *ἵνα μὴ . . . ἐκπέσῃτε, κ.τ.λ.* With regard to the two ideas, *χάρις* and *γνώσις*, Aretius says: “*illud ad conversationem inter homines refero, quae gratiosa esse debet; hoc vero ad Dei cultum, qui consistit in cognitione Christi;*” this explanation is wrong; *χάρις* can be only either the grace of God, so that the sense of the exhortation would be, that they should seek to acquire the grace of God in ever richer measure (Hornejüs, etc.); or — and this is preferable — the state of

¹ Although in other parts of the N. T. αἱ γραφαὶ always means the O. T. Scriptures, still the addition of *λοιπαὶ* proves that other

Scriptures are here referred to; it would be different were *λοιπὰς* not added.

grace of the Christians (according to Calvin, etc. : the sum of the divine gifts of grace). — The *γνώσις* is here specially mentioned, because the author regarded it as the living origin of all Christian activity. — The genitive, *τοῦ κυρίου, κ.τ.λ.*, is taken by De Wette, Brückner agreeing with him, with reference to *χάρις* as the subjective, with reference to *γνώσις* as the objective genitive; in like manner Hofmann. This twofold reference of the same genitive is inconceivable;¹ if it belong to *both* ideas, it can only be the gen. auctoris (Dietlein, Steinfass); but since it is more natural to explain it in connection with *γνώσις* as gen. objec., *χάρις* must be taken as an independent conception. — Finally, the doxology, applied to Christ; Hemming: "*testimonium de divinitate Christi, nam cum tribuit Christo aeternam gloriam, ipsum verum Deum absque omni dubio agnoscit.*" — The expression *εἰς ἡμέραν αἰῶνος*, is to be found only here; Bengel takes *ἡμέρα* in contrast to the night: *aeternitas est dies, sine nocte, merus et perpetuus*; this is hardly correct; most interpreters explain the expression as equivalent to *tempus aeternum*, synonymous with *εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα*, 1 Pet. i. 25, or with *εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας*, Rom. xvi. 27; this is too inexact; *ἡμέρα αἰῶνος* is the day on which eternity, as contrasted with time, begins, which, however, at the same time, is eternity itself. — *ἀμήν*; cf. Jude 25.

¹ Hofmann, indeed, appeals to Rom. xv. 4; Tit. ii. 13; 1 Pet. i. 2; but these passages do not prove what they are meant to prove.

THE FIRST EPISTLE OF THE APOSTLE JOHN.

INTRODUCTION.

SEC. 1.—CONTENTS AND DESIGN OF THE EPISTLE.

1. LEADING IDEAS.—The entire development of the argument of the Epistle is based upon the single fundamental conviction of the antagonism subsisting between the “*world*” and “*believers.*” Whilst the former are under the power and dominion of the devil, the latter are in *fellowship with God*. Those who belong to the world are *the children of the devil*, the others are the *children of God*. The objective basis of believers’ life-fellowship with God is the mission of the Son of God, originating in His love, for the reconciliation of the world, or the incarnation of the Son of God (the Eternal Life which was with God from eternity), and His self-sacrifice unto death; its subjective basis is *faith* in this fact of the divine love. Whosoever believes in Jesus Christ, the Son of God, belongs no more to the world, but has been born of divine seed, a child of God. The Christian must therefore, above all things, be on his guard against the false doctrine which, making a distinction between Jesus and the Son of God (or Christ), denies the manifestation of the Son of God in the flesh,—and, consequently, the fact of the revelation of divine love,—and thereby abolishes the ground of the life-fellowship with God.—In the communion which the believer, anointed with the Holy Ghost, enjoys with God in Christ, he possesses not only *true knowledge*, but also *righteousness*. Whilst the world is dominated by darkness, and those who belong to it know not whither they go, believers walk in *the light*. Enlightened by the Holy Ghost, they know God in the truth of His being, and are able to distinguish between truth and falsehood. At the same time their life is in sharpest contrast to sin. The latter is so opposed to their nature, that, as those who are born of God, they do not, nay, can not sin, but, on the contrary, in harmony with the pattern of Christ, *do righteousness*; whereas those who belong to the world,

as children of the devil, commit sin, which is the principle of their life. It is true the Christian is conscious that he also still has sin; but inasmuch as he does not deny, but, on the contrary, confesses it openly, *the blood of Christ cleanses him*; and, further, in the consciousness that Christ, the Righteous One, is his Paraclete with the Father, *he also purifies himself*, as Christ is pure. — The essence of the believer's righteousness is *love to God*, which manifests itself *in obedience to His commandments*, the sum of which is *love to the brethren*. — Whilst the world, following the example of Cain, who hated and slew his brother on account of his righteous life, hates the children of God, and in the spirit of hatred incurs the guilt of murder, the believer, imitating the pattern of Christ, feels himself bound, not in word only, but in deed as well, to love his brother, and to give his life for him if necessary. In love like this he possesses evidence of his divine adoption, and therein *eternal life*. Whilst the world continues in death, he has passed out of death into life; and in this new life he is free from fear and full of joyful confidence. He knows that his prayers are heard of God, and looks forward with confidence to the day of judgment, when he shall not be put to shame, but shall be like God, inasmuch as he shall see Him as He is. — The period still continues during which the world manifests its antagonism to the believer, who is also tempted by the devil; but in his faith, which is the victory over the world, he has vanquished these enemies, and the devil can accomplish nothing against him. Moreover, the world has already begun to vanish; it is the last time, as the appearance of Antichrist clearly proves; soon Christ shall appear, and with Him the perfecting of His own.

2. *Line of Argument*. — At the outset we have an introduction, in which the apostle announces the appearing of that Eternal Life which was with the Father to be the theme of his apostolic message; and indicates the perfecting of his readers' joy, in their communion with the Father and with His Son Jesus Christ, as the end aimed at in his Epistle (chap. i. 1-4). The letter itself he begins with the thought that God is Light (i. 5), from which he infers that if a man asserts that he has fellowship with God, whilst walking in darkness, it is a lie (i. 6); and, on the other hand, that the fellowship of Christians with each other, and purification through the blood of Christ, are conditioned by a walk in the light (i. 7). In connection with the purification mentioned, he urges that whosoever claims to be without sin deceives himself, and makes God a liar, whereas in case of an honest confession of sin God manifests His faithfulness and justice by forgiving the sin and cleansing from it (i. 8-10); and with this con-

sciousness, in case he sin, the Christian may comfort himself, since he has Jesus Christ the righteous, who is the propitiation for the sins of the whole world, as his Paraclete with the Father (ii. 1, 2). In ver. 3 the apostle returns again to the starting-point in his argument, by showing that (just as fellowship with God can only be enjoyed whilst walking in the light) the knowledge of God can only exist in obedience to His commandments, and the being in Him in following after Christ (ii. 3-6). The command involved in this for the readers, says the apostle, is the old one which they had heard from the beginning, and which he now once more impresses on them because the darkness is already beginning to vanish. He then describes (ii. 7, 8) walking in the light as walking in brotherly love, whereas the man who hates his brother is in darkness (ii. 9-11); and turns directly to his readers, whom he addresses as true Christians who have obtained forgiveness, known the Father, and conquered the evil one (ii. 12-14), in order to warn them against love of the world and seduction by false teachers. The exhortation: "love not the world," he bases on a reference to the incompatibility of love of the world with love of God, and on the passing away of the world and its lust (ii. 15-17). The necessity for this exhortation the apostle discovers in the fact that it is the last time, as the appearance of the antichrists shows (ii. 18). The line of thought thus passes on to the consideration of these antichrists. The apostle mentions, first of all, their relation to the Christian Church. "They have," he says, "gone out from us, but they were not of us;" and he then describes them, after the interjectory remark that his readers, as the anointed of the Holy One, know the truth, as those who deny that Jesus is the Christ (i.e., as deniers of the identity of Jesus and Christ), whereby they deny the Father as well as the Son (ii. 19-23). After an exhortation to his readers to abide by what they had heard from the beginning, whereby they should continue in the Son and in the Father, and enjoy everlasting life, he expresses his confidence towards them that the unction they had received remains in them, that therefore they require no human teacher; and exhorts them to abide in Christ in order that they may not be put to shame at His coming (ii. 24-28).

In like manner as the apostle, in chap. i. 5, inferred from the light-nature of God that only the person who walks in light can have fellowship with Him, so now he argues from the righteousness of God, that only the person who practises righteousness is born of Him (ii. 29). But since Christians are the children of God, and as such entertain the hope of one day being like Him, therefore this hope is, as it were, an incentive

to them to purify themselves even as Christ is pure, and consequently to avoid sin, which is disobedience to the law; and this is all the more since Christ has appeared for the very purpose of taking away sin, and is Himself free from it. From the sinlessness of Christ it follows that whosoever is in Him does not sin; but, on the contrary, whosoever sinneth hath not truly known Him (iii. 1-6). The apostle, having pointed out that he alone is righteous according to the pattern of Christ who *doeth* righteousness (iii. 7), sharply contrasts those who commit sin, as children of the devil, with those who are born of God, and therefore cannot sin, because the divine seed remaineth in them (iii. 8-10); and then indicates, as the righteousness which the children of God practise, that brotherly love which he describes as the theme of the message which Christians had heard from the beginning (iii. 10, 11). Warningly does the apostle point to the world, which, following the type of Cain, hates the children of God, and is in death; whereas the believer shows by love that he has passed from death unto life (iii. 12-15). The pattern of Christian love is Christ; as *He* gave His life for us, so also must the Christian give his life for the brethren; nor may he content himself with a mere apparent love, but must love in deed and in truth (iii. 16-18). Love like this bears its own blessing with it; he who practises it knows that he is of the truth, and, whilst he overcomes thereby the accusation of his own heart, he has confidence towards God in the consciousness that God hears his prayers because he keeps the commandments of God (iii. 19-22). With the foregoing the apostle then immediately connects the idea that God's commandment embraces a twofold element: viz., (1) that we believe on the name of His Son Jesus Christ; and (2) that we love one another (iii. 23); and then proceeds, after remarking that whosoever obeys the commandments of God stands in communion with Him (he in God, and God in him), and is conscious of this fellowship through the Spirit given him of God (iii. 24), to a further reference to the false teachers, which he commences with the warning: "Believe not every spirit, but try the spirits whether they are of God." He gives the characteristic mark of the Spirit that is of God, and also of the spirit of Antichrist, assures the believers of victory over false teachers, and presents the difference between them and the true apostolic teachers: "They are of the world, wherefore they speak of the world, and the world hears them; we are of God; whosoever knoweth God heareth us" (iv. 1-6).—Without introducing any ideas to mark the transition thereto, the apostle now utters the exhortation: "Let us love one another," which he establishes by saying that love

is of God, or—as he also says—that God is love. God has proved His love by sending His Son to be a propitiation for our sins; but if God has loved us so much, we ought also to love one another. When we do this, then God is in us, and lets us know that He is by His Spirit (iv. 7-13). Having pointed out that the manifestation of the love of God is the substance of apostolic testimony, and faith therein the condition of fellowship with God, the apostle once more utters the thought that God is love, in order to urge that communion with Him can consist only in love, and that this love manifests itself as perfect by our having confidence on the day of judgment, since love drives out all fear (iv. 16-18). But if the love of God compels us to love Him in return, we must remember that we really love God only in case we love the brethren; for the man who does not love the person whom he sees, cannot possibly love God whom he does not see (iv. 19-21). That the *believer* loves the brethren, the apostle then infers from the fact that he is born of God; for if, as such, he loves God who has begotten himself, he must also necessarily love those who are begotten of God, i.e., his own brethren (v. 1); and he is conscious of this love in that he loves God and keeps His commandments. After remarking that love to God consists in keeping His commandments, and that God's commandments are not hard to the believer, because being born of God he conquers the world by faith (v. 3-5), the apostle proceeds to refer to the divine evidence of the belief that Jesus is the Son of God. He describes the latter as having come by water and blood, and in proof of this appeals to the testimony of the Spirit. This testimony is all the stronger inasmuch as it is a threefold one, viz., that of the Spirit, the water, and the blood. If human evidence is accepted, much more ought the witness of God to be received. To the believer, however, this witness is not merely an external, but also, at the same time, an inward thing; viz., the eternal life which has been given him in the Son of God (v. 6-12). As already previously, so also here again, the apostle sets forth, as a main element in the believer's eternal life, his confidence that God hears his prayers, and couples with this the exhortation to make intercession for the brother who may chance to sin. At the same time, however, he distinguishes between the case of the man who sins unto death and the man who does not, and explains that his precept against intercession only refers to those who do not sin unto death (v. 13-17). — In bringing his Epistle to a close, the apostle once more announces, in three propositions, its leading thoughts, viz., that he who is born of God does not commit sin; that they, the Christians, are born of God,

whilst the world, on the other hand, belongs to the evil one; and that they have received, through the Son of God, the faculty to recognize Him that is true as the substance of their Christian consciousness. After the remark, that being in Christ we are in Him that is true, and that He is the Son of God and eternal life, the Epistle closes with the exhortation: "Little children, keep yourselves from idols."

Concerning the various theories as to the construction of the Epistle, compare especially Erdmann, *Primae Joannis ep. argumentum*, etc., I. 1855; Lücke's *Kommentar*, § 4, 3d ed. 1856; and Luthardt's *Programm: de primae Jo. ep. compositione*, 1860. Pre-Reformation commentators hardly troubled themselves about the construction of the Epistle at all. After the Reformation, the theory which first prevailed was that a systematic, logically arranged sequence of ideas of any kind is entirely absent from the work (Calvin: *sparsim docendo et exhortando varius est*). After the time of Matth. Flaccius, some expositors assumed that it was made up of a number of isolated aphorisms, only loosely jointed together, and in which various subjects were discussed; though others (Calvin, Hunnius), notwithstanding, labored to show a close sequence of ideas in accordance with a dogmatic plan. The most ingenious attempt of this kind was that made by Bengel, who, basing his argument upon the passage in v. 7 (*Receptus*), traced the construction of the Epistle to the dogma of the Trinity; a view adopted also by Sander. The right point of view from which to gain an insight into the structure of the Epistle was first discovered by Joach. Operinus in his work, *Johannis ap. paraenesis ad primos christianos de constanter tenenda communione cum patre ac filio ejus Jesu Christi*, etc., Göttingen, 1741, in which he shows that the purpose which John himself has announced in the preface is the same by which he was led in the composition of the Epistle throughout. Nearly all modern expositors, with the exception of a few of the earlier ones, have followed in the path opened up for them by Operinus. But with regard to the coupling of the ideas, unanimity has not been attained.

Whilst Lücke, in dividing the argument into eight groups of ideas, approaches at least the aphoristic method, the other modern commentators have labored to prove a more stringent arrangement of the thoughts conveyed in the book. It is plain, however, on closer study of the work, that none of these attempts has really succeeded. The Epistle has indeed been divided into different sections, and to each section a separate superscription been given, expressive of the main idea which informs the entire argument of that particular portion; but, on the one hand, the same ideas

are found repeating themselves in the various sections, and, on the other, the leading thought suggested for a particular section does not invariably so inform that portion, that it might serve as the point of departure for studying its details. In the first edition of this commentary it is asserted, — following the view of De Wette, — that the Epistle from chap. i. ver. 5 till chap. v. ver. 17, may be divided into three groups of ideas, distinguishable from each other by the fact that at the outset of each, as it were, a chord is struck which, more or less, gives tone to the melody throughout the entire part which it marks. As keynotes for the three sections suggested, the three truths are indicated: 1st, God is light, i. 5; 2d, Christ (or God) is righteous, ii. 28; and 3d, God is love. But that these keynotes actually sound throughout the whole of the parts they are respectively supposed to lead, is not and cannot be proved.

REMARK. — That the theories respecting the argument suggested by other commentators, ancient as well as modern, are insufficient, has been shown by Luthardt in the work already quoted; the same remark, however, applies also to the construction which he himself — following in the lead of Hofmann (*Schriftbew.* 2d ed. II. 2, p. 353 ff.) — has proposed, and which divides the Epistle into the following five parts: i. 5–ii. 11; ii. 12–27; ii. 28–iii. 24a; iii. 24b–iv. 21; v. 1–21. For, when he thus defines the contents of the third part: *Salutis futuræ spes christiana quantum afferat ad vitam sancte agendam, exponitur*, it is manifestly inappropriate, since the apostle throughout the entire section only refers to the Christian hope in ii. 2, from which it is plain that this is not the informing main idea of it. Again, when he represents the fourth part as treating of the Holy Ghost, his view is indeed so far correct, that, especially in the beginning, the discourse does turn upon the Spirit of God; but from iv. 7 onwards the development of the argument proceeds independently, without any reference to the Spirit, and only in ver. 13 — and even then merely in passing — is there any mention of Him made whatever. Much more decidedly does the apostle refer to Him in v. 6 ff., which passage, however, according to Luthardt, belongs not to the fourth, but to the fifth part, in which the subject treated of is faith. But even this definition is doubtful, since faith is discussed not only in v. 1 ff., but also, and very distinctly, long previously, in iii. 23 and iv. 13–16. Braune hardly attempts a disposition of the Epistle at all. It is true he divides it into four parts: namely, Introduction, i. 1–4; first main division, i. 5–ii. 28; second main division, ii. 29–v. 11; conclusion, v. 12–21. He also suggests leading chief topics for the two main divisions (viz., for the first, God is light; for the second, Whosoever is born of the righteous God doeth righteousness). But he only indicates as leading main topics the ideas which the apostle expresses in i. 5 and ii. 29, that is, at the beginning of the passages which Braune has marked as the

chief sections, without showing how these thoughts inform the various groups of ideas which follow them. He contents himself with pointing out the simple sequence of the ideas as they follow each other in the development of the argument.

In order to understand the construction of the Epistle, the following three points are especially to be observed: 1st, The apostle's object is to preserve the readers in the fellowship of God, that their joy may be perfect. 2d, That the apostle, in order to achieve his end, unfolds especially the ideas that fellowship with God is only possible in the case of one whose life, rooted in faith in Jesus Christ, and harmonizing in holiness with the nature of God, is in love; and that the Christian is not only bound to such a life, but also in virtue of his divine birth (which has placed him in a relation of absolute antagonism to the world, which is *ἐκ τοῦ πονηροῦ*) is impelled by an inward necessity to lead it. 3d, That the apostle develops these ideas under the conviction that the antichristian lie is present in the world, and also that the second advent of Christ is rapidly approaching. Keeping these elements in view, it depends upon the identification of the various points in the unfolding of the argument in the Epistle when the latter takes such a turn that a new feature may be said to enter and to inform the discourse which follows. Nearly all commentators are agreed, and rightly, that the verses from chap. i. ver. 5 to chap. ii. ver. 11 form one self-contained group of ideas. The informing and ruling idea of this passage, however, is not a distinct and specific doctrinal proposition, intended to be explained in its several parts, but rather the antithesis to that indifferentism which ignores the antagonism between fellowship with God and a life in sin, in opposition to which the apostle urges that only the man who walks in light — or who keeps the divine commandments and loves his brother — is in communion with God, and knows Him. The close relation in which these propositions stand to each other is shown also outwardly by the phrases: *ἐὰν εἴπωμεν, κ.τ.λ.*, chap. i. 6, 8, 10, and *ὁ λέγων, κ.τ.λ.*, ii. 4, 6, 8, which are only found here, and is proved by the fact that ii. 10, 11, manifestly refers backwards to i. 5, 6. — The argument takes a new turn, as most commentators also have noticed, with ii. 12, in which the apostle, after reminding his readers of their happy experiences in salvation, and indicating these as the ground of his writing to them, in direct exhortation warns them against the love of the world. With this warning is coupled the reference to the antichrists which has impelled the apostle to exhort his readers to abide by what they had heard from the beginning, because thus alone can they abide in the Son and in the Father, and enjoy ever-

lasting life, so that they may not be put to shame on the day of judgment. The last turn in the argument shows how closely the apostle has kept in view, throughout this exhortation, the intention of the entire Epistle (i. 4). Moreover, the fact that the ἀντίχριστοι — as the apostle himself asserts subsequently — are ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου, justifies our joining together in one whole the warning reference to the antichrists, and that against the love of the world. — In the foregoing the apostle has indeed shown that if Christians are to glory in their communion with God, they must walk in the light (that is, in obedience towards God, and in love towards the brethren), abstain from fellowship with the world, and faithfully abide by the Word of God; but he has not yet shown how they stand, *in accordance with their nature*, in antagonism to sin, and therefore also to the world. To this proof he proceeds in ii. 29, from which onwards he explains in detail how Christians as such are born of God, and therefore the children of God, who necessarily sanctify themselves in the hope of the future glory, do righteousness, and abstain from sin, nay, cannot sin, because the divine seed remains in them; whilst, on the other hand, those who commit sin, and therefore belong to the world, are the children of the devil. This explanation the apostle gives from ii. 29–iii. 10, where, with the words καὶ ὅς μὴ ἀγαπῶν, κ.τ.λ., he begins to discourse about brotherly love. But that a new section, properly speaking, does not open herewith, notwithstanding that the conception of the divine birth recedes into the background, appears not only from the nature of the connection with the foregoing, but also from the fact that the apostle at the outset holds fast to the contrast which he had so sharply defined at the close of the preceding — directing the attention of his readers to Cain, who was ἐκ τοῦ πονηροῦ, as the representative of the world. The immediate transition from the conception of the δικαιοσύνη to that of the ἀγάπη cannot excite surprise if we consider that to the mind of the apostle the latter was not something added to the former, but is the δικαιοσύνη itself in its practical manifestation. The propositions which treat of love, and in which the line of argument is so plainly defined by the intention of the work, hang so closely together down to ver. 22, that, although one new element after another is introduced, still it is impossible to make a new section until, in ver. 23, to the conception of brotherly love there is added that of faith in the name of Jesus Christ the Son of God. This, however, dare all the less be overlooked, since in the whole discussion hitherto the element of faith, so weighty for the purpose of the work, has nowhere been exhaustively considered, nor even the word πιστεύειν been once introduced. It is true the apostle seems immediately

afterwards to pass on to something else, since in iv. 1-6 he discourses of the difference between the antichristian spirit and the Spirit of God, and in iv. 7-21 of the love of the brethren ; nevertheless, on closer examination it is manifest that in these sections the reference to faith is maintained throughout. In the section iv. 1-6, namely, the *ὁμολογεῖν Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν*, κ.τ.λ., is given as the characteristic of the Spirit of God. This *ὁμολογεῖν*, however, is nothing else than the belief *εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τ. υἱοῦ Θεοῦ Ἰ. Χριστοῦ*, expressing itself in words. That the apostle, while he would exhort his readers to hold fast their faith, first of all calls on them to try the spirits, need not surprise us when we think of the danger threatened to believers by the false teachers that had arisen. It may appear more strange that in ver. 7, with the exhortation *ἀγαπῶμεν ἀλλήλους*, there is a transition to a train of thought that treats of love; but it is to be observed, not only that in iii. 23, *ἀγαπῶμεν ἀλλήλους* is closely connected with *πιστεύσωμεν*, κ.τ.λ., but also that the further statements about love serve exactly to explain its connection with faith. The thought of the apostle is this: He only lives in God who loves God; God can only be loved because He is love; God has revealed Himself as love by the sending of His Son to be a propitiation for sin, therefore love to God is conditioned by faith in this act of the divine love. But while the believing Christian, who as such is born of God, now loves God, his love extends also to his brethren who, as he is, are born of God. In the development of these ideas, not only do the preceding statements of the apostle about brotherly love obtain their special confirmation, but the necessity of faith for fellowship with God is also set forth, so that the apostle in what follows, after referring to the world-overcoming power of faith, can proceed to treat of the divine evidences for faith, and emphasize the fact that the believer has eternal life, and therein possesses *παῤῥησια πρὸς τὸν Θεόν*. The ideas from iii. 23 to v. 17 are so grouped into a whole, as indeed may be perceived in them, that v. 13 (*οἱ πιστεύοντες εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ*) plainly refers backwards to iii. 23, in addition to which it is to be observed that the concluding thought here bears the same reference to the purpose stated in i. 4 as the concluding thought of the preceding group.

From this explanation it is clear, that if we lay aside the preface, i 1-4, and the conclusion, v. 18-21, three points are to be noticed in the Epistle, at which the development of ideas takes such a direction that a newly introduced point of view dominates what follows, and that the Epistle therefore divides itself into four leading sections, namely, i. 5-ii. 11; ii. 12-28; ii. 29-iii. 22; and iii. 23-v. 17. In order to fulfil in his readers the purpose of his writing, the apostle in the *first* section attacks the moral

indifference which endangers them; in the *second* he warns them of love of the world and of antichrist; in the *third* he shows that only a righteous life of brotherly love corresponds to the nature of the Christian; and in the *fourth* he points them to faith in Jesus Christ, the Son of God, as that which is testified by God to be the basis of Christian life.¹

3. *Motive*. — From chap. ii. 18 ff. and iv. 1 ff. it is to be understood that the appearance of the false teachers, spoken of by him as *ἀντίχριστοι*, furnished the special motive for the production of this Epistle. These are neither *different* false teachers (according to Storr, Sabians and Docetans; according to Sander, Ebionites and Docetans), nor even “*true Jews* as deniers of the Messiahship of Jesus” (Löffler, *Disert. hist. exeg. Joannis Ep. I. gnosticos impugnari negans*, 1784, and *Comm. theol.*, ed. Velthusen, vol. I.), nor “*practical false teachers, proceeding from heathenism*” (Baumgarten-Crusius), nor “*such men as partly had suffered shipwreck of their faith, and partly did not practise worthily the Christian belief in their lives*” (Bleek); but *Docetans*, and indeed such *Docetans* as denied the identity of Jesus and Christ, and so adhered to *that* false doctrine which Irenaeus ascribes to Cerinthus in the words: *Cerinthus . . . subjecit, Jesum . . . fuisse . . . Joseph et Mariae filium . . . post baptismum descendisse in eum . . . Christum, . . . in fine autem revolasse iterum Christum de Jesu*. Not only the passages named, but also v. 5, 6, i. 3, iii. 23, iv. 15, point to *this* form of Docetism only (so also Braune). Without foundation is the view of several commentators (Sander, Lücke, Ewald, also Thiersch, Hilgenfeld, who, however, is not definitely decided, and others), that the polemical purpose of the apostle was equally, or even alone, directed against the stricter *Docetism* which ascribed to Christ only an apparent body, on behalf of which appeal is erroneously made to 1 John i. 1, iv. 2; 2 John 7. — That the former Docetans had a distinct antinomian direction, or in their darkness of knowledge in regard to duty felt themselves elevated to a moral course of life (Hilgenfeld, Thiersch, Guericke, Ewald, etc.), cannot be inferred from the moral exhortations of the apostle (comp. Brückner); it is much rather to be observed, that nowhere in these exhortations does the apostle refer to the antichristians, and that where he does mention them he nowhere characterizes them as Antinomians.²

¹ We may also unite the first and second sections more closely in *one* whole; for the former contains the premises for the warning uttered in the latter. In the threefold division which then arises, the conclusion of each part

points to the joy of which the Christian partakes in fellowship with God.

² In opposition to the view that the passage, iii. 4, bears evidence for the Antinomianism of the false doctrine, Neander (*Gesch. d. Pfanz-*

According to Lücke and Erdmann, the Epistle was occasioned not only by the appearance of the antichristians, but also by the *critical state* of the churches to which it is addressed (which Erdmann describes as a state of moral depravity). But although some of it, especially the antithetical import of the section, i. 5-ii. 11, indicates that in the case of many indifference to holiness of life was not wanting, yet nowhere do we find any blame expressed in regard to the moral condition of the churches on the whole. The apostle does not exhort his readers to return to the moral earnestness originally displayed by the Christians, but to perseverance in that which they are and have.

SEC. 2. — FORM AND CHARACTER OF THE EPISTLE.

1. *The Form.* — While the mass of ancient writers regarded this composition as a *letter*, Heidegger first speaks of it in his *Enchiridion bibl.*, 1681, p. 986, as, *brevis quaedam christianae doctrinae epitome et evangelii a Joanne scripti succinctum quoddam enchiridion.* Similarly Michaelis judges, who understands it as a “treatise,” and indeed as the second part of the Gospel; so also Berger (*Versuch einer moralischen Einl. ins. N. T.*) and Storr (*Ueber den Zweck der Evangel. Gesch. u. Briefe Johannis*), only that the former speaks of it as the *practical*, the latter as the *polemical* part of the Gospel. Even Bengel (*Gnomon*, 2d ed.) thinks it is to be called rather a libellus than a letter; his reason is, that a letter *ad absentes mittitur*, *Joannes autem apud eos, quibus scribebat, eodem tempore fuisse videtur.* Reuss (*Die Gesch. der heil. Schriften N. T.*, p. 217) expresses himself similarly, when he would prefer to call it “a homiletical essay, at the most a pastoral, the readers of which are present,” rather than an epistle. But, in opposition to these views, the work proves itself by the form of its contents to be a real epistle. The author shows himself throughout in the most lively interchange of thought with his readers; and even though not infrequently the objective development of thought predominates, as is peculiar to a treatise, — which, however, is found no less in other Epistles of the N. T., — yet the language always returns involuntarily to the form of an address, in which is specially to be observed “the oft-recurring distinctive epistolary formula: *ταῦτα γράφομεν*, or *γράφω*, or even *ἔγραψα ὑμῖν* — in contrast particularly with the formula in the more general historical

ung der Kirche durch d. Ap., p. 377) rightly remarks, that the apostle against Antinomians would have had to say: “Whosoever trans-

gresseth the law committeth sin, for transgression of the law is sin.”

writing, the Fourth Gospel: ταῦτα γέγραπται without ὑμῖν, xx. 31; comp. xix. 35 and xxi. 24" (Lücke). Düsterdieck rightly remarks that "the epistolary nature expresses itself in the whole import and progress of the work," inasmuch as in it "there dominates that easy naturalness and freedom in the composition and presentation, which corresponds with the immediate practical interest and with the practical purpose of an epistle" (comp. Bleek, *Einl. in d. N. T.*, p. 589, and Braune, *Einl.*, § 5). — The absence of a blessing or a doxology at the close occurs also in the Epistle of James, and there is nothing strange in it; but it is rather striking that the epistolary introduction is also wanting to the work, as the author neither mentions himself, nor the readers to whom he is writing; in the Epistle to the Hebrews, however, such an introduction is also omitted. We must explain this want in this way, that, on the one hand, the apostle presupposed that the readers would recognize him as the author of the Epistle without his naming himself in it, and, on the other, that he did not intend it for a single church, or for a limited circle of churches.¹ The description of this work as a second part of the Gospel is so much the more arbitrary, as each of those works forms in itself a completed whole. — The view of some critics and commentators (Augusti, who calls the Epistle a summary of the Gospel; Hug, Frommann in the *Studien und Kritiken*, 1840, Heft 4; Thiersch in *Versuch zur Herstellung des hist. Stupktes.*, p. 78, and *Die Kirche im apostol. Zeitalter*, p. 266; Ebrard in *Kritik der evangel. Geschichte*, p. 148, and in his *Commentary*), that the Epistle is a *companion-work* of the Gospel, is opposed by the contents of the Epistle, which follow an individual aim, as well as by the complete absence of a distinctly indicated reference to the written Gospel.² In opposition to Reuss, according to whose view the

¹ In opposition to Ebrard, who, admitting the epistolary character of the work, thinks that this want may be easily explained if the epistle "had no individual aim in itself, but depended on something else," inasmuch as "by its form it bears the nature of a sort of preface, or of an *epistola dedicatoria*," it is to be remarked that the Epistle, from its whole character, cannot be at all compared to a *preface*, and that in an *epistola dedicatoria* this want would be just as striking as in any other epistle.

² Ebrard derives the proof for his opinion from i. 1-4 and from ii. 12-14, referring ἀπαγγέλλομεν in the former passage, and the thrice-

repeated ἔγραψα in the latter, to the writing of the Gospel. That this is without adequate ground, comp. the commentary on these; but even if this reference were correct, yet the description of the Epistle as a "sort of dedicatory epistle" would still remain unjustified, for its purpose is clearly quite other than to dedicate the Gospel to its readers. We would then have to call every epistle, in which reference is made to another work, a dedicatory epistle. Even the designation "companion-work" is unsatisfactory, because it does not at all appropriately state the true character of the Epistle in accordance with its actual contents.

Epistle "was destined to bring home to the readers of the Gospel the practical side of the Gnosis there laid down," it is to be observed that neither is the practical side wanting in the Gospel, nor the Gnosis in the Epistle.

2. *The Character.* — The same peculiarity of conception, development of thought, and form of expression, which characterize the Gospel of John, penetrate the Epistle also, and distinguish it from all other Epistles of the N. T. There dominate in it the same spiritual tendency, and the same preference for the concrete and abstract ideas: ὁ ἦν, κ.τ.λ., φῶς, ζωή, ζωὴ αἰώνιος, Ἰλασμός; ποιεῖν τὴν ἁμαρτιαν, π. τὴν ἰνομίαν, π. τὴν δικαιοσύνην; εἶναι ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας, etc.; the same combination of antitheses: φῶς . . . σκοτία; ἀλήθεια . . . ψεῦδος; ἀγαπᾶν . . . μισεῖν; ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ πατρὸς . . . ἡ ἀγ. τοῦ κόσμου; ποιεῖν τὴν δικαιοσύνην . . . π. τὴν ἁμαρτίαν; τὰ τέκνα τοῦ Θεοῦ . . . τὰ τ. τοῦ διαβόλου; τὸ πνεῦμα τῆς ἀληθείας . . . τ. πν. τῆς πλάνης; ἁμαρτία οὐ πρὸς θάνατον . . . ἁμαρτία πρὸς θάνατον; ζωὴ . . . θάνατος, etc.; the same continuation of the thought by the resumption of an idea that has preceded, and the accompanying and correspondingly unusual application of the relative pronoun; the same juxtaposition of the positive and negative expression of a thought. Both works, as Ebrard brings out, bear the same impress, not only in style and construction, but also in the sphere of ideas, and in the dogmatic views; comp. also Ewald, *Die Joh. Schriften*, I. p. 429 ff. — With regard to the Epistle especially, here, in contrast to the dialectical development of thought which is characteristic of the Pauline Epistles particularly, the individual propositions follow one another in gnomon fashion,¹ and unitedly form groups of ideas, which are sometimes strung together without any mark of the transition.² Even the proof of an idea takes place in the simplest manner by reference to a truth self-evident to the Christian consciousness. By the peculiar manner of connection of the ideas arises the appearance of rather frequent repetition of the same thoughts; but on closer observation it is evident that even where the negative expression follows the positive, or *vice versa*, generally both expressions do not say *the same thing*, but that in the second a new element is taken up, a new

¹ Comp. on this, Ewald, *D. Joh. Schriften*, I. p. 441.

² Düsterdieck finds the peculiarity of the manner of development and statement of thought in the Epistle in this, "that the ideas move, combine, and circle round certain leading propositions as points of support and con-

nection." But it might be more appropriate to perceive it in this, that the apostle by single leading thoughts strikes as it were chords, which he allows to sound for a while in the thoughts deduced for them, until a new chord results, which leads to a new strain.

direction is prepared for. Characteristic is the simplicity and plainness of statement. Whether the apostle states divine truths by themselves, whether he discourses in exhortation or in warning to his readers, his language always retains the same calmness and precision. He nowhere shows a disposition excited by passion. Everywhere the stillness of a heart reposing in happy peace is mirrored, and having this he is sure that the simple utterance of the truth is enough to procure for his discourse an entrance into the minds of his readers. At the same time, a firm, manly tone pervades the Epistle, in contrast with every weak fanaticism of sentiment, which is so little characteristic of the apostle, that he, along with the internal character of life, constantly urges that the reality of it is proved by *action*. It is also worthy of notice, that, on the one hand, he speaks to his readers as a father to his children, but, on the other hand, does not ignore the fact that they are no longer minors, to whom he has some new information to give, but are quite like himself, and are, like himself, in possession of all the truth which he utters, of all the life which he is anxious, not to produce in them for the first time, but only to maintain in them. Against the reproach that the Epistle bears "the clearest traces of the feebleness of old age" (S. G. Lange), or that — as Baur says — "it is wanting in the fresh color of direct life," that "the tenderness and fervor of John's manner of conception and representation have relaxed far too much into a tone of childlike feebleness, which loses itself in indefiniteness, falls into continual repetitions, and is lacking in logical force," it must be maintained that the Epistle bears the impress of directness, freshness, definiteness, and vigorous clearness in no degree less than the Gospel of John.¹

SEC. 3. — GENUINENESS.

According to the testimony of antiquity, the Epistle was written by the Apostle John, which is confirmed by the Epistle itself, in so far as that the author, in the whole tone in which he speaks to his readers, and in particular expressions (i. 1, iii. 5, iv. 14), may be recognized as an apostle, and that the agreement with the Gospel of John favors the conclusion that both

¹ Hilgenfeld rightly states, in opposition to Baur, that the Epistle belongs to the *most beautiful* writings of the N. T., that it is specially rich and original "exactly in what relates to the subjective, inner life of Christ-

ianity;" "that the fresh, vivid, attractive character of the Epistle, consists exactly in this, that it conducts us with such a predilection into the inner experience of genuine Christian life."

works proceed from the same author. Eusebius (*H. E.*, iii. 24, 25) rightly reckons it among the Homologoumena; and Hieronymus (*De viris illustr.*, c. 9), says: *ab universis ecclesiasticis eruditis viris probatur*. — In the writings of the Apostolic Fathers, it is true, the Epistle is not considered in a definite way; but the passage found in Polycarp, cap. vii.: *πᾶς γὰρ ὃς ἀν μὴ ὁμολογῇ Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν ἐν σαρκὶ ἐληλυθέναι, ἀντίχριστός ἐστιν*, etc., may be recognized as a “natural use of 1 John iv. 2, 3” (Düsterdieck), by deduction from particular resemblances to some expression or other of the Epistle;¹ and Eusebius (*H. E.*, iii. 39) states of Papias: *κέχηρται δ' ὁ αὐτὸς μαρτυρίας ἀπὸ τῆς Ἰωάννου προτέρας ἐπιστολῆς καὶ τῆς Πέτρου ὁμοίως*. — By the Fathers of the church: Tertullian (*Adv. Prax.*, c. 15; *Scorp.*, c. 12; *Adv. Marc.*, iii. 8; *de Praescript.*, c. 33; *De Carne Christi*, c. 24), Irenaeus (*Adv. Haeret.*, iii. 16), Clemens Alex. (*Strom.*, l. ii. c. 15, l. iii. c. 4, 5, 6; *Paedag.*, iii. 11, 12, etc.), Origen (in Euseb., *H. E.*, vi. 25), Cyprian (*De Orat. Dom.* and *Ep.* 25), passages are frequently quoted from it, often with explicit mention of the apostle. Dionysius Alex. uses it, along with the Gospel, to prove the spuriousness of the Apocalypse; the *Peshito* and the *Muratorian Fragment*²

¹ In the *Ep. ad Diognet.* several expressions appear, which point back to John's mode of thought; so cap. vi.: *Χριστιανοὶ ἐν κόσμῳ οἰκοῦσιν, οὐκ εἰσὶ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου*; cap. vii.: ὁ . . . Θεὸς . . . τὴν ἀλήθειαν καὶ τὸν λόγον τὸν ἅγιον καὶ ἀπεριόριστον ἀνθρώποις ἐνίδρυσε; cap. xi.: οὗτος ὁ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς; as also in the *Shepherd of Hermas*, lib. ii. mand. 9: *πιστεύει τῷ Θεῷ. ὅτι πάντα τὰ αἰτήματά σου, ἂ αἰτῇ, λήψῃ* (comp. 1 John iii. 23, iv. 15); lib. ii. mand. 12: *εὐκόλως αὐτὰς* (i.e., τὰς ἐντολὰς τοῦ Θεοῦ) *φυλάξεις, καὶ οὐκ ἔσονται σκληραὶ* (comp. 1 John v. 3).

² By the words: “epistola sane Jude et superscriptio [*superscripti*]; or, according to Laurent, *Neuest. Studien*, pp. 201, 205: *superscriptae* = ‘provided with superscriptions’] Joannis duas [duae] in catholica habentur,” are not meant, as Braune supposes, the first and second, but the second and third Epistles. When, however, it is previously written: “Quid ergo mirum, si Johannes tam constanter singula etiam in epistolis suis proferat dicens in semet ipso; quae vidimus oculis nostris et auribus audivimus et manus nostrae palpaverunt, haec

scripsimus,” this is a clear evidence for the composition of the First Epistle by the Apostle John. The reviewer of the first edition of this commentary, in the *Theol. Literaturblatt zur allg. Kirchenztg.*, 1855, No. 92, thinks, indeed, that in the words: “quarti evangelorum Joannis ex discipulis,” the Presbyter John is indicated as the author of the Gospel, because it is not said *ex apostolis*; but that the author of the *Fragment* indicates by the expression *discipuli* such disciples of Jesus as were not apostles, can neither be proved by the fact that Papias (in Euseb., *H. E.*, iii. 39) calls the Presbyter John a disciple (*μαθητής*) of Jesus, nor by the fact that afterwards “ex apostolis” is added to characterize Andrew. If the author of the *Fragment* had regarded as the author of the Gospel, not the Apostle, but the Presbyter John, he would certainly have expressed this definitely. The expression *ex discipulis* presented itself to him here so much the more naturally, as he had immediately before spoken of Luke, and said of him: “Dominum nec ipse vidit in carne.” — Rightly, therefore, Lücke, Düsterdieck, Ebrard, and others

also testify to its genuineness. That the Alogi rejected it, as Epiphanius conjectures, and that Marcion did not admit it into his canon, is of no importance; just as little is the highly obscure account of Cosmas in his *Topogr. Christ.*, l. vii., according to which some maintain that all the catholic epistles were composed, not by apostles, but by presbyters; and the remark of Leontius Byz. (*Contra Nestor. et Eutyichian*, iii. 14) in regard to Theodore of Mopsv.: *Epistolam Jacobi et alias deinceps aliorum catholicas abrogat et antiquat*; comp. on this Lücke's *Comment. Introd.*, § 8, 4, p. 135 ff., 3d ed. — The genuineness continued unchallenged until first Jos. Scaliger came forward with the assertion: *tres epistolae Joannis non sunt apostoli Joannis*; since then it has been variously disputed. Sam. J. Lange, indeed, recognized the unanimous testimony of antiquity as too significant to permit of denial of the apostolic authorship of the Epistle, but he, nevertheless, regarded it as a writing not worthy of the apostle; Claudius (*Uransichten des Christenth.*, p. 52 ff.) went further, explaining it as the performance of a Jewish Christian, which was revised by a Gnostic. Bretschneider (in his *Probabilien*) and Paulus ascribe it to the Presbyter John, while they, however, at the same time, maintained the identity of the author of the Epistle and the author of the Gospel; Horst (*Museum für Religionswissensch. Henke*, 1803, vol. i.) declared himself against this. — The later Tübingen school cannot, in consequence of their conception of the development of Christianity, regard either the Gospel or the Epistle as the work of the apostle; the admission of the genuineness of one of these writings would overthrow their whole historical construction. Since, therefore, the adherents of this school are agreed in denying the genuineness of both writings, they, nevertheless, explain in different ways the relation of them to one another. K. R. Köstlin (*Lehrbegr. des Ev.*, etc.) and W. Georgii (*Ueber die eschatolog. Vorstellungen der N. T. Schriftsteller; Theol. Jahrb.*, Tübingen, 1845) ascribe both writings (even the second and third Epistles) to the same author. After Zeller, who, in his "*Beiträgen zur Einl. in die Apokalypse*" (in the *Theol. Jahrb.*, Tübing., 1842) presupposed the identity of the author in his review of Köstlin's writings (*Theol. Jahrb.*, 1845), and K. Planck ("*Judenthum und Urchristenth.*" in the *Theol. Jahrb.*, 1847) had intimated the opposite view, the former position was strongly defended by Baur (*Die Joh. Briefe*, in the *Theol. Jahrb.*, 1848, 3), and by Hilgenfeld (*Das Evang. u. die Briefe Joh.*, 1849, and "*D. Joh. Briefe*" in the *Tüb. theol. Jahrb.*, 1855, part iv.);

(comp. also Meyer in his *Comment. on Gospel of John*, and Laurent as above) have

regarded the *Murat. Fragm.* as evidence for the apostolic origin of the Epistle.

but with this difference, that the former explains the Epistle as the *copy*, the latter as the *pattern* of the Gospel.

For the *non-identity of the authors*, it is specially advanced, that, in the Gospel, a "more ideal and internal," in the Epistle, on the other hand, "a more material and external," mode of thought dominates. This difference is to be chiefly recognized in the eschatological ideas. While the author of the Epistle expects a visible "*material*" (!) *parousia* of Christ, the Evangelist is held to know only of a "re-appearance of Christ in the spirit of His disciples," and of a merely "present" judgment, because for him "the future has already become the present." How incorrect, however, this assertion is, is proved by passages such as Gospel of John v. 28, 29, vi. 39, 40, 44, 54, in which, distinctly enough, a *future* day of resurrection of the dead, and of judgment by Christ, is spoken of (comp. Weiss, p. 179 ff.); and, as in this the Gospel is quite in agreement with the Epistle, so, on the other hand, the Epistle expresses, no less distinctly than the Gospel, the idea of a resurrection, already accomplished in belief, of Christians from the dead.¹ The fundamental conceptions, therefore, are the same in both writings; the only difference is that in the Epistle the thought is expressed that the *εσχάτη ώρα* is already, — but in the Gospel there was plainly no room for the expression of this thought. — For that difference between the material and the ideal conception, Baur appeals, moreover, to 1 John v. 6, comp. with Gospel xix. 34, and Hilgenfeld (1849) to 1 John i. 5, 7. Baur asserts, that in place of the ideal import which the two symbols, blood and water, have in the Gospel, the sacramental appears in the Epistle. This assertion, however, is based on a false interpretation of *both* of those passages, since neither has the circumstance recorded in the Gospel, xix. 34, the meaning "that death (of which the blood is the symbol) is the necessary preliminary condition under which alone the Spirit (of which the water is the symbol [!]) can be communicated to the believer;" nor is 1 John v. 6 to be directly interpreted of the coming of Christ in or through the two sacraments, baptism and the Lord's Supper. Besides, it is rather strange to call the conception of water and blood as the two sacraments, a *material* one. —

¹ In the article of Hilgenfeld quoted above, he thinks that "there is undeniably a different representation of the last day, when the author of the Epistle exhorts his readers so to deport themselves that they may meet the judgment day without shame, and when, on the other hand, the Evangelist excludes believers from the judgment;" but neither

of these views is at all exclusive of the other; it is only to be remembered that the future judgment for those who here already have passed from death into life, who here already possess the *ζωη αιώνιος* (1 John v. 13), is such that for them it is not a judgment in *that* sense in which it is a judgment for the wicked.

Hilgenfeld thinks that when in 1 John i. 5, 7, it is said of *God* that He is $\phi\omega\varsigma$, nay, that He is $\epsilon\nu\ \tau\hat{\omega}\ \phi\omega\tau\acute{\iota}$, a representation is expressed which "has too much the ideas of matter and of space in it for the Evangelist to have any connection with it," since he uses $\phi\omega\varsigma$ only as predicate of the Logos. But from the application which is made in the Epistle of the thought there expressed, it is clear that the writer of the Epistle, in the idea $\phi\omega\varsigma$, did not think less of any thing than of something "pertaining to matter and space." That alleged difference, therefore, does not exist; the groundless pretence of it proves neither the hypothesis of Baur, that the Epistle is the performance of an imitator of the Gospel, nor that of Hilgenfeld, that it belongs to an earlier stage of development than the latter. Nevertheless, according to Baur, we may recognize the imitative hand not only in the character of the whole epistle (see on this Sec. 2), but in the passages i. 1-4 and v. 6-9; according to Hilgenfeld (1849), the earlier stage of development may be perceived in the O. T. conception expressed in the Epistle, and in its views of the Logos and of the Holy Spirit. In regard to the passage i. 1-4, Baur says: "In all the features, in which the author himself would give us a picture of his personality, the premeditated most anxious concern cannot be mistaken, to be regarded as one person with the Evangelist;" but that those verses are only to serve "to give a picture of the personality of the author," is a *groundless* supposition of Baur. In the other passage (v. 6-9, comp. with John viii. 16 ff.) Baur sees nothing but a mere playing on words, "for the $\mu\alpha\rho\tau\upsilon\rho\acute{\iota}\alpha\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\ \Theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$ has the same subject as the $\mu\alpha\rho\tau\upsilon\rho\acute{\iota}\alpha\ \tau\hat{\omega}\nu\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\acute{\omega}\pi\omega\nu$, and the latter differs from the former only in this, that the three—spirit, water, and blood—are counted as three, and it therefore consists of nothing else than the numerical relation of those three to one another, which again is immediately annulled when it is said that it is God that bears witness in those three." But this entire conclusion is purely fanciful; for, on the one hand, the $\mu\alpha\rho\tau\upsilon\rho\acute{\iota}\alpha\ \tau\hat{\omega}\nu\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\acute{\omega}\pi\omega\nu$ is not at all spoken of, in regard to its subject, as identical with the $\mu\alpha\rho\tau\upsilon\rho\acute{\iota}\alpha\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\ \Theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$; and, on the other hand, in the mention of the former $\mu\alpha\rho\tau\upsilon\rho\acute{\iota}\alpha$, the numerical relation is not alluded to by a single syllable.—Hilgenfeld asserts that the epistle stands in a more intimate relationship to the O. T. law than the Gospel does. The proof of this is supposed to lie in the passages 1 John iii. 4 and ii. 7, 8; but with regard to the first passage, the idea $\acute{\alpha}\nu\omicron\mu\acute{\iota}\alpha$ in no way hints at the Mosaic law; and besides, if the author attached a higher importance to the Mosaic $\nu\omicron\mu\omicron\varsigma$ than the Evangelist, he would somewhere state its signification; this, however, he is so far from doing, that the idea $\nu\omicron\mu\omicron\varsigma$ never appears in his work at all. With

regard to the second passage, Hilgenfeld, indeed, admits that ἀπ' ἀρχῆς refers to the transition to Christianity, but thinks that "this old commandment of love is not set forth as it is in the Gospel, as an absolutely new one which first receives its rule through the love of the Saviour to His people;" but, apart from the explanation of that passage itself, the immediately preceding verse, and, moreover, what is written in iii. 16 and iv. 7 ff. about love, shows how unfounded is the assertion of Hilgenfeld. It is not any thing better with the remark of Hilgenfeld (1849), that "the greatest probability is in favor of the statement that the idea of the personal Logos is still foreign to the Epistle, whilst it is distinctly expressed in the Gospel;" this Hilgenfeld infers from this, that for description of what is loftier in Christ the expression ὁ λόγος is not used in the Epistle.¹ But even if in the expression ὁ λόγός τῆς ζωῆς the idea λόγος had the meaning of "doctrine," yet the supposition of Hilgenfeld would still be unjustified, since it cannot be denied that ἡ ζωὴ (ἡ ζωὴ αἰώνιος), whereby the superhuman⁺ that appeared in Christ is indicated, is considered by the writer of the Epistle as hypostatic nature, nor that the υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ is identical with Him who in the Gospel is called ὁ λόγος. Nay, the whole Epistle in the most unmistakable manner presupposes the hypostatic nature of the Son of God.—That, finally, the writer of the Epistle ascribed no personality to the Holy Spirit, can neither be proved by this, that he does not call Him ὁ παράκλητος, nor by this, that He indicates Him by the expression χρίσμα; the words τὸ πνεῦμά ἐστι τὸ μαρτυροῦν especially, 1 John v. 6 comp. with John xv. 26, presuppose His personality.²—For proof of the non-identity, Baur finally appeals to this, that the "representation of Christ as the *παρίκλητος*, i.e., the interceding High Priest, accords more with the sphere of ideas of the Epistle to the Hebrews than with that of the Gospel; that thereby intervening thoughts are inserted into John's view of the relation of Jesus to those who believe on Him, which lay far from the horizon of the Evangelist." But if Baur were right in this assertion, then there would exist not only a difference between the Epistle and the Gospel, but a difference between the Epistle and itself, since, apart from those representations, quite the same view of the relation

² In the article of 1855 this is merely noticed, without the former inference being drawn from it.

² In the article of 1855, Hilgenfeld finds the difference only in this, that in the Epistle the Holy Spirit is not called *παράκλητος*, but

χρίσμα and *σπέρμα*. Along with this he admits, however, that the Gospel, in the expression ἄλλος παράκλητος shows an agreement with the Epistle, in which Christ is spoken of as *παράκλητος*.

of Jesus to believers dominates in the Epistle as in the Gospel; with regard, however, to those representations, they are not peculiar to the Epistle to the Hebrews only, but are a common property of the apostles, as they are expressed in the Epistle to the Romans (comp. chap. iii. 25 and viii. 34) with no less distinctness than in the former.

The reasons adduced by Baur and Hilgenfeld are therefore unable to shake the conviction of combined antiquity, that both writings come from one and the same author. That each of the works—along with all unity of conception and of expression—has its own peculiarities, is naturally caused both by the difference of their object, and by the living activity of the Spirit from whom they both proceeded. It is also to be observed, that in the Gospel it is chiefly the Master, in the Epistle the disciple, that speaks,—a fact to which the Tübingen critics can certainly attach no importance. There is, however, the further question as to the character of the reasons which are said to be opposed to the genuineness of the Epistle, and to prove that the author of it could not be the Apostle John. When S. G. Lange says that on account of “its lack of all individual references, its slavish imitation of the Gospel, the too great generality of the thoughts, the traces of the feebleness of old age, the non-reference to the destruction of Jerusalem,” he *only reluctantly* regards the Epistle as the work of an apostle; these reasons are of such arbitrarily subjective character as to require no refutation. Of greater importance, indeed, is the frequently-expressed assertion, that the Epistle refers to circumstances which first belong to a time later than that of the apostles. As such Bretschneider regarded the doctrine of the Logos and the Docetism contended against in the Epistle; but “without the previous existence and assurance of a canonical doctrine of the Logos, the patristic doctrine from Justin on would be almost inexplicable” (Lücke), and that *Docetism*—to which the Jewish as well as the heathen speculation must be added, when, without giving itself up, it amalgamated with Christianity—first belonged to the post-apostolic age, is historically an unjustifiable assertion.—After Planck (in the article already quoted) advanced the view that the author of the Epistle moves in the *Montanist* sphere of thought, as he “seeks to transform the external Jewish-Christian mode of conception into the deeper, more internal mode of John,” Baur developed it further. He explains the Epistle directly as a writing belonging to *Montanism*. His proofs of this are: (1) the thought that the fellowship of Christians is sinless, holy; (2) the mention of the *χρισμ*; and (3) the distinction between venial and mortal sins. But how weak are these reasons! If the Mon-

tanists considered themselves as the Spirituales, in contrast to the *rest of the Christians*, who in their eyes were Psychici, this is plainly something very different from the representation of the Epistle that believing Christians—in contrast to the unholy world—form a holy fellowship. If the Epistle says that Christians possess the holy *χρῖσμα*, there lies therein nothing but an allusion to the custom, first mentioned by Tertullian, of anointing candidates for baptism with holy oil. And if in 1 John v. 16 the *ἁμαρτία πρὸς θάνατον* is distinguished from the *ἁμαρτία οὐ πρὸς θάνατον*, this distinction is of a very different character from the Montanist distinction between venial and mortal sins. Baur, indeed, maintains that in the Epistle the same sins are called mortal sins, as in Tertullian; but while Tertullian represents as mortal sins, *homicidium, idololatria, fraus, negatio, blasphemia, moechia et fornicatio, et si qua alia violatio templi Dei*, Baur arbitrarily selects only *three* of these, namely idolatry, murder, adultery or fornication, which are alleged to be spoken of in the Epistle as mortal sins. To idolatry, namely, not only chap. v. 21, but also chap. iii. 4, is alleged to refer; to murder, chap. iii. 15;¹ and to *πορνεία*, which is nowhere mentioned in the Epistle itself, the superscription that appears in Augustin (corrupted from *πρὸς παρθένους*): *ad Parthos*.—The hypothesis so feebly established (comp. Lücke's incisive refutation in the 3d ed. of his comment.), of the Montanism of the writer of the Epistle, found in Hilgenfeld an opponent in the Tübingen school itself. In opposition to it,² Hilgenfeld has attempted to show that not only the false doctrine of the antichristians who are contended against in the Epistle, but also many of the views of the author himself, would go to prove that the appearance of the Epistle is to be fixed at the time immediately preceding that in which Gnosticism was at its prime. As Gnostic elements in the system of the epistle, Hilgenfeld specifies the idea of the *σπέρμα* (iii. 9), the thought that we

¹ Baur himself admits that with regard to these two points the author does not mean "the outward action," but "altogether the inner character of the moral sentiment;" but if that be the case, then it is clear that his position is not *in* Montanism, but *outside* it, since in Montanism it is precisely *actions*, and indeed particular, definite actions, that are referred to in that distinction of sins. Tertullian (*De Pudicit.*, c. 19): "Cui non accidit, aut irasci inique et ultra solis oceanum, aut et manum immittere, aut facile maledicere, aut temere jurare, aut fidem pacti destruere,

aut verecundia aut necessitate mentiri. In negotiis, in officiis, in quaestu, in victu, in visu, in auditu quanta tentamur, ut si nulla sit venia istorum, nemini salus competat," etc.

² Hilgenfeld urges especially that it is impossible to conceive that a Montanist author would not have known to begin with the idea of the Paraclete; and also that the idea of special mortal sins already occurs in the *Περίοδοι Περρον* (Rec. iv. 36), which belong to the pre-Montanist pseudo-Clementine literature.

should not fear, but only love God (iv. 18, 19), and the idea of the *χρίσμα* (ii. 20); but these ideas are so *essential* to the Christian consciousness, that it cannot at all be thought of without them. At the most, the expressions *σπέρμα* and *χρίσμα* might seem strange, but the former so naturally suggested itself in connection with the idea of being born of God, and of God's being in him who is born of Him,¹ and the latter from the antithesis of the *Christian* to the *ἀντίχριστος*, — especially with the O. T. type of anointing, — that a derivation of them from Gnostic fancies is entirely unjustified; quite apart from the fact that these ideas play quite another part in the Gnostic systems from that which they fulfil in this Epistle. Even if it be conceded to Hilgenfeld, further, that the false doctrine contended against is Gnostic, yet it cannot be admitted that *Gnosticism* also, as regards its beginnings, belongs first to the post-apostolic time. Hilgenfeld rightly says that the features alluded to by the author of the Epistle do not mark a completely definite Gnostic system; but wrongly, that therefore the doctrine of Cerinthus must not be thought of, because this represents a form of Gnosis as yet quite incomplete. The whole character of the polemic of the writer of the Epistle shows, however, that he has to do with a system of Gnosticism which, in comparison with the systems of the second century, had a form still incomplete. For there is only *one* point which he brings forward, namely *Docetism*, and indeed that form of it which consists of the distinction of the Son of God from the man Jesus, and therefore the same as was propounded by Cerinthus; comp. Dorner, *Lehre von der Person Christi*, I. p. 314 ff. — That this Docetism was associated with an antinomian sentiment “which set itself far above all the moral laws of life,” by no means follows, as has already been remarked in Sec. 2, from the polemic of the Epistle. — Against the assertion of Baur, that even the *form of the polemic* is decisive against the genuineness of the

¹ In his article of 1855, Hilgenfeld attaches the chief importance to the idea of the *σπέρμα*, and tries to deduce from 1 John v. 1, that according to the representation of the author of the Epistle, “being born of God is to be regarded as the presupposition of Christian faith,” and therefore that the *σπέρμα* is, according to him, “the metaphysical ground of existence” from which faith proceeds. But if the distinction between the *τεκνα τοῦ Θεοῦ* and the *τεκνα τοῦ διαβόλου* has, according to the author, a metaphysical ground lying beyond faith, and if the former, by virtue of

the *σπέρμα* which is peculiar to them by nature, cannot sin — how does this accord with the soteriology which is so clearly expressed in the Epistle, and according to which Christ is the *ἰλασμός* *περὶ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν*, and the blood of Christ cleanses us *ἀπὸ πάσης ἁμαρτίας*? — In this article also Hilgenfeld derives the “repeated assurance that God is love,” from the influence of Gnosticism on the author, without any regard to the close connection with the fundamental essential truth of Christianity in which this is brought forward by the author.

Epistle, since "nothing further is said than just that the false teachers of Docetism are antichristians," it is to be observed that the main force of the apostle's polemic throughout does not consist in negation, but in the positive presentment of the truth, in the light of which the antagonistic doctrine is manifested as a lie (see on this the excellent exposition of Thiersch, *Versuch*, etc., p. 255).

The spuriousness of the Epistle (as also of the Gospel, and of John's two other Epistles) also follows, according to Hilgenfeld (article of 1855), from *the relation of these writings to the Apocalypse*. While, namely, he presupposes the genuineness of the latter, he maintains that "the contrast between it and the Epistles must not be ignored," and that "the latter occupy a middle place between the two most extreme contrasts of the Apocalypse and the Gospel." The contrast is seen, according to him, first, in the language (in the Epistles not indeed an Attic, but an easy and versatile Greek style; in the Apocalypse, on the other hand, a strongly Hebraizing impress); and, second, in the sphere of thought, although he recognizes "between the spheres of thought on both sides very essential points of contact." But against these instances it is to be observed—1. That the composition of the Apocalypse by the Apostle John is by no means so surely established as Hilgenfeld assumes, and is certainly not to be proved by stating that it is the product of a still judaistically-narrowed mode of conception; 2. That in the explanation of the Hebrew-colored style of the Apocalypse, attention is to be paid to the fact that it stands in close connection with O. T. prophecy; 3. That the appearance of the contrast, alleged by Hilgenfeld, between the spheres of thought on both sides, disappears when with the necessary critical impartiality they are taken hold of with consideration of the entire individual elements which constitute them.¹

¹ Hilgenfeld proceeds uncritically in his demonstration of the contrast between the spheres of thought, inasmuch as he not only adduces, as antithetical, ideas which are not so, but also ascribes to one or the other writing views which are not contained in it. The former is, for example, the case when he thinks that the idea of an *angry* God, as is peculiar to the Apocalypse, and the idea of a God who is *love*, as we find it expressed in the Epistle, contradict one another; or when he asserts that the conception of the Divine justice, according to which it is shown as the punishment of the wicked, is in contradiction

to that according to which it appears as the forgiveness of sins; when he supposes a contrast between the representation of the Apocalyptic judgment and the idea of the spiritual victory of the Christian over the devil and the world, accomplished by means of morality and faith. He does the latter when, for example, he says that the Apocalypse considers "the political world-power of the Roman Empire" as Antichrist, whereas the name ἀντιχριστος is never once mentioned in the Apocalypse; or when he ascribes to the Epistle the idea of a metaphysical antagonism between the children of God and the children

As the internal tests, which have been asserted to be opposed to the genuineness of the Epistle, do not prove the alleged spuriousness; as the Epistle much rather bears on the face of it quite the impress of an apostolic writing; as it also — as even Hilgenfeld admits — “belongs to the writings of the N. T., the genuineness of which was never disputed in the ancient Church, and the chain of witnesses who have made use of it begins as far back as Papias,” — the composition of it by the Apostle John is as surely established as it can ever be.

SEC. 4. — THE READERS; TIME AND PLACE OF COMPOSITION.

1. *The Readers.* — Augustin says in his *Quaest. Evang.*, ii. 39, when he is quoting the passage 1 John iii. 2: *scriptum est a Joanne in Epistola ad Parthos*; this more particular determination of the Epistle is also found (only however, in the Benedictine edition of Augustin's works) in the superscription of his treatises on the Epistle; and similarly in Possidius, in his *Indiculus operum S. Augustini*, as he introduces those treatises with the words, *De Ep. Joannis ad Parthos sermones decem*. The same statement, it is true, frequently appears later; thus in the work of Vigilius Tapsensis (end of the fifth century), published under the name of Idacius Clarus, *Contra Varimadum Arianum*; in Cassiodorus, *De Institut. Divin. Script.*, c. 14, who, however, refers the words *ad Parthos* to all the three Epistles; in Col. 62 of Griesb., and in several lat. codd. (see Guericke, *Gesamtgesch. des N. T.*, 1854, p. 486, note 2); but the whole Greek Church, and similarly the Latin Church before Augustin, knows nothing of it.¹ It is therefore of no importance even for the determination of the original readers of the Epistle (against Grotius); nay, it cannot even be said that in it was retained an old tradition in regard to the determination of the Epistle or the activity

of the devil, which is found in the Gnostics. — For the rest, it must not be denied that the difference in character between the Apocalypse and the other writings of John is considerable enough to allow the view, that it does not proceed from the same author, to appear not unjustified. While that difference, on the one side, is often not sufficiently estimated, on the other side, with the object of bringing it more clearly out, the mistake is not infrequently made, of not keeping strictly enough within the truth. But, as may hold good of the origin of the Apocalypse also, the Gospel and

the First Epistle of John are too strongly attested, both by their whole character and by the external evidences, as writings of the Apostle John, to allow their genuineness to be denied on account of the Apocalypse.

¹ Against this fact the strange remark of Bede in the *Prologus super septem epistolas canonicas* (printed in Care's *Script. Eccles. Hist. Liter.*): “Multi scriptorum ecclesiasticorum, in quibus est S. Athanasius, primam ejus (i.e., Joannis) epistolam scriptam ad Parthos esse testantur,” cannot of course be regarded as of any weight.

of John (Baumgarten-Crusius), and still less that it "refers to its designation for Farther and Central Asia, as formerly Persian lands" (Guericke as above, p. 487). It might no doubt be possible that Augustin thereby expressed *his own* conjecture (Michaelis), but then he would hardly have proceeded with the Epistle under this designation *without further remark*. Perhaps a mistake is at the bottom of it. Some critics assume a corruption of the reading in Augustin. Serrarius conjectures as the original reading: *ad Pathmios*; Wetstein: *ad sparsos*; Semler: *adpertius*. Most explain the words as originating in a Greek expression; quite arbitrarily, Paulus (*Heid. Jahrb.*, 1832, p. 1071) thinks that they might have arisen through misunderstanding of a probable inscription *πρὸς πάντας*; it is more natural to have recourse, with most critics, to the Greek word *παρθένος*, and to regard *ad Parthos* as originating in *πρὸς παρθένους*. Whiston considers *πρὸς παρθένους* as the description of the yet uncorrupted, virgin condition of the churches of John; according to Hug's view, the inscription of some manuscripts of the Second Epistle, *πρὸς πάρθους* (i.e., *πρὸς παρθένους*), was transferred to the First Epistle, because that designation was regarded as unsuitable to the Second Epistle, Gieseler (*Lehrbuch der Kirchengesch.*, 4th ed., vol. i., Pt. 1, p. 139, note 1), with whom Lücke (3d ed., p. 52 f.) agrees, supposes that the inscription of the First and of the Second Epistle was: *ἐπιστολὴ Ἰωάννου τοῦ παρθένου*; this is certainly not found in any codex of the Epistle, but the inscription of the Apocalypse in *Cod. Guelpherit.* (30 of Griesb.) runs thus: *τοῦ ἁγίου . . . ἀποστόλου καὶ εὐαγγελιστοῦ παρθένου ἡγαπημένου ἐπιστηθίου Ἰωάννου θεολόγου*. The simplest supposition might be that Augustin misunderstood the remark of Clemens Alex. (*Opp.*, ed. Potter., *Fragm.* 1011) that the Second Epistle was written *πρὸς παρθένους* (*ad virgines*) — (see *Introd. to Second and Third Epistle*, Sec. 1), — and then by mistake referred it to the First Epistle. — But whatever be the origin of this *ad Parthos*, it can be of no value as an historical evidence for the original place of destination of the Epistle. As John, according to the unquestionable accounts of antiquity, after the death of the Apostle Paul, took up his place in Asia Minor; and as in Asia Minor, as the Epistle to the Colossians testifies, heretical tendencies of Gnostic character already appeared at an early date, — it is to be assumed, with most critics, that the Epistle was originally directed to the churches of Asia Minor; not to *one* of them (according to Hug, to that of Ephesus), but as *ἐπιστολὴ ἐγκυκλική* (Oec.) to several (perhaps to "John's Ephesian circle of churches," Lücke), perhaps to all of those to which the personal activity of the apostle extended, for the Epistle would otherwise certainly touch at individual circumstances of

the single church.¹ It is clearly quite arbitrary to regard as its place of destination, with Benson, Palestine, or, with Lightfoot, Corinth.

2. *The Place of Composition.*—This is just as little stated in the Epistle as the place of destination; the prevailing opinion, that John wrote it in Ephesus, has at least nothing against it. Hug and Ebrard, who regard it—though without tenable reason—as a companion work of the Gospel, suppose that it was written with the latter in Patmos; but even though the statement is found in some of the later Fathers, that the Gospel was written in Patmos, the *more ancient* tradition names Ephesus as its place of composition; comp. Meyer's *Comment. on the Gospel*, 3d ed., p. 39.—Hug appeals also to 2 John 12 and 13, 3 John 13: unwarrantably, however, for a want of writing materials is here in no way hinted at.

3. *The Time of Composition.*—That the Epistle belongs not to the earlier, but to the later apostolic time, i.e., the time after the departure of the Apostle Paul, is not to be disputed. The whole tone in which it is written leaves us in no mistake as to the advanced age of the writer; moreover, the somewhat prolonged existence of the Christian churches to which it is addressed is brought out pretty clearly; and there is the additional fact that the antagonism between Jewish and Gentile Christianity is no longer the subject, and that the Docetism therein opposed points also to the later time. With this corresponds the tradition, according to which it was written by John during his sojourn in Ephesus. As, however, the tradition states indeed the end (Iren., *Haer.*, iii. 3, 4, in Euseb. iv. 14: Ἰωάννου δὲ παραμείναντος αὐτοῖς μέχρι τοῦ Τραϊανοῦ χρόνων), but not the beginning of this sojourn, the time of composition of the Epistle is only indefinitely fixed by it. This much only seems to be indisputable, that John first settled in Ephesus after the death of the Apostle Paul, in order from there to direct the churches of Asia Minor, especially those in the proconsulate; against which, the view that he remained in that city until the destruction of Jerusalem (Ewald, *Gesch. d. Volkes Israel*, VII. p. 202 ff.) lacks any certain ground. The composition of the Epistle *before* the destruction of Jerusalem, Grotius, Hammond, and Düsterdieck infer from chap. ii. 18; Ziegler, Fritzsche, and others, from the circumstance that that event, so important for Christianity, is not mentioned in the Epistle. But ii. 18 refers, indeed, to the nearness of the *parousia* of Christ, not, however, to

¹ Hilgenfeld thinks that the Epistle was addressed to the whole of orthodox Christendom, in so far as it did not belong to the immediate sphere of the apostle's labors; but

even if the apostle mentions no specific limit of his sphere of readers, such a limit is nevertheless indicated in the warning reference to the Docetan heresy.

the fall of Jerusalem; that even later the time reaching to the *parousia* of Christ was considered as the "last time," is shown by the passage in *Ignat. Ep. ad Ephes.* c. xi. : ἔσχατοι καιροὶ λοιπὸν αἰσχυνθῶμεν, φοβηθῶμεν τὴν μακροθυμίαν τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἵνα μὴ ἡμῖν εἰς κρίμα γένηται. And that the destruction of Jerusalem is not mentioned, might be explained in this way, that when the Epistle was written a considerable time might have already elapsed since that event. Most commentators place the composition in the time *after* the destruction of Jerusalem, especially because, as they think, the state of the churches brought out in the Epistle was such as was appropriate only to the end of the apostolic age. But even this conclusion is at least not *quite* sure, since even already Paul in his later Epistles had to take notice of moral indifferentism, nay, Antinomianism and Gnostic error;¹ and the disturbing influence of the Judaistically-inclined Christians on the Gentile-Christian churches must be regarded as already overcome by the labors of the Apostle Paul, inasmuch as even Paul himself does not combat it in his later Epistles in the way in which he had done in the earlier ones. — Thiersch appeals, in favor of a comparatively late appearance of the Epistle, to this, that according to chap. ii. 19, "the separation of the heretics from the Christian community was already accomplished," though they still, according to the Epistle of Jude, revelled at the Agapæ; but on the one hand, it is to be observed that from the former passage it is not clear how far a *formal* separation was at that time already carried out (the church-forming activity of the heretics belongs first to the second-century); and, on the other hand, it is at least uncertain whether John and Jude had to do with heretics of the same kind, for the one class are depicted as Antinomians, the other as Docetans. — Ebrard fixes as the time of composition the year 95 aer. Dion. His reasons for this are: the Epistle was written at the same time as the Gospel, as its dedicatory epistle; the Gospel was composed at Patmos; John was at Patmos in the 15th year of Domitian. But these premises lack any certain foundation. — By most critics it is considered that the Epistle was written later than the Gospel, and that the latter was written after the destruction of Jerusalem. As regards the first part, appeal is made in its favor especially to this, that in the Epistle reference is sometimes made to the Gospel. This, however, is not the case; there is (as Bleek, as above, also remarks) in the whole Epistle not a *single* passage

¹ Still it cannot remain unobserved, that the heretics, against whom Paul directs his polemic, are never accused of Docetism; that Cerinthus probably appeared only towards

the end of the apostolic age; and that the heretical error which the Ignatian Epistles contend against was of specially Docetan character.

which assumes the *written* Gospel as *known*¹ (Guericke). It would seem on the face of it more probable that John, induced by the false teachers, first wrote the Epistle to warn and exhort the churches intrusted to him, and then wrote the Gospel for entire Christendom, as “a consecrated record of the historical foundation of salvation” (Thiersch), than that he first wrote the latter and then the former.² Some of the very passages by which it is thought the dependence of the Epistle upon the Gospel can be proved seem to tell in favor of this. The passage, 1 John i. 1-4, appears, when compared with Gospel i. 1 ff., to be not the later, but the earlier one, since the apostle in the former is still striving to give to the idea the suitable expression, whereas in the latter he has already found it. None the less, compared with the expression *ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο*, is the expression *Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς ἐν σαρκὶ ἐληλυθώς* the more indefinite, and therefore no doubt the earlier. Besides, the affinity of the two works permits the conjecture that the dates of their composition do not lie far from one another (comp. Bleek, p. 590; differently Brückner), especially as this appears not only in their peculiar character, but also in the form, to such an extent that not only do they both begin with a proemium containing the same ideas, but even the thoughts expressed at the close completely correspond with each other: Gospel of John xx. 31: *ταῦτα δὲ γέγραπται, ἵνα πιστεύσητε, ὅτι Ἰησοῦς ἐστὶν ὁ Χριστὸς, ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ, καὶ ἵνα πιστεύοντες ζωὴν ἔχητε ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι αὐτοῦ*, and 1 John v. 13: *ταῦτα ἔγραψα ὑμῖν, ἵνα εἰδῆτε, ὅτι ζωὴν αἰώνιον ἔχετε οἱ πιστεύοντες εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ*. — As regards the second point, no exact proof can indeed be drawn from the Gospel itself in favor of its composition *after* the destruction of Jerusalem;³ but, on the other hand, there lies in this no ground to contradict the old tradition, that John wrote it in his more advanced age. It is also not improbable that it was not already circulated in the lifetime of the apostle; at least, it is more natural to suppose that the

¹ Reuss (as above, p. 218) rightly says: “For us the Epistle requires the Gospel as a commentary; but as it once had this in the oral instruction of its author it is not thereby proved that it is the later.”

² What Thiersch (*Versuch f. d. Kritik*, p. 79) says generally: “As a general rule, the proposition may be proved to be historically true, that the writings of momentary design, to which most of the Epistles belong, appeared earlier, and the writings of permanent design, especially the Gospels, later,” — may also be

applied to the relation of the Gospel and the Epistle of John.

³ From the use of *ἦν* in the passages of the Gospel of John xi. 18, xviii. 1, xix. 41, nothing can be inferred, as it is entirely explained “by the context of historical narrative;” on the other hand, however, the *ἔστι*, John v. 2, does not prove that Jerusalem was not yet destroyed at the time when John wrote this, for John in his account of the past event might represent to himself that which no longer existed as still existing (comp. Ebrard, *Comment.* p. 40 ff.).

21st chapter was added to it immediately on its appearance than later, when it had already become a possession of the Christian churches.¹ In *that* case, John composed the Gospel as a legacy for the age after his death; hence, however, it would result as to the Epistle, that it also was written only in the advanced age of the apostle, although before the Gospel. True, the apostle nowhere says that his readers have heard the gospel *from him*, though he often speaks of their acquaintance with it, nor is there any passage from which it could be proved that he himself already labored among them in person; but from this the conclusion cannot be drawn, that "John composed the Epistle when he took up his place in Asia Minor after the death of the Apostle Paul, and indeed in order, by means of it as a pastoral Epistle, to introduce his labors there" (1st ed. of this comment.); for, on the one hand, such a purpose of the Epistle is nowhere hinted at; and, on the other hand, that circumstance might arise from this, that the Epistle was not exclusively destined for *those* churches in which the apostle had already labored by oral preaching, but was equally for others which he had not yet visited. On impartial consideration of all points, it appears probable that the Epistle of John was written in the last quarter of the apostolic age.

¹ Ewald (*Gesch. Israels*, vii. p. 217 ff.) thinks that the Gospel was written about the year 80, but was first circulated later, shortly before the death of John, with the supplementary chap. xxi. added by him; and that the First Epistle was written later than the Gospel, though independently of it, but was

circulated earlier than it, immediately after its composition. For this, however, there is quite as little certain proof as there is for the opinion that both the Gospel and the Epistle of John were composed only at the special urgency of his friends.

Ἰωάννου ἐπιστολὴ α΄.

In A, B, the superscription runs: Ἰωάννου (B: -ανου) ᾶ; in other codd., ἐπιστολὴ Ἰωάννου πρώτη. The Rec. is Ἰωάννου τοῦ ἀποστόλου ἐπιστολὴ καθολικὴ πρώτη.

CHAPTER I.

Ver. 1. Instead of *ἔωρακαμεν*, Tisch. 7 has, both here and hereafter, and iii. 6, iv. 20, accepted the form *ἔορ.*; on this form, see Ph. Buttmann, *Ausf. griech. Grammat.*, 1819, § 84, Anm. 11, note; Al. Buttmann (p. 56) says: "The form *ἔορακα*, it is true, is often presented by the MSS., but has not, up to the present, been received by the editors." — Ver. 2. Cod. B has, before *ἔωρακαμεν*, the relative *ὁ*, perhaps, through mistake, from vv. 1 and 3; even Buttm. has not accepted it. — Ver. 3. *ἀπαγγέλλομεν ὑμῖν*. Rec., according to G, K, and several others, Copt. and others, Oec., Aug., Beda (Tisch.); according to A, B, C, however, with Lachm., a *καὶ* is to be inserted after *ἀπαγγέλλομεν*, — it seems to have been omitted as superfluous on account of the following *ἵνα καὶ ὑμεῖς*; in Thph., it reads: *καὶ ἀπαγγέλλομεν ὑμῖν*; so also *κ*, in which it reads: *ἀκηκ. καὶ ἔωρακ. καὶ ἀπαγγέλλομεν*. — Ver. 4. Instead of *γράφομεν ἡμῖν* (Rec., Tisch., Lachm., ed. maj.), A*, B, *κ* read *γραφομεν ἡμεῖς* (Lachm., ed. min., Buttm.); Lücke, De Wette, Ewald, and Reiche consider this reading as unsuitable; differently Brückner; the change of *ἡμεῖς* to *ὑμῖν* can, at any rate, be more easily explained than that of *ὑμῖν* to *ἡμεῖς*. — *ἢ χαρὰ ὑμῶν*. Rec., according to A, C, K, several others, Copt., etc. (Tisch.); Lachm., following B, G, *κ*, and others, reads *ἡμῶν*; hardly correct. — Ver. 5. *καὶ ἔστιν αὕτη*, according to B, C, G, K, *κ*, and others, Syr., Thph., Oec. (Tisch.), instead of the Rec., *καὶ αὕτη ἐστίν*, according to A, Vulg. (Lach.). The Rec. is an alteration of the original reading; comp. ii. 25, iii. 11. — *ἄγγελια*], so Lachm. and Tisch. (approved of by Reiche and most modern commentators), following almost the entire number of authorities, A, B, G, K, by far the most of the others (Thph. in Comm. Oec.), instead of the Rec., *ἐπαγγελία*, which only a few codices support; perhaps C; according to Lachm., C has *ἄγγελια*; according to Tisch., *ἐπαγγελία*. Paulus considers *ἄγγελια* as an explanatory gloss from iii. 11; so De Wette; but, on the contrary, *ἐπαγγελία* is a correction of *ἄγγελια*, which, otherwise, does not appear in the N. T., except in iii. 11, where, however, the same correction is found. The original reading of *κ* is *ἀπαγγελιας*; later it corrects this to *ἄγγελια*; others have corrected it to *ἀγάπη τῆς ἐπαγγελίας*. Socin thinks that *ἐπαγγελία* should be read. — Ver. 7. Instead of *ἀλλήλων*, A* (?), Tol., some lat. codices, Aeth., Clem., Didym., Tert. read *αὐτοῦ*, which is plainly a correction, as *ἀλλήλων* does not seem conformable to the train of thought; see the comment. on this passage. After Ἰησοῦ, the Rec., following A, G, K, and others, Vulg., etc., has *Χριστοῦ*, which is wanting in B, C, *κ*;

Lachm. and Tisch. have omitted it; Reiche would have it retained; the addition is easily explained, comp. v. 3. — Ver. 8. Instead of *ὄκ ἐστὶν ἐν ἡμῖν* (Rec., after B, G, 8, Vulg., etc.), Lachm. and Tisch., following A, C, K, and others, read *ἐν ἡμῖν οὐκ ἐστὶν*; perhaps the former is a correction, after ver. 10. — Ver. 9. Instead of *καθαρισθῆναι* is found, in A, h., some min. (perhaps also in C**), *καθαρίσει*, which, however, has too little evidence to be regarded as genuine.

Vv. 1-4. Introduction of the Epistle: Statement of the subject of the apostolic proclamation and of the aim of this writing. The construction of the periods is not carried out conformably to rule. The relative clauses beginning with *ὃ* form the object of a verbal idea, which is just as little directly expressed as the subject which belongs to it; nay, more, with *περὶ* the period that was begun breaks off, and with *καὶ ἡ ζωὴ* (which refers back to the preceding *τῆς ζωῆς*) begins a new period consisting of two principal members. In the new sentence, ver. 3, the object, expressed in relative form, is placed before the finite verb, which contains in itself the subject. The parts of the sentence in ver. 1, beginning with *ὃ*, are co-ordinate with each other; it is grammatically impossible to take the first part as subject, and the following parts as the predicate of it.¹ As far as regards the sense, it is unsuitable to find in *ἐψηλάφησαν* the verb which governs the preceding objective clauses (Paulus: "that which was, etc., which we have seen, our hands also have touched"). The governing verb cannot be contained in ver. 2 either, for the verbs of this verse have their object near them in *τὴν ζωὴν τὴν αἰωνίον*. As *ὃ ἐώρακαμεν κ. ἀκηκόαμεν*, ver. 3, shows itself to be the resumption of the objective clauses of ver. 1, — only in more abridged form, — it is to be assumed that *ἀπαγγέλλομεν*, ver. 3, is the verb which was before the apostle's mind from the very beginning, from the immediate addition of which he was, however, prevented by feeling himself constrained to define the object more precisely by the appositional addition *περὶ τοῦ λόγου τῆς ζωῆς*. As he was then induced by *τῆς ζωῆς* to the parenthetical continuation in ver. 2, he made the finite verb follow after he had first resumed the object.

Ver. 1. *ὃ ἦν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς*]. This thought, indefinite in itself, is more fully explained by the following relative clauses to this extent, that "that which was from the beginning" is identical with that which was the subject of perception by the apostle's senses. But from the appositional adjunct *περὶ*, κ.τ.λ., and the parenthetical sentence, ver. 2, it follows that John understands by it the *λόγος τῆς ζωῆς* or the *ζωή*, and more exactly the *ζωὴ ἡ αἰώνιος*, which was with the Father and was manifested. That the apostle, however, does not thereby mean a mere abstraction, but a real personality, is clear, first from *ὃ ἀκηκόαμεν*, κ.τ.λ., and *ἐφανερώθη*, and then especially from the comparison with the proemium of the Gospel of John, with which what is said here is in such conformity that it cannot be doubted that by *ὃ ἦν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς* the same subject is meant as is there spoken of as *ὁ λόγος*. The neuter form does not entitle us to understand by *ὃ ἦν*, κ.τ.λ., with the Greek commentators Theophylact, Oecumenius, and the Scholiasts, the "*μυστήριον* of God;"

¹ Cappellus: "Quod erat ab initio hoc ipsum est, quod audivimus," etc.

namely, *ὅτι Θεὸς ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί*, or even, with Grotius, the "*res a Deo destinatae*." Nor does De Wette's interpretation, "that which appeared in Christ, which was from eternity, the eternal divine life," correspond with the representation of the apostle, according to which the *ζωή* not only was manifested in Christ, but is Christ Himself. By far the greatest number of commentators interpret *ὁ ἦν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς* correctly of the personal Christ. The reason why John did not write *ὁς* (comp. chap. ii. 13: *τὸν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς*), but *ὁ*, cannot, with several commentators (Erdmann, Lücke, Ebrard¹), be found in this, that John means not only the person in itself, but, at the same time, its whole history, all that it did and experienced, for *ἦν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς* (synonymous with *ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν*, Gospel of John i. 1) is decisive as to the historical manifestation of Christ. Nor is it, with Düsterdieck, to be found in this, "because only this form (the neuter) is wide and flexible enough to bear, at the same time, the two conceptions of the one . . . object, the conception of the pre-mundane existence and that of the historical manifestation," for then each of the four *ὁ*'s would have to embrace in itself both these ideas, which, however, is not the case. But neither is it, with Hofmann (*Schriftbeweis*, ed. 2, I. p. 112), this: "because John just wants to describe only the subject of the apostolic proclamation as such;" for this is not the order, that John first describes the subject of the apostolic proclamation only generally, and "then" defines it more particularly, but *ὁ ἦν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς* is itself the more particular definition of the subject of the proclamation. Nor, finally, is it, with Weiss, this, that the apostle does not here mean the Son of God Himself, but "that which constituted the eternal being of the Son," namely, life; for, on the one hand, nothing here points to a distinction of the Son and His being, and, on the other hand, it is not the being of the Son which the apostle heard, saw, handled, but the Son Himself. The neuter is rather to be explained in this way, that, to the apostle, Christ is "the life" itself; but this idea *in itself* is an abstract (or general) idea²

¹ Lücke gives this explanation of the neuter: that John, "seeking to express briefly the idea of the Gospel, combines in this idea the person of Christ, as the incarnate Logos, with His whole history and work."—Erdmann first remarks: "Forma neutrius generis generalis notio e contextis atque Joannis dicendi ratione facile definienda, ad personam Christi aperte referenda significatur, nec solum vis et amplitudo sententiae apte notatur, sed etiam illo ὁ quater repetito orationis sublimitati concinnitas additur;" and then continues: "Praeterea meminerimus, non solum Christi personam per se spectatam hic designari, verum etiam omnia, quae per vitam humanam ab eo perfecta et profecta, acta, dicta, etc., λόγον in eo apparuisse comprobant.—With this the opinion of Ebrard agrees, that *ὁ* shows that the person was not to be proclaimed *qua* person, not as an abstraction, but in its historical manifestation. Against this, however, it is a valid objection, that John in *ὁ ἦν ἀπ'*

ἀρχῆς has plainly in his view the Logos not *in*, but *before*, its historical manifestation.—When Erdmann appeals, in favor of John's reference of the neuter to persons, to the passages, Gospel of John iii. 6, vi. 39, xvii. 2, I John iv. 4, it is, on the other hand, to be observed that in all these passages the neuter serves to combine the single individuals into a whole that embraces the entirety of them, which permits of no application to the use of *ὁ* here.

² Ebrard rejects this explanation as quite erroneous, and as being in contradiction with the acceptation of the verse otherwise. The rashness of this judgment is clearly evident from the question which he adds: "Where would there be even the shadow of a grammatical reference of *ὁ* to *ζωῆς*?" for a grammatical reference is not and could not be asserted.—Bertheau's objection (Lücke, *Comment.*, ed. 3, p. 206 f.), that "we would still have to regard the neuter form as a

True, the apostle could have written even $\delta\varsigma$ instead of the neuter; but as Christ has His peculiar importance just in this, that He is the Life itself (not merely a living individual), — comp. Gospel of John xiv. 6, — and as John begins his Epistle filled with this conception, it was more natural for him to write here δ than $\delta\varsigma$.¹ By $\eta\nu$ $\acute{\alpha}\pi'$ $\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\eta\varsigma$, John describes Christ as Him who, although at a particular time He was the object of perception by sense, has been from all eternity; the imperfect $\eta\nu$, however, does not express the pre-mundane, eternal existence, but is explained in this way, that John speaks historically, looking backwards from the point of time at which Christ had become the object of sensuous perception. — $\acute{\alpha}\pi'$ $\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\eta\varsigma$ has frequently in the N. T. its more particular determination along with it, as in Mark xiii. 19, 2 Pet. iii. 4: $\tau\eta\varsigma$ $\kappa\tau\acute{\iota}\sigma\epsilon\omega\varsigma$, or it is easily discovered from the context, as in Acts xxvi. 4. In the passage 2 Thess. ii. 13, $\acute{\alpha}\pi'$ $\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\eta\varsigma$ corresponds to the expression used in Eph. i. 4: $\pi\rho\delta$ $\kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\beta\omicron\lambda\eta\varsigma$ $\kappa\omicron\sigma\mu\omicron\nu$, and is identical with the German *von Ewigkeit her* (from all eternity), for which elsewhere is said: $\acute{\alpha}\pi\omicron$ $\tau\omega\nu$ $\acute{\alpha}\iota\omega\nu\omega\nu$ (Eph. iii. 9), or similar words. Here it is explained by the following $\eta\tau\iota$ $\eta\nu$ $\pi\rho\delta\varsigma$ $\tau\omicron\nu$ $\pi\alpha\tau\epsilon\rho\alpha$. This existence of Christ with the Father precedes not merely His appearance in the flesh, but also the creation of the world, for according to John i. 2, the world was made by Him; $\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\eta$ is therefore not the moment of the beginning of the world, as it is frequently interpreted, but what preceded it (comp. Meyer on Gospel of John i. 1); Christ was *before* the world was, and is therefore not first from the beginning of the world, as Christ Himself in John xvii. 5 speaks of a $\delta\acute{\omicron}\zeta\alpha$ which He had with the Father $\pi\rho\delta$ $\tau\omicron\upsilon$ $\tau\omicron\nu$ $\kappa\omicron\sigma\mu\omicron\nu$ $\epsilon\iota\nu\alpha\iota$.² The apostle says here $\acute{\alpha}\pi'$ $\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\eta\varsigma$, because he is looking back from the time when Christ by His incarnation became the object of sensuous perception (similarly Ebrard). It is incorrect either to change the idea of $\epsilon\iota\nu\alpha\iota$ $\acute{\alpha}\pi'$ $\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\eta\varsigma$ into that of existence in the pre-determined plan,³ by which the words are strained, or to interpret $\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\eta$ here of the beginning of the public activity of Christ in the flesh (Semler, Paulus, and others), by which the connection with ver. 2 is ignored. — δ $\acute{\alpha}\kappa\eta\kappa\omicron\alpha\mu\epsilon\nu$, $\kappa\tau\lambda$.] By the four sentences the apostle expresses the thought that that which was from the beginning was the subject of his own perception; the main purpose of them is not “to put forward that which is to be proclaimed about Christ as absolutely certain and self-experienced (Ebrard), but to bring out and to establish the identity of that which was from the beginning with that which was manifested in the flesh, while he has at the same time in his view the Docetan heresy afterwards

general comprehensive expression which refers both to that to which the apostle ascribes a primeval existence and to that which he has heard with his ears,” etc., is not tenable, for it rests on the unproved assumption that δ $\lambda\acute{\omicron}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ $\tau\cdot\zeta$ is not identical with that which the apostle regarded as the object of the $\acute{\alpha}\kappa\omicron\upsilon\epsilon\iota\nu$, $\kappa\tau\lambda$.

¹ It is unsuitable to explain the δ , with Braune, in this way, that the apostle, “in view of the mysterious sublimity, . . . wrote in a flight and feeling of indefiniteness.”

² That the $\lambda\acute{\omicron}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ before the creation of the world was immanent in God, but by the accomplishment of the act of creation hypothetically proceeded from God (see Meyer on Gospel of John i. 1), is an idea nowhere hinted at in Scripture.

³ Grotius: “Eae res, quas apostoli sensibus suis percipere, fuerunt a Deo destinatae jam ab ipso mundi primordio.”

mentioned by him.¹ By the δ with which these sentences begin, nothing else, therefore, is meant than by the δ of the first sentence, namely, Christ Himself (Brückner, Braune); and here the peculiar paradox is to be noticed, which lies in this, that the general ($\acute{\eta}$ ζωή) is represented by the apostle as something perceived by his senses. It is erroneous to understand by each of these δ 's something different; thus by the first (with $\acute{\alpha}$ κηκόαμεν), perhaps the testimony which was expressed by God Himself (Grotius), or by the law and the prophets (Oecumenius), or by John the Baptist (Nicolas de Lyra), or even the words which Christ uttered (Ebrard); by the second δ (with $\acute{\epsilon}$ ωράκαμεν), the miracles of Christ (Ebrard); by the third δ (with $\acute{\epsilon}$ θεασάμεθα), *tot et tanta miracula* (Grotius), or even "the divine glory of Christ" (Ebrard); and by the δ which is to be supplied with $\acute{\epsilon}$ ψηλάφησαν, the resurrection-body of Christ (Ebrard), or, still more arbitrarily, the *panes multiplicatos*, Lazarus, etc. (Grotius); all these supplementary ideas, which have originated in the incorrect assumption that John refers here to "the various sides of Christ's appearance in the flesh," and which can easily be confounded with others, are utterly unjustified, since they are in no way hinted at in the context. John does not mean here to say that he has experienced this or that in Christ, but that he has heard, seen, looked upon, and handled Christ Himself. In the succession of the four verbs there lies an unmistakable gradation (a Lapide: *gradatim crescit oratio*); from $\acute{\alpha}$ κηκόαμεν to $\acute{\epsilon}$ ωράκαμεν a climax occurs, in so far as we are more certainly and immediately convinced of the reality of an appearance of sense by sight than by hearing; the addition of the words *τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ἡμῶν* is not, as Lorinus already remarks, a *περισσολογία* or *βαττολογία*, but there is in them "plainly an aiming at emphasis, as, to see with one's own eyes" (Winer, p. 564 [E. T., 607]). The third verb $\acute{\epsilon}$ θεασάμεθα must not here be taken — with Bede and Ebrard — in the sense of *spiritual* beholding, by which it is removed from the sphere to which the other verbs belong; it is rather of similar signification with $\acute{\epsilon}$ ωράκαμεν — in this respect, that, equally with the latter, it indicates the seeing with the bodily eyes. The difference does not, however, lie in this, that $\theta\epsilon\acute{\alpha}\sigma\theta\alpha\iota = \mu\epsilon\tau\grave{\alpha} \theta\acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\tau\omicron\varsigma \kappa\alpha\iota \theta\acute{\alpha}\mu\beta\omicron\upsilon\varsigma \acute{\iota}\rho\alpha\upsilon$ (Oecumenius, a Lapide, Hornejus, etc.), or = *attente cum gaudio et admiratione conspicerere* (Blackwell), by which significations are put into the word which are foreign to it in itself, but in this, that it has in it the suggestion of *intention*.² It is to be remarked that $\acute{\epsilon}$ θεασάμεθα is closely connected with the following *καὶ αἱ χεῖρες ἡμῶν ἐψηλάφησαν*; for δ is not repeated here, and both verbs are in the aorist, so that they thus go to form a sort of contrast to the two preceding clauses; whilst $\acute{\alpha}$ κούειν and $\acute{\iota}\rho\alpha\upsilon$ express rather the involuntary perception, $\theta\epsilon\acute{\alpha}\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$ and

¹ Erdmann: "Jam etiam clarum fit, cur tam diserte . . . testem oculatum et auritum se significare studeat, scilicet primum ut veritatem et certitudinem verbi aeterni in Christo manifestati sensibusque humanis percepti adversus contrariam pseudodocorum doctrinam . . . confirmet, deinde ut sui praeconii apostolici fidem et auctoritatem in ipsa sensuum

experientia fundatam ab insolentia illorum vindicet."

² This force Lücke brings out correctly: "Where the expressions are used as contrasted, $\acute{\iota}\rho\alpha\upsilon$ signifies altogether the objective seeing, but $\theta\epsilon\acute{\alpha}\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$ the *designed*, continued beholding."

ψηλαφείν express acts of voluntary design, — the former the purposed beholding, the latter the purposed touching of the object in order to convince one's self of its reality and of its nature. As both these parts of the clause remind us of the words of the risen Christ: *ψηλαφήσατέ με καὶ ἴδετε* (Luke xxiv. 39), it is not improbable that John had in his mind the beholding and touching of the Risen One, only it must be maintained at the same time that Christ was one and the same to him before and after His resurrection. In this view, the transition from the perfect to the aorist is naturally explained in this way, that the apostle in the last verbs refers to single definite acts.¹ The plural *ἀκηκόαμεν, κ.τ.λ.*, is not *plur. majesticus*, but is used because John, although he speaks of himself as subject, still at the same time embraces in his consciousness the other apostles as having had the same experience as himself. — *περὶ τοῦ λόγου τῆς ζωῆς* is not dependent on any of the preceding verbs;² it is also inadmissible to explain *περὶ* here, with Brückner, in the sense in which it is used in 1 Cor. xvi. 1, 12, namely, in order to mark the transition to something new; not only the sense, but also the position of *περὶ*, prohibits this signification; it is an additional clause in apposition to the preceding descriptions of the object, by which it is stated to what *ὁ ἦν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς, ὁ ἀκηκόαμεν* refers. The expression *ὁ λόγος τῆς ζωῆς* may be in itself a description of the Gospel (so it is taken by Grotius, Semler, Frommann, Ewald, De Wette, Brückner, Dusterdieck, etc.), and *τῆς ζωῆς* either *gen. obj.* (1 Cor. i. 18; 2 Cor. v. 19), or *gen. qualitatis* (Phil. ii. 16; Gospel of John vi. 68): but this acceptation is refuted, first, by the preposition *περὶ*, instead of which the simple accusative would have had to be put, for John proclaimed not *about* the gospel, but the gospel itself (*ἀπαγγέλλομεν*, ver. 3); then by the close connection of this additional clause with the preceding objective clauses; and, finally by the analogy with the prooemium of the Gospel of John (ver. 1: *ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος*; ver. 4: *ἐν αὐτῷ ζωὴ ἦν*). These reasons, which are opposed to that explanation, are in favor of the explanation of Hornejus: *hic non denotatur sermo s. verbum evangelii, sed Christus*, which is also that of most commentators. The opinion of Dusterdieck, that “as John (according to ver. 2) considered the Logos itself as *ἡ ζωὴ, ἡ ζωὴ αἰώνιος*, the *λόγος* in the composition *ὁ λόγος τῆς ζωῆς* cannot again be the personal Logos,” is overthrown by this, that *τῆς ζωῆς* in itself is not the name of a person, but of a thing, just as in Gospel of John i. 4, *ζωὴ* in

¹ Dusterdieck rightly remarks that the change of the tenses does not here originate in an indefiniteness. His view, however, “that the transition from the perfect to the aorist is to be explained in this way, that the nearer the apostle's discourse comes to the definite historical force of *ἐφανερώθη*, the more it takes the historical form,” is untenable, for *ἀκούειν* and *ὁρᾶν* stand to *ἐφανερώθη* in no other relation than *θεᾶσθαι* and *ψηλαφείν*. Brückner opposes the view indicated above, being of opinion that the perfect emphasizes “the certain effect,” the aorist, on the other hand, “the historical event;” but why would

John there emphasize the former and here the latter, if this were not to be explained by the distinction which we have stated?

² S. G. Lange construes *περὶ* with the first sentence: *ὁ ἦν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς*, so that the sense that results to him, explaining *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς* = “from the beginning of His ministry,” and *εἶναί* = “*feri*, to happen,” is: “that which happened from the beginning in connection with our Lord, the Word of life”! — Not less extraordinary is the explanation of Paulus: “what in general was thus in regard to the Logos; what we, in regard to Him, heard, saw, etc., that also, in regard to Him, these

the clause ἐν αὐτῷ ζωὴ ἦν, and τὸ φῶς τ. ἀνθρ. in the clause καὶ ἡ ζωὴ ἦν τὸ φῶς τ. ἀνθρ. Even ὁ λόγος is the name of a thing; not, indeed, that we should understand by it, first, "the word, which was preached by the apostles," and then, because this has Christ as its subject, "Christ Himself," as Hofmann (*Schriftbew.*, ed. 2, I. p. 109 ff.) thinks, for the subject of a word cannot be called the *Word* (comp. Meyer on Gospel of John i. 1)¹ but ὁ λόγος signifies, in the province of religious thought, κατ' ἐξοχήν, the Word by which God expressed Himself ἐν ἀρχῇ. Though John of course knows that this *Word* is the personal Christ, yet in this expression *in itself* the idea of personality is not yet brought out. This being the case, we will have to understand the compound phrase, ὁ λόγος τῆς ζωῆς, first of all as *the name of a thing*:² so that John in this description, which in itself does not express the idea of personality, does not mean to say that that which was from the beginning, and which he has heard, etc., is the *person* that bears the name ὁ λόγος τῆς ζωῆς, but only defines more particularly the object, previously stated indefinitely, in so far that it is the Word of life, i. e., the Word which has life in it (whose nature consists in this, that it is life), and is the source of all life (Braune); comp. John vi. 35, viii. 12. In agreement with this, Weiss says (p. 35) that ὁ λόγος is here, as in the prologue of the Gospel, a description of the nature of the Son of God; but the assertion is incorrect, that the genitive τῆς ζωῆς describes the Word as "the Word belonging to life, necessary for life," in favor of which he appeals incorrectly to the expressions ἄρτος τῆς ζωῆς (John vi. 35, 48) and ῥήματα ζωῆς αἰωνίου (John vi. 68). This explanation is refuted by this, that with it ἡ ζωή, ver. 2, must be taken in a different reference from that which τῆς ζωῆς has here.³—The personality of this Word, which has already been indicated by ὁ ἀκηκόαμεν, κ.τ.λ., is still more definitely expressed in ver. 2 by the twofold ἐφανερώθη, in which ὁ ἐωράκαμεν καὶ ἀκηκόαμεν of ver. 3 finds its explanation. That in the expression ὁ λόγος τῆς ζωῆς the emphasis lies on τῆς ζωῆς, is clear from this, that in ver. 2

hands of ours have touched," namely, "the human body which here contained Him as the Logos come down from above."

¹ The identification of the ideas: κήρυγμα (= λόγος) and ὁ κηρυσσόμενος, by which, without enlargement, the former could be put where the latter is meant, is rightly opposed by Luthardt (*Das Ev. Joh.*, p. 234 ff.); and what Hofmann, in the 2d ed. of his *Schriftbeweise*, brings forward for his defence, does not refute the statements of Luthardt. But even the explanation of Luthardt, that Christ is called the Word because He "is the Word which God has spoken to the world, because He is the final and last word of all earlier words of God to the world," cannot be justified, because, on the one hand, in the simple expression λόγος nothing is less indicated than that He is the *final* word, and, on the other hand, it must be acknowledged that Christ, not merely from His incarnation, but from the

very beginning, is the Word in which life is, or the Word of Life.

² Even Hofmann has rightly recognized this, although only from his inadmissible interpretation of the idea ὁ λόγος: "As ὁ λόγος is the word of the apostolic proclamation, ὁ λόγος τῆς ζωῆς is also not meant to be the proper name of a personal being, but the description of a thing, which requires the genitive attributive τῆς ζωῆς in order to be described according to its peculiar essence."

³ This incongruity is concealed by Weiss in this way, that he takes ζωή = "knowledge of God;" but it is not thereby removed, for Weiss understands by ζωῆς here "our knowledge of God," but by ἡ ζωὴ in ver. 2, on the other hand, the knowledge of God *which the Logos has*.—It is arbitrary for Ewald to explain λόγος by "subject," and, accordingly, περὶ τοῦ λόγου τῆς ζωῆς by "in regard to the subject of life."

it is not *ὁ λόγος*, but *ἡ ζωὴ*, that is the subject. The construction with *περὶ* is thus explained, that the apostle does not thereby mean to speak of the object of his proclamation, which he has already stated in *ὃ ἦν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς, κ.τ.λ.*, but only desires to add a more particular description of it, for which reason also it is not to be regarded as dependent on *ἀπαγγέλλομεν*. Braune incorrectly takes it as "a new dependent clause parallel in its matter to the succession of relative clauses, which along with the latter comes to an end in *ἀπαγγέλλομεν*." Ebrard groundlessly finds in this construction the suggestion, that John considers as the object of his proclamation, not Christ "as an abstract single conception" (!), but "his concrete historical experiences of Christ."

Ver. 2. Without bringing to an end the thought begun in ver. 1, from the exact continuation of which he has already digressed in *περὶ τοῦ λόγου τ. ζ.*, the apostle in this verse expresses the double thought, that the life was manifested, and that this eternal life which was with the Father and was manifested, has been seen and is declared by him; so that in this, both *ὃ ἦν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς* and *ὃ ἀκηκόαμεν*, how the former, namely, could have been the subject of sensuous perception, find their more particular determination. This *whole* verse is of course parenthetical; but that it is not regarded by John as mere parenthesis (contrary to Düsterdieck) is clear, partly from the connecting *καί*, and partly from this, that in ver. 3 it is not *ὃ ἦν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς*, but only *ὃ ἀκηκόαμεν, κ.τ.λ.*, that is resumed, while the former is fully dealt with in this verse. — *καί* is not put for *γάρ*, but is copulative, "not disjunctive, but conjunctive" (Lucke); the thought with which it is connected is that which lies in *ὃ ἦν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς*, that the life, before it became subject of perception, was, as it is afterwards put, *πρὸς τὸν πατέρα*.¹ — *ἡ ζωὴ ἐφανερώθη*]. Instead of a relative, the noun is repeated, as is peculiar to the diction of John; *ἡ ζωὴ* instead of *ὁ λόγος τῆς ζωῆς*, because the emphasis, as has been already remarked, is on *ζωὴ*, is analogous to Gospel of John i. 4, where also, after it is said of the *λόγος*, *ἐν αἰτῷ ζωὴ ἦν*, it is not *ὁ λόγος*, but *ἡ ζωὴ*, that is the subject of the following sentence.² It is plainly incorrect to understand by *ζωὴ* the *doctrina de felicitate nova = evangelium* (Semler), or, with others, the *felicitas* of believers; but neither is S. G. Lange's explanation, according to which *ζωὴ* = "*auctor vitæ*, the Life-giver," sufficient, for Christ is so designated not merely according to the operation that proceeds from Him, but, at the same time, according to the peculiarity of His nature.³ — *ἐφανερώθη*. In

¹ Ebrard wrongly conceives the logical relation thus, that by *καί* the thought that is latent in the preceding verse, "that Christ was of eternal being, but became Incarnate and was manifested," is *confirmed*.

² Groundlessly Baumgarten-Crusius asserts that *ζωὴ* "has here more inner, spiritual meaning than in Gospel i. 14;" this is to mistake the meaning which the word has in that passage.

³ The chief elements which are contained in the idea *ζωὴ* are differently stated by the

commentators. Frommann mentions as such: "the truth, perfection, or the living and happy character of being;" Köstlin: "the mightiness, blessedness, and endlessness of being." If we keep to the scriptural mode of conception, the chief elements appear to be "consciousness, activity, and happiness;" true activity is only where consciousness is, and happiness is activity which is not disturbed or hindered by any opposition. — Weiss wrongly infers from John xvii. 3, that by *ζωὴ* is to be understood only the knowledge of God, and

what way the *φανέρωσις* took place, is taught in chap. iv. 2 and John i. 14. In this way, that the life which was in itself hidden appeared in the flesh or became flesh, did it become perceptible by sense, subject of the *ἀκούειν*, *ἴδω*, κ.τ.λ. Ebrard rightly remarks: "The *σὰρξ γίγνεσθαι* indicates the objective event of the incarnation as such; the *φανερωθῆναι*, the result of it for our faculty of perception." — καὶ ἐωρίκαμεν καὶ, κ.τ.λ.]. The object that belongs to the verbs is *τὴν ζωὴν τὴν αἰώνιον*; according to De Wette, Brückner, and Düsterdieck, this object is only attracted to *ἀπαγγέλλομεν*, and the object is to be supplied to both of the first verbs from what precedes (*ζωή*); but the two ideas *μαρτυροῦμεν* and *ἀπαγγ.* are thereby unduly separated from each other; there is more in favor of supplying only an *αὐτὴν* with *ἐωρίκαμεν* (1st ed. of this comn., Myrberg), by which the idea of this verb is significantly brought out: "the life was manifested, and we have seen it;" but as in the context even this construction is not indicated, it is better, with most commentators, to connect *τὴν ζωὴν τ. αἰών.* also with *ἐωρίκαμεν*. — By *ἐωρίκαμεν* the apostle brings out that the eternal Life which was made manifest and perceptible was seen by himself; the verb *μαρτυροῦμεν*, which signifies the utterance of that which one has personally seen or experienced (comp. Gospel of John xix. 35; also 1 John i. 34, iii. 32),¹ is directly connected with this, and thereupon first follows the more general idea *ἀπαγγέλλομεν*; Baumgarten-Crusius incorrectly refers *μαρτυροῦμεν* specially to *ἐφανερωθη*, and *ἀπαγγέλλομεν* to *ἐωρίκαμεν*, with the assertion that "the former two have more objective, the latter more subjective meaning."² By *ἴδω*, *ἀπαγγέλλομεν* is put in reference to the readers of the Epistle; hence it does not follow, however, that it is to be understood only of the writing of this Epistle, and is therefore simply resumed by *ταῦτα γράφομεν* in ver. 4; but the former is the more general idea, in which the more special one of the writing of the Epistle is embraced; the *γράφειν* is a particular kind of the *ἀπαγγέλλειν*.³ Ebrard incorrectly separates the two by referring *ἀπαγγέλλομεν* to the written Gospel of John, and *γράφομεν* to this Epistle. — *τὴν ζωὴν τὴν αἰώνιον*]. The noun is here put for the pronoun *αὐτὴν*, not only in accordance with John's usual mode of expression, but because the idea of *ζωή* was to be more particularly defined by *αἰώνιος*. Baumgarten-Crusius erroneously explains *ἡ ζωὴ ἡ αἰώνιος* by "bestowing higher, unending life;" rather the *ζωή*, which Christ is, is marked by *αἰώνιος* as such as *ἦν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς*, or, still more comprehensively, as such as, though by

it is erroneous for him to maintain that *ἡ ζωὴ* does not here signify Christ Himself, but "His peculiar knowledge of God," which He possessed even before His *φανέρωσις*. The relative clause *ἧτις ἦν πρὸς τὸν πατέρα*, which is connected with *τὴν ζωὴν τὴν αἰώνιον*, is opposed to this interpretation; inasmuch as it shows that here *ἡ ζωὴ ἡ αἰώνιος*, and just as much *ἡ ζωὴ*, is to be considered as the same subject which John in the proemium of the Gospel calls *ὁ λόγος*, and of which he says there that *ἦν πρὸς τὸν Θεόν*.

¹ Incorrectly, a Lapide. "Quasi martyres,

i. e., testes Dei tum voce, tum vita, tum passione, morte et martyrio."

² Myrberg's explanation also: "μαρτυρία est expertae veritatis simplex confessio, qua homo sibi ipsi potius, quam aliis consulat: ἀπαγγελία annuntiatio veritatis cognitae, qua aliis potius, quam sibi ipsi providere studeat," is without grammatical justification.

³ Bengel's interpretation: "Testimonium, genus; species duae: annuntiatio et scriptio; annuntiatio ponit fundamentum, scriptio superaedificat," is inadmissible.

the incarnation it entered into time, is in itself nevertheless without measure of time, eternal (Brückner; similarly Braune). It is true, the idea ζωῆ αἰώνιος has elsewhere in the N. T. admittedly another signification, but this does not justify the explanation of Calvin: *ubi secundo repetit: annuntiamus vitam aeternam, non dubito quin de effectu loquatur, nempe quod annuntiet: beneficio Christi partam nobis esse vitam.* De Wette's explanation also, that ἡ ζωῆ ἡ αἰώνιος is an idea "which hovers in the middle between the eternal true life which is to be appropriated by believers (John xvii. 3), and life in Christ, so that the first is to be considered in closest connection with ἀπαγγέλλομεν, but the second in reference to the reflexive ἡ τις ἑν," can so much the less be held correct as the simple and clear thought of the apostle is thereby rendered complicated and obscure. Of that which the believer possesses in Christ there is here no mention at all, but only of Christ Himself; and, besides, that ἡ ζωῆ ἡ αἰών. is to the Apostle John not merely a subjective, but also an objective conception, is proved by chap. v. 11. — ἡ τις ἑν]. ἡ τις is more significant than the simple ἡ, inasmuch as it makes the twofold relative clause as containing a confirmation of the preceding statement: ἐωράκαμεν, κ.τ.λ., τὴν ζωὴν τὴν αἰώνιον.¹ — The imperfect ἦν also does not here indicate the intemporal existence, but is used in reference to ἐφανερώθη: ere the ζωῆ appeared, it was with the Father. — πρὸς τὸν πατέρα; comp. Gospel of John i. 1: πρὸς τὸν Θεόν. The preposition πρὸς is often combined with the accusative in the N. T. in the sense of "with:" comp. Matt. xiii. 56, xxvi. 55; but πρὸς with the accusative differs from πρὸς with the dative in this, that it describes being with one another not as a mere being beside one another, but as a living connection, a being in intercourse with one another (so also Braune); but we put too much into it, if we find the relationship of love directly expressed by πρὸς.² John does not mean to bring out that the ζωῆ (Christ) was connected with the Father in love, but that Christ already was, before He appeared (ἐφανερώθη); before He was ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ with men, He was therefore in heaven with God, and, indeed, in lively union with God as he afterwards entered into a lively communion with men. Quite erroneously, Socin, Grotius, and others understand the expression of the

¹ The statement of Ebrard is inapposite, that by ἡ τις the subject-matter of the relative clause is stated as an already (from ver. 1) known and at the same time acknowledged element of the substantive idea on which the relative clause depends. The right view seems to lie at the base of the explanation of Sander: "I declare unto you eternal life, even as such as," etc.; at least, it is not touched at by the remark of Ebrard in opposition: "The meaning of John is plainly this, that the ζ. αἰών. is really and in itself one which was with the Father and was manifested to us, and is by no means represented as such merely in the proclamation of it." Düsterdieck rightly says: "By ἡ τις the twofold extension of the predicate is connected with the subject ἡ ζ. ἡ

αἰών., not merely in simply relative manner, but in such a way that the extension of the predicate contains at the same time an explanatory and confirmatory reference;" but it is difficult to admit that by virtue of ἡ τις the καὶ ἐφανερώθη ἡμῖν in its close connection with ἦν πρ. τ. πατ. is marked as the connecting link which unites to ὁ ἦν ἀπ' ἀρχ. the accessory elements ο ἀκηκόαμεν, κ.τ.λ.

² Besser: "The Word was with God, related to the Father in *filial love*." Still less justifiable is Ebrard's explanation: "The ζωῆ was a life flowing forth indeed from the bosom of the Father, but immediately returning to it, floating in the inner circulation of the life of God" (!).

concealment of the *ζωὴ αἰών*. in the decree of God. From the fact that John here calls God in His relation to Christ *πατήρ*, it follows that the sonship of Christ to God is to be regarded not as first begun with His incarnation, but as pre-mundane. — *καὶ ἐφανερώθη ἡμῖν* is not a mere repetition of what has been already said, but in *ἡμῖν* a new element is added, by which *ἐωράκαμεν* and *ὁ ἀκηκόαμεν*, κ.τ.λ., ver. 1, find their explanation.

Ver. 3. In the opening words of this verse, *ὁ . . . ἀκηκόαμεν*, the object expressed in ver. 1 is resumed, and the governing verb, which was there already in the apostle's view, is added. The drift of this verse does not, however, lie in this, but rather in the final clause: *ἴνα*, κ.τ.λ. While John first meant to state what was the subject of his proclamation, namely, that it was that which was from the beginning and was perceived by his senses, — which he then more particularly defined in ver. 2, — he now wants to state the *purpose* of this proclamation of that subject. In this lies the reason why the object is resumed in abridged form, namely, in the form which the immediately preceding words (*καὶ ἐφανερώθη ἡμῖν*) suggested. The *ὁ ἦν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς*, and similarly the *ὁ ἐθεασάμεθα*, was not to be resumed; the former, because it has been fully dealt with in what follows it; the latter, because it was not here in the purpose of the apostle once more to bring out the reality of the sensuous appearance of Him who was from the beginning. That *ἐωράκαμεν* is placed before *ἀκηκόαμεν*, in which, no artificial parallelism is to be sought for (against Ebrard), resulted naturally from the interweaving of *ἐωράκαμεν* into ver. 2 (De Wette). — *ἀπαγγέλλομεν καὶ ὑμῖν*; with *ἀπαγγέλλομεν*, comp. ver. 2. — *καὶ* (see the critical remarks) distinguishes the readers either from others to whom the apostle had declared the same thing (Spener, De Wette, Baumgarten-Crusius, Lücke, Düsterdieck, Myrberg, Braune, etc.), or from John (along with the other apostles). *Lorinus: vos qui nimirum non audistis, nec vidistis, nec manibus vestris contrectastis verbum vitæ*; so also Zwingli, Bullinger, Ebrard. The latter interpretation would be preferable, if the following *καὶ* before *ὑμεῖς*, to which the same reference is to be attributed, did not thereby become pleonastic. — *ἴνα καὶ ὑμεῖς κοινωνίαν ἐχητε μεθ' ἡμῶν*]. Many commentators, as Socin, Bengel, Russmeyer, Spener, and others, supply with *κοινωνίαν* as enlargement: “with God and Christ;” without adequate ground; the enlargement of the idea *κοινωνία* is *μεθ' ἡμῶν* (Baumgarten-Crusius, Düsterdieck, Braune), whereby, however, John does not mean “the apostles and other Christians” (De Wette), but himself, although including the other apostles, who have also seen and heard the Word of Life. This *κοινωνία* is self-evidently the fellowship of spirit in faith and love, which was brought about by the apostolic preaching. — *ἔχειν* is neither to be explained, with a Lapide, by *pergere et in ea (κοινωνία) proficere et confirmari*, nor, with Fritzsche, by “to acquire;” the word is rather to be retained in the signification peculiar to it; the apostle simply indicates the *having* fellowship as the aim of the apostolic proclamation, quite apart from the question as to how the hearers of this are related to that. — *καὶ ἡ κοινωνία δὲ ἡ ἡμετέρα*, κ.τ.λ.]. By *ἡ κοινωνία ἡ ἡμετέρα* most commentators understand “the fellowship which the apostles and the believing hearers of their proclamation have *with one another*,” and, according as *ἡ* or *ἐστὶ* is supplied,

have thus defined the thought of the verse, that the apostle states of this mutual fellowship that it either should be or is a fellowship with the Father and the Son. But as this view necessitates a scarcely justifiable enlargement of the idea *κοινωνία* (*ἡ κοινωνία ἡ ἡμετέρα ἢ [ὅρ ἐστι] κοινωνία μετὰ τ. πατρ., κ. τ. λ.*),¹ the explanation of Baumgarten-Crusius, who resolves *ἡ κοινωνία ἡ ἡμετέρα* into *ἡμεῖς ἔχομεν κοινωνίαν μετὰ τ. πατρ.*, deserves the preference (so also Ewald, Braune); taking this explanation, the *κοινωνία* meant here is not identical with that mentioned before, inasmuch as the distinction is marked both by the difference of the subject, *ὑμεῖς* and *ἡμεῖς* (which is contained in *ἡμετέρα*), and that of the object, *μεθ' ἡμῶν* and *μετὰ τοῦ πατρός*. According to this acceptance, the apostle here brings out that he (along with the rest of the apostles) has fellowship with the Father and with the Son, and, no doubt, in order to intimate by this that his readers, if they have fellowship with him, are thereby received with him into that fellowship. It is at all events incorrect, with Augustin, Luther, Calvin, Grotius, Ebrard, etc., to supply *ἢ* with this sentence. In opposition to it are: (1) the structure of the sentence, for if it were dependent on *ἵνα*, the verb could not be omitted;² and (2) the thought, for as the apostles are already in fellowship with the Father and with the Son, it cannot be the aim of their *ἀπαγγελία* to elevate the fellowship which exists between them, and those who accept their word, into fellowship with the Father and with the Son. Therefore it is *ἐστί* that must be supplied, as Erasmus, a Lapide, Vatablus, Hornejus, De Wette, Baumgarten-Crusius, Dusterdieck, Myrberg, Ewald, Braune, etc., have rightly recognized. The conjunction *καὶ . . . δέ*, which is pretty often found in the N. T., is used when the idea which is *connected* with a preceding one is at the same time to be *contrasted* with it; "the introduction of *something new* is thereby intimated" (Pape, see on *καὶ . . . δέ*). Whether it be the connection or the contrast which is to be the more emphasized, this particle is never used to resume an idea with the view to a further expression of it. This usage therefore also proves that by *ἡ κοινωνία ἡ ἡμετέρα* it is not the previously mentioned *κοινωνία μεθ' ἡμῶν*, but another fellowship, namely, the fellowship of the *ἡμεῖς*, i. e., of John and the other apostles (not with one another, but) with the Father and with the Son, that is meant.³ God is here called

¹ This enlargement is involuntarily made by the commentators—although they do not mention it; thus by Lücke, when he explains: "that ye may have fellowship with us: but (not with us only, but—ye know) our fellowship with one another is also that with the Father and with the Son;" similarly by Dusterdieck; Ebrard also says: "It is the purpose of John in his *ἀπαγγελία*, that his readers may enter into fellowship with the disciples, and that this fellowship may have its life-principle in the *fellowship* with the Father and with the Son."

² The omission of *ἐστί* very often occurs; on the other hand, *ἢ* is *very seldom* omitted in the N. T., only in 1 Cor. viii. 11 and 13 (still

stronger is the ellipsis in Rom. iv. 16); thus even with Paul, who so frequently expresses only the outlines of the thought, the subjunctive of the substantive verb is almost never omitted; how much less can it be held as omitted in a construction of periods otherwise quite conformable to rule, in the second part of the dependent clause!

³ For the usage of *καὶ . . . δέ*, comp. Matt. xvi. 18; Mark iv. 36; Luke ii. 35; Acts iii. 24, xxii. 29; Heb. ix. 21; and in Gospel of John vi. 51, viii. 16, 17, xv. 27. Lücke wrongly says that the particle is used for the more exact definition, expansion, and strengthening of a preceding thought, and that there is contained in it an "at the same time"

πατήρ in relation to τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ. — The full description of Christ as τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ serves to bring out the identity of that which was from the beginning with Him who became man.

Ver. 4. After stating the subject and aim of his apostolic proclamation, the apostle intimates specially the aim of this Epistle. — καὶ ταῦτα γράφομεν ὑμῖν. By καὶ, γράφομεν is made co-ordinate with ἀπαγγέλλομεν, the particular with the general, not the composition of the Epistle with that of the Gospel (Ebrard). ταῦτα refers neither merely to what precedes (Russmeyer, Sander), nor merely to what immediately follows (Socin), but to the whole Epistle (Lücke, De Wette, Düsterdieck). With γράφομεν ὑμῖν, comp. ii. 1, 12, v. 13. The plural is used because John as an apostle writes in the consciousness that his written word is in full agreement with the preaching of all the apostles; all the apostles, as it were, speak through him to the readers of the Epistle. — ἵνα ἡ χαρὰ ὑμῶν ᾖ πεπληρωμένη. Comp. with this John xv. 11, xvii. 13. The aim of the Epistle is the πληρωσις of joy which it, as apostolic testimony to the salvation founded on the φανέρωσις of the ζωὴ αἰώνιος (ver. 2), was to produce in its readers. De Wette groundlessly thinks that the effect, namely, the perfected Christian frame of mind, is here put for the cause, namely, Christian perfection. It is rather very especially the perfect χαρὰ (not merely “the joy of conflict and victory,” Ebrard) that is the goal to which the apostle would lead his readers by this Epistle. With the reading ἡμῶν it is the χαρὰ of the apostles — first of all of John — that is the goal, and no doubt the joy which for them consists in this, that their word produces fruit in their hearers.¹ Incorrectly Ebrard: “If ἡμῶν is right, then the apostle resumes the mutual ἡμετέρα: that our (common) joy may be full;” for, on the one hand, ἡμετέρα is not mutual (embracing the apostles and the readers), and, on the other, ἡμῶν would have to be referred to the ἡμεῖς that is contained in γράφομεν, but not to the more remote ἡμετέρα.

Ver. 5—chap. ii. 11.

After the apostle has indicated the fulness of joy, which is in the fellowship with the Father and with the Son, as the aim of his Epistle, he brings out in what follows, from the point of view that God is φῶς (ver. 5), in opposition to moral indifferentism, the condition under which alone that fellowship can exist.

Ver. 5. This verse contains no inference from what precedes (καὶ is not = *igitur*, Beza), but the thought that lays the foundation for what follows. — ἐστὶν αὕτη ἡ ἄγγελια, “and this is the message;” ἐστὶν is here put —

or “not only . . . but also.” It must also be held as erroneous when Düsterdieck says: “John has just spoken of a ‘fellowship with us;’ now he wants to expand this idea further; therefore he continues: ‘and our fellowship’—the new explanatory thought, however, forms a certain antithesis to what was previously said: but our fellowship is not so much the fellowship with us as rather that with the Father and with the Son.”—Apart from the fact that καὶ . . . δὲ has not the force

of such a restriction (not so much . . . as rather), who does not feel that, if John wanted to express this thought, he would have had to write οὐ ἡμετέρα, but ὑμετέρα, or rather αὕτη δὲ κοινωνία?

¹ Theophyl.: ἡμῶν γὰρ ὑμῖν κοινωνούντων πλειστην ἔχομεν τὴν χαρὰν ἡμῶν, ἣν τοῖς θερισταῖς ὁ χαρῶν σπορεύς ἐν τῇ τοῦ μισθοῦ ἀπολήψει βραβεύσει, χαϊρόντων καὶ τούτων ὅτι τῶν πονῶν αὐτῶν ἀπολαύουσι.

contrary to its usual position, comp. ii. 25, iii. 11, 23, iv. 3, etc. — before *αὐτῆ* “in order to mark the reality of the message” (Braune); *αὐτῆ* here — as elsewhere also — refers to what follows: *ὅτι ὁ Θεὸς, κ.τ.λ.*, by which the subject-matter of the message is stated. Calvin incorrectly, following the reading *ἐπαγγελία*: *promissio, quam vobis afferimus, hoc secum trahit, vel hanc conditionem habet annexam.* — The word *ἀγγελία* only here and iii. 11 (where, however, it is also not unopposed); frequently in the LXX., 2 Sam. iv. 4; Prov. xii. 26, xxv. 26, xxvi. 16; Isa. xxviii. 9; Jer. xlviii. 34. The reading *ἐπαγγελία* is more difficult with the meaning “promise;” yet this may be justified in so far as every N. T. proclamation carries with it a promise.¹ De Wette prefers this reading, but takes *ἐπαγγελία*, following the example of Oecumenius, a Lapide, Beza, Hornejus, etc., — contrary to the constant *usus loquendi* of the N. T., — in the signification: “announcement” (Lange: ‘teaching’). — *ἦν ἀκηκόαμεν ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ*, “from Him, that is, Christ.” Instead of *ἀπὸ*, it is more usual to have *παρά*, comp. John viii. 26, 40, xv. 15; Acts x. 22, xxviii. 22; 2 Tim. ii. 2. — *αὐτός* in the Epistle, not always (Paulus, Baumgarten-Crusius) indeed, but mostly, refers to God, while *ἐκεῖνος* refers always to Christ; here it refers backwards to *τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ* ‘I. Chr. in ver. 3; Düsterdieck: “From Him, Christ, the Son of God manifested in the flesh (ver. 3), whom the apostle himself has heard (ver. 1 ff.), has he received the message about the Father.” In favor of the correctness of this explanation is also the following: *ὅτι ὁ Θεός.*² — *καὶ ἀναγγέλλομεν ὑμῖν*. *ἀναγγέλλειν* is synonymous with *ἀπαγγέλλειν*, vv. 2 and 3, only that in *ἀνα* the idea “again” is contained; Erasmus: *quod filius annuntiavit a patre, hoc apostolus acceptum a filio RENUNCIAT.*³ This *ἀναγγέλλομεν* refers back with peculiar subtleness to the preceding *ἀγγελία*, and thus testifies to the correctness of that reading (Düsterdieck). The subject is, as in vv. 2 and 3, John and the rest of the apostles. To reduce their proclamation to the word which they heard from Christ Himself serves to confirm its truth; comp. the combination of *ἀκούειν* and *ἀπαγγέλλειν* in ver. 3. Ebrard wrongly interprets this *ἀναγγέλλομεν* also of the proclamation of John which occurred in his Gospel, to which this Epistle is related as the concentrating development.⁴ — *ὅτι ὁ Θεὸς φῶς ἐστὶ*. *φῶς* is inappropriately translated by Luther: “a light;” the article weakens the thought; God is light, i.e., God’s nature is light = absolute holiness and truth (comp. chap. iv. 8; Gospel of John

¹ Spener: “Promise; inasmuch as, in what follows, a promise is really involved. God is not only a light in Himself, but to believers He is also their light. And that is the promise.”

² The use of this pronoun even where the reference is obscure is caused by this, that John does not think of the Father without the Son, or the Son without the Father; the thought therefore remains *essentially* the same, whether we refer it in the first instance to the Father or to the Son; notwithstanding, however, the view of Socinus is unjustifiable, ac-

ording to which, on account of the *conjunctio inter Deum et Christum* (which Socinus, moreover, holds not as a *conjunctio essentialis*, but only as a *conjunctio voluntatis et rerum aliarum omnium*), by *αὐτοῦ* is here to be understood equally *God and Christ*.

³ Bengel: “Quae in ore Christi fuit ἀγγελία, eam apostoli ἀναγγέλλουσι; nam ἀγγελίαν ab ipso acceptam reddunt et propagant.”

⁴ According to Ewald, John is here quoting a definite utterance of Christ; possibly, but not necessarily.

iv. 24).¹ For the signification of the symbolical expression "light," comp. especially Jas. i. 13, 17. — As God is φῶς in absolute sense, so also all light outside of Him is the radiation of His nature, as all love flows forth from Him whose nature is ἀγάπη; comp. chap. iv. 7 ff. — καὶ σκοτία ἐν αὐτῷ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδεμία]. The thought contained in the foregoing is emphasized by the negation of its opposite, which is here expressed in the strongest manner by οὐκ . . . οὐδεμία, in accordance with John's diction (comp. chap. ii. 4, 18, etc.). — σκοτία: antithesis of φῶς: sin and falsehood; the same antithesis is frequently in the N. T.; comp. Rom. xiii. 12; Eph. v. 8 ff.; 1 Thess. v. 4, 5. In opposition to the general prevalent explanation given here, Weiss thus explains the sense of this verse: "God is light, i.e., He has become visible, capable of being known, namely, in Christ, who certainly proclaims this truth; there is no more any darkness in God at all, i.e., no part of His nature remains any longer dark and unknown; He has (in Christ) become completely revealed." This interpretation, to which Weiss is led by the erroneous supposition that the idea φῶς has, in the N. T., no ethical reference,² is refuted both by the form of expression, which exhibits φῶς (just as ἀγάπη, chap. iv. 8) as a description of the nature of God, and also by the train of thought, in so far as the truth expressed here forms the starting-point for all the following amplifications — which bear on the ethical relationship of Christians. Besides, the apostle would have insufficiently expressed the thought, as he would have left out the essential ἐν Χριστῷ, which Weiss unjustifiably inserts. John rightly puts the truth that God is light, as the chief subject-matter of the ἀγγελία of Christ, at the top of his development; for it forms the essential basis of Christianity, both in its objective and in its subjective subsistence; in it there lies, as well as judgment in regard to sin, so also salvation from sin by the incarnation and death of Christ, as well as necessity of repentance and faith, so also the moral exercise of the Christian life.

Ver. 6. Inference from ver. 5. He alone has fellowship with God, who does not walk in darkness. — ἐὼν εἰπωμεν]. The same form of speech (ἐὼν) is repeated from verse to verse (only with the exception of ii. 2) until chap. ii. 3; then appears the participle with the definite article: ὁ λέγων, ii. 4, vi. 9; ὁ ἀγαπῶν, ii. 10; ὁ μισῶν, ii. 11. — The use of the hypothetical particles, especially of ἐάν, is also found very often in the Gospel.³ On the first person

¹ The fulness of the references contained in these words, Lorinus states in the following manner: "Deus lux est, quia clarissime se ipsum percipit, omniaque in se ipso, utpote prima et ipsissima veritas; quia summe bonus, ac summa et ipsissima bonitas; fidelis absque ulla iniquitate, justus et rectus, quia fons omnis lucis in aliis i. e. veritatis atque virtutis, non solum illustrans mentem, docensque quid agendum sit, verum etiam operans in nobis, ut agamus et sic radiis suis liberans mentem ab ignorantiae tenebris, purgans a pravitate voluntatem."

² The assertion that φῶς refers only to

knowledge and not to the ethical state, is so much the more untenable, as Weiss himself describes this knowledge as "the true knowledge of God, i.e., such that the entire spiritual life of man is absorbed in it, so that he is henceforth completely in God," or "in which the object of cognition is received into the whole spiritual life of man in such a way that it becomes a force, inspiring and determining, or ruling, the latter in its totality." But even such a cognition must certainly be regarded as an ethical act.

³ ἐάν is used — as Wlner says, p. 273 (E. T., 291) — with the idea of an objective possibility,

plural, Lorinus says: *suam quoque in hac hypothesisi personam conjugit, ut lenius ac facilius agat*; better Lücke: "By the communicative and hypothetical form, the language gains, on the one hand, in refining delicacy, and, on the other, in more general reference and force;" unsatisfactorily Ebrard: "The first person plural serves only to express the general 'we.'" — *ὅτι κοινωνίαν ἔχομεν μετ' αὐτοῦ*. See ver. 3. Fellowship with God forms the innermost essence of all true Christian life. — *καὶ ἐν τῷ σκότει περιπατῶμεν*. Comp. Gospel of John viii. 12. *ἐν τῷ σκότει περιπατεῖν* is not merely "not to know whither we are going" (Luther), but to live in darkness, i.e., in sin, as our element. According to Weiss, who denies to the *σκότος*, as well as to the contrasted *φῶς*, an ethical reference, it is = "to walk in the unenlightened state;" but is not this just the very state in which the life is ruled by sin? — Bengel, for more particular definition, rightly adds: *actione interna et externa, quoque nos vertimus*; such a walking in darkness is all life whose principle is not the love of God.¹ — *ψευδόμεθα καὶ οὐ ποιοῦμεν τὴν ἀλήθειαν*; for, *τις κοινωνία φωτὶ πρὸς σκότος*; (2 Cor. vi. 14). *ψευδόμεθα* expresses the moral objectionableness of such a contradiction between the deed and the word. — The negative clause is not a mere repetition of the same thought, but introduces along with it a new idea: *ψευδόμεθα* refers to *εἶπωμεν*; *οὐ ποιοῦμεν τ. ἀλ.* refers back to *ἐν τ. σκ. περιπατῶμεν*; for *ποιεῖν τὴν ἀλ.* is not merely = *ἀληθεύειν* (Eph. iv. 15), but signifies the practice of *ἀλήθεια* in word and deed; comp. John iii. 21, where it is contrasted with *φάλλα πράσσειν*, and is used expressly of *ἔργα*. In the common interpretation, according to which it is = *agere candide*, sincere (Cyprian, Theodorus, Socinus, Grotius, etc.), *τὴν ἀλήθειαν* does not receive its due force; by the article the idea is specified in its complete generality and objectivity: "the true," i.e., that which corresponds to the nature and will of God (Brückner, Braune), although it must be admitted that the general idea is here used with special reference to the desirable conformity between word and deed; emphasis is thereby given to the fact that in the case mentioned in *ἐὼν, κ.τ.λ.*, the alleged *κοινωνία* with God is practically denied. In De Wette's explanation: "to do that which corresponds to the nature of Christian fellowship," a meaning is given to the expression which is neither indicated in the word nor in the train of thought.

Ver. 7. This verse does not merely repeat in its antithetical form the preceding thought, but contains also — as is peculiar to John's lively fertility of ideas — an expansion of it. — *ἐὼν δὲ ἐν τῷ φωτὶ περιπατῶμεν* is contrasted not only with the preceding (*ἐὼν ἐν τῷ σκότει περιπατῶμεν*), but also with *ἐὼν εἶπωμεν, ὅτι κοιν. ἔχ. μετ' αὐτοῦ* (so also Ebrard), thus: "if we do not merely say that we have fellowship with God, and yet at the same time walk in dark-

i.e., when the particular event is to be represented simply as objectively possible, and the speaker does not want to express his subjective view of it (whether he considers it probable, desirable, etc.). A *Tertium non datur* (Ebrard) is not contained in it.

² That in *περιπατεῖν* there is a reference to the outward manner of life, is self-evident, but that it only signifies this, as *visible by the eyes*

of men, to the exclusion of the inner activity of life, is an unfounded assertion of Ebrard. The commentators rightly point out that this *περιπατεῖν ἐν σκότει* is different from "the falling and falling, through over-haste and weakness, in temptation and in conflict" (Gerlach); "it does not mean: still to have darkness in us" (Spener).

ness, but if we really walk *ἐν τῷ φωτί*." — *ἐν τῷ φωτί περιπατεῖν* is not "to strive after likeness to God" (Lücke), but so to walk that the light (by which, however, we are not, with Weiss, to understand only knowledge) is the element in which our light moves; this, however, is a life which does not consist in *striving* after likeness to God, but which has this already as its own, or which is an *ἔχει κοινωνίαν μετ' αὐτοῦ* with *Him* who is *light*. This unity between walking in the light, and fellowship with God, is even more clearly brought out by the following words: *ὡς αὐτός ἐστιν ἐν τῷ φωτί*. *ὡς*, because it is *the same* element in which the true Christian walks, and in which God "lives and works" (Düsterdieck, Brücker), inasmuch as the Christian has become *θείας κοινωνῆς φύσεως* (2 Pet. i. 4). — *αὐτός* refers back to *αὐτοῦ*, ver. 6, and is put for *Θεός*. The idea "that God is in the light," is the same as this, "that God is light," that which is the nature of God is also the element of His life; the expression used here is occasioned by the preceding *ἐν τῷ φωτί περιπατεῖν*. Ebrard incorrectly explains: "God has chosen for His habitation the spheres of the sinless, holy, and pure life of the angels and those made perfect;" there is not the slightest hint at such a conception in the context. As Weiss denies to the expression *ὡς* an ethical reference, and explains *ἐν τῷ φωτί περιπατεῖν* = "to walk in a state of right knowledge," the clause *ὡς αὐτός ἐστιν ἐν τῷ φωτί* necessarily causes him a difficulty which he can only solve by the supposition "that an idea similar to that in 1 Tim. vi. 16 was before the apostle's mind, and that he institutes a parallel between the walk of the Christian in the light of true knowledge, and the dwelling of God in the brightness of His glory," in which it is plainly ignored that the second *ἐν τῷ φωτί* must necessarily have *the same* meaning as the first *ἐν τῷ φωτί*. — *ἴστι* is contrasted with *περιπατῶμεν*; the former is peculiar to God, the latter to men; the former (being) to Him who is *eternal*, the latter (walking) to him who is *temporal*. — *κοινωνίαν ἔχομεν μετ' ἀλλήλων*]. Several commentators wrongly deviate from the statement of the apostle, by interpreting as if "*μετ' αὐτοῦ*" were used instead of *μετ' ἀλλήλων*, as indeed the reading of some is (see the critical notes); or by understanding, quite unsuitably, *ἀλλήλων* of God and men; so Calvin: *quod dicit, societatem esse nobis mutuum, non simpliciter ad homines refertur, sed Deum in una parte, nos autem in altera*; the same interpretation in Augustin, Beza, Socinus, Hornejus, Lange, Spener, Russmeyer, Ewald, etc. De Wette, it is true, interprets *ἀλλήλων* correctly, but supplies "*μετὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ*," thus: "we have fellowship one with another, namely, with God." Against this explanation are: first, that then John would not have mentioned the very leading thought; and, secondly, that a tautological idea results from it (Lücke), for a *περιπατεῖν ἐν τῷ φωτί* is only possible through the *κοινωνία μετὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ*, nay, even is the necessary proof of it. The subject here is much rather the fellowship of Christians with one another (Bede, Lyranus, Grotius, Wolf, Bengel, Semler, Lücke, Baumgarten-Crusius, Neander, Sander, Düsterdieck, Ebrard, Braune, Brücker, etc.), and indeed quite generally; not, as Bengel considers, so that the apostle and his readers (*nos et vos*) would be regarded as the *two* parts bound together. The brotherly fellowship of Christians with one another *ἐν ἀγάπῃ* presupposes therefore the walking in light, or in

fellowship with God, of which it is the necessary consequence. — With such a walk a second element is, however, united, namely, *καὶ τὸ αἷμα Ἰησοῦ τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ καθαρίζει ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ πύσης ἁμαρτίας*. — τὸ αἷμα Ἰησοῦ is not a metonymical expression for “the consideration of His death” (Socinus, Episcopius, Grotius, etc.),¹ but the blood which Jesus (thus spoken of here as incarnate) shed as an offering at his death; or, the bloody sacrificial death of the Lord (Düsterdieck, Ebrard, Braune).² — τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ is “not merely added as a name of honor,” but also not “to indicate the close connection between the cause of God and Christ,” as Baumgarten-Crusius says, but in order to bring out the identity of the crucified One with the Son of God (so also the incarnation of the Son of God); compare chap. v. 6; at the same time, however, there lies in it an indication how the blood of Jesus can have the effect which the apostle attributes to it (so also Ebrard). — *καθαρίζει ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ πύσης ἁμαρτίας* may mean either the cleansing from guilt, i.e., the forgiveness of sins (Bede, Socinus, a Lapide, Calov, Lange, Baumgarten-Crusius, Erdmann, Weiss, etc.), or cleansing from sin itself, its eradication (Lücke, Frommann, Düsterdieck, Ebrard, Myrberg, Braune, Ewald, etc.), or, finally, both together (Spener, Hornejus, Bengel, De Wette, Brückner). According to ver. 9, where *ὑφιέναι τὰς ἁμαρτίας* and *καθαρίζειν ἀπὸ πύσης ἁδικίας* are placed together, and thus distinguished from one another, the second view must be regarded as the correct one,³ as indeed the context also demands; for, as the fact that even the believer has still continually sin is in opposition to the exhortation to *περιπατεῖν ἐν τῷ φωτί*, the apostle had to point out that sin is ever disappearing more and more, and how, so that the walk which is troubled by it may still be considered as a walk in light, and that in spite of sin, there may exist a fellowship with God, who is light. As *περιπατεῖν ἐν τῷ φωτί* is given as the condition (not as the means, which the blood of Christ is) of *καθαρίζεσθαι*, and as the subject here therefore is not the *change*, wrought by the blood of Christ, of man from a child of darkness into a child of light, but the growing transformation of him who has already become a child of light, the present *καθαρίζει* is not to be turned into the preterite, but is to be retained as the present; Spener: “He purifies us ever more and more until the final perfect purity.” Comp. Gospel of John xv. 2.⁴ — ἀπὸ

¹ That the operation of the blood of Jesus on us is to be regarded as conditioned by faith, is evident; but there is no justification in this for paraphrasing τὸ αἷμα by “faith in the blood.”

² It is unjustifiable for Myrberg to say: “Quum hic sanguis nominatur, de toto opere Christi Mediatoris, immo de toto Christo Deum nobis et nos Deo reconciliante ac opus divinum in nobis operante cogitare debemus.”

³ Against Erdmann's assertion: “Quum notio αἵματος J. Christi in s. scriptis aequae ac mors ejus semper vim expiandi habeat atque idem quod ἰλασμός significet (ii. 2), etiam h. l. explatio ab apostolo designatur, qua sola fieri potest, ut peccata nobis condouentur;” it is to

be observed that in Scripture the *vis expiandi only* is by no means ascribed to the blood of Christ; comp. 1 Pet. i. 18. In opposition to the assertion of Weiss, that “we cannot imagine how the blood of Christ should effect a deliverance from sin,” it may be stated that a forgiveness of sin which produces no deliverance from sin, is no true forgiveness; comp. Tit. ii. 14. Forgiveness is here to be associated with the thought only in so far as it is the necessary presupposition of that deliverance.

⁴ In what this purifying efficacy of the αἷμα Ἰησοῦ is founded, John does not here say; but from the fact that in ver. 9 the ἀφιέναι τὰς ἁμαρτίας is put before the καθαρίζειν, and

πάσης ἁμαρτίας, "from every sin;" sins are regarded as the single dark spots which still continually trouble the Christian's walk in light. The *καί* which connects the two parts of the subordinate clause is explained by Oecumenius, Theophylact, Beza, Lange, Semler, etc. = *nam*. Sander recognizes the grammatical incorrectness of this interpretation, but is of opinion that the second clause is to be taken as *causal* as the basis and condition of the first; but even this is arbitrary. According to De Wette, "*καί* connects directly with the idea of fellowship the progressive and highest perfection of it;" but this view is founded on the incorrect assumption that the subject of the first clause is fellowship with God. Ebrard thinks that John in these two clauses together expresses the idea of *κοινωνία* with God, while he "analyzes it forthwith into its two elements: the fellowship of believers with one another, and the fellowship and participation in the divine vital power;" but it is in the first place incorrect to describe the *κοινωνία μετ' ἀλλήλων* as an element of the *κοινωνία μετὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ*, and in the second place the purifying efficacy of the blood of Jesus can much less be regarded as an element of it; besides, Ebrard has clearly been induced to add the word "participation," through the perception that the idea of fellowship is quite unsuitable to the second clause. While the *κοινωνία μετὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ* is manifestly pre-supposed before the *περιπατεῖν ἐν τῷ φωτί*, these two clauses express rather the "double fruit of our walk in light, of our living fellowship with God, who is light" (Düsterdieck); but when John puts *κοινωνία μετ' ἀλλήλων* first, he thereby indicates that it is the sphere within which the purifying power of the blood of Christ operates on each individual (Brückner, Braune). Besides, it may be observed that the second clause is intended to point out the progressive growth of Christian life, and cannot therefore suitably precede the first clause.

Ver. 8. Purification from sin presupposes the existence of sin even in believers; the denial of this is self-deception. — *ἐὰν ἐπιωμεν*; as in ver. 6; thereby is meant not merely "the speech of the heart" (Spener), but the actual expression and assertion. — *ὅτι ἁμαρτίαν οὐκ ἔχομεν*]. The view of Grotius,¹ that this refers to sinning *before* conversion, and that *ἁμαρτία* therefore means the guilt of sin, is rightly rejected by Lücke, Sander, etc. — The question, especially of earlier commentators, whether *ἁμαρτία* is here original sin (or sinfulness, as Weiss still thinks) or actual sin (*pecc. actuale*), desire (*concupiscentia*) or deed, is solved by the fact that the idea is considered quite generally by the apostle (so also Braune) — only, of course, with the

Christ in chap. ii. 2 is described as *ἰλασμός*, it follows, that according to John the purifying power is associated with the blood of Christ in so far as it is the blood of atonement. Ebrard improperly separates the two elements from one another, ascribing to the death of Christ "the power of purifying our hearts from sin, because in Christ's death sin is condemned;" and, on the other hand, "the power of making atonement and obtaining forgiveness, because in Christ's death the debt was paid and mercy

procured." — When Frommann says, "The power that purifies from sin does *not exactly* lie in the blood of Christ itself, but in the love of God, of which Christ in His bloody death is the most speaking token, and of the existence of which He supplies the most unquestionable evidence," this is clearly an inadmissible twisting of the apostle's words.

¹ "Habere peccatum, non est: nunc in peccato esse, sed ob peccatum reum posse fieri."

exception of the sin spoken of in chap. v. 16. The first person plural *ἐχομεν* is to be noticed in so far as the having sin is thereby represented as something that is true of *all* Christians. The expression *ἀμαρτίαν ἔχειν* describes in a quite general way the taint of sin; only of the absolutely pure, in whom no trace of sin exists, is it true that he *ἀμαρτίαν οὐκ ἔχει*; the relation of this *ἀμαρτίαν ἔχειν* to *περιπατεῖν ἐν τῷ σκότει* (ver. 6), in which the will of man serves sin (or in which sin is the dominating principle of life), is therefore not that of contrast (say in this way, that *ἀμαρτίαν ἔχειν* is a being tainted with sin, where no act of will takes place),¹ but is to be defined thus, that the latter (*περιπατεῖν ἐν τῷ σκότει*) is a particular species of *ἀμαρτίαν ἔχειν*. Even though as Christians, who are born of God, we have no longer sin in the sense that *περιπ. ἐν τῷ σκότει* is true of us, nevertheless we do not yet cease to have sin; if we deny this, if we maintain that we have no sin at all, then what John says in the following words is the case with us. *ἐαυτοὺς πλανῶμεν*; not = "we are mistaken," which *πλανώμεθα* would mean;² but, as Sander explains, "we mislead ourselves, take ourselves astray from salvation (or better, from truth);" by that assertion, which is a lie (not an *unconscious* mistake), the Christian (for the apostle is not here speaking of non-Christians) deceives himself about the truth, for which he leaves no room in himself. Braune rightly observes that *ἐαυτὸν πλανῶν* emphasizes the self-activity, which the middle with its passive form leaves in the background. — *καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια ἐν ἡμῖν οὐκ ἔστιν* is not a mere repetition of *ἐαυτοὺς πλανῶμεν*, but adds to this another new element. — *ἡ ἀλήθεια*, as in ver. 6, is neither = *studium veri* (Grotius), nor = *castior cognitio* (Semler), nor even = uprightness, or truthfulness (Lücke in his 2d ed.), or, as De Wette explains, "the veracity of self-knowledge and self-examination;"³ but truth in its objective character (Lücke in his 1st ed., Baumgarten-Crusius, Düsterdieck, Brückner, Braune). Baumgarten-Crusius rightly says: "*ἀλήθεια* does not need to be taken in a subjective sense, the subjective lies in *οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ἡμῖν*." The expressions used here: *ἐαυτ. πλανῶμεν* and *ἡ ἀλ. οὐκ. ἔστιν ἐν ἡμῖν*, are not milder (Sander) than the corresponding expressions in ver. 6: *ψευδόμεθα* and *οὐ ποιοῦμεν τὴν ἀλήθειαν*, but stronger (Ebrard), since in *ἐαυτ. πλ.* the self-injury, and in *ἡ ἀλήθ. οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ἡμῖν* the negation of possession of the truth, are more sharply marked.

Ver. 9. Not a mere antithesis of the previous verse, but an expansion of the thought; "there follows as conclusion not merely this, that *we* are then true, but the incomparably greater and surprisingly glorious thought that *God* then proves Himself actually towards us as the True, as the *πιστὸς καὶ*

¹ Even Ebrard does not correctly state the relation of the two expressions to one another, when he says that "in *ἔχειν ἀμαρτίαν* man is not in *ἀμαρτία*, but *ἀμαρτία* is in man," for plainly he also who is in *ἀμαρτία* has this in himself.

² When Ebrard, in opposition to this, remarks that it cannot be asserted "that the middle *πλανῶσθαι* means 'to be mistaken,' and *πλανῶν ἐαυτόν*, on the other hand, 'to

mislead one's self,'" this is not at all to the point, since it is not said that *πλανῶσθαι* has always the meaning "to be mistaken," but that the German "sich irren" [Engl. "to be mistaken"] is expressed in Greek not by *πλανῶν ἐαυτόν*, but by *πλανῶσθαι*.

³ Ewald's explanation is also unsatisfactory: "Truth about this relation of things, and therefore easily about every other also."

δικαίος" (Ebrard). — *ἐὰν ὁμολογῶμεν τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἡμῶν*]. *ὁμολογεῖν* does not mean to recognize (Socinus: *confiteri significat interiorem ac profundam suorum peccatorum agnitionem*),¹ but to confess; of course it is manifest that the confession is not here spoken of as a purely outward act; still, at the same time, it is not sufficient to regard it merely as "an inward fact, which is founded on the whole internal tendency of the mind" (Neander); it is rather the real (even if not *always* vocal) expression of sins recognized within and confessed to one's self; here also it is the word in which the inner life has to operate.² — What are to be confessed are *αἱ ἁμαρτίαι ἡμῶν*, i.e., the sins of Christians, which are the particular manifestations of *ἁμαρτίαν ἔχειν* (so also Braune); therefore the plural.³ — Ebrard rightly calls attention to the fact that John here mentions, as the subject of the confession, not the abstract *ἁμαρτίαν ἔχειν*, but *τὰς ἁμαρτίας*, i.e., the definite, concrete, single sins committed; "the mere confession in the abstract that we have sin would not have truth without the acknowledgment of the concrete particular sins, but would shrivel up into a mere phrase." — *πιστός ἐστι καὶ δίκαιος*]. It is true God is both in Himself, He does not become so only when we confess our sins; but this confession is the condition on which He actually proves Himself to us as *πιστός καὶ δίκαιος*.⁴ These two epithets are indeed not of the same signification, but still, as their combination proves, of cognate meaning. God is called *πιστός*, inasmuch as He, as the promise-maker, also fulfils what He has promised, Heb. x. 23: *πιστός ὁ ἐπαγγελάμενος*; Heb. xi. 11; especially as He accomplishes in believers the promise of blessing, which lies for them in the fact of their call, by conducting them through manifestation of His grace to the goal of their calling (according to Ewald, "inasmuch as He keeps His promise already repeatedly given in the O. T."), 1 Cor. i. 9: *πιστός ὁ Θεός, δι' οὗ ἐκλήθητε εἰς κοινωνίαν τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ*; x. 13; 2 Cor. i. 18-21; 1 Thess. v. 24: *πιστός ὁ καλῶν ἡμῖς, ὃς καὶ ποιήσει*; 2 Thess. iii. 3. *πιστός* has this meaning here also, as results from the following *ἵνα, κ.τ.λ.* Ebrard incorrectly calls the reference of the faithfulness of God here to His promises and prophecies an introduction of foreign ideas, and says "the subject here is faithfulness to the nature of truth and light, akin to His own nature, and which prevails in us, inasmuch as we confess our sins." — God is described as *δίκαιος* in the N. T., inasmuch as He, for the realization of His kingdom of grace, gives

¹ Similarly * Baumgarten - Crusius says: "ὁμολογεῖν is not exactly to confess, but to recognize, perceive, become conscious of, as opposed to the *εἰπεῖν μὴ ἔχειν ἁμαρτίαν*;" but it is just to *εἰπεῖν* that *ὁμολογεῖν* is exactly opposed only when it is taken in its natural signification.

² It is quite clear that confession to God is meant; when, however, Braune adds: "and indeed a confession so fervent and deep that it becomes public and regulated by the church," he introduces an element which nothing here suggests. In genuine Catholic fashion a Lapidé says: "Quam confessionem exigit Johannes? Haeretici solam generalem quae

fit Deo admittunt; Catholici etiam specialem requirunt. Respondeo: Johannem utramque exigere, *generalem pro peccatis leuibus, specialem pro gravibus*."

³ Even here Socinus, Grotius (Si fatemur nos in gravibus peccatis vixisse ante notitiam evangelii), and others understand *ἁμαρτίας* of sins before conversion.

⁴ Semler's interpretation is not satisfactory: "Logice intelligendum est; nec enim in Deo jam demum oritur nova ratio tanti praedicati, sed in his christianis succrescit nova cognitio taeptae rei." The subject is not our perception, but the actual manifestation of God.

to every one — without *προσωποληψία* — what is due to him, according to the righteous judgment of God, in proportion to the position which he occupies toward God (or toward the kingdom of God), God being in this regarded as the *Judge*. The idea of the righteousness of God and that of His judicial activity are very closely connected; God is *ὁ δίκαιος κριτής*, 2 Tim. iv. 8; He judges *ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ*, Acts xvii. 31 (Rev. xix. 11), or *δικαίως*, 1 Pet. ii. 23; His *κρίσις* is a *κρίσις δικαία*, 2 Thess. i. 5. The relation of the *δικαιοσύνη* of God to His judicial activity is found throughout in the N. T., even where the former is the subject without the latter being expressly mentioned with it. As the manifestation of the *δικαία κρίσις* of God consists in the righteous distribution of punishment and of blessing, it follows that *δικαιοσύνη* is referred to not only where both of these are mentioned together (as in 2 Thess. i. 5 seq.), but also where only one of the two is spoken of. God *punishes* as the *δίκαιος*, but He *blesses* also as the *δίκαιος*, no doubt in view of the realization of His kingdom, which depends upon the good obtaining the complete victory over the evil. Towards him who walks *ἐν τῷ σκότει*, God shows Himself *δίκαιος* in that He *κατακρίνει* him; towards him who walks *ἐν τῷ φωτί*, by ever more and more removing from him every thing that hinders his perfect *κοινωνία μετὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ* (namely, both his consciousness of guilt, and the *ἁδικία* which still clings to him), and by finally permitting him to inherit the perfect happiness which is prepared for those who love God (comp. 2 Tim. iv. 8). Here God is called *δίκαιος*, inasmuch as His purpose is directed to allotting to those who, walking in light, confess their sins, that which is suitable for them, namely, the blessing mentioned in the following *ἴνα, κ.τ.λ.* The meaning of *δίκαιος* is rightly stated by Baumgarten-Crusius, Düsterdieck, Brückner, and Braune;¹ on the other hand, it is incorrect to refer *δίκαιος* here to the *punitive* activity (Drusius: *justus, quia vere punivit peccata nostra in filio suo*), but also to explain it = *bonis, lenis, aequus* (Grotius, Lange, Carpzov, etc.), for *δίκαιος* never has this meaning in the N. T.; it is here of cognate meaning with *πιστός*,² because the allotment of blessing bestowed in accordance with the *δικαιοσύνη* of God has been promised by Him, and is accomplished according to His promise; yet it must not therefore be regarded as synonymous with it (Hornejus: = *in promissis servandis integer*). Following Rom. iii. 26, some commentators have here interpreted it = *δικαιῶν*; but this is so much the more unjustifiable, as that very passage by the juxtaposition of the two ideas proves their different meaning.³ According to the Roman-Catholic view, *πιστός* refers to the

¹ Ewald's explanation is unsatisfactory: according to which God is here called just, because He "knows well and considers that He alone is the Creator, whilst we are His creation exposed to error and sin, and acts according to this just consideration."

² In the passage Rom. iii. 3-5, *πίστις* and *δικαιοσύνη* are also used as cognate ideas, but even here in such a way that *δικαιοσύνη* has not lost its reference to the judicial activity of God; Meyer on this passage explains *δικαιο-*

σύνη, on account of the contrast with *ἁδικία*, generally by "justice;" but the former reference appears both in *μη ἄδικος ὁ Θεὸς ὁ ἐπιφέρων τὴν ὄργην*, and also in ver. 6 *πῶς κρινεῖ ὁ Θεὸς τὸν κόσμον*.

³ Not less inexact is it for Ebrard to say: "God manifests Himself towards us as the *δίκαιος*, inasmuch as He is not only just, but also *makes just*," since *δικαιῶν* does not mean "to make just." His assertion is also inappropriate, that here and in Rom. i. 17 to iii. 26,

*peccata mortalia, δικαίως to the peccata venialia.*¹ — *ἵνα ὡφῆ ἡμῖν τὰς ἁμαρτίας*]. *ἵνα*, not = “so that” (Castellio: *ita justus, ut condonet*), has here (as in other passages of the N. T.) not retained strictly its idea of *purpose* (hence not: “in order that”), but it states what is the aim of the divine faithfulness and justice to attain which these qualities operate on men; Luther therefore translates correctly: “*that*.” De Wette’s explanation, with which Braune agrees, “in the divine faithfulness lies the law or the will of forgiving sins,” is unsatisfactory, inasmuch as *ἀφιέναι, κ.τ.λ.*, is not merely the *will*, but the operation of the divine faithfulness and justice. — *τὰς ἁμαρτίας* refers back to *ὁμολογῶμεν τὰς ἁμαρτίας*, thus: “the sins confessed by us.” The *remission*, i.e., the forgiveness, of sins is therefore, by virtue of the faithfulness of God, the first result of the confession; the second, John describes by the words: *καὶ καθάριση*² ἡμῶς ἀπὸ πάσης ἀδικίας. Here the first thought is not repeated epexegetically (Semler), or only in figurative manner (Lange); but the words express the same thing as the corresponding words of the 7th verse, with which the 8th and 9th verses are in closest connection (Düsterdieck, Braune; Brückner does not explain himself definitely); *καθαρίζειν* has here the same meaning as there, and *ἀδικία* (not = *poena peccati*, Socinus) is synonymous with *ἁμαρτία*; they are two different names for the same thing; comp. chap. v. 17.³ The order in which the two clauses that express the redemptive operations of God are connected together (Myrberg: *ordo verborum ponit remissionem ante abrogationem*), points to the fact that purification takes place by means of forgiveness. — The context is quite decisive in favor of regarding as the subject of *πιστός ἐστι, κ.τ.λ.*, not *Χριστός*, but (with Lücke, De Wette, Düsterdieck, Braune, etc.) *ὁ Θεός*; for even though in ver. 7 the *καθαρίζειν* is described as the operation of the *αἷμα Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*, and in chap. ii. 2, *Ἰ. Χρ.* is the subject, yet in this section *ὁ Θεός* is the principal subject; ver. 5, *ὁ Θεός*; ver. 6, *αὐτός*; even in ver. 7, *τοῦ υἱοῦ*

“the justice of God appears as the source in Him from which His saving, sin-forgiving, and sin-overcoming action flows.” This source is rather God’s *ἀγάπη* manifesting itself as *χάρις* towards the guilt of men; there is a reference to that in chap. iii. 24 of the passage in Romans, but here the *source* of the salvation is not mentioned. — The interpretation of Calov: “*Justa est haec peccatorum remissio et ex justitia debita, sed Christo non nobis*,” and that of Sander: “The Lord is just, inasmuch as He remits the sin of the sinner who appeals to the ransom paid in the blood of Christ, because it would be unjust to demand the payment twice,” introduce references into this passage which are foreign to it.

¹ Suarez: “*Fidelis est Deus, cum condonat poenitentibus peccata mortalia; justus, cum justis condonat venialia, quia, sc. justi per opera (!) poenitentiae, charitatis, etc., merentur de condigno hanc condonationem.*”

² The Rec. *καθαρίζει* corresponds to the passage Luke xxii. 30, where, according to

the best attested Rec., *ἵνα* is followed both by the subjunctive first, and then by the indicative; but not to the passage John vi. 40, cited by Ebrard, where the indicative is not regarded as dependent on *ἵνα*. On *ἵνα* with the indicative, comp. A. Buttman’s *Gramm.*, p. 202 [*E. T.*, 234]. Winer, p. 271 ff. [*E. T.*, 289 f.].

³ While Weiss also interprets both expressions of the forgiveness of sins, he tries to repel the reproach of tautology by saying: “If sin committed is regarded as a stain, it is quite correct that God forgives us the sin, and thus purifies us from all unrighteousness, since by the very fact that God forgives it, sin has ceased to exist before Him, and at the same time also to stain us;” true though this may be, however, it cannot serve to refute that objection, for as *καθαρίζειν* in this sense is not the result of *ἀφιέναι*, but the former consists in the latter, both clauses express only one and the same thought.

αὐτοῦ; the blood of Christ, therefore, is regarded as the means by which God produces purification from sins. To hold, with Sander, that *God and Christ* together form the subject,¹ is quite as inappropriate here as in ver. 5 to understand by *αὐτοῦ* both together. Though, with John, God and Jesus Christ approach very close to a unity, yet they are always distinguished by him, and never represented as one subject.

Ver. 10. Not a repetition, but "a strengthening of ver. 8" (Baumgarten-Crusius). As ver. 8 is connected with the end of ver. 7, so is this verse with ver. 9. — *ἐὰν εἰπωμεν* as in ver. 8. — *ὅτι οὐχ ἡμαρτήκαμεν* is substantially synonymous with *ὅτι ἡμαρτ. οὐκ ἔχομεν*, only distinguished from it in this way that the former describes an activity, the latter a state (so also Braune); the expression used here is called forth by the plural *τὰς ἁμαρτίας* and the idea *ἡ ἀδικία* (ver. 9), by which the sinful character is more definitely specified as an activity than by *ἁμαρτία* in ver. 7. The perfect does not prove that *ἡμαρτήκαμεν* is meant of sins before conversion (Socinus, Russmeyer, Paulus, etc.); the subject here, as in all the verses before, is the sinning of Christians; for to deny former sin could not occur to a Christian.² The perfect is explained both by John's *usus loquendi*, according to which an action lasting up to the present is often represented in this tense, and also by the fact that the confession every time refers to sins previously committed. — *ψεύστην ποιούμεν αὐτον* corresponds to *ἐαντοὺς πλανῶμεν*; it brings out that the Christian by the denial of his sin accuses God (*αὐτόν*, i. e., *τὸν Θεόν*) of lying. In *ποιεῖν* there lies, as Düsterdieck remarks, a certain reproachful bitterness; comp. John v. 18, viii. 53, x. 33, xix. 7, 12. This thought presupposes the declaration of God that even the Christian sins, which ver. 9, *πιστός ἐστι, κ.τ.λ.*, also suggests; for if God has promised Christians forgiveness of their sins on condition of their confessing them, the above declaration is thereby made on God's side. — *καὶ ὁ λόγος αὐτοῦ* (i. e., *τοῦ Θεοῦ*) *οὐκ ἐστιν ἐν ἡμῖν*]. *ὁ λόγος*, corresponding to the thought *ἡ ἀλήθεια* in ver. 8, refers directly to the preceding *ψεύστην, κ.τ.λ.* Lücke explains it correctly: "the revelation of God, especially the gospel of Jesus Christ" (so also Brückner, Düsterdieck, Braune); to understand by it (with Oecumenius, Grotius, De Wette, etc.) especially the O. T., is forbidden by the train of thought, for the subject here is not the sinfulness of man in general, but the *ἁμαρτάνειν* of Christians.³

¹ In favor of conjoining Christ as the subject, Sander adduces the fact that just in the following chapter Christ is called *δικαίος*; but in this he overlooks altogether the different meanings which the word has in the two passages; for in the verse before us *δικαίος* is used of a relation to men, but in chap. ii. 1 of the relation of Christ to the divine will; and when Sander further says that in Heb. ix. 14 it is precisely stated of Christ that He purges the consciences, this is incorrect, since *τὸ αἷμα τοῦ Χριστοῦ* is the subject there just as here in ver. 7; and there even more expressly than here God is specified as the author of the purification, for the *αἷμα τ. Χρ.* purges because

it is offered as a sacrifice *τῷ Θεῷ*. Moreover, it is not meant by this that forgiveness and cleansing could not be ascribed to Christ quite as much as to God, only it does not follow from this that *ὁ Χριστός* is the subject here.

² Therefore it is also not correct to refer *ἡμαρτήκ.* to present and past, as Hornejus explains: "Si dixerimus nos non tantum peccatum nunc non habere, sed nec peccatores unquam fuisse."

³ This has been more or less overlooked by the commentators (even by Düsterdieck and Ebrard), although it is also important for the understanding of chap. ii. 1, 2. But John may with justice assume that the word of God

Ebrard interprets *ὁ λόγος τ. Θ.* as the "self-proclamation of the nature of God, which has taken place both in the verbal revelations of the O. and N. T. and in the revelations of deeds," so that even the *λόγος* of Gospel of John i. 1 is to be regarded as included; but from the fact that the elements mentioned here are very closely connected, it does not follow that that idea has here, or anywhere else, this extensive signification. The words *οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ἡμῖν* are erroneously explained by Baumgarten-Crusius: "we have given it up, or, also, we are not qualified or fit for it;" it means rather: "it is not vividly imprinted in our hearts" (Spener); it has remained external to us, inwardly unknown.

denies the absolute sinlessness of Christians, since—apart from the fact that even the O. T. does not depict the *δίκαιοι* as perfectly holy—in every evangelical announcement the

παράκλησις is an essential element for believers, which presupposes their having and doing sin.

CHAPTER II.

Ver. 2. Lachm., according to A, B, Vulg., has put *ἔστι* before *ἰλασμός*. Instead of *μόνον*, B has *μόνων*, which, no doubt, is only to be regarded as a mistake. — Ver. 3. The original reading of *ⲛ* is *φυλάξωμεν*, instead of *τηρώμεν*; but it was afterwards corrected. — Ver. 4. A, B, *ⲛ*, *al.*, Clem., Thph., etc. (Lachm., min., Tisch. 7), read *ὅτι* after *λέγων*; it is wanting in C, G, K, *al.* (Tisch. 2); Lachm., maj., has *ὅτι* in brackets. It is possible that *ὅτι* was, in later times, omitted as an interruption. *ⲛ*₁ has, with *ἡ ἀλήθεια*, the addition: *τοῦ Θεοῦ*. — Ver. 6. *οὕτως* before *περιπατεῖν* (Rec. following C, K, *ⲛ*, *al. pl.*, Copt., etc., Thph., etc., Tisch.) is uncertain; A, B, *al.*, Vulg. (Lachm.), omit it; perhaps it was inserted to emphasize more strongly *καθώς*, etc. — Ver. 7. *ἀγαπητοί*, accepted by Griesb., on overwhelming authority, instead of the Rec., *ἀδελφοί* (G, K, etc.). — The addition *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς*, after *ἠκούσατε* (Rec., after G, K, etc.), already regarded as doubtful by Griesb., is with justice deleted by Lachm. and Tisch. (after A, B, C, *ⲛ*, *al.*); it was added from the preceding; Reiche, it is true, thinks otherwise. — Ver. 8. *ἐν ὑμῖν*]. Rec. The reading *ἐν ἡμῖν*, recommended by Griesb., has in A too feeble evidence. — Ver. 10. Instead of *ἐν αὐτῷ οὐκ ἔστιν* (Rec., after B, G, K, *al.*, Tisch.), A, C, *ⲛ*, *al.*, have *οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν αὐτῷ* (Lachm.). — Ver. 13. Instead of the Rec. *γράψω ὑμῖν παιδία* (K, *al.*), we must read, in accordance with A, B, C, G, *ⲛ*, many min., vss., and Fathers: *ἔγραψα ὑμῖν παιδία* (Lachm., Tisch.; also recommended by Griesb.); see, further, on this passage. Instead of *τὸν πονηρόν*, *ⲛ* erroneously reads *τὸ πονηρόν*. — Ver. 14. Instead of *τὸν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς*, B reads *τὸ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς*, plainly following chap. i. 1; this, however, is not accepted by Buttm.; in B the addition *τοῦ Θεοῦ* is wanting after *ὁ λόγος*. — Ver. 15. Instead of *τοῦ πατρὸς* (Rec., after B, G, K, *ⲛ*, *al.*, Vulg., Syr., utr., etc., Oec., Thph., etc.), A, C, *al.*, read *Θεοῦ*; which reading is the correct one, cannot be decided, as an intentional change of the one to the other cannot be proved. Ebrard considers *Θεοῦ* as original, but without adequate grounds. Lachm. and Tisch. have retained the Rec. — Ver. 17. Although Griesb. approves of the omission of *αὐτοῦ* after *ἐπιθυμία* (following A), it must nevertheless be considered genuine. The difficulty of it easily explains why it would be left out. In some of the Latin Fathers there is found at the close of the verse the addition: *quo modo et Deus manet in aeternum*, which Bengel, without reason, is disposed to regard as genuine. — Ver. 18. The article before *ἀντιχριστός* is at least doubtful; Lachm. and Tisch. have omitted it: it is wanting in B, C, *ⲛ**. — Ver. 19. Instead of *ἐξῆλθον* the more unusual form *ἐξῆλθαν* is probably, with Lachm. and Tisch. (after A, B, C), to be regarded as genuine. *ⲛ*, however, has *ἐξῆλθον*. — The generally prevailing reading: *ἀλλ' οὐκ ἦσαν ἐξ ἡμῶν*, has been changed by Buttm. into *ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἦσαν*, according to his own statement, following B; Tisch. has not noticed this reading. In the following clause Tisch. reads: *εἰ γὰρ ἐξ ἡμῶν ἦσαν*, after B, C, *al.*; Lachm., on the other hand,

has retained the Rec.: *εἰ γὰρ ἦσαν ἐξ ἡμῶν*, after A, G, K, \aleph , *al. pl.*, Vulg., etc. It is remarkable that even Buttm. — against the evidence of B — has the Rec. It cannot be decided which reading is the correct one. — Ver. 20. Buttm. omits *καὶ* before *οἰδατε*; according to B; the *πάντες*, instead of *πάντα* presented (according to the statement of Tisch. maj.) by B, has not, however, been accepted by Buttm. — Ver. 23. The words *ὁ ὁμολογῶν . . . ἔχει* are wanting (after G, K, etc., Oec.) in the Rec. Calvin, Milius, Wolf, etc., do not consider them genuine; but they are sufficiently attested by A, B, C, \aleph , etc., etc., and with justice admitted into the text by Griesb., Scholz, Lachm., and Tisch. — Ver. 24. The Rec. *οὐν* after *ὑμεῖς* is with justice deleted by Lachm. and Tisch., following A, B, C, \aleph , *al.* Vulg., etc. — *ἐν τῷ πατρὶ*. Rec. after A, C, G, K, *al.*, Syr., utr., Sahid., *al.*, Thph., Oec. (Tisch.). Lachm. has omitted *ἐν* (after B, Vulg., etc.). The omission of the preposition is perhaps explained by the fact that it appeared superfluous. \aleph reads *ἐν τῷ πατρὶ καὶ ἐν τῷ υἱῷ*. — Instead of *ἠκούσατε*, \aleph has both times the unusual reading *ἀκηκόσατε*. — Ver. 25. Instead of *ἡμῖν*, Lachm. in his small edition, following B, has accepted *ὑμῖν* (Buttm.); in the larger edition, however, *ἡμῖν* is rightly found, which is defended by almost all the authorities. — Ver. 27. On the form *ἐλάβατε*, received by Tisch. 7, following B*, comp. Ph. Buttmann's *Compl. Gram.*, § 96, note 9, and Winer, p. 68, VII., p. 71. — Instead of *ἐν ὑμῖν μένει* is to be read, with Lachm. and Tisch., which Griesb. previously recommended: *μένει ἐν ὑμῖν* (after A, B, C, \aleph , several vss., etc.). Buttm., following B, has accepted, instead of *ἀλλ' ὡς*, the reading *ἀλλά*, which probably arose through a correction. Instead of the Rec. *τὸ αὐτὸ χρίσμα* (A, B, G, K, etc., Thph., Oec., Hier.), retained by Lachm., with the approval of Bengel, Lücke, Brückner, *τὸ αὐτοῦ χρίσμα* has been accepted by Tisch., following C, 4, 5, 7, *al.*, which is approved of by Reiche and Braune; \aleph has also *αὐτοῦ*, but instead of *χρίσμα*, "*πνεῦμα*;" see the comm. — Instead of *διδάσκει ὑμᾶς*, Lachm. in his large edition reads *διδ. ἡμᾶς*; probably a misprint, as it is not noticed either by him or Tisch. as a special reading. — *μένετε*]. Rec. after G, K, *al.* (Tisch.); Lachm. has received instead of it the reading *μένετε*, recommended by Griesb., following A, B, C, \aleph , *al.* The overwhelming evidence of the authorities is in favor of this reading, which probably was changed at a later date in accordance with ver. 24; Reiche, however, has decided in favor of the Rec.; Düsterdieck, Ewald, Braune, and now Brückner also, justly prefer *μένετε*. — Ver. 28. The words at the beginning: *καὶ νῦν . . . ἐν αὐτῷ*, are wanting in \aleph . — Instead of *ἵνα διαί* (Rec. after G, K, *al.*, Thph., Oec., Tisch.) we must read, with Lachm., following A, B, C, \aleph , *al.*, Copt., Sahid.: *ἵνα εἰάν*. Instead of *ἐχωμεν* (Rec. after A, G, K, etc., Oec.), Lachm. and Tisch., following B, C, *al.*, Thph., read *σχωμεν*. \aleph^* has *σχωμεν*; \aleph_1 has *ἐχωμεν*. The words *ἀπ' αὐτοῦ* are read by \aleph not before but after *παρουσίᾳ αὐτοῦ*. — Ver. 29. The Rec. *ὅτι πᾶς* (Lachm., Tisch. 2) is found in B, G, K, several min., vss., and Fathers; A, C, \aleph , *al.*, Vulg., read *ὅτι καὶ πᾶς* (Tisch. 7); if *καὶ*, on which Tisch. (ed. maj.) observes, *cujus addendi nulla causa erat*; *ex Johannis vero usu est*, be genuine, it serves "to bring out the agreement of the conclusion with the premise" (Ebrard).

Vv. 1 and 2 are most closely connected with what immediately precedes, and further determine and conclude it.

Ver. 1. The apostle had considered, in chap. 1. 7, the blood of Christ, in i. 9 the faithfulness and justice of God — and both in reference to the forgiveness and purification of believers; now he comfortingly points to

Christ as the Paraclete, whereby the previous thought now obtains its necessary complement. First, however, he mentions the object of his previous statement. — *Τεκνία μου*]. Similarly chap. iii. 18; without *μου*, ii. 12, 28, iii. 7. John chooses this form of address: *tum propter aetatem suam, tum propter paternam curam et affectum* (Hornejus). In regard to the verbal form, Lorius rightly says: *diminutiva nomina teneri ac blandientis sunt amoris signa*. The Apostle Paul, in Gal. iv. 19, uses the same form of address, with special reference to the spiritual fatherhood in which he stood toward his readers. — *ταῦτα γράφω ὑμῖν*]. *ταῦτα* is referred by Bengel to what follows, by Grotius to what follows and what precedes, by most commentators (Lücke, Baumgarten-Crusius, De Wette, Sander, Düsterdieck, Braune), correctly, to the latter only; it refers, however, not merely to the truth expressed in ver. 6, nor merely to the “exhortation to self-knowledge and penitence” (De Wette) which is contained in the preceding, nor merely to the statement about forgiveness and cleansing; but to the “whole in its vivid harmony” (Düsterdieck, so also Braune)¹ — *ἵνα μὴ ἀμάρτητε*. Statement of the object for which the apostle wrote what precedes; the direction which Calvin gives it: *ne quis putet eum peccandi licentiam dare, quum de misericordia Dei concionatur*, which is also found in Augustin, Bede, Calov, Bengel, Hornejus, Düsterdieck, Ewald, etc., is incorrect, since the sternness of the apostle against sin has already been sharply and definitely expressed, and the context, in which the subject previously was the forgiveness of sin, would not permit such a supposition to arise at all.² — *καὶ ἔαν τις ἀμάρτη- καὶ* is neither = “however” (Baumgarten-Crusius), nor = *sed* (Vulg.); it connects as simple copula a new thought with the preceding one. By *ἔαν* the possibility of sinning is admitted; Calvin incorrectly explains it: *conditionalis particula “si quis” debet in causalem resolvi; nam fieri non potest quin peccemus*. Whether it is possible for the Christian *not* to sin, John does not say. Under the influence of the new spirit of life which is communicated to the believer, he cannot sin; but, at the same time, in his internal and external mechanism there lies for him the possibility of sinning — and it is this which the apostle has in view. Socinus perverts the idea of the apostle when he interprets: *si quis peccat, i. e., post Christum agnatum et professionem nominis ipsius adhuc in peccatis manet, necdum resipuit, etc.*; for,

¹ Ebrard refers *ταῦτα* to the two sentences i. 6, 7, and 8-10, in which these thoughts, involving an apparent contradiction, are contained, — (1) “That we must by no means walk in darkness,” and (2) “that we must confess that we have, and that we commit sin,” and thinks that this apparent contradiction is solved by il. 1, in this way, that in contrast to those theoretical statements these two practical conclusions from them are here given, namely, (1) “that we *are not* to sin;” (2) “that when we have sinned we *are* to reflect that in Christ we have an Advocate.” But against this it is to be observed, (1) that by such a changing of theoretical statements

into practical precepts the problem mentioned above is really not solved; (2) that the ideas expressed in i. 6, 7, and in i. 8-10, do not stand to one another in the relation of co-ordination, but the idea of i. 8-10 is subordinated to that of i. 6, 7; (3) that it is herewith presupposed that the apostle should have written: *καὶ ἵνα εἰδῆτε, ὅτι, ἔαν τις ἀμάρτη, παράκλητον ἔχομεν*, which, however, is incorrect, as the advocate-office of Christ is not mentioned in the preceding.

² Socinus incorrectly renders *ἀμαρτάνειν* = *manere in peccatis*; Löffler even more so = “to remain unbaptized.”

on the one hand, the true Christian may indeed sin, but cannot remain in his sins; and, on the other hand, Christ is not the *παράκλητος* for him who remains in his sins. Besser correctly: "If any man sin — not with wilful doing of sin, but in spite of the will in his mind, which says *no* to sin." — *παράκλητον ἔχομεν πρὸς τὸν πατέρα*. From the first pers. plur. it follows that the preceding *τις* is used quite generally; the apostle is speaking communicatively, and does not wish himself to be considered excluded.¹ It is unnecessary for the connection of this sentence to supply "let him know that," or "let him comfort himself with the thought that," or any similar expression; for it is precisely through the *ἀμαρτάνειν* of believers, that Christ is induced to be their Paraclete. The verb *ἔχειν* indicates that Christ belongs to believers.² — The word *παράκλητος* has both a general and a special forensic meaning; in the former, in which it is = "assister," or "helper," it is used in Gospel of John xiv. 16, 26, xv. 26, xvi. 7, where the Holy Ghost is so called because by His witness He leads the disciples into all truth; see Meyer on John xiv. 16;³ here, on the other hand, it is used in its forensic meaning = "*advocatus, patronus causae*," or even more special = "intercessor," and is in close connection with the following *ἰλασμός*, and refers back to the *ἀφέναι* and *καθαρίζειν* of chap. i. 9; so that in Christ the typical action of the high priest interceding for the people has reached its complete fulfilment. The idea of the apostle therefore is — as almost all commentators recognize⁴ — the same as is expressed in Rom. viii. 34 (*ὃς καὶ ἐντυγχάνει ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν*), in Heb. ix. 24 (*εἰσῆλθεν ὁ Χριστὸς . . . εἰς . . . τὸν οὐρανόν, νῦν ἐμφανισθῆναι τῷ προσώπῳ τοῦ Θεοῦ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν*), and in Heb. vii. 25.⁵ — *πρὸς τὸν πατέρα*. *πρὸς* in the same sense as chap. i. 2. — God is called *πατήρ*, because the *παράκλητος* is the Son of God, and we also (believing Christians) have become through Him *τέκνα τοῦ Θεοῦ*, chap. iii. 1, 2. — *Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν δίκαιον*. Christ is the Paraclete, not as the Logos, but as the *incarnate* Logos, who has shed His *αἷμα* (chap. i. 7) for the atonement, — and indeed inasmuch as He is *δίκαιος*; *δίκαιος* is here also neither = *lenis et bonus* (Grotius), nor = *δικαιῶν* (see Wolf on this

¹ Augustin: "*Habemus dixit, non habetis*; maluit se ponere in numero peccatorum, ut habeat advocatum Christum, quam ponere se pro Christo advocato et inveniri inter damnandos superbos." — Socinus thinks that the apostle speaks in the first person, "non quod revera ipse esset unus ex illis, qui adhuc peccarent, sed ut melius indicet, id quod affirmat pertinere ad omnes, quibus evangelium annunciatum est;" clearly erroneous. Grotius arbitrarily: "Habet ille advocatum, sed ecclesia habet, quae pro lapso precatur. Preces autem ecclesiae Christus more advocati Deo patri commendat."

² Besser: "He has made Himself ours, has given our faith an eternally valid claim on Him."

³ In the fact that in the Gospel of John the Holy Ghost, but here Christ, is called *παράκλητος*, there is so much the less a contradiction,

as in John xiv. 16 it is expressly put: *ἄλλον παράκλητον*, by which Christ signifies that He Himself is the proper *παράκλητος*, and the Holy Ghost His substitute.

⁴ Ebrard, who here gives the same explanation, explains the expression in the Gospel of John = "Comforter," ὃς παρακαλεῖ (more correctly *παρακαλεῖται*, mid.), according to the Hebrew *מְנַחֵם*, LXX. Job xvi. 2; but in this passage it is not *παράκλητος*, but *παρακλήτως*, that is used; Hofmann's explanation is also incorrect (*Schriftbew.*, II. 2, p. 15 ff.) = "Teacher" (comp. Meyer and Hengstenberg on John xiv. 16).

⁵ This idea is not, as it might appear, in contradiction with John xvi. 26; for even in this statement a lasting intercession by Christ is indicated, since Christ ascribes the hearing of prayer in His name to Himself (xiv. 13) as well as to the Father.

passage); but neither is it = *fidelis atque verax, quatenus id praestat quod promisit, se scilicet suis adfuturum* (Socinus); according to the *usus loquendi*, *δικαιος* could be understood of (judicial) justice (Bede: *justus advocatus, injustas causas non suscipit*), but then the adjective would have had to be put with *παράκλητον*; Ebrard incorrectly explains it = *δικαιος καὶ δικαίων*; but this explanation is so much the more unwarrantable, as *δικαιοῦν* is the very business of the *παράκλητος*; by the epithet *δικαιος*, Christ is held up before the *ἁμαρτάνουσι* as one who by His nature is fitted to be the Paraclete of sinners, i.e., as one who perfectly satisfies the will of God; who is "just and stainless, and without sin" (Luther). "Only as the Holy One, in whom the holy ideal of manhood is seen realized, can He intercede for sinners with the heavenly Father" (Neander).

REMARK. — How Christ executes His office of Advocate with the Father, John does not say; a dogmatic exposition of it is not in place here, still it is important to mark the chief elements which are the result of the apostle's statement. These are the following: 1. The Paraclete is *Jesus*, the glorified Redeemer, who is with the Father; therefore neither His divine nature alone, nor His human nature alone, but the Lord in His divine-human personality. 2. The presupposition is the reconciliation of men with God by His blood. 3. His advocacy has reference to believers, who still sin amid their walking in light; and, 4. It is a real activity in which He intercedes for His people (that God may manifest in their forgiveness and sanctification His faithfulness and justice) with God, as His (and their) Father. If these points are observed, on the one hand, there is found in the apostolic statement no ground for a materialistic conception, which Calvin opposes in the following words: *obiter notandum est, nimis crasse errare eos, qui patris genibus Christum adolvunt, ut pro nobis oret. Tollendae sunt eiusmodi cogitationes, quae coelesti Christi gloriae derogant*; but neither, on the other hand, is there any justification for doing away with the idea, as not a few commentators have been guilty of. Even Bede has not kept himself free from it, when he says that the advocacy consists in this, that Christ presents Himself as man to God, and prays for us *non voce, sed miseratione*, and therefore considers the *intercessio*, not as an *actio realis*, but only as an *actio interpretativa*. But the idea is even more done away with, when the intercession is viewed only as the permanent effect of the redemptive work accomplished by Christ in the giving up of His life to the death, which is no doubt the opinion of Baumgarten-Crusius when he says: "The apostles certainly did not think of a special oral intercession, but of an intercession by deed, in His work."¹ Lücke rightly says: "The meaning of this form of representation is no other than this, that Jesus Christ also in His *δόξα* with the Father continues His work of reconciliation. If Christ were not the eternal Paraclete for us with God, His saving and reconciling work would be limited to His earthly life merely, and in so far could not be regarded as eternal and complete;" but it is not to the point when he further puts it: "Without the eter-

¹ Similarly Kötlin (p. 61): "Christ is the eternal *παράκλητος*; He does not, however, pray the Father, but the sense of His office of Advocate is simply this, that for His sake the Father also loves those who believe on Him."

Frommann also (p. 472 ff.) finds in the statement of the apostle only a symbolical form of expression, by which the continuation of the atoning work of Christ in His state of exaltation is indicated.

nally active saving and reconciling spirit of Christ, without the πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ, Christ would not be a perfect, a living Christ;" for John is not here speaking of the πνεῦμα of Christ, but of the personal Christ Himself. The explanation of De Wette, that the advocacy of Christ is the combination of the idea of the glorified and of the suffering Messiah, is also unsatisfactory, because it changes the objective reality into a subjective representation. Neander rightly says: "When Christ is described as the Advocate, this is not to be understood as if only the effects of the work once accomplished by Him were transferred to Himself. — John considers the living Christ as personally operating in His work, as operating in His glorified position with His Father, with the same holy love with which He accomplished His work on earth as a mediation for sinful man. It is by Him in His divine-human personality that the connection between man, saved and reconciled to God by Him, and God as the Father, is always brought about." Comp. also Meyer on Rom. viii. 34, and Braune in the fundamental dogmatic ideas of the passage.

Ver. 2. καὶ αὐτός = *et ipse, idemque ille*; καί is here also the simple copula, and is not to be resolved either into *quia* (a Lapide) or *nam*. — αὐτός refers back to Ἰησ. Χριστὸν δίκαιον, and the epithet δίκαιον is not to be lost sight of here; Paulus, contrary to the context, refers αὐτός to God. — *ἰλασμός ἐστι*]. The word *ἰλασμός*, which is used besides in the N. T. only in chap. iv. 10, and here also indeed in combination with *περὶ τῶν ἡμῶν, μαγ*, according to Ezek. xliv. 27 (= אַתָּחַת), mean the *sin-offering* (Lücke, 3d ed.), but is here to be taken in the sense of כִּפָּרִים, Lev. xxv. 9, Num. v. 8, and no doubt in this way, that Christ is called the *ἰλασμός*, inasmuch as He has expiated by His *αἷμα* the guilt of sin. This reference to the sacrificial blood of Christ, it is true, is not demanded by the idea *ἰλασμός in itself*,¹ but certainly is demanded by the context, as the apostle can only ascribe to the blood of Christ, in chap. i. 7, the cleansing power of which he is there speaking, because he knows that reconciliation is based on it.

REMARK. — In classical Greek *ἰλάσκεσθαι* (as middle) is = *ἰλεων ποιειν*; but in Scripture it never appears in this active signification, in which God would not be the object; but in all the passages where the Septuagint makes use of this word, whether it is as the translation of כִּפָּר (Ps. lxxviii. 38, lxxix. 9), or of קָלַם (Ps. xxiv. 11; 2 Kings v. 18), or of נָחַם (Exod. xxxii. 14), God is the subject, and sin, or sinful man, is the object; in Heb. ii. 17, Christ is the subject, and the object also is τὰς ἁμαρτίας. The case is almost exactly similar with *ἐξίλασκεσθαι*, which does not appear in the N. T. at all, but in the O. T., on the other hand, is used as the translation of כִּפָּר much more frequently than the simple form; it is only where this verb is used of the relation between men,

¹ In the Septuagint not only does *ἰλασμός* appear as the translation of the Hebrew קָלַם (Ps. cxxix. 4; Dan. ix. 9), but *ἰλάσκεσθαι* is also used = *to be merciful, to forgive* (Ps. lxxviii. 38, lxxix. 9), — quite without reference to an offering. — The explanation of Paulus, however: "He (i.e., God) is the

pure exercise of compassion on account of sinful faults," is not justifiable, because, in the first place, God is not the subject, and secondly, the *ἰλασμός* of Christ is not the forgiveness itself, but is that which procures forgiveness.

namely, Gen. xxxii. 21 and Prov. xvi. 14, that the classical *usus loquendi* is preserved; but elsewhere with *ἐξιλάσκεισθαι*, whether the subject be God (as in Ezek. xvi. 63) or man, especially the priest, the object is either man (Lev. iv. 20, v. 26, vi. 7, xvi. 6, 11, 16, 17, 24, 30, 33; Ezek. xlv. 17) or sin (Exod. xxxii. 30; both together, Lev. v. 18, Num. vi. 11), or even holiness defiled by sin (the most holy place, Lev. xvi. 16; the altar, Lev. xvi. 18, xxvii. 33, Ezek. xliii. 22); only in Zech. vii. 2 is found *ἐξιλάσκεισθαι τὸν κύριον*, where, however, the Hebrew text has *יְהוָה אֱת-פָנָי יְחַלֵּל*. *ἱλασμός*, therefore, in Scripture does not denote the reconciliation of God, either with Himself or with men, and hence not *placatio* (or, as Myrberg interprets: *propitiatio Dei*, but the justification or reconciliation of the sinner with God, because it is never stated in the N. T. that God is reconciled, but rather that we are reconciled to God.¹

Grotius, S. G. Lange, and others take *ἱλασμός* = *ἱλαστήριον*; of course that abstract form denotes the personal Christ, but by this change into the concrete the expression of the apostle loses its peculiar character; "the abstract is more comprehensive, more intensive, comp. 1 Cor. i. 30" (Brückner); it gives it to be understood "that Christ is not the propitiator through any thing outside Himself, but through Himself" (Lucke, 2d ed.), and that there is no propitiation except through Him.²—The relation of *ἱλασμός* to the preceding *παράκλητον* may be variously regarded; either *παράκλητος* is the higher idea, in which *ἱλασμός* is contained, Bede: *advocatum habemus apud Patrem qui interpellat pro nobis et propitium eum ac placatum peccatis nostris reddit*. or, conversely, *ἱλασμός* is the higher idea, to which the advocacy is subordinated, as De Wette thus says "*ἱλασμός* does not merely refer to the sacrificial death of Jesus, but, as the more general idea, includes the intercession as the progressive reconciliation" (so also Rickli, Frommann); or, lastly, both ideas are co-ordinate with one another, Christ being the *ἱλασμός* in regard to His blood which was shed, and the *παράκλητος*, on the other hand, in regard to His present activity with the Father for those who are reconciled to God through His blood. Against the first view is the sentence beginning with *καὶ αὐτός*, by which *ἱλασμός* is marked as an idea which is not already contained in the idea *παράκλητος*, but is distinct from it; against the

¹ Comp. Delitzsch in his *Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews*, on chap. ii. 17, p. 94 ff. But it is to be noticed that Delitzsch, while he states correctly the Biblical mode of representation, bases his opening discussion on the idea of the "self reconciliation of the Godhead with itself," an idea which is not contained in Scripture.—It is observed by several commentators that *ἱλασμός*, as distinguished from *καταλλαγή* = "*Versöhnung*" (reconciliation), is to be translated by "*Sühnung*" or "*Versöhnung*" (both = Engl. *expiation, atonement*). It is true, *Versöhnung* and *Versöhnung* are properly one and the same word, but in the usage of the language the distinction has certainly been fixed that the latter word denotes the restoration of the

disturbed relationship by an expiation to be performed; only it is inexact to assert that the idea *ἱλασμός* in itself contains the idea of punishment, since *ἱλασκεισθαι* does not include this idea either in classical or in Biblical usage, and *ἐξιλάσκεισθαι*, though mostly indeed used in the O. T. in reference to a sacrifice by which sin is covered, is also used without this reference (comp. Ecclus. iii. 25).

² The case is the same with the expression *ἱλασμός* as with other abstractions by which Christ is described, as *ζωή*, *ὁδός*, *αγιασμός*, κ.τ.λ. Who does not feel that by these words something much more comprehensive is expressed than in the concrete forms: *ὁ ζωοποιῶν*, *ὁ ὁδηγῶν*, *ὁ ἀγιάζων*, κ.τ.λ.?

second view it is decisive that the propitiation, which Christ is described as, has reference to *all* sins, but his intercession, on the other hand, has reference only to the sins of the believers who belong to Him. There remains, accordingly, only the *third* view as the only correct one (so also Braune). The relationship is this, that the intercession of the glorified Christ has as its presupposition the *ἵλασμός* wrought out in His death,¹ yet the sentence *καὶ αὐτός* is not merely added, *ut causa reddatur, cur Christus sit advocatus noster* (Hornejus, and similarly Beza, Lorinus, Sander, etc.), for its independence is thereby taken away; the thought contained in it not merely serves for the explanation or confirmation of the preceding, but it is also full of meaning in itself, as it brings out the relation of Christ to the whole world of sinners. *περὶ πῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν*]. *περὶ* expresses the reference quite generally: "in regard to;" it may here be observed that *ἐξιλάσκεσθαι* in the LXX. is usually construed with *περὶ*, after the Hebrew *עָפַר עָלָיו*. The idea of substitution is not suggested in *περὶ*. — With *τῶν ἁμαρτ. ἡμῶν*, comp. chap. i. 9; it is not merely the sins of Christians (*ἡμῶν*, i. e., *fidelium*; Bengel) before their conversion that are meant, but also those which are committed by them in their Christian life; comp. chap. i. 7. Ebrard's opinion, that these words are added to *ἵλασμός* merely as a preparation for the following additional thought, is inadmissible; they rather suggest themselves to the apostle — and without regard to what follows — inasmuch as it is only by virtue of them that the idea obtains complete expression. — *οὐ περὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων δὲ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου*]. Expansion of the thought, in reference to the preceding *περὶ τ. ἁμ. ἡμῶν*, in order to mark the universality of the propitiation. It is incorrect to understand by *ἡμεῖς* the Jews, and by *κόσμος* the Gentiles (Oecum., Cyril, Hornejus, Semler, Rickli, etc.); *ἡμεῖς* are rather believers, and *κόσμος* is the whole of unbelieving mankind; so Spener, Paulus, De Wette, Lücke, Sander, Neander, Düsterd., Braune, etc. — Baumgarten-Crusius agrees with this interpretation, only he understands by *κόσμος* not mankind together (extensive), but successively (protensive); but this distinction is unsuitable. It would be preferable to say that John was thinking directly of the *κόσμος* as it existed in his time, without, however, limiting the idea to it. The interpretation of Augustin and of Bede, by which *κόσμος* is = "*ecclesia electorum per totum mundum dispersa*," is clearly quite arbitrary. The propitiatory sacrifice was offered for *the whole world*, for the whole of fallen mankind; if all do not obtain the blessing of it, the cause of that does not lie in a want of *efficacia* in it; Düsterdieck therefore rightly says: "The propitiation is of judicial nature; according to this, the propitiation for the whole world has its real *efficacia* for the whole world: to the believing it brings life; to the unbelieving, death." Calvin quite improperly asserts: *sub omnibus reprobos non comprehendit, sed eos designat, qui simul credituri erant et qui per varias mundi plagas dispersi erant* (similarly

¹ Köstlin incorrectly says (p. 180): "Christ is *παράκλητος*, while he is *ἵλασμός*, i. e., high priest, and at the same time sacrifice, a high priest who offers himself; and *ἵλασμός*, while He is *παράκλητος*, i. e., a sacrifice which offers

itself:" for neither does *παράκλ.* describe the high-priesthood of Christ, according to its full comprehension, nor does *ἵλασμός* mean "sacrifice."

Beza); against this the statement of Bengel is sufficient: *quam late peccatum, tam late propitiatio*. The expressly added *ἅλων* places the matter beyond all doubt. — With regard to the genitive *περὶ ἅλων τοῦ κόσμου*, Winer says (p. 536 [E. T., 577]): “instead of this, either *περὶ τῶν ἅλων τ. κ.*, or, instead of the first words, *περὶ ἡμῶν* might have been written; similarly Heb. ix. 7;” many commentators, on the other hand, supply *τῶν* directly, as Grotius, Semler, Wilke (*Hermeneutik*, II. p. 145), De Wette, Düsterdieck; as the Vulg. renders: “*pro totius mundi*,” and Luther: “*für der ganzen Welt*.” On behalf of this, appeal is made to passages such as John v. 36,¹ Matt. v. 20; but the construction which appears in these passages is the well-known *comparatio compendiaris*, which does not occur here, as there is no comparison here at all; an *oratio variata* is therefore to be accepted, which was the more natural to the apostle, as the idea *κόσμος* includes in itself that of *sin*.²

Vv. 3-11. Further antithetical statement of the believers' walk in light; it is described as *τηρεῖν τὰς ἐντολάς Θεοῦ* (vv. 3-6); this then is further defined as a *περιπατεῖν καθὼς ἐκεῖνος περιεπάτησε* (ver. 6). and *ἀγαπᾶν τὸν ἀδελφόν* is emphasized as being the essence of this walk (vv. 7-11).

Ver. 3. Semler would make a new section begin here: “after the foundation of salvation has been spoken of, there follows the exhortation to preserving the salvation;” incorrectly; ver. 3 is closely connected with chap. i. 5, 6, and states in what the Christian's walk in light consists; therefore also it begins simply with *καί*. — *ἐν τούτῳ γινώσκομεν*]. *ἐν τούτῳ* refers to the following *ἔάν*; the object is stated by *ὅτι*; the same combination is found in the Gospel of John xiii. 35; similarly in chap. iv. 13, where, however, the particle *ὅτι* is used instead of *ἔάν*, and chap. v. 2, where *ὅταν* is used. A Lapidé wrongly weakens the force of *γινώσκομεν*: *non certo et demonstrative, sed probabiliter et conjecturaliter*; it is rather the anxiety of the apostle to bring out that the Christian has a sure and certain consciousness of the nature of the Christian life. This certainty is confirmed to him by unmistakable facts, in which the truth of his knowledge attests itself. — *ὅτι ἐγνώκαμεν αὐτόν*]. *αὐτόν* seems to refer to the last-mentioned subject in ver. 2, therefore to *Christ*; so it is explained by Oecumenius, Erasmus, Grotius, Calov, Spener, Bengel, Semler, Johannsen, Sander, Myrberg, Erdmann, etc.: but the deeper train of thought is opposed to this; John is not continuing the idea of ver. 2, but is going back to the fundamental thought of the whole section: “He who has fellowship with God walks in the light;” the principal subject is *God*, and to it, therefore, *αὐτόν* is to be referred; so Calvin, Beza, Lücke, Baumgarten-Crusius, Ewald, De Wette, Brückner, Ebrard, Düsterdieck, Braune, etc.³ — On *ἐγνώκαμεν*, which is not, with Lange and Carpzov,

¹ This passage is cited by Ebrard further, in order to prove his assertion: “This abbreviation for *περὶ τῶν ἅλων τοῦ κόσμου* needs no explanation” (!).

² When Braune, who has accepted the explanation which is here given of the verse as a whole and in detail, says in reference to the *oratio variata* which occurs here: “it has

not happened for the sake of the evil which attaches to the *κόσμος*, for this is true of Christians also (contrary to Huther),” he thereby shows that he has not correctly understood the above remark.

³ The reason brought forward by Ebrard: “it lies also in the idea of the *commandments*, that they are mentioned as *commandments* of

to be interpreted = "love," the commentators rightly remark that it is not a mere external, purely theoretical knowledge that is to be understood by it;¹ it is the *living* knowledge that is meant, i.e., a knowledge in which the subject (God) is really received into the inner life, and thought and action are determined by it,² so that *ἐγνωκέαι* is necessarily connected with the *κοινωνίαν ἔχειν μετ' αὐτοῦ* (chap. i. 6); still it is inexact to render *ὅτι ἐγνώκαμεν αὐτόν*, with Oecumenius, directly by *ὅτι συνεκράθημεν αὐτῷ*, or, with Clarius, by *societatem habemus cum eo*. By *ἐγνώκαμεν* the element of consciousness in the fellowship, and with this its internal and spiritual side, is brought out. — *ἐὰν τὰς ἐντολάς αὐτοῦ τηρῶμεν*]. The expression *τ. ἐντολ. τηρεῖν*³ describes the obedience resulting from the internal faithful keeping of the commandments: ⁴ it is incorrect, with Braune, so to press the idea *τηρεῖν* here, in its distinction from *ποιεῖν*, that merely "attention to the commandments" is to be understood by it; it rather includes in itself the actual obedience. This obedience is not here regarded as the means of the knowledge of God, but as the proof of it; rightly Oecumenius: *διὰ τῶν ἔργων ἡ τελεία δεδείκνυται ἀγάπη*; only he should have said "*γνώσις*" instead of *ἀγάπη*. Between both of these there is the same relationship as between fellowship with God and walking in light; for as the former is related to the knowledge of God, so is the latter related to the observance of the divine commandments, which is the concrete embodiment of *ἐν τῷ φωτὶ περιπατεῖν*.

Ver. 4. Inference from ver. 3, expressing the antithetical side. — *ὁ λέγων, κ. τ. λ.*, is used in the same sense as *ἐὰν εἴπωμεν*, chap. i. 6. Without reason, Braune considers that "in the singular there lies a progress in the develop-

the Father and not of the Son," is not valid; comp. Gospel of John xiv. 15, 21, 23, xv. 10. Ebrard, on the other hand, rightly points to ver. 6, where *ἐκεῖνος* (Christ) is distinguished from *αὐτός*. From this verse it also follows that John, in this section, is considering Christ not as having given commandments, but as having walked according to the commandments of God.

¹ Lorinus: "Cognoscere cum quadam voluntatis propendentis approbatione." — A Lapide: "Cognitione non tantum speculativa, sed et practica, quae cum amore et affectu conjuncta est, ac in opus derivatur." — Spener: "This is not a mere knowing (1 Cor. viii. 1), such as may exist without love, but a knowledge which comes into the heart and fulfils His will with trust." — De Wette: "Knowledge of the heart, not of the mind, wherewith activity is also assumed." — Lücke: "The knowledge of God in the highest sense; not, however, in so far as it is identical with the love of God, but only in so far as it really impels men practically to fulfilment of the divine commands, and thus reveals itself in growing love to the God who is known as the Light."

² Weiss not unjustly contends against the current view of *γινώσκειν* in John, in so far

as the idea of knowledge is not kept pure in it from confusion with other ideas; but when Weiss says that in John only "the knowledge that rests on immediate contemplation is to be thought of," and observes that "it lies in the nature of the case, that in this intuition and contemplation the object is received into the entire spiritual being of a man as a — nay, as the determining power," he not only agrees with the explanation given above, but defines the idea in such a way as not to deviate so very far from the commentators whom he opposes as his polemic would lead one to suppose.

³ It is to be noticed, that to describe the Christian commandments John never uses *νόμος* (which by him is *only* used in reference to the Mosaic law), but generally *ἐντολαί* (only now and then *λόγος Θεοῦ* or *Χριστοῦ*); and as verb, *τηρεῖν*, never *ποιεῖν* (except in Rev. xxii. 14). — In the writings of Paul, *τηρεῖν ἐντολήν* appears only in 1 Tim. vi. 14, and besides in the N. T. in Matt. xix. 17 (chap. xxviii. 20: *τηρεῖν πάντα ὅσα ἐνετειλάμην ὑμῖν*).

⁴ The paraphrase of Semler may be given here merely for its curiosity: "Si (nos Apostoli) retinemus et magnificimus hanc ejus doctrinam: Deum esse pariter omnium gen- tium."

ment of the thought." The statement that *ἐγνωκα* is used "with manifest regard to the *Gnostics*" (Ebrard), is not to be accepted; *ὁ λέγων* is rather to be taken in a quite general sense, comp. ver. 6, at the same time referring to the appearance of such a moral indifferentism among the churches. *αὐτόν*, as in ver. 3 = *Θεόν*. — *ψεύστης ἐστί* = *ψεύδεται*, chap. i. 6; but in such a way that the idea is more sharply brought out by it (Braune). — *καὶ ἐν τούτῳ*, κ.τ.λ., as in chap. i. 8. — From the connection between the knowledge of God, and the observance of His commandments, it follows that he who boasts of the former, but is wanting in the latter, has not the truth in him, but is a liar.

Ver. 5. In this verse the apostle confirms the idea of ver. 3, in the form of an antithesis to ver. 4, and with the introduction of a new element. — *ὃς ὁ ἦν τῆρῃ αὐτοῦ* (i. e., *Θεοῦ*) *τὸν λόγον*]. The particle *δέ*, which refers not to ver. 3 (Lücke), but to the words *καὶ τὰς ἐντολὰς αὐτοῦ μὴ τηρῶν*, ver. 4, shows that this verse stands in the same relationship to ver. 4 as chap. i. 7 to ver. 6; "*τηρῆ* is with emphasis put first, and similarly *αὐτοῦ* before *τὸν λόγον*" (Braune). — *αὐτοῦ ὁ λόγος* is synonymous with *αἱ ἐντολαὶ αὐτοῦ*, vv. 3 and 4: "the essence of the divine commandments;" a Lapidé: *Dicit verbum ejus in singulari, quia praeicipue respicit legem caritatis; haec enim caeteras omnes in se comprehendit*. — The predicate does not run, *οὗτος ἐγνωκεν αὐτόν*, but *ἄληθῶς ἐν τούτῳ ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ Θεοῦ τετελείωται*, whereby "a new side of the thought comes into view" (Ebrard). — *ἄληθῶς*, "in truth," opposed to appearance and mere pretence; it is emphatically put first, as in John viii. 31, with reference to the preceding *ἡ ἀλήθεια* (De Wette); and serves to bring out not a quality of the *τετελείωται* (Ebrard), but the actuality of the *ἐν τούτῳ . . . τετελείωται* (so also Brückner). — *ἐν τούτῳ ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ Θεοῦ τετελείωται*]. *ἡ ἀγάπη τ. Θεοῦ* is not here, as in chap. iv. 9, "the love of God to us" (Flacius, Calovius, Bengel, Spener, Russmeyer, Sander, Lange, etc.), nor, "the love commanded by God" (Episcopius), nor, "the relationship of mutual love between God and man" (Ebrard: "the *mutua amicitia et conjunctio* between God and the Christian");¹ but "love to God," as in chap. ii. 15, iii. 17, iv. 12, v. 3 (Bede, Oecumenius, Luther, Calvin, Beza, Lorinus, Hornejus, Paulus, De Wette-Brückner, Baumgarten-Crusius, Lücke, Düsterdieck, Erdmann, Myrberg, Braune, etc.). This interpretation is required by the context; for "the love of God" appears here in place of the "knowledge of God," vv. 3 and 4. As in the latter, so in the former also, consists fellowship with God. Both, love and knowledge, are so inseparably connected, and are so essentially one in their principle and nature, that the one is the condition of the other.² — The idea *τετελείωται* is not to be weakened, as in Beza: *τελειοῦν hoc in loco non declarat perfecte aliquid consummare, sed mendacio et simulationi opponitur, ut hoc plane sit, quod dicimus: mettre en exécution*; but it is to be taken in its

¹ Similarly Besser: "The love of God in us" usually embraces both God's love to us, by which, and our love to God, in which, we live. This is the case in this passage also." This interpretation can be just as little grammatically justified as that of Ebrard; neither a du-

plexity nor a mutual relationship is expressed in the phrase *ἡ ἀγ. τοῦ Θεοῦ*.

² Grotius, it is true, is not wrong when he says: "Amor praesupponit cognitionem;" but it is just as correct to say: "Cognitio praesupponit amorem."

constant meaning: "has been perfected," as in chap. iv. 12, 17, 18.¹ The objection, that nevertheless no Christian can boast of perfect love to God, does not justify an arbitrary change of meaning. The absolute idea *τηρεῖν αὐτοῦ τὸν λόγον* demands for its counterpart an idea quite as absolute (so also Brückner).² Where the word of God is perfectly fulfilled, there love to God is perfect; in perfect obedience, perfect love is shown. That the Christian has not attained this perfection at any moment of his life, but is ever only in a state of progress towards it, is no doubt true; but John is not here considering that aspect (so also Braune).³ — *ἐν τούτῳ γινώσκομεν*]. *ἐν τούτῳ* refers neither to the thought contained in ver. 6 (Socinus, Ewald), nor to *ἡ ἀγάπη . . . τετελ.*, but to the keeping of the commandments (so also Düsterdieck, Ebrard, Brückner, Braune). Obedience is the evidence for the knowledge that we are *ἐν αὐτῷ*. — *ὅτι ἐν αὐτῷ ἔσμεν*]. The expression signifies the inward fellowship of life (differently Acts xvii. 28); it combines the preceding *ἐν τούτῳ . . . τετελ.* and the former *ἐγνώκαμεν αὐτόν*, and is identical with *κοινωνίαν ἔχομεν μετ' αὐτοῦ* (chap. i. 6), which it defines in its internal character. The knowledge and love of God is being in God (so also Brückner).⁴ — Grotius, who understands *αὐτῷ* of Christ, enfeeblingly explains: *Christi ingenii discipuli sumus*.

Ver. 6 gives the more particular definition of what the *τηρεῖν* of God's commandments, and therefore the Christian's walk in light, consists in. — *ὁ λέγων*, as in ver. 4; here, however, with the infinitive construction. — *ἐν αὐτῷ μένειν*]. *ἐν αὐτῷ* does not refer to Christ (Augustin, Hornejus, Wolf, Lange, Neander, etc.), but to God. — *μένειν* instead of *εἶναι*, ver. 5. Both expressions are synonymous, it is true, but not identical (Beza); in *μένειν* the unchangeableness of the being is brought out. Bengel: *Synonyma cum gradatione: illum nosse, in illo esse, in illo manere*. Frommann (p. 187): "The being and abiding in God signifies one and the same fellowship with God. The latter describes it merely as something constant, lasting, which accessory notion is not contained in the former expression." — *ὀφείλει* (comp. chap. iii. 16, iv. 11, "is in duty bound") refers back to *ὁ λέγων*; it is not meant to be indicated here what is demanded in regard to the *μένειν ἐν Θεῷ*, but what

¹ Even Bengel's interpretation: "Perfectum regimen nactus et perfecte cognitus est (viz., amor Dei erga hominem)," does not correspond to the idea of the word.

² Ebrard, it is true, wants the idea *τετελειῶται* to be retained unweakened, but finds himself compelled by his interpretation of *ἡ ἀγ. τ. Θ.* to agree with Beza's explanation, because "in the case of a relationship its perfection is nothing else than its conclusion." Ebrard's opinion, that if *ἡ ἀγ. τ. Θ.* = "love to God," John must have written *τελεία ἐστίν* instead of *τετελειῶται*, is — besides being contrary to John's *usus loquendi* — without foundation.

³ In Calvin's explanation: "Si quis objiciat, neminem unquam fuisse repertum, qui Deum ita perfecte diligeret, respondeo: sufficere,

modo quisque pro gratiae sibi datae mensura ad hanc perfectionem aspiret," and in that of Socinus: "Est autem perfectio ista caritatis in Deum et obedientia praeceptorum ejus ita intelligenda, ut non omnino requiratur, ne ei quicquam deesse possit, sed tantum ut ejusmodi sit, qua Deus pro sua ingenti erga nos bonitate contentus esse voluit," limitations are introduced which are foreign to the apostle's train of thought.

⁴ In substantial agreement with this Weiss says: "In vv. 3 and 4 it was stated that in the keeping of God's commandments we recognize that we have known God. If, therefore, there is a continuous train of thought here, the being in God must only be a new expression for the knowing of God, or must be directly given along with it."

is the duty of him who *says* that he abides in God — if he does not want to be a liar, in whom the truth is not, ver. 4. — *καθὼς ἐκεῖνος περιεπάτησε, καὶ αὐτὸς [οὕτως] περιπατεῖν*. By these words Christ is placed as a pattern before Christians, i. e., in regard to His whole walk (which is elsewhere done in the N. T. only in regard to His self-abasement and to His conduct in suffering; see this commentary on 1 Pet. ii. 21); of *what sort* this was, John does not here say; from the connection with what precedes, however, it is clear that the apostle points to Him in so far as He kept the commandments of God, and therefore walked in the light.¹ This reference to Christ as an example is frequently found in the same form (*καθὼς ἐκεῖνος*) in our Epistle; so iii. 3, 7, iv. 17; comp. also John xiii. 15, xv. 10, and *passim*. — *περιπατεῖν* describes not merely the disposition, but the action resulting from it. In the fact that John brings just this out (comp. especially chap. iii. 17, 18), it is evident how far his mysticism is removed from mere fanaticism. — On *οὕτως*, see the critical notes.

Vv. 7–11. A more particular statement of the nature and import of *τηρεῖν τὰς ἐντολὰς αὐτοῦ* or of *περιπατεῖν καθὼς ἐκεῖνος περιεπάτησε*.

Ver. 7. *ἀγαπηταί*. Such a form of address does not necessarily indicate the commencement of a new section, but is also used when the subject of the discourse is intended to be brought home to the hearers or readers; this is the case here. — *οὐκ ἐντολὴν καινὴν γράφω ὑμῖν* certainly does not mean: “I do not write to you of a new commandment;” neither, however: “I write (set) before you” (Baumgarten-Crusius); for *γράφειν* has not this signification; it simply means *to write*; when connected with an object, as here, it is = to communicate or announce any thing by writing; comp. chap. i. 4. The subject of his writing, the apostle calls an *ἐντολή*. It is arbitrary to take the word here in a different meaning from that which it always has; thus Rickli: “the whole revelation of divine truth as it has been brought to us in Jesus Christ”² (similarly Flacius, Calovius, etc.); and Ebrard: “the announcement, that God is light, chap. i. 5;” *ἐντολή* means “commandment;” this idea must not be confounded with any other. Most of the commentators (Augustin, Bede, Oecumenius, Theophylact, Luther, Calvin, Baumgarten-Crusius, De Wette-Brückner, Neander, Sander, Erdmann, Myrberg, Ewald, etc.) understand by it, according to vv. 9–11, the commandment of brotherly love; others, on the other hand (Socinus, Episcopius, Calovius, Schott, Lücke, Fritzsche, Frommann, etc.), according to ver. 6, the commandment of following Christ. These two views seem to be opposed to one another, but they really are so only if we assume that John here wants to emphasize a single special commandment — in distinction from other commandments.

¹ Semler paraphrases: “Si quis gloriatur, se suamque doctrinam semper convenisse cum doctrina illa Christi, is sane debet etiam in humanae vitae modo non Judaismum praeferre” (!).

² Ebrard wrongly maintains that *ἐντολή* is “a truth including directly in itself practical requirements.” Only the practical requirements contained in a truth can be — when

regarded as a unity — called *ἐντολή*, but not the truth which contains them in itself. It is true, the demand of faith in the message of salvation may be described as *ἐντολή*, but not the message of salvation itself; here, however, the context forbids us to take the expression in that sense (as Weiss), since neither in what precedes nor in what immediately follows is there a demand for faith expressed.

This supposition, however, is erroneous; the command to keep the commandments (or the word) of God after the example of Christ, or to walk in the light, is no other than the command to love one's brother. From chap. i. 5 on, John is speaking not of different commandments, but of the one general commandment of the Christian life which results from the truth that God is light. It is to this commandment that reference is made when John, in order to bring it home to his readers, says: *οὐκ ἐντολὴν καινὴν γράφω ὑμῖν*, so that by *ἐντολή* he does not indicate a commandment which he then for the first time is about to mention, but the commandment which he has already spoken of in what precedes (only not merely in ver. 6), but defines more particularly in what follows, namely, in regard to its concrete import.¹ Of this commandment John says, that it is not an *ἐντολὴ καινὴ*; ² in what sense he means this, the following words state: *ἀλλ' ἐντολὴν παλαιάν, ἣν εἶχετε ἀπ' ἀρχῆς*; it is not new, but old, inasmuch as his readers did not first receive it through this writing, but already had it, and indeed *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς*, i. e., from the very beginning of their Christian life; comp. chap. iii. 11; 2 John 5, 6; and, for the expression *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς*, ver. 24 (Calvin, Beza, Socinus, Episcopius, Piscator, Hornejus, Lange, Rickli, Lücke, De Wette-Brückner, Sander, Neander, Besser, Düsterdieck, Erdmann, Myrberg, Ewald, Braune, etc.). The imperfect *εἶχετε*, instead of which we should expect the present, either refers back to the time before John had come to his readers, or is to be explained: "which ye hitherto already had." The latter is the more probable. Some commentators weaken this interpretation, which is demanded by the context, and hold that John calls the commandment (namely, "the commandment of love") an old one, because it was already given by Moses; thus Flacius, Clarius, etc.; the Greek commentators even go beyond that, and refer it at once to this, that it was written from the very beginning in the heart of man; ³ the latter Baumgarten-Crusius maintains, and says: "here, therefore, the ethics of Christianity are represented as the eternal law of reason," in which he explains *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς* "from the beginning of the history of man," and regards "ye as men" as

¹ This view is in accordance with that of Düsterdieck, who rightly remarks: "The solution of the problem lies in this, that the holy command to walk as Christ walked, fully and essentially resolves itself into the command of brotherly love;" it is also accepted by Braune. The objection of Brückner, that brotherly love is only a *principal element*, and not the complete fulfilment of following Christ, can only be regarded as valid if brotherly love is not viewed in its full, complete character; comp. John xiii. 34, and also the statement of the Apostle Paul: *πλήρωμα νόμου ἡ ἀγάπη*, Rom. xiii. 10. — The instances adduced by Ebrard against the reference to brotherly love can only have any force if the commandment which prescribes this is distinguished, as a special one, from the command to walk in light.

² Certainly what John here says reminds us of the statement of Christ in John xiii. 34; nor can it be denied that John was here thinking of that, as well as in the passage 2 John 5; but from this it does not follow that *οὐκ ἐντολ. καιν. γράφω ὑμῖν* does not refer to what precedes, but only to what comes after (ver. 9).

³ In the scholia of Matthæi it is thus put: *εἰ μὲν Ἰουδαῖοι ταῦτα γράφει, εἰκότως, τὴν περὶ ἀγάπης ἐντολὴν οὐ καινὴν εἶναι φησί. πάλαι γὰρ αὐτὴν διὰ τῶν προφητῶν ἐπηγγείλατο. Εἰ δὲ οὐκ Ἰουδαῖοι ἦσαν, μήποτ' οὖν ἐντολὴ παλαιά . . . ἔστιν ἢ κατὰ τὰς φυσικὰς ἐννοίας φιλικῆς διαθέσεις, πάντες γὰρ φύσει ἡμερα καὶ κοινωνικὰ ζῶα ὄντες ἀγαπῶσι τοὺς πλησίον. — Oecumenius and Theophylact combine the two together, holding that the Epistle was addressed to Jewish and Gentile Christians.*

the subject of εἶχετε. — ἡ ἐντολὴ ἡ παλαιὰ ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος ὃν ἠκούσατε. This addition serves for a more particular definition of the preceding; ἡ παλαιὰ is repeated in order to accentuate this idea more strongly. By εἶχετε it was only stated that the readers were in possession of the commandment; now the apostle defines it more particularly in this respect, that it is the word (not “the chief substance of the word,” De Wette) which they had *heard* (comp. ver. 24, iii. 11, iv. 3), which, therefore, was *proclaimed* unto them (comp. chap. i. 2, 3), namely, by the apostolic preaching. The clause is therefore not to be taken, as Baumgarten-Crusius holds, as a correction of γράφω: “not by *him* was it first given; it is from the beginning of Christianity, the λόγος, ὃν ἠκούσατε, namely, from Christ;” for ἠκούσατε does not refer directly to γράφω (Bengel), but to εἶχετε.¹ On the addition ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς (Rec.) after ἠκούσατε, which Ewald regards as genuine, see the critical notes.

Ver. 8. πάλιν ἐντολὴν καινὴν, κ.τ.λ.]. Almost all commentators hold that the ἐντολὴ καινὴ is the same ἐντολὴ as was the subject of ver. 7; differently Ebrard, who explains as follows: “With ver. 7 begins a new section which continues to ver. 29, in which the leading thought is the position of the readers to the light as one which was already shining; by ἐντ. παλαιὰ is meant the clause, chap. i. 5: ὁ Θεὸς φῶς ἐστὶ; by ἐντ. καινὴ, on the other hand, the following clause: ἡ σκοτία παράγεται καὶ τὸ φῶς τὸ ἀληθινὸν ἤδη φαίνει;”² the relative clause ὃ ἐστὶν ἀληθές, κ.τ.λ., belongs, by apposition, to the following sentence: ὅτι ἡ σκοτία, κ.τ.λ., and states to what extent the essential true light has already begun to shine, namely, the fact that the light already shines has a double sphere in which it is ἀληθές, i.e., actually realized, first in Christ, but then also ἐν ὑμῖν, i.e., in the Ephesian readers themselves, and equally in all true Christians.” This explanation is, however, incorrect; for (1) the truth ἡ σκοτία παράγεται, κ.τ.λ., can just as little be called an ἐντολὴ as the sentence ὁ Θεὸς φῶς ἐστὶ (see on ver. 7); (2) the relative clause, if it was to be a preceding apposition to ἡ σκοτία, κ.τ.λ., would have had to come after ὅτι; according to the structure of the verse, ὃ must necessarily be connected with what precedes; (3) it is a false idea, that that which the clause ὅτι ἡ σκοτία expresses was actually realized in Christ; the incorrectness of this idea is concealed in Ebrard’s interpretation in this way, no doubt, that he gives to ἐν αὐτῷ a different relation from that which he gives ἐν ὑμῖν, and changes the present παράγεται into the perfect.³ Nor is the

¹ Wolf assumes a peculiar antithesis between the two sentences: “Ratio fortassis aliqua reddi possit, cur ἔχειν et ἀκούειν ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς sibi invicem subjungantur. Prius enim ad illos spectaverit, qui ex Judaels ad Christum conversi erant; illi enim jam ante praeceptum hoc de amore mutuo ex lege Mosis et prophetis cognitum habebant; posterius respiciet ex-Gentiles, qui idem inter prima evangelicae doctrinae praecepta acceperant;” this amounts, partly, if not altogether, to what the Greek commentators adduce for explanation of the expression παλαιὰ. The arbitrariness of such an antithesis is self-evident.

² The same view is found in Castello, Socinus, and Bengel. The latter remarks on ἐντολὴν καινὴν: “Praeceptum novum, quod nobis nunc primum in hac epistola scribitur;” and on ὅτι: “Quod hoc est illud praeceptum,” to which he then very strangely adds: “amor fratris, ex luce.”

³ Ebrard says: “The eternally existing light is one which has already appeared ἐν αὐτῷ, in so far as in Christ the light objectivized has arisen for the world and has overcome the darkness, and ἐν ὑμῖν in so far as also subjectively to the readers the light of the gospel has arisen, and they also subjectively

opinion that we are to understand by *ἐντ. παλ.* the commandment of walking in light, and by *ἐντ. καινῆ*, on the other hand, that of brotherly love (ver. 9), tenable, because these commandments, according to their import, are not two distinct commandments, but one and the same commandment. Still more unjustifiable is the assumption of S. Schmid, that in ver. 7 the fundamental law of Christianity, namely, justification by faith, but here the commandment of Christian sanctification, is meant; and that of Weiss, that by *ἐντολή*, ver. 7, is to be understood the evangelical message of salvation, but here the commandment of love. The apostle, having in view here the same commandment as in ver. 7, says: "*Again a new commandment I write unto you, which thing is true in Him and in you: because the darkness is past, and the true light now shineth.*" The relative clause *ὁ ἔστιν, κ.τ.λ.*, serves not merely to establish the statement that the commandment is a *new* one (Socinus, Flacius, Morus, Hornejus, De Wette-Brückner, Lücke, ed. 2 and 3, ed. 1 of this commentary, Erdmann, etc.);¹ but the apostle thereby describes the commandment, yet not in a *material* way, so that *ὁ* would be referred to the substance of it (Oecumenius, Luther, Baumgarten-Crusius, Semler, Frommann, Düsterdieck, etc.),² but only in a *formal* way, as that which is actually fulfilled in Christ and in his readers; as the commandment in ver. 7 was also only defined in a formal way by *ἦν εἶχετε ἀπ' ἀρχῆς. — ὁ ἔστιν . . . ἐν ὑμῖν* is

have been drawn from darkness unto light." By *ἐν ὑμῖν* he means, therefore, the readers, in whom, i.e., in whose souls, the transition from darkness to light has taken place; by *ἐν αὐτῷ*, however, not Christ, in whom, but the world, for which that has happened objectively, inasmuch as Christ entered as the light into the darkness of the world. Quite a different meaning, therefore, is here assigned to *ἐν αὐτῷ* from that which is given to *ἐν ὑμῖν*, as the difference in the relation from the antithesis of "objective" and "subjective" clearly shows. — It is not merely the change of the present *παράγεται* into the perfect that is the cause of this treatment, for it appears elsewhere in the commentary, — thus on p. 148: "that which is true in Christ and in you, that the darkness *is past*," etc.; p. 150: "similar to the new announcement, that the darkness is past," etc.; p. 155: "It is the truth, that the darkness *is past*;" against which, on the other hand, *παράγεται* is correctly explained on p. 159: "the darkness is passing by, is in a state of passing away, of disappearing."

¹ For if *ὁ ἔστιν, κ.τ.λ.*, is, according to the intention of the apostle, to be referred to the idea of the newness of the commandment, he would — first, have given this idea a more independent form than he has given it as a simple attribute of the object *ἐντολῆν* depending on *γράφω*; and, secondly, not have given the confirmation of the statement (that the commandment is a *new* one) in a sentence which does not so much show the truth of

this idea as merely state the sphere in which that statement is true; to which may be added, that the idea so resulting is itself so indistinct, that it requires, in order to be understood, an explanatory circumlocution, such as: "that the commandment is a new one has its truth in Christ, inasmuch as it did not exist before Him," etc. (ed. 1 of this comm.). Besides, an emphasis unwarranted by the context is placed on the idea of the newness of the commandment, especially if it is thought that the following *ὅτι* again serves to establish the thought expressed in the confirmatory clause (Lücke, De Wette, Brückner).

² Düsterdieck, it is true, approves of Kuapp's paraphrase, which agrees with the above explanation: *πάλιν (ὡς) ἐντολῆν καιν. γρ. ὑμῖν τοῦτο ὁ ἔστιν ἀληθές, κ.τ.λ.*; but, with the idea of a *constructio ad sensum*, refers *ὁ* to the preceding *ἐντολῆν*, so that this forms the object of *γράφω*, which by the relative clause obtains its more particular definition. In opposition to this construction, De Wette has rightly observed that it has grammatical difficulty. When Düsterdieck, in reply to Lücke's objection, that with that interpretation it would need to run *ἢ ἔστιν ἀληθές*, says that it is not the *ἐντολή* itself as such, but its substance in Christ, etc., that has been fulfilled, Ebrard's observation is a sufficient answer: "That which is required in the *ἐντολή* is nothing else than just the *ἐντολή* itself; the requirement itself is fulfilled in Christ when its substance is fulfilled in Him."

the object belonging to γράφω, and ἐντολὴν καινὴν is to be taken as the accusative of more particular definition; this construction of it is found in Ewald, only he explains ἐν αὐτῷ incorrectly by "in the last-mentioned (in ver. 7) word of God;" most recently it has been accepted by Braune with the interpretation here given. The sense accordingly is: that which is already true, i.e., fulfilled, in Christ and in you, namely, the τηρεῖν τὰς ἐντολὰς τοῦ Θεοῦ (comp. John xv. 10, where Christ says of Himself, ἐγὼ τὰς ἐντολὰς τοῦ πατρὸς μου τητήρηκα), I write unto you as a new commandment.¹ With this view it is self-evident that the apostle calls the old commandment a *new* one only in so far as he writes it anew to them. It is true, a different reference has usually been given to καινῆ, by understanding it either of the constant endurance of the commandment of love,² or to indicate that this commandment first entered into the world along with Christianity — whether emphasis was put more upon the substance of it (Lücke, De Wette, ed. 1 of this comm.), or upon the mere time of it (Düsterdieck);³ but these constructions, not being indicated in the context, are purely forced. — On πάλιν, Erasmus says: *et contrarietatem declarat et iterationem; hic autem non repetitionis sed contrarietatis est declaratio*; with this interpretation almost all commentators agree, referring πάλιν to the idea ἐντ. καινῆν; but an antithetical construction is foreign to the word; it is = "again, once more," is to be connected with γράφω, and is explained by the fact that the readers have already heard the commandment, nay, even are already fulfilling it. Lücke and De Wette connect it directly with the verb, but in such a way that even they give to it an antithetical reference.⁴ — ἐστὶν ἀληθές]. ἀληθές signifies here the actual reality, as in Acts xii. 9 (see Meyer on this passage). — ἐν αὐτῷ]. ἐν is to be retained in its special meaning, not = "*respectu*, in reference to," nor is it used "of the subject in which something true is to be recognized as true (ver. 3)" (De Wette), for there is no mention here of any knowledge. That by αὐτός here not God (Jachmann), but Christ is to be understood, is shown

¹ That John places before his readers anew as a commandment that which already has been fulfilled in them, is clearly not more strange than that he declares to them truths of which he himself says that they know them already (comp. ver. 21). Brückner admits that the construction here advocated is simple and clear, but groundlessly thinks that "the strangeness of this form of speech" is not mitigated by the reference to ver. 21.

² Calvin: "Novum dicit, quod Deus quotidie suggerendo veluti renovat; Joannes negat ejusmodi esse doctrinam de fratribus diligendis, quae tempore obsolescat: sed perpetuo vigere."

³ On the basis of the right view of ἀπ' ἀρχῆς, ver. 7, we find the nature of the newness of the commandment indicated just in this; this, however, is only the case if the temporal reference is retained in its purity. This Düsterdieck indeed insists on; but this relation has only force if we regard at the same time

the substance of the commandment, as Düsterdieck does. But nothing in the context indicates this *new* substance, and it is therefore very differently defined by the commentators.

⁴ Lücke does so when he says: "In ver. 8, John continues *correctly* thus: Again a new commandment I write unto you." (In the edition of 1851, Lücke agrees with the usual acceptance: "Again — in contrast — a new commandment I write unto you;" see ed. 3, p. 249, note 1.) — De Wette does not expressly give his opinion about πάλιν; but when he thinks that John should properly have written: "again a new commandment I call it," and when he then paraphrases it: "The commandment of love is an old and long-known one to you; *but* (as it is altogether revealed as a new one by Christ) for you who partake in the newness of life it is in an especial manner a new one," the antithetical reference is clearly brought out by him also.

by the context. Socinus incorrectly explains *ἐν αὐτῷ* = *per se ac simpliciter*. On the point that *ἡμῖν* is not to be read, see the critical notes. Grotius unjustifiably understands by *ἡμῖν* the apostles. — Neander has a wrong conception of the relation of *ἐν αὐτῷ* and *ἐν ἡμῖν* when he explains: "it takes place in reference to Christ and in reference to the church, therefore in reference to their mutual relationship to one another." — *ὅτι ἡ σκοτία*, κ.τ.λ.]. *ὅτι* is not used *declaratively*, nor in such a way as to be dependent on *ἀληθές* ("it is true that the darkness," etc.), or on *ἐντολήν* (Castellio, Socinus, Bengel, Ebrard), — to both these views the structure of the verse is opposed, — but *causally*; this is rightly perceived by most of the commentators; but it is incorrect when they connect it with the immediately preceding *ὁ ἐστιν ἀληθές*, κ.τ.λ., for the double-membered clause, *ὅτι ἡ σκοτία . . . φαίνει*, being a confirmatory clause, does not stand in a corresponding relationship to the thought, *ὁ ἐστιν ἀλ. . . ἡμῖν*, which it is intended to confirm.¹ By *ὅτι*, κ.τ.λ., the apostle rather states the reason why he writes to them as a new commandment that which is true in Christ and in them (Düsterdieck, Braune); this reason is the already commenced disappearance of darkness, and shining of the true light. The contrasted words *ἡ σκοτία* and *τὸ φῶς τὸ ἀληθινόν* are to be taken in an ethical sense (Braune);² the former idea signifies the darkness which consists in error and sin, as it exists outside the fellowship with God; the latter, the light which consists in truth and holiness, as it proceeds from Christ, who Himself is the true light. It is incorrect to understand here by *τὸ φῶς τὸ ἀλ.*, Christ Himself (Bengel, Erdmann), as the contrast with *ἡ σκοτία* shows. *ἀληθινός* is an expression which is almost confined to the writings of

¹ With this connection of the thoughts, the double-membered clause *ὅτι ἡ σκοτία . . . φαίνει* must confirm both *ἐστιν ἀλ. ἐν αὐτῷ* and also *ἐστιν ἀλ. ἐν ἡμῖν*. Now, when Lücke makes the apostle to say, as a proof that the commandment to walk in light shows itself in Christ and in his readers as a new one: "Not only in Christ Himself (*ἐν αὐτῷ*) has the true light appeared, but it has also shed itself abroad, dispelling the darkness in the minds of his readers (*ἐν ἡμῖν*), and is shining in them," he attributes the thought really expressed by the apostle (*ἡ σκοτία . . . φαίνει*) only to *ἐν ἡμῖν*; while to *ἐν αὐτῷ*, on the other hand, he attributes an idea which the apostle has not expressed. — Brückner says: "The *ἐν αὐτῷ* refers to *καὶ τὸ φῶς*, κ.τ.λ., the *ἐν ἡμῖν* rather to *ἡ σκοτία*, κ.τ.λ.;" but this reference of the one member of the confirmatory clause to the one element of the thought to be confirmed must be regarded as unjustified, although Brückner thinks "it can easily be imagined that the apostle in the one part of the confirmation had in view rather the latter, and in the other rather the former part of the clause to be confirmed," for such a different reference is in no way hinted at; besides, *ἦδη* is here altogether left out of view. Düsterdieck

rightly establishes the proposition that the whole sentence *ἀληθ. . . ἡμῖν* is to be regarded as confirmed by the whole sentence *ὅτι ἡ σκ. . . φαίνει*; but when he then, in interpretation, says: "Already the darkness is dispelled by the true light, which shines in truth in Christ and in His believers (in so far, namely, as brotherly love attained its most perfect manifestation in the walk of Christ, and is exercised by believers also)," it is only the second part of the confirmatory clause that is referred by him to *ἐν αὐτῷ* *καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν*, but not the first part; and this indeed is quite natural, since in Christ a disappearance of darkness is not imaginable.

² It was to be expected that Weiss here also denies to the ideas *σκοτία* and *φῶς* the ethical meaning, and wants to be understood by the former only error, by the latter only the knowledge of God. Weiss himself, however, views them both so that they are of ethical — and not merely theoretical — character; and, moreover, as he admits that with the former error sin, and with the latter knowledge holiness, is necessarily connected, it is so much the more arbitrary to allege that John, in the use of these ideas, utterly ignored this necessary connection.

John; outside them it is only found in Luke xvi. 11, 1 Thess. i. 9, and three times in the Epistle to the Hebrews; it describes the light of which the apostle is speaking as the eternal, essential light, of which the earthly light is merely the transitory reflection; see especially Neander on this passage. — *παράγεται* is translated by the Vulgate as perfect: *quoniam tenebrae transierunt*; similarly by Luther: “the darkness is past;” and Calvin directly says: *Praesens tempus loco Praeteriti*. This, however, is arbitrary; the present is to be retained as such; it is used in the same sense as in 1 Cor. vii. 31: *παράγει* (see Meyer on this passage), so that we must interpret: “*the σκοτία is in the state of passing away.*” It is unnecessary to take *παράγεται*, with Bengel, with whom Sander and Besser agree, as passive (Bengel: *non dicit παράγει transit, sed παράγεται traducitur, commutatur, ita ut tandem absorbeatur*); it is more natural to regard it as the middle form with intransitive meaning. With the meaning “is in the state of passing,” corresponds the particle *ἤδη* with *φαίνει*, which is not = “now” (Luther), but by which the moment is described in which the darkness is retreating before the light, at which therefore neither has the darkness already completely disappeared, nor is the light completely dominant. Most of the commentators, both the older and more recent (Baumgarten-Crusius, De Wette-Brückner, Lücke, Sander, Düsterdieck, Erdmann, Ebrard), take this as referring to Christianity in general, in so far as by it, as the true light, the old darkness is being ever more and more overcome; but by the word *ἤδη* the apostle shows that in these words he is looking forward to a future time at which that victory will have been completely won, and which he regards as close at hand (so also Braune). The moment in which he writes this is in his eyes, therefore, no other than that which immediately precedes the second coming of Christ, and which He Himself in ver. 18 calls the *ἐσχάτη ὥρα*,¹ in which it is of the greater importance for Christians, by keeping the commandment, to show themselves as children of the light. The same train of thought essentially occurs here as afterwards in vv. 15–18; compare also the Pauline *ἡ νύξ προέκοιπεν, ἡ δὲ ἡμέρα ἤγγικε*, Rom. xiii. 12.

Vv. 9–11. Further definition of the life of light as life in love. — Ver. 9. *ὁ λέγων*; the same form as in ver. 4, to which the structure of the whole verse is very similar. *ἐν τῷ φωτὶ εἶναι* stands in close relation to what immediately precedes; although he alone is in the light who lives in fellowship with Christ, and belongs to the Church of Christ, yet *τὸ φῶς* describes neither Christ Himself (Spener, etc) nor “the church as the sphere within which the light has operated as illuminating power” (Ebrard). Chap. i. 6, 7, may be compared. — In contrast with *καὶ τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ μισῶν* is ver. 10, *ὁ ἀγαπῶν ἑαυτὸν*, in which the apostle states the substance of the *τηρεῖν τὸν λόγον τοῦ Θεοῦ* after the example of Christ. As *φῶς* and *σκοτία*, so *μισεῖν τ. ἀδ.* and *ἀγαπᾶν τ. ἀδ.* exclude each other; they are tendencies diametrically

¹ Rickli: “John says this of the time in which they are living, and in which the great work of the Lord had had a wonderful, rapid progress of development. The true Light, the Lord in His perfect manifestation of divine

truth, is already shining; . . . already the great morning is dawning for mankind. When the Lord shall return, then shall be the perfect day of God. Towards this manifestation all believers walk.”

opposed to one another; human action belongs *either* to the one *or* to the other; that which does not belong to the sphere of the one, falls into that of the other; Bengel: *ubi non est amor, odium est: cor non est vacuum*. Here also John speaks absolutely, without taking into consideration the imperfect state of the Christian, as is seen in the hesitations between love and hatred. — τὸν ἀδελφόν Grotius interprets: *sive Judaeum, sive alienigenam; fratres omnes in Adamo sumus*; similarly Calov, J. Lange, etc.; by far the greatest number of commentators understand thereby fellow-Christians. Apart from its exact meaning and the wider meaning = brethren of the same nation (Acts xxiii. 1; Heb. vii. 5), ἀδελφός is used in the N. T. generally, in Acts and in the Pauline Epistles always, to denote Christians; but in many passages it is also = ὁ πλησίον or ὁ ἕτερος; thus in Matt. v. 22 ff., vii. 3 ff., xviii. 35; Luke vi. 41 ff.; Jas. iv. 11, 12 (in Matt. v. 47 it describes our friendly neighbor). In the Gospel of John it is only used in the sense of relationship, except in chap. xx. 17, where Christ calls His μαθηταί “οἱ ἀδελφοί μου,” and in chap. xxi. 23, where οἱ ἀδ. is a name of Christians. If, therefore, according to the *usus loquendi* of the N. T., ὁ ἀδελφός may certainly be = ὁ πλησίον, yet in the Epistles of John, according to chap. iii. 11 (comp. Gospel of John xiii. 34, xv. 12; besides, especially with iii. 16, comp. Gospel of John xv. 13; there ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀδελφῶν τὰς ψυχὰς τιθεῖναι; here ὑπὲρ τῶν φίλων αὐτοῦ), and according to chap. v. 1 (where the ἀδ. is specifically called a γεγεννημένος ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ), we must understand by it *the Christian brother*; so that John, therefore, is speaking, not of the general love towards men, but of the special relationship of Christians to one another; comp. the distinction in 2 Pet. i. 7; Gal. vi. 10. — ἕως ἄρτι; “until now,” refers back to ἡδῆ, ver. 9; the meaning is: although the darkness is already shining, such a one is nevertheless *still* (*adhuc*) in darkness; on this peculiarly N. T. expression, see Winer, p. 439 (E. T., 470); A. Buttmann, p. 275 (E. T., 320); there is no reason for supplying, “even if he were a long time a Christian” (Ewald). With the ἐν τ. σκ. ἐστίν is contrasted (ver. 10), ἐν τῷ ὥρτι μένει; see on this ver. 6.¹ That the “exercise of brotherly love is itself a means of strengthening the new life” (Ebrard), is not contained in the idea μένει. Even if the idea of ver. 10—in relation to that of the 9th verse—is brought out more distinctly by μένει, this is much more done by the words καὶ σκάνδαλον ἐν αὐτῷ οὐκ ἐστίν. σκάνδαλον appears in the N. T. only in the ethical signification = “offence,” i. e., that which entices and tempts to sin; in the case of ἐν αὐτῷ, the preposition ἐν is generally either left unnoticed by the commentators (Grotius says, appealing to Ps. cxix: *est metonymia et ἐν abundant*. Sensus: *ille non impingit*), or changed in meaning; De Wette: “in his case (for him) there is no stumbling; comp. John xi. 9 ff.,” similarly Baumgarten-Crusius, Neander, etc.; Lücke even says: “ἐν αὐτῷ can here only signify the outer circle of life,” because “the σκάνδαλα for the

¹ Kōstlin incorrectly finds the reason why he who loves his brother remains in the light, in this, “that the Christian life of the individual requires for its own existence the support of all others.” Of such a support

the apostle is not speaking here at all; but the truth of his statement lies rather in this, that *love* and *light* are essentially connected with one another.

Christian lie in the world, and not in him;" with him Sander agrees. For such changes there is no ground, since, in the usage of the word, the figure (the snare, or rather the wood that falls in the snare) has quite given place to the thing; and it is therefore unnecessary to say, with Düsterdieck, that "in the expression *ἐν αὐτῷ* the thing itself penetrates into the otherwise figurative form of speech;" the offence may be outside a man, but it may be *in* him also; comp. Matt. v. 29, 30. The preposition *ἐν* is here to be retained in its proper meaning (Düsterdieck, Ewald, Braune). The sense is: In him who loves his brother, and thus remains in the light, there is nothing which entices him to sin. Some commentators refer *σκανδάλον* to the temptation of *others* to sinning; so Vatablus: *nemini offendiculo est*; Johannsen: "he gives no offence;" Ebrard: "there is nothing in them by which they would give offence to the brethren," etc.; but in the context there is no reference to the influence which the Christian exercises upon others, and if John had had this relationship in his mind, he would certainly have expressed it;¹ this is decisive also against Braune, who would retain both references. Paulus quite unwarrantably refers *ἐν αὐτῷ* to *τὸ φῶς*: "in that light nothing is a stumbling-block."—The beginning of the 11th verse repeats, in a form antithetical to ver. 10, that which was said in ver. 9; but with further continuation of the *ἐν τῇ σκοτίᾳ ἐστίν*.—The first subordinate clause runs, *καὶ ἐν τῇ σκοτίᾳ περιπατεῖ*. The difference of the two clauses does not consist in this, that the representation passes over from the less figurative (*ἐστίν*) to the more figurative (*περιπατεῖ*) (Lücke); for, on the one hand, *περιπατεῖν* is so often used of the ethical relationship of man, that it is scarcely any longer found as a figurative expression; and, on the other hand, the connection by *καί* shows that there is a difference of idea between the two expressions; this has been correctly thus described by Grotius: *priori membro affectus* (or better, *habitus*, Sander), *altero actus denotatur* (similarly De Wette, Baumgarten-Crusius, Braune). Both the being (the condition) and the doing (the result) of the unloving one belong to darkness; comp. Gal. v. 25. The second subordinate clause, *καὶ οὐκ οἶδε ποῦ ὑπάγει*, is closely connected with *περιπατεῖ*; *ποῦ*, properly a particle of rest, is in the N. T. frequently connected with verbs of motion; comp. John vii. 35, xx. 2, 13; Heb. xi. 8; in the Gospel of John especially, as here, with *ὑπάγειν*; see John iii. 8, viii. 14, etc.; in John xii. 35 it runs exactly as here: *ὁ περιπατῶν ἐν τῇ σκοτίᾳ οὐκ οἶδε ποῦ ὑπάγει*. The translation "where he is going," is false, for *ὑπάγειν* is not "to go," but "to go to." To the unloving one, the goal whither he is going on his dark way, and therefore the direction of his way, is unknown. By this goal it is not exactly the final goal, i.e., condemnation (Cyprian: *it nescius in gehennam, ignarus et caecus praecipitatur in poenam*), that is to be thought of, for the subject according to the context is not punishment; but by the figurative expression the apostle wants to bring out that the unloving one, not knowing whither, follows the impulse of his own

¹ When Ebrard finds no obstacle in the thought that he who loves his brother does not by any act give offence to others, he should

find no obstacle in the thought that there is nothing in him which becomes an offence to himself.

selfish desire: he does not know what he is doing, and whither it tends. As a confirmation of this *last* idea, the apostle further adds: *ὅτι ἡ σκοτία ἐτύφλωσε τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς αὐτοῦ; τυφλοῦν* does not mean "to darken," but "to make blind, to blind;" this idea is to be retained, and is not, with Lücke and others, to be enfeebled by an interpolated *tamquam*, as ("in the darkness they are as if blind"), by which the clause loses its meaning; the apostle wants to bring out, that, inasmuch as the unloving one walks in the darkness, the sight of his eyes is taken from him by this darkness, so that he does not know, etc. He who lives in sin is blinded by sin, and therefore does not know whither his sin is leading him; comp. John xii. 40 and 2 Cor. iv. 4.

Vv. 12-14. After the apostle has depicted the Christian life in its essential features, he passes on to exhortation. To this these verses form the introduction, in which the apostle assures his readers that their Christianity is the ground of his writing. The motive of this, which explains also the form of expression, is the earnest longing which inspires the apostle, that his readers may take home to themselves the following exhortation. — The apostle addresses them under four different names: *τεκνία* and *παιδία, πατέρες, νεανίσκοι*. By the two latter names they are distinguished according to the two corresponding degrees of age;¹ in the case of *πατέρες* the proper meaning is not to be strictly retained, but in contrast to *νεανίσκοι* it is = *γέροντες* or *πρεσβύτεροι*, the members of the church who are already in advanced age; thus Erasmus, Calvin, Socinus, Morus, Carpzov, Lange, Paulus, De Wette-Brückner, Lücke, Düsterdieck, Braune, etc. — The *νεανίσκοι* are the younger members of the church; Calvin: *tametsi diminutivo utitur, non tamen dubium est, quin sermonem ad omnes dirigat, qui sunt in aetatis flore et statu*. The view of Augustine is to be rejected, that under the three names the same persons are addressed whom the apostle only designates differently in different aspects: *filioli, quia baptismo neonati sunt; patres, quia Christum patrem et antiquum dierum agnoscunt; adolescentes, quia fortes sunt et validi*. So also is the opinion that the apostle has in view, not the difference in age, but the difference in the degree, or even in the length of existence, of Christian life; a Lapidé: *triplici hoc aetatis gradu triplicem Christianorum in virtute gradum et quasi aetatum repraesentat; pueri enim repraesentant incipientes et neophytos; juvenes repraesentant proficientes; senes perfectos*; similarly Clemens, Oecumenius, further Gagneius, Cajetanus, Russmeyer, Grotius,² etc. Some commentators (as Erasmus, Socinus, J. Lange, Myrberg) also refer the two expressions, *τεκνία* (ver. 12) and *παιδία* (ver. 13), to the difference of age, and understand by them *children*, in the proper sense of the word; but more prevalent is the view that this is true of *παιδία* only, and that *τεκνία*, on the other hand, is to be regarded as a form of address to *all* Christians; Calvin: *haec (namely, ver. 12) adhuc generalis est sententia, mox speciales sententias accommodabit singulis aetatibus*; similarly Luther, Beza, Calov, Wolf, Baum-

¹ That "the distinction between church leaders and church members appears in the distinction between old and young" (Hilgenfeld), is in no way suggested.

² Grotius: "Partitur Christianos in tres

classes, quae discrimina non secundum aetatem, sed secundum gradus diversos ejus profectus, qui in Christo est, intelligi debent," cf. 1 Cor. xiii. 11, 12; Heb. v. 13; Eph. iv. 13, 14.

garten-Crusius, Sander, Neander, Besser, Ebrard, etc. With the first view there arises a wrong succession, namely, children, fathers, young men; instead of, children, young men, fathers, or, fathers, young men, children; and, moreover, since *τεκνία* is in the Epistle frequently the form of address to all readers, and not only with but also without *μου* (see on ver. 1), so it is to be taken here also. Equally, however, by *παῖδια* the apostle addresses all readers; as Lücke, De Wette-Brückner, Düsterdieck, Gerlach, Erdmann, Ewald, Braune, rightly interpret. If we read before *παῖδια*, with the *Receptus*, *γράφω ὑμῖν*, there certainly results, if *παῖδια* is taken as alluding to children, a more accurate succession: fathers, young men, children; but (1) according to almost all authorities we must read, not *γράφω*, but *ἔγραψα*, and the former reading can only be explained in this way, that *παῖδια* was understood in its proper sense, and it was thought that this clause must be brought into the closest connection with the preceding; (2) then in the repetition of the same succession in ver. 14 one member of it is wanting, as the children are not mentioned again; and (3) in ver. 18 *παῖδια* is used as a form of address in reference to all readers; comp. John xxi. 5. Against the two last reasons it might indeed be alleged, with Bengel, Sander, and Besser, that from ver. 14 to ver. 17 is still intended for the *νεανίσκοις*, and that then in ver. 18 the address to the children comes in, and that the sequel as far as ver. 27 refers to them. But against this construction is: (1) the dissimilarity in the form of the sentences that thereby results; (2) the absence of an exhortation addressed to the fathers; (3) the unsuitable reference of the warning against false teachers specially to the children, with the additional remark, *οἴδατε πάντα*, ver. 20, and *οὐ χρείαν ἔχετε, ἵνα τις διδάσκῃ ὑμῶς*, even though the warning against false teachers in chap. iv. 1 ff. is referred without distinction to all readers; and, finally (4), the close connection of ver. 17 and ver. 18: *ὁ κόσμος παράγεται* (comp. ver. 8: *ἡ σοκία παράγεται*), and *ἐσχάτη ὥρα ἐστὶ*. — According to the true construction of the sentences, they fall into two groups; in each group first all Christians, and then specially the older and the younger members of the church, are addressed; ¹ the correctness of this construction is shown also by this, that in reference to *πατέρες*, and equally to *νεανίσκοις*, in both groups the same thing is expressed, but in reference to all there are different statements. The arbitrary conjecture of Calvin (with whom Wall agrees), that both the clauses of ver. 14 are spurious, and interpolated *temere* by ignorant readers, requires no refutation. — The interchange of *γράφω* with the aorist *ἔγραψα* is peculiar, and is not to be explained by saying that *ἔγραψα* points to another writing of the apostle, whether it be the Gospel (Storr, Lange, Baumgarten-Crusius, Schott, Ebrard, Hofmann, *Schriftbew.*, II. 2, § 336; Braune),² or even an earlier Epistle

¹ Even Ebrard regards the second triad as beginning with *παῖδια*, although he understands by it children in age; there is a glaring inconsistency in this construction.

² To this view the following reasons are opposed: 1. That if the apostle in *ἔγραψα* had another writing in view than in *γράφω*, he

would have expressed this distinctly; 2. That thereby the train of thought of the Epistle is unduly interrupted, since the assertion of the reason why he had written the Gospel is here introduced without any connecting link; 3. That then the emphasis contained in the three-fold repetition of *ἔγραψα* remains inexplicable

(Michaelis); both expressions rather refer, as most of the commentators have recognized, to this Epistle; not, however, to *the same thing*, as some commentators suppose; thus Bengel, who regards the two expressions as synonymous, explains: *verbo scribendi ex praesenti in praeterito transposito innuit commonitionem firmissimam*, which cannot be grammatically justified;¹ and Düsterdieck, who thinks that the "different import of the present and of the aorist can only be sought for in the representation of the writing itself; that both times the apostle means the whole Epistle lying before him; that by *γράφω* he represents himself in the immediately present act of writing, and by *ἔγραψα*, on the other hand, his readers, who have received the completed Epistle:" opposed to this, however, is the fact that such a change of the mere form of representation would certainly be rather trifling. The *ἔγραψα* must be referred to something else than the preceding *γράφω*; yet it is not, with Neander and Erdmann,² to be referred to that which is expressed in the clauses beginning with *γράφω*; for, on the one hand, the clauses beginning with *ἔγραψα* have not the form of confirmation, and, on the other hand, there is no real cause apparent for the addition of such a confirmation; it seems more appropriate when Rickli thinks that *γράφω* refers to what follows, and *ἔγραψα* to what precedes;³ but opposed to this is the fact that *ἔγραψα* would then stand more naturally before *γράφω*. The correct view has been taken by De Wette, Brückner, and Ewald, who refer *ἔγραψα* to what was already written, and *γράφω* to the immediate act of writing, and hence to the Epistle in general; taking this view, it is quite in order for John to write *γράφω* first, and that he then refers specially by *ἔγραψα* to what has been already written is explained in this way, that this contains the principal grounds for the following exhortations and amplifications.⁴ — In each part a clause beginning with *ὅτι* follows the address; this *ὅτι* is not

whereas it is perfectly justifiable if the reference to something written in this Epistle is intended to stimulate the readers more earnestly to attend to the following exhortation. The view of Ebrard, that "while the Epistle plainly could only be understood by grown people," the Gospel "is even for children (*παιδία*) enjoyable and pleasing food," scarcely any one will indorse; although even Braune passes this over in silence.

¹ When Buttman (p. 172 [E. T., 198]) thinks that the change of tense is entirely occasioned by the need for variation in a sixfold repetition of the verb, it may be observed against this, that then ver. 14a would be nothing but a repetition of ver. 13a.

² Neander explains: "As John had said: 'I write unto you,' so now he resumes confirmingly what has just been written, and says: 'I have written unto you,' as if he would say: 'It is agreed. This that I am now writing to you, I have now written, it is settled, I have nothing else to say to you, this you must always allow to be said to you.'" Erdmann:

"Pertinet hoc (*ἔγραψα*) neque ad superiorem epistolam, neque ad quidquam in hac ep. supra dictum, sed ad ea, quae modo verbo *γράφω* notata sunt." Similarly Paulus, who compares with this the expression: "His majesty decrees and has decreed."

³ Lücke, following Rickli, thought that with the first part (*ὅτι ἀφένονται, κ.τ.λ.*) corresponded the section ii. 15-17 in what follows, and i. 5-7 in what precedes; with the second part (*ὅτι ἐγνώκατε, κ.τ.λ.*), in the former ii. 18-27, and in the latter i. 8-ii. 2; and with the third part (*ὅτι νενικήκατε, κ.τ.λ.*), in the former ii. 28-iii. 22, and in the latter ii. 3-11; but he afterwards gave up this artificial, cruciform construction of the clauses, and explained the *γράφω* with *ἔγραψα* as belonging to the rhetoric of the author. See 3d ed. p. 265, note.

⁴ It is only if the signification of the section chap. i. 5-ii. 11 for the essentially hortatory Epistle is ignored, that it can be said, with Ebrard and Braune, that with this view the antithesis of *γράφω* and *ἔγραψα* becomes a mere repetition, or play upon words.

objective or declarative = "that" (Socinus, Lange, Russmeyer, Bengel, Paulus, Johannsen, Neander, Hilgenfeld, etc.), but causal, "because" (Calvin, Beza, Baumgarten-Crusius, Lücke, De Wette-Brückner, Gerlach, Düsterdieck, Myrberg, Ebrard,¹ etc.). The apostle does not want to say *what* he is writing, but *why* he is writing to them; comp. especially ver. 20, also vv. 21, 27, iii. 5, 14, 15, v. 18-20. The particular Christian experiences of his readers form the fundamental presuppositions of the Epistle; it is not any thing *new* that the apostle declares unto them, but he reminds them of what they know, so that they may take it more seriously to heart. — The first thing that the apostle, addressing all, reminds them of is: *ὅτι ἀφέωνται ὑμῖν αἱ ἁμαρτίαι διὰ τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ*. The forgiveness of sins is the basis of all Christian life; therefore this is put first. — On the form used here, the perfect passive *ἀφέωνται*, see Buttmann, *Ausf. gr. Gr.*, § 97, Anmerk. 3, and § 108, note 1; and Winer, p. 77 (E. T., 80). The Vulgate and Luther incorrectly translated it as if it were the present: "are forgiven" (similarly Rickli and others; Paulus strangely interprets, deriving it from *ἀφ' ἐώω = ἀφ' ἐώνται, dimittuntur*). — *διὰ* with the accusative is not = "through" (this meaning, as is well known, it has only with the genitive, comp. Acts x. 43: *ἄφεσιν ἁμαρτιῶν λαβεῖν διὰ τοῦ ὀνόματος αὐτοῦ*), but = "for the sake of;" *αὐτοῦ = Χριστοῦ*, not = Θεοῦ (Socinus, Paulus). According to most of the commentators, *διὰ τ. ὄν. αὐτοῦ* refers to the objective ground of the forgiveness of sins, and *τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ* signifies Christ Himself; thus Düsterdieck: "Christ who is what His name signifies;"² but this is contrary to the Biblical *usus loquendi*; if by *διὰ* Christ is referred to as the author of salvation, the preposition is always construed with the genitive; by *διὰ τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ*, therefore, it is the *subjective* ground of forgiveness that is stated (De Wette-Brückner, Braune), in this sense: because His name is in you, i. e., because ye believe on His name (comp. ver. 23: *πιστεύειν τῷ ὀνόματι Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*). The name is therefore not regarded as empty, but as the form which includes the contents and reveals them; so that the subjective ground embraces in itself the objective. — In the second group it is said, in regard to the readers of the Epistle there called *παῖδια*: *γρ. ὑμῖν . . . ὅτι ἐγνώκατε τὸν πατέρα*. By *ὁ πατήρ* we are not to understand, with Hornejus, Christ, inasmuch as believers *per fidem in nomen ejus renati sunt*, for such a designation of Christ has the constant *usus loquendi* of Scripture against it, but God; for the name *ὁ πατήρ* is used here without any more particular definition, with clear reference to *παῖδια*, and so God is here so called, not merely on account of His relationship to Christ, but equally on account of His relationship to those who, by

¹ Luther varies curiously in his translation: in ver. 12 he translates *ὅτι* "that," in ver. 13 "for," and in ver. 14 again "that." Sander thinks that in vv. 14 and 18 *ὅτι* is used causatively, but that in ver. 12 both "because" and "that" are contained in *ὅτι*. Erdmann takes *ὅτι* in the first three sentences *objectively*, but he leaves it undecided whether in the last three sentences it is to be taken *objectively* or *causally*.

² Similarly Sander: "God forgives our sins for the sake of the offering which Christ made; both of these — the person and work of Christ — are His name, for the sake of which we receive forgiveness." Besser: "for the sake of all that Christ is, from the manger to the throne." Ewald: "because Christ is and is called Christ."

faith in Christ, have obtained the forgiveness of their sins, and are thereby placed in the relationship of children to God. From this it is clear also how exactly *ὅτι ἀφένται ὑμῖν αἱ ἁμαρτίαι* and *ὅτι ἐγνώκατε τὸν πατέρα* correspond with one another. But in the fact that John ascribes to the believers both of these, he testifies to them that they are in possession of the fulness of divine peace and of divine truth. — In regard to the *πατέρες*, the apostle brings out the same thing in both groups, vv. 13 and 14: *ὅτι ἐγνώκατε τὸν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς*. If the forgiveness of sins and the knowledge of God are common to all, the knowledge of Him who is *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς* is specially appropriate to the older members of the church. When some commentators, as a Lapide, Grotius (*novistis Deum, qui Senex dierum*; Dan. vii. 9, xiii. 22), and others, understand by *ὁ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς* God, they ignore the deeper connection which exists between the particular ideas; *ὁ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς* is Christ, but not so called because He is the author of Christianity,¹ but because He is from all eternity; *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς* is used in the same sense as in chap. i. 1. John brings out by this designation of Christ the truth that Christ is subject of their knowledge in the quality of His being herein mentioned; it is therefore incorrect to understand *ἐγνώκατε* of the personal knowledge of Him who was manifest in the flesh (Bengel, Schoettgen, etc.); the word has rather the same meaning as in ver. 3.² John ascribes this knowledge to the *fathers*, because he might with justice assume that they had not contented themselves with a superficial knowledge of Christ in His appearance according to the sense, but had looked more deeply into the eternal nature of the Lord. — In regard to the *young men*, it is said in both groups: *ὅτι νενικήκατε τὸν πονηρόν*; not as if the same were not true also of the older members of the church, but John attributes this eminently to the young men, because *they*, in accordance with their age, had just recently obtained this victory, and their care therefore must be specially this, not to lose again what had been lately won. That *ὁ πονηρός* is the devil (comp. Matt. xiii. 19, 38, 39; Eph. vi. 16; 1 John iii. 12, v. 18, 19), the commentators have rightly recognized.³ Carpzov suitably says: *Viris fortibus et robustis tribuitur supra fortissimum et robustissimum victoria*. In the second group some further subordinate clauses precede that word, which state the conditions under which the young men have attained their victory: *ὅτι ἰσχυροὶ ἐστε; ἰσχυροί*, “strong in spirit,” with special reference to the fight, comp. Heb. xi. 34; Luke xi. 21; Matt. xii. 29 (Düsterdieck); here also *ὅτι* is “because,” not “that,” thus: “because ye are strong,” not “that ye are to be strong” (Paulus). — This conquering power of the young men is not their “own moral strength” (Baumgarten-Crusius), but the effect of the Word of God; therefore John

¹ Socinus: “Novi foederis et evangelii patefacti primum initium;” Semler: “Qui inde ab initio auctor fuit hujus melioris religionis.”

² Neander: “A knowledge of Christ as the One who is from the beginning, which results from the deeper communion with the personality of Christ. This is something else than

the statement of a certain formula about the person of Christ.”

³ Even Semler admits this, but then observes: “Est usitata Judaeorum descriptio, quae gravium peccatorum et flagitiorum magistrum diabolum designat, quam descriptionem non opus est ut Christiani retineant, quum non sint ex Judaeis.”

adds: *καὶ ὁ λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐν ἑμὶν μένει*, and only then brings in *καὶ νενικήκατε*, κ.τ.λ. — The individual sentences are simply placed side by side in order to let each of them appear the more strongly in its own meaning. The train of thought, however, is this, that their strength has its ground in the Word of God, which is permanent in them (*μένει*), and that it is in this power that they have attained the victory.¹ This relation is correctly stated by Grotius, who explains the first *καὶ* by *quia*, the second by *ob id*. — *ὁ λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ* is not = Christ, but the word proceeding from God, i.e., the Gospel, of which the personal Christ is no doubt the substance.

Vv. 15–17. A warning against love of the world, which is directed neither specially to the children (Oecumenius: *ἐπτόηται γὰρ ἕλ τὰ παῖδια περὶ τὸ φαινόμενον ἡδύ*), nor specially to the young men (Bengel, Semler, Besser), but to all (Bede: *omnibus haec generaliter ecclesiae filiis scribit*).

Ver. 15. *μὴ ἀγαπᾶτε τὸν κόσμον*]. The meaning of *ἀγαπᾶν* depends on that of the idea *κόσμος*. — *κόσμος* is with John eminently an ethical conception = mankind, fallen away from God, and of hostile disposition towards Him, together with all that it lives for and has made its own; comp. on Jas. i. 27, iv. 4 (similarly Gerlach, Besser, Düsterdieck, Myrberg, Ebrard, Braune).² The explanations that deviate from this are divided into three leading classes: (1) Those in which *κόσμος* is regarded as a total number of men indeed, but in a limited way; either = “the heathen world” (Lange), or, more indefinitely, “the mass of common men” (Oecumenius: *ὁ συρφετὸς ὄχλος, ὃς οὐ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς ἔχει ἀγάπην ἐν ἑαυτῷ*; Calovius: *homines dediti rebus hujus mundi*), or “the greater part of men” (Grotius: *humanum genus, secundum partem majorem, quae in malis actionibus versatur*); Storr limits the idea here “to that part of the world which the antichristians constituted.” (2) Those which understand *κόσμος* not of the human world itself, but of the evil dwelling in it; so says the Scholiast: *κόσμον τὴν κοσμικὴν φιληθνοῦσαν καὶ διάχυσαν λέγει, ἧς ἐστὶν ἄρχων ὁ διάβολος*; Luther: “the world, i.e., godlessness itself, through which a man has not the right use of the creatures;” to this class belong also the explanations of Calvin, Morus, S. Schmid, Semler;³ but in this abstract sense the word never appears elsewhere; and besides, taking this view, difficulties appear in the sequel which can only be

¹ Weiss groundlessly finds in what is said above an incorrect expression, and thinks that not the *abiding*, but the *being* of the Word of God in them is the ground of their strength; for to the Apostle John the *being* is really this only when it is a firm and abiding existence.

² It might not be incorrect to suppose that John, when he here and afterwards in his Epistle places the *κόσμος* in sharp contrast with believers, specially understands the sum-total of those who, as the light has come into the world, love the darkness rather than light (Gospel of John iii. 13), and therefore not unsave humanity as such, but those of mankind who resist salvation, while by *ὅλος ὁ*

κόσμος (li. 2) the whole human race, as needing salvation, is to be understood.

³ Calvin: “Mundi nomine intellige, quicquid ad praesentem vitam spectat, ubi separatur a regno Dei et spe vitae aeternae. Ita in se comprehendit omne genus corruptelae et malorum omnium abyssum.” Morus explains *κόσμος* by: “malum morale;” S. Schmid by: “corruptio peccaminosa;” Semler by: “vulgata consuetudo hominum, res corporeas unice appetentium.” Here may be enumerated also the interpretation of Erdmann: “Totus complexus et ambitus mali, quatenus hoc non solum toti generi humano, verum etiam propter hominum a Deo defectionem omnibus rebus humanis totique rerum naturae inhaeret.”

overcome by arbitrary interpretations. (3) Those explanations in which *κόσμος* is regarded as the total of perishable (actual) things; these things being regarded as purely physical, there lies in the idea *κόσμος*, in and by itself, no ethical meaning, but this appears only through the *ἀγαπᾶν* which is connected with it; the *κόσμος* as a creature of God is in itself good and irreproachable, but the love to the *κόσμος*, through which man centres his affections on it, and makes it the single aim of his activity, is to be blamed, because amid all association with earthly things it is not they, but God, that must be loved; thus there results for the command, *μὴ ἀγαπάτε τὸν κόσμον*, certainly an appropriate idea; but what follows in vv. 16 and 17 has induced almost all commentators who accept this view to give, nevertheless, to the idea *κόσμος* itself, more or less distinctly, an ethical reference; thus Lücke indeed says: "*ὁ κόσμος* is, as the sum total of the temporal and sensuous, in contrast (!) to the *πνεῦμα*, always only the objective sphere of evil, i.e., to which it tends as ethical direction and disposition," but immediately afterwards he explains the same idea "as the sum total of all sensuous appearances, which excite *the desire of the senses*;" still more definitely De Wette says: "the sum total of that *which attracts desire*, the temporal, sensuous, earthly—*regarded in contrast with God*." But this connection of the ethical reference with the idea of actual things is itself rather unsuitable: not in the things, but in man himself, lies the cause of the seductive charm which things exercise upon him; besides, it is not possible to retain this conception of the word without modification to the end of the 17th verse.¹ It is true some commentators² distinctly say that John here makes a sort of play upon the word; but such an assumption does too much violence to the clearness and certainty of the thought for us to approve of it. The right view, therefore, is to take *ὁ κόσμος* here in the same sense that the word prevailingly has throughout John's works, so that it signifies the world lying *ἐν τῷ πονηρῷ*. This *κόσμος*, this is the meaning of the apostle's warning, is not to be the object of the *ἀγάπη* of believers. From this it follows that *ἀγαπᾶν* here means neither "to love too much,"

¹ Thus Lücke finds himself compelled in the case of *πάν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ* to make an abstraction of the things themselves, and to understand thereby *their ethical reference*; and here results the certainly unjustifiable thought that this ethical reference of things has its origin in the things themselves (*ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου*). Still more decidedly De Wette says that in the words *ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου ἐστὶ*, ver. 16, "*ὁ κόσμος* is not regarded as the sum total of earthly things, but as the sensuous life alienated from God, or as the sum total of worldly men who enjoy this." Somewhat differently, Brückner: "that the sum total of earthly evil, of the *κόσμος*, is here regarded rather of *real things*, is clear from the subordinate clause *μηδὲ τὰ ἐν τῷ κ.*; in ver. 16, the *personal* aspect prevails." Neander, on ver. 16, equally devi-

ates from the explanation which he had given of ver. 15; in the latter he regards *ὁ κόσμος* as "the world and earthly things," but in the former as "the predominating tendency of the soul to the world, the growing worldliness of the soul, which blends itself with the world."

² Thus a Lapidé says (after he has assigned to the word three meanings, namely (1) "homines mundani, in his proprie est concupiscentia;" (2) "orbis sublunaris, in hoc mundo proprie et formaliter non est concupiscentia; sed in eo est concupiscentia materialis, i.e., objectum concupiscentie;" (3) "ipsa mundana vita vel concupiscentia in genere"): "omnibus hiis modis *mundus* hic accipi potest et Johannes nunc ad unum, nunc ad alterum respicit; *ludil* enim in voce *mundus*."

nor "to love with unhallowed sense," but love in the strictest sense of the word, consisting in a life of inner fellowship.¹ — *μηδὲ τὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ*]. As *κόσμος* is an ethical idea, natural objects as such cannot be meant by *τὰ ἐν τ. κ.*, but only these in so far as they are taken by the ungodly world into its service; or, better, the apparently good things which the world pursues, or with which it delights itself, and which therefore belong to it, as riches, honor, power, human wisdom, and such like. Ebrard erroneously understands thereby "the different kinds of sinful impulse, thought, and action, e.g., avarice, ambition, sensuality, and such like," for either of these is plainly a love (although a false, unholy love) which cannot itself again be regarded as the object of love. — *ἐάν τις ἀγαπᾷ τὸν κόσμον, οὐκ ἔστιν, κ.τ.λ.*]. By this sentence the apostle confirms the previous exhortation, expressing the incongruity of love to the *κόσμος* with the *ἀγάπη τοῦ πατρὸς*; Bede: *Unum cor duos tam sibi adversarios amores non capit*. By *ἀγάπη τοῦ πατρὸς* is to be understood neither the love of God to us (Luther II., Calovius), nor the *charitas quam Pater praescribit* (Socinus); but, as by far the most of commentators (Bede, Beza, Grotius, Vatablus, Spener, etc., and all the modern commentators, even Ebrard, despite his erroneous interpretation of ver. 5), interpret, *love to God*.² — If *πατρός* is the correct reading, then the name Father is here to be explained from the filial relationship of Christians to God, and points to their duty not to love the world, but God. — Between the two sorts of *ἀγάπη* here is the same exclusive contrast as between the *θεῷ δουλεύειν* and *μαμωνῇ δουλεύειν*, Matt. vi. 24. Compare also Jas. iv. 4: *ἡ φιλία τοῦ κόσμου, ἐχθρα τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐστίν*.

Ver. 16. Confirmation of the preceding thought that love to the world is inconsistent with love to God. — *ὅτι πᾶν τὸ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ*]. Bede incorrectly explains the neuter here (as it certainly does appear elsewhere in John) as masculine: *omnes mundi dilectores non habent nisi concupiscentiam*; most commentators regard the expression as identical with the foregoing *τὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ*; even Düsterdieck, who, in reference to the following *ἡ ἐπιθυμία, κ.τ.λ.*, thinks that a "change occurs from the representation of the objects of the love of the world to the subjective desire itself, and its actual manifestations." But even apart from the fact that the assumption of such a change in the form is only a makeshift, the expression of the apostle himself is opposed to this; for had he not meant by *πᾶν τὸ ἐν τ. κ.* something else than by *τὰ ἐν τῷ κ.*, he would have put the neuter plural here also. Besides, it must not be overlooked why the following, *ἡ ἐπιθυμία, κ.τ.λ.*, could not be the apposition stating the sense of *πᾶν τ. ἐν τ. κ.* (Fronmann, p. 269).³ Accordingly, the apostle means by this expression, all that forms the contents, i.e., the substance of the *κόσμος*; its inner life, which animates it (Braune): in what this consists.

¹ Lücke groundlessly thinks the idea of love must necessarily be weakened to that of "mere longing for," if by *κόσμος* the human world is understood.

² A combination of both interpretations: "Amor patris erga suos et filialis erga patrem" (Bengel), is clearly unjustifiable.

³ According to Ebrard, *πᾶν τὸ ἐν τ. κ.* is a resumption of *τὰ ἐν τ. κ.*; as, however, he understands by it various kinds of conduct, etc., that idea is rightly interpreted by him. Myrberg agrees with the interpretation given above.

the following words state. ἡ ἐπιθυμία τῆς σαρκός, κ.τ.λ.]. Although the ideas ἐπιθυμία and ἀλαζονεία in themselves denote a subjective disposition of man, yet several commentators think that here not this, but the objective things are meant, to which that subjective disposition is directed (Bengel, Russmeyer, Lange, Ewald), or that the otherwise subjective idea disappears into the objective (De Wette), or at least that both the subjective and the objective are to be thought of together (Lorinus, Brückner). But with the correct conception of the ideas κόσμος and πᾶν τὸ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ there is no apparent reason for such an arbitrary explanation, by which violence is done to the words of the apostle. — ἡ ἐπιθυμία τῆς σαρκός]. The genitive is here not the genitive of the object, but, as is the case with ἐπιθυμία¹ always in the N. T. (except 2 Pet. ii. 10; on Eph. iv. 22 comp. Meyer on this passage), the genitive of the subject, hence not "the desire directed towards the flesh," but "the desire which the flesh, i. e., the corrupted sensual nature of man, cherishes, or which is peculiar to the flesh;" comp. Gal. v. 17, ἡ σὰρξ ἐπιθυμεῖ. — Ebrard interprets, describing the genitive as that "of quality and reference," for which he wrongly appeals to Eph. iv. 22, 2 Pet. ii. 10: "the desire which occurs in the sphere of the flesh;" the apostle scarcely conceived the idea so indefinitely. The idea may be taken in a broader or in a narrower sense; the first view in Lücke ("fleshly, sensuous desire in general, in contrast to πνεύματι περιπατεῖν and ἄγεσθαι; comp. Eph. ii. 3; 1 Pet. ii. 11"), De Wette, Neander, Düsterdieck; in the second, the desire of sensuality and drunkenness is specially understood; Augustine: *desiderium earum rerum, quae pertinent ad carnem, sicut cibus et concubitus et caetera hujusmodi*; similarly Grotius, Baumgarten-Crusius, Sander, Besser, etc.; Brückner limits the idea to "the lust of the flesh in the narrower sense;" Gerlach specially to every sort of pursuit of *enjoyment*;² and Ebrard to "sexual enjoyments."³ The right explanation can be found only on the consideration of the following expression. — καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν, i. e., "the desire that is inherent in the eyes, that is peculiar to them;" the expression is explained in this way, that the desire of seeing something is attributed to the sense of sight itself.⁴ This idea also is understood in a broader and in a narrower sense. As Lücke calls the eyes, "as it were, the principal gates of sensual desire for the external world," he identifies this idea with the preceding one; De Wette does the same, interpreting it (in objective aspect): "what the eyes see, and by what *sensual desire* is excited." The connection by καί, however, which is further followed by a second καί, shows that the two ideas are to be definitely distinguished. Accordingly, most

¹ It is arbitrary for Ebrard to say: ἐπιθυμία is here — as in John viii. 44; Rom. vii. 8; Gal. v. 16, etc. — "that which one lusts after," which indeed he again cancels by translating the word by "lust."

² Even Bengel takes the expression (while, however, he understands it of the objective things) in a narrower sense: "Ea quibus pascentur sensus, qui appellantur fructivi: gustus et tactus."

³ This explanation results for Ebrard from the fact that he takes σὰρξ here = σῶμα, and then describes the idea "sensual" as identical with "sexual" (!).

⁴ Ebrard strangely thinks that in this view the genitive ὀφθαλμῶν is regarded as objective genitive = "the desire for eyes, i. e., for enjoyment of the eyes."

commentators justly regard ἐπιθ. τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν as the description of a special sort of ἐπιθυμία; thus (against De Wette) Brückner in subjective and objective view, "the lust of the eyes, and, at the same time, that in which, as sensuous and earthly, the eyes delight." Two different interpretations are found with a more exact definition. Very many commentators, as Luther, Socinus, Grotius, Hornejus, Estius, Lorinus, Wolf, Clarius, Paulus, Semler, Baumgarten-Crusius, Gerlach, etc.,¹ hold, though with some modifications, the expression to be substantially synonymous with πλεονεξία, avaritia. On behalf of this interpretation, appeal is made principally to several passages of the O. T., and especially to Eccles. iv. 8, v. 10; Prov. xxiii. 5, xxvii. 20; but erroneously, for even though the eye of the covetous or avaricious man looks with pleasure on his treasures, and eagerly looks out for new ones, still the possession or acquirement of wealth is to him the chief thing; the striving for it, however, is not expressed by the phrase ἐπιθυμία τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν. Still less justifiable is the explanation of Ebrard, who partly agrees with those commentators, but regards the idea of "avarice" as too narrow; and, with an appeal to passages such as Ps. xvii. 11, liv. 9, xci. 8, xcii. 12; Prov. vi. 17, etc., maintains that by ἡ ἐπιθ. τ. ὀφθ. is meant "the whole sphere of the desires of selfishness, envy, and avarice, of hatred and revenge (!)." Other commentators, on the contrary, retain the reference to the pleasure of mere sight, but limit this too much to dramatic performances, etc.; thus Augustine: *omnis curiositas in spectaculis, in theatris*; similarly, Neander and others. Such a limitation, however, is arbitrary; accordingly, others refer the expression to other objects of sight;² but it is more correct to take the reference to these things in a quite general way, and, with Spener, to interpret "all sinful desire by which we seek delight in the seeing itself" (so also Braune); besides, it is to be observed that ἡ ἐπιθυμία τ. ὀφθ. is not the desire for wealth, etc., which is excited by the sight (Rickli and others),³ but the desire of seeing unseemly things, and the sinful pleasure which the sight of them affords.⁴ Thus, this idea is quite exclusive of the ἐπιθυμία τῆς σαρκός; if the latter is taken quite generally, then the lust of the eyes is a particular species of it, which the apostle specially mentions in order to meet the idea that the desire of seeing any thing can have nothing sinful in it. But, having regard to the simple juxtaposition of the ideas by καί, it is more correct to suppose that John conceived the ἐπιθ. τῆς σαρκός not in that general sense, but in the particular sense of the "lust for wealth and immoderate enjoyment," so that the two ideas stand to one another in the relation not of subordination, but of co-ordination, both being subordinate to the general idea of ἐπιθυμία. — καὶ ἡ ἀλαζονεῖα τοῦ βίου]. ἀλαζονεῖα is usually translated by

¹ Sander also explains it of avarice, but would not exclude the *curiositas in spectaculis*, etc.; regarding this, however, as merely collateral.

² Thus Calvin: "Tam libidinosos conspectus comprehendit, quam vanitatem, quae in pompis et inani splendore vagatur."

³ Rickli interprets: "the low, sensual style of thought, in so far as this is excited and

fostered by the sight." Düsterdieck understands by it specially covetousness and avarice; but at the same time observes that every sort of desire may be excited by the eye.

⁴ Bengel extends the idea beyond the limit which lies in the expression itself, when he explains: "Ea, quibus tenentur sensus investigativi: oculus, sive visus, auditus et olfactus."

superbia, ambitio (Socinus: *ambitio in honoribus quaerendis ac sectandis*), and by similar words, and thereby is understood *ambition*, together with the pride and haughty contempt for others which are frequently associated with it;¹ thus Cyril interprets (*Homil. Pasch.*, xxvii.): ἄλαζονεΐαν τ. β. φησὶ τῶν ἄξιωματῶν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὸ ἡμέτερον ὕψος κατὰ γε τιμὴν καὶ δόξαν. Thereby, however, its peculiar meaning is not assigned to the word. In the N. T. ἄλαζονεΐα only appears in Jas. iv. 16 (in the plural); the adjective ὑλάζων in Rom. i. 30 and 2 Tim. iii. 2, in close connection with ὑπερήφανος, from which, however, it does not follow that the idea of ambition, thirst for glory, etc., is contained in it, but only that the ἄλαζ is related to ὑπερηφανία; in James is meant thereby — according to the context — the *haughtiness which overlooks the uncertainty of earthly happiness, and ostentatiously relies on its permanence*. In the same sense = *ostentatious pride in the possession*, whether real or pretended, of earthly good things, such as happiness, power, knowledge, etc., the word appears also in the Apocrypha of the O. T.; comp. *Wisd.* v. 8, xvii. 7; 2 *Macc.* ix. 8, xv. 6. In classical Greek ἄλαζονεΐα has almost always the collateral meaning of the unreality of proud ostentation,² which has obtained in Hellenistic usage only in so far that the idea here also always refers to something by its very nature worthless and trifling, and in this way certainly includes a delusion or unreality. This meaning is to be retained here also, as is rightly done by Lücke, Sander, Besser, Braune;³ for examples in the Scriptures, comp. 1 *Chron.* xxii. 1 ff.; *Eccles.* ii. 1 ff.; *Ezek.* xxviii. 16, 17; *Dan.* iv. 27; *Rev.* xvii. 4, xviii. 7, etc. The genitive τοῦ βίου serves for the more particular definition of the idea; βίος signifies in the N. T. either “temporal life” (1 *Tim.* ii. 2; 1 *Pet.* iv. 3, *Rec.*), or more commonly “the support of life, the means” (*chap.* iii. 17; *Mark* xii. 44; *Luke* viii. 43, xv. 12, 30, xxi. 4); it never has the meaning “conduct of life” (Ebrard). Following Polyb., *Hist.*, vi. 576: ἡ περὶ τοὺς βίους ἄλαζονεΐα καὶ πολυτέλεια, it is appropriate to take βίος here in the second meaning, and the genitive as objective genitive (so Lücke); as, however, σαρκός and ὀφθαλμίων are subjective genitives, it is much more correct to take βίου also as subjective genitive, and accordingly to interpret “the ἄλαζονεΐα peculiar to the βίος;” in the expression ἡδοναὶ τοῦ βίου, *Luke* viii. 14, τοῦ βίου may also be the objective genitive, thus: “the pleasures which refer to the βίος, the temporal good;” but more probably it is the subjective genitive here also, especially if it be connected with the preceding ideas (see Meyer on this passage), thus, “the pleasures peculiar to the present life.”⁴

¹ Calvin: “Fastus aut superbia, cui conjuncta est ambitio, jactantia, aliorum contemptus, coeans amor sui, praeceptis confidentia.”

² Theophr., *Charact.* 23: προσποιησίς τις ἀγαθῶν οὐκ ὄντων πρὸς δόξαν; Plato, *Phaedr.*: ἐξίς προσποιητικὴ ἀγαθοῦ ἢ ἀγαθῶν τῶν μὴ νπαρχόντων; antithesis of εἰρωνεία.

³ With this view Neander, Gerlach, and Düsterdieck substantially agree also; yet their paraphrases do not keep precisely enough within the definite limits of the extent of the idea, as they include ostentation, ambition,

etc.; a definite distinction between this idea and ἐπιθυμία is requisite. — Augustine not inaccurately describes the ἀλάζων thus: “jactare se vult in honoribus, magnus sibi videtur, sive de divitiis, sive de aliqua potentia.” Ebrard wrongly denies that according to Hellenistic usage the element of pride is contained in the idea ἄλαζονεΐα; neither in classical nor in Hellenistic usage has the word the meaning “luxury,” which he maintains for it.

⁴ The commentators for the most part express themselves somewhat vaguely. De

REMARK. — It has almost become traditional to find the modes of appearance of the evil fully stated in this threefold form, corresponding to the triplicity which appears in the Greek writers, as in Pythag. *Clinias*: *φιληδονία μὲν ἐν ταῖς ἀπολαύσει ταῖς διὰ σώματος, πλεονεξία δὲ ἐν τῷ κερδαίνειν, φιλοδοξία δὲ ἐν τῷ καθυπερέχειν τῶν ἴσων τε καὶ ὁμοίων*; for other expressions, see Wetstein.¹ This threefold form, it has been thought, is found both in the fall, and again in the temptation of Christ; thus Bede, following Augustine, says: *Per hæc tria tantum cupiditas humana tentatur; per hæc tria Adam tentatus est et victus; per hæc tentatus est Christus et vicit*; while a Lapidist finds expressed in it even the contrast with the three Persons in the divine Trinity.² — Bengel opposes this view, and makes such a distinction between the *ἐπιθ. τῆς σαρκός* and the *ἐπιθ. τ. ὀφθ.*, that he refers the former to the *sensus fructivi*, the latter to the *sensus investigativi*, but says of the *ἀλαζονεία τ. β.*: *arrogantia vitæ est, quæ cupiditatem foras educit et longius in mundum diffundit, ut homo velit quam plurimus esse in victu, cultu, etc.*; and then observes: *non concidunt cum his tribus tria vitia cardinalia: voluptas, avaritia, superbia; sed tamen in his continentur*. By the last clause Bengel shows, however, “that there is a trace of that scheme to be found even in him” (Düsterdieck). — Lücke has more decidedly expressed himself against it, inasmuch as he finds in that threefold form only “the three chief points of worldly lust” (according to the first edition, only “as examples”); and, moreover, the points “in which it proceeds from the sensual desire to the climax of the *ἀλαζονεία*.” But Lücke’s own interpretation of the particular ideas is opposed to such a progress, as he makes the first two ideas to coincide in regard to *their substance*, and thus no progress takes place from the one *ἐπιθυμία* to the other, nor is it, besides, in any way hinted at by the apostle. — Lücke rightly contends that particular leading vices are the subject here; not individual vices, but the leading forms (Lücke);³ or, as Brückner says, the leading tendencies of worldly sense are stated by the apostle in that threefold form. But in what relation do these stand to one another? According to Düsterdieck, the *ἐπιθυμία τῆς σαρκός* forms the superior idea, to which the two other ideas, as mutually co-ordinate, are in subordination: “The first-mentioned lust of the flesh, the most comprehensive and thorough description of the love of the world (ver. 15), embraces both the lust of the eyes and the pride of life.” This is incorrect. For, on the one hand, the *ἀγάπη* to the *κόσμος* is not to be identified with the *ἐπιθυμία τῆς σαρκός*, as the latter rather describes the inner nature of the *κόσμος*; the apostle warns against that love, because in the *κόσμος*

Wette explains: “the enjoyment, combined with pride of (earthly) life (not: of the good things of life);” Braune says that the genitive is to be taken as subjective genitive, and then interprets: “the genitive *τ. βίου* signifies the side on which ostentatious pride usually appears;” Ewald translates: “swindling in money,” which is not only indefinite, but even unjustifiable.

¹ Ebrard justly denies that a division of sin as such is to be sought for here; but his own view, that in that threefold form there is given a distribution of worldly conduct in its entire extent, and in this way, that first the relation of man to his own bodily and sensual nature is expressed, then the egotistical opposition

to his fellow-men, and finally, his relation to them and complication with them, is, as resting on a false interpretation of the particular ideas, just as little to be justified.

² The counterpart of these three forms of the sinful life is, according to a Lapidist, the three *primariæ virtutes*: *continentia, charitas, humilitas*, which coincide very exactly with the three monastic vows of chastity, poverty, and obedience.

³ When Lücke calls those three not merely the leading forms, but also the principles and sources of the worldly sense, this is not correct; for the worldly sense does not spring from the *ἐπιθυμία*, κ.τ.λ., but the latter is the living motion of the former.

the ἐπιθυμία which is not of God dominates; the thought that is to be supplied is this, that love to the κόσμος necessarily implies an entrance into its nature; and, on the other hand, the apostle's form of expression is utterly opposed to such a subordination; the two first-mentioned forms of worldly sense are by the same appellation ἐπιθυμία closely connected with each other, and distinguished from the third, which is not called ἐπιθυμία, but ἀλαζονεία;¹ it is unsuitable, however, to regard the latter as ἐπιθυμία; ἐπιθυμία is the *desire* directed to the attainment of any good — the lust *for* something (not exactly the lust or delight *in* any thing), but the ἀλαζονεία is a definite behavior in regard to the good which one possesses. The worldly man stands in a double relationship to the perishable good things; on the one hand, he *aspires* after them, whether he wants to possess and enjoy them or to delight himself with looking at them; on the other hand, he fancies himself great in them when he has them as his own. — That the whole sphere of sinful life is not here surveyed, Luther has noticed when he says: “The following three things are not of the Father, viz.: (1) hatred of the brethren; (2) the three idols of the world; (3) false and seductive teaching.” — Sander also brings out the same trichotomy of sinful corruption, appealing for it to chap. ii. 2-12, where the subject is the first, to vv. 15-17, where it is the second, and to ver. 19 ff., where it is the third. The apostle certainly mentions these different modes of the appearance of sin; but that the organism of the Epistle rests on this, is an assertion that goes too far.

The following words, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς, κ.τ.λ., express the anti-divine character of the worldly nature of the ἐπιθυμία, κ.τ.λ. — πατήρ, as in ver. 15; κόσμος here quite in the same sense as before. — εἶναι ἐκ is, according to Paulus, Baumgarten-Crusius, De Wette, not the description of the origin, but only of the connection and similarity; by this view, however, the depth of John's conception is ignored; the expression rather embraces both, but the second only as the result of the first (so also Ebrard); comp. John viii. 44. — By the addition of ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου ἐστὶ the antagonism between God and the world, as the source of the ungodly disposition, is brought out with peculiar distinctness.

Ver. 17 adds a new element to the preceding, whereby the exhortation of ver. 15 is strengthened and confirmed. — καὶ ὁ κόσμος παράγεται is frequently taken by commentators, with an appeal to 1 Cor. vii. 31, as an expression of the transitoriness of the world; either the present being changed into the future (Bede: *mundus transibit, quum in die iudicii per ignem in meliorem mutabitur figuram, ut sit coelum novum et terra nova*), or the peculiar nature of the world being regarded as described in it (Oecumenius: τὰ κοσμικὰ ἐπιθυμήματα οὐκ ἔχει τὸ μένον τε καὶ ἐστώς, ἀλλὰ παράγεται); Dusterdieck combines both; the apostle, according to him, expresses a truth “which holds good with ever present meaning, and which will thereby show itself some time in fact” (so also Ebrard and Braune). But ver. 8 and the following ἐσχάτη ὥρα ἐστὶν make it more than probable that the apostle here also uses παράγεται in the consciousness of the approaching second advent of Christ and the judgment

¹ Frommann (p. 270 ff.) justly remarks that the two leading forms are the ἐπιθυμία and the ἀλαζονεία; that the ἐπιθυμία signifies the

desire, and the ἀλαζονεία the action, which in the attainment of the object desired has already found its satisfaction.

on the *κόσμος* which is connected with it, thus, “*the world is in the state of disappearing*,” in 1 Cor. vii. 31, *παράγει τὸ σχῆμα τοῦ κόσμου τούτου* is said with the same feeling. — *καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία αὐτοῦ*]. With the world passes away also the *ἐπιθυμία* which dwells in it; whereby the apostle briefly refers to the threefold form previously named: *αὐτοῦ* is not genitive of the object (Lücke, Neander, Sander, Besser), but of the subject (Düsterdieck, Braune); though there is mention previously of an *ἄγαπᾶν τὸν κόσμον*, yet there is none of an *ἐπιθυμία* directed towards the *κόσμος*; the contrary view rests on an erroneous interpretation of *κόσμος*. — *ὁ δὲ ποιῶν τὸ θέλημα τοῦ Θεοῦ*, antithesis to *ὁ κόσμος*, which in its *ἐπιθυμία* does not do the will of God. It is true, “*ὁ πατήρ*” is previously put as antithesis to the *κόσμος*, but it does not follow from this that the antithesis here is not to be taken as fully corresponding, and “*ἐπιθυμιῶν*” to be taken out of *ἐπιθυμία* (Lücke); the appearance of this arises only from the fact that *κόσμος* is taken as something concrete. The expression used by the apostle is synonymous with *ὁ ἀγαπῶν τὸν Θεόν*; for the doing of the divine will is the effect of love to Him. — *μένει εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα*, antithesis of *παράγεται*; the expression signifies, as frequently, eternal, infinite endurance, comp. John vi. 51, 58, viii. 35, etc. That John regarded this abiding forever as the eternally happy life in the fellowship of God, is certain, but is not contained in the expression.¹ To the *κόσμος* is assigned *θίνατος*, to the children of God *ζωὴ αἰώνιος*.

Vv. 18-27. Warning against the antichrists, whose presence shows that the last hour has come. Description of them, and exhortation to believers to continue in that which they have heard from the beginning, combined with the testimony that they have known the truth. — This section stands in closest connection with the preceding one; for, in the first place, the preceding exhortation is occasioned by the thought that it is *ἐσχάτη ὥρα*, as is evidenced by the appearance of the *ἀντίχριστοι*; and, in the second place, the *ἀντίχριστοι*, of whom the apostle treats here, are, as it is put in chap. iv. 5, *ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου*.

Ver. 18. The appearance of the *ἀντίχριστοι* shows that the last hour has come. — *παῖδια*; not an address to the children (see on vv. 12-14), but to all readers.² — *ἐσχάτη ὥρα ἐστὶ*]. *ἐσχάτη ὥρα* may be the whole Christian era from the incarnation of Christ to His second advent. In the O. T. prophecy the appearance of the Messiah was promised *יְהוָה יִבְרָךְ* (Isa. ii. 2; Hos. iii. 5; Mic. iv. 1, LXX.: *ἐν ταῖς ἐσχάταις ἡμέραις*; comp. also Acts ii. 16). Hence arose among the Jews the distinction of the two eras: *יְהוָה יִבְרָךְ* (*αἰὼν οὗτος*) and *יְהוָה יִבְרָךְ* (*αἰὼν μέλλων*), the former the time up to the appearance of the Messiah, the latter embracing the Messianic time itself. — In the N. T. are found, partly the former idea that Christ has appeared in the *last*

¹ Ebrard arbitrarily explains that by *αἰὼν* is to be understood “the æon which will begin with the visible establishment in glory of Christ’s kingdom on earth,” and that *ὁ ποιῶν . . . εἰς τ. αἰῶνα* therefore means: “he who does the will of God shall remain till the establishment of the kingdom of Christ — he

will be permitted to see the victory of Christ’s kingdom.”

² For the contrary, Ebrard appeals to the peculiarly childlike character of this section; but plainly this bears no other character than the *whole* Epistle, of which Ebrard himself says that it could only be understood by adults.

time (Heb. i. 1; 1 Pet. i. 20), partly also the distinction of these two periods, but in this way, that the *αἰὼν οὗτος* does not close with the *first* appearance of Christ, but only with his *parousia*, which coincides with the *συντέλεια τοῦ αἰῶνος*; comp. Mark x. 30; Luke xx. 34, 35; Eph. i. 21. — Inasmuch as the period which begins with the birth of Christ is now the last preceding the *συντέλεια*, it may be described by the expression *ἔσχατη ὥρα*, as Calvin says: *ultimum tempus, in quo sic complentur omnia, ut nihil supersit praeter ultimam Christi revelationem.* This view is the customary one with the older commentators; Semler agrees with it, but the context is opposed to it; on the one hand, it results from vv. 8 and 17 that the apostle is writing with a presentiment of the *parousia* of Christ; and, on the other hand, the conclusion of this verse: *ὅθεν, κ.τ.λ.*, shows that the apostle cannot here mean the whole period extending from the first appearance of Christ to His second coming, but only a distinct time in it, namely, the time immediately preceding its termination; in favor of this also is the *usus loquendi* of the N. T.; comp. 2 Tim. iii. 1; Jas. v. 3; 1 Pet. i. 5; 2 Pet. iii. 3; along with which it is to be observed, that, especially in the Gospel of John, the day of judgment is called *ἡ ἡμέρα ἔσχατη*. Lücke, Neander, Baumgarten-Crusius, Gerlach, Erdmann, Myrberg, Ebrard, etc., have therefore rightly interpreted the expression as a description of this time. The hesitation to admit that the apostle was mistaken in his expectation of the nearness of the advent, has given rise to many a false interpretation. Socinus and Grotius think that *ἔσχατη ὥρα* is the time immediately preceding the *destruction of Jerusalem*; this view approximates to that of Düsterdieck, according to which the last time before the commencement of the *κρίσις* is meant, which had its beginning at the destruction of Jerusalem. But the scruple is not overcome by this, for chap. ii. 28 shows that John regarded the *παρουσία* of the Lord as near, and not as distant, just as the other apostles, and especially also Paul, according to 1 Thess. iv. 15, in view of which even Düsterdieck finds himself compelled to admit this; Besser urges the want of the article, and translates "a last time," i. e., the time before a special revelation of the judicial glory of Christ, in which the last hour before the universal final judgment is prefigured; but it is well known that the article is often wanting just with ideas which are definite in themselves; to which it may be added that the idea of such a succession of different epochs, which are to be regarded as special revelations of the judicial power of Christ, is nowhere found expressed in the N. T.¹ Oecumenius regarded it as likely that *ἔσχατη* here is used = *χειριστή*; this explanation is found in Schoettgen (*tempora periculosa, pessima et abjectissima*), Carpzov, and others (similarly Paulus: it is a late, i. e., dark, and ever growing worse, time); whereas the distinction between these ideas is perfectly clear from 2 Tim. iii. 1: *ἐν ἔσχαταις*

¹ Braune, who speaks of Calvin's view and that of Besser as "worthy of notice," expresses himself somewhat vaguely when he says: "The expression *ἔσχατη ὥρα* is to be taken prophetically, eschatologically, and has a value connected with the history of the kingdom,

even a *historical* reference to the *parousia* of Christ, as the beginning of the second era of the world, but no *chronological* reference to the date of the commencement of this *parousia*." Clearly a quite arbitrary assertion.

ἡμέραις ἐνστήσονται καιροὶ χαλεποί.¹ The result of an impartial exegesis therefore remains, that, as the other apostles, John also expected that the advent of the Lord would *soon* take place.² It was only when the first generation of believers was already dead, without that expectation having been fulfilled, that in the consciousness of Christians the period till the coming of the Lord extended to an indefinitely *distant* limit, without, however, extinguishing the hope of His *speedy* advent; comp. 2 Pet. iii. 4 ff.; but that later still, the time which began with the appearance of false teachers was regarded as the *last*, is proved by Ignatius, *Ep. ad Eph.*, c. xi. — καὶ καθὼς ἠκούσατε, κ.τ.λ.]. With the observation that it is the last time, the apostle connects the other, that in accordance with what his readers have heard, that the ἀντίχριστος would come, many ἀντίχριστοι have already come. Bengel supplies before καθὼς, “*et ita est*,” and after καὶ, “*adeo*” (*et ita est, sicut audistis, nempe antichristum venire: atque adeo jam multi, etc.*); these supplements are, however, unnecessary, for the καὶ before νῦν is not the simple copula, but serves to mark the appearance of the ἀντίχριστοι as a fact corresponding to the καθὼς ἠκούσατε, κ.τ.λ.: “*as ye have heard, etc., so, accordingly, many ἀντίχριστοι are even now actually appearing.*”³ καθὼς ἠκούσατε, namely, by the apostolic declaration which had been communicated to his readers (comp. vv. 7, 24) either by John, or even earlier, by Paul especially, according to Semler by Jewish teachers, who were spreading false rumors of the end of the world (!). ὅτι (ὁ) ἀντίχριστος ἔρχεται καὶ, κ.τ.λ.]. The present ἔρχεται is put for the future; it marks what is still future as a certainly occurring event. Ebrard incorrectly translates ἔρχεται by “is to come;” even in the passages cited by him, chap. iv. 3; Matt. xi. 3; Gospel of John xvi. 13; Rev. i. 8 (why not i. 4?), ἔρχεσθαι does not express simply the idea of the future; besides, Ebrard *interprets* correctly: “will one day appear.” — The prophecy that before Christ comes (hence before His *parousia*) Antichrist will come, accordingly formed a part of the apostolic preaching, although it

¹ Peculiar, but artificial, is Bengel's interpretation, which, moreover, rests on the false opinion that the children are here specially addressed. “*ultima, non respectu omnium mundi temporum sed in antitheto puerulorum ad patres et ad juvenes. Tres omnino horae erant, quarum una post allam et inchoavit, et conjunctim continuato cursu ad finem se inclinavit. Patrum itemque juvenum hora statim absoluta fuit. Hinc puerulis Johannes dicit: ultima hora est. Hac ultima hora nos etiamnum vivimus omnes.*”

² In opposition to the “prejudice” that the apostles regarded the advent as so near, Sander thinks that they could not possibly have imagined that “all the great changes, transformations, and developments,” to which 2 Thess. iii. 3, Rom. xi. 25, 26, Luke xxi. 24–28, allude, could be accomplished within a generation. But could not important events take place within a comparatively short period? As it was not the business of the apostles to foresee

the course of history, it cannot be any reproach on them if they cherished the hope that the longed-for coming of the Lord would soon occur, especially as they formed out of this hope no peculiar doctrine, and did not venture to determine the time and the hour. The certainly extravagant assertion of Ebrard, that it would have been contrary to the order of God's economy of revelation, if John, at the time when he wrote his Epistle, had not expected the second advent of Christ in the *near* future, rests entirely on Ebrard's views of the Apocalypse, from the visions of which, according to him, it could only be clear to the apostle for the first time that the ἔρχομαι of the Gospel of John xxi. 22 is to be understood of the coming of the Lord in a vision.

³ Dülsterdieck: “With the expectation ὅτι ὁ ἀντίχρ. ἔρχ., founded on the apostolic teaching, corresponds the fact already begun: ἀντίχρ. πολλοὶ γεγόνασιν.”

is not contained in the last discourses of Christ that have been handed down to us, for the *ψευδοπροφήται* and the *ψευδόχριστοι*, whose appearance Christ foretells, are not to be identified with the *ἀντίχριστος*. — According to the view which has prevailed from antiquity, the *ἀντίχριστος* and the *πολλοὶ ἀντίχριστοι* are to be distinguished in this way, that the latter are only the *πρόδρομοι* of the former, in which for the first time the antichristian spirit which already animates them will be revealed in his full perfection and energy. Bengel, deviating from this, takes the expression *ἀντίχριστος* as a collective idea: *ubi Joh. antichristum, vel spiritum antichristi, vel deceptorem et antichristum dicit, sub singulari numero, omnes mendaces et veritatis inimicos innuit. Antichristus pro antichristianismo, sive doctrina, et multitudine hominum Christo contraria dicitur*; with this interpretation, Lange, Baumgarten-Crusius, Besser, and Myrberg agree. But neither here nor in iv. 1 ff. does John say that antichrist has already come; here he merely indicates the fact that *πολλοὶ ἀντίχριστοι γεγόνασιν* as corresponding to the announcement of the coming of antichrist, and in the other passage it is merely stated that many *ψευδοπροφήται* are gone out into the world, and that the *πνεῦμα* of antichrist is already in the world. In the passage 2 John 7, “it is true that the explanatory clause *οὗτος ἐστὶν ὁ πλάνος καὶ ὁ ἀντίχριστος* refers so directly to the preceding *πολλοὶ πλάνοι*,” that it appears that “the identity is thereby indicated” (1st ed.); but this direct connection may, no doubt, be explained in this way, that he who speaks through the many is, according to John, no other than the one antichrist; and even though John “neither describes the *ἀντίχριστοι* as the *πρόδρομοι*, nor the *ἀντίχριστος* as the one in whom the principle that animates them is concentrated in highest potency,” it is to be remembered that John is speaking of the antichrist here, not in doctrinal aspect, but only in order to show by the heretics, whom he calls *ἀντίχριστοι*, that the *πνεῦμα* of antichrist is already *ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ*.¹ The name *ἀντίχριστος* is not found in the Scriptures outside of the First and Second Epistles of John; only in the later ecclesiastical literature does it appear frequently. — That the prefixed *ἀντι* does not express the substitutionary reference (as in *ἀντιβασιλεύς*), but the reference of antagonism, is with justice now commonly recognized; but the prevailing translation, “enemy of Christ,” is grammatically inaccurate, as in *substantive* compounds formed with *ἀντι* (in the antagonistic sense), the substantive is an object which by *ἀντι* is described as standing in opposition to an object of the same kind. Thus, an *ἀντιφιλόσοφος* is not an “opponent of philosophy” (Ebrard), or of philosophers, but a philosopher who is opposed to other philosophers, a hostile philosopher; comp. *ἀντιμαχητής, ἀντιπαλαιστής, ἀντιπολις, ἀντίβησις, ἀντίβροια, κ. τ. λ.*² Accordingly, *ὁ ἀντι*

¹ Weiss justly maintains, against Frommann and Reues, according to whom John has spiritualized or confused the dogma of antichrist, that he in no way denies the reality of the antichrist, although Weiss thinks that John regards the prophecy of the antichrist as fulfilled in this, that the spirit of antichrist has come into the world, and in the false teachers is denying the fundamentals of Christian truth.

² From this it is clear that the rule laid down by Lücke, that “the word compounded with *ἀντι* is the object of the opposition,” can by no means hold good for all compounds with *ἀντι*, inasmuch as the examples adduced by Lücke — *ἀντιρριον ἄκρον, ἀντιβόρειος, ἀντήλιος, ἀντιθυρος* — are not substantives; and, in the second place, *ἀντι* does not express in them the idea of hostile antagonism.

χριστος does not mean generally, the enemy of Christ, but the “*opposition Christ*,” i.e., that enemy of Christ who, under the false pretence of being the real Christ, seeks to destroy the work of Christ.¹ Almost all commentators have correctly supposed that John understands by this enemy the same as Paul speaks of in 2 Thess. ii. 3; the features which appear in the description of the Apostle Paul and in the statements of John correspond too closely to permit of this being doubted; according to both, his appearance in the Church is preceded by a falling away (John says in ver. 19, of the antichrists: *ἐξ ἡμῶν ἐξήλθον*; Paul in ver. 3 speaks of an *ὑποστασία* connected with his *ἀποκάλυψις*); both ascribe to him a God-opposing, wicked nature (Paul calls him *ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῆς ἁμαρτίας, ὁ ἄνομος*; John puts the *πνεῦμα τοῦ ἀντιχριστοῦ* in antithesis to the *πνεῦμα τοῦ Θεοῦ*, and says of the antichrists who are animated by the former, that they are *ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου*); both characterize him as a liar, who seeks to establish the lie against the truth; according to both, he appears in the last time before the *parousia* of Christ. Even the names correspond with each other; for, even though the name *ἀντίχριστος* contains an important feature which is not expressed in the name *ὁ ἀντικείμενος*, yet this very feature comes out so distinctly in the Pauline description, that it is clear how suitable John’s appellation of that enemy is; when, namely, Paul describes him as the *ἄνθρωπος τῆς ἁμαρτίας*, and afterwards says of him that he *ἀποδείκνυσι ἑαυτόν, ὅτι ἐστὶ Θεός*, this points to the fact that he will represent himself as the *incarnate God*, and this is just what is indicated in the name *ἀντίχριστος*.

REMARK.—On the various views of the antichrist, see Lünemann on 2 Thess. ii. 1–12, p. 204 ff., and Düsterdieck on this passage.—The Greek Fathers regard the antichrist usually as a man who, as an instrument of the Devil, imitates the true Christ, comp. Hippolyt., *De Consummat Mundi*, c. vi. 14, c. xlviii.; Cyril, *Catech.* xv.; yet there is also found the incorrect view that he is the incarnate Devil himself (comp. Theodoret, *Epit. Div. Decret.*, c. xxiii., and *Comment. in Dan.*, ii.; Hippolyt. c. xxii.).—Like the *parousia* of Christ, so the appearance of antichrist also belongs still to the future: of antichrists, as they had appeared in the time of John, there has never since been any lack; but the antichrist has not yet come, and it was equally arbitrary for Grotius to regard Barkochba, or others Mohammed, or Luther the Pope, or Catholics Luther, and so on, as antichrist.—Not merely rationalistic writers, but also Lücke, De Wette, Neander, and others, distinguish *form* and *idea* in John’s representation of the future appearance of the antichrist. As the fundamental *idea*, they regard the thought, that, equally with the development of Christianity, the evil will gradually increase more and more in its contest against Christ, until at last, when it has attained its highest summit, it will be completely conquered by the power of Christ. As the *form*, they regard the representation that this highest energy of the evil will finally appear in one *single* person. For such a

¹ While Brückner agrees with the explanation given here, it is opposed by Braune; but he does not pay attention to the grammatical vindication. Besides, it is to be observed that the more particular definition of “false pre-

tence” does not lie in the word itself, but certainly in the fact, since there is only *one* Christ; it is different in the case of the word *ἀντιφιλόσοφος*.

distinction it is difficult, however, to show any justification, as Scripture itself gives no suggestion of it; it is therefore rightly rejected by Düsterdieck, Braune, Brückner.

In the words *καὶ νῦν ἀντίχριστοι πολλοὶ γεγόνασιν*, the apostle mentions the fact in which the expectation, *ὅτι ὁ ἀντίχριστος ἔρχεται*, is beginning to be realized. The *ἀντίχριστοι* are the heretics who accept the lie described in ver. 22; but they bear that name because the *πνεῦμα τοῦ ἀντιχρίστου* animates them, and thus the antichrist himself is already revealing himself in them. *γεγόνασιν* is not = *coeperunt esse* (Erasmus), but "they have become," i.e., they are already in existence. By means of the subordinate clause *ὄθεν γινώσκουμεν, κ.τ.λ.*, the connection between the two first parts of the verse is to be recognized.

Ver. 19. Relation of the *ἀντίχριστοι* to the Christian Church. — *ἐξ ἡμῶν ἐξῆλθαν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἦσαν ἐξ ἡμῶν*]. On the form of the second aorist with *a*, see Winer, p. 71 (E. T., 73). — By *ἡμῶν* we are not to understand the Jews (Grotius, Eichhorn, Rickli), nor the apostles (S. Schmid, Spener, Besser, and others), but Christians in general, as the Church of Christ.¹ *ἐξῆλθαν* is taken by several commentators = *prodierunt* (Vulgate, Baumgarten-Crusius, Erdmann, and others), finding the idea of origin expressed in it: this is incorrect; the following *μεμενέκεισαν* shows that it is rather to be taken in the sense of *secessio* (so Augustine, Bede, Erasmus; and among the moderns, Lücke, Düsterdieck, Ebrard, Braune, and others). By the emphatic position of *ἐξ ἡμῶν* it is brought out that the antichrists were previously *μεθ' ἡμῶν*, and belonged therefore to the Christian Church. How far this separation had been formally accomplished, John does not say; but it is contained in *ἐξῆλθαν* that they had taken up an antagonistic position, not merely to the apostolic doctrine (Beza: *ad mutationem non loci sed doctrinae pertinet*), but to those who by their faithful observance of the unadulterated gospel proved themselves to be the children of God (as also Braune). — *ἀλλ' οὐκ ἦσαν ἐξ ἡμῶν*]. *ἀλλ'* expresses the contrast to the preceding thought: although they went out from us (and therefore were connected with us), yet they were not of us. *εἶναι ἐκ* expresses connection in the most complete reality, thus: they were not of us, viz., in such a way that they would have really belonged to us, as common members of *one* body, in which *one* soul lives; in contrast to which the *εἶναι μετὰ* contained in the following *μεμενέκεισαν ἂν μεθ' ἡμῶν* expresses the *outward* fellowship as distinguished from the former idea. Even here *ἐκ* does not depart from its original meaning (see on ver. 16), for he only truly belongs to the Church of the Lord who in regard to his inner life has proceeded from it, i.e., from the Spirit ruling in it.² The imperfect

¹ Ebrard finds himself compelled by his interpretation of *παιδία* not to include in *ἡμεῖς* those addressed, but to say "the apostle puts himself and the Church in contrast to the little ones whom he addresses."

² Düsterdieck: "That those antichrists left the fellowship of the believers, follows from *μεμενέκ. ἂν μεθ' ἡμῶν*; but the original, *ἡμεῖς*,

ethical relationship of those men who *went out* from the bosom of Christian fellowship, and fell away from it, is indicated by the different meaning in which the same phrase *ἐξ ἡμῶν* appears, on the one hand, with *ἐξῆλθαν*, with which *μεμενέκ.*, κ.τ.λ., is to be combined; and, on the other hand, in the expressions *οὐκ ἦσαν ἐξ ἡμῶν* and *εἰ γὰρ ἦσαν ἐξ ἡμῶν*.

ἦσαν embraces the whole previous period during which the antichristians were connected with the believers, and does not merely refer to the time immediately preceding their separation (Episcopius, Socinus). — That they were not ἐξ ἡμῶν, John proves by the words, εἰ γὰρ ἦσαν ἐξ ἡμῶν, μεμενήκεισαν ἂν μεθ' ἡμῶν. The ἀντίχριστοι belonged therefore to the Christians for a while; they were μετ' αὐτῶν, although not ἐξ αὐτῶν, for in this case they would also have remained μετ' αὐτῶν. Here, too, John proceeds on the idea that the μένειν is the evidence of the εἶναι. On the pluperfect without the augment, see Winer, p. 70 (E. T., 72). — ἀλλ' ἵνα φανερωθῶσιν, κ.τ.λ.]. ἀλλά refers back to ἐξῆλθον, or to the thought, οὐ μεμενήκασι μεθ' ἡμῶν, “but they have not remained with us.” Less simply Düsterdieck interprets: “they have not remained with us, but (ἀλλά) they have been separated from us, in order that.” Such a double supplement is not necessary, for ἀλλά is not necessarily the antithesis of a negation. — By ἵνα, κ.τ.λ., it is not the result (Paulus), but the purpose, that is stated, — the purpose, namely, of their separation or not remaining, which was willed by God; the purpose is that it might be manifest that they are not ἐξ ἡμῶν. The connection of φανερωθῶσιν with the following ὅτι οὐκ εἰσὶ πάντες ἐξ ἡμῶν is not quite regular; Socinus construes οὐ and πάντες together: non omnes = nulli, i. e., nemo ex illis est ex nostro numero: this is incorrect; οὐ πάντες is not = nulli, but = nonnulli. De Wette rightly supposes the conjunction of two thoughts, viz., (1) ἵνα φανερωθῆ, ὅτι οὐκ εἰσὶ πάντες ἐξ ἡμῶν; and (2) ἵνα φανερωθῶσιν, ὅτι οὐκ εἰσὶν ἐξ ἡμῶν, only De Wette should have put the second thought first, for John's immediate intention was, as the plural φανερωθῶσιν shows, to speak only of the ἀντίχριστοι, but then he extends his idea so as to introduce the new subject πάντες; the sense is: it was to be made manifest in the ἀντίχριστοι that they were not — and therefore that all who were μεθ' ἡμῶν were not — ἐξ ἡμῶν (so also Braune).¹ — For the work of the Christian Church it is necessary that it shall be manifest who really belongs to it, and who does not; this κρίσις is the purpose for the sake of which God has so arranged it that those ἀντίχριστοι should go out: comp. with the idea in 1 Cor. xi. 19.

REMARK. — In the words, εἰ ἦσαν ἐξ ἡμῶν, μεμενήκεισαν ἂν μεθ' ἡμῶν, this thought is contained: He who really belongs to the Church never leaves it; he who leaves it shows thereby that he did not really belong to it. This confidence of the apostle in the preserving love of the Lord, and in the faithfulness of those whom He has saved, seems to be opposed to the idea brought out in Heb. vi. 4 ff., that even those who were once enlightened, and have tasted of the heavenly gift, and were made partakers of the Holy Ghost, etc., may fall away. But, as constantly in his Epistle, so here also John speaks absolutely, without taking into view the state of gradual development, from which, however, it does not follow that he does not recognize it. The one circumstance that he exhorts believers as such to abide in Christ, shows that he would not deny the

¹ Myrberg interprets: “Sed (egressi sunt) ut manifesti redderentur; nam non omnes sunt de nobis;” but incorrectly, for (1) φανερωθῶσιν requires a more particular definition; and (2) the idea: “non omnes sunt

de nobis,” cannot serve to establish the idea φανερωθῶσιν. According to Hilgenfeld, πάντες is to be referred only to the antichrists: “that they all were not of us;” but this is refuted by the position of πάντες.

possibility of their falling away; only it is — justly — certain to him that he who does not abide had not yet with his *whole* heart entered into the fellowship of the Lord, but even though touched by His love, and exhibiting the trace of love towards Him, had nevertheless not broken completely with the world. Ebrard thinks that the apostle means only, that temptation by this particular lie (namely, by Gnosticism) is only possible with those who in their inner being were previously strangers to Christianity; but even though John here speaks of particular antichrists, yet the *general* thought is at the basis of the words *ἐῖς ἡσαν* uttered in reference to them; otherwise the apostle would have definitely pointed out the difference of *these* apostates from *others* to whom the word has no reference. — Augustine, Calvin, Beza, etc., find in the words a confirmation of *their* doctrine of predestination, but only by inserting in them ideas which are foreign to them, since the subject here is neither a *donum perseverantiae* nor a distinction of the *vocati* and *electi*.

Vv. 20, 21. Testimony that the believers, to whom the apostle writes, know the truth. — *καὶ ὑμεῖς χρίσμα ἔχετε*]. The apostle writes this neither as a *captatio benevolentiae* (Lange), nor as a justification of the brevity of his writing on the foregoing subject (a Lapide), nor for the purpose of quieting his readers, “who at the appearance of so many antichrists might possibly be alarmed for the safety of their own faith” (Lücke), but in order to make the warning contained in his words in reference to the antichristian lie the more forcible; see on ver. 12. — Most commentators take *καὶ* here as *particula adversativa* (so even De Wette; more cautiously, Lücke: “the logical relationship of this verse to ver. 19 is that of an antithesis, therefore *καὶ* becomes logically adversative”); the incorrectness of this view is recognized indeed by Dusterdieck and Ebrard, yet they maintain the antithetical reference of this verse to the preceding one; and of course in itself there is nothing against the supposition of a connection of adversative ideas by the simple copula; but that an adversative relationship occurs here is very much to be doubted, for the apostle did not now need to say to his readers that they, as such as have the *χρίσμα*, were in opposition to the antichrists, and, besides, in the sequel that idea is not further followed up.¹ It is more suitable to the context, to connect the first part of this verse closely with the second, and in this two-clause sentence to find the presupposition stated for what is said in the following verse (so also Brückner). — *χρίσμα* appears in the N. T. only here and in ver. 27; according to Greek *usus loquendi*, it is the *anointing oil*; as in the O. T., for example, Exod. xxix. 7, xxx. 31. “In the O. T. the holy anointing oil is constantly the type of the Holy Spirit, both where anointing appears as a figurative action (besides the passages quoted, in 1 Sam. x. 1 ff., xvi. 13, 14) as well as where it appears in figura-

¹ By this, however, it is not meant that the apostle, when he turns to his readers with *ὑμεῖς*, does not contrast them at all with the antichrists, but only that he does not do it in *this* sense, that he wishes thereby to emphasize a contrast between them. Had the apostle intended this, he would certainly not have used *καὶ*, for in *such* antitheses *καὶ* is only

suitable when the predicates exactly correspond with one another (e.g., *they* have τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ ἀντιχριστοῦ, and *ye* have τὸ πνεῦμα Θεοῦ); but even then, usually *δέ* is used (comp. Matt. v. 21, 22, and many other passages), or no particle at all (comp. John iii. 31, etc.).

tive language (Ps. xlv. 8; Isa. lxi. 1). But that which in the O. T. is presented in type and shadow, in the N. T. has appeared in truth and substance" (Besser); *χρῖσμα* is therefore a symbolical expression for the *Holy Spirit*, as *χρίειν*, moreover, is frequently used of the gift of the Holy Spirit; comp. Acts iv. 27, x. 38; 2 Cor. i. 21. With this most of the commentators agree, only that *χρῖσμα* is usually incorrectly explained as the act "*unctio*, anointing," and this is then taken as a description of the Holy Spirit; so by Augustine, and even by De Wette, Ewald, Sander, and Erdmann. It is erroneous to understand *χρῖσμα* of the "true tradition about Christ, vividly transmitted, proceeding from the apostles" (Köstlin, p. 243), or of the working of the Holy Spirit (Didymus: *charitas, quae diffunditur in cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum*; Socinus: *divinum beneficium cognoscendi ipsas res divinas, quatenus homini est opus*; Emanuel Sa: *christianismus*), or of the act in which the Spirit is given to Christians, thus of baptism (Ewald) or of confirmation. Oecumenius wrongly finds here (*ἐλάβετε διὰ τοῦ βαπτίσματος τὸ χρῖσμα τὸ ἱερόν, καὶ διὰ τούτου τὸ εἰς πάσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ὁδηγοῦν ὑμῖς θεῖον πνεῦμα*) an allusion to the old custom of anointing the candidate for baptism; this custom does not belong to the apostolic age, but was probably first introduced by this passage, as Bengel has observed.¹ It is, on the whole, less likely that John was here thinking of the communication of the Spirit by means of baptism, as is usually supposed, than that he was thinking of that by means of the preaching of the gospel (Düsterdieck), as in the whole context there is nothing to suggest the former.² That John uses just the word *χρῖσμα* is not without meaning; as in the O. T. not only kings, but also priests and (sometimes) prophets were anointed, he reminds believers thereby "of their high honor, calling, office, and glory" (Sander).³ If it be the case that there is also an allusion in it to the name of the Antichrist (Bengel, Düsterdieck), then the apostle wanted to bring out that believers in possession of the *χρῖσμα* are enabled to fully know the *antichristian ψεῦδος* in its contradiction to the *ἀλήθεια*; see ver. 21. — *ἔχετε ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀγίου*]. For *ἔχετε*, in

¹ As Bengel thinks that this whole section is addressed to the children, he says: "Eam unctionem spiritualem habent τὰ παῖδια pueruli; namque cum baptismo, quem susceperunt, conjunctum erat donum Spiritus s., cuius, significandi causa ex hoc ipso loco deinceps usu receptum esse videtur, ut oleo corpora baptizatorum ungerentur." — How in modern times this passage is misused as a proof of the post-apostolic origin of the Epistle, see the Introduction, sec. 3.

² As quite arbitrary interpretations, we may further mention here that of Semler and that of J. J. Hess (*Flatt's and Susskind's Magaz.*, vol. xiv.); the former, on the false assumption that the Epistle is addressed especially to the presbyters also, explains *χρῖσμα* by: *legitima auctoritas docendi*, and adds: *χρῖσμα est idem ac χάρισμα illud, cuius auctor spiritus s., qui per apostolos imperti-*

tur doctoribus; and the latter understands by it the instruction which the churches of Asia Minor received about Antichrist through the Apocalypse.

³ Neander: "That which in the Old Covenant was connected only with individuals to whom in some way the guidance of God's people was intrusted, with individuals who thereby were singled out from the mass of the rest of the people, this under the New Covenant is connected with the people of God in general. . . . There are therefore no longer among the people of God any such distinctions as there were in the Old Covenant between kings, prophets, priests, and people. . . . They are one kingly priestly race, whose nobility and high destination all share; all are prophets by virtue of that common enlightenment by the Holy Spirit."

ver. 27, ἐλάβετε is put; the possession rests upon a reception, and this, indeed, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἁγίου; ὁ ἅγιος is—following the correct interpretation of χρίσμα—not the Holy Spirit (Didymus, Lorinus, Semler), but either *God* (Rickli, Besser, Neander: “ἀπό indicates the source;” which, however, is not always the case),—comp. John xiv. 16; 1 Cor. vi. 19: τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος, οὐ ἔχετε ἀπὸ Θεοῦ,—or more probably, as most commentators think, *Christ*; comp. John xv. 26: ὁ παράκλητος, ὃν ἐγὼ πέμψω ὑμῖν παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς; and John vi. 69, where Christ (according to the overwhelming authorities) is called ὁ ἅγιος τοῦ Θεοῦ; in favor of which is the fact that John, in ver. 29, calls Christ δίκαιος, and in chap. iii. 3, ἄγνος (comp. also Acts iii. 14; Rev. iii. 7).—That the bestower of the χρίσμα is called by John ὁ ἅγιος (whether it be God or Christ) arises from this, that the anointing with the Spirit is an act of *making holy*, i.e., of separation from the world; but he only can *make holy* who himself is holy.—καὶ οἴδατε πάντα]. Bengel, according to the sense, explains καὶ correctly by *et inde*; the possession of the χρίσμα is the reason of the εἰδέναι πάντα.—πάντα is not masculine (Syrus: *omnes*; Bede: *discernitis inter probos et improbos*), but neuter. Calvin rightly says: *omnia, non universaliter capi, sed ad praesentis loci circumstantiam restringi debet*: still it must not be restricted merely to those things (*quae sunt*) *necessaria agnoscendis antichristis et cavendis illorum insidiis* (Bengel), but it embraces along with these τὴν ἀλήθειαν in general (ver. 21); comp. John xiv. 26, xvi. 13: πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. In the possession of the whole truth Christians are also enabled to distinguish lies and truth.¹

Ver. 21. οὐκ ἔγραψα ὑμῖν does not refer to the whole epistle (Beza), but to that which is said of the antichrists; comp. ver. 26.²—ὅτι οὐκ οἴδατε τὴν ἀλήθειαν, κ.τ.λ.]. ὅτι = because (comp. vv. 12–14); the apostle does not want to teach the *anointed* Christians for the first time the truth which was revealed in Christ, but he is writing to them because they know it; a Lapidé: *non ut haec vos doceam, sed ut doctos confirmem*.—καὶ ὅτι πᾶν ψεῦδος, κ.τ.λ.]. This ὅτι is not co-ordinate with the preceding one, but is dependent on οἴδατε. Luther, correctly according to the sense: “but ye know it, and know that,” etc.—πᾶν ψεῦδος, quite generally, though with special reference to the antichristian doctrine; ψεῦδος: “not merely error, but lie” (De Wette)—the absolute antithesis of ἀλήθεια; Lange quite arbitrarily thinks that the abstract is here put for the concrete: “that no false teacher can be a genuine Christian.” It is incorrect to take πᾶν . . . οὐ as a Hebraism = οὐδέν; οὐ belongs rather to the predicate.—ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας οὐκ ἔστι]. ἐκ here also indicates the source, and does *not* express *merely* the connection (De Wette, Baumgarten-Crusius). Because the lie is not *of* the truth, so also it has no connection with it; Lorinus: *ex vero non nisi verum sequitur, et verum vero consonat*. Whence the lie, which is not ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας, originates, Christ says in John viii. 44: The truth is *from* God, who is Himself the truth; the lie from the Devil, who is not in the truth.

¹ The genuinely Catholic interpretation of Estius is worthy of notice: “Habetis episcopos et presbyteros, quorum cura ac studio vestrae ecclesiae satis instructae sunt in his,

quae pertinent ad doctrinae christianae veritatem.

² Ebrard refers this ἔγραψα also arbitrarily to the Gospel of John.

Vv. 22, 23. The existence of the antichrists and their relationship to the Christian Church having been previously stated, there follows now the more particular definition of the antichristian lie. — *τίς ἐστιν ὁ ψεύστης*. The interrogative form, with which John addresses his readers who know the truth, is explained by the vividness of the feeling with which the apostle is writing; similarly in chap. v. 5. He passes from the abstract (*πᾶν ψεύδος*) directly to the concrete (*ψεύστης*). The definite article *ὁ ψεύστης* (Luther incorrectly: *a liar*) brings out the idea in clearer distinctness: *the liar* *κατ' ἐξοχήν*, i. e., he in whom the lie appears in concrete personality (so also Braune), identical with *ὁ ἀντιχριστος*, which is denied by Jachmann through mistake of John's idea. The thought is weakened by the supposition that the apostle is speaking here comparatively (Grotius: *quis potest major esse impostor?*). Nor is Bengel's interpretation satisfactory: *qui est illius mendacii imposturaeque reus?* with which Düsterdieck agrees, when he paraphrases: "What sort of a lie I mean, ye know very well. Who are the liars? Are they not those who deny, etc.?" The apostle certainly has the particular lie of the antichrists of his time in view, but this he regards as the *one* chief and fundamental lie "in which all *ψεύδος* is comprised" (Lücke). The explanation of Baumgarten-Crusius is plainly quite erroneous: "what else is a false doctrine than, etc.?" nor is that of Ebrard less so, as he finds in this *catechetical* (!) question intended for *children* this meaning: "on whose side is the lie?" with which he then supplies the corresponding question: "and on whose side is the truth?" — *εἰ μὴ ὁ ἀρνούμενος*. *εἰ μὴ*, often after a negation, may also stand after a question, as in this a negation is contained; comp. Luke xvii. 18; Rom. xi. 15; 1 Cor. ii. 11; 2 Cor. ii. 2; 1 John v. 5; it corresponds to the German "*als nur*" (English: "but only," "except"), and limits the general thought to a particular one; the sense accordingly is: No other is the liar but he who, etc. According to Ebrard, *εἰ μὴ* must here only have the meaning of "than," because the question here is, which *of the two dogmatical tendencies* (!) belongs to the lie; that the apostle here has in view *two* parties, namely, the antichrists and the believing Christians, and asks which of them is in possession of the truth, is a pure fiction, for which there is not the slightest evidence in the text. *ὅτι Ἰησοῦς οὐκ ἐστιν ὁ Χριστός*]. On the construction of the negative idea *ἀρνεῖσθαι* with the following *οὐκ*, by which the negation is more strongly emphasized, see Kühner, II. p. 410. — The lie of the antichrist consists in the denial that Jesus is *ὁ Χριστός*, i. e., in the denial of the identity of Jesus and Christ, whereby is meant, according to ver. 19 and chap. iv. 3, not the Jewish unbelief, that Jesus is not the promised Messiah, but the Gnostic heresy of the *distinction between Jesus and Christ*, which forms the sharpest contradiction to the apostle's doctrine that Jesus is the *λόγος σὰρξ γενόμενος*. It is erroneous to find here a reference to two different kinds of heresy; on the one hand, the denial of the *divine*, on the other, the denial of the *human*, nature of Jesus;¹ for John speaks only of *one* lie. — *οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἀντιχριστός*].

¹ So Tertullian (*de Praescript.* c. 33): "Joh. in ep. eos maxime antichristos vocat, qui Christum negarent in carne venisse et qui

non putarent Jesum esse Filium Dei; Illud Marcion, hoc Ebion vindicavit." Similarly Besser: "That Jesus was not the Christ, the

οὗτος refers back to *ὁ ἀρνούμενος*: the liar who denies the identity of Jesus and Christ, he is the antichrist. It is natural to take *ὁ ψεύστης* and *ὁ ἀντιχρ.* here in a general signification, and to find therein a justification for Bengel's conception of John's idea of antichrist; but as the lie of the antichrists proceeds from the *πνεῦμα τοῦ ἀντιχριστου*, it may be ascribed to the antichrist himself; the individual antichrists are the mouth by which he speaks. — *ὁ ἀρνούμενος τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὸν υἱόν* is not to be connected with *οὗτος*, so that the sense would be: this one, who denies the Father and the Son, is the antichrist; but as a clause of more particular definition subordinate to *ὁ ἀντιχριστος*. "John hereby adds a new element which states the full unhappy consequence of that antichristian lie" (Düsterdieck; similarly Braune). The apostle wants to bring out here that the denial that Jesus is *ὁ Χριστός* is in its very essence a denial of the *Father* and of the *Son*. He who denies the identity of Jesus and Christ directly denies the Son, for the Son is no other than *Ἰησοῦς ὁ Χριστός* (neither an æon named Christ that did not become man, nor Jesus who is not Christ, or, according to John i. 14, the Logos);¹ but he who denies the Son denies also the Father, and not merely inasmuch as Son and Father are logically interchangeable ideas, but because the nature of the Father is only manifested in the Son, and all true knowledge of the Father is conditioned by the knowledge of the Son, so that the God of those who deny the Son is not the true God, but a false image of their own thoughts, an *εἰδωλον*.²

Ver. 23. Confirmation of the last stated thought in two clauses which express the same idea, only in different form.³ — *πῶς ὁ ἀρνούμενος τὸν υἱόν, οὐδὲ τὸν πατέρα ἔχει*. *ἀρνεῖσθαι τὸν υἱόν* is in meaning synonymous with *ἀρνεῖσθαι, ὅτι Ἰησοῦς οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ Χριστός*. The assertion that John here confounds with the idea of Christ that of the Son, i.e., of the eternal Logos (De Wette and others), is erroneous; it is not Christ apart from Jesus that he regards as the Son, but Christ in his identity with Jesus (Düsterdieck, Brückner). — Instead of saying in the second part of the first clause *καὶ ἀρνεῖται*, corresponding to the first part, John says, *οὐδὲ . . . ἔχει*, which has a wider import, for *ἔχειν* is to be taken emphatically = "to possess in living fellowship" (Düsterdieck); the explanation of Beza is insufficient: *nec patrem esse*

Christ not Jesus. Either the *Word* that was from the beginning was separated from this Jesus, or the *flesh* was denied to the eternal Word." Comp. Introd. sec. 3.

¹ Weiss correctly brings out the distinction between the ideas *Χριστός* and *υἱός*, when he observes that *ὁ Χριστός* is a historical conception to the apostle, and that it is enough for him that that proposition of the false teachers denies the Messiahship of Christ, from which all belief in Him must take its starting-point, in order to arrive at the recognition that Jesus is the Son of God, and thus in the Son to recognize the Father.

² That such commentators as proceed on rationalistic assumptions have not been able

to interpret the thought of the apostle, is quite natural. But even others have got a more or less indistinct view of it by putting, as Düsterdieck rightly says, "the ideas of John too directly into dogmatic forms (and, indeed, into those defined by the Church);" or by ignoring the realism of the apostle, and regarding what he considered in an objectively real way as a mere element of the subjective consideration; or, finally, by bringing out one-sided references instead of giving the ideas the due force of their entire comprehension.

³ Braune, rightly: "Here is the progress from the denying to the having, and from the particular (*ὁ ψεύστης*) to the general (*πῶς*)."

credit (better, a Lapide: *habere in mente et fide, in ore et confessione*); the thought of the apostle is utterly eliminated when, with Socinus, Episcopus, Grotius, *ἔχειν τ. πατέρα* is explained by "to know the will of God;" erroneously Storr also: "to him is the Father not gracious."—In the following words: *ὁ ὁμολογῶν, κ.τ.λ.*, which are wanting in the *Recepta* (see the critical notes), *ὁμολογεῖν* forms the antithesis of *ἀρνεῖσθαι*; it means a confession which is the expression of faith (Matt. x. 32; Rom. x. 10). In regard to the construction, Ebrard rightly remarks: "That *τὸν υἱόν* is dependent on *ὁμολογῶν*, and not along with *καὶ τὸν πατέρα* (as in 2 John 9) on *ἔλκει* (in which case *ὁμολογῶν* would be used absolutely), clearly results from the preceding words, to which these form the antithesis."

Vv. 24, 25. Exhortation to the faithful keeping of the gospel. Ver. 24. *ὑμεῖς*]. By the *Recepta*, *ὑμεῖς οὖν*, the correct relationship of this verse is taken away; it is not a conclusion from what immediately precedes (Düsterdieck, Braune), but with the emphasized *ὑμεῖς* it is put in contrast with what is said of the false teachers; Theophylact: *ἐλείνοι μὲν οὖν οὕτως ὑμεῖς δὲ ἄπερ ἠκούσατε ἀπ' ἀρχῆς φυλαττετε παρ' ἑαυτοῖς.*—In regard to the construction: *ὑμεῖς ὁ ἠκούσατε ἀπ' ἀρχῆς, ἐν ὑμῖν μενέτω*, Beza and Socinus, it is either an attraction (*ὑμεῖς ὁ ἠκ.* for *ὁ ὑμεῖς ἠκούσ.*, so also Bengel: *antitheton est in pronomine, ideo adhibetur trajectio*; De Wette: "*ὑμεῖς* is properly no doubt the subject of the relative clause placed first;" Jachmann)¹ or an ellipsis (*ὑμεῖς = quod ad vos attinet*); Paulus and Ebrard regard *ὑμεῖς* as the pure vocative; but it is more correct to admit an anacolouthon which has its natural origin in this, that the apostle's thought in opposition to the false teachers was first directed to his readers, but equally also to the word which they had heard from the beginning; accordingly the apostle begins with *ὑμεῖς*, but does not follow it up by *μένετε ἐν* or a similar expression, but by *ὁ ἠκούσατε, κ.τ.λ.*, as a new subject; comp. Winer, p. 534 (E. T., 574); Buttman, p. 325 (E. T., 380). The same anacolouthon in ver. 27.² With *ὁ ἠκούσατε ἀπ' ἀρχῆς*, comp. ver. 7; thereby, of course, the whole gospel is meant, but here specially the fundamental doctrine of it, — that Jesus is the Christ. — *ἐν ὑμῖν*]. Theophylact interprets *ἐν* by *παρά*; Luther: "among;" but the preposition must be retained in its proper meaning; for upon that it depends that what was heard "abides in the soul as something that determines the life" (Neander; comp. John xv. 7), because only then does that take place which the apostle expresses in the sequel. — *καὶ ὑμεῖς . . . μενεῖτε*]. The *καὶ* before the concluding clause brings out more clearly its corresponding relationship to the preceding clause; here it is so much the more significant, as in both clauses the same verbal idea *μένειν* is used: If the Word remain in you, ye also will remain in the Son, etc.³ That our remaining in the Son is the immediate

¹ The idea of an attraction is erroneous, because "*ὑμεῖς*, if attracted to the relative clause, would be too strongly emphasized in this position" (Winer).

² Myrberg's reply, that *ὑμεῖς* is rather to be regarded as nominative absolute, is met by the fact that the use of the nominative absolute is precisely an anacolouthon.

³ Düsterdieck: "By *καὶ* before *ὑμεῖς* John specifies the promised consequence which will correspond to the condition which is stated, while at the same time he brings out the nice point which is contained in the significant interchange of *ἐν ὑμῖν μεῖνῃ* and *ὑμεῖς ἐν τῷ υἱῷ . . . μενεῖτε.*"

result of the *Word* remaining in us, is explained by the fact that "the words of Christ substantially contain nothing else than a self-revelation or explanation of His person and His appearing, and similarly the evangelical proclamation of the apostles is only the copy of this preaching of Christ Himself" (Weiss). ἐν τῷ νίῳ is put first, because fellowship with the Father is conditioned by fellowship with the Son.

Ver. 25. Καὶ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπαγγελία, κ.τ.λ.] αὕτη may be referred either to what precedes, or to the concluding words of this verse: τὴν ζωὴν τὴν αἰώνιον. In the first case the meaning is: and this remaining is what He has promised, namely, eternal life. Gagnejus: "*Manere in filio et patre promissio est, quam nobis pollicitus est orans pro nobis patrem Dominus Joh. xvii. 20. Bene ergo ait de hoc Johannes: haec est promissio, quam pollicitus est nobis, quae quidem est vita aeterna; vita enim aeterna est manere in Deo eoque frui hic per gratiam, in futuro per gloriam;*" τὴν ζωὴν τὴν αἰώνιον then forms an apposition, by which that very remaining is described as happiness; this view in Oecumenius, and among modern commentators in Sauder, Besser, Weiss. In the second case the thought is, "and eternal life is the promise which He has given us;" taking this view, a new thought, it is true, enters with ver. 25, and it requires something to be supplied to connect it with the preceding, perhaps what a Lapidé gives: *si in ipso maneamus* (Spener: that is the promise if we remain in the Word, and consequently in the Father and the Son); but nevertheless it is, in accordance with the analogy of John's mode of expression, to be preferred; comp. chap. i. 5, v. 14; similarly also chap. iii. 23, v. 11; in the last two passages the connection with what precedes appears clearly enough by both being connected with the same idea, whereas here there is no previous mention of the ἐπαγγελία; but even here the connection is not to be mistaken, because the ζωὴ αἰώνιος is directly connected with the μένειν ἐν τῷ νίῳ, κ.τ.λ. This second interpretation in a Lapidé, Grotius, Lorinus, Russmeyer, Spener, Lücke, De Wette, Düsterdieck, Erdmann, Myrberg, Ebrard, Braune, and others. — καὶ is not used here αἰτιολογικῶς (Oecumenius), but is the simple copula. — ἡ ἐπαγγελία: "the promise." Lücke unnecessarily conjectures that instead of this perhaps ἀπαγγελία is probably to be read, or that ἐπαγγελία has here the meaning, "proclamation," for neither is it the case that the idea of the promise refers only to the distant future life, nor, according to John, that Christ does not bestow any promise.¹ — αὐτός is Christ, who in this whole passage forms the centre round which all the statements of the apostle move. — On the accusative τὴν ζωὴν, which has occurred through the attraction of the verb in the relative clause, comp. Winer, p. 583 (E. T., 628); Buttmann, p. 68 (E. T., 78).

Vv. 26, 27. Conclusion of the section on the antichrists.

¹ From this passage it is clear that with John ζωὴ αἰώνιος and the *knowledge of God* are not by any means, as Weiss thinks, identical ideas; for if John here, according to the view of Weiss, describes the abiding in the Son and in the Father as the ζωὴ αἰώνιος, he then mentions what this consists in, as something

plainly transcending the idea of knowledge; but if αὕτη is directly connected with τὴν ζ. τ. αἰών., then the abiding in the Son and the Father is considered as the condition of the ζωὴ; it is impossible, however, for it to be the condition of knowledge, for it rather presupposes the latter.

Ver. 26. *ταῦτα* refers to all that the apostle has written about the anti-christs from ver. 18 down. In calling them here *οἱ πλανῶντες ὑμᾶς*, he gives it to be understood that their efforts were directed to seduce the Church from the truth of the gospel to their lie; that their purpose had actual effect (Braune) is not indicated by the verb. — Ver. 27. In the first part of this verse the apostle testifies to his readers that they do not need any teacher, in which he goes back to what he had already expressed in vv. 20, 21. — *καὶ ὑμεῖς*]. *καί* is here used just as in ver. 20. — On the anacolouthon, see on ver. 24. — *τὸ χρίσμα ὃ ἐλάβετε ἀπ' αὐτοῦ*]. *τὸ χρίσμα* is, with Braune, to be regarded as the accusative, for the juxtaposition of two nominatives could not be explained; the apostle probably had an *ἔχετε* in his mind, instead of which, however, he then wrote *μένει ἐν ὑμῖν; αὐτοῦ*, i. e., *Χριστοῦ*; so the context demands; *αὐτός*, ver. 25. Herein lies a proof that *τοῦ ἁγίου* in ver. 20 is to be understood of Christ. — *ἐν ὑμῖν μένει*]. The indicative, instead of which the imperative is used in ver. 24, expresses the certain confidence of the apostle. — *καὶ οὐ χρεῖαν ἔχετε*]. This sentence, which by *καί* is made co-ordinate with the preceding, stands to it in the relation of conclusion; meaning: since, as is not to be doubted, the Spirit is in you — and abiding — you do not need; Bengel describes this relation correctly by *et ideo*. — *ἵνα τις διδάσκη ὑμᾶς*]. *ἵνα* is used here, as not unfrequently in the N. T., in an enfeebled signification; only in an artificial way could the original force of purpose of this particle be here retained; while this force sometimes passes over into that of object, this is still further weakened, so that the clause beginning with *ἵνα* is the object which completes the idea of the verb; so it is here; comp. especially Heb. v. 12: *χρεῖαν ἔχετε τοῦ διδάσκειν ὑμᾶς*; in other passages *χρ. ἔχειν* is used even with the simple infinitive, Matt. iii. 14, xiv. 16; 1 Thess. i. 8, iv. 9; with *ἵνα* as here, John xvi. 30.¹ — Several commentators suppose here a reference to the false teachers, so that in the words of the apostle there lies a warning against those who wish to impose themselves on the Church as teachers; so a Lapide, Spener (*τις* = “who may make pretence of a new revelation”), Sander, Gerlach, Besser, and others. But it is more appropriate (according to ver. 21) to refer the apostle’s word to a teaching proceeding from himself or other apostolic teachers; so Hornejus, De Wette-Brückner, Lücke, Düsterdieck, Braune, etc. — only we must not restrict the generally expressed thought merely to instruction about the false teachers, even though it is intended with special reference to that.² Believers need no human teacher in order that the divine truth may be made known to them. They have received, with the word which was declared unto them (*ὃ ἤκουσαν*), the *χρίσμα*, which leads them *εἰς πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν*; therefore the apostle frequently in this epistle emphasizes the fact that he does not want

¹ At the most it may be said that *ἵνα* is used with the verb *χρεῖαν ἔχειν*, because that of which one is in need may be regarded as the object of his need; on the other hand, it is unsuitable when Braune says: “the teaching is here regarded as the object and purpose for the sake of the position of him who is to be taught.”

² Lücke paraphrases the passage: “The reason why I do not write any more about the false teachers, is that I assume that that holy unction of the Spirit remains in you; and if that is so, you do not need that any one shall instruct you further on the subject.”

to *instruct* them, but is writing to them what they already know (*οἴδατε πάντα*, ver. 20). John thereby assumes *believing* readers, in whose hearts that which they have heard from the beginning is preserved true and uncorrupted. Nothing *new* therefore can be proclaimed to *the believers*, but only that which they already possess in faith may be brought to a clearer consciousness.¹ — ἀλλ' ὡς τὸ αὐτὸ χρίσμα, κ.τ.λ.]. In this second part of the verse the first question is about the construction. Lücke, Ewald, De Wette, Neander, Düsterdieck, Braune (and previously Oecumenius and Theophylact) think that the whole to the end of the verse forms *ὅνε* period, in which the premise ἀλλ' ὡς . . . διδάσκει is resumed by the words καὶ καθὼς ἐδίδαξεν ὑμῖν, and has its conclusion in μενεῖτε (or μένετε) ἐν αὐτῷ, and in which the words καὶ ἀληθές . . . ψεῦδος contain a parenthetical adjunct. The difficulty that in the resumed premise καὶ is put instead of ἀλλά, καθὼς, instead of ὡς, and the aorist ἐδίδαξεν instead of the present διδάσκει, can certainly be easily got over by the fact that the apostle wanted not simply to repeat the thought, but at the same time to bring out a new phase of the subject; but the additional περὶ πάντων, which does not stand in any relationship whatever to the conclusion μενεῖτε (μένετε), is decidedly opposed to this construction; to this is added that ἀλλά indicates that the apostle wants to express a *contrast* to the οὐ χρείαν ἔχετε, κ.τ.λ., that is, a clause in which the teaching of the χρίσμα is described as such as removes the need of any other (human) teacher; finally, that the subordinate clause καὶ οὐκ ἔστι ψεῦδος conjoined with ἀληθές ἔστι raises this thought above the level of a mere parenthetical adjunct, and stamps it as a leading thought. For these reasons it is preferable, with Luther, Calvin, Baumgarten-Crusius, Sauder, Brückner, Besser, and in general most of the commentators, to divide the whole into two parts, and to regard καὶ ἀληθ. ἔστι . . . ψεῦδος as the conclusion of the first part; Luther: "but as the anointing teaches you all things, it is true, and is no lie; and," etc.² — ὡς refers not so much to the form and fashion, as to the substance of the teaching. — τὸ αὐτὸ χρίσμα]. τὸ αὐτό is not *IDEM SEMPER, NON ALIUD ATQUE ALIUD, SED SIBI CONSTANS ET IDEM APUD SANCTOS OMNES* (Bengel; so also Erdmann), but *just the same χρίσμα*, namely ὁ ἐλάβετε. Still the reading αὐτοῦ might be preferable, for it seems unnecessary to emphasize the fact that the χρίσμα is the same that they have received, and no other. — περὶ πάντων is used in the same sense as πάντα, ver. 20. — καὶ ἀληθές ἔστι, κ.τ.λ.]. καὶ before the conclusion, as in ver. 24: "then it is also true," etc.; it brings out prominently the idea ἀληθές; ἀληθές is referred to τὸ χρίσμα by Lücke, De Wette, Brückner, Düsterdieck, Ebrard, Ewald, Braune, and others; but the substantive ψεῦδος is opposed to this connection, for it cannot be referred to τὸ χρίσμα, inasmuch as it is con-

¹ Several commentators rightly remark here, that in the statement of the apostle there is no foundation for the error of the "enthusiasts," inasmuch as John does not separate the teaching of the χρίσμα and the apostolic word from one another, but places them in the closest connection.

² Ebrard makes ὡς dependent upon ἐγραψα, ver. 26; it is true he himself admits that this

gives a "laxe and legere form of speech," but he thinks that there is "nothing strange" in this, because the apostle is speaking to *children* in quite *childlike* language. But what child's understanding would be capable of supplying with the words: "but as the same anointing teacheth you of all things," the thought: "sc. I have said to you"?

sidered by John as a person (διδάσκει), and must neither be arbitrarily explained, with Beza, by ψευδής, nor, with Braune, be separated from ἀληθής (“and there is no lie in it”); Oecumenius, Theophylact, Luther, Neander, Besser, Erdmann, and others, have therefore rightly referred ἀληθής, κ.τ.λ., to that which the χρίσμα teaches. Because this is true, and is no ψεύδος, therefore believers do not need any teacher besides, but they may rely entirely upon the teaching of the χρίσμα. To this thought the apostle further adds a new one, in which he goes back to the end of ver. 24. — καὶ καθώς]. καθώς, as distinct from ὡς, means “in proportion as.” — ἐδίδαξεν ὑμᾶς, namely, ἀπ ἀρχῆς. — μένετε (μενετε) ἐν αὐτῷ]. The *Recepta* μενετε is taken by Socinus, a Lapide, Lorinus, Semler, and others, in the sense of the imperative; others retain the future meaning, as in ver. 24; thus Beza says: *mihī videtur omnino servanda Futuri propria significatio ut est optime sperantis*; as the apostle thereby expresses his good confidence, the future accordingly has the *vim consolandi* (Bengel). The correct reading, however, is μένετε, which, corresponding to the preceding μένει and ἔχετε, is not imperative (Ewald, Braune), but indicative (Brückner), and as such it expresses the firm conviction of the apostle that they, according to the constant instruction of the χρίσμα, abide ἐν αὐτῷ, i. e., in *Christ* (Erasmus, erroneously: = ἐν τῷ χρίσματι, and Baumgarten-Crusius: “in the teaching which the χρίσμα communicates to them”). In favor of this view is also the exhortation of ver. 28 herewith connected.¹

Ver. 28 concludes the section beginning at ver. 18, but serves at the same time as an introduction to the following section. — καὶ νῦν cannot, it is true, be explained, with Paulus, by “even now already,” but neither can it be explained, with most of the commentators, exactly by *igitur*, or a similar word; here it rather introduces, as it frequently does, the following exhortation as a deduction from the present circumstances. Incorrectly, Ebrard: “And now (namely, after I have spoken to the παίδις) I turn to you” (namely, to the whole Church): a supplement of that kind cannot be justified from the passages quoted by Ebrard; John xvii. 3; Acts x. 5, xxii. 16. — τεκνία, as in ver. 1. — μένετε ἐν αὐτῷ, quite the same thought as in ver. 27. Rickli’s view is incorrect, that in ver. 27 it is “the abiding in the confession that Jesus is the Christ, but here another abiding, namely, the abiding in righteousness,” that is meant. — ἵνα ἐὰν φανερωθῇ]. ἐὰν is distinguished from ὅταν (*Recepta*) in this way, that it describes not the time, but only the actuality of the manifestation of Christ. The φανέρωσις of Christ is His *parousia* occurring at the end of the ἐσχάτη ὥρα; comp. Col. iii. 4. By the same word the first appearance of Christ on earth is also elsewhere described; see chap. iii. 5, 8. ἔχωμεν (σχῶμεν) παρήσϊαν]. The communicative form of expression indicates that John tacitly includes himself also under the exhortation: μένετε ἐν αὐτῷ.² — παρήσϊα: the confidence of the believer at the day of judg-

¹ Myrberg on ver. 28: “Sperantis verba illa sunt, quae paullo ante leguntur; haec adhortantis, quod novum quoddam initium dicendi indicat.”

² Sander introduces here a foreign reference, when he thinks that John includes himself as if he would also have to be ashamed if on that day his children, whom he begot through the

ment; chap. iv. 17. — καὶ μὴ αἰσχυνθῶμεν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ]. Elsewhere also παῤῥησία and αἰσχύνεσθαι are contrasted with one another; so Prov. xiii. 5: ἡσιβῆς αἰσχύνεται καὶ οὐχ ἔξει παῤῥησίαν; comp. also Phil. i. 20. αἰσχυνθῶμεν is either used in the passive sense, in which case the original meaning "to be shamed" passes over into this, "to be put to shame" (see Meyer on Phil. i. 20); then ὑπό (which is not = ὑπό) describes Christ as the one from whom this αἰσχύνεσθαι comes, namely, by means of His judgment of condemnation; or it is used in the middle sense: "to be ashamed," in which case ὑπό is not = coram (Luther, Ewald), but = "away from," thus, "to draw back from Him with shame;" so Calvin, Beza, Episcopius, De Wette, Lücke (who adduces Sir. xxi. 22: ἄνθρωπος δὲ πολῦπειρος αἰσχυνθήσεται ὑπὸ προσώπου), Düsterdieck, Ebrard.¹ The second view deserves the preference, on account of the corresponding contrast with ἔχειν παῤῥησίαν. — ἐν τῇ παρουσίᾳ αὐτοῦ expresses definitely the reference already implied in φανερωθῆ: "at His (Christ's) coming;" παρουσία, in John only here, frequently appears in this sense in the N. T.: comp. Matt. xxiv. 3, xxvii. 37, 39; 1 Cor. xv. 23; 1 Thess. ii. 19, and elsewhere.

Ver. 29. With this verse the third section begins, which continues to chap. iii. 22, and consists of two groups: (1) ver. 29—iii. 10a, and (2) iii. 10b—22. — After the apostle has warned them against the love of the κόσμος, and against the false teachers (who are ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου), he shows the obligation of Christians to δικαιοσύνη, in which they reveal themselves as τέκνα Θεοῦ, in contrast to the τέκνα διαβόλου.

Ver. 29. The apostle now goes on to indicate how it is consistent with the nature of Christians, as those that are born of God, to do righteousness. — ἐὰν εἰδῆτε]. Here also the apostle directs himself to his readers' own consciousness, as he does not want to teach them any thing new, but only to state what they already know for their more earnest consideration. — ὅτι δίκαιός ἐστι. The present ἐστι is not used, either here or in iii. 5, iv. 17, for ἦν (Storr). It is doubtful whether the subject is *Christ* (a Lapede, Lorinus, Bengel, Rickli, Frommann, Myrberg, first edition of this commentary, etc.) or *God* (Baumgarten-Crusius, Neander, Gerlach, Köstlin, De Wette, Düsterdieck, Erdmann, Ebrard, Braune, Weiss, and others). In favor of the former is the fact that previously, not only in ver. 25 by αὐτός, and ver. 27 by ἐν αὐτῷ, but also in ver. 28 by φανερωθῆ, ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, and ἐν τῇ παρουσίᾳ αὐτοῦ, *Christ* is clearly meant; for the latter, that in the following ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεγέννηται the pronoun refers back to the subject of δίκαιός ἐστι, and the idea γεννᾶσθαι ἐκ Χριστοῦ never appears in the writing, and, moreover, John, in what follows,

gospel, should come short. Similarly a Lapede: "Ne pudeflamus utrique, sc. tam vos, si a doctrina Christi aberretis, quam nos Apostoli et Pastores, quod vos in ea non conservaverimus." Lorinus: "Conjungit seipsum discipulis, spe de illorum gloria adgaudens."

¹ Braune thinks that the passive meaning is

to be retained: "For we shall not draw back and tremble, but we shall be rejected and cast out." but the meaning above stated, and accepted also by Braune, does not suit the passive idea; besides, the correspondence with the idea ἔχειν παῤῥησίαν demands the middle signification of the word.

calls Christians τέκνα Θεοῦ, and in ver. 9 makes use of the expression γεγεννημένος ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ (comp. iv. 7, v. 1, 4, 18). From the predicate δίκαιός nothing can be inferred, as this attribute is assigned by John both to God (i. 9) and Christ (ii. 1). As, with John's peculiar blending of the Father and the Son (or of God and Christ), it would not be easy to explain how he can pass from the one to the other without specially indicating it, it appears more safe, in accordance with the constant mode of conception and expression in the Epistle, to supply as the subject of δίκαιός ἐστι God, than Christ. It is inappropriate, with Storr, Lücke, and others, to refer δίκαιος to Christ, and ἐξ αὐτοῦ, on the other hand, to God, because the thought of the apostle would thereby lose its peculiar force (Bengel: *justus justum gignit*).¹—The statement that God is δίκαιος corresponds with the statement that He is φῶς (chap. i. 5); it does not follow from ver. 28 that by δίκαιος here the *justitia judicialis* is to be understood; Erdmann: *quum poeiv tēn dikaiosūnēn ad dikaios ēsti referendum sit, hoc justitiam Dei sensu judiciali significare nequit, sed absolutam ejus sanctitatem*.—γινώσκετε is here not to be regarded as the indicative (Beza, Bengel, Semler, Düsterdieck, Myrberg, Ewald, and others), but, as its position between μένετε (ver. 27) and ἴδετε (chap. iii. 1) shows, as the imperative: "then know, i. e., observe and reflect," with Vulgate, Grotius, Russmeyer, Baumgarten-Crusius, De Wette, Lücke, Erdmeyer, Ebrard, Braune, and others.—ὅτι πᾶς . . . γεγέννηται]. The same relationship in which, according to chap. i. 6, κοινωνίαν ἔχειν μετὰ Θεοῦ and περιπατεῖν ἐκ τῷ φωτί stand to one another, exists between γεγεννησθαι ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ and ποιεῖν τὴν δικαιοσύνην (so also Braune), inasmuch as the latter is the practical proof of the former, so that every one who practises righteousness—but no one else (Bengel: *omnis et solus*)—is born of God. That when Episcopius describes the *nasci ex Deo*, not as the condition, but as the result, of the *exercitii justitiae*, he perverts the thought of the apostle, needs no proof. The right interpretation in Bengel, Neander, Besser, Düsterdieck, Erdmann, Myrberg, Ebrard, Brückner, Braune, Weiss.² By τὴν δικαιοσύνην it is plainly righteousness, in the full extent of the idea, that is described; with the expression ποιεῖν τὴν δικαιοσύνην, compare the synonymous idea ποιεῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν (chap. i. 6); similarly in Hebrew קָרַךְ הַשָּׁמַיְמָה; Gen. xviii. 19; Isa. lvi. 1; Ps. xiv. 15; in the N. T. comp. Matt. vi. 1. On ποιεῖν an emphasis is placed which must not be overlooked; comp. chap. iii. 18; for now is the truth of the experience and of the word first proved in deed.—In ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεγ., we must

¹ Sander would leave the question undecided; still he correctly states the alternative: "If δίκαιος must be referred to Christ, so also must ἐξ αὐτοῦ. But if the latter cannot be, if ἐξ αὐτοῦ can only be referred to God, then δίκαιος must also be referred to God."

² The thought that only he who is born of God can practise righteousness, is not exactly expressed here by John, but it is suggested in the preceding πᾶς. When Lücke in his 2d ed.

says: "We might have properly expected ὅτι πᾶς ὁ γεγεννημένος ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ποιεί τὴν δικαιοσύνην; but John would appear to have the purpose of exciting in his readers the consciousness of sonship to God in Christ, therefore he states the reversed relation,"—this is erroneous, since it is rather ποιεῖν τὴν δικαιοσύνην that has the chief emphasis; in his 1st ed. Lücke correctly stated the thought of the apostle.

retain *ἐξ* in its proper meaning; explanations which weaken it, such as that of Socinus, *dei similem esse*, or of Rosenmüller, *amari a deo*, are of course to be rejected (Braune); the relation of the perfect *γεγέννηται* to the present *ποιῶν* is to be observed.¹

¹ The definition of Weiss: "The being born of God is the act by which the known nature of God, and therewith God Himself, who indeed is received into our entire spiritual life as the object of that intuitive knowledge, operates determiningly, mouldingly, regenerat-ingly, upon our spiritual and moral being," is in various aspects unsuitable; for (1) it is not so much the act of God as rather the activity of man, his knowledge, which is represented as causing the being born of God; (2) it is erroneous to describe the *birth* as *producing*, since the birth is the result of the

generating activity; (3) it is no doubt true that the birth is brought about by knowledge, for it is only by producing in man the knowledge of His nature that God produces in him the new birth; but, on the other hand, it is just as true that the knowledge of God is conditioned by the being born of God: only he who is born of God knows God; there are two grades of the knowledge to be distinguished, namely, the knowledge as condition, and knowledge as result, of being born of God.

CHAPTER III.

Ver. 1. Instead of *δέδωκεν*, A, G, read the aorist *ἔδωκεν*; the Rec. is, however, sufficiently attested by the majority of authorities. — The reading *ὑμῖν* in B is not even accepted by Buttm., rightly; for it no doubt owes its existence merely to the connection with the second pers. *ἴδετε*. — After *κληθῶμεν* is found in A, B, C, **8**, many min. and vss., in Thph., Aug., Bede, the addition *καὶ ἔσμεν*; the Vulg. and other Latin vss. have: *et simus*; Oecum. in his comm.: *ἔδωκεν ἡμῖν τέκνα αὐτοῦ γενέσθαι τε καὶ κληθῆναι*, and Thph. in his comm.: *γενέσθαι τε καὶ λογισθῆναι*. According to these authorities, the addition must be regarded as genuine (Lachm., Düsterd., Ewald, Brückner); Tisch. (following G, K, many min., Copt., etc.) has not accepted it; many critics (thus even Reiche) explain it as a gloss; this it certainly may be — taken from ver. 2; but the overwhelming weight of authorities is in favor of its genuineness. Düsterdieck thinks that the omission originated in a false explanation of *κληθῶμεν*. — Instead of *ἡμῖς*, **8** has *ὑμᾶς*. — Ver. 2. After *οἶδαμεν* the Rec. has *δέ* (G, K, etc., Syr., Copt., etc., Thph., Oec., etc.), which, with Lachm. and Tisch., following A, B, C, **8**, several min., etc., is to be deleted; its insertion is easily explained by the apparent antithesis to the preceding. — Ver. 4. The Rec. *ἡ ἁμαρτία* is certified by all the authorities; Lachm. omits *ἡ*, but, as Tisch. observes, *sine teste*, for even B, to which Lachm. appeals, reads *ἡ ἁμαρτία*. After *ἔστιν*, **8** (sol.) reads *καί*, which, scarcely genuine, serves to connect more closely the two ideas *ἁμαρτία* and *ἰνομία*. — Ver. 5. Instead of *οἴδατε*, **8** (sol.) reads *οἶδαμεν*, which makes no essential difference in the thought. — *τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἡμῶν*, Rec., following C, G, K, **8**, etc., Syr., etc., Thph., Oec., Bede (De Wette); Lachm. and Tisch. omit *ἡμῶν*, following A, B, etc., Copt., Theb., etc., Tert., Aug., etc. The genuineness of *ἡμῶν* is certainly doubtful; perhaps it was omitted at a later date, to generalize the idea *τὰς ἁμαρτίας*; Reiche regards it as genuine. — Ver. 6. With the reading *ἑώρακεν* in Tisch. 7, comp. chap. i. 1. — Ver. 7. Instead of the Rec. *τεκνία* (in B, G, K, **8**, etc., vss., min., Thph., Oec., Tert., etc., Lachm.), Tisch. has accepted *παῖδια*, after A, C, etc., Copt., etc.; it is difficult to decide; it is possible that *τεκνία* is a correction for *παῖδια*, a form of address unusual in the Epistle. That *παῖδια*, as Ebrard thinks, is a correction, because in the section beginning with the address *παῖδια* (chap. ii. 18) the conclusion is *περὶ τῶν πλανώντων* (ver. 25), and here the same verb (*μηδεὶς πλανᾷτω ὑμᾶς*) follows the address, has little probability in its favor. — Ver. 10. Lachm. in his larger ed. has instead of the Rec. *ποιοῦν δικαιοσύνην*, which he had retained in his smaller ed., the reading *ὦν δίκαιος*, attested by no cod., but only by the Vulg., some other vss., and several Fathers (Or., Tert., Cyp., etc.); clearly without adequate reason. — The Codd. A, C, K, etc., have before *δικαιοσύνην* the article *τὴν*, probably inserted in correspondence with ver. 7 and chap. ii. 29. — Ver. 11. Instead of the Rec. *ἄγγελία*, C, **8**, etc., some vss. read *ἐπαγγελία*; probably in accordance with chap. ii. 25; De Wette considers it the original reading, just as chap. i. 5;

scarcely correct. — Ver. 13. \aleph has, before $\mu\eta$ *θανυμάζετε*, “*καί*,” clearly added for the purpose of closer connection. — *ἀδελφοί*, according to A, B, C, \aleph , 27, etc., Vulg., etc., Aug., Oros., etc.; recommended by Griesb., accepted by Lachm., Tisch.; the Rec. adds *μου*, after G, K, etc. — Ver. 14. After *τοὺς ἀδελφούς* \aleph reads *ἡμῶν*, probably a later addition to complete the thought. — *ἀγαπῶν τὸν ἀδελφόν*, Rec., following C, G, K, Thph., Oecum.; *τὸν ἀδελφόν* is, however, a later addition; it is not found in A, B, \aleph , etc., Vulg., etc., Aug., etc.; justly omitted by Lachm. and Tisch.; its insertion is easily explained; Reiche, however, is of a different opinion. — Ver. 15. Instead of *αὐτοῦ*, as Lachm. and Tisch., or *αὐτοῦ*, as most of the editors read, B has *ἐαυτοῦ*. — *ἐν αὐτῷ* (or better, *ἐν αὐτῷ*, Tisch.), Rec., after B, G, K, etc., Thph., Oec. — Lachm. has accepted *ἐν ἐαυτῷ*, the reading of A, C, \aleph , etc. — Ver. 16. Instead of *τιθεῖναι* (Rec., according to G, K, etc., Oec.) we must read, with Lachm. and Tisch., following the overwhelming evidence of A, B, C, \aleph , etc., the aorist *θεῖναι*. — Ver. 18. After *τεκνία* the Rec. (following G, K, etc.) has *μου*, the genuineness of which, however, is justly doubted by Griesb. — The article *τῆ* before *γλώσση*, which is omitted by the Rec., is with certainty attested by almost all authorities; it is wanting, however, in \aleph . — Before *ἐργῶ* the Rec. has omitted *ἐν*, only on the evidence of K; almost all the authorities attest its genuineness; as the co-ordinate ideas are without *ἐν*, it was natural to omit the preposition with *ἐργῶ* also. — Ver. 19. Before *ἐν τούτῳ* the Rec., following C, G, K, \aleph , most min., vss., etc., reads *καί*, which is also accepted by Tisch. Lachm. has omitted it; it is wanting in A, B, etc., Vulg., Copt., etc.; it is, however, probably genuine; omitted because it seemed unsuitable for the connection. — Instead of *γινώσκωμεν*, Rec., following G, K, etc., Vulg., etc. (Tisch.), A, B, C, \aleph , etc.,¹ several vss., etc., read *γνωσόμεθα* (Lachm.); as the latter is the more difficult reading, and besides has the most important authorities in its favor, it is to be regarded as genuine, with Ewald, Brückner, Braune, contrary to the opinion of Lücke, De Wette, Reiche; Bengel and De Wette think that the following *πίσσωμεν* has led to the change of the present to the future; but it is just as likely that the indicative is a correction of the copyists, in accordance with the frequently-occurring formula *ἐν τούτῳ γινώσκωμεν*, ii. 3, iii. 24, iv. 2, v. 2 (Erdmann). — *τὰς καρδίας ἡμῶν*. Rec., following A**, C, G, K, \aleph , almost all min., several vss., Thph., Oecum., Bede; retained by Tisch. and Lachm. (in his larger ed.); in the small ed. Lachm. has *τὴν καρδίαν ἡμῶν*, after A*, B, Syr., etc.; the plural was apparently altered to the singular in accordance with ver. 20. — Ver. 20. Instead of *ὅτι ἐάν*, Lachm. and Buttm. read: *ὁ τι ἐάν*; see on this the explanation of the verse. — The *ὅτι* before *μειζῶν*, which Lachm. had omitted in his small ed. (following A, etc., Vulg., etc., Oec., etc.), he has again rightly accepted in the larger ed. The change of it to *ἐτι*, which Henr. Stephanus would read, is arbitrary. — Ver. 21. The genuineness of *ἡμῶν* (Rec.) after *ἡ καρδία* is uncertain; it is found in C, G, K, \aleph , etc. (Tisch.), but is wanting in A, B, etc., Vulg., etc. (Lachm.). — The *ἡμῶν* after *καταγνώσκῃ* is wanting in B and C; it is, however, hardly spurious, as it is indispensable for the sense. Instead of *ἔχομεν*, attested by almost all the authorities, B has *ἔχει*, originating in a false reference to *καρδία*. — Ver. 22. Instead of *ὁ ἐάν*, B reads *ὁ ἄν*. — Instead of the active form *αἰτῶμεν*, there is found in \aleph the middle form *αἰτῶμεθα*. — In opposition to the Rec. *παρ' αὐτοῦ* (G, K, etc.), *ἀπ' αὐτοῦ* deserves the preference, according to the authorities (A, B, C, \aleph , etc., Lachm.,

¹ Lücke, whom Sander copies, says that C does not testify in favor of *γνωσόμεθα*, but according to Tischendorf it certainly does.

Tisch.). — The reading *τηρῶμεν* in \aleph instead of *τηροῦμεν* is no doubt only a clerical error. — Ver. 23. *πιστεύομεν*, Rec., following B, G, K, *al. pl.*, Oec., Tisch.; the reading of A, C, \aleph , etc., Thph., on the other hand, is *πιστεύωμεν*; recommended by Griesb., accepted by Lachm., probably a change in accordance with the following present *ἀγαπῶμεν*; so Reiche thinks. — After *ἐντολήν, ἡμῖν* is wanting in G, K, etc. (omitted by Tisch.). The most important authorities attest the genuineness of *ἡμῖν*; Reiche, however, regards it as a later edition. — Ver. 24. In \aleph the *καί* is wanting before *ἐν τούτῳ*; in the same cod. *οὐ ἔδωκεν ἡμῖν* is found instead of the Rec. *οὐ ἡμῖν ἔδωκεν*.

Ver. 1. From the *ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεγέννηται* (chap. ii. 29) the apostle goes on to the thought that he and his readers are children of God, whence he deduces the necessity that exists for them of *ποιεῖν τὴν δικαιοσύνην*. First, however, he points his readers to the *love* of God, through which they have become children of God, inviting them to the consideration of it by *ἴδετε*. — *ποταπὴν ἀγάπην δέδωκεν ἡμῖν ὁ πατήρ*, *what manner of love the Father has bestowed on us*. *ποταπός* (later form for *ποδαπός*, properly = from whence?) in the N. T., never in the direct question, is strictly, it is true, not = *quantus*, but = *qualis* (comp. Luke i. 29; 2 Pet. iii. 11), but is frequently used as an expression of admiration at any thing especially wonderful (comp. Matt. viii. 27; Mark xiii. 1; Luke vii. 39), so that the meaning of *qualis* passes over into that of *quantus*; and so it is to be taken here also. — *ἀγάπην δίδόναι* only here; *διδόναι* is more significant than *ἐνδεικνύναι* or a similar expression; it means, “to give, to bestow.” God has made His love our property (so also Braune). It is quite incorrect to take *διδόναι* = *destinare*, and, weakening the thought, *ἀγάπην* as metonymous for “love-token” (Grotius), or for *effectum charitatis* (Socinus).¹ The reference which Calvin finds in the word, when he says: *quod dicit DATAM esse caritatem, significat: hoc MERAE esse liberalitatis, quod nos Deus pro filiis habet*, is not indicated by John. — On *ἡμῖν* a Lapidé remarks: *indignis, inimicis, peccatoribus*. — The name *ὁ πατήρ* points to the following *τέκνα Θεοῦ*. — *ἵνα τέκνα Θεοῦ κληθῶμεν*]. Paulus, De Wette, Lücke, etc., retain *ἵνα* in its original meaning; “the greatness of the divine love,” says Lücke, “lies in the sending of the Son” (chap. iv. 10). This thought is correct in itself; but the apostle is not here thinking of the sending Christ; it is therefore arbitrary to supply it; here there is in his mind only the fact that we — as believers — are called the children of God: “This is the proof and the result of love” (Spener); *ἵνα* is accordingly used here in modified signification, synonymous with *ἐν τούτῳ, ὅτι*, only that by *ἵνα* the *τέκνα Θεοῦ κληθ.* is more definitely described as the purpose (not, however, as the object of an act distinguished from it) of the love of the Father; Ebrard unsuitably gives the meaning by the explanation *ποτ. ἀγ. δέδωκεν ἡμ. ὁ πατήρ ἐν τῷ βούλεσθαι ἵνα, κ.τ.λ.*,

¹ A Lapidé interprets *ἀγάπην* in the Catholic interest: i. e., “charitatem tum activam (actum amoris Dei quo nos mire amat), tum passivam nobisque a Deo communicatam et infusam. Videte quantam charitatem . . . nobis . . . praestitit et exhibuit Deus, cum . . . charitatem creatam nobis dedit et infudit, qua filii

Dei nominamur et sumus.” — Very appropriately Luther, in his *Scholía*: “usus est Joannes singulari verborum pondere: non dicit, dedisse nobis Deum donum aliquod, sed ipsam caritatem et fontem omnium bonorum, cor ipsum,” etc.

inasmuch as the love of God is bestowed on us, not in His will, but in the act which is the outcome of it. — *καλεῖσθαι* is erroneously explained by Baumgarten-Crusius = *ἐξουσίαν ἔχειν γενέσθαι*, John i. 12, so that the sense would be: “that we have the *right* to *dare* to call ourselves God’s children” (Neander); it is very common to take *καλεῖσθαι* = *εἶναι*, Augustin: *hic non est discrimen inter dici et esse*; this is so far correct as the name, which is here spoken of, *inanis esse titulus non potest* (Calvin), for: “where God gives a name, He always gives the nature itself along with it” (Besser); the *εἶναι* is included in the *καλεῖσθαι*; yet the very fact of being *called* is significant, for it is only in the *name* that the *being* is revealed, and it is through that giving of a name that the separation of believers from the world is actually accomplished. *ἵνα . . . κληθῶμεν* is usually translated, “that we *should* be called.” Ewald adds, “at the day of judgment,” but it is not the future, but the present, that is here spoken of; *κληθῶμεν* is therefore not to be taken as the subj. fut., but as the subj. aor.: “that we were named, and therefore are called.” Braune would explain the apostle’s expression in this way, that being children of God is “a work only gradually accomplished, an operation;” incorrectly, for “being the children of God” is certainly “a simply stated fact;” comp. the *καὶ ἐσμέν* and ver. 2. Instead of *τέκνα αὐτοῦ*, John says *τ. Θεοῦ*, because he wants to state the *full* name itself. The view of Baumgarten-Crusius has less in its favor, that the apostle contrasted *πατήρ* and *Θεοῦ* in order to indicate: “He bestowed it on us *lovingly*, that we should be connected with the *Godhead*, inasmuch as the former describes the divine will, the latter the divine nature.” — *καὶ ἐσμέν*, which according to the majority of authorities is scarcely a mere gloss (see the critical notes), says John in an independent form, not depending on *ἵνα* (the Vulgate erroneously = *simus*),¹ in order still more specially to bring out the element of being, which was certainly contained already in *κληθῶμεν*. — Not in order to comfort believers in regard to the persecutions which they have to suffer from the world (De Wette, Lücke, etc.), but to specify the contrast in which believers as *τέκνα Θεοῦ* stand to the world, and the greatness of the love of the Father who has given them that name, the apostle continues: *διὰ τοῦτο ὁ κόσμος οὐ γινώσκει ἡμᾶς*. *διὰ τοῦτο* refers back to the preceding thought (Bengel, De Wette, Brückner, Braune); thus: therefore, because we are children of God; the following *ὅτι* then serves to confirm the reason why the world does not know us as children of God. It is true, *διὰ τοῦτο* might be also directly referred to *ὅτι* (Baumgarten-Crusius, also perhaps Lücke, Ewald);

¹ Ebrard thinks that *ἐσμέν* may be dependent upon *ἵνα*, not certainly according to Buttmann’s, but according to John’s grammar; incorrectly, for the present indicative after *ἵνα* is not surely attested in John even by a single passage, whilst it is unmistakably in Paul, 1 Cor. iv. 6, and Gal. iv. 17 (comp. in addition, Al. Buttmann, p. 202, note [E. T., 234]); it therefore appears most probable that *καὶ ἐσμέν* is added by John, not indeed as a triumphant exclamation, but as an utterance

about the actual present state of his readers, confirming the preceding. If *ἐσμέν* is regarded as dependent on *ἵνα*, we are compelled to weaken the idea *κληθῶμεν*, for Ebrard’s supposition that in *κληθῶμεν* is contained the relationship of God to us, or the element of “being reconciled,” and in *ἐσμέν*, on the other hand, “our relationship to God, or the element of the conversion and renewal of our nature,” lacks any tenable ground.

but with this reference the sentence would come in too disconnectedly. — With *ὁ κόσμος* comp. chap. ii. 15. — *οὐ γινώσκει* means, “does not know us,” i.e., our inner nature, which we as *τέκνα Θεοῦ* possess, is to the world something incomprehensible; to it, alienated from God, what is godly is strange and inconceivable: compare John xiv. 17. Many commentators unnecessarily deviate from this proper meaning of the word; thus Grotius, who interprets it = *non agnoscit pro suis*; Semler = *nos rejicit, reprobat*; Baumgarten-Crusius = *μοσεῖ* (“therefore the world cannot endure us, because it cannot endure Him — God”). — *ὅτι οὐκ ἔγνω αὐτόν*, “for it did not know Him” (namely, God or the Father). S. Schmid erroneously explains *ἔγνω* by *credere in Deum*; Episcopius, by *jussa Dei observare*; John’s idea of *knowledge* is to be retained, as in the case of *γινώσκει*, so also in *ἔγνω* (Düsterdieck, Ebrard, Braune).

Ver. 2. After emphatic resumption of *ἐσμέν*, the apostle indicates the yet concealed glory of the *τέκνα Θεοῦ*. He begins with the address *ἀγαπητοί*, which occurs to him here the more readily as he feels himself most closely connected with his readers in the common fellowship with God (so also Düsterdieck). — *νῦν τέκνα Θεοῦ ἐσμέν*. *νῦν* is used in reference to the future (*σῆπω*); it is here a particle of time, not = “now, in consequence of that decree” (De Wette); a contrast with what immediately precedes (Lücke: “amidst all mistake on the part of the world, we are *nevertheless* really now the children of God;” so also Düsterdieck and Braune) is not suggested by it. Hereby the present glory of the believing Christian is described;¹ before the apostle mentions the future glory, he observes that this is yet concealed: *καὶ οὐπω ἐφανερώθη τί ἐσόμεθα*]. *φανεροῦσθαι* may, as Ebrard remarks, mean “to be actually revealed,” or, “for the knowledge to be revealed;” most commentators rightly take the word here in the first meaning; it is true, Ebrard maintains that this explanation is grammatically impossible, because *φανερώω*, as governing a question, can only have the meaning of theoretical revelation; but this assertion is unfounded, for in the N. T. *usus loquendi* (nay, even in the classics) the interrogative *τίς*, sometimes *τί*, confessedly appears where, according to the rule, the relative should properly be used; comp. Winer, p. 158 f. (E. T., 168), Al. Buttmann, p. 216 (E. T., 250 f.); and especially if the thought involves an assumed question, as is the case here.² That *φανεροῦσθαι* cannot here be understood of the theoretical revelation, is clear — (1) from the fact that no *ἡμῖν* is put with it, which Ebrard arbitrarily inserts when he interprets, “it has not yet been revealed *to us*, no information about it has yet been communicated *to us*;” (2) from the fact that the apostle himself immediately afterwards says what

¹ De Wette incorrectly remarks on *ἐσμέν*: “by destiny, by faith and aspiration or idea;” John rather signifies by *ἐσμέν* the actual reality.

² Acts xiii. 25 is especially to be compared. According to Buttmann, the interrogative is used for the relative only after predicates which have a certain similarity with the *verba sentiendi*, etc., thus especially after *ἔχειν* (Mark viii. 1, 2); yet this similarity is some-

times at the least very remote, thus with *δοθήσεται*, Matt. x. 19, and with *ἐτοιμάσον*, Luke xvii. 8, where Buttmann finds himself compelled to supply a connecting verb. Besides, a similarity with the *verba sentiendi* is not to be denied to the verb *φανεροῦσθαι*, even if it does not describe the theoretical revelation, for the coming out of concealment includes the becoming visible.

Christians will be in the future; (3) from the fact that a confession of present ignorance is at variance with the natural connection; from the fact that with this view a very artificial thought results for the following words, *οίδαμεν*, κ.τ.λ.; see below. — By *οὕτω ἐφανερῶθη*, κ.τ.λ., the apostle accordingly states that the future condition of those who at present are *τέκνα Θεοῦ* is still concealed, has not yet come to light (comp. Col. iii. 3; Rom. viii. 18).¹ This future state is, it is true, something different from the present, yet it is not *absolutely* new, but is that “which is latent and established in the present” (Düsterdieck, Braune). — *οίδαμεν ὅτι ἐὰν φανερωθῆ, κ.τ.λ.*]. By *οίδαμεν* the apostle expresses his own and his readers’ consciousness of that which, as *τέκνα Θεοῦ*, they will be in the future. — With *φανερῶθη* we must supply *τί ἐσόμεθα*, the meaning is the same as it previously has; so it is correctly explained by Didymus, Augustine, Socinus, Grotius, Paulus, Baumgarten-Crusius, De Wette, Semler, Lücke, Düsterdieck, Erdmann, Braune, etc. As Ebrard similarly supplies *τί ἐσόμεθα*, but understands *φανερῶθη* here also of the knowledge, there results from him this thought: “we know *rather* that when it shall be made known to us, we shall *even already* be like Him,” in which “the emphasis is made to rest on the *contemporaneousness* of the theoretical *φανεροῦσθαι* with the actual *ὁμοιοί εἶσθαι*,” but in this interpretation, which suffers from unjustifiable supplements, a reference is brought out as the chief element of the thought which is in no way indicated, and is foreign to the context. — Some critics supply with *φανερῶθη* as subject *Χριστός*, as in chap. ii. 28, so Syrus, Calvin, Beza, Hornejus, Calov, Semler, etc. (Myrberg at least thinks that this is not *omnino improbabile*); this is, however, erroneous, as in this *φανερῶθη* what immediately precedes is clearly resumed. It is self-evident that this revelation will take place *ἐν τῇ παρουσίᾳ Χριστοῦ*; comp. ii. 28. — *ὁμοιοί αὐτῷ ἐσόμεθα*]. *αὐτῷ*, i. e., *Deo, cujus sumus filii* (Bengel); the idea remains, indeed, essentially the same if *αὐτῷ* is taken = *Χριστῷ* (Storr), but the context decides in favor of the first explanation. The apostle says: we shall be to God *ὁμοιοί*, not *ἴσοι*, because likeness to God will not be unconditioned, but conditioned by the nature of the creature, as a creature; in so far *ὁμοιοί* may be translated by “like,” only this idea has something indefinite in it, and therefore Sander not unjustly says that “thereby the point of the thought is lost.” As John himself does not more particularly define this future *ὁμοιοίτης* of man with God, the commentator must not arbitrarily restrict the general idea on the one side or the other, as, for instance, by the reference to the “light-nature of God” (Ebrard), or the *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ* (Düsterdieck), or the *δόξα Θεοῦ* (De Wette).² — *ὅτι ὁψόμεθα αὐτόν, καθὼς ἐστι*]. This sentence states the *logical* ground of the foregoing; Calvin, correctly: *ratio haec ab effectu sumta est, non a causa*; so that the sense is: “because we shall see

¹ Ebrard groundlessly asserts that this view amounts to a tautology: “our future state is still future;” for according to it the apostle rather expresses the thought that the future condition of the *τέκνα Θεοῦ* will be distinguished from the present; in which, plainly, there is not the slightest tautology contained.

² Baumgarten-Crusius and others quote on this passage 2 Pet. i. 4: *κοινωνοί τῆς θείας φύσεως*; this is (as Brückner also remarks) unsuitable, for in this expression the author of that Epistle does not say what the Christian *will be* one day, but what he *already is*; it therefore corresponds rather to the *τέκνα Θεοῦ*.

Him as He is, we therefore know that we shall be like Him" (Rickli; so also Socinus, S. Schmidt, Erdmann, Myrberg, etc.). It is a different thought in 2 Cor. iii. 18, according to which Bengel explains: *ex aspectu, similitudo* (similarly Irenaeus, *Adv. Haer.*, iv. 38, says: *ὁρασις Θεοῦ περιποιητικὴ ὑφ' ἁρσίας*), according to which the sense is: "the beholding is the cause of the likeness" (Spener; similarly Baumgarten-Crusius, De Wette, Neander, Köstlin, Düsterdieck, Ebrard, Braune, Weiss, etc.). But John does not here want to explain whence the *ὁμοιον εἶναι τῷ Θεῷ* comes to the believer, but on what the *οἶδαμεν* is based. The certain hope of the Christian is that he shall see God. In that hope there lies for him the certainty that he will one day be like God; for God can only be seen by him who is like Him.¹ When Rickli remarks on *ὁψόμεθα*: "not a bodily vision of Him who is Spirit; it is the spiritual beholding, the knowledge of God in His infinite divine nature" (similarly Frommann, p. 217), or when others interpret this *ὁρᾶν* simply by "to know aright," and similarly, this is contrary to the sense of the apostle; for as the word itself indeed *shows*, an *actual* seeing is meant. For man in his *earthly body*, God is certainly invisible; but it is different with the *glorified* man in his *σῶμα πνευματικόν* (1 Cor. xv. 44); he will not merely *know* (the believer has *knowledge* already here), but *see* God; and, moreover, no longer *δέ' ἐσώπριον ἐν αἰνίγματι*, but *πρόσωπον πρὸς πρόσωπον*, 1 Cor. xiii. 12. Compare, on the seeing of God, Matt. v. 8; 2 Cor. v. 7; Rev. xxii. 4. — By *καθὼς ἐστι* the entire reality of the nature of God: "as He is, not merely in a copy, etc., but in Himself and in His nature, His perfect majesty and glory" (Spener), is described.² The relation of the single parts of this verse is usually regarded by the commentators as adversative; certainly *νῦν* and *ὁπω* form an antithesis, but the connecting *καί* shows that the apostle considered the first two thoughts less in their antithesis to one another than in their co-ordination, inasmuch as it occurred to him to emphasize them both equally: both that believers are now really *τέκνα Θεοῦ*, and also that a glory as yet concealed — namely, likeness to God — awaits them. Between the third and fourth parts also, a sort of antithesis occurs (hence the *Recepta δέ*), but here also the apostle is not anxious to bring out this contrast, but rather to add to the negatively-expressed thought, for its confirmation, the positive substance of Christian consciousness; comp. De Wette-Brückner, Braune.

Ver. 3 shows the moral effect of the Christian hope; not the condition with which the fulfilment of it is connected, as Lücke thinks. The same

¹ To Düsterdieck's question, Why then did not the apostle write: *ὁψόμεθα αὐτόν, ὅτι ὅμοιοι αὐτῷ ἐσόμεθα*? it is a valid reply: because he did not want to represent the beholding of God, but likeness to God, as the purpose of the divine love. The justification of the rejected explanation by 2 Cor. iii. 18 is inappropriate, because John describes the future condition of the children of God, not as a *becoming* like, but as a *being* like (*ἐσόμεθα*).

² Calvin: "Deus nunc se nobis conspiciendum offert, non qualls est, sed qualem modulus noster eum capit." Weiss rightly

observes that the emphasis is laid on *καθὼς ἐστιν*; but it is incorrect for him to place this in contrast with His manifestation *in the Son*; for God has not revealed Himself in Christ otherwise than *καθὼς ἐστι*. — As a curiosity the explanation of Oertel may be given here: "One day after several centuries, mankind, which now belongs too much to the spirit of barbarism, will become more glorified, more ennobled, and more happy, and thus attain to the perfect knowledge of the plan of God and the purpose of Jesus."

combination of ideas, only in the form of exhortation, occurs in 2 Cor. vi. 18 and vii. 1; 2 Pet. iii. 13, 14. — *πᾶς ὁ ἔχων τὴν ἐλπίδα ταύτην ἐπ' αὐτῷ*, namely, the hope of one day being like God.¹ “In the case of *πᾶς ὁ ἔχ.* we can, as in ii. 29, bring out the converse in the meaning of the apostle: every one . . . and only such” (Düsterdieck). The phrase *ἔχειν ἐλπίδα ἐπὶ* with dative only here; Acts xxiv. 15: *ἔχ. ἐλπ. εἰς Θεόν*; but *ἐλπίζειν ἐπὶ* with dative: Rom. xv. 12 and 1 Tim. vi. 17. — *αὐτῷ*, i.e., *Θεῷ*]. God is regarded as the basis on which the hope is founded. The idea of maintaining (Spener) is not contained in *ἔχειν*. — *ἀγνίζει ἑαυτὸν καθῶς, κ.τ.λ.*] *ἀγνίζειν* (comp. on 1 Pet. i. 22), not “to keep one’s self pure” (à Mons, Bengel, Russmeyer, etc.), but “to purify one’s self, i.e., to make one’s self free of every thing that is unholy;” in Jas. iv. 8 it is used synonymously with *καθαρίζειν*. This self-purification necessarily follows from the Christian’s hope, because the object of this is to be like God, and therefore also to be holy. — In reference to the opinion that this purification is described as an act of *man*, Augustine says: *videte quemadmodum non abstulit liberum arbitrium, ut diceret: castificat senetipsum. Quis nos castificat nisi Deus? Sed Deus te nolentem non castificat. Castificas te, non de te; sed de illo, qui venit, ut habitet in te.* The active impulse of this *ἀγνίζειν ἑαυτὸν* does not lie in the natural *liberum arbitrium* of man, but in the *hope*, which the salvation work of God presupposes in man. — This purification takes place after the pattern (*καθῶς*) of Christ (*ἐκεῖνος*, ver. 4), who is *ἀγνός*, i.e., “pure from every sinful stain.” The want of harmony which exists in the juxtaposition of the *ἀγνίζειν ἑαυτὸν* of the Christian and the *ἀγνὸν εἶναι* of Christ, must not induce us to take *καθῶς* here otherwise than in ver. 7, ii. 6, iv. 17, namely = *quandoquidem*, so that this clause would add a *second* motive for the *ἀγνίζειν ἑαυτὸν*, as Ebrard thinks; the sense rather is, that the purity of Christ is the pattern for Christians, which the Christian by self-purification strives to copy in his life also. — *ἐστὶ*: “the *ἀγνότης* is a quality inherent in Christ” (Lücke); the present is not put for the preterite, but signifies the unbroken permanent state; chap. ii. 29.

Ver. 4. The believer is so much the more bound to holiness, as all sin is *ἀνομία*. — *πᾶς ὁ ποιῶν, κ.τ.λ.*, corresponding to the beginning of ver. 3, *πᾶς ὁ ἔχων, κ.τ.λ.* The apostle is anxious to emphasize the truth of the thought as being without exception. *ποιεῖν τὴν ἀμαρτίαν*, as the antithesis of *ποιεῖν τὴν δικαιοσύνην*, chap. ii. 29, is contrasted with *ἀγνίζειν ἑαυτὸν*, ver. 3; as the apostle “wants to contrast with the positive sentence, ver. 3, its negative counterpart,” “he begins with the antithesis of that idea which formed the predicate in ver. 3, and makes it the subject” (Ebrard). The definite article shows that the idea, according to its complete extent, is intended as definite, as forming the concrete antithesis to *ἡ δικαιοσύνη*;² both the

¹ Ebrard groundlessly would understand by *ἐλπίς* the treasure which is the object of the hope.

² Branne, however, rightly observes that too strong an emphasis is not to be laid here, either upon the article or on *ποιεῖν*; for in

ver. 9 it is put *ἀμαρτίαν ποιεῖν*, and then, as synonymous with it, simply *ἀμαρτάνειν*; nevertheless, it is to be noticed that “the fuller idea *ποιεῖν τὴν ἀμ.* at the beginning includes and determines the others, *ποιεῖν ἀμ.* and *ἀμαρτάνειν*” (Ebrard).

interpretation of Socinus: "to remain in sin," and that of Baumgarten-Crusius: "to receive sin into one's self, to let it exist in one's self," are alike arbitrary; even the very common definition: "to sin knowingly and wilfully," is out of place here, as the subject here is not the *way in which* sin is done, but the actual doing of sin itself. According to Brückner,¹ by *ποιεῖν τὴν ἁμαρτίαν* "an actual moral tendency of life" is indicated; this explanation is apparently justified by vv. 6, 8, 9, but even in these passages the apostle's meaning goes beyond the restricted idea of "tendency of life," inasmuch as he certainly has sinning in view. — *καὶ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν ποιεῖ*]. "*καὶ* accentuates the idea that the very doing of *ἁμαρτία* is as such equally the doing of *ἀνομία*" (Düsterdieck); by *ἀνομία* we are to understand, according to the constant *usus loquendi*, never the mere non-possession of the law (differently *ἀνομος*, 1 Cor. ix. 21), but always the violation of the law, namely, of the divine law, of the divine order according to which man should regulate his life, — *lawlessness* (Lücke).² The sense therefore is: he who practises sin (in whatever way it may be) thereby makes himself guilty of the violation of divine order, he acts contrary to the *θέλημα τοῦ Θεοῦ*, chap. ii. 17. According to Ebrard, *τὴν ἀνομίαν ποιεῖν* expresses the antithesis of *ἔχειν τὴν ἐλπίδα ταύτην*, ver. 3; but it is more correct to perceive in that sentence — instead of a conclusion — the introduction of a new element, by which the sharp contrast with *τὴν δικαιοσύνην* (ii. 29) is indicated. — The following words, *καὶ ἡ ἁμαρτία ἐστὶν ἡ ἀνομία*, are added, partly to confirm the previous thought, partly to mark emphatically the identity of *ἁμαρτία* and *ἀνομία* which is expressed in it. The apostle does not want to give an exact definition of the idea *ἁμαρτία* (contrary to Sander), but to indicate its nature from the side "on which its absolute antagonism to any fellowship with God appears most unrestrictedly" (Brückner). The apostle could not more sharply express the antithesis between the character of the believer, who *is* a *τέκνον Θεοῦ*, and *will be* *ὁμοιος Θεῷ*, and the *ἁμαρτία*, than by showing *ἁμαρτία* to be *ἀνομία*, whereby he most distinctly opposes the moral indifferentism against which the first section of the Epistle is also directed. Violence is done to the thought, both by limiting the idea *ἁμαρτία* to a *particular* kind of sin (a Lapidé: *loquitur proprie de peccato perfecto, puta mortifero*), and by making *ἀνομία* the subject and *ἁμαρτία* the predicate;³ so also by mixing up references which are foreign to the context.⁴ The *καὶ* by which the two

¹ Brückner rightly rejects the interpretation of De Wette: "*ἁμαρτία* appears to be the broader idea, *ἀνομία* the narrower, more definite and stronger, including particular offences, vices, etc."

² *ἀνομία* is distinguished from *ἀδικία* (i. 9, v. 17) in this way, that the former idea is contrasted with abstract right (*δικη*), the latter with the concrete form of right (*νόμος*) (Brückner).

³ Köstlin (p. 246) appeals in behalf of this construction to John i. 1: *καὶ Θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος*, assuming that *καὶ ἁμαρτία, κ.τ.λ.*, is to be read; see, however, the critical notes. Against

this construction there is, besides, the fact that *ἁμαρτία* would have to be taken in a different sense here from that in which it is previously used, namely, as Köstlin says: "The first time *ἁμαρτία* means sinful action; the second time, guilt in the sight of God."

⁴ This is the case, for example, in Hilgenfeld's explanation: "Not every one who deviates from the *ceremonial laws*, but only the sinner, falls under the category of *ἀνομία*;" not less in the remark of Calvin: "the sum of the thought is that the life of those who give themselves to sin *is hateful to God, and cannot be tolerated by God.*"

sentences are connected with one another, Bengel translates and explains by: *immo* (so also Brückner by "nay"), with the remark: *non solum conjuncta est notio peccati et iniquitatis, sed eadem*; this is incorrect, for even the first sentence expresses, not a mere connection, but identity. The apostle could have written instead of *καί* the confirmatory particle *ὅτι*, or the like, but by means of *καί* the thought of the second clause obtains a more independent position (so also Braune).

Ver. 5 contains a new proof of the incompatibility of the Christian life with sin; this exists in Christ, to whose example the apostle has already pointed in ver. 3. Of Christ, John states two things, while he appeals to the consciousness of his readers (*οἴδατε*; the same is the case with the reading of \aleph : *οἴδαμεν*) — (1) that His manifestation (*ἐφανερώθη*, an expression which refers to the previously unrevealed existence of Christ in heaven) had this purpose: *ἵνα τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἄρῃ*; and (2) that He is without sin. — *τὰς ἁμαρτίας αἶρειν* may, of course, mean in itself "to bear our sins," i. e., as the atoning sacrifice, in order thereby to procure their forgiveness, but here it means "to take away, to remove our sins;" for even although the Hebrew expression לָקַח אֲשֶׁר signifies both, yet the LXX. translates this *in the second sense only* by *αἶρειν*, but in the first sense by *φέρειν* (comp. Meyer on John i. 29, and my commentary on 1 Pet. ii. 24); moreover, *αἶρειν* with John constantly means "to take away;" comp. xi. 48, xv. 2, xvii. 15, xix. 31, 38; and the context is also decisive in favor of this meaning, for even though in the thought that Christ bore our sins, inasmuch as He suffered for them, there lies a mighty impulse to avoid sins, yet the antagonism of the Christian life to sin appears more directly and more strongly if the *taking away of sins* is described as the purpose of the manifestation of Christ. Köstlin (p. 180) rightly says: "The expression signifies, to take away the sins themselves, but not their guilt or their punishment, for it is added: *καὶ ἄμ. ἐν αὐτῷ οὐκ ἔστιν*, and in ver. 8: *ἔργα τοῦ διαβόλου*." This interpretation in Calvin, Luther, Russmeyer, Paulus, Baumgarten-Crusius, Neander, Frommann (p. 449), Düsterdieck, Myrberg, Ebrard, Braune, etc., contrary to which Lücke, De Wette, Erdmann, etc., explain *αἶρειν* = "to bear;" Lücke: "the object of the manifestation of Christ is the bearing of sins as a holy offering in His death;" while others, as Bede ("*tollit et dimittendo quae facta sunt et adjuvando ne fiant et perducendo ad vitam, ubi fieri omnino non possint*"), Socinus, a Lapide, Spener, Sander, Besser (also Lücke in his 1st ed.),¹ combine both meanings. Weiss, it is true, interprets *αἶρειν* correctly, but thinks that the plural *ἁμαρτίας* "can only signify actually existing sins" which Christ takes away, "inasmuch as His blood cleanses us from their guilt;" but in the whole context the subject is not the *guilt* of sins, but the sins themselves. The plural, however, by no means renders that interpretation compulsory. — The pronoun *ἡμῶν* after *τὰς ἁμαρτίας* (see the critical

¹ "Αἶρειν τ. ἄμ. ἡμῶν corresponds to the *καθαρίσειν ἀπὸ πάσης ἄμ.*, i. 7, and signifies the whole extent of the redemptive activity of Christ, His office of taking away sin, both in

the ideal sense by the act of forgiving sin, and also in the real sense by the act of sanctifying the saved."

notes) is regarded by Lücke and De Wette as genuine; Lücke: "because John would otherwise have written τὴν ἁμαρτίαν;" De Wette: "because its omission appears to be occasioned by the interpretation of αἰρεῖν = to remove;" Düsterdieck remarks against ἡμῶν, that in the whole section vv. 4-10 there is no direct application expressed; from internal grounds it cannot be decided, inasmuch as τὰς ἁμαρτ. ἡμῶν can be taken quite as generally as the simple τὰς ἁμαρτίας. In regard to the plural τὰς ἁμαρτίας, Düsterdieck rightly says that "thereby the form of representation is made so much the more vivid, as the whole mass of all individual sins is taken into view." It is to be observed, that John does not regard Christ, according to the Pelagian mode of thought, only as the *motive* for the free self-determination of man, but as the active living cause of sanctification determining the will of man. It is His crucifixion especially from which proceeds, not only the forgiveness of sins, but also (in and with this) the new life, in which the believer purifies himself (ἀγνίζει), even as He is pure (ἀγνός).—The second thing which John states of Christ is: καὶ ἁμαρτία ἐν αὐτῷ οὐκ ἔστι. The meaning of these words is not that in those who are in Christ there is no sin (Calvin, Paulus), but that Christ Himself is without sin; com. ver. 3, ii. 29. This clause is not meant to confirm the preceding one (a Lapide: *ideo Christus potens fuit tollere peccatum, quia carebat omni peccato, imo potestate peccandi*: so also Oecumenius, Lorinus, Baumgarten-Crusius, Sander, Neander); but it is co-ordinate with it (Lücke, De Wette-Brückner, Düsterdieck, Braune), in order to serve as a basis for the following statement.—The present ἐστὶ is not used instead of the preterite (Grotius), nor is it to be explained in this way, with Winer (p. 251 [E. T., 267]), that "the sinlessness of Jesus is considered as still present *in faith*;" but it rather denotes, as in ver. 3, the character of Christ in its eternal existence.

Ver. 6. πῶς ὁ ἐν αὐτῷ (i.e., Χριστῷ) μένων refers back to the exhortation in ii. 27; μένειν, not merely = *in esse*, expresses close fellowship.—οὐχ ἁμαρτάνει]. John hereby states the abiding in Christ and sinning as irreconcilable opposites; still it is not his meaning, that the believing Christian does not sin any more at all, or that he who still sins is not in Christ, for in i. 8-10, ii. 1, 2, iii. 3, he clearly enough expresses that sin still clings to the Christian, and that he therefore needs constantly both the forgiving and saving grace of God, and the intercession of Christ, as well as self-purification. The solution of the apparent contradiction must not be sought by giving the word ἁμαρτάνειν here a meaning different from what it has elsewhere (e.g. = *persistere in peccato*; or with Capellus = *sceleratum esse*, or = to commit *peccata mortalia*); nor even by appealing to the apostle's *ideal* mode of conception (De Wette, Düsterdieck; substantially also Weiss and Brückner),¹ for "John has here to do with *real* cases, and wants to indicate to us the marks by which it may be known whether a man loves the Lord or not, whether he is a child of God or of the wicked one" (Sander), as is clear

¹ When Weiss (and Brückner agreeing with him) says "that John here represents the Christian life as according to its nature it is

and ought to be," the expression of the apostle is explained by him also from its idealism.

from *φανερά ἐστι*, ver. 10; but only in the fact that the Christian, who is a *τέκνον Θεοῦ*, bears the contradiction in himself that he, on the one hand, it is true, still actually sins, but, on the other hand, is also actually free from sin—so free from it that he *cannot* sin (ver. 9); he has actually broken with sin, so that in his most inner nature he is in the most decided opposition to it; yet at the same time he finds it in himself, and indeed in such a way that he still actually sins (chap. i. 10), but inasmuch as he confesses it, and experiences the forgiving and saving love of the faithful God towards him (chap. i. 9), and with all earnestness practises the *ἀγνίζειν ἑαυτόν*, it ever loses more and more its power over him, and thus it results that it is no longer sin, but opposition to it (as something foreign to his nature), that determines his conduct of life; and hence the apostle may with perfect justice say, that he who abides in Christ does not sin (so also Braune),¹ which is quite the same as when Paul says: *εἴ τις ἐν Χριστῷ, καὴνὴ κτίσις· τὰ ἄρχαία παρῆλθεν, ἰδοῦ, γέγονε καινὰ τὰ πάντα* (2 Cor. v. 17).—The antithesis expressed in the first clause is even more sharply brought out in the second, inasmuch as John does not say *πᾶς ὁ ἁμαρτάνων . . . οὐ μένει ἐν αὐτῷ*, but *οὐχ ἑώρακεν αὐτόν, οὐδὲ ἔγνωκεν αὐτόν*.—*πᾶς ὁ ἁμαρτάνων* is every one who leads a life in *ἁμαρτία*, and therefore has not come out of the *κόσμος* into the number of God's children;² such an one, says John, hath not seen neither known *αὐτόν*, i. e., Christ. Lücke takes the perfects *ἑώρακεν* and *ἔγνωκεν* in present signification, the former in the meaning of "the present possession of the experience," the latter in the meaning of "the present possession of previously obtained knowledge;" but this is not rendered necessary by the context, and hence the perfects are to be retained as such, although it must be admitted that John is considering the result as one that continues into the present. The meaning of the two verbs in their relation to one another is very differently explained; according to some commentators, *ἑώρακεν* signifies something inferior (Semler, Baumgarten-Crusius, Lücke in his first edition), according to others, something superior (Socinus, Neander, Frommann, p. 223), to *ἔγνωκεν*. With the former view, *οὐδέ* is taken as = "and still less;" with the latter, as = "and not as much as." Both are incorrect, for a difference of degree is in no way suggested. Yet the two expressions are not to be regarded as synonymous, so that *ἔγνωκε* would only be added to bring out the *spiritual meaning* of *ἑώρακεν* (Düsterdieck); for, although *οὐδέ* can neither be necessarily "disjunctive" (Lücke, first edition) nor "conjunctive" (Lücke,

¹ Besser appropriately says: "Every one who abides in Christ, to whom He once belongs, does not sin, but says 'No' to sin, which belongs to the old man, and resists its alien power. A Christian does not *do* sin, but he *suffers* it. His will, his Christian ego, is not at one with sin. *Hatred of sin* is the common mark of the children of God; *love of sin*, the common property of the children of the Devil. Augustine's explanation: "in quantum in Christo manet, in tantum non peccat," is unsatisfactory, because it would thereby appear as if the inner life of the

Christian were something divided in itself; but it is more correct when he says. "Etsi infirmitate labitur, peccato tamen non consentit, quia potius gemendo luctatur."

² Ebrard says this explanation is opposed to the context, because "even from ver. 4 the subject is such as are Christians, but are lacking in holiness, and it is only in ver. 6 that it is stated how far such Christians cannot be regarded as truly regenerate;" but (1) do not the *unregenerate* Christians still belong to the *κόσμος*? and (2) does not that explanation refer precisely to the close of the 6th verse?

second edition), yet the form of the clauses shows, inasmuch as the object is put along with each verb, that οὐδέ here has a stronger emphasis, and that John wanted to express by the two verbs two distinct ideas. In order to determine these, the original signification of the words must be retained. ὁρᾶν signifies neither "the mere historical knowledge of Christ" (Lücke), nor the *perseverantia communionis cum Christo* (Erdmann), and γινώσκειν signifies neither "the experience of the heart," nor even "love;" but even here ὁρᾶν means *to see*, and γινώσκειν *to know*: but the seeing of Christ takes place when the immediate consciousness of the glory of Christ has dawned upon us, so that the eye of our soul beholds Him as He is in the totality of His nature; the knowing of Him when by means of inquiring consideration the right understanding of Him has come to us, so that we are clearly conscious not only of His nature, but also of His relation to us.¹

Ver. 7. While the apostle would reduce the specified antithesis to the last cause, and thereby bring it out in all its sharpness, he begins the new train of thought, connected, however, with the preceding, after the impressive address τεκνία (or παιδία), with the warning directed against moral indifference: μηδεὶς πλανᾷτω ὑμᾶς, which, as Dusterdieck rightly observes, is not necessarily founded on a polemic against false teachers (Antinomians, for instance); comp. chap. i. 8. — ὁ ποιῶν τὴν δικαιοσύνην, δικαίος ἐστὶ καθὼς, κ.τ.λ., with ποιεῖν τὴν δικ., comp. chap. ii. 29. From the connection with the foregoing we would expect as predicate either ἑώρακεν αὐτὸν, κ.τ.λ. (ver. 6), or ἐν αὐτῷ μένει (ver. 5); but it is peculiar to John to introduce new thoughts and references in antithetical sentences. By the subordinate clause καθὼς ἐκεῖνος (i.e., Χριστός) δικαίος ἐστὶ, he puts the idea δικαίος in direct reference to Christ, so that the thought of this verse includes in it this, that only he who practises δικαιοσύνη has known Christ and abides in Him; for he only can be exactly καθὼς Χριστός (i.e., in a way corresponding to the pattern of Christ), who stands in a real fellowship of life with Him. It is incorrect, both to interpret, with Baumgarten-Crusius: "he who is righteous follows the example of Christ," and also to take δικαίος = "justified," and to define the meaning of the verse thus: "only he who has been justified by Christ does righteousness."² — There is this difference between the two ideas: ποιεῖν τὴν

¹ With this interpretation that of Sander, who interprets ἑώρακεν of "spiritual intuition or beholding," and ἐγνώκεν of the "knowledge obtained more by reflection along the lines of dialectic and inquiry," as well as that of Myrberg, according to which the former signifies the "immediata perceptio Christi spirituali modo homini se manifestantis," the latter the "perdurans cognitio atque intelligentia," are in substantial agreement. Braune, it is true, assents to this view; but he erroneously thus defines the thought of the apostle: "Every one who sins, and inasmuch as he sins, is one in whom the seeing and knowing of Christ is a thing of the past, but does not continue and operate into the present;" for John plainly says of him who sins that he *has* not seen

or known Christ. When Erdmann defines ἐγνώκεν as the "cognitio Christi, quae et intuitu et intellectu non solum personae Christi verum etiam totius ejus operis indolem complectitur," this is in so far unsuitable, as the *intuitu* belongs precisely to the ἑώρακεν. Very unsatisfactory is Ebrard's explanation, that ὁρᾶν is "the seeing of Christ as the *light*, γινώσκειν the *loving* knowledge." The difference between ὁρᾶν and γινώσκειν appears also in this, that in the former the operating activity is represented rather on the side of the object, which presents itself to the eye of the soul; in the latter, rather on the side of the subject, which this verb makes the subject of consideration.

² As there is no reference here at all to

δικ. and *δίκαιον εἶναι*, that the first signifies the action, the second the state. The reality of the latter is proved in the former. He who does not *do* righteousness shows thereby that he *is* not righteous.¹

Ver. 8. *ὁ ποιῶν τὴν ἁμαρτίαν* forms the diametrical opposite of *ὁ ποιῶν τὴν δικαιοσύνην*, inasmuch as it signifies the man whose life is a service of sin, "who lives in sin as his element" (Sander). While the former belongs to Christ, and is a *τέκνον Θεοῦ*, the latter is *ἐκ τοῦ διαβόλου*; *ἐκ* does not signify here either merely connection (De Wette), or similarity (Paulus), or imitation (Semler), but, as the expression *τέκνον τοῦ διαβόλου* (ver. 10) shows, origin (so also Ebrard): the life that animates the sinner emanates from the Devil; "not as if the Devil created him, but that he introduced the evil into him" (Russmeyer). The apostle confirms the truth of this statement by the following words: *ὅτι ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ὁ διάβολος ἁμαρτάνει*. The words *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς* are put first, because the chief emphasis rests on them, inasmuch as those who commit sin are *ἐκ τοῦ διαβόλου*, not because he sins, but because it is he who sinneth *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς*. From this expression it must not, with Frommann and Hilgenfeld, be inferred that John was considering the Devil as an originally evil being, — in dualistic fashion (comp. Köstlin, p. 127, and Weiss, p. 132 ff.), — for John is not here speaking of the *being*, but of the *action* of the Devil. In order not to accuse John of the Manichæan dualism, the attempt has been made to define *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς* more particularly, either by referring it to the creation of the world (Calvin, S. G. Lange; also Hofmann, *Schriftbew.*, second edition, I. 429. "since the beginning of the world;" or, "from the beginning of history, in the course of which the sin of men has begun"); or, to *res humanæ* (Semler); or, to the time of the Devil's fall (Bengel: *ex quo diabolus est diabolus*): but all these supplements are purely arbitrary. Many modern commentators take the expression in reference to the sin of man, and find this idea expressed in it, that "the Devil is related to all the sins of men as the first and seductive originator" (Nitzsch, *Syst. der christlichen Lehre*, sixth edition, p. 244 f.); thus Lücke, Düsterdieck, Ebrard, Weiss, Braune, and previously in this commentary: but this thought, while it no doubt lies in the preceding *ἐκ τοῦ διαβόλου* and in the following *τέκνον τοῦ διαβόλου*, and hence in the thesis to be established, does not lie in this confirmatory clause, apart from the fact that in *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἁμαρτάνει* no reference is indicated to the sin of man. It is otherwise in John viii. 44, where the more particular definition of the relation of the Devil to men is supplied with *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς* from the context ("since he has put himself in connection with men"): here, on the contrary, John does not say "what the Devil is to men, but what is his relationship to God" (Hofmann as above); but as he describes his relationship by *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἁμαρτάνει*,

justification, there is no ground whatever for the assertion of a Lapede, that the thought of this verse forms a contradiction to the Protestant doctrine of justification by faith. — The interpretation of Lorinus, that *ὁ ποιῶν τὴν δικ.* is "qui habet in se justitiam, i. e., opus gratiæ, videlicet virtutem infusam," is also plainly erroneous.

¹ Braune rightly proves, against Roman Catholics and Rationalists, that "the predicate is not first attained after what is expressed in the subjective clause has taken place," and that rather "the predicate is immanent in the subject."

as a sinning which has continued from the beginning, this can only mean that the Devil's first action was sin, and that he has remained and remains in that action. Likewise in the interpretation which Brückner gives of ἀπ' ἀρχῆς, "i.e., so long as there is sin," ἀπ' ἀρχῆς does not receive its full force.¹ — The present ἀμαρτάνει describes the sinning of the Devil as uninter- ruptedly continuous. — εἰς τοῦτο ἐφανερώθη, κ.τ.λ.]. As vv. 6, 7, refer to the second part of ver. 5, these words refer to the first part of that verse: they not only express the antithesis between Christ and the Devil, but they bring out the fact that the appearance of Christ has for its object the destruction of the ἔργα τοῦ διαβόλου, i.e., of the ἀμαρτίαι which are wrought by him (not "the reward of sin," Calov, Spener; nor "the agency that seduces to sin," De Wette). λύνει is used here as in John ii. 19 (similarly 2 Pet. iii. 10-12), in the meaning of "to destroy;" less naturally some commentators (a Lapede, Lorinus, Spener, Besser, etc.) maintain the meaning "to undo," sins being regarded as the snares of the Devil.

Ver. 9. Antithesis of the preceding verse; yet what was there the subject is here—in its opposite—the predicate, and what was there the predicate is here the subject. — πᾶς ὁ γεγεννημένος ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ]. Antithesis to him who is ἐκ τοῦ διαβόλου (ver. 8); "by πᾶς the general signification of the clause is indicated" (Braune); ἀμαρτίαν οὐ ποιεῖ is used in the same sense as οὐχ ἀμαρτάνει, ver. 6. To be born of God and to commit sin are mutually exclusive contraries; for ὁ Θεὸς φῶς ἐστὶ, καὶ σκοτία ἐν αὐτῷ οὐκ ἐστὶν οὐδεμία, chap. i. 5; comp. also chap. ii. 29; the child is of the same nature with him of whom he is born. For confirmation of the thought, John adds: ὅτι σπέρμα αὐτοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ μένει. Both the deeper context and the expression itself are opposed to the interpretation of these words, according to which σπέρμα is explained = τέκνον, and ἐν αὐτῷ = ἐν Θεῷ (Bengel, Lange, Sander, Steinhöfer); for if the apostle meant to say that "a child of God remains in God," he would certainly not have exchanged the word τέκνον, which so naturally would suggest itself just here, for another word, unusual in this sense. By σπέρμα Θεοῦ is rather to be understood the divine element of which the new man is produced² (comp. Gospel of John i. 13), and which, as the essence of his being, keeps him from sin. According to many commentators (Clemens Al., Augustine, Bede, Luther (1),³ Spener, Grotius, Besser, Weiss, Ewald, etc.), this is the word of God, in favor of which appeal is made not only to the parable of the sower (Matt. xiii.), but also to 1 Pet. i. 23 and Jas. i. 18. But that parable can here so much the less be adduced,

¹ The idea that the Devil, before he sinned, was for a time without sin, is nowhere expressed in Scripture; neither in John viii. 44 nor in the deuterocanonical passages Jude 6 and 2 Pet. ii. 4 (see my comm. on these passages). — The view of Frommann, that John's statements do not justify the representation of a personal existence of the Devil, that "he is nothing further than the world-spirit that tempts man, considered in concrete personality," is to be rejected as arbitrary.

² Frommann (p. 170) incorrectly interprets σπέρμα of the divine light originally dwelling in man, by which he is distinguished from the rest of creation; for the subject here is not men as such, but the τέκνα τοῦ Θεοῦ.

³ In his second edition Luther says: "He calls the cause of our change a seed, not a full ear of corn, but what is cast into the ground, and must first die there; from thence there now results true repentance, so that it is accordingly said: he cannot sin."

as in it the reference is to the seed *of plants*; but here, as the allusion to the idea *γεννημένος* shows, "the comparison is made to the seed of human birth, as in John i. 13" (Neander); and in the two other passages the word is not represented so much as the seed, but as the means of producing the new life.¹ It is scarcely to be doubted that the apostle was here thinking of the Holy Spirit; the only question is, whether he means the Spirit Himself, the *πνεῦμα ἅγιον* in His divine personality (so Beza: *sic vocatur Spiritus sanctus, quod ejus virtute tanquam ex semine quodam novi homines efficiamur*; Düsterdieck and Myrberg; also, perhaps, Lücke and De Wette), or the Spirit infused by Him into the heart of man, the germ of life communicated to his nature (Hornejus: *nativitatis novae indoles*, Semler: *nova quaedam et sanctior natura*; so also Ebrard, Braune, and others). The figurative expression is more in favor of the second view than of the first, only this germ of life must not, on the one hand, be regarded as something separate from the Holy Spirit Himself,² nor, on the other hand, as *love* (a Lapide, Lorinus), for this is the life which has proceeded from the *σπέρμα*, but not the *σπέρμα* itself. — The thought that he who is born of God does not commit sin is still further emphasized by the words *καὶ οὐ δύναται ἁμαρτάνειν*, whereby, of course, not the physical, but no doubt the moral, impossibility of sinning is described; both ideas, *ἁμαρτάνειν* as well as *οὐ δύναται*, are to be retained in their proper meaning, and not to be arbitrarily perverted; *ἁμαρτάνειν* must here, just as little as in ver. 6, be restricted to mortal sins (a Lapide, Gagnejus), or to "sinning in the way in which they who are of the Devil sin" (Besser), or "to sinning knowingly and wilfully" (Ebrard), or even merely to the *violatio charitatis* (Augustine, Bede); but just as little is the pointedness and definiteness of *οὐ δύναται* to be weakened and to be explained = *aegre, difficulter potest*, or similarly,³ for the apostle here wants to bring out the *absolute* antagonism which exists in general between being born of God and committing sin (so also Braune); comp. on ver. 6. With regard to the question as to the relationship of the thought expressed here to Heb. vi. 4 ff., comp. the remark on chap. ii. 19. — As in the case of the first thought of this verse, so here to this second one a confirmatory clause is added, namely: *ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ γεννήθηται*; it is true, the idea of the subject seems to be here repeated (similarly John iii. 31: *ὁ ὢν ἐκ τῆς γῆς, ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἐστί*), but here *ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ* is put first, whereas in the subject it follows *γεννημένος*, by which that idea is strongly accentuated; Bengel: *priora verba: ex Deo, majorem habent in pronunciendo accentum, quod ubi observatur, patet, non idem per idem probari, collato inito verso*. The sense therefore is: Because he is born of *God* (comp. chap. i. 5), he who is born of God, i. e., the believer, cannot sin.

¹ Wess appeals to chap. ii. 14; but from the fact that John there says: *ὁ λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐν ὑμῖν μένει*, it does not follow that *σπέρμα* is here = *ὁ λόγος τ. Θε.*; so much the less as there is no reference there to being born of God. It is more appropriate in connection with *σπέρμα* to refer to chap. ii. 27.

² Brückner inversely first interprets *σπέρμα*

as the *πνεῦμα τ. Θε.*; but then adds: "and, indeed, in this way, that the principle of life which operates on man is at the same time regarded as the germ of life planted in man."

³ Grotius explains: "res de qua agitur aliena est ab ejusmodi ingenio," Paulus: "not absolutely impossible, but: his whole spirituality and *habit* (!) are opposed to it."

Ver. 10a concludes the development of the thought with the sharp antithesis of the children of God and the children of the Devil. — ἐν τούτῳ is by most commentators justly referred to the preceding, inasmuch as in ver. 9 the characteristic sign of the τέκνα τοῦ Θεοῦ, and in ver. 8 that of the τέκνα τοῦ διαβόλου, are stated. Some commentators, however (a Lapidé, Grotius, S. Schmidt, Spener, Episcopius, Ebrard, etc.), refer it to what follows; but as in this only the one part of the antithesis is resumed, this reference is found to necessitate an arbitrary supplement. The explanation of a Lapidé is clearly quite erroneous: *hae sunt duae tesserae et quasi duo symbola filiorum et militum Dei, sc. justitia et caritas.* — φανερά ἐστι]. The εἶναι ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ, and equally the εἶναι ἐκ τοῦ διαβόλου, are in their principle internal, and therefore concealed: it is by the different ποιεῖν that the different nature is disclosed; comp. Matt. vii. 16. — The expression, τὰ τέκνα τοῦ διαβόλου, nowhere else in the N. T. except in Acts xiii. 10: υἱὸς διαβόλου, is easily explained from ver. 8; comp also John viii. 44. Sander supposes a distinction between these and the children of wrath, Eph. ii. 3; while the latter name signifies all who are not born again, the former only signifies those among them “who despise the grace offered to them in Christ, and wantonly set themselves against it.” This is, however, incorrect, as the whole conduct of men falls under the contrast of ἀμαρτάνειν and οὐχ ἀμαρτάνειν, so the distinction of τέκνα τοῦ Θεοῦ and τέκνα τοῦ διαβόλου, that is based on it, equally embraces the whole of humanity (see also Braune). Socinus accordingly with justice says: *Ex Apostoli verbis satis aperte colligi potest, quod inter filios Dei et filios Diaboli nulli sint homines mediū.*

Vv. 10b–22. This section treats on brotherly love as the substance of δικαιοσύνη, and is therefore most closely connected with the foregoing; it is the commandment of Christ (ver. 11), instead of which hatred reigns in the world (vv. 12, 13); with love, life is connected; with hatred, death (vv. 14, 15); in Christ we possess the ideal and example of love (ver. 16). True love consists not in word, but in deed (vv. 17, 18); it produces firm confidence towards God, and obtains an answer to prayer (vv. 19–22)

Ver. 10b. Transition to the section on brotherly love. — πᾶς ὁ μὴ ποιῶν δικαιοσύνην refers to ver. 7, and further to chap. ii. 29; the meaning of ποιεῖν δικαιοσύνην is here the same as there; only that the idea δικαιοσύνη is indicated by the article as definite and restricted; comp. ver. 8: τὴν ἀμαρτίαν; ver. 9. ἀμαρτίαν. — οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ = οὐκ ἔστιν τέκνον τοῦ Θεοῦ. — καὶ ὁ μὴ ἀγαπῶν τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ]. Calvin correctly says: *hoc membrum vice expositionis additum est.* The ἀγάπη is not a part of the δικαιοσύνη (Bengel, Spener, Lange, Neander, Gerlach), still less something different from the δικαιοσύνη, which must be connected with it (Rickli), or even forms an antithesis to it (Socinus);¹ but it is the *essence and nature of the δικαιοσύνη* (so also Braune),² or rather the δικαιοσύνη itself in reference to the brethren;

¹ While Socinus understands by δικαιοσύνην ποιεῖν “juste vivere ex praescriptione Mosaicæ legis et ipsius humanæ rationis,” he explains ἀγάπη as the transcendent Christian virtue of sacrifice for the brethren.

² Ebrard and Myrberg object to this, that it

may be true of love to God only, but not of love to the brethren; but Christian brotherly love is, according to John, certainly identical with love to God, for the Christian loves his brother as one who is born of God.

comp. Rom. xiii. 8-10; Gal. v. 14; Col. iii. 14; 1 Tim. i. 5; John xiv. 15. Besser: "brotherly love is the essence of all righteous life;" it is related to *δικαιοσύνη* just as to the *περιπατεῖν καθὼς ἐκεῖνος περιπάτησε*, chap. ii. 6. Ebrard erroneously tries to prove from the *αὐτοῦ* which is added, that *ἀδελφός* = *ὁ πλῆσιον*, Luke x. 36, and is therefore used differently from ii. 9, 10, 11, iv. 20, 21, for that John in this relative sentence passes on to the love of Christians towards one another is quite clear from ver. 11; the *αὐτοῦ* only shows that, though in the foregoing the antithesis between the regenerate and the unregenerate is quite generally stated, this is for the special consideration of *Christians*. It is incomprehensible that the view, according to which John in this section speaks of Christian brotherly love (i.e., the love of Christians towards one another), is in antagonism with Matt. v. 44; 1 Cor. iv. 12 (according to Ebrard). The co-ordinating *καί* is epexegetical = "namely;" it is unnecessary to supply *οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ τ. θ.*

Ver. 11. *ὅτι* confirms the thought expressed in the foregoing, that he who does not love his brother is not of God. — *αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἀγγελία*]. *αὕτη* refers to the following *ἴνα*, with a retrospective allusion to *ἀγαπῶν τ. ἑδ. αὐτοῦ*. The word *ἀγγελία* = "message," is here to be taken in the meaning of "commission," "commandment." With the reading *ἐπαγγελία*, comp. i. 5. By the words *ἦν . . . ἀπ' ἀρχῆς*, which do not refer to the Old-Testament period (Grotius: *etiam sub lege*), or to "the beginning of history" (Ebrard), the commandment of brotherly love is characterized as the *ἀγγελία* which is necessarily connected with the preaching of the gospel; comp. chap. ii. 7. — *ἴνα*, κ.τ.λ., states, not the *purpose* for which the *ἀγγελία* is given, but the import of it, as frequently with words of wishing, commanding, etc.; comp. Buttm., p. 203 ff.¹ The *ἀγαπῶμεν ἀλλήλους* shows that the apostle is in this section treating of the love of Christians towards one another; it is self-evident that the Christian has to fulfil the general commandment of love, even to those who are not Christians. Yet John does not here enter on that, as it would be inappropriate, for he has here to do with the ethical antithesis between Christians as children of God and those who are opposed to them as children of the Devil; it is only on the ground of this antithesis that it can be said *μὴ ἀγαπᾶτε τὸν κόσμον*, ii. 15.

Ver. 12. The converse of Christian brotherly love is the hatred of the world, which has its example in Cain. — *οὐ καθὼς Κάιν*, κ.τ.λ.]. Contrary to the opinion of Grotius, with which Lücke agrees, that before *καθὼς* we must supply "*οὐκ ὤμεν ἐκ τοῦ πονηροῦ*" dependent on *ἴνα*, De Wette has shown the clumsiness of speech that would result with this construction; it is unjustifiable, however, on the side of the thought also, for it is impossible that John would say that to Christians the commandment has been given from the beginning, not to be *ἐκ τοῦ πονηροῦ*. Most commentators supply after *οὐ* the thought "we should be disposed," and after *Κάιν* the relative *ὅς*. Thus there certainly results a good sense; but if the apostle had thought *thus*, he

¹ Braune would have the idea of purpose retained; but in his interpretation: "it is not merely the substance of a commandment that is treated of, but a commandment which is con-

tained as a *task* in the *gift* of the *message*," he quite overlooks the fact that if *ἴνα* = in order that (and only thus is the original idea of purpose retained), it cannot refer to *αὕτη*.

would also have expressed himself thus; at least he would not have left out the $\delta\varsigma$. De Wette rightly finds here "an inexact comparison of contrast, as John vi. 58, only still more difficult to supply, and just on that account not to be supplied," i.e., by a definitely formulated sentence (so also Braune). Christians are (and therefore should also show themselves as) the opposite of Cain; they are $\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\ \Theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$, Cain was $\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\ \pi\omicron\nu\eta\rho\omicron\upsilon$; $\tau\omicron\upsilon\ \pi\omicron\nu\eta\rho\omicron\upsilon$ is not neuter, but masculine; $\delta\ \pi\omicron\nu\eta\rho\omicron\varsigma = \delta\ \delta\acute{\iota}\alpha\beta\omicron\lambda\omicron\varsigma$; comp. especially Matt. xiii. 38.¹— $\kappa\alpha\iota\ \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\phi\alpha\zeta\epsilon\nu\ \tau\omicron\nu\ \acute{\alpha}\delta\epsilon\lambda\phi\omicron\nu\ \acute{\alpha}\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon$]. This murder of his brother is the evidence that Cain was $\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\ \pi\omicron\nu\eta\rho\omicron\upsilon$. The verb $\sigma\phi\acute{\alpha}\zeta\epsilon\iota\nu$ (besides here, only in the Apocalypse), strictly used of slaughter, indicates the *violence* of the action;² the *diabolical* character of it is brought out by the following: $\kappa\alpha\iota\ \chi\acute{\alpha}\rho\iota\nu\ \tau\iota\nu\omicron\varsigma$, κ.τ.λ.; the form of the sentence in question and answer serves to bring out emphatically the thought contained in it, that the hatred of Cain towards his brother was founded in his hatred towards the good, i.e., that which is of God, for it is just in this that the hatred of the world towards believing Christians is also founded.³ The correspondence between $\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\ \pi\omicron\nu\eta\rho\omicron\upsilon$ and $\tau\acute{\alpha}\ \acute{\epsilon}\rho\gamma\alpha\ \acute{\alpha}\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon\ \pi\omicron\nu\eta\rho\acute{\iota}\alpha$, which J. Lange and Dusterdieck have already noticed, is to be observed.

Ver. 13. If Cain is the type of the world, it is not to be wondered at that the children of God are hated by it; accordingly the apostle says, $\mu\eta\ \theta\alpha\nu\mu\acute{\iota}\zeta\epsilon\tau\epsilon$, κ.τ.λ.; comp. ver. 1; not exactly to *comfort* his readers about it, but rather to bring out the antithesis clearly; Neander: "it must not surprise Christians if they are hated by the world; this is to them the stamp of the divine life, in the possession of which they form the contrast to the world."—The particle *ei* expresses here neither a doubt nor even merely possibility; for, that the world hates the children of God, is not merely possible, but in the nature of the case *necessary*; it is only the form of the sentence, and not the thought of it, that is hypothetical;⁴ comp. John xv. 18, also Mark xv. 44.

¹ The strange rabbinical view of the devilish nature of Cain in Zohar on Gen. iv. 1: "Rabbi Eleazar dixit: Cum projecisset serpens ille immunditiam suam in Evam eaque illam suscepisset, remque cum Adam habuisset, peperit duos filios, unum ex latere illo immundo et unum ex latere Adami; fuitque Cain similis imagine superiorum h. e. Angelorum et Abel imagine inferiorum h. e. hominum, ac propterea diverse fuerunt viae istius ab illius viis. Equidem Cain fuit filius spiritus immundi, qui est serpens malus; Abel vero fuit filius Adami; et propterea quod Cain venit de parte Angeli mortis, ideo interfecit fratrem suum."

² From the fact that $\sigma\phi\acute{\alpha}\zeta\epsilon\iota\nu$ is used in the Revelation of "slaying in a holy service, as the martyrs are slain, even though by the godless" (which is never quite appropriate, comp. Rev. vi. 4), it cannot be concluded that John here used the expression in order "to mark the death of Abel as a martyrdom by the

hand of a godless man, or as a sacrifice which Cain offered to his god, the Devil."

³ That Cain slew his brother because his own works were evil and his brother's righteous, does not seem to correspond to the Mosaic narrative, for $\tau\acute{\alpha}\ \acute{\epsilon}\rho\gamma\alpha$ are not the offering, but the works in general (Spener: "the whole manner of life"); but there is no real contradiction, for the narrative in Genesis does not exclude the idea that the piety of Abel had already excited in Cain hatred towards his brother, and that, when God despised his offering, but had respect unto his brother's, this hatred went so far that he became guilty of murder. Cain with his hatred, and Abel in his suffering on account of his $\delta\iota\kappa\alpha\iota\omicron\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\nu\eta$, serve the apostle as prototypes of the world and of the children of God. On the similar view in Philo and in the Clementine Homilies, see Lücke on this passage.

⁴ Ebrard explains *ei* incorrectly: "when-

Ver. 14. The contrast of love and hatred is at the same time one of life and death. — *ἡμεῖς οἶδαμεν*]. *ἡμεῖς* forms the antithesis of *ὁ κόσμος*. Though the world hate us and persecute us *to death*, as Cain killed his brother, *we* know, etc. — *ὅτι μεταβεβήκαμεν ἐκ τοῦ θανάτου εἰς τὴν ζωὴν*]. Comp. Gospel of John v. 24; the perfect shows that the subject is a present and not merely a future state; moreover, the apostle does not say that the Christian has received the *title* to eternal life (Grotius: *juri ad rem saepe datur nomen rei ipsius*), but that the believer has already passed from death into life, and therefore no longer is in a state of death, but in life. By *ζωή* is to be understood not merely the knowledge of God (Weiss), but holy life in truth and righteousness; by *θάνατος*, not merely the want of the knowledge of God (Weiss), but unholy life in lying and sin. The natural man is fallen in lies and unrighteousness, and hence wretched *ἐν θανάτῳ*: by the salvation of Christ he enters from this state into the other, the essence of which is happiness in truth and righteousness.¹ That the Christian, as such, is in a state of *ζωή*, he knows from the fact that he loves the brethren; brotherly love is the sign of the *ζωή*; therefore the apostle continues: *ὅτι ἀγαπῶμεν τοὺς ἀδελφούς*. — *ὅτι* refers, as most commentators rightly interpret, to *οἶδαμεν* and not to *μεταβεβήκαμεν* (Baumgarten-Crusius, Köstlin); the relation between *ζωή* and *ἀγάπη* is, namely, not this, that the latter is the originating cause of the former (Lyra: *opera ex caritate facta sunt meritoria*), but both are one in their cause, and are only distinguished in this way, that *ζωή* is the *state*, *ἀγάπη* the *action* of the believer: out of the happy life, love grows, and love again produces happiness; therefore John says: *ὁ μὴ ἀγαπῶν* (*sc. τὸν ἀδελφόν*, see the critical notes) *μένει ἐν τῷ θανάτῳ*, by which the identity of not loving and of abiding in death is directly brought out.² — It is not without a purpose that the apostle contents himself here, where he has only to do with the simple antithesis to the preceding, with the negative idea, *μὴ ἀγαπῶν*, with which the *ἐν τῷ θανάτῳ μένει* also corresponds; it is only in the following verse that the negation reaches the form of a positive antithesis. — *μένει* expresses here also the firm, sure being (so also Myrberg); it is therefore used neither merely in reference to the past, nor merely in reference to the future.

Ver. 15. *πᾶς ὁ μισῶν*, instead of the preceding *μὴ ἀγαπῶν*; *not loving*, and *hating*, are one and the same thing: ³ for pure indifference is not possible to the *living* human soul. — *ἀνθρωποκτόνος ἐστὶ*]. This word (except only in John viii. 44, used of the Devil) does not signify the murderer of the *soul*, whether

ever the case occurs," for the hatred which is here spoken of is not a frequently occurring case, but a necessary relationship. Braune unintelligibly says: "by *εἰ* John signifies that his readers as a whole or as individuals have after all at present no hatred to endure."

¹ By this expression *μεταβεβήκαμεν*, κ.τ.λ., the apostle describes Christians as having been, previously to their believing, *ἐν τῷ θανάτῳ*, hence also not yet *τέκνα τοῦ Θεοῦ*; contrary to the assertion of Hilgenfeld, that the author of the Epistle shared the Gnostic view of the original metaphysical difference in men.

² Besser: "Where hatred is, there is death; where love is, there is life; nay, love itself is life." Weiss erroneously maintains that here, "instead of the strict converse in the form of a progressive parallelism, just that is mentioned which is the result of the non-transition from death to life, namely, the abiding in death," for John did not need to say actually that he who has not passed from death to life is in death.

³ Wrongly, Nicol. de Lyra: "Odisse pejus quam non diligere."

one's own or one's brother's, but the murderer in the strict sense. Every one who hates his brother is a murderer, not merely inasmuch as hatred sometimes leads to murder, but because by his nature he is inclined to the destruction of his brother, and if he does not attain this object is only hindered from it by other opposing forces. As in the moral life it is not the outward act in itself, but the intention, that is of consequence, every one who lives in hatred towards his brother must by the moral consciousness (or by God, Drusius, Hornejus) be regarded as a murderer; comp. Matt. v. 21 ff., 27, 28. — Hence it is clear that the real thought of the apostle is missed when *μισεῖν* is here limited to the *odium perfectum* (Hornejus). Baumgarten-Crusius erroneously denies that *ἀνθρωποκτόνος* refers to Cain, ver. 12; this reference is clearly patent. — *καὶ οἴδατε*]. De Wette: "whence? from the Christian consciousness in general." — *ὅτι πᾶς ἀνθρωποκτόνος, κ.τ.λ.*]. He who takes his brother's life can not and must not retain life himself, his life decays in death; that is the order appointed by God; comp. Gen ix. 6 Accordingly he who *in his heart* murders his brother, cannot be in possession of the life which dwells in the heart, i.e., of "eternal life." By *ζωὴ αἰώνιος* we are to understand the same thing as in ver. 14 was described by the simple word *ζωή*; and *ἔχει* is to be retained as the actual present: erroneously, a Lapide: *non habebit gloriam vitæ*. — The adjective *μένουσαν* Lücke, with whom Sander agrees, appealing to the parable of the unmerciful servant, explains by the fact that John is speaking to Christians who already had some part in eternal life. But the expression *πᾶς ὁ μισῶν* shows that John is here speaking quite generally, and, indeed, in order to confirm the preceding thought, *ὁ μὴ ἀγαπῶν μένει ἐν τῷ θανάτῳ*; it must therefore be the condition of those who form the *κόσμος* (to whom also the mere nominal Christians belong), of those accordingly who have no part in the *ζωὴ αἰώνιος*, that is stated. By *μένουσαν* is therefore not suggested the *loss* of a previously possessed good; just as little as in the corresponding passage, Gospel of John v. 38: *τὸν λόγον αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἔχετε ἐν ὑμῖν μένοντα*, where also the meaning is not that those addressed have previously had the word of God, for this is distinctly denied in ver. 37. The *μένουσαν* is rather explained by the fact that he alone really has the *ζωὴ αἰώνιος* in whom it abides (comp. chap. ii 19); *μένειν* expresses here also, according to John's *usus loquendi*, the idea of *being* in a strengthened degree, and may accordingly be used quite apart from any reference to the previous state; *μένουσαν* is to be connected with *ἐν αὐτῷ*; he has not the life abiding, i.e., surely and firmly existing, in him.¹

Vv. 16–18. Description of true love.

¹ It is incorrect to say, with Braune: "by *μένουσαν* the existence of eternal life from baptism, etc., is indicated," since in the context there is no reference whatever to baptism, instruction, etc., and the advantage resulting therefrom. Weiss artificially explains: "John supposes the case of a person having eternal life, and now goes so far as to say that even such an one may not have it permanently at least, but may be in the condition of losing it if by hating his brother he becomes a mur-

derer;" such a case John would not and could not at all assume. Very strange is Ebrard's interpretation: "supposing that the murderer had at the time the *ζωὴ αἰώνιος* in him (which, however, according to ver. 9, is not possible in the full (!) sense), yet this *would* not remain in him, he would again fall away from the *ζωὴ* (which just for this reason could not be *genuine*)," as well as his assertion that *ζωὴν αἰών.* is here used without the article, because John could not ascribe to him who is not a true

Ver 16. Whilst he who belongs to the world hates his brother and is therefore an *ἀνθρωποκτόνος*, Christians, on the contrary, are by the example of Christ to lay down their life for their brethren. — *ἐν τούτῳ* refers to the following *οὗτι*. — *ἐγνώκαμεν τὴν ἀγάπην*, “we have known the love, i.e., the character or the nature of the love” (Bengel, De Wette, Baungarten-Crusius, Lücke, Sander); some commentators (Carpzov, Paulus, etc.) erroneously supply with *τὴν ἀγάπην* as a more particular definition, *τοῦ Χριστοῦ*; others (Grotius, Spener, etc.), *τοῦ Θεοῦ*. In Christ’s self-devotion to death, love itself became concrete. Without adequate reason Ebrard supplies with *ἐν τούτῳ* an *οὐσαν*, so that *ἐν τούτῳ* forms the predicate of *τὴν ἀγάπην*; thus, “we have known love as consisting in this;” and *ἐγνώκαμεν* is only used as an accessory. — *οὗτι ἐκεῖνος*, i.e., Christ; comp. ver. 7, chap. ii. 6. “He, says the apostle, without mentioning him by name, for He is to every believer the well-known” (Rickli). — The phrase, *τὴν ψυχὴν τίθεναι*, besides here and frequently in the Gospel of John, never appears elsewhere either in the N. T. or in the classics. Meyer on John x. 11 explains it by the “representation of the sacrificial death as a ransom paid: *to lay down, to pay*; according to the classical usage of *τίθεναι*, according to which it is used of *payment*;” Hengstenberg (on the same passage) explains it by Isa. liii. 10; but it is unsuitable to supply the idea “ransom” or “an offering for sin,” for the *τίθεναι τὴν ψυχὴν* is not merely ascribed to Christ, but is also made the duty of Christians; besides, in that case *ὑπὲρ* could not be wanting, as is the case in the Gospel of John x. 17, 18. The derivation of it from the Hebrew *רָצַח שָׁחַב דָּבַח* (Ebrard) is equally unsuitable, because “here the *רָצַח* is essential” (Meyer). According to John xiii. 4, *τίθημι* may in this phrase also be interpreted = *deponere* (so most commentators), which is so much the more appropriate as in John x. *ἵνα πάλιν λάβω ἀπ’ αὐτῆν* is conjoined with *τίθημι τὴν ψυχὴν μου*, just as in chap. xiii. 12 it runs, *καὶ ἐλάβεν τὰ ἱμάτια αὐτοῦ*; “comp. *animam ponere* in Propert. II 10, 43, and *animam deponere* in Corn. Nep., *Vita Hannib. I. 3*” (Brückner). Perhaps *τίθημι* might also be taken in the meaning of “to give up” (*II. xxiii. 704*: *θεῖναι εἰς μέσον, τίθεναι εἰς τὸ κοινόν*, in Pape see *τίθημι*). — *ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν* is, “for our good,” i.e., to save us from destruction; for the idea, comp. chap. ii. 2. — *καὶ ἡμεῖς, κ.τ.λ.*, comp. chap. ii. 6. By this the climax is stated (John xv. 13); but even every self-denying sacrifice for our brethren belongs to the *τίθεναι τὴν ψυχὴν*, to which we are bound by the example of Christ by virtue of our fellowship with Him. — The reading *θεῖναι* is just as conformable to the N. T. *usus loquendi* as the Rec. *τίθεναι*, for *δφείλειν* is sometimes connected with the pres. inf., and sometimes with the aor. inf. For the idea, comp. Rom. xvi. 4.¹

child of God “the eternal life,” but “eternal life,” i.e., powers of the future world. Comp. against this, v. 13.

¹ The thought of this verse is, according to Ebrard, the surest proof that John in this section is not treating of the “general and vague (!) idea of brotherly love,” but of “the relation of the τέκνα Θεοῦ to those who are not τέκνα Θεοῦ,” because the apostle cannot possi-

bly “limit the duty of loving sacrifice of life to the relationship of the regenerate to one another.” But (1) the idea of Christian brotherly love is very far from being a vague idea; (2) when Christians are exhorted so to love one another as to lay down their lives for one another, that is not a limitation of the commandment of love; (3) those who are not τέκνα Θεοῦ, and are therefore τέκνα τοῦ δια-

Ver. 17. As the apostle wants to bring out that love must show itself by action, he turns his attention to the most direct evidence of it, namely, compassion towards the needy brother. "By the adversative connection (*δέ*) with ver. 16, John marks the progress from the greater, which is justly demanded, to the less, the non-performance of which seems, therefore, a grosser transgression of the rule just stated" (Düsterdieck). According to Ebrard, the *δέ* is meant to express the opposition to the delusion "that love can only show itself in great actions and sacrifices;" but there is no suggestion in the context of any thing like this. — τὸν βίον τοῦ κόσμου: "the life of the world," i.e., that which serves to support the earthly, worldly life; comp. Luke viii. 43, xv. 12, xxi. 4.¹ The expression forms here a significant contrast to ζῶν αἰώνιος (ver. 15). — θεωρεῖν, stronger than ὁρᾶν, strictly "to be a spectator," hence = *to look at*; "it expresses the active beholding" (Ebrard, similarly Myrberg: *oculis immotis*). — With *χρεῖαν ἔχειν*, comp. Mark ii. 25; Eph. iv. 28. — The expression, κλείειν τὰ σπλίγχνα, is found only here; τὰ σπλίγχνα as a translation of מַצְרִיף appears both in the LXX. as well as often in the N. T. = καρδία; "to close the heart," is as much as "to forbid to compassion towards the needy brother entrance into one's heart;" the additional ἀπ' αὐτοῦ is used in pregnant sense = "turning away from him" (Lücke, De Wette, Düsterdieck). The first two clauses *might* have had (not, as Baumgarten-Crusius says, "*must* have had") the form of subordinate clauses; but by the fact that the form of principal clauses is given to them, the statement gains in vividness. The conclusion, which according to the sense is negative, appears as a question with πῶς (comp. chap. iv. 20), whereby the negation is emphatically brought out. ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ Θεοῦ is love to God, not the love of God to us (Calov).² Here also μένειν has the meaning noticed on ver. 15 (Myrberg); incorrectly, Lücke: "as John is speaking of the probable absence of the previously-existing Christian life, it is put μένει and not ἐστίν." The apostle does not want to say that the pitiless person loses again his love to God, but that it never is really in him at all. Pitilessness cannot be combined with love to God; the reason of this John states in chap. iv. 20.

Ver. 18. *True* love proves itself by deed. The exhortation contained in this verse is, on the one hand, a deduction from the foregoing (especially from vv. 16 and 17); but, on the other hand, it forms the basis of the further development. — τεκνίω]. Impressive address before the exhortation. — μὴ ἀγαπῶμεν λόγῳ μὴδὲ τῇ γλώσσῃ, i.e., "let us not so love that the proof of our love is the outward word or the tongue;" μὴδὲ τῇ γλώσσῃ is expegetically added, in order to mark the externality of the love indicated by λόγῳ ἀγαπᾶν, inasmuch as it points out that by λόγος here only the outward word is meant;

βόλου, John cannot possibly call ἀδελφοί without any further statement; (4) the whole section is an explication of ἀγαπῶμεν ἀλλήλους, ver. 11; but by ἀλλήλους cannot be understood the children of God and the children of the Devil in their relation to one another; comp. besides, iv. 2-11.

¹ Comp. the Greek proverb: βίος βίου δεόμενος οὐκ ἐστὶ βίος.

² Ebrard explains ἡ ἀγάπη τ. Θεοῦ: "the love which in its essential being took substantial form after Christ and in Christ's loving deed" (!).

it is erroneous to regard γλώσσα as a climax in so far as "one may love with words (without deeds), but in such a way that the words are nevertheless really and sincerely meant" (Ebrard), for John would not in the very least consider as truly and sincerely meant words of love which remain without corresponding deed. The article serves "to vivify the expression" (Lücke): *the tongue as the particular member for expression of the word. It is unnecessary, nay, "contrary to the text" (Düsterdieck), with Beza, Lange, Sander, etc., to supply "μόνον" with ἀγαπῶμεν, κ.τ.λ.; for ἀγαπᾶν λόγῳ, κ.τ.λ., in itself expresses the mere apparent love. — ἀλλ' ἐν ἔργῳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ]. Instead of the Rec. ἔργῳ, we must read ἐν ἔργῳ. According to De Wette, the two readings are synonymous; according to Lücke, ἐν ἔργῳ κ. ἀλ. has more of "adverbial nature" than ἔργῳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ; "in τῷ λόγῳ the apostle is considering more the way in which love expresses itself, in ἐν ἔργῳ κ. ἀλ. he is considering more the form and fashion of it." The preposition suggested itself to the apostle because the *work*, as being the realization of love, stands in an inner relationship to it, "is the element in which love moves" (Düsterdieck).¹ λόγος and ἔργον are frequently in the N. T. connected with one another; so Luke xxiv. 19, Acts vii. 22, and many other passages; in order to bring out the insufficiency of λόγος in 1 Cor. iv. 19, 20, 1 Thess. i. 5, δύναμις is contrasted with it. By καὶ ἀληθείᾳ the apostle does not mean to add a *second* element of love, but to characterize the ἀγαπᾶν ἐν ἔργῳ as the *true* love (so also Myrberg); a love which does not show itself ἐν ἔργῳ is only an apparent love.² The relationship of (ἐν) ἀληθείᾳ to ἐν ἔργῳ is just the same as that of τῇ γλώσσῃ to λογῳ. The two words of each clause express together *one* idea, and these two ideas are contrasted with one another, so that it is not to be asked whether λόγῳ corresponds with ἔργῳ, and γλώσσῃ with ἀληθείᾳ, or γλώσσῃ with ἔργῳ, and λόγῳ with ἀληθείᾳ (against Düsterdieck and Braune). With the thought of this verse compare especially Jas. ii. 15, 16; only here the thought is more comprehensive than there.³*

Vv. 19, 20. Blessed result of true love. — καὶ ἐν τούτῳ]. καί: simple copula. — ἐν τούτῳ does not refer here, as in chap. ii. 3, iii. 16, 24, iv. 2, to the following thought, but to the foregoing ἀγαπᾶν ἐν ἔργῳ κ. ἀλ. The future γνωσόμεθα, which, according to the authorities, is to be read instead of γνώσκομεν (see the critical notes), "is used as in John vii. 17, viii. 31, 32, xiii. 35, where the subject is the possibility of an event which may with justice be expected" (Braune): it is the more natural here, as the form of thought is the cohortative; the sense is: If we love ἐν ἔργῳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ, we shall thereby know that, etc. — ὅτι ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας ἐσμέν: weakening and partly erroneous explanations of the phrase: ἐκ τῆς ἀλ. εἶναι, are those of Socinus: *vere talem esse ut quis se esse profiteatur*; of Grotius: *congruere evangelio*, of

¹ Braune: "It is to be observed that the first pair in the dative only states the means by which love operates; the preposition ἐν states the element in which it moves."

² Comp. John iv. 24, where also "καὶ ἀληθείᾳ" is added to ἐν πνεύματι, not to bring out a *second* element of true worship (contrary to Meyer on this passage), but to describe the

προσκυβεῖν ἐν πνεύματι as true worship in contrast to every apparent worship.

³ Wolf quotes the corresponding statement of Piche, *Aroth*, chap. v.: "Omnis dilectio, quae dependet a verbo, verbo cessante, ipsa quoque cessat: at quae non dependet a verbo, nunquam cessat." — In Theognis 979 it is put thus: μη μου ἀνὴρ εἶη γλώσσῃ φίλος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔργῳ.

Semler: ἀληθεύειν ἐν ἀγάπῃ; of Baumgarten-Crusius: "to be as we ought to be;" of De Wette: "to belong to the truth; to live in it." Bengel, on the other hand, rightly interprets the preposition ἐκ of the principium or ortus; so also Lücke, Düsterdieck, Braune, etc.; comp. John xviii. 37, and Meyer on this passage. The truth is the source of life in love. It is indeed in its deepest nature God himself; but ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ must not be put instead of ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας, for the apostle here, with reference to the preceding ἀληθεία, arrives at the idea of truth. Love ἐν ἀληθείᾳ is the evidence of being born ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας. — καὶ ἐμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ πείσομεν τὰς καρδίας ἡμῶν]. This sentence is not governed by ὅτι, but it is independently connected with the preceding, either depending or not depending on ἐν τούτῳ; if the former is the case, "we must take ἐν τούτῳ combined with πείσομεν somewhat differently than when connected with γινώσκομεν (γνωσόμεθα); with the latter it would be more therein, with the former more thereby" (Lücke; so also Braune); if the latter be the case, the thought: ἐν τούτῳ γνωσόμεθα ὅτι, κ.τ.λ., serves as the presupposition of the following ἐμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ, κ.τ.λ., in this sense: *if we truly love our brethren, we shall therein know, etc., and thus* (in this consciousness of being of the truth) *we shall assure our hearts, etc.*¹ The idea that with καὶ ἐμπροσθεν an entirely new thought appears, which stands in no intimate connection with the preceding (Ebrard), is contradicted by the καί, which closely connects the two thoughts with one another. What, then, is the meaning of πείσομεν τὰς καρδίας ἡμῶν? Plainly πείσομεν expresses a truth which we (the subject contained in πείσομεν) impress upon our hearts, so that they are thereby determined to something, which presupposes at least a relative contrast between us and our hearts. The verb πείθειν means either to persuade a person to something, so that he thinks or acts as we wish, or to convince him of something so that he agrees with our opinion. Some ancient commentators have interpreted in accordance with the first signification: *suadebimus corda nostra, ut studeant proficere in melius*; the more particular definition which is added is here clearly quite arbitrary; it is not much better with the explanation of Fritzsche (*Comment. III. de nonnullis Pauli ad Gal. ep. locis*); *animos nostros flectemus, nempe ad amorem vita factisque ostendendum*, or even with the more recent one: *anim. n. flectemus sc. ut veram Christi doctrinam tueamur* (see Erdmann, p. 129 ff.).² It is very common to explain πείθειν here by *placare, to calm, to compose*; this, it is true, is in so far inaccurate as πείθειν has not this meaning in itself, but certainly the verb is sometimes used in such a connection that the purpose of the persuasion is the calming of anger or of a similar passion;³ hence

¹ Lücke: "Even if it be unadvisable to connect καὶ ἐμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ, κ.τ.λ., directly with ἐν τούτῳ, so that it appears better, with Lachmann and the old commentators, to put a comma after ἐσμέν, every one must at least admit the connection in the direct succession of the sentences. But then it must also be permitted to take the logical connection thus: In this (vv. 16-18) do we know that we are of the truth. And thus (if we in living love

have the assurance that we are of the truth) we shall, etc."

² This interpretation is based on the erroneous view that εἶναι ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας is = *veram doctrinam tenere*; the former interpretation is contradicted by the fact that if we already know from our love to the brethren that we are of the truth, we do not need for the first time to move our hearts to love.

³ In favor of this we may appeal to the

the original meaning of the word passes into the above. This may be the case here also, for the following *καταγινώσκη* shows that the apostle regards our heart as affected with a passion directed against us; then the following *ὅτι*, ver. 20 (at least the second, for the first may also be the pronoun *ὁ* *τι*), is the causal particle = "because, since." Taking this view, the sense is: *In the consciousness that we are of the truth, we shall silence the accusation which our heart makes against us, because God is greater than our heart.* — If, on the other hand, we take *πείθειν* in the meaning of *to convince*, *ὅτι* (at least the second) is = "that;" and the sentence *μείζων ἐστὶν ὁ Θεὸς τῆς καρδίας ἡμῶν* is the object belonging to *πείσομεν*; so that the sense is: *If our heart accuses us, we shall bring it to the conviction that God is greater than it.* — The words *ἐμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ*, i.e., *τοῦ Θεοῦ*, do not point to the "future judgment" (Lücke, De Wette), but to the representation of God in the devotion of the soul, which is peculiar to the Christian. By putting them first, it is brought out that the *πείσομεν* only occurs in this representation of God (Düsterdieck, Ewald, Brückner, Braune). — Ver. 20. By far the most of the commentators take the *ὅτι* with which this verse begins as the particle, either = "because" or "that," and explain the second *ὅτι* as epanalepsis of the first. The supposition of the epanalepsis of a particle has, considered in itself, nothing against it, although it very seldom appears in the N. T., but it is only suitable if *ὅτι* is the objective particle (comp. Eph. ii. 11, 12);¹ from this it follows, that, if *πείθομεν* has the meaning "to calm," the first *ὅτι* is not to be regarded as the particle. Sander, it is true, translates: "we can calm our heart, that — God is greater," etc., but this has only sense if before "that" is supplied "with this," or "inasmuch as we reflect;" such a supplement, however, is arbitrary. Several commentators (Hoogewen, Bengel, Morus, Baumgarten-Crusius, Ewald) regard the first *ὅτι* as the pronoun, as also Lachmann (in his large edition) reads *ὁ* *τι* *ἐάν*. Düsterdieck erroneously asserts (as even Bertheau in the third edition of Lücke's Commentary, p. 339, Ebrard, and now even Brückner and Braune, have acknowledged) that this form is never found in the N. T. It is true that in Col. iii. 23 it is probably not *ὁ*, *τι* *ἐάν*, but *ὁ* *ἐάν* that is to be read, although D***, E, J, K, have the former; but in Acts iii. 23 Tisch. reads *ἦτις ἐάν* (so also *κ*), and in Col. iii. 17, according to the overwhelming authorities, it is not *ὁ* *τι* *ἐάν*, but *ὁ* *τι* *ἐάν*, that must be read (which is admitted by Lachm., Tisch., and Buttm.), and similarly in Gal. v. 10, not *ὅστις ἐάν*, but *ὅστις ἐάν* (also accepted by Lachm.,

passages cited by Lücke, Matt. xxviii. 14; Joseph., *Arch.* vi. 5, 6 (Samuel), *ὑπισχυεῖται καὶ παρακαλέσειν τὸν Θεὸν συγγνώμην περὶ τούτων αὐτοῖς, καὶ πείσειν*, and the passage in Plutarch, where *τὸ ἀπολοίμην, εἰ μὴ σε τιμωρησάμην*, the reply runs: *ἀπολοίμην, εἰ μὴ σε πείσαιμι*, although *πείθειν* has not in them exactly the meaning of "to calm."

¹ Lücke himself admits that the passages adduced by him in favor of the epanalepsis "have only value for those who take *ὅτι* both times not as causal particle, but as conjunction, belonging to *πείσομεν*;" but thinks that

the context makes it necessary to assume the epanalepsis here even for the causal particle; similarly Braune, although without even showing the grammatical justification in any way. Besides, in this construction it is quite overlooked that if the intermediate clause *ἐάν καταγινώσκη, κ.τ.λ.*, is connected with the preceding, the first *ὅτι* comes in disturbingly; and if it is connected with the following, the second *ὅτι* does so. As in accordance with the thought only the former connection can be the correct one, it is incomprehensible how John should have here interrupted it by *ὅτι*.

Tisch. 7, and Buttm.); moreover, there is nothing syntactically against reading here δ , $\tau\iota$ $\acute{\epsilon}\acute{\alpha}\nu$, for $\kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\gamma\acute{\iota}\nu\omega\sigma\kappa\epsilon\upsilon\iota$ is frequently construed with the accusative of the thing. Ebrard, however, thinks that this view is "improbable," nay, "absolutely impossible:" "improbable," because in ver. 22, δ $\acute{\epsilon}\acute{\alpha}\nu$ is used (but in the first edition of this commentary it was shown that δ $\acute{\epsilon}\acute{\alpha}\nu$ is by no means the constant form with John, but that in the Gospel, ii. 5, xiv. 13, xv. 16, δ , $\tau\iota$ $\acute{\alpha}\nu$ also appears,¹ and that the sudden change of forms is found elsewhere also in the N. T., as in Matt. v. 19, first $\delta\varsigma$ $\acute{\epsilon}\acute{\alpha}\nu$ and afterwards $\delta\varsigma$ $\delta'\acute{\alpha}\nu$ is used, and in Matt. xvi. 19, in some codd. (Lachm.), first δ $\acute{\alpha}\nu$, and then δ $\acute{\epsilon}\acute{\alpha}\nu$ is read); "absolutely impossible," "on account of the mutual relationship of the two conditional clauses, ver. 20 and ver. 21." Certainly the $\acute{\epsilon}\acute{\alpha}\nu$ in ver. 21 seems to form a sharp antithesis to the $\acute{\epsilon}\acute{\alpha}\nu$ in ver. 20; but it must not be unnoticed, that, similar though the two clauses are to one another, they nevertheless have not the pure form of antithesis, inasmuch as in ver. 21 there is no antithetical particle, in the clauses the succession of the particular words is different, and the first conditional clause only forms an inserted intermediate clause.² In favor of the explanation: "before Him shall we calm our heart, whatever it may accuse us of, because," etc. (or convince . . . that, etc.), is the fact that not only is the idea $\kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\gamma\acute{\iota}\nu\omega\sigma\kappa\eta$ thereby more closely connected with $\pi\epsilon\iota\sigma\omicron\mu\epsilon\nu$, but also the certainly strange epanalepsis of the $\delta\tau\iota$ is avoided.³—The verb $\kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\gamma\acute{\iota}\nu\omega\sigma\kappa\epsilon\upsilon\iota$, according to Lücke, does not signify condemnation, but only accusation: in the inner life of the heart, however, the two are not distinctly separated from one another, but the accusation of conscience rather includes the condemnation; the special $\kappa\alpha\tau\acute{\alpha}\kappa\rho\iota\sigma\iota\varsigma$ is certainly the work of God.⁴ The object of the $\kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\gamma\acute{\iota}\nu\omega\sigma\kappa\epsilon\upsilon\iota$ of the heart is variously defined by the commentators; some understanding by it, with reference to the preceding thought, the "want of love," others more generally the sinfulness which still adheres to believers even with all the consciousness of loving the brethren (chap. i. 8). The decision as to which is the correct interpretation depends on the explanation

¹ \aleph has in chap. ii. 5: δ $\acute{\alpha}\nu$; xiv. 13: δ $\tau\iota$ $\acute{\alpha}\nu$; xv. 16: δ $\tau\iota$ $\acute{\epsilon}\acute{\alpha}\nu$.

² If it was the apostle's intention to contrast sharply two different cases, he could do this more definitely if he constructed the first period thus: $\acute{\epsilon}\acute{\alpha}\nu$ $\kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\gamma$, $\acute{\eta}\mu\omega\acute{\nu}$ $\acute{\eta}$ $\kappa\alpha\rho\delta\iota\alpha$, $\acute{\epsilon}\mu\pi\rho\sigma\theta\epsilon\nu$ $\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\omicron\upsilon$ $\pi\epsilon\iota\sigma\omicron\mu\epsilon\nu$ τ , κ , $\delta\tau\iota$ $\mu\epsilon\acute{\iota}\zeta\omega\nu$, κ , τ , λ , and the second: $\acute{\epsilon}\acute{\alpha}\nu$ $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$ $\mu\acute{\eta}$ $\kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\gamma$, $\acute{\eta}\mu\omega\acute{\nu}$ $\acute{\eta}$ $\kappa\alpha\rho\delta\iota\alpha$. From the fact that he did not do so, it may be concluded that such a sharp contrast was not in his purpose.

³ That the supposition of an epanalepsis for the causal particle is improper, has been already noticed above; and for the passage before us it is further clear from the fact that if $\delta\tau\iota$ is the causal particle, the clause $\mu\epsilon\acute{\iota}\zeta\omega\nu$ $\acute{\epsilon}\acute{\sigma}\tau\iota\nu$, κ , τ , λ , forms, according to the thought, the conclusion of $\acute{\epsilon}\acute{\alpha}\nu$ $\kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\gamma\acute{\iota}\nu\omega\sigma\kappa\eta$, as plainly appears in Lücke when he explains: "Then, if . . . our conscience accuses us, God is greater than our heart," etc. — But even the

epanalepsis of $\delta\tau\iota$ as objective particle may be doubted; for as the thought $\acute{\epsilon}\acute{\alpha}\nu$ $\kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\gamma\acute{\iota}\nu\omega\sigma\kappa\eta$ does not form the presupposition for $\mu\epsilon\acute{\iota}\zeta\omega\nu$ $\acute{\epsilon}\acute{\sigma}\tau\iota\nu$, κ , τ , λ , but for $\pi\epsilon\iota\sigma\omicron\mu\epsilon\nu$, it is unsuitable to place it in the objective clause dependent on $\pi\epsilon\iota\sigma\omicron\mu\epsilon\nu$, instead of connecting it with $\pi\epsilon\iota\sigma\omicron\mu\epsilon\nu$.

⁴ Düsterdieck, with whom also Braune agrees, appropriately remarks that $\kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\gamma\acute{\iota}\nu\omega\sigma\kappa\epsilon\upsilon\iota$ occupies a middle place between $\kappa\alpha\tau\eta\gamma\omicron\rho\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu$, along with which an $\acute{\alpha}\pi\omicron\lambda\omicron\gamma\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu$ further occurs, and $\kappa\alpha\tau\acute{\alpha}\kappa\rho\iota\mu\epsilon\nu$, which includes the judicial decree of punishment; comp. Deut. xxv. 1, 2. — Düsterdieck suitably quotes on this passage Sir. xiv. 2, comp. xix. 5, and *Test. Gad.* 5; J. A. Fabricius, *Cod. pseudep. V. T.*, p. 681. — $\kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\gamma\acute{\iota}\nu\omega\sigma\kappa\epsilon\upsilon\iota$ means, to pronounce against a person that he is guilty; $\kappa\alpha\tau\acute{\alpha}\kappa\rho\iota\mu\epsilon\nu$, on the other hand, to pronounce the merited punishment on a person.

of the following sentence: *ὅτι μείζων ἐστὶν ὁ Θεὸς τῆς καρδίας ἡμῶν καὶ γινώσκει πάντα*. — The old controversy is, whether God is called greater than our heart as *forgiving* or as *judging*: the *former* is the view of Thomas Angl., Luther, Bengel, Morus, Russmeyer, Spener, Noesselt, Steinhöfer, Rickli, Baumgarten-Crusius, Sander, Besser, Düsterdieck, Erdmann, Myrberg, Ewald, Brückner, Braune, etc.; the *latter* is the view of Calvin, Beza, Socinus, Grotius, a Lapide, Castalio, Hornejus, Estius, Calovius, Semler, Lücke, Neander, Gerlach, De Wette, Ebrard, etc. — If *πεῖθειν* is = “to calm,” then *μείζων* must refer to the forgiving love of God. Lücke, indeed, gives the following explanation: “after John has said that *only* if we are, in active brotherly love, conscious that we are of the truth, shall we calm our hearts in the judgment, he adds: for if the contrary is the case, if our conscience accuses us of the want of genuine love, then God is greater than our heart, and before His holiness and omniscience there is no calm for the accusing conscience.” But the assumption of such a *declaratio e contrario*, which is in no way hinted at, is only an artificial expedient for reconciling contraries. *μείζων* can only be referred to God as judging, if *πεῖθειν* has the meaning “to persuade.” As Ebrard regards this as the right view, and would begin “a perfectly independent new sentence” with *καὶ ἔμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ*, he states the meaning as follows: “In the sight of God we shall convince our hearts of this, that if (even) our heart (so prone to self-deception and self-excuse, and therefore *small*) accuses us (namely, of not practising love), God, the all-knowing, is greater than our heart, and we shall therefore *so much the less* be able to stand before Him.” This interpretation is contradicted, in the first place, by the fact that it separates the second part of the nineteenth verse from the first, nay, even places it in antithesis to it,¹ whereas such an independence is not only not suggested as belonging to it, but is refuted by the connecting *καί*; and, in the second place, by the fact that the thought is in itself inadmissible. According to the representation of the apostle, *we* and *our heart* are regarded as contrasted with one another, inasmuch as our heart brings a condemning accusation *against us*, which plainly refers to the fact that we by our sins have made ourselves liable to the judgment of God; it is not *we* therefore that hold out *to our heart*, but *our heart* that holds out *to us*, the judgment of God; how, then, shall *we* after this bring *our heart* to the conviction that God will condemn us, nay, will condemn us even more than our heart does already? From this it follows that — whatever be the meaning of *πεῖθειν* — *μείζων* cannot refer to the judicial activity of God. As God is called *μείζων* in comparison with our heart that condemns us, the comparison expresses an opposition. Erdmann: *Notioni cordis condemnantis magnitudo Dei comparatur et opponitur*, the heart, inasmuch as it condemns us, is like the “*hostis, qui nos aggreditur, sed Deus μείζων h. e. fortior est, ut hostem illum devincere possit*” (comp. iv. 4). As this greatness of God, which surpasses the heart, proves itself in this, that in those who are *ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας* it overcomes the accusations of the heart, those

¹ The conviction, namely, that we cannot stand before God, plainly forms an antithesis to the conviction that we are of the truth.

commentators are right who assign to this verse a comforting tendency, and therefore refer *μείζων* to the *forgiving love*. No doubt, it is objected that the thought of God's omniscience (*γινώσκει πάντα*)¹ is not able to comfort the man whom conscience accuses; but this can only hold good in reference to those who are not yet *ἐκ τῆς ἄληθείας*, and not in reference to those of whom John is here speaking, namely, those who in their sincere love to the brethren have the evidence that they are *ἐκ τῆς ἄληθείας*.² If this is the right interpretation, then it is clear that *καταγινώσκει* does not refer to the want of love, but to sin in general, from which even the *τέκνον τοῦ Θεοῦ* is not yet free (i. 8 ff); and this is also indicated by the apostle's very form of expression, if *πίσσομεν* is directly connected with *καταγινώσκει*, and if, accordingly, *ὁ, τι εἶναι* is to be read (see above), in which case *ὅτι μείζων ἐστίν, κ.τ.λ.*, states the *objective* ground of the *πίθειν*: "*because God is greater than our heart, we therefore* (in the consciousness that we are of the truth) *shall calm our hearts before God, however much our heart may accuse us.*" This interpretation deserves the preference before that according to which *πίσσομεν* is = "*to convince,*" and *ὅτι μείζων, κ.τ.λ.*, the object governed by it; because not only does the purpose of the verse thereby appear more clearly, but it is not easy to perceive how the conviction of the greatness of God which overcomes the heart should result from the consciousness *ὅτι ἐκ τῆς ἄληθείας ἐσμέν*.³— It is further to be observed that De Wette makes the *first* *ὅτι* as causal particle dependent on *πίσσομεν* (= to calm), the *second*, on the other hand, on *καταγινώσκει*: "*for, if our heart accuses us because God is greater than our heart, He also knows all things;*" but this construction is opposed not only by the fact that the *καί* is more naturally taken as copula (Baumgarten-Crusius), but also by the fact that the thought that our heart condemns us *because* God is greater than our heart, is incorrect.⁴— Without adequate

¹ Several commentators find in the words *καὶ γινώσκει πάντα* the explanation of the idea *μείζων*: so Oecumenius, Augustine, Bede, Socinus, a Lapide, Lortius, Hornejus, Paulus, De Wette, etc.; even Ebrard says that God is called *μείζων*, "because He cannot be deceived," but its position gives no justification for that; we can at the most say that the apostle by those words brings specially out *one* element which is included in *μείζων*.

² Luther rightly says: "Though our conscience makes us despondent, and represents God to us as angry, yet God is greater than our heart. Conscience is a single drop, but the reconciled God is a sea full of comfort. . . . When conscience punishes and condemns a man, he becomes alarmed; but against this darkness of the heart it is said: God knows all things. Conscience is always in fear, and closes its eyes; but God is deeper and higher than thy heart, and more exactly searches the innermost parts of it."—Besser: "Our heart knows some things, and decides against us; God knows all things, and does not decide against us, but for us, because before His eyes

the seed of truth, of which we have been born, is not concealed."

³ Ewald construes correctly, but in his explanation: "If we earnestly seek in His sight whether we really love . . . we shall be able, even if we must sometimes accuse ourselves before God, nevertheless by the penitent (?) acknowledgment of the truth, to convince our conscience that we are men and God is God, that we may therefore sometimes fail and must be admonished by Him,"—he introduces references into the thought which are not contained in it.

⁴ Brückner, it is true, defends De Wette's interpretation, but he substantially perverts it; for whilst De Wette refers the *whole* verse to the *accusation* of God (therein agreeing with Lücke), Brückner takes the *ὅτι γινώσκει πάντα* in *comforting* sense; but it then becomes still more untenable, for it is plainly unjustifiable to refer the omniscience of God in the subordinate clause to *condemnation* (for both explain *μείζων* by: "looking more deeply, examining all the recesses of the heart"), but in the principal clause to *forgiveness*.

ground, Erdmann thinks that *καρδία*, in ver. 19, is used in a wider sense than in ver. 20 (" *vertimus πείσομεν τὰς καρδίας: nobis ipsis persuadebimus*"), because there the plural, and here the singular, is used; this change of the number has no influence on the meaning of the word, but the apostle speaks of the *καρδία* as the object of *πείθειν*, and as the subject of *καταγινώσκειν*, inasmuch as the heart is the seat or the union of the affections; the Greek commentators explain *καρδία* here as synonymous with *συνειδήσεις*.

Ver. 21. In this verse the apostle states the case of our heart not accusing (or condemning) us. We can understand it thus, that what he previously observed has happened, namely, that, in the consciousness that we are of the truth, we have induced our heart to refrain from its accusation against us. Then this thought does not stand to the preceding one in the relation of antithesis (as if in this verse a different case was contrasted with the case stated in ver. 20), but in that of continuation;¹ but it is more correct to suppose that the apostle is here speaking of a relationship which is different from that indicated in ver. 20, and that he is not regarding the question whether the non-condemnation has never taken place at all, or has been only brought about by persuasion. That two sentences may stand to one another in the relation of antithesis, even without the antithetical particle, is proved by chap. i. 8 and 9. — *παρῆρσιαν ἔχομεν πρὸς τὸν Θεόν* states what occurs when the case exists which is mentioned by *εἰάν*; it is erroneous to explain *παρῆρσιαν ἔχομεν* = *πείσομεν τὰς καρδίας ἡμῶν*; the same expression in chap. ii. 28 and iv. 17, and construed with *πρὸς*, chap. v. 14; the same construction in Rom. v. 1: *εἰρήνην ἔχ. πρὸς τὸν Θεόν*. As the calming of the heart, so also confidence toward God, which is the subject here, is based on the fact that God is greater than our heart, and knows all things.

Ver. 22. By *καί* the following is closely connected with the preceding, inasmuch as it states what further happens when, in consequence of non-condemnation on the part of the heart, the *παρῆρσία πρὸς τὸν Θεόν* exists; it is not merely the consciousness of the hearing of our prayers, but it is this hearing itself. — *ὁ εἰάν αἰτῶμεν* is to be taken quite generally, and must not be spoiled by arbitrary limitations; the necessary limitation lies, on the one hand, in the subject itself: *the child of God* asks for nothing which is contrary to his Father's will, comp. v. 14; and, on the other hand, in the *παρῆρσία* with which he prays; comp. Matt. xxi. 22; the contrary in Jas. i. 6, 7. — *λαμβάνομεν ἄπ' αὐτοῦ*, i. e., *τοῦ Θεοῦ*. The present is not used instead of the future (Grotius); the subject is here not something future, but what constantly occurs in the life of believers. Augustine suitably says: *Charitas ipsa gemit, claritas ipsa orat, contra hanc aures claudere non novit, qui illam dedit. ὅτι τὰς ἐντολὰς αὐτοῦ, κ. τ. λ.*] *ὅτι* is connected with the immediately preceding *λαμβάνομεν*, and states the ground of God's manifestation of love in the hear-

¹ The objection of Ebrard to this interpretation, that *εἰάν* cannot serve the purpose of introducing a deduction from a premise which is presupposed as already having actually occurred, is inappropriate; for *εἰάν* is not in this view at all taken as "If, then, therefore," but

is retained in its own proper meaning. Contrary to Braune's opinion, that with this interpretation not *μή*, but *μηκέτι*, would have to be used, it is to be observed that it was not necessary to bring out the element which is contained in *μηκέτι*.

ing of prayer; this ground, which, however, is not to be regarded as the *causa meritoria*, is the childlike obedience of him who prays, wherein God recognizes him as His child; the idea of obedience is expressed in two mutually co-ordinate sentences (similar to the Hebrew parallelism): τὰς ἐντολάς αὐτοῦ and τὰ ἀρεστὰ ἐνώπιον αὐτοῦ are synonymous;¹ by ποιεῖν the obedience is specified as *active*; the second clause indicates that it consists, not in a slavish subjection to the *commandment*, but in a childlike fulfilment of that which is *pleasing* to God. In John viii. 29, ἀρεστόν is construed with the dative; only in Acts vi. 2, xii. 3 is the word besides found; similar is the expression ἀπόδεκτον ἐνώπιον τοῦ Θεοῦ (1 Tim. v. 4).

Ver. 23. With this verse, which — as the statement of the substance of God's commandments — is most closely connected with the preceding, begins a new leading section, indeed the last in the Epistle, inasmuch as in *ἵνα πιστεύσωμεν τῷ ὀνόματι, κ.τ.λ.*, a new element of the development of ideas appears, by which the sequel is not merely "prepared for" (Ebrard), but is dominated. — *καί* is not explicative, but simply copulative. — *αὐτῆ* refers to the following *ἵνα*, which here also does not merely state the *purpose* (Braune), but the *substance*. — *ἡ ἐντολὴ αὐτοῦ*]. The singular is used, because the manifold commandments in their inner nature form one unity: this is especially true of the two commandments of faith and love, here mentioned. From the fact that *faith* is described as an *ἐντολή*, it must not be inferred that it is not a work of God in man, but it certainly follows that neither can it be accomplished without the self-activity of man. — The phrase *πιστεύειν τῷ ὀνόματι τοῦ υἱοῦ, κ.τ.λ.*, only appears here; in chap. v. 13 the preposition *εἰς* is used instead of the dative; so also in John i. 12, ii. 23, iii. 18, etc.; by the dative the *ὄνομα* of Christ is indicated as the object of devoted, believing trust;² "to believe on the name of Christ," is, however, identical with "to believe on Christ," inasmuch as in the name the nature of Him who is spoken of is expressed; comp. Meyer on John i. 12. Grotius, quite erroneously: *propter Christum sive Christo auctore Deo credere*. — While faith is the fundamental condition of the Christian life, brotherly love is the active proof of the living character of the faith; the two things cannot be separated from one another; hence it follows here, *καὶ ἀγαπῶμεν ἀλλήλους*,³ which as the effect is distinguished from *πιστεύειν* as the cause; *καί* is therefore copulative and not expegetical (as Frommann thinks, p. 591). — The subordinate clause, *καθὼς ἔδωκεν ἐντολὴν ἡμῖν*, is best referred to *ἀγαπῶμεν ἀλλήλους*, inasmuch as it is

¹ Meyer actually thinks that by *ἀρεστά* are meant the so-called *consilia evangelica*, by which ordinary Christians are not bound, but which are voluntarily undertaken by Christians who are specially holy!

² Weiss has been at pains to show that *πιστεύειν* in John does not include the element of trust; in this, however, he is wrong, because even where the element of *conviction* prevails in the use of the word, this must not be identified with the theoretical belief, which is a mere act of the understanding, but it includes as an essential element the immediate

trust of the words or of the person to which the *πιστεύειν* refers; in the phrase: *πιστεύειν τῷ ὀνόματι Ἰ. Χρ.*, the ethical meaning of the verb is so much the more to be recognized, as the denial of it necessitates also a weakening of the idea *ὄνομα*.

³ Frommann (p. 200) wrongly concludes from this passage and iv. 7, 19, in which the obligation to love is expressed, that being born of God is conditioned by love, as the free act of man, "by which He keeps His independent personality and freedom towards God" (!), nay, even is *produced* by it (p. 205).

not *God* (Estius, Bengel, Sander) but Christ that is to be regarded as the subject; by *καθώς* ("in proportion as") the *quality* of love is indicated: it must correspond to the commandment of Christ; Myrberg: *Non modo amandum est, sed etiam vere et recte amandum.*

Ver. 24. After the apostle has mentioned the substance of the divine commandment, he describes the keeping of it as the condition of fellowship with God, and states the mark whereby the Christian knows that God is in him. — *καί* is the simple copula, not = *itaque*; *τὰς ἐντολὰς αὐτοῦ* is a resumption of the *ἡ ἐντολὴ αὐτοῦ* of ver. 23; the plural is used because the commandment is described as containing two elements; *αὐτοῦ* = *τοῦ Θεοῦ*, not *Χριστοῦ* (Sander, Neander, Besser). — *ἐν αὐτῷ μένει*, κ.τ.λ.]. The mention of fellowship with God, which consists in this, that we abide in God and God abides in us,¹ is explained by the purpose of the Epistle. — *καὶ ἐν τούτῳ γινώσκομεν*. *ἐν τούτῳ* is referred by Lücke and Ebrard to the preceding, namely to *τηρεῖν τὰς ἐντολὰς αὐτοῦ*; but thus there results a superfluous thought, for with the connection which according to the apostle exists between the keeping of God's commandments and God's abiding in us, and which he has expressed in the first half of the verse, it is plainly superfluous to say once more that we know the latter by the former; it is, besides, contradicted by the following *ἐκ τοῦ πνεύματος*, which has induced Lücke to assume a combination of two trains of thought and an ambiguity of *ἐν τούτῳ*,² and Ebrard arbitrarily to supply with *ἐκ τ. πνεύματος* the words "we know;" Düsterdieck, De Wette, Erdmann, Braune, etc., refer *ἐν τούτῳ* to *ἐκ τοῦ πνεύματος*, so that according to the apostle it is from the *πνεῦμα* which is given to us that we know that God is in us if we keep His commandments; comp. iv. 12, 13, where the same connection of ideas occurs. The change of the prepositions *ἐν* and *ἐκ* is certainly strange, but does not render this interpretation "impossible" (Ebrard); for, on the one hand, the form, "*ἐν τούτῳ γινώσκομεν*," is too familiar to the apostle not to have suggested itself to him here; and, on the other hand, by *ἐκ* the *πνεῦμα* is indicated as *the source* from which that *γινώσκειν* flows; besides, the construction with *ἐκ* appears also in chap. iv. 6. — By *πνεῦμα* is here to be understood, just as by *χρῆσμα* in chap. ii. 20, "*the Holy Ghost*," who lives and works in the believer, but not, with Socinus, the disposition or the love produced by Him; or, with De Wette, "first of all, the true knowledge and doctrine of the person of Jesus." With this verse the apostle makes the transition to the following section, in which, with reference to the false teachers, the distinction is made between the *πνεῦμα τοῦ Θεοῦ* and the *πνεῦμα* which is not *ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ*.

¹ When Weiss defines the abiding or being of God in him who keeps His commandments, in this way, that God who is known, or the knowledge of God, is the determining principle of his spiritual life, this seems "to weaken the powerful realism of John's conception;" yet Weiss guards himself against this when he says that he does not in any way diminish the divine causality in the act of regeneration, but only means thereby that God accomplishes

this act by means of His revelation in Christ, which must be accepted into knowledge.

² The two thoughts which Lücke considers as combined here are: (1) that we in the keeping of God's commandments know that we are in fellowship with Him, and (2) that the *τηρεῖν τὰς ἐντολὰς* is nothing else than the expression and operation of the Divine Spirit. — It is plainly quite mistaken for Paulus to regard *ἐκ τοῦ πνεύματος* as the subject belonging to *μένει*.

CHAPTER IV.

Ver. 2. Instead of the Rec. *γινώσκετε*, found in K, several min., vss., and Fathers have *γινώσκεται*: in \aleph^* : *γινώσκομεν* (\aleph_1 : *γινώσκετε*); the Rec. is to be regarded as genuine. — The reading in B: *ἐληλυθέναι*, instead of the Rec. *ἐληλυθότα*, is a correction. — Ver. 3. Instead of the Rec. *ὁμολογεῖ Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν ἐν σαρκὶ ἐληλυθότα* (K, etc., and G, though with the article *τόν* prefixed), A, B, etc., have the simple *τὸν Ἰησοῦν* (Lachm., Tisch.). This is probably the original reading (Brückner), and is confirmed by the preceding (contrary to Reiche, etc.). \aleph reads: *Ἰησοῦν κύριον ἐν σ. ἐληλυθότα*. — According to Socrates, vii. chap. 32, *ὁ λύει* is found in old manuscripts instead of *ὁ μὴ ὁμολογεῖ*; the same reading in Iren. iii. 18: *qui solvit Jesum Christum*; similarly the Vulg. (Lucif.: *destruit*) and in Fulg. — Tertullian also prefers this reading, though in connection with the common one; *Adv. Marc.*, v. 16: *negantes Christum in carne venisse . . . hic antichristus est*; the same connection in Tychonius and Augustine: *qui solvit Jesum et negat in carne venisse*. Semler's view is a strange one, that *ὁ λύει* has arisen *oculorum vitio*; the reading is probably to be explained by the polemic against the Gnostics (Grotius, Lücke, De Wette), in favor of which is the Scholion in Matthaei, p. 225: *προώδυνσαν γὰρ αὐτοῦ (τοῦ ἀντιχριστοῦ) αἱ αἵρέσεις, ὧν χαρακτηριστικὸν τὸ διὰ ψευδοπροφητῶν καὶ πνευμάτων λύειν τὸν Ἰησοῦν ἐν τῷ μὴ ὁμολογεῖν αὐτὸν ἐν σαρκ. ἐληλυθέναι*. — The reading in \aleph : *ὅτι (ὁ τι) ἀκηκόαμεν*, instead of *ὁ ἀκηκόατε*, is singular. — Ver. 6. In his small edition Lachm., after A, Vulg., etc., reads *ἐν τούτῳ* instead of *ἐκ τούτου*; in his large edition he has accepted the latter reading. — Ver. 7. To *ἀγαπῶν* is wrongly added in A, *τὸν Θεόν*. — Ver. 8. Instead of *ἐγνω*, \aleph^* has *ἐγνωκεν*; in the original text of \aleph the whole sentence, *ὁ μὴ ἀγ. . . Θεόν*, is wanting. — Ver. 9. \aleph has *ζῶμεν* for *ζήσωμεν*. — Ver. 10. To *ἡ ἀγάπη* is added in \aleph : *τοῦ Θεοῦ*, plainly a correction. For *ἠγαπήσαμεν*, B has *ἠγαπήκαμεν* (Buttm.). — For *ἀπίστεύειν*, \aleph has *ἀπίσταλκεν*. — Ver. 12. The order of words varies: the Rec. is *τετελειωμένη ἐστὶν ἐν ἡμῖν*, following G, K, etc. (Tisch.); A, etc., Vulg., etc., have *ἐν ἡμῖν* before *τετελειωμένη* (Lachm.); B and \aleph : *ἐν ἡμῖν* between *τετελ.* and *ἐστίν* (Buttm.). — Ver. 15. B reads *ὃς εἶν* instead of *ὃς ἄν*, and *Ἰησοῦς Χριστός* instead of the simple *Ἰησοῦς*. — Ver. 16. At the end of the verse B, G, K, \aleph , etc., several vss., etc., read *μένει* (bracketed by Lachm.); in A, etc., Vulg., several Fathers, *μένει* is wanting (Tisch.); according to the authorities it is to be regarded as genuine, being probably omitted to correspond with the end of the 15th verse (Reiche). — Ver. 17. \aleph has after *μεθ' ἡμῶν* the further words *ἐν ἡμῖν*, and instead of *ἐσμέν* the future *ἐσόμεθα*. — Ver. 19. The Rec. *ἡμεῖς ἀγαπῶμεν αὐτόν, ὅτι αὐτός* is found in G, K, etc.; in A is found *ἡμεῖς οὖν ἀγαπῶμεν, ὅτι ὁ Θεός* (Lachm.): in B *ἡμεῖς ἀγαπῶμεν, ὅτι αὐτός* (Tisch.); \aleph has *ἡμ. ἀγ. τὸν Θεόν, ὅτι αὐτός*. The *αὐτός* after *ὅτι* is sufficiently attested by the authorities; the *αὐτόν* after *ἀγαπῶμεν*, on the other hand, appears to be a later addition, added for explanation of the thought. Reiche, however, regards it as genuine; Lücke thinks that if *ἀγαπῶμεν* is with-

out an object, ὁ Θεός is necessary; this, however, according to John's *usus loquendi*, is not the case.—Ver. 20. \aleph omits the *ὅτι*. In reference to the reading *ἔδρακεν* in Tisch. 7, see on chap. i. 1.—Instead of the Rec. (Tisch.) *πῶς*, \aleph , B, etc., Theb., etc., read *οὐ* (Lachm.). The interrogative is, however, more expressive than the negative.

Vv. 1-6. Resumption of the warning against the false teachers; comp. chap. ii. 18 ff. The connecting link is formed by *ἐκ τοῦ πνεύματος*, chap. iii. 24; the object is to distinguish between the *πνεῦμα* which is of God and the *πνεῦμα* which is not of God (vv. 2, 3), between the *πν. τῆς ἀληθείας* and the *πν. τῆς πλάνης*. The distinguishing mark is the confession; the former confesses, the latter denies, Jesus; the former is mightier than the latter; therefore the believers have overcome the *ψευδοπροφήτας*; the words of the former spring *ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου*, and are pleasing to the *κόσμος*; the words of the latter are accepted by him who is *ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ*.

Ver. 1. The apostle first exhorts them not to believe *παντὶ πνεύματι*. The idea *πνεῦμα* is in closest connection with *ψευδοπροφήται*. The true prophets spoke, as we read in 2 Pet. i. 21, *ὑπὸ πνεύματος ἁγίου φερόμενοι*; the source of the revelations which they proclaim (*πρόφημι*) is the *πνεῦμα ἁγίων* or *πν. τοῦ Θεοῦ*, by which is meant not an affection of their mind, but the power of God, distinct from their own personality, animating and determining them (*δύναμις ὑψίστου*, synonymous with *πνεῦμα ἁγίων*, Luke i. 35). This *πνεῦμα* speaks through the prophet, penetrating into his *πνεῦμα* and communicating to him the truth to be revealed; thus the *πνεῦμα* of the prophet himself becomes a *πνεῦμα ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ*. As every prophet has his own *πνεῦμα*, there exists, though the *πνεῦμα ἁγίων* is a single being, a plurality of prophetic spirits. The same relationship holds good, on the other hand, in the case of the false prophets. These also are under the influence of a spirit, namely, of the *πνεῦμα* which *ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ οὐκ ἔστι*, of the *πνεῦμα τῆς πλάνης*; this similarly is a single being, but inasmuch as with its lie it penetrates the *πνεύματα* of the false prophets and makes them like itself, it is true of the *πνεῦμα* of every individual prophet that it is not of God, not a *πνεῦμα τῆς ἀληθείας*, but a *πνεῦμα τῆς πλάνης*. As John speaks here of a plurality of spirits (*παντὶ πνεύματι, τὰ πνεύματα*), we are to understand by *πνεῦμα* in this passage not the higher spirit different from the human spirit, but this spirit itself, penetrated, however, and filled with the former¹ (comp. 1 Cor. xiv. 32, and Meyer on this passage). This spirit, however, may be spoken of, not merely in plurality, but also in unity, that is, in collective sense; for on each of the two sides all *πνεύματα*, being animated by one and the same spirit, — whether the divine or that which is against God, — are of *one* nature, and so form together one unity. It is incorrect to understand by *πνεῦμα* here, by metonymy,

¹ Düsterdieck considers the expression as describing "the superhuman principle animating the man who prophesies," and explains the plural in this way, that "those different principles reveal themselves differently in their different instruments;" but with this inter-

pretation the plural would be used in a very figurative signification. Braune, correctly: "The question is not about a dual, but about a plural; we must therefore understand *the spirits of men*, to whom *the Spirit* bears witness."

“the prophets” themselves (= λαλοῦντες ἐν πνεύματι, Lücke, De Wette, Calvin: *pro eo, qui spiritus dono se praeditum esse jactat ad obeundum prophetae munus*; so also Erdmann, Myrberg, etc.), or “their inspiration” (Socinus, Paulus), or even “the teaching of the prophet, his inspired word” (Lorinus, Cyril, Didymus, etc.). — ἀλλὰ δοκιμάζετε τὰ πνεύματα]. The appearance of the ψευδοπροφήται, i. e., such teachers as, moved by the ungodly spirit, proclaimed instead of the truth the antichristian lie, under the pretext of speaking by divine inspiration, necessitated in the Christian Church a trial of the spirits (a διάκρισις of them, 1 Cor. xii. 10, xiv. 29); comp. 1 Thess. v. 20, 21; in order to know *εἰ ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐστίν*, i. e. (if ἐκ is to be retained in its exact meaning), if they originate in and proceed from God. — This trial is to be exercised by all (comp. Rom. xii. 2; Eph. v. 10; 1 Cor. x. 15, xi. 13), for “*alloquitur (apostolus) non modo totum ecclesiae corpus, sed etiam SINGULOS fideles*” (Calvin); against which Lorinus arbitrarily says: *non omnium est probare; unum oportet in ecclesia summum judicem quaestionum de fide moribusque; is est sine dubio Pontifex Maximus*. — The necessity of the trial John establishes by the words *ὅτι πολλοὶ ψευδοπροφήται, κ.τ.λ.* These ψευδοπροφήται are the same as in chap. ii. 18 are called ἀντίχριστοι; comp. vv. 2, 3. The name ψευδοπροφήται indicates that the teachers proclaimed their doctrine, not as the result of human speculation, but as a revelation communicated to them by the πνεῦμα of God. The expression, *ἐξεληλύθασιν εἰς τὸν κόσμον*, does not merely signify their public appearance (Socinus: *existere et publice munus aliquod aggredi*; Grotius: *apparere populo*), nor is “*ἐξ οἰκῶν αὐτῶν* to be mentally supplied” (Ebrard), but it is to be explained by the fact that the prophets, as such, were sent (comp. John xvii. 18), and therefore go out from Him who sends them. It is He, however, that sends them, who through His πνεῦμα makes them prophets. The idea of *ἐξέρχεσθαι* is accordingly different here from what it is in chap. ii. 19 (contrary to Lorinus, Spener, etc.); a going out of the false prophets from the Church of the Lord is not here alluded to. With *εἰς τὸν κόσμον*, compare John vi. 14, x. 36.

Ver. 2. Statement of the token by which the πνεῦμα τοῦ Θεοῦ is to be recognized. — ἐν τούτῳ refers to the following sentence: *πάν πνεῦμα, κ.τ.λ.* — γινώσκετε is imperative, comp. πιστεύετε, δοκιμάζετε, ver. 1. — *πάν πνεῦμα ὁ ὁμολογεῖ Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν ἐν σαρκὶ ἐληλυθότα*]. It is arbitrary not only to change the participle ἐληλυθότα into the infinitive ἐληλυθέναι, but also to change ἐν into εἰς (so Luther, Calvin, Piscator, Sander); by ἐν σαρκὶ the flesh, i. e., the earthly human nature, is stated as the form of being in which Christ appeared. The form of the object is explained by the polemic against Docetism; it is to be translated either: “*Jesus Christ as come in the flesh*” (Lücke, De Wette, Düsterdieck, Ebrard, etc.); or, “*Jesus, as Christ come in the flesh*”; the last interpretation has this advantage, that it not only brings out more clearly the reference to the Cerinthian Docetism,¹ but it makes it more

¹ In the first interpretation the antithesis to the Cerinthian Docetism lies not merely in the combination of Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν as one name (Ebrard), but also in this, that this

subject so described, which contains in it the idea Χριστός, is more particularly defined as having come in the flesh.

easy to explain how the apostle in ver. 3 can designate the object simply by τὸν Ἰησοῦν. It might, however, be still more suitable to take Ἰησοῦν . . . ἐληλυθότα as one object = "the Jesus Christ who came in the flesh," so that in this expression the individual elements on which John here relied in opposition to Docetism have been gathered into one; so perhaps Braune, when he says: "the form is that of a substantive objective sentence," and "in ἐν σ. ἐλ. it is not a predicate, but an attributive clause, that is added." That the apostle has in view not only the Cerinthian, but also the later Docetism, which attributed to the Saviour only a *seeming* body, cannot be proved from the form of expression used here. The commentators who deny the reference of the apostle to Docetism find themselves driven to artificial explanations; thus Socinus, who expands the participle by *quamvis*, and Grotius, according to whom ἐν σαρκί refers to the *status humilis* in which Christ appeared, in contrast to the *regia pompa* in which the Jews expected the Messiah.¹ To exact unbelievers there can here be no reference, as, according to chap. ii. 2, the false prophets had previously belonged to the Church itself.² That John brings out as the token of the Spirit, that is, of God, just the confession of this particular truth, has its ground in the circumstances that have been mentioned; while it is also so very much the fundamental truth, that, as Lücke on chap. ii. 22 with justice says, "every ψεῦδος is contained in this, and amounts to this, the denial of that truth in any sense."³

Ver. 3. In the reading, ὁ μὴ ὁμολογεῖ τὸν Ἰησοῦν, the article (which is not, with Lücke, to be deleted) must not be overlooked, for it indicates Jesus as the historical person who is Christ. The false teachers did not confess Jesus when they ascribed the work of healing, not to Jesus, but to the Aeon Christ. The particle μὴ indicates the *contradiction* of the true confession, whilst οὐ would only express the simple negation. At the words καὶ τοῦτο ἔστι τὸ τοῦ ἀντιχρίστου, almost all commentators (even Brückner and Braune) supply with τὸ the word πνεῦμα; but Valla (with whom Zegerus agrees) interprets: *et hic est antichristi spiritus, VEL POTIUS: et hoc est antichristi i. e. proprium antichristi*, if this latter interpretation be correct, then τοῦτο refers to μὴ ὁμολογεῖν, and τὸ τοῦ ἀντιχρίστου is "the antichristian nature." As it is not easy to see why John should have left out πνεῦμα, this interpreta-

¹ Socinus: "Qui confitetur Jesum Christum i. e. eum pro suo servatore ac domino et denique vero Christo habet, *quamvis* is in carne venerit h. e. homo fuerit, non modo mortalis, sed infinitis malis obnoxius." Without any ground, Baumgarten-Crusius asserts: "If any force were to be assigned to the predicate, 'come in the flesh,' the infinitive would have been used." — Brückner thinks that if in ver. 3 the shorter reading (without the apposition) be the correct one, the reference to Docetism is here uncertain and unnecessary; but the uncertain expression is plainly to be interpreted in accordance with the more certain, and not, contrariwise, the latter in accordance with the former.

² Comp. with this passage Polycarp, *Ep. ad Philipp.*: πᾶς γὰρ ὃς ἂν μὴ ὁμολογῇ Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν ἐν σαρκὶ ἐληλυθότα, ἀντιχριστός ἐστι καὶ ὃς μὴ ὁμολογῇ τὸ μαρτύριον τοῦ σταυροῦ ἐκ τοῦ διαβόλου ἐστὶ.

³ Augustine peculiarly turns this sentence against the Donatists, whom he reproaches with a denial of their love, on account of their separation from the Catholic Church, when he says that John speaks here of a denial of Christ not merely by word, but also by deed: "Quisquis non habet charitatem negat Christum in carne venisse;" so Bede: "Ipse est Spiritus Dei, qui dicit Jesum Christum in carne venisse, qui dicit non lingua, sed factis, non sonando, sed amando."

tion is to be preferred to the usual one (so also Myrberg; Ewald similarly interprets: "the work of antichrist;" the same form of expression in Matt. xxi. 21; 1 Cor. x. 24; 2 Pet. ii. 22; Jas. iv. 14).¹—ὁ ἀκηκόατε ὅτι ἔρχεται; compare chap. ii. 18. Stephanus, groundlessly, would read "ὄν" instead of δ; the relative does not refer to ἀντιχρίστου, but to τὸ τ. ἀντιχρ. — καὶ νῦν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἐστὶν ἡδὴ, i. e., in the false prophets; comp. ver. 1. John does not say here that antichrist, but only that the antichristian nature (or the spirit of antichrist), is already in the world; ἡδὴ is doubtless added, not merely to intensify the νῦν, but to point to the future time of the appearing of antichrist, which is already being prepared for. According to Ebrard, the last sentence depends on ὄ; this, however, is not likely, as δ is the accusative; it is rather connected, as an independent sentence, with the preceding one.

Ver. 4. After the apostle has characterized the twofold πνεῦμα, he directs the attention of his readers to the relationship in which they stand to the false prophets. — ὑμεῖς ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐστε]. A contrast to those who are ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου; believers are of God, because the πνεῦμα which animates them is the πνεῦμα τοῦ Θεοῦ. — καὶ νενικήκατε αὐτούς]. αὐτούς is not = *antichristum et mundum* (Erasmus), but τοὺς ψευδοπροφήτας, in whom the antichristian nature dwells. — νενικήκατε is to be retained as perfect; comp. chap. ii. 13. Calvin inaccurately interprets: *in media pugna jam extra periculum sunt, quia futuri sunt superiores*. John could say to his readers, νενικήκατε, not only inasmuch as in them was mighty the strength of Him who had said, θαρσεῖτε, ἐγὼ νενίκηκα τὸν κόσμον, and inasmuch as they in Him were sure of ultimate success (Neander, Düsterdieck), but also inasmuch as their opponents with their seductive arts must have been put to shame by their faithfulness, and must have been repulsed by them (Ebrard, Braune). The cause of this victory, however, did not and does not lie in the human power of believers, but in the fact ὅτι μεῖζων ἐστὶν ὁ ἐν ὑμῖν ἢ ὁ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ. — ὁ ἐν ὑμῖν, i. e., ὁ Θεός (according to Grotius, Erdmann, and others: ὁ Χριστός); as the believer is of God, God remains in him as the soul of his life; ὁ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, i. e., ὁ διάβολος, "whose children the antichrists are" (Lücke). Instead of the more particular ἐν αὐτοῖς, John uses the more general ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, in order thereby to signify that they, although they were for a while in the Church, belong nevertheless to the κόσμος, which the following words expressively bring out.

Ver. 5. In chap. ii. 19, John had said of the false teachers, οἱκ εἰσὶν ἐξ ἡμῶν; now he states from what source they spring; this is the κόσμος; the antichristian nature in them belonged to *the world, quatenus Satanas est ejus princeps* (Calvin). The manifestation of life corresponds with the source of it; because they are of the world, διὰ τοῦτο ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου λαλοῦσι; ἐκ τ. κόσμου λαλεῖν means: to speak that which the κόσμος supplies, to take the burden of their speech from the κόσμος, *ex mundi vita ac sensu sermones suos promere* (Bengel). This is not identical with ἐκ τῆς γῆς λαλεῖν (John iii. 31), for ἡ γῆ is not an ethical idea like ὁ κόσμος. — καὶ ὁ κόσμος αὐτῶν ἠκούει]. The false

¹ Braune thinks that in these passages it was of importance to form a substantive conception, but that here the simple genitive would have been sufficient; it is plain, how-

ever, that the substantive idea τὸ τοῦ ἀντιχρ. is here also more significant than a mere genitive connected with ἐστίν.

prophets had gone out from the Church into the world, to which they inwardly belonged, and proclaimed to it a wisdom which originated in it; therefore the world *heard* them, i.e., gave to their words applause and assent, τῷ γὰρ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὁμοιον προστρέχει (Oecumenius); in contrast to which, believers were hated and persecuted by the world.

Ver. 6. *ἡμεῖς*]. Antithesis of *αὐτοί*, ver. 5; either specially John and the other apostles (Storr, Düsterdieck, Brückner, Braune, etc.) as the true teachers, or believers generally (Calvin, Spener, Lücke, De Wette, etc.); in favor of the former interpretation is the fact that believers are addressed in this section in the second person, together with the following *ἀκούει ἡμῶν*, as also the antithesis to *ψευδοπροφήται* indicates *teachers*. — With *ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἴσμεν* we are to supply, according to ver. 5, the thought, *διὰ τοῦτο ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ λαλοῦμεν*; the following words, *ὁ γινώσκων τὸν Θεὸν ἀκούει ἡμῶν*, contain the proof of the thought just expressed. — *ὁ γιν. τὸν Θεόν* forms the antithesis of *ὁ κόσμος*, and is synonymous with *ὃς ἐστὶν ἐκ τ. Θεοῦ*, for it is only he who is a child of God that possesses the true knowledge of God. According to Lücke and others, the apostle means by this, those to whom belongs the “*general ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ εἶναι*, i.e., the divine impress and instinct, which is *the condition of childhood of God in Christ*,” but the expression itself is opposed to this, for the knowledge of God is necessarily conditioned by faith in Christ. — In the second clause, *ὃς οὐκ ἐστὶν . . . οὐκ ἄκ. ἡμῶν, ὃς . . . Θεοῦ* forms the antithesis to *ὁ γινώσκων τ. Θεόν*. This is the antithesis between “*world*” and “*church of the children of God*.” — In the concluding clause, *ἐκ τούτου . . . τῆς πλάνης*, it is to the immediately preceding thought that *ἐκ τούτου* refers. According to the usual view, with which Düsterdieck agrees, the sense of this passage is: He who hears the apostles shows thereby that the *πνεῦμα τῆς ἀληθείας* is in him; he who, on the contrary, does not hear them, shows that the *πν. τῆς πλάνης* is in him; it is in his relation to the apostolic teaching that any one shows of what spirit he is the child.¹ But, according to the train of thought in this section, it is not the spirit of the *hearers*, but that of the *teachers*, that is the subject (so also Myrberg and Braune); the sense therefore is: That the *πνεῦμα τῆς πλάνης* prevails in the false prophets, may be known by this, that *the world* hears them; that in us, on the contrary, the *πνεῦμα τῆς ἀληθείας* dwells, may be perceived by this, that those who know God, i.e., *the children of God*, hear us. The *πν. τῆς ἀληθείας* cannot be in him whom the world hears, nor can the *πν. τῆς πλάνης* be in him whom the children of God hear; Braune: “the *πν. τῆς πλάνης* is certainly in him whom the world hears, and the *πν. τῆς ἀληθείας* in him whom the children of God hear.” — *τὸ πνεῦμα τῆς ἀληθείας*; comp. John xiv. 17, xv. 26, xvi. 13; a description of the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as He not only produces a knowledge of the truth, but “*makes the truth His very nature*” (Weiss).² *τὸ πν. τῆς πλάνης*, the spirit that emanates from the

¹ Luther: “If we hear God’s true messengers, that is a plain token of true religion; if, however, we despise and mock them, that is a plain token of error.”

² The thought of this passage corresponds

with that of John x. 3-5, where Christ appeals for a proof that He is the Good Shepherd, to the fact that the sheep know and hear his voice, whilst they do not know the voice of the stranger, and flee from it.

Devil, which seduces men to falsehood and error: comp. chap. i. 8; 1 Thess. ii. 3; 1 Tim. iv. 1.

Vv. 7-21. After the apostle, induced by the appearance of the anti-christian nature, has characterized the spirit of truth and the spirit of error, he passes on directly to a detailed account of the elements of faith and love alluded to in chap. iii. 23.

Vv. 7, 8. Exhortation to mutual love, and the establishing of this. — The address *ἀγαπητοί* emphatically introduces the command: *ἀγαπῶμεν*. — The object *ἀλλήλους* shows that here also it is not human love in general, but Christian brotherly love, that is the subject. Mutual love is the holiest calling of Christians who are *τέκνα τοῦ Θεοῦ*, for *ἡ ἀγάπη ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐστίν*,¹ i.e., love proceeds from God. Calovius: *originem habet a Deo*. Unsatisfactory is the explanation of Grotius: *Deo maxime placet bonitas*. *ἡ ἀγάπη* is used without a determining object, because it is love in its *full* extent that is meant. — *καὶ πᾶς ὁ ἀγαπῶν ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ γεγέννηται*, κ.τ.λ.]. Inference from what immediately precedes. If love is of God, then he who lives in love must also be born of God and know Him. The relation of *ἀγαπᾶν* and *ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ γεγεννησθαι* is not to be defined thus, that the former is the condition of the latter (De Wette), but thus, that the former is to be regarded as the criterion of the latter; to be born of God does not follow from love, but love follows from being born of God. The same relationship exists also between *ἀγαπᾶν* and *γινώσκειν τὸν Θεόν*;² what sort of a knowledge of God is meant, however, is seen from the close connection of *γινώσκει* with *ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ γεγέννηται*. — Ver. 8. From the foregoing it follows further: *ὁ μὴ ἀγαπῶν οὐκ ἔγνω τὸν Θεόν; οὐκ ἔγνω*, i.e., “has not known.” The reason is: *ὅτι ὁ Θεὸς ἀγάπη ἐστίν*. — By this thought the preceding *ἡ ἀγάπη ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐστίν* receives its full comprehension. — *ἀγάπη* is without the article, because it is considered as a general definition of the nature of God; so ver. 16, comp. i. 5: *ὁ Θεὸς φῶς ἐστίν*. “Love is not so much a quality which God has, as rather the all-embracing total of what He is” (Besser). Luther: *Deus nihil est quam mera caritas*; Grotius, tamely: *plenus est dilectione*.

Ver. 9. The manifestation of the love of God is the sending of His Son. — *ἐν τούτῳ* refers to the following *ὅτι*. — *ἐφανερώθη ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐν ἡμῖν*]. *ἐφανερώθη* expresses the objective fact, not the subjective knowledge; the apostle does not mean that the love of God is *known* by us through the sending of His Son (comp. ver. 16), but that it has by that means come

¹ Neander: “The apostle does not here lay down a commandment of love; he does not want to impress on believers new motives for love, but to convince them, that, as sure as they are God’s children, this fact must be manifested by mutual love. — As proof he adduces that love is of God, and therefore every one who loves is born of God.”

² It was previously stated in this commentary: “John does not here say that love flows from the knowledge of God, but that love, because it is of divine nature, necessarily

brings with it the knowledge of God.” This is incorrect, since *γινώσκει τὸν Θεόν* stands in the same relationship to *ἀγαπῶν* as *ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ γεγέννηται* does, even though it is in itself true also that only he who himself loves can really know God, who is love. For the correct explanation, see Lücke, Braune, Weiss. It has already been observed, however, that the last-named does not correctly state the connection between being born of God and the knowledge of God, as he makes the latter the condition of the former.

forth from its concealment, has manifested itself in act. *ἐν ἡμῖν* is therefore neither "in" nor "among" us; neither must it be explained = *εἰς ἡμῶς*; *ἐν* is here, as in ver. 16 and John ix. 3 = "to," either connected with *ἐφανερώθη* or with *ἡ ἀγάπη τ. Θ.*; hence, either "it has been manifested to us" (Düsterdieck, Brückner, Braune, etc.), or, "the love of God to us" (Ewald) has been manifested. With the first interpretation the sentence: *ὅτι . . . εἰς τὸν κόσμον*, makes a difficulty which has been overlooked by the commentators;¹ with regard to the second, the article *ἡ* is wanting before *ἐν ἡμῖν*; but a direct connection of an attributive clause with a substantive, without a connecting article, is very often found in the N. T., and is therefore not "ungrammatical" (as Düsterdieck thinks); the idea is here, then, the same as that which John in ver. 16 expresses by: *ἡ ἀγάπη ἦν ἐχει ὁ Θεὸς ἐν ἡμῖν*.² The difference between *εἰς ἡμῶς* and *ἐν ἡμῖν* is this, that the former indicates only the tendency towards the goal, the latter the abiding at the goal. By *ἡμῖν* we are to understand not mankind in general, but believers in particular, so also ver. 10 in the case of *ἡμεῖς, κ.τ.λ.* — In the following sentence: *ὅτι τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ . . . ἵνα ζήσωμεν δι' αὐτοῦ*, the special emphasis rests on the last words, for the love which God has towards us is manifested in the fact that He sent His Son into the world *for this purpose*, that we might live through Him, i. e., become partakers through Him of the life of blessedness. It is especially in its purpose that the sending of His Son is the manifestation of God's love to us. The more particular description of the Son of God as *ὁ μονογενής*, which is frequently found in the Gospel of John, appears only here in his Epistles. In Luke (vii. 12, viii. 42, ix. 38) and in the Epistle to the Hebrews (xi. 17), *μονογενής* denotes the only child of his parents. So the expression is used by John also to denote Christ as the *only* Son of God, "besides whom His Father has none." This predicate is suitable to Him, inasmuch as He is the *λόγος* who is *ἐν ἀρχῇ, πρὸς τὸν Θεόν, Θεός*. Lorinus arbitrarily explains *μονογενής* = *ἀγαπητός*; comp. Meyer on John i. 14. Calvin rightly remarks: "*quod unigenitum appellat, ad auxesin valet.*" How great the love of God, in that He sent His only begotten Son in order that we might live! Baumgarten-Crusius: "*μονογενής* and *ζήσωμεν* are the principal words: the most glorious . . . for our salvation!"

¹ Even Ebrard has not perceived the difficulty. It lies in this, that by *ὅτι, κ.τ.λ.*, something is mentioned which happened for us, but not which happened *to* us; differently in John ix. 3. Brückner thinks that the difficulty is removed by the fact that "in the purpose of the sending of Christ there also lies something which happened *to* us;" incorrectly, since even if the purpose of that is *our* life (*ἵνα ζήσωμεν*), yet it cannot be said that the love shown in the sending of Christ has manifested itself to us; the result is then that *ἐφανερώθη* is taken = "has operated," and that an emphasis is laid on *ἐν ἡμῖν* which it does not receive from the context.

² Lücke incorrectly observes that with this

connection there is in *ἐν ἡμῖν* "something superfluous and unsuitable." This is so far from being the case, that it is just in this that the apostle arrives at the consideration of the relationship between God and the believer. True, the love of God relates to the *whole* world, John iii. 16: *ἠγάπησεν ὁ Θεὸς τὸν κόσμον*, and to all, without exception, He has given, by sending His Son, the possibility of not being lost, but obtaining eternal life, but the loving purpose of God is accomplished only in them that believe; the unbelieving remain *ἐν ὀργῇ τοῦ Θεοῦ*; hence the love of God to the world is more narrowly limited than His love to believers, who are His *τέκνα*.

Ver. 10. ἐν τούτῳ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀγάπη, i. e., "herein consists love," love is in its nature of this kind. Oecumenius, inaccurately: ἐν τούτῳ, δείκνυται, ὅτι ἀγάπη ἐστὶν ὁ Θεός; for ἐστὶ is not = δείκνυται; nor is τοῦ Θεοῦ to be supplied with ἡ ἀγάπη (with Lücke, De Wette, Brückner, etc.), but the expression means love in general, as in ver. 7 in the words: ἡ ἀγάπη ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐστὶ (Düsterdieck, Ebrard, Braune). — οὐχ ὅτι ἡμεῖς ἠγαπήσαμεν τὸν Θεόν, ἀλλ' ὅτι, κ.τ.λ.]. Grotius and Lange arbitrarily render οὐχ ὅτι here = ὅτι οὐχ. Several commentators take the first part as, according to its sense, a subordinate clause = ἡμῶν μὴ ἀγαπήσαντων. Meyer: "Herein consists love, in that, although we had not previously loved God, He nevertheless loved us;"¹ this, however, is incorrect; as John in ver. 7 has said that love is ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ, so here also he would emphasize the fact that love has its origin not in man, but in God; it is originally in God, and not first called forth in Him by the love of men; the latter is rather first the outcome of the divine love;² the words οὐχ ὅτι therefore serve to specify love as something divine, not, however, as Düsterdieck (who otherwise interprets correctly) thinks, to emphasize the fact that "the love of God to us is entirely undeserved;" this is a thought which is only to be derived from the statement of the apostle (Braune). — ἡμεῖς and αὐτός are emphatically contrasted with one another. — καὶ ἀπέστειλε τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ, κ.τ.λ., states the actual proof of αὐτὸς ἠγάπησεν ἡμῖς; here also the special emphasis rests, not on ἀπέστειλε, but on ἰλασμόν, κ.τ.λ., which corresponds to the ἵνα ζήσωμεν of ver. 9, inasmuch as it states the basis of the ζωή; with ἰλασμόν, comp. chap. ii. 2. The aorists ἠγαπήσαμεν, ἠγάπησε, ἀπέστειλεν, are to be retained as historical tenses (De Wette); by the perfect ἀπέσταλκεν, ver. 9, the sending of Christ is merely stated; whereas the aorist employed here narratively depicts the loving act of God in the sending of His Son (Lücke).

Ver. 11. Conclusion from vv. 9 and 10, giving the motive for the exhortation in ver. 7. — The love of God (previously described: οὕτως) to us obliges us, believers, to love one another. The obligatory force lies not merely in the example given by God's act of love, but also in this, that we by means of it have become the children of God, and as such love as He loves (Lücke). At the same time, however, the correspondence between ἡμῖς and ἀλλήλους is to be observed; the Christian, namely, as a child of God, feels himself bound to love his brother because he knows that God loves him, and him whom God loves God's child cannot hate.

Ver. 12. The blessing of brotherly love is perfect fellowship with God. — Θεὸν οὐδεὶς πρόποτε τεθέαται; comp. ver. 20 and Gospel of John i. 18. In opposition to Rickli's view, that these words were spoken in polemic reference to the false teachers who pretended to see God, i. e., to know Him fully,

¹ Similarly a Lapide: "Hic caritatem Dei ponderat et exaggerat ex eo, quod Deus nulla dilectione, nullo obsequio nostro provocatus, imo multis injuriis et sceleribus nostris offensus, prior dilexit nos."

² With this interpretation it is not at all necessary, as Baumgarten-Crusius thinks, to

give a different meaning to the ὅτι in each case: "not as if . . . but in the fact that;" but ὅτι has the same meaning both times, as the sense is: "this is not the nature of the love that we were the first to love, but that God was the first to love."

Lucke rightly asserts that in that case the apostle would have more definitely expressed the polemic element; *τεθέαται* does not here at all denote spiritual seeing or knowledge (Hornejus, Neander, Sander, Erdmann), but seeing in the strict sense of the word (De Wette, Düsterdieck, Braune). John, however, does not here emphasize this invisibility of God (in which He is infinitely exalted above man; comp. 1 Tim. vi. 16) in order to suggest that we can reciprocate the love of God, not directly, but only through love to our *visible* brethren (Lucke, Ebrard; similarly Hornejus, Lange, etc.), but in order thereby to emphasize still more the following: ὁ Θεὸς ἐν ἡμῖν μένει, κ.τ.λ., as the Scholiast in Matthiae indicates by paraphrasing, ὁ ἀόρατος Θεὸς καὶ ἀνεφικτος διὰ τῆς εἰς ἀλλήλους ἀγάπης ἐν ἡμῖν μένει; a Lapide correctly interprets: *licet eum non videamus, tamen, si proximum diligamus, ipse invisibilis erit nobis praesentissimus* (so also De Wette, Düsterdieck, Erdmann, Myrberg, Braune). The *πωποτε* which is added shows that *τεθέαται* is regarded as the simple perfect, and does not "include past and present" (Lücke); nevertheless with the thought, "no one has seen God at any time," the further thought, "no one can see Him," is tacitly combined. That the apostle had in view the passage Exod. xxxiii. 20 (Sander), is the more improbable, as both thought and expression are different. In reference to the appearances of God which the O. T. in Gen. xii. 7, xvii. 1, and elsewhere, relates, Spener rightly remarks: "All such was not the seeing of the Divine Being Himself, but of an assumed form in which His being manifested itself." — ἐὶν ἀγαπῶμεν ἀλλήλους, ὁ Θεὸς ἐν ἡμῖν μένει]. In these words the blessing of brotherly love is stated: With brotherly love fellowship with God is associated, because, indeed, love is of God. The explanation of several commentators, "if we love one another, then it may thereby be known that God is in us," weakens the thought of the apostle.¹ God's dwelling in us is certainly not meant to be represented here as a result or fruit of our love to one another (as Frommann, p. 109, interprets); and just as little is it the converse relation; but it is the inseparable co-dependence of the two elements, which mutually condition each other (so also Braune). — καὶ ἡ ἀγάπη αὐτοῦ τετελειωμένη ἐστὶν ἐν ἡμῖν]. ἡ ἀγάπη αὐτοῦ is not here "the love which God has to us" (Calovius, Spener, Russmeyer, Sander, Erdmann, etc.), for the idea *τετελειωμένη ἐστὶν* does not agree with this (comp. ver. 18), but the love which the believer has; *αὐτοῦ* may, however, be either the objective genitive (so most commentators) or the subjective genitive; but in the latter case we must not interpret, with Socinus: *ea dilectio, quam ipse Deus nobis praescripsit*," nor, as Calvin thinks probable: "*caritas, quam Deus nobis inspirat*," but "*the love which is inherent in God*" (which is His nature and ἐξ αὐτοῦ); this, however, considered as dwelling in believers (ἐν ἡμῖν) as the soul of their life (so also Brückner and

¹ Weiss insists on this interpretation, because "it is meant to be shown how we have in brotherly love the *visible* evidence of an existence of God who is in Himself *invisible*;" incorrectly, for (1) Christians need no visible proof of the existence of the invisible God, and, besides, it is not the *existence* of God, but

God's dwelling in us, etc., that is the subject here; (2) the conjunction *ἐὰν* shows that the subordinate clause states the condition under which what is stated in the principal clause takes place; (3) the supplement of a *γινώσκωμεν* is purely arbitrary.

Braune). This explanation, in which no object which would restrict the general idea of love has to be supplied (comp. vv. 7, 8, 16, 18), deserves the preference, because the specific love to God is first mentioned in ver. 19. Quite unjustifiably Ebrard asserts that ἡ ἀγ. αὐτοῦ denotes "the mutual loving relationship between God and us; comp. ii. 5."

Ver. 13. The token of our fellowship with God (ἐν αὐτῷ μένομεν corresponds to the preceding ἡ ἀγάπη αὐτοῦ . . . ἐν ἡμῖν) is ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ πνεύματος αὐτοῦ δέδωκεν ἡμῖν; comp. iii. 24. The expression, ἐκ τοῦ πνεύματος (instead of τὸ πνεῦμα), is explained by the fact that the πνεῦμα of God is the entire fulness of the life of God operating in believers, of which his share is given to each individual. The expression is not to be connected with the διαίρεσις τῶν χαρισμάτων, of which Paul speaks in 1 Cor. xii. 4, 11. Compare Acts ii. 17; in reference to Christ it is said: οὐκ ἐκ μέτρου δίδωσι τὸ πνεῦμα, Gospel of John iii. 34. Against the view that by πνεῦμα here "love" or a similar quality is to be understood, Spener says: "it is the Spirit Himself, and not His gifts only, that we receive."¹ — ὅτι does not mean "if" (Baumgarten-Crusius), for John supposes that his readers are believers, and as such are certainly partakers of the Spirit.

Vv. 14, 15. That love brings with it fellowship with God, is caused by the fact that God is love, and love springs from God. But God's love was made manifest by the sending of His Son, and this is testified by the apostles, who themselves have seen Him. The last thought which ver. 14 expresses serves as an introduction to the thought that follows in ver. 15, in which the believing confession (and therefore faith) is described as the condition of fellowship with God, and hence also of true love. — καὶ ἡμεῖς]. By ἡμεῖς John means here himself and his fellow-apostles; comp. ver. 6. — τεθεύμεθα καὶ μαρτυροῦμεν, comp. chap. i. 1, 2. τεθεύμεθα expresses the direct seeing (Gospel of John i. 14), not knowledge through the medium of others. The apostles saw that the Father sent the Son, inasmuch as they saw the Son Himself — and not after the flesh merely, but also as the μονογενῆς παρὰ πατρός. With τεθεύμεθα corresponds the closely-connected idea μαρτυροῦμεν, which presupposes one's own direct experience; comp. Gospel of John i. 34. — The subject of this testimony is, ὅτι ὁ πατὴρ ἀπέσταλκε τὸν υἱὸν σωτήρα τοῦ κόσμου, comp. vv. 9, 10; σωτήρα τ. κ. states the purpose of the sending, which does not refer to particular elect ones, but to the whole number of sinners (comp. chap. ii. 2 and Gospel of John iii. 16). — Ver. 15. With ὁμολογήσῃ, comp. ver. 2. The subject of the confession is ὅτι Ἰησοῦς ἐστὶν ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ; this is precisely what the antichrists deny; comp. vv. 2 and 3. — Weiss erroneously interprets: "Whosoever abides in this confession, in him it is seen that God is in him;" the words "in him it is seen" are a mere interpolation.

Ver. 16. The beginning of this verse, καὶ ἡμεῖς, is indeed of the same import as the beginning of ver. 14; but ἡμεῖς here does not merely mean the

¹ Weiss incorrectly uses this passage as a proof that, whilst *Jesus* considered the Holy Ghost as a personal being, *John* had not yet perfectly taken hold of this conception; for even if it be admitted that the expression used

here does not specify the personality of the Spirit, yet it is in no way contradictory to it. Besides, Weiss himself admits that the passage τὸ πνεῦμά ἐστιν ἡ ἀλήθεια (chap. v. 6), points to the personality of the Spirit.

apostles (Myrberg), for otherwise *ἐν ἡμῖν* also would have to be referred to them, and a contrast, here inappropriate, would be drawn between the apostles and the readers, but it is used in its more general sense (as most commentators take it), which is also indicated by the connection of this verse with the preceding one. — With *ἐγνώκαμεν καὶ πεπιστεύκαμεν*, comp. John vi. 69. As the object of faith must have been previously made known to us, and hence made the subject of knowledge before we can take hold of it in faith, and as, on the other hand, it is only through faith that knowledge becomes the determining principle of our life, and these two elements mutually condition each other continually in the Christian life, knowledge, therefore, can be put before faith, as here, and faith can also be put before knowledge, as in John vi. 69.¹ — *τὴν ἀγάπην, ἣν ἔχει ὁ Θεὸς ἐν ἡμῖν* is not, with Wilke (*Hermeneutik des N. T.*, II. 64), to be interpreted: “the love which God has in us, i.e., as a love dwelling in us,” or, with Ebrard: “God’s love which He has kindled in us, by means of which, as by His own nature, He works in us,” for the verbs *ἐγνώκαμεν* and *πεπιστεύκαμεν* show that the subject here is not something subjective, and therefore not our love (which only in so far as it is the outcome of the divine love is described as the love which God has in us), but something objective, and therefore the love of God, which has manifested itself in the sending of His Son for the propitiation for our sins. *ἐν* is used here just as in ver. 9. The following words, *ὁ Θεὸς ἀγάπη ἐστὶ, κ.τ.λ.*, which are closely connected with what immediately precedes, form the keystone of the foregoing, inasmuch as the particular ideas of the previous context are all embraced in them. — On *ὁ Θεὸς ἀγ. ἐστὶ*, see ver. 8. — *καὶ ὁ μένων, κ.τ.λ.*, is the inference from the thought that God is love, in this way, namely, that all true love springs from Him. The idea of love here is not to be restricted to *brotherly* love (ver. 12, *ἐὶν ἀγαπῶμεν ἀλλήλους*), but (as also Düsterdieck, Braune, and Weiss remark)² is to be understood quite generally.³ The idea of fellowship with God is here expressed just as in ver. 15. If John makes it at one time dependent on knowledge, and at another dependent on love, this is explained by the fact that to him both knowledge and love are the radiations of that faith by means of which the new birth operates.

Ver. 17. After the apostle has said in ver. 16, that *he that dwelleth in love* (and therefore no one else) has fellowship with God, he now indicates wherein love shows itself as perfected; the thought of this verse is accord-

¹ Lücke: “True faith is, according to John, intelligent and experienced; true knowledge is a believing knowledge. Both together form the complete Christian conviction, so that John, when he wants to express this very strongly, puts them both together, in which case it is indifferent whether the one or the other comes first.” Comp. also Neander on this passage, and Köstlin, *Der Lehrbegr. des Ev.*, etc., pp. 63, 215 ff.

² Weiss further erroneously observes that “here also being in God is not to be made

dependent on love, but love on being in God.”

³ Ebrard introduces a reference foreign to the passage when he includes in *μένειν ἐν τῇ ἀγάπῃ* also the “dwelling in the love of God to us, in faith in God’s love;” Erdmann also incorrectly interprets: “*τῷ μένειν ἐν τῇ ἀγάπῃ* eadem animi nostri ad caritatem Dei relatio denotatur, quæ verbis *ἐγνώκαμεν καὶ πεπιστεύκαμεν* significatur.” Had the apostle meant this, he would have added to *ἀγάπῃ*, as a more particular definition, *τοῦ Θεοῦ*. Comp. Gospel of John xv. 10.

ingly connected with the preceding: *ὁ μένων ἐν τῇ ἀγάπῃ*. — ἐν τούτῳ τετελείωται ἡ ἀγάπη μεθ' ἡμῶν]. Several commentators, Luther, Calvin, Spener, Grotius, Hornejus, Calovius, Semler, Sander, Besser, Ewald, etc., understand by ἡ ἀγάπη "the love of God to us," interpreting μεθ' ἡμῶν = εἰς ἡμᾶς, and τετελείωται as referring to the perfect manifestation of the love of God. Grotius: *hic est summus gradus delectionis Dei erga nos*.¹ This interpretation, however, has the context against it, for in ver. 16: *ὁ μένων ἐν τῇ ἀγάπῃ*, as well as in ver. 18: *ὁ φόβος οὐκ ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ ἀγάπῃ*, by ἀγάπη is meant the love of man, the love that dwells in us; comp. also ver. 12. Here also, therefore, ἀγάπη must be understood of this love, with Estius, Socinus, Lange, Lücke, De Wette, Neander, Gerlach, Düsterdieck, Braune, etc.; τετελείωται is used in the same sense as τετελειωμένη ἐστὶν, ver. 12; comp. also ver. 18: ἡ τελεία ἀγάπη. — It is not the object of the love that is described by μεθ' ἡμῶν, for μετὰ is not = εἰς, but it means "in;"² it either belongs to the verb: "therein is love made perfect in us" (Lücke, De Wette, Düsterdieck, Braune, etc.; Erdmann, who explains μετὰ = ἐν), or to ἀγάπη: "the love which exists (prevails) in us is," etc. With the first construction, the addition appears rather superfluous; besides, its position would then be more natural before ἡ ἀγάπη. The underlying idea is that the love which has come from God (for all the love is ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ) has made its abode with believers. Here, also, ἡ ἀγάπη is used without more particular definition, as in ver. 16, and is therefore not to be limited to a specific object (so also De Wette, Düsterdieck, Braune); it is therefore neither merely "love to the brethren" (Socinus, Lücke,³ etc.), nor merely "love to God" (Lange, Erdmann); Baumgarten-Crusius not incorrectly explains the idea by "the sentiment of love;" only it must not be forgotten that true love is not merely sentiment, but action also; comp. chap. iii. 18. — ἐν τούτῳ does not refer to the preceding, nor to dwelling in love, nor to fellowship with God, but to what follows; not, however, to ὅτι, as Beza,⁴ Grotius, etc., assuming an attraction, think, but to ἵνα παρρησίαν ἔχωμεν

¹ Sander: "That it is made perfect must only mean: this love of God which was manifested in the sending of His Son is manifested in its might and glory in this, that, as overcoming every thing, it brings us so far that we," etc. — Calovius: "Perficitor dilectio Dei in nobis, non ratione sui, sic enim absolute perfecta est, sed ratione nostri, non quoad existentiam, sed quoad experientiam."

² Hence ἡ ἀγ. μεθ' ἡμῶν is neither = ἡ ἀγ. (τοῦ Θεοῦ) εἰς ἡμᾶς, nor = ἡ ἀγάπη (ἡμῶν) εἰς ἀλλήλους, as Lücke in his 1st ed. interprets ("our love among ourselves, i.e., our mutual love"); still less justifiable is the interpretation of Rickl: "the mutual love between God and the believer;" for John never includes God and men in ἡμεῖς. When Ebrard, admitting this, nevertheless accepts the interpretation of Rickl as far as the sense is concerned, explaining "the love of God with us" by "the love which exists between God and us," this

is purely arbitrary, for even though μετὰ is frequently used to denote a reciprocal action (see Winer, p. 336; VII. p. 352 ff.), yet this reference is here unsuitable, for it is not God and we, but love and we, that are placed together. Moreover, to supply τοῦ Θεοῦ with ἡ ἀγάπη is at the best only defensible if in μεθ' ἡμῶν the subject to which the love refers is stated; but this is grammatically impossible. If, as Ebrard thinks, ἡ ἀγάπη denotes not love, but the love-relationship, then ἡ ἀγάπη μεθ' ἡμῶν may only mean "the loving-relationship that exists among us;" this idea, however, as Ebrard with justice says, does not suit the context.

³ According to Bertheau's note in the 3d ed. of Lücke's *Commentary* (p. 364), Lücke has, however, in the edition of 1851, interpreted ἡ ἀγάπη: "brotherly love combined with love to God."

⁴ Beza's interpretation runs: "Charitas

ἐν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τῆς κρίσεως. From ver. 18 it is clear that the chief aim of the apostle is to emphasize the fact that perfect love (ἡ τελεία ἀγάπη, ver. 18) is free from fear, or that he who is perfect in love (τετελειωμένος ἐν τῇ ἀγάπῃ) experiences no fear, but has confident boldness (παρρησία). The thought of this verse is no other than this, that love has its perfection in the fact that it fills us with such παρρησία; the clause beginning with *ἵνα* therefore contains the leading thought, to which the following *ὅτι* is subordinated. It is true, the combination ἐν τούτῳ . . . ἵνα (instead of ὅτι, vv. 9, 10, and frequently) is strange, but it is quite John's custom to use the particle of purpose, *ἵνα*, not seldom as objective particle; the same combination is found in the Gospel of John xv. 8 (Meyer, indeed, differently on this passage); comp. chap. iii. 10, 23: αὐτῇ . . . ἵνα (Gospel of John xvii. 3); by *ἵνα*, παρρησίαν ἔχειν is indicated as the goal, not "which God has in view in the perfecting of love in us" (Braune), but which the ἀγάπη in its perfection attains (Düsterdieck). With παρρησίαν ἔχειν, comp. chap. ii. 28.¹—The ἡμέρα τῆς κρίσεως is the day ὅταν φανερωθῇ Ἰησοῦς Χριστός, ii. 28. The preposition is not to be interpreted = εἰς, and ἔχωμεν is not to be taken as a future (Ewald: "that we shall have"); the difficulty that any thing future (behavior on the judgment-day) should be taken as the evidence of perfect love in the present (τετελειώται is not to be taken as future complete, but as perfect: "has been made perfect," or "has become perfect" = "is perfected"), is removed if we take it that in ἐν the παρρησία, which the believer will have at the judgment-day, and which he already has when he thinks of the judgment, is included, which could the more easily occur in John, as in his view the judgment-day did not lie in far-off distance, but was already conceived as begun (chap. ii. 18). The future παρρησία is to him in his love already present; similarly De Wette, Sander, Besser.²—The following words: ὅτι καθὼς . . . τούτῳ, serve to establish the foregoing thought. By ἐκεῖνος we are not to understand, with Augustine, Bede, Estius, Lyranus, Castalio, etc., God, but, with most commentators, Christ, who is also suggested by the idea: ἡ ἡμέρα τῆς κρίσεως. — The comparison (καθὼς) does not refer to εἶναι ἐν

adimpletur in nobis per hoc quod qualls ille est, tales et nos simus in hoc mundo, ut fiduciam habeamus in die iudicii."

¹ In Luther's version, παρρησία is here, as elsewhere frequently, translated by *Freudigkeit*; this is not a word derived from *freude* (joy), but the old German word *freidikeit* (from *freidic*, *fraidig*) = haughtiness, boldness, confidence (comp. Villmar's *Pastoraltheol. Blätter*, 1861, vols. i. and ii. p. 110 ff.); in the older editions it is written sometimes *freydickeit* (Wittenb. ed. 1525), sometimes *freydigkeit* (Nürnberg ed. 1524), but in 1537 (in a Strasburg ed.) *freudigkeit*. In what sense Luther understood the word, is clearly seen from a sermon on 1 John iv. 16-21 (see Plochman's ed., xix. 383), in which he says: "he means that faith should thus show itself, so that when the last day comes, you may have

boldness and stand firm." It is to be observed also, that such Hebrew and Greek words as contain the idea of joy, Luther never translates by that word ("boldness"), but by "joyous," "joy."

² Braune, though he explains correctly the particular thought, denies that these two elements are here to be regarded as combined; but without entering into the difficulty which lies in the expression. Ebrard states the meaning of the words incorrectly thus: "In the fact that the will of God, that we should have boldness in the day of judgment, is internally revealed to us, and manifests itself as a power (of confidence) in us (even now), the loving relationship of God with us is shown to be perfect." How many elements foreign to the context are here introduced!

τῷ κόσμῳ τούτῳ, so that the sense would be: "as Christ is in this world, so are we also in this world," for (1) Christ is no longer in this world (comp. Gospel of John xvii. 11), and (2) in the fact that we are in this world lies no reason for *παθήσῃα* at the day of judgment. By *καθώς . . . καὶ* it is rather the *similarity of character* that is brought out, as in ii. 16, where *καθώς* does not refer to the idea of *περιπατεῖν* in itself, but to the character of the walk, so that it is to be interpreted: "as the character of Christ is, so is our character also;" in the second clause *οὕτως* is to be supplied, as in 1 Cor. viii. 2; Eph. iv. 17, 21. What sort of character is meant, must be inferred from the context; it is entirely arbitrary to find the similarity in the temptation (Rickli) or in the sufferings of Christ (Grotius), or in the fact that Christ was in the world but not of it (Sander), for there is no such reference in the context. But it is also inadmissible to regard as the more particular definition of *καθώς* the *δικαιοσύνη* (Düsterdieck), or the sonship of God (Lücke: "as Christ is the Son of God, so are we also children of God"), for neither do these ideas appear in the context. We are rather to go back to *ὁ μένων ἐν τῇ ἀγάπῃ*, and accordingly to refer *καθώς* to *love* (so Lorinus: "*reddit nos charitas Christo similes et conformes imagini filii Dei:*" Bengel, De Wette, Ewald, Myrberg, Braune, etc.),¹ so that the sense is: "if we live in love, then we do not fear the judgment of Christ, because then we are like Him, and He therefore cannot condemn us."² The present *ἐστὶ* is to be retained as a present, and not to be turned into the preterite (Oecumenius: *ὡς ἐκεῖνος ἦν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἄμωμος καὶ καθαρός*). Love is the eternal nature of Christ, comp. iii. 7: *καθώς ἐκεῖνος δικαίως ἐστὶν*. In the concluding words: *ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ τούτῳ*, which belong, not to *ἐστὶ*, but *only to ἔσμεν*, it is brought out that we are still *in the earthly world* (*κόσμος οὗτος* is not an ethical idea), whereas Christ has already ascended from it into heaven.

¹ The reference of *καθώς* to love is the only one demanded by the context, so that it is not suitable to regard love only as a single element in the likeness of believers to Christ which is here spoken of, as is the case with Lücke, for instance. Erdmaun lays the chief emphasis not so much on love as on fellowship with God, which exists in love; but by *καθώς . . . ἐστὶ* it is not a relationship, but a quality, that is indicated.

² Ebrard in his Interpretation arrives at no definite result; as, on his supposition that the centre of the *tertili comparationis* lies in the words *ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ τούτῳ*, the present *ἐστὶ* is objectionable to him, he would prefer to conjecture "*οὕτως*" instead of *ἐστὶ*; but "as a faithful attention to the requirements of Biblical exegesis would scarcely permit such a conjecture," he thinks that nothing else remains but either to suppose that *ἐστὶ* (in the sense of a historical present) "is added as an indifferent, colorless word," or to refer *καθώς ἐκ. ἐστὶν* to the fact that Christ even now "still exists in the wicked world to a certain extent,

namely, in the Church, which is His body." Ebrard regards the second conjecture as the more correct, and in accordance with it thus states the sense: "We look forward to the judgment with boldness, for, as He (in His Church) is still persecuted by the wicked world (even at the present day), so are we also in this world (as lambs among wolves)" (!). Ebrard groundlessly maintains, against the explanation given in the text, "that with it an *οὕτως* could not be omitted, nay, that even this would not suffice, but that it would have to read: *ὅτι οἷος ἐκεῖνός ἐστι, τοιοῦτοι καὶ ἡμεῖς ἔσμεν*, and that even then the passage remains obscure enough;" and "that with this acceptance, *ἐν τ. κ. τ.* almost appears quite superfluous and foreign." Against the statement that "our confidence in view of the judgment could not possibly be founded on our likeness to Christ, but only on the love of God as manifested in Christ," it is a decisive answer that John in other passages as well makes the *παθήσῃα* dependent upon *our* character: comp. ii. 28, iii. 21.

Ver. 18 serves to establish the preceding thought, that love has its perfection in *παβήρσία*. — φόβος οὐκ ἔστω ἐν τῇ ἀγάπῃ]. The thought is quite general in its character: “where love is, there is no fear” (Ebrard); φόβος is therefore not specially the fear of God, and by ἀγάπη we are not to understand specially love to God, but at the same time this general thought is certainly expressed here in reference to the relationship to God. It is quite erroneous to explain ἀγάπη here, with Calvin, Calovius, Flacius, Spener, etc., as “the love of God to us;”¹ but it is also incorrect, with Lücke and others, to understand by it, specially, brotherly love.²—The preposition ἐν is not = with (à Mons: *ne se trouve avec la charité*); Luther, correctly: “Fear is not in love;” i.e., it is not an element in love, it is something utterly foreign to it, which only exists outside it. By the following words, ἀλλ’ ἡ τελεία ἀγάπη ἔξω βάλλει τὸν φόβον, the preceding thought is confirmed and expanded: love not only has no fear in it, but it does not even endure it; where it enters, there must fear completely vanish. Beza inadequately paraphrases the adjective τελεία by *sincera, opposita simulationi*; it is not love in its first beginnings, love which is still feeble, but love in its perfection, that completely casts out fear. The reason why love does not suffer fear to be along with it is, ὅτι ὁ φόβος κόλασιν ἔχει. The word κόλασις (besides here, only in Matt. xxv. 46; comp. Wisd. xi. 14, xvi. 2, 24, xix. 4) has always the meaning of “punishment” (also LXX., Ezek. xiv. 3, 4, 7, xviii. 30, xlv. 32, as incorrect translation of לִישׁוֹן); if we adhere to this meaning, that expression can only mean: fear has punishment, in which case that which it has to expect is regarded as inherent in it, just as on the other hand it could be said: ἡ ἀγάπη ἔχει ζωὴν αἰώνιον (this being considered as future happiness, as in Matt. xxv. 46); this idea has nothing against it, for fear, as rooted in unbelief, is in itself deserving of punishment, and therein lies the reason (ὅτι) why perfect love casteth out fear.³ Several commentators, however, explain κόλασις by “pain,” thinking that “here *causa* is put *pro effectu*” (Ebrard), or, in more correspondence with the thought, by “pain of punishment” (Besser, Braune, so also previously in this commentary); similarly Lücke explains κόλασις = “consciousness of punishment.” The thought that then results is indeed right in itself, for “certainly this having of κόλασις does actually show itself in the consciousness or the pain of the expectation of punishment” (Brückner); but such a change in the meaning of the idea κόλασις cannot be grammatically justified. The following sentence, ὁ δὲ φοβούμενος οὐ τετελείωται ἐν τῇ ἀγάπῃ, which is not connected with the subordinate

¹ Calovius interprets: “Charitas divina, quae apprehensa per fidem, omnem servilem timorem expellit,” whereby a reference foreign to the context is plainly introduced.

² For justification of this interpretation Lücke refers to the words ἔξω βάλλει τὸν φόβον, and remarks: “it cannot be said of the love of God in its perfection, that it casts out fear of God, for it has not got any.” But John does not say that love casts out fear out of itself; the idea rather is, it drives fear out of the

heart in which it dwells before it (love) obtains its entrance. If ἀγάπη and φόβος were meant to have different references, the apostle would certainly have indicated this.

³ It is unnecessary to take the abstract (ὁ φόβος) for the concrete (ὁ φοβούμενος), as De Wette and Düsterdieck do; De Wette incorrectly interprets ἔχει by “receives,” and Baumgarten-Crusius by “keeps, tenet, thinks of . . . punishment” (so that the sense is: “Fear knows nothing of mercy, of love”).

clause *ὅτι ὁ φόβος*, κ.τ.λ., but with the preceding principal clause, does not contain a conclusion from this (*δέ* is not = *οὖν*), but (as Braune also thinks) expresses the same thought in negative form (hence the connection by *δέ*); only with this difference, that what was there expressed in an objective way, here receives a subjective aspect. It needs no proof, that the apostle has in view in this verse no other fear than that of which Paul says, Rom. viii. 15, *οὐκ ἐλάβετε πνεῦμα δουλείας πάλιν εἰς φόβον*, and therefore not the childlike awe of God arising from the consciousness of God's glory, which forms an essential element of love to God.¹ The conjectures of Grotius, instead of *κόλασιν*: *κόλουσιν* (i. e., *mutilationem*; so that the sense is "*metus amorem mutilat atque infringit, aut prohibet, ne se exserat*"), and instead of *φοβούμενος*: *κολούμενος* ("*qui mutilatur aut impeditur in dilectione, is in ea perfectus non est*"); and that of Lamb. Bos: instead of *κόλασιν*, *κώλωνσιν*, are not merely useless, but even rob the thought of the apostle of its peculiar force.

Ver. 19. *ἡμεῖς ἀγαπῶμεν*]. According to this reading (omit *αὐτόν*), *ἀγαπᾶν* is here to be taken in the same comprehensive way as *ἀγάπη* in ver. 16 (Düsterdieck, Myrberg,² Ebrard), and must not be restricted to "brotherly love" (Lücke). — *ἀγαπῶμεν*, in analogy with *ἀγαπῶμεν* in ver. 7, and with *ὑφείλοαεν*, ver. 11, is taken by Hornejus, Grotius, Lorinus, Lange, Lücke, De Wette-Brückner, Baumgarten-Crusius, Sander, Besser, Düsterdieck, Myrberg, etc., as imperative subjunctive; but it might be more correct to regard this verse, just as ver. 17, as an expression of the actual character of true Christians, with whom, in ver. 20, by *εἰάν τις εἶπη* the false Christian is contrasted, and therefore to take *ἀγαπῶμεν*, with Beza, Socinus, Spener, Bengel, Rickli, Neander, Ebrard, Hofmann (*Schrißbew.*, II. 2, p. 338), Braune, etc., as indicative, in favor of which is also the prefixed *ἡμεῖς*. — The reason of *ἡμεῖς ἀγαπῶμεν* is stated in *ὅτι αὐτὸς πρῶτος ἠγάπησεν ἡμᾶς*, in which the chief emphasis rests on *πρῶτος*; comp. vv. 9, 10.

Ver. 20—chap. v. 1. Proof of the necessary co-existence of love to God and love to the brethren. The absence of the latter is evidence of the absence of the former; where love to God is, brotherly love also cannot be wanting.

Ver. 20. This verse divides itself into two parts, the second part confirming the thought of the first. — *εἰάν τις εἶπη*]. The same form of thought as in chap. i. 6 ff. — *ὅτι ἀγαπῶ τὸν Θεόν*]. *ὅτι* is used, as frequently, at the commencement of the direct oration. — *καὶ τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ μισῶ*]. With *μισῶ* corresponds the subsequent *ὁ μὴ ἀγαπῶν*, comp. chap. iii. 14, 15. Spener: "not only with actual hatred towards him, but even not loving him in perfect truth." To hate is the positive expression for "not to love" (so also Braune). —

¹ That the fear which the apostle means has its necessary place also in the development of the spiritual life, Augustine strikingly expresses thus: "Timor quasi locum præparat charitati. Si autem nullus timor, non est qua intret charitas. Timor Dei sic vulnerat quomodo medicæ ferramentum. Timor medicamentum, charitas sanitas. Timor servus est charitatis. Timor est custos et paedagogus

legis, donec veniat charitas." — The different steps are thus stated by Bengel: "Varius hominum status: sine timore et amore; cum timore sine amore; cum timore et amore; sine timore cum amore."

² Myrberg remarks: "Totum genus amoris hic proponitur; sed ubi totum genus amoris nuncupatur, ibi mens ante omnia fertur ad considerationem amoris erga Deum."

φείσσης ἐστίν; see chap. i. 6. The truth that he who hates (or, does not love) his brother, also does not love God, the apostle confirms by the contrast between ὃν ἐώρακε and ὃν οὐχ ἐώρακεν, in which the *visibility* of the brother is contrasted with the *invisibility* of God. The perfect indicates the permanent state; comp. ver. 12, Gospel of John i. 18. Lücke: ἐωρακέναι = "to have before one's eyes;" a Lapidé: "vidit et assidue videt." Socinus incorrectly lays a certain emphasis on the preterite when he says: *quandoquidem satis est ad amorem per cognitionem alicujus erga illum excitandum, quod quis ipsum aliquando viderit; nec necesse est, ut etiam nunc illum videat.* The premise for the conclusion of the apostle is, that the visible — as the object directly presented to the sight — is more easily loved than the invisible. Even the natural man turns with love to the visible,¹ whereas love to God, as the Unseen, requires an elevation of the heart of which only the saved are capable. Hence brotherly love is the easier, love to God is the more difficult. In him who rejects the former, the latter has certainly no place. The truth that love to God is the condition of Christian brotherly love, is not in contradiction with this; for that love, as the glorification of natural love, has its necessary basis in the natural inclination which we have to our visible brother, who is like us. It is therefore unnecessary to attach any importance to elements which the apostle here leaves quite untouched, as is the case with Calvin (with whom Sander, Ebrard, etc., agree) when he says: *Apostolus hic pro confesso sumit, Deum se nobis in hominibus offerre, qui insculptam gerunt EJUS IMAGINEM; Joannes nil aliud voluit, quam fallacem esse jactantiam, si quis Deum se amare dicat, et EJUS IMAGINEM, quae ante oculos est, negligat;*² and with De Wette in his interpretation: "the brother is the visible empiric object of love; whereas God, the ideal invisible object, can really be loved *only in him.*" By the interrogative πῶς δύναται ἀγαπᾶν (comp. chap. iii. 17), and by placing the object τὸν Θεόν first, the expression gains in vivacity and point. — πῶς δύναται must not be taken: "how can he attain to that?" but "how can we suppose that he loves?" (Baumgarten-Crusius). Bengel: *sermo modalis: impossibile est, ut talis sit amans Dei, in praesenti.*

Ver. 21. *Aalterum argumentum cur amare proximum (or, more correctly, fratrem) debeamus: quia Deus id praecepit* (Grotius). — καί, not = and yet (Paulus); for this verse does not contain an antithesis, but an expansion, of the preceding thought. — ταύτην τὴν ἐντολήν, κ.τ.λ.]. Lange interprets ἐντολή here by "teaching;" and Grotius paraphrases ὁ ἀγαπᾶν τὸν Θεόν by *qui a Deo*

¹ Oecumenius: ἐφελκυστικὸν γὰρ ὄρασις ἀγάπην. Hornejus: "Sicut omnis cognitio nostra communiter a sensu incipit, ita amor quoque, unde facilius et prius amatur, quod facilius et promptius cognoscitur." Similarly Luther, Calovius, etc. Compare also the statement of Gregory (*Homil. XI. in Evang.*); "Oculi sunt in amore duces;" and Philo (*Ad Decalog.*): ἀμήχανον εὐσεβεῖσθαι τὸν ἀόρατον ὑπὸ τῶν εἰς τοὺς ἐμφανεῖς καὶ ἔγγυς ἀσεβούντων.

² The objection of Ebrard, that "it is not easier to love a person who stands visibly before me, and has, for instance, *injured* me,

than a person whom I have not seen at all," is overthrown by the fact that the apostle does not here make the slightest reference to the conduct of persons standing in visible opposition to us, by whom the natural feeling of love towards our equals is destroyed and turned into hate. As the apostle is contrasting the elements of visibility and invisibility, it is so much the more arbitrary to introduce here a reference to the *imago Dei*, as this is not something visible, but something invisible, — the object, not of sight, but of faith.

pro amante ipsius haberi vult; both false and unnecessary; for although brotherly love is the natural fruit and activity of love to God, yet at the same time the practice of it is the habitual task which he who loves God has to perform, as one appointed him by God. It is doubtful whether we are to understand by *αὐτοῦ* God (Baumgarten-Crusius, De Wette, Düsterdieck, etc.) or Christ; that in the latter case *ἐκείνου* must be read, is unfounded; because *τὸν Θεόν* follows, the second view seems to be the more correct; but as in the context there is no reference here at all to Christ, it might be safer to understand by *αὐτοῦ* God. — By *ἵνα* referring back to *ταύτην*, it is here, as frequently after verbs of wishing and commanding, not so much the purpose as the purport of the commandment (the realization of which is certainly the aim and object of the commandment) that is stated, which Braune here also incorrectly disputes.

CHAPTER V.

Ver. 1. Lachm. has bracketed the *καί* before τὸν γεγεννημένον, because it is wanting in B, some min., Vulg., Hil., etc. Instead of τὸν γεγεννημένον, \aleph reads τὸ γεγ. as it runs in ver. 4. — Ver. 2. Instead of τηρῶμεν, Rec. in A, G, K, \aleph , etc., Lachm. and Tisch. read ποιῶμεν, according to B, several min., Vulg., Syr., Thph., etc. The authorities, however, decide in favor of τηρῶμεν, even A; in which the following words: αὕτη γὰρ . . . τηρῶμεν, are wanting, perhaps through a mistake. Still it remains likely that τηρῶμεν has been inserted as John's usual expression (with ἐντολάς) instead of ποιῶμεν. — Ver. 5. Instead of the Rec. τίς ἐστίν (A, G, al., pl., Vulg., etc., Lachm., Tisch.), is found in B, K, several min., etc.: τίς ἐστίν δέ; τίς δέ ἐστίν; in \aleph the δέ is inserted, perhaps for closer connection of the clauses. — Ver. 6. Instead of αἵματος, πνεύματος is found in some min., etc.; in A, \aleph , some min., etc., is found the addition: καὶ πνεύματος; others read πνεύματος καὶ αἵματος, and αἵματος καὶ πνεύματος is also found; πνεύματος is evidently a later addition. — The Rec. has before Χριστός the article ὁ; it is wanting in A, G, \aleph (K: Χριστὸς Ἰησοῦς) and, according to the statement of Tisch. 7, in B; according to Tisch. 2, it is found in B (namely, *e silentio collatorum*); Buttmann has retained it, as well as Lachmann and Tisch. 2; Tisch. 7 has, however, rejected it. — Instead of μόνον, B reads μόνω; a correction right according to the sense. — καὶ τῷ αἵματι]. According to A, B, G, and many others, Syr., Copt. (with Lachm. and Tisch.), καὶ ἐν τῷ αἵμ. is probably to be substituted. Other variations, as πνεύματι instead of αἵματι, etc., do not call for observation; the reading ὅτι Χριστός instead of ὅτι τὸ πνεῦμα need only be mentioned, which, because it is found in the Vulgate, is the basis of several old interpretations, although it is supported by scarcely any other authorities. — Ver. 7. Before τρεῖς, \aleph has the article οἱ; but in this it is alone. — The words that follow οἱ μαρτυροῦντες in the Rec.: ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ, ὁ πατήρ, ὁ λόγος καὶ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα καὶ οὗτοι οἱ τρεῖς ἐν εἰσι. (Ver. 8) Καὶ τρεῖς εἰσιν οἱ μαρτυροῦντες ἐν τῇ γῆ, are rejected by Griesb., Lachm., Tisch., etc., and are considered spurious by almost all modern commentators (except Sander, Besser, Mayer). — They are wanting in *all the Greek Codices*, except in 173** (of the 16th cent.), 34, and 162; in the two latter, however, which also belong only to the 16th cent., the words καὶ οἱ τρεῖς τὸ ἐν εἰσιν, and the articles ὁ, ὁ, τό, are omitted. They are wanting, further, in *almost all the versions*. With regard to the Latin Codices, they are only found in these after the 8th cent.; the Codex Amiatinus (circa 541), Harleianus (of the 7th cent.), and others do not contain them; the Codex Demidovianus has transposed them, thus: *quia tres sunt qui testimonium dant in terra, spiritus, aqua et sanguis, et tres unum sunt. Et tres sunt, qui testimonium dant in coelo, pater, verbum, et spiritus.* — Of the *Greek Fathers* not a single one mentions them, although reference to them would have been very convenient in the Arian controversies; just as little

is there any reference to them in most of the older Latin Fathers, as Hilary, Lucifer, Ambrose, Faustinus, Jerome, Augustine, etc. An allusion to them has incorrectly been believed to exist in Tertullian in the passages: *c. Prax.*, 25, and *De Pudicit.*, 21; on the other hand, Cyprian (*De Unitate Ecclesiae*) seems to refer to them in the words: *Dicit Dominus: Ego et Pater unum sumus; et iterum de Patre et Filio et Spiritu Sancto scriptum est: Et tres unum sunt.* The passage in Phoebadius (4th cent.), *Contra Arianos*, c. 45, refers rather to Tertullian than to John;¹ and in Eucherius (5th cent.), *Lib. Formularum*, c. 11, they are only found in interpolated handwriting. They are first certainly quoted by Vigiliius (towards the end of the 5th cent.) in the books written under the name of Idacius, *Contra Varimadum*, by Fulgentius, Cassiodorus (of the 6th cent.), and in many later ones since the 9th cent. — The peculiar quotation in Cyprian finds its explanation in the symbolical interpretation of the words τὸ πνεῦμα, τὸ ὕδωρ, and τὸ αἷμα of the Trinity, which is also found in the Schol. in Matthaei: *οἱ τρεῖς δὲ εἶπεν ἄρσενικῶς, ὅτι σύμβολα ταῦτα τῆς τριάδος;* and in the Schol.: *τουτέστι τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον καὶ ὁ πατήρ καὶ αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ (and ὃν ἐν εἰσιν: τουτέστι μία θεότης, εἰς Θεός),* and which Facundus (6th cent.) has rightly recognized when he says, *Pro Defens. Trium Capit.*, l. i. c. 3: *tres sunt qui testimonium dant (in terra?): Spiritus, aqua et sanguis, et hi tres unum sunt . . . quod Joannis apostoli testimonium Cyprianus . . . de Patre, Filio et Spiritu s. intelligit.*² — As at first the three persons of the Trinity were substituted for the former words, as was the case with Cyprian, the idea arose afterwards that they were named by the apostle *in addition to them*, and some Fathers then quoted the passage as it had taken shape in accordance with this idea. — The weight of the evidence *against* the genuineness of the disputed words is so strong, that it is opposed to the fundamental principles of a sound and unprejudiced criticism to regard them as genuine. — In the 16th cent. the words are found in most of the Latin translations, as well as in some of the German translations which were made in accordance with the Vulgate. With regard to the editions of the Greek text, the Complutensian (1504–1514), following the Vulgate, accepted them; on the other hand, Erasmus in his earliest editions rejected them, as well as Aldus Manutius in the Venetian edition (1518); in his translation of 1521, and in the 3d edition of 1522, Erasmus, however, accepted them, adducing Cod. 34; Stephanus and Beza did the same; “the Rec. sanctioned the claim of this reading” (Braune). Luther *never* admitted them into his translation.³ They are first found in the translations which appeared in *Switzerland* without Luther’s name; thus in the *Zürich* edition of Froschover, 1529; the edition of

¹ The passages in Tertullian run thus: *the first*: “Ceterum de meo sumet, inquit, sicut ipse de Patris. Ita connexus Patris in Filio et Filii in Paracleto, tres efficit cohaerentes alterum ex altero: qui tres unum sunt, non unus, quomodo dictum est. Ego et Pater unum sumus, ad substantiae unitatem, non ad numeri singularitatem;” *the second*: “Et ecclesia proprie et principaliter ipse est Spiritus, in quo est trinitas unus divinitatis, Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus.” The passage in Phoebadius: “Sic alius a Filio Spiritus, sicut alius a Patre Filius. Sic tertia in Spiritu, ut in Filio secunda Persona: unus tamen Deus omnia, quia tres unum sunt.”

² Ebrard, indeed, also holds these words to be spurious, but thinks it probable that they existed in the MSS. which were available to Cyprian; this, however, is the less to be inferred from the fact that Vigiliius had the passage in his N. T., since he quotes it in a corrupt sense.

³ It is strange that the words are found explained in Luther’s second commentary on the Epistle (Walch) without the slightest reference to their spuriousness, whilst in Luther’s first commentary they are distinctly specified as spurious. This is no doubt explained by the fact that he based his second edition on the later text of Erasmus.

1531 also has them, but with the omission of "in earth," and in small print; in that of 1533 they are printed in ordinary letters, whilst they are bracketed in later editions of 1540, 1545, 1549.¹ The *Basel* edition of Bryllinger, 1552, has them without brackets; the *Zürich* edition of Gessner, 1555, on the other hand, has them bracketed. — With regard to the editions published in *Frankfort-on-the-Main*, these words, according to the usual statement, are first found in the edition of 1593; this, however, is incorrect, for they previously occur in the quarto edition of 1582, though they are wanting in the octavo of Feyerabendt, 1582.² Among the editions printed in *Wittenberg*, the quarto edition of Zach. Lehmann, 1596, is probably the first that admitted the words; but again they are wanting in many later editions; the last which does not contain them is the quarto of 1620, which was published by Zach. Schürer at Joh. Richter's. — In the 17th cent. their genuineness was defended — certainly on insufficient and false grounds. After Richard Simon had declared himself against them, they were opposed in the 18th cent., especially by Thomas Emlyn (1715), Clarke (1738), Wetstein, Michaelis, Semler, Hezel, Griesbach, Matthæi. Bengel, on the contrary, defended them, but with the arbitrary assumption that the text originally ran: "ὅτι τρεῖς εἰσιν οἱ μαρτυροῦντες ἐν τῇ γῆ· τὸ πνεῦμα, κ.τ.λ., εἰς τὸ ἐν εἶσιν. Ver. 8. καὶ τρεῖς εἰσιν οἱ μαρτυροῦντες ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ, ὁ πατήρ, ὁ λόγος καὶ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα καὶ οὗτοι οἱ τρεῖς ἐν εἶσιν." Compare especially Bengel, *Apparat. Criticus*; Griesbach, *Diatribē in loc. 1 Johann. v. 7, 8*, as appendix of the 2d part of his edition; Semler in his *Hist. u. krit. Sammlungen über die Sog. Beweisstellen in d. Dogm. St., I.*; Rickli in his notes on this passage; Knittel, *Neue Kritiken über 1 Joh. v. 7, 8*. — Ver. 9. Instead of ἦν, according to G, K, etc., Thph., Oecum., A, B, S, etc., Vulg., etc., Cyr., read ὅτι, which is recommended by Griesbach and accepted by Lachm. and Tisch.: ἦν seems to have arisen from ver. 10; Reiche, however, holds ἦν to be the original. — Ver. 10. ἔχει τὴν μαρτυρίαν]. Rec., according to B, G, K, S, very many min., and vss., Thph., etc. (Tisch.); Lachm. (following A, Vulg.) adds τοῦ Θεοῦ, which, however, seems to be an explanatory gloss. — Instead of ἐαυτῷ, Tisch. reads αὐτῷ, following A, G, K; only a clerical variation. τῷ Θεῷ, Rec., after B, G, K, S, Syr., etc., Thph. (Tisch.). Against this A and the Vulg. have τῷ υἱῷ (Lachm.). This reading has arisen from the idea that this negative sentence must exactly correspond to the preceding: ὁ πιστεύων εἰς τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ. — Ver. 13. The Rec. runs: ὑμῖν τοῖς πιστεύουσιν εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἵνα εἰδῆτε ὅτι ζωὴν ἔχετε αἰώνιον καὶ ἵνα πιστεύητε εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ. In A, B, S, etc., Vulg., Copt., Theb., etc., Cassiod., Bede, the addition τοῖς πιστεύουσιν . . . τοῦ Θεοῦ, is wanting after ὑμῖν; instead of the concluding καὶ ἵνα, κ.τ.λ., the reading in A, etc., almost all the vss., Cassiod., Bede, is: οἱ πιστεύοντες εἰς τὸ ὄν., κ.τ.λ.; in B,

¹ According to Rickli, these brackets were first omitted in 1597; Ehrard, on the other hand, says that they were already omitted in the edition of 1561 which was in his possession.

² For these and the following notices I have to thank my friend Dr. Klose of Hamburg, who has personally examined these editions in the Hamburg Library. According to Panzer (*Hist. de Bibelübers.*, p. 492 ff.) and Mönckeberg (*Beitr. z. Feststellung*, etc., p. 152), the words are said to occur as early as in the Frankfurt edition of 1574, edited by Keffeler

(published by John Feyerabendt); but this statement is incorrect. According to a written communication from Professor Dr. Keil, who has compared the edition in the Leipzig University Library, the passage referred to runs: "And it is the Spirit that bears witness that the Spirit is truth. For there are three that bear record on earth, the Spirit and the water and the blood, and these three are one. If we receive the witness of men," etc. The folio edition of Weyg. Hanen, 1574, also does not contain the words.

however, τοῖς πιστεύουσιν; so also \aleph^* ; in \aleph_1 , however, οἱ πιστεύοντες. — Griesb., Scholz, Lachm., Tisch., have accepted the reading as it is in A, Buttmann as it is in B. Even if the common reading is to be justified according to the sense (De Wette, Sander, Reiche), yet its correctness does not therefore follow, as it has too little support from external authorities, and as ἵνα πιστεύητε seems to owe its origin to the passage, Gospel of John xx. 31. The reading of B might, however, be preferable to the reading of A, since the former is not only the more difficult, but by it the origin of the Rec. can be more easily explained; so also Brückner; Braune prefers the reading of A, “as *difficilior*,” but the addition is more easily connected with ἔχετε than with the preceding ὑμῖν. — It is doubtful whether αἰώνιον had its original position before or after ἔχετε; the former is attested by G, K, \aleph , several min., Thph., Oec.; the latter by A, B, etc., Vulg., etc. (Lachm., Tisch.). — Ver. 14. Instead of *ἵνα ἐάν τι*, Lachm., following A, reads: *ὅ, τι ἂν*, which, however, has too little support. — Ver. 15. Lachmann’s reading, *καὶ ἂν*, instead of *καὶ ἐάν*, has too little evidence in B. A omits entirely the words *καὶ . . . ἡμῶν*; so also \aleph^* ; \aleph_1 reads *καὶ ἐν ἰδομεν, κ.τ.λ. — ὁ ἂν*. Rec., according to A, K, etc., Oec. (Lachm.); instead of which B, G, \aleph , and many others, Thph., have *ὁ ἐάν* (Tisch.). The reading in \aleph^* , *ἵνα ἐάν* ἔχωμεν, is merely a mistake. — Instead of *παρ’ αὐτοῦ* (A, G, K, and several others), B, \aleph , read *ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ* (Lachm., Tisch.). — Ver. 16. Instead of *ἰδῆ*, Rec., according to A, B, G, K, \aleph , etc., Clem., Thph., Oec., Lachmann, has accepted the reading *εἰδῆ*, presented only by the Vulg. and Latin Fathers. \aleph^* has *αἰτήσεις καὶ δώσεις* instead of the third person. — Ver. 18. Instead of *ἀλλ’*, Tisch. and Buttm., following B, read *ἀλλά*. The reading *αὐτον* in A*, B, instead of *ἐαντόν*, is only a clerical variation of the word. — Ver. 20. *καὶ οἴδαμεν*. Rec., according to A, several min., etc. (Lachm., Buttm.); K, \aleph , etc. (according to Tisch., also B; contrary to which Buttm. states that *καὶ οἶδ.* is found in B) have *οἴδαμεν δέ* (Tisch.); G reads merely *οἴδαμεν*. — Tisch. 7, following A, B*, G, \aleph , etc., reads *γινώσκουμεν*, whilst the Rec., according to B**, K, etc., is *γινώσκουμεν* (Tisch. 2, Lachm., Buttm.); the latter is probably a correction. — To τὸν ἀληθινόν, A, several min., vss., and Fathers add Θεόν, which, though approved of by Lücke, De Wette, Reiche, is with justice not accepted by Lachm. and Tisch., since it may easily be recognized to be an interpolation. \aleph^* has τὸ ἀληθ.; \aleph_1 , however, τόν. — *ἡ ζωὴ αἰώνιος*. According to A, B, \aleph , many min., etc., the article ἡ, which is only supported by a few min., is, with Lachm. and Tisch., to be deleted, inasmuch as it is either *ζωὴ αἰώνιος*, or *ἡ ζωὴ ἡ αἰώνιος*, or *ἡ αἰώνιος ζωὴ* (John xvii. 3), that always appears in John, but never *ἡ ζωὴ αἰώνιος*. The grounds which Frommann (p. 91 ff.) adduces for the retention of the article are not adequate. — Ver. 21. Instead of *ἐαντούς* (Rec., according to A, K, etc., Tisch.), B, G, \aleph^* (\aleph_1 ; *ἐαντούς*) read *ἐαυτά* (Lachm.); this is probably a correction with reference to *τεκνία*.

Ver. 1 shows that the believer, as born of God, necessarily loves his brother. The two elements of the Christian life, faith and love, are represented in their real unity. — *πᾶς ὁ πιστεύων ἵνα ἴησους ἐστιν ὁ Χριστός* refers back to chap. iv. 15; comp. ii. 22, iv. 2; instead of *ὁ Χριστός*, the apostle in ver. 5 puts *ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ*; comp. iii. 23, from which, however, it does not follow that *ὁ Χριστός* and *ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ* are to the apostle exactly identical ideas, but certainly that he only is Christ to him, who is also Son of God. That John says here *ὁ Χριστός*, is occasioned by the antithesis to

the false teachers; comp. on this Weiss, p. 155 ff. Grotius erroneously explains: *qui credere se ostendit*: it is not the manifestation of faith, but faith itself, that is the subject. — ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ γεγεννηται; for faith is not a human, but a divine work in us.¹ This first sentence forms the premise from which the apostle draws his conclusion. He does not specially emphasize the self-evident intermediate thought: πᾶς ὁ γεγεννημένος ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἀγαπᾷ τὸν Θεόν, but presupposing it,² he says: καὶ πᾶς ὁ ἀγαπῶν τὸν γεγεννησάντα, ἀγαπᾷ καὶ τὸν γεγεννημένον ἐξ αὐτοῦ]. ὁ γεγενν. ἐξ αὐτοῦ is not "Christ" (Augustine, Hilarius, a Lapide, etc.), but "the believer." Calvin, correctly: *Sub numero singulari omnes fideles Ap. designat. Est autem argumentum ex communi naturae ordine sumptum.* By the last thought Calvin rightly indicates why the apostle here says "τὸν γεγεννησάντα" instead of τὸν Θεόν, and "τὸν γεγεννημένον ἐξ αὐτοῦ" instead of τὸν ἀδελφόν. — ἀγαπᾷ is not subjunctive "let him love," but indicative "he loves;" John is here expressing not an exhortation, but a fact.

Ver. 2 states how love to the "children of God" is to be recognized. The sign of it is: ὅταν τὸν Θεὸν ἀγαπῶμεν καὶ τὰς ἐντολὰς αὐτοῦ τηρῶμεν (ποιῶμεν). The difficulty, that whereas elsewhere the keeping of the commandments or brotherly love is mentioned as the evidence of love to God (or of knowing God), comp. ii. 3, iv. 20, 21, here the converse relationship is represented, so that, as De Wette says, "the apostle here makes the cause (love to God) the token of the effect (love to the brethren)," cannot be solved by the arbitrary assumption of an attraction, which Oecumenius supposes when he interprets, δέϊγμα τῆς εἰς Θεὸν ἀγάπης τὴν εἰς τὸν ἀδελφὸν ἀγάπην τιθεται, and which Grotius distinctly expresses when he paraphrases: ἐν τούτῳ γινώσκουμεν ὅτι τὸν Θεὸν ἀγαπῶμεν, ὅταν ἀγαπῶμεν τὰ τέκνα αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰς ἐντολὰς αὐτοῦ τηρῶμεν; nor even with De Wette by the view "that τὰς ἐντολὰς αὐτοῦ τηρῶμεν is the principal clause, and τὸν Θεὸν ἀγαπῶμεν only the anticipated confirmation of it, so that the one result of love to God is put for a token of the other:" but the explanation lies in this, that these two elements, "love to God" and "love to the brethren as children of God," in reality mutually prove one another.³ By the addition of the words, καὶ τὰς ἐντολὰς αὐτοῦ τηρῶμεν, it is brought out that love to God necessarily shows itself in the obedient keeping of His commandments. This obedience, rooted in love to God, is equally with the former the token of true brotherly love, because the commandments of God include the duties which we owe

¹ The relationship between being born of God and faith is not to be expressed thus, that first the latter and then the former follows; but neither is it first the former and then the latter, but being born of God happens in this way, that God works faith in man. "The new birth is," as it runs in the Mecklenburg Catechism, "the working and gift of faith." The πιστεύειν, which begins with the gift of πίστις, is therefore the result, and hence also the token, of being born of God, as the ποιεῖν τὴν δικαιοσύνην (chap. ii. 29) and the ἀγαπᾶν (chap. iii. 7).

² That this thought is presupposed by John, which Ebrard and Braune erroneously deny, is proved by the fact that John does not say here, ὁ ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ γεγεννημένος, but instead of it, ὁ ἀγαπῶν τὸν γεγεννησάντα.

³ He who loves God has therein an evidence that he loves the brethren also — as τέκνα τοῦ Θεοῦ, because brotherly love is the necessary result of love to God; but it is also quite as true that he who loves the brethren has therein an evidence of love to God, because the latter is the necessary cause of the former.

to the brethren. He therefore who regards it as incumbent on him to fulfil God's commandments, possesses therein the evidence that he loves his brethren, the *τέκνα τοῦ Θεοῦ*, that his love to them is not mere appearance, but reality: similarly Lücke, Sander, Baumgarten-Crusius, Ewald, Düsterdieck, Braune, interpret; Calvin, on the other hand, gives the thought an erroneous direction when he says: "*nunc docet, recte et ordine amari homines, quum Deus priores obtinet; vult sic mutua coli inter nos caritatem, ut Deus praeferatur.*" — It is further to be observed, that the first *ἀγαπῶμεν* is neither subjunctive nor used instead of the future (Carpzov, Lange), but is simple indicative; and that *ὅταν* is not = *quamdiu* (Carpzov, Lange), but conditional particle, as *ἐάν*, chap. ii. 3.

Ver. 3 refers to the last two ideas, which were simply mentioned coordinatively, and expresses their unity: *αὕτη γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ Θεοῦ*]. *αὕτη* is explained by the following *ἵνα*. — *ἐστίν* is to be kept in its proper meaning, though *ἵνα* follows; the paraphrase: "it brings this with it, it includes the endeavor" (De Wette), weakens the thought; *ἵνα* states the import of the *ἀγάπη τ. Θεοῦ*, to the realization of which it is directed. Quite incorrectly Grotius takes *ἡ ἀγάπη* metonymically for: *ostensio dilectionis*. — *καὶ αἱ ἐντολαὶ αὐτοῦ βαρεῖαι οὐκ εἰσὶν* is connected with the preceding as a new idea; *βαρεῖαι* = "heavy, as an oppressive burden;"¹ comp. Luke xi. 46: *φορτία δυσβάστακτα*, and Matt. xi. 30: *θορπίον ἐλαφρόν*. It is grammatically incorrect to explain *βαρεῖαι*: "difficult to fulfil" (Ebrard). The idea is, indeed, expressed absolutely, but from the confirmation that follows in ver. 4 it is evident that the apostle meant it in special reference to those who are born of God.

Ver. 4. Confirmation of the preceding thought. — *πάν τὸ γεγεννημένον ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ*]. The neuter is used here as in Gospel of John iii. 6, vi. 37, xvii. 2; it serves "to bring out the general category;" see Meyer on John iii. 6; comp. Winer, p. 160; according to the sense = *πάντες οἱ, κ.τ.λ.*, it is not the disposition, but persons, that are meant. Quite erroneously is the remark of Baumgarten-Crusius: "the *γεγενν. ἐκ τ. Θ.* has here only an external signification: whatever has the position of God's children." — *νικᾷ τὸν κόσμον*, for *μειζων ἐστὶν ὁ ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἢ ὁ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ*, chap. iv. 4. — *νικᾷ* is the simple present; in the conflict between the *κόσμος* and him who is born of God, the latter is constantly gaining the victory. Baumgarten-Crusius unsatisfactorily explains *νικᾷν* by "to keep one's self innocent;" this does not exhaust the idea of victory; that is not obtained when we take our stand against the enemy, but only when the enemy is overcome. The completion of the victory in its full sense certainly only takes place with the second coming of Christ. — Rickli and De Wette explain *κόσμος* by "love of the world and of self:" better Lücke, Calvin, Sander, Düsterdieck, Brückner, etc., "all that strives

¹ Spener: "We are to understand the heaviness of a burden that is so oppressive that one cannot bear it, that is, painful." Calovius: "Dicit ea non esse gravia, quia non aggravant, aut instar mollis onerosae praemund renatum." The commandments of God, as the demands of His love on man, who is made

after His own image, cannot be grievous to the latter; if, however, they are so, that is because man has departed from his original relationship to God; to the believer they are not grievous, because as the child of God he has gone back to the original relationship of love to God.

against the will of God within and without man;" but even this is too abstract. It is the kingdom of the wicked one, which, under its prince the Devil, striving against the kingdom of God, seeks to tempt the believer to unbelief and disobedience to the divine commands. — As the apostle wants to show how he that is born of God overcomes the world, he continues: *καὶ αὐτὴ ἐστὶν ἡ νίκη ἢ νικήσασα τὸν κόσμον ἢ πίστις ἡμῶν*. The pronoun *αὐτὴ* refers to *ἡ πίστις ἡμῶν*, which in its import is no other than the *πίστις, ὅτι Ἰησοῦς ἐστὶν ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ*, ver. 5. The expression is peculiar, inasmuch as faith is described as the *νίκη* itself, and the *νικῶν* is ascribed to it. Lorinus rightly remarks: *victoria proprie non vincit, sed comparatur pugnando, sed energiam continet ea formula, denotans in quo sita sit vincendi ratio, unde victoria parta.*¹ The aorist *νικήσασα* is not to be turned into the present (a Lape, Lorinus, Grotius, etc.); even though the victory is a continuous one, in which every believer is constantly taking part, the aorist nevertheless indicates that faith from the beginning overcame the world. The explanation of Baumgarten-Crusius: "it is already victory won that ye have become believers" (similarly Neander), is incorrect; it is not here intended to commend faith as the result of a fight, but as that which fights, and which has won the victory; hence the active *ἡ νικήσασα* (so also Braune).

Ver. 5. Confirmation of the preceding thought by an appeal to the experience of the readers (Lücke). — *τίς ἐστὶν ὁ νικῶν, κ.τ.λ.*]. The same form of speech as in chap. ii. 22. The thought is: "*Credens omnis et solus vincit*" (Bengel). With *ὅτι Ἰησοῦς ἐστὶν, κ.τ.λ.*, comp. ver. 1, chap. ii. 22, iii. 23. — The believer is victorious because he is born of God; vv. 1 and 4 (Düsterdieck).

Vv. 6–12. That Jesus is the Son of God, is confirmed by divine testimony.

Ver. 6. In order to arrive at an understanding of this verse we must first of all look at the expression, *ἐρχεσθαι δι' ὕδατος καὶ αἵματος*. The question, what is to be understood by *ὕδωρ* and *αἷμα*, has been answered in very different ways. The explanations worthy of notice are these: 1. That the apostle means thereby the blood and water which flowed from Christ's side on the cross, John xix. 34; this explanation is found in Augustine, Vatablus, and many of the old commentators; but some of them consider that the apostle here mentions this water and blood as the proof of the actual occurrence of the death of Christ, others that he uses them as symbols of baptism and the Lord's Supper. 2. That by *ὕδωρ* and *αἷμα* are to be understood the sacraments appointed by Christ; this is the explanation of Wolf (who, however, understands an allusion to the incident recorded in John xix. 34), S. Schmid, Carpzovius, Baur, Sander, Besser, and others.² 3. That by *ὕδωρ* John means

¹ Ebrard opposes this explanation with the arbitrary statement that *ἡ νίκη* "is the action which conquers the world" (!).

² To this class belongs also Luther's interpretation (in the 1st ed. of Walch), which, however, differs in this, that according to it water and blood together constitute the sacrament of baptism; he says: "Most commentators consider both sacraments; . . . I do not object, indeed, to this explanation, but I

understand the phrase of baptism merely. . . . Christ comes not by water only, but by water which is mixed with blood, that is, by baptism, which is colored with blood." So also in the interpretation of the following verse: "If you are baptized with water, the blood of Christ is sprinkled by the Word. If you are baptized in blood, you are at the same time washed by the Holy Spirit through the Word." In his 2d ed., on the other hand, Luther under-

the baptism of Christ by John the Baptist, and by *αἷμα* the atoning death which He suffered. This is the explanation of Tertullian, Theophylact, Cappellus, Heumann, Semler, Storr, Lange, Baumgarten-Crusius, Hilgenfeld, Neander, Ewald,¹ Brückner, Lücke (third edition, Introduction, p. 160; comp. Bertheau's note on this passage, p. 381), Erdmann, Myrberg, Weiss, Braune, etc. Not a few commentators, however, divide the explanation, understanding *ἕδωρ* of the baptism appointed by Christ, and *αἷμα* of His own death; so Horneus, Knapp, Lücke (in the commentary on this passage; also in the third edition, Introduction, p. 110; differently, Introduction, p. 160), De Wette, Rickli, Gerlach, Frommann (p. 596), Düsterdieck, etc.²—By many commentators (as Bede, a Lapide, Russmeyer, Spener, Bengel, etc.) different interpretations are connected together in one or the other of these ways.³

To these interpretations may be added others, the arbitrariness of which is evident at the first glance. To this class the following belong: 1. That by *ἕδωρ* and *αἷμα* John denotes the two elements of the physical life of Jesus; this is the view of Schulthess. Wetstein adds even the following *πνεῦμα*, and says that the apostle wants to prove that Christ was a *verus homo*, who was formed *ex spiritu, sanguine et aqua sive humore*.⁴ 2. That by both words, or at least by *ἕδωρ*, the ethical nature of Christ is indicated; thus Grotius interprets *ὁ ἕδωρ* = *per vitam purissimam, quae per aquam significari solet*. Socinus understands by *ἕδωρ*: *ipsa doctrina pura cum vitae puritate conjuncta*. 3. That in *ἕδωρ* and *αἷμα* it is not so much the baptism and death of Christ themselves that are to be thought of, as rather the testimonies that were given in connection with them; in *ἕδωρ* the testimony of the divine voice in the baptism (Wahl); in *αἷμα* either the testimony of the good centurion (Stroth), or the events that followed the death of Jesus, namely, His resurrection and ascension (Wahl,

stands water and blood, with reference to John xix. 34, of the two sacraments: "This brief summary has been kept in the Church, that out of the side of Jesus the two sacraments flowed."

¹ Ewald understands by them, however, not merely the baptism and the death, but by *ἕδωρ* the baptism, "with every thing special which besides occurred in His case," and by *αἷμα* "the bloody death on the cross, with every thing still more wonderful that was connected with it."

² To this class Ebrard also belongs, but he differs from the other commentators in this respect, that he understands by *ἕδωρ* Christian baptism indeed, but "not the entire sacrament of baptism (consisting of symbol and thing signified), but only the symbol in the sacrament;" hence, only that side of Christian baptism in which it is identical with the baptism of John. Clearly an unjustifiable division of the sacrament! The same view is no doubt that of Hofmann, who says (*Schriftbew.*, II. 1, p. 76): "*αἷμα* is, in contrast with *ἕδωρ*, the blood shed by Jesus for the remission of sins,

differing from the water of baptism, which John also performed;" then on p. 470 he asserts that *ἕδωρ* is not the baptism which Jesus received, but that which He introduced, hence it denotes that which Jesus had in common with the Baptist; and in il. 2, p. 221, he describes *ἕδωρ* precisely as "the baptism with water originated by John." But how strange it is to say, nevertheless, that the baptism which Jesus introduced is the baptism of water originated by John!

³ Bengel: "*Aqua dicit baptismum, quem primum administravit Johannes; ideo in aqua baptizare missus, ut Jesus manifestaretur tanquam Filius Dei. Porro baptismus etiam per discipulos Jesu administratus est. Sanguis est utique sanguis—Jesu Christi, qui effusus in passione, in coena dominica bibitur.*" Tertullian says: "Venerat per aquam et sanguinem, sicut Joh. scripsit, ut aqua tingeretur, sanguine glorificaretur. Proinde ut nos aqua faceret vocatos, sanguine electos, hos duos baptismos de vulnere perfossi lateris emisit."

⁴ Similarly Paulus in reference to *αἷμα*; *ἕδωρ* he understands of the baptism of John.

Ziegler, Lange), or even the testimony of God in John xii. 28 (Oecumenius).¹ 4. That in these two expressions we are to consider the operations brought into exercise by Christ; in *ἕδωρ*, *regeneratio et fides* (Clemens Al.), or *purgatio* (Cameron); in *αἷμα*, *cognitio* (Clemens Al.), or *expiatio* (Cameron), or *redemptio* (Bullinger). To this class belongs also Calvin's explanation: *ego existimo Joannem hic fructum et effectum exprimere ejus rei, quam in historia evangelica narrat. Christi latus sanguinis et aquae fons erat, ut scirent fideles, veram munditiam (cujus figuræ erant veteres baptismi) in eo sibi constare: ut scirent etiam completum, quod omnes sanguinis aspersiones olim promiserant.* 5. That those expressions and *πνεῦμα* are descriptive of the threefold redemptive office of Christ: that *ἕδωρ* (= *coelestis doctrinæ*, Bullinger) represents Him as prophet, *αἷμα* as priest, and *πνεῦμα* as king. Here may be added the strange explanation of *ἕδωρ* as the tears which Jesus shed on various occasions, and of *αἷμα* as the blood which He shed at His circumcision. Again, some of the old commentators understood by *αἷμα* the blood of the martyrs.

It is at all events incorrect to permit ourselves, in the interpretation of *ἕδωρ* and *αἷμα*, to be led by the question as to the nature of their testimony (Sander: "It must be maintained as the chief difficulty in the passage before us, what are the three witnesses on earth"), for that is not the subject in this verse, in which the *πνεῦμα* only is mentioned as bearing witness.² By the words *οὗτός ἐστιν, κ.τ.λ.*, the apostle simply states who Jesus the Son of God is. — With regard to the expression *ὁ ἐλθὼν δέ, κ.τ.λ.*, most commentators interpret as if it were "*οὗτος ἐρχεται,*" or, "*οὗτός ἐστιν ἐρχόμενος.*" Others, it is true, have not overlooked the aorist, but they interpret it as if it expressed something present; thus Sander = "has come and comes," against which Bengel rightly says, *non dicit: ὁ ἐρχόμενος in Praesenti, sed ὁ ἐλθὼν Aoristo tempore, Praeteriti vim habenti.* It is true, it is further correct when, in opposition to De Wette, who takes *ἐλθὼν* as synonymous with *ἐληλυθώς*, chap. iv. 2, Brückner objects that by the aorist as a purely historic tense nothing continuous or permanent is expressed; but even then the expression does not obtain complete justice. It is to be observed that John did not write "*ἦλθε,*" or "*ἐστὶν ἐλθὼν,*" but *ἐστὶν ὁ ἐλθὼν.* By the participle with the definite article, it is not a verbal, but a nominal, and, if it is not in apposition to a preceding substantive (as in John i. 18, 29, iii. 13, vi. 44, and *passim*), a substantive idea that is expressed; comp. John i. 15, 33, iii. 31, 36, and many other passages. It therefore does not mean "this came," or "this is one who came," but "this is he that came;" by this predicate it is not merely stated

¹ Oecumenius: *διὰ τοῦ ὕδατος, τουτέστιν, ἐν τῷ δὲ ὕδατος βαπτισματι ἐξεφάνθη υἱὸς Θεοῦ ὁ Ἰησοῦς διὰ τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς μαρτυρίας διὰ δὲ τοῦ αἵματος ὅτι μέλλων σταυροῦσθαι ἔλεγε, δοξασάν με συ πάτερ, καὶ ἠνέχθη ἡ φωνή, καὶ ἐδόξασα, καὶ πάλιν δοξάσω διὰ δὲ τοῦ πνεύματος, ὅτι ὡς Θεὸς ἀνέστη ἐκ νεκρῶν.*

² This is usually too little noticed by commentators. Even Lücke — who remarks on the following words, *καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα, κ.τ.λ.*, that "it was not said of the water and blood that they

bear witness," and then "it is only through the *πνεῦμα* that both of them, which in themselves give no testimony, likewise become witnesses" — has in his discussion of the meaning of *ἕδωρ* and *αἷμα* all along regarded them as "witnesses" for the Messiahship of Jesus. Brückner also, in his Interpretation of the ideas *ἕδωρ* and *αἷμα*, has all along included the element of testimony, whereby the clearness of his statement is only too much diminished.

what the subject which is here spoken of (namely, οὗτος) *has done*, but the subject is thereby characterized as the particular person to whom this predicate is suitable as a specific characteristic; according to the analogy of John i. 33 (οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ βαπτίζων ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ), iii. 13 (ὁ ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καταβάς), and other passages, the expression therefore serves to state something characteristic of the Messianic office of Christ. If this is taken into consideration, the incorrectness of Augustine's interpretation (see above) follows; for even if the flowing of the blood and water from the side of Jesus was intended by John not so much as a proof of the actual occurrence of Christ's death (Lücke), but as a wonder proving the Messiahship of Jesus (Meyer on John xix. 34), yet this would be only a very subordinate proof, which by no means states a characteristic sign of the Messiah as such. — In the life of Jesus there are two points which correspond with the expressions ἕδωρ and αἷμα, namely, *His baptism* at the beginning of His Messianic work, and *His bloody death* at the end of it; by His baptism Jesus entered on His mediatorial work; it formed the *initiatio* (Erdmann, Myrberg) of it, but this did not take place only by means of what happened at the baptism, but by the act of baptism itself; by His death he effected the atonement itself, inasmuch as by His blood he blotted out the guilt of the sinful world, for χωρὶς αἵματεκχυσίας οὐ γίνεται ἄφεσις (Heb. ix. 22). John may with justice therefore describe Christ as the Mediator by calling Him the one who came δι' ἕδατος καὶ αἵματος.¹ Against the view that ἕδωρ and αἷμα are to be understood of the sacraments instituted by Christ, is not only the circumstance that these are only *the means for the appropriation* of the atonement effected by Him, whereas the subject here is *the accomplishment of the atonement itself*, but also the use of the aorist ἐλώων, instead of which, in that case, the present would have to be used, and also the expression αἷμα, which by itself alone never in the N. T. signifies the Lord's Supper; even in 1 Cor. xii. 13 ἐπορίσθησαν is not an allusion to the Lord's Supper, but to the communication of the Spirit in baptism. In opposition to the idea that αἷμα indeed signifies the death which Christ suffered, but that ἕδωρ does not denote the baptism which He received, but the baptism which He instituted, are (1) that the close connection of the two words (without repetition of δὲ before αἵματος) is only suitable if the ideas correspond with one another, which is not the case if by δι' ἕδατος we understand an institution of Christ, but by αἵματος, on the other hand, the blood shed by Christ; ² (2) that the simple expression ἕδωρ is little suited for a description of *Christian baptism*; ³ (3) that as the institution of baptism

¹ That "Jesus in both cases proved His obedience to His Father's will, and that His obedience proved Him to be the Son of God, the holy and innocent One" (Braune), are ideas which John here in no way suggests.

² This inconsistency is only apparently removed by Düsterdleck's observation that "John regards the blood of the Lord shed at His death as something which has a substantial existence;" for even if this be correct, yet there remains the difference that the water of

Christian baptism *is* something at present existing, but the blood which Christ shed is only *regarded* as such by John. It is no better with the interpretation of Hofmann, who at one time describes αἷμα as "the blood of Christ shed for remission," and at another time as "the sprinkling of blood which Christ bestows."

³ It is indeed just this very fact that distinguishes Christian baptism from that of John, that the former in its *nature* is not ἕδωρ

took place *after* the death of Christ, and necessarily presupposes it, John, if he had understood by *ὕδωρ* Christian baptism, would certainly have put *ὕδατος* not *before*, but *after*, *αἵματος*. Hilgenfeld and Neander have rightly shown that if *ἔρχεσθαι δι' αἵματος* signifies something pertaining to the Messiah personally, the same must be the case with *ἔρχεσθαι δι' ὕδατος*. The connection must be the same in both expressions. If by *αἷμα* is meant the death which Christ underwent, then by *ὕδωρ* can thereforé only be meant the baptism which He likewise underwent.

The objection of Knapp (with whom Lücke and Sander agree), that *ἐλθὼν δι' ὕδατος* in this sense is much more appropriately said of John the Baptist than of Christ, is untenable, for that expression may at least just as well be used of him who allowed himself to be baptized as of him who baptized; Erdmann: *sane id non alius momenti, ac si quis objiceret, ἔρχεσθαι δι' αἵματος non posse dici de Christi sanguine et morte, sed potius de iis, qui cruentam mortem ei paraverint*. There is just as little in the objection of Lücke, that Christ allowed Himself to be baptized, not in order to purify Himself, but to fulfil all righteousness; since two ideas are here placed in antagonism to one another, which are by no means mutually exclusive, as Jesus underwent the baptism of purification just for the very purpose of fulfilling all righteousness.

With regard to the expression *ἐλθὼν διὰ, διὰ* is not to be separated from *ἐλθὼν*, so that *ο ἐλθὼν* in itself would denote "the Saviour who came," and *δι', κ.τ.λ.*, would state "in what way Jesus is the Saviour who came" (Hofmann, in the *Schribew.*, second edition, p. 469); for that Christ is called *ὁ ἐρχόμενος* (Matt. xi. 4; Luke vii. 19, 20) does not confirm, but contradicts, this interpretation; besides, John does not here want to bring out how Jesus is the Messiah, but that He is so. The preposition *διὰ* has been differently explained: usually it is here taken simply in the sense of accompaniment, which, however, is unjustifiable; in this commentary, with reference to Heb. ix. 12 (where it is indicated by *διὰ* that the high priest entered into the holy place *by means of* the blood which he had *with* him), the idea of instrumentality is combined with that of accompaniment, inasmuch as Jesus *operated* as mediator by means of *ὕδωρ καὶ αἷμα*; similarly Brückner explains *διὰ* as a preposition of instrumentality, namely, in the passive sense, as "by which he was *proved*;" *διὰ*, however, is here connected neither with an idea of operation nor of verification, but with *ἐλθων*. Weiss takes the preposition in this way, that *ὕδωρ κ. αἷμα* are thereby "introduced as historical elements of the life of Christ, through which His career *passed*," but it might be more suitable to interpret *δι' ὕδ., κ.τ.λ.*, in this way, that thereby the elements are brought out *by* which the *ἐλθων* was specially characterized; just as in 2 Cor. v. 7, by *διὰ πίστεως* the feature is mentioned by which our present *περιπατεῖν* is characterized; comp. also Rom. viii. 24: *δι' ὑπομονῆς ἀπεκδεχόμεθα*, and Heb. xii. 1; Braune simply abides by

as the latter is, as John the Baptist himself, marking his difference from Christ, said: *ἐγὼ βαπτίζω ἐν ὕδατι* (John i. 26), whereas Jesus

was described by him as *ὁ βαπτίζων ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ* (John i. 33).

the idea of instrumentality, without further explaining himself on the subject. The question, whether *ούτος* refers to *Ἰησοῦς* or to *ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ*, is to be answered in this way, that it refers to the *whole* idea: *Ἰησοῦς ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ*; Jesus, the Son of God, is the subject of Christian faith; it is *He* who came by water and blood. In favor of this reference is the addition *Ἰησοῦς ὁ Χριστός*, which, as *Ἰησοῦς* shows, is not an explanatory apposition of the predicate ("He who came by water and blood," i.e., Christ), but is in apposition to the subject *ούτος*, which is more particularly defined by the predicate; the preceding *Ἰησοῦς ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ* is thereby resumed, but in this way, that in consequence of *ὁ ἐλθὼν, κ.τ.λ.*, the idea *ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ* is changed into *ὁ Χριστός*. — The import of the preceding lies, as cannot be doubted, simply in the statement which is therein contained; Ebrard, indeed, thinks that the apostle wants thereby to express "that in the loving and merciful act of the devotion of Jesus to death lies the power by which He has overcome the world;" but although in the preceding the victory over the world is ascribed to the belief that Jesus is the Son of God, yet it is not to be inferred from this that it is Christ's victory over the world that is the subject here, as John does not make the most remote suggestion of that. — By the words: *οὐκ ἐν τῷ ὕδατι μόνον ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ ὕδατι καὶ τῷ αἵματι*, the apostle brings out with special emphasis the fact that Jesus did not come by water only, but by both water and blood; as the latter *two*, in their combination, are contrasted with the former *one*, the principal emphasis plainly falls on the *blood*, as that by which the Mediator as such has operated. This emphasis is not intended for the purpose of indicating the difference between Jesus and John the Baptist (Lücke, De Wette, Düsterdieck, Ebrard); for, on the one hand, it is self-evident to Christians that Jesus would not be the mediator if He had not acted differently from John; and, on the other hand, the feature which distinguishes Jesus from John in regard to baptism is this, that the latter baptized with water, but the former baptizes with the Holy Ghost.¹ The addition has a polemic import (not against "disciples of John," Ewald, but) against the Docetans, who in a certain sense indeed taught that Christ came *δι' ὕδατος*, but denied that He came *δι' αἵματος*, inasmuch as, according to their heresy, Christ united Himself with Jesus at His baptism, but separated from Him again before His death (Erdmann, Myrberg, Weiss, Braune); indeed, it is only by the reference to these heretics, against whom the apostle frequently directs a polemic in the Epistle, that the whole section from ver. 6 to ver. 12 can be explained. — With regard to grammar, it is to be observed that *μόνον* is not connected with *ὀβ*, but with *ὑδατι*, and therefore there can be no *καὶ* after *ἀλλά*, which is not observed by A. Buttmann (p. 317 [E. T., 369 f.]). The

¹ Erdmann has rightly pointed out that the view, according to which *ὑδωρ* is understood of the baptism instituted by Christ, is opposed to the idea that the addition refers to John the Baptist; this antagonism can only be removed if we explain the idea *ὑδωρ* in the principal clause differently from its meaning in this

subordinate clause, in the former of a baptism which was not merely a baptism of water, but also of the Spirit, but in the latter of a baptism which is only a baptism of water; but that would be an interpretation which condemns itself.

preposition *ἐν* simply expresses the idea of accompaniment without bringing out the accessory notion which lies in *δαί*; comp. Heb. ix. 12 and 25. — The definite article before *ὕδατι* and *αἵματι* is explained by the fact that both have been already mentioned. Bengel, correctly: *Articulus habet vim relativam.* — καὶ τὸ πνεῦμά ἐστιν τὸ μαρτυροῦν]. Just as in regard to *ὕδωρ* and *αἷμα*, so in regard to *πνεῦμα*, the views of commentators vary very much. The following opinions are to be rejected as utterly arbitrary: (1) that it denotes the psychical element, which, with *αἷμα* and *ὕδωρ* as the physical elements, constituted the human nature of Christ (Wetstein); (2) that it is the spirit which Christ at His death committed into His Father's hands (Augustine, etc.); (3) that it means "the teaching of Jesus" (Carpzovius); (4) that τὸ πνεῦμα is = ὁ πνευματικός, whereby John means himself (Ziegler, Stroth). By τὸ πνεῦμα can only be understood either the *Holy Ghost* Himself or the *spiritual life* produced by Him in believers.¹ Against the latter view there are, however, two reasons, — (1) that τὸ πνεῦμα never has this meaning without a more particular definition indicating it; and (2) that the τὸ μαρτυροῦν, which is added, here defines the πνεῦμα as something specifically different from the subjective life of man. We must therefore understand by it the objective Spirit of God, yet not, however, inasmuch as He descended on Christ at His baptism, and testified to Him as the Messiah, nor inasmuch as He was in Christ as the divine power which manifested itself in His miracles,² but (as most commentators correctly interpret) the *Holy Ghost*, whom Christ sent to His disciples at Pentecost, and who is the permanent possession of His Church. The predicate ἐστὶ τὸ μαρτυροῦν is not put for μαρτυρεῖ or for ἐστὶ μαρτυροῦν; here also the article must not be overlooked; τὸ μαρτυροῦν is a nominal idea, and, moreover, not adjectival, but substantive: "the Spirit is the witness" (Lücke). The office of witnessing belongs essentially to the Holy Ghost; comp. John xv. 26.³ — As the apostle continues: ὅτι τὸ πνεῦμά ἐστιν ἡ ἀλήθεια, he seems thereby to state the object of μαρτυρεῖν;⁴ but this view is opposed to the whole context, according to which the apostle does not want to bring out that the Spirit is truth, but "that Jesus the Son of God is the Christ." Therefore ὅτι here must, with Gerhard, Calovius, and most modern commentators (De Wette, Lücke,

¹ Sander is very uncertain in his explanation of τὸ πνεῦμα; first he explains it by "the conversion of man accomplished by the communication of the Holy Ghost," but then he puts instead of this, without further explanation: "those who are born of the Spirit" (!).

² Grotius understands by τὸ πνεῦμα even the miracles themselves: "admiranda ejus opera a virtute divina manifeste procedentia."

³ The assertion of Ebrard, that John in these words shows "how and how far our faith in Christ, in consequence of the fact that Christ bears in Himself the power that overcomes the world, is itself an overcoming power," and that μαρτυρεῖν therefore "must denote an act which is in substance identical

with the act of overcoming the world," is simply to be rejected.

⁴ In connection with this view, Luther takes τὸ πνεῦμα in a different sense from that in the principal sentence, namely, as "the word which has saved us by baptism and by blood," and of which the Spirit bears witness that it proceeds from the Spirit of truth, and is the truth itself; Besser distinguishes το πν. in the principal clause from the πν. in the subordinate clause, in that he understands by the former "the Spirit bearing witness to the heart of believers," and by the latter "the Spirit dominating in the sacraments and in the word." Ebrard interprets: "the Spirit evidences itself . . . by its power;" clearly the words "by its power" are a pure importation.

Düsterdieck, Erdmann, Myrberg, Braune), be taken as *causal particle*, so that the subordinate clause serves to strengthen the preceding thought. It is *because* the Spirit is the truth, that the Spirit is the witness in the fullest sense of the word. — To interpret *ἡ ἀλήθεια* = *ἀληθής* (Grotius) is to weaken the thought; by the definite article the idea *ἀλήθεια* is indicated in its full concrete vividness; comp. John xiv. 6, where Christ calls Himself *ἡ ἀλήθεια*. Weiss calls attention to the way in which this designation proves the personality of the Spirit, inasmuch as “the truth is the nature of God Himself made manifest.” — The object which is to be supplied with *τὸ μαρτυροῦν* can be no other than the thought which John has previously expressed in the first half of the verse.

Ver. 7. By means of the witness of the Spirit, water and blood also attain to the position of witnesses. As such John now adduces them in connection with the Spirit, in order by the weight of this threefold witness to confirm the truth that the Son of God, who is identical with Jesus, is the Messiah. — The *ὅτι* which begins the verse means neither “*jam vero*” (Grotius, Calov.), nor “hence” (Meyer), nor “consequently” (Baumgarten-Crusius), but “*for*.” This connection with the foregoing is explained by the fact that the truth of the testimony of the Holy Ghost (who is the truth itself) is strengthened by the circumstance that it is not He alone that bears witness, but that with Him the water and the blood bear witness also, as the two elements by means of which the atonement took place (similarly Lücke).¹ De Wette unnecessarily supplies: “and, humanly considered, the witness is also true, *for*.” Paulus connects ver. 9, as consequent, with this verse as antecedent: “because there are three, etc., then, if, etc., the witness of God is much greater.” This construction, which is contrary to the style of John, is the more to be rejected as an erroneous idea arises from it. — *τρεις ειναι οι μαρτυροῦντες*]. The masculine is used because the three that are mentioned are regarded as concrete witnesses (Lücke, etc.), but not because they are “types of men representing these three” (Bengel),² or symbols of the Trinity (as they are interpreted in the Scholion of Matthæi, p. 138, mentioned in the critical notes). It is uncertain whether John brings out this triplicity of witnesses with reference to the well-known legal rule, Deut. xvii. 6, xix. 15, Matt. xviii. 16, etc., as several commentators suppose. It is not to be deduced from the present, that *ὕδωρ* and *αἷμα* are things still at present existing, and hence the sacraments; for by means of the witness of the Spirit the whole redemptive life of Christ is permanently present, so that the baptism and death of Jesus — although belonging to the past — prove Him constantly to be the Messiah who makes atonement for the world (so also Braune). The participle *οι μαρτυροῦντες*,

¹ “In ver. 6 it was said that the witnessing Spirit is the truth, and hence it is implied that, to prove that Jesus is the Christ, the Spirit unites with the water and blood, as the testimony of the truth. As John now assumes this conclusion from ver. 6, he adds, passing on to another subordinate *confirmatory* proof: *for*,” etc.

² Tropum . . . Ap. adhibet . . . ut hoc dicat: tria sunt genera hominum, qui ministerio testandi in terra funguntur: (1) illud . . . genus testium, quod praeconio evangelii vacat; (2) illud gen. test., quod baptismum administrat, ut Johannes baptista et caeteri; (3) illud gen. test., quod passionem et mortem Domini spectavit et celebrat.

instead of the substantive *οἱ μάρτυρες*, emphasizes more strongly the activity of the witnessing. — τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ καὶ τὸ αἷμα]. All these three expressions have here, of course, the same meaning as previously.¹ — καὶ οἱ τρεῖς εἰς τὸ ἓν εἰσιν]. Luther, inaccurately: “and these three are one;” τὸ ἓν is the one specific object of the witness; “the three are directed to this one,” namely, in their thus unanimous witness. Storr, inaccurately: “they serve one cause, they promote one and the same object, namely, the object previously mentioned (v. 1, 5).”

REMARK. — According to the Rec., after *οἱ μαρτυροῦντες* appear the words *ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ . . . οἱ μαρτυροῦντες ἐν τῇ γῇ* (see the critical notes). Luther says in reference to them: “It appears as if this verse was inserted by the orthodox against the Arians, which, however, cannot suitably be done, because both here and there he speaks not of witnesses in heaven, but of witnesses on earth.” With this most modern commentators agree, with the exception of Besser and Sander. It is true, that, if we consider the contents of the whole Epistle, the idea of the three witnesses in heaven may be brought into connection with something or other that appears in the Epistle; but it does not follow from this that that idea has here a suitable, or even a necessary, place. This plainly is not the case, so much the more, as neither in what follows, nor in what immediately precedes, with which ver. 7 is closely connected by *δτι*, is there the slightest reference to such a witness of the Trinity. There are clear and intelligible grounds in the foregoing for adducing the three witnesses *πνεῦμα, ὕδωρ, αἷμα*, but not for adducing the three witnesses *ὁ πατήρ, ὁ λόγος, τὸ πνεῦμα ἅγιον*; this trinity appears quite unprepared for; but the sequel is also opposed to it, for it makes it unintelligible what witness is meant by the *μαρτυρία τοῦ Θεοῦ*, ver. 9, whether that of the three in heaven, or that of the three on earth. — To this it may be added that these two different classes of witnesses appear together quite unconnected; it is said, indeed, that these three witnesses agree in one, but not in what relationship the two threes stand to one another. — Besides, however, the idea in itself is utterly obscure; for what are we to understand by a witness in heaven? Bengel, it is true (with whom Sander agrees), says: “*non fertur testimonium in coelo, sed in terra: qui autem testantur, sunt in terra, sunt in coelo; i. e., illi sunt naturae terrestres et humanae, hi autem naturae divinae et gloriosae.*” How untenable, however, this is, is shown, on the one hand, in the fact that *ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ* does not belong to *εἰσιν*, but rather to *μαρτυροῦντες*, and the text therefore does not speak of being, but of bearing witness, in heaven; and, on the other hand, in the fact that according to it the

¹ Weiss erroneously refers the witness of the baptism here to that which was given at the baptism of Christ, and the witness of the death to that which was given at the outflowing of His blood. — It is not by what happened in connection with them, but in themselves, that *ὕδωρ* and *αἷμα* are the *μαρτυροῦντες*. — According to Ebrard, *ὕδωρ* here “is the baptism of water instituted by Christ, as an external institution, . . . as the representation of every means of grace to be administered by men, above all in its connection with the preaching of the word;” and *αἷμα* is “the

blood of Christ, i. e., His atoning death, . . . not, however, the blood of Christ alone, but also the power of the blood of the testimony, which is shed from time to time by His disciples for the sake of confessing Jesus.” To this Ebrard further adds: “we may say that in the water of baptism is embodied the confession which by its firmness overcomes the lie, and in the blood of testimony that love which by patience overcomes the power of the flesh.” This interpretation needs no refutation.

πνεῦμα which is connected with ὕδωρ and αἷμα must be regarded as something earthly and human. — There is further the un-Johannean character of the diction, as by John ὁ Θεός and ὁ λόγος, and similarly ὁ πατήρ and ὁ υἱός, are certainly conjoined, but never ὁ πατήρ and ὁ λόγος. Sander avails himself of the assumption, which is certainly very easy, of a ἄσασ λέγόμενον; but this is here unwarrantable, for those ideas are so frequently occurring in John, and that mode of conjunction is not accidental, but is grounded on the nature of the case. We see that the interpolator wrote λόγος, because this suggested itself to him as a genuine Johannean expression, without reflecting that its connection with πατήρ is un-Johannean. Finally, the καὶ οὗτοι οἱ τρεῖς ἐν εἰσι is also strange. Bengel interprets: *unum sunt essentia, notitia, voluntate, atque adeo consensu testimonii*. Bengel with justice puts the *essentiality* first, for it is just this that is denoted by the expression; but just this is unsuitable here, where the subject rather is *the unity of the witness*.

Ver. 9 brings out the greatness of the witness of God, and our obligation to accept it. The two clauses which are here connected with one another do not perfectly correspond in form; for in the antecedent clause the idea that corresponds to the *μειζων* of the consequent clause is not expressed, nor in the consequent clause the idea that corresponds to the *λαμβάνομεν* of the antecedent. The sentence, if completed, would run: If we receive the witness of men because it is of some value, much more must we receive the witness of God, as it has a much greater value (comp. A. Buttm., p. 338). The sentence contains a conclusion *ex minore ad majus*. The conjunction *εἰ*, as frequently, is not dubitative. — Brückner justly says, in opposition to Baur: "The witness of men is only alluded to on the side of its judicial value; there is not assumed to be in it an import which would be equal to that of the witness of God by water and blood and spirit."¹ — ἡ μαρτυρία τοῦ Θεοῦ is here used quite generally; the more particular definition is only given by the sequel (so also Düsterdieck). — *ὅτι αὐτὴ ἐστὶν ἡ μαρτυρία τοῦ Θεοῦ*]. With *ὅτι* it seems necessary to supply a thought to which it refers; Lücke supplies the thought: "if we accept the witness of God, we must believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God;" Düsterdieck, with whom Braune agrees: "a witness of God now really exists, namely this . . .;" but such a supplement is not necessary if we suppose that the clause beginning with *ὅτι* is intended to give the reason of the contrast of the human and of the *divine* witness which here appears, in *this* sense: "I say, ἡ μαρτυρία τοῦ Θεοῦ, for . . ." — In the reading, *ὅτι* (instead of *ἦν*) *μεμαρτύρηκε περὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ*, which is attested by the best manuscripts, this second *ὅτι* may be taken as causal particle, in which case *αὐτὴ* would be referred to the witness spoken of in vv. 6 and 7, in this sense: "for this is the witness of God, since He has testified (it) of His Son;" but the want of an *αὐτός* before *μεμαρτύρηκε* is an obstacle to this view; it is therefore better to interpret *ὅτι* by "*that*," and to refer *αὐτὴ* to this sentence which begins with *ὅτι* (Lücke, Erdmann, Düsterdieck, Myrberg, Ebrard, Ewald, Brückner, Braune), so that the sense is:

¹ It is quite erroneous for Storr to understand by the witness of men specially the witness of John the Baptist.

for this is (therein consists) the witness of God, that He has testified of His Son. By this witness we are to understand no other than that which was spoken of in the preceding, namely, the objective witness of the Spirit, not the internal witness, of which the apostle does not speak until afterwards (contrary to Düsterdieck), but still less, as Ebrard interprets, the witness in John i. 33. — With the reading ἦν, αὐτῆ must be referred back to the preceding; the sense then is: “for that (vv. 6 and 7) is the witness of God which He has testified of His Son.”¹—The perfect *μαρτύρηκε* is here to be taken in the same way as John frequently uses the perfect, namely, in this way, that the witness which God has given is to be regarded as permanently remaining.

Ver. 10. God’s testimony of His Son has for its object faith in the Son of God. Hence, “*He that believeth on the Son hath the witness in himself.*” — *τὴν μαρτυρίαν*, i.e., the witness of God which was previously spoken of; *ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ*, i.e., the witness is no longer merely external to him, but by virtue of his faith he has it *in* (not as Luther translates, “with”) himself; the external has become internal to him. This thought forms the transition to that contained in ver. 11. The believer, namely, has the objective witness *in* himself, inasmuch as he experiences in his soul the power of the truth attested by God; yet *τὴν μαρτυρίαν* must not here be understood — as in ver. 11 — of this operation itself (contrary to Düsterdieck). In the interpretation, “he accepts the witness,” — for which, corresponding to the *ἔχει*, it should at least be put, “he *has accepted it*,” — the preposition *ἐν* does not receive due justice. — In the following negative sentence, by which the thought expressed is strengthened and extended, we must supply with *τῷ Θεῷ* (instead of which *τῷ νίῳ* is not to be read), “*τῷ μαρτυρηκότι.*” — *ψευστὴν πεποίηκεν αὐτόν*, see chap. i. 10. In his unbelief, the witness of God is regarded by him as a lie, and God, who has given it, therefore as a liar. — This thought is confirmed by the following words: “*for he believeth not (has not become a believer) in the record which God has given (as a permanent record) of His Son.*” — With the participle *πιστεύων*, which describes a general class (not a single particular individual), *μὴ* is used; but with the finite verb *πεπίστευκεν* it is *οὐ*, because thereby the *πιστεύειν* of those that belong to that class is exactly and directly denied (comp. chap. ii. 4, iii. 10, 14, iv. 8).²

Ver. 11 states in what way that witness of God shows itself as internal to the believer; to him who, by believing, has the objective witness of God in himself, it is no longer purely objective, but he experiences it in himself as a divine power, or as the *ζωὴ αἰώνιος* which God has given him.³ Hence

¹ Lücke erroneously thinks that with the reading ἦν there results only an imperfect sense, when he says, “the witness of God, which He has testified, consists — in what?” This appearance of incompleteness disappears, however, as soon as αὐτῆ is referred to the preceding.

² It is different in John iii. 18, where *οὐκ ἐπίστευκεν* follows *ὁ μὴ πιστεύων*, but as the reason for *ἡδὴ κέκριται*, and where, therefore, it is considered as the reason of the con-

demnation operating in the mind of the judge; differently Winer, p. 441 ff. [E. T., 474]. The distinction lies in this, that by *ψευστὴν πεποίηκεν αὐτόν* it is an act of the subject, but by *κέκριται* the action of the judge (i.e., of God), that is indicated.

³ According to Braune, by *ὅτι* the import of the record is meant to be stated; but then John would be speaking of a different record from that which he mentioned before.

the apostle says: "And this is the record, ὅτι ζωὴν αἰώνιον ἔδωκεν ἡμῖν ὁ Θεός." With ἡμῖν, τοῖς πεπιστευκόσιν is to be mentally supplied. — ζωὴ αἰώνιος is not "the hope of eternal life" (Bede: *dedit nobis vitam aeternam, sed adhuc in terra peregrinantibus IN SPE, quam daturus est in coelis ad se pervenientibus IN RE*), but it is this itself, the divine life, of which the believer is even here a partaker; what the believer hopes for, that he has already. — ζωὴν αἰώνιον, as the principal idea, is put first. — ἔδωκεν means, "he gave;" it is not = *promisit* (Socinus), nor does it express merely the *firmitatem et certitudinem promissionis divinae* (a Lapide). — Myrberg incorrectly finds the import of the μαρτυρία of God stated in ὅτι, κ.τ.λ., which is in opposition to the context. The second part of the verse, καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ ζωὴ ἐν τῷ υἱῷ αὐτοῦ ἐστίν, which is not dependent on ὅτι (Baumgarten-Crusius), but forms a co-ordinate principal clause, gives a further explanation in regard to ζωὴ αἰώνιος. Several commentators find this thought expressed in these words, that we possess the ζωὴ αἰών. in the Son, i.e., in fellowship with the Son: but this the words do not say; they rather state where the ζωὴ αἰών., which God gave to believers, had its original place, namely, in the Son; comp. John i. 4. Frommann (p. 405): "the eternal life of which the Christian is by faith a partaker is one with the life that dwells in Christ" (so also Düsterdieck, etc.). Braune incorrectly separates αὐτὴ from ἡ ζωὴ, as he puts ἐστίν between them in the thought, and refers αὐτὴ to the idea αἰώνιος: "and this . . . namely, αἰώνιος . . . is the life," etc.

Ver. 12 states the inference from the immediately preceding thought. If the ζωὴ is originally in the Son, then he who has the Son has with him also the ζωὴ. With ὁ ἔχων τὸν υἱόν, comp. chap. ii. 23. Changing and weakening the sense, Grotius puts for τὸν υἱόν: *verba illa quae Pater Filio mandavit*; even ἔχει τὴν ζωὴν he erroneously explains by *jus certum ad vitam aeternam*. Whilst John in the first clause says simply τὸν υἱόν, in the second he adds τοῦ Θεοῦ; on this Bengel remarks: *habet versus duo cola; in priore non additur DEI, nam fideles norunt Filium; in altero additur, ut denum sciant fideles, quanti sūt, non habere*.

Ver. 13. Many commentators (Lorinus, Spener, Bengel, Rickli, Baumgarten-Crusius, Lücke, Sander, Düsterdieck, Braune) make the conclusion of the Epistle begin with this verse ("a sort of concluding section," Ebrard), referring ταῦτα to the whole Epistle. This, however, is incorrect. That this verse also belongs to the last leading section beginning at iii. 23, is shown not only by the idea ζωὴν αἰώνιον, which refers to what immediately precedes, but also by the idea πιστεῦειν εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ, which refers back to iii. 23; besides, it is to be observed that the following sentences, vv. 14 and 15, correspond to the thought with which the preceding leading section ended; comp. iii. 21, 22. Accordingly, ταῦτα is not to be referred to the whole Epistle, but to the last section, vv. 6–12 (Brückner), which reaches its climax in the thought, ὁ ἔχων τὸν υἱὸν ἔχει τὴν ζωὴν; comp. ii. 1, 21, 26. In the words *ἵνα εἰδῆτε, ὅτι ζωὴν ἔχετε αἰώνιον*, John states the object for which he wrote that which is contained in the foregoing. The *certainty* of the life which is bestowed on him is so much the more necessary to the Christian's mind, as this is sometimes hidden from him in the struggles of life—the life is there, but at times like a hidden treasure. That the possession of

this life, however, is conditioned by faith, the apostle brings out especially by an additional clause, which indeed runs differently in the different codices (see the critical remarks), but in its different forms expresses essentially the same thought; according to the probable reading, it is connected with *ὕμιν*; according to A, however, with *ἐχετε*. The second clause in the Rec., *καὶ ἵνα πιστεῖητε εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ*, indicates as the second object the adherence to faith; with the phrase, *πιστεύειν εἰς τὸ ὄνομα*, comp. chap. iii. 23.

Ver 14, as the preliminary *καὶ* shows, is not the beginning of a new section (contrary to De Wette); but the thought expressed here is in close connection with the foregoing, inasmuch as the *παβήρησία* is an essential element of the *ζωὴ αἰώνιος*. As in chap. iii. 21, 22, so here also, *παβήρησία* is the confidence which the believer experiences in the certainty that his prayer is heard. — *αὐτὴ ἐστὶν ἡ παβήρησία* does not mean, “hence arises also a happy spirit” (Ziegler), but “*herein consists the confidence*” (De Wette). — *ἦν ἐχομεν πρὸς αὐτόν*. *αὐτόν* does not refer to the Son, but to God; though God is not previously mentioned as the subject, yet He is nevertheless considered as the principal subject, as the One who gives life through the Son. — *ὅτι*. Lücke (with whom Ebrard agrees, with the incorrect remark that *ὅτι* does not depend on *αὐτὴ*, but simply on *παβήρησία*) supplies before *ὅτι*: “that we have the confidence;” but the concise thought of the apostle is thereby weakened, and besides the *παβήρησία* is itself this confidence (Düsterdieck). — *ἐάν τι αἰτώμεθα κατὰ τὸ θέλημα αὐτοῦ*. By means of *κατὰ τ. θέλ. αὐτοῦ*, i.e., *τοῦ Θεοῦ*, prayer is more particularly defined as to its substance and character. — *ἀκούει ἡμῶν*. In chap. iii. 22 it is put instead of this, *λαμβάνομεν ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ*. — *ἀκούειν* includes the idea of *granting*, which, however, is not brought definitely out until the following verse.

Ver 15. *καὶ ἐάν σῶδαμεν*. By the indicative after *ἐάν* (see on this, Winer, p. 277 [E. T., 295]; Al. Buttmann, p. 191 ff. [E. T., 223]) this knowledge is emphasized as something undoubtedly belonging to the believer; differently ver. 16: *ἐάν τις ἴδῃ*. — *ὅτι ἀκούει ἡμῶν, ὃ ἐάν (ἂν) αἰτώμεθα*. Resumption of what was previously stated. — *σῶδαμεν, ὅτι, κ.τ.λ*. In the certainty that God hears us lies also the certainty, *ὅτι ἐχομεν τὰ αἰτήματα ἃ ἠτήκαμεν ἀπ’ (παρ’) αὐτοῦ*. — *ἐχομεν* is neither = *λαμβάνομεν*, nor is the present put for the future (Grotius); the present is rather to be kept in its proper meaning; the believer always has that for which he has asked God (*κατὰ τὸ θέλημα αὐτοῦ*); he has God, and in Him all things. — *τὰ αἰτήματα* are the *res petitae* (Lorinus). — *ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ* from its position is not to be connected with *ἐχομεν*, but with *ἠτήκαμεν*; comp. Matt. xx. 20; Acts iii. 2; differently chap. iii. 22: *λαμβάνομεν ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ*.

Ver 16. The apostle applies the general thought expressed in ver. 15 to a particular case, namely, to a prayer for one’s brother when one sees him committing sin. — *ἐάν τις ἴδῃ τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ*. By *ἐάν* with the subjunctive the possibility is simply stated. By *ἀδελφός* we are to understand, according to the *usus loquendi* of the Epistle, not the neighbor in general (Calovius), but the Christian brother (*αὐτοῦ*), not exactly the “regenerate” (Düsterdieck); Ebrard, erroneously: “first of all, members of the Christian Church, yet without excluding those who are not Christians.” — *ἁμαρτάνοντα ἁμαρτίαν μὴ πρὸς θάνατον*. The phrase *ἁμαρτάνειν ἁμαρτίαν* is stronger and more ex-

pressive than *ποιεῖν ἁμαρτίαν*. — The sort of *ἁμαρτία* is more particularly defined by the addition *μὴ πρὸς θάνατον*. The negative *μὴ* (instead of which *οὐ* is used in ver. 17) is explained by the fact that the idea is regarded as dependent on *ἐάν τις ἰδῆ* (comp. Winer, p. 442 [E. T., 475]). The apostle distinguishes between the *ἁμαρτία οὐ πρὸς θάνατον* and the *ἁμαρτία πρὸς θάνατον*. What sin is to be understood by the latter? The idea לְמַתָּה, LXX.: *ἁμαρτία θανατηφόρος*, is found already in the O. T., Num. xviii. 22, whence the Rabbis distinguish between לְמַתָּה וְלְחַטָּאת and לְחַטָּאת לְמַתָּה (Schoettgen, *Hor. Hebr.*); in accordance with this, as Schoettgen also interprets, the *ἁμαρτία πρὸς θάνατον* would be that sin to which the Mosaic law assigned the punishment of death, as idolatry, adultery, etc.: but even if that Old-Testament definition is the basis of John's expression, yet it does not follow that he used the idea in the same sense; *θάνατος* may here, as distinguished from *ζωή* (καὶ δώσει αὐτῷ ζωὴν), not mean *bodily* death. For this reason alone, therefore, the explanation of Morus and S. G. Lange is to be rejected, according to which *that* sort of sin is meant which is punished by the authorities with death or with other severe punishments (!), even apart from the fact that it makes the prayer of the Christian dependent on the penal decrees of civil law. But the opinion of Zachariae, Michaelis, and Linder (in the *Zeitschrift für d. luth. Theol.* of Rudelbach and Guericke, vol. iv., 1862), that here, as in Jas. v. 14 ff., it is those who are in *bodily* sickness that are spoken of, and that such sin is meant as God punishes with deadly sickness or sudden death, is for the same reason unfounded.¹ — If *θάνατος* is not *bodily* death, then by *πρὸς θάνατον* the period to which the sin lasts cannot either be meant. — With reference to the ecclesiastical discipline exercised in the Church, the older Catholic theologians especially understood by the *ἁμ. πρ. θάν.*, without further comment, all those sins which were punished by the punishment of excommunication. But even if the Church had always punished in that way the sin which John here has in view, yet that expression could not be explained by that practice. — As *θάνατος* is not *bodily* death, it is only *spiritual* death or *damnation* that can be meant by it; *ἁμ. πρὸς θάνατον* is therefore the sin which leads to damnation. But what sin is this? It is much too general to regard every grievous transgression as such. As Christ Himself refuses forgiveness absolutely only to *one* sin, the commentators who assent to the above view find themselves driven to an arbitrary weakening of *πρὸς θάνατον*; so Ambrosius (*Lib. de Poenit.*), when he says: *quodvis peccatum gravissimum, quod vix remittitur*, and still more strangely, a Lapide: *peccatum quodvis gravissimum, quod . . . juxta legem communem per gratiam, quam Deus ORDINARIE dare solet, est quasi immedicabile, incorrigibile et insanabile*. It is more correct, indeed, to regard

¹ Linder, it is true, remarks against this that a new section begins with ver. 13, but even in that verse *ζωή* is used in the spiritual sense. The above view is also opposed by the fact that it assumes in John the opinion that deadly sickness or sudden death is always divine punishment for a special sin, which can neither be justified by Acts v. nor by 1 Cor.

xi. 30. The appeal to Jas. v. 14 ff. is so much the more inappropriate, as John here in no way suggests that he is speaking of *those who are in bodily sickness*. It is therefore quite arbitrary for Linder to interpret *καὶ δώσει αὐτῷ ζωὴν*: "God will grant to him pardon and recovery."

it as sin which is not repented of, and to find the characteristic of the ἄμ. πρ. θάν. in the impenitence of the sinner who will give heed to no exhortation (Grotius, Socinus, etc.); but even this cannot be the feature which John here has specially in view, because at the time of the commitment of a sin it cannot be decided whether it will be repented of or not. John must mean a ἁμαρτία, which in itself is characterized as a ἁμαρτία πρὸς θάνατον. Many commentators accordingly fix the meaning of it on a single particular sin; thus Tertullian, who understands by it, *moechia post baptismum commissa*; Bede, who, following the precedent of Augustine,¹ understands by it the *peccatum invidentiae, quo quis invidet fratri gratiam, virtutem et salutem*, but then we do not see why John did not specifically and definitely mention this particular sin. We might therefore agree with those who take ἁμαρτία here as the description of a state, as Bengel, who thus interprets: *talis STATUS, in quo fides et amor et spes, in summa, vita nova exstincta est*; but this is opposed by the apostle's mode of expression, which plainly refers to a *sinful deed*, and not to a state. Though, on the one hand, a *single sin* cannot be meant (Calvin: *non est partialis lapsus, nec praecepti unius transgressio*), yet we must only think of a whole species of sins, or better, of such sinning as is characterized not by the object with which it is connected, but by the disposition from which it proceeds. For the further definition it is to be observed, as Lücke with justice points out, that it can "only be a class of sins of *Christians*, and not of those who are not Christians," that is spoken of, and that "the distinction between the sin unto death, and sin that is not unto death, must be capable of being known." It is true, every sin can be called a ἁμαρτία πρὸς θάνατον, inasmuch as it tends in the direction of θάνατος, but every sin does not *infallibly* lead to θάνατος: so long as along with the ἁμαρτία there still exists an ἔχειν τὸν νόον (vv. 11 and 12), the sinning Christian is still in fellowship with the ἄλμα Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ which cleanses him ὑπὸ πάσης ἁμαρτίας (chap. i. 7); and so long as he has a παράκλητος πρὸς τὸν πατέρα, namely, Jesus Christ the righteous (chap. ii. 1), sin does not deprive him of the ζωὴ αἰώνιος, and is not therefore ἁμαρτία πρὸς θάνατον; this it only is when it involves an *actual falling away* from Christ; De Wette and Lücke therefore rightly say that the sin unto death is the sin by which the Christian falls back again from the Christian's ζωὴ into the θάνατος (comp. also Hofmann, *Schriftbew.*, II. 2, p. 340), only it is not exactly the *falling away itself* that is to be understood, for this is an *internal act* which, as such, is invisible,² but rather the sinful conduct by which the internal loss of life with Christ externally operates and reveals itself (so also Braune).³ It is incorrect of

¹ Augustine (*De Serm. Dei in Monte Matt.*, lib. i. c. 22, § 73) says: "Peccatum fratris ad mortem puto esse, cum post agnitionem Dei per gratiam. . . . Jesu Christi quisque oppugnat fraternitatem et adversus ipsam gratiam . . . invidentiae facibus agitur." Yet Augustine is not consistent in his interpretation; in the *Retractations* he adds further: "si in hac perversitate finierit vitam;" in his work, *De Corrupt. et Gratia*, c. 12, § 35, he explains the

idea by "fidem, quae per dilectionem operatur, deserere usque ad mortem."

² This also contradicts Ebrard's interpretation, according to which the ἄμ. πρ. θάν. is "the act of inward rejection;" although Ebrard is correct when he says: "πρὸς θάν. is that sort of sinning which has resulted in a corruption of the soul, from which the return to πίστις and ζωὴ is no longer possible to him."

³ Several commentators, as Calvin, Beza,

Düsterdieck (and similarly Ebrard) to understand by the sin unto death the antichristian denial that Jesus is the Christ; for if John had meant this, he would have expressed it definitely, so much the more as in the Epistle he is carrying on a polemic against that antichristianity. Just as little has Myrberg arrived at the correct explanation when on *ἔστιν ἡμαρτία πρὸς θάνατον* he remarks: *varia genera peccatorum, quae mortem in sensu loci nostri adferant, vide enumerata*, Gal. v. 18–21; for although Paul says: *ὅτι τὰ τοιαῦτα πρὸςσόντες βασιλείαν Θεοῦ οὐ κληρονομήσουσιν*, yet it does not follow from this that no return is possible from such sins.—In the face of the apostle's words the possibility of knowing the *ἡμορτάνειν πρὸς θάν.* cannot be denied, yet it is difficult to distinguish amongst the particular concrete manifestations: but, on the one hand, the Christian mind which is fitted for the *κρίσις* will not decide without scrupulous examination; and, on the other hand, John himself shows by the *μή* that the decision can at any time be only a subjective one. The meaning of the sentence accordingly is: If any man see his brother sin in such a way that the sin which he commits does not involve absolute renunciation of Christ, and therefore does not necessarily bring condemnation with it, he shall pray for him.¹—*αἰτήσει* is not to be understood of the united prayer of the Church as such (so Neander; Ewald also says: "Christian prayer, especially in the consecrated bosom of the Church"), but of *every* prayer of one for another. The future is not exactly used instead of the imperative: it rather expresses the certainty that, in the case stated, the Christian will pray, but in this there is certainly involved the injunction actually to do it. The substance of the prayer is indicated by the following — *καὶ δώσει αὐτῷ ζωὴν* denotes the result of the prayer; very many, perhaps most commentators (Socinus, a Lapide, Lorinus, Grotius, Spener, Lücke, Sander, Erdmann, etc.), supply with *δώσει* as subject *ὁ Θεός* or *ὁ αἰτούμενος* (so also Winer, p. 487 [E. T., 523]; Al Buttm., p. 116 [E. T., 116, note 1]); a similar change of subject occurs in Acts viii. 6: but considering the close connection of *αἰτήσει* and *δώσει*, along with which the similarity of the verbal form is also to be noticed, it is preferable, with Jerome, Sander, De Wette-Brückner,² Baumgarten-Crusius, Frommann (p. 674), Düsterdieck, Myrberg, Braune, etc., to assume the same subject with *δώσει* as with *αἰτήσει*; then the sense is: he that prays gives the *ζωή*, inasmuch as God grants him his prayer. The idea finds its explanation in the fact that every sin brings with it a weakening of the

Calovius, Heumann, Sander, etc., identify this sin with the sin against the Holy Ghost in Matt. xli. 31 ff.; certainly the *ἡμαρτία* meant here is not imaginable without a *βλασφημία τοῦ πνεύματος*; and the *βλασφημία τ. πν.* has *θάνατος* as its reward: but the ideas do not quite coincide, for (1) the *βλασφημία τ. πν.* may occur even on the part of non-Christians, but it is the sin of the Christian that is spoken of here; and (2) the former is completed in words (*εἰπεῖν κατὰ τοῦ πνεύματος τ. ἀγ.*), but the *ἡμ. πρ. θάν.* can only consist in further action.

¹ When Linder (as above quoted) remarks

against this explanation, that "the decision whether a sin is a *ἡμ. πρ. θ.* or not is *objectively* made by God Himself, and must be cognizable in some outward manifestation," we may reply that even the occurrence of bodily death cannot be regarded as a certain proof; for even though God sometimes ordains it as a punishment of the sinner, yet it occurs also when it is not to be concluded that there is special guilt.

² Brückner seems, however, to be doubtful, as he remarks: "if there were only an *αὐτός*, or a similar indication!"

ζωή; in order that he that sins may not remain in this want, he requires a new infusion of life, and this is procured for him by the prayer of his believing brother. In addition to this, of course, the confession of his sin, with trust in the cleansing power of the blood of Christ (comp. chap. i. 7), is necessary on his part; but it is just in this that the blessing of the prayer consists, that he receives as the result of it the needful inclination for this.¹— τοῖς ἁμαρτάνουσι μὴ πρὸς θάνατον] apposition to αὐτῶ; the plural serves only for generalization (De Wette, Winer, etc.); Bornemann (*Bibl. Studien der sächs. Geistlichen*, I. p. 71; and Alex. Buttin., p. 156 [E. T., 179]) erroneously explains τοῖς ἁμαρτάνουσι as the dative *commodi*, referring αὐτῶ to the person that prays himself. By the following words, ἔστιν ἁμαρτία πρὸς θάνατον, the apostle brings out that there is really a sin unto death, with which he connects the observation, οὐ περὶ ἐκείνης λέγω ἵνα ἐρωτήσῃ. Most commentators find in this a prohibition, even though mildly expressed, of prayer in reference to the sin unto death; but this is not contained here, as Grotius, Hornejus, Besser, Myrberg, Ebrard, Brückner, etc., rightly observe; for the negative οὐ does not belong to ἐρωτήσῃ, but to λέγω; if the negative was to be referred to the former, it would have had to be μὴ. The sense is: My injunction does not mean (οὐ λέγω) that a man is to offer prayer (ἵνα ἐρωτήσῃ) in reference to (περὶ) the sin πρὸς θάνατον.²— The words do not express more than this, although it is admitted that in the emphasizing of οὐ λέγω a warning is indicated (similarly Braune): John does not want to make a duty of a prayer, to which the certain assurance of being granted is wanting; he therefore adds this limitation to his exhortation to prayer (so also Besser): a formal *prohibition* would only be appropriate if the ἁμαρτάνειν πρ. θάν. were always cognizable as such. It is observable that John does not say here αἰτήσῃ, but ἐρωτήσῃ; ἐρωτᾶν (lit. "to ask"), is a milder idea than αἰτεῖν (lit. "to demand"); the apostle warns against the ἐρωτᾶν, and, of course, much more against the more urgent αἰτεῖν.³

Ver. 17. To guard against indifference to transgressions occurring in the Christian's life, the apostle continues: πάντα ἄδικία ἁμαρτία ἐστί. — ἄδικία is not synonymous with ἄνομια, chap. iii. 4; for whilst ἄνομία there serves to strengthen the idea ἁμαρτία, the idea ἄδικία is here more particularly defined and strengthened by ἁμαρτία; ἄδικία, namely, is the character of every offence against that which is right, "every breach of duty" (Meyer). Though, on the one hand, every such transgression is *sin*; yet, on the other hand, it must be maintained that every sin does not lead to *death*; hence καὶ ἐστὶν ἁμαρτία οὐ πρὸς θάνατον; καὶ is not adversative, but serves to emphasize the

¹ It is to weaken the thought of the apostle if, with Rickli, we find the blessing of the prayer only in this, that he who prays is himself led thereby to a right relation toward his brother. According to the apostle's view, the prayer rather brings blessing directly to the brother, for as James (v. 16) says: πολὺ ἰσχύει δέσσις δικαίου ἐνεργουμένη.

² As Neander thinks that it is only Church prayer that is spoken of here, he interprets: "one who sins πρὸς θάνατον is not to be in-

cluded in the united prayer of the Church for sinners in general, so that he may not be confirmed in his sin and be led to a false trust in the prayer of others;" but John in no way indicates that he is speaking only of Church prayer.

³ Braune unsuitably says that "αἰτεῖν implies conversation; ἐρωτᾶν, on the other hand, equalization of him who prays with him whom he addresses."

thought. — οὐ πρὸς θάνατον does not belong to ἐστιν (Luther: “some sin is not to death”), but to ἁμαρτία: “there is sin not unto death.”

Ver. 18, it is true, is closely connected with the foregoing, but at the same time forms the commencement of the conclusion of the Epistle, which is indicated as such by the successive thrice-repeated οἶδαμεν (Ebrard), and in which the apostle describes the position of believers in brief vigorous strokes. — As in vv. 16 and 17 it was admitted that even in Christians ἀδικία, and hence ἁμαρτία, still exists, the apostle finds himself compelled to repeat, confirmingly, what was said in chap. iii. 6–10, as a truth known to Christians (οἶδαμεν, in which there does not lie “an appeal to the fact that he has already said it,” Ebrard), in order that it may be thoroughly impressed on them that all sin is in the sharpest antagonism to their essential principle of life. — οἶδαμεν, ὅτι πᾶς γεγεννημένος ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ, οὐχ ἁμαρτάνει]. This appears to be in contradiction with what is previously admitted; John does not solve the contradiction; many commentators seek to do so by supplying πρὸς θάνατον as a more particular definition of οὐχ ἁμαρτάνει, or by interpreting it of *remaining in sin*: both are, however, arbitrary; the solution lies rather in the fact that the apostle wants simply to emphasize the antagonism between being born of God, and sinning. Though sin is still found in the life of the believer, who as such is γεγεννημένος ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ, yet it is nevertheless foreign to him, opposed to his nature, and in the strength of his faith he is ever becoming more and more free from it.¹ — ἀλλ’ ὁ γεννηθεὶς ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ τηρεῖ ἑαυτόν]. This second clause is not dependent on ὅτι, but is to be regarded as an independent sentence (Düsterdieck, Braune). Bengel erroneously states the difference between the form ὁ γεννηθεὶς and the preceding ὁ γεγεννημένος thus: *Praeteritum grandius quiddam sonat, quam aoristus: non modo qui magnum in regeneratione gradum assecutus, sed quilibet, qui regenitus est, servat se*, it is rather the same distinction that occurs here as that by which these two verbal forms are generally distinguished; ὁ γεννηθεὶς is: “he who *was* born,” regarded as an historical fact. — In 1 Tim. v. 22, ἄγνον, and in Jas. i. 27, ἄσπιλον, are put with τηρεῖ ἑαυτόν as more particular definition. It is, however, unnecessary to supply such a predicate (De Wette); τηρεῖ ἑαυτόν denotes the self-preservation of the believer in his proper character (so also Braune);² the more particular definition results from the following: καὶ ὁ πονηρὸς οὐχ ἄπτεται αὐτοῦ is the result of the τηρεῖ ἑαυτόν; Ebrard, incorrectly: “Satan dare not touch him; God does not permit it;” the present simply expresses the fact, but this, according to the context, is the case, because the Devil is prevented from ἄπτεσθαι by the τηρεῖν ἑαυτόν of him who is born of God. With ὁ πονηρὸς, comp. chap. i. 13. By ἄπτεσθαι we are to understand touching in order to do harm; Ps. cv. 15, LXX. (see Raphelii, *Annot. ex Polybio*). Compare Jas. iv. 7: φεύξεται ὡς

¹ It needs no proof, that the thought of the apostle is perverted by the explanation of De Wette: “the apostle expresses his confidence that the occurrence of the sin unto death, and of sin in general, cannot often (!) take place in the Christian Church.”

² It is less suitable to explain τηρεῖν ἑαυτόν here, with Ebrard = τηρεῖσθαι, “to be on guard, to take care;” for, in the first place, it is opposed to the *usus loquendi* of the N. T. to assign this meaning to the word; and, secondly, it is not expressive enough for the context.

ὑμῶν. It is true the believer is still tempted by the Devil (comp. 1 Pet. v. 8, etc.), just as sinful desires still arise in him; but being in his most inner nature redeemed from the fellowship of sin, he suffers from these temptations no injury to the life that has come to him from God: in the πανοπλία τοῦ Θεοῦ he is protected against all the μεθοδεῖαι τοῦ διαβόλου (Eph. vi. 11 ff.).¹

Ver. 19 marks the antithesis between believers as being born of God, and the κόσμος, as belonging in its whole extent (ὅλος) to the πονηρός; and this is done by the apostle vindicating for himself and his readers—who are united with him in faith—the εἶναι ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ.—ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐσμεν finds its explanation in the preceding: ὁ γεννηθεὶς ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ. Socinus, incorrectly: *a Deo pendemus*.—καὶ ὁ κόσμος ὅλος, κ.τ.λ., probably as an independent sentence, not depending on ὅτι (Düsterdieck). καὶ is not = δέ; it is just the connecting καὶ that brings out the antithesis which exists between the two parts of the verse, still more clearly than if this had been done by an adversative particle. ὁ κόσμος is here used in the ethical meaning of the word, which is peculiar to John.—ἐν τῷ πονηρῷ κείται]. τῷ πονηρῷ is not neuter (Socinus, Episcopius, Rickli, Erdmann), but masculine, as is clear both from ὁ πονηρός in ver. 18, as also from the antithesis to ὁ Θεός.—By the preceding ἐκ τ. Θεοῦ and Luther's translation of Isa. xlv. 3, some commentators have been led erroneously to refer the expression ἐν . . . κείται to the relation of the child to its mother (Spener: "as a child in its mother's womb"); by ἐν it is expressed that the κόσμος is, as it were, surrounded by the Devil, i.e., is quite in his power; κείται, stronger than ἰστί, indicates, if not, as Lücke thinks, the permanent, yet certainly the passive state (so also Braune), and hence the complete domination of the Devil, which is in the most pronounced contrast with the preceding: καὶ ὁ πονηρός οὐχ ἄπτεται αὐτοῦ.

Ver. 20. In conclusion, the apostle indicates whence the εἶναι ἐν τῷ Θεῷ (the result of the εἶναι ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ) has come to him and his readers; and he does this by expressing it through οἶδαμεν as the substance of their Christian consciousness.—οἶδαμεν δέ, ὅτι ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ ἦκει]. The conditioning cause of the former is the coming of the Son of God.—The particle δέ is here used to indicate the antithesis to the immediately preceding thought; Brückner has with justice decided in favor of this reading (contrary to καὶ οἶδαμεν; see the critical notes).—ἦκει is not = *adest* (Bengel), but "*has come*;" the reference is to the incarnation of the Son of God.—καὶ δέδωκεν ἡμῖν διάνοιαν, ἵνα γινώσκωμεν τὸν ἀληθινόν]. Still dependent on ὅτι.—The subject of δέδωκεν is not ὁ Θεός (Bengel), but ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ, as the close connection of this clause with that immediately preceding clearly shows; τὸν ἀληθινόν, on the other hand, is not a description of the Son (Bengel), but of God.—By διάνοια we are not to understand, with Lücke and De Wette, "knowledge," or even "insight," but the *capability* of knowledge (Düsterdieck, Ebrard), yet in its living activity, hence "*the faculty of*

¹ Calvin: "Ut ut malignus renatum ad peccatum sollicitet, tela tamen illius irrita cadunt,

quoniam renatus scito fidelis munitus ea repellit et diabolo per fidem resistit."

knowing." ¹—By *ἵνα γινώσκομεν, κ.τ.λ.*, it is neither the purpose, "in order that," nor even the result, "so that," that is stated, but the object to which the *διάνοια* is directed, and which it attains. We can only regard *ἵνα* as the particle of purpose, if we unjustifiably understand by *διάνοια* "the spiritual disposition" (contrary to Braune).—The idea *γινώσκειν* is here used with the same force as in chap. ii. 4, 5, where it is similarly connected with *ἐν αὐτῷ εἶναι*. By *τὸν ἀληθινόν* God is described, in distinction from all idols, especially from the idol which the false teachers made of God, as the true God. Calvin: *Verum Deum intelligit, non veracem, sed eum qui re vera Deus est, ut eum ab idolis omnibus discernat*; comp. John xvii. 3 ² (similarly Lücke, De Wette, Neander, Erdmann, Düsterdieck, Myrberg, Ebrard, Braune, etc.). He is the true God, who has sent His Son into the world; the coming of Christ has not been ineffectual, but has produced in believers the knowledge of God,—a knowledge which is one with being in God. Therefore the apostle continues: *καὶ ἐσμὲν ἐν τῷ ἀληθινῷ*. These words are not dependent on *ὅτι* (Vulg.: *et simus*), but form an independent sentence. The *ἐν τῷ ἀληθινῷ* refers back to *τὸν ἀληθινόν*; considering the close connection of the two sentences, it must be *the same* subject, namely *God*, that is meant by *the same* word (Brückner, Braune); it is arbitrary to understand by *τὸν ἀληθινόν* God, and by *τῷ ἀληθινῷ*, on the other hand, Christ, and it is, moreover, forbidden by the context, in accordance with which the *καὶ ἐσμὲν ἐν τῷ ἀληθινῷ* states the consequence of the preceding, namely of the fact that the Son of God has come and has given to us the capability of knowing *the true God*.³ Therefore also the following words, *ἐν τῷ νόῳ αὐτοῦ Ἰησοῦ Χριστῷ*, are not to be taken as apposition to *ἐν τῷ ἀλ.* (Weiss), against which even the *αὐτοῦ* testifies, for then it would have to be referred, not to *τῷ ἀληθινῷ*, but beyond it to *τὸν ἀληθινόν*. The additional clause shows in what the *εἶναι ἐν τῷ ἀληθινῷ* has its ground and stability (Brückner, Braune): *ἐν* is not = *per*, but indicates, as generally in the formula *ἐν Ἰησ. Χριστῷ*, the relationship of intimate fellowship: the believer is in God, inasmuch as he is in Christ.—Before the last warning, connected with this (ver. 21), the apostle expressively concludes with the statement: *οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἀληθινὸς Θεὸς καὶ ζωὴ αἰώνιος*. As is well known, views have differed from old times about the meaning of *οὗτος*. While the Arians understand *οὗτος* of God, the orthodox refer it to the immediately preceding *ἐν τῷ νόῳ Ἰ. Χρ.*, and use this passage as a proof of the divinity of the Son. This interpretation remained the prevailing one in the Church, even after Erasmus had remarked: "*hic est verus Deus*" *referri potest ad Deum verum Patrem qui praecessit*; and against this the Socinians, and then Grotius, Wetstein, the English Anti-trinitarians, and

¹ It is quite arbitrary, with Semler, to interpret the idea *διάνοια* = *μετάνοια καὶ πίστις*. Paulus lays a special emphasis on *διά*: "thinking through (out) in contrast to a vague acceptance and thoughtless belief" (!).

² Baumgarten-Crusius thinks that *ἀληθ.* means more here than in John xvii. 3, namely, "he who gives a satisfaction, in quo uno acquiescendum est;" but if this were really con-

tained in the idea here, that would be the case in John xvii. 3 also.

³ This explanation is so much the more justifiable, as it is to be expected from John, that at the close of his Epistle he would express in brief language the highest thing that can be said of the life of the believer, and this is the *εἶναι ἐν τῷ Θεῷ* (*τῷ ἀληθινῷ*).

the German Rationalists followed the opposite view. It is not to be denied, that on both sides the different dogmatic interests did not remain without influence on the interpretation, until in more recent times a more unbiassed consideration has led the way. Among the latest commentators, Rickli, Lücke, De Wette, Neander, Gerlach, Frommann, Dusterdieck, Erdmann, Myrberg, even Brückner and Braune (who, however, leave room for doubt), similarly Hofmann (*Schriftbew.*, second edition, I., p. 146), Winer (p. 148 [E. T., 157]), and Al. Buttmann (p. 91 [E. T., 104]), have decided in favor of the reference to God; Sander, Besser, Ebrard, Weiss, etc., for the reference to the Son. The dispute cannot be settled on grammatical lines, for *οὗτος* can be referred both to *τὸν ἀληθινόν*¹ and also to *τῷ υἱῷ*. The addition *καὶ ζωῆ αἰώνιος*, seems to support the latter reference; for Christ, in the Gospel of John, calls Himself precisely *ἡ ζωῆ*, and also in the beginning of this Epistle it is the Son of God that is to be understood by *ἡ ζωῆ* and *ἡ ζωῆ ἡ αἰώνιος*. The former reference, on the other hand, is supported by the expression: *ὁ ἀληθινὸς Θεός*; for, in the first place, it is more natural to understand here the same subject as is previously designated by *ὁ ἀληθινός*, than any other; and, in the second place, the Father and the Son, God and Jesus Christ, are always so definitely distinguished throughout the whole Epistle, that it would be strange if, at the close of it, and, moreover, just after both subjects have been similarly distinguished immediately before, Christ — without further explanation, too — should be described as *ὁ ἀληθινὸς Θεός*, especially as this designation is never ascribed to the Son in the writings of John, definitely though the divinity of the Son is taught in them.² To this it may be added, that, after John has brought out as the peculiar characteristic of the Christian's life, of which he partakes in the Son of God, the *εἶναι ἐν τῷ ἀληθινῷ*, the clause in question has its right meaning only if it states who that *ἀληθινός* is, namely that he is the *ἀληθινὸς Θεὸς καὶ ζωῆ αἰώνιος*. Now, though elsewhere it is only Christ that is called exactly *ἡ ζωῆ*, yet He has the *ζωῆ* — according to His own words, John v. 26 — only from the Father, who originally has the life in Himself (*ὁ πατὴρ ἔχει ζωὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ*), and may therefore be called *ζωῆ αἰώνιος* no less than the Son. Besides, it is to be observed that *ζωῆ αἰώνιος* is here used without the article, so that the expression comes under the same category as the expressions: *ὁ Θεός ἐστι φῶς* (i. 5), *ἀγάπη* (iv. 16), *πνεῦμα* (Gospel of John iv. 24). — The objection that "it would be a feeble repetition, after the Father had twice been called *ὁ ἀληθινός*, again to say: this is the *ἀληθινὸς Θεός*" (Ebrard,

¹ It lies in the very nature of the case, that *οὗτος* may refer to the principal subject, nay, that this is the reference most suitable to the word: comp. 1 John ii. 22; 2 John 7; Acts iv. 11, vii. 19. Calvin's rule, which Sander repeats, is erroneous: "Pron. demonstr. *οὗτος ordinariē*, nisi evidentē textus aliud requirat, immediatē antecedens nomen respicit ac demonstrat."

² It is only through a superficial consideration, that, for the refutation of this assertion,

appeal can be made to John i. 1, xx. 28, and the passages in the Apocalypse in which the predicate *ἀληθινός* is ascribed to Christ. — How little care is sometimes exercised in the proof of the truth that what is stated by John of Jesus Christ really proclaims Him as the true God, is shown, amongst others, by Schnlze, in the way in which he appeals on behalf of this to John xvii. 23 and xiv. 20; since it would follow from this, that even the disciples of Jesus could be described as the true God.

similarly Weiss; also Schulze, *Menschensohn*, etc., p. 263),¹ is the less valid, as the apostle has already in view the warning of ver. 21, and by ἐν τῷ νιῷ αὐτοῦ Ἰ. Χρ., it is indicated that He alone is the true God, with whom we are in fellowship in Christ: it is only the Father of Jesus Christ that is the true God.—The connection of the words, καὶ ζωὴ αἰώνιος, as a second predicate, with οὗτος, has appeared a difficulty to many commentators. Socinus wanted to take οὗτος = τοῦτο, with reference to the whole preceding thought, and then he paraphrases τοῦτο by ἐν τούτῳ and interprets: *in eo, quod diximus, est ille verus Deus et vita aeterna; nam quatenus quis habet et cognoscit Christi Patrem et ipsum Christum, habet et illum verum Deum et aeternam vitam*; similarly Ewald, when he paraphrases: “this, both these things together, that we know and that we are all this, this is the true God and eternal life.” The arbitrariness of this explanation is self-evident. Others, as Clarke, Benson, Lücke (in his first edition), supply before ζωὴ αἰών. an αὐτὴ ἐστίν out of οὗτός ἐστιν, referring αὐτὴ either to ὁ νιός or to the idea εἶναι ἐν τῷ ἀληθ. Lücke has rightly withdrawn this explanation in his second edition, as unwarrantable, and correctly says: “καὶ ζωὴ αἰών. can certainly not be grammatically connected directly with οὗτος.” Lücke, however, thinks that there is an ellipsis in the expression, and that it is to be interpreted: “this . . . the true God is eternal life, which can either be understood of the fact that God is the cause and source of eternal life, or thus: *His fellowship is eternal life.*” But why could not John have described by ζωὴ αἰών. the substantial character of the divine nature? If God has ζωὴ in Himself (John v. 26), namely the ζωὴ which He has given to the Son, and which believers possess through the Son (John v. 24), then God in His very nature is ζωὴ, and ζωὴ αἰώνιος too. As John mentions this as the characteristic of God’s nature, there certainly lies in this the indication that God is the source of life for us.

Ver. 21. If believers have come to the true God through Christ, they have to take care that they do not lose this eternal and highest good by giving themselves up to any vain idol. In this train of thought John closes his Epistle with the short exhortation, so impressive, however, in its brevity: *τεκνία φυλάξτετε ἑαυτοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν εἰδώλων*. In the address *τεκνία* we may see the depth of the feeling with which John utters these concluding words.—*εἰδῶλα* are properly *images*; this signification is retained here by many commentators (Tertullian, Oecumenius, Lyranus, Lorinus, Salmeron, Lücke, Baumgarten-Crusius, Erdmann, Düsterdieck, etc.), whilst some of them, however, extend the idea to that of “false, heathen gods;” others, again, refer the expression to the arbitrary self-made representations of God which the false teachers had,—thus Bede, Rickli, Sander, Thiersch (*Versuch zur Herstellung*, p. 241), etc.; others combine both views, and understand by *εἰδῶλα* here all sorts of images which men arbitrarily make for themselves of God (Ebrard, Braune). If the warning is not to be regarded as a detached appendix, foreign to the contents of the Epistle, we cannot rest satisfied

¹ Brückner and Braune also consider the “tautology” at least as something not quite out of the question; but a real tautology is here so far from being the case, that “Θεός”

is here added to ἀληθινός, and the idea ζωὴ αἰώνιος is directly connected with the idea ὁ ἀληθινός Θεός.

with the first interpretation. As the apostle, just in the antithesis to the false teachers, who belong to the *κόσμος*, has so decidedly referred to the *ἀληθινὸς Θεός*, he certainly has in view in this warning, if not altogether, yet principally, the untrue mental images of those teachers.¹ It is only if so taken, that the warning to keep themselves from idols forms the appropriate conclusion of the whole Epistle.

¹ That the apostle here also means the *res mundanae*, inasmuch as man is attached to them (Myrberg), is so much the more improb-

able, as the foregoing contains no reference to them.



THE SECOND AND THIRD EPISTLES OF THE APOSTLE JOHN.

INTRODUCTION.

SEC. 1. — GENUINENESS.

THE testimony of the ancient Church is not very certain. The first mention of the Second Epistle is found in Clemens Alex. and Irenaeus. The former calls the First Epistle the *greater* (*Strom.* ii. 15, ed. Potter), and says in the *Adumbrat.*: *secunda Joannis epistola, quae ad virgines scripta est, simplicissima est; scripta vero est ad quandam Babyloniam Electam nomine.* Irenaeus (*Adv. Haer.*, i. 163) quotes the passage 2 John 11, with the words: Ἰωάννης, ὁ τοῦ κυρίου μαθητῆς, ἐπέτεινε τὴν καταδίκην αὐτῶν, μηδὲ χαιρεῖν αὐτοῖς ὑφ' ἡμῶν λέγεσθαι βουληθεῖς· ὁ γὰρ λέγων αὐτοῖς, φησί, χαιρεῖν, κ.τ.λ.; he further adduces (iii. 16, 8) the passage 2 John 7, 8, but by mistake, as a passage of the First Epistle. From this it follows, that at the time of these Fathers the Second Epistle was not merely known in the Church, but was also received as an Epistle of the Apostle John. If the remark of Eusebius (*H. E.*, vi. 14), that Clemens Alex. commented on *all* the Catholic Epistles, be correct, then the Third Epistle was known to him also; according to the statement of Cassiodorus, however (comp. my *Commentary on Second Peter*, *Introd.*, § 2, p. 291 ff.), this is at least uncertain. — Origen likewise knew several Epistles of John; for in the Eighth Homily on Joshua he says, *addit et Joannes tuba canere per EPISTOLAS SUAS*: yet he did not express himself quite certainly about the *apostolic origin* of the Second and Third Epistles, as is seen from his words in Euseb. (*H. E.*, vi. 25): Ἰωάννης . . . καταλέλοιπε δὲ καὶ ἐπιστολὴν πᾶν ὀλίγων στίχων· ἔστω δὲ καὶ δευτέραν καὶ τρίτην. ἐπεὶ οὐ πάντες φασὶ γνησίους εἶναι ταύτας; that the *canonicity* of these Epistles was doubted, is not contained in these words. — His disciple Dionysius Alex., in his polemic against the genuineness of the Apocalypse, according to Eusebius (*H. E.*, iii. 25), appealed not only to the First, but also to the Second and Third

Epistles of John. His words are: *ὁ δὲ εὐαγγελιστῆς οὐδὲ τῆς καθολικῆς προέγραψεν ἑαυτοῦ τὸ ὄνομα . . . , ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ φερομένη Ἰωάννου καὶ τρίτῃ . . . , ὁ Ἰωάννης ὀνομαστὶ πρόκειται.* According to Ebrard, in the word *φερομένη* a doubt is meant to be expressed as to the apostolic authorship of the two Epistles: this, however, is erroneous; *φερομένη* is only added because the Epistles were accepted as apostolic, without bearing the name of the Apostle John, as even Eusebius (*H. E.*, iii. 25) calls the First Epistle *τὴν φερομένην Ἰωάννου προτέραν*, although he was convinced of its composition by the apostle (Düsterdieck); and, besides, how could Dionysius have appealed to those two Epistles if he had doubted their apostolic origin? — The Epistles are nowhere mentioned by Tertullian and Cyprian; but that the Second Epistle at least was known in the North African Church at the time of the latter as a canonical writing, is clear from the fact that, at a synod held at Carthage on the subject of the baptism of heretics, the bishop Aurelius appealed to the passage 2 John 10. — The Peshito originally contained of the Catholic Epistles only the Epistle of James, First Peter, and First John; the Syrian Ephraem, on the other hand, quotes the Second and Third of John as well as the rest of the Catholic Epistles. — The testimony of the Muratorian Fragment is not quite certain; after a passage is quoted in it from the First Epistle, it is stated, after the mention of some spurious writings: *epistola sane Jude et superscriptio Joannis duas in catholica habentur*, and then, *ut (or et) sapientia ab amicis Salomonis in honorem ipsius scripta.* It is possible that by *duas (duae)* the First and Second Epistles are meant; yet it is more probable that he understood by it the Second and Third Epistles (Düsterdieck, Ebrard, Braune: comp. also Laurentius, *Neutest. Studien*, p. 205). From the following words: *ut (or et) sapientia*, etc., it is not to be inferred, with Düsterdieck, that the author regarded the two Epistles as spurious. — Eusebius (*H. E.*, iii. 25) says: *τῶν δ' ἀντιλεγόμενων . . . ἡ ὀνομαζομένη δευτέρα καὶ τρίτη Ἰωάννου, εἴτε τοῦ εὐαγγελιστοῦ τυγχάνουσαι, εἴτε τοῦ ἑτέρου ὁμωνύμου ἐκείνου;* he therefore reckoned them among the first class of the Antilegomenoi (comp. Guericke, p. 606 ff.), and thereby proves that their canonical authority was not uncontested; but by the addition *εἴτε, κ.τ.λ.*, by which he does not want to confirm the doubt as to their *canonicity*, he expresses the uncertainty whether the Epistles were composed by John or by another of the same name, namely, the Presbyter John. In the Antioch school they were refused acceptance; Theodosius Mops. is said to have rejected them on the testimony of Leontius Byz.; Theodoret does not mention them; and in the Homily on Matt. xxi. 23, ascribed to Chrysostom, it is said, *τὴν δευτέραν καὶ τρίτην οἱ πατέρες ἀποκαλονίζουσι.* For the rest, after the time of Eusebius

their *canonicity* was undisputed; but that doubts still obtained in regard to their *apostolic origin*, is proved by Jerome, who, in his *Catal. Script. Eccl.*, chap. 9, s.v. Papias, says: *scripsit Joannes et unam epistolam, quae ab universis ecclesiasticis et eruditis viris probatur; reliquae autem duae, quarum principium SENIOR . . . JOANNIS PRESBYTERI asseruntur*; and in chap. 18 calls this view an *opinio, quam a plerisque retulimus traditam*. The, generally speaking, infrequent quotation of these Epistles, as well as the hesitation in the decision as to their canonicity and apostolicity, are easily explained, partly by their character, partly by the designation of the author (*ὁ πρεσβύτερος*) which is prefixed. From the fact, however, that the oldest authorities, Clemens Alex. and Irenaeus, quite unhesitatingly cite them, at least the Second Epistle, as writings of the Apostle John, it may be concluded that in the most ancient tradition they were regarded as apostolical Epistles, and that it was only at a later date that they were ascribed by many, perhaps only on account of the superscription, to the Presbyter John, whom Papias (Euseb. iii. 39) calls a *μαθητῆς τοῦ κυρίου*, but definitely distinguishes from the Apostle John. In the Middle Ages the authorship of the Apostle John was not disputed. Erasmus first again regarded the Presbyter John as the author of the Epistles; the same view was afterwards expressed and defended by Grotius, J. D. Beck (*Observ. Crit.-Exeget.*, Specim. I.), Fritzsche ("Bemerkk. über die Br. Joh.," in Henke's *Museum für Religionswissenschaft*, iii. part 1), Ammon (*Leben Jesu*, i. p. 45 ff.), and others. Almost all modern commentators and critics (Lücke, De Wette, Brückner, Baugarten-Crusius, Düsterdieck, Ewald,¹ Bleek, Braune), on the other hand, have with more or less confidence decided in favor of their apostolic authorship; against which Ebrard again ascribes them to the Presbyter John. It is extraordinary, that *the same* reasons are alleged for both views; namely, (1) the character of the style, (2) the self-designation of the author by *ὁ πρεσβύτερος*, and (3) the connection with Diotrephes. (1) As far as the style is concerned, the Second Epistle has unmistakably a pronounced Johannean impress. This is less the case with the Third Epistle; yet even this, which at any rate has the same author as the Second Epistle, bears in itself, in particular expressions and ideas, traces of the same peculiarity (comp. Lücke, Braune, Düsterdieck). According to Ebrard, the correspondences are to be explained by "*allusions and certain reminiscences*," while the peculiar style of the author of the two Epistles appears in the section

¹ According to Ewald's idea (*Gesch. Isr.*, vii. 219), John in Ephesus, in answer to urgent demands, wrote several letters to particular churches and persons, of which, however,

only these two have been accidentally preserved. Comp. also Ewald's *Joh. Schriften*, p. 505.

vv. 5-10 of the Third Epistle, and this deviates altogether from that of the Apostle John. But that the elsewhere well-known diction of John is not reflected in this section, may be very well explained by the fact that he is treating of quite special circumstances, and that, too, only in hints, and with the greatest possible brevity; but that in 2 John 5, 12, and 3 John 11, there is "an intentional allusion to particular *dicta* of the First Epistle," and that in 2 John 6, 7, 9, such *dicta* "are almost exactly quoted," are assertions which cannot be proved, as the agreements may just as well, at least, have their origin in the identity of the author. (2) As, according to the distinct testimony of Papias (in Euseb., *H. E.*, iii. 99), the existence of a presbyter named John, who was a *μαθητής* of the Lord, cannot be doubted, it is natural to regard him as the author of the Epistle, who calls himself *ὁ πρεσβύτερος*. But as Papias designates this John as *ὁ πρεσβύτερος* merely to distinguish him from the previously mentioned (Apostle) John, it cannot be inferred from his words that "*ὁ πρεσβύτερος*" was *in itself* a name denoting the non-apostolic John. If this was not the case, how then could this John venture to call himself *κατ' ἐξοχὴν* "*ὁ πρεσβύτερος*"? Ebrard thinks that, as the two Johns lived in Ephesus, the non-apostolic John was in his intimate circle called "*the Presbyter*" in distinction from the Apostle, and that "it is easily intelligible from this how the Presbyter John would, in his confidential private circles, use this designation as a stamped coin;" but, besides, Ebrard appeals to the fact that the small filial churches in the neighborhood of the city, the single members of the presbytery established in the mother church, and hence those small churches which had gathered round the Kyria and Caius and Diotrophes, had been handed over to the care of of the Presbyter John, "so that according to his official position he was '*the Presbyter*' to these churches." Ebrard thus gives two explanations, of which, however, only *one* could be valid;¹ moreover, both explanations are based on uncertain assumptions. — Lücke and Düsterdieck (similarly Brückner and Braune) with justice show that the name, *ὁ πρεσβύτερος*, would not have been suitable for the Presbyter John without the addition of his proper name. But how does the case stand in this respect with the Apostle John? Oecumenius says: *ἦτοι ὅτι γεραῖος ὧν ἤδη ἔγραψε ταύτας, ἢ καὶ ἐπίσκοπον καλῶν αὐτὸν διὰ τοῦ πρεσβυτέρου*; the former view, which is defended by Piscator, Lange, Carpzovius, Sander, Bleek, etc., has the form of the word against it; if John wanted to describe himself as "the old man," it is not conceivable why he

¹ For, if John used the name because it was a coin once stamped for him, then he did not use it to describe his special position to those

to whom he was writing; and if he did it for the latter cause, then plainly he did not do it for the former.

did not write *ὁ γέρον*, *ὁ πρεσβύτερος*, or similarly, especially as *ὁ πρεσβύτερος* was already in use as an official name; even apart from the fact that the designation would only vaguely state who the author was, the expression must certainly be taken, with Baumgarten-Crusius, Lücke, Düsterdieck, Braune, as an official name. For this purpose it was quite suitable to the Apostle John, as he was connected with the churches in question not merely as an apostle, but had entered into a special (episcopal) relationship towards them. He undertook the same position towards them as, immediately after the apostolic age, the bishop occupied towards the churches subordinate to him. Hence John *might* have called himself *ὁ ἐπίσκοπος*, but he *could* not, as in his time both expressions denoted the same position; though in later times, when in the ecclesiastical organization bishops and presbyters were definitely distinguished from one another, the former were still frequently described by the name *οἱ πρεσβύτεροι*.¹ — (3) In the Third Epistle there is reference to a relationship of Diotrophes to the author of the Epistle, which, if this was the Apostle John, must certainly be regarded as strange. It seems more easy of explanation if, as Ebrard thinks, the author was an Ephesian presbyter to whose oversight the churches, in which Caius and Diotrophes were prominent members, had been intrusted; but in the first place this supposition lacks historical foundation, and, secondly, a still greater degree of violence would belong to the case if Diotrophes “prated with malicious words” against a man who was not only a member of the Ephesian presbytery, but also had to exercise an oversight over those churches, and who as an immediate *μαθητῆς τοῦ κυρίου* certainly enjoyed great respect. If Diotrophes was capable of *that*, then his ambition — which indeed may lead to the most extreme steps — might have induced him to despise even the dignity of an apostle. Besides, the particular circumstances are much too unknown by us for it to be justifiable for us on their account to deny the Apostle John the authorship of the Epistle. — The assertion that the prohibition contained in 2 John 10, 11, contradicts the loving disposition of the Apostle John, is with justice rejected by Ebrard, and that, too, with the suitable remark, “the love of the Apostle John was that sort of love which does not want to please, but to save souls; and hence he meets the lie not with careless connivance, but with firm confession of the truth and other discipline.”

¹ When Ebrard says that *πρεσβύτερος* cannot have been a title of the apostles, he is so far right, as an apostle, as such, was not designated by that name; but it does not there-

fore follow that an apostle might not assume to particular churches such a position as would make this name suitable to him.

Baur (in the work quoted above) regards these two Epistles, as he does the First Epistle, as writings of *Montanist* origin. He proceeds from the fact that they both have one author, and that the second was written to the church to which Caius (to whom the Third Epistle is directed) belonged, and is no other than the Epistle mentioned in 3 John 9: in this church, Baur further says, a schism had taken place; the one part, with Diotrephes at their head, had refused ecclesiastical fellowship to the church to which the author of the Epistle belonged; the other part, on the contrary, were in agreement with this church; and that, although the cause of that schism is not evident from the Epistles themselves, it is nevertheless clear that it is conformable to a time at which there had already occurred between several churches too lively differences about questions of the highest interest for the Christian mind. From these premises Baur concludes that the Second Epistle "was written to the *Montanistically* disposed section of the *Roman* Church;" and that Diotrephes is the symbolic description of the bishop of Rome, not indeed, as Schwegler (*Montanismus*, p. 284) supposed, of Victor (for Irenaeus and Clemens Alex. already knew both Epistles), but of an earlier bishop, perhaps Soter, or Anicet, or Eleutheros. Baur in this proof lays a special weight upon the *partisanship* of the writer of the Epistle, which had gone so far that he describes the followers of Diotrephes just as *heathen* (3 John 7) (1). Baur finds the main support of his view in the passage of Clemens Al. cited above: *Secunda Joannis ep., quae ad virgines scripta est, simplicissima est. Scripta vero est ad quandam Babyloniam Electam nomine, significat autem electionem ecclesia sanctae*; he holds that in these words Clemens refers the name Ἐκλεκτῆ to the idea of the Church, inasmuch as the predicate of holiness is appropriate to it; that this quite corresponds to the idea of the Montanists, whose first demand of the Ecclesia was that she should be, as the "*sponsa Christi*," *vera, pudica, sancta*; that the name *Babylonia* is to be allegorically understood of the city of Rome (as in 1 Pet. v. 13), where there were divided opinions in regard to Montanism. It does not require to be pointed out, how very much arbitrary and extraordinary modes of interpretation are heaped up in this statement. Quite apart from this, Baur's assertion places Clemens in the most wonderful contradiction with himself: on the one hand, Clemens exactly specifies the Second Epistle as written by the Apostle John; and on the other hand, — though in an obscure way, — he is said to have stated that it was of Montanist origin. And then, what could have induced a Montanist to invent epistles under the pretended name of the apostle, which do not contain any thing of Montanist character at all? Did he want to put the authority

of John in the scale against the bishop of Rome? But the Epistle could not in any way have been used for that purpose, as it must have been clear to any one that *John* could not have written against Soter (or Anicet, or Eleutheros). The Montanists, however, have taken so little advantage of these Epistles for their interests, that the Montanist Tertullian never once mentions them!—Hilgenfeld assigns the appearance of the Second and Third Epistles, as that of the First Epistle, to the post-apostolic age: yet he does not seek their explanation in the interest of the author on behalf of Montanism, but he thinks that the Second Epistle is an “excommunicatory writing,” by which, in the form of the epistles which the Christian churches interchanged, an “official apostolic condemnation” was meant to be uttered against the fellowship with the Gnostic false teachers; and that the Third Epistle is an *ἐπιστολὴ συστατικὴ* which originated in the church of John, and had the object of vindicating for that church the right to the circulation of such commendatory epistles, which the strict Jewish Christians would allow only to their patron James, as the author had known “the usefulness of such a regular passport” in the storms of Gnosticism. These hypotheses, according to which the circumstances hinted at in the Third Epistle are a pure invention, can, however, only be regarded as make-shifts to explain, as well as is possible, the origin of the two Epistles, which Hilgenfeld, for the same reasons as those for which he denies the genuineness of the First Epistle, thinks it is impossible to regard as memorials of the apostolic age.

SEC. 2.—CONTENTS AND DESIGN OF THE EPISTLES; TIME AND PLACE OF THEIR COMPOSITION.

The Second Epistle begins with the inscription, which, after mentioning the writer and the receiver of the Epistle, contains the greeting of benediction. It is addressed, according to the most probable explanation of the word *κυρία* (see the commentary on ver. 1), to a Christian church, to which the author expresses his joy that its members are walking in truth, with which he connects an exhortation to mutual love, which he confirms by a reference to the appearance of false teachers who deny that Jesus is the Christ, come in the flesh. After he has mentioned the abiding in the doctrine of Christ as the condition of fellowship with God, he forbids the brotherly reception of the opponents of this doctrine, because thereby we would make ourselves guilty of fellowship with their evil deeds. The conclusion of the Epistle contains a justification of its shortness, and the

delivery of the greeting from the church in which the apostle is. — The design of the Epistle accordingly lies in the danger which threatened the church through the false teachers, and of which the author wanted to warn the church in few words before he could come to it himself.

The Third Epistle also begins with an inscription, in which Caius (see on ver. 1) is mentioned as the receiver of it. After the wish that Caius may have prosperity, the apostle expresses his joy that he — according to the testimony of some brethren — is walking in the truth, and praises him especially on account of his active display of love towards strange brethren, whom he then recommends to his further care, because they went forth for Christ's sake, and it is a duty to receive such. — Then he mentions the arbitrary procedure of Diotrephes, who withheld from the church a letter written to it by him, made evil speeches against him, and opposed the reception of the brethren; in connection with which the author expresses his intention to come and bring him to account. After an exhortation not to follow that which is evil, but that which is good, the apostle gives Demetrius (the probable bearer of this Epistle) a good testimonial, justifies himself for the shortness of his writing, and, after a short benediction, concludes by giving the greeting of friends and sending greeting to friends. The design of the Epistle accordingly was furnished by an incident which had occurred in the church of Caius. Some strange missionary brethren, who had found a friendly reception from Caius, had come to the apostle. The latter had written on their behalf to the church to which Diotrephes also belonged; but Diotrephes, with insolent expressions against the apostle, had opposed the reception of those brethren, and had even cast out of the church those who did not agree with him. This Epistle is now meant to serve the purpose of confirming Caius in the continuation of his manifestations of love, as well as of intimating to him the near arrival of the apostle. — Ewald's ideas, that both Epistles were addressed to one and the same church, that Diotrephes had specially interested himself in the false teachers, and that the Third Epistle was written to Caius from fear lest the Second Epistle might have been withheld from the Church by Diotrephes, are to be regarded as mere conjectures, which cannot be proved from the contents of the two Epistles.

The Place and Time of their Composition are unknown in the case of both Epistles; yet it is not unlikely that 2 John 12 and 3 John 14 refer to a tour (perhaps one and the same) of inspection (especially as Eusebius, *H. E.*, iii. 24, describes such a tour of inspection made by John from Ephesus), and that the Epistles were written in Ephesus. — As in the

Second Epistle the same false teachers are referred to that are spoken of in the First Epistle, it is probable that the places at which these two Epistles were composed are not far remote from one another.¹— The remark of Eichhorn, that in the Second Epistle a more vigorous spirit is displayed than in the First, is no less incorrect than the idea that the “rigorous” (!) prohibition in 2 John 10, 11, indicates the still youthful old age of the apostle.

¹ According to Ebrard, the Second Epistle appeared at a later date than the First; the proof of this he finds in the fact that the former refers back to the latter. But that

the similarities are the result of a backward reference, is only certain if the two Epistles proceed from *different* authors.

Ἰωάννου ἐπιστολὴ δευτέρα.

THE superscription is shortest in B and \aleph : *ιωάννου β.*; in some codd. *καθολικὴ* is added to *ἐπιστολῇ*; in some *τοῦ ἐπὶ στηθοῦς* comes after *Ἰωάννου*; in G it runs: *τοῦ ἁγίου ἀποστόλου Ἰωάννου τοῦ θεολόγου*. In the Elz. ed., the superscription runs: *Ἰωάννου τοῦ ἀποστόλου ἐπιστολὴ καθολικὴ δευτέρα*; the Rec. is *ἐπιστολὴ Ἰωάννου δευτέρα*.

Ver. 1. *καὶ οὐκ ἐγώ*]. Rec. The reading *οὐκ ἐγὼ δέ* in A, 73, Syr., Thph., owes its origin to the desire to mark the antithesis more sharply (Düsterdieck); Ebrard regards the Rec. as a correction, made in order to make the Second and the First Epistles conformable in style. Scarcely credible. G reads: *καὶ οὐκ ἐγὼ δέ*. — Ver. 2. The reading in A, *ἐνοικοῦσαν*, instead of *μένουσαν*, is too feebly attested for us to regard it, with Ebrard, as the correct one; it has probably arisen in order to avoid the tautology which *μένουσαν* appears to form with the following. — Ver. 3. The Elz. ed. reads *ἔσται μεθ' ὑμῶν*, which is attested by B, G, \aleph , etc., several versions, etc. It is possible that *ἡμῶν* arose from the immediately preceding (so Braune), but just as likely that *ἡμῶν* was changed to *ὑμῶν*, because the former did not seem appropriate for the greeting; the weight of authorities is in favor of *ἡμῶν*. — Instead of *παρά*, \aleph^* reads *ἀπό* (sol.). — Before *Ἰησοῦ Χρ.*, the Rec. has *κυρίου*, which is found in G, K, \aleph . In A, B, etc., *κυρίου* is wanting (Lachm., Tisch.); Bengel, Brückner, Sander, are in favor of the genuineness of *κυρίου*; yet the later insertion of it seems more probable than the omission. — The *αὐτοῦ* of \aleph between *τοῦ υἱοῦ* and *τοῦ πατρός* must be regarded as a clerical error. — Ver. 4. \aleph (sol.) has instead of *ἐλάζομεν* the third person, *ἐλαβον*. — B omits *τοῦ* before *πατρός*. — Ver. 5. Instead of the Rec. *γρίφω*, we must read *γράφω*; according to A, B, G, K, \aleph , etc. — Lachm. has *καινήν* before *γράφων*, which is not adequately attested by A, \aleph , Vulg. — Ver. 6. In the second part, the succession of the words varies; in G, \aleph , most of the min., etc., *αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐντολὴ* (Rec.) is found; in A, B, K, etc., on the other hand, *αὕτη ἡ ἐντολὴ ἐστὶν* (Lachm., Tisch.); it is possible that the Rec. has been formed in accordance with the preceding *αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἀγάπη*. It is to be noticed that \aleph has before *αὕτη* a *καί*, and after *ἐντολὴ* an *αὐτοῦ*, and also that in the same cod. *ἵνα* is found before *καθώς*, so that an epanalepsis occurs here. — Instead of *περιπατήτε*, \aleph reads *περιπατήσητε*. — Ver. 7. The most probable reading is *ἐξῆλθον*, according to A (*ἐξήλθαν*, Tisch.), B, \aleph (Lachm.); the Rec. *εἰσῆλθον*, according to G, K, etc., is a correction; comp. 1 John ii. 19, iv. 1, and 3 John 7. — Ver. 8. The Rec., according to G, K, has *ἀπολέσωμεν . . . εἰργασάμεθα . . . ἀπολάβομεν*. Cod. A, and \aleph read: *ἀπολέσητε* (\aleph^* , *ἀπολήσθε*) . . . *εἰργάσαθε . . . ἀπολάβητε*; this reading, accepted by Lachm. and Tisch., is regarded as the original reading by Lücke, De Wette, Reiche. Cod. B reads: *ἀπολέσητε* (according to Bentley's collation; Griesb. gives *ἀπολέσεται*, which is also given by Tisch., bracketed, however) . . . *εἰργασάμεθα . . . ἀπολάβετε*; De Wette regards this reading as a

combination of the reading of A with the Rec.; Düsterdieck, Brückner, Braune (also the 2d ed. of this comm.) regard the reading in B as the original. It is certainly the one by which the origin of the various readings can be easily explained; yet the circumstance that it is almost only found in B (Reiche: *lectio codicis B in nullis aliis subsidiis inventa est, nisi quod Syr. p. in m. et Sahid. ejus sensum expressit*) must render it doubtful. Of the two others, that of A and \aleph , at any rate, deserve the preference. Bengel would arbitrarily read: ἀπολέσητε . . . εἰργάσασθε . . . ἀπολάβομεν, which is only found in Cod. 34. — Ver. 9. παραβαίνων]. Rec., according to G, K, etc., Syr., Thph., Oec. (Reiche). Lachm. and Tisch. read instead of it, προύγων, which is attested by A, B, \aleph , etc., and the readings *praecedit* and *procedit* in several codd. of the Vulg. (against which, in the printed Vulg. and Lucif., is *recedit*). The opinion of Matthaei and Lücke, that προύγων arose out of the paraphrase which appears in the scholia: ἀπάγων ἑαυτὸν, which also occurs in Oecumenius, is unfounded; this explanation rather points to προύγων as the original reading. — The Rec. (according to G, K, etc., several vss., Thph., Oec.) has, both after the first and after the second ἐν τῇ διδαχῇ, the addition τοῦ Χριστοῦ; Lachm. and Tisch. have the addition only after the first; so in A, B, \aleph , several min., Vulg., etc.; this is to be regarded as the correct reading. — It is doubtful whether *υἰόν* or *πατέρα* comes first in the following sentence; the Rec., retained by Lachm., is: τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὸν υἰόν; this is found in B, G, K, \aleph , etc., several vss., Thph., Oec.; Tisch., on the other hand, following A and several vss., has accepted τὸν υἰὸν καὶ τὸν πατέρα; but this appears to be a change effected on account of ἐν τῇ διό. τοῦ Χριστοῦ. — Ver. 11. ὁ γὰρ λέγων]. Rec., according to G, K, almost all min., Thph., Oec. (Tisch. 2); instead of it Tisch. 7 (similarly Lachm.), according to A, B, \aleph , reads ὁ λέγων γάρ, which, as unusual, might be preferable. Tisch. 7 remarks: γὰρ *tertio loco positum fere ubique a plerisque testibus in secundum locum translatum*. — Tisch. has omitted γάρ after αὐτῶ, although it is wanting only in K, several min., and Oec. — Ver. 12. \aleph^* has ἔχω; \aleph_1 , however, ἔχων. — Instead of ἐλπίζω γάρ, Rec. (Lachm.), according to A, some min. and vss., Tisch., following B, G, K, \aleph , many min., etc., reads: ἀλλὰ ἐλπίζω; this reading is the original one; the context might easily lead to the change of ἀλλὰ into γάρ. — γενέσθαι]. This reading, recommended by Griesbach, has been accepted also by Lachm. and Tisch. The Rec. ἐλθεῖν (according to G, K, etc.) is a correction. Instead of στόμα πρ. στ., \aleph^* reads: στόματι πρὸς στόμα. — ἡ χαρὰ ἡμῶν]. Rec., according to G, K, \aleph , etc., Tisch.; instead of it, Lachm., following A, B, etc., Vulg., etc., reads: ἡ χαρὰ ὑμῶν; ὑμῶν perhaps is preferable; the preceding ἡμῶς might easily lead to the change into ἡμῶν. — Instead of ἡ πεπληρωμένη, Rec., according to A, G, K, all min., etc. (Tisch.), the reading of B, \aleph , Vulg., is πεπληρ. ἡ (Lachm.). — The Rec., following G, K, etc., adds for conclusion ἀμήν, a later addition. — In various codd., a subscription is found which runs most briefly in A, B, \aleph , thus: Ἰωάννου β̄. The Cod. 62 adds the words πρὸς Πάρθους (comp. on 1 John).

Vv. 1–3. Superscription of the Epistle.

Ver. 1. ὁ πρεσβύτερος]. The definite article restricts the general idea *πρεσβυτερος* to a particular person, to whom this epithet is specially appropriate. That this is most probably the *Apostle* John, see Introduction, sec. 1. The reflection on his age may have led the apostle to write, not ὁ ἐπίσκοπος, but ὁ πρεσβύτερος. — ἐκλεκτῇ κυρίᾳ καὶ τοῖς τέκνοις αὐτῆς]. The inter-

pretation of these words has from the earliest times been very diverse, according as either *ἐκλεκτή* or *κυρία* has been regarded as a proper noun, or both words have been considered as appellatives. The first opinion (Lyranus, a Lapide, Lorinus, Cappellus, Grotius, Wetstein, etc.) has been with justice given up by modern commentators; it is clearly enough opposed not only by the mode of its conjunction with *κυρία*, but also by ver. 13. The second view, according to which *κυρία* is the proper noun, is found as early as in Athanasius, and afterwards in Bengel, Carpzovius, Heumann, Krigel (*Commentatio de κυρία Johannis*, Lips, 1758), Paulus, Lücke, De Wette, Brückner, Guericke, Düsterdieck, Ebrard, Braune, etc. That *Κυρία* appeared as a feminine proper name, is not to be doubted; see Grutteri, *Inscriptt.* p. 1127, num. xi.; comp. Heumann: *Poecile de Cyria Johannis*: but if this view be taken, not only is the adjective *ἐκλεκτή* strange, as it never is assigned to any individual in the N. T. as a single predicate except in Rom. xvi. 13 (where, however, *ἐν κυρίῳ* is put along with it), but also its connection with the proper noun, instead of *Κυρία τῇ ἐκλεκτῇ*: comp. 3 John 1; Phil. i. 1, 2; Rom. xvi. Lücke, it is true, refers to 1 Pet. i. 1: *ἐκλεκτοῖς παρεπιδήμοις*; but here the case is different, as *παρεπιδήμοις* is not a proper noun, as even Brückner admits, though he nevertheless falls back on a "familiar carelessness" in this case.¹ The third interpretation is found in Luther ("the elect woman"), Hornejus, Wolf, Rittmeier (*Diatriba, de electa domina*, Helmst., 1706), Baumgarten-Crusius, Sander, etc. According to Epictetus, chap. 62: *αἱ γυναῖκες εὐθὺς ὑπὸ τεσσαρεσκαίδεκα ἐτῶν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν κυρίαὶ καλοῦνται*, women might certainly be called *κυρίαὶ*; but this was plainly only a *polite* address, corresponding not to the German *Frau* (woman), but to the German *Herrin* (lady). It hardly corresponds with the apostolic dignity of the author, however, to describe the receiver of the Epistle in the superscription by this name of a conventional politeness.² But the opinion of Knauer (*Stud. u. Krit.*, 1833, Part 2, p. 452 ff.), that by *ἐκλεκτὴ κυρία* is to be understood Mary, the mother of Jesus, lacks any tenable foundation (see Lücke on this passage). — Already at an early date *κυρία* was taken as a symbolic description of the Christian Church; so Jerome (*Ep. xi. ad Ageruchian*) and the Scholiast I. (*ἐκλεκτὴν κυρίαν λέγει τὴν ἐν τινὶ τόπῳ ἐκκλησίαν*), and later Calovius, Whiston, Michaelis, Augusti, Hofmann (in his *Weissagung u. Erfüllung*, II. p. 321, and in his *Schriftbew.*, I. p. 226 ff.), Hilgenfeld (1855), Ewald, etc. It is true the word does not elsewhere appear in this signification; but according to its connection with Him who is *ὁ κύριος*, the Church may certainly be called *κυρία* in its relationship to the individual members.³ Both the contents of

¹ According to Ewald, it is "foolish to think" that "the apostle is here writing to an individual woman."

² Against the distinction between the expressive *Frau* and *Herrin*, Braune adduces the etymology of the former word (*Frau*, feminine of *fro = Herr*); this is quite irrelevant here, however, as it is not the *German*, but the *Greek*, expressions, that are in question; it is the distinction between *γυνή* and

κυρία. That *Frau* originally corresponded to the expression *κυρία*, is certain, — the word is even yet frequently used in this sense, — but it does not therefore follow that the Greek *κυρία* became so much weakened in usage as the German word *Frau*.

³ Hofmann recalls the description of the Church in the Apocalypse as the *νύμφη* and the *γυνή*. When Ebrard objects to this, that the Church in contrast with the "Lord" is

the Epistle, which is lacking in the slightest individual reference to a single person, and the way in which John speaks to the receivers of the Epistle and passes judgment on them (comp. what follows in this verse; further, vv. 4, 5, 8, 10); and, finally, the way in which the sister and her children are mentioned,¹—are no less *opposed* to the opinion that the Epistle was written to one particular woman, than they are *in favor* of the opinion that it was directed to a Christian church: only *κυρία* must not be regarded as the name of honor of any one particular church (according to Serrarius of the Corinthian church, or according to Augusti of that of Jerusalem); it is rather a name suitable for every church, by which, therefore, *that* church could also be described to which the Epistle is directly addressed.²—*καὶ τοῖς τέκνοις αὐτῆς*]. If *κυρία* is a description of the church, the *τέκνα* are her individual members. The representation of the Church as a mother, and of her members as her children, occurs elsewhere also; comp. Gal. iv. 26.—*οὗς ἐγὼ ἀγαπῶ ἐν ἀληθείᾳ*]. If we take *κυρία* as a proper noun, then *οὗς* indicates that by *τέκνοις* only sons are to be understood; but why then does not the apostle write *καὶ τοῖς υἱαῖς αὐτῆς*? If the *τέκνα* are the members of the church, however, then *οὗς* is used here exactly as *τεκνία μου, οὗς* in Gal. iv. 9; comp. also Matt. xxviii. 19: *τὰ ἔθνη . . . αὐτούς*. Suitable though the masculine is to denote *all* church-members, it would be just as unsuitable to denote members of one *family*, if this consisted not merely of sons, but—as Braune here supposes—of daughters also. *ἐγὼ* is used emphatically, inasmuch as the apostle wants to bring out *his* intimate relationship to the members of the Church.—*ἐν ἀληθείᾳ* in its connection with *ἀγαπῶ* is not = *ἐν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ*, as if the (Christian) truth were thereby indicated as the element in which love has its existence (Bengel, Düsterdieck); but it is used adverbially, not, however, to emphasize the sincerity of the love, but, as the word itself states, the *truth* of the love (Ebrard: “I love thee with that love which is a *love* in truth;” similarly Lücke: “it is the real *Christian* love that is meant;” and Braune).—*καὶ οὐκ ἐγὼ μόνος, ἀλλὰ πάντες*]. All who have known the truth share with the apostle love to the *τέκνα* of the *κυρία*. This addition also goes to show that *κυρία* is not a proper noun; for, how could the children of an individual woman be regarded as an object of the love of all believers? Bengel, with whom Düsterdieck agrees, remarks indeed on this, *communio sanctorum*; but the apostle’s mode of expression presupposes

not “the lady,” but the obedient handmaid, it must be remembered that she is here spoken of not in regard to her subordinate relationship to Christ, but in regard to her superior relationship to her individual members.

¹ De Wette also says: “The way in which her sister and her sister’s children are mentioned is favorable to the idea that a single Christian church is meant.”

² That the Epistle is directly addressed to a particular church, is evident from ver. 12; the want of references to individual circumstances may perhaps be explained by the fact that it also had an encyclical design: that the author,

however, “had in view the *whole* of orthodox *Christendom*” (Hilgenfeld), is just as little appropriate to this Epistle as to the First.—Braune’s considerations are of little importance: the name of the church might be omitted, because the bearer of the Epistle knew to what church he had to take it; *ἐκλεκτή* is by no means unsuitable with *κυρία* = *ἐκκλησία*, according to *ἡ ἐν Βαβυλῶνι συνεκλεκτή* (by which the church is certainly to be understood); it has not been asserted that the relationship of the mother in Gal. iv. 26 has been given to a single church.

an actual knowledge about one another. Several commentators accordingly have recourse to a weakening of the idea πάντες,¹ which, however, is arbitrary. — ἀλήθεια is the divine truth, of which the believer becomes a partaker in Christ. The emphasis of ἀλήθεια both here and in ver. 2 is caused by the antithesis to the πλάνοι (ver. 7). The bracketing of the words καὶ οὐκ . . . τὴν ἀλήθειαν, “spoils the clearness of the connection, and is also logically not quite correct, because ver. 2 refers not only to ἐγώ, but also to πάντες” (Lücke).

Ver. 2 states the cause of the love. — διὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν τὴν μένουσαν ἐν ἡμῖν]. The idea μένειν signifies here, as in the First Epistle, firm, sure existence. — In ἡμῖν the apostle includes the loving and the loved (so also Braune). — The ἀγαπᾶν ἐν ἀληθείᾳ is based on the possession of the ἀλήθεια. — Carpovius incorrectly connects these words with ver. 3. — By the addition, καὶ μεθ' ἡμῶν ἔσται εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα, the imperishable endurance of fellowship with the truth is declared (Düsterdieck, Braune), and it is not merely the wish for it that is expressed (Lücke, Ebrard). By μετὰ (as distinguished from ἐν) the objectivity of the truth is indicated (Braune). The irregularity of the construction, inasmuch as the finite verb is used instead of a participle (comp. A. Buttman, p. 327 [E. T., 382]; Winer, p. 533 [E. T., 578]), serves to give prominence to the idea.

Ver. 3. The formula of greeting. It agrees substantially with that which is found in most of the N. T. Epistles; the prefixed ἔσται μεθ' ἡμῶν (ὁμῶν), however, is peculiar; the future indicates the wish as a certain expectation, which is based on the immediately preceding statement (Düsterdieck). If we take the reading ἡμῶν (see the critical notes), the apostle includes himself along with the readers of the Epistle, which indeed does not elsewhere occur in the salutatory formulae; μετὰ = “with.” — χάρις, εἰρήνη, just as in 1 and 2 Tim. and Tit. 1. 4.² — παρὰ Θεοῦ πατρός]. Instead of παρὰ, ἀπὸ is elsewhere regularly used in this connection, as 8 reads here also; on the difference of the two prepositions, see Winer, p. 342 (E. T., 364 f.). — Το Θεοῦ πατρός, ἡμῶν is always added by Paul, except in the Pastoral Epistles. God is here called πατήρ, first of all in His relation to Christ, but also with the consciousness that in Christ He is the Father of believers also. — καὶ παρὰ Ἰησ. Χρ. τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ πατρός, similarly in the other Epistles of the N. T., only that here the sonship of Christ is specially indicated; the repetition of the preposition brings out the independence of the Son along with the Father. — The last addition, ἐν ἀληθείᾳ καὶ ἀγάπῃ, is peculiar to John; the ἀλ. and ἀγάπη are the two vital elements (Baumgarten-Crusius: funda-

¹ Horncjus: “Omnes fideles, non quidem qui in toto orbe tum temporis erant, sed qui in illis partibus et simul Domluam illam et liberos ejus norant.” — Lücke: “πάντες, κ.τ.λ., i. e., all Christians (perhaps of this place?) who know the Kyria and her children;” Braune agrees with this explanation, but would regard “as included, even those who would later become acquainted with her” — which is clearly unsuitable.

² The explanation of these words given on 1 Tim. i. 2 is regarded as unsatisfactory by Düsterdieck, although it is in substantial agreement with his own, only that it is not expressly stated that χάρις means “grace,” ἔλεος “mercy,” and εἰρήνη “peace,” — which is surely self-evident, — but only the relation of the three ideas to one another, which is often erroneously interpreted, is pointed out.

mental features) of the believer, in which the divine manifestations of grace, mercy, and peace have to work (Düsterdieck): "the words contain an indication of the contents of the whole Epistle" (Ebrard); a Lapidè erroneously supplies: *ut perseveretis vel ut crescatis*. Grotius wrongly defines the relationship when he says: *per cognitionem veri et dilectionem mutuam, nam per haec in nos Dei beneficia provocamus, conservamus, augemus*, in the first place, *en* is not = *per*; and, in the second place, *our* conduct is not the cause of the divine *χάρις*, κ.τ.λ., but the relationship is the converse.

Ver. 4. The Epistle begins with the assurance of joy at the conduct of those to whom it is addressed. The preface to most of the Pauline Epistles is similar. This verse refers back to the preceding *en* ἀληθείᾳ; ver. 5, on the other hand, to *en* ἀγάπῃ. — ἐχάρην λίαν; not, "I have greatly rejoiced" (Luther); the aorist is to be kept in its own meaning. The apostle is speaking historically of the time at which he had the experience which he states in the following words. — ὅτι εὐρηκα ἐκ τῶν τέκνων σου περιπατοῦντας ἐν ἀληθείᾳ]. ἐκ τῶν τέκν. is not = τὰ τέκνα σου; it is indicated by the ἐκ that John could not boast the περιπατεῖν ἐν ἀλ. of all,¹ but not that "he had not become acquainted with all" (Düsterdieck). Braune's observation is erroneous, that, "as the article is wanting with περιπατοῦντας, it is not indicated that the other children were not walking ἐν ἀλ." With περιπατεῖν ἐν, comp. John viii. 12; 1 John i. 6, 7; 3 John 3, 4, and several other passages. — εὐρηκα indicates a previous meeting with the children of the κυρία — and hence a previous sojourn of the apostle in the church to which he is writing; incorrectly, Sander: "I have found as the result of my examination;" the preterite ἐχάρην does not suit this interpretation. — If κυρία be a proper noun, it remains uncertain where the apostle met with her children. Lücke, on account of ver. 12, considers it unlikely that the apostle had been in the family; "he seems to have met the τέκνα somewhere else without the mother" (so also Braune). Not only this uncertainty, but also the circumstance that John does not express himself further about the children who are not walking in the truth, indicates that he is not speaking of a family, but of a church, which is erroneously disputed by Braune. — καθὼς ἐν τολῆν ἐλάβομεν]. καθὼς (which is not to be taken here, with Ebrard, argumentatively = "because indeed") does not more particularly define the περιπατεῖν in itself, as if ἐν ἀληθείᾳ were only added adverbially for confirmation = "who in truth walk as," etc.; but καθὼς refers to the περιπατεῖν ἐν ἀληθ., and ἀλήθεια is Christian truth, as in ver. 3; thus, "who are walking in the truth, according as we received commandment" (Düsterdieck). By this, however, we are not to understand one particular commandment, but the obligation which is contained in the Christian faith to walk in the truth. παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς, see ver. 3; the intervention of the Son is implied.

Vv. 5, 6. καὶ νῦν ἐρωτῶ σε]. νῦν is used here, not temporally, but logically. Düsterdieck refers it to the immediately preceding subordinate clause, καθὼς, κ.τ.λ.; Ebrard, on the other hand, to the idea εὐρηκα, κ.τ.λ.; but

¹ Ebrard, appropriately: "It is a delicate way in which the presbyter covers the blame

which he has to express in a mere limitation of praise."

it is more correctly referred to *ἐχάρην*, κ.τ.λ.; the joy which the apostle felt is the cause of his present request (so also Brückner and Braune). John says *ἔρωτῶ* instead of the usual *παρακαλῶ*, as the *request* is suitable to the church, as a *κυρία*. — οὐχ ὡς ἐντολὴν γράφων σοι καινὴν, κ.τ.λ.]. Comp. 1 John ii. 7. — *ἵνα ἀγαπῶμεν ἀλλήλους*, dependent on *ἔρωτῶ*, comp. John xvii. 15, not on *ἐντολὴν ἔχομεν* (Baumgarten-Crusius), “for this is used in a subordinate clause merely, and *ἔρωτῶ* would be without connection and without object” (Brückner). *ἵνα* states here also not merely the purpose, but the substance of the request (contrary to Braune). — Ver. 6. *καὶ αὕτη . . . ἵνα*]. The same construction, 1 John v. 3. The apostle is not distinguishing the commandment of love from the other commandments (De Wette), but is describing the walking according to the commandments of God as the substance and essence of love; with justice, for, in the first place, only *that* love is moral — or, more particularly, Christian — in its character, which is founded on obedience toward God, and therefore “consists in the fulfilment of the commandments of God that regulate our relationship to our neighbor” (Ebrard); and, in the second place, the aim of all the divine commandments is nothing else than love. Brückner, Braune, and others here interpret *ἡ ἀγάπη* incorrectly of “Christian love simply,” including also the love of God and Christ; the close connection of this sentence with the preceding one (*ἡ ἀγάπη* clearly refers back to *ἵνα ἀγαπῶμεν ἀλλήλους*) compels us to understand *ἡ ἀγάπη* of Christian brotherly love. The thought last expressed is specially emphasized by the following words. According to the reading, *αὕτη ἡ ἐντολή ἐστι*, we must translate: “*This commandment is (consists in this), as ye have heard from the beginning (no other than this), that ye should walk ἐν αὐτῇ.*” — *ἡ ἐντολή* resumes the preceding *τὰς ἐντολὰς αὐτοῦ*: the transition from the plural to the singular is not difficult; comp. 1 John iii. 22, 23. — *ἵνα* states the substance of the commandment, and *ἐν αὐτῇ* refers to *ἀγάπη* (De Wette-Brückner, Lücke, Düsterdieck, Ebrard, Braune), and not to *ἐντολή* (Sander); for this would not only give an inadmissible tautology, but would also be contrary to John’s mode of expression, in which the phrase *περιπατεῖν ἐν τῇ ἐντολῇ* does not appear. — By the intervening clause *καθὼς ἠκούσατε*, “a subordinate definition of the *ἐντολή*” (Lücke, De Wette) is not given, but it is observed that the readers have heard from the beginning what is the substance of the divine commandment; the apostle thereby refers back to what was said in ver. 5 (so also Düsterdieck, Ebrard, Brückner, Braune). The circle that results from this interpretation only serves to bring clearly out the identity of brotherly love and obedience toward God.¹

Ver. 7. In this verse the apostle addresses himself to the warning against the false teachers, whom he first more particularly characterizes. The *ὅτι*, with which the verse begins, indicates that the foregoing exhortation to

¹ Köstlin incorrectly interprets (p. 218): “The old commandment, that we should love one another, means nothing else than that we should abide in what He has commanded us to believe.” That *ἐντολή* here denotes the command to *believe* (1 John lii. 23), finds no con-

firmation in the context. — Ebrard unjustifiably asserts that the obscurity of the expression in this verse is to be explained by the fact that the apostle intentionally alludes to some passages of the First Epistle, with which he assumes the *Kyria* to be familiar.

mutual love has its origin in the fear of their being disturbed by the influence of the false teachers; but it is not to be inferred from this that *ὅτι* is grammatically dependent on *ἔρωτῶ σε*. It would be grammatically possible also to regard this verse as the premise on which ver. 8 is based (Grotius, Carpzovius), but such a construction is at variance with the peculiarity of John's diction. — *ὅτι πολλοὶ πλάνοι*]. The expression *πλάνοι* does not elsewhere appear in John; comp. on the other hand, Matt. xxvii. 63; 2 Cor. vi. 8; 1 Tim. iv. 1; instead of it in 1 John ii. 26: *οἱ πλανῶντες ὑμᾶς*. — With this passage may be compared 1 John ii. 18 ff., iv. 1. — *ἐξῆλθον* [*εἰσῆλθον*] *εἰς τὸν κόσμον* does not denote separation from the church; *κόσμος* does not here form the antithesis of the *ἐκκλησία τοῦ Θεοῦ*; the sense is rather the same here as in John iv. 1. The difference between *εἰσῆλθ.* and *ἐξῆλθ.* is only this, that by the latter expression the point of departure is more definitely indicated. — *οἱ μὴ ὁμολογοῦντες, κ.τ.λ.*, comp. 1 John iv. 2, 3; on the N. T. usage of the article before the participle after *πολλοί*, comp. Buttm., p. 254 (E. T., 296); *μὴ ὁμολογεῖν = ἀρνεῖσθαι*. The *μὴ* is not to be explained, with Winer (p. 450 [E. T., 483]), by the fact that the participle refers to a representative class (= *quicumque non profitentur*), but it is used just as in 1 John iv. 3: *ὁ μὴ ὁμολογεῖ*; see on this passage. — *Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν ἐρχόμενον ἐν σαρκί* is to be taken just as the words 1 John iv. 2, that run almost exactly similarly. The present participle *ἐρχόμενον*, instead of which *ἐληλυθότα* is used there, expresses the idea in itself — apart from the idea of time; comp. John vi. 14. Bengel, incorrectly, *qui veniebat*, with an appeal to 3 John 3, for in this passage *ἐρχομένων* and *μαρτυρούντων*, by their close connection with *ἐχάρην*, are distinctly indicated as imperfect participles; such a connection does not exist here, nor are we to interpret, with Baumgarten-Crusius, "He who *was* to come." Still more incorrectly Oecumenius takes it as future participle, referring it to the second coming of Christ: — *οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ πλάνος καὶ ὁ ἀντίχριστος*]. *οὗτος* refers back to *οἱ μὴ ὁμολογοῦντες, κ.τ.λ.* By *ὁ πλάνος* the apostle resumes the preceding *πλάνοι*; by *ὁ ἀντίχριστος* he adds a new characteristic. — The definite article indicates these ideas as familiar to the readers; the antichrist of whom they have heard, comp. 1 John ii. 18. — The singular is here used in collective signification (Lücke); the many are the antichrist, inasmuch as the same *πνεῦμα τῆς πλάνης* is in all; comp. further, the remarks on 1 John ii. 18.

Ver. 8. The warning against the deceivers. — *βλέπετε ἑαυτοῦς*, "take heed to yourselves;" *βλέπειν* with the refl. pron. besides here only in Mark xiii. 9. — The construction *ἵνα* after *βλέπειν* only in 1 Cor. xvi. 10 besides; by *ἵνα* it is not the *purpose* ("take heed to yourselves, sc. of them, so that"), but the immediate object of their foresight that is stated (contrary to De Wette, Braune, and A. Buttm., p. 209).¹ — *ἵνα, κ.τ.λ.*]. Whatever may be the correct reading, the thought remains essentially the same: the apostle warns his

¹ Braune here adduces various passages of the N. T. in order to vindicate for the particle *ἵνα* the meaning of purpose ("so that"); but he has not paid attention to the distinction whether the verbal idea with which *ἵνα* is con-

nected is absolute or relative (requiring supplement), and he has not reflected that if the clause beginning with *ἵνα* forms the supplement of the preceding verbal idea, *ἵνα* cannot be = "so that."

readers not to let themselves be deprived, by the false teachers, of the blessing of which they became partakers through the evangelistic work. With the reading *εἰργασάμεθα* those who have worked are John and his associates; that *ἐν ἑμῖν*, or a similar phrase, must be put along with it for more particular definition (Lücke), is unfounded, as this more particular definition lies in the context itself. with the reading *εἰργάσασθε*, on the other hand, it is the work of the receivers of the Epistle themselves that is meant, who should just as little come short of the attainment of the blessing as the former.—The object of *ἐργάζεσθαι*, indicated by *ἃ*, is not exactly the *μισθός*, which is also spoken of, but the work directly effected by the labor, the result or the fruit of it. Fruit had been obtained in the church by means of the work (fruit of knowledge, love, etc.); it was of importance that they should not again be deprived of this fruit; this is expressed by *μὴ ἀπολεσσητε*: their loss may also, however, be considered as a loss to those who had worked among them by the preaching of the gospel, so that, as far as the sense is concerned, the Rec. *ἀπολέσωμεν* is perhaps justifiable; but the reading *ἀπολέσηται*, “that they (*ἃ*) may not be lost,” also gives good sense, so that no cause exists for regarding it, with Lücke, as a mere clerical error.—If, however, that which was directly obtained by the work be lost again, then the future reward (*μισθός*) promised to Christians also disappears; therefore the apostle antithetically adds: *ἀλλὰ μισθὸν πλήρη ἀπολαβητε*. With the reading *ἀπολάβωμεν* we might be disposed to understand by the reward the heavenly gift which the apostle himself had to expect on account of his work; but he could not be deprived of this by the conduct of those among whom he had labored, as it depends not on the result, but on the faithfulness of the work; by *μισθός*, therefore, must certainly be understood the reward which those to whom John is writing have to expect; for this, however, the reading *ἀπολάβητε* is plainly more suitable than *ἀπολάβωμεν* (so also Brückner).—*μισθὸν πλήρη* is not = *μισθὸν πόλυν* (Carpzovius), but “full reward;” by *πλήρη* it is not meant that if they did not exhibit faithfulness they would receive only an imperfect reward, nor even that up to the present they had only received a part of the reward (Grotius, Aretius, Ebrard), but that the reward which, if they exhibit faithfulness, they shall obtain, is a quite full reward, in which there is nothing lacking (Düsterdieck, Brückner).

Ver. 9 brings out clearly the importance of abiding in the truth. — *πᾶς ὁ προάγων καὶ μὴ μένων*]. *προάγειν* and *μένειν* form a natural antithesis; *προάγειν* in the neuter sense, “to advance farther,” signifies here, in reference to *διδαχῆ*, “to advance beyond the limits of the (Christian) doctrine,” and contains an ironical allusion to the pretensions of the false teachers to have advanced to a higher degree of knowledge.¹ The Rec. *παραβαίωνων* means: “to pass by any thing;” we must supply along with it either *τὴν διδαχὴν* (according to the analogy of *παραβαίνειν τὴν ἐντολήν*, Matt. xv. 3), or *ὑπὸ (ἐκ) τῆς διδαχῆς*; comp. Acts i. 25: *ἀποστολῆς ὑφ’* (Rec. *ἐξ*) *ἧς παρέβη Ἰουδαίς*. It is clearly

¹ When Braune rejects this with the remark: “there is a bitter truth in fact,” he did

not consider in what connection the above was said.

unwarrantable to supply the idea *ἐντολή* out of ver. 7. — *καὶ μὴ μένων ἐν τῇ διδαχῇ τοῦ Χριστοῦ*; comp. John viii. 31: *μένειν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ ἐμῷ*; 2 Tim. iii. 14. — *τοῦ Χριστοῦ* is not the objective (Sander, Ebrard, etc.), but the subjective genitive (Düsterdieck, Ewald, Braune); the doctrine which, proceeding from Christ, was proclaimed by the apostles. — *Θεὸν οὐκ ἔχει*; comp. 1 John ii. 23. The doctrine of Christ is the truth; he who has not the truth has not God; for in its deepest source the truth is the living God Himself. Weiss (p. 29) unsatisfactorily interprets *ἔχειν* of the mere "possession in knowledge," in place of which, on p. 77, however, he says, "the possession effected by means of the contemplative knowledge of Christ," as if the latter were identical with the former. By the following sentence the same thought is expressed positively, and is completed by *τὸν υἱόν*, which is the cause of changing *Θεός* to *πατήρ*.¹

Ver. 10. Warning against fellowship with false teachers. *εἰ τις ἐρχεται πρὸς ὑμᾶς*]. The more particular definition of the *τις* is contained in the following: *καὶ . . . φέρει*. The particle *εἰ* is used here because "the case is put as if actual" (Winer). The author assumes the *ἐρχεσθαι* as really occurring, and in reference to it gives the command: *μὴ λαμβάνετε*; if he had regarded the coming as a thing which might only possibly occur, he would have put *ἐάν*; hence it is unsuitable to say that *εἰ τις* is un-Johannean (Ebrard), "for it cannot be un-Johannean to assume a case as a reality" (Braune). — *καὶ ταύτην τὴν διδαχὴν οὐ φέρει*] τ. τ. *διδ.*, namely, the *διδ. τοῦ Χριστοῦ*. The phrase *φέρειν τ. διδ.* only here in the N. T.; comp. the classical *μῦθον, ἀγγελίην φέρειν τινί*. — On *οὐ* after *εἰ*, see Al. Buttm., p. 299 (E. T., 348). Grotius rightly says: *non de iis qui alieni semper fuerunt ab ecclesia* (1 Cor. v. 10), *sed de iis qui volunt fratres haberi et doctrinam evertunt*. It is only with this interpretation that the prohibition of the apostle can be correctly understood. — *μὴ λαμβάνετε αὐτὸν εἰς οἰκίαν* is to be understood of the hospitable reception into our house, which is to be accorded to the brethren as such; the apostle therefore forbids the brotherly reception of such as bring not the doctrine of Christ, but another doctrine opposed to it, and are, accordingly, assiduous in asserting the latter. The limitation of the prohibition to the relationship of *φιλοξενία* (Rom. xii. 13; Heb. xiii. 2) finds no support in the words of the apostle. Now such a *κρίσις* was so much the more necessary, the more the false teachers sought to abuse the Christian hospitality, in order to gain for themselves access to the churches; comp. 2 Tim. iii. 6. — *καὶ χαίρειν αὐτῷ μὴ λέγετε*]. It is arbitrary to limit this prohibition, with Clemens Alex., to the *salutatio, quae fiebat, postquam surgebatur ab oratione solemnī velut gaudii et pacis indicium*; as well as to interpret it in that degree of generality which a Lapidé gives it when he says: *vetat hic Joh. omne colloquium, omne consortium, omne commercium cum haereticis*: just as little is it to be interpreted, with Vitringa (*De Synag. vet.*, p. 759), of the excommunication proper. This prohibition is in closest connection with

¹ According to Ebrard, this verse is a quotation of the passage 1 John ii. 23. But that this is not so is shown by the manifold devia-

tions, the existence of which can otherwise be explained only by arbitrary conjectures in an artificial way.

the preceding, and similarly refers to *εἰ τις ἔρχεται πρὸς ὑμᾶς, κ.τ.λ.*; it is meant to strengthen the former; not merely the hospitable reception into the house, but also the friendly greeting of the false teacher, if he comes as a Christian brother, is not to take place¹ (comp. Hofmann, *Schriftbew.*, ii. 2, p. 339). The word *χαίρειν*, as a formula of salutation, appears frequently both in the classics and also in the N. T., especially in Epistles; see Wahl on this word.

Ver. 11. Confirmation of the preceding prohibition. — *ὁ λέγων γὰρ αὐτῷ χαίρειν*]. The apostle mentions only this one thing, because what he says about it is self-evident in regard to the rest also. — *κοινωνεῖ τοῖς ἔργοις αὐτοῦ τοῖς πονηροῖς*, i. e., inasmuch as the *χαίρειν λέγειν* is not merely an outward display of politeness, but an expression of an intimate relation of fellowship. — By *τὰ ἔργα τὰ πονηρὰ* we are to understand, of course, the false doctrine, but, at the same time, along with this the whole evil character of the false teachers, which was very closely connected with their doctrine.²

Ver. 12. Justification of the shortness of the Epistle. — *πολλὰ ἔχων ὑμῖν γράφειν*, says the apostle, conscious as he was of having only given a few brief hints of that which was agitating his mind. — *οὐκ ἐβουλήθην διὰ χάριτος καὶ μέλανος*]. From the idea *γράφειν* the more general idea of communication is to be supplied. — *χάρτης* “is the Egyptian paper (papyrus), and probably the finer augustan sort, which served for letters (Hug, *Einkl.*, i. 106);” De Wette. — *μέλαν*, besides here, only in 3 John 13; 2 Cor. iii. 3. The following words: *ἀλλὰ ἐλπίζω*, state the reason of *οὐκ ἐβουλήθην*; by *ἀλλά* the reason is expressed in the form of an antithesis. — *γενέσθαι πρὸς ὑμᾶς*]. In the phrase: *γίγνεσθαι πρὸς*, the ideas of motion, and of rest, are both included; comp. *γιν. εἰς*, Acts xxi. 17, xxv. 15; the construction with *πρὸς*: 1 Cor. xvi. 10; comp. John x. 35; Acts x. 13, etc. — *καὶ στόμα πρὸς στόμα λαλῆσαι*]. An imitation of the Hebrew *הֶפֶז-לְהֶפֶז הֶפֶז*, Num. xii. 8; comp. *πρόσωπον πρὸς πρόσωπον*, 1 Cor. xiii. 12. Similar combinations in the classics also; Xen., *Mem.*, ii. 6, 32, *στόμα πρὸς στόμα* is used of a kiss. — *ἵνα ἡ χαρὰ, κ.τ.λ.*; comp. 1 John i. 4. With the reading *ἡμῶν* (see the critical notes) mutual joy is meant; comp. Rom. i. 11, 12.

Ver. 13. Presentation of the greeting from the children of the *κυρία*'s sister. If *κυρία* were a proper noun, we would have to suppose that the

¹ Ebrard contradicts himself when, in opposition to the interpretation given here, he first maintains that *χαίρειν λέγειν* here is the “quite general idea of the greeting of conventional politeness,” and afterwards interprets: “He who greets such a false teacher, i. e., keeps up personal acquaintance and conventional intercourse with him.”

² De Wette's remark, justly rejected by Brückner, is utterly erroneous: “This prohibition finds its justification in polemic zeal, and the necessity for defence against what seemed fatal to the maintenance of the Church. We, with the sure foundation of the Christian Church, and in accordance with the higher

view, then perhaps impossible, that man even in his errors still remains man, and an object of esteem and love, see in it impatience.”

— Difficult though it may be under present circumstances, considering the development which doctrine has taken, in many particular cases rightly to apply what is here said by John, yet it must still be regarded as a valid maxim, not only that the Christian should remain conscious of the antithesis between anti-Christianity and Christianity, but also that he should not deny this consciousness in his conduct towards his neighbor. — Better unjustifiably seeks to make use of the expression of the apostle as a weapon against union.

sister had either already died, or was not with her children near the apostle, as he would otherwise certainly have mentioned her. — Such uncertain hypotheses are removed by the correct explanation of *κυρία*; now it is self-evident that the *ἀδελφῆ* is the church from which John wrote this Epistle, — and the *τέκνα*, therefore, are its individual members; on *τῆς ἐκλεκτῆς*, comp. ver. 1.

Ἰωάννου ἐπιστολὴ τρίτη.

The superscription runs in B, \aleph : Ἰωάννου ᾗ; in C: Ἰω. ἐπιστολὴ ᾗ; in G: ἐπιστολὴ τρίτη τοῦ ἁγίου ἀποστόλου Ἰωάννου; in the Elzev. ed.: Ἰωάννου τοῦ ἀποστόλου ἐπιστολὴ καθολικὴ τρίτη.

Ver. 3. \aleph omits γάρ. — Ver. 4. In some min. is found, plainly as a correction, ταύτης instead of τοῦ τωυ. — Instead of ἔχω, B (*teste* *Mxjo*) has ἔχων (not mentioned by Buttm.), and instead of χαράν, B, 7, 35, Vulg., etc., read χαριν; Buttm. has retained the Rec. — Instead of the Rec. ἐν ἀληθείᾳ (according to C**, G, K, \aleph , Thph., Oec.), A, B, C*, etc., read ἐν τῇ ἀλ., which Lachm. and Tisch. have accepted; the omission of the article is explained by the preceding ἐν ἀλ., ver. 3. — Ver. 5. ἐργάζω]. Rec., according to B, C, G, K, S, all the min., Thph., Oec. (Tisch.), Lachm., following A, Vulg. (*operaris*), has accepted ἐργάζη, which, however, appears to be only an alteration on account of the present ποιεις. — Instead of καὶ εἰς τοὺς ξένους (Rec., according to G, K, etc.), καὶ τοῦτο ξένους must be read, with A, B, C, \aleph , etc., most of the versions, Lachm., and Tisch. — Ver. 6. Ewald arbitrarily conjectures: οἰς ἐμαρτίρῃσα. — The reading of C, ποίησας προπέμψεις, is clearly a correction. — Ver. 7. After ὀνόματος the Elzev. ed., following several min. and some vss., has αὐτοῦ, which is found in none of the greater MSS. (nor, according to Tisch. 7, in B). Buttm. has accepted this αὐτοῦ, and that, too, as the reading of B; Tisch. 2 also ascribes it to this codex, but with the remark: *e sil. collat.* Reiche says: Lachm.: *falso codicem B pro C αὐτοῦ citat. Codicem B αὐτοῦ non habere nunc e Maji atque Kuenii et Cobeti edit. constat.* — On the reading ἐξήλθαν (Lachm., Tisch. 7), comp. 2 John 7. — Instead of ἐθνῶν, Rec., according to G, K, etc., Lachm. and Tisch. have with justice accepted ἐθνικῶν, which is the reading of A, B, C, \aleph , and many others; Reiche, however, regards ἐθνῶν as the original reading. — Ver. 8. ἀπολαμβάνειν]. Rec., following C**, G, K, etc. Instead of it A, B, C*, \aleph , etc., read ὑπολαμβάνειν, which Lachm. and Tisch. have accepted, and in favor of which Reiche also declares himself. Both words are, in the signification in which they are here used, ἅπ. λεγόμενα; the overwhelming authorities are in favor of ὑπολ. — Instead of τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, \aleph * reads τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, clearly a correction. — Ver. 9. After ἔγραψα, A, B, C, \aleph (Lachm., Tisch.), read τι. The Rec. is only supported by G, K, some min., etc.¹ Two min., 29, 66**, have ἂν τι; and some others ἂν without τι; the Vulg.: *scripsissam forsitan.* These readings have arisen from an erroneous interpretation of the thought. — Ver. 10. Instead of βουλομένους is found in C, several min., Vulg.: ἐπίδεχομένους; a correc-

¹ Reiche incorrectly says: "Lectiones variae a rec. discedentes singulae non satis testatae sunt," whereas the overwhelming evidences decide in favor of τι being original. That B

reads ἔγραψας (Reiche), has not been observed either by Tischendorf 7 or by Buttmann. Should it be the case, it must be regarded merely as a clerical error.

tion. In \aleph , the preposition $\acute{\epsilon}\kappa$ is wanting before $\tau\eta\varsigma \acute{\epsilon}\kappa\kappa\lambda\eta\sigma\iota\alpha\varsigma$. — Ver. 11. The $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$ between δ and $\kappa\alpha\kappa\omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\omega\acute{\nu}$ (Rec.) is, according to almost all the authorities, to be deleted; it was interpolated to mark the antithesis. — Ver. 12. In Cod. C, to the words $\tau\eta\varsigma \acute{\alpha}\lambda\eta\theta\epsilon\iota\alpha\varsigma, \tau\eta\varsigma \acute{\epsilon}\kappa\kappa\lambda\eta\sigma\iota\alpha\varsigma$ $\kappa\alpha\iota$ is further prefixed. In A the reading is uncertain; according to the statement of Tisch., A* probably reads $\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\kappa\lambda\eta\sigma\iota\alpha\varsigma$ instead of $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\eta\theta\epsilon\iota\alpha\varsigma$; Lachm. states the reading thus: “ $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\eta . . . \theta\iota\alpha\varsigma$ corr. A, . . . $\theta\iota\alpha\varsigma$ pr. A.” — $\omicron\iota\delta\alpha\tau\epsilon$]. Rec., according to G, K, etc., several vss., Thph., Oec. (Tisch.). In A, B, C, \aleph , Vulg., etc., on the other hand, is found $\omicron\iota\delta\alpha\varsigma$, which Griesb. recommended, and Lachm. accepted. — If the overwhelming evidences were not for $\omicron\iota\delta\alpha\varsigma$, we might regard it as a correction, as $\omicron\iota\delta\alpha\tau\epsilon$ seemed objectionable in an Epistle addressed to *one* person. — Ver. 13. Instead of $\gamma\rho\acute{\alpha}\phi\epsilon\upsilon$ (Rec., according to G, K, etc., Oec.), the reading of A, B, C, \aleph , etc., almost all versions, Thph.: $\gamma\rho\acute{\alpha}\psi\alpha\iota$ $\sigma\omicron\iota$, accepted by Lachm. and Tisch., is to be preferred. — The reading in A, $\omicron\upsilon\kappa \acute{\epsilon}\beta\omicron\upsilon\lambda\acute{\eta}\theta\eta\eta\nu$, instead of $\omicron\upsilon \theta\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\omega$, has originated in 2 John 12. — Though the Rec. (according to G, K, etc., Thph., Oec.) has $\gamma\rho\acute{\alpha}\psi\alpha\iota$ at the close of the verse, A, B, C, \aleph , etc., here read $\gamma\rho\acute{\alpha}\phi\epsilon\upsilon$, which is justly accepted by Lachm. and Tisch. The pronoun $\sigma\omicron\iota$ is put *after* the verb in A, etc., Vulg., etc. (Lachm.); most of the authorities, however, decide in favor of its position *before* the verb (Tisch.). — Ver. 14. Instead of the Rec. $\acute{\iota}\delta\epsilon\iota\nu$ $\sigma\epsilon$ (G, K, \aleph , several versions, etc.), $\sigma\epsilon \acute{\iota}\delta\epsilon\iota\nu$ is probably to be read, with A, B, C, etc. (Lachm., Tisch.). — Ver. 15. Instead of $\alpha\iota \phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\alpha\iota$, A has $\omicron\iota \acute{\alpha}\delta\epsilon\lambda\phi\omicron\iota$; clearly a correction. — \aleph , sol., has $\acute{\alpha}\sigma\pi\alpha\sigma\alpha\iota$ for $\acute{\alpha}\sigma\pi\acute{\alpha}\zeta\omicron\nu$. — Only a few codd. (G, some min., etc.) have at the close the word $\acute{\alpha}\mu\acute{\eta}\nu$. — The subscription runs in A, B, \aleph , $\text{I}\omega\acute{\alpha}\nu\eta\nu \bar{\gamma}$; in G, $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\iota\sigma\tau\omicron\lambda\eta \bar{\gamma} \tau\omicron\upsilon \acute{\alpha}\gamma\iota\omicron\upsilon \acute{\alpha}\rho\omicron\sigma\tau\omicron\lambda\omicron\upsilon \text{I}\omega\acute{\alpha}\nu\eta\nu$; in other codd., still more prolix.

Ver. 1. Superscription. On $\delta \text{πρεσβύτερος}$, see the *Introd.*, sec. 1. With regard to the person of Caius, nothing particular is known; that he is identical with one of two (or three) Caiuses who are mentioned as friends and helpers of the Apostle Paul (comp. Acts xix. 29, xx. 4; 1 Cor. i. 14; and Rom. xvi. 23), is at least improbable.¹ It is also uncertain whether he is the same person as the Caius who, according to the *Constit. Apostol.*, vii. 46, is said to have been appointed by John as bishop in Pergamos (Mill., Whiston). That he was presbyter of the Church (Köstlin), does not follow from ver. 8. The apostle expresses his love to Caius in the epithet $\tau\omega \acute{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\pi\eta\omega$; how sincere it was, is shown by the fact that he not only adds: $\acute{\omicron}\nu \acute{\epsilon}\gamma\omega \acute{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\pi\omega \acute{\epsilon}\nu \acute{\alpha}\lambda\eta\theta\epsilon\iota\alpha$ (comp. with this 2 John 1), but also addresses him three times in the Epistle by $\acute{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\pi\eta\tau\acute{\epsilon}$. On $\acute{\epsilon}\nu \acute{\alpha}\lambda.$ Oecumenius here well observes: $\acute{\epsilon}\nu \acute{\alpha}\lambda\eta\theta\epsilon\iota\alpha \acute{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\pi\acute{\alpha} \delta \text{κατὰ Κύριον } \acute{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\pi\acute{\omega}\nu \acute{\epsilon}\nu\delta\iota\alpha\theta\acute{\epsilon}\tau\omega \acute{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\pi\eta$.

Ver. 2. Instead of with the usual formula of greeting, the Epistle begins with a wish for the welfare of Caius. — περὶ πάντων]. παντων is not masculine (Paulus: “on account of all, i. e., for the good of all”), but neuter. Several commentators, Beza, Castellio, Wahl, Lücke (first edition), Ewald, Düsterdieck, etc., interpret $\text{περὶ πάντων} = \text{πρὸ πάντων}$ here, and connect it

¹ Lücke thinks that if he was one of these, he would only be the Caius of Derbe (Acts xx. 4); yet he states no reason for this opinion, but merely refers to Wolf's *Curæ*; Wolf,

however, regards it as probable that he was the same as the Caius mentioned in 1 Cor. i. 14, whom he distinguishes as the Corinthian Caius from the Caius of Derbe.

with *εὔχομαι*; but *usus loquendi* and thought are opposed to this. Although *περί* in some passages in Homer indicates precedence, yet this signification is utterly foreign to the LXX. and the N. T.; besides, it is not to be supposed that the apostle would have so specially emphasized the wish referring to the external circumstances of life; *περὶ πάντων*, with most of the commentators (even Lücke, second edition), is rather to be connected with *σε εὐδοδοῦσθαι* (though not with *ὑγιαίνειν*) in its usual signification, “*in regard to all things.*” In reply to the objection which has been made out of the position of the words, Lücke with justice remarks: “it is put first with rhetorical emphasis, corresponding to *ἡ ψυχὴ*, which is compared with it, at the end.” — *εὔχομαι*, it is true, means also “to pray” (Jas. v. 15), but usually, “to wish,” so here also; that with John it was an *εὔχεσθαι πρὸς τὸν Θεόν*, is self-evident. — *σε εὐδοδοῦσθαι καὶ ὑγιαίνειν*. *εὐδοδοῦσθαι*, besides here, is only found in Rom. i. 10 and 1 Cor. xvi. 2; in both passages it means, “to be fortunate” (see Meyer on Rom. i. 10); similarly it signifies here also prosperity; comp. the detailed account of the usage of the word in the classics and in the LXX. by Lücke and Düsterdieck on this passage. — The apostle wishes that it may go well and happily with Caius in all *external* circumstances; that it is just these he has in view in *πάντων*, is clear from the contrasted *ψυχὴ*. By means of *ὑγιαίνειν* (= “to be in health,” comp. Luke v. 31, vii. 10, and other passages) one element of the general *εὐδοδοῦσθαι* is brought specially out. It is not to be inferred from the wish which is expressed, that Caius had been ill (Düsterdieck). — *καθὼς εὐδοοῦταί σου ἡ ψυχὴ*]. By the prosperity of the soul of Caius, to which the external welfare was to correspond, it is not the *natural* condition, as the sequel shows, but the Christian state of salvation, that is to be understood.

Ver. 3. Confirmation of the foregoing statement. — *ἐχάρην γὰρ λίαν*, see on 2 John 4. When and why the apostle felt such a joy, is stated in the two following participial sentences, of which, however, as far as the sense is concerned, the first is subordinate to the second; à Mons: *lorsque les frères qui sont venus ont rendu témoignage.* — *μαρτυρεῖν*, with the dative of the thing, “to testify of any thing;” comp. vv. 6, 12; John iii. 26, v. 33, xviii. 37. — By *σου τῆ ἀληθεία* it is not the truth in the objective sense (Calovius: *veritas evangelii*) in so far as Caius had received it, but the truth in the subjective sense, that is to be understood (so also Lücke, Düsterdieck, Braune, etc.): the inner Christian life, which is born of the truth, is itself truth; some commentators incorrectly limit the idea to a single element of it; e.g., Lorinus to *liberalitas*. — The addition, *καθὼς σὺ ἐν ἀληθείᾳ περιπατεῖς* (comp. 2 John 4), serves as an explanation of the preceding: “namely how thou,” etc. In the fact that the brethren testified that Caius was *walking* in the truth, they bore a testimony to the truth that was in him. The sentence is not “a direct sentence” (Baumgarten-Crusius: “as thou indeed art living in accordance with the truth”) by which “John adds his testimony to that of the brethren (Besser) in order to confirm it” (Ebrard), but “an indirect sentence” (Brückner) dependent on *μαρτυροῦντων*, on which a special emphasis is laid, as also the *ἀκούω* in ver. 4 shows (so also Düsterdieck, Braune). *σὺ* is emphatically used in contrast to those who do not walk *ἐν ἀληθείᾳ*.

Ver. 4 serves as confirmation of *ἐχάρην λίαν*. — *μειζότεραν*]. Grotius: *est ad intendendam significationem comparativus e comparativo factus*; similar formations occur in the classical language of poets and later writers; see Winer, p. 67 [E. T., 69]; in the N. T., comp. Eph. iii. 8. — *τούτων οὐκ ἔχω χαράν ἵνα*, κ.τ.λ. — “*I have not a greater joy than this, that*”; *τούτων* is not used for *ταύτης*, but “as an indefinite word is to be connected with the more definite *ἵνα*” (Lücke); some commentators incorrectly supply “*ἡ*” before *ἵνα*. John xv. 13 is to be compared with this passage; only that *ταύτης* is used there, but it does not refer, however, to something preceding, but finds its explanation in the following *ἵνα*.¹ — *τὰ ἐμὰ τέκνα*, not “all Christians;” but neither merely the converts of John, but the members of the churches which were under the special fatherly direction of the apostle (so also Braune).

Vv. 5, 6. Praise of Caius for his *φιλοξενία*, induced by that which he exhibited towards the brethren (ver. 3). — *πιστὸν ποιεῖς ὁ ἐὼν*, κ.τ.λ.]. By *πιστὸν* the conduct (*ποιεῖς*) of Caius, which he had shown towards the brethren, is described as *faithful*, i.e., corresponding to the Christian profession. Ebrard's view, that *πιστὸν ποιεῖν* is = the classical *πιστὸν* (= *πίστιν*) *ποιεῖσθαι* in the sense of “to give a pledge of faithfulness, a guaranty,” cannot be grammatically justified. By *ἐὼν* (= *ἄν*) the idea is generalized: “*every thing whatever*.” — *εἰς τοὺς ἀδελφοὺς καὶ τοῦτο ξένους*]. With the construction *ἐργάζεσθαι εἰς*, comp. Matt. xxvi. 10. By *καὶ τοῦτο* it is brought out that the *ἀδελφοί* to whom Caius is showing his love are *ξένοι*; even with the reading *καὶ εἰς τοὺς ξένους* the thought remains the same: *καί*, namely, is epexegetically used = “and that too;” as the *ξένοι* were Christians, they cannot be distinguished from the *ἀδελφοί*. Lücke takes *καί* in a specializing sense, “and particularly or especially;” but it is not brotherly love in general, but just the *φιλοξενία*, that is the subject here. That is to say, the apostle in this praise has specially in view what Caius had done to the brethren who had come to him (the Ap.: ver. 3), and who are also spoken of in vv. 6 and 7; these, however, were *ξένοι*.² — Ver. 6. *οἱ ἐμαρτύρησάν σου τῇ ἀγάπῃ ἐνώπιον ἐκκλησίας*]. That *οἱ* “dissociates the concrete representation of some from the generic representation of *ξένοι*” (De Wette), is incorrect: it rather refers directly to the previously mentioned *strange brethren*. By *ἐνώπιον ἐκκλησίας* we are not to think of the church to which Caius belonged, but of that in which John was sojourning. — *οὓς καλῶς ποιήσεις*, κ.τ.λ.]. The same brethren that had come from Caius to John wanted to return thither again, in order from thence to continue their missionary journey (ver. 7). John now recommends them to the loving care of Caius. — *οὓς* are not others (De Wette),

¹ In opposition to Meyer, who says on the passage cited, “the usual view, according to which *ἵνα* is taken as the explanation of *ταύτης*, does not correspond to the idea of purpose which is contained in *ἵνα*,” it may be observed that in the *usus loquendi* of the N. T., *ἵνα* has by no means retained the idea of *purpose* in its distinctness, and often serves, in reference

to the demonstrative pronoun, to state the meaning of the latter.

² The present *ποιεῖς* is not opposed to this view, as it would seem to be; it is explained by the fact that the apostle regards the single, special case, as an evidence of the *φιλοξενία* of Caius in general.

but the same as were spoken of in the preceding sentence. The combination of the future *ποιήσεις* and the aorist participle *προπέμφας* is strange, as the two verbs do not denote two different actions, but the *καλῶς ποιεῖν* consists in the *προπέμπειν*; it is different in Mark xiii. 13, Acts xxiv. 25, Rom. xv. 28, where two different actions are placed in connection with one another, and the aorist participle is used in the sense of the *fut. exacti* (see Winer, p. 321 [E. T., 342]). This has not been properly noticed by the commentators. The explanation of Düsterdieck: "The aorist form is to be explained by the fact that the good deed will consist in this, that Caius will have worthily brought the brethren forward," does not solve the difficulty, as the good deed consists in the bringing them forward itself. The apostle may have used the aorist, however, in the feeling that "the action of Caius is only completed when he has accomplished the equipment and escort of the brethren" (Braune). The same connection is found in Eurip., *Orest.*, 1210 ff.: *εὐτυχήσομεν . . . ἐλόντες*, which Matthiae (*Ausf. Gramm.*, second edition, p. 1087) translates, "if we are so fortunate as to take;"¹ in accordance with which we may translate here also, "thou shalt act worthily to accompany them." Luther, incorrectly, "thou hast done well that thou hast sent them on their journey;" in the revised edition, 1867, correctly, "thou shalt do well if thou sendest them on their journey." Ebrard arbitrarily conjectures, *εποίησας*. — It is quite evident from the connection with the sequel, that by *καλῶς ποιήσεις* John wants to encourage Caius to the *προπέμπειν*. The reading *ποίησας προπέμφεις* means: "whom thou, after thou hast treated them well, shalt bring forward on their journey." With *καλῶς ποιεῖν*, comp. Acts x. 13, Phil. iv. 14; with *προπέμπειν* = "to fit out for a journey," Rom. xv. 24, 1 Cor. xvi. 6, 16, Tit. iii. 13. — *ἀξίως τοῦ Θεοῦ* (comp. 1 Thess. ii. 12; Col. i. 10) does not belong to *καλ. ποιήσεις*, but to *προπέμφας* = "as worthy of God, with all care and love" (Lücke).

Ver. 7. Confirmation of the exhortation that has been uttered: the brethren deserve such help, for, etc. *ὑπὲρ γὰρ τοῦ ὀνόματος ἐξήλθαν*]. With the Rec. reading, *ὀνόματος αὐτοῦ*, *αὐτοῦ* refers back to *τοῦ Θεοῦ*; but this *αὐτοῦ* is to be regarded as an interpolation; τὸ ὄνομα (without *αὐτοῦ*) is neither "the Christian doctrine or religion," nor "the name of the brethren" (Paulus: "because they were called missionaries"), but "the name of Christ" (Lücke, De Wette, Baumgarten-Crusius, Sander, Braune, etc.), as in Acts v. 41 (according to the correct reading); comp. also Jas. ii. 7, and *Ignatii ep. ad Ephes.*, cap. 3 and 7. — *ὑπὲρ* is here used in the same sense as in Rom. i. 6, and *ἐξέρχασθαι* as in Acts xv. 40 (Lücke, De Wette, Baumgarten-Crusius, Sander, Braune, etc.); so that the sense is: for the sake of the name of Christ, i. e., for the spread of it, they went forth (as missionaries). Several commentators (Beza, Schmidius, Bengel, Carpzovius, Wolf) connect *ἐξήλθαν* with *ἀπὸ τῶν ἐθνικῶν [ἔθνων]* in the sense: *expulsi sunt a paganis*: but this idea is arbitrarily imported into *ἐξήλθαν*;² besides, the connection with

¹ The whole passage in Euripides runs: —
ἤξει δ' ες οἶκους Ἑρμιονη τίνος χρόνου;
ὡς τάλλα γ' εἶπας, εἰπερ εὐτυχήσομεν,
κάλλισθ, ἔλονται σκυμνον ανοσίου δοκῶ.

² Grotius, indeed, correctly connects *ἀπὸ τ. ἐθν.* with *λαμβάνοντες*, but interprets *ἐξήλθον*: "a Judaea ejecti sunt per Judaeos incredulos;" the erroneous idea that the apostle

ἀπὸ τ. ἔθν. is unsuitable, because then the words μηδὲν λαμβάνοντες remain too indefinite. The assertion of Wolf, that λαμβάνειν is not construed with ἀπό, is refuted by Matt. xvii. 25. By the addition, μηδὲν λαμβάνοντες ἀπὸ τῶν ἔθνικῶν, the necessity of assisting these brethren is brought out. The present participle is either used in the imperfect sense (ver. 3), or—as is more probable—it is used in order to indicate the μηδὲν λαμβάνειν ἀπὸ τ. ἔθν. as the maxim of these missionaries (so also Düsterdieck and Braune). It is very usual to regard this maxim as the same as that which Paul took for his, and of which he speaks in passages like 1 Cor. ix. 18; 2 Cor. xi. 7 ff., xii. 16 ff.; 1 Thess. ii. 9 ff.; but ἀπὸ τῶν ἔθνικῶν (= ἔθνων, comp. Matt. vi. 7, xviii. 17) does not suit this: the maxim of Paul was not to make the care for his support an obligation on the churches among which he labored, but here it is heathen that are spoken of. It was by these that these missionary brethren would not allow themselves to be assisted, because they did not want to build up Christ's work by the wealth of the heathen, but trusted to Christians that in Christian love they would provide for them what was needful.¹

Ver. 8 indicates "the highest point of view for Christian φιλοξενία" (Lücke).—ἡμεῖς οὖν]. ἡμεῖς emphatically forms the antithesis to οἱ ἔθνικοί; as they take nothing from the Gentiles, we Christians are bound to take an interest in them; ὀφείλομεν ὑπολαμβάνειν τοὺς τοιοῦτους]. ὑπολαμβάνειν is just as little used in the N. T., in the sense of hospitable reception (Oec. ὑποδέχεσθαι) as the ὑπολαμβάνειν that is found in the Rec. In the classics it appears (but not ὑπολαμβάνειν) both in this meaning and in the modified signification, "to support" (so in Strabo: οἱ εὐποροὶ τοὺς ἐνδεεῖς ὑπολαμβάνουσι); so it is to be taken here also, and in connection with it the play upon words, between λαμβάνοντες and ὑπο . . . λαμβάνειν, must not be overlooked.—ἵνα συνεργοὶ γινώμεθα τῇ ἀληθείᾳ]. Confirmation of ὀφείλομεν. The dative τῇ ἀληθ. is not dependent on συν; Vulg., *ut cooperatores simus veritatis*; Luther, "so that we may be helpers of the truth" (so Grotius, Bengel, Besser, etc.); but it is the dative of reference, and συν refers back to τοὺς τοιοῦτους (Brückner, Düsterdieck, Ebrard, Braune): "so that we may be their fellow-workers for the truth;" comp. 2 Cor. viii. 23, Col. iv. 11, where instead of the dative the preposition εἰς is used.

Vv. 9, 10. Notice of Diotrephes.—ἔγραψά τι τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ]. The τι, which according to the authorities is probably genuine, does not serve, as Lücke rightly remarks, to intensify = "something important," but rather to weaken = "something, a little."—The reading, ἔγραψα ἂν (Vulg.: *scripsissem forsitan*), has originated in the idea that the apostle would not write an epistle, of the unsuccessfulness of which he was previously convinced. The church to which the apostle wrote is not that from which the brethren (ver. 7) went forth (Bengel, Besser), but that to which Caius belonged. The opinion that this writing is the so-called First Epistle of John (Wolf, Storr, etc.) is just as untenable as the view that it is the Second Epistle of John (Ewald,

considered the *Jeios* as the antithesis of the Gentiles has clearly led him to this arbitrary interpretation.

¹ Ewald unsuitably deduces this maxim from the command of Christ, Matt. x. 8-10.

Besser, etc.), for the contents of these two have nothing in common with the circumstances which are here alluded to. This writing must, according to the context in which it is mentioned, have treated of the reception or support of the missionary brethren. If it was only such a short occasional writing, it is easily intelligible how it may have been lost; besides, however, it is natural to suppose that it was withheld from the church by Diotrephes. — ἀλλ' ὁ φιλοπρωτεύων αὐτῶν Διοτρεφῆς οὐκ ἐπιδέχεται ἡμῶς]. In these words the apostle expresses the experience which he had had of Diotrephes. It may be assumed that the apostle wrote to the church of Diotrephes in regard to the reception of the missionary brethren, and that the bearers of the epistle reported to him the conduct of Diotrephes, which he now tells to Caius. As to the more particular circumstances of Diotrephes, nothing further is known. From what John says about him, it cannot be inferred either that he was presbyter, or that he was deacon of the church; yet the contrary conclusion cannot either be drawn. When Grotius represents him as an opponent of the Jewish Christians, and others, on the contrary, regard him as a false teacher of Jewish or Gnostic views, these are unfounded conjectures; if either the one or the other were the case, John would certainly have indicated it. John only accuses him of one thing, namely, the φιλοπρωτεύειν, from which his unchristian conduct resulted. φιλοπρωτεύειν is a ἀπ. λεγ.; yet in the later Greek writers φιλόπρωτος and φιλοπρωτεία appear. The scholion in Matthiæ rightly explains ὁ φιλοπρωτεύων by ὁ ὑφαρπύζων τὰ πρωτεία: he ambitiously arrogated to himself the highest authority in the church, which made himself an opponent of the apostle. By what means he was able to obtain validity for this assumption, we do not know; perhaps by assembling the church in his house. — αὐτοῦ refers to ἐκκλησία, as a collective idea. — οὐκ ἐπιδέχεσθαι ἡμῶς]. ἐπιδέχεσθαι, in the N. T. only here and in ver. 10, means "to receive;" it is incorrect to change ἡμῶς into "our epistles or exhortations" (Grotius, Lücke, De Wette, etc.). In the fact that Diotrephes rejected the communication of the apostle, and refused to receive the brethren recommended in it, he justly obtained rejection for himself (so also Braune). It is unnecessary, therefore, to ascribe to ἐπιδέχεσθαι here the modified meaning, "to accept, to let pass," in which it appears in the classics. Ver. 10. δὲ τοῦτο, ἐν ἔλθω, ὑπομνήσω, κ.τ.λ.]. Though, in the absence of John, Diotrephes resisted his authority, yet John hoped by his presence to obtain for it its due weight, and therefore he had resolved to come himself to that church, and personally to oppose the intrigues of Diotrephes. — With ὑπομνήσω, which is here used with the secondary signification of blame, it is not necessary to supply αὐτόν; although Diotrephes is meant, yet John did not write αὐτόν, because he had in view at the same time all those who adhered to him (so Braune, correctly); comp. 2 Tim. ii. 14. In what the ἔργα of Diotrephes, to which the apostle intends the ὑπομνήσκειν to refer, consisted, the following participial clauses state.¹ — λόγος πονηροῖς φλυαρῶν ἡμῶς]. φλυαρεῖν (in the

¹ Ewald strangely overlooks the following words when, after translating the preceding words, he says: "But the author cannot dwell

on this painful incident; he breaks off abruptly, to turn back to the good, exclaiming, Beloved!" etc.

N. T. a ἄπ. λεγ.; the adj. φλόγος, 1 Tim. v. 13) = *nugari*; Oecumenius paraphrases it by λουδορεῖν, κακολογεῖν: this, however, does not express the idea of the chatter *that says nothing*, which is contained in φλναρεῖν. The verb, in itself intransitive, is here construed with the accusative (as θριαμβεῖω, Col. ii. 15; μαθητεύω, Matt. xxviii. 19), thus, “*he prates against us slanderously with wicked words.*” — καὶ μὴ ἄρκούμενος ἐπὶ τούτοις]. Diotrophes did not content himself with φλναρεῖν against the apostle alone (ἀρκεῖσθαι is only here used in construction with ἐπὶ; elsewhere the dative is found; Luke iii. 14; Heb. xiii. 5, and other passages); he injured the brethren also. — οὔτε αὐτὸς ἐπιδέχεται τοὺς ἀδελφούς καὶ, κ.τ.λ.]. With οὔτε the following καὶ corresponds; αὐτὸς is contrasted with τοὺς βουλομένους. — There is no reason to take ἐπιδέχεσθαι here in a different sense from that of ver. 9, although it takes a different bearing towards different persons, one way in regard to the apostle, another way in regard to the ἀδελφοί, who are here mentioned, and who are to be regarded as ξένοι; they are the same as were spoken of previously (ver. 7, etc.). — With τοὺς βουλομένους we are to understand ἐπιδέχεσθαι αὐτούς (C reads just ἐπιδεχομένους instead of βουλ.); there were therefore some persons in the church who were ready to receive the strangers, in opposition to Diotrophes; but Diotrophes did not permit it, nay, he opposed them with all force. — καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἐκκλησίας ἐκβάλλει]. It is not τοὺς ἀδελφούς, but τοὺς βουλομένους, that is the object. — ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῆς ἐκκλησίας signifies expulsion from the church, as the object is not τοὺς ἀδελφούς, but τοὺς βουλομένους; the expression is arbitrarily weakened if we understand by it merely that “Diotrophes no longer admitted those who opposed him to the meetings of the church which he held in his house” (Braune). The common opinion is, that Diotrophes had actually already expelled some persons from the church, whether irregularly by means of faction, or with arrogant violence, or whether by intrigues he had brought about resolutions of the church to that effect; but it is also possible that the apostle describes as an act of Diotrophes what he in his pride had threatened to do, so that the expression then is one of keen irony. — If arbitrary hypotheses are not admitted, we must regard as the cause of the behavior of Diotrophes only his vanity — which showed itself in his φιλοπρωτεύειν. By the way in which a part of the church (especially Caius) had interested itself in the strangers, and had been mentioned in John’s communications on the subject, Diotrophes, in his vanity, had probably felt offended, and this had excited his anger, which led him to the conduct which John rebukes in such simple but severe words.

Ver. 11. From the special case the apostle deduces an exhortation of general import. — μὴ μμοῦ τὸ κακόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀγαθόν]. On μμείσθαι, comp. especially Heb. xiii. 7. — The expressions, τὸ κακόν and τὸ ἀγαθόν, can so much the less be regarded as un-Johannean (De Wette), as in John v. 29 the corresponding antithesis, τὰ ἀγαθὰ and τὰ φαῦλα, is found, and in John xviii. 23 the neuter singular τὸ κακόν. The additional sentence, ὁ ἀγαθοποιῶν . . . τὸν Θεόν, expresses the same thought that frequently appears in the First Epistle of John, especially in chap. iii. 6. — The ideas, ἀγαθοποιεῖν and κακοποιεῖν, are to be taken quite generally, and must not be limited to the special virtue of benevolence (a Lapide, Lorinus, Grotius, Paulus); comp. 1 Pet. ii. 14, 15, 20,

iii. 6, 17. — The corresponding expressions, *ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ εἶναι* and *ἔωρα-κέναι τὸν Θεόν*, are used also in the First Epistle of John; but why the Johannean *οὐκ ἔγνω τὸν Θεόν* (1 John iv. 8), should be more conformable to the style of John than the equally Johannean *οὐχ ἔώρακε τὸν Θεόν* (1 John iii. 6), as Lücke and De Wette think, is not quite perceptible.

Ver. 12. As the apostle, by *μὴ μιμοῦ τὸ κακόν*, has warned Caius against imitation of Diotrephes, so he now puts Demetrius before him as an example for imitation — corresponding to *ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀγαθόν*. Who this Demetrius was, however, and where he had his abode, is not stated. Ebrard thinks that he had been one of the *βουλόμενοι* (ver. 10) in the church of Diotrephes, and had perhaps been excommunicated by him; but in that case Caius must have known him, so that he did not require this strong testimony of the apostle in his favor; the view that he was the bearer of the Epistle (Düsterdieck, Lücke, etc.) is more probable. — *μεμαρτύρηται* refers — in accordance with John's usage of the perfect — not merely to a past, but also to a present record. *μαρτυρεῖσθαι* frequently appears in the same absolute way as here, especially in the Acts; comp. chap. vi. 3, x. 22, and *passim*. — *πάντων* is not to be extended to the heathen, with Oecumenius and Theophylact, but refers to the church to which Demetrius belonged; Ebrard incorrectly understands by it "the brethren," vv. 10, 7, 5; the apostle would have distinctly mentioned them, and besides, the *πάντων*, which is clearly used emphatically, would be unsuitable in reference to them. — *καὶ ὑπ' αὐτῆς τῆς ἀληθείας*]. Whilst the commentators are agreed in this, that the truth is here personified, they deviate widely from one another in their more particular definition of the idea; most of them understand by it the life of Demetrius as that which testifies for him, whether they interpret *ἀλήθεια* = reality (Hornejus: *ipsa rei veritas*; Grotius: *res ipsae*) or as the life itself, in so far as it is a testimony to his virtue (Beausobre: *c'est à dire, que sa conduite est un témoin réel de sa vertu*). This, however, is incorrect, as both the expression itself (*αὐτῇ ἢ ἀλήθεια*) and also its position (between *πάντες* and *ἡμεῖς*) indicate that the apostle meant by *ἡ ἀλήθεια* something objectively contrasted with Demetrius. Düsterdieck (with whom Braune agrees) has rightly perceived this; but as he at the same time retains the reference to the life, he finds the testimony of the objective Christian truth in the fact that it gives commandments to man, and that, inasmuch as Demetrius fulfils them, it is by these commandments that the truth bears a good testimony to him. But apart from the fact that this introduction of the commandments cannot be justified, the whole interpretation has something too artificial to permit of its being regarded as correct. The hypothetical interpretation of Lücke: "if the infallible Christian truth, comp. ver. 3, itself were asked, it would give him a good testimony" (similarly Schlichting), does not suit the positive *μεμαρτύρηται*. It is too far-fetched, with Baumgarten-Crusius, to regard the result of the Christian activity of Demetrius as the testimony of the truth to him. A simple, clear idea would be brought out if, with Sander, we could regard it as "a special testimony which John had received through the Holy Ghost in reference to Demetrius;" but there is no justification for this. The correct way will be to interpret *ὑπ' αὐτῆς τῆς ἀληθείας* in close con-

nection with ὑπὸ πάντων, and to conclude that the apostle adds the former in order to bring out the fact that the good report of all has its origin not merely in their human judgment, but in the testimony of the ἀλήθεια which dwells in them (so also Brückner); and that the expression αὐτῇ ἡ ἀλήθεια is not merely a personification, but is a description of the Holy Ghost (comp. 1 John v. 6: τὸ πνεῦμά ἐστιν ἡ ἀλήθεια). The opinion that αὐτῇ ἡ ἀλήθεια, in contrast with πάντες, cannot be the truth that produces their testimony, and that testifies for Demetrius (Ebrard,¹ Braune), is refuted by John xv. 26, 27, as here, in a quite similar way, the testimony of the Spirit of truth is conjoined with the testimony of the disciples, the latter being produced and confirmed by the former. — To the testimony of *all*, the apostle further specially adds his *own*: καὶ ἡμεῖς δὲ μαρτυροῦμεν]. By καὶ . . . δέ a stronger emphasis is laid on ἡμεῖς. — With καὶ οἶδας, κ.τ.λ., comp. John xix. 35, xxi. 24. — By the reading, οἶδάτε, Caius and his friends are addressed together.

Vv. 13, 14. The same thoughts as in 2 John 12; even the expression is little different; this agreement is most naturally explained by the contemporaneousness of the two Epistles. — πολλὰ εἶχον γράψαι]. “*I would have many things to write to thee, but . . .*” as in Acts xxv. 22; comp. Winer, p. 265 (E. T., 282); A. Buttmann, p. 187 (E. T., 216 f.) (De Wette); an ἄν is not omitted. Düsterdieck and Ebrard translate: “I had much to write,” unsuitably, because the apostle is not speaking of the past, but of the present. — Instead of paper (Second John), it is the κάλαμος, “*the writing-reed*,” that is mentioned as the writing material along with the ink. — On ἐλπίζω δὲ, κ.τ.λ., see ἐὰν ἔλθω, ver. 10.

Ver. 15. εἰρήνη σοι]. The blessing at the end of the First Epistle of Peter runs similarly; comp. besides, Gal. vi. 16; Eph. vi. 23; 2 Thess. iii. 16 (also Rom. xv. 33; 2 Cor. xiii. 11; 1 Thess. v. 23; Heb. xiii. 20). — ἀσπάζονται σε οἱ φίλοι, κ.τ.λ.]. It is in harmony with the character of the Epistle, as a private communication, that John does not send greetings from the whole church, but from the special friends of Caius, and so also commissions him with greetings only to his (the apostle’s) φίλοι. The latter was the more natural, as indeed a part of the church was at enmity with John. — On κατ’ ὄνομα, comp. John x. 3; it belongs to ἀσπάζου, and is = ὀνομασί (see Meyer on this passage); the personal relationship is thereby emphasized, as Caius is to greet every one of the friends specially (by name).

¹ Ebrard’s view, that we are here “to consider the truth as a power and might showing itself in the life of Demetrius; the truth which mightly showed itself in him in those days in the relations with Diotrophes, without doubt

(!) in the fact that for the sake of the ἀλήθεια he endured serious ill-treatment or suffering,” is clearly affected, apart from other defects, by arbitrary importations.

THE EPISTLE OF JUDE.

INTRODUCTION.

SEC. 1.—AUTHOR AND READERS OF THE EPISTLE.

THE author to his name Jude subjoins the particular designations: Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ δούλος and ἀδελφός δὲ Ἰακώβου. The first of these designations is no evidence against his apostleship, as Arnaud correctly observes (see Phil. i. 1; Philem. 1); but the second is, inasmuch as it is not credible that an apostle, in order to make himself known, should have named himself according to his relationship to another, whether that other be an apostle or not. It is true, in order to prove the identity of the author of this Epistle with the Apostle Jude, whom Matthew (x. 3) names Λεββαῖος (Rec. adds: ὁ ἐπικληθεὶς Θαδδαῖος), and Mark (iii. 18) Θαδδαῖος, the fact has been appealed to that Luke (Acts i. 13; Luke vi. 16) calls him Ἰούδας Ἰακώβου; but it is arbitrary to supply to Ἰακώβου, ἀδελφός, instead of the usual supplement νίος; see Meyer on Luke vi. 16. It is to be observed, against Winer (*Bibl. Realw.*, under the word *Judas*), who will supply ἀδελφός, because in Matt. x. 3 and Mark iii. 18, Lebbæus is directly united by καί with James as an apostolic pair, that this is properly only the case in the first passage; but in that very passage, where a brotherly relationship exists, as with Peter and Andrew, and with John and James, this is expressly stated; whilst Philip and Bartholomew, Thomas and Matthew, Simon and Judas Iscariot, are united together by καί, without any assertion that these pairs so united are brothers. The very mode and manner, then, in which James the son of Alphæus, and Jude, are placed together in the apostolic lists, proves that they were not brothers.—Further, if it be possible that an apostle could refer to the apostles generally, as is done in this Epistle (vv. 17, 18), yet that mode of expression is more natural in the mouth of one who was not an apostle than in the mouth of an apostle.—Jude does not more definitely state who this *James* was, whom he calls his brother.

But doubtless he was *that* James who, from an early period, stood at the head of the church in Jerusalem. — Since, then, from preponderating proofs (see Introduction, section 1, to commentary on the Epistle of James), it is to be assumed that this James, who was called the brother of the Lord, is not identical with the Apostle James the son of Alphaeus,¹ it is also not to be doubted that Jude is not a brother of the latter, but of the former, and, consequently, likewise a brother of Jesus. That, nevertheless, he does not call himself the brother of Jesus, cannot appear strange, since the bodily relationship to the Lord must retire before the spiritual relationship, which he expresses by the appellation *Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ δοῦλος*; it is the same reason which induced James in his Epistle not to designate himself as a brother of the Lord. — We possess only very uncertain notices of the personal history and labors of Jude (for an account of them, see Arnaud), which are the less to be considered as historical, since they are not only frequently contradictory, but also in them the author of the Epistle and the Apostle Jude are confounded together.

The readers, for whom this Epistle was primarily intended, are described only in the most general terms, and neither their locality nor their condition is definitely stated. There is no indication that the Epistle was written only to Jewish Christians. Arnaud, indeed, with truth remarks: "Jude expounds his proofs in a manner peculiar to the Jews. From the beginning to the end he uses their mode of speech and their manner of expressing an idea; he employs images and comparisons, makes allusions, and uses myths,

¹ Thiersch (*Herst. des. Hist. Standp.*, etc., p. 430 f.) rightly observes: "If ever a critical view concerning historical persons was artificial and unnatural, assuredly that is which regards *the brothers of the Lord* as the cousins of Jesus, the sons of Clopas and a Mary, a sister of the mother of Christ. Herder's argument against this view is so obvious and striking, that it is almost unintelligible how such an hypothesis, which does violence to a series of passages, should even down to our times be maintained by critics." — If, on the contrary, Dietlein ("Review of Arnaud's Researches," etc., in the *Allg. Repert. von Reuter*, August, 1851) maintains the idea of the Messianic family, in order to reckon among the ἀδελφοῖς, besides the cousins, also the uncle, etc., of Jesus, history is thereby subordinated to hypothesis. The same is the case when

Schott maintains that "it is opposed to the spirit of the N. T. history of salvation, that an actual brother of the Lord should attain to such a high position in the church, as James obtained as chief of the church of Jerusalem;" and when he declares that "it is a historical necessity that the actual brothers of Jesus should retire into the background." The other proofs by which Schott, who considers the so-called "brothers of Jesus" as his actual brothers, will attempt to prove that the James and Jude here mentioned belong not to them but to the apostles, are not here, but in the commentary to the Epistle of James, discussed; so also with regard to the view of Hofmann, who likewise regards the author of this Epistle and his brother James as the Apostles Jude and James.

traditions, and examples, which were familiar to them." But all this might have its reason in the individuality of the writer, without being conditioned by a regard to the readers. Most expositors assume that the readers resided in Asia Minor; on the contrary, Schmidt, Credner, Augusti, Arnaud, and Wiesinger are of opinion that they are to be sought for in Palestine. The question cannot with certainty be decided.

SEC. 2. — OBJECTS AND CONTENTS OF THE EPISTLE. TIME AND PLACE OF ITS COMPOSITION.

The Object of the Epistle is the confirmation of the readers in the gospel published to them by the apostles, in opposition to certain intruders, who, abusing the liberty of the gospel, gave themselves up to immoral excesses, and even to blaspheming the divine majesty. De Wette, Schweglér, Arnaud, Reuss, Bleek, Brückner, and Hofmann consider them to be only vicious men. On the contrary, Dorner (*Entwicklungsgesch. der Lehre von der Person Christi*, Thl. i., p. 104) observes: "The opponents of Jude are not only corrupt in practice, but also heretical teachers." They are not indeed described as actual false teachers; but yet from vv. 4, 8, 18, 19, we can hardly think otherwise than that their libertinism was conjoined with dogmatic (perhaps Gnostic) errors; on which account also Brückner states that "they had points which bordered on the dogmatic;" and Hofmann says that "they screened their immoral conduct by blasphemous assumptions." Weiss (*Petrin. Frage* ii., in *Stud. u. Krit.*, 1866, II. 2) calls them "Libertines on principle."¹ That they attached themselves to a particular definite Gnostic system, for example, that of the Carpocratians (Clemens Alexandrinus), cannot be proved. Their tendency appears to have been related to the error of the Nicolaitanes and the Balaamites (Rev. ii.); (Thiersch, Wiesinger, Schott). Jude opposes to them simply the apostolic gospel, without particularly characterizing the points of their contradiction to it.

It is peculiar to this Epistle, that passages occur in it which appear to be taken from the apocryphal Book of Enoch, or, if this should not be the case, at least to have arisen from an apocryphal tradition of Enoch; as the quotation contained in vv. 14, 15; the statement about the sin of the

¹ See also Ritschl, *Abhandl. üb. die im Br. des Judas Charakterisirten Antinomisten in d. Stud. u. Krit.*, 1861, part I. p. 103 ff. The opinion of Ritschl, that these heretics had

retained only abstractly their principle that grace establishes freedom to practise immorality, has been justly rejected by Wiesinger as unwarrantable.

angels and their punishment, ver. 6; the description of the false teachers, ver. 8; also the reference (ver. 9) to the apocryphal tradition of the contest of Michael with the Devil is peculiar.¹ This admixture of apocryphal traits can, on an unprejudiced consideration, only serve to strengthen the conviction that the Epistle does not proceed from an apostle.

The Train of Thought is as follows: After the address, in which the readers are only generally characterized as Christians, the author states that he esteemed it necessary to exhort them to continue in the faith delivered to them (ver. 3), and that because of certain intruders, whom he designates as lascivious men and deniers of Jesus Christ, whose condemnation was certain (ver. 4). That this condemnation will come upon them, he confirms by three examples: that of the people delivered from Egypt, that of the fallen angels, and that of the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah (vv. 5-7). These intruders are then described by two characteristics, namely, as defilers of the flesh and as despisers and blasphemers of heavenly dignities; the greatness of their sin is brought prominently forward by comparison with the conduct of Michael in his contest with the Devil, and a woe is denounced upon them as those who walk in the way of Cain, Balaam, and Korah (vv. 8-11). In the following verses (vv. 12, 13) the author proceeds with his description, adducing their debauchery at the Agapae, and representing in various figurative expressions their vain and impudent conduct, by which he is reminded of the judgment which awaits them, quoting for this purpose a saying of Enoch as a prophecy which holds good of them (vv. 14, 15). To this succeed some additional characteristics of those erroneous teachers, to which an exhortation to the readers is added to be mindful of the words of the apostles who have prophesied of the appearance of such mockers (vv. 16-18). After Jude, with another glance at his opponents, has exhorted his readers to keep themselves by faith and prayer in the love of God, and to wait for the mercy of Christ (vv. 19-21), he gives a short direction how to behave toward those who have been already perverted (vv. 22, 23). A doxology forms the conclusion of the Epistle (vv. 24, 25).

The Epistle contains no other data for the determination of the *time* of its composition than the description of the heretics and the exhortation to attend to the preaching of the apostles; but from these it may be inferred

¹ Hofmann disputes this, maintaining that in Jude there occurs only an interpretation or expansion of what is stated in Scripture, and which is as justified as that which occurs in

Acts vii. 22 f., xiii. 21; Gal. iv. 23; Heb. xi. 37; 2 Tim. iii. 8; although he grants that more is signified in Jude than in these passages.

that it belongs not to the earlier, but, as most expositors assume,¹ to the later apostolic age; although "there is no necessity, with Reuss, to assign it to the extreme limits of the apostolic literature" (Brückner). Although in the Pastoral Epistles the immoral life of the heretics there attacked is censured, yet libertinism does not appear to have attained to the same stage of development as with the opponents of Jude; and Jude would hardly have appealed to the preaching of the apostles as a thing of the past, if the apostles were yet at the height of their apostolic activity. Bertholdt, Guericke, Stier, Arnaud, and others think, from the fact that there is no mention of the judgment of God on Jerusalem, that it is to be inferred that the Epistle was written before the destruction of that city, since Jude would certainly not have omitted this most fearful and most significant judgment, if it had already taken place, particularly as he mentions almost all the most noted examples of divine judgments. But this conclusion is very uncertain, especially as the hypothesis on which it is founded is incorrect. Jude takes at random only *some* of many examples, and indeed such — at least this is evidently the case with the judgment on the angels, and with that on Sodom and Gomorrha — as refer to a definite kind of sin, which is not applicable to the judgment on Jerusalem. He mentions neither the deluge nor the first destruction of Jerusalem. From the relation which exists between this Epistle and the apocryphal Book of Enoch, nothing certain regarding the period of composition can be inferred, particularly as the opinion concerning that relation is by no means settled; for whilst early critics assert the origin of this book, at least in its original condition, to pre-Christian times, and assume later interpolations, as Lücke (*Einleitung in die Offb. Joh.*, etc.), Ewald, Weizsäcker (*Untersuchungen über die evangel. Geschichte*), Köstlin (*Tübing. theol. Jahrb.*, 1856), especially Dillmann (*Das Buch Henoch übersetzt und erklärt*, 1853), and others; Hofmann and Ferd. Philippi (in his book, *Das Buch Henoch, sein Zeitalter*, etc., 1868) attempt to prove that it belongs to the Christian age, and was composed by a Jewish Christian; the reasons, however, adduced by them are not sufficient to cause us to regard the result of their examination as well founded.

Mayerhoff (*Einl. in die Petrin. Schriften*, p. 195) supposes the *place of composition* to be Egypt, because Clemens Alexandrinus first quotes it,

¹ The reasons by which Schott endeavors to prove that the Epistle was written at the end of the year 70, or the beginning of the

year 80, are too uncertain to enable us to draw this conclusion with certainty.

because the images employed in ver. 12 refer to a country which bordered on the sea, and was frequently exposed to draught by the east and south winds, and because the Book of Enoch was first used in Egypt. But Schwegler has correctly rejected these reasons as insufficient.

SEC. 3.—AUTHENTICITY OF THE EPISTLE.

Eusebius reckons this Epistle, as indeed all the Catholic Epistles except First John and First Peter, among the Antilegomena. The earliest Fathers who mention it are Tertullian (*De Habit. Mul.*, c. 3) and Clemens Alexandrinus (*Strom.*, iii. p. 431, *Paedag.*, iii. 8, p. 239, ed. Sylb.), who has also commented on it. Origen often quotes it, and distinguishes it by special praise; *Comm. on Matt.*, xiii. 55: Ἰούδας ἔγραψεν ἐπιστολὴν, ὀλιγόστιχον μὲν, πεπληρωμένην δὲ τῶν τῆς οὐρανοῦ χάριτος ἐβρωμένων λόγων. He, however, indicates that its genuineness is doubted by many. Jerome also mentions these doubts, saying that many rejected it on account of the quotation from the apocryphal Book of Enoch; he himself, however, considered it as genuine. It is wanting in the Peshito (but not in the MS. in the Bodleian Library at Oxford; see Guericke, *Einkl.*, p. 42); but, on the other hand, it is mentioned in the Muratorian Canon. Since the fourth century it has been generally acknowledged as a genuine canonical writing. As the author does not call himself an apostle, criticism in more recent times was more inclined to consider it authentic than some other writings of the N. T. Even De Wette observes, that there is no reason why Jude should not be the author of this Epistle; neither its use of the Book of Enoch, nor its probable acquaintance with the Epistle to the Romans, nor its harsh style though betraying a familiarity with the Greek language, is opposed to this. — Schwegler judges otherwise. He infers from vv. 17, 18, that the Epistle belongs to the post-apostolic times, although in point of doctrine its character is very simple and undeveloped. He thinks that the forger chose the name of Jude the brother of James, in order to indicate the community of principle with this latter person. In opposition to this it is to be observed, that, had the Epistle been written in the interests of Jewish Christianity against Pauline, we should surely have found indications of this; and a forger would hardly have attributed his writing to Jude, a person otherwise so entirely unknown. The above-mentioned verses by no means point to a post-apostolic age, since they rather suppose that the readers have heard the preaching of the apostles. The fact that we find no definite references to

this Epistle among the early Fathers, and that its genuineness at a later period was not wholly undoubted, is easily accounted for, partly from its special tendency (particularly from doctrine being so little referred to), partly from the apocryphal traits with which it is pervaded, and partly from the fact that the author did not belong to the apostles.

Ἰούδα ἐπιστολή.

Instead of this superscription (in A, C, K), there is found in B only Ἰούδα.

Ver. 1. Instead of Ἰησ. Χρ. (Rec., after A, B, L, 8, etc., several vss., etc., Lachm., Tisch. 8), Tisch. 7 had adopted Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ, after K, P, etc., without sufficient justification. — ἡγιασμένοις]. Rec., after K, L, P, etc.; instead of this, ἡγαπημένοις, in A, B, 8, 5, al., Syr., utr., Erp., Copt., etc., Orig., Eph., is adopted by Lachm. and Tisch. It is true that there are exegetical difficulties connected with the latter reading, but it is too strongly defended by authorities to be on that account considered spurious. Reiche, Schott, Hofmann, have declared for it, Wiesinger against it; Brückner is undecided. — Ver. 3. τῆς κοινῆς σωτηρίας]. Rec., after K, L, P, al.; Tisch. 7 has retained this reading; Lachm. and Tisch. 8, on the contrary, read κοινῆς ἡμῶν σωτηρίας, for which A, B, C, 8, 5, al., Syr., Erp., Sahid., Theoph., Lucif., testify. The weight of authorities is in favor of this latter reading; it is possible that ἡμῶν was omitted in order to give to the idea a universal character. — Ver. 4. Instead of the usual form χάριν, Lachm. and Tisch., after A, B, read χάριτα, which occurs in classical writers only among the poets (see Buttman, *Ausf. gr. Sprachl.*, § 44. *Ann.* 1) [E. T., 13]. — τὸν μόνον δεσπότην καὶ κύριον ἡμῶν Ἰ. Χρ., with Griesbach, Scholz, Tittmann, Lachm., Tisch., after the testimonies of A, B, C, 8, 10, Lect. 1, 3, Erp., Copt., Sahid., etc., Eph., Didym., Chrys. — The Rec. has after δεσπότην the word Θεόν (in K, L, P, etc., Syr., utr., Thph.), which, however, is a later addition, the more definitely to distinguish δεσπότην from κύριον ἡμῶν. In later MSS. many other variations are found, namely, Θεὸν καὶ δεσπότην τὸν κύρ. ἡμ. Ἰ. Χρ., or δεσπότην καὶ Θεὸν τὸν κύρ. ἡμ. Ἰ. Χρ., or Θεὸν δεσπότην καὶ κύρ. ἡμ. Ἰ. Χρ. — Ver. 5. After εἰδότας, the Rec. has ὑμᾶς; Lachm. and Tisch. have omitted it; it is wanting in A, B, C**, several min., etc., but is found in K, L, 8, etc. It may have been omitted on account of the preceding ὑμᾶς. — τοῦτο (Rec., after K, L, etc.) appears to be an explanatory correction instead of the original πάντα, for which A, B, C**, 8, etc., Vulg., etc., testify; also Reiche considers πάντα as the original reading. 8 has ἀπαξ after κύριος, so also several versions, yet after ὅτι κύριος. Two reasons co-operated for this displacement: (1) because ἀπαξ did not appear to suit εἰδότας, and (2) because the following τὸ δεύτερον appeared to require a word corresponding with σώσας. Tisch. on this observes: *quae quidem lectio omnino praeferenda esset alteri, nisi incredibile esset ἀπαξ locum post εἰδότας a quopiam correctore nactum esse.* Reiche remarks: *loco, quem vulgo occupat, testium auctoritate servari debet.* — The Rec. ὁ κύριος is found in K, L, most min., some vss., and Fathers; Tisch. 7 has retained it; Tisch. 8 reads, after C*, 8, κύριος without the article. A, B, several min., etc., have Ἰησοῦς instead of κύριος (on this Tisch. 8 remarks: *articulum om. et A, B, et reliqui qui Ἰησοῦς praebent*); Lachm. and Buttm. have adopted ὁ Ἰησοῦς; C** and Lucif.

read δ *Θεός*. The reading *Ἰησοῦς* (instead of *κύριος*) is indeed very strange, but might for this reason be changed into the other readings.— Ver. 6. Instead of *τε* after *ἀγγέλους* (Tisch.), A, some min., etc., have *δέ*. Lachm. has *δέ* in the text-edition; but, on the other hand, in the larger edition he has rightly again adopted *τε*.— Ver. 7. *τούτοις τρόπον*]. Rec., after K, L, etc.; a correction instead of *πρόπον τούτοις* (Lachm., Tisch.) in A, B, C, \aleph , many min., etc.— Ver. 9. Instead of δ *δὲ Μιχ. ὁ ἀρχάγγελος, ὅτε*, Lachm., against the testimony of A, C, K, L, \aleph , etc., has adopted, after B, *ὅτε Μιχ. ὁ ἀρχ. τότε*.— Ver. 12. A, B, 13, al., m., edd., Syr., utr. (Copt.?), etc., read after *οὗτοι εἰσιν* the relative *οἱ*, which Griesbach considers as probably genuine, and Lachm. and Tisch. have rightly adopted into the text;¹ the omission must be considered as an explanatory correction.— *ἀγάπαις*; instead of which A, C, and some min., read *ἀπάταις*; a correction after 2 Pet. ii. 13.— *ἑμῶν*]. Lachm. has in the small edition *αὐτῶν*, after A, etc., but in the larger edition the Rec. *ἑμῶν*, which is sufficiently attested by B, C, K, L, \aleph , etc.; the reading *αὐτῶν*, which Stier without reason considers as original, is explained from 1 Pet. ii. 13.— Instead of *ὑπὸ ἀνέμων*, \aleph reads *παντὶ ἀνέμῳ*; an evident correction.— *παραφερόμεναι* is already by Griesb., Scholz, etc., after almost all authorities, rightly adopted into the text instead of the Rec. *περιφερόμεναι*.— Ver. 13. *ἄγρια κύματα* is in \aleph instead of *κύματα ἄγρια*, which is attested by all authorities.— Buttman has, after B, adopted *πλανήτες* instead of *πλανήται*, and *ζόφος* instead of *ὁ ζόφος*; as the other authorities, so also \aleph testifies for the reading of the Rec.— *εἰς αἰῶνα*; after A, B, C, \aleph , etc., instead of the Rec. *εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα*.— Ver. 14. Instead of the form *προεφήτευσε*, attested by almost all authorities, Tisch. has, after B*, adopted *ἐπροφήτευσε*.— *ἀγίας μυριάσι*, after A, B, K, L, etc., instead of the Rec. *μυριάσιν ἀγίας* in C; in \aleph the reading is *μυριάσιν ἀγίων ἀγγέλων*.— Ver. 15. *ἐλέγξει*, after A, B, C, K, L, \aleph , etc., instead of the Rec. *ἐξελέγξει*.— After *ἀσεβεῖς*, the Rec. has *αὐτῶν*, found in K, L, some min., vss., and Fathers; retained by Tischendorf,² and defended by Reiche; on the other hand, it is wanting in A, B, C (Lachm.); its spuriousness is scarcely to be doubted.— *ἀσεβείας αὐτῶν* is wanting in \aleph ; *ἀσεβείας* in C; the omission is easily explained.— Tisch. 8 inserts after *τῶν σκληρῶν* the word *λόγων*, after C, \aleph , and many min.; it is wanting in most authorities (Tisch. 7); it appears to have been added from a regard to the preceding *τῶν ἔργων*.— Ver. 18. After *ἔλεγον ὑμῖν*, Tisch. 7, after A, C, K, L, etc., has *ὅτι* (Rec.); Tisch. 8 has omitted it after B, L*, \aleph ; so also Lachm. in his larger edition, but hardly correctly.— Instead of the Rec. *ἐν ἐσχάτῳ χρόνῳ* (K, L, P, some min., and Oecumenius), which is an explanatory correction, Lachm. and Tisch. have rightly adopted *ἐπ' ἐσχάτου τοῦ χρόνου*; the article *τοῦ* is found in A, \aleph , al., etc.; its omission is easily explained, because *ἐσχάτου* was taken for an adjective.— *ἔσονται*]. Whilst Lachm. in his small edition instead of it reads *ἐλεύσονται*, he has in the large edition rightly adopted the reading of the Rec. The reading *ἐλεύσονται* (in A, C**, etc.) is a correction after 2 Pet. iii. \aleph has *primo manu ἔσονται*; on the other hand, corrected *ἐλεύσονται*.— Ver. 19. After *ὑποδιρίζοντες*, the Rec. has *ἐαυτοῖς* (C, Vulg., Aug.); an evident correction.— Ver. 20. Instead of the Rec. *τῇ ἀγῶτι. ἑμῶν πισ- τεῖ ἰποκοδομοῦντες ἐαυτοῦς* (K, L, P, al., pl., Syr., etc.), Lachm. and Tisch. read

¹ Reiche incorrectly observes that Buttman has not adopted *οἱ*, and has adduced B as a witness for the reading of the Rec. On account of the difficulty which the article presents, Reiche considers the reading of the Rec.

as the original.

² Tisch. 8 has it likewise in the text, although he says in the notes: "omisismus cum A, B, C, \aleph ," etc.

ἐποικοδομοῦντες ἑαυτ. τῇ ἀγ. ὑμ. π. (A, B, C, \aleph , al., several vss., etc.). — Vv. 22, 23. The readings are here very various. The Rec. has καὶ οὓς μὲν ἐλεεῖτε διακρινόμενοι οὓς δὲ ἐκ φόβου σώσετε, ἐν τοῦ πυρός ἀρπάζοντες. This reading is found in K, L, P (only τοῦ before πυρός is omitted); A reads καὶ οὓς μὲν ἐλέγχετε διακρινόμενοι, οὓς δὲ σώσετε ἐκ πυρός ἀρπάζοντες, οὓς δὲ ἐλεεῖτε ἐν φόβῳ; Lachm. and Tisch. have adopted this reading, only that instead of ἐλεεῖτε they read, with B, ἐλεᾶτε. — B deviates in this, that in ver. 22 it reads not ἐλέγχετε, but ἐλεᾶτε (so also \aleph); in ver. 23 it omits the first οὓς δέ, and instead of ἐλεεῖτε has the form ἐλεᾶτε; C agrees on the whole with A, yet C** has in ver. 22 ἐλεᾶτε, as B, and in ver. 23 the words οὓς δὲ ἐλεεῖτε are wanting in C. The reading of A is held as the original by Brückner, Wiesinger, Schott, Reiche, because the other readings can be most easily explained from it; Hofmann, on the contrary, prefers the reading in \aleph , which is found also in B, only with the inadvertent omission of the words οὓς δέ after διακρινόμενοι; whilst De Wette thinks that the original reading is preserved in C. The reading in B probably lies at the foundation of the reading in K, L, P; the twofold ἐλεᾶτε was naturally objectionable, and therefore the words οὓς δὲ ἐλεᾶτε were left out, διακρινόμενοι changed into the nominative, and ἐν φόβῳ placed before σώσετε. For further observations, see the exposition. — Ver. 24. Instead of ὑμῶς (ed. Elz., A, C, L, \aleph , al., perm., several vss., Theoph., etc., Lachm., Tisch. 8), Tisch. 7 had, after K, P, al., etc., hardly correctly adopted αὐτοῖς; A has ἡμᾶς. — Ver. 25. μόνῳ Θεῷ is correctly adopted by Griesbach, after A, B, C, \aleph , 6, al., Syr., etc., instead of the Rec. μόνῳ σοφῷ Θεῷ; σοφῷ is evidently borrowed from Rom. xvi. 27, and is without reason defended by Reiche. — διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν is likewise adopted by Griesbach (after A, B, etc.), whilst the words are wanting in the Rec. — The Rec. between δόξα and μεγαλοσύνη has καί after K, L, P, etc., which is correctly omitted by recent critics; on the other hand, the words πρὸ παντὸς τοῦ αἰῶνος, wanting in the Rec., are attested by almost all authorities. — The subscription of the Epistle is in B: Ἰούδα; in C: Ἰούδα ἐπιστολῇ καθολικῇ; and in A: Ἰούδα ἐπιστολῇ.

Vv. 1, 2. The superscription is in form similar to that of the Epistles of Paul and Peter: Ἰούδας Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ δοῦλος, κ.τ.λ.]. δοῦλος, as its position and Rom. i. 1, Phil. i. 1, Jas. i. 1 (see also Tit. i. 1), show, denotes not the general service of believers to Christ (Schott), but the special service of those appointed to the gospel ministry. The more definite statement of office is here wanting, as the author is not the Apostle Jude (see Introd., sec. 1), so that his position in the Christian Church is to be regarded as similar to that which a Barnabas, an Apollos, and others occupied, who, without being apostles in the narrower sense of the term, yet exercised a ministry similar to the apostolic. — With the first appellation the second ἀδελφὸς Ἰακώβου is connected by δέ (see Tit. i. 1), which, although not precisely a contrast (Schott), yet marks a distinction. This appellation serves not only to indicate who this Jude is (Arnaud), but likewise to justify his writing. Jude does not call himself “the brother of the Lord,” because his bodily relation to Christ stepped behind his spiritual, perhaps also because that surname already specially belonged to James. — τοῖς ἐν Θεῷ πατρὶ ἡγαπημένοις [ἡγιασμένοις] καὶ, κ.τ.λ.]. According to the reading ἡγιασμένοις, ἐν expresses not the mere instrument of holiness, but holiness as consisting in fellowship with God. The participle is either *substantive*, co-ordinate to the following Ἰησοῦ Χριστῷ

τετηρημένοις κλητοῖς, or *adjective*, which is more probable on account of the similar participial form, *τετηρημένοις*. — According to the reading *ἡγαπημένοις, ἐν Θεῷ πατρὶ* may denote the sphere within which the readers are *ἡγαπημένοις*, namely, by the writer. Against the opinion of De Wette, “that in this objective designation the subjectivity of the author cannot be mixed,” Col. i. 2 might be appealed to, where Paul names the readers of his Epistle *ἀδελφοί*, that is, the brethren of himself and Timotheus (see also 2 John 1 and 3 John 1); but in relation to what follows: *καὶ Ἰησ. Χρ. τετηρημένοις*, this view is correct. — In the Vulgate, *τοῖς ἐν Θεῷ πατρὶ* is taken as an idea by itself: *his qui sunt in Deo Patre*, etc.; and then to this idea the two attributes are added: *ἡγαπημένοις* and *Ἰησ. Χρ. τετηρ. κλητοῖς*. Apart from its harshness, not only is it opposed to this construction, that by it the parallelism (incorrectly denied by Schott) of the two members of the clause — which is strongly indicated both by the form of the sentence and also by *ἐν τῷ πατρὶ* in reference to the following *Ἰησοῦ Χριστῷ* — is destroyed, but also *ἡγαπημένοις* would then be without any proximate statement. The same is also the case when it is assumed, with Rampf and Schott, that the participles *ἡγαπημένοις* and *Ἰ. Χ. τετηρημένοις* are equally subordinate to *ἐν Θεῷ πατρὶ*, and explained as expressing “the living ground on which the called possess that which is expressed in the two participles” (Schott). The supplying of *ὑπὸ Θεοῦ* or *παρὰ Θεῷ*, necessary for this view, is at all events arbitrary; moreover, the juxtaposition of *τοῖς ἐν Θεῷ πατρὶ Ἰησ. Χριστῷ τετηρημένοις* is extremely harsh. — It is incorrect to take *ἐν* as equivalent to *ὑπό* (Hensler); *ἐν* is rather to be retained in its proper signification, in which it is entirely suitable to the idea *ἀγαπᾶσθαι*, as the love which proceeds *from* any person dwells *in* him, the *κλητοί* as they are loved *by* God so are they loved *in* God. Hofmann incorrectly explains it: “who have been accepted in love *by* God;” for *ἀγαπᾶν* never has this meaning, not even in the passages cited by Hofmann: 1 Thess. i. 4; 2 Thess. ii. 13; Col. iii. 12. — God is called *πατρὶ* in His relation to *Christ*, not to *men*: see Phil. ii. 11; Gal. i. 1; and Meyer on the latter passage. — *καὶ Ἰησοῦ Χριστῷ τετηρημένοις κλητοῖς*]. The dative *Ἰησ. Χριστῷ* is not dependent on an *ἐν* to be supplied from *ἐν Θεῷ πατρὶ* (Luther: preserved in Jesus Christ). Hofmann indeed appeals for this supplement to Kühner, *Gr.*, II. p. 477; but incorrectly, as this is rendered impossible by *ἡγαπημένοις* intervening. What Kühner says, could only be the case were it written *ἐν Θεῷ πατρὶ καὶ Ἰησοῦ Χριστῷ ἡγαπημένοις*. Also *Ἰησοῦ Χριστῷ* is not the causative dative with the passive, instead of *ὑπό* with the genitive, but the dative *commodi*: for *Christ* (Bengel, De Wette, Wiesinger, Schott, and others). The participle *τετηρημένοις* is used neither instead of the present participle, as Grotius thinks, nor is it here to be understood of the act completed before God (De Wette, Wiesinger); but it simply denotes that which has taken place up to the time when the Epistle was written: thus, “to the called, who have been kept for Christ;” namely, in order to belong to Him in time and in eternity (so also Schott).¹ The idea *τετηρ.* is completely explained

¹ Arnould incorrectly explains it: “aux appelés gardés par J. Chr., c'est-à-dire: à ceux

qui ont été appelés à J. Chr. par la prédication de l'Évangile et que J. Chr. garde fidèles.”

from the falling away from Christ which had taken place among so many; see ver. 4; comp. also John xvii. 11; 1 Pet. i. 5. — Although ἐν Θεῷ πατρὶ cannot be grammatically connected with τετηρημένοις, and although it primarily belongs to ἡγαπημένοις, yet it indicates by whom the preservation has taken place; Hornejus: *quos Deus Pater . . . Christo . . . donavit et asservavit huc usque, ne ab impostoribus seducerentur et perirent.* — κλητοῖς, a designation in the Pauline sense of those who have not only heard the gospel, but have embraced it by faith; see Meyer on 1 Cor. i. 24. Ver. 2. ἔλεος, κ.τ.λ.]. The word ἔλεος is used in the formula of salutation only here and in the Pastoral Epistles. The addition καὶ ἀγάπη is peculiar to Jude. The relation of the three terms is thus to be understood: ἔλεος is the demeanor of God toward the κλητοῖς; εἰρήνη their condition founded upon it; and ἀγάπη their demeanor proceeding from it as the effect of God's grace. Accordingly ἀγάπη is used here as in Eph. vi. 23 (see Meyer *in loco*); only here the love is to be limited neither specially to the brethren (Grotius), nor to God (Calov, Wiesinger). Still ἀγάπη may also be the love of God to the κλητοῖς; comp. ver. 21 and 2 Cor. xiii. 13 (14) (so Hornejus, Grotius, Bengel, De Wette-Brückner, Schott, and others). No ground of decision can be derived from πληθυνθείη. With the reading ἡγαπημένοις the second explanation merits the preference, although the position of this expression *after* εἰρήνη is somewhat strange. On πληθυνθείη, see 1 Pet. i. 2; this form is apparently derived from Dan. iii. 31.

Vv. 3, 4. Statement of the reason which determined Jude to write this Epistle: comp. on this 2 Pet. i. 12 f, iii. 1 f. — ἀγαπητοί, found at the beginning of an Epistle only here and in 3 John 2. — *πάσαν σπουδὴν ποιούμενος, κ.τ.λ.]. Giving all diligence to write unto you of the common salvation, I felt constrained to write to you, exhorting you to contend for the faith once delivered to the saints.* Pricæus, Lachmann, Buttmann, put a comma after the first and after the second ἴμιν, so that περὶ . . . σωτηρίας is connected with ἀναγκὴν ἔσχον, and παρακαλῶν, etc., is separated from γράψαι. Most expositors, on the contrary, as Erasmus, Luther, Calvin, De Wette, Wiesinger, etc., connect περὶ σωτηρίας with the preceding γράφειν, and unite παρακαλῶν with γράψαι. Not only the position of the words, but also the train of thought, decides for this latter arrangement; for since, according to ver. 4, the ἀνάγκη, inducing the author to write this Epistle, consisted in the appearance of wicked men, so it is evidently more suitable to connect γράψαι with παρακαλῶν ἐπαγωνίσεσθαι, having special reference to it, than with the general idea περὶ τῆς κοινῆς σωτηρίας, particularly as the contents of the Epistle are any thing but a treatise concerning the common salvation.¹ The preceding participial clause states in what condition Jude was when the ἀνάγκη ἐχεῖν came upon him; the σπουδὴ to write already existed when the entrance of certain ungodly men constrained him not to write generally περὶ τῆς κοινῆς σωτηρίας, but to compose such a

¹ The translation of the Vulg.: "omnem sollicitudinem faciens scribendi vobis de communi vestra salute necesse habui scribere vobis depræcans supercertari," etc., may also be punctuated in both ways. Lachmann has, in

his larger edition of the N. T., punctuated it as he has done in the Greek text; in other editions of the Vulgate, on the contrary, the other punctuation is found.

hortative epistle as the present. Some expositors incorrectly think that the *ἀνάγκη* had its reason in the *σπουδή* (Erasmus: *tantum mihi studium fuit, ut non potuerim non scribere vobis*); others, that to the *σπουδή* the *ἀνάγκη* supervened as a new point; so Hornejus: *cum summum mihi esset studium scribendi ad vos aliquid de communi nostrum omnium salute, etiam necessitas insuper scribendi imposita fuit, quae autem illa sit, statim addit* (so also Calvin and others). De Wette (with whom Brückner agrees) considers that Jude by the first clause expresses that "he had been engaged on the composition of a longer and more comprehensive Epistle (the loss of which we have to lament), when he was for the time called away from that work in order to write the present Epistle;" but the expression *πάσαν σπουδὴν ποιούμενος* does not necessarily involve *actual* writing.¹ — *σπουδὴν ποιῆσθαι* is only found here in the N. T. (2 Pet. i. 5: *σπουδὴν πᾶσαν παρεισόβειν*; prologue to Eccclus.: *προσφέρειν τινὰ σπουδὴν*); the meaning is, *to be eagerly solicitous about something*; it may refer both to mental activity and to external action; here the former is the case. Luther's translation, "after I purposed," is too flat; Meyer's is better: "since it lies pressingly upon my heart." — *πάσαν* serves, as frequently, for the strengthening of the idea. — The participle *ποιούμενος*, in connection with the aorists *ἔσχον γράψαι*, is to be taken as the imperfect participle. Stier incorrectly translates: "when engaged in it I would take diligence." It expresses the activity which took place, when the action expressed by the finite verb occurred, and therefore must not be resolved, with Haenlein, into the perfect or pluperfect. — *περὶ τῆς κοινῆς ἡμῶν σωτηρίας* states on what Jude intended to write. On *κοινῆς*, comp. Tit. i. 4; 2 Pet. i. 1. There is no reason to refer the idea, with Semler, to the Jews and Gentiles, as the object *common* to both. — *σωτηρία*, not the *doctrine* of salvation (Jachmann), but the *salvation* itself, acquired by Christ for the world, and applied to believers. The explanation of Beza: *de iis quae ad nostram omnium salutem PERTINENT*, deviates from strict precision, as *σωτηρία* itself is indicated by Jude as the object of writing. Schott incorrectly explains *σωτηρία*, *state of salvation, possession of salvation*. — *ἀνάγκην ἔσχον*]. Comp. Luke xiv. 10, xxiii. 17; 1 Cor. vii. 37. The explanation of Grotius is inaccurate: *nihil potius habui, quod scriberem, quam ut, etc.* The translation of Luther is too flat: "I considered it necessary;" for in *ἀνάγκην ἔχειν* is contained the idea of an objective necessity founded on duty, circumstances, etc. (De Wette, Wiesinger, Schott). The meaning here is: The entrance of false teachers constrained me, made me to recognize it as necessary. On the one hand, Semler inserts a strange reference, paraphrasing it, *accidit interea INOPINATO, ut statuendum mihi . . . esset*; and, on the other hand, Schott, who, in order to emphasize the contrast between the two members of the sentence,

¹ De Wette incorrectly appeals for this supposition to Sherlock (in Wolf), who thus explains it: "dilecti, animus mihi erat, scribere ad vos de communibus doctrinis et spe evangelii ad fidem vestram et Jesu Christi cognitionem amplificandam; jam vero coactum me video, ut hoc institutum descream et ad

caendum praesens periculum, vos exhorter, ut serio teneatis eam quae vobis tradita est, doctrinam, contra falsos doctores, quos clanculum audio irrepisse." What De Wette regards as accomplished, or in the act of being accomplished, Sherlock considers only as intended.

finds in *ἀνάγκ. ἔσχον* the thought expressed that Jude wrote this Epistle *unwillingly, contrary to his inclination*. — *γράψαι ὑμῖν παρακαλῶν*]. *παρακαλῶν* is closely united to *γράψαι*, as indicating the kind of writing to which the author felt constrained by circumstances; therefore no comma is to be put after *ὑμῖν*. — *ἐπαγωνίζεσθαι τῇ . . . πίστει*]. *ἐπαγωνίζεσθαι*, a *ἄπ. λεγ.*, as *συναθλέω*, Phil. i. 27, connected with the dative of the object which is contended for; Stier: “to fight for the faith;” comp. *Ecclus. iv. 28: ἀγωνίζεν περί*. — *πίστις* is not = *doctrina, system of doctrine*; nor yet does it here denote the subjective quality of the believing disposition; but that which is believed by Christians (*τοῖς ἀγίοις*), the objective contents of faith. Schott is incorrect in explaining it, “the conduct arising from faith;” for the notion of conduct does not suit *παραδοθείση*. The explanation, *the way of salvation* (Hofmann), is also wanting in correctness; it is not proved by Gal. iii. 23. — As the subject to *παραδοθείση*, by whom the communication or transmission was effected, *God* (Bengel) is not here to be thought of, but the *apostles*, as ver. 17 shows; 2 Pet. ii. 21; Luke i. 2 (comp. also 1 Cor. xi. 2, 23, xv. 3); yet the author does not name them, because “he is not concerned here with the personal instruments, but with the mode and manner of transmission contained in *ἅπαξ*” (Schott). *τοῖς ἀγίοις* are not the apostles (Nic. de Lyra), but Christians. — *ἅπαξ* brings prominently forward the fact that as it once took place, so there is now an end to the *παράδοσις*; Bengel: *nulla alia dabitur fides*. Jachmann incorrectly explains it by *ἡδη, olim, jam*, appealing to ver. 5 and Heb. vi. 4. According to Hofmann’s view, *ἅπαξ* is used “with reference to the preceding intention of Jude to present to the readers a writing having the common salvation as its object;” but this reference is not indicated.¹

Ver. 4. Compare 2 Pet. ii. 1-3. — *παρασιέδυσαν γάρ*, the reason of *ἀνάγκην ἔσχον*. *παρασιέδυσαν* marks the entrance of false teachers into the church as a secret and unauthorized creeping-in of such as do not properly belong to it, but are internally foreign to it (comp. Gal. ii. 4: *παρείσακτοι*, explained by the scholiasts by *ἄλλότριαι*); it is synonymous with *παρασιέρχεσθαι*; comp. 2 Tim. iii. 6. — *τινες ἄνθρωποι*]. In the same indefiniteness the false teachers are also mentioned in 1 Tim. i. 6. Arnaud observes: “*le mot quelques chose de méprisant, comme dans Gal. ii. 12;*” so also Wiesinger and Schott; this is possible; but the appeal to Gal. ii. 12 is unjustified. That the expression *ἄνθρωποι* is used in order to bring forward the fact that they “with their entrance into the church remained in their natural state” (Schott), is highly improbable. Hofmann unnecessarily separates *τινες* from *ἄνθρωποι*, taking *ἄνθρωποι, οἱ, κ.τ.λ.*, as in apposition to *τινες*. — *οἱ πάλα προγεγραμμένοι εἰς τοῦτο τὸ κρίμα*]. By the participle with the article, a peculiar circumstance worthy of remark, concerning these men, is brought forward (Winer, p. 127 [E. T., 139 f.]); but not as Schott, after Rampf, arbitrarily maintains, “a mark perfectly clear to the readers is given for the *recognition* of those who are meant;” the article being equivalent to *isti, those notorious men*. — *προγε-*

¹ When Hofmann maintains that ver. 4 could only have been written by an apostle, he evidently proceeds too far; for, why could

not also another besides an apostle have cherished the design to address a writing to Christians respecting the common faith?

γραμμένοι]. The preposition *προ* in this verb indicates either *antea*, *earlier*, *before*,—thus always in the N. T.; see Gal. iii. 1 (comp. Meyer in *loc.*); Rom. xv. 4; Eph. iii. 3,—or *palani*. If it has this last meaning, then *προγράφειν* signifies “to announce something publicly by writing;” thus in an entirely special sense *proscribere*; accordingly Wolf explains it: *qui dudum sunt accusati et in hoc iudicium (εις τοῦτο τὸ κρίμα) vocati*. Yet this is inaccurate, as the peculiar idea of *proscribere* is not retained; for, if retained, it would not suit *εις τ. τ. κρίμα*. Yet more arbitrarily Wahl explains *προγράφειν* by *designare*. Oecumenius, Hornejus, and others have correctly taken *προ* here as a preposition of time. According to Isa. iv. 3, LXX.: *οἱ γραφέντες εις ζωὴν*, the sense might be: those who are written before (as in God’s book of fate, and consequently *destined*) *εις τοῦτο τὸ κρίμα* (Calvin: *haec metaphora inde sumpta est, quod aeternum Dei consilium, quo ordinati sunt fideles ad salutem, Liber vocatur*); but the term *πάλαι* is unsuitable, as it is never in the N. T. used of God’s *eternal* counsels. *προγράφειν* is here rather to be understood entirely as in the adduced passages of the N. T.; and with De Wette a pregnancy of expression is to be assumed; thus, *those who are already before by writing destined to this judgment*. Hofmann explains *προγεγραμμένοι* according to John i. 46 compared with v. 46 (*γράφειν τινα = γρ. περί τινος*): “those of whom it is written before;” and then *εις τοῦτο τ. κρ.* = “in reference to this judgment;” but with regard to the former it is to be remarked, that the form of expression here is different from John i. 46; and with regard to the latter, that by it a weakening of the preposition in its direct connection with *προγεγραμμένοι* takes place.¹ Oecumenius refers this to the prophecies concerning future false teachers contained in the Epistles of Paul and Peter. Grotius, Schott, Hofmann, and others point particularly to 2 Pet. ii. But *πάλαι* combined with *προγεγρ.* evidently points back to an earlier period,² so that only older prophecies can be meant, namely, the prophecies and types of the O. T., and perhaps particularly the prophecies contained in the Book of Enoch: see ver. 14 (so also Wiesinger). Against Calvin and Beza, who find the idea of the *decretum aeternum* here expressed, Bengel remarks: *non innuitur praedestinatio, sed scripturae praedictio*.—*εις τοῦτο τὸ κρίμα*]. Although *κρίμα* in itself is not equivalent to *κατάκριμα*, yet here a condemnatory judgment is meant; *τοῦτο*, namely, that which Jude has in view, and which is indicated in the following verse; Stier: “for *this* judgment, which I now announce to them;” Arnaud: *il y a τοῦτο, parceque cette punition est l’objet qui l’occupe*. It is incorrect, with Wiesinger and Hofmann, to refer *τοῦτο τὸ κρίμα* to *παρσιδόνσαν*, as something including judgment in itself; or, with Schott, to the “damnable error of those men,” specified in the words *τὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ, κ.τ.λ.*; for neither the entering-in nor the error can in themselves be

¹ Luther’s translation: “there are certain men crept in, of whom it is written before, to this punishment,” by which *προγεγρ.* is separated from *εις τ. τ. κρ.*, is contradicted by the natural verbal connection.

² Schott and Hofmann contest the fact that *πάλαι* points to an earlier period. *πάλαι*, which “generally indicates the past in contrast to the

present” (Pape), may certainly be used when that past is not distant (comp. Mark xv. 44); but, on the one hand, this use of the term is rare; and, on the other hand, it is not here applicable, as the reference to the past generally is already contained in the *προ* of the compound verb; *πάλαι* here can only be put to mark this past as lying in the distance.

called a *κρίμα*. — *ἀσεβείς* to be taken by itself; not to be united with *οἱ προγεγραμμένοι* (against Tischendorf, who has placed no comma before *ἀσεβείς*). The ungodliness of these men is further indicated, according to its nature, by the participial clauses which follow (comp. 2 Pet. ii. 6). — *τὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡμῶν χάριν, κ.τ.λ.,* who pervert the grace of our God into lasciviousness. *χάρις*, not = *doctrina gratiae* (Vorstius), nor *evangelium* (Grotius), nor *fides catholica nobis gratis data* (Nicolas de Lyra); but *grace* itself as the proffered gift of God in the forgiveness of sin and redemption from the law; so also Wiesinger, Fronmüller, Hofmann. It is incorrect to explain the idea by “the life of grace” (De Wette-Brückner), or by “the ordinances of grace” (Schott). *ἡμῶν*, belonging to *τοῦ Θεοῦ*, is to be understood as an expression of the feeling of sonship; Bengel: *nostri, non impiorum*. — In *μετατιθέντες εἰς ἀσέλγειαν, ἀσέλγ.* is either the purpose of the change of the grace of God, or that into which grace is changed. In the former case *μετατιθημι* here would in itself have a bad subsidiary meaning (De Wette: “who pervert the grace of our God for the purpose of licentiousness”); but it never elsewhere so occurs in the N. T. Accordingly, the second explanation is better (Brückner), according to which the meaning is: they have converted the *χάρις*, which God gave to them, into something different, namely *ἀσέλγεια*; inasmuch as liberty was converted by them into lasciviousness; comp. Gal. v. 13; 1 Pet. ii. 16; 2 Pet. ii. 19. — *καὶ τὸν μόνον δεσπότην καὶ κύριον ἡμῶν* Ἰ. Χρ. ἀρνούμενοι]. In 2 Pet. ii. 1 the epithet *δεσπότης* is used of Christ; this favors the combination of *τὸν μόνον δεσπότην* as an attribute with Ἰησ. Χρ. (so De Wette, Schmidt, Rampf, Wiesinger, Schott, Fronmüller, Hofmann). But, on the one hand, in every other place this word denotes *God*, and, on the other hand, *δεσπότης* would hardly be distinguished from the word *κύριος*, if both were to be referred to Christ,¹ add to this that *μόνος* elsewhere expresses the unity of the divine nature; comp. Jude 25; John v. 44, xvii. 3; Rom. xvi. 27; 1 Tim. i. 17, vi. 15, 16; Rev. xv. 4; against which view Schott incorrectly urges 1 Cor. viii. 6 and Eph. iv. 5. For these reasons, it is more probable that *τὸν μόνον δεσπότην* is not an appellation of Christ, but a designation of God (Brückner); comp. 1 John ii. 22: *ὁ ἀρνούμενος τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὸν υἱόν* (also Enoch xlvi. 10 is to be compared: “they have denied the Lord of the spirits and His Anointed”). No argument against this explanation can be drawn from the want of the article before *κύριον*; see author’s commentary on Tit. ii. 3 (Winer, p. 121 ff. [E. T., 130]),² which is in an unjustifiable manner denied by Hofmann. The denial may be considered

¹ Hofmann gives the distinction of these two ideas as follows: “Christ is our *δεσπότης*, as we are His property bound to His service, He is our *κύριος*, as His will is the standard of ours.” But if this be correct, it is not in favor of Hofmann, but against him, because Jude would then in an incomprehensible manner make the weaker idea to follow upon the stronger.

² When Wiesinger and Schott appeal for their explanation to the fact that the relation to God is already expressed in the preceding

clause, and that therefore it would be unsuitable to express it here again, it is to be observed that in that clause the relation to Christ is also indicated, since the grace of God is communicated through Christ; also, there is no reason why Jude should not have indicated *μετατιθέναι* as a denial both of Jesus Christ and of God. Whilst Schott grants that the expression “the only master” may only refer to God, he so interprets the article *τὸν* before *μόνον δεσπ.*, that he explains it as equivalent to “he who is.”

as either practical (comp. Tit. i. 16) or theoretical. Since throughout this Epistle the carnal and godless disposition of these men is brought forward, it is most probable that Jude at least had the first kind of denial specially in view. At all events, such explanations as those of Grotius: "*abnegabant Jesum, quia eum dicebant hominem natum ex homine,*" are to be rejected, as Jude never reproaches his adversaries with such a definite erroneous doctrine.

Ver. 5. From this verse to ver. 7 we have three examples, as representations of the judgment which threatens those mentioned in ver. 4. Compare with this 2 Pet. ii. 4-6. — *ὑπομνήσαι δὲ ὑμᾶς βούλομαι*. *δέ* is used metabatically (as a mere particle of transition); not in order to put *ὑπομνήσαι* in contrast to *παρακαλῶν* (ver. 3), which is only to be justified by the explanation of Schott, that "Jude intends not properly to *exhort* the readers, but by *παρακαλεῖν* he means only that he will *remind* them." *ὑμᾶς* is not the subject, but the object to *ὑπομνήσαι*; comp. 2 Pet. i. 12 (Rom. xv. 15). — *εἰδότας [ὑμᾶς] ἅπαξ πάντα*. *εἰδότας* is either in an adversative sense = *καίπερ εἰδότας* (De Wette); or, which is to be preferred on account of *ἅπαξ* the statement of the reason of *ὑπομνήσαι*.¹ — *ἅπαξ* is not to be united *per hyperbaton* with *σώσας*; also not = first, so that *δευτερον* corresponding to it would be = secondly, and both referred to *εἰδότας* (Jachmann); but *ἅπαξ* belongs to *εἰδότας*, and *τὸ δευτερον* to *ἠπόλεσεν*. Hornejus incorrectly explains *ἅπαξ* by *jampridem et ab initio* (Arnaud: *vous qui l'avez su une fois*); it has here rather the same meaning as in ver. 3, rendering prominent that a new teaching is not necessary (De Wette, Stier, Wiesinger, Frommüller, Schott, Hofmann). — *πάντα*; according to Nicolas de Lyra = *omnia ad salutem necessaria*; better, every thing which is an object of evangelical teaching, here naturally with particular reference to what directly follows, to which alone the *τοῦτο* of the Rec. points.² — *ὅτι ὁ κύριος (Ἰησοῦς) λαὸν . . . σώσας*. *ὅτι* belongs not to *εἰδότας πάντα*, but to *ὑπομνήσαι*. — With the reading (*ὁ*) *Ἰησοῦς* (Stier calls it, "without example, and incomprehensibly strange") Jude here would speak from the same point of view as Paul does in 1 Cor. x. 4 (comp. also 1 Pet. i. 11), according to which all the acts of divine revelation are done by the instrumentality of Christ, as the eternal Son and revealer of God. The name *Ἰησοῦς*, by which Christ is designated in His earthly and human personality, is, however, surprising; but Jude might have so used it from the consciousness that the eternal Son of God and He who was born of Mary is the same Person (comp. 1 Cor. viii. 9; Phil. ii. 5). With the reading *κύριος* — certainly the more natural — which De Wette-Brückner and Hofmann prefer, whilst Wiesinger and Schott consider *Ἰησοῦς* as the original — a designation of God is to be understood. — *λαὸν*. That by this the people of Israel is meant, is evident; the article is wanting, because Jude would indicate that Israel was saved as an entire people, with

¹ Nicolas de Lyra: "commonere autem vos volo et non docere de novo; et subditur ratio;" Bengel: "causa, cur admoneat duntaxat: quia jam sciant, semelque cognitum habeant;" so also Wiesinger and Schott.

² Schott, indeed, explains *πάντα* correctly;

but he erroneously thinks that *ἅπαξ* with *εἰδότας* indicates "this knowledge is meant as a knowledge effected by a definite *individual* act," and that *ἅπαξ* is to be understood of the instruction given in Second Peter.

reference to the following *τοὺς μὴ πιστεύσαντας*.¹ — *τὸ δεύτερον* is to be retained in its proper meaning, and to be explained neither, with Nicolas de Lyra, and others, as = *post* (Arnaud: *de nouveau, ensuite, après*), nor, with Grotius and Wolf, as = *ex contrario*. It indicates that what was said in the preceding participial sentence, namely, the divine deliverance of the people from Egypt, is considered as a first deed, to which a second followed. The definite statement of what this second is, is usually derived from the preceding *σώσας*, and by it is accordingly understood a second deliverance; but there are different views as to what deliverance is meant. In this commentary the deliverance of the people from the wilderness was designated as this second deliverance, which certainly occurred to the people, yet only so that those who believed not did not attain to it, but were destroyed by God in the wilderness (so, in essentials, Stier, Brückner, Wiesinger). On the other hand, Schmidt (*Bibl. Theologie*, ii.), Luthardt, Schott, Hofmann, understand by it the deliverance effected by Christ; whilst they regard as the punishment falling on unbelievers, the destruction of Jerusalem, or the overthrow of the Jewish state. But both explanations are arbitrary: for, first, it is unauthorized to refer *τὸ δεύτερον* only to *σώσας* and not to *ἐκ γῆς Αἰγύπτου σώσας*; and, secondly, in the principal sentence a deliverance is not at all indicated.² Whilst, then, Jude thinks on the deliverance from Egypt as a first deed, he does not mention a deliverance, but the destruction of those who believed not, as the second deed following the first. But this second is not indicated as a single deed, and therefore by it is to be understood generally what befell the unbelieving in the wilderness after the deliverance from Egypt; what this was, is expressed in the words *τοὺς μὴ πιστεύσαντας ἀπόλεσεν*. It is arbitrary to refer this, with Ritschl, only to the history recorded in Num. xxv. 1-9; and still more arbitrary to refer it, with Fronmüller, to the Babylonish captivity (2 Chron. xxxvi. 16 ff.). Compare, moreover, with this verse, Heb. iii. 16-19. — *τοὺς μὴ πιστεύσαντας*]. On *μὴ*, with participles, see Winer, p. 449 f. (E. T., 482); comp. ver. 6: *τοὺς μὴ τηρήσαντας*. It is to be observed, that in the corresponding passage, 2 Pet. ii., instead of this example, the deluge is named.

Ver. 6. A second example taken from the angelic world. As God spared not the people rescued from bondage, so neither did He spare the angels who left their habitation. This also was an admonitory representation for Christians, who, in the face of the high dignity which they possessed by redemption, yielded themselves to a life of vice. — *ἀγγέλους τε τοὺς μὴ τηρήσαντας, κ.τ.λ.*, is, according to the construction, as the *τε* indicates, closely connected with the preceding. — *ἀγγέλους* without the article con-

¹ Calvin observes: "nomen populi honorifice capitur pro gente sancta et electa, ac si diceret, nihil illis profuisse, quod singulari privilegio in foedus assumpti essent;" but were this correct, *αυτοῦ* would at least have been added.

² Against Winer's explanation, p. 576 (E. T., 620): "the verb connected with *τὸ*

δεύτερον should properly have been *οὐκ ἔσωσε* (ἀλλά, κ.τ.λ.); the Lord, after having saved, the second time (when they needed His helping grace) refused them this saving grace, and left them to destruction." But there is nothing indicated in the context of a state of being in want of grace.

sidered generally; the participle connected with the article indicates the definite class of angels who are here meant. For the understanding of this verse the following points are to be observed: (1) By the twofold participial clause *τοὺς μὴ . . . ἀρχὴν* and *ἀπολιπόντας . . . οἰκητήριον*, something sinful is attributed to the angels (2 Pet. ii. 4: *ἁμαρτησάντων*), on account of which the punishment expressed by *εἰς κρίσιν . . . τετήρηκε* was inflicted upon them; (2) The two clauses *μὴ . . . ἀλλὰ . . .* so correspond, that the second positive clause explains the first negative clause; and (3) what Jude says of the angels corresponds with the doctrine of the angels contained in the Book of Enoch. — *τοὺς μὴ τηρήσαντας τὴν ἐαυτῶν ἀρχὴν, κ.τ.λ.*]. *ἀρχή* must here denote something which the angels by forsaking *τὸ ἴδιον οἰκητήριον* did not preserve, but gave up or slighted. But by *ἀπολ. τὸ ἴδ. οἰκητ.*, according to the Book of Enoch xii. 4,¹ is meant their forsaking of heaven, and their descent to earth in order to go after the daughters of men (so also Hofmann); but not, as Hornejus and others think, the loss of the heavenly dwelling, which they drew upon themselves by conspiring against God; which would militate against the first observation. — By *ἀρχή* expositors understand either *the original condition (origo: Calvin, Grotius, Hornejus,*² and others), or *the dominion which originally belonged to them* (Bengel, De Wette, Wiesinger, Schott, Hofmann; Brückner thinks that the meaning *dominion* passes over into that of *origin*). According to the first explanation, the term is too indefinite, both in itself and in reference to the second parallel clause. It is in favor of the second explanation, that in the N. T. angels are often designated by the name *ἀρχή*, *ἀρχαί*; as also the prevailing idea among the Jews was, that to the angels a lordship belongs over the earthly creation. By this explanation, also, the two clauses correspond; instead of administering their office as rulers, they forsook their heavenly habitation, and thus became culpable. The explanation, according to which *ἀρχή ἐαυτῶν* denotes not the dominion of the angels, but the dominion of God, to which they were subjected, is both against linguistic usage and against the context. — *εἰς κρίσιν . . . τετήρηκεν*]. Statement of the punishment. This also corresponds with the expression in the Book of Enoch, where in chap. x. 12 it is said; “Bind them fast under the mountains of the earth . . . even to the day of judgment . . . until the last judgment will be held for all eternity.”³ — *τετήρηκεν* is in sharp contrast to *μὴ τηρήσαν-*

¹ “Announce to the watchers of heaven, who forsook the high heaven and their holy eternal abodes, and have corrupted themselves with women;” xv. 3: “Wherefore have ye forsaken the high and holy and eternal heaven, and have slept with women?” . . . lxiv.: “These are the angels who have gone down from heaven to earth;” and other passages. Gen. vi. 2 lies at the foundation of this tradition, the explanation of which is to this day contested. Whilst Hofmann explains the expression *בְּנֵי הָאֱלֹהִים* as a designation of the angels, Ferd. Philippi decidedly rejects this explanation.

² Hornejus, after John viii. 44, designates as the original condition here meant, *veritas*, i. e., *innocentia et sanctitas*. Stier thinks “that the original condition was at the same time the *ground* of their nature and condition in God, or, as it is now perhaps called, the principle of their true life. They preserved not themselves in God, whilst they surrendered and lost the proper pure ground of their glorious being.”

³ Comp. also x. 4: “Bind Azâzël, and put him in darkness,” xiv. 5, xxi. 10, etc. In the Midrash Ruth in the Book of Zohar it is said: “Postquam filii Dei filios genuerunt, sumsit

τας: the perfect expresses an action begun in the past and continued in the present. The *mode* of retention is more precisely stated by δεσμοῖς αἰδίοις ὑπὸ ζόφου]. By αἰδίοις the chains by which they are bound are designated as eternal, and incapable of being rent. ὑπὸ ζόφου]. ζόφος only here and ver. 13, and in the parallel passages, 2 Pet. ii. 4 and 17; comp. also Wisd. xvii. 2;¹ usually σκοτός, the darkness of hell; ὑπό is explained by conceiving the angels in the lowest depths of hell, covered with darkness.² In τετήρηκεν is not contained the final doom which will only take place at the general judgment; therefore: εἰς κρίσιν μεγάλης ἡμέρας]. μεγ. ἡμέρα, without any further designation, used of the last judgment only here; the same adjective, as an attribute of that day, in Acts ii. 20; Rev. vi. 17, xvi. 14.

Ver. 7. Third example: the judgment on Sodom and Gomorrha and the cities about them, which, however, is not co-ordinate with the preceding two, but is closely connected with the last mentioned, "whilst here both times a permanent condition is meant, which a similar sin has had as its consequence, whereas ἀπόλεσεν (ver. 5) states a judgment of God already past" (Hofmann's *Schriftb.*, I. p. 428). — ὡς is not to be connected with the following ὁμοίως, ver. 8; nor is ὅτι, ver. 5, to be connected with ὑπομνήσαι . . . βούλομαι (De Wette) = *how* instead of "that;" it refers rather to what directly precedes = *like as* (Semler, Arnaud, Hofmann, Brückner, Wiesinger, Schott, and others; Luther: *as also*), whilst ver. 7 confirms ἀγγέλους . . . τετήρηκεν by the comparison with what befell Sodom and Gomorrha: God retains the angels kept unto the day of judgment, even as Sodom and Gomorrha πρόκεινται δείγμα, κ.τ.λ. With the connection with ὑπομν. βουλ. (ver. 5) a preceding και would hardly be necessary, also the words τὸν ὅμοιον τούτους indicate the close connection with ver. 6. — Σόδομα καὶ Γόμορρα frequently adduced in the O. and N. T. as examples of the divine judgment; see, for example, Rom. ix. 29. — καὶ αἱ περὶ αὐτὰς πόλεις, according to Deut. xxix. 23; Hos. xi. 8, Admah and Zeboim. — τὸν ὅμοιον τρόπον τούτους ἐκπο-

eos Deus et ad montem tenebrarum perduxit, ngavitque in catenis ferreis, quae usque ad medium abyssi maguae pertingunt."

¹ Comp. also Hesiod, *Theog.*, v. 729, where it is said: —

Ἐνθα θεοὶ Τιτήνες ὑπὸ ζοφῷ ἤρβεντα
Κεκρυφάται, βουλήσι Διὸς νεφεληγερεταο,
Χάρψ ἐν εὐρώεντι.

² There is an apparent difference between what is here said, and the representations of the N. T. elsewhere, according to which Satan and his ἄγγελοι have even now their residence in the air (Eph. ii. 2, or in the upper regions, ἐν τοῖς ἐπουρανίοις, Eph. vi. 12), and although already judged by Christ (John xvi. 11), yet as κοσμοκράτορες exercise power over unbelievers, and also lay snares for believers, in order to bring them again into subjection. Expositors, in general, have attempted to reconcile this by referring this continued activity of the Devil to the special permission of God; Calvin, otherwise: "porro nobis figen-

das non est locus, quo inclusi sint diaboli; simpliciter enim docere voluit Ap., quam misera sit eorum conditio . . . nam quocunque pergaut, secum trahunt sua vincula et suis tenebris obvoluti manent." Dactlein remarks on 2 Pet. ii. 4: "Not only Tartarus, but also the chains of darkness, are to be understood in a local and corporeal sense, but not of such a locality, or of such an imprisonment in that locality, as would require an exclusion from our locality, or an incapability of movement through our locality." But all these artificial explanations are to be rejected, inasmuch as Jude does not speak of Satan and his angels, but of a definite class of angels, to whom, in agreement with the Book of Enoch, he refers Gen. vi. 2. This is correctly observed by Hofmann, Wiesinger, and Schott, with whom Brückner appears to agree; on the other hand, F. Philippi (p. 140) observes: "Jude speaks here of the original fall of the angels from pride, not of their union with earthly women."

νεύσασαι]. *τούτοις* may grammatically be referred to Σόδ. κ. Γόμ. (or, by synesis, to the inhabitants of these cities; so Krebs, Calvin, Hornejus, Vorstius, and others); but by this construction the sin of Sodom and Gomorria would only be indirectly indicated. Since, also, *τούτοις* cannot refer to the false teachers, ver. 4, because, as De Wette correctly remarks, the thought of ver. 8 would be anticipated, it must refer to the *angels* who, according to the Book of Enoch, sinned in a similar way as the inhabitants of those cities (thus Herder, Schneckenburger, Jachmann, De Wette, Arnaud, Hofmann, and others). — *ἐκπορνέυσασαι*, the sin of the inhabitants, is designated as the action of the cities themselves. The verb (often in the LXX., the translation of *זָנָה*; also in the Apocrypha) is in the N. T. a *ἄπ. λεγ.* The preposition *ἐκ* serves for strengthening the idea, indicating that “one by *πορνέειν* becomes unfaithful to true moral conduct” (Hofmann), but not that “he goes beyond the boundaries of nature” (Stier, Wiesinger, and similarly Schott). — *καὶ ἀπελθοῦσαι ὀπίσω σαρκὸς ἐτέρας*]. The expression *ἀπέρχ. ὀπίσω τινός* is found in Mark i. 20 in its literal sense; here it has a figurative meaning; comp. 2 Pet. ii. 10, *πορεύεσθαι ὀπίσω*; Jer. ii. 5; Eccus. xlv. 10. — Arnaud: *ces mots sont ici un euphémisme, pour exprimer l'acte de la prostitution.* In *ἀπό* is contained the turning aside from the right way. Oecumenius thus explains the import of *σὰρξ ἐτέρα*: *σάρκα δὲ ἐτέραν, τὴν ἄβρῆνα φύσιν λέγει, ὡς μὴ πρὸς συνοουσιαν γενέσεως συντελοῦσαν*; so also Brückner and Wiesinger. Stier, Schott, Hofmann, proceed further, referring to Lev. xviii. 23, 24, and accordingly explaining it: “not only have they practised shame, man with man, but even man with beast” (Stier). Only this explanation corresponds to *σαρκὸς ἐτέρας*, and only by it do the connection of ver. 7 with ver. 6, expressed by *ὡς*, and the explanation: *τὸν ὁμοιον τρόπον τούτοις*, receive their true meaning. The *σὰρξ* of men was *ἐτέρα σαρξ* to the angels, as that of beasts is to men. In the parallel passage, 2 Pet. ii. 6, the sin of the cities is not stated. — *πρόκεινται δείγμα πυρὸς αἰωνίου δικην ὑπέχουσαι*]. *πρόκεινται*: *they lie before the eyes as a δείγμα*; not, “inasmuch as the example of punishment in its historical attestation is ever present” (Schott); but, inasmuch as the Dead Sea continually attests that punishment, which Jude considers as enduring. There is a certain boldness in the expression, as properly it is not the cities and their inhabitants who are *πρόκεινται*. The genitive *πυρὸς αἰωνίου* may grammatically depend both on *δείγμα* and on *δικην*. Most expositors (particularly Wiesinger, Schott, Brückner) consider the second construction as the correct one, but hardly rightly: as, (1) *δείγμα* would then lose its exact definition; (2) *πῦρ αἰώνιον* always designates hell-fire, to which the condemned are delivered up at the last judgment (see Matt. xxv. 41); (3) the juxtaposition of this verse with ver. 6, where the present punitive condition of the angels is distinguished from that which will occur *after* the judgment, favors the idea that the cities (or rather their inhabitants) are here not designated as those who even now suffer the punishment of eternal fire.¹

¹ Wiesinger incorrectly observes that “by this connection we must also assume that those angels also suffer the punishment of eternal

fire,” since precisely the contrary is the case. Wiesinger arrives at this erroneous assumption by taking *δείγμα* as equivalent to *example*. It

But Jude could designate the cities as a *δείγμα* of eternal fire, considering the fire by which they were destroyed as a figure of eternal fire. Hofmann correctly connects *πυρὸς αἰωνίου* with *δείγμα*, but he incorrectly designates *δείγμα πυρ. αἰων.* as a preceding apposition to *δίκην*: "it may be seen in them (*δείγμα* = exhibition) what is the nature of eternal fire, inasmuch as the fire that has consumed them is enduring in its after-operations;" by this explanation *πῦρ αἰωνιον* is deprived of its proper meaning. With *δίκην ὑπέχουσαι* the fact is indicated that they have continually to suffer punishment, since the period that punishment was inflicted upon them in the time of Lot;¹ corresponding to what is said of the angels in ver. 6.—*δείγμα* in N. T., ἄπ. λεγ. (Jas. v. 11, and frequently: *ὑπόδειγμα*), not = example, but *proof, testimony, sign.* *ὑπέχειν* likewise in N. T., ἄπ. λεγ.; 2 Macc. iv. 48, *ζημίαν ὑπέχειν* (2 Thess. i. 9, *δίκην τίειν*).

Ver. 8. Description of the sins of the false teachers; comp. 2 Pet. ii. 10.—*ὁμοίως*, i. e., similarly as Sodom and Gomorrha, etc.—*μέντοι* expresses here no contrast (so earlier in this commentary: "notwithstanding the judgment which has come on those cities on account of such sins"), but it serves, as Hofmann correctly observes, appealing to Kühner's *Gramm.*, II. p. 694, "simply for the strengthening of the expression, putting the emphasis on *ὁμοίως*; those men, says Jude, actually do the same thing as the Sodomites."—*καὶ οὗτοι* refers back to *τινες ἄνθρωποι*, ver. 4.—*ἐνυπνιαζόμενοι* only here and in Acts ii. 17, where it is used of prophetic dreams, according to Joel iii. 1. This meaning does not here suit, for Bretschneider's explanation, "*falsis oraculis decepti vel falsa oracula edentes*," is wholly arbitrary. Most expositors unite it closely with the following *σάρκα μαίνουσαι*, and understand it either *de somniis, in quibus corpus polluitur* (Vorstius), or of voluptuous dreams, appealing to Isa. lvi. 10 (LXX., *ἐνυπνιαζόμενοι κοίτην*, an inaccurate translation of the Hebrew שִׁכְבִּים חֲזִים), or of unnatural cohabiting (Oecumenius). Jachmann (with whom Brückner agrees) understands it generally = "sunk in sleep, i. e., hurried along in the tumult of the senses," appealing to the parallel passage, 2 Pet. ii. 10 (*ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ*). Similarly Calvin: *est metaphorica loquutio, qua significat, ipsos tam esse habetes, ut sine ulla verecundia ad omnem turpitudinem se prostituant.* But in all these explanations the expression is only referred to the first clause of the following sentence; but this is opposed to the construction: it refers to *both* clauses,—else it would have been put directly with *μαίνουσαι*,—and denotes the condition in which and out of which they do those things which are expressed in the following clauses. It is unsatisfactory to keep in view only the negative point of *ἐνυπνιάζεσθαι*, the want of a clear consciousness;² the positive point is chiefly

is also entirely erroneous when it is asserted that *πυρὸς αἰωνίου δίκη* is an evident type of hell-fire, since *πῦρ αἰωνιον* is itself hell-fire. To be compared with this is 3 Macc. ii. 5: *σὺ . . . Σοδομίτας . . . πυρὶ . . . κατεφλέσας, παράδειγμα ταῖς ἐπιγινόμενοις καταστήσας*; and Libanius in reference to Troy: *κεῖται παράδειγμα δυστοχίας πυρὸς αἰωνίου.*

¹ There is no necessity to derive this repre-

sentation from *Wisd.* x. 7, and the various phenomena which lead to the supposition of a subterranean fire at the Dead Sea (see Winer's *Bibl. Reale.*: *totdos Meer*).

² Hornefus: "tam insipientes sunt, ut quasi lethargo sopiti non tantum impure vivant," etc.; Arnaud: "qui agissent sans savoir ce qu'ils font."

to be observed, which consists in living in the arbitrary fancies of their own perverted sense, which renders them deaf to the truths and warnings of the divine word (so in essentials, Stier, Frommüller, Wiesinger, Schott, Brückner, Hofmann).¹ The reference to Isa. xxix. 10, LXX.: *πεπότικεν ἡμᾶς κύριος κατανύξεως*, is unsuitable (against Beza, Carpzov, and others), as here the discourse is not above a punitive decree of God. — *σάρκα μὲν μαίνονται*, not *their* flesh, but generally *the flesh*, both their own and that of others: the thought refers back to ver. 7: *ἐκπορνεύσασαι*, etc. — *κυριότητα δὲ ἀθετοῦσι, δόξας δὲ βλασφημοῦσιν*, announces a new side of their sinful nature. As this verse is in evident connection of thought with ver. 10, where the words *ἄσα δὲ φησικῶς . . . φθείρονται* refer back to *σάρκα μὲν μαίν.*, so *κυριότης* and *δόξαι* can only be here such things as suit the words *ἄσα οὐκ οἶδασιν*. It is thus incorrect to understand them of political powers (Erasmus, Calvin, Grotius, Wolf, Semler, Stier, and others), or of ecclesiastical rulers (Oecumenius),² or of human authorities generally, the two words being either taken as designations of concrete persons, or one of them as a pure abstraction; Arnaud: *par κυριότητα il faut entendre l'autorité en général et par δόξας les dignités quelconques, les hommes méritant, par leur position, le respect et la considération*. — Both expressions are to be understood as a designation of supermundane powers. Almost all recent expositors agree in this, although they differ widely in the more definite statement. These different explanations are as follows: (1) *κυριότης* is taken as a designation of God or Christ, and *δόξαι* as a designation of the good angels (Ritschl); (2) the good angels are understood in both expressions (Brückner); (3) *κυριότης* is understood in the first explanation, but *δόξαι* is explained of the evil angels (Wiesinger); (4) both expressions are understood as a designation of the evil angels (Schott). In order first correctly to determine the idea *κυριότης*, the relation of ver. 8 to what goes before is to be observed. The judgments which have befallen the people (ver. 5), the angels (ver. 6), and the cities (ver. 7), are by Jude adduced as a testimony against the Antinomians (*οἱτοί*, ver. 8) mentioned in ver. 4, evidently because these persons are guilty of the same sins on account of which those judgments occurred. Since *σάρκα μαίνονται* evidently points back to *ἐκπορνεύσασαι*, ver. 7, and further to *ἀσέλγειαν*, ver. 4, it is most natural to refer *κυριότητα ἀθετοῦσιν* to *μὴ πιστεύοντας*, ver. 5, and, further, to *τὸν μόνον δεσπότην . . . ἠρνούμενοι*, ver. 4. Consequently, by *κυριότης* — if one takes *τὸν μόνον δεσπότην* as a designation of God — is to be understood the *Godhead*; or, if one understands *τ. μ. δ.* as a predicate to *Ἰησ. Χρ.*, *Christ*. If, now, it is assumed that *δόξαι* is an idea corresponding to *κυριότης*, and to be taken along with it, then by it the good angels are to be understood. But it must not be overlooked that the clause *δόξας δὲ βλασφημοῦσιν* is separated from the preceding clause by *δέ*; and that ver. 9 leads to a different understanding of *δόξαι*. When in

¹ "Those here spoken of are wakeful dreamers, so that they, when they should perceive with their wakeful senses, have only dreams, and what they dream they esteem as the perception of the wakeful spirit."

² Oecumenius, however, wavers, thinking

that by *κυριότης* may also be understood *ὁ τοῦ κατὰ Χριστὸν μυστηρίου τελευτή*, and by *δόξαι* also *ἡ παλαιὰ διαθήκη καὶ ἡ νέα*; on 2 Pet. ii. 10 he observes: *δόξας, ἧτοι τὰς θείας φησι δυνάμεις, ἡ καὶ τὰς ἐκκλησιαστικὰς ἀρχὰς*.

ver. 9 it is said of the archangel Michael that he dared not κρίσω ἐπενεγκεῖν βλασφημίας against the Devil, this βλασφημίας evidently refers back to βλασφημοῦσιν, ver. 8, consequently the two ideas δόξας and δῆμιος are brought together, so that from this the preference must be given to the explanation which understands by δόξας the diabolical powers, or the evil angels. That not only δόξαι, but also κυριότης, is a designation of evil powers, Schott incorrectly appeals to the fact that in 2 Pet. ii. 10, and also here, the unchaste, carnal life of the false teachers is connected with their despising or rejection of κυριότης; for although it is presupposed that the recognition of the reverence for κυριότης might restrain these men from the abuse of their fleshly nature, yet it does not follow from this that only evil spirits can be meant, since also the recognition of the reverence for the divine power restrains from the abuse of the corporeal senses which were created by God. To the identification of κυριότης and δόξαι — whether good or evil angels are to be understood — not only is the form of the expression opposed, Jude not uniting the two clauses by καί, but, as already remarked, separating them by δέ,¹ but also the difference of the conduct of the Antinomians, whilst they despise (ἀθετοῦσιν; 2 Pet. : καταφρονοῦσιν) the κυριότης, but blaspheme the δόξαι. The clearer this separation and distinction are kept in view, the less reason is there against deriving the exact meaning of δόξαι from ver. 9 (2 Pet. ii. 10 from ver. 11), and consequently against understanding by it evil angels (comp. Hofmann); only it must not be affirmed that Jude has used the expression δόξαι as a name for the evil angels as such, but only that, whilst so naming angels generally, he here means the evil angels, as is evident from ver. 9. That these may be understood by this designation, cannot be denied, especially, as Wiesinger points out, as Paul in Eph. vi. 12 names them αἱ ἄρχαί, αἱ ἐξουσίαι, οἱ κοσμοκράτορες, and says of them that they are ἐν τοῖς ἐπουρανίοις. — ἀθετοῦσιν . . . βλασφημοῦσιν]. The first expression is negative, the second positive; the Antinomians manifested the despising of κυριότης by the carnal licentiousness of their lives, whilst they fancied themselves exempt by χάρις (ver. 4) from the duty of obedience to the will of God (or Christ) as the κύριος requiring a holy life; but their blasphemy of the δόξαι consisted in this, that, on the reproach of having in their immorality fallen under diabolical powers, they mocked at them as entirely impotent beings.

REMARK. — According to Ritschl's opinion, the actions which Jude here asserts of the Antinomians represent directly only the guilt of their forerunners (namely, the Israelites, ver. 5; the angels, ver. 6; and the Sodomites, ver. 7), and his expressions can therefore only be understood in an indirect and metaphorical sense. To this conclusion Ritschl arrives (1) by explaining the second clause of ver. 10, that the Antinomians understood relations to be understood spiritually φυσικῶς ὡς τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα, i. e., that they considered the blessings promised in the kingdom of heaven as the blessings of sensual enjoyment; (2) by so understanding the relation of ver. 8 to the preceding, that δόξας βλασφ. is to be referred back to ver. 7, κυριότης. ἀθετ. to ver. 6, and σαρκῶ μαίιν to ver. 5. According

¹ Also in 2 Pet. ii. 10, δόξας οὐ τρέμουσιν καταφρονοῦντας by the intervening τομηται βλασφημοῦντες is separated from κυριότητος αὐθάδεις.

to his view, Jude finds the guilt of the Sodomites (ver. 7) to consist in this, that by the design of practising their lust on the angels, they blasphemed them; the guilt of the angels (ver. 6) in this, that they undervalued their own dominion; and the guilt of the Israelites (ver. 5) in this, that they had criminal intercourse with the impure daughters of Moab. Over against this, the guilt of the Antinomians consisted in this: (1) that they regarded immorality as a privilege of the kingdom of God, which they have in common with the angels; (2) that by referring their immoral practice to the kingdom of God, they showed a depreciation of the dominion which belongs to Christ, or to which they themselves are called; and (3) that by their *ἀσελγεια* they were guilty of the defilement of those connected with them in the Christian Church. But both the explanation of the second clause of ver. 10, where there is no mention of the blessings of the kingdom of heaven, and the statement of the relation of ver. 8 to what goes before, is incorrect, since in ver. 7 the Sodomites and the other cities are reproached, not with an evil intention, but with an actual doing; in ver. 6 the not preserving their *ἀρχή*, and the forsaking of their *οἰκητήριον*, are indeed reckoned as a crime to the angels, but specially on this account, because they did it—as *τὸν ὁμοίον τρόπον τούτοις*, ver. 7, shows—for the sake of *ἐκπορνεύειν*; and, lastly, in ver. 5 the criminal intercourse with the daughters of Moab is not indicated as the reason of their *ἀπόλεια*, but their unbelief (*μὴ πιστεύοντας*). For these reasons Wiesinger has correctly rejected the explanation of Ritschl as mistaken.—The view of Steinfass, expressed on 2 Pet. ii. 10, that the blasphemy of the *δόξαι* by the Antinomians consisted in their wishing to constrain the angels by charms to love-intrigues, is, apart from all other considerations, contradicted by the fact that neither in 2 Peter nor in Jude is there any reference to charms and love-intrigues with the angels.

Ver. 9 places in a strong light the wickedness of this blasphemy (comp. 2 Pet. ii. 11). They do something against the *δόξαι*, which even Michael the archangel did not venture to do against the Devil.—*ὁ δὲ Μιχαὴλ ὁ ἀρχάγγελος*]. Michael, in the doctrine of the angels, as it was developed during and after the captivity by the Jews, belonged to the seven highest angels, and was regarded as the guardian of the nation of Israel; Dan. xii. 1, *עֲרַךְ עֲנַן עֲלֵה עֲלֵי הַקַּיִן לִלְחָמֵהּ*; comp. x. 13, 21; in the N. T. he is only mentioned in Rev. xii. 7. In the Book of Enoch, chap. xx. 5, he is described as “one of the holy angels set over the best part of the human race, over the people.”—*ἀρχάγγελος* only here and in 1 Thess. iv. 16 (Dan. xii. 1, lxx., *ὁ ἀρχων ὁ μέγας*).¹—*ὅτε τῷ διαβόλῳ, κ.τ.λ.*]. This legend is found neither in the O. T., nor in the rabbinical writings, nor in the Book of Enoch; Jude, however, supposes it well known. Oecumenius thus explains the circumstance: *λέγεται τὸν Μιχαὴλ . . . τῇ τοῦ Μωσέως ταφῇ δεδιηκονηκέναι τοῦ γὰρ διαβόλου τοῦτο μὴ καταδεχομένου, ἀλλ’ ἐπιφέροντος ἔγκλημα διὰ τὸν τοῦ Αἰγυπτίου φόνον, ὡς αὐτοῦ ὄντος τοῦ Μωσέως, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μὴ συγχωρεῖσθαι αὐτῷ τυχεῖν τῆς ἐντίμου ταφῆς*. According to Jonathan on Deut. xxxiv. 6, the grave of Moses was given to the special custody of Michael. This legend, with reference to the manslaughter committed by Moses, might easily have been formed, as

¹ See Winer's *Bibl. Reallex.*: *Angel, Michael*.

Oecumenius states it, "out of Jewish tradition, extant in writing alongside of the Scriptures" (Stier).¹ According to Origen (*περὶ ἀρχῶν*, iii. 2), Jude derived his account from a writing known in his age, *ἀνάβασις τοῦ Μωσέως*.¹ Calvin, and others, regard oral tradition as the source; Nicolas de Lyra, and others, a special revelation of the Holy Ghost; and F. Philippi, a direct instruction of the disciples by Christ, occasioned by the appearance of Moses on the mount of transfiguration. De Wette has correctly observed that the explanation is neither to be derived from the Zendavesta (Herder), nor is the contest to be interpreted allegorically (*σῶμα Μωσέως* = the people of Israel, or the Mosaic law). — *διακρινόμενος διελέγετο*]. The juxtaposition of these synonymous words serves for the strengthening of the idea; by *διελέγετο* the conflict is indicated as a verbal altercation. — *οὐκ ἐτόλμησε, he ventured not.* — *κρίσιν ἐπενέγκειν βλασφημίας*]. Calovius incorrectly explains it by: *ultionem de blasphemia sumere*, the words refer not to a blasphemy uttered by the Devil, but to a blasphemy against the Devil, from which Michael restrained himself. — *κρίσιν ἐπιφέρειν* denotes a judgment pronounced against any one (comp. Acts xxv. 18: *αἰτίαν ἐπιφέρειν*). — *κρίσιν βλασφημίας* is a judgment containing in itself a blasphemy. By *βλασφ.*, that saying — namely, an invective — is to be understood by which the dignity belonging to another is injured. Michael restrained himself from such an invective against the Devil, because he feared to injure his original dignity; instead of pronouncing a judgment himself, he left this to God. Herder: "And Michael dared not to pronounce an abusive sentence." — *ἀλλ' εἶπεν' ἐπιτιμῆσαι σοι κύριος, the Lord rebuke thee*; comp. Matt. xvii. 18, xix. 13, etc. According to Zech. iii. 1–3, the angel of the Lord spoke the same words to the Devil, who in the vision of Zechariah stood at his right hand as an adversary of the high priest Joshua (LXX.: *ἐπιτιμῆσαι κύριος ἐν σοὶ διάβολε*).

Ver. 10. Description of the false teachers with reference to ver. 8 in contrast to ver. 9; comp. 2 Pet. ii. 12. — They blaspheme, *ὅσα μὲν οὐκ οἶδασι, what they know not*: the supermundane, to which the *δόξαι*, ver. 8, belong, is meant. Hofmann: "they know about it, otherwise they could not blaspheme it; but they have no acquaintance with it, and yet in their ignorance judge of it, and that in a blasphemous manner" (comp. Col. ii. 18, according to the usual reading). Those expositors who understand *κυριότητα* and *δόξας* of human authorities, are at a loss for an explanation of the thoughts here expressed; thus Arnaud: *il est assez difficile de préciser, quelles étaient ces*

¹ Schmid (*Bibl. Theol.*, II. p. 149), Luthardt, Hofmann (*Schriftbeweis*, I. p. 340), Schott, Wiesinger (less definitely), think that the conflict consisted in Michael not permitting the Devil to exercise his power over the dead body of Moses, but withdrawing it from corruption; for which an appeal is made to the fact that "God had honored Moses to see in the body a vision of His entire nature" (Hofmann), and also that "Moses was to be a type of the Mediator conquering death" (Schott), and that Moses appeared with Christ on the mount of transfiguration. In his explanation

of this Epistle, Hofmann expresses himself to this effect, that Satan wished to prevent "Moses, who shared in the impurity of death, and who had been a sinful man, from being miraculously buried by the holy hand of God (through Michael)."

² See on this apocryphal writing, F. Philippi (*Das Buch Henoch*, p. 166–191) who ascribes the composition of it to a Christian in the second century, and assumes that he was induced to it by this 9th verse in the Epistle of Jude; this at all events is highly improbable.

choses qu'ignoraient ces impies. — ὅσα δὲ φυσικῶς ἐπίστανται, a contrast to what goes before; corresponding to *σάρκα μαινοῦσι*, ver. 8, only here the idea is carried farther. Jachmann explains it: “the passions inherent in every one;” but this does not suit *ἐπίστανται*. De Wette, correctly. *the objects of sensual enjoyment*; to which the *σάρξ* (ver. 8) especially belongs. By *φυσικῶς* (ἄπ. λεγ. = *of nature*) ὡς τὰ ἄλογα ζῶα is prominently brought forward the fact that their understanding is not raised above that of the irrational animals, that to them only the sensual is something known. There is no distinction between *εἰδέναι* and *ἐπίσασθαι*, as Schott thinks, that the former denotes a comprehensive knowledge, and the latter a mere external knowing (“they understand, namely, in respect of the external and sensual side of things, practically applied”); but these two verbs obtain this distinctive meaning here only through the context in which they are employed by Jude (comp. Hofmann). — ἐν τοῦτοις φθείρονται]. ἐν, more significant than δῶ, designates their entire surrender to these things. — φθείρονται. Luther, *they corrupt themselves*; better, *they destroy themselves*, namely, by their immoderate indulgences. In Luther’s translation the words ὡς τὰ ἄλογα ζῶα are incorrectly attached to this verb.

Ver. 11. The author interrupts his description of these ungodly men by a denunciation on them, which he grounds by characterizing them after the example of the ungodly in the O. T. (comp. 2 Pet. ii. 15 ff.). — οὐαὶ αὐτοῖς]. The same denunciation frequently occurs in the discourses of Jesus: “at once a threatening and a strong disapproval” (De Wette). With this οὐαὶ Jude indicates the judgment into which the Antinomians have fallen; it refers back to vv. 5–7. Wiesinger incorrectly understands it only as a mere “exclamation of pain and abhorrence.”¹ This denunciation of woe does not occur with an apostle; frequently in the O. T. — ὅτι τῇ ὀδῷ τοῦ Κάιν ἐπορεύθησαν]. On the phrase: τῇ ὀδῷ τινος πορεύεσθαι, comp. Acts xiv. 16. (Acts ix. 31: πορ. τῷ φόβῳ τ. κυρίου.) τῇ ὀδῷ is to be understood locally (see Meyer on the above passages), not “instrumentally” (Schott), which does not suit ἐπορεύθησαν. — ἐπορεύθησαν; preterite (Luther and others translate it as the present), because Jude represents the judgment threatened in οὐαὶ αὐτοῖς as fulfilled (De Wette-Brückner). Schott incorrectly explains it: “they have set out, set forth.” Many expositors find the similarity with Cain to consist in this, that, whereas he murdered his brother, these by seduction of the brethren are guilty of spiritual murder; so Oecumenius, Estius, Grotius (*Cain fratri vitam caducam ademūt; illi fratribus adimunt aeternam*), Calovius, Hornejus, Schott, and others. But this conversion into the spiritual is arbitrary, especially as the desire of seduction in these men is not specially brought forward by Jude. Other expositors, adhering to the murder committed by Cain, think on the persecuting zeal of these false teachers against believers, so Nicolas de Lyra, *sequuntur mores et studia latronis ex invidia et avaritia persequentes sincerioris theologiae studiosos*. As the later Jews re-

¹ Hofmann correctly observes: “οὐαὶ has evil in view, whether it be in the tone of compassion which bewails it (Matt. xxiii. 15), or of indignation which imprecates it (Matt. xi.

21).” As not the first but the second is the case here, Hofmann should not have rejected the explanation of De Wette.

garded Cain as a symbol of moral scepticism, so Schneckenburger supposes that Jude would here reproach his opponents with this scepticism; but there is also no indication of this in the context. De Wette stops at the idea that Cain is named as "the archetype of all wicked men;" so also Arnaud¹ and Hofmann; but this is too general. Brückner finds the point of resemblance in this, that as Cain out of *envy*, on account of the favor shown to Abel, *resisting the commandment and warning of God*, slew his brother, so these false teachers resisted God, and that from envy of the favor shown to believers. But in the context there is no indication of the definite statement "from envy." It is more in correspondence with the context to find the *tertium compar.* in this, that Cain, in spite of the warning of God, followed his own wicked lusts. Frommüller: "The point of comparison is acting on the selfish impulses of nature, in contempt of the warnings of God." — καὶ τῇ πλάνῃ τοῦ Βαλαὰμ μισθοῦ ἐξεχύθησαν]. πλάνη, as a sinful moral error, denotes generally a vicious life averted from the truth; comp. Jas. v. 20; 2 Pet. ii. 18 (Ezek. xxxiii. 16, LXX., translation of יִצְחָק). ἐκχεῖσθαι in the middle, literally, to issue forth out of something, construed with εἰς τι; figuratively, to rush into something, to give one's self up with all his might to something (Clemens Alexandrinus, p. 491, 3; εἰς ἡδονὴν ἐκχυθέντες; several proof passages in Wahl, Elsner, Wetstein); it is less suitable to explain the verb according to Ps. lxxiii. 2, where the LXX. have ἐξεχύθη as a translation of יִצְחָק = to slip (Grotius: errare). The dative τῇ πλάνῃ is = εἰς τὴν πλάνην; Schott incorrectly explains it as *dativus instrumentalis*, since ἐξεχύθησαν requires a statement for the completion of the idea. The genitive μισθοῦ is, with Winer, p. 194 (E. T., 206), to be translated: for reward (see Grotius in loco); so that the meaning is: "they gave themselves up for a reward (i.e., for the sake of earthly advantage, thus from covetousness; Luther: 'for the sake of enjoyment') to the sin of Balaam;" thus most interpreters, also Brückner, Wiesinger, Hofmann. De Wette, on the contrary, after the example of Erasmus, Vatablus, and others, explains Βαλαάμ as a genitive dependent on τοῦ μισθοῦ; the dative τῇ πλάνῃ as = by means of the error; and ἐξεχύθησαν as an intransitive verb = "to commit excesses, to give vent to." Accordingly, he translates the passage as follows: "By (by means of) the error (seduction) of the reward of Balaam, they have poured themselves out (in vice)." So also Hornejus: *deceptione mercedis, qua deceptus fuit Balaam, effusi sunt.*² But this construction is extremely harsh, the ideas πλάνη and ἐξεχύθησαν are arbitrarily interpreted, and the whole sentence, so interpreted, would be withdrawn from the analogy of the other two with which it is co-ordinate.³ Schott construes the genitive with πλάνη, whilst he designates it "as an additional,

¹ Arnaud: "J. compare seulement, d'une manière très générale, ses adversaires à Cain, sous le rapport de la méchanceté."

² Calvin: "dixit (Ap.), instar Bileam mercede fuisse deceptos, quia pletatis doctrinam turpis lucri gratia adulterant; sed metaphora, qua utitur, aliquanto plus exprimit; dixit enim

effusus esse, quia scilicet instar aquae diffuentis projecta sit eorum intemperies.

³ "The parallelism of the three clauses requires that τῇ πλάνῃ ἐξεχύθησαν should remain together, accordingly the genitive is equivalent to ἀντὶ μισθοῦ" (Stier).

and, as it were, a parenthetically added genitive for the sake of precision," and for this he supplies a *πλάνη*: "the error of Balaam, which was an error determined by gain." This construction, it is true, affords a suitable sense, but it is not linguistically justified: it is entirely erroneous to take *μισθοῦ* as in apposition to *Βαλαάμ* = *ὅς μισθὸν ἠγάπησεν*, 2 Pet. ii. 15 (Fronmüller, Steinfass). — De Wette, chiefly from Rev. ii. 14, finds the point of resemblance in this, that "Balaam as a false prophet and a seducer to unchastity and idolatry, and contrary to the will of God, went to Balak, and that he is also particularly considered as covetous and mercenary." But there is no indication that the men of whom Jude speaks enticed others to idolatry. Hofmann observes that this clause calls the sin of those described as "a devilish conduct against the people of God, the prospect of a rich reward being too alluring to Balaam to prevent him entering into the desires of Balak to destroy the people of God;" but in this explanation also a reference is introduced not indicated by the context. That Jude had primarily in view the covetousness of Balaam, *μισθοῦ* shows; blinded by covetousness, Balaam resisted the will of God; his resistance was his *πλάνη*, in which, and in the motive to it, the Antinomians resembled him (Brückner, Wiesinger); whether Jude had also in view the seduction to unchastity (comp. Num. xxxi. 16; Fronmüller), is at least doubtful; and it is still more doubtful to find the point of resemblance in this, that the Antinomians "had in view a material gain to be obtained by the ruin of the Church of God" (Schott). — *καὶ τῇ ὀντιλογία τοῦ Κορὲ ἀπώλοντο*. *ὀντιλογία*, contradiction; here, seditious resistance. *ἀπώλοντο* does not mean that "they lost themselves in the *ὀντιλ.* of Korah," but "that they perished;" accordingly, *τῇ ὀντιλογία* is the instrumental dative. The point of resemblance is not, with Nicolas de Lyra, to be sought in this, that the opponents of Jude formed *propter ambitionem honoris et gloriæ sectas erroneas*; or, with Hornejus, that they assumed the *munus Apostolorum ecclesiae doctorum*; or, with Hofmann, that they, as Korah ("whose resistance consisted in his unwillingness to recognize as valid the law of the priesthood of Aaron, on which the whole religious constitution of Israel rested"), "desired to assert a liberty not restricted:" but it consists in the proud resistance to God and His ordinances, which the Antinomians despise. By Schott's explanation: "that they opposed to the true holiness a holiness of their own invention, namely, the holiness alleged to be obtained by disorderly excess," a foreign reference is introduced.¹ The gradation of the ideas *ὀδός*, *πλάνη*, *ὀντιλογία*, in respect of definiteness, is not to be denied; but there is also a gradation of thought, for although the point about which Cain, Balaam, and Korah are named is

¹ Ritschl finds the point of resemblance between the Antinomians and the three named in this, "that they, as these, undertook to worship God in a manner rejected by Him." But it is erroneous that "the Korahites exhibited their assumption of the priesthood by the presentation of an offering rejected by God;" it is incorrect that by *ὀδός* is indicated "the

religious conduct" of Cain; and it is incorrect that the utterance of the curse willed by Balaam is to be considered as a religious transaction. Moreover, in the description of the Antinomians there is no trace indicating that their view was directed to a particular kind of worship.

one and the same, namely, resistance to God, yet this appears in the most distinct manner in the case of Korah.

Ver. 12. A further description of these false teachers; comp. 2 Pet. ii. 13, 17. — οὗτοί εἰσιν [οἱ] ἐν ταῖς ἀγάπαις ὑμῶν σπιλάδες]. In the reading οἱ, ἕντες is either (with De Wette) to be supplied; thus, “these are they who are σπιλάδες in your ἀγάπαις;” or οἱ is to be joined to συννεωχούμενοι (comp. vv. 16, 19; so Hofmann). That by ἀγάπαις the love-feasts are to be understood, is not to be doubted. Erasmus incorrectly takes it as = *charitas*, and Luther as a designation of alms. — The word σπιλάδες is usually explained = *cliffs* (so also formerly in this commentary). If this is correct, the opponents of Jude are so called, inasmuch as the love-feasts were wrecked on them (De Wette-Brückner, Wiesinger), i. e., by their conduct these feasts ceased to be what they ought to be; or, inasmuch as they prepared destruction for others, who partook of the love-feasts (Schott, and this commentary). It is, however, against this interpretation, that σπιλάς does not specially indicate *cliffs*, but has the more general meaning *rocks* (Hofmann: “projecting interruptions of the plain”), and the reference to being wrecked is not in the slightest degree indicated.¹ — Stier and Fronmüller take σπιλάδες as = σπίλοι, 2 Pet. ii. 13; this is not unwarranted, as σπιλάς, which is properly an adjective (comp. σποράς, φηγάς, λογάς), may be derived as well from σπίλος = filth (comp. γῆ σπιλάς = clayey soil; so Sophocles, *Trach.*, 672, without γῆ), as from σπίλος = a rock (comp. πολυσπιλάς). In this case σπιλάδες may either be taken as a substantive = what is filthy, spots (these are spots in your ἀγαρέ; so Stier and Fronmüller), or as an adjective, which, used adverbially (see Winer, p. 433, 464), denotes the mode and manner of συννεωχίσθαι (so Hofmann). The former construction merits the preference as the simpler. — Apart from other considerations, σπίλοι καὶ μῶμοι in 2 Peter are in favor of taking σπιλάδες here in the sense of σπίλοι. — συννεωχούμενοι]. The verb ἐνωχίσθαι² has not indeed by itself a bad meaning, signifying *to eat well, to feast well*; but it obtains such a meaning here by the reference to the ἀγαρέ. The συν placed before it may either refer to those addressed, *with you*, see 2 Pet. ii. 13, where ὑμῖν is added to the verb (Wiesinger, Schott, Fronmüller, Hofmann); or to those here described by Jude, *feasting together*, i. e., *with one another*. Against the first explanation is the objection, that according to it the ἐνωχίσθαι in their ἀγαρέ would render those addressed also guilty (so formerly in this commentary); but against the second is the fact that the Libertines held no special love-feasts with one another, but participated in those of the church. The passage, 2 Pet. ii. 13, is decisive in favor of the first explanation. — The connection of ἀφόβως is doubtful; De Wette-Brückner, Arnaud, Schott,

¹ The explanation of Arnaud: “les rochers continuellement battus par les flots de la mer et souillés par son écume” (after Steph.: σπιλάς), is unsuitable; since, when the Libertines are called cliffs, this happens not because they are bespattered and defiled by others, but because others are wrecked on them.

² An explanation of this word is found

in Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, lib. iii.: ἔλεγε (namely, Socrates) δὲ καὶ ὡς τὸ ἐνωχίσθαι ἐν τῇ Ἀθηναίων γλώττῃ ἑσθίειν κάλοιο. Τὸ δὲ εὐπροσκεῖσθαι, ἔφη, ἐπὶ τῷ ταῦτα ἑσθίειν ἅτινα μῆτε τὴν ψυχὴν, μῆτε τὸ σῶμα λυποῖη, μῆτε δυσεύρετα εἶη; ὥστε καὶ τὸ ἐνωχίσθαι τοῖς κοσμίως διαιτωμένοις ἀνετίθει. However, ἐνωχίσθαι sometimes occurs in classical Greek in a bad sense.

Fronmüller, unite it with *συννεωχούμενοι*; Erasmus, Beza, Wiesinger, Hofmann, with *ἐαυτοῦς ποιμαίνοντες*. In this commentary the first connection was preferred, "because the idea *συννεωχ.* would otherwise be too bare." This, however, is not the case, because if the verse is construed as it is by Hofmann, it has its statement in what goes before; but if *σπιλάδες* is taken as a substantive, as it is by Stier and Fronmüller, then *συννεωχ.* is more precisely determined by the following *ἀόβως . . . ποιμαίνοντες*, whilst it is said that they so participate in the *agapé* that their feasting was an *ἀόβως ποιμαίνειν ἐαυτοῦς*. Erasmus takes the latter words in a too general sense: *suo ductu et arbitrio viventes*; Grotius, Bengel, and others give a false reference to them after Ezek. xxxiv. 2, understanding "that these feed themselves and not the church" (comp. 1 Pet. v. 2), and accordingly Schneckenburger thinks specially on the instructions which they engage to give: but this reference is entirely foreign to the context. According to De Wette, it is a contrast to "whilst they suffer the poor to want" (1 Cor. xi. 21); yet there is also here no indication of this reference. — *νεφέλαι ἄνυδροι* is to be understood no more of the *agapé* (De Wette, Schott), but generally. *νεφ. ἄνυδρ.* are light clouds without water, which therefore, as the addition *ὑπὸ ἀνέμων παραφερόμεναι* makes prominent, are driven past by the wind without giving out rain; comp. Prov. xxv. 14. This figure describes the internal emptiness of these men, who for this reason can effect nothing that is good; but it seems also to intimate their deceptive ostentation;¹ the addition serves for the coloring of the figure, not for adducing a special characteristic of false teachers; Nicolas de Lyra, incorrectly: *quae a ventis circumferuntur, i. e., superbiae motibus et vanitatibus*. — In the parallel passage, 2 Pet. ii. 17, two images are united, *πηγαὶ ἄνυδροι καὶ ὀμίχλαι ὑπὸ λαίλαπος ἐλάνθόμεναι*. — According to the reading *περιφερόμεναι*, the translation would be, "driven hither and thither;" *παραφερόμεναι* denotes, on the other hand, *driven past*. A second figure is added to this first, by which the unfruitfulness (in good works) and the complete deadness of these men are described; in the adjectives the gradation is obvious. — *δένδρα φθινοπωρινά* are not a particular kind of trees, such as only bear fruit in autumn, but trees as they are in autumn, namely, destitute of fruit (De Wette-Brückner, Wiesinger, Schott, etc.). It is arbitrary to desert the proper meaning of the word, and to explain *φθινοπωρινά* according to the etymology of *φθίνειν* by *arbores quarum fructus perit illico = frugiperdae* (Grotius; so also Erasmus, Beza, Carpzov, Stier: "which have cast off their fruit in an unripe state"). — *ἄκαρτα*; not "whose fruit has been taken off" (De Wette), but "which are without fruit" (Brückner). Whether they have had fruit at an earlier period, and are now destitute of it, is not said. "The impassioned discourse proceeds from marks of unfruitfulness to that of absolute nothingness" (De Wette). *δὶς ἀποθανόντα*]. Beza, Rosenmüller, and others arbitrarily explain *δὶς* by *plane, prorsus*. Most expositors retain the usual meaning: yet they explain the idea *twice* in dif-

¹ Calvin: "Vanam ostentationem taxat, quia nebulones isti, quum multa promittunt, intus tamen aridi sunt." Bullinger: "Habent enim speciem doctorum veritatis, pollicentur

datorios se doctrinam salvificam, sed veritate destituuntur et quovis circumaguntur doctrinae vento."

ferent ways; either that those trees are not only destitute of fruit, but also of leaves (so Oecumenius, Hornejus, and others); or that they bear no fruit, and are accordingly rooted out; or, still better, *δις* is to be referred to the fact that they are not only *fruitless*, but *actually dead and dried up*.¹ That Jude has this in his view, the following *ἐκρίζωθέντα* shows. Several expositors have incorrectly deserted the figure here, and explained this word either of twofold spiritual death (Beza, Estius, Bengel, Schneckenburger, Jachmann, Wiesinger, Schott), or of death here and hereafter (so Grotius: *neque hic bonum habebunt exitum, neque in seculo altero*), or of one's own want of spiritual life and the destruction of life in others. All these explanations are without justification. *ἐκρίζωθέντα* is in close connection with *δις ἀποθανόντα*; thus, trees which, because they are dead, are dug up and rooted out,² thus incapable of recovery and of producing new fruit (Erasmus: *quibus jam nulla spes est revirescendi*). This figure, taken from trees, denotes that those described are not only at present destitute of good works, but are incapable of producing them in the future, and are "on this account rooted out of the soil of grace" (Hofmann). It is incorrect when Hofmann³ in the application refers *δις ἀποθανόντα* to the fact that those men were not only in their early heathenism, but also in their Christianity, without spiritual life. There is no indication in the context of the distinction between heathenism and Christianity. Arnaud observes not incorrectly, but too generally: *tous ces mots sont des métaphores énergiques pour montrer le néant de ces impies, la légèreté de leur conduite, la stérilité de leur foi et l'absence de leurs bonnes œuvres*.

Ver. 13. Continuation of the figurative description of those false teachers. The two images here employed characterize them in their erring and disordered nature. — *κύματα ἄγρια θαλάσσης, κ.τ.λ.*]. Already Carpzov has correctly referred for the explanation of these words to Isa. lvii. 20; the first words correspond to the Hebrew *נָּרַשׁוּ מִיָּמֵי*; the following words: *ἐπαφρίζοντα τὰς ἑαυτῶν αἰσχύνας*, to the Hebrew *וַיִּרְשִׁי מִיָּמֵי רַפְּשׁ וְטִי*, only Jude uses the literal word where Isaiah has the figurative expression. — *ἐπαφρίζειν*, properly, *to foam over*. Luther well translates it: *which foam out their own shame*. — *αἰσχύνας*, not properly *vices* (De Wette); the plural does not necessitate this explanation, but their disgraceful nature, namely, the shameful *ἐπιθυμίαι* which they manifest in their wild lawless life; not "their self-devised wisdom" (Schott). — From the fact that the Hebrews sometimes compared their teachers to the sea (see Moses, *Theol. Samar.*, ed. Gesenius, p. 26), it is not to be inferred, with Schneckenburger and Jachmann, that there is here a reference to the office of teachers; this is the more unsuitable as the opponents of Jude hardly possessed that office. — *ἁστέρεις πλανήται*]. These two words are to be taken together, *wandering stars*; that is, stars which

¹ Fronmüller, incorrectly: "trees which have at different times suffered fatal injury by frosts or from insects."

² Fronmüller, linguistically incorrect: "trees which still remain in the earth, but which are shaken loose by their roots."

³ "If, when they became Christians, a fresh

sap from the roots, by which they were rooted in the soil of divine grace, appeared to establish them in a new life out of their heathen death in sin, yet this new life was to them only a transition into a second and now hopeless death."

have no fixed position, but roam about. The analogy with the preceding metaphors requires us to think on actual stars, with which Jude compares his opponents; thus on comets (Bretschneider, Arnaud, Stier, De Wette, Hofmann) or on planets (so most of the early commentators, also Wiesinger). The latter opinion is less probable, because the *πλανᾶσθαι* of the planets is less striking to the eye than that of the comets. It is incorrect "in the explanation entirely to disregard the fact whether there are such *ἀστéρες* *πλανῆται* in heaven or not" (so earlier in this commentary, after the example of Schott), and to assume that Jude, on account of their ostentation (Wiesinger, Schott), designates these men as stars, and by *πλανῆται* indicates their unsteady nature. De Wette incorrectly assumes this in essentials as equivalent with *πλανῶντες καὶ πλανώμενοι*, 2 Tim. iii. 13. Bengel thinks that we are in this figure chiefly to think on the *opaqueness* of the planets; but such an astronomical reference is far-fetched. Jachmann arbitrarily explains *ἀστéρες* = *φωσῆρες*, Phil. ii. 15, as a designation of Christians. Several expositors also refer this figure to the teaching of those men, appealing to Phil. ii. 15 and Dan. xii. 3;¹ but the context gives no warrant for this. — *οἱς ὁ ζῶφος τοῦ σκότους εἰς αἶωνα τετήρηται*]. This addition may grammatically be referred either to what immediately precedes, thus to the *ἀστéρες* *πλανῆται*, or to the men who have been described by the figures used by Jude. It is in favor of the first reference (Hofmann: "Jude names them stars passing into eternal darkness, comets destined only to vanish"), that a more precise statement is also added to the preceding figure; thus the addition *ἰπὸ ἀνέμων παραφερόμενοι τοὺς νεφέλαι ἀνδρῶν, κ.τ.λ.* But it is against it, that the expression chosen by Jude is evidently too strong to designate only the disappearance of comets, therefore the second reference is to be preferred (Wiesinger; comp. ver. 6), which also the parallel passage in 2 Pet. ii. 17 favors. The addition of the genitive *τοῦ σκότους* to *ὁ ζῶφος* serves to strengthen this idea.

Vv. 14, 15. The threatening contained in the preceding verses is confirmed by a saying of Enoch. — *ἐπροφήτευσε δὲ καὶ τούτους*]. *καὶ* refers either to *τούτους*: "of these as well as of others;" according to Hofmann, of those who perished in the deluge; or it is designed to render prominent *ἐπροφ. τούτους* in reference to what has been before said: "yea, Enoch also has prophesied of them." Hofmann, in an entirely unwarrantable manner, maintains that there can be no question that *καὶ* puts its emphasis on the word before which it stands. — *προφητεύειν* generally with *περὶ* here construed with the dative, as in Luke xviii. 31, *in reference to these*. — *ἑβδομος ἀπὸ Ἀδὰμ Ἐνώχ*]. *ἑβδομος* has hardly here the mystical meaning which Stier gives it: "The seventh from Adam is personally a type of the sanctified of the seventh age of the world, of the seventh millennium, of the great earth sabbath." Also in the Book of Enoch, he is several times expressly designated as "the seventh from Adam" (lx. 8, xciii. 3); not in order to characterize him as the oldest prophet (Calvin, De Wette, and others), but to mark his importance by the coincidence of the sacred number seven (Wiesinger, Schott).

¹ So already Oecumenius: *δοκοῦντες εἰς ἀγγελον φωτὸς μετασχηματίζεσθαι . . . ἀπέναν-*

τίας μόνον τοῦ κυρίου φέρονται δογμάτων (Hort, Jesus and others).

The saying of Enoch here quoted is found, partly verbally, at the beginning of the Book of Enoch (i. 9): "And behold He comes with myriads of saints to execute judgment on them, and He will destroy the ungodly and judge all flesh concerning all things which the sinners and ungodly have committed and done against Him."¹ These words are taken from a speech in which an angel interprets a vision which Enoch has seen, and in which he announces to him the future judgment of God.

The question, from what source Jude has drawn these words, is very differently answered by expositors. It is most natural to conceive that he has taken them from the Book of Enoch; but then this pre-supposes that this book, although only according to its groundwork, is of pre-Christian Jewish, and not of Jewish-Christian origin, which is also the prevailing opinion of recent critics. Hofmann, who denies the pre-Christian composition of the book, says, "Jude has derived it, in a similar manner as the incident between Michael and Satan, from a circle of myths, which has attached itself to Scripture, amplifying its words." Yet, on the other hand, it is to be observed that it is difficult to conceive that oral tradition should preserve such an entire prophetic saying. F. Philippi thinks that Enoch in Gen. v. 22 is characterized as a prophet of God, and, as such, prophesied of the impending deluge; and that Jude, by reason of a deeper understanding of Gen. v., could add the exposition already become traditional, and speak of a prophecy of Enoch, *the reality of which was confirmed to him by the testimony of the Holy Ghost*; or that this prophecy of Enoch was imparted to the disciples by Christ Himself, when the already extant tradition concerning Enoch might have afforded them occasion to ask the Lord about Enoch, perhaps when he was engaged in delivering His eschatological discourses. But both opinions of Philippi evidently rest on suppositions which are by no means probable. As an example of the method by which the older expositors sought to rescue the authenticity of the prophecy, let the exposition of Hornejus suffice: *haec quae Judas citat, ab Enocho ita divinitus prophetata esse, dubium non est; sive prophetiam illam ipse alicubi scripsit et scriptura illa vel per Noam ejus pronepotem in arca, vel in columna aliqua tempore diluvii conservata fuit sive memoria ejus traditione ad posteros propagata, quam postea apocrypho et fabulosa illi libro autor ejus inseruerit, ut totum Enochus scripsisse videretur.*

ἐν ἀγίαις μυριάσιν; comp. Zech. xiv. 5; Deut. xxxiii. 2; Heb. xii. 22; (μυριάσιν ἀγγέλων) Rev. v. 11. — Ver. 15. πῶσαι κρίσιν; see Gen. xviii. 25; John v. 27. — τοὺς ἄσεβεις]. The pronoun αὐτῶν, according to the Rec., would refer to the people of Israel. — ὡν ἠσέβησαν; the same verb in Zeph. iii. 11; 2 Pet. ii. 6; here used as transitive; comp. Winer, p. 209 (E. T., 222). The frequent repetition of the same idea is to be observed: ἄσεβεις, ἄσεβείας, ἠσέβησαν, and finally again ἄσεβεις; a strong intensification of ungodliness. — τῶν σκληρῶν]. σκληρός, literally, dry, hard, rough; here in an ethical sense, *ungodly*, not equivalent to *surlly* (Hofmann); in a somewhat

¹ The passage thus stands in De Sacy's version: "et venit cum myriadibus sanctorum, ut faciat judicium super eos et perdat impios

et litigat cum omnibus carnalibus pro omnibus quae fecerunt et operati sunt contra eum peccatores et impil."

different sense, but likewise of sayings, the word is used in John vi. 60. — κατ' αὐτοῦ is by Hofmann in an unnecessary manner attached not only to ἐλάλησαν, but also to ἡσέβησαν, in spite of Zeph. iii. 11, where it is directly connected with ἡσέβησαν, which is not here the case. The sentence emphatically closes with ἁμαρτωλοὶ ἄσεβεις, which is not, with Hofmann, to be attracted to what follows.

Ver. 16. A further description of the false teachers attached to the concluding words of the prophetic saying: τῶν σκληρῶν ὧν ἐλάλησαν κατ' αὐτοῦ; comp. 2 Pet. ii. 18, 19. — οὗτοί εἰσι, as in vv. 10 and 19 with special emphasis. — γογγυσταί]. ἄπ. λεγ. in N. T.; the verb is of frequent occurrence; Oecumenius interprets it: οἱ ἕπ' ὀδόντα καὶ ἀπαρῆσιόστως τῷ δυσαρεστομένῳ ἐπιμεμφόμενοι. Jude does not say against whom they murmur; it is therefore arbitrary to think on it as united to a definite special object as rulers (De Wette), or, still more definitely, ecclesiastical rulers (Estius, Jachmann). Brückner correctly observes that “the idea is not to be precisely limited.” Every thing which was not according to their mind excited them to murmuring. The epithet μεμφίμοιροι (ἄπ. λεγ.), *dissatisfied with their lot*, gives a more precise statement; denoting that they in their pretensions considered themselves entitled to a better lot than that which was accorded to them. The participial clause, κατὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας αὐτῶν πορευόμενοι, is added to the substantive, which, whilst it unfolds the reason of their dissatisfaction and murmuring, at the same time expresses a kind of contrast: they were dissatisfied with every thing but themselves. Calvin: *qui sibi in pravis cupiditatibus indulgent, simul difficiles sunt ac morosi, ut illis nunquam satisfiat*. The view of Grotius is entirely mistaken, that Jude has here in view the dissatisfaction of the Jews of that period with their political condition. — καὶ τὸ στόμα αὐτῶν λαλεῖ ὑπέρογκα]. ὑπέρογκα only here and in the parallel passage, 2 Pet. ii. 18. Luther: “proud words” (*verba tumentia*, in Jerom., *contra Jovian.*, i. 24); comp. Dan. xi. 36, LXX.: καὶ λαλήσει ὑπέρογκα; such words are meant which proceed from pride, in which man exalts himself, in contrast to the humility of the Christians submitting themselves to God. To this the parallel passage (2 Pet. ii. 18) also points, where the expression ὑπέρογκα refers to boasting of ἐλευθερία. A participial clause is again added to this assertion, as in the former clause, likewise expressing a kind of contrast: θαυμάζοντες πρόσωπα ὠφελείας χάριν. The expression θαυμάζειν πρόσωπα is in the N. T., ἄπ. λεγ.; in the O. T., comp. Gen. xix. 21, LXX.: ἐθαύμασόν σου τὸ πρόσωπον; Hebrew, ׀ִןִ ׀ִןִ; in other passages the LXX. have λαμβάνειν τὸ πρ. In Lev. xix. 15, the LXX. translate ׀ִןִ ׀ִןִ by λαμβ. τὸ πρ.; on the other hand, ׀ִןִ ׀ִןִ by θαυμάζειν τὸ πρόσωπον. Whilst in the first passage the friendly attitude of God toward Abraham is expressed, in the second passage it has the bad meaning of partiality. It has also this meaning here: it is to be translated *to render admiration* to persons (Herder: *to esteem*; Arnaud: “*admirer, honorer*”). In this sense θαυμάζειν occurs in Eccus. vii. 29.¹ This partial treatment of persons consisted in the flattering

¹ Comp. Lysias, *Ora.* 31, where it is said of death: οὔτε γὰρ τοὺς πονηροὺς ὑπερορᾷ, οὔτε

τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς θαυμάζει, ἀλλ' ἴσον ἑαυτῶν παρέχει πᾶσιν.

homage of those who hoped for some advantage from them, as *ὠφελείας χάριν* shows. It is unwarranted, with Hofmann, to interpret *θανυμάζειν πρόσωπα*: "to gratify and to please a person." Proud boasting and cringing flattery form indeed a contrast, but yet are united together. Calvin: *magniloquentiam taxat, quod se ipsos fastuose jactent: sed interea ostendit liberali esse ingenio, quia serviliter se dimittant.* — *θανυμάζοντες* is not parallel with *πορευόμενοι*, but refers in a loose construction to *αὐτῶν*; by this construction the thought gains more independence than if *θανυμάζόντων* were written. — *ὠφελείας χάριν* belongs not to the finite verb, but to the participle.

Vv. 17, 18. Jude now turns to his readers, comforting¹ and exhorting them in reference to the ungodly above described; see 2 Pet. iii. 2, 3. — *ὕμεις δέ*, an emphatic contrast to those above mentioned. — *μνήσθητε* presupposes the words meant by Jude known to the readers, as learned from the apostles. — *τῶν ῥημάτων τῶν προειρημένων*]. *ῥίμα*; the word as an expression of thought. The *προ* in *προειρημένων* designates these words not as those which predict something future, but which were already spoken before (so also Hofmann). — *ὑπὸ τῶν ἀποστόλων, κ.τ.λ.*]. Jude would hardly have so expressed himself were he himself an apostle, which several expositors certainly do not grant, explaining this mode of expression partly from Jude's modesty and partly from the circumstance that, except himself and John, the other apostles were already dead. — Ver. 18. *ὅτι ἔλεγον ὑμῖν*]. *ὑμῖν* here renders it probable that Jude means such sayings as the readers had heard from the mouth of the apostles themselves; yet the words which follow are not necessarily to be considered as a literally exact quotation, but may be a compression of the various predictions of the apostles concerning this subject.² — *ἐπ' ἐσχάτου [τοῦ] χρόνου*]. A designation of the time directly preceding the advent of Christ. In the reading *τοῦ χρόνου, ἐσχάτου* is the genitive neuter, as in Heb. i. 1. — *ἔσονται ἐμπαίκται*, only here and in 2 Pet. iii. 3, a word occurring only in later Greek; the LXX. have translated *ἐμπαίκται* by *ἐμπ.*, as they render *ἐμπαίζω* by *ἐμπαίζω*. *Mockers*, that is, men to whom the holy (not merely the *resurrection*, Grotius) serves for mockery. *λαλεῖν ὑπέρογκα* is a *ἐμπαίζω* of the holy (which Hofmann without reason denies); this is naturally united with a surrender to their own lusts; therefore *κατὰ τὰς ἐαντῶν ἐπιθυμίας πορευόμενοι τῶν ἁσεβειῶν*]. *τῶν ἁσεβειῶν*, an echo of the saying of Enoch, is placed emphatically at the close, in order to render prominent the character and aim of *ἐπιθυμίας*. — That the apostles in their writings frequently prophesied of the entrance of heretical and ungodly men into the church, is well known; comp. Acts xx. 29; 1 Tim. iv. 1; 2 Tim. iii. 2 ff.; yet *ἐμπαίζω* is not elsewhere stated as a characteristic

¹ Why Jude should not have intended to comfort his readers by reminding them of what the apostles had, at an earlier period, said of the appearance of these men, as he here describes them, cannot be perceived (against Hofmann)

² Entirely without reason, Schott maintains that the intervening words, *ὅτι ἔλεγον ὑμῖν*,

prove that Jude will here give a verbal quotation, and that this must be a *writing* earlier directed to the readers. *ὅτι ἔλ. ὑμ.* simply introduces the statement of the contents of the *ῥήματα* which were earlier spoken by the apostles. The plural is not to be referred to one apostle, and the verb does not in the least degree indicate that this word was *written*.

mark of these men; this is only the case in 2 Pet. iii. 3, where, however, the mockery is referred only to the denial of the advent of Christ.

Ver. 19. Final description of the false teachers, not specially, but according to their general nature. — οἱ τοὶ εἰσιν, parallel with ver. 16. — οἱ ἀποδοριζόντες. The article marks the idea as definite. "these are they who," etc. — ἀποδοριζέω, a word which occurs only in Aristotle's *Polit.*, iv. 8, 9, is here very differently explained; with the reading *ἐαυτούς* it would most naturally be taken as equivalent to *separate*; thus, "who separate themselves from the church, whether internally or externally" (Wahl); without *ἐαυτούς* it is explained either as = *to secede* (Fronmüller), or = *to cause separations and divisions*, namely, in the church (Luther: "who make factions;"; De Wette-Brückner, Wiesinger; so also in this commentary). Neither explanation is, however, justified from the use of the word *δοριζέω*. It is still more arbitrary, with Schott, to explain it: "who make a distinction, namely, between the pneumatical (*Pneumatikern*), as what they consider themselves, and the psychical (*Psychikern*), as what true Christians regard them;" for there is no indication of such a distinction made by them. If we base the explanation on the significance of *δοριζέω*, the word may be understood as = *to make definitions*. But in this case what follows must be closely connected with it, by which the mode and manner of their doing so is stated, namely, that they do so as psychical men, who are without the *πνεῦμα*. Hofmann gives to the verb the meaning: "to determine (define) something exactly in detail," and then assumes that the preceding genitive τῶν ἀσεβειῶν depends on οἱ ἀποδοριζόμενοι, which may well be the case, because a participle standing for a substantive may as well as a substantive govern the genitive. According to this explanation, Jude intends to describe those men as persons "who make impieties the object of an exercise of thought exactly defining every thing, and so are the philosophers of impieties." This explanation is condemned by the harsh and artificial construction which it requires.¹ — ψυχικοί, πνεῦμα μὴ ἔχοντες]. πνεῦμα is not man's natural spirit,² for Jude could not deny this to his opponents; and to explain μὴ ἔχοντες in the sense, "I might say that they have no spirit at all" (Fronmüller), is completely arbitrary. It is rather to be understood of *the Holy Spirit* (De Wette-Brückner, Wiesinger, Hofmann); the want of the article and of an epithet, such as ἁγίου or Θεοῦ, is no objection against this interpretation, since the simple word πνεῦμα is often used in the N. T. as a desig-

¹ Certainly the dependent genitive may precede the governing substantive; but this union is here rendered impossible by the intervening οἱ τοὶ. A participle also, taken as a substantive, may sometimes govern a genitive; but this is only found with the neuter, and then only rarely. Add to this that οἱ τοὶ εἰσιν here corresponds to the οἱ τοὶ εἰσιν in vv. 16 and 12, and accordingly must stand at the beginning of the sentence.

² Schott explains πνεῦμα as "spiritual life in the distinctive character of its being, that it

is self-controlled in personal self-consciousness and self-determination," and so equivalent to "free personality of the spirit" (!); but this free personality, Schott further observes, is not denied to them in the sense as "if they were actually deprived of it," but only that it "does not attain permanence and reality in actual performance." This distorted interpretation is contradicted by the fact that Jude simply denies to them πνεῦμα ἔχειν.

nation for the objective Holy Spirit. It is erroneous to affirm that by this interpretation the conclusion of the description is too flat, for nothing worse can be said of a man who desires to be esteemed a Christian than that he wants the Holy Spirit. Moreover, only so understood does πνεῦμα μὴ ἔχοντες correspond to the preceding ψυχικοί, to which it is added as an explanation; ψυχικοί they are, inasmuch as their natural spiritual life left to itself is under the unbroken power of the σὰρξ; see 1 Cor. ii. 14, 15; Jas. iii. 15.

REMARK. — Schott attempts to prove that the three verses, 12, 16, and 19, beginning with οὗτοι, refer to the threefold expression contained in ver. 11, namely, in this manner: that the Antinomians, in showing themselves to be σπυλάδες in their ἀγαπῆ (ver. 12) resembled Cain; that in being γογγυσταὶ μεμφιμοῖροι, and out of greed for material gain indulging in mercenary flattery (ver. 16), they resembled Balaam; and that in establishing a self-invented, ungodly sanctity in opposition to the divinely appointed and divinely effective Christian sanctity (ver. 19), they resembled Korah. This juxtaposition, however, is any thing but appropriate, resting, on the one hand, on incorrect explanations; and, on the other hand, on the arbitrary selection of separate points. It is incorrect to affirm that the similarity of the Antinomians with Cain consisted in this, that what he did *corporally* they did *spiritually*; there is contained in this rather a distinction than a similarity. It is arbitrary to bring forward only the last clause of ver. 16, which reproaches the Antinomians with flattery, and which may also be found in Balaam; whereas the other expressions in the verse do not suit in the least degree. And, lastly, it is erroneous so to interpret ver. 19 that the Antinomians were accused of the setting-up of a false sanctity; even were this correct, yet the sanctity claimed by them is of a totally different nature from that to which Korah and his company laid claim.

Vv. 20, 21. Exhortation to the readers respecting themselves. — ὑμεῖς δὲ, ἀγαπητοί, as in ver. 17, in contrast to the persons and conduct of those mentioned in the last verse. — ἐποικοδομοῦντες, κ.τ.λ.]. The chief thought is contained in the exhortation ἐαυτοὺς ἐν ἀγίῳ Θεοῦ τηρήσατε, to which the preceding ἐποικοδομοῦντες . . . προσευχόμενοι is subordinate, specifying by what the fulfilment of that exhortation is conditioned. Yet it is asked, whether προσευχόμενοι is connected with ἐποικοδομοῦντες, or is annexed as an independent sentence to the following imperative; and whether ἐν πν. ἀγίῳ is to be united with ἐποικοδομ. or with προσευχόμενοι. These questions are difficult to decide with perfect certainty. Wiesinger and Schott, apparently correctly, unite ἐν πν. ἀγ. with προσευχόμενοι, and these taken together with what follows. Hofmann, on the other hand, unites ἐν πνεύματι ἀγίῳ with what goes before, and προσευχόμενοι with what follows. In this construction, however, the structure of the participial clause becomes too clumsy; also ἐν πν. ἀγ. becomes superfluous, as ἐποικοδομεῖν ἐαυτοὺς cannot take place otherwise than ἐν πνεύματι ἀγ. It is true, Hofmann observes that ἐν πν. ἀγ. is superfluous with προσευχόμενοι, and that Jude could not intend to say *how* they should pray, but *that* they should pray. But this is erroneous, for τηρεῖν ἐαυτοὺς here mentioned depends not only on this, that one should pray, but that one should pray rightly, that is, ἐν πν. ἀγ. Wiesinger correctly observes, that

the first clause gives the general presupposition; the second, on the other hand, the more precise statement how *τηρήσατε* has to be brought about. — *τῇ ἀγωγῇ τῶν ἐμῶν πίστει*]. Both the adjective and the verb show that *πίστις* is here meant not in a subjective (the demeanor of faith, Schott), but in an objective sense (Wiesinger: “appropriated by them indeed as their personal possession, yet according to its contents as *παραδοθεῖσα*;” so similarly Hofmann). — *ἐποικοδομοῦντες ἑαυτούς*]. When verbs compounded with *ἐπί* are joined with the dative, as here, this for the most part is used for *ἐπί τι*, more rarely for *ἐπί τινι* (see Winer, p. 400 f. [E. T., 430]). If the first is here the case, then *ἐποικοδομοῦντες τῇ πίστει* is to be interpreted, with Wiesinger: “building on *πίστις*, so that *πίστις* is the foundation which supports their whole personal life, the soul of all their thinking, willing, and doing” (so also hitherto in this commentary);¹ comp. 1 Cor. iii. 12: *ἐποικοδομοῦντες ἐπὶ τὸν θεμέλιον τοῦτον*. If, on the other hand, the second is here the case, then it is to be explained, with Hofmann, “their faith is the foundation which supports their life; and accordingly, in the further development of their life it should ever be their care that their life rests upon this foundation;” comp. Eph. ii. 20: *ἐποικοδομηθέντες ἐπὶ τῷ θεμελίῳ τῶν ἀποστόλων*. The first is, however, to be preferred, because, as already remarked, with these verbs the dative mostly stands for *ἐπί τι*. Both explanations come essentially to the same thing. — *ἑαυτούς* is not here = *ἀλλήλους*; the discourse is indeed of a general, but not precisely of a mutual, activity; *ἑαυτούς* with the second person creates no difficulty; comp. Phil. ii. 12. — *ἐν πνεύματι ἀγίῳ προσευχόμενοι*]. The expression *προσευχ.* *ἐν πν. ἀγ.*, it is true, does not elsewhere occur, but similar combinations are not rare (*λαλεῖν ἐν πν. ἀγ.*, 1 Cor. xii. 3; see Meyer *in loc.*); it means so to pray that the Holy Spirit is the moving and guiding power (Jachmann, unsatisfactorily: “praying in consciousness of the Holy Ghost”); comp. Rom. viii. 26. — *ἑαυτοὺς ἐν ἀγάπῃ Θεοῦ τηρήσατε*]. Θεοῦ may either be the objective genitive (Vorstius: *charitas Dei passiva, i. e., qua nos Deum diligimus*; so also Jachmann, Arnaud, Hofmann, and others), or the subjective genitive, “the love of God to us” (so De Wette, Schott, Wiesinger, Fronmüller); in the latter case the thought is the same as in John xv. 9, 10; this agreement is in favor of that interpretation, nor is the want of the article opposed to it (against Hofmann). This keeping themselves in the love of God is combined with the hope of the future mercy of Christ, which has its ground, not in our love to God, but in God’s love to us (comp. Rom. v. 8 ff.). — *προσδεχόμενοι τὸ ἔλεος τοῦ κυρίου, κ.τ.λ.*]. On *προσδεχ.*, Tit. ii. 15. — *τὸ ἔλεος τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν* is the mercy which Christ will show to His own at His coming. Usually the idea *ἔλεος* is predicated not of the dealings of Christ, but of God; in the superscriptions of the Pastoral Epistles and of the Second Epistle of John, it is referred to God and Christ. — *εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον* may be joined either with *ἔλεος* (De Wette), or with *προσδεχόμενοι* (Schott), or with *τηρήσατε* (Stier, Hofmann); since the imperative clause forms the main point,

¹ *πίστις* is the foundation, the *θεμέλιος* on which Christians should build themselves (more and more), by which the representation

at the bottom is that they are not yet on all sides of their life on this foundation.

the last-mentioned combination deserves the preference, especially as both in *προσέχεσθαι* and in *ἐλεος Ἰησ. Χρ.* the reference to *ζωὴ αἰώνιος* is already contained. The prominence here given to the Trinity, *πνεῦμα ἅγιον, Θεός, Ἰησοῦς Χριστός*, as frequently in the N. T., is to be observed. With the exhortation contained in vv. 20, 21, Jude has accomplished what he in ver. 3 stated to be the object of his writing.

Vv. 22, 23. The exhortations contained in these verses refer to the conduct of believers toward those who are exposed to seduction by the *ἀσεβεῖς* (ver. 4) (De Wette); not toward the false teachers themselves (Reiche), for these are of such a kind (ver. 12) that the church should have nothing to do with them. The best-attested text is that which codex A affords: *καὶ οὓς μὲν ἐλέγχετε διακρινομένους· οὓς δὲ σώζετε ἐκ πυρὸς ἀρπάζοντες, οὓς δὲ ἐλεεῖτε* (Lachmann and Tischendorf, *ἐλεῖτε*) *ἐν φόβῳ*; see critical remarks. — *οὓς μὲν . . . οὓς δὲ* instead of *τοὺς μὲν . . . τοὺς δὲ*, see Winer, p. 100. According to this reading, three classes of the seduced are distinguished, and toward each a special conduct is prescribed. It is, however, asked whether, as Brückner, Wiesinger, Schott, Reiche, and others assume, there is a gradation from the curable to the incurable (*a dubitantibus minusque depravatis ad . . . insanabiles, quibus opem ferre pro tempore ab ipsorum contumacia prohibemur*. Reiche); or conversely from the incurable to the curable. In reference to the first class it is said: *οὓς μὲν ἐλέγχετε διακρινομένους*]. The verb *ἐλέγχειν* denotes to rebuke some one's sins by punishing him. The object for which this is done is not indicated in the word itself; it may be to lead the sinner to the acknowledgment of his sins, and thus to repentance, comp. 1 Cor. xiv. 24; 2 Tim. iv. 2; Tit. i. 13; or it may also be condemnation, comp. particularly Jude, ver. 15 (Johu xvi. 8; Tit. i. 9). The explanation of Oecumenius is incorrect: *φανερῶτε τοῖς πᾶσιν τὴν ἀσεβειαν αὐτῶν*. Those who are to be punished are denoted *διακρινομένους*. Both the translation of the Vulgate, *judicatos*, and the interpretation of Oecumenius, *κακεινοὺς εἰ μὲν ὑποδίστανται ὑμῶν ἐλέγχετε*, are incorrect. *διακρίνεσθαι* signifies in the N. T. either to contend, which is here unsuitable, or to doubt, and is opposed to *πιστεύειν*; comp. Matt. xxi. 21; Mark xi. 23; Rom. iv. 20; especially Jas. i. 6. This last passage shows that, although not equivalent to *ἄπιστεῖν*, it denotes the condition in which *ἄπιστία* has the preponderance over *πίστις*, the latter being a vanishing point.¹ It is evident that Jude does not consider the *διακρινομένοι* as weak believers (Schott), because, with reference to them, he will employ no other method than *ἐλέγχειν* (not *παρακαλεῖν*, or something similar); those seduced are in his view such as (punishment apart) are to be left to themselves.² In reference to the second class it is said: *οὓς δὲ σώζετε ἐκ πυρὸς ἀρπάζοντες*]. Their condition is not stated, but it is to be inferred from the conduct to be observed towards them. Toward those belonging to this class a *σῶζειν* is to

¹ When Hofmann says, "that *διακρίνεσθαι* cannot have this meaning, requires no proof," he makes an entirely groundless assumption.

² In the reading of the Rec.: *οὓς μὲν ἐλεεῖτε διακρινομένοι*, we are obliged to explain *διακρίνεσθαι* as = distinguished. Luther: "and

make this distinction, that ye compassionate some;" or, more exactly, "compassionate the one, making a distinction," namely from others. But *διακρινομένοι* must be passive, since not *διακρίνεσθαι*, but only *διακρίνειν* has the meaning to distinguish.

be employed, but of such a nature as is more precisely stated by *ἐκ πυρός ἀρπάζοντες*. *ἐκ πυρός* is not from the fire of *future* judgment (Oecumenius, Fronmüller), but *πῦρ* is the present destruction, in which they already are (Brückner, Wiesinger, Schott); *ἀρπάζειν* denotes hasty, almost violent, snatching out, and indicates that those are already in extreme danger of perdition; comp. Amos iv. 11; Zech. iii. 2. Distinguished from the *διακρινομένους*, the second class are to be considered as those who have not yet lost the faith, but have, through fellowship with the Antinomians, been enticed to their licentious life; these are to be *rescued*. *σώζετε* is evidently in contrast to *ἐλέγχετε*, and denotes them to be such as one may certainly hope to rescue, provided one snatches them with violence, and tears them out of this fellowship. In reference to the third class, Jude prescribes *ἐλεειν* (on the form *ἐλεῦτε*, see Winer, p. 82 [E. T., 85]). This verb in the N. T. *never* means only "to have compassion" (Schott), but always to *compassionate one with helpful love*, as also *ἐλεος* is always used only of *active* compassion; so that with *ἐλεεῖτε* the exact contrary is said to what Luther finds expressed, when he explains it: "let them go, avoid them, and have nothing to do with them." By this is denoted rather the helpful and saving benevolence by which the erring are again to be brought back to the right way. As this *ἐλεειν* makes a fellowship necessary with those upon whom it is exercised, Jude defines the same more precisely by *ἐν φόβῳ*; accordingly, they must not be wanting in *foresight*, lest they suffer injury themselves,¹ and he adds the participial sentence as an explanation of this *ἐν φόβῳ*: *μισοῦντες καὶ, κ.τ.λ.*² This exhortation shows that Jude considers the third class as those who are indeed already involved, but who, by active compassion, may again be re-established; it is not so bad with them as with those toward whom only *ἐλέγχειν* is to be employed; but also it is not yet so bad as with those who can only be rescued by hastily snatching them.

Hofmann considers the reading of *κ*: *καὶ οὓς μὲν ἐλεῦτε διακρινομένους οὓς δὲ σώζετε ἐκ πυρός ἀρπάζοντες, οὓς δὲ ἐλεῦτε ἐν φόβῳ*, as the correct one. In his explanation of this reading he distinguishes not three, but only two classes, assuming that only the first, but not the second *οὓς δὲ* stands opposed to *οὓς μὲν*; and that this latter *οὓς δὲ* is to be considered rather as a resumption of the object mentioned in *οὓς μὲν*. This opinion is, however, erroneous, since, according to it, the third *οὓς* is understood differently from the first and second *οὓς*, namely, as a pure relative pronoun; and since, in a highly arbitrary manner, "*ἐν φόβῳ* is explained as a consequence, united with an imperative *ἐλεῦτε* to be taken from *οὓς ἐλεῦτε*:" "whom ye compassionate, them compassionate with fear." Also

¹ Schott is entirely mistaken when he says that *ἐλεειν* denotes here "a compassion which has, and may have, its definite peculiarity no longer in an impulse to help, but only in a fear of acting wrongly, and in consequence of receiving injury;" in other words, a compassion which is no compassion.

² According to the reading of the Rec., *ἐν φόβῳ* belongs to *σώζετε*. Some expositors

(Grotius, Stier, and others) incorrectly explain it of the fear of the persons to be rescued; correctly Arnaud: "c'est à dire, prenant garde que, tout en cherchant à les convertir, ils ne vous séduisent pas vous-mêmes." Reiche incorrectly, with the reading *A*, separates *ἐν φόβῳ* from *ἐλεῦτε*, and joins it with *μισοῦντες*, whilst it would attract to it a very superfluous addition.

the explanation of the first member of the sentence: "the readers are to compassionate the one with distinction," is to be rejected, since it has against it N. T. usage, according to which διακρίνεσθαι is never used as the passive of διακρίνειν in the sense of "to distinguish."

The addition *μισούντες καὶ τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς σαρκὸς ἐσπιλωμένον χιτῶνα*¹ is correctly explained by Oecumenius: *προσλαμβάνεσθε . . . αὐτοὺς . . . μετὰ φόβον, περισκεπτόμενοι μήπως ἢ πρόσληψις τούτων . . . λύμης ὑμῖν γένηται αἰτία.*—καί, *even*, gives greater emphasis to the thought. The expression *τὸν χιτῶνα* is to be understood in a literal, and not in a figurative sense (Bullinger: *exuvias veteris Adami, concupiscentias et opera carnis*). *χιτῶν* is the undergarment worn next the skin, and which, by means of its direct contact with the flesh unclean by unchastity, etc., is itself soiled (*σπύλλω* only here and in Jas. iii. 6); comp. Rev. iii. 4.—This garment is to the author the symbol of whatever, by means of external contact, shares in the moral destruction of those men.²

Vv. 24, 25. Conclusion of the Epistle by a doxology.—*τῷ δὲ δυνάμει*]. The same commencement of the doxology in Rom. xvi. 28.—*ὑμῶς*]. Were *αὐτοὺς* the correct reading, we could hardly do otherwise than refer it to the last-mentioned *οὗς δέ*, to which it is unsuitable, as they are not *ἄπταιστοι*, who, as such, require only *φυλάσσειν*. That Jude actually wrote *αὐτοὺς*, but that "in the flight of devotion he has turned from his readers, and speaks of them in the third person" (De Wette), is highly improbable.—*ἄπταιστους*]. *ἄπ.* *λεγ.*, literally, who strikes not against; then figuratively, who stumbles not, does not offend; here in the moral sense as *πταίω*, Jas. ii. 10, iii. 2; Vulgate: *sine peccato*.—*καὶ στήσαι κατενώπιον τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ ἁμῶνους*]. Schott correctly remarks on *καί*: The second effect is the ultimate result of the first, so that *καί* might be rendered by *and so, and accordingly*. *δόξα* is here the glory of God, as it will be manifested at the day of judgment. On *στήσαι ἁμῶνους*, comp. 1 Cor. i. 8; Col. i. 22; 1 Thess. iii. 13. The meaning is: "who can effect it that ye may appear as *ἁμῶμοι* before His judgment-seat."—*ἐν ἀγαλλιάσει* mentions the condition in which Christians will then be found; comp. 1 Pet. iv. 13.—Ver. 25. *μόνῳ Θεῷ*, see ver. 4; John v. 44; Rom. xvi. 27; 1 Tim. i. 17.—*σωτῆρι ἡμῶν* marks, in connection with *διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χρ.*, the essential Christian element in the idea of God; on *σωτῆρ* as a designation of God, comp. 1 Tim. i. 1. Schott incorrectly joins *μόνῳ Θεῷ* with *σωτῆρι ἡμῶν*, as if it meant, "to Him who alone is God, in such a manner that He is our Saviour;" and the reason which he assigns, "because *μόνος Θεός* is never used by itself, but always occurs as a designation of God relative to other attributes," is contradicted by John v. 44; also by 1 Tim. i. 17 and Jude ver. 4.—*διὰ Ἰησ. Χριστοῦ* belongs to *σωτῆρι ἡμῶν* (Schott), not to *δόξα*, κ.τ.λ. (Wiesinger); in this latter case it would be put after *ἐξουσία*.—*δόξα, μεγαλω-*

¹ Both in the reading of the Rec. and in the reading of C, this addition is surprising; one may regard it, with Jachmann, as the adversative reason of *σῶζετε* (though ye hate); or, with De Wette, as the real reason (since ye hate, for which De Wette appeals to

1 Cor. v. 6!).

² Calvin: "vult fideles non tantum cavere a vitiorum contactu, sed ne qua ad eos contagio pertingat, quicquid affine est ac vicinum, fugiendum esse admonet."

σύνη, κ.τ.λ.]. δόξα and κράτος occur frequently in the New-Testament doxologies (see 1 Pet. iv. 11); μεγαλωσύνη and εξουσία only here; μεγαλωσύνη corresponds to the Hebrew גָּדַל ; comp. Deut. xxxii. 3, LXX. : *δόξε μεγαλωσύνην τῷ Θεῷ ἡμῶν. — πρὸ παντὸς τοῦ αἰῶνος*]. By these words, wanting in the Rec., the idea of eternity is expressed in the most comprehensive manner. Not *ἔστω*, but *ἔστί* (De Wette, Schott), is to be supplied; comp. 1 Pet. iv. 11. — *ἀμήν*, the usual conclusion of doxologies, as in Rom. i. 15; 1 Pet. iv. 11, etc.; it stands in the Epistles to the Galatians and Hebrews, probably also in 2 Peter, as here, at the end of the Epistle.

ADDITIONAL NOTES BY THE AMERICAN EDITOR.

THE EPISTLE OF JAMES.

I.

CHAPTER I.

Ver. 1.

1. The salutation of this Epistle differs in the form of expression from those which are found in the letters of Paul: (a) in that Paul in all his epistles, except 1 and 2 Thessalonians, describes himself as an apostle (so generally), or as a servant of Jesus Christ, while James calls himself a servant of God and the Lord Jesus Christ, but does not designate himself as an apostle; (b) in that James addresses a wide-extended body of Christians, not those limited within a particular city or district; (c) in that James uses the word *χαίρειν*, which Paul never employs. In the Pauline salutations this verb is only suggested by the words which bear in them the contents of it: "Grace and peace to you." — 2. The absence of the word *ἀπόστολος* does not prove that the author was not an apostle, for Paul does not always use this title in speaking of himself (comp. Phil. i. 1, where only the word *δούλος* is found, and 1 and 2 Thessalonians, where there is no descriptive word). But if James who was the head of the church in Jerusalem, was not the same person as James the son of Alphæus, it is probable that he, and not the apostle, was the writer of the Epistle: *first*, because the character of the letter answers to the character which is given of him in the early writings; and, *secondly*, because his position as related to Jewish Christians was such as to make it more probable that he would address them. — 3. That he was not the same person with James the son of Alphæus, is indicated by the reasons presented by Huther in his Introduction. The reason, therefore, why he omits the word *apostle*, is that he did not belong to the apostolic company. But it may be regarded as somewhat remarkable, if he was, in the strict sense, the brother of the Lord, that he should not have given himself this title, which, as it would seem, would have added authority to his words. The only satisfactory explanation which can be given of the omission of the title is, that, after the death and ascension of Jesus, the earthly relationship sank into a kind of insignificance, as the Divine glory of Jesus impressed itself more deeply on the minds of all His disciples alike. We see Jesus Himself thus rising in His thought above the earthly and family relation, as He committed His mother at the crucifixion, not to her own sons, but to John the son of Zebedee (comp. John xix. 25-27). May we not find in the very phrase which James uses (*a servant of God and of the Lord Jesus Christ*) — a

phrase which so completely separates Jesus from himself, and so closely unites Him with God—an indication that he appreciated the change, as we might say, from the earthly to the heavenly relationship? The time had come, long before this letter was written, when the words of Jesus were realized in their full meaning: “Whosoever shall do the will of God, the same is my brother, and sister, and mother.”—4. The expression, “to the twelve tribes which are of the dispersion,” is to be understood, with Huther, as showing that the readers for whom the letter was designed were Jewish Christians living outside of Palestine.

II.

Vv. 2-18.

1. The Epistle has no introductory passage corresponding with those which are found in the Pauline letters. It begins with exhortations and statements respecting trials, which prepare the way for all that follows. The emphasis on the word *joy* in the opening exhortation may be accounted for by the contrast between this idea and the idea naturally connected with *πειρασμοί*. The writer would urge the readers to consider that which seems to be only an evil and distressing, a matter altogether of joy. It is possible, however, that the position of *χαράν* in the sentence may be owing to some intended connection in the writer's mind between this substantive and the verb *χαίρειν*. As he sends the readers a greeting which involves the thought of joy, he exhorts them to count even their trials as grounds of rejoicing.—2. The *πειρασμοί* here referred to, being described by the adjective *ποικίλοι*, are doubtless the various kinds of trials or tests of character which were likely to befall the readers. To a considerable extent, they were connected with persecutions or evils which came upon the Christians of that time from without, and thus they answer to the *θλίψεις* of Rom. v. 3. But there is nothing in the words here used which limits the reference to these. The correspondence of vv. 2, 3, with the passage in Rom. v. 3, 4, however, cannot fail to be noticed.—The verb *περιπέσητε*, to fall into so as to be encompassed by, suggests the idea of a complete involvement in the testing trials of which the writer speaks. It was this involvement in the trials which made these trials, in an especial sense and degree, a testing of the readers' faith (*τὸ δοκίμιον τῆς πίστεως*).—3. The participle *γινώσκοντες* is causal, and is to be rendered *since you know*, rather than *whilst you may know*, as Huther gives it. It gives the ground on which they may well count the falling into trials a matter of joy.

4. *Τὸ δοκίμιον* is regarded by Grimm as equivalent in this place to *τὸ δοκιμάζειν*, the proving or testing. This explanation of the word is given by many commentators, as intimated by Huther in his note, and is favored by A. R. V. and A. V. It is also favored by Beyschlag in his edition of Huther. It is clear, however, that in 1 Pet. i. 7,—the only other passage in the N. T. in which the word occurs,—it is to be understood as *approvedness*. It is thus equivalent to *δοκιμή*, as that word is probably to be explained in Rom. v. 4. The double use of the verb *δοκιμάζειν* by the N. T. writers, and the double possibility of its meaning, make the decision as to the meaning of the noun here quite difficult. Whichever explanation is adopted, the main idea of the passage will not be greatly changed. If *δοκ.* means *proving*, the readers are reminded that the proving or testing of their faith, which comes through the *πειρασμοί*, works out the result of steadfastness. If, on the other hand, it means *approvedness*, their

tested or approved faith, which is the effect of the *πειρασμοί*, is declared to accomplish the same result.—In Rom. v. 4, steadfast endurance is represented as working out tested character; here, tested character, approved faith, works out steadfast endurance. The two statements are alike true. Steadfastness in trials naturally leads to the result of a character which is approved as the consequence of tests which it has successfully met, and then the latter enables the man more easily and victoriously to persevere in his endurance.—5. The thought of ver. 4, which is set forth in the form of a new exhortation, is closely related to that of ver. 3 as subordinate to ver. 2. The trials serve to test and establish faith; faith as thus tested serves to further steadfast endurance; the perfect development of endurance is essential to the perfect development of the man in the Christian life. The Christian readers may, therefore, well count it all joy when they fall into manifold testing trials, because these lie, in this way, in the line of the growth of complete character. The *ἔργον* of *ὑπομονή* is that in and by which it works out its legitimate and natural result.—6. The end in view of the *τέλειον ἔργον* of *ὑπομονή* is that the man may be *τέλειος καὶ ὀλόκληρος*; the former of these words referring rather to the development towards the limit of completeness, the latter to the filling out to the fulness of character in all its parts, while the following phrase presents the latter idea on its negative side.

7. The fifth verse is probably connected in thought with those which precede, and immediately with the fourth. This is indicated by the verb *λείπεται* following *λειπόμενοι*. The supposed case of lacking wisdom is made prominent among the possible wants or deficiencies, because wisdom lies near the foundation of all development towards completeness, and so is necessary in that line of development in which the tests and trials particularly referred to in this passage work to their best result.—*Wisdom*, as the word is here used, seems to mean that fundamental element of the Christian life which, in itself, sets the possessor of it apart from the evil world; the true apprehension of things, which works out into right living. If one is fully endowed with this, there is a guiding principle in the soul which will lead to the right use of all things, and will be the means of developing the man toward perfection. With this wisdom, the man will make even the *πειρασμοί* work out the end of *ὑπομονή*; that is, will turn the things which seem to be only evil, into good and a cause of joy.—8. In case of felt deficiency, the Christian reader is directed to ask God for the supply of the want, and the assurance of receiving such supply is given him. It is worthy of notice, that the words of the writer are all in the line of the joyous greeting which the writer offers to his Christian brethren. They may count the apparent evils of their experience a matter of joy, for they bring, when met and used with the true wisdom, the steadfast endurance which tends towards perfection of character; and if there is any want of this wisdom, nothing needs to be done but to ask it from God, who will certainly and liberally give it. The freeness and fulness of God's giving are represented here by very striking expressions,—the adverb *ἁπλως*, *simply*, conveying the idea, as Grimm happily expresses it, of being "led solely by his desire to bless" (the idea of liberal giving, suggested in the translation of A. V. and R. V., is rather implied, in a secondary way, than distinctly set forth, in the Greek word); and the participle *ὀνειδίζοντος*, *reproaching*, *upbraiding*, presenting the thought of such reproaches as connected with unworthiness on the part of the petitioners to ask for gifts, or possibly with their failure to profit by past gifts, or their want of thankfulness in receiving them, or even with the number of such gifts already bestowed,

as would indicate a want of readiness to give, and as were often uttered by men when asked for help or favor. No such reproaches are experienced as we ask of God. The confidence in God's willingness to answer prayer, which Jesus awakened in the minds of his disciples, continued with them ever afterwards. The legal James, as well as the loving John, was prepared to say to every Christian, as the Lord Himself had done, "Ask, and ye shall receive." The soul in want had but to ask of God for the filling-up of its imperfection, and the promise was, "it shall be given."—9. The asking, however, must be in faith. This is put in the form of a new exhortation (ver. 6); but evidently the exhortation is intended, in its connection with what precedes, to indicate the manner in which the gift just mentioned should be sought. The faith, also, should be with no doubting. The explanation of *μηδὲν διακρινόμενος* given by Huther is the true one. This is shown by the words which describe the doubter in the following clause. The mind is not to be drawn this way and that, by questionings or uncertainties, with a prevailing tendency to believe that the answering gift will not be given in response to the prayer. The petitioner's faith must correspond to the Divine impulse towards giving.

10. The second sentence of ver. 6 gives a reason for the exhortation to ask with no doubting. The meaning of this sentence seems, however, to go beyond the limits of the participial clause *μηδὲν διακρ.* The latter clause is connected immediately with the matter of faith in the act of prayer, but this second sentence apparently covers the sphere of the inward life. The Christian should ask in faith with no wavering in his mind, for the man whose whole mind is in this wavering and doubting state does not possess the calm and peaceful inner life which is the true condition of the child of God. The Christian life is a life of trust; it is the calmness and confidence of the untroubled sea. The doubter, or the man who is in a wavering state, is necessarily thrown out of this condition—like the waves which are driven and tossed by the winds—and is, therefore, without one of the prime characteristics of the Christian life. Particularly as connected with prayer, he is without an element which is made prominent and essential in the conditions of the promise of answers to prayer. The man who prays in this doubting way has, therefore, no right to expect the fulfilment of his request (ver. 7).—11. Ver. 8, which is an appositional and explanatory supplement to the expression *that man* of ver. 7, and thus to the expression *he that doubteth* of ver. 6, sets forth still more emphatically the same idea as the ground of the exhortation of ver. 6a. Such a man has, as it were, two souls, and accordingly will be likely to move in opposite directions in his life and conduct,—now with impulses towards God, now towards the world, but, by reason of the want of firm and established faith, prevailing and finally towards the world.—12. Vv. 9–11 seem necessarily to be connected with the passage which precedes, because the subject of *πειρασμός* is continued in ver. 12. In themselves, however, they apparently turn to a new subject. The explanation which appears to meet the demands of the case most satisfactorily is that which makes *ὁ ἀδελφὸς ὁ ταπεινός* refer to the Christian in his depressed condition as viewed from the standpoint of the world's judgment,—poverty, slavery, ignoble birth, etc.,—and *ὁ πλούσιος* to the rich as a prominent class among the exalted men of the unbelieving world; and that which supplies with *ὁ πλάσιος* the indicative of *καυχῆσθαι* from the previous imperative, making ver. 10a an affirmative sentence. In that age the outward, earthly condition of the majority of believers must, in itself and by reason of the oppressions experienced from the rich and powerful of the world, have constituted, in a peculiar

sense and measure, a *πειρασμός*, such a one as was most likely to disturb and distress the minds of Christian believers. The writer singles out this peculiar *πειρασμός* as a special example, and bids the believer who is subjected to it rejoice in that exaltation which Christianity brings to him in this condition, through his new and higher life, and the hope of the future glory; whereas the rich man of the world, on the other hand, rejoices in what is really his humiliation, for his glory is a perishing one. — 13. With this understanding of vv. 9–11, the connection of ver. 12 with those verses becomes apparent. The steadfast endurance, under the *πειρασμός* alluded to, works out the result of the consummated and completed exaltation — that which belongs to the heavenly world. And so of all similar steadfast endurance: blessed is the man who has it and manifests it; for when the result in character is fully accomplished, and the man has become approved, he will receive the crown of life, i.e., eternal life as his crown and reward.

14. At ver. 13 the thought turns to the other side of the matter of *πειρασμός*, the drawing towards sin. God may bring us, or suffer us to be brought, into circumstances which may bear with them a solicitation to evil, and He may allow this in order to strengthen character through steadfast endurance. But the solicitation to evil itself does not come from Him. The thought here, as also in the former case, is presented in the form of an exhortation. This is doubtless to be explained in connection with the prevailing hortatory character of the Epistle. In vv. 14, 15, however, the construction changes to affirmative and declaratory sentences, a fact which shows the underlying purpose of the writer, and the movement of his main thought. — 15. The connection of *ἀπειραστος* in this passage with *πειρασμός* and *πειράζω* seems to show that, in the writer's use of the word, the idea of temptation is to be discovered. It thus means *cannot be tempted with* (R. V. text), rather than *untried in* (R. V. marg.). With either sense of the word, however, this clause is introduced as a proof that we cannot properly say that we are tempted of God. As God cannot be tempted by evil, He cannot tempt any one to evil; or, if the other meaning be adopted, as God is untried, unversed in evil things, as His inner life is wholly outside of the sphere of evil, He cannot be a solicitor to evil: evil must have a source like itself. — 16. The good side of *πειρασμός*, its impelling power towards *ὑπομονή*, its working force in the development of right character towards perfection, comes from God. He puts the testing trials in the way of His followers as they move along their course; and He does this in order that they may be strengthened. But the bad side of *πειρασμός* has no connection with Him. On the contrary, He is the source of good only, and of all good. The bad side must be allied with evil, and this lies in the heart of man, — in the desire or lust which moves the man to sin. — 17. The writer does not carry sin back in these words to its final and earliest source. As Alford remarks, he takes up the matter at a point lower down the stream than Paul does in the Epistle to the Romans, or, we may add, than Christ does as represented in the Gospel of John, and in contrast to the originating of sin, in any given case or man, by a solicitation to evil from God, he declares that the cause of the sin is the lust of the man, which, in the *πειρασμός*, lays hold of the bad side, and leads the whole man after itself. — 18. By *θάνατος* in ver. 15, there can be little doubt that eternal death is meant. Beyschlag in his edition of Huther denies this, and makes the word mean spiritual death. The reason of the introduction of this word is probably twofold: first, in order to complete the development of the idea of the bad side of *πειρασμός*; and, secondly, in order to present the contrast

between the result on the good side (*ζωή*, ver. 12), and that on the bad side (*θάνατος*, ver. 15). — 19. Vv. 16, 17, are closely connected with what precedes; ver. 18 forms a transition to what follows. Ver. 16 calls special attention to the statement of ver. 17 as showing the impossibility of an originating of temptation by God. Be not deceived or led astray in your thoughts on the matter, says the writer; so far is it from being true, that God ever solicits man to evil, that, on the other hand, every good comes from Him, and in Him there is no variability. He moves unchangeably towards good.

20. With respect to the peculiar expressions in the closing part of ver. 17, the following suggestions seem to be well founded: (a) There is a reference to the heavenly bodies (the stars, etc.) in the words used, and yet the language is not strictly astronomical throughout the entire sentence. This is evident from the fact that *παραλλαγή* is not employed as an astronomical term (*παράλλαξις* is the technical term). (b) The word *ἄποσκίασμα* must be understood as meaning a dark shadow cast by a body which has its dark side towards the observer, or which intervenes between him and the light. The rendering of the Authorized Version, *shadow of turning*, cannot therefore be correct. (c) The word *τροπής* does not appear to be used in a special technical sense except of the points or times at which there is an apparent turning of the course, as in the case of the sun at the solstices. It must therefore, as it would seem, refer to such a turn or revolution of the body as would cause a shadow to be cast. (d) In calling God the Father of lights, the writer apparently intends to compare Him with the heavenly bodies, and represent Him as not only the author and maker of them, but also as a greater light belonging, in the figurative representation, in the same class. — We may believe, therefore, that he means to say that God is a light or illuminating body which never, by reason of revolution or turning, casts a dark shadow, but which sheds forth unchanging brightness. All good in the spiritual sphere is in the region of light. Evil is darkness. The great, unchanging, ever-undimmed light can have no dark shadow. God can never solicit to evil. — 21. Ver. 18 is related to what precedes, as showing how God of His own will bestows the greatest of all good gifts, and the fundamental one for the human soul. As related to what follows, it prepares the way for the exhortations which are introduced in the succeeding verses. Of the words in this verse, *βουληθεῖς* has a certain special emphasis. It carries back the whole matter to the self-moved will of God, and thus serves to show that, as the greatest and most all-comprehensive good is purposed and determined by Him, it is certainly true that no temptation can proceed from Him. This is made still further evident by the fact that the spiritual begetting of Christians is with a view to the consummation of His great plan for the whole world. They are to be the first-fruits, as it were, of the new creation for which all things are waiting. — It is doubtful whether we are to regard *ἡμῶς*, as some, including Benschlag in his edition of Huther, do, as meaning the Christians of that day who were the beginnings of the Church. More probably it may refer to Christians in general, or to the readers as representatives of Christians generally. Probably *κτισμάτων* includes all the creatures of God, and the thought is of the final and universal blessedness, after the subjugation of all enemies, even including death, the last of all. The bringing of Christians, or of the Christians of that time, into the life of faith and holiness, is the beginning of the result which will be realized in its fulness at the end.

III.

Vv. 19-27.

1. The exhortation of ver. 19 follows as a consequence from the statement of ver. 18. This relation is expressed in the most simple way, if the reading *ὥστε* of the T. R. is adopted; and this fact, as well as the peculiar variations in the different authorities (*εσπε, εστω, ισπε*), may be regarded as in some degree favoring that reading. The external evidence, however, is so strongly in favor of *ισπε*, that it seems almost necessary to accept it as the original text. The connection of the verses, with this reading, is through this verb as forming an independent and intermediate clause, which probably refers to ver. 18, and prepares the way for ver. 19*b*. This verb, if thus understood, is an indicative, and means *you know, or are well aware of this*; that is, that God, of His own will, etc. Beyschlag rejects Huther's view of the connection, and joins the words in thought with what precedes. — 2. As God gives us the new life by means of the word of truth, it becomes every one to be swift to hear (ver. 19*b*-21), and to hear obediently, turning what one hears into action (ver. 22*ff.*). This is the substance of the main thought as developed in what follows. Along with this, however, it would seem that the writer must have had in mind some special tendency on the part of the readers whom he was addressing to assume the position of teachers and to contend against others. In this way only is it easy to account for the added words, *slow to speak, slow to wrath*. This Epistle seems to be characterized, in some measure, by the insertion or addition of such more special points, while, at the same time, the main thought moves on in a continuous line of development. — 3. Ver. 20 gives the reason for the last words of ver. 19: *slow to wrath*. Wrath does not work or produce the righteousness of God. Righteousness is to be understood here, not in the peculiar sense which belongs to the Pauline Epistles, but in the ordinary sense, — conformity to what ought to be, or to be done. The genitive *Θεοῦ* sets forth the righteousness as that which is demanded or approved by God, and is perhaps to be most simply explained as a possessive genitive carrying with it this idea. This righteousness is that which appertains to the new life to which God brings us, and hence whatever does not work to the end of producing it is to be avoided. — 4. *διό* (ver. 21) points back to ver. 20, but the exhortation which is introduced by it goes out beyond the matter of avoiding *ὀργή*, to the laying aside of all *κακία*. Not improbably, we should, with Huther, Alford, and some others, connect *ῥυπαρίαν* with the genitive *κακίας*; so R. V., *all filthiness and overflowing of wickedness*, as opposed to A. V., *all filthiness, and superfluity of*, etc. If so, the word *ῥυπ.* is used as indicating the polluting character of sin, its defilement, while *περισσεῖαν* designates its abundance. We should lay aside that evil or wickedness which is so abundant within us and so defiling in its influence. Alford says, "It is very possible that the agricultural similitude in *ἐμφυτος* may have influenced the choice of both these words, *ῥυπ.* and *περισσ.* The ground must be ridded of all that pollutes and chokes it, before the seed can sink in and come to maturity; it must be cleaned and cleared." — 5. The connection of ver. 21 with the immediately preceding verses may indicate that *πραῦτητι* is here used in the sense of gentleness, rather than meekness, in contrast to *ὀργήν* (ver. 19). This is the view of most of the recent commentators. It is not necessary, indeed, to take the word in this sense; but if, as is not improbably the case, the expression *bridleth not his tongue*, in ver. 26, is to be explained in

connection with *ὁργή*, the argument in favor of this interpretation is a strong one. — 6. The adjective *ἐμφυτον* is used, probably, because the establishing of the word in the soul is that by which the new life is made to begin and grow. This implanted word is able to save the soul.

7. Ver. 22 presses the necessity of so receiving the word as to carry it out into conduct and life. The *doing* of the word here spoken of has reference, partly at least or prominently, to that doing of Christian duty which belongs to the relation of the man to others. This seems to be indicated by the *ὁργή* and *παύτης*, by the expressions *bridleth not his tongue* and *visit the fatherless*, and by what is set forth in the following parts of the Epistle. The subjective, interior, hearty reception of the word (denoted by *δέξασθε*) involves the addition of doing to hearing. The man who satisfies himself with the latter only deludes himself, as by a false reckoning or reasoning (*παραλογιζεσθαι*); see this verb as used in Col. ii. 4, where the word *πιθανολογία* is added. — 8. The contrast in vv. 23–25 seems not to be between two mirrors, or two men looking into two different mirrors, but between the chance or careless looking to see one's face in a mirror, and the close examination of a law or a moral system to know its teachings and to compare one's character and actions with what it describes or demands. The man who does the former has no earnestness in his action. The impression is a passing one, and what he sees takes no hold upon the inner life. But he who does the latter must be affected by what he sees, and must put in practice what is discovered by his careful and continuous study. The word *παρακνύσας* of ver. 25 is a strong one, denoting a bending-down to look into, an intent, earnest looking; and to this is added the strong word *παραμείνας*, which denotes a continuous, persistent action in this looking. Such looking must affect conduct, and must lead to blessing. — 9. The expression, *the perfect law*, refers to the gospel as giving the rule and description of the true life. The adjective *τέλειον* seems to be used as connected with the fact that this rule is complete for the life which reaches perfection. The law is called the law of *freedom*, probably because the perfect life, in its relation to law and duty, must be a life of freely-given obedience, — a service of love. Paul and James draw near to each other at this point, though they may seem, in some views of their thinking, to approach the central truth from opposite sides. — 10. Vv. 26, 27, carry on the general thought of the preceding verses, — religion as related to the doing of the work set forth in the perfect law of liberty, — and suggest prominently (in ver. 26) the idea first brought forward in the words *slow to speak*, ver. 19. — Of the words in these two verses, *δοκῆ* has the sense of *thinks* or *fancies* (see 1 Cor. iii. 18, Gal. vi. 3, etc., in which passages the idea of deceiving one's self is also expressed, as it is here); *θρησκός* and *θρησκεία* are words designating religion as connected originally with the fear of God, if the commonly assumed derivation from *τρέω* is accepted; the latter word seems to be connected with external manifestations of religion, worship, etc., — possibly the words are selected here because the writer has in mind the religious life as an active and outgoing life: visiting the fatherless, etc.; *παρὰ Θεῶν*, in the judgment of God, as God looks upon it; the reference to visiting the fatherless and widows in their affliction — the calamities which befall them — is by way of illustration, giving one of the many acts which manifest and are the forth-putting of the religious life; the keeping one's self unspotted from the world, on the other hand, goes out beyond the sphere of these external acts, and covers the whole inward and outward living.

IV.

CHAPTER II.

Vv. 1-13.

1. The writer passes at this point to a more particular exhortation in the line of Christian duty,—the first in a series of exhortations which occupy the larger part of the Epistle. The exhortations bear upon failings or sins by which the readers were especially characterized, and are to the end of avoiding them and practising the opposite virtues. The writer opens this new passage with the words *ἀδελφοί μου*. The frequency with which these words of address are used in this letter is very noticeable, and shows the hortatory character of it. There is no prominence given to the discussion of truths for their own sake. Such discussion, if occurring at all, is only incidental to the pressing of some duty or to the appeal to the reader to conform in one point or another to the perfect law.—2. The word *προσωποληψιαίς* is placed in an emphatic position. This may possibly be accounted for by a connection in thought with the ministering or refusal to minister to the afflicted and weak, i. 27. But not improbably there is a marked turn in the thought here to a new point of duty, and the emphasis on the word is only for the sake of calling special attention to this point.—3. *ἔχετε τὴν πίστιν*—Probably the writer has in mind the thought of the latter part of the chapter, where he sets forth the deadness of faith without works. To his mind, the Christian faith moved, in a peculiar sense and measure, in the sphere of works, and the man who indulged in sin or violated obligations and duties, held the faith in—that is, in the midst of, or as if involved in or with—the sin in question.—4. The genitive *τοῦ κυρίου* is probably objective: *faith in*; but possibly it is a possessive genitive, the faith being regarded as belonging to the Lord, in that He taught it as the essential thing in His teaching. The genitive *τῆς δόξης*, on the other hand, is, on the whole, satisfactorily and most simply explained as a characteristic genitive following *τοῦ κυρίου*. Though a peculiar and unusual construction, involving difficulties, this is the least difficult of all the constructions proposed. The phrase as thus explained is not a formal doxology, and perhaps it does not necessarily involve as much as such doxologies do. But it certainly approaches them in force, and may be regarded as suggestive with reference to the thought of the immediate disciples and brethren of the Lord respecting the fitness of the ascription of praise and worship to Him.

5. The double supposition of vv. 2, 3, is evidently intended to be understood as realized in both its parts. It is put in the form of a mere supposition, and is doubtless only one instance illustrative of the matter of respecting persons, which is under consideration. The passage itself, however, and other allusions to the relations to the rich in later verses or chapters, make it probable that the illustrative example is brought forward because it was well known in the experience of the readers.—6. As to the question whether the rich man of ver. 2 is to be regarded as a Christian or not, the suggestions of Huther appear to be decisive, as showing that he is not a Christian. The probability indicated in connection with i. 10, 11, is so greatly strengthened by this verse and by what follows, that the correctness of this view must be admitted.—7. The past tenses in ver. 4 are used, we may believe, because the writer thinks of such cases as actually having occurred, and therefore likely to occur. For this reason he puts the supposition in the form, If there shall have come . . . did you not, etc. The verb *διακρίθητε* is rendered in A. V., *Are ye not partial (in yourselves, ἐν ἑαυτοῖς)*; in R. V. text,

Are ye not divided; in R. V. marg., *Do ye not make distinctions* (text, in your own mind; marg., among yourselves). The question as to the meaning of this verb is somewhat difficult of determination. The use of the verb in i. 6, and the more common usage of the N. T. in cases where the middle and aorist passive occur, favor the meaning *doubt*; and if this is the meaning, the explanation given by Huther in his note is probably the correct one. It must be admitted, however, as we think, that this idea of doubting, as equivalent to "a contradiction of their faith, according to which external glory and riches are nothing," is not quite parallel with the doubting of i. 6, and that a more distinct and direct expression of such contradiction, had this been the writer's idea, would have been more natural and simple. On the other hand, if it is allowable to adopt the signification given to the verb in R. V. marg., *make distinctions*, the expression becomes very simple, and the sentence falls naturally into harmony with itself and with the general thought of the passage. The interpretation of *ἐν ἑαυτοῖς* will follow that of *διακριθητε*: if the verb has the former of the two meanings alluded to, the preposition is to be taken in the sense of *in*; if the verb has the latter signification, the preposition means *among*. Grimm and the recent commentators generally agree substantially with Huther respecting the verb. — 8. There can be little doubt that the genitive *διαλογισμῶν πονηρῶν* is a descriptive or characteristic genitive, and that the substance of meaning is, as given in R. V., *judges with evil thoughts*, or, as Grimm gives it, *judges who follow perverse opinions, reprehensible principles*. The Christian who made such distinctions and discriminations, favoring the rich as against the poor, was, in his judgments and principles which were the result of his reflection (*διαλογισμοί*), in opposition to the true Christian idea. This is proved by the following verse (ver. 5). The argument here is similar to that which Paul urges in 1 Cor. i. 26 ff. Their own experience as to the Divine calling would plainly show the impropriety of their conduct in this matter. The similarity of this passage to the one in 1 Cor., as well as the general underlying thought of the passage itself, favors the view that *in faith* denotes the sphere in which the persons spoken of were rich, — poor in the view of the world and according to the world's standard of judgment, but rich in the Christian sphere and according to the standard of the kingdom of God. — 9. The writer now sets forth the behavior of the rich towards the Christians as a second reason why the latter should not honor them in the way indicated. The rich oppress and persecute them, and blaspheme the name of Christ which is called upon them at the beginning of their Christian life. The conduct here spoken of is such as could hardly be descriptive of rich persons connected with the Church; and these verses (5-7) seem, therefore, clearly to show, by the contrasts and statements which they contain, that the unchristian rich are the persons referred to throughout the entire passage. The evidence for this view thus becomes stronger as the passage moves forward, and the reference to the same class of persons in the later part of the Epistle accords with and confirms what is here said. — 10. The view of Huther, that in vv. 8, 9, the writer "meets the attempt which his readers might perhaps make to justify their conduct toward the rich by the law of love" seems improbable. The readers would hardly attempt to justify conduct which made such a distinction between men, by appealing to the law of love, which required them to love every one as themselves, — a love which evidently must apply to the poor equally with the rich. It seems more probable that the writer is, as Alford says, guarding his own argument from misconstruction. The rich should be treated, indeed, according to the principles of the law of love; but this is a widely different thing

from such respecting of persons as that which is referred to. The latter is a sin, — a violation of the law of love.

11. The word *μέντοι*, to which Huther assigns the meaning *assuredly* or *certainly*, has, not improbably, a mild adversative sense. It should probably be rendered *however*, rather than as in R. V. *howbeit*. It suggests the contrast connected with the possible misconception alluded to. — 12. *Being convicted by the law as transgressors* — The law here spoken of is the whole Mosaic law as viewed on the side of duties towards our fellow-men, — that portion of the Mosaic law which, as Paul says in Rom. xiii. 10, Gal. v. 14, is fulfilled and summed up in the command, “Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.” This command gathers up into itself every thing in the treatment of others which is demanded by its spirit, and consequently it is transgressed by any act, or manner of acting, which is contrary to the love required. The proof which follows in vv. 10, 11, is illustrative, showing that such a single violation is a transgression of the whole law. — 13. The view of Huther with respect to *ούτως* of ver. 12 — that it refers backward, rather than simply to the following *ώς* — is to be regarded as correct. The case seems to be parallel to 1 Cor. ix. 24. In closing the paragraph, the writer gives a general exhortation which covers and includes the particular matter discussed in the preceding verses, and, at the same time, reaches out to the entire circle of action and speech in the Christian life. The law of liberty here spoken of is undoubtedly the same with that mentioned in i. 25, and this law is characterized by the same descriptive word for the same reason as in the former case. The gospel rule is one which is fulfilled by a freely-given obedience. This law, which can be truly fulfilled only in this way, — the law of love obeyed in the free and hearty spirit of love, — is the one by which the Christian is to be judged; and hence he should be careful that in every thing he yields obedience to it. And he should do this because (ver. 13) the merciful judgment, which is the ground of hope as connected with the Christian system, gives way to the opposite in the case of one who contradicts the Christian spirit by violating the law of love. In the case of one who, on the other hand, is governed by that law, mercy which forgives and justifies prevails over judgment, and secures the man the offered blessing.

V.

Vv. 14-26.

1. The turn in the thought at this point seems to be connected with the general underlying idea of the Epistle, that true religion is that only which shows itself in acts and life, and, more immediately and particularly, with the suggestion of the preceding verses which refer to judgment. The justifying judgment, which comes through mercy, is not to be expected on the ground of a mere dead faith. The faith which is the animating principle of the Christian life, and which saves the soul, is one which works in the line of obedience to the law of love. — It would seem evident, that in connection with the conduct alluded to in the preceding verses, and at the close of chap. i., there must have been a doctrine or claim on the part of many of the readers whom the writer addresses, that faith apart from works was all-sufficient. The writer combats this doctrine, first, by presenting an illustrative example from the ordinary course of life — a case of need which might present itself for relief; and secondly, by pointing to the history of Abraham — the great historic case of Abraham. — 2. That the faith which is here spoken of is a mere belief, a faith

which has in it no love element, no working power, and thus a faith which is different from that which Paul has in mind in his Epistles (e.g., Gal. v. 6), seems evident from all the indications of the passage. The difference between Paul and James is not that the latter affirms the faith of the former to be dead, while the former affirms it to be the living and life-giving principle of the true life. Paul holds that faith has a working, as well as a believing, element. In other words, the Pauline faith is trust; it is a uniting force as between the soul of man and God. The Pauline faith proved its existence by works; it was not a mere belief of a proposition, such as the proposition or truth, that God is one. The two writers thus regard the living faith and the dead faith in the same way: the question of life and death here, as everywhere, being the question of the presence or absence of the working element. But James, by reason of the exigencies of his discussion, is speaking of a dead faith, while Paul has always occasion to refer to living faith.

3. The question as to justification is more difficult. So far as the necessity of a living faith to justification is concerned, the two writers would seem to agree that it is necessary. But does James teach a doctrine inconsistent with Paul's position, that justification is through faith alone? Is the statement respecting Abraham in this passage inconsistent with what is implied or declared in Romans, chap. iv. ? On this point the following suggestions may be offered: (a) Paul, in his Epistles to the Romans and Galatians, was contending against Judaizing partisans, who insisted that all, even the Gentile converts, should conform to the whole Mosaic system, and that they could not be justified without this. He maintained the sufficiency of faith for justification, and declared that there was no justification by works, because there was no such thing in human experience as a perfect and complete fulfilment of the law. The Christian system, according to him, was a system of free forgiveness on the ground of faith. Faith was the first movement of the soul, in turning from enmity to God, towards a friendly relation to Him. This first movement of the soul involved an element of love, which, as the life and activity of the soul went forward, would result in good works, i.e., in conformity of the whole life to the will of God. The act of forgiveness and justification on God's part, however, was, to his view, coincident with the act of faith; and the man, being justified when he believed, had only to go forward thereafter under the impulse of the love-element connected with his faith. — (b) James, on the other hand, was contending in this Epistle against persons who held that faith without the love-element was all that was necessary. These persons held that a mere belief which had no effect upon conduct, a faith which could give no evidence of its existence as a transforming and elevating power in the life, was sufficient to secure justification. — (c) With reference to the case of Abraham as mentioned by James, and the use which he makes of it, it will be noticed that the sacrifice of Isaac (Gen. xxii. 2) was later in point of time than the statements that faith was accounted to him for righteousness (Gen. xv. 6), and that he was called the friend of God (probably founded upon Gen. xviii. 17); also, that the act of sacrifice is spoken of as completing or perfecting the faith, and the words of Gen. xv. 6 are said to have been thereby fulfilled; also, that the conclusion drawn in the twenty-fourth verse must be interpreted in consistency with the declaration of the O. T., which places the justification before the act of sacrifice, and may naturally be interpreted (not to say, must be interpreted) in such a way as to understand *and not by faith only*, as meaning not by such faith as the writer of the Epistle has in mind in his discussion. In view of these considerations,

it would seem that James must have recognized the fact of the justification of Abraham, at a time which preceded not only the sacrifice of Isaac, but even the birth of this heir of the promises; and that when he speaks of his justification by works in connection with the sacrifice, he cannot mean to deny that he was justified when he first exercised faith. — (d) The true position of James, therefore, seems to be this: that, when the test time for the man's faith comes, — the test which determines whether the faith is a living or a dead one, — justification depends on whether the faith displays its living force by an act of obedience and love. In other words, justification is on the ground of a faith which is a living, loving, active principle. — It is indeed true, as Huther says, quoting from Wieseler, that it is one thing to say, *to be justified by faith which is proved by works*, and another thing, *to be justified by works in which faith is proved*. But it must be borne in mind, that we are not dealing here with abstract theological propositions. The writer of this Epistle is guided in his use of language by the circumstances of the case, the character and position of the persons against whom he is contending, etc. What he says is to be judged accordingly; and, when viewed from this standpoint, the difference between the two statements is not of that marked and distinct character which may be observed when they are considered as theological propositions. — (e) The correctness of the view which is in the line of these suggestions is confirmed by all the indications of the passage. The fact that faith without works is illustrated by the empty saying to a destitute brother, *Go in peace*, without doing any thing for his relief; the impossibility, which is clearly hinted at, of showing or proving the existence of real faith, except by such works as would be naturally prompted by it; the description of faith apart from works, as similar to that which the demons have; the statement that faith apart from works is barren; the points already set forth in connection with the case of Abraham; the comparison between faith apart from works, and the body without the animating and vivifying power of the spirit, — all these things exhibit the writer's idea of the faith which he regards as so insufficient and worthless, and show what he means when he says that a man is justified by works, and not only by faith.

4. With respect to individual words and phrases, the following suggestions may be offered: (a) The abrupt turn in the question, *τι τὸ ὄφελος* (ver. 14), is calculated to arrest the attention of the reader, and bring him at once to the very centre of the subject. — (b) R. V. renders *ἡ πίστις* of ver. 14b, *that faith*. Huther denies this force of the demonstrative pronoun to the article in this place. It would seem doubtful, to say the least, whether the demonstrative force can be insisted upon. — (c) The word *σῶσαι* refers, no doubt, to future salvation, and this word, accordingly, suggests that the writer is referring throughout the passage to that justification which is connected with the securing of salvation for a man who has the opportunity to put his faith in exercise; that is, that he is not limiting his thought to the first moment of forgiveness, when the man is set right before the judgment of God with reference to his past sins. — (d) Huther is hardly justified in insisting on our regarding *χαρτίζεσθε* and *θερμαίνεσθε* as in the middle voice, on the ground that only thus does the contrast appear pointed and definite. The point seems to be simply, that there is an empty expression of good wishes, but no corresponding action, and not that the destitute brother might warm or satisfy himself. — (e) The remark of Huther in his note on ver. 17 is worthy of special notice: "From the fact that James calls faith *dead* if it has not works, it is evident

that by these works is not meant something which must be added to faith, but something which grows out of faith; the *ἔργα* here treated of are works of faith, in which are the germs of faith." Paul and James alike have in mind a working faith, a faith which works through love, which is alive with a living energy. — (*f*) The objections which Huther urges against making the person referred to in the expression, *ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ τις*, "a *vir sapiens et intelligens*, to whom James assigns the part of carrying on the argument in his stead against his opponent," are worthy of consideration, but they do not appear to be decisive. His own explanation must be regarded as artificial and improbable. Beyschlag, in his edition of Huther, rejects Huther's explanation. The use of *ἀλλά* even in Paul's writings is such that a somewhat wide range must be given to its meaning and force in some cases. It seems sometimes to be nearly equivalent to our word *nay*, as used in sentences of this sort; and to express a contrast, not, indeed, to the form of words immediately preceding, but to an underlying idea or a suggested thought. If it can be understood in this way here, the thought of the sentences moves forward simply and easily. So far from faith, apart from works, having any living force, a man may say, "Show me," etc. The remark of Huther, that it cannot be perceived why James should express his own opinion in the person of another, who is entirely indefinite, can hardly be regarded as of serious importance; for the statement that some one, or any one, may urge what is thus said has a certain force which the same thing presented as from the writer himself might not have. — The objections to the view which makes the *τις* a person who opposes the position taken by James, seem to be insuperable. — (*g*) Ver. 19 is apparently connected with what precedes, and ver. 20 opens the new stage in the argument, founded upon the case of Abraham, etc. The article of faith which is fundamental is taken as an example, — the belief that God is one, — and it is shown, that, without any thing growing out of it in works and life, it amounts to nothing more than even the demons have. The verb which is added with regard to the demons (*φρίσσειναι*) expresses apparently the opposite idea to *σῶσαι* of ver. 14, and the thought moves, in connection with *σῶσαι* and its opposite, to the *ἐδικαιώθη* of ver. 21. — (*h*) The justification of Abraham here spoken of is, as we may say, connected with that of which Paul speaks in Romans, chap. iv., and Galatians, chap. iii., through the passage in the Epistle to the Hebrews (xi. 17 f.), where the writer of that Epistle says, "By faith Abraham, being tried, offered up Isaac," etc. The offering of Isaac was a fruit of faith, a work growing out of it; and as viewed from the side of faith with, or without, works, Abraham was justified by works. The justification would not have been realized, had there been no working energy in the faith. This working energy manifested itself in action, when the demand came for the sacrifice.

(*i*) The statement of ver. 22 accords with and confirms this view of the matter. Faith co-operated with Abraham's works, in the sense that it was the inspiring principle which caused them to be done; and, on the other hand, it was itself completed by them in the sense that, if there had been no outworking force showing itself when the opportunity and summons came, the faith would have been, and would have proved itself to be, an imperfect and even a dead thing. It was in this way, and in this sense, that the Scripture passage in Gen. xv. 6 found its real and perfect fulfilment. In this light of the passage, and with this explanation, there is no real contradiction between Paul and James. This very passage of Genesis on which Paul founds his doctrine of justification by faith was actually fulfilled in the sense that the faith was made complete,

and the justification was assured and made manifest, when the faith had put forth its living energy in act. The word *ἐτελειώθη* refers to the perfecting of faith in the realization of its force in action; the verb *ἐπληρώθη* refers, in a similar way, to the fulfilment of the Scriptural words in the realization and sealing, as it were, of the justification. — (*j*) The twenty-sixth verse repeats in substance the statement of ver. 20, or *verbatim* if we read *νεκρά* instead of *ἀργή* in that verse; but it adds the comparison of the body and spirit. The character of the faith of which the writer is speaking is most clearly indicated by these two verses. The faith which is entirely apart from works is like the body without the spirit; it is *ἀργή*, without working energy, because it is *νεκρά*, having in it no animating and inspiring force. — (*k*) All things in the passage thus combine to show the truth of what Huther says in his closing remarks upon the chapter, — namely, that James did not design to make an attack upon Paul's doctrine. It does not, however, seem quite as clear that he may not have referred to some misapprehending or misappropriation of it, or that the Epistle belongs to the earlier apostolic times. This latter view is, nevertheless, not improbable.

VI.

CHAPTER III.

V. 1-12.

1. It is evident that, as Huther says, the writer passes at the beginning of this chapter to a new subject. Apparently the empty faith which characterized those whom the preceding chapter had referred to, had the influence which it often has: as it had no living force and energy leading to the appropriate works of the Christian life, it exerted its force, if such it might be called, in the way of assuming to teach others. Talking and teaching took the place of working. The exhortation which he gives, therefore, follows appropriately after the passage relating to living and dead faith. — 2. The verb *γίνεσθε* seems to be used here because the writer would dissuade them from entering upon the course indicated. The word *πολλοί* is explained correctly by Beyschlag in his edition of Huther, Be not in great numbers teachers; that is, do not be seeking the office and work of teachers, as if this were the thing to be aimed at by the great mass of Christians. The connection of thought in the following verses seems to be this: that as we all offend in many points, and the higher the position voluntarily assumed the greater the condemnation, it is unbecoming to thrust one's self forward in the way mentioned. Ver. 3 then adds the peculiar danger of offence as connected with the tongue, — an idea evidently suggested by the desire of the readers to become teachers, but yet it goes beyond this particular subject to the general matter of the sins of the tongue. — 3. The suggestion that the man who controls his tongue is able also to control his whole body, is hardly to be understood in its most direct and full meaning; but as conveying the idea that the control of the tongue is so difficult, that one who succeeds in gaining this will show power enough to make him equal to the emergency of meeting the temptations to sin which come in connection with any other part of the man. The word *body* seems to be used because *tongue*, one of the members of the body, has been used. This is a sufficient account of its introduction, but it is possible that the thought of the members of the body as the avenues through which temptations come into the soul, and appetites and desires go out, may have been in the author's mind. — 4. The comparison of ver. 5 has, indeed, a certain relation to the illustration of ver. 3, as well as that of ver. 4, but its immediate

reference is evidently to the latter. The words *μεγάλα ἀρχεῖ* (or, if that be the true reading, *μεγαλαρχεῖ*) are regarded by Grimm as denoting a kind of haughty language which stirs up strife. This would seem to be indicated by the passage which follows, and may be regarded as the correct view, rather than the view which would hold that *ἀρχεῖ* is simply substituted for *ποιεῖ* because the tongue is the member spoken of. — 5. Ver. 5b f. unfolds what is suggested by *μεγάλα ἀρχεῖ*. The sense of the first *ἡλίκων* is *how small*; for, even if this is not the direct signification of the word as here used, the thought of the whole passage would lead us to interpret the phrase, *how great a fire kindles how great a wood*, by measuring the greatness in the former case by contrast with that in the latter. If it is understood otherwise, the sentence is out of harmony with: *the tongue is a little member*, etc. The word *ύλην* probably means *forest* here, as in R. V. marg., rather than *wood*, as in R. V. text.

6. As between the construction of ver. 6 given in R. V. text, *And the tongue is a fire; the world of iniquity among our members is the tongue, which*, etc., and that given in R. V. marg., *And the tongue is a fire, that world of iniquity; the tongue is among our members that which*, etc., the decision is probably to be made in favor of the former, because in this way the thought of the clauses best divides itself. That the tongue is a fire, is a statement which naturally follows upon ver. 5b; and as thus following, it has in itself a marked emphasis and solemnity which arrest attention. Then the thought moves on with a corresponding solemnity in a sentence which is explanatory of this brief affirmation, and gives a justification for it: *The world of iniquity, the tongue is*, etc. Huther takes the other view on grounds which seem hardly sufficient. He objects to the construction as difficult, and as isolating too much the first thought, and also because there is no correct meaning unless the words *ἡ γλ. πῦρ* are closely connected with what follows. There is no difficulty, if the close union with 5b is noticed, and this close union accounts for what Huther regards as the isolating of the first thought. The last point made by Huther falls away with the other two. Beyschlag objects to Huther's explanation, and favors the other. — 7. The word *κόσμος*, whichever view of the sentence is taken, is undoubtedly used in the sense of the sum or totality of unrighteousness. The tongue is thus conceived of because, in the line of the writer's present thought, it appears as if the source of all evils. The idea of *sum* is designedly expressed with greatest emphasis by the use of this particular word *κόσμος*, *the world*. This sum of evil is in the tongue, making it a consuming fire on every side for the man himself and for others. — 8. *καθίσταται* — On this verb see Additional Notes in the Amer. edition of Meyer's Commentary on Romans, v. 19. The tongue is set (or sets itself) in the midst of (among) the members as that which, etc. The sense of *καθίσταται* as here used is most clearly seen in connection with iv. 4 and 2 Pet. i. 8. It is substantially equivalent to *ἐστί* (see iv. 4, where the two verbs are used in parallel sentences); but possibly has the additional idea of: caused to appear as — shown to be — what it really is. The "is" notion, is, however, the most prominent one, so far as the truth or fact declared is concerned.

9. The tongue is spoken of as set on fire by Gehenna, apparently because of the violence of expression given forth by it, and the impulse given thereby to various sorts of sin which the writer now has in mind, as he is speaking especially of the tongue. In another connection, and with a more full survey of sin in all its lines and sources, he might, no doubt, have limited his expressions more exactly. — The words *φλογίζουσα τὴν τροχὸν τῆς γενέσεως* have a certain parallelism with the preceding participial clause, and so far there is a measure of

probability that τροχ. γενέσ. refers to the course of the individual life,—the wheel of birth or human origin. This probability, however, can hardly be considered as sufficient in itself to determine the question. Nevertheless, it appears to the writer of this note, that, if this view of the matter is adopted, the harmony of the clauses with each other, and the unity of the thought as presented in the figures, is most successfully realized. The only other view worthy of serious consideration is that of R. V. text: the wheel of nature, the orb of creation (Alf., etc.), or that mentioned in Grimm's N. T. Lex.: the wheel of life or existence (like the English word "machinery").—10. The γάρ of ver. 7 introduces that verse and the following as a justification of the statements which precede, and especially as a ground for the strong expression in the last participial clause of ver. 6. The untamable character of the tongue, its restless evil character, full of deadly poison, is the evidence that it is set on fire by Gehenna, that it is moved and impelled in its evil by the author of evil. The words *a restless evil, full, etc.*, are to be explained with Winer and Huther as independent, and a sort of exclamation, rather than as a sentence introduced by *it is*.—11. The true explanation of ver. 9 ff. is connected with the fact that these evils and sins which arise from the tongue are those which the writer has observed among the Christian readers whom he is addressing. They have fallen into sins in this regard which are illustrative of the power of evil connected with the tongue; and he warns them of the deadly character of such evil in its possible development, in order that he may arrest the progress of what may become unconquerable, if not restrained. Possibly this whole passage may be related to the closing part of the preceding chapter in the way which seems to be suggested by Neander, who says, "The show of piety James opposes in all its forms. Such is that pious cant, in which, along with praise to God in words, are mingled a hateful censoriousness and bitter denunciation of men, in whom God's image is to be honored. James exposes the inherent inconsistency of such conduct, which to his view is mere hypocrisy." And he adds, "Thus does James express the ground-thought of this whole Epistle (in these verses, 9-12), namely, that all turns on the inward temper from which the whole life takes its direction." The view of some writers, that ver. 9 is an exemplification of the restlessness or unsteadfastness of the tongue, is much less probable than that which is thus given, and which takes hold upon the underlying thought of the whole context.—12. The word *χρή* here seems to refer to that necessity which is connected with the fitness of things, and so to be equivalent to our word *ought* in such sentences. This contrariety to fitness is set forth by the illustrations which follow and which are taken from things familiar to all in nature.

VII.

Vv. 13-18.

1. There is apparently a certain connection between this passage and the exhortation of ver. 1, as related to the verses which follow. The claim of wisdom and knowledge was naturally united with the disposition to become teachers; and that contentiousness, etc., which accompanied this claim, manifested itself, no doubt, in the outspokening of boasting, and of bitter opposition, by which the destructive power of the tongue was displayed. There is also, as we may not improbably be justified in holding, a certain connection with the closing part of chap. ii., such as is indicated in the words of Neander, "As James has contended against a false faith, unaccompanied by works, so does

he, in like manner, against that knowledge and wisdom in divine things, which does not make itself known by a living activity in a corresponding course of life." In this latter view of the passage, it becomes a third presentation of the necessity of such correspondence to the true Christian life, faith, speech, wisdom, all being manifested by the appropriate outworking of the inner principle. — 2. The two adjectives σοφός and ἐπιστήμων are here used, apparently, as in substance equivalent to each other, the latter being added only as emphasizing the idea of the former. This is indicated by the fact that, in the development of the thought in the following verses, σοφία alone appears. — 3. The substitution of the word *works* instead of *wisdom*, in the second part of ver. 13, is not improbably to be accounted for in connection with the reference in the passage to oppositions and peace as the results of the false and true wisdom. The readers who were disposed to claim wisdom should show *out of*—that is, *by*, because springing out of—a good manner of life, the corresponding results, in the particular line here suggested, the opposite of bitter envying and strife; and they should do this in the sphere of the working of that meekness which appertains to wisdom in its truest and genuine sense. The word *πραΰτης*, as here used, means *meekness*; but there may be, perhaps, in connection with the context, a suggestion, in a subordinate way, of the other idea of the word, namely, *gentleness*. — 4. The arrangement of the thought in ver. 14 is the reverse of that in ver. 13. If you claim wisdom, show it in its appropriate fruits (ver. 13); if, on the other hand, you manifest what is opposite in your feelings and spirit and acts, do not glory in your wisdom, and lie against the truth (ver. 14). The opposite results, in the attitude towards one another, to that to which the meekness of wisdom would lead, are jealousy and faction, or selfish partisanship. The compound verb *κατακαυχῶσθε* suggests the idea of glorying in wisdom over against, or to the disparaging or injury of others. The expression, *lie not against the truth*, is not in the proper sense tautological; at least, the addition of the last words is not without a certain solemnity and emphasis. The claim of wisdom on the part of such persons was a glorying against others, and was a lie against the inward truth of the soul, or perhaps, taking the word objectively, against the truth in the objective Christian sense, as Wiesinger holds.

5. The relation of *κατερχομένη* (ver. 15) to the sentence is shown by its contrast with *ἐπίγειος*. It is a descriptive adjective. The wisdom whose fruit is jealousy and bitterness is not one that comes down from above, but earthly. The demonstrative pronoun *αὕτη* evidently points to the sort of wisdom suggested by the words of ver. 14, and the proof which is given in ver. 16 goes back directly to the language of the fourteenth verse. The adjective *ἐπίγειος* is the direct contrast to *ἄνωθεν κατερχομένη*, while the two following adjectives are added as giving further characteristics which belong to the earthly wisdom. This adjective *ἐπίγειος*, according to its strict and original meaning, describes the wisdom as having its whole existence, its origin and life as it were, on the earth. It is not connected with, and does not belong in the sphere of, that part of the man which has communication with heaven and the Divine Spirit. It is of the *νοῦς* only, as distinguished from the *πνεῦμα*. It is *ψυχική*, as contrasted with *πνευματική*, belonging to that part of the man, in his intelligent life, which is open only to the visible and sensible and earthly. It is what Paul calls the wisdom of this age, and to which he alludes in its contrast with the higher wisdom which he presents to the full-grown Christians in the passage dealing with this subject in the First Epistle to the Corinthians.

James, however, adds another descriptive word, *δαμονιώδης*, *demon-like*, *devilish*, because he has prominently in mind, as Paul has not in the passage referred to, the evil spirit which is connected with this wisdom, and which manifests itself in jealousy and selfish factiousness. Beyschlag thinks the word does not mean so much as *devilish*, which would be *διαβολική*. — 6. The making prominent of *ἀκαταστασία* in ver. 16 is evidently connected with the manifestation of this among those to whom he was writing. This word denotes an unstable and unsettled condition, and may mean more or less in this line of thought, according to the circumstances or demands of the individual case. Thus in 1 Cor. xiv. 33, its use is suggested by a disorderly condition which might arise in the church meetings, from the too-abundant exercise of the gift of tongues, without accompanying interpretation; while in Luke xxi. 9, it refers to the commotions connected with tumults and wars. Here the reference is to that which underlies the thought of the whole chapter. — 7. The wisdom from above is described by a succession of words, the main pointing of which is in the direction opposite to *ἀκαταστασία*, *ζήλος πικρός*, *ἐριθρία*. It is first described as *ἀγνή*. This word, at least in its N. T. use, seems, as Trench remarks, to move along a somewhat different line from *ἅγιος*, which is a kindred word, and to have in it the idea of purity, rather than of separation and thus consecration to God. The heavenly wisdom is pure in the large and full sense, it is free from all that is impure, it is the source of every good thing, not every evil. This is its first and fundamental characteristic. Then it is *εἰρηνική*, as Grimm renders the word, peaceable, pacific, loving peace; *ἐπιεικής*, gentle, having a sweet reasonableness; *εὐπειθής*, pliant or compliant, easy to be persuaded, not disposed to contend persistently; *μεσῆ ἑλέους καὶ καρπῶν ἀγαθῶν*, full of mercy or compassionate feeling and good fruits. The suggestion of compassionate feeling seems to be by way of contrast to the jealousy, etc., which is the fruit of the other kind of wisdom. *ἀδιάκριτος*; this word is rendered by R. V. text, *without variance*, and by R. V. marg., in two ways, either *without doubtfulness*, or *without partiality*. The decision as to the meaning is difficult, but the choice seems to lie between the first and second meaning mentioned. The preceding words are favorable to the first view, the following word to the second. The first view seems on the whole to be preferable, because of the general thought which apparently occupies the writer's mind. *ἄνυπόκριτος*, without hypocrisy; this final word marks the wisdom as free from all that pretence and falseness which characterize those who have an empty, dead faith, etc., and who have been already referred to. — 8. *δικαιοσύνης* is here used in its ordinary, not in its peculiar Pauline sense, and the genitive is appositional. This view of the word, which is favored by Huther and others, accords best with the whole course of thought in the passage. The fruit which springs from the sowing in character and life is a fruit of right living, when it is sown in the sphere of peace, in the way and spirit of peace, and such fruit results for those who make peace.

VIII.

CHAPTER IV.

Vv. 1-12.

1. There is a certain abruptness in the opening of this chapter, and yet evidently a connection between it and that which immediately precedes. The idea of peace, as related to and the result of the wisdom from above, in contrast with the bitterness, etc., springing from the earthly wisdom, suggests

the abrupt and even indignant expressions which now follow. The wars and fightings refer, no doubt, to violent and unseemly contentings among themselves; but the passage has such a vehemence of denunciatory rebuke, that we may believe its expressions to have a rhetorical strength which the writer did not measure by the literal facts. So when he uses the word *φονεύετε*, and speaks of the readers as [adulterers and] adulteresses. The connection of sin, as it outwardly displays itself, with the desire and inward movement of the heart, are set forth as in chap. 1. — 2. The word *ἡδόνων* seems to be used in the sense of desires for pleasure (see ver. 3), and is substituted for *ἐπιθυμίων*, because the writer has the idea of ver. 3 especially in mind. These desires for pleasures war (Alf. says, campaign, have their camp, and, as it were, forage about; and this is not improbably the sense of the word as here employed) in your members. The following three sentences present the condition into which these desires for pleasures bring men; the going-out of desire without gaining possession of what is desired; then, the whole series of evil desires and acts, from envy or jealousy up to murder; and then, the fighting and warring which characterize and make up the life of a community full of bitter jealousy and the factious spirit. Having thus set forth the condition, the writer gives the reason why they do not have the things which may give them satisfaction, namely, because they do not ask of God except for the purpose of expending upon their pleasures what they would wish to receive. — 3. The reading *μοιχαλίδες*, as against *μοιχοί καὶ μοιχαλίδες*, is so strongly supported that it is probably to be accepted. If so, the feminine form is used, as we may believe, because of the relation of the church to God, as presented many times in the O. T. The members of the church are conceived of as, in a sense, sustaining this same relation. Beyschlag also holds that the word refers to the individual members of the church. The explanatory marginal note added in A. R. V. gives, accordingly, the true sense, and is helpful to the common reader: "That is, *who break your marriage vow to God.*" — 4. *Know ye not*, etc. (ver. 4). — This confident inquiry which is equivalent, as in similar cases in the Pauline Epistles, to an emphatic affirmation of the fact, presses upon the thought of the readers, that, if they desire and act after this manner, they cannot expect to receive anything from God. The genitives *κόσμου* and *θεοῦ* express an objective relation. The verb *ἐβουλήθη* is the word *minded* of the English version, and denotes the inclination and disposition as turned in a certain direction. *καθίσταται* is evidently parallel with *ἐστίν* in this verse, and certainly approximates most closely to it in meaning. The centering of the life in the will, the disposition and inclination of the whole inner man, is indicated in this place, as it is in many parts of the N. T. This is the N. T. doctrine. The friendship of the world is enmity to God; whoever therefore has his mind set in the direction of the world is placed by that very fact in the condition of an enemy of God; he is constituted such by the action of his own will and purpose; he becomes such *ipso facto*, and thus *is* such. Beyschlag holds that here and in Rom. v. 19, *καθίσταται* = *ἐστί*, as not unfrequently in classic Greek. — 5. *Or*: — this *ἢ* is like that which we find often in Paul's writings, and introduces the following sentence, which is put in the form of a question, as the only supposition possible, unless the preceding one is admitted; the question implying that they cannot hold this supposition. The force of these verses, therefore, is as follows: Whoever . . . maketh himself an enemy of God. This you must admit, or you must suppose that the Scripture speaks in vain when it says what is in ver. 5b. But this you cannot suppose.

6. The words of ver. 5*b* are regarded as a question, according to the rendering of R. V. text. The exact meaning and translation of this part of ver. 5 are uncertain, but the second marginal rendering of R. V. gives that which seems, not improbably, to present the true sense: That Spirit which He made to dwell in us yearneth for us even unto jealous envy. If this is correct, the idea of the sentence is in harmony with the context, and with the peculiar construction with η . Since the Spirit which God makes to dwell in us longs for us even unto jealous envy, it must be that the man who is minded to be a friend of the world will be an enemy of God. — The first marginal rendering of R. V. is that which Huther prefers, and no serious objection can be urged against it: The spirit which He made to dwell in us, He yearneth for even unto jealous envy. In this case, the subject of the two sentences, 5*b* and 6*a*, is the same; and in this fact an argument may perhaps be found for this view of 5*b*. — 7. The view which holds that λέγει of ver. 5 means *says*, not *speaks*, and that the πρὸς φθόνον, κ.τ.λ., depends on it, is the simplest and best, — the explanation being that the writer gives first the substance of the idea of what the O. T. says, and then makes a particular citation in ver. 6*b* as supporting the statement of ver. 6*a*. — 8. *But he gives greater grace*, i. e., greater because of, and in proportion to, this jealous envy. *Wherefore*, i. e., it is on account of the fact stated, that the O. T. uses the language quoted. God gives grace, because of His desire and longing unto jealous envy, to those whom he loves; but, for the same reason, He resists the proud, His enemies, those who are minded to be friends of the world. These verses thus support and strengthen that which underlies the suggestions of ver. 1 ff.

9. Ver. 7 (*οὖν*) draws the conclusion from the preceding context in the form of exhortations. In the first two of these exhortations there is, in a certain sense, a corresponding positive and negative, which are in the immediate line of the preceding thought and expressions. They should submit themselves to God, and thus, in the exercise of the humility just alluded to in the O. T. quotation, place themselves in accord with God's yearning desire, and should resist the Devil, the prince of the world, under whose dominion they would come by turning towards friendship with the world. Such resistance will be successful, for the very reason that to those who submit to God He gives a grace proportioned to His desire for them. To the exhortation to resist the Devil, is added the assurance that they will be successful in their effort, — he will flee from them; while on the other hand, to the exhortation to submit themselves to God, which is now put in another form, though in substance it is the same thing, is joined the promise that the corresponding blessing will come: draw near to Him, and He will draw near to you. The positive and negative sides of the first and fundamental exhortation are presented in vv. 7, 8*a*. In ver. 8*b* we find an exhortation to that which is an essential accompaniment or antecedent of drawing near to God. This is addressed to sinners and to those who have a double soul or mind, as it were, divided between God and the world. Apparently, the writer addresses the Christian readers thus because of their non-conformity to the duties and requirements of their Christian profession, as indicated in the preceding part of the Epistle. — 10. The exhortations in ver. 9 set forth what is necessary with reference to past conduct, as connected with the cleansing, etc., mentioned in ver. 8*b*. These, again, are expressed in the same vigorous, strong language which characterizes the Epistle throughout: Be wretched, and mourn and weep; let your laughter be turned, etc. — The word *κατῆφεια*, not found elsewhere in the N. T., is compounded of *κατά* with the sense of *downward*, and *τά*

φάη, the eyes, — with downcast eyes; and carries with it the idea of humiliation, i. e., the feeling of humiliation. — The final exhortation returns to the one at the beginning, and expresses distinctly what is there put in the form of submission, — *humble yourselves in the sight of the Lord*; and then the promise is, in substance, renewed: *and He shall exalt you*. *κυρίου* is to be regarded, with Huther, as referring to God, not Christ, because of the reference to God throughout the immediate context.

11. To these exhortations, which move along the line of the main thought of the chapter thus far, and bring it to its end, the writer now appends a new exhortation, *not to speak against one another*. The connection here is somewhat uncertain. Possibly, there is a return to the general thought of contentions, etc., at the end of chap. iii. and beginning of chap. iv.; possibly, he reminds them that, even in reference to the desires for worldly things, they should not be too ready to condemn one another. The *speaking against* involves a censorious judgment. The reason given for the exhortation is akin to that suggested by Paul in Rom. xiv. 4, where the words correspond substantially with those in ver. 12^b of this chapter. James, however, first introduces the statements of ver. 11^b. The one who speaks against a brother speaks against and judges the law. The law here referred to is the law of love, — that is, either the Christian law itself, or the O. T. law which is fulfilled and filled out in its complete meaning, so far as duties to one another are concerned, by the loving one's neighbor as one's self. — 12. The view of Huther respecting ver. 11^c is to be regarded as correct. The man who judges the law puts himself in a position above the law, and instead of doing what it requires, which is his duty as a man, he becomes a judge in and of himself, usurping thus a function which does not belong to him. This function of judge appertains to Him alone who is the law-giver, and who is able to assign the destiny of men. The words *ὁ δυνάμενος*, κ.τ.λ., in the construction of the sentence, belong to the subject, being appositional to and explanatory of *εἷς*. The last words of ver. 12, as following these, press the impropriety of such judgment of one another very emphatically.

IX.

CHAPTER IV. 13 — CHAPTER V. 6.

Vv. 13-17.

1. These verses seem to form one section of the Epistle, which is divided by the close of chap. iv. into two sub-sections. These two sub-sections have reference, the first to the presumptuous confidence in the certainty of future opportunities for work and success which those devoted to worldly gain seem often to have; and the second, to the oppressions, etc., of selfish rich men, upon whom a woe is denounced. The connection of this passage with what precedes seems less evident than in the case of former passages; but the thought may be regarded as following along the general line of the exhortation not to love the world, or the things of the world. Whether the rich here alluded to are those in the church, or outside of it, is a question of some difficulty. Huther takes the latter view. This harmonizes with the probable reference of *πλούσιος*, in chap. ii., and is favored by the fact that the language which the writer uses appears almost too strong for any proper application to Christians. At the same time, the Epistle is addressed to Christians, and it would seem that some application to them must be intended. Perhaps the true view is that the writer

is addressing professedly Christian rich men, but with the vigorous and denunciatory language which characterizes him, and which is due to his abhorrence of all worldliness, and his deep sense of its inconsistency with the righteousness of true Christian living. If this be not the correct view, we may believe that he intends, while warning the worldly rich, to apply the same admonition to the Christian readers, so far as any of them may be led away to the same actions and wrong-doing. — 2. The phrase *ἀγε νῦν* arrests attention, and demands the thought of the persons addressed upon the subject presented. The repetition of this phrase in v. 1, inasmuch as it is used nowhere else, seems, as Huther also suggests, to indicate a close union between the two sub-sections; and perhaps, also, it indicates that the movement of the writer's thought, even from the beginning of iv. 13, is towards the *κλαύσατε* of v. 1, and the declarations which follow in the subsequent verses. — 3. The view of Huther with respect to *τῆνδε*, with which R. V. and some other commentators, as well as Buttmann (N. T. Gram.), agree, is in all probability correct. The sentence in which this word occurs may be supposed to contain the very words which the men referred to would use: having a particular city in mind, they would naturally speak of it as *this city*.

4. Westcott and Hort adopt the reading which omits *τά* before *τῆς αὔριον* and *γάρ* following *ποία*. The meaning thus becomes, You know not of what sort the life of the morrow will be; i. e., what will be your condition and circumstances. The other reading, which separates *ποία* from *τῆς αὔριον*, gives to the sentence more of that nervous force which belongs to this author, and brings out more distinctly the uncertainty of life. The *γάρ* following *ποία* is probably to be omitted. In the following clause, *ἔστε* is supported by the best authorities. What sort of thing is your life? A thing full of uncertainty, for you are a vapor, appearing for a little time and then vanishing away. That this is the true sense of the passage, is also indicated by ver. 15, which is founded upon what is implied in *ποία ἢ ζωὴ ἡμῶν*. — 5. The particle *νῦν*, in ver. 16, seems to be equivalent to: as the case now stands; as the fact of the case is. The word *ἀλαζονείας* denotes the confident boasting and assurance which belong to such presumptuous planning and action as that which has been referred to. All glorying in such presumptuousness is wicked. Thus far, he has only called attention to and rebuked this disregard of God, with reference to the question of the continuance of life. — 6. Ver. 17 evidently contains in its words a general statement; but by reason of its position at the end of one part of a section of the Epistle, it must have a particular application to the matter referred to in the verses immediately preceding. The meaning of the verse, therefore, as here introduced, must be, that, inasmuch as they knew what was right in this matter of the uncertainty of the future, and yet, notwithstanding this knowledge, acted as they did, they were guilty of actual sin. This verse is introduced by *οὖν* as a conclusion from what goes before. This conclusion-element in the sentence seems to belong to the special application, rather than the general truth. The general truth can hardly be supposed to result as an inference from what has been here said about their thoughtlessness and presumptuousness as to the uncertainty of life. The special application, on the other hand, results naturally, and the sentence, as such an inference, becomes an impressive rebuke of their sin. In this way, also, the verse becomes a kind of transition passage, carrying the thought over to the severer rebuke and denunciation which fill the opening verses of the following chapter.

X.

CHAPTER V.

Vv. 1-6.

7. The address now turns to the rich. These are either the same persons with those addressed in iv. 13, only speaking of them in another light, or a portion of the class there mentioned who had acquired wealth. It would seem from the severity of the language here used, as well as from certain individual expressions in vv. 4-6, that the writer has in mind persons who were not merely trading, etc., with presumptuous disregard of the possibility of the ending of life, or of the power of God over their lives, but were also guilty of oppression, and other acts of injustice, towards the poor. The passage is denunciatory of judgment. Precisely what the judgment here referred to is, may be questioned, — whether the expressions give a figurative presentation of the final condemnation which will come upon them from God, or whether, on the other hand, they refer to the calamities which were expected immediately to precede the second coming of the Lord, or, if the Epistle was written before that event, those which were realized in connection with the destruction of Jerusalem. — 8. The similarity of this passage in its general style to some of the denunciatory passages in the O. T. prophetic writings will not fail to be noticed. The writer of this Epistle evidently resembled the prophets in character. His words here rise into the poetic region of the prophetic books, and our interpretation of them is doubtless to be affected by this fact. The language used, however, plainly indicates great calamities impending in the way of Divine judgment, in view of which they might well do what he calls upon them to do, namely, weep and howl for the miseries that were just before them. The present participle *ἐπρχομέναις*, as well as the expressions, *in the last days*, ver. 3, and, *Be patient until the coming of the Lord*, implies the nearness of the things to which he refers, and the two last-mentioned expressions show that they were those which preceded the Lord's coming.

9. The things mentioned in vv. 2, 3, are the calamities or the results of the calamities. Their riches waste away and are destroyed, and this destruction will be a testimony of the destruction which awaits themselves. The connection of *ὡς πῦρ* with the following words, which is favored by Westcott and Hort, seems much less simple and natural than the connection with what precedes. The latter view of the sentences is adopted by R. V., A. V., and most of the recent interpreters. The references to O. T. passages, which Huther makes in his note, are sufficient to establish the probability of this view. — 10. The expression, *You are laying up treasures in the last days*, is apparently to be understood as meaning that they were doing that which was unsuitable and wrong: it was the time for repentance, and taking heed to the commands of God. — 11. From this reference to the destruction and worthlessness of their riches in the times of judgment, the writer turns to the setting-forth of some of the wrongs or sins of which they were guilty, and which would bring the judgment as their result. Mention is made of three of these, as Huther remarks in his notes; namely, injustice and oppression as related to the laborers employed by them, their wanton luxury and self-indulgence, and their condemnation of the righteous. The first two of these points stand in contrast to each other. The third has reference apparently to another subject, their treatment of the righteous servants of God; and by reason of the words of the seventh verse, we may

believe that some of the Christian readers may have been sufferers from this treatment. — 12. The view of Huther, which makes a certain kind of parallelism between *in the last days* (ver. 3), and *in the day of slaughter* (ver. 5), and thus refers the latter to the time of the Divine judgment, appears, on the whole, to be the correct view. — 13. The expression *τὸν δίκαιον* is undoubtedly the singular, individualizing, as we may say, the plural. This use of the singular is in accordance with the style of the passage, — the denunciatory and prophetic-poetic style. An especial emphasis is gained by this individualization. The language here used might fitly be employed as describing the experience of Christ; but the definiteness of the application of all the other phrases in these verses to the particular rich men whom the writer has in mind, and the exhortation of the following verse, which is addressed to the particular Christian readers to whom the letter is written, show that it does not refer to Him.

XI.

Vv. 7-12.

1. This passage contains (yv. 7-11) an exhortation to patience, which is drawn as an inference or conclusion (*οὖν*) from the verses which precede. These verses present the idea of the condemnatory judgment of God against the rich oppressors as speedily approaching. In the last clause of the sixth verse, the idea of the non-resistance of the righteous who suffer from the oppressions and persecutions is presented. The exhortation, however, passes beyond the limits of these particular evils, to all the trials and sufferings to which, as Christians, they were at that time exposed, and urges the readers to endure them patiently, and also, bravely to persevere until the coming of the Lord. This is urged upon them by the example of the tiller of the soil, who watches for the growth of the seed which he has planted, and waits patiently for the two seasons of rain. In the same way as he exercises patience, the readers should have it, steadfastly enduring until the end; and they should strengthen and establish their hearts in confidence, because the coming of the Lord (has drawn near) is near at hand. This repeated reference to the nearness of the coming of the Lord, and the striking distinctness of the language used, make this passage one of the prominent ones in the N. T., as bearing upon the question of the view of the apostolic writers as to the time of that event. It must be admitted that it would seem strange to exhort the members of a Christian church, in our day, to have patient endurance, with respect to the trials befalling them, until the *parousia*, the coming of the Lord. The ordinary preacher does not regard that event as near enough to make it natural for him to employ such language. The question, which is one of much interest, must be determined by a careful and candid examination of each passage in which reference is made to the subject, and by a comparison of what are in this way discovered to be the views and expectations of the several N. T. writers. It is clear, from the declaration made by Christ in Acts i. 7, that the exact time of the coming was not revealed to the disciples. How early they placed it, can only be decided by what they say, and the general tenor of their teaching on the subject.

2. The verb *στηρίξατε* expresses, in substance, the opposite or affirmative, which corresponds with the *μακροθυμήσατε*, as setting forth the more negative side of the same idea. They should endure with patience until the coming of the Lord, and should establish their hearts in strength and confidence because

it was at hand. — 3. The exhortation of ver. 9, by reason of its position between vv. 7, 8, and vv. 10, 11, must be in the line of thought of all these verses. The murmuring against one another, referred to, is apparently an unfavorable judgment or accusation of which the Christian readers were guilty in their relation to each other. Huther thinks that this murmuring was the result of an irritability towards one another incident to the experience of all in the oppressions of the rich. Whether this limitation is to be accepted, is doubtful, though it may be suggested by the early verses of the chapter. It would not, however, be out of accordance with the custom of the N. T. writers, in such passages, to pass from the particular case first mentioned to other cases of a more general character. The correspondence of the thought here with that in Matt. vii. 1 is noticed by many, and is quite manifest. — 4. The expression, "Behold, the judge stands before the doors," must be understood, in the connection of the verses, as involving the idea which is suggested by the last words of ver. 8. The judge is Christ. — 5. Ver. 10 passes in its thought over ver. 9 to vv. 7, 8, and belongs in connection with the idea of the verb *μακροθυμῆν* of those verses. The emphatic position of *ὑπόδειγμα* is thus accounted for. The example of the prophets should influence the readers to endure with patience, as, in another way, the waiting of the husbandmen should influence them to the same end. In presenting this *ὑπόδειγμα* of *μακροθυμία*, the writer speaks of it also as an example of *κακοπαθίας*, the suffering of evil, because it was the enduring patience under similar circumstances or experiences which he would press as the ground of his exhortation. The prophets, who are here, no doubt, the prophets of the O. T., are spoken of as those *οἱ ἐλάλησαν ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι τοῦ κυρίου*. By these words, the writer apparently intends not merely, as Huther holds, to mark them as standing opposed to the world, as the readers do, but as persons who were especially honored of God by the commission to speak in His name, and yet were subjected to the experience of suffering. — 6. The text of the best authorities, in ver. 11, reads *ὑπομείναντας*; and this seems the more natural reading in this place, where the preceding reference is to the prophets, and the following one is to Job. It is of the O. T. examples of patient endurance that the writer speaks. The fact that we count these heroic men of the past happy, is a reason why we should imitate them in their *μακροθυμία* and *ὑπομονή*. — 7. The case of Job is added as the most prominent one in the O. T., in that the story of it fills the entire book bearing his name, and every hearer (*ἠκούσατε*) of the O. T., as it was read in the synagogues, must have been impressed by it. In a peculiar manner also, the record of it gave the resultant blessing from God, in connection with which the *μακρισμός* which we utter is pronounced. The word *ὑπομονή* here, as in all other places, means more than patience: it carries in it the idea of steadfast endurance under, and notwithstanding, all trials or sufferings. — 8. *The end of the Lord* is to be understood, with Huther, as the end which God gave him after, and as the result of, his patient endurance. The question as to whether *εἶδετε* or *ἰδετε* is the true reading, is one of some difficulty, owing to the nearly equal weight of external authorities on both sides. The most simple way of understanding the sentence, however, would seem to be that which makes the whole a reference to the knowledge or conviction connected with the case of Job; and, if this be the case, *εἶδετε* (corresponding with *ἠκούσατε*) and the union of this verb with the preceding words, would appear to be the most probable text and construction of the sentence. The particle *ὅτι* is to be understood as meaning *that* or *how that*. This explanation accords with the rendering of the sentence which is given in R. V. The verb *ἔσται* of the last clause of the verse is the propositional present.

9. The tenth verse properly forms a paragraph in itself, and introduces a new subject. The phrase *πρὸ πάντων* presents the exhortation with respect to swearing as one which the writer would especially impress upon his readers. Whether these words, however, can be pressed so far as to involve the idea that the writer would insist upon this as the first and most urgent exhortation of the whole Epistle, may be questioned.—10. The similarity of this verse to Matt. v. 34-36 is very striking, and is noticeable in several points: (a) *μὴ ὀμνέετε* (James), *μὴ ὀμῶσαι ὄλωσ* (Matthew); (b) *neither by heaven, nor by the earth* (James and Matthew); *nor by any other oath* (James); *nor by Jerusalem, nor by thy head*, giving examples of other oaths (Matthew); *ἦτω δὲ ὑμῶν τὸ ναὶ, ναὶ, καὶ τὸ οὐ, οὐ* (James); *ἔστω δὲ ὁ λόγος ὑμῶν ναὶ ναὶ, οὐ οὐ* (Matthew). There can scarcely be a doubt that James bases his language here on that of Jesus. The same question arises here as in Matthew, whether the intention is to prohibit all oaths, or only the oaths which were frequent in daily conversation. It will be observed that in both cases (Matthew and James), the swearing by God is not mentioned, unless—which seems improbable—it is included by James under the phrase *by any other oath*. It will also be observed that the passage in Matthew indicates a feeling of the solemnity of an oath by God on the part of the Jews, which might naturally exclude this from the oaths referred to and prohibited. The fact that solemn asseverations are added to simple assertions by the N. T. writers themselves, at times, may also indicate that an absolute prohibition of every thing beyond the mere yea and nay was not intended. At the same time, in the perfected state of the Divine kingdom, it can hardly be supposed that oaths will be known; and laws such as those in Matt. v., which are expressive of the inmost principles of the Divine government, set forth what is according to the standard of that perfected state. The question is certainly one of no inconsiderable difficulty. The view of Meyer, Bleek, etc., is that Christ's prohibition is absolute and universal; and with them Beyschlag seems to agree substantially, so far as the universality of the prohibition is concerned. These writers (Meyer, Bleek, etc.) hold that it has reference to the ideal state of His kingdom, "while in the present incomplete temporal condition of Christianity, as well as in the relation to the world in which it is placed, and to the existing relations to public law to which it conforms itself, the oath has its necessary indeed, but conditional and temporary, existence." It would seem that James must be speaking with a more particular reference to practical evils surrounding him, and not so much from the standpoint of the ideal state of the kingdom, and that he therefore has in mind the oaths used in ordinary life and conversation.—11. As for the construction of *τὸ ναὶ, ναὶ, κ.τ.λ.*, in this verse in James, it is certainly possible to take the sentence either as R. V. text or as R. V. margin has it: either, *let your yea be yea, and your nay, nay*; or, *let yours be the yea, yea, and the nay, nay*. Westcott and Hort apparently understand the words in the latter way. If the latter view be adopted, the correspondence with Matthew is closer than it is on the other explanation; but, taken in the former way, the difference between James's sentence and Christ's, as given by Matthew, belongs rather to the accidents, than to the essentials of the prohibition. Perhaps the best explanation is that given by R. V. marg., and the article may refer to the well-known expression, *yea, yea, nay, nay*, in the Sermon on the Mount.—12. The clause *ἵνα . . . πείσητε* is not found in Christ's words, but it expresses what may be easily inferred from them. The judgment here referred to is the condemnatory judgment of God.

XII.

Vv. 13-20.

1. These closing verses of the Epistle call the attention of the readers to several points which have no immediate connection with ver. 12, or with the verses which precede that verse. Their connection with one another, it may be added, is not very close and immediate. The first exhortations have reference to the opposite experiences of suffering or sickness, and of joy or gladness. Both in suffering and joy the expression of the heart is to be directed towards God, either in prayer or the singing of psalms. Then the words turn to the case of sickness. Here the elders are to be called in, apparently as connecting the earnest desire of the church with that of the sick person. The prayers of the elders are regarded as the efficacious element in the case (ver. 15); how far the anointing with oil is looked upon as having healing power, is not made clear. The assurance of healing is given in an absolute way; but all such sentences with regard to the removal of physical evils, etc., need to be interpreted with a constant remembrance of the supremacy of the will and wisdom of God. The word *save* is almost certainly to be taken, with Huther, in the sense of: will lead to his recovery from the sickness. This is indicated by the following clause: *the Lord will raise him up*, as well as by the fact that the forgiveness is spoken of, in the closing sentence of the verse, as if a distinct thing. — 2. *οὖν* of ver. 16 makes this verse a conclusion, or inference, drawn from the preceding. Neander says that as James “regards the presbyters in the light of organs of the church, so he holds all other Christians in such a relation, as members of one body, that they should mutually pray for one another in bodily and spiritual need, should confess their sins to one another, and pray for the forgiveness of each other’s sins.” The close connection of this verse with ver. 15 seems to make it probable that Huther was right in his earlier editions of his commentary, in making *ιαθῆτε* refer to the healing of physical maladies, but it is possible that the author of the Epistle means to give this word a wider range of meaning. — 3. R. V. agrees with Huther in translating *ἐνεργουμένη* (ver. 17), *in its working*. The example of Elijah is introduced, as is that of Job a few verses earlier, and also that of the prophets, because it was an instance of the remarkable power of prayer which occurred in the history of one of the great characters of the O. T. times, and was well known to all from the reading of the O. T. in the synagogues. The explanation of the difference in the counting of time between James and the O. T., referred to by Huther as favored by Benson, would seem, on the whole, to be a satisfactory one. It is evident, at all events, that Luke (iv. 25) and James have the same statement as to the time, and we may believe that, in some way, the three years and a half were recognized, at this period, as the interval in question. The error, if it be such, is not at all vital to the point here in hand. What Huther has to say, in his note, respecting the twofold prayer of Elijah, is sufficient to meet any difficulty that may be suggested. — 4. The final exhortation of the Epistle has reference, apparently, to the Christian brother who has been led astray from the truth. This is indicated by *ἐν ὑμῖν*, and its position in the sentence. The connection with the general exhortation to pray for one another is thus natural, and the words are in the same line of brotherly love. — The multitude of sins covered in the case supposed are those of the one who is restored from his wanderings. — The closing of the Epistle

with these words seems abrupt, but is perhaps such as we might have looked for, from the character of the writer, as we see it manifested in the whole course of the letter. It is an abruptness which leaves the reader with an urgent bidding to help and to save.

THE FIRST EPISTLE OF PETER.

XIII.

CHAPTER I.

Vv. 1, 2.

1. The general characteristics of the salutation correspond with those of Paul's Epistles; yet there are certain peculiarities, as, indeed, there are in the different letters of that apostle. The correspondence in phraseology with what is found in the Pauline Epistles is in many places in this Epistle noticeable and striking; and there is considerable evidence in connection with this fact to show that Peter may have been a reader of some of those Epistles, and have been affected in his own writing by them.—2. The persons addressed are evidently Christians (*ἐκλεκτοίς*), and Christians living in Gentile regions where the Jews were scattered. That the readers were not wholly of the Jewish-Christian body, is indicated by several passages in the Epistle (e.g., i. 14, ii. 10); but it would seem probable that they were partly or mainly such, and that they may be described as they are, because they were in places whither Jews had gone forth from their own land, and where they had found a dwelling-place. They are described also as *παρεπίδημοι*, that is, persons who come from another country to a particular region to dwell there beside the natives of the region. They are looked upon thus as strangers in the districts alluded to, belonging to the class who had gone thither from Palestine, and were Christian converts.—3. The word *ἐκλεκτοίς* is defined and further developed in its idea by three phrases: (a) *κατὰ πρόγνωσιν θεοῦ πατρός*, the election was in accordance with the foreknowledge of God the Father; the word *πρόγνωσιν* denoting *foreknowledge*, and carrying back the choice of these persons to be recipients of the great Divine blessing to that foreknowledge of God, which, in the order of thought, preceded His pre-determining purpose and decree.—(b) *ἐν ἀγιασμῷ πνεύματος*, the election moved, so to speak, to its result in the sphere of sanctification which comes from the Holy Spirit.—(c) *εἰς ὑπακοὴν καὶ ῥασπισμὸν αἵματος Ἰ. Χ.*, the end in view of the election was obedience and sprinkling, etc. The *obedience* here spoken of seems to indicate the moral side of the Christian life, the result of faith as it works through love, and the *sprinkling*, etc., to the side of Divine forgiveness and the cleansing power of the blood of Christ. The two things together make up the full idea of the Christian life as viewed on the subjective and objective side.—4. The last sentence of ver. 2 introduces the word *πληθυνθείη*, which we do not find in the Pauline salutations. As Huther remarks, however, this word occurs in 2 Pet. i. 2, and Jude 2, and it may perhaps be suggestive as to the relations of the three Epistles to one another.

XIV.

Vv. 3-12.

1. The opening words of ver. 3 are found in Eph. i. 3, with a similar construction of \acute{o} with a past participle following immediately afterwards. Paul, however, turns the thought of the reader, in connection with the ascription of praise, especially towards the choice and fore-ordination of God, which Peter has alluded to in his words of salutation. Peter directs his attention rather to hope and the future inheritance, as connected particularly with the resurrection of Christ from the dead. God is spoken of as *having begotten us again to a living hope*, etc., by which the apostle seems to mean that the new life into which we are brought by the Divine influence, so far as it moves out into the sphere of hope of the future blessedness in heaven, is made a real experience to us by means of the resurrection of Christ. The hope is called *living*, because it "has vital power in itself, and exerts the same upon the soul" (Thayer's Grimm's Lex.). — 2. The preposition *εις*, at the beginning of ver. 4, is, in a certain sense, parallel with the same preposition in ver. 3, and in a certain sense it is not. Grammatically, and in the construction of the long sentence, it is so; but in the thought, the hope looks forward to the inheritance, and we are begotten of God to a hope which is realized finally in the actual possession of the inheritance. — 3. The verb *τηρέω* seems to be used here in the sense of $\acute{\alpha}\pi\acute{o}\kappa\epsilon\iota\mu\alpha\iota$ in Col. i. 5, 2 Tim. iv. 8. The inheritance is kept in reserve in heaven during the period of hope. Huther holds that the perfect participle here suggests the idea of the nearness of the time when the inheritance will be received, but this may be pressing the force of the tense too far. — 4. The word *φρουρουμενος* is used in Gal. iii. 23 of those who were kept in ward, in a kind of guardianship, until the faith-system should be fully revealed. The condition under the law was preparatory and educational with reference to the gospel. Here the idea seems rather to be that of preservation by being guarded, and thus protected from dangers and disaster, with a view to, and until the attainment of, the blessing designed for us in the future. The word is the same as that which is used by Paul of the guarding of the city of Damascus to prevent his escape. The foundation meaning is the same in all cases, but the peculiar shade of meaning or the special application is determined by the context. The guarding takes place in the sphere of God's power: it is accomplished by the exercise of that power. It is accomplished also by means of faith, in that faith in the person guarded is that by means of which God is able, in accordance with His plan of salvation, to keep him safe until the end. — 5. The preposition *εις* before *σωτηριαν* carries with it, perhaps, both the idea of *for* and *until*; or it may mean *with reference to*, leaving the idea of *until* to be suggested by the sentence as a whole. A *salvation* (R. V.), rather than *salvation* (A. V.), is to be understood as the meaning of *σωτηριαν*. The phrase *ready to be revealed* answers to the idea of the participle *reserved* (ver. 4).

6. The phrase $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \kappa\alpha\iota\rho\acute{\omega}\ \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\chi\acute{\alpha}\tau\omega$ evidently refers to the time of the final realization of salvation; that is, the time of the ending of the world, and of the second coming of Christ. The ending of the *αι\acute{o}\nu\ \acute{o}\nu\tau\omicron\varsigma* was to be followed by the entrance of the saints upon the consummated blessedness of the kingdom. — 7. The question as to the reference of the relative ψ of ver. 6, as it seems to the writer of this note, is to be determined in connection with that respecting the present or future sense of *ἀγαλλιάσθε*. If the verb is to be regarded as a present, the relative more naturally refers to the thought of the preceding sentence; but

if the verb has a future sense, ϕ refers most probably to $\epsilon\sigma\chi\acute{\alpha}\tau\omega$ καιρῶ. That the verb is a future in sense, or, rather, the present carried forward to the future standpoint, is not certain; but this seems, on the whole, to be the most probable supposition. It is certainly more difficult to explain the aorist participle $\lambda\upsilon\pi\eta\theta\acute{\epsilon}\nu\tau\epsilon\varsigma$, the use of $\acute{\alpha}\rho\tau\iota$, the participles $\kappa\omicron\mu\iota\zeta\omicron\mu\epsilon\upsilon\omicron\iota$ (ver. 9) and $\delta\epsilon\delta\omicron\varsigma\alpha\sigma\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\eta$ (ver. 8), if the verb has the full present sense in this verse and ver. 8, than if it is the present as of a future time. If ϕ refers to $\kappa\alpha\iota\rho\acute{\omega}$ $\epsilon\sigma\chi\acute{\alpha}\tau\omega$, this carrying forward of the present in ver. 6 is somewhat easily accounted for: and yet it must be admitted, that in both verses a future tense would be more natural if the intended meaning were future; and in ver. 8, the immediate connection between $\acute{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\pi\acute{\alpha}\tau\epsilon$, which is an undoubted present in signification, and $\acute{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\lambda\lambda\iota\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\theta\epsilon$, furnishes an argument of considerable force for the present sense in the case of the latter verb. The confidence with which some writers affirm the future sense passes beyond the state of the arguments on the two sides. At the most, there is but a certain greater measure of probability in favor of this view. — If $\acute{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\lambda\lambda\iota\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\theta\epsilon$ of ver. 6 is to be taken as the ordinary present, the aorist $\lambda\upsilon\pi\eta\theta\acute{\epsilon}\nu\tau\epsilon\varsigma$ is best explained as referring to an actual experience of trial and temptation which had befallen the readers in the past, and out of which they had now come. In this case, $\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ ϕ is best translated *wherein*, referring to the words, *a salvation*, etc., of the preceding verse. — 8. On the word $\delta\omicron\kappa\acute{\iota}\mu\omicron\nu$, see Note II. 4, on Jas. i. 3. — 9. The construction of the adjective $\mu\omicron\lambda\upsilon\tau\iota\mu\acute{\omicron}\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\nu$ is somewhat doubtful. Huther takes it with $\acute{\epsilon}\upsilon\rho\epsilon\theta\acute{\eta}$, and the points which he urges against its appositional connection with $\tau\omicron$ $\delta\omicron\kappa\acute{\iota}\mu\omicron\nu$ $\acute{\iota}\mu\omega\nu$ $\tau\eta\varsigma$ $\pi\acute{\iota}\sigma\tau\epsilon\omega\varsigma$ are worthy of serious consideration. By reason, however, of the position of this adjective and its accompanying words in the sentence, and the fact that $\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\alpha\iota\nu\omicron\nu$, κ.τ.λ., forms a sufficient defining phrase for the verb, it seems, on the whole, better to give the adjective the appositional relation referred to, as is done by R. V. and A. V. This apposition is with $\delta\omicron\kappa\acute{\iota}\mu\omicron\nu$ grammatically, but in thought it is with the compound idea *approvedness of faith*, if this meaning be given to the phrase, or with $\pi\acute{\iota}\sigma\tau\epsilon\omega\varsigma$, if $\delta\omicron\kappa\acute{\iota}\mu\omicron\nu$ is regarded as meaning *proof* or *proving*. More probably the former meaning is to be given to $\delta\omicron\kappa.$ $\tau.$ $\pi\acute{\iota}\sigma\tau.$; and thus approved faith, or tested faith, is declared to be a more precious thing than gold that perishes. The force of $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$ $\delta\omicron\kappa\iota\mu\alpha\zeta\omicron\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\nu$ is probably not *though it is tried by fire*, but *and*, or *and yet*, etc. The fact that gold, a thing which perishes, is tested by fire, is put in comparison with faith; and thus is suggested the idea of the naturalness of such testing by trials, and even fiery trials, as has been alluded to in the case of the Christian believer. The verb $\acute{\epsilon}\upsilon\rho\epsilon\theta\acute{\eta}$ is equivalent here to *be proved or shown to be*. [Kühl holds that the meaning of $\delta\omicron\kappa\acute{\iota}\mu\omicron\nu$ is *means of testing or proving*. He regards the thought of the apostle as in substance this: If fire has value as a means of testing, because by it gold, which is perishable, is proved to be a precious thing; much more value must the $\lambda\acute{\upsilon}\pi\alpha\iota$ or sufferings have as a means of testing, inasmuch as by them faith, an imperishable thing, is proved to be real faith.]

10. The apparent parallelism of $\acute{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\pi\acute{\alpha}\tau\epsilon$ and $\acute{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\lambda\lambda\iota\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\theta\epsilon$, when we consider these verbs in themselves, and in connection with the participles inserted between them, constitutes a strong argument for regarding the latter verb as fully present in its signification, like the former. The following participles, $\delta\epsilon\delta\omicron\varsigma\alpha\sigma\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\eta$ and $\kappa\omicron\mu\iota\zeta\omicron\mu\epsilon\upsilon\omicron\iota$, point toward the future sense. The adjective $\acute{\alpha}\nu\epsilon\kappa\lambda\alpha\lambda\acute{\eta}\tau\omega$ is claimed by Keil to have, as distinguished from $\acute{\alpha}\rho\acute{\rho}\eta\tau\omega$ or $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\alpha\lambda\acute{\eta}\tau\omega$, a meaning more suited to describe the future heavenly joy, *inexpressible, unspeakable*, too great to be expressed in human language. In view of these last points, if indeed the last of all be admitted, and of the considerations connected with

ver. 6, there is a somewhat greater probability that the future sense is to be given in both cases to ἀγαλλιῶσθε, than that it refers to a present experience. [Kühl regards the verb ἀγαλλιῶσθε, in both verses, as present in signification.]—11. The explanation of τέλος and σωτηρίαν given by Huther is correct. The former word means that to which faith is directed, that to which it looks and in which it ends; the latter, the completed salvation, salvation in its fully realized state in eternity, that salvation which is revealed in the last time.—12. The object of vv. 10-12 seems to be to set forth with emphasis before the minds of the readers, what a glorious and precious thing the assurance of this salvation, as before them in the future, is, by calling to their remembrance the earnest searching and inquiry of the O. T. prophets with reference to it. The prophets are described as having prophesied respecting the grace which “*was destined for, or was to come to, you:*” that is, the believers of the Christian period, to which number the readers of the Epistle belonged. They were thus enlightened as to what was to come (the χάρις τοῦ Θεοῦ), though they did not understand it in all its fulness. But they were not enlightened as to the time and circumstances,—they were searching into the depths of an unsolved and unrevealed problem, when they inquired *what and what manner of time the Spirit of Christ which was in them did point unto, when it testified, etc.* The rule of prophecy, as we may call it, both in the O. T. and the N. T., was to reveal to the prophet, more or less clearly, the matter to which the prophecy had reference, but to conceal the time,—both τίνα, *what* it should be, and ποῖον *of what sort*, with what attendant circumstances, surroundings, etc., etc. This fact may have an important bearing on the question as to whether the apostles may, or may not, in consistency with the fact of their inspiration, have been under a misapprehension with respect to the time of the second coming. We may remember that Jesus Himself said to them (Acts i. 6), “It is not for you to know the times or the seasons, which the Father has set within His own authority.”—13. The expression, *the Spirit of Christ*, as used in this passage, is, like the expression in 1 Cor. x. 4, *the rock was Christ*, an indication that the apostles believed in the pre-existence of Christ.—14. The expression τὰ εἰς Χριστὸν παθήματα is to be regarded as referring to the sufferings which were destined or appointed for Christ Himself, and the glories (plural) correspond with the sufferings. The Spirit testified within these prophets, and through them, of these experiences awaiting Christ, and He also revealed to them the fact that in their ministration of these things,—that is, their fulfilment of the prophetic office in announcing what was made known to their minds,—they were doing this work for those who should follow in the Christian period. The things which they prophesied are those which had been now announced to the readers by the same Holy Spirit, through the preachers of the gospel.

XV.

Vv. 13-25.

1. διό, with which this passage opens, refers backward to the general thought of the preceding verses. This thought is that of the certainty and assurance of the salvation which was ready to be revealed in the last time. In view of this thought, the exhortations of the Epistle, which begin at the thirteenth verse, are urged. The passage from ver. 3 to ver. 12 is introductory in its character, like the introductions of the Pauline Epistles; and, like them, it is opened by an ascription of praise to God for His goodness in bestowing the blessing which is especially referred to.—2. The exhortations begin with one which

urges hope upon the readers (*ἐλπίζατε*). This is the fundamental exhortation of the Epistle, as the idea of hope is its fundamental idea. With this verb, according to Huther and most commentators, the adverb *τελείως* is to be connected. This is probably the correct view of the matter, and the exhortation is to have a hope which has no intermingling of doubt or fear. Westcott and Hort join the adverb with *νήφοντες*; but there seems to be no special reason for adding the word to this participle, for *being sober*, in such a case, necessarily carries with itself the idea of *being perfectly sober*. This participle in the present tense indicates that sober-mindedness is to be the permanent abiding state in which the fulfilment of the more special exhortation should (aorist participle and imperative) take place. The aorist *ἐλπίζατε*, followed by *ἐπί* with the accusative, is well translated in R. V. by *set your hope perfectly on the grace*, etc. — 3. That the view of Huther, with respect to the phrase *the grace*, etc., is correct, is shown by the principal indications of the verse itself, and of the preceding context: thus the verb *hope*, and the expression *set your hope on*, which point to the future; the revelation of Jesus Christ, which is the revelation at His second coming; the connection through *διό* with the preceding verses, which point forward to the future; and the third verse, which gives the keynote to the thought of the entire passage which it opens. The words *χάριν* and *φερομένην*, which are urged against this view, are reconcilable with it in the way suggested by Huther. — 4. Ver. 14 introduces a second exhortation, subordinate to this first and leading one; an exhortation, the development of which is carried forward as far as the end of the twenty-first verse. This exhortation is to holiness. They should live, not after their former manner before their conversion, but in accordance with that holiness which God Himself set before them, and called them to. The passage opens with a call upon them to act in this way, because it was befitting that Christians should do so. As Christians, they were, and should be, children of obedience, that is, persons whose source of character is obedience, whose distinctive characteristic this is; and as such persons, they should live after the manner which is indicated, because this is the command of God. The word *συσχηματιζόμενοι* is parallel with *κατὰ τὸν καλ. . . ἅγιον*, in the way of contrast, and gives the idea of manner; but it seems necessary to connect it with *γενήθητε*, or a word suggested by that verb, instead of taking it as Huther does. — 5. The simplest and most natural construction of *κατὰ τὸν . . . ἅγιον* (ver. 15), is that of R. V. marg., by which *ἅγιον* is regarded as a noun, and *καλέσαντα* as a descriptive adjective. This construction seems, also, to give the simplest character to the sentence: Like, or after the pattern of, the Holy One who called you, do you also become holy, etc., because it is written, Ye shall be holy, for I am holy. [Kühl regards *διό* of ver. 13 as referring either to vv. 10-13, or to the whole thought of the preceding passage. He agrees with Huther in connecting *τελείως* with *ἐλπίζατε*. With respect to *φερομένην* he holds a different view from Huther, regarding it as a present participle in sense, as well as in form, and taking *ἐν ἀποκαλίψει* in close connection with *χάριν*. He thus would not carry forward the thought wholly into the future, but would centre it upon the present and permanent manifestation of grace.]

6. Ver. 17 connects with the exhortation of vv. 14-16 another, which seems to be subordinate to it, and, strictly speaking, a part of it. The holy manner of living involves, in our relation to God, that we should live, during this sojourn on earth, in that fear which bears in remembrance the thought of Him as an impartial judge. This fear has reference to sin, and thus the exhortation

is a part of the general one, to live the holy life. The time of the sojourning is mentioned, apparently, with a view to the critical character of it, as related to the final result; and perhaps, also, with reference to the brevity of it, as preceding the time of judgment. — 7. Ver. 18 gives a reason for the preceding exhortation, by reminding the readers of their knowledge that they were redeemed from their vain manner of life by the precious blood of Christ. It cost the blood of Christ to buy them out of their former way of living; surely they should with holy fear follow the opposite way of living, now that they had been called of God. — 8. The former manner of life is spoken of as handed down from the fathers. This word *πατροπαραδότου*, and also the word *ματαίως*, seem more adapted to describe Gentiles (heathen) than Jews (persons educated under the O. T.); but they do not prove that the readers must have been Gentiles. — 9. The reference in the word *lamb* (ver. 19) to Isa. liii. 7, supposed by Huther, is not improbably the correct reference. This seems to be the reference intended in John i. 29. The placing of the words *ὡς ἄμνου, κ.τ.λ.*, before the word *Χριστοῦ*, seems to give an emphasis both to them and to it. — 10. The participle *προεγνωσμένου* corresponds with the substantive *πρόγνωσιν* of ver. 1. In both cases, the word is chosen which carries back the fore-ordination to the foreknowledge, and the meaning, accordingly, is not *fore-ordained*, in the strictest sense of that word. In the formation of the Divine plan, the mission and sacrifice of Christ were foreseen and foreknown, as involved in the plan, and were predetermined in its adoption. This was before the foundation of the world, in eternity past; the manifestation of Christ was in the closing period of the *αἰῶν οὗτος*, *the end of the times*. — 11. The manifestation of Christ is declared to have been made on account of the readers as believers, and to the end that their faith and hope might be in God. At the end of the passage, the thought is thus brought back to the point from which the beginning was made in ver. 13. Huther agrees with Weiss and others, against the majority of commentators, in translating *ὥστε τὴν πίστιν ὑμῶν καὶ ἐλπίδα εἰς Θεόν*: so that your faith is (may be) at the same time hope in God. If this rendering is adopted, — and it would seem not improbable that it should be, — the return to the idea of hope, which is that of ver. 13, and the governing one of the Epistle, becomes more emphatically marked. [Kühl remarks that the words *redeemed from your vain manner of life*, etc., do not present the idea of the ransoming from guilt by the payment of a price, as elsewhere in the N. T.; but of ransoming from the slavery to sin. The sinful life held the readers as slaves before their conversion. Of the word *προεγνωσμένου*, he says that the meaning is, foreknown as the one who alone would be qualified to be the Messiah and Redeemer. He agrees with Huther in his construction of the clause *ὥστε, κ.τ.λ.*, of ver. 21.]

12. The third exhortation given in vv. 22–25 may also be regarded as, in a sense, subordinate to that of ver. 14, which exhorts to holiness; but it is not as fully so as is the second one, that of vv. 17–21. The connection with the idea of ver. 14 ff. seems to be indicated by the first words of ver. 22. These words point to purification through obedience as preparatory to the fulfilment of the duty of loving one another. The preposition *εἰς* denotes the end in view of the purification, this particular end being mentioned because of the exhortation which is to follow. The adverb *ἐκτενῶς* means, as Alford has it, *with the energies on the stretch*. On this word, and on *ἐκ καρδίας*, as Huther remarks, the chief emphasis lies. — 13. The participle *ἀναγεγεννημένοι* is equivalent to: since you are (have been) born again of incorruptible seed. This incorruptible

seed is best taken as referring to the spiritual force, the Divine Spirit, which is the originating power of the new life. This power works through the word of God. The grounds mentioned by Huther, as opposing this view, do not seem to be decisive against the general indications of the N. T., that the Holy Spirit is the origin of the spiritual life. The word of God, which here means the gospel, is spoken of as living and abiding, as, in the O. T. citation, it is said to abide forever. The force of these words is indicated by the contrast set forth in the cited passage. They suggest the permanent and ever-continuing energy of that power by means of which the Spirit brings about the new life in the soul. [Kühl regards ver. 22 as beginning a new section which extends as far as ii. 10, the thought of ver. 22 being resumed in ii. 1, after the long quotation from the O. T. He assents to Huther's view, that the seed refers to the word of God, and not to the Spirit. He holds, with Huther, that *ἐκτενῶς ἀγαπήσατε* is to be understood as conveying the twofold idea of perseverance and intensity; and he regards the latter as the fruit of the living word, and the former, of the abiding word.]

XVI.

CHAPTER II.

Vv. 1-10.

The beginning of this chapter is immediately connected with the close of the preceding one, *οὖν, therefore*, referring backward to the idea expressed in *ἀναγεγεννημένοι, κ.τ.λ.* As they were begotten again to a new and spiritual life, they should lay aside every thing that was opposite to and inconsistent with it, and should give themselves to that which would develop its power within themselves. With respect to the words and phrases of these first ten verses of the second chapter, the following points may be especially noticed: 1. The laying aside of the evil was, strictly, to precede the sending forth the desires after the good; the soul being cleared, as it were, in preparation for the coming action and the changed life. Substantially, however, the two things were contemporaneous. — 2. The word *κακία* is to be understood here in the more limited sense of *malice*, according to Huther, Alford, Keil, etc.; but R. V. text renders it, in the more general sense, *wickedness*, and there seems to be no sufficient reason against understanding it in this way. If it is thus understood, it is a general word, to which the following words, as designating particular evils, are subordinate. — 3. The expression *ἀρτιγέννητα βρέφη* is rightly understood by Huther as indicating that the readers were, in view of the goal of manhood yet afar off, but recently born again. The connection between *ἀρτιγέννητα* and *ἀναγεγεννημένοι* is evident. The whole thought is moving in the sphere of the idea of the new birth. — 4. The adjective *λογικόν* is most naturally taken in the same sense in which it is used in Rom. xii. 1, the only other passage in which the word occurs in the N. T. It is nearly equivalent to *spiritual*. Strictly speaking, it seems to designate the thing spoken of, as not to be understood in the physical or material sense, but as pertaining to the region of the mind or reason, or the higher and spiritual part of the man. Of course the precise shade of idea will almost necessarily vary in different connections, but the same notion lies at the basis of the word in all cases of this character. In Dr. Thayer's Lexicon, the phrase *λογικῆ λατρεία*, in Romans, is explained as *the worship which is rendered by the reason or soul*; the phrase *λογικὸν γάλα* in this passage, *the milk which nourishes the soul*. The adjective

ἄδολον conveys the idea of *unadulterated*, and thus *pure*. The connection of the passage seems to show clearly that *γάλα* refers to *the word of the Lord*; and this word of the Lord, the gospel, is by the two defining adjectives described as *unadulterated*, i.e., unmingled with any thing which takes away from or obscures its truth, such as wrong teachings, etc., and as *spiritual*, i.e., pertaining to the life and growth of the soul in the spiritual sphere. For this they were to send forth the ardent desires of their souls. — 5. The end in view which they should have in the outgoing of these desires was, that in the sphere of this word they might grow, as in the development of the natural life, from birth towards maturity, unto the full experience and realization of salvation (*εἰς σωτηρίαν*). — 6. *εἴπερ*, if this, and not *εἰ*, be adopted as the true reading (ver. 3), carries with it, according to its general use, the idea of a supposition assumed to be a fact, and apparently also, according to what seems to be the usage in the N. T., the idea of a supposition which the writer holds to be rightly thus assumed. More probably, however, *εἰ* is the true text here. By this conditional clause the apostle supports his exhortation *ἐπιπόθησατε*, as a suitable and natural one. [Kühl agrees with Huther as to the meaning of *κακία*. He regards *ὡς* of ver. 2, as equivalent to *since*, and not the particle of comparison. The *ὡς* clause thus involves a declaration of a fact with respect to the readers, — since you are new-born babes. The addition of *ἄρτιγέννητοι* must be due, he thinks, to the desire on the writer's part to emphasize the idea of recent entrance upon the Christian life; *ἄρτι* being the prominent element in the word, distinguishing it from the kindred *βρέφη*. He finds an indication here, accordingly, that the letter could not have been written to Pauline churches which had been already established for a generation. He supposes *λογικόν* to be connected here with *λόγος*, *word*, and the meaning to be, milk which proceeds from the word of God. The reference, he thinks, is to Christ as the nourishing force of the new life. He is presented to us in the word.]

7. The relative *ὃν* (ver. 4) refers to *κύριος*, and connects this new exhortation with the one which precedes. In fact, we may say that the second exhortation is an outgrowth of the first, and, in a sense, is a part of it. The figure passes from that of the growth of a man towards maturity to that of a building in process of erection; and, as the figure changes, the thought moves outward from the development of the individual believer to the development of the whole body of believers united together in the church. *Ὁν* refers to Christ evidently, as is shown by the following words; in the O. T. passage on which the words *εἰ ἐγέυσασθε, κ.τ.λ.*, are founded (Ps. xxxiv. 9), *ὁ κύριος* refers to God. The suggestion arising from this fact, with respect to the view which the apostle had of Christ, is worthy of consideration. — 8. The participle *προσερχόμενοι* does not have the meaning which it has in Heb. vii. 25, and other passages where it refers to approaching God in worship or in seeking for His favor; but it has the sense rather, of drawing near to Christ in the way of communion in heart and life with Him. — 9. Christ is called a *stone*, because the figure is that of a building of which He is a part, and, in a peculiar sense, the foundation. He is afterwards spoken of as the corner-stone. The epithet *living* is used, apparently, because the writer desires to keep the mind of the reader fixed upon the fact that the building is one of living men, and because Christ is possessed of and imparts that life which is needed for all who are to be built as stones into the building. They come to Him, a living stone, and become themselves, in their connection with Him, living stones. — 10. As to the question whether *οἰκοδομείθε* is an indicative or an imperative, the latter supposition seems on the whole to be preferred,

because of the general hortatory character of the passage, and because in this way the change of the figure is most easily explained; the same exhortation in substance is given, only under the forms of expression involved in the two figures. R. V. takes the other view, and regards the verb as indicative. — 11. There can be no doubt that the true text in ver. 5 reads *εἰς* before *ἱεράτευμα*, and thus, that this phrase is not appositional to *οἶκος πνευματικός*. The *εἰς* is either to be connected with the preceding *οἰκοδομεῖσθε οἶκ. πν.*: be ye built up a spiritual house to the end of being a holy priesthood; or, with *οἶκ. πν.*, a spiritual house for a holy priesthood. The infinitive *ἀνεύγκαι* sets forth the end in view of the whole combined expression which precedes. — 12. The quotation from the O. T. is evidently introduced as giving an additional ground of, and an additional impressiveness to, the exhortation; and it is the passage from which the idea of the stone, and of its character and relation to the building, is borrowed. In the verses which include this quotation, 6-10, the verb *περιέχει* is used intransitively, and, according to Buttman, is equivalent to *it runs or stands written*; — *τιμῇ* is probably to be explained in the sense of *honor*, and the meaning is, to you appertains the honor which is connected with this honored position given by God to the chief corner-stone. The words *τοῖς πιστεύουσιν* are added evidently as uniting this clause with *ὁ πιστεύων* of the cited passage; *οἱ* of ver. 8 refers to the persons designated by *ἀπιστοῦσιν*, and is substantially equivalent to *for they*, as it is rendered in R. V.; *τῷ λόγῳ* is, on the whole, to be joined with *ἀπειθοῦντες* rather than the verb, — they stumble through disobedience to the word; — *εἰς ὃ* refers not to the compound idea of the verb and the participial clause which immediately precede, but to the verb only, as Huther takes it, — the stumbling is the principal idea of the O. T. words; — *ἐτίθησαν* were set or appointed, — this verb seems to indicate that for which they were appointed in the providential arrangement of God, as set forth in the prophecy. — 13. The words of ver. 9, which describe the persons referred to in *ὑμεῖς*, i.e., the Christian readers of the Epistle, are borrowed from different passages in the O. T.; and thus the quoted passage of ver. 6 is continued, in the explanation given, as far as ver. 10. Of the words in ver. 9, the three which present the idea of a people or nation are to be understood in the same sense, the object being rather to emphasize one idea than to present minor distinctions. The idea of the royal priesthood is nearly akin to the other, as the conception which the apostolic writers had of the Christian believers in the Messianic kingdom was that of a peculiar people made up of kings and priests. The expression *λαὸς εἰς περιποίησιν* is equivalent, in substance of meaning, to a people especially belonging to God, or God's own in a peculiar sense. The particle *ὅπως* introduces the following words as expressing the design of the preceding, i.e., of the fact that the believers are, and become by their believing, a chosen race, etc. This design is, that they may tell out, show forth, the excellences or moral perfections of God. These moral perfections are seen in the fact that He called them out of darkness into His marvellous light. In the use of the words *darkness* and *light*, Peter draws near to the idea which John has in his first Epistle; but the words have here somewhat less of their purely internal or subjective meaning, if it may be so expressed, and more of the objective sense — the darkness of their heathen condition, and the light of the gospel. [Kühl calls attention to the force of the present participle *προσερχόμενοι* (ver. 4) as indicating a continuous, constant drawing near to Christ, on the part of the Christian. We should draw near to Him as the living stone, in the conviction that He is the living stone. He regards *οἰκοδομεῖσθε* as a present indicative. He joins the words *εἰς ἱεράτευμα ἅγιον* immedi-

ately with *οἰκος πν.* In the words of vv. 9, 10, he finds a reference to believing Jews as distinguished from unbelieving Jews, not to Gentile believers as contrasted with Jewish unbelievers. He thus finds this verse according with his view as to the persons to whom the Epistle was addressed.]

XVII.

Vv. 11-25.

1. In the first two of these verses a more general exhortation is given, which is followed by more special ones having reference to various relations in life. The general exhortation may perhaps be regarded as forming a transitional passage which, in a certain sense, closes the preceding paragraph, and, in a certain sense, opens the following one. Ver. 11, in its bidding to abstain from fleshly lusts, is in the line of ver. 1, laying aside all evil, etc. Ver. 12, on the other hand, in its reference to seemly behavior in their Christian living, suggests that which lies at the foundation of all the exhortations which follow, and which bear upon right and fitting conduct in several spheres or relationships of human life. There is, however, an independent element in these verses, as is shown by the special mention of the relation of the believers to the heathen among whom they lived, and the influence which their conduct might have upon these heathen. — 2. The exhortation of these two verses is based, in a certain measure, upon the fact that the readers are *πάροικοι* and *παρεπίδημοι*. These two words seem to be used here, instead of the one or the other alone, for the sake of expressing the idea common to both with greater emphasis. The readers were strangers and sojourners in the world. They were living as such among the Gentiles who surrounded them, and who were the citizens of the world, at home in it and having its spirit. They should for this reason lay aside all evil, and abstain from fleshly desires (those desires which arise from the sinful and evil element in man), and should act in the way which befitted the new life upon which they had entered. — *αἰτινες* may be a causal word, *since they*; or it may be used here as designating these desires as belonging to the class of things which war against the soul. — 3. The participle *ἔχοντες*, in its grammatical construction, belongs to the subject of *ἀπέχεσθαι*, and should be in the accusative case. It is placed in the nominative to give the thought greater prominence and emphasis. The adjective *καλῆν* is predicative, as Huther also says; and the word *ἀναπροσῆν* refers to the whole manner of life. *καλῆν* seems to mean good, in the sense of fair, beautiful, honorable, seemly, — such as would become Christian believers who realized that their home was in heaven. The end in view of this seemly behavior, as related to the heathen around them, was to be, that, in the very matter (*ἐν ᾧ*) in which these heathen were wont to speak against the readers as evil-doers, they might, by observing their good works, be led to glorify God. As Canon Cook says, “Christians were specially attacked by Gentiles, generally at the instigation of Jews, on political grounds, as enemies of the state (comp. Acts xvii. 6, 7); on religious grounds, as atheists, i. e., rejecting the objects of heathen worship; on ethical grounds, as introducing unlawful customs, and, as it was believed, abominable impurity” (Acts xvi. 10). The thought of the apostle seems to be, that in the very things which characterized the Christians as turning aside from the heathen around them, and which led to charges against them as evil-doers or malefactors, they should so conduct themselves, — living in the true Christian, seemly manner, and abstaining from all fleshly desires, — that the heathen themselves, being eye-witnesses, spectators, of their good

works, would be influenced to give glory to God. By the power of their life they would thus turn the hearts of the heathen. The day of visitation is to be explained of the time when God's mercy should be brought to them.

4. With ver. 13 begins the series of exhortations having reference to various relations in life, — those of subjects of civil government to their rulers, servants to their masters, wives to their husbands, etc. It can scarcely be doubted, that these exhortations are suggested here as a part of the seemly behavior of the Christian believers in the presence and midst of their heathen surroundings and enemies. The same liability or tendency on the part of Christians, by reason of the doctrine of their equality in Christ and before God, to disregard the obligations of civil or family law, which we observe as we read the letters of Paul, may not improbably be seen here. The similarity of the exhortations given in these verses to those which Paul gives in the Epistles to the Romans, Ephesians, and Colossians, is quite noticeable, — the language even corresponding in considerable measure with that of Paul, — and by reason of this fact the reader may be referred to the annotations on the passages in those Epistles, a few points only being specially mentioned here. — 5. The word *κτίσει* is peculiar to Peter, and it seems to be used in the classical sense of instituting or establishing something, — ordinance or institution. Paul speaks of the civil powers as ordained of God (Rom. xiii. 1). Peter here speaks of them as in the light of a human institution. Huther explains this word *human* as meaning, *applying to human relations*; and in this way there is no difference between Paul and Peter. Keil and Hofmann have the same view. Alford, Grimm, and others regard the word as equivalent to *instituted by men*. According to this view, the expression of Peter is supposed to refer to government, etc., from the human side, an institution organized and maintained by men; while Paul's expression evidently describes it from the side of its divine origin and authority. Either explanation of the word seems to be allowable. The argument presented by Huther and Keil, as connected with *κτιζειν* and its derivatives, as applied to God, not to man, is worthy of consideration, but is hardly decisive. — 6. The explanation of *διὰ κριτον* given by Huther, "because such is Christ's will," is doubtless correct. — 7. Paul evidently refers to the higher magistrates, those possessing the power of condemning to death, but without special designations: Peter makes such designations, — of the king or Roman emperor, the governors of provinces. But it will be noticed that both Peter and Paul represent the magistrates as appointed of God for the same purpose, — the punishment of evil-doers and the praise of those that do well. Peter adds, as connected with the thought of his Epistle and the circumstances of his readers, a sentence giving the ground of the exhortation, which borders closely upon the words of ver. 12. This fact shows what has been said above, that the verses beginning with ver. 13 grow out of vv. 11, 12. — 8. Ver. 16 reminds us of the Pauline thought. The Christian readers were free, but they were bondservants of God. They were to yield their obedience to the earthly powers as those who were in this condition. It was to be a free service rendered in submission to God's will. They were to be conscious of their freedom as Christians, but were to limit the exercise of their freedom by their sense of obligation to obey God. They were thus not to use their freedom as a covering for wickedness, — as Huther says, seek to conceal their wickedness by boasting of their Christian freedom, — but through due subjection to the civil magistrates were, in this line as in others, to behave in a seemly way among the Gentiles. — 9. Ver. 17 does not correspond precisely with Rom. xiii. 7, but we can scarcely fail to be reminded of that verse as we read the

words of this one. Both verses suggest the idea of the obligation to render to each and all the respect and honor, etc., which are justly due to them. [Kühl seems to favor the view of Alford, Grimm, and others, with respect to *ἀνθρωπίνῃ* (ver. 13). He regards *κύριον* (ver. 13) as referring not to Christ, but to God, because of ver. 15*a*, and the connection of this verse with that verse, and the one which follows it. The words *ὡς ἐλεύθεροι, κ.τ.λ.* (ver. 16), he would not connect immediately with *ὑποτάγητε*, as Huther does, but would join them with ver. 15, and would hold that there is a change of construction from the accusative case to the nominative, as in ver. 12 (comp. ver. 11).]

10. Following upon the exhortation relative to the duty to civil magistrates, exhortations are given bearing upon social or family relations; and first, with regard to servants. Probably *οἰκέται*, though meaning domestic servants, as distinguished from *δοῦλοι*, slaves, is here used as equivalent to the latter word. The word *φόβος* is found in the Pauline exhortations addressed to slaves, — in Ephesians, *with fear and trembling*; in Colossians, *fearing the Lord*. Here the word evidently does not have the peculiar sense of the compound phrase in Ephesians. Whether it means the *fear of the Lord*, is more open to question. On the whole, it seems more probable that it refers to that reverence for authority which belonged to the position of the slave as related to the master. The reference to the two kinds of masters is peculiar to Peter. The following verses show that the apostle felt that the special need of the exhortation existed in the case of those who had perverse or froward masters; but they may also be regarded, in connection with other allusions in the Epistle to sufferings and trials, as indicating that, among the evils which befell the readers for whom the Epistle was designed, a prominent one in the case of slaves was that which came from such masters. At this point, the thought turns aside from what we discover in similar passages in the Pauline writings, and the writer is apparently dealing with persons who were in a somewhat different condition of things. [Kühl thinks that the word *οἰκέται* is used instead of *δοῦλος*, probably, because the apostle desired to turn the readers' minds, from the beginning, to the household and family relationships. He regards *ἐν παντί φόβῳ* as referring to the same thing as *διὰ κύριον* (ver. 13), and *διὰ τὴν συνείδησιν τοῦ Θεοῦ*; thus the fear of God.]

11. The most simple explanation of *χάρις* (ver. 19) is that of Grimm, *this wins for us God's favor*; which is also the explanation of Huther, except that he takes *favor* in the general sense, *this causes favor*. The word *λύπας* in the conditional clause seems to be used of the things which cause *λύπη*, and thus cause the persons experiencing them to be in the condition indicated by *λυπηθέντες* of chap. i. ver. 6. *ὑποφέρει*, *bears patiently*; *πάσχων*, *when in the experience of suffering unjustly or undeservedly*. — 12. Ver. 21. *εἰς τοῦτο* refers to the patient endurance of suffering inflicted wrongfully. The call to the Christian life was peculiarly, in those days, a call which brought the person to whom it came into the experience of trials, persecutions, etc., and which summoned him to this experience as a test of faith, which, being met successfully, resulted in praise and honor and glory at the revelation of Jesus Christ (i. 7). — 13. *Ὅτι* gives the ground of *εἰς τοῦτο ἐκλήθητε*. The Christian is called to undergo, according to his measure, what Christ underwent. The suffering of Christ on behalf of His people is presented here, also, in the special light of an example which He left behind Him peculiarly for them (the *ὑμῖν* is in the position of emphasis), to the end that they should follow close upon His footsteps. By going through the experiences of suffering which they should be called to meet, the disciples

of Christ would be brought into inward likeness to Himself; and, knowing this, He left behind Him the example of His own endurance for the purpose of accomplishing the desired result. — 14. In vv. 22, 23, two points with respect to Christ are set forth, which correspond with what has been urged upon the servants: He did no wrong, and yet, when He suffered, He endured patiently. The first of these points is brought forward in the language of Isaiah, chap. liii.; and the second one is so expressed, as Huther also says, as to show that the apostle's mind was recalling and dwelling upon that chapter of the prophecy. — The object of *παρεδίδον* is probably *His cause*, or *the decision in the case*; more probably the former. — 15. Ver. 24. This verse can hardly be regarded as altogether in the line of the two which precede it. The writer seems, rather, in his dwelling upon Isa. liii., to think of what Christ did and suffered for His followers, and to be so impressed by his thought of this as to lead him to present it before his readers as the source of all their Christian life. The thing which He did for us is expressed in the words, *bore our sins in His own body upon the tree* (as R. V. text reads); or, *carried up our sins . . . to the tree* (as R. V. marg. reads). This was the way in which He suffered on our behalf. The vicarious suffering and death of Christ are here plainly set forth; but precisely how His death provided the way for our forgiveness, and deliverance from the penalty of sin, can hardly be determined from this expression alone, without taking into account the many other passages of the N. T. which have a more or less immediate bearing upon the subject. — 16. The end in view of Christ's suffering for us in the manner indicated was, that we, having died to sins, might live to righteousness. The participle *ἀπογενόμενοι* is here used in the same sense as *ἀποθνήσκειν*, which Paul uses in a similar construction with the dative *ἁμαρτία*, Rom. vi. 2, — dying to sin, in the sense of completely terminating our relations to it. — 17. Ver. 25 gives the ground of the preceding clause immediately; but, more remotely, that of the main thought of ver. 24 in its bearing upon the Christian readers. [Kühl holds that *ἀνήνεγκεν* of ver. 24 is to be understood as meaning *carried up*. Jesus carried up our sins upon the cross, and thus took them away from us. He regards this as made clear by the use of *ἐπὶ τῷ ξύλῳ*, instead of *ἐπὶ τῷ ζύλῳ*.]

XVIII.

CHAPTER III.

Vv. 1-12.

1. The exhortations addressed to wives and husbands are in the same line with those addressed to servants, and, like them, are connected with ver. 12 of the preceding chapter. The exhortation to wives is the same which we find in the Pauline Epistles; and in the Epistle to Titus, ii. 5, the same reason, substantially, is given which is urged here, though on the negative side, and with a more general reference: that the word of God be not blasphemed. Here the duty of subjection on the part of the wives is presented with reference to its effect upon the husbands, to the end that any of them who may be unbelievers may be won over to the Christian faith, and thus to reverence and obedience to the word of God. The exhortation to submission was especially needed by reason of the state of society at that period, and because of the possible influence of the doctrine of equality in the Christian life upon conduct in social and family relationships. — 2. *καὶ εἰ, even if*, implies that such cases were not common, and it is evident that the apostolic writers regarded marriage between believers

and the heathen around them with disfavor. The ground of the exhortation here given is the same, only having the necessary limitations of the case, with that presented for all good conduct in ii. 12. — 3. The words *ἀνευ λόγου* are somewhat doubtful as to their meaning. R. V. and A. V. render them, *without the word*, and thus, apparently, make the sense of the clause to be: that they may be gained or won for the Christian life without the intervention or use of that word to which they refuse obedience. There is evidently a certain improbability in this explanation, arising from the fact that there is no article with *λόγου*. Though not decisive as an argument against this view, this fact is worthy of serious consideration; for the parallelism with *τῷ λόγῳ*, if this were the intended meaning, would seem to make the insertion of the article natural, if not necessary, in this case. Huther, Alford, De Wette, and others hold that the phrase means *without word*, and is equivalent to *without preaching to them and exhorting them*. Some have carried this so far as to make it mean absolute silence in the matter, on the part of the wives; but this appears to be unnecessary. The view of Huther escapes the difficulty of the first-mentioned view, and yet, at the same time, it keeps the word *λόγου* in near relation to *λόγῳ*. On the whole, it seems to offer the best and simplest explanation. Canon Cook says that the preposition here used implies that the husbands had rejected the word. That they had rejected it, is evident from the sentence as a whole; but as *ἀνευ λόγου* qualifies the verb *κερδήθησονται*, it seems necessary to view this phrase as referring to the manner in which the husbands are to be won over — in a similar way to that in which *διὰ τῆς ἀναστροφῆς* is to be understood. — 4. The participle *ἐκπτεύσαντες*, corresponding with the participle of the same verb in ii. 12, is to be explained in the same way. In the foundation meaning of the word, they are conceived of as being eye-witnesses of the pure and modest and becoming behavior of their wives. In describing this behavior the writer uses the expression *ἐν φόβῳ*: it was to be in the sphere of *φόβος*. This word represents that reverential fear which, in the higher and more complete sense, is its signification oftentimes when it is applied to the Christian's fear of God, and not the fear which involves terror or being afraid. *Coupled with fear*, R. V. and A. V. [Kühl agrees with Huther respecting the expression *ἀνευ λόγου* (ver. 1). He affirms that it cannot refer to the word, as meaning the gospel, because there is no definite article, and says that it is added to give further emphasis to *διὰ τῆς ἀναστροφῆς*. He holds that *φόβῳ* (ver. 2) means *fear of God*, and not, as Huther says, a shrinking from every violation of duty towards the husband.]

5. The words with regard to the adornment of the women correspond in some measure with those in 1 Tim. ii. 9 ff. The words used, however, are mainly different. The construction adopted by R. V., which supplies the word *κόσμος* before *ἔστω*, and also supplies a second *ἔστω* before *ὁ κρυπτὸς, κ.τ.λ.*, of ver. 4, is the simplest and best. The explanation of *ἐν τῷ ἰσθμῷ*, which is given by Huther, on the other hand, seems better than that of R. V., which supplies the word *apparel* after it. The meaning appears to be this: Let it (the adorning) be the hidden man of the heart in (which it abides and lives in, as it were) the imperishable region or element of a meek and quiet spirit. The adorning is the heart abiding in this condition of spirit. — 6. Vv. 5, 6, give a reason for urging this exhortation, which is drawn from the example of the holy women of the O. T. history, of whom Sarah is especially mentioned, as being the wife of Abraham with whom the covenant was made and who was thus the father of all believers. — 7. The word *ἀγαθοποιῆσαι* is, in all probability, to be connected with *ἐγενήθητε*, as Huther and R. V. text take it, and not with

ὑποτασσόμεναι, as R. V. marg. suggests, — the latter word being too remote, considering the peculiar character of the sentence. This word *ὑπαγοποιῶσαι* is better regarded as equivalent to *if you do good*, than as indicating the evidence that they have become children of Sarah. The thought of the passage suggests as the meaning here: you are her children, if you do good, etc. *πτόηαι* is to be taken objectively; and it refers, no doubt, to the treatment which Christian women might have reason to fear, at times, on the part of their heathen husbands. — 8. The exhortation to husbands is founded on the same general idea which we find in other passages on the same subject. The language used here, however, is mainly different from what we find elsewhere. The word *συννοικοῦντες* refers to the whole domestic life of husbands with their wives; *κατὰ γνώσιν* in accordance with knowledge, intelligence, understanding; this phrase seems to be more definitely explained by the words which follow: *ὡς ἰσθηνεστέρω, κ.τ.λ.*; τῷ *γυναικείῳ* depends on *συννοικοῦντες*, as Huther also says; this seems to be the simplest construction, not only for the reason suggested by Huther, that *συννοικ.* requires a nearer definition, which is more readily found in a word expressed in the sentence than in one to be supplied, but also because the two clauses beginning with *ὡς* are most readily explained if the first one is connected with *συννοικ.*, and the second with *ὑπομένοντες*. If *συγκληροῦμοις* is the true reading,^b this parallelism of the two participles, each with its *ὡς* clause, is even more probable than with *συγκληροῦμοις; χάριτος ζωῆς*, the grace of life, i.e., the gift of the Divine grace which consists in eternal life; *εἰς τὸ μὴ ἐγκόπτεσθαι τὰς προσηυχὰς ἡμῶν*: this denotes the end in view of the whole sentence. By the opposite course to that here urged upon them, the husbands would hinder the union with their wives in prayer, and thus the growth and development of religious life in themselves and their wives. — 9. In the verses which follow the exhortation to husbands, the thought passes to what is more general and comprehensive, the new passage forming a kind of conclusion to the hortatory verses from ii. 11 to this point. Thus we have the expression *τὸ τέλος*. As Huther remarks, these verses (8 ff.) “deal with the relations of Christians towards each other, and towards those who are inimically disposed to them.” In this way the connection of the passage with the thought of ii. 12 is made manifest. The several words of ver. 8 express the ideas of harmony, sympathy, love, humility, etc., which are the normal results of the Christian spirit, as believers live together and have relations to each other; those of ver. 9 suggest the thought of the ill-treatment which believers were likely to receive from those outside of their own number. These latter they should bless, in the way of kind words and actions, or more probably in the way of invoking blessings from God upon them, and this because, in their call to the Christian life, they were themselves called to the inheritance of blessing from God. — 10. The quotation from Ps. xxxiv. serves the purpose of emphasizing the exhortation which immediately precedes, and seems to be selected because of two things: first, the turning away from evil action and evil speaking, to which it refers; and, secondly, the suggestion contained in it of the Divine favor as resting upon those who thus turn away from evil and do good, and of the Divine wrath as falling upon those who do not thus turn. The thought in the passage from the Psalms is evidently more general in its meaning and reference than the single application which is here made of it. The passage serves, however, the purpose of impressing the thought here in mind upon the attention of the readers. This quoted passage also carries the thought easily forward to that which is introduced in ver. 13 and what follows. [Kühl rejects the construction of *ὦν ἔστω* (ver. 3) which

Huther favors, and supplies *κόσμος* as suggested in this note. He would also supply *κόσμῳ* with *ἐν ἀφάρτῳ*. He would connect *ἀγαθοποιῆσαι* (ver. 6) with *ἐγενήθητε*, but would not regard it, as Huther does, as showing the mark by which the women proved themselves children of Sarah; nor again as meaning, *if you do good*. He would take *ἐγενήθητε* as *futurum exactum*: whose children you will have become through the fact that you do good.]

XIX.

Vv. 13-22.

1. This passage is evidently connected in thought with that which precedes, and is a more full drawing-out of the matter of right conduct in the midst of sufferings and persecutions at the hands of enemies and unbelievers. The attitude and behavior which should characterize the readers is presented more impressively, together with the encouragements for such behavior; and then the example of Christ is set forth as the greatest of all encouragements. No real harm, the apostle says to his readers, could befall any of them in their suffering for righteousness' sake.—2. The word *κακώσω* probably means, *do real harm* or *evil*. The negative which is implied in this question is supported and confirmed by the words of the following verse, although these, according to the form of the sentence, are placed in contrast to the idea of *κακώσω*. *ἀλλά* is equivalent to *on the contrary*; *εἰ καὶ*, *if even*, if it goes so far as, if it prove even to be the fact that, you suffer; *πάσχετε* refers to the suffering of persecution, etc., but is used, as we may believe, as purposely conveying a different idea from that which is intended to be set forth in *κακώσω*. The Christian may suffer in the *πάσχειν* sense, and yet be *μακάριος*.—3. The expression *fear not their fear*, is probably to be interpreted according to the view which takes *φόβον* objectively: do not be agitated by the fear which they excite. The words *sanctify*, etc., stand in contrast with this expression. The word *sanctify* conveys the idea of so holding Christ as Lord, in and before the mind, as to bring the man into the attitude of reverential awe before Him. With this sanctifying of Christ in their hearts, the believers should be ready, instead of being troubled, or in dread, because of their adversaries, to give an answer to every one who demanded a reason for the hope which was in them. This giving of an answer was, however, to be with meekness and fear, i.e., with that meekness which was becoming to Christians, and that reverential fear which we may fitly feel in making any claim in our relations of God.—4. The words *having a good conscience* (ver. 16), are best explained as connected with the leading thought, which is that of giving an answer, or making an apologetic defence; this answer was to be given while the person had a good conscience, a conscience void of offence, a consciousness of that right state of the life which would disarm the adversaries in their attacks. The good conscience thus corresponds, on the inward side, to the good manner of life, on the outward side.—5. The seventeenth verse (*γάρ*) gives the ground for the sixteenth. In this verse, and the sixteenth also, the thoughts suggested in ii. 12 are evidently in the writer's mind, the emphasis on suffering evil being, however, somewhat greater here. The underlying thought of maintaining the good life in the midst of, and in spite of, evils which are experienced at the hands of unbelievers, is manifest throughout this entire passage, which had its beginning at ii. 12. The correspondence between the verses now immediately before

us, and those commencing with ii. 19, where the application of what is contained in ii. 11, 12, is made to the special case of servants, will be noticed by every careful reader. —6. The case of Christ is again brought forward, as furnishing the great example, and as the encouraging and strengthening fact on the foundation of which their own action and attitude should find support. The special point made prominent with respect to Christ is, that He suffered as a righteous person in the way of, and because of, doing good. He suffered for the sins of men, Himself a righteous person taking the place of unrighteous persons, and to the end that He might bring those who had been unrighteous near to God. [Kühl is disposed to take φόβον (ver. 14) in the subjective sense: do not fear with the fear of them, do not be afraid of them. He allows the possibility, however, of the other explanation. He agrees with Huther in regarding ἔχοντες (ver. 16) as not co-ordinate with ἔτοιμοι, but subordinate to it. He regards κρείττον (ver. 17) as meaning, not *better*, but, *more powerful*, *stronger*, in the sense of *more profitable*, or *useful* to an end in view. He thinks the reference is not to what the Christian gains for himself from the suffering, but to what is effected for “those who revile the Christian’s good manner of life” (ver. 16). This he thinks is indicated as the true meaning of the verse by the γὰρ, which connects it with ver. 16. There is, accordingly, a certain parallelism in thought here with ii. 12.]

Up to this point the comparison with the case of Christ seems to be carried forward, but with ver. 18b the thought turns more exclusively to Christ’s own experience and work in connection with, and following upon His death. The immediate connection of the words of ver. 18b with the death of Christ, which is brought before the reader’s mind, in ver. 18a, in the expression: *suffered for sins*, would seem to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that these words refer to His experience as related to that event. He was put to death in the flesh, but made alive in the spirit. The parallelism of contrast in these two clauses shows that the phrases *in the flesh* and *in the spirit* must be interpreted according to the same principles. They refer thus to two divisions, as we might say, or rather aspects, of Christ’s life and being. *Quoad σῶξ*, He was put to death; *quoad πνεῦμα*, He was made alive. In respect to the earthly and perishable side of His nature, according to which He was subject to the law of death, *θανατωθεὶς* is true of Him. In respect to the higher and imperishable side, on the other hand, the spiritual side, His experience as connected with His dying is described by the word *ζωοποιηθεὶς*. It is plain, therefore, that, in ver. 18b, the starting-point for the two statements which it contains is the time of Christ’s death. It is evident also, that the limit of the thought in vv. 21, 22, which close this half paragraph, is the resurrection of Christ, His ascension, and His life at the right hand of God in heaven. A strong probability arises from these facts, that what is predicated of Him in the words which intervene between ver. 18b and vv. 21, 22, refers to what took place after, and not before, His death. If this be so, we find in this fact the first point which may bear upon the determination of the meaning of ver. 19. [Kühl agrees mainly with Huther in respect to the words *θανατωθεὶς σαρκί* and *ζωοποιηθεὶς πνεύματι*. He holds that in the latter expression the *ζωοπ.* involves the idea of the receiving of the spiritual body. Christ did not continue a mere spirit, but He received at His resurrection the *σῶμα πνευματικόν*, by means of which, as the organ of the *πνεῦμα*, He was thereafter in a condition to carry forward His activity with relation to men. Christ had a *πνεῦμα* which had in itself the capacity and power to be thus *ζωοποιηθεὶς*.]

7. The words *ἐν ᾧ* of ver. 19 must of necessity, as it would seem, refer to *πνεύματι*. It was, then, in the sphere of the *πνεῦμα* part of Christ's nature, and not in that of the *σάρξ* part, that what is mentioned in vv. 19, 20, was done by Him. This expression in itself, as thus explained, may not indeed be inconsistent with a spiritual proclamation before the time of the incarnation, that is, in the days of Noah. But if what has been said above of the time of vv. 19-22 is correct, the connection of *ᾧ* with *πνεύματι* here must exclude such an explanation of the meaning. — 8. The participle *πορευθεῖς* may be determined in its meaning, so far as the probabilities of the case are concerned, by two considerations: first, by the indication which the word itself gives of an actual movement or going of the person himself who is mentioned — if a preaching through or in the person of another were intended, the verb *ἐκήρυξεν* would have been all that was either necessary or natural in the case; and secondly, by the evident meaning of the same participle in ver. 23, where a personal going of Christ Himself is alluded to. It would scarcely seem possible that, in a connected passage no longer than the one now under consideration, the same participial form of such a verb as this would be used in two different senses, without any explanation or suggestion of such difference in the form of expression, or the surrounding words. This participle in ver. 19, accordingly, is to be understood — such, at least, are the linguistic and grammatical probabilities of the case — as referring to a personal going on the part of Christ, for the purpose of a personal proclamation. No such personal going, in the sense corresponding to His going into heaven, spoken of in ver. 22, took place before the incarnation. — 9. The word *ἐκήρυξεν* indicates what Christ did. The probabilities as to its meaning may be seen from the following facts: (a) This word, which in itself has an indefinite meaning, to *proclaim as a herald*, without specifying the sort of proclamation, occurs in the N. T. about sixty times. Among all the instances of its occurrence, there is none in which the idea of a proclamation of judgment or condemnation is expressed. The word is used almost exclusively of preaching the gospel, and this is the case in every instance in which Christ stands either in the subjective or objective relation to the proclamation. The kindred words *κήρυξ* and *κήρυγμα* (at least, with the exception of two cases, where the preaching of Jonah is spoken of, on which see below) are used with reference to the making known of the gospel, or, in a single instance, 2 Pet. ii. 5, of righteousness. The probability as to the meaning of the verb in this case, as connected with usage, must therefore be regarded as overwhelmingly strong against any other signification than *preaching the gospel*. — (b) This probability is strengthened by the use of the verb *ἐνηγγελίσθη* in iv. 6, provided that we are to consider that verse as having any close relation to this. — (c) It is also strengthened, in some measure, by the fact that the thought of Christ throughout all the remainder of the passage, vv. 18-22, is that of saving, and not of condemning men.

10. The expression *τοῖς ἐν φυλακῇ πνεύμασιν* is to be explained, as it would seem, by observing two points: first, the word *πνεύμασιν* is most naturally interpreted through its connection with *πνεύματι* of ver. 18, and that word suggests a contrast to *σαρκί*; it would seem, therefore, most reasonable to understand these spirits to be disembodied spirits, or spirits of those who had already met physical death; secondly, as there is no particle, such as *νῦν*, to indicate that the meaning is, spirits who are *now* in prison, and especially nothing to indicate that the writer means persons who were alive in this world at the time of the preaching, but whose spirits are now (at the time of his

writing) in prison, it is most reasonable, not to say necessary, to believe that the condition of the persons as disembodied spirits, and the time of their imprisonment, are to be determined in accordance with the time of the verb; that is, they were already disembodied spirits at the time when Christ preached to them. As disembodied spirits in prison, they must have been in prison in the spirit-world, not in this world; and as having the gospel preached to them, they cannot as yet have been finally condemned. — 11. The word *ἀπειθήσασι* is antecedent in point of time to *ἐκήρυξεν*. It is claimed by some that it can only be *immediately* antecedent; and, therefore, that the time of the preaching must have been nearly coincident with the time of the disobedience. This claim may, however, be questioned or denied, with reference to the aorist participle when employed as descriptive of particular persons, and especially in a case like this, considering the defining of the time of the participle by *πότε ὅτε, κ.τ.λ.* But even if it be allowed, in case the participle is merely descriptive, this fact will by no means decide the question, because the participle may mean *although they were disobedient*, and in this sense may undoubtedly be carried back far beyond the time of *ἐκήρυξεν*. Wiesinger, as mentioned by Huther, and some others, take the participle in this sense: *although, etc.* Moreover, the absence of the article with *ἀπειθήσασι* is not to be regarded as excluding the construction which makes it substantially equivalent to *who were once disobedient*, as R. V., A. V., and many commentators explain the word. See Huther's remark in answer to Hofmann, in his note on ver. 19 (4). Affirmations with respect to the impossibility of the use of a participial construction by a N. T. writer, with a particular meaning, should be made only with the greatest caution, and especially in cases where the great majority of scholars have not found the alleged difficulty. As regards the omission of the article, even greater caution should be exhibited. As Winer remarks, "Whether the article is to be used or omitted before the participle, depends sometimes on the subjective view of the writer." And Buttmann most fitly adds, "In the endeavor to lay down fixed laws respecting the use of the article, many a learned and laborious inquiry has already come to naught. A writer's sovereign pleasure does not allow itself to be curtailed, whenever it seems good to him to depart even from a well-founded grammatical law." A living writer has a living force within him, and at times he answers the grammarian, who would fetter him with never-yielding rules, as Paul answered the Jews: I am not under bondage to the letter, but in the freedom of the spirit. — 12. The close connection of *πότε ὅτε*, shows that these two words together define the time, and the position of *πότε* shows that the fact or thing whose time is thus defined is that which is indicated by *ἀπειθήσασι*, and not that indicated by *ἐκήρυξεν*. — 13. The *ὅτε* clause involves the statement that the men who are alluded to lived, and also were disobedient, in the time of Noah, and before the flood came. They sinned during the period when God was, in that age, waiting with long-suffering.

The examination of this passage which is thus set forth is purely exegetical, and is connected wholly with the natural meaning of the words, and their relation to the sentences and the paragraph. The purpose of these notes is exegetical, not doctrinal. If the suggestions offered are well-founded, they show that, with respect to every word and phrase, the probability of the case favors the interpretation of the passage, which makes it declare, that, after His death and before His resurrection, Christ went to the place where the persons mentioned were in their disembodied spiritual state, and there preached the gospel to these persons, i. e., the persons who were disobedient in the time of

Noah, when, etc. It is to be observed, that the passage does not extend the statement beyond the case of these particular persons. That it suggests the *possibility* of such an extension of the Divine grace, is the most that can be affirmed.

The view of this passage, other than that above given, which meets the least difficulties as connected with the several probabilities mentioned, is that which holds to the above explanation in all particulars, except with reference to *ἐκήρυσεν*; but makes this verb contain the idea of a *praedicatio damnatoria*, a proclamation by Christ to these spirits in prison of their coming final condemnation. It is claimed, on behalf of this view, that the verb *κηρύσσειν* is, in itself, a verb of indefinite meaning in regard to such a point as this, that it conveys simply the idea of proclaiming as by a herald, and that the character of the proclamation must be determined by the context. It is also claimed, that in some passages in the N. T. there are indications of the designed application of this idea of proclamation (expressed by this verb, or the kindred nouns) to threatened punishment. Thus Jonah's *κηρυγία* is spoken of in Matt. xii. 41, Luke xi. 32; and in 2 Tim. iv. 2, the words *ἐλεγξον* and *ἐπιτίμωσον* are added to *κήρυξον*, showing that a part of the proclamation was of this character. It is to be observed, however, that the passages in Matthew and Luke do not refer to Christ's preaching; and that Jonah's proclamation was, as the sequel showed, and also these verses themselves indicate, with a view to repentance; and in the case of 2 Timothy, the rebuking, etc., is only a part of the gospel preaching, subordinate to the end of securing the salvation of those to whom it is addressed. As stated above, wherever Christ is either the subject or the object of the verb *κηρύσσειν*, in the N. T., the verb is substantially equivalent to *εὐαγγελίζεσθαι*. This fact seems to the writer of this note to determine the probability of its meaning in the present instance, and to exclude the idea of a *praedicatio damnatoria*.

The view of the passage which makes it refer to a preaching of Christ, in and through the person of Noah, before the flood, or to "a gracious activity on the part of the pre-incarnate Christ, a preaching in the form of the Divine warnings of the time, the spectacle of the building of the ark, etc.," encounters all the improbabilities and difficulties mentioned. The only grammatical or linguistic point which has been held to be *decisive* in favor of this view, is that connected with the aorist participle *ἀπειθήσαντι*, which has been already alluded to in the earlier part of this note. The decisiveness of this point is not admitted by the great majority of interpreters. The position taken by the advocates of this view, in general, is, so far as the sentence in itself is concerned, that which makes the reference to a preaching in the time of Noah *possible*, rather than *necessary*, the point mentioned with respect to the aorist participle not being insisted upon.

The discussion of the passage thus far has dealt with the words and phrases of the passage itself. There are considerations derived from the context, or the New Testament elsewhere, which have a bearing on the question which is presented by ver. 19, and which ought to be candidly weighed before coming to a decision. *The first* of these is the fact, that an allusion to a preaching of Christ to these persons, long after their death, seems quite remote from the direct line of thought in the context. With regard to this point, the following remarks may be made: (*a*) that such remoteness, it must be admitted, impresses the mind of the reader at the first view of the passage; (*b*) that on any other explanation of the passage, however, somewhat of the same remoteness is evident. The real difficulty in the case is to explain how the writer is led to introduce here any allusion to Noah, the flood, the men of that age, and the subject of

baptism as antitypical of the flood. It seems strange to find the words of vv. 19-21 connected with the thought of ver. 18*a*, and what precedes ver. 18. If we can account for the allusion to Noah's time, etc., we may perhaps as easily account for the reference to a preaching to the persons of that age after Christ's death, as for a similar reference to a preaching before Noah's death. The attempts to explain the allusion to this matter by those who hold that the preaching followed Christ's death, have been as successful, to say the least, as those of the interpreters who hold the other view. Compare, for example, what is said as to this point by Alford, on the one side, and by the writer (Professor Salmond) in Schaff's Pop. Comm. on the other. — *The second* of the considerations drawn from outside of the passage is connected with the general indications of the N. T. as to the question whether the offer of salvation or the proclamation of the gospel is made to men after death. With respect to this point, the writer of this note would say: (*a*) that, in his judgment, the general impression produced upon the mind of the candid reader of the N. T. is, that the apostolic writers and Christ Himself do not continue the offer of salvation beyond the present life; (*b*) that they lay an emphasis, at times, on the present life as the period for securing salvation, or on death as the limit, which is most easily explained if we hold that such was their teaching; (*c*) that the few passages (leaving the present one, as being here under discussion, out of view) in which the opportunity for recovery after death may be suggested as a possibility, can be satisfactorily explained without making them convey this idea, and that, not improbably, they should be thus explained; the candid scholar, however, will, in this case as in all others, carefully and justly estimate the force of all passages, on whichever side of the question they may seem to give their evidence; (*d*) that the absence of any definite and full unfolding of the condition of things in the period following death, which, at least so far as details are concerned, is noticeable throughout the New Testament, may have its proper weight in determining our view of doubtful passages; and that the absence of allusions to the intermediate state between death and the last judgment may also be justly taken into consideration; (*e*) that there may have been reasons in the Divine mind, for the presentation of the gospel after death to those persons who lived in the time of the flood, which are unknown to us, and which did not, and do not, exist in the case of other persons; and that an exception to the general law, made in their case, does not necessarily prevent the existence of such a general law for all other men, which places the limit of the opportunity for salvation at death; (*f*) that the possible hint of a future opportunity for some other men beyond the particular class mentioned, which this verse may be supposed to suggest, and which can hardly be denied as a possibility, if the preaching was to the spirits in prison after Christ's death, must be most carefully compared with and adjusted by other passages, which seem more or less distinctly to declare the opposite, before any doctrine as to such opportunity is accepted or believed by the New-Testament interpreter because of the statement of this passage. These points must all be fairly and fully considered in estimating the force of the general teaching of the N. T. as bearing against that interpretation of ver. 19 which makes it mean, that Christ preached to the departed spirits of the men of Noah's time after His own death. — *A third point*, connected with what is outside of the present context, is the fact that in 2 Pet. ii. 5, Noah is spoken of as a preacher of righteousness (*κῆρυκα δικαιοσύνης*), in connection with a statement as to the bringing of the flood upon the ungodly; and a somewhat kindred idea, though without the word *κῆρυξ*, is presented in Heb. xi. 7. If the authorship of 2 Peter

by the apostle is to be admitted, the allusion in that Epistle to Noah as a preacher, and that, too, in a passage having some similarity to the present one, may possibly serve to indicate what he intended to say here; and even if the Petrine authorship of the second Epistle is rejected, the two passages in Hebrews and 2 Peter may show something of the habit of thought, in this regard, of the earliest Christian writers. This argument must not be pressed beyond the limits of its proper force. The same writer does not always follow the same line of thinking in such allusions. What his sentence legitimately means is far more indicative of his present thought, than what he says elsewhere and at another time. And especially is it true that one writer may deviate, in such a matter, from the forms of expression of other writers.

The passage, it must be confessed, is one beset with difficulties, and involved to some extent in obscurity. It becomes those who deal with it in the matter of doctrinal statements, or doctrinal controversies and questionings, to approach it and study it with the calm, unprejudiced, teachable, and peaceable spirit of the most candid and reverential exegetical scholar.

[Kühl holds that the connection of the words shows the reference of ἐν ᾧ (ver. 19), to be only to πνεύματι. The apostle accordingly says that Christ went ἐν πνεύματι, and not ζωοποιηθεὶς πνεύματι, to the doing of what is indicated by ἐκήρυξεν, κ.τ.λ. As Christ, when He was in the condition described by ζωοπ. πν., was no longer ἐν πνεύματι, but ἐν σώματι πνευματικῷ, and as He was, while yet on earth, not ἐν πν., but ἐν σαρκί, the time referred to in this expression must be the time between His death and His resurrection. If this position is correct, the reference to a preaching through Noah, or in Noah's time, is excluded by the words themselves. — With respect to the *spirits in prison*, Kühl holds that the phrase describes the present condition of the spirits at the time of the preaching, φυλακῇ referring to Hades. He differs slightly from Huther, in that he regards it as impossible to decide whether the reference is to the whole kingdom of the dead, or to that part of it which serves as the abode for the souls of the ungodly until the day of judgment. If iv. 6 is connected with this passage, he thinks the reference is to the former. — He regards πορευθεὶς as indicating a *real*, as it were, *spatial*, going. — The verb κηρύσσειν is here, he says, as everywhere in the N. T., the technical expression for that proclamation of the gospel which offers salvation; and thus he regards the end in view of the proclamation as being the same with that of the preaching of the gospel on earth, — namely, to present the offer of salvation to those spirits.

The view which holds that the preaching was a *praedicatio damnatoria*, he declares to be wholly arbitrary, and apparently connected with an idea of the passage, which is contrary to the true one, — namely, that the prominent thought of the verses is that of judgment, whereas it is, in fact, that of the blessed results of Christ's death, and of the Messianic salvation. In connection with the past tense of the verb ἐκήρυξεν, and the past participle πορευθεὶς, he holds that the participle ἀπειθήσασιν with ποτέ must be pluperfect in sense, and that the meaning must be, *he preached to the spirits which had been formerly disobedient*, etc., and not, *he preached to them when they were*, etc.; with the latter idea, the writer would have joined ποτέ with ἐκήρυξεν. — As the result of his exegesis of the passage, Kühl holds: (a) that Christ, as πνεῦμα, went to Hades, and preached there to the spirits; (b) that the time of His thus going and preaching was between His death and His resurrection; (c) that the purpose of His preaching was to offer salvation to all the spirits, without exception. That all the spirits are meant by the apostle's words, he regards as

indicated by the absence of the article before ἀπειθήσασιν. The article, he thinks, would have been necessary if the writer had meant *only* the disobedient ones of Noah's time. The true meaning is, as he holds: He preached to the spirits in prison, to such He preached as had been disobedient, etc. The reference is, accordingly, to all, with a certain special designation of the men of Noah's time. This special designation he explains in connection with the fact that the contemporaries of Noah are viewed in the N. T. (comp. Matt. xxiv. 37 f., Luke xvii. 26 f.) as typical of mankind, as fallen deeply under the power of sin. The participle ἀπειθήσασιν has, he thinks, a certain special emphasis: to the spirits, etc., yea, even to such as, etc.]

14. The remark of Huther with respect to ver. 20 is worthy of special notice, and is in accordance with what is undoubtedly the fact in the case, namely, that "the stress is laid, not so much on the judgment which overtook unbelievers in the flood, as on the deliverance of the few." The whole passage is illustrative of the statement that Christ suffered for sins, that He might bring men to God; in other words, of His work to the end of salvation. — 15. The view which Huther takes of the preposition *διὰ* as being instrumental, rather than local, is probably correct. The few who entered into the ark were borne safely on by the water, and thus, in a certain sense, were saved by means of water. This is indicated by the statement of the next verse, which presents the idea of water (in connection with baptism) as saving us. The presentation of the water of baptism as the antitype of the water of the flood, must be regarded as a comparison or antitypical correspondence which reaches, as it were, the limits of the figurative; and a part of the special difficulty and obscurity of this whole passage — not to say, the very centre of it — is to be found here. The point of the comparison would seem to be connected with the fact that the water bearing up the ark was the means of saving Noah and his family. In a similar way, water, as the means by which baptism takes place, is also the means by which the Christian is, as it were, borne safely into his Christian life and salvation. That the water, in the second case, is not the primary means or the direct cause of the salvation, as also it was not in the first case, is proved by the words which follow, which words show that the actual saving element of Christian baptism is not found in the water, but in the state of the mind towards God. It was the entrance into the ark which was the salvation of Noah's family, and it is union of heart with God which is the salvation of the believer. The expression, *not the putting away of the filth of the flesh*, indicates that what the writer has in mind is not what water, in itself, can accomplish.

16. The question as to the meaning of ἐπερώτημα is one which cannot be answered with confidence. On the whole, it seems to the writer of this note, that the word *question* most probably represents the meaning of the Greek word. This is confessedly the meaning in classical Greek, and appears to be not inconsistent with the general thought of the sentences. The preposition *εἰς*, being added to the noun, naturally carries the meaning to the point either of making it equivalent to *question directed towards*, or *inquiry after*. With either of these meanings, the genitive *συνειδήσεως ἀγαθῆς* is to be regarded as a subjective genitive. The idea of the whole sentence would seem, accordingly, to be this: that baptism, with its application of water, does not find its true significance in a cleansing of the outward man, but in the movement of the pure inner man towards God. Whether this movement is represented as a questioning of the soul directed towards God, or an inquiry and seeking of the soul after Him — in either case, the same general condition of the soul is indicated. Per-

haps *inquiry after* is the most simple and best rendering, as corresponding with *ἐπερωτᾶν εἰς*. The objection urged by Huther, that the idea is thus incomplete, inasmuch as the contents of the question or request are not stated, is not one of serious importance, because the reader, with either of these two nearly-allied meanings of *ἐπερώτημα*, will readily understand what movement of the soul is in the writer's thought. — 17. The phrase *δι' ἀναστάσεως* is best connected with *σώζει*. Baptism, in the sense indicated, saves the believer by means of the resurrection of Jesus Christ. The resurrection of Christ is referred to here, apparently, for two reasons: first, because this great fact is the ground on which the results of His death are secured, and the life of the Christian in union with God is carried forward in its development; and, secondly, because the author has the desire to set forth the facts with regard to Christ's own experience, from His suffering of death for sin to His exaltation at the right hand of God. [Kühl agrees with Huther in regarding *διὰ* of ver. 20, as instrumental. — He holds that by the words *ἐπερώτημα*, κ.τ.λ. (ver. 21), baptism is described as a request addressed to God, for power and strengthening to the end of *ἀγαθοποιεῖν*, on the ground of which *ἀγαθ.* we can have a good conscience. The connection of the thought of the good conscience with good action, which is suggested in ver. 16, appears in another form here, even though there may be no immediate connection between the two verses. — He agrees with Huther in connecting *δι' ἀναστάσεως* with *σώζει*.]

XX.

CHAPTER IV.

Vv. 1-6.

1. These verses contain a new exhortation in the line of what precedes, and one which takes up the thought of Christ's suffering, as set forth in iii. 18. In this passage, *ὄν* evidently connects the new exhortation with the reference to Christ's death, according to the flesh; *σαρκί* is the dative of reference: so far forth as the *σῶρξ* is concerned; *ὀπλίσασθε* is used because the thought is of defence against the assaults of persecution, etc.; *ἐννοῖαν* is perhaps best translated by *thought*, with the sense as given by Huther: "they should not refuse the thought of, like Him, suffering according to the flesh," but there is some reason to believe that the word may mean *mind*, in the sense of *disposition of mind*. Alford holds that it means *intent or resolution*, and appeals to Eur. Hel. 1012, and Isocr. p. 112d; *ὁ παθὼν*, κ.τ.λ., seems to have a certain reference to the first words of ver. 1, but not to be limited, in its application, to Christ; these words appear, rather, to be an encouragement to the readers to be ready to suffer, by reason of the thought that the result of such suffering in the course of true Christian living is a ceasing of subjection to the power of sin. The believer ceases from his connection with sin, after a kindred manner to that in which Christ ceased from His (widely different) relation to it. — 2. The phrase *εἰς τὸ μηκέτι*, κ.τ.λ., of ver. 2, is, no doubt, rightly explained by Huther as connected with *ὀπλίσασθε*. It expresses the end in view of the exhortation. If the readers armed themselves with the same thought, as related to sufferings in the righteous Christian life, which was in Christ, they would cease to live in accordance with, as governed by the rule of, the lusts of men, and would be governed by the will of God. The *ἐπιθυμίαι* here referred to are evidently the unholy desires of men apart from God, and especially those which characterized the lives of the heathen, by whom the readers were surrounded, and which are indicated in

ver. 3. — 3. The contrast of *the time past* to *the remaining time* shows clearly the correctness of Huther's remark, that *σαρκί* denotes here, as in ver. 1, the earthly human nature, to which the mortal body belongs. The third verse is introduced as a ground or reason for the *μηκέτι βιώσαι, κ.τ.λ.* It would seem to indicate that a considerable proportion, at least, of the readers had been heathen before their conversion. [Kühl agrees with Huther that *ἐννοίαν* (ver. 1) means *thought*. He regards *πέπανται* as in the middle voice: he has ceased from sin. The idea of Peter, as here expressed, does not correspond with that of Paul in Rom. vi.; the thought of Paul being that of a dying in the spiritual sense, while that of Peter is of suffering according to the flesh. The word *παθών*, in both parts of the verse, is used with reference to outward sufferings. — Kühl thinks the expression to *have wrought the will of the Gentiles* (ver. 3) is an indication that before their conversion, the readers were not Gentiles, but Jews. It was the Jews only who were prepared by special Divine revelations, and bound thereby to live, not according to human desires, but to the Divine will. The word *ἀθέμιτος*, he regards, also, as appropriate only for Jews.]

4. The words *ἐν ᾧ* of ver. 4 are translated by A. V. and R. V. by *wherein*, and if this may be regarded as meaning: their astonishment that you do not go on in the same course, and with a similar excess of riot with themselves, arises and moves in the sphere of this fact, — this explanation may be the best one. The sense would thus approach closely towards Huther's explanation, who makes *ἐν ᾧ* mean: *because*, or on account of the fact that, you have thus walked, they are surprised that, etc. If the English versions refer by *wherein* to the former heathen life of revellings, etc., and make it limit the words, *run not to the same excess of riot*, the meaning given by them is less in accordance with the sentence than that given by making *ἐν ᾧ* equivalent to *because*. The genitive absolute *μη συντρεχόντων, κ.τ.λ.*, is causal. — 5. Ver. 5 points to the judgment awaiting these heathen revilers, as a thing which, when under persecution, under the injury coming from being defamed, etc., the Christian readers should bear in mind. The enemy was not always to triumph, or to have power against them: God was their avenger, their support, and the mighty power on their side; and the day of judgment was to come. — The phrase *τῷ ἐτοίμῳ ἔχοντι* indicates the nearness of the judgment, according to its most natural interpretation, and may thus have a bearing upon the question as to Peter's view with regard to the parousia. [Kühl agrees with Huther that *ἐν ᾧ* (ver. 4) is to be understood as meaning *because*. — He holds that *νεκροί* of ver. 5 refers to all the dead, and that the apostle has in mind, and makes prominent, the universality of the judgment.]

6. The *living* and *dead* mentioned in ver. 5 are thus described, apparently, with reference to the matter and time of the judgment; and thus the meaning is, that the Lord will judge all, whether they be living at the time of judgment, or whether they have died before that time. There is no necessary limitation of the expression to the revilers, etc., here spoken of; but from the general character of the words, the thought suggested is, that, as the judgment is to be passed upon all, whether living or dead, it will come upon these men. — 7. Ver. 6 is introduced by *γάρ*, as a ground of what is said in ver. 5. It is evident that in ver. 6 the case of the *νεκροί* is made the subject of thought, the *ζῶντες* being no longer in mind. The statement of the verse is, that something was done or occurred to the dead to the end of their being judged, and thus they are brought under the *κρίναι* of the preceding verse. The thing which was thus done is set forth in the word *εὐηγγελίσθη*, and the purpose of this verb is

presented in the *iva* clause. The determination of the writer's meaning must depend, or partly depend, on the true explanation of this verb, as affected by what follows the final particle. It will be noticed that the verb is in the aorist tense. It must therefore, as it would seem, refer to a time past, either as related to the time of writing the sentence, or as related to the time of judgment. The fact that *νεκρούς* of ver. 5 is used of those who shall be dead at the time of the judgment may favor the latter reference; but the natural understanding of a past tense, which sets forth a fact, as indicating a fact which is already past when the word is written, points most strongly to the former reference. When we add to the fact of this natural understanding of the tense, the striking presentation of a certain class of persons, belonging to the O. T. history, in the earlier part of the passage which closes with the present verse, — namely, the men who lived just before the flood, iii. 19, — the case becomes much stronger for this first view of the meaning. There seem, therefore, to be weighty reasons to believe that, in this verse, the apostle is speaking again of those whom he has mentioned already, and that he alludes to the same thing in *εὐηγγελίσθη* to which he alluded in *ἐκήρυξεν* in iii. 19. If this is correct, the verb *εὐηγγ.* determines the meaning of the verb *ἐκήρυξεν*, and the time of the act indicated by both is one and the same. — 8. The word *νεκροῖς* of ver. 6 is, in its form, as unlimited as *νεκρούς* of ver. 5; but it does not seem to follow from this necessarily, that it is actually, according to the writer's thought, as unlimited in its application. The expression, in both cases, is not *οἱ νεκροί*, but *νεκροί*, and thus the persons referred to are described according to the peculiarity of their condition, rather than as the whole of a class. In such a form of expression, the whole class may be designated, or it may not be: the decision will depend on the suggestions of the sentence or the context. In ver. 5 all the indications of the sentence point to the word as denoting the whole company of the dead, but in ver. 6 the suggestions already made may show that a more special reference is intended. — It ought to be remarked, however, that, while this word in ver. 6 may refer to a special section of the dead, it is contrary to all the indications of the passage to make it mean, in the one verse, persons who are dead in a different sense from that in which the persons mentioned in the other verse are dead, — ver. 6 meaning the spiritually dead, and ver. 5 the physically dead. — 9. The reader should observe that, in the *iva* clause, the first verb is in the aorist tense, and the second in the present. This fact is significant, and seems to show that the words *iva κριθῶσιν* do not prove the preaching to have taken place before the death of the persons referred to. Rather does the form of the sentence in this regard indicate the correctness of Huther's view of it: that while *κριθῶσιν* and *ζῶσιν* are grammatically co-ordinated, the former verb holds, in the thought, a subordinate position, and that the meaning of the clause is: *in order that they, after the flesh, indeed, judged by death, may live according to the spirit.* As Canon Cook says, the term *κριθῶσιν* "is evidently used with reference to their previous state, not to the time of the announcement." He also says, "The Greek makes a distinction between the two propositions: the former does not apply to the effect of the tidings, but to the condition of those who were addressed; the next proposition, *but live*, tells us what was the ultimate and perfect effect upon those who were prepared to receive it." — 10. The datives *σαρκί* and *πνεύματι* are to be explained as datives of reference: so far forth as the flesh, or the spirit, is concerned; as regards the flesh, or the spirit. The expressions *κατὰ ἄνθρώπους*, *κατὰ θεόν*, mean *after the manner of men, God*, in such a manner

as corresponds with the nature of man and the law of his being,—in such a manner as answers to the life of God and as He imparts His own life to men. [Kühl holds that the special emphasis in ver. 6 is on *νεκροῖς*. This is clear, as he thinks, both from the repetition of this word, and from the *καί*. This *καί* points to the contrast to the *ζῶντες*, to whom also the gospel is preached; and as these *ζῶντες* are the same as those in ver. 5, the *νεκροί* in this verse must be the same with the *νεκροί* in ver. 5. All the dead are referred to here, as in the previous verse, and thus the gospel, he thinks, is declared to be preached to all the dead. — The explanation of *κριθῶσι* and *ζῶσι*, and of the *ἵνα* clause, in which these verbs are found, which is favored by Huther, is adopted by Kühl. — The idea lying at the foundation of the thought of ver. 6, in its connection with ver. 5, is, as he thinks, that a judgment of the dead is to be thought of only in case the possibility of salvation is given them through the proclamation of the gospel.]

In the consideration of this whole passage from iii. 13 to iv. 6, it is important to keep in remembrance the fact, that the apostle has in mind not only an exhortation for his readers in the midst of persecutions and revilings, and an encouragement for them as connected with Christ's experience and His work, but that he has also the desire to set forth the experience of Christ for its own sake, as connected with His glorification, and His work, in itself, as leading to the end of life and salvation. These two things are interwoven together throughout the passage, and the interpreter who does not bear this in mind is liable to misapprehension of the apostle's thought. — The work of Christ is represented here, as it is everywhere in the N. T., as tending towards the salvation of men. He suffered, that they might be forgiven, and delivered from sin. He rose again, that the new life might be secured within them. He ascended to the right hand of God, exalted above the highest powers, that His people and His kingdom might be forever triumphant. The bearing of this upon the two difficult verses iii. 19 and iv. 6, whatever our final decision as to their meaning may be, will be carefully estimated by all who properly examine them as parts of this passage.

XXI.

Vv. 7-11.

1. The seventh verse sets forth, in a brief and distinct statement, the nearness of the end of all things. This statement seems to be suggested by the thought of the approaching judgment; and in this way the discourse passes on from what precedes to this new paragraph. The exhortations of this paragraph are directed, in the first place, towards that sober-mindedness, love to one another, etc., which are befitting in view of the nearness of the end, and secondly, to that devotion to the use of the peculiar gifts and duties belonging to each believer, as an individual, which may promote the glory of God, — a thing which also becomes the believer, especially as the time of the end draws near. — 2. The two verbs, *σωφρονήσατε* and *νήψατε*, are kindred in meaning; the former is rendered by R. V., *be of sound mind*; the latter, *be sober*. Both verbs convey the idea of that sober and temperate condition of mind, which restrains and governs all undue passion, and abides in a serious thought of life, its duties and its meaning. The words *εἰς προσευχάς*, which designate the end in view of the verb *νήψατε*, bring before us the thought of that communion with God in prayer, which is so

often presented in the N. T. as the very atmosphere of the Christian's life. — 3. The expression *πρὸ πάντων* is not to be regarded as setting love above prayer; for the comparison is not with prayer, but with sober-mindedness. Expressions of this character, we may believe, are not to be pressed to the absolute literalness and fulness of their meaning. They are used many times, no doubt, as indicating what the writer regards as most important to be urged in connection with some special point which he has in mind at the time, and occasionally even with a mere rhetorical earnestness. The love which he would urge them to have is intense, on the stretch, fervent; and he would press this upon them with special emphasis, because love covers a multitude of sins. The remark of Leighton on this verse probably gives the true idea of the meaning: "Hatred stirs strife [the first words of the O. T. passage (Prov. x. 12) from which not improbably this verse is borrowed], aggravates, and makes the worst of all; but love covers, etc.; it delights not in undue disclosing of brethren's failings, doth not eye them rigidly, nor expose them willingly to the eyes of others."

4. The exhortation to hospitality follows naturally upon that which urges to love, as this was one of the prominent forth-puttings of love at that period of the history of the Church. The expression *ἀνευ γογγυσμοῦ* is really involved in the idea of *φιλόξενοι*, — loving hospitality is without murmuring or complaining, an ungrudging gift of Christian brotherly love.

5. The exhortations with respect to the *χαρίσματα* correspond closely, though much of the language used is different, with what is said by Paul in Rom. xii. 6 ff. These verses (10, 11) may indicate the true view respecting Peter's language in such cases, — that it was possibly affected in some measure by his knowledge of what Paul had written, but that it was not borrowed from Paul, and that the thought was suggested by the needs of the readers for whom he wrote, by which he was himself impressed. — What Paul expresses in Romans and 1 Corinthians by the verb *μερίζω*, — the distribution of the gifts according to the measure of the grace of God bestowed in each gift, — is here hinted at by Peter, apparently, in the word *παικίλης*. — 6. Peter specializes only two gifts, one in the line of the teacher's or prophet's office; the other, in that of the diaconate. With regard to the individual words of the eleventh verse, it may be observed, that *λαλεῖ* is a general word which may cover the utterances both of the *διδάσκαλος* and the *προφήτης*; that *λόγια* evidently here means words or utterances communicated by God, thus teachings and revelations; *ισχύος* means strength or ability ("to the extent of one's ability," Grimm), which is regarded as supplied in every case by God according to His own will; *ἐν πάσιν* means *in all things*, rather than *in all persons*, the reference being to the varied things suggested by the preceding words respecting the gifts; *ᾧ*, in the doxology, is to be understood as referring to God, as Huther and most recent commentators take it. The doxological passages in the N. T. almost universally refer to God, and here God is manifestly the prominent subject of thought. Though it is evidently possible to refer the relative to *Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*, and this is the nearest name in the sentence, Christ is so entirely secondary in the sentence, the instrumental agent through whom the glory comes to God, that the ascription of glory to Him at the close of the whole paragraph is altogether improbable. [Kühl, like Huther, connects the exhortation to sobriety and sound-mindedness, through the particle *οὖν* (ver. 7), with the thought of the nearness of the end. The participles and adjectives of the following clauses, he would regard as grammatically dependent on *σωφρονήσατε καὶ νήψατε*. The turn of thought from ver. 8 to ver. 9 is from forgiving love to ministering and serving love. The word *χάρισμα* (ver. 10)

does not refer, he thinks, to extraordinary gifts, but to the capacity to use one's ordinary gifts for the service of others, and the good of the church. — Inasmuch as the words *διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ* (ver. 11) hold a subordinate position as related to the verb *δοξάζονται*, which contains the principal idea, Kühn regards it as impossible to refer the doxology to Christ.]

XXII.

Vv. 12-19.

1. The apostle now passes to a further line of exhortation with respect to suffering under persecution, showing by this repeated reference, and the careful and solemn drawing-out of the matter, how largely this subject was occupying his mind. The introduction of the word *ἀγαπητοί* again at this place may be intended to give emphasis to the new presentation of this urgent request and demand. — 2. The subject is opened by bidding the readers not to think it strange that they should meet with severe trials. The dative *τῇ πυρώσει* is a dative used with this verb, and seems to mean *at or with reference to*. The participle *γωνιμένη* is present, and indicates that the fiery trial is now happening, or coming upon them. The *πύρωσις* is evidently here used of the persecutions, etc., which, as a refiner's fire, were designed of God to be for a proving or testing of their Christian character. — 3. In contrast to such a thought of these trials as strange, they should, so far forth as (*καθὸ*) they participated in Christ's sufferings by undergoing experiences of a similar character, rejoice in order that, etc., — that is, they should be in that state of joy in their sharing of Christ's sufferings which is the legitimate preparation for the joy hereafter, at the time of the revelation of His glory, in the participation in that glory. The participle *ἀγαλλιώμενοι*, *with exultant joy*, gives not only a characteristic of the heavenly rejoicing, but also therewith an incitement to the preparation for it. — 4. Ver. 14 adds an encouragement to obey the exhortation, which is founded on the proof, which their suffering in the name of Christ gives, that they have the Divine Spirit resting upon them. The Divine Spirit is also called the Spirit of glory, as we may believe, because the apostle's thought is of the glory of the future as the ground of the exultant joy of the future. The Spirit whose characteristic is glory, and who thus can give it, rests permanently upon suffering followers of Christ, and thus the joy of the future is assured, because the glorifying process is ever going forward towards its consummation at the end. — 5. *γὰρ* of ver. 15 is best taken with Alford, as giving the ground for the supplied thought: "I say, *In the name of Christ*," for it is not of the suffering indicated in ver. 15, but of that indicated in ver. 16, that the macarism can be uttered and the glory now and hereafter can be predicated. — 6. The peculiar word *ἄλλοτρισεπίσκοπος* occurs nowhere else in the N. T., and seems somewhat strange as connected with such words as "thief" and "murderer." The connection apparently indicates such an interfering in the way of attempted oversight, etc., as would be likely to provoke hostility, and thus bring violent treatment from the other (heathen) party upon themselves. The word *περιεραζόμενοι*, which Paul uses in 2 Thess. iii. 11, is a kindred word, and is nearly, though perhaps not precisely, equivalent in meaning. [Kühn regards the passage from ver. 12 to ver. 19 as a new section with which chap. v. is closely connected, and the suggestions in which refer to sufferings, etc., within the church, and occasioned by persons who were in the membership of the church. — He regards

the use of the words *ξενίζεσθε* and *ξένου* as indicating the early date of the Epistle, — a time when such experiences might be looked upon as strange or surprising. — He agrees with Huther in taking *γάρ* of ver. 15 as equivalent to *that is to say*, or *namely*, and not as a causal particle.]

7. The term *χριστιανός* occurs elsewhere in the N. T. only in Acts xi. 26, xxvi. 28. Whether it is here used as a mere designation of the believers as followers of Christ, or whether, on the other hand, the idea of scorn or contempt lies in the name as used by those outside of the church, may be questioned. The verb which follows, *let him not be ashamed*, may indicate the latter. The second of the two imperatives, *let him glorify God*, indicates that he should praise God that he is thus permitted to suffer for the sake of Christ. The phrase *ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι τούτῳ* may mean, in the sphere of this name of Christian, or of the name of Christ. The *ἐν*, in either case, means *in* (in the sphere of) in the sense of *on account of*. — 8. The particle *ὁτι* of ver. 17 introduces the reference to the judgment as the ground for not being ashamed, but for glorifying God. The word *καιρός* suggests the idea of the appointed time as already at hand; and the writer apparently conceives of the persecutions, etc., which serve the end of severely trying and testing the Christians, as the beginning of that judgment of God which is to be consummated at the *parousia*, and to result in the final condemnation of the ungodly. He thus takes into his thought the whole epoch of the *parousia*, if it may be so designated, including the calamities, etc., preceding it, as well as the *parousia* itself, and its attendant events. This passage furnishes strong evidence, therefore, that the writer regarded himself and his readers as being already in the last times. — 9. The preposition *ἀπό* conveys the idea of the moving of the judgment from its beginning-point, the house of God, towards the unchristian world. The same thought is presented in *πρώτων ἂφ' ἡμῶν*. — The word *τέλος* means the final result, that which will be the issue of the judgment for the disobedient and unrighteous. — *Μόλις*, *scarcely*, apparently refers to the difficulty of passing the judgment. As Keil says, the believer is not free from sin before God, who tries the reins and hearts, but comes short of the glory of God, and cannot, therefore, base his salvation on his own good works and his own merits; but owes it only to the Divine grace, which forgives his sins. — *ποῦ φανεῖται*; *where will he appear?* i. e., he will not be able to appear at all as standing before God in the judgment. This question is equivalent to an emphatic negative, as frequently in the Pauline Epistles. — 10. The omission of *ὡς* in ver. 19 before *πιστῶ κτιστῇ*, is in accordance with the best authorities, and the expression gains by means of it its best form. The readers are exhorted in the midst of their sufferings to commit their souls in well-doing to a faithful Creator. These sufferings are in accordance with the will of their Creator; and, as they trust in Him, He will be faithful to them in the fulfilment of His plan for their salvation. The phrase *ἐν ἀγαθοποιῳ* indicates the sphere within which their life and action should be, as they commit themselves to the protection of God; and, being placed where it is at the end of the sentence, and of the whole section on the matter of suffering, it emphatically turns the thought again to the main idea of *doing good*, and not *evil*, and thus leaves the impression of this idea as the final impression on the reader's mind. [Kühl thinks the words *in this name* may refer either to the name *Christian* or *Christ*, but is apparently inclined to favor the latter reference. — He regards the words *where will he appear* as indicating that the ungodly will, as Keil says, go away from the Divine judgment *εἰς ἀπώλειαν*. — He connects *καί*, of ver. 19, with *πίσχοντες*, and not, as Huther does, with *ὡστε*. The latter construction is not

found in the N.T., he says. He thinks the thought here presented is in the sphere of the earliest Christian teaching, wherein that which is specifically Christian sometimes, in a remarkable way, retires into the background.]

XXIII.

CHAPTER V.

Vv. 1-7.

1. There can be but little doubt that in ver. 1 the apostle addresses official elders. This is indicated both by the fact that he speaks of himself as *συμπρεσβύτερος*, a word which can hardly apply to age only, and by what he calls upon the persons addressed to do, and not to do, — to tend the flock of God as shepherds, and to exercise oversight; and, on the other hand, not to lord it over the charge committed to them. On the contrary, when he addresses the *νεώτεροι* in ver. 5, since there were no officials bearing this designation, he must mean the younger in years; and by *πρεσβυτέροις*, in the same verse, he must mean the elder in years. The change in the sense of *πρεσβυτέροις* from that of the same word in ver. 1 is far less improbable than the use of the adjective *νεώτεροι* to designate the younger ministry, or the church as contrasted with the elders. The word *πρεσβύτερος*, as employed in the N. T., has two meanings; the word *νεώτερος* but one. We should determine the signification of the word which has a double possibility of meaning, in a case like this, by the one which has only a single meaning. — 2. The exhortation to the elders to do their work is founded, by the particle *οὖν*, on what goes before; possibly on the idea suggested by *ἀγαθοποιία* of iv. 19, possibly on this idea as being, in a sense, the basis of the whole thought from iii. 14 onward. — 3. Peter calls himself a fellow-elder, as John, in the second and third Epistles, speaks of himself as the elder, because in the essential idea of oversight, and of the tending of the flock, he was in the same position with the elders. In one sense, as an apostle he was above them, and in the exercise of a higher function; but in another, they and he were substantially alike. We can hardly fail to be reminded, by the apostle's exhortation here, of the bidding which Jesus gave to him after His resurrection, John xxi. 16. — 4. That he was also a witness of the sufferings of Christ, is mentioned as a part of his likeness to the other elders. This word *μαρτύς*; according to the common use in the N. T., means rather a bearer of testimony than an eye-witness. As used by Peter respecting himself, however, we may believe that it carried within it to his own mind, and also to the minds of his first readers, the latter idea in connection with the former. He was one of those apostles to whom Jesus said, "And ye also bear witness, because ye have been with me from the beginning." — 5. The allusion to the sufferings of Christ, and the glory that shall be revealed, connects this passage with the closing part of chap. iv.; and this fact may indicate, that, in his exhortation to the elders to shepherd or tend the flock of God, he had in mind, as a thing of some prominence, the bringing them under the influence of thoughts such as those with the presentation of which the preceding chapter closes. [Kühl regards the first words of ver. 1 as substantially equivalent to: presbyters among you, i.e., if there are such among you who are eldest in years. He finds here an indication that Peter thought it possible that in many of the churches there might be no presbyters, and thus an indication of the early date of the Epistle. — He regards the word *μαρτύς* as not referring to the fact, that, as an apostle, he had been an eye-witness of the sufferings of

Christ, but only as meaning a *witness*, in the sense that he bore testimony of them. The emphasis in respect to the witnessing is found in the fact that he is a participator in the sufferings. — He thinks the νεώτεροι here spoken of were a particular body, or class of young men, who were assigned to duties in subordination to the elders (presbyters)].

6. The participle ἐπισκοποῦντες is omitted by the Sinaitic and Vatican MSS., but is accepted by Tischendorf, R. V., and most of the best recent commentators. If read, this verse becomes one among the several passages tending to prove that the two titles ἐπίσκοπος and πρεσβύτερος belonged to the same office, and were, in this sense, equivalent to each other. — 7. The proper discharge of the duty of the office of elder is set forth by means of three contrasts: the first, that it should be with willingness, and not by constraint; i. e., the elder should be moved by an inward impulse, and not by a compelling influence from outside of himself; the second, that it should be with the readiness and zeal of a warm-hearted soul (out of love to the thing itself, as Huther says), and not under the influence of base avariciousness (αἰσχροκερδῶς is strictly equivalent to αἰσχροῦ κέρδου χάριν, Tit. i. 11, which passage Huther refers to); the third, that it should be with the desire of inspiring and helping the members of the churches by the example of their own Christian living, and not in the way of exercising authority and being oppressive governors. The apostle thus carefully guards against the idea of an authoritative priesthood, lording it over the church. The elder is to be a shepherd, tending the flock with a loving oversight. He is to be moved by no desire of authority, but to be an example to those under his pastoral charge, and to be moved by the noblest and most unselfish impulses only to earnest effort and care. — The word κλήρων is explained as a plural correctly by Huther. It refers to the several congregations under the charge of the several elders. — 8. Following the exhortation, we find the assurance of reward given to the elders. The reward is the δόξα, which is referred to in ver. 1. It is called here an amarantine crown. The adjective is explained by Huther and others as derived from the substantive ἀμάραντος, and thus as meaning strictly *amaranthine*. This flower was the unfading flower, and so the idea is that the crown or garland is to be unfading, — the glory, which is the crown, is to be endless. [Kühl agrees with Huther as to the derivation and meaning of ἀμαράντος, and also as to the relation of the genitive δόξης to στέφανον. — The chief shepherd is Christ; under Him are the presbyters, as shepherds; the owner and lord of the flock is God.]

9. The exhortation now passes to the younger Christians, and is to the end of a submissive demeanor; and thus, that they should exhibit the spirit of humility in their relation to those who were advanced in life beyond themselves. This idea of humility seems to pervade the whole passage. It manifests itself prominently in the μηδὲ καυκρυιέοντες of ver. 3, in the ὑποτάγητε of ver. 5, and in the ταπεινοφροσύνην of the second exhortation in ver. 5. This uniting idea of humility may account, as Huther holds that it does, for the use of the adverb ὁμοίως, at the beginning of ver. 5. But this adverb may simply suggest, that, as the exhortation to fulfil appropriate duties has been given to one class, so now a similar exhortation to fulfil a certain other appropriate duty is given to another class. — 10. The thought moves outward from individual classes to all, and the particle δέ becomes thus nearly equivalent to the γὰρ of R. V. The dative ἀλλήλοις seems, on the whole, to be explained satisfactorily as a dative of reference after the expression τὴν ταπεινοφροσύνην ἐγκομβώσασθε; but the explanation favored by Huther, which connects the words πάντες δὲ ἀλλήλοις with the preced-

ing sentence, and makes πάντες, like νεώτεροι, the subject of the verb ὑποτάγητε, is certainly a possible one, against which no serious objection can be urged. The suggestions made by Huther with reference to ἐγκομβώσασθε, are probably to be accepted, and the word is to be rendered as in R. V.: *gird yourselves with humility*, — bind it closely about you as a garment. — 11. In vv. 6, 7, the idea of the sufferings which the Christian readers were called upon to endure is again clearly suggested, and the course which they should take, as already set forth in iv. 19, is once more impressively urged upon their thought. The issue of all their sufferings would be their exaltation to glory when the appointed time should come; and the anxiety with which their hearts were likely to be filled, in connection with their trials and persecutions, might be laid upon God; they might trustfully and peacefully commit their souls to Him, their faithful Creator, because their welfare and salvation were a care to Him. The distinction in the words used here may be noticed: in the human mind, it is anxiety; in the Divine mind, it is care, *He careth for you*. — The aorist ἐπιρρίψαντες, perhaps, conveys the idea of an act once for all. The whole anxiety of life was to be cast upon God by one great act of confidence and trust in His perpetual care of the trusting soul. [Kühl regards ὁμοίως (ver. 5) as indicating only that the exhortation of this verse corresponds with the one which precedes, without finding, in the adverb, the suggestion which Huther presents. — The connection of ver. 8 with ver. 7 he thinks to be this: This confidence (ver. 7) should not be like a carnal security, but the Christian should be, after casting his care, etc., as well as before, always sober and watchful (ver. 8).]

XXIV.

Vv. 9-11.

1. The thought now turns from the sufferings to the one who originates them by inspiring his followers to contend against the kingdom of God. The adversary, the Devil, is to be resisted. To this end, especially, must the Christian readers be sober and watchful. The Devil is represented as roaming about, like a wild beast, with the intent to destroy all those whom he can seize upon, and by the power of persecution, etc., can draw away from the Christian faith. The way to withstand his assaults and resist his power is, to be firm, established immovably, in the faith which the believer has in his soul. Faith is here, as elsewhere, subjective faith. R. V. text renders τῇ πίστει, *in your faith*. — 2. The participle εἰδότες is causal; it presents a ground on which they may thus resist the Devil, and an encouragement to do so. This ground of encouragement is the knowledge that the same sufferings are being accomplished, — that is, are in process of being brought to their end, and to the issue which is designed in the plan of God for His people, — with reference to, for, in the case of, their Christian brotherhood in the world. The consciousness of the fact that the heavenly kingdom at the end is to be entered only after a course of testing and trial, is a strength to the Christian in every age, when he is called upon to endure. — 3. The expression τὰ ἀντὰ τῶν παθημάτων seems to be used, instead of τὰ ἀντὰ παθήματα, in order, as De Wette says, to emphasize peculiarly the idea of sameness. — 4. The assurance and promise of the result and issue of the sufferings are still again set forth. The God who called you unto His glory will not abandon His purpose. Whom He called, these He will glorify. The suffering will continue ὀλίγον, which seems here to refer to time, *a little*

while; the result will be permanent. This result is set forth in three words, *perfect, establish, strengthen*; or if *θεμελιώσαι*, which is doubtful, be admitted into the text, a fourth word is added, *settle, as on a firm foundation*. All these words seem to express a single idea, and the reference of them all is, apparently, to the establishment of character in holiness, and against all assaults of enemies and of evil, rather than to the reward in glory of the heavenly life: God *Himself* will secure this result (*αὐτός*); *He careth for you*. — 5. The word *κράτος* is peculiarly appropriate in the doxology following this tenth verse, and is more impressive without the doubtful word *δόξα*, which is omitted by Tisch. and Westcott and Hort, than with it. [Kühl takes *ἀδελφότητι* as a dative of reference (*dativ. incommodi*). The doxology of ver. 11 he compares with that in iv. 11; but he thinks that the thought is concentrated here upon the idea of *κράτος*, by means of which God is able to accomplish what He wishes to bring to pass.]

XXV.

Vv. 12-14.

1. In these concluding verses, the writer refers to his letter briefly, as Paul does sometimes at the end of his epistles, and then offers salutations from those with whom he was now living. Then follows the apostolic benediction. — 2. On the words and phrases of this passage, the following suggestions may be offered: (a) Silvanus is, in all probability, the person of this name mentioned by Paul. — (b) The words *ὡς λογίζομαι* are more naturally connected with *τοῦ πιστοῦ ἀδελφοῦ*, than, as Huther prefers, with *δι' ὀλίγων*. These words do not mean *as I suppose*, as A. V. renders, but *as I account him* (R. V.), or, as I judge or think, by reason of my knowledge of him. It is an expression of assurance, not of doubt. — (c) *This is the true grace of God*. If we read *σῆτε*, as the external evidence shows that we should, it seems probable that it is an imperative, as R. V. takes it. If this be the true view, the word *this* refers most naturally to what precedes, and the simplest and best explanation of the meaning, as it appears to the writer of this note, is this: At the close of the epistle, the apostle looks back, as it were, over its whole thought, and he finds everywhere, at the foundation of it, this idea of the Divine grace. His epistle has been called the epistle of hope. The hope is founded on the grace. He says to his readers: This grace which I have set before you throughout my letter, the grace on which all Christian hope rests, and on which it may securely rest, is the true grace of God. This I testify to you, as I exhort you. Stand fast and firmly in this grace. — (d) With respect to ver. 11, the writer of these notes would only say, that *ἡ συνεκλεκτή* appears to him to designate a church, and not an individual, Peter's wife, or some other Christian woman; that Babylon is to be understood literally, and not figuratively as if referring to Rome; and that Mark is the one spoken of in the Acts, and in the Second Epistle to Timothy, and is the author of the Gospel which bears this name, — the word *son* being used here in a figurative, spiritual sense. The remarks of Huther in his note on this verse, and in his Introduction to the Epistle, with respect to Babylon and Rome, may be commended to the attention of the reader. But the question of Peter's relation to Rome is one which requires, for its full discussion, much more space than is given to it in this commentary. Whether he was ever in that city, or not, the question of the present verse is simply the question as to the place where this Epistle was written. [Kühl connects *ὡς*

λογίζομαι with τοῦ πιστοῦ ἀδελφοῦ. — He regards εἰς ἣν στήτε as an impossible reading, because the relative sentence must be only a further description of the particular χάρις to which ταύτην refers, and cannot be of a hortatory character. — He thinks the word συνεκλεκτή is to be understood as referring to a church, and this church is, as he holds, the one in Babylon, which word is to be taken in its literal sense, and not as a figurative or symbolic designation of Rome.]

THE SECOND EPISTLE OF PETER.

XXVI.

CHAPTER I.

Vv. 1-11.

1. The salutation of this epistle is in some points like that of 1 Peter, but in some it is different. The differences, however, do not seem to be such as necessarily to suggest any difference in the authorship of the two letters. The addition of the name Simon, or Simeon, was not unnatural in the case of an old man who was drawing near his end, and, in view of it, was in a paternal and affectionate way addressing his readers. The addition of δούλος to ὑπόστολος, if any explanation of this is needed, may readily be accounted for in a similar way. That the readers should be spoken of in the more general manner which we observe here, instead of being described according to their places of abode as in 1 Peter, can hardly be regarded as occasioning difficulty, especially when we consider the indication in chap. iii. ver. 1.—2. The participle λαχοῦσαν denotes an obtaining by a divine allotment, and regards the Christian condition of the readers as a gift of God. Faith is subjective faith here, as generally in the N. T. It is simply placed in an objective relation to the participle. The pronoun ἡμῖν refers to the writer and his fellow-apostles; at least, this is a natural reference, and all that is necessary to meet the demands of the case. This pronoun, as a dative, depends on the ἴσος idea in the adjective ἰσότημον, and the use of this adjective seems to be occasioned by the sense of the value of faith to every believer, which the writer had, and the sense of fairness in the equal allotment to all believers as they come into possession of the same faith. This sense of equal allotment is carried into a more full expression of it by the addition of the words ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ, κ.τ.λ. That δικαιοσύνη has here its ordinary, rather than its peculiar Pauline sense, is indicated both by the immediately preceding words with which it is connected, and by the fact that we do not obtain faith through justification, but justification through faith. The word here draws near to the idea of justice, that is, it suggests the thought of righteousness in its dealing equally and fairly with all.

3. With reference to the words τοῦ θεοῦ ἡμῶν καὶ σωτῆρος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, and the question whether they involve a declaration that Jesus Christ is θεός, the reader may be referred to the Additional Note of the American editor of Meyer's Commentary, Epistle to Titus, chap. ii. 13, the passage most nearly parallel with this, in which the arguments on both sides of the question are

presented. The points which are peculiar to the present passage are: (a) that *ἡμῶν* is here placed after *θεοῦ*, and not after *σωτήρος*; this pronoun cannot, therefore, have a limiting and defining force for the latter noun, and thus supply the place of an independent article distinguishing *σωτήρ* from *θεός* as a different person; (b) that in this epistle there are four cases seemingly parallel with this, where the phrases *ὁ κύριος καὶ σωτήρ*, *ὁ κύριος καὶ σωτήρ* 'I. Χρ., or *ὁ κύριος ἡμῶν καὶ σωτήρ* 'I. Χρ. are used, namely, i. 11, ii. 20, iii. 2, 18, and in all these the two words joined by *καὶ* under a single article, are evidently appellatives relating to one and the same person; (c) that, on the other hand, in the verse which follows the present one (ver. 2), *Θεός* and *Χριστός* are evidently separated, though with a different arrangement of words, as two distinct persons. The different arrangement of the words in ver. 2 is pressed by those who claim that ver. 1 applies the name *Θεός* to Christ; but the change from *Θεός* to *κύριος* in the passages referred to under (b) is urged, after a similar manner, against the force of those passages in the argument, by those who deny this application in ver. 1. — In the R. V., the English revisers, both here and in Tit. ii. 13, read *our God and Saviour* (in Titus, *our great God*); the American revisers, on the other hand, adopt the other view, and read *our God and the Saviour* here, *the great God and our Saviour* in Tit. ii. 13.

4. The same form of salutation, *χάρις καὶ εἰρήνη πληθυνθείη*, is found here which is used in 1 Peter; but the remaining words of ver. 2 are peculiar to this passage. *Ἐν ἐπιγνώσει* indicates that this grace and peace should be in and through the knowledge of God and of Jesus Christ. The word *ἐπίγνωσις* seems to denote a more full knowledge than is meant by the simple *γνώσις*; but sometimes the two words appear to be used in substantially the same sense, and this may not improbably be the case here. Possibly, however, it has its full significance here, and the apostle may ask for his readers that grace and peace which are connected with the fulness of knowledge, towards which fulness, at the close of the Epistle, iii. 18, he exhorts them to grow.

5. Huther regards *ὥς* (ver. 3) as beginning a new sentence and paragraph; so do Alford, Tischendorf, Keil, and others. Westcott and Hort, Lachmann, and others, place a comma after *ἡμῶν* of ver. 2 (R. V., a semicolon), and continue the sentence begun in ver. 2 to the end of ver. 4. The fact that all the apostolic greetings in all the other epistles are complete in themselves, and form a paragraph or sentence by themselves, to which Huther alludes, is a point worthy of consideration. It must be admitted, however, that the *καὶ* of ver. 5 seems to be the beginning of an independent sentence, and not to be a conclusion from the preparatory and incomplete sentence contained in vv. 3, 4. With some doubts, the writer of this note favors Huther's view, believing that the *καὶ ὅς* of ver. 5 may be accounted for as an irregular construction, occasioned by the length and involved character of the protasis portion of the long sentence, and by the thought of ver. 5, as something added on the readers' own part to what had been done and made possible for them by God or Christ. — 6. Whichever view we take of the connection of vv. 3, 4, the particle *ὥς* is best translated by *seeing that* (as R. V.). The objective reason for the exhortation in ver. 4, as Huther remarks, is characterized by *ὥς* as a subjective motive. It is the not unfrequent construction of *ὥς* with the genitive absolute. The word *πάντα* in the passage introduced by *ὥς* is placed first for the purpose of marked emphasis. As the divine power has given us all things which pertain to life and godliness, we may well, on our part, give all diligence to develop all the virtues of the godly life, adding one to another and building up one upon another. — 7. The refer-

ence of *αὐτοῦ* seems to the writer of this note, provided we hold God and Christ to be distinguished from one another in ver. 1, to be rather to God than to Christ, to whom Huther refers it, because God is, in that case, clearly the most prominent subject in the preceding verses. If, however, Jesus Christ is spoken of as God in ver. 1, He takes the first place in the thought, and the pronoun naturally refers to Him. The objection which Huther urges from the improbability that the author would use the adjective *divine*, if he were speaking of God, is worthy of consideration, but can hardly be considered decisive. — 8. The arrangement in the sentence of *τὰ πρὸς ζωὴν καὶ εὐσέβειαν* as related to *πάντα* is noticeable. It is almost as if the writer had his thoughts so filled with a sense of the blessedness of piety, that he thought it to be everything, and so he said *all things*, but afterwards, bethinking himself, he added, “I mean those which pertain to piety.” Of the two words *ζωὴν* and *εὐσέβειαν*, the former denotes the spiritual life of the soul, and the latter that life viewed in the light of its outgoing towards God: piety or godliness; or perhaps, with Huther, the former is to be taken as conveying the idea of blessedness, and the latter, that of conduct as pertaining to the spiritual life. The preposition *πρὸς* is used here in the sense of tending or leading to. These things which tend to life and piety have been given us by God, and we are to use and appropriate them.

9. *δεδορημένης* is a deponent middle form, with the sense of the active. The gift is bestowed upon us *διὰ τῆς ἐπιγνώσεως*, — this word seems to refer to that more full knowledge of God which belongs to the believer, as contrasted with the unbeliever. It is by means of this knowledge alone, that the gift, in the actual realization of it, is made possible to the human soul. — *The one who called us* is God, of whom this phrase is everywhere used in the N. T. — *διὰ δόξης καὶ ἀρετῆς* refers to God’s *δόξα* and *ἀρετή*. By means of these the call comes to us in an effectual way. The word *ἀρετή* is taken by Grimm and some commentators as meaning *power*. It thus becomes a kindred word to *δόξα*, or perhaps an explanation of the particular sense in which *δόξα* is here used. As we find the idea of power, however, expressed in the verse by another word (*δύναμις*), and as *δόξα* in itself, in such a sentence, naturally suggests this idea, it may perhaps seem better to regard *ἀρετή* as referring to God’s moral perfection, and *δόξα* to His natural perfection. This accords with the view of Bengel. The glorious attributes of God in both lines unite in the accomplishing of His plan, which finds its realization in the call which brings us into the new life and the divine kingdom. — 10. *δι’ ὧν* (ver. 4) is more naturally referred to *δόξης καὶ ἀρετῆς*, than to *τὰ πρὸς ζωὴν καὶ εὐσ.*, as Huther takes it; and if, as is probable, the subject here is God, and not Christ, the objection made by Huther to this reference is removed. The very great and precious promises, which are connected with the full attainment of the perfected spiritual life, are given through the same glory and virtue through which the call bringing us into that life comes to us. The promises here referred to are perhaps best taken as including all the promises connected with Christ and His kingdom, — both those which were fulfilled at and after His first coming, and those which are to be fulfilled at and after the second coming. — 11. *Διὰ τούτων* refers to *ἐπαγγέλματα*. This is probably the correct view, both because of the fact that this word is the nearest and natural antecedent, and because of the prominence which the promises have in the thought of the writer. The promises have been given to us, the writer says, in order that, by means of them, you (the readers) may become partakers in the divine nature. The view of Huther, that *ἵνα γένησθε* means *that you might become*, and thus carries the participation into the present as well as the future,

is possibly correct, but not necessarily so. The aorist subjunctive may be used in such cases with no marked distinction from the present. — The expression *divine nature* refers to the spiritual nature or character of God, with its perfect holiness, of which through the faith and love of the Christian life we become partakers, in the sense that the Christian life is a communication of God to man. The words are to be understood of *the divine nature*, rather than of *a divine nature*, the definite article being unnecessary because the divine nature is but one. — 12. The words ἀποφυγόντες, κ.τ.λ., denote that which is attendant upon the becoming, etc., and involved in it. The man who becomes a partaker of the divine nature, in the sense in which the promises are intended to make him so, has escaped already from the corruption which is in the world in lust. — The preposition ἐν before ἐπιθυμία denotes the sphere or element *in which* the corruption in the world has its existence, its origin, and its continuance. R. V. translates, *by lust*. The corruption here referred to may be both physical and moral; but the connection would seem to show that the latter, rather than the former, is what the writer has especially in mind.

13. The explanation of αὐτὸ τοῦτο (ver. 5) given by Luther is the one more generally adopted by interpreters at present, — the meaning being the same as if the preposition διὰ were inserted before the words. The reference in these words is to the main thought of vv. 3, 4; that is, that God has given all things that pertain to life and godliness, including the idea of the gift of the promises, with their purpose and design. The Christian is, in view of all this, to make all effort on his own part. — 14. Παρεισεπέγκαντες, *bringing in alongside* of what is thus done for you, i. e., *adding on your part*, as R. V. renders it, *all diligence*. Ἐπιχορηγήσατε, *furnish or supply*. The Christian readers are exhorted to supply or provide, on their part, what corresponds to, and naturally grows out of, that which God bestows. The preposition ἐν, in each of the cases in vv. 5–7, is to be translated *in*; and it marks that which is designated by the following word, in each case, as the condition in which the soul is supposed to be when the call is for a new supply, or the virtue which is already possessed, and in the possession of which the further development is to be carried on. The first of the points mentioned is *faith*. This is placed first, because faith is the foundation of all Christian life. It is assumed as existing when the Christian begins his work of providing the other things mentioned. The word ἐπιχορηγήσατε is not prefixed to it, because it is obtained as a gift from God; see ver. 1, τοῖς ἰσότημον ἡμῖν λαχούσαν πίστιν. — (a) *In faith*, in the possession of faith, and that condition of the soul's life which is indicated by it, furnish or provide virtue. — (b) The word *virtue*, as here used, seems to be nearly equivalent to Christian manliness, moral energy, the strength and courage of the soul: it is that which gives working-power to the soul, and thus gives life to faith, and perfects it on the out-going side, — the love side, where it develops its energy in good works. — (c) *In virtue, knowledge* is to be provided. Knowledge here means, by reason of its position in the order of the words, knowledge which guides and directs the working of faith as possessed of ἀρετή. By the supply of this, when the soul is already ἐν ἀρετῇ, the character is built up and built out towards its perfect development. It is moved along the right course, and away from the wrong course, so far as all the forth-putting of the energies of faith is concerned. — (d) Next in order comes *self-control*. The putting in exercise, if we may so speak, of this guiding and directing knowledge, must be in accordance with the regulating power of self-government, or the movement of the life under the influence of the ἀρετή of πίστεως, as affected by γνώσις, may not be restrained and well-ordered as it

should be. — (e) In the possession of self-control, the Christian is also to furnish or supply *steadfast endurance*. The thought seems here to comprehend all that goes before: faith, as putting forth all the outgrowths which have been mentioned, is also to develop into this new excellence; this being the characteristic of faith which secures its permanence and its final reward. Steadfast endurance under trials, temptations, etc., is the legitimate fruit and result growing out of self-control. — (f) *Piety* or *godliness* is placed next to steadfast endurance. If that piety which trusts and reverently regards and fears God is not the development of the soul's life, when in the sphere of endurance, the truly patient and loving element is lost out of the latter, — that which makes it a Christian virtue, as distinguished from the mere courageous endurance of a man of the world. — (g) Piety is, according to the writer's progress of thought, to develop into, or in the line of, love of the Christian brethren. This is a turning of the thought into a particular line, indeed; but such a turning is very natural and very characteristic of the apostolic writers. The movement of love to God and Christ in a development of itself towards that brotherhood of men, of which God is the Father, in a peculiar sense, and Christ is the head, was brought to the minds of all the apostles by the last command of Jesus, given to them on the evening of the Lord's Supper, and was, no doubt, made to appear always of peculiar importance to them by reason of the circumstances and condition in which the company of believers was then placed. — (h) Brotherly love is now widened into *love*, which here, as it would seem, must mean love to all men. The virtues named grow, each one of them, out of the one already attained, and the development in the line of holy character and life is first God-ward, and then man-ward.

15. Vv. 8, 9, are introduced as giving a reason, set forth on the positive and negative side, for the exhortation to supply these virtues with all diligence. It is an added reason, beyond the one indicated by *αὐτὸ τοῦτο* of ver. 5 and contained in vv. 3, 4; but it does not stand in precisely the same relation to the thought of vv. 5-7. As connected with vv. 3, 4, the writer exhorts (vv. 5-7) his readers to do their part in the cultivation of character, because God has, on His part, done so much to make it possible for them to become like Himself. As connected with vv. 8, 9, he exhorts them (vv. 5-7) to cultivate the character in the line of these virtues, because these virtues help them onward in and towards that knowledge of the Lord Jesus Christ, which is the means of realizing the participation in the Divine nature to which they are called of God. — 16. With reference to the words in vv. 8, 9, the following points may be noticed: (a) *πλεονάζοντα*, if taken in the sense given by Brückner, Wiesinger, Alfrod, and others, *multiplying, increasing, becoming more*, may perhaps follow somewhat more naturally the suggestion of development and growth which is contained in vv. 5-7. But the simple idea of *abounding*, which Huther favors, is all that the verb necessarily implies, and the other meaning cannot be insisted upon. — (b) *ἀργούς* and *ἀκάρπους* seem to be substantially equivalent to each other, only presenting the common idea under different figures or relations. — (c) *καθίστηναι* — This passage shows clearly the use of this verb in the sense of rendering or making, or, at least, of that setting of a person or thing in a position and condition in which he, or it, actually is by reason of that which belongs to the nature or life, and which comes out of it. The bearing of this instance of the use of the verb in the important passage, Rom. v. 19, is worthy of consideration. — (d) *εἰς* is the preposition looking towards an end. The knowledge of Christ is the end towards which the activity and fruitfulness of the Christian life tend. — (e) *γάρ* of ver. 9 is used where we might have expected *δέ*; by the use of this

particle here, as in some other similar instances in the N. T., the negative side of the matter is made a proof of the positive side. — (*f*) The correspondence of *ἔστω* with *καθίστησιν*, as indicating the meaning of the latter word, should not be overlooked. — (*g*) *μνωπάζων* seems to be added as a sort of limitation and explanation of *τυφλός*: he is blind in the sense that, and because, he is short-sighted, — seeing only what is near, and not the distant realities of the heavenly life, etc. — (*h*) The cleansing of his old or former sins is that which was given him personally at the beginning of the Christian life. — 17. *Διό* points back to vv. 8, 9, and on the ground of what has been presented in those verses the exhortation of ver. 10 is given. This exhortation, though not precisely the same as that in vv. 5–7, is evidently in the same line, and, substantially, to the same end. For this reason, perhaps, the writer uses the word *σπουδάσατε*, corresponding with *σπουδήν* of ver. 5. The word *μᾶλλον* connects itself with the two opposite facts or results stated in the immediately preceding verses; according to the quotation given by Alford, *quae cum ita sint, impensius*. — 18. The explanation of the word *election* here, which is given by Huther, seems to the writer of this note to be very probably the correct one, and for the reasons which he suggests. The *ἐκλογή* “is the election effected by the *κλήσις* [not that which precedes it], i. e., the separation of those who are called from the world, and the translation of them into the kingdom of God.” — 19. The thought of ver. 11, which closes the paragraph, reminds us of the latter part of vv. 3, 4, the promises and their final design, and brings before us the fulfilment of the purpose of those promises in the entrance into the eternal kingdom of Christ. The connection with vv. 5–7 is also manifest. As the Christian “supplies” the virtues in the development of the Christian life, Christ “supplies” the consummation at the end.

XXVII.

Vv. 12–21.

1. *Διό* of ver. 12 points back to ver. 11, i. e., to *ταῦτα ποιῶντες*, which points to *σπουδάσατε βεβαίαν . . . ποιῆσθαι*. As the taking of this course on their part was the means of securing the entrance into the kingdom which is spoken of, the writer is impelled, on account of this fact, to remind and exhort the readers. The form of expression which he uses, if the reading adopted by the best textual critics is correct (*μελλήσω*), is quite peculiar, being found elsewhere in the N. T. but once in a similar construction. The reading of the T. R. (*ἄμελλήσω*) would seem, at first sight, more simple and natural. The external evidence, however, is strongly opposed to this reading. Perhaps the rendering given by R. V. for *μελλήσω*, *I shall be ready*, fully meets the idea of the word, but there may be somewhat more of purpose and intention in it, *I shall have it in mind*. Huther apparently regards the compound expression *μελλήσω ὑπομνήσκειν* as a mere circumlocution for the simple future. The things respecting which the writer affirms that he shall have the intention or the readiness, on all occasions, to remind them, are those presented in vv. 4–11. The reason for this intention or readiness, so far as he is personally concerned, is set forth in the later verses of the chapter. This action on his part is not, indeed, necessary, as if the readers were unacquainted with the gospel or weak in their convictions; but he feels it to be fitting, and he has the impulse towards it, notwithstanding the fact that they were altogether in the opposite condition. The apostolic exhortations are sometimes given because of the failures and the very imperfect development of Christian life and character which were seen in the churches.

Sometimes, on the other hand, as is the case here, they were not given for this reason. They were given, rather, for the purpose of impelling forward by a stronger incentive, or by a renewed and earnest suggestion of the truth, those who had already a firm standing in the truth. The words used here, and the manner in which this putting them in remembrance of what they knew is set forth, are such as might be expected in the case of a man in advanced life, who was looking forward to his death as near at hand. — 2. The particle *δέ* at the beginning of ver. 13 is the *and* of continuous discourse, rather than the adversative *but*. The contrast with the clause immediately preceding, *εἰδόντας, κ.τ.λ.*, which is supposed by some to be indicated by the particle, is not to be regarded as occasioning its use. This contrast is, as shown by the *καίπερ*, with the beginning of ver. 12; and ver. 13 unites itself with this earlier clause of the twelfth verse. The adjective *δίκαιον* means *right*: in accordance with what ought to be. I shall have the intention or readiness always to remind you, and I think it right that I should remind you. — *διεγείρειν*, to thoroughly waken up, stir up; *ἐν ὑπομνήσει*, in the sphere of, in the way of, reminding.

3. Ver. 14 gives the subjective reason for the *ἠγούμαι δίκαιον*, because I know. It was his knowledge of the approach of his death, — his consciousness of the fact of its nearness or its suddenness, — which made the apostle feel that it was right for him to be ready always to press the truths and duties upon his Christian brethren, no matter how well they might be acquainted with them. As for the meaning of *ταχῶς*, there is a difference of opinion on the question whether the word here means *soon* or *sudden*. Perhaps the rendering of R. V., *which cometh swiftly*, which takes hold upon both ideas, may best satisfy the demands of the case. The reference in the clause beginning with *καθώς* is, in all probability, to what Jesus said to Peter in John xxi. 18. In that passage there is an allusion to a death by violence, and nothing further. The prophecy of such a death might suggest the idea of suddenness; but it would not, in itself, suggest that of nearness. Nevertheless, when we consider the form of expression which Jesus used, “when thou shalt be old,” etc., — we may readily see how Peter, after he had become old, might, on the ground of this expression, refer to his death as impending in the near future. — 4. *Δὲ καί* of ver. 15, *more-over also*. The connection is evidently with the thought of vv. 12, 13; not only will he endeavor to waken up their remembrance of these things by repeating them as occasion may offer, but he will give diligence (*σπουδάσω*, comp. vv. 5, 10) that they may, on every occasion, be able to call them to remembrance after his decease. *Ἐκάστοτε*, on each occasion as it arises. This word, as Huther and other commentators hold, is to be united with *ἔχειν*. — 5. The particle *γάρ* of ver. 16 introduces the reason for *σπουδάσω*, and through this, as we may say, more remotely for all that he has said of his desire and purpose to put them in remembrance, from ver. 12 onward. The consciousness of the truth of the facts and teachings which they proclaimed, was the underlying reason of the earnest proclamation of them which the apostles made.

6. The word *μύθοις* probably finds its main force in the contrast which it presents to the idea set forth by the words *eye-witnesses of His majesty*. It may be, however, — and this view would seem to be not unreasonable, — that, as Dr. Lunby remarks, the apostle refers, in these fables, “to the heathen stories of the appearance of the gods among men, or to some of the Gnostic figments concerning emanations from the Divinity.” Of course, if the Epistle is by Peter, and his death is to be placed before the year 70, the “Gnostic figments” must be developments in that line which were not beyond those which are, perhaps,

discoverable in the Epistle to the Colossians or the Pastoral Epistles. — 7. The words *δύναμις* and *παρουσία*, since the latter is regularly used of the second coming, are both of them probably to be explained of the exalted and triumphant state of Christ, and not of His earthly life. These words do not refer to the Transfiguration scene; but the fact that Peter and his two fellow-apostles were eye-witnesses of His majesty, as then exhibited, gives the apostle the assurance that His power and coming are facts of the future. — 8. The fact that the scene here spoken of is referred to as being on *the holy mountain*, and that the words, *This is my beloved Son*, etc., are given, which were heard at that time, is decisive evidence that the writer refers to the Transfiguration. The word *μεγαλειότης*, therefore, is used to designate that visible manifestation of the glory of Christ which was witnessed by Peter, James, and John, at that time. The writer speaks of himself and his fellow-apostles as having been *ἐπόπται*, a word which possibly refers, as Huther also allows, to the scene as involving a witnessing of what was hidden from others, a vision of the mysterious grandeur and glory of Christ. As the verb *ἐποπτεύειν* is found twice in the First Epistle of Peter without any special meaning of this sort, it may be that the substantive is used here with the simple idea expressed by the verb in those instances, and has no significance as connected with its use as a *terminus technicus*. — 9. Ver. 17 is introduced by *γάρ* as giving, in connection with ver. 18, the justification of the words of ver. 16, *γάρ* being causal (*for*), as in ordinary cases, rather than explanatory (*that is*), as Huther takes it. The construction, also, is better taken as Winer takes it substantially, than as Huther takes it. The simplest explanation seems to be this, that the writer gives, in ver. 18, the conclusion of the participial sentence of ver. 17, the fact on which he wished to lay stress, — the construction being changed either purposely or accidentally. The fact which he wishes to present is, that he himself and his fellow-apostles heard the voice from heaven which followed the manifestation of the glory; and thus the evidence of the hearing of the words was added to that of the vision. — 10. The genitive absolute, *φωνῆς ἐνεχθείσης*, is explanatory of the honor and glory, but is perhaps best taken as indicating time: *when there came*, or *was borne*, a voice of such a sort (as that mentioned in the following words) *to him from or by the majestic glory*. — 11. *And this voice we heard borne out of heaven*: This is the point on which the writer would lay emphasis, as connected with the evidence, that in making known the power and coming of Jesus he was not following cunningly-devised fables. The *and* at the beginning of ver. 18 connects the hearing of the voice with the fact of its utterance. — On the expression *the holy mount*, Alford justly says: “De Wette is partly right when he says that this epithet ‘holy’ shows a later view of the fact than that given us in the evangelistic narrative; but not right when he designates that later view as *wundergläubigere* (more ready to believe in miracles). The epithet would naturally arise when the gospel history was known, as marking a place where a manifestation of this Divine presence and glory had taken place. The place whereon Moses stood, is said, in Exodus, to be *holy ground*. So that really all we can infer from it is, that the history was assumed to be already well known; which is one entirely consistent with the probable date of the Epistle.”

12. Vv. 19–21 add to what precedes a setting-forth of the prophetic evidence, or declaration. In this passage there are several points which may be particularly noticed as bearing upon the interpretation: (*a*) The question as to what the *καί* at the beginning of ver. 19 connects the passage with, must depend, in some measure, on the explanation of the several words in the passage. The

connection, however, when we consider this question by itself, would seem almost necessarily to be either between *ἔχομεν* (ver. 19) and *ἐγνωρίσαμεν* of ver. 16, or *ἠκούσαμεν* of ver. 18. The latter would appear to be the more correct view, because the writer seems to be moving in his thought along the line of the proof of the fact, that what is proclaimed by the apostolic preachers is the truth. — (b) *βεβαίωτερον*, by reason of its position, is evidently predicative: *we have the prophetic word more sure*. The question as to what, in the thought of the writer, follows these words, *more sure*, is left by him in uncertainty, and consequently cannot be answered with absolute confidence. It would seem, however, from the emphasis placed upon the word by its position, and from the close connection of the sentences, that the writer's meaning is *a more sure proof than the one already mentioned*. If this is the right view, the prophetic declarations of the O. T., which are fulfilled in Christ, are regarded and set forth by the writer as an evidence of even greater strength and certainty than that of the vision on the mountain. This may be readily believed, because the long course of prophecies fulfilled, which could be understood and appreciated by every Christian for himself, would carry the greatest weight. The hearing of the voice came to a few, and was the evidence of one event to which they bore testimony. The fulfilment of prophecy was the realization in fact of God's revelations respecting His plan. This interpretation accords well with all that follows, and is free from the objections which may be urged against other explanations of the meaning. If it be not adopted, the one to be preferred is that of De Wette and others, "the prophetic word is more stable to us from the fact that we saw and heard." — (c) The words of ver. 19, which speak of the lamp shining, etc., are to be explained in view of the fact that the readers are called upon to give heed to this light in the present, and until a clearer light shall come in the future; and that this clearer light is spoken of under the figure of the dawn and the day-star. The meaning of the words would thus seem to be: that the light of prophecy, as pointing to Christ and fulfilled in Him, should be the illumination and guide of their souls, until the beginning of that time when every thing should be made clear. The fulness of this time is the *parousia*; the beginning of it is the near approach of that period, when the signs of the final and complete redemption are made manifest beyond doubt. — 13. Ver. 20 presents that which would strengthen the readers in their giving heed to the prophetic word, and which, at the same time, constituted a reason for it. The explanation of this verse given by Huther is the best and most satisfactory one: No prophecy of Scripture arises out of, or depends on, private (of him who utters the prophecy) interpretation of the future. This explanation satisfies the demands of the sentence itself, and brings it into most natural and easy connection with what follows. The *γάρ* of ver. 21 gives the ground justifying the statement of ver. 20; and this ground is, that the prophecies were given not by the will of man, but by the inspiring power of God. This proves that the prophecy, in any and every case, does not arise out of the interpretation of the future which the prophet makes for himself; and so, as being not humanly, but divinely, originated, it demands for itself the most careful and constant consideration and regard. — The explanation given by Grimm and others: "No one can explain prophecy by his own mental power (it is not a matter of subjective interpretation); but to explain it one needs the same illumination of the Holy Spirit in which it originated," suits the words of the sentence itself, and is consistent with what follows; but the connection with ver. 21 is not so simple and natural as in the case of the other explanation.

XXVIII.

CHAPTER II.

Vv. 1-11.

1. The opening verses of this chapter seem to form a sort of contrast to the closing ones of the preceding chapter. Besides, and in contrast with, the true prophets of the O. T. times, there arose also among the people of Israel false prophets. This connection of the chapters accounts for the placing the statement respecting the O. T. false prophets in the principal part of the sentence. If the main thought and purpose of the passage are considered, it is evident that the statement concerning the false teachers is the one of most importance, and the one for which the verse is introduced. In this view of the verse, the first clause should have been opened by the particle *as*, or *according as*, and the *ὡς* of the second clause should have been replaced by *οὕτως*. — 2. With respect to the word *ψευδοδιδάσκαλοι*, the view of Huther, with whom Keil also agrees, is probably to be preferred, “persons who falsely give themselves out as teachers.” The fact that they are also teachers of what is false, is plainly declared in the clause which immediately follows this word. It is said of these teachers, that they *shall be*, not that they *are*, and that they *shall privily bring in*, etc., *παρεισάξουσιν*; while, in Jude, it is said that they have already *crept in unawares* or *privily*, *παρεισίδουσιν*. This difference is one which can be most readily accounted for, if Jude be regarded as the later writer of the two. That which it is said that they will introduce, is called *αἵρέσεις*. This passage seems to be the one which favors, more than any other in the N. T., the view that this word was used in the sense of *heresy* within the period of the apostolic writers. It is, however, at the most, only somewhat probable that this meaning should be given here. As these persons enter into the church life by a side gateway, as it were, and in a secret manner, so they may be properly said to introduce into the church, in the same side and secret manner, those *divisions* which result from their entrance and influence. The genitive *ἀπωλείας*, on either supposition as to the meaning of *αἵρέσεις*, is a descriptive genitive which sets forth the objective relation: which tend or lead to destruction. — 3. It may be fairly questioned whether the view, that *ἀρνούμενοι* is equivalent to this participle with *ἔσονται*, is not as free from difficulties as that which takes *καί* as equivalent to *even*, and holds to a double participial construction. By regarding *ἀρνούμ.* as a verb, the sentence is made a simple one, the *καί* being the connecting particle *and*. If neither of the participles can be taken as equivalent to a verb, the view of Huther is doubtless to be adopted. With Huther's view of *καί ἀρνούμ.*, there is a certain additional probability derived from these words, which seem thus to become explanatory, that *αἵρέσεις* is used in the sense of heretical opinions or doctrines. But no decisive argument could be drawn from this source. — 4. There seems to be an intentional emphasis in the use of *ἀπόλθειαν* at the end of ver. 1, as related to the *ἀπωλείας* which precedes. They bring upon themselves the destruction to which the *αἵρέσεις* introduced by them into the church naturally lead. This destruction will be, in their case, sudden.

5. Ver. 2 adds the result of what these teachers do, in the action of others. If we regard Jude as the later writer, we may explain the introduction of the word *ἀσελγείαις* by the commentary, as it were, which Jude gives. Jude says (ver. 4), *Turning the grace of God into lasciviousness, and denying*, etc. These followers are led by that teaching which makes grace an incitement to indul-

gence in sin, to imitate their teachers in such indulgence. Δι' οὗς probably refers to the πολλοί. The writer's purpose is to describe the teachers and their evil influence; and the setting forth of this following on the part of many, on account of whom (i.e., of whose following thus) the way of the truth will be evil spoken of, serves to show what this evil influence is. — 6. Ver. 3 describes the false teachers as moved by covetousness, and trying to "make merchandise" of the Christians by feigned words, i.e., as Huther well explains *πλαστοίς, deceitfully-invented words*. This verse seems to show that ver. 2 is intended rather to form a part of the description of the teachers and their work, than to speak of the followers in and for themselves alone. — 7. The difference between ver. 3*b* and Jude ver. 4 will be noticed. It may perhaps be said with propriety, that, of the two writers, the later one would more naturally speak of the false teachers, after they had appeared, as *προγεγραμμένοι εἰς τὸ κρίμα τοῦτο*. This cannot, however, be insisted upon.

8. Ver. 4 introduces the examples from the O. T., etc., by way of direct proof of what has just been said (γάρ). In Jude, the examples are evidently intended to serve the same purpose, but they are introduced more formally, and, as it were, independently. The passage is also carried forward in the way of condition (εἰ) and conclusion, instead of being presented, in this respect also, in a more complete independence, as Jude gives it. As to the examples themselves in the two Epistles, see Note on Jude, ver. 5 ff. (a) The first example in this Epistle corresponds with the second one given in Jude. In the presentation of it, the writer simply speaks of the angels referred to as having sinned, without alluding to the special fact mentioned in the other Epistle. The statement of what befell them is substantially the same, — that they are reserved in darkness for judgment. The chief peculiarity of Peter's expression is found in the word *ταρταρώσας*. The word Tartarus is held by some to be equivalent to Gehenna, by others (as Huther) to mean an intermediate place of punishment. The latter view is perhaps the more correct one. — (b) The second example does not correspond with the first in Jude, but seems to occupy its place. If 1 Pet. iii. 19 is explained of the preaching of Christ through Noah, there may be some connection between this passage and that one; but evidently there is a reference in 1 Peter to something more than is here presented. — (c) The third example answers to the third in Jude. The presentation of this example is, however, quite different in its details from that which Jude gives; especially, in that the characterization of the sins of Sodom and Gomorrah is less particular in Peter, and, also, in that the case of Lot is set forth here, as it is not in Jude. Peter takes pains to bring out the deliverance of the righteous, as well as the punishment of the wicked, while Jude limits himself to the latter; see ver. 9 of this chapter. — The word *τερρώσας* seems to indicate the way in which the condemnation was inflicted, or possibly a fact attendant upon the condemnation. Huther appears to be correct in regarding *καταστροφή* as the dative of reference. The statement with respect to the condemnation may be indicative of Jude's meaning in the corresponding passage (ver. 7), namely, that the eternal fire there referred to is the fire which destroyed Sodom, and not the fire of Gehenna. — 9. The words of ver. 9 form the apodosis of the conditional passage covering vv. 4–8; and in the development of the main thought, the γάρ of ver. 4 belongs with the idea expressed in *οἶδεν, κ.τ.λ.*, of ver. 9. The whole matter of these examples, therefore, which results in the establishment of the proposition of ver. 9, is connected, through this resulting conclusion, with ver. 3*b*, as a proof (γάρ, ver. 4) of the statement that the judgment of these false teachers does

not linger or slumber. The manner in which the thought of ver. 10 is introduced, as compared with Jude, ver. 8, is somewhat strikingly indicative of the differences between the two Epistles, which are found in connection with the marked correspondences. On the general idea of the passage, see note on Jude, ver. 8 ff. — 10. On ver. 11, see note on Jude, ver. 9. The expression *greater in might and power* means, probably, greater than men; that is, than these persons of whom the writer is speaking. This is the natural suggestion of the sentence, rather than *greater than other angels*, which is Huther's explanation.

XXIX.

Vv. 12-22.

1. At ver. 12, the thought turns to the more detailed presentation of these false teachers in their immorality, etc. The difference between this Epistle and that of Jude, in these verses, consists largely in the greater detail here, and the greater emphasis of denunciation in Jude. This latter element in Jude possibly points to a later date for the Epistle; a time when what was looked forward to in Peter's words was actually realized in Jude's surroundings. The severity of Jude's language in vv. 10-13 is almost unequalled in any writing. — 2. Of the words in the passage, the following are found in exactly or nearly the same form in both Epistles: *ἄλογα ζῶα*; *φυσικά* (*κῶς*, Jude); *ἐν οἷς ἀγνοοῦσιν βλασφημοῦντες* (*ὅσα οὐκ οἶδασιν βλασφημοῦντες*, Jude); *ἐν τῇ φθορᾷ αὐτῶν καὶ φθαρῆσονται* (*ἐν τούτοις φθείρονται*, Jude); *σπίλοι* (*σπιλάδες*, Jude); *ὑπάταις* or *ὑγάταις* (*ὑγάταις*, Jude); *συνευχοῦμενοι*; the reference to Balaam, with the idea of hire; *πηγαὶ ἄνυδροι* (*νεφέλαι ἄνυδροι*, Jude); *ὀμίχλαι ὑπὸ λαίλαπος ἐλαυνόμεναι* (*νεφέλαι ὑπὸ ἀνέμων παραφερόμεναι*, Jude); *οἷς ὁ ζῶφος τοῦ σκότους* (*εἰς αἰῶνα*, Jude) *τετήρηται; ὑπέρογκα*. The parts peculiar to Peter are as follows: (a) the word *γεγεννημένα* following *ἄλογα ζῶα* and connected with *φυσικά*: *born mere animals*, or connected with *εἰς*, κ.τ.λ.: *born to ἄλωσις according to their nature*, — *εἰς ἄλωσις* is to be regarded as passive in sense, *to be taken and destroyed*; (b) the peculiar variation in the representation that they will be destroyed: Jude saying that they *rail at what they know not, and what they understand naturally, like the irrational creatures, in these things they are destroyed*; while Peter has: *as irrational creatures, railing in matters whereof they are ignorant (they) shall in their destroying surely be destroyed*. The form in Peter has here possibly the appearance of a later working-over of the sentence, but no positive affirmation can be made; the explanation of *φθορᾷ* as *destruction*, rather than the active *destroying*, is probably to be preferred; (c) the phrase *κομιοῦμενοι* (*ἀδικούμενοι*) *μισθὸν ἀδικίας*. The reading here is doubtful, but the word *ἀδικούμενοι* gives no very satisfactory meaning, since the suffering of wrong or injustice, as the reward for doing the same, seems scarcely to be an idea which the author would express with regard to these persons; and that the words are not suited to express the general idea of *experiencing* evil as the reward for doing it to others, is shown by Huther in his foot-note, in which he comments on Hofmann's view. — (d) *ἠδονὴν ἠγούμενοι τὴν ἐν ἡμέρᾳ τρυφῆν*. The explanation given by Huther to *ἐν ἡμέρᾳ*, referring it to the present life as contrasted with the future, seems to the writer of this note improbable, because some other and less doubtful expression would have been at the author's command, had he wished to set forth this idea. It seems more simple to make the words mean, as in A. V. and R. V., *in the daytime*, extending their indulgences and pleasures into the working time (the day), as well as the quiet and

resting time (the night). — (e) On *σπίλοι, σπιλάδες, ἀπάταις, ὑγάταις*, see notes on Jude, ver. 12. The word *ἐντροφῶντες* is added in Peter.

(f) Ver. 14. The several phrases of this verse, which are not found in Jude, serve to set forth the sensuality, covetousness, and evil and enticing influence of the false teachers. The sensual character of these men is referred to, however, by Jude, though not in this immediate connection. — (g) The compressing of the statement with respect to Balaam, and the addition, as if by way of compensation, of the cases of Cain and Korah, may suggest that Jude worked over, and worked on the foundation of, what Peter says. On the alleged discrepancy in the last words respecting the case of Balaam, which is the chief difficulty connected with the passage, Alford remarks: "A discrepancy has been discovered between this and the Mosaic account, seeing that it was the angel, and not the ass, from whom the rebuke came, the ass having merely deprecated ill-treatment at Balaam's hands. But the apostle evidently regards not so much the words of the rebuke uttered, as the miraculous fact, as being the hinderance. It was enough to prevent his going onward, when the dumb animal on which he rode was gifted with speech to show him his madness." — (h) Ver. 17 corresponds with vv. 12b, 13, of Jude; but, evidently, Jude draws out the description more extendedly, and sets it forth with a much stronger denunciatory emphasis. Peter presents in two figurative expressions the empty and restless character of the false teachers. Jude has four such expressions, adding to what Peter says a picturing of their useless and destructive character; see note on Jude, ver. 13. — (i) The words, *uttering great swelling words of vanity*, are placed in a different connection from that in which Jude puts the nearly corresponding words of his ver. 16. Jude inserts before the passage containing these words, the quotation from Enoch's prophecy, and seems to make a new beginning, as it were, of his description with the verse of which these words constitute a part. In his sixteenth verse, Jude represents the teachers as *walking after their own lusts*; Peter represents them as *enticing in the lusts of the flesh, by lasciviousness, those who are just escaping from those who live in error*, and adds the words, *promising them liberty, while they themselves are bond-servants of corruption*. Peter thus sets forth their action and evil influence as regards others, while Jude speaks only of their own personal life and behavior. The indication of this passage is rather towards the working-over in Peter of what is found in Jude, than the opposite. — (j) At ver. 20 the two writers cease to move together, and Peter joins what he says in this verse very naturally to what has just been declared in ver. 19. There can be but little doubt that Huther is correct, as against Hofmann, with regard to the reference of *ἀποφυγόντες, κ.τ.λ.*, of ver. 20, to the false teachers. The writer adds these verses as setting forth the idea of destruction in the case of these men, to which he had alluded in other terms before this point. This passage corresponds in some measure, so far as the matter of falling away is concerned, with those in Heb. vi. 4-6, x. 26 ff., and is perhaps more difficult of explanation, in this respect, than either of those passages. — (k) The word *righteousness*, in ver. 21, is to be understood in its ordinary, not its peculiar Pauline or forensic, sense. It means the actual righteousness belonging to the true Christian life, as *ἐντολή* means here the commandment appertaining to that life, its moral law. As the writer in Ellicott's Commentary for English Readers says: "That which in a doctrinal point of view is 'the way of truth' (ver. 2 of this chapter), is in a moral point of view 'the way of righteousness.'"

The question as to the priority in time which arises respecting the Epistle of Jude and this Epistle is, so far as it is connected with this chapter, one of

much difficulty; but to the writer of this note, the probability, on the whole,—as the several verses are carefully compared,—seems to be on the side of the priority of 2 Peter.

XXX.

CHAPTER III.

Vv. 1-7.

1. The third chapter constitutes, as Huther says, a third section of the Epistle, which is directed against the deniers of Christ. At the same time, there is an evident and close connection with what immediately precedes; and what the writer has now to say, belongs in that general line of description of the false teachers and doubters to which the Epistle is so largely devoted. — 2. It is evident that the writer refers in ver. 1 to the fact that he had already addressed another letter to the readers. This reference does not, of course, necessarily point to 1 Peter as the other letter; but, when taken in connection with the allusions to himself as the apostle, there can be no question that, in the use of the expression employed here, the writer means to indicate that Epistle as the earlier one. — 3. The object or design which the writer has in view in the two Epistles, he declares to be that to which he has already given expression by the use of the same phrase, *διεγείρειν ἐν ὑπομνήσει*, in chap. i. ver. 13, together with the words dependent on this phrase. It is to be observed that the clauses beginning with *τοῦτο πρῶτον γινώσκοντες* contain what is subordinate to the remembrance, etc., and thus, what is not the contents of the design, if this expression may be allowed, but, at the most, a secondary element connected with it. There is, therefore, nothing in the setting forth of the design of the Epistle here which is inconsistent with the design for which the First Epistle of Peter was written.

4. The more particular statement of this design is contained in the words of ver. 2, *that you should remember*, etc.; these words, however, are not to be limited to the matter of the rising-up of doubters and mockers, but they refer to the more general idea of the teachings of Christ and the apostles. The things which they should remember are described as the words of the prophets (of the O. T., as we must believe) and the commandment of the Lord. The meaning of this compound phrase must be determined, as it would seem, by the principal word contained in it. This word, evidently, is *ἐντολῆς*, which cannot justly be regarded as exhausted by the idea of the following verse, but must, at the least, include what Huther speaks of, “the command to lead a Christian life in expectation of the second coming of Christ.” Perhaps it may have an even more extended meaning than this, and may cover the whole sphere of Christian duty, though this is less probable. The prophetic word also, as may be seen in i. 19, relates to the glory and majesty of Christ, which are to be fully realized, indeed, at and after His second coming, but which are manifested, before that time, in the course of the development of the kingdom which He is carrying forward. While there is more, therefore, of the thought of the second coming in this Epistle than in the first, the great thought of both bears upon that which is only consummated and perfected at that time.

5. With respect to the words of ver. 2, the reader may be referred to the note on the corresponding passage in Jude (ver. 17). The similarity and dissimilarity in the expressions here used, as compared with what we find in that verse, are equally striking. Here only, we have the allusion to the prophets, the word *προειρημένων*, which in Jude is applied to the apostles' words, being

here used of those spoken by them. The position of the phrase respecting the prophets, before that which relates to Christ and the apostles, makes it substantially certain that the O. T. prophets are meant. This is confirmed, also, by the allusion to the O. T. prophets in i. 19, in connection with the reference to the apostles in i. 16-18. — The expression which is here used of the apostles is also peculiar, as compared with what is found in Jude. According to all the best authorities, ὑμῶν should be read here. But whether we read ὑμῶν, or with T. R. ἡμῶν, the position of the word in the sentence is different from that in Jude, and this difference is one of much importance. In Jude, the pronoun is placed after κυρίου, and by reason of this fact the apostles are spoken of in the third person, in such a way as apparently to set them altogether apart from the writer himself. In this Epistle, on the other hand, the pronoun is connected with ἀποστόλων. If the true reading is ὑμῶν, as it doubtless is, *your apostles*, it may indeed point to the apostles as distinct from himself, but the expression is not inconsistent with a reference to himself as one of the number. If ἡμῶν is the correct reading, and the meaning is as given in the A. V., he places himself among the apostolic company. It is only when we read ἡμῶν, and make it dependent on ἀποστόλων, that he certainly excludes himself: *our apostles*. While, therefore, it is possible, with either reading, that there is an indication here that the author was not an apostle, it is only possible, while in Jude the most natural understanding of the words points to such a conclusion. — The peculiar expression, “the-of-your-apostles-commandment of the Lord and Saviour,” is to be accounted for, probably, by the desire which the writer had to represent the commandment, with a certain emphasis, as being both from the Lord and from the apostles, in contrast with the words of the O. T. prophecies which had been spoken by the prophets. The words τῶν ἀποστόλων ὑμῶν are a kind of adjective phrase belonging to ἐντολῆς, and in respect to prominence are secondary to τοῦ κυρίου καὶ σωτῆρος; the meaning being *the commandment of the Lord and Saviour communicated to you by or through your apostles*.

6. The correspondence of ver. 3 with Jude, ver. 18, will be noticed, and it will be observed that the language in Peter is such as may naturally describe a future which lies beyond the time of the writing of the epistle, while in Jude the expression is most naturally understood as a reference to a past foretelling of events then future, but now partly or wholly realized. — 7. Ver. 4 presents a special matter which is not alluded to in Jude. The doubt respecting the coming of the Lord, because of the fact that the fathers had died, and no change or sign of the end had been seen, could only belong to a time, as it would seem, near the close of the apostolic period, or later than that epoch. It will be noticed, indeed, that the time of the appearance of these doubters is placed in the future, by the verb which is used. Ver. 5, however, seems to refer to them as already, in some sense and measure at least, present in or around the church. If we are to infer from ver. 5 that the future time mentioned had already come, this passage suggests a difficulty in placing the epistle within the lifetime of Peter, in case his death occurred at a date very near the time of Paul's death. But perhaps we are not obliged to interpret the passage in this way. That doubters as to the second coming may have lived as early as the year 68, is by no means impossible, but the placing of the ground of their doubts in the particular fact alluded to in ver. 4, is that which suggests the difficulty. If we can, with any propriety, carry the time of the present verb λαμβάνει forward to the standpoint of the future ἐλεύσονται, the difficulty may perhaps be avoided. — 8. The fathers here referred to are those of the generation or generations

immediately preceding. There is evidently a combined construction in the latter part of ver. 4, the thought being, that the permanent continuance of things, observable since the beginning of the creation, is still observable since the death of the fathers, — we see, these men said, what has always been seen; no change, no sign of the end, and of His coming.

XXXI.

Vv. 5-10.

1. In these verses the writer answers and refutes the assertion of the scoffers: First, in vv. 5-7, by a reference to the history of the creation, and the flood, as given in the O. T. As at that early time the world, which had been created and preserved by the word of God, was destroyed by the flood, so the world that now is, is reserved for destruction by fire. — 2. The explanation of *θέλοντας* and *τοῦτο*, given by Huther, is not generally favored. He refers *τοῦτο* to the contents of the preceding statement, and makes it dependent on *θέλοντας*, to which he assigns the meaning *assert* (desiring it to be so, holding as an opinion), *for, whilst they assert this, it is hidden from them that, etc.* This explanation involves a meaning which, though possible for *θέλοντας*, is not found in the use of that word elsewhere in the N. T.; and it seems less simple than the more common interpretation, which gives *θέλοντας* the adverbial force, which so often belongs to such participial words in connection with *λανθάνειν*. Were it not for these objections, Huther's view would be a satisfactory and successful explanation of the words. — 3. On ver. 5*b*, Alford says, “*ἐξ ὕδατος*, because the waters that were under the firmament were gathered together into one place, and the dry land appeared, and thus water was the material *out of* which the earth was made: *δὲ ὕδατος*, because the waters above the firmament, being divided from the waters below the firmament, furnishing moisture and rain, and keeping moist the earth, are the means *by which* the earth *συνίσταται*.” On the whole, this is, perhaps, as satisfactory an explanation of this somewhat difficult clause as can be given. — 4. *δὲ ὧν*. — The reference of *ὧν* is probably to the two things previously mentioned, — the word of God, which was the creating force that brought the heavens and earth into being, and the water, which was the material agency, so to speak, through which the result was accomplished. The two things which brought the then world into existence effected its destruction, and so in the case of the present heavens and earth. They are kept in store by the same powerful word of God. The idea of the passage is, that there is a reserving of them for destruction by fire, as of old by the flood. The dative *πυρί* seems to be most naturally connected with *τεθαυρισμένοι*, *for fire, τηρούμενοι* being limited by the following words only. — 5. Vv. 8-10 contain the second point which the writer urges: The time-element in God's plans and dealings is far different from what it is in those of men. *But let this one thing not escape you*: The verb here corresponds with that in ver. 5. Though they forget, and if *θέλοντας* be rendered adverbially, wilfully forget, the lesson which might be learned from the world in the time of the flood, they should by no means lose sight of the fact here mentioned. Possibly there may be in the contrast here an argument of slight force in favor of Huther's view of *θέλοντας* (ver. 5); the contrast being, more naturally, between forgetting and not forgetting, than between wilfully forgetting and not forgetting. — 6. The genitive *τῆς ἐπαγγελίας* of ver. 9 is probably to be explained, with Huther, as depending immediately

upon the verb, but R. V. and A. V. give the most successful English translation. The following phrase is, perhaps, best rendered: *count*, or *account it*, i. e., the Lord's failure to fulfil the promise of the coming, *slackness*. *ὑμᾶς* refers to the readers, but as representative of all men, as is indicated by *πάντας*, which follows in the next clause. — 7. Ver. 10 contains a renewed affirmation, closing this refutation of the scoffers and doubters, that the day of the Lord will certainly come, and come suddenly and unexpectedly. The statement of this verse, and the repetition of it, substantially, in the verses which follow, present more distinctly before the mind than almost any other passage in the N. T., perhaps than any other passage, the idea of a physical destruction or transformation of the present visible heavens and earth, and their renewal in the future as the abode of righteousness. If taken literally, the whole passage would seem to suggest, also, the idea that the righteous will live hereafter, in the future period referred to, on the earth. The language, however, is of a poetic order, and it may be intended only as a figurative setting-forth of the change to the future blessedness. — 8. Huther's explanation of *στοιχεῖα* is probably correct, the *δυνάμεις τῶν οὐρανῶν* of Matt. xxiv. 29. The idea is that the heavens and their constituent parts, the earth and what fills it, will be burned up and dissolved.

XXXII.

Vv. 11-18.

1. On the foundation of what is asserted in ver. 10, the writer now presses his closing exhortations upon his readers. The genitive absolute which opens ver. 11 is evidently causal in its character; and the present tense of the participle seems to be expressive of the certainty of that which has just been declared respecting the future. — 2. The word *ποσάπους* is undoubtedly, as Huther also takes it, exclamatory, and the sentence goes forward to the end of ver. 12. The word *σπεύδοντας* is best understood in the sense of *hastening*: they should not only look for, but should (by their piety, etc.) hasten, the coming of the day of God. Grimm, R. V. text, and others, regard the participle as meaning *desiring earnestly*. — *ὅτι ἦν*, on account of which day, or which coming of the day. The Lord's day, when it comes, will be attended by, and will occasion the results indicated. — 3. *Διό* of ver. 14 refers to what immediately precedes, that is, the coming of the day of God, with what it involves. The verb *εἰρεθῆναι* refers to the time of the coming; and the words *in peace* are probably to be explained of that state of peace between the soul and God which may be reached in its perfection when the Lord comes. — 4. The words, *and account the long-suffering of our Lord salvation*, are a recalling of the thought of ver. 9, the desire of the writer being to impress his readers, as he closes, with a deep sense of the meaning of God's mercy in any delay of the end. — 5. The allusion to Paul's writings in vv. 15, 16, is quite difficult of determination. To the writer of this note, the following points seem probable: (a) That a particular letter or class of letters is referred to in *ἐγραψεν ὑμῖν*, which was addressed by Paul to readers of the same general region with those here addressed: thus, of the letters which have been preserved to us, those to the Ephesians and Colossians are most probably the ones indicated. — (b) That the reference is not simply to the one thought of the day of the Lord, etc., as here set forth, but to Paul's exhortations to blameless living in view of the shortness of life, the end, etc. — 6. With respect to the expression, *the other scriptures*, all that it seems necessary to find in it

is a comparison of Paul's writings with the other writings which were read by the Christian readers of this Epistle, and by the persons alluded to as wresting them, etc. It does not prove that the author places Paul's letters on the same level of authority with the O. T. Scriptures, or even that an established collection of Christian writings, such as we now have in the N. T., had already been fully completed when this letter was written. It does, however, seem to recognize some such writings as already having a certain acknowledged authority. The bearing of this matter upon the date of the Epistle can hardly be considered as decisive, but is deserving of serious consideration. —7. The word *προγινώσκοντες* seems to refer to a foreknowledge on the part of the Christian readers, which was gained through the declarations of this Epistle, or which was thereby renewedly established in their minds. —8. The doxology at the end of this Epistle is one of the two or three in the N. T. which are applied to Christ, all others being doxologies to God. The reference to Christ here is beyond question.

THE FIRST EPISTLE OF JOHN.

XXXIII.

CHAPTER I.

Vv. 1-4.

1. The similarity between the opening passage of this Epistle and that of the Gospel of John will be noticed by every attentive reader. At the very beginning the two books meet each other; and these first sentences carry in themselves evidence that the writer of the Gospel was also the author of this letter. The relation of the two books, in the order of time, may be open to discussion; but, whatever may be the decision of this question, there can be little doubt, it would seem, that, in the order of thought and development, the Epistle comes later than the Gospel. The Epistle is, as it were, the development of thoughts, the historical foundation of which is presented by the Gospel, in its biographical record of Jesus' life. This relation of the later work to the earlier makes it antecedently probable that the writer, in his use of the word *Logos*, in ver. 1, has reference to the personal *Logos*, of whom he speaks in the first verses of the Gospel. —2. The central thought of the Epistle is that of *ζωή*. This *ζωή* is that which God has,—the light-life, in which there is no darkness. This *ζωή* was manifested in a person, so that it could be observed and studied, like an ordinary life. The revelation of it through this person was the means by which the realization of it in all other persons could be most easily and fully accomplished. It was through the fellowship with Jesus Christ, that the fellowship with the Father was to be attained. —3. Such being the author's thought, it was natural that he should make very prominent, at the beginning, the fact of the manifestation of the life in Jesus, as he and his fellow-disciples had seen it. The peculiar repetition and emphasis of his

expressions are characteristic of his style, as seen both in the Gospel and elsewhere in the Epistle. By this means, he would impress upon the minds of his readers that the life had been actually lived in his own presence.

4. With reference to the individual words and expressions used in these first four verses, the following suggestions may be offered: (a) By the words *ὁ ἦν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς*, we are carried in thought to the *ἐν ἀρχῇ* in the first verse of the Gospel. That the reference is to the eternal existence of the Logos, is indicated also by the fact, that, in ver. 2, the life predicated of the Logos is said to have been with the Father in the same sense, apparently, as that indicated in the Gospel i. 1. The form of expression, *ἦν πρὸς τὸν πατέρα*, is so precisely like the *ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν* of John i. 1, that it can hardly be interpreted in a different way. We have, therefore, in these verses, the two thoughts of the prologue of the Gospel, — the existence in the indefinite, eternal past, and the manifestation in personal form in the present. — (b) The form of words used, *ὁ ἦν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς, ὁ ἀκηκάμεν . . . περὶ τοῦ λόγου*, as distinguished from the direct predications respecting the Logos which we find in the Gospel, is to be explained in connection with the difference between the two books. The writer is not here making statements with reference to the Logos, as to what He was, etc., but is preparing to set forth the life which dwelt in Him, and which was manifested in and through Him. The Logos was and became, he says in the Gospel; but here: what was, etc., concerning the Logos, we declare and announce to you who read. As connected with the same fact, we may easily account for the use of *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς* instead of *ἐν ἀρχῇ*. The existence of the Logos was in the beginning; but that which the apostles announce respecting the manifestation of the light-life, in and through the Logos, is that which was from the beginning, and which has now been revealed in His personal life on earth. — (c) The addition of *ζωῆς* as a descriptive genitive to *λόγου*, and the fact that in other writings of the N. T. we find such expressions as *the word of truth, the word of the kingdom*, etc., referring to the Gospel, can hardly be considered as decisive grounds for denying to *λόγος* here the personal sense. Nor can the use of *λόγος* without such a defining genitive, in the three or four places in John's Gospel where the personal Logos is spoken of, be urged as conclusive. The prominence which the writer here evidently desires to give to the idea of *ζωή*, as connected with Jesus Christ, accounts sufficiently for the addition of this word; and the evident suggestion of personality in the verbs of vv. 1, 2, turns the reader's mind most naturally and directly to the personal Logos. The writer's thought moves after a somewhat similar manner to that which is noticeable in his Gospel (yet of course with differences belonging to the character of the two books), from a reference to the Logos, who appeared in the world in the presence of the disciples, to Jesus Christ, the manifested Logos in a human personality. — (d) The word *handled*, of ver. 1, may possibly refer, as some indeed hold that it does, to what occurred after the resurrection of Jesus. It seems doubtful, however, whether there is any such definite and particular reference, and whether, on the other hand, there is any thing more in this repetition of substantially the same idea than a special emphasis which the writer would give to his statement, and perhaps a certain distinct recalling, in the two aorist tenses, of the personal experience of the disciples during the lifetime of the Lord. Ver. 2 seems to present the strict order of time and tenses: The life was manifested; we have seen it; we bear witness, and announce to you. — (e) The correspondence in the idea of *ζωή* and *ζωὴ αἰώνιος*, which is noticeable in John's Gospel, is evident here. The life of the soul — the light-life, which is like God's life — is in itself, and as soon as it is

possessed, *eternal life*, according to this writer's view of it. This eternal life was in the Logos; it was manifested in Jesus; it was imparted by Him to the apostle and his fellow-disciples, with whom Jesus lived in His earthly life; through the possession of it they came into fellowship — into a real and vital participation in the eternal life, the light-life — with Jesus, and with God Himself. The apostle now announces it to the readers that they also may, in union with himself, have participation in the same life. — (f) If in ver. 4 ἡμῶν is the true text, it would seem probable that the apostle's thought is connected with the idea that the fellowship in life with God and Christ is the completeness of the joy of the soul. The idea suggested in John xv. 10, 11, may be compared with that of this verse. On the other hand, if ἡμῶν is the true text, the meaning would seem to be this: that the apostle's joy would be made complete, if his readers should enter into the same fellowship into which he had himself entered, and that, so far as he is himself concerned, he writes to the end of making his joy in this way complete. The καί of this verse, in either case, adds the expression of this purpose (*iva*) to that previously mentioned.

XXXIV.

Vv. 5-10.

1. After the introductory passage, vv. 1-4, the apostle begins the development of his thought in the Epistle by stating the great fundamental truth which lay at the basis of his message to the readers; the truth that the Divine life is light, a perfect and complete light, in which no darkness at all is intermingled. This message was the great revelation given by Jesus, and heard from Him. The manifestation of the Logos in Jesus Christ was to the end of bringing life to men, or of bringing men to life. The true life is God's life, and this life is light. Man is to gain this life by coming into fellowship with God in His life. The end is to be attained as the apostle himself had attained it, by putting one's self under the influence and teaching of Jesus Christ, and thus growing into His likeness. The gateway by which one truly enters within the sphere of this influence and teaching is faith. — 2. The same contrast between light and darkness is found here as in the prologue of John's Gospel. Darkness is the sphere of the sinful world's life. The man who walks in the darkness has no fellowship with God, no participation in God's life. — 3. This writer, like the other writers of the N. T., has the idea of sin as possessing and having control over men. Like them, he writes for the purpose of showing the way out of the sinful life, and into the opposite. But his mode of conception, and his phraseology, are affected by the peculiar character of his mind and soul. He is of the introvertive, contemplative, inward class. Life thus seems to him a growth into the likeness of God — a movement of the soul out of darkness and sin into light — a coming into and progress in communion with God — a receiving into one's self the light-life, until at length all the darkness is expelled. To say, therefore, that we have fellowship with God, and yet to live and walk in the darkness, is a contradiction in terms. The man who does this is outside of the sphere of truth; he is a liar. There is no true living except as the life rises above the darkness into the light, that is, except as the soul's life moves upward towards God's life, and transfers the latter into itself. — 4. The addition of the peculiar expression, *and we do not the truth*, to the word *we lie*, is in accordance with the style of John. The Epistle keeps very prominently before the mind of the reader, even from the beginning, the idea that the true

life is one which manifests itself in action; that the true faith and love are the faith and love which have a working force in them. The truth is something to be done, as well as to be believed. But the doing is, to his thought, the natural forth-putting of the inward vitality. The inward life, as he dwelt in it for himself, and concentrated his thinking upon it, was an inward *life*; and, therefore, it was necessarily also an energizing power for the doing of all that to which the belief naturally led in action.

5. If, however, we walk in the light (ver. 7) as He is in the light, the light-life has begun within us. The word *as*, in this verse, can hardly be regarded as indicating measure or degree. It conveys rather the idea of correspondence in the facts of the case. The light-life is perfect and complete in God; it may be partial and incomplete in Christian men; nevertheless it is the same life, and the latter walk in the light as, i.e., as really as, (and with the same fact lying at the basis of the statement), God Himself lives in the light. — 6. Instead of saying in ver. 7, *we have fellowship with Him*, which expression we might naturally expect as answering to ver. 6, the writer uses the words, *we have fellowship with one another*. This change of expression is to be accounted for, as we may believe, by the fact that the two ideas of union with God and union with one another, which are first suggested in ver. 3, seem to be in the writer's mind in the development of his whole thought. — 7. The addition of the words, *and the blood of Jesus*, etc., is in the line of the thought hinted at above in connection with the expression, *as He is in the light*. The Christian believer enters, when he comes into union with God by faith, into the sphere of the light. But the influence and power of the light upon his soul become gradually greater. There is still somewhat of remaining sin,—the lingering of the element of darkness, in which he had previously had his life. The indication of this verse seems evidently to determine the reference of the word *sin* to be to this sin which still abides with the Christian after the beginning of his new life. As the Christian enters within the light-sphere, and comes into fellowship with God, the blood of Jesus, which was made effective for him in his passing out of his old condition, is also continually made effective in removing the sinful element which remains. — 8. The reference of the word *sin*, thus determined in ver. 7, is, by the connection of thought, determined also in ver. 8; and the view of Huther and others here is correct, that the writer is alluding to sin as belonging to the Christian after he has entered upon the Christian life. As Huther remarks: "Even though as Christians, who are born of God, we have no longer sin [see iii. 9] in the sense that *περιπ. ἐν τῷ σκότει* is true of us, nevertheless we do not yet cease to have sin; if we deny this, if we maintain that we have no sin at all, then what John says in the following words is true of us." — 9. The denial that we have sin—that sin still has remaining influence over us, and an abiding force as a principle—is a denial of the true fact of the case. It is such a contradiction of the reality as proves that the truth has not found entrance into the soul and its life. With such a denial, therefore, the soul places itself outside of the true path along which it must pass from the darkness into the light—*πλανῶμεν*: it puts itself on the wrong road, and goes astray from the truth.

10. The true course, on the other hand, is confession, which acknowledges the fact and power of sin, and seeks to be delivered completely. When the soul moves along this course, the promises are fulfilled; as the soul is forgiven, so also it is cleansed. It is cleansed from all unrighteousness, until the light-life becomes perfect and complete. — 11. This cleansing, as well as the forgive-

ness, is so vitally connected with the whole plan and offer of salvation, that God's faithfulness and righteousness are pledged to its accomplishment. The idea of righteousness here, like that of faithfulness, is related, no doubt, to the thought of God's promise of salvation to the one who confesses, etc. After such a promise, His righteousness requires Him to fulfil it, the conditions having been fulfilled. But not improbably, in all such expressions as this, the N. T. writers—and especially one who penetrated so deeply into the central thoughts of the Christian system, and reflected so constantly upon the life of the human soul in its relation to God, as did the writer of this Epistle and the Fourth Gospel—had a conception of the righteousness of God as connected with the very life and being of God. It is, as we may say, of the essence of God's life, that when the finite, dependent, created life draws near to itself, with the desire and effort to pass out of the darkness into the light, it should open itself helpfully and forgivingly. The conformity of God's nature to what it ought to be, and what it must be if it is true to itself,—that is, His righteousness, in the strictest sense of the term,—requires that He should forgive and purify the one who confesses his sins. He can be no more faithful to Himself, than He can be to His promise, if He fails to do all this for the soul which truly turns towards Him.—12. It is because of this deeper thought of God's righteousness, as we may believe, that the writer presses the subject upon the reader's attention, and it is in the line of this thought that he develops the idea of the fundamental necessity of the union of the loving and believing soul with God, in various ways, throughout the Epistle.—13. Ver. 10, as Alford remarks, is not a mere repetition, but a confirmation and intensification, of ver. 8. The denial of sin puts us in an absolute contradiction of God, and outside of the whole sphere of His word. The whole plan of God revealed in the Gospel is founded upon the fact of sin, and of sin which needs to be forgiven, and from the power of which the soul needs to be perfectly cleansed.—By these strong contrasts, among which this last one is especially emphatic, the apostle lays the foundation of what he has to say in the following chapters. The light-life is to be secured, if the soul is to be saved. In order to the entrance upon the light-life, there must be a passing out of the darkness. To this end, the fact of sin must be acknowledged, and the cleansing through the blood of Christ must be realized.

XXXV.

CHAPTER II.

Vv. 1-6.

1. The word *ταῖτα*, of ver. 1, refers primarily to what is said in i. 5-10; in a secondary sense, it may refer also to the entire contents or message of the Epistle. The apostle announces to his readers the great fundamental truth which he has to proclaim, the truth that the Divine life is the light-life in which no darkness at all is intermingled; and he sets forth the way by which this Divine life is opened to and secured by the human soul, namely, by passing out of the sphere of darkness and walking in the light, in order that the end to be attained may be realized in the case of these Christian readers. The man who walks in the darkness is wholly outside of the sphere of the light; he knows nothing of the true life. But the man who turns from the darkness towards the light, will still have some element of sin remaining with him, which, as he comes more and more into the fulness of the light-life, will pass away, yet

which needs, so long as it remains, to be forgiven and cleansed. This is accomplished through Christ and the efficacy of His blood. — The truth, therefore, is, that the way to life for the human soul is the conforming of its life to the Divine, the living and walking in the light; and the way out of the darkness is through forgiveness and purification. This the writer announces to his readers, he now says, to the end that they may not sin; that is, that they may become free from the sin which remains, and thus may come into the perfect light. The verb *sin* here is in the aorist tense, and, as Canon Westcott remarks, “the thought is of the single act, not of the state;” “the apostle is” not “simply warning his disciples not to draw encouragement for license from the doctrine of forgiveness. His aim is to produce the completeness of the Christ-like life.” But with the setting-forth of this aim, which carries with it an urgent exhortation, the apostle connects the encouraging assurance that, in case the Christian who is ready to yield to the exhortation falls into any act of sin (the aorist tense again), there is an advocate with the Father, and a propitiation for sin. — 2. The word *παράκλητος*, as here used, undoubtedly has the sense of *advocate*. Jesus is the one “called to the side or aid” of men, (the original significance of the word), in this particular way of aiding. On the general use and meaning of this adjective-noun, some suggestions are offered in the Additional Notes to the American edition of Godet’s Commentary on the Gospel of John, chap. xiv. The meaning in John’s Gospel is there held to be *helper*, as including the ideas of teaching, revealing the truth, etc. The Paraclete spoken of in the Gospel is the Holy Spirit; here, it is Christ. The offices of the two are somewhat different, but they both stand in the relation of helpers, — the former being teacher, guide, comforter, as He is referred to in John xiv.-xvi.; the latter, as here referred to, being an advocate before the tribunal of God. Some prominent writers, however, hold that the word means *advocate* in the Gospel, as certainly as in the Epistle. — 3. The adjective *δικαιον* seems to have a certain predicative character: *as being righteous*, and not to be a simple descriptive word, *the righteous*. This word evidently refers to Jesus as having exhibited perfect righteousness in His earthly life and in His character as a man. As having such righteousness, He is fitted to present His offering for sin, and to become the advocate for those who sin. The four points which Huther presents, in his “Remark” at the end of his note on ver. 1, are worthy of notice as setting forth, according to his own expression, the chief elements which are the result of the apostle’s statement.

4. The statement of ver. 2, that Christ is the propitiation, etc., is added by *καί* as co-ordinate to what precedes. This verse, therefore, is not expressed in the form of a ground or reason for the preceding verse; it is, on the other hand, an additional declaration, which brings out the thought that the same one who is the advocate is also Himself the propitiation. This co-ordination of the sentences serves to show that the deliverance from sin, even from its beginning to its end, is due to Christ, and is secured by Him. The advocate presents His propitiatory offering of Himself in His plea before the tribunal. By that offering He opens the way of forgiveness for all men, if they will accept it. By His advocacy He gains for His followers the result for which He undertook His work as a Saviour. — 5. Ver. 3 seems to indicate the relation in which vv. 1, 2, stand to each other, according to the writer’s thought, so far forth as ver. 2 is universal and ver. 1 applies to the believer. Ver. 2 presents, in the clearest language, the declaration that the atonement is universal for all men. Ver. 1 limits the advocacy to the case of the believer. Ver. 3 declares that that true knowledge of

Christ, which is connected with the realized result of the application of the propitiatory offering to the individual soul, is gained and possessed only by those who come into union with Him by obedience. — This third verse, however, brings before the mind of the reader the importance and necessity, also, of not sinning (ver. 1), that is, of passing completely out of the dominion of sin and darkness, in order to the full possession of the true life. The knowledge here spoken of is that knowledge which John has in mind in his writings, and which is connected with his mode of thought and conception. To know God is to be in that union and communion of the soul's life with Him, which gives to one soul a true and full apprehension of another. It is not love or friendship, but it is the *knowledge* which belongs within the sphere of love and friendship. Paul, in passages like 1 Cor. viii. 2, 3, 1 Cor. xiii. 12, seems to hesitate to affirm such knowledge on man's part, while in this life. To know God, or rather to be known by Him, he would say. I shall hereafter fully know, as I was while in this life myself fully known. But John, with his tendency to abide in the soul's inmost living, and in his joyful experience of the growth of the soul in the society and under the influence of Jesus, feels that this knowledge is realized now — in its beginnings and its early stages indeed, but yet truly. The eternal life is begun already. The reality is already in possession of the soul; the growth towards the fulness is to be ever onward in the future. — 6. The necessity of obedience to the existence of this knowledge belongs to the relation of man to God as a creature under moral obligation, and is also connected with the fact that the light-life, in which is no darkness at all, is God's life. Man must, therefore, come into complete conformity of will with God, if he would enter into the completeness of the light-life. To pretend to know God, without obedience, is a contradiction in terms. The man who makes this pretence and claim is a liar, a person in whom the truth has no place.

7. The intimate and vital connection between love and knowledge, which is manifest everywhere as appertaining to this apostle's thought, is evident in this passage. The love of God (ver. 5) is, as Huther also affirms, love to God, the genitive being objective. When the Christian believer keeps the word, that is, when he keeps and fulfils the commandments of God, his love to God, in the union of friendship as between two souls, is perfected; and by means of this perfect obedience, manifesting, and growing out of, perfected love, we know that we are in Him in the inmost life of the soul. — 8. Ver. 6 turns the thought to Christ, and suggests that which lies at the foundation of the entire Epistle; namely, that, as Christ is the revelation to the world of the light-life in God, men must imitate Christ, and live after His way of living, and be in fellowship with Him, if they are to come into the possession of the life which God has. — 9. The verses from i. 5 to ii. 6 serve to show the relation in thought, if not indeed, also, in the date of the two books, between the Epistle and the Gospel. We have here most evidently, as it would seem, the truth which the apostle formulated as the result of his meditations on what Christianity had laid open to him. In the Gospel, on the other hand, we find what is set forth as the words of Christ in His conversations with His disciples and the people. If the latter is regarded as the record of what grew, in the progress of the writer's thinking, into the formulated thought, the most natural and simple account of the two books is given. But if we change the supposition, and make the Gospel grow out of, or find its foundation in, the Epistle, we have what is most improbable, not to say inexplicable, as the result.

XXXVI.

Vv. 7-11.

1. The view of Huther respecting the connection of these verses with those which precede seems to be correct: that in these verses we have a more particular statement of the nature and import of *τηρεῖν τὰς ἐντολάς αὐτοῦ* or of *περιπατεῖν καθὼς ἐκεῖνος περιπάτησε*. The close union between the love of God and the love of one's brother is central to the Johannean thought; and, by reason of this fact, a special prominence is given to the latter kind of love, as the fulfilment of the commands of God. This apostle had no idea of an inward life which had no outward forth-putting of itself in action. The true inward life was, in a certain sense, every thing to him. He meditated upon it, and watched its growth in himself, with intense interest. The light-life of the soul was, to his thought, the in-breathing, as it were, of the light-life of God, and was to be developed by communion with God and Christ. But this light-life was, in his conception, as truly as it could have been in that of any other of the apostles, a living, outgoing life. Love which loved no one, and was not ready to do good to any one, had nothing of the essence of love in it. The love of the soul to God proves itself by love to the brethren. — 2. This being the case, we may easily account for what seems, at the first sight, to be a somewhat abrupt turn at the beginning of ver. 7. But when it is borne in mind, that, in a sense, the central command of all is that of love, it cannot be considered strange, that, at this point, the apostle should pass from what he has said of the light-life, and of the way into it and in it, to this command. Moreover, it is to be remembered that he has called the thought of the reader to Christ in His relation to the opening of the new life and to the growth of the soul in it. It would seem not unnatural, therefore, that he should bring to their minds the command which Christ, at the time of His separating from His disciples, gave to them as the guide and ruling power of their future life. Love to one another because of and inspired by love to Him; love to one another, therefore, which would bring them into closest union with Him, and thus bring them into the life which He revealed to the world: this was the commandment which was at once new and old, and was the sum and centre of all commands.

3. The commandment here referred to is evidently that of love to one's brother. It is called *a new commandment* in ver. 8, and *not a new one* in ver. 7. The explanation of the latter expression is indicated by the closing words of the seventh verse. The command was *not new*, because, and in the sense that, the readers had heard it from the beginning of their knowledge of the Christian life. It was a part of the message which came to them from Christ, the revealer of the light-life, through the apostolic preachers. It was *new* in another sense. This seems, again, to be indicated by the words which form the latter part of ver. 8. It is new, in that, as it enters into human experience, and is realized in its fulfilment in each individual reader through the passing-away of the darkness, and the shining of the light for and in him, it becomes that new commandment for each one, which it was for the twelve when it was first given by Jesus. — 4. The antecedent of the neuter relative *ὃ* is the *ἐντολήν*. This commandment as true, that is, as realized in its fulfilment in Him and in you, — in Christ and His followers in their individual and successive experience, and thus in and through the union between Him and them, — is a new commandment. — 5. The relation of the *ὅτι* clause, in which *ὅτι*, no

doubt, means *because*, is to the $\delta \epsilon\sigma\tau\iota\nu$ clause which precedes. It is because the darkness is passing away, and the true light is already shining, that this commandment is fulfilled in the experience of Christ's followers as united with Himself. — 6. We find now, in vv. 9-11, another instance of the peculiar repetition of positive and negative sentences, or sentences which present the same idea on opposite sides, which has been already noticed, and is so characteristic of this Epistle and this writer. This repetition is evidently for the purpose of emphasis, centering, still more impressively than before, upon love to the Christian brother, what had been previously said of keeping the word and the commands of God. Comp. $\acute{o} \lambda\epsilon\gamma\omega\nu$ of this verse with the same expression in ver. 4, and also the other correspondences in the parallel verses 4-6 and 9-11. — 7. The phrase $\epsilon\omega\varsigma \acute{\upsilon}\rho\tau\iota$ seems to be added to the other words as emphatically calling attention to the fact, that up to the very moment (and at that moment) when the person says this, he is still completely outside of the light-life, and in the opposite sphere. On the other hand, the man who loves his brother has a permanent dwelling of the soul in the light. The apparently designed contrast between ver. 10 and ver. 11 seems to show that the last clauses of the two verses are intended to have a relation to each other. The figure in the closing part of ver. 12 is evidently like that in the words used by Jesus in John xii. 35, — the traveller who attempts to make his journey in the darkness, and who cannot see his pathway before him, and, therefore, does not know whither he is going. When the figure is transferred in its application to the spiritual condition of the man, of course the darkness belongs to the interior life; and so, in the opposite case (ver. 10), it is natural to say that the occasion of stumbling which would exist in the other condition does not exist *in him*. The occasion of stumbling is, strictly speaking, as Huther says, that which entices to sin.

XXXVII.

Vv. 12-14.

1. This passage is apparently of a transitional character in the movement from what precedes towards what follows, or of an introductory character as related to what follows. The former is perhaps the better light in which to view it. The message which is heard from Christ, and is announced to the readers, is that which relates to the light-life (i. 5 ff.). The way to the light-life is through the forgiveness of sins, and the cleansing by means of the blood of Jesus (i. 7, 9, ii. 1 f.). In order to the living this life in the light, we must keep the commandments of God (ii. 3 ff.). These commandments are, in a certain peculiar sense, centered and gathered up in the new command given by Jesus Himself, the command to love one another (ii. 7 ff.). To the carrying-out of this movement out of the darkness into the light, which is thus set forth, it is necessary that the love of the world should be put aside (ii. 15 ff.). The thought thus passes on continuously from i. 5, to ii. 17. In this continuous passage is inserted, just before the last section of it, the address, as we may call it, to the readers, which covers these verses now under consideration (12-14).

2. In this address to the readers, the following points are especially worthy of notice: (a) The classes of persons addressed are the same in the two parts of the passage, except so far as the change of the word $\tau\epsilon\kappa\nu\acute{\iota}\alpha$ (ver. 12) to $\pi\alpha\iota\delta\acute{\iota}\alpha$ (ver. 13 c) may possibly indicate a change of persons. The probability, how-

ever, is that no such change is indicated. The correspondence in the other cases tends to show that the same persons are intended here. The same thing is implied by the use of *παῖδια* in ver. 18, which apparently has the same sense, substantially, and is used of the same persons, as *τεκνία*, in other parts of the Epistle. — (b) The persons intended by these two words are probably the whole body of Christian readers, whom the writer addresses. This is indicated, *first*, by the fact that both words, as elsewhere used by this apostle, both in his Epistle and his Gospel, have reference to believers, without regard to the question of age. It is indicated, *secondly*, by the fact to which Alford calls attention, that the three terms in each case are arranged in an order which is neither that of ascending nor descending age — children, fathers, young men. — (c) The distinction in meaning between *τεκνία* and *παῖδια* may lie in the fact, that the former is a word bearing in itself more of the element of tenderness or affection. Westcott thinks that the former word carries in it the idea of kinsmanship, the latter that of subordination. John speaks in the use of the former, he says, as sharing the nature of those to whom he writes; in the use of the latter, as placed in a position of authority over them. This is possible, but doubtful. Such a distinction can hardly be insisted upon in John xxi. 5, as compared with John xiii. 33. Moreover, there would seem to be no special reason for such a change of words in these sentences, which convey substantially the same idea in all other respects. Perhaps the change is a mere rhetorical one. — (d) The two forms of the verb *γράφειν* (aorist and present) are, not improbably, best explained by Huther. They are substantially repetitions of the same thought, as we may believe, in view of the general character of the verses. But they are possibly to be accounted for in connection with the epistolary use of the aorist, as related to the present, after the manner suggested by Düsterdieck; the present referring to the immediate act of writing, the aorist to the reader's act of reading when complete, and both referring to the whole Epistle. — (e) There can be no doubt that in the words *fathers* and *young men*, the apostle intends to address the older and younger members of the Christian body. The two classes are included in the term *τεκνία* or *παῖδια*; these words being words of affection, as from an apostle and chief leader of the church. — (f) The reasons given for writing, in the several cases, do not pass beyond the limits of a particular circle of thought and expression. With respect to the *τεκνία* and *παῖδια*, we find two expressions: *because your sins have been forgiven you*, and *because you know the Father*. These two things, the forgiveness of sins, and the knowledge of the Father, are connected together, in that the former is the entrance-way into the Christian life, and the latter is the essence of it (as viewed from the standpoint of John, with reference to the truth that God is light) and also in that they both come to the soul through Christ. The apostle addresses his letter, which contains that central truth which he had himself learned from Christ, to all his Christian readers, because they have gained entrance into the new life, and are living in its atmosphere and its light. They have already come to the knowledge of God, and are abiding in it. — (g) The division into older and younger, which is indicated by *πατέρες* and *νεανίσκοι*, is a not unnatural one, and is suggested in the writings of other N. T. writers. If this Epistle was written as late as the year 80 or 90, there must of course have been many believers among the Christian company, to whom its author was writing, who were advanced in years, as well as many who were young. The fathers are spoken of, both in ver. 13 and ver. 14, as knowing *τὸν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς*. There can be no doubt that by this phrase the apostle means Christ. There

can be no reasonable doubt, as it would seem, that the words *from the beginning* have the same sense here as in i. 1, and thus that the eternal existence of the Son is referred to. That this knowledge is predicated of the fathers, while the young men are spoken of as having overcome or conquered the evil one, is in itself an indication that the apostle means by it a full knowledge, such as belongs to the fully developed state of the Christian life. It is not merely true, in their case, that they have overcome the evil one, and given the word of God an abiding-place in their hearts; but the conflict is long since over, and they are now living in the more complete development of the life which consists in the knowledge of God, and of Jesus Christ His Son. — (h) In the second allusion to the young men, two clauses are added: *because you are strong, and the word of God abides in you*. The word *strong* here denotes spiritual strength, but is doubtless connected with the idea of strength as characteristic of youth. “The young soldier,” says Westcott, “is strong as having the personal qualifications for his work; and the word of God abideth, etc., so that he is in living contact with the source of life.”

XXXVIII.

Vv. 15-17.

1. These verses are closely connected with those which precede; and, if the explanation suggested above is correct, they form the closing part of the passage, in the midst of which vv. 12-14 are inserted by way of transition. To the fulfilment of the commands of God, and the great duty of love, — to the carrying forward and perfecting of that life which opens with forgiveness, and moves on in the sphere of the knowledge of God, — it is essential that the love of the world should cease. — 2. The world, as the expression is here used, evidently means the world conceived of as apart from God, and as drawing away thought and love from Him, when it draws thought and love towards itself. This is evident from ver. 15*b*, which declares that the love of the world, when dwelling in the soul, excludes from the soul the love of God. It is also evident from ver. 16. This latter verse indicates, that by the expression: *the world*, the apostle means those things, like the vainglory of life, which especially excite the desires of men, and turn them from the service and love of God. It will be noticed that ver. 16 is connected with ver. 15 by *ὅτι*; and thus the fact that every thing like the vainglory, etc., is not of the Father, is made a proof of what goes before. This relation of the sentences is decisive of the writer's meaning.

3. The things which the apostle selects as representative of *πᾶν τὸ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ* are evidently indicative of what is in his mind; but it is scarcely to be supposed that he means to cover the whole of worldly human desire by the words, or that he is particularly careful to make accurate divisions into kinds or classes of desire. His object is rather to make clear to the reader what is the character of those things which he refers to under the head of *the world*. This is not a place for critical distinctions, but for combined and total impression. The genitives *σαρκός* and *ὀφθαλμῶν* are both of them subjective genitives, as Huther says, and present the flesh and the eyes as the source of the desires. The flesh is the fleshly or carnal nature opposed to God, and is the most general word here used. It would seem almost impossible to take *the flesh*, in this place, in any other sense than that in which John uses it, elsewhere, in its contrast to the spiritual and divine life. The eyes must be connected with the matter of seeing,

and thus the desires here alluded to are those which come from seeing, and they are desires for the things seen. The vainglory of life apparently (the word being derived from *ἀλαζων*, which contains the idea of boasting or bragging) seems to refer to that pomp, power, distinction of any sort, belonging to the earthly and outward life, in connection with which a man becomes filled with pride, and a sense of exaltation above others about him. This vainglory of life, and the things which are seen by the eye, make up a large share of that which fills the hearts and hopes of the men of the world, so far as they are raised above mere animal desire and passion. Of this latter sort of desire and passion, the apostle is probably not speaking in this passage. His thought is of the life of the soul in its higher regions, as we may say; and his question as to the true life is, whether the man is animated by that love which goes out towards God, or, on the other hand, by that love which goes out towards the higher (rather than the lowest) things which belong to the world. The desire for these higher things of the world (and not only that for the lowest) is, as opposed to the love of God, the desire of *the flesh*; and it is not *from* (having its source in) the Father, but *from* the world. What is said in these few sentences is presented as setting forth what, in the view of the writer of this note, is the true meaning and thought of these phrases and of the passage in which they occur. The note of Huther is worthy of careful reading. —4. The statement of ver. 17, “And the world is passing away,” is an added thought, simply joined by *καί* with what precedes, but it seems to give an additional reason for not loving the world and the things in it. The suggestion of Huther, that this expression has reference to the thought of the *parousia* as near at hand, is favored by ver. 18 and ver. 28, if these verses are to be interpreted as suggesting this thought. If the N. T. writers had this idea of the nearness of Christ’s second coming, all thoughts of the passing away of the present condition of things must have had a peculiarly deep impressiveness to their minds, which, so far as this point is concerned, is unknown to us. But whether John had this thought of the nearness of the *parousia*, or not, we must believe, that to a mind like his, which dwelt so much upon the soul’s life, and so little upon the outward life in comparison with it, the fact that the world, and the desires to which it gives rise, are passing by and passing away, must have been deeply impressive. This fact made the great distinction, in his view of the matter, between the inner and the outer life, between that Divine friendship into which he had himself entered long since, and the giving-up of the soul to the desire of those things which are in the world, and which make up, in a sense, the idea of the world. —5. The last clause of ver. 17 sets forth the opposite idea to that of the first part. But now we have the personal form: *He that does the will of God abides for ever*. In this clause, two points may be noticed: *First*, that there is a return at the end of the paragraph to the idea of doing the commandments of God, the sum of what He wills, *His will*; and, *secondly*, that the introduction of the personal form is most natural here, as the mind of John was dwelling, first of all, and last of all, on personal life. Not simply does the doing of God’s will lead to eternal life, but he that does it continues in his personal life for ever.

XXXIX.

Vv. 18-25.

1. At this point, the apostle turns to a warning against the many antichrists who have already appeared. The connection of this passage with what goes before may be noticed, with reference to the general progress of the thought, and also with respect to the immediate relation of the sentences. In the latter respect, the connection is evidently with ver. 17. The thought of the world as passing away leads to the thought of the last hour as present. In the former point of view, the exhortation to avoid the love of the world, as essential to the fulfilling of the commands of God, easily brings to mind the suggestion of the antichrists who impersonate the worldly spirit in its opposition to God. After setting forth what the antichrists are, in contrast to the true believers, he urges the readers, in the last verses of the chapter, to abide in Christ, and thus to be prepared, in their inner life, to meet Him, at His coming, with joy and confidence, and not with shame. The thought thus moves forward, in a direct progress, from the preceding chapter towards the following one. — 2. The expression *the last hour* is kindred to *the last days*, *the end of these days*, etc., found elsewhere. It has, perhaps, some connection, in John's use of it, with the word *ᾠρα*, which is frequently used in his Gospel, where it refers to the time of Christ's death. This usage of John, as well as the definiteness in the word itself, would seem to give the word a more limited and particular reference than the other expressions alluded to have, and thus to indicate that the apostle looked upon the period or time to which he refers as the final critical season before the end. The precise reference will be determined according to the view which may be held with respect to the idea of the apostles concerning the time of the second coming. If John looked for the coming at an early day, the expression *the last hour* will, of course, have a peculiar force and emphasis. Huther takes this view, as also do many other commentators.

3. The term *antichrist* occurs only in this Epistle, and the Second Epistle of John, but the person or power indicated by it appears elsewhere. As Huther remarks, the same person is undoubtedly referred to here, who is spoken of in 2 Thess. ii. 3 as the man of sin. The reader may be referred to the notes of Meyer on 2 Thess. ii. 3 ff., and also to the Additional Notes in the Amer. ed. of Meyer, for suggestions on this subject. It is evident from John's statement, as it is from Paul's, that the N. T. writers either looked upon the antichrist as a particular person, or that they personified the enmity and opposition, which, arising in and going out from the Church, in the way of apostasy, was, in their view, to appear not long before the Lord's second coming, — the great consummation of evil in its assault upon the kingdom of God. This great personage, or development of evil, was to be immediately preceded, it would seem, by other and minor developments in the same line, and preparing the way for it; and many of these, the apostle here says, had already appeared. The characteristic feature of these many antichrists must be regarded as that which also belongs to the one great antichrist himself, namely, the denial that Jesus is the Christ. They take the position which is fundamentally opposed to the Christian system and doctrine. — 4. The appearance of these many immediate precursors of the antichrist proves that the last hour has come. The language here used can hardly be explained, except by supposing that John believed some great crisis to be already at hand, and some great movement or event in the triumph of the Divine kingdom to lie in the immediate future, which should, at least in some

sense, be the coming of the Lord. This Epistle being written in his advanced life, perhaps in his extreme old age, the nearness of the great event was impressed deeply upon his mind. The correspondence between this passage and Matt. xxiv. 24, etc., seems to indicate what the idea of the apostle was with regard to the coming, and that which should precede it. — 5. These persons, to whom the writer alludes as having already appeared, are declared to have gone out from the church. This statement would seem to imply, that, in some marked degree and manner, they had separated themselves from the body of true believers. The same is indicated, also, by the *μεμενήκεισαν* of the following sentence. — 6. The simplest construction of *ἀλλ' ἵνα* is that which is first given by Huther in his note, the *ἵνα* being made dependent on *ἐξῆλθαν* to be supplied after *ἵνα*. This *ἵνα* carries with it the idea of the Divine purpose.

7. Ver. 20 is probably to be taken, with Huther, as preparatory to what follows, rather than as in contrast with what precedes, although a certain element of contrast may be indicated by *ὑμεῖς*. The apostle calls the attention of the readers to the fact that, as true Christian believers, they have the anointing which consists in the gift of the Holy Spirit; and that, being led into all the truth by Him, they know all things within its limits. He reminds them, also, that of course, as fundamental to the idea of knowing the truth, they know that *no lie is of the truth*. The fact of their possession of this knowledge, not their want of it, is the ground of his writing to them respecting the antichrists, etc. The *holy one* mentioned in ver. 20 is probably Christ (John xvi. 7). — 8. Ver. 22. By the question, *Who is the liar?* the apostle presents the central point of opposition to the Divine truth, and introduces the attitude of these false teachers towards Christ as directly hostile to, and contradictory of, the essential Christian teaching. To deny that Jesus is the Christ, is to deny the whole truth of Christianity, and to set one's self outside of the revelation of the eternal life. Westcott says, "The phrase by which St. John describes the master-falsehood as the 'denial that Jesus is the Christ,' itself marks the progress of Christian thought. In the earliest stage of the Church, the words would have expressed a denial of the Messiahship of Jesus from the Jewish point of view. They now answer to a later form of opinion. A common 'Gnostic' theory was that 'the æon Christ' descended upon the man Jesus at his baptism, and left Him before the passion. Those who held such a doctrine denied that 'Jesus was the Christ;' and in so denying, denied the union of the Divine and human in one person. This heresy St. John signalizes here." Undoubtedly, at the time of John's writing, the foreshadowings, or early beginnings, of Gnosticism, were manifest, and against such ideas John directed his words. But the words which he here uses contain in themselves, and independent of all changes of ideas on the part of adversaries, the fundamental thought of the Christian doctrine: Jesus is the Christ. The man who denies this, is outside of the Christian system. He who, in the full and wide meaning of the word, confesses it, is a Christian. — 9. The apostle connects this denial that Jesus is the Christ, immediately with the denial of the Son and the Father. The central and vital relation of the belief that Jesus is the Christ, to the union of the soul with God, which is the idea of life in the Johannean thought, is brought out in the closing sentence of ver. 22; and the essential and intimate connection between the confession or denial of the Son, and the inward possession of the Father as the life-power of the soul, is set forth in ver. 23. In the immediate relation of ver. 23 to ver. 22*b*, the former (ver. 23) is a ground justifying the statement of the latter (ver. 22*b*).

10. These verses, in respect to denial and confession, are followed by an exhortation addressed to the readers. The word *ὑμεῖς* (ver. 24) has the same emphasis in the way of contrast as in ver. 20. *That which you heard from the beginning*: This refers evidently, in the connection in which the words stand, to that fundamental truth, here alluded to, which had been made known to them by the apostle in his preaching; that is, the truth of Jesus as the Christ, the Son of God, and of the light-life (the union of the soul with God) as secured through believing in Him. He exhorts the readers to let this truth abide within them; and assures them that, if it does abide thus, they will themselves abide in the Son and in the Father. The relation of the Epistle to the Gospel of John is seen in such passages as this. We find, in the Epistle, the doctrine and truth as it had dwelt and worked in the writer's mind; in the Gospel, the sayings of Jesus during His lifetime, on which the doctrine rested, and in which it was first set forth. — 11. The reference in *αὐτῆ* of ver. 25, seems to be to the assurance just given in the verb *μενεῖτε*: You shall abide in the Son and in the Father, if that which you heard from the beginning abides in you. Of this I give you a solemn assurance, and I am authorized so to do, for: This permanent abiding in the Father and the Son is the very thing which Jesus Himself promised us, and the very thing which he meant by *eternal life*. Interpreted in this way, the verse forms a most fitting close to the succession of verses at the end of which it stands; and the explanation of the paragraph, or half-paragraph, opened by *ταῦτα ἔγραψα* of ver. 26, is most simple and natural. The break in connection, and the necessary supply of something as an intermediate thought, which Huther admits as involved in his interpretation (making *αὐτῆ* refer to *ζωὴν αἰώνιον*, and the sense to be: "eternal life is the promise which He has given us"), are strong and, as it seems to the writer of this note, decisive arguments against Huther's view.

XL.

Vv. 26-28.

1. These verses form a conclusion to the preceding section, which began with ver. 18; and they take up anew, and press upon the mind of the readers, the thoughts which have been suggested, — that of the antichrists, that of the anointing from the Holy One, that of abiding in Christ, and that of the coming of Christ, which follows after "the last hour." — 2. The antichrists are here spoken of as *οἱ πλανῶντες*, that is, they are viewed from the side of their influence on the Church, rather than that of their denial that Jesus is the Christ. In contrast to them, their attempted work and position, the readers are once more spoken of with reference to the anointing with the Holy Spirit which they had received. As this impartation of the Spirit, and the guidance into the knowledge of the truth, which results from it, remain with them as their permanent possession, they do not need to be taught by another teacher; they only need to be reminded of the fact of the appearance and working of the antichrists, that they may see them in their true character, and may refuse to yield to their misleading influence. On the contrary, as this anointing which comes by the gift of Christ, i. e., the Holy Spirit, teaches them with that complete and perfect truthfulness in which there is no intermingling at all of what is false, they will surely abide in Christ, not being led astray from Him. The entire part of the sentence following *ἀλλὰ* of ver. 27, from *ὡς* to *ἐδίδαξαν*, is to be regarded as the protasis, *μενεῖτε* being the apodosis, and the simplest explanation of the

καθὼς ἐδίδαξεν is, that it is added to indicate that what is continually taught by the anointing is the same thing which was taught from the beginning, from the time when the gift of the Spirit was first made. — 3. As to the question of the reading at the end of ver. 27, — whether *μενεῖτε* or *μένετε*, — the oldest authorities are unanimous in favor of the latter, and it is now generally adopted. If this is the true text, the verb is to be regarded, with Huther, as an indicative. The apostle affirms in this verse, and exhorts in the next. He affirms here (making his statement in a general present), as true of the readers, that which must necessarily, and will certainly, be true of them when they are viewed as fully possessed of the Spirit, and under His teaching and guiding influence. — 4. The *μένετε* of ver. 28 is clearly an imperative; for the apostle now turns to an exhortation, with a view to the result which he hopes for in the future, *ἵνα, κ.τ.λ.* — 5. The weight of authorities is such that we must adopt *ἔάν*, rather than *ὅταν*, as the true reading; and this reading may perhaps indicate that the apostle thought of the coming as possibly, or not improbably, near at hand, — in case it takes place while we are still in the earthly life, to which the exhortation *μένετε* applies. It may, however, be only the *ἔάν* which merely puts the supposition in a less positive form than *εἰ*.

XLI.

VER. 29—CHAPTER III. 10*a*.

1. Huther and many commentators think that a new leading section of the Epistle begins with ver. 29, and this seems to be the fact. The new life is the life of righteousness. This thought has been suggested before, in connection with the keeping of the commandments of God. The special development of righteousness in the matter of love to one's brother has also been hinted at. But the apostle now proceeds to a more direct and full unfolding of the idea, and connects it with the thought of the sonship to God, in which the Christian grows continually more and more into the Divine likeness. — 2. *If ye know that he is righteous*: This conditional sentence takes up the idea of *knowing the truth*, which has been predicated of the Christian, and puts forth a fundamental element of this knowledge. In case you know this fundamental truth, says the apostle, — and this you should and must know, if you are truly taught by the Holy Spirit, — *you also know* (or, taking the verb as an imperative, *know ye*, be assured) *that every one that doeth righteousness is begotten of Him*. The light-life in man springs from, and is in the likeness of, the light-life in God. This sentence contains, thus, a statement and declaration which the writer makes the foundation of what he has to urge upon the readers in the following verses.

CHAPTER III.

3. Following upon the declaration of the truth, that the one who does righteousness is begotten of God (ii. 29), we find an expression of wonder and thankfulness in view of the love of God, which gives to man this relation to Himself. This is the substance of ver. 1, when it is viewed with reference to its words and the form of the sentence; and to give expression to these feelings, was undoubtedly the primary object in writing the words. But in the development of the main thought, in its progress from ver. 29 onward, this

verse calls attention to the fact that we are children of God, as preparatory to the setting-forth of the idea of our growth, as children, into the complete likeness of God. And this idea is presented with especial reference to the end, when the consummation shall be realized, in order that the legitimate influence of the hope of this consummation on the growth of the soul in righteousness, and its movement away from sin, may be pressed upon the reader. — 4. The character of the expression, as one of wonder and thankfulness, is distinctly seen in its form and words. The desire to give forth such an expression determines the abruptness of the sentence, and the use of *ιδετε*. The use of *τέκνα*, instead of *υἱός*, which occurs also elsewhere in John, is natural here, because the idea is related immediately to the *γεννηθῆναι* of ii. 29. Comp. John i. 12. It is the child-relationship, which is connected with birth, that is at the foundation of this whole passage. — 5. The word *called* here does not signify, to have the name of, without being in reality what we are called; but it means simply that we have this name bestowed upon us. The emphasis on the *ἵσμεν*, for the purpose of which it is added to the sentence, is not, therefore, that of *being*, as opposed to *being called* without *being*, but that of confident affirmation of the fact, on the foundation of which the name is given to us. — 6. The last sentence of ver. 1 corresponds with thoughts and statements contained in Christ's language, as given in the Gospel of John. This sentence, though not expressed in the form directly adapted to this end, really sets forth a confirmation of the truth of the *καὶ ἴσμεν*. That we are the children of God, is proved by the fact that the sinful world, which lives in the sphere of the darkness, does not recognize and apprehend us in our life, as it did not recognize and apprehend Him. This incapacity of the world to apprehend our life, shows that we have a life outside of its sphere, — the light-life, which is beyond the limits of the darkness.

7. The word *αὐτόν* must, almost necessarily, refer to God, because of the connection with the preceding sentence. This word seems likewise to govern, by its meaning and reference, the words *αὐτῷ*, *αὐτόν*, and *ἐκείνος* in vv. 2, 3, and also to determine the question as to the subject of *φανερωθῆ* of ver. 2, — at least, if that verb should be understood as having a personal subject, which is probably the correct view. All these words must point to God, not Christ. The true explanation of this matter is, as we may believe, after the following manner: The underlying thought of the Epistle, as we have seen, is that of the life of the human soul as coming into the likeness of, and participation in, the life of God, — the life in which there is no darkness at all. The turning of the soul towards the growth of its life into and in this likeness is, therefore, what is constantly before the writer's mind. The *eternal life* is this life in likeness to, and union with God. God is thus the one who occupies the central and first place in the whole development of the thought. Christ is the one who brings the message respecting this life of God, and reveals it. It is through Christ that we attain to the life, by believing in Him, and imitating Him, and growing into His likeness. But the consummation at the end, like the first beginning, is the possession of the life of God, the light-life. This life is to be perfected, we know not precisely in what manner, through the clearer and more perfect manifestation of God, which will take place hereafter, and through the fact that, by seeing Him as He is, we shall become in the more perfect sense like Him. God is thus naturally the one who is made most prominent everywhere; and He is, for the reason indicated, presented as the subject of thought here. The word *φανερωθῆ*, which, under ordinary circumstances, would more naturally be used of the manifestation of Christ, as in ii. 28, is thus here used

with reference to God. The revelation of the future is, according to the underlying thought of the Epistle, the revelation and manifestation of God.

8. The use of the verb *φανερῶθῆ* is to be observed in its connection with *ἐφανερῶθη* of the preceding sentence, and *φανερῶθῆ* of ii. 28. Its connection with the former may be regarded as showing that the idea of clear revelation is contained in it, and its connection with the latter apparently suggests the thought that this clear revelation will be made, or at least begin, at the *parousia*. The employment of the word to denote the more complete manifestation of God, as the fulness of the light-life, is readily accounted for in the light of this relation to the context. — 9. Huther, Haupt, Alford, and other commentators, regard *τί ἐσόμεθα* (*it*) as the subject of *φανερῶθῆ*. This would correspond with the subject of the preceding *ἐφανερῶθη*, but the sense of the passage would thus seem not to be in accordance with the suggestion of the context. This suggestion is, that hereafter we shall be like Him: this we know, although we do not know precisely what we shall be. To make this knowledge, or this likeness, dependent on the fact of the making manifest to us precisely what we shall be, is outside of the line of thought, and such an idea would seem to carry an improbability in itself. The whole progress of the Christian life, in John's idea of it, is *one thing*, the development in the likeness of God. The future is not to be different from the present, except in the circumstances of the living, and the measure of the development. We know, therefore, that our life is to be this development, independently of any future manifestation as to precisely what we shall be. — The thought, then, which fills the apostle's mind and heart, is this: that we are children of God, and are to be so forever. We do not know, indeed, what may be our condition in every respect, or what precisely we shall be in the future time, which is beyond the limits of the present life; but we do (now) know that, if He shall be manifested, we shall be like Him in the more full and complete sense, for we shall see Him more fully and completely as He is. — 10. The particle *νῦν* of ver. 2 is the temporal particle, the *now* being contrasted with the future indicated by the *not yet*. The fact that we are now children of God is the great fact which carries with it the essential life of the future, leaving only the question as to precisely what we shall be, in our new condition and circumstances hereafter, in uncertainty. — 11. The likeness to God, of which the apostle speaks, *must be realized* in the soul of the one who, being already a child of God, shall hereafter see Him as He is, for he has within him that principle of life which only needs the seeing in order to the likeness. In this way John himself, as we see in his Gospel, grew into the likeness of Jesus by seeing Him, and so into the likeness of God. The seeing is represented as the condition, not the consequence, of the likeness, and this representation accords with the Johannean idea throughout. — 12. The question raised by some writers as to the possibility of seeing God the Father, as connected with the words: No man hath seen or can see God, — is one which does not properly arise here. The expressions have reference to that spiritual comprehension of the light-life of God, which is, according to all indications in the N. T., revealed in heaven to the saints. As Alford says, "The incapacity to behold the Creator," in the sense in which this incapacity is declared in some passages kindred to the one referred to, "does not prevent the vision, as far as it can reach, being clear and unclouded; being, to the utmost extent of which our glorified nature is capable, *ὡς ἐστίν*, a true and not a false vision of God."

13. Ver. 3 forms a transition from vv. 1, 2, to ver. 5 ff., and thus brings the thought back to the opening of this section, ii. 29. The hope of such a sight of

God, and such a likeness to Him, naturally works in every one who has it, to the end of making him purify himself, that is to say, cleanse himself from every polluting power and influence, and bring himself more and more into the likeness of the Divine purity. — 14. *Καθὼς ἐκεῖνος ἄγνός ἐστιν.* The word *ἐκεῖνος* here is referred by Huther and most interpreters to Christ. This corresponds with ii. 6, where there is a similar change of pronouns, *αὐτός* and *ἐκεῖνος*. There would seem to be no serious difficulty in supposing that the writer turns in his thought here from God to Christ (indicating the change of subject by the change of pronouns), and particularly when it is considered that the revelation of God's purity is in and through Christ, in so far as it is made to the man who is purifying himself during the period of the hope spoken of. The close relation of Christ to God, and the fact that Christ reveals the *ζωὴ αἰώνιος*, must be borne in mind in all our interpretation of passages like this. No doubt, the author passed without difficulty from the one thought to the other, and had in his mind, as a combined idea, *God in Christ*, so that he could easily make one prominent at one time, and, not long afterwards, give a similar prominence to the other. It is in this way, if the explanation advocated above is correct, that the author's thought passes, in connection with the verb *φανερώω*, from Christ, as the subject in ii. 28, to God, as the subject in iii. 2, and again to Christ in iii. 5. Such changes are incidental to the development of the thoughts which form the basis of the Epistle, and are specially characteristic of this author. — 15. The object of ver. 4 ff., as related to the verses immediately preceding, is to give prominence to the idea of the necessity of purifying one's self, as set forth in ver. 3, by presenting the incompatibility of the opposite course with that seeing and knowing the Divine life, as manifested in Christ, which is the essence of the light-life. As related to ii. 29, these verses, 4 ff., add emphasis to the thought which underlies that verse, — namely, that righteousness is necessary to the idea of sonship to God, — by showing what the opposite of righteousness is, and the irreconcilability of this opposite with the character of Christ, and the life in Him. The verses have thus a twofold relation; but, in each of the two connections, they express substantially the same idea, and point to the same end. — 16. The word *ἀνομία*, as here employed, means violation of law, and the law which the apostle has in mind is, apparently, that law of God which is universal in its application, and is designed to govern the whole man and the whole life. It is not the Mosaic law, but, so far as related to that law, it is the Mosaic law spiritualized, i. e., carried into the inmost feelings and thoughts of the soul, and extended over every movement of the inner man. It is the law which sets forth the idea of righteousness given by Christ in Matt. v. 17 ff., and elsewhere in His teachings. Sin is violation of this law, and every one who "does sin," instead of "doing righteousness," does what is a violation of it. A man who does sin, therefore, — who violates the divinely given law of life, — cannot be begotten of God in the spiritual sense; he cannot be a child of God.

17. Ver. 5 is introduced as confirming what is said in the preceding verse, by calling the readers' attention to the fundamental and well-known truth of Christ's mission in this regard, and also of His personal life. *And you know*, the apostle says. The *and* connects this well-known fact with the proposition of the preceding verse, which rests upon the contrariety of sin and righteousness. *He was manifested*, etc., — the very object of His appearance in the flesh, and of the manifestation of God in Him, was that He might take away sins; and His character was in complete consistency with His work, — *in Him was no sin*. — 18. The relation of ver. 6 to ver. 5, though it is not expressed in this way by

an inferential particle, such as *ὅτι*, is that of a conclusion. If sin is violation of the Divine law, and if Christ came to take away sins, and in Him personally sin had no dwelling-place, it follows that the one who abides in Him does not sin, and, on the other hand, that the one who sins does not abide in Him, — has not even seen Him, or known Him. This is true of every one, in each of the two opposite cases. — The relation of the verbs *see* and *know* is probably to be explained in accordance with what has been already indicated as the thought of John. As he himself lived in the society and friendship of Jesus and came to know Him, in the true sense, by seeing Him (and thus the seeing and knowing have reference to the inward life of Jesus); so his idea of the knowledge of Christ, and of God, is the idea of a knowledge which comes from the contemplation of the Divine life. The man who sins — so far is he from abiding in Christ — has not even seen Him in this inward and true sense, and has not attained, as yet, to that knowledge of Him which comes by seeing, and is essential to abiding. — 19. After the development of the thought thus far, the apostle returns to the thought of ii. 29, pressing it still more solemnly upon their attention: Little children, let no man lead you astray in this matter; the man who doeth righteousness, and he only, is righteous. The inward life must put forth its vital energy and force in the doing of righteousness; if it does not, it is not, in John's view, the true inward life at all. Much as he dwelt upon the inner life, and much as he dwelt within his own inner life, he contemplated it only as a life having in itself this vital energy. And so he again sets forth the negative statement corresponding with this positive one, that he may give the latter yet more emphasis, — he that doeth sin is of the Devil. — 20. *Even as He is righteous.* The comparison here is probably with reference to the reality of righteous character and living, and not to the measure and degree of righteousness. The man who does righteousness has the life-principle of righteousness within him, even as God has. The man who "does sin," on the other hand, is of the Devil; that is, his inner life-principle has its origin in the Devil, who, in his whole life, moves and acts in the sphere of sin even from the beginning.

21. The last clause of ver. 8 is added as impressing the thought still further: The very purpose for which the Son of God was manifested was, that He might destroy the works of the Devil. The Christian idea of righteousness must, therefore, be in accordance with what has been said in this passage. — 22. The statement of ver. 9a is substantially what has been previously indicated, but it is put in the reverse order. This new order of arrangement is due, no doubt, to the statement of ver. 8a. As the one who commits sin is of the Devil, so he who is begotten of God does not commit sin. The fundamental cause of this not sinning is presented in the *ὅτι* clause; it is because the life-giving principle received from God, which is exclusive of sin and which is the principle of righteousness, abides in such a man. If it does not dwell in him, the divinely given life is not there. And, as showing this more emphatically, the words are added: And he cannot sin, because he is begotten of God. The *cannot* here is that which appertains to the new life within the man; so far as that life and life-principle are concerned, the continuance of sin is impossible. This is the very fact and ground on which the question, who are the children of God, and who are the children of the Devil, is determined. The sin-destroying life element in the former, and its outworking into action, make manifest the child-relationship to God. The absence of all this, and the presence of the opposite, show forth the similar relationship to the Devil.

XLII.

Vv. 10b-24.

1. The additional idea found in this passage is brotherly love. As he desires to speak of this particularly, the apostle unites it with what precedes by repeating, in the negative form, the proposition just made respecting righteousness, *whosoever doeth not righteousness is not of God*; and then adds—concentrating thereby, upon this point, the main thought of the reader—*and he who loveth not his brother*. Brotherly love, therefore, is given the same prominence in the great matter of righteousness here as in chap. ii. (comp. ii. 7-11).—2. Ver. 11 gives the proof of ver. 10b: Because, etc. It is because this is the message sent from God to men in and through Jesus Christ,—the Divine message which the readers had heard from the beginning. The readers had heard this message or announcement as a continuous tradition, and as a fact of the Christian preaching ever since the evening of the Last Supper, when Jesus uttered these words in the presence of the eleven faithful disciples. The message which the writer and his fellow-apostles had heard from Jesus, as the incarnate Logos revealing the *ζωὴ αἰώνιος*, was that God is light, and in Him is no darkness at all. The central element of the light-life is love. In the sphere of righteousness, therefore, which is the outworking and result of the light-life, love is the primary thing; the command to love one another is (ii. 7-11) the sum of all commandments. The man who does not have brotherly love, therefore, is truly declared to be no child of God, because he has not taken into himself the foundation-message from heaven, in this its central element. He is animated by an opposite spirit, and inspired by an opposite life-principle, after the manner of Cain. The Divine message is not of such a feeling, or action, as this: *not as Cain was of the evil one, and slew his brother*. To this statement is added the reason of the slaying; or, if we express it in other words, the life-principle out of which the act sprang is set forth as showing the complete contrast to the life-principle of which the message speaks. Cain's works were evil, Abel's righteous; by reason of this fact, recognized by the former, the hatred which ended in murder entered his soul.

3. The verses 10a-12 inclusive are introductory to 13 ff., in which the matter of brotherly love is presented in its wider relations and contrasts. The hatred of the world is a thing to be expected, and not to be wondered at; for the life-principle in the world is the same with that which was in this first murderer of the O. T. history. This life-principle will inevitably work out into feeling and action; it will lead to hatred of the brother, and thus to that which lies at the basis of the act of murder; and it will lead to such hatred, because the works of those who have this life-principle are evil, while those of the men who have the divine life-principle are righteous, and because this fact is recognized by the world. So true is this, and so little reason is there for wonder at the world's hatred, that, on the other hand, the very ground of our knowledge that we have passed out of death, darkness, the sphere of the world, into the light, is the fact that love of the brethren has found its dwelling-place in our hearts. So soon as this love thus finds its dwelling-place within us, we have passed out of death into life; the result is already accomplished; the eternal life is begun. The apostle emphasizes his thought here, as in other places, by repeating it in different forms: *He that loveth not abideth in death. Whosoever hateth his brother is a murderer; and ye know that no murderer hath eternal life abiding*

in him. — 4. The fact, that, in the story in Genesis, the reason for the murder indicated in ver. 12 is not distinctly set forth, need occasion no difficulty here. The mere facts are given in the O. T. record. The historian had this as his object. But the apostle, with his tendency to penetrate the inward life, goes beneath the facts and the act to discover the cause, and this becomes plain to him as he looks for it in and through the facts. What he thus does with respect to the case of Cain is in accordance with that penetration into the heart which is manifested in ver. 15. It is also akin to that which Jesus does as He carries the several provisions of the Mosaic system, in the Sermon on the Mount, into their application to the earliest and inmost feeling of the soul, which finally develops into the outward act.

5. In ver. 16, the passage passes to a new half-paragraph, and the writer declares that we reach our knowledge, our true apprehension of love, in the sphere of the fact that Christ laid down His life for us. This greatest manifestation of love shows what love is; and the movement of the Christian life, when we see this manifestation, and learn the lesson of it, is to imitate the love thus exhibited, and, in this way, to make it truly and effectively our own.

— 6. The true explanation of the words, *we ought to lay down our lives for the brethren*, is to be found in connection with the seventeenth verse, which speaks of having compassion upon and helping those who are in need. The highest possible exhibition of love is placed in close connection with one of the common cases of ordinary life; and we must believe that this is in order to cover, as it were, the whole sweep of love; not to make *laying down one's life for another* a frequent duty, or a test of love, but to point, with emphasis, from this possible duty of extreme self-sacrifice to the urgent and constant duty of self-sacrifice and loving service in the minor things.

7. We may believe that there is a close connection of thought between the end of ver. 17 and the first part of ver. 16. If Christ, who came into the world to reveal the Divine life and life-principle, gave the great and final manifestation of them by laying down His life for us, it must be impossible that in the heart of him who has not even the compassion referred to in ver. 17, the love of God can have found its dwelling-place. *The love of God* is understood here by Huther to mean *love to God*; so Haupt, Alford, and others. This view is supported by iv. 20. Westcott regards it as "the love of which God is at once the object, and the author, and the pattern." If we are to consider the present context only, it would seem to the writer of this note that the genitive *θεοῦ* is rather subjective, than objective. God's love, which was manifested in Jesus, in the act of laying down His life for men, cannot be in the heart which is compassionless. The apostle is here entering into the principles of things. He is penetrating the centre of the Christian life in its opposition to the world's life. It would appear to be natural under these circumstances that he should consider whether God's love—the Divine love-principle—has its abode in the heart. But it may be that iv. 20 is decisive.

8. The exhortation of ver. 18, which evidently has a certain degree of independence, is naturally enough connected with the words of ver. 17. The next step beyond the closing of the heart there indicated, is the giving expression in words, yet in words only, to the feeling of compassion or of love in its other outgoings. But this, again, is not the love which springs from the Divine life-principle. There must be a manifestation of love in act, when such action is called for. The addition of *γλώσση* to *λόγῳ* is partly due to the desire for greater emphasis, as we may believe; but the suggestion of Huther may be regarded as also giving

a part of the true reason for it; namely, that it is "epexegetically added, in order to mark the externality of the love, inasmuch as it points out that by *λόγος* here only the outward word is meant." The word *truth* is added to *deed*, no doubt, because the writer wished to emphasize the fact, and to place it, as we may say, distinctly before the reader's eye, that love is love in truth only when it has within itself the active force; just as faith works on its love side, or, if not, is a dead faith. 9. The weight of manuscript authority favors the future *γνωσόμεθα* in ver. 19, and this accords with *πίσσομεν*, which is probably to be explained as a co-ordinate verb, the two clauses being parallel. The future is that of conclusion, as Huther remarks, — the condition being that which is suggested by *ἐν τούτῳ*, which phrase refers to the thought of the preceding verse. The verb *γνωσόμεθα* may be used here as equivalent to *οἶδαμεν* of ver. 14, or it may carry in it the idea of reaching the knowledge by a process of thought. Westcott says it is "the knowledge which comes through outward experience," and is "in contrast with the knowledge which belongs to the idea of faith," ver. 14 (*οἶδαμεν*).

10. The relation of ver. 20 to ver. 19 has been a matter of much discussion. The simplest construction, as it seems to the writer of this note, is that which is adopted by R. V. for the text: namely, that which places a comma after *πίσσομεν*, and joins the following *ὅτι* with *ἐάν*, making these two words equivalent to *as to whatever* or *whereinsoever*. This explanation of *ὅτι ἐάν* accords with Col. iii. 17, as Huther holds, in accordance with most of the best authorities. The explanation of *ὅτι* as *because*, involves a double *because* in the two clauses, the second being a mere repetition of the first, which is highly improbable. The same difficulty occurs if we explain *ὅτι* as *that*. — With the explanation given, it appears altogether probable that the sentence is to be interpreted as suggesting the thought of God's mercy and forgiveness. The meaning of the apostle seems, accordingly, to be this: By the fact of our having love in deed and truth, we come to the knowledge that we are of the truth, and we are enabled to assure or convince our hearts before God, whereinsoever our heart may condemn us, because (we know that) God is greater than our hearts, and knows all things. Love is the fulfilment of the law, the fulfilment of the command which gathers up into itself all others. If we have love, therefore, we are assured that God, who knows all things, knows the existence of this all-fulfilling and satisfying principle within us, and thus knows that we are of the truth, even though our own hearts may accuse us of occasional sins or failures. — 11. Regarding the above as the true explanation of vv. 19, 20, the explanation of ver. 21 will be affected or determined by it. This verse must be viewed rather as the converse of the preceding, while the main thought yet moves on in the same line, than as the direct reverse or opposite of that main thought. Two suppositions are made — one of the case where the heart accuses or condemns; the other, of the case where it does not. In the former case, we may assure our hearts, because God sees farther and more deeply than they do; He knows all things, and knows the existence of the love-force within us. In the latter case, on the other hand, we have the boldness of confidence, — not needing to assure ourselves only by the thought, that God penetrates into the depths of the life to discover the vital principle, — and, boldly asking, we receive what we ask. The conception of the apostle thus seems to be that of the existence of love in both classes or conditions of which he speaks; but, in the one case, there is a consciousness of shortcomings, while, in the other, a fulfilment of all obligations, and a consciousness of this fact, are supposed.

12. In ver. 23, the writer makes a new turn in the thought. He moves backward, as we may say, to the foundation principle of the Christian life, namely, faith. Faith works through love. The entrance or doorway into the light-life is faith. That this is John's idea, as truly as it is Paul's, is made manifest both in his Gospel and in this Epistle. As he began his own Christian course by believing Jesus to be the Christ, so he places believing at the beginning for every disciple of Jesus and every child of God. "The right to become children of God" is given "to those who believe" — such is his doctrine. Here faith is spoken of as God's commandment, because the thought has been upon the fulfilling of the commandments, in the preceding context. It is, in the deep sense in which this author uses his language, and in relation to the essential life of the soul, a commandment; that is, the expression of God's will that the light-life should be entered by means of that outgoing of the soul towards God which is the necessary condition of all experience of the light-life. Faith is the commandment of God, the summing-up of the commandments of God; as in the Gospel of John (vi. 28, 29), when the multitude asked Jesus what they must do to work the works of God, the answer was: This is the work of God, that ye believe on Him whom He hath sent. — 13. The expression, *believe the name*, etc., is found only in this place, and is to be explained in accordance with the fact that the name is regarded, in the scriptural usage, as the representative before others of the person — that by which the person is made known. — 14. The words *love one another* are introduced in ver. 23 because they contain the thought which has pervaded the preceding context. The true view of the verse is, not that these words are added to the expression respecting faith, but that the writer, still keeping his mind upon love, goes back to that foundation principle which displays its energy through love, and thus adds the thought of this, which had not been previously set forth. — 15. In ver. 24, the writer returns once more to the idea of *abiding in him*, which has been made so prominent, and declares that he who keeps the commandments, which are summed up in faith and love, thus abides. This abiding is also a dwelling of God in the believer, and the assurance of this is given in the gift of the Spirit, which had been made to all believers.

XLIII.

CHAPTER IV.

Vv. 1-6.

1. The thought turns again, at the beginning of the fourth chapter, to the false prophets or antichrists. This seems to be suggested or occasioned by the reference to the Holy Spirit, in iii. 24, as the evidence within the believer of his abiding life in God. The verse mentioned is the first one in which the Holy Spirit is alluded to in the Epistle; and as He is placed in such a relation to the knowledge of the believer respecting his union with God, it is natural that the reader's mind should be directed, at this point, to the importance of testing and determining whether the Holy Spirit is the one which indeed dwells within him. We find an exhortation given, accordingly, which is kindred to the one hinted at by Paul in 1 Cor. xii. 1-3, and possibly also in 1 Thess. v. 19-21. It is noticeable, also, that the confession of Jesus Christ is made the decisive test here, as in 1 Corinthians, though the confession is carried more definitely to the point of His having come in the flesh. This is, doubtless, due

to the particular false doctrine against which John was contending; perhaps, as Luther thinks, it was the Cerinthian Docetism. — 2. The central truth, the denial of which is the evidence of the spirit of Antichrist, is declared by the apostle to be the truth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh. When we pass into the depths of the Johannean thought, and beyond and beneath the oppositions to, or of, the particular adversaries whom he may have had in mind, we may believe that this truth was central to his apprehension, because Jesus as come in the flesh, the Divine Logos as manifested in the person of this Divine man, was the revelation of the light-life of God in our human life. The way of access to that light-life was only by seeing this revelation as thus made, and by imitating and growing into the likeness of the life thus exhibited. To deny this central truth, was therefore, in his view, to place one's self in antagonism to Christianity and to Christ Himself. Whoever did so, as a prophet or teacher, became thereby, as it were, an antichrist. *The antichrist* would be but the full development of such denial and antagonism, the complete manifestation of the spirit which each one of such prophets and teachers showed forth in himself. It is a most striking fact, and one most suggestive to the candid reader of John's writings (the Gospel and Epistle alike), that whenever we reach the innermost recess of his thinking, and of his own soul's life as displayed in his thought, we find that the reality of Jesus' earthly life (His life as a man and a friend, who has in Himself the life of God to reveal to the world) is the central and fundamental thing. It was thus central and fundamental to his thought, — and this is the only explanation which can be given when we view all the phenomena, — because he had himself lived with Jesus, had seen in Him the revelation of the Divine light-life, had grown into the light-life by contemplating Him and imitating Him, had sat at His feet, and had learned of Him by drawing into his own soul the influence which came from the soul of Jesus. — 3. Vv. 1-3 set forth the means of testing the spirits, so far as the confession of Christ is concerned. Vv. 4-6, on the other hand, give the means of testing them by the character of their teachings, and of those who accept their teachings. We find in these latter verses the same thought which is clearly presented in John's Gospel. The one who knows God, and is susceptible to the influence of the Divine truth, accepts it when it is presented. He hears those who proclaim this truth. Those who belong to the world, on the contrary, hear the teachers who are of the world. By the character of those who listen joyfully and receptively to the teaching which is given, the character of the teaching itself may be determined, whether it is of God or of the world. By this means we are enabled to know the spirit of truth and the spirit of error. — 4. The spirit of error or of truth, therefore, is tested and proved by the answer to two questions: first, whether the confession made by it is, or is not, the confession that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh; and secondly, whether those who are animated by the principles of the world, or by Divine principles, receive its teachings with readiness into their lives.

5. These last three verses (4-6) are introduced by the words, *Ye are of God*. These words seem to have a connection of thought with the words of ver. 1, and are thus placed with emphasis at the beginning of the new verses, partly as giving a strong ground why the Christian readers should not believe every spirit, but test them as to whether they are of God. You should thus test before you believe, because you are of God. Partly, however, we are to account for these words as connected with the contrasts of the three verses themselves, and they are placed emphatically at the beginning, as making prominent at the outset

the position of the Christian believers. — 6. The connection of vv. 4-6 with what precedes is confirmed by the words, *and have overcome them*, etc. These words carry back the reader's mind necessarily to the last part of ver. 1. The verb *νενικήκατε* reminds us of the last words of Jesus (John xvi. 33) addressed to His disciples at the supper. Huther seems to be correct in his view of this verb, that it signifies not merely that the Christian readers had the strength of Christ as a mighty force within them, or that they were sure of final success; but that they had already overpowered the false prophets by their Christian fidelity, their faith and love. Huther is also correct in making *ὁ ἐν ὑμῖν* refer to God, rather than Christ. — 7. It is probable that *ἡμεῖς* of ver. 6 refers to the apostolic teachers, because of the change from the second person (*ὑμεῖς*) in ver. 4 to the first person here. This view is confirmed by the word *ἀκούει* which follows. If this be correct, *ἡμεῖς* are the teachers, who, being heard and accepted in their teachings by the *ὑμεῖς* who are *ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ*, are shown to be themselves *ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ*.

XLIV.

Vv. 7-16 a.

1. Beginning with ver. 7, the apostle develops more fully than before, throughout the remainder of this chapter, and the earlier part of the next, the relation of love and faith to the light-life. This is presented in iii. 23, as the idea and essence of the commands of God, and now it is unfolded at length. While in one sense, therefore, no new leading thought is brought forward in the section which is now opened, there is a progress and development which add to the impressiveness of the Epistle. Beginning with ver. 7, and ending with v. 12, we have one section which is divided into two parts, iv. 7-21 and v. 1-12, the former treating of love, and the latter of faith. — 2. Ver. 7 opens with the exhortation to love one another; the exhortation, that is, to fulfil that one of the two things presented as making up the commandment of God, to which Jesus called the thought of the apostles on the last evening of His life, and the allusion to which is found in the closing words of iii. 23.

3. The ground on which the exhortation is urged is, that *love is of God*. The preposition *ἐκ* denotes the source; the love-principle has its origin in God, and, as a consequence, the presence of love in a man's heart is the proof that he is spiritually begotten of God, and has the true spiritual knowledge of God. On the other hand, where love is absent, this true knowledge of God is absent. In connection with this latter statement, the ground on which it is affirmed is given, — a repetition of that mentioned in ver. 7, and yet put in a stronger form: *God is love*. Not only has love its source and fountain in Him, but the very essence of His own life is love. As in chap. i. 5, it is said that *God is light*, so here it is said that *He is love*; and this is a fitting expression, as in a sense equivalent to the former one, because the light-life is animated by the principle of love. — 4. Having presented the thought that *love is of God* and that *God is love*, the writer now turns to the setting-forth of the way in which God has manifested His love, and of the evidence thus given that the source of love is in God Himself. The words *ἐν ἡμῖν* are most naturally connected with *ἐφανερώθη*; and they convey the idea that there was not only a display of God's love to us, or before our minds, but *within* us, so that it became a manifestation to and in the inmost life of the soul. The fact that *God has sent His only begotten Son into the world, that we might live through Him*, is the great fact

which John tries to prove in his Gospel, by a record of the words and works of Jesus, and also the great fact on which his own inner life rested. It was natural, therefore, that, in addressing his Christian readers, he should say, "was manifested *in us*." — 5. The thought of the tenth verse seems to be this: that love proves its divine origin by this manifestation. The sending of the Son to be the propitiation for our sins, is an indubitable proof that love, as it appertains to Christian thought, does not begin in us as loving God, but in God as loving us. — 6. But if God manifests such love to us, if such love comes forth from the Divine source of love, the exhortation certainly presents itself with most impressive force, — *we ought to love one another*. The passage containing the exhortation thus rounds itself into completeness at the end. — 7. The twelfth verse evidently makes an abrupt turn, and yet the general thought of the section seems to move on to the close of the chapter. We may believe the idea of the apostle to be this: that while the sight of God is and has ever been denied to men, there is an inward apprehension of Him, — such an intimate union with Him that we abide in Him and He abides in us, — provided we have that love to one another which is, as it were, the sum of His commandments. The foundation and growth of this love-principle, whereby we come into this close union with Him, is, first, the sight which the writer and fellow-apostles had of the fact that God sent His Son into the world, and their testimony to it; secondly, the confession that Jesus is the Son of God; and thirdly, the consequent belief and knowledge of the love which God has in us. Thus love is perfected, and the Christian comes into the likeness of Christ: *as He is, so are we in this world*. Confidence in the day of judgment is secured, and through perfected love all fear is removed.

8. The correspondence of ver. 12a and John i. 18, cannot fail to be noticed. It is evident, however, that the connection and thought in this passage are different from what is noticeable in that verse of the Gospel. The contrast in the Gospel is between the inability of man to see God, and the revelation of Him by the incarnate Logos. Here it is, as we may say, between the outward and inward vision. If we love one another, we have the inward vision. We have, and know that we have, the indwelling of God within us. The words of ver. 12b and ver. 13 answer closely to what has been said before, but in connection with ver. 12a they are brought out in a new light. — 9. The words *ἡ ἀγάπη αὐτοῦ* are to be interpreted as meaning: the love which has its source in God, and is infused into and implanted in the believer as the life-principle within him. This love is in the completed and perfected state in us, as we love one another according to the measure of Christ's command. Love, by reason of its very nature, goes out towards others; so with the Divine love-principle, as it enters into and abides in the souls which open themselves to receive it. — 10. Ver. 13 gives the statement of iii. 24, but it gives this statement as a part of the contrast to the words: "No one hath beheld God at any time." We do not see God, but we have in the possession of the Spirit the proof that we have Him dwelling in us. — 11. With ver. 14 begins the presentation of the development of the love-principle by which we are brought into union with God. Men have not seen God at any time; the disciples of Christ have not seen Him, any more than other men. But the latter have what supplies for them the place of sight, in that which is brought to them through Christ. The earliest disciples have beheld in their seeing of Him, and communion with Him, the great truth that God has sent His Son to be the Saviour of the world. This truth is the fundamental one with relation to the inward sight. The apostle and his fellow-

apostles had seen, heard, handled, the Word of life, and thus had known the revelation of God and of God's life. This revelation was to the end of the salvation of man (*σωτήρα τοῦ κόσμου*), and thus was the revelation of the Divine life for the realizing of eternal life in men. The testimony continually borne (*μαρτυροῦμεν*) by these apostles, who had thus seen, heard, handled, etc., sets the great truth before men for their acceptance; and those who willingly receive it give expression to their faith by confessing that Jesus is the Son of God. This confession is the beginning of the true Divine life in their souls, because it answers in their case to the seeing, hearing, and handling, which was permitted to those who were associated with Jesus in His daily living when on earth. The striking correspondence in the thought here, with that which is set forth in John xx. 30, 31, will be observed by the careful reader. The whole record of John's Gospel was given in order that those who should read it might, in view of the testimony of the writer to what he had heard and seen, believe that Jesus is the Son of God, and believing might have life, Confession resting upon a belief founded upon testimony, which testimony was based upon sight and experience: this is the order of the Johannean thought, as to the beginning and growth of the Christian life, the life of light and love, in which God abides in the soul, and the soul in God. With the confession the life begins, and it moves onward from that beginning. The confession, however, is only the outward voice answering to the inward faith, and so the true beginning is faith. And the life is thus begun for *every one* who makes the confession on the basis of the belief (*ὅς ἐάν*).

12. With respect to individual words or phrases in ver. 11 ff., the following suggestions may be made: (a) *θεόν* of ver. 12 has its prominent position as connected with the impossibility of actually seeing God Himself, in contrast with the inward union with and vision of Him, which come through love, faith, confession, etc. — (b) *ἐν τούτῳ* (ver. 13) seems to refer forward to the second *ὄτι* clause. The sure evidence of the existence of the Divine love in us, and thus of our abiding in God and His abiding in us, is the gift of the Spirit to every believer. — (c) *ἡμεῖς* (ver. 14) evidently refers to the apostolic preachers. — (d) Testimony founded upon sight is, so far as the apostolic preaching is concerned, the keynote both of the Epistle and of the Gospel of John (comp. Ep. i. 1; Gosp. i. 14). — (e) The word *σωτήρα*, which is here a predicative appositional word, does not occur elsewhere in John's writings, except in the Gosp. iv. 42. The idea that Jesus is the Saviour of the world is an idea vitally related to the whole thought of John; but it is, as it were, incidental to the peculiar character of his inward life, and the peculiar line of thinking in his two great works, that Jesus is presented by him more prominently in His relation to God and to the *ζωὴ αἰώνιος*, than in the light of a Saviour and Redeemer. — (f) The words *ἐγνώκαμεν καὶ ἐπιστεύσαμεν* (ver. 16) correspond with those found in John vi. 69, in the reverse order. The order in the Gospel is the order of growth and development, belief moving forward to knowledge. But when the Christian believer is looking from the standpoint of an already developed life, and is stating a truth of the soul's experience, as the apostle is doing here, the order is not essential, — the two things are united in one, as it were, and the emphasis of the soul's experience is given forth in the expression, *I know and believe*. — (g) *The love which God has in us*: This is the love which is exhibited and proved in the great fact of the sending of the Son as a Saviour, and it is spoken of as *in us*, because it takes up its abode in our hearts, as the life-principle within us.

XLV.

Vv. 16b-21.

1. The last part of ver. 16 forms a connecting link between ver. 16a, the close of the preceding passage, and ver. 17, the opening of the following one. The two passages, however, form rather half-paragraphs than paragraphs, since the thought of love as the life-principle of the Divine life in the soul moves on to the end of the chapter. — 2. The reference of *ἐν τούτῳ*, of ver. 17, to what precedes is, on the whole, to be preferred. It is in that love-union between God and man which makes the life of man to be an abiding of his soul in God, and an abiding of God in his soul, that the perfecting of love is realized. The words *μεθ' ἡμῶν*, *with us*, instead of *ἐν ἡμῖν*, *in us* (ver. 12), are almost necessarily to be explained, as it would seem, as involving somewhat of that idea of union which has been previously presented. The phrase hints at the notion of God's dealing with us, and his co-operation with us in the matter of the perfecting. The *ἵνα* clause sets forth the end towards which this perfecting of love works. This end is confidence, or boldness, in the day of judgment. — The sentence is differently explained by Huther and some other interpreters, and *ἐν τούτῳ* is regarded as referring to, and explained by the *ἵνα* clause. Love is perfected in the fact that we have boldness in the day of judgment. The idea of boldness, and casting out fear, is thus made the one idea to which every thing else is subordinate. — 3. The sentence beginning with *ὅτι* (ver. 17) gives the ground of the boldness or confidence; it is founded on the fact, that, *as He is, so are we in this world*. The words *ἐν τ. κόσμ. τούτ.* belong with *ἔσμεν* only, not also with *ἔσιν*. Huther regards the phrase, *as He is*, as meaning *as He is in this matter of love*; that is, we have love as our life-principle, even as He has it as His eternal life-principle. This would seem to be the natural suggestion of the context, and there is apparently no reason for going beyond this suggestion simply because the phrase happens to be in the general and unlimited form. Some interpreters refer the likeness here indicated to the whole character of Christ. This whole character, however, has its centre in the love-principle; and, according to the writer's present line of thought, he is speaking of the life as viewed in relation to its central and vital principle. — 4. Ver. 18 is added by way of carrying out and emphasizing the idea of *boldness in the day of judgment* as connected with perfected love. Fear and love are inconsistent with each other. When love is perfected, therefore, fear must be excluded. The incompatibility of fear with love is grounded on the fact that fear has *κόλασις*. This word, as connected with its use in Matt. xxv. 46, and in the Septuagint, means punishment. As following upon the mention of the day of judgment in ver. 17, it must be understood, it would seem, in the sense of that punishment which follows the day of judgment. Fear has within itself, carries with it, and brings forward into the present, this punishment, in and through the painful apprehension of it.

5. There can be but little doubt that the true text in ver. 19 is *ἀγαπῶμεν*, without the added *αὐτὸν* of the T. R. We love, the apostle says, because He first loved us. This statement is evidently made as preparatory to the two following verses. The fact that love in us is the offspring of God's love — that love, as an active and out-working principle in us, is due to His love as manifested in act towards us — makes it essential to the real life of our love, that it should go out towards our brethren. The man who claims to have love as his life-principle, and to have this life-principle in action towards God, while it is not

in action, but is even replaced by its opposite, in relation to the brethren, knows nothing of true love. Such exercise of love to the brethren is, moreover, the command, and even the sum of the commands, of God.

XLVI.

CHAPTER V.

Vv. 1-5.

1. There seems to be a manifest and close connection between ver. 1 of this chapter, and ver. 21 of the chapter which precedes. This is indicated by the correspondence in the fundamental thought of ver. 1*b* and ver. 21*b*, and also by the bringing-forward of the idea of the children of God, and the fulfilment of God's commandments, in the following context. Alford holds that this connection is so close as to indicate, that, in the words *every one that believes*, etc., the apostle refers to the ἀδελφός. This view of Alford, however, must probably be rejected, and we must regard the apostle as setting forth anew, and with renewed emphasis, the two great and united principles which lie at the basis of the true life: faith and love. By believing, the man enters into the relationship of a child to God; he is begotten of God, according to the language here used. The natural and necessary result of this relationship of a child to a father is love, — love to the father, and love to the other children who are begotten of him. God's child must love God's children. The phrase πᾶς ὁ πιστεύων accordingly refers, as does πᾶς ὁ ἀγαπῶν, to the Christian believer, whose duty to love his brethren is under discussion, and τὸν γεγεννημένον alone refers to the brother. — 2. We have, in ver. 2, a reversing of what is indicated in chap. iv. There the thought is: If we love the brethren, we may be sure that we love God; here it is: If we love God, we may know that we love the brethren. The explanation of this change seems to be twofold: *First*, it is a case similar to that of ἐγνώκαμεν καὶ πεπιστεύκαμεν in iv. 16: in the Christian life, the proof moves in both directions; and, *secondly*, the writer is desiring here to bring out the inseparable connection between love to the brethren and love to God: if we love God, we love the brethren; and so truly is this the fact, that, whenever we have love to God which is real and genuine, so that we keep His commandments, we have therein the knowledge that we love the brethren also. — 3. The idea of love to the brethren as the fulfilment of the commands of God, is evidently still in the writer's mind. For this reason it is, that he adds, ver. 3: The love of God is the keeping of His commandments. If, therefore, we love God, we must keep the great command, and, with the presence of this love in our hearts, we shall keep it, and fulfil its call to love. — 4. The mark of punctuation, which should be placed after τηρώμεν (ver. 3), cannot be determined with certainty. It seems to the writer of this note most natural to place a comma here, as Westcott does, and thus to join this clause closely to the preceding. Love to God is that keeping of His commandments which finds them not burdensome. R. V. places a colon here; Tischendorf, a colon; Alford, a period. In any case, it is probable that a comma should be placed at the end of ver. 3. The first clause of ver. 4 is thus immediately connected with the last words of ver. 3, and presents the reason why the commands are not grievous or burdensome, — namely, because the one who is begotten of God overcomes the world. The overcoming of the power which stands in opposition to God places the man in a new condition. The enmity which belongs to the world has passed

away from him, and love has entered into its place. The loving spirit conquering all opposition, the commands are fulfilled in love, and are no longer a burden.

5. Ver. 4*b* sets forth faith as the victory which overcomes the world. Faith is said to be the victory, because it involves in itself the overcoming of the world. When the man believes, he turns in his whole life from the world to God. At this point, the apostle comes back to the idea of faith, which opens the chapter, and which is also presented as the foundation of the new life, in iii. 23, and in the idea of confession, in chap. iv. The necessity of faith is emphasized, in ver. 5, by the significant question, *Who is he*, etc., which is equivalent to *No one but he*. — If we examine carefully the latter part of chap. iv., and these early verses of chap. v., we can scarcely fail to see that the apostle brings out the two great essential principles of the Divine life in the soul, love and faith, and that, while in accordance with the natural development of his thought, he makes love especially prominent, and also gives it the first place in the preceding chapter, he is at pains to show that faith is the primary element of the life in chap. v., and that it is through faith that the life begins. The man who believes is begotten as a child of God; when he is thus begotten, he loves. Faith works through love; it puts forth into action the love-force which is in itself. — In this closing sentence of the first paragraph of chap. v., the belief is again represented as belief that Jesus is the Son of God. The thought in which the Gospel of John ends is the great and all-powerful conviction of the apostle's life. — The word *faith*, as a substantive, occurs in the Gospel and Epistle only in ver. 4; the writer turns again to the verbal form in ver. 5.

XLVII.

Vv. 6-12.

1. At this point the apostle turns to a new and distinct presentation of Jesus, and the testimony respecting Him, to the reader's mind. This more special presentation naturally follows after the words of vv. 4, 5; and it becomes by reason of its position, and the preparation made for it through the development of all the thoughts of the Epistle, a most impressive statement of the author's belief. — *οὗτος*. This one who is the object of the Christian confession, and the faith in whom involves the belief that He is the Son of God, is the one who came, in the fulfilment of the Messianic promises (*ὁ ἐλθών — ὁ ἐρχόμενος*), by means of water and blood, Jesus Christ. The historical person Jesus, who is the Christ, is also the Son of God. To believe that this person is the Son of God, is the door of entrance into union of soul with God, i. e., into the Divine life, for all men, even as such belief had been the entrance-way into the experience of the blessedness of that life for the apostle himself. The correspondence of this sixth verse, in its relation to ver. 5, with the first part of the closing verse of the Gospel of John, xx. 31, is most clearly manifest. — 2. The reference in the *water and blood* is almost certainly to the baptism and death of Jesus. By means of these two things, which began and ended His life, He came — in the full sense of His divine mission. Whether there is any allusion or meaning in the words beyond this, is questionable. As to the two suggestions which are most frequently made: that there is an allusion to John xix. 34, or an allusion to the sacraments of baptism and the Lord's Supper, it may be remarked that no such use is made of the fact mentioned in John xix., in the context surrounding that verse, as is made here of the water and blood. In John xix., indeed, the fact

that blood and water came from the side of Jesus may be, not improbably, included as an element in the evidence presented by the story of which it is a part, (though it seems to be only a minor element); but there is no such marked distinction made between the water and the blood, as related to the evidence, as is here set forth (ver. 8), and there was apparently no such separation in the two things in the event itself; and, again, it may be remarked, that, as John makes no reference to the Lord's Supper in his Gospel (unless it be in chap. vi., which is altogether improbable), it seems unlikely that in this Epistle, which is so closely connected in its thought with the Gospel, he would make so much of it. — 3. The second part of ver. 6: *not by water only, but by water and blood*, is evidently designed to bring out with emphasis the fact, that the two together are the essential elements in the case, and that the latter is included with the former, and is prominent. It is probable that this statement has reference to some particular error of the time and region in which John was writing, and not improbable that this error, as Huther and several other interpreters hold, was that of the Docetans, as explained by Huther in his note. The thought of the apostle is, that in the mission of Christ to the world, and His office and work in the world, His death is the consummation and the great event. Without the atoning death, the work was not accomplished.

4. The *kai* which opens the third part of ver. 6 joins the following statement immediately to the preceding one. This close connection is due to the fact that the testimony of the Spirit is a testimony to the truth just mentioned, and also, as we may believe, to the fact that the writer is intending, in the next verse, to unite the water and blood with the Spirit as witnesses. The Spirit is, beyond any reasonable doubt, the Holy Spirit. He is spoken of here as the witness; that is, the one whose great office it is to bear testimony, and in whom the highest testimony abides. The Spirit is the truth. He takes the place of Christ, after the death of Christ, and He is the revelation of the truth, as Christ was during His earthly life. As having in Himself the truth, He guides the human soul to the knowledge of the truth, and thus becomes an ever-continuing witness. That to which the Spirit bears testimony, so far as this passage is concerned, is the fact that Jesus is the Son of God, and consequently that eternal life is in Him. The second point, however, is only made prominent in the following verses, and that which is here especially referred to is the first point. This reference to ver. 5 (Jesus is the Son of God) seems better than that of Huther, who makes the Spirit testify to the first part of ver. 6. Huther, however, regards the main truth which the apostle desires to bring out in the whole context as being the truth expressed in the words: Jesus the Son of God is the Christ. — 5. The emphasis of ver. 7, in its relation to the thought of the passage, lies in the last words: *and the three agree in one*. The unity in the testimony of the three witnesses is the point which is urged with special force, as proving the truth which is set forth. This agreement in the testimony confirms the truth of the thing to which the testimony is given. This thing is the statement of the last words of ver. 5, or the doctrine that Jesus is the Son of God. The prominent position given to *τρεῖς*, in the first part of ver. 7, may be accounted for by the fact that the water and blood, which had not been alluded to in ver. 6 as witnesses, are now brought forward under that aspect. This would seem to be a sufficient reason for the emphasis; but it may be, as some writers think, that there is a reference here to the provision of the Mosaic law, that two or three witnesses establish the truth of an alleged fact. In the latter case, the idea of the apostle is, we may believe, that the testimony fills out the demands of

human law, with respect to testimony, to the full measure. This reference, however, must be regarded, as Huther also says, as quite doubtful.

6. The discussion as to the genuineness of the disputed words in vv. 7, 8, has reached a point, at present, where substantially all competent and candid scholars are agreed that they are to be rejected from the text. The facts of the case, so far as the external evidence is concerned, are presented briefly in Huther's textual note at the beginning of the chapter. The internal evidence, if not equally strong with the external, is very strong as bearing against the words. The introduction of the statement that there are three who bear witness in heaven, and that the three are one, is unconnected with the development of the thought of the context and the chapter. This thought, so far as the matter of fact or truth is concerned, is: Jesus is the Son of God; so far as the matter of evidence is concerned, the design of the passage is clearly to set forth the evidence which is brought before the minds of men by the water and the blood (i.e., by the great facts at the beginning and end of the ministry of Jesus), and by the Holy Spirit as working in the soul and bearing testimony to it. The passage speaks thus of a truth which is to be apprehended by men in their earthly life, and of evidence which is presented to them here on earth. The fact that the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit are three bearing witness in heaven, and that they are one, does not suggest evidence of the same sort; but, so far as it indicates evidence at all, it suggests what is of quite a different kind. This fact comes to the mind in a different way, and is, as we may say, apprehended in its force only after the truth, that Jesus is the Son of God, has been accepted and believed. The difficulties presented by Huther in his Remark at the end of ver. 7 are also very serious and weighty. The fact that the first three are spoken of as bearing witness *in heaven*, takes the words out of the connection of the passage, which necessarily, as we may say, turns upon testimony as given on earth. Moreover, the ninth verse bears strongly against the genuineness, either because, as is urged by Huther, these disputed words, if admitted, make it unintelligible what witness is meant by the *μαρτυρία τοῦ θεοῦ* of this verse; or, because, if we regard the *witness of God* here alluded to as the witness of the Father, Word, and Holy Spirit, the contrast must be with the testimony of the Spirit, the water, and the blood, as the *witness of men*, whereas this latter is evidently not a human, but rather a divine testimony. The un-Johannean character of the expression, *the Father and the Word*, is worthy of consideration. In connection with the external evidence, attention may be called to the extreme improbability that such a formal statement involving the doctrine of the Trinity, if originally belonging to the Epistle, could by any means have disappeared from all the Greek MSS. from the fourth to the fifteenth century.

7. The purpose of ver. 9 is to set forth the value of the Divine testimony, and, consequently, to insist upon the credit which should be given to it. The conditional clause refers to the fact that human testimony is received as satisfactory and sufficient evidence, according to the common custom of mankind. If this be so, urges the apostle, we ought to receive with a deeper conviction, and a more immovable belief, the testimony of God; for it is greater, i.e., greater in its authority and value. There can be no doubt that this verse has a certain connection with what immediately precedes; and that thus the force of the evidence mentioned as a divinely-given evidence is pressed upon the attention of the readers. This is to be affirmed, whatever may be the direct and special reference of *ἡ μαρτυρία τοῦ θεοῦ*. With reference to this question,

the following suggestion is offered as best satisfying the conditions of the passage: namely, that the writer passes, in the progress of the verses here, from the objective side of the evidence for the Divine Sonship of Jesus to the subjective side. The objective side is that presented in ver. 6, the Spirit and the water and the blood. The subjective side is brought forward in ver. 11, the eternal life within the soul, given to the soul and possessed by it. But these are, really, not two different things, but two different sides or aspects of the same thing. Jesus Christ, who was seen, heard, handled, is the eternal life. The experience of what He is within the soul is the other side — the corresponding internal manifestation of what is borne witness to by the great facts of His earthly career, and by the outpouring of the Holy Spirit on the day of Pentecost and afterward. — 8. The force and connection of ver. 9b are uncertain. The simplest and most natural construction of the sentence, however, would seem to be that which makes $\delta\tau\iota$ explanatory of $\alpha\acute{\omega}\tau\eta$, and gives to the words this meaning: The witness of God (of which the apostle is speaking in the argument) is this, that, etc.; that is, when I speak in this passage of the testimony of God, I mean the fact that He has borne testimony concerning His Son. This fact, that He has thus testified to His Son through the Spirit, the water, and the blood, is a ground of conviction for us which is of more force and value than any human testimony could be. If this is the true view of the meaning, the connection through $\delta\tau\iota$ with what immediately precedes, may be believed to be this: I call your attention to the greater value of the Divine testimony, because, in this matter which I have just mentioned, there exists that Divine testimony which God gives to men.

9. At ver. 10, the writer turns towards the internal side of the matter, which is fully and distinctly set forth in ver. 11. The transition is made through the word *believeth*. The man who believes on the Son of God, as made known by this testimony and evidence, thereby transfers the evidence, as it were, from *without himself* to *within himself*. The testimony becomes an internal possession, an inward experience. This idea is presented more emphatically by means of the contrasted negative statement of the latter part of the verse, according to the peculiar style of this writer. — 10. Ver. 11. This verse is to be immediately connected in thought with ver. 12. The full idea on the internal side is brought out in the two verses as taken together. The witness or testimony, says ver. 11, is this: that God gave to us eternal life, and this life is in His Son. The testimony that Jesus is the Son of God (ver. 5) becomes, as it passes towards and into the internal sphere, the testimony that God has bestowed upon us, in and through Him, eternal life. Whether the clause *and this life is in His Son* is to be regarded as independent and co-ordinate with the first clause: *The witness is, etc.*, or is dependent on $\delta\tau\iota$, and is thus referred to as a part of the testimony, is uncertain. Huther, and most recent commentators who express an opinion on the subject, take the former view. There is, however, at least one strong reason in favor of the latter view, namely, that the real testimony which is given in John's Gospel, and which, we may believe, was brought to his own mind by the water and the blood and the Spirit, was not simply that God gave us eternal life, but also, that this life is in His Son. This was the truth which John learned from the Divine testimony, and we may believe that it was also the truth which he intended to proclaim to his readers as the Divine testimony. This view of the sentence seems also to the writer of this note to make the progress of the thought in vv. 10–12 most simple and natural: he that believes that Jesus is the Son of God, and so believes on Him, has the external testi-

mony transferred, as it were, to the internal sphere within himself (ver. 10); this testimony now passing to the mind and becoming internal is, that God gave us eternal life, and that this life is in His Son (ver. 11); he that possesses the Son as indwelling in himself has, accordingly, as his own possession, as the actual experience of his own soul, the eternal life.

XLVIII.

Vv. 13-21.

1. The correspondence of ver. 13 with John xx. 31 is very noticeable, and we can scarcely doubt that in this verse the apostle turns to the closing of his Epistle. The reference in *ταῦτα ἔγραψα* is probably to the entire Epistle, though there are certain parts of it, and particularly the last section, which present the idea of eternal life more distinctly than others. The purpose of the Gospel is stated, in the verse just mentioned, to be this: That the readers may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that, believing, they may have life in His name; that of the Epistle is here given in the words: That you may know that you have eternal life, — you that believe on the name of the Son of God. To produce faith, was the object of the apostle's record of the life of Jesus. To give the knowledge of their actual and present possession of eternal life, to those who already had faith, was his desire and design in writing this letter to his Christian brethren. In the order of progress with relation to Christian living, therefore, as well as in the order of the development of thought, the Epistle follows the Gospel. We may believe that it followed the Gospel also in time. — The possession of the knowledge that we have eternal life is the fulfilling of our joy (chap. i. ver. 4). The end of the Epistle, in this sense, corresponds with the beginning. — 2. Ver. 14 adds, through *καί*, which opens the verse, a result or out-working of the knowledge mentioned in ver. 13 in a special line, — that line of communion with God in which our petitions for ourselves and our Christian brethren go forth towards Him, and thus in that line or sphere in which the support and joy and peace of our life are to be found. The knowledge produces or becomes, in this line or sphere, confidence towards God. This confidence is explained or defined in the following words, that, if we ask anything according to His will, he hears us; and if we know that He hears us, whatsoever we ask, we know that we have the petitions which we have asked of Him. The Christian believer has confidence, founded upon his possession of the Divine life — the light-life — in the soul, that his future prayers will be answered, and that his past prayers have been answered. He knows, that, as his desire and will are conformed to God's will, the real and fundamental petition in every prayer, that God's will may be done, is answered in his own experience and life. All things work together for his good as he loves God; his joy is made full as his fellowship is with the Father and with the Son. — 3. Ver. 16 changes the thought from prayer in general to prayer for the sinning brother. This change, and the introduction of this reference to the fellow-Christian, may be connected with the thought of brotherly love which is so prominent in the Epistle. We may believe, however, that the new verses (16, 17) are suggested partly in connection with some special dangers which belonged to the time and surroundings of those to whom the apostle was writing. The fact that the prayer here spoken of is limited to the case of sinning, and that the sin unto death is made prominent, is confirmatory of this

view. The prominence of the sin unto death is indicated, not only by reason of the fact that it is distinctly mentioned, but also by the special exception of it which is made in the other parts of the verses.

4. The sin unto death is left by the writer without further definition. This fact would seem to indicate that the phrase was understood, or likely to be understood, by the readers to whom the Epistle was addressed. With regard to the question what sin is referred to, it may be said: (a) That it is evidently a sin which might be committed by Christians; it is the brother, not the unbeliever, who is conceived of as possibly sinning thus; (b) That it would seem to be probable, rather than otherwise, not to say certain, that it must be a sin which is indicated, or alluded to, in the Epistle itself; the writer would scarcely introduce with such abruptness, and so near the close of his letter, a reference to such a sin without any explanation of its meaning, or any development of thought respecting it, unless there had been something in the earlier part of the Epistle which could throw light upon it; (c) That the words *πρὸς θάνατον* are to be understood as conveying the idea that the sin certainly leads to death; this is shown by the fact, that, in the sense of mere tendency towards death, the expression *πρὸς θάνατον* is applicable to all sin, whereas what is here spoken of is evidently a particular kind of sin; (d) That the death here mentioned is the death which is contrasted with *ζωή*, and must accordingly be understood in the sense of eternal death; (e) That the sin unto death has a certain individuality in it, if, indeed, it is not a special and particular sin. The general form of the sentence setting forth this sin, and the sinning which is opposite to this, makes it improbable that the division here made is between two equal or great classes of sins, but rather indicates that there is a single exception. If, in view of these several points, we examine the Epistle for the suggestions which it may give, we find that it makes peculiarly prominent one sin, which, if committed, shows that the person guilty of it, though in the company of Christian believers, is not of them, and is not of God. This sin is that denial of the Son which involves in itself the denial of the Father (ii. 22), and that denial that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, which shows the spirit of antichrist (iv. 3). Huther claims, that, if the apostle had meant this sin only, he would have designated it plainly. But this depends on the special thought and purpose which the writer had in mind. He may have intended to present the sin here in this particular light, after having already designated it by the use of clear and definite descriptive words; and his desire may have been to use the words here employed, because he wished to limit the matter of petitions for others at the point which is determined by *οὐ πρὸς θάνατον* and *πρὸς θάνατον*. It seems most probable, therefore, that the sin which involves the spirit of antichrist is the one which is referred to in this expression. The Christian who is guilty of this sin falls away utterly, and is in the condition of apostasy. This passage would seem to border, therefore, on Heb. vi. 4 ff., x. 26 ff.; rather than on Mark iii. 22, where the scribes said, *He hath Beelzebub*, etc., and Jesus declared the sin against the Holy Spirit (ver. 29) to be unpardonable.

5. The language of ver. 16 is peculiar in some respects: (a) With reference to sin not unto death, the word *αἰτήσῃ* is used, while, in connection with the sin unto death, the word employed is *ἑρωτήσῃ*. The former is the stronger word in itself; the two corresponding nearly to our *ask*, in the sense of *demand*, and of *request*. But as both are here used with respect to prayer, and as we find in John xvi. 26 the same two words used of praying or petitioning, it may be

regarded as doubtful whether the change from the one verb to the other is anything more than a rhetorical change. — (b) The subject of *δώσει* is, by the peculiarity of the sentence, left in uncertainty. Huther regards it as the same with the subject of *αἰτήσῃ*; so Haupt, Alford, Moulton, and others. Westcott and others, on the other hand, make God the subject of *δώσει*. There seems to be no serious objection to the view of Huther; and, if it is adopted, the sentence moves forward in a more simple and direct way. In this case, the word *αὐτῷ* refers to the sinning brother; and the verb *δώσει* means, shall give through his intercession with God. In this case, also, the dative *τοῖς ἁμαρτάνουσιν* is in an appositional relation to *αὐτῷ*, only extending the thought from the individual to all who are in a similar condition. — (c) The expression *οὐ περὶ ἐκείνης λέγω ἵνα ἐρωτήσῃ* deserves special notice. The author does not prohibit prayer in case of the sin unto death; he simply excludes this from what he is speaking of in the earlier part of the verse. This failure to prohibit such prayer may, perhaps, be regarded as hinting at the possibility of repentance even in case of this sin, as the language in Heb. vi. 4–6 and x. 26 ff. may be explained; see Additional Notes to Meyer's Comm. on Heb., Amer. ed., pp. 550 f., 662 f. If this is so, this sin here referred to cannot be the unpardonable sin spoken of, Mark iii. 29; and the *πρὸς θάνατον* cannot involve an absolute certainty of death for every individual who commits it, i. e., the absolute impossibility of repentance and pardon. But all that the expression distinctly declares is, that the writer is not speaking of prayer for this sin, when he gives the assurance that the Christian who asks on behalf of his brother *ἁμαρτ. ἄμ. μὴ πρ. τ. θαν.* shall secure the blessing for which he asks.

6. The connection of ver. 17 is evidently with what goes before; but precisely what the connection of thought is intended to be, is a point of some difficulty, and one on which interpreters have differed. It would seem that two things must be observed, in order to a decision of the question: first, that the subject before the writer's mind is intercessory prayer for other Christians, who are sinning; and, secondly, that the form of the sentences of this verse indicates the including of the class of sins here mentioned, as a part of that which is meant by the general word *sin*. If we take these two things into consideration, the result will follow, that the verse is added with reference to what precedes, as showing the wideness of the sphere within which intercessory prayer may be offered, without including the case of sin unto death. — We may believe, however, that this verse has also a forward look; and, in this view of it, it suggests the idea of sin as covering all unrighteousness, and being mainly not unto death. It may thus cling to the Christian believer in some degree; but when the Christian is viewed in the light of the ideal of his life, "he who has been begotten of God does not sin." The Epistle thus returns at the end to a thought kindred to that of its beginning; see chap. i. vv. 6–8. — In this view of the matter, ver. 18, with what follows, may be regarded as gathering up the thought which the writer would impress upon his readers as the beginning and ending of his Epistle. The Son of God, in the person of Jesus Christ, is come into the world to give eternal life through the knowledge of God, — the life which is originated by a Divine force, and which has its being in the sphere of the Divine light-life. — 7. The three verses 18–20 begin, each of them, with the word *οἶδαμεν*. The statements which they contain are thus presented with a special formality, and even solemnity, as setting forth fundamental known truths. The three points are arranged here in a peculiar order, and, as we may believe, with a view to the final impression which the apostle desires to make.

We know that the one who is begotten of God does not sin, — the light-life is not intermingled with darkness; we know that we, who are Christian believers, are of God — we thus are those who possess the light-life which is free from sin; we know that the Son of God is come, and has given us an understanding that we may know God — and thus we are in God, through being in His Son.

8. As to individual words and phrases in these three verses, the following points may be noticed: (a) The first clause of ver. 18 is a repetition of what is said in iii. 9, except in the substitution of *ἀμαρτάνει* for *ἀμαρτίαν ποιεῖ*, and presents what is evidently an essential element in the Johannean thought. — (b) The second and third clauses have not appeared in the earlier part of the Epistle. They set forth that by means of which, or the process by which, the result is accomplished, but in the form of a contrast to the idea of sinning, presented in the first clause. The text is doubtful in the second clause, some authorities reading *αὐτόν*, and some *ἑαυτόν*. If *ἑαυτόν* is read, *ὁ γεννηθείς* refers to the same person as *ὁ γεγεννημένος* of the first clause, and the thought is: he that was begotten of God (the aorist referring to the definite time and event of the new birth) keeps himself, and (the result is, — so that this end is reached, namely, that) the evil one touches him not. If, on the other hand, *αὐτόν* is read, *ὁ γεννηθείς* may most naturally be referred to Christ, and the meaning is, that Christ is a guardian power, keeping him, and (so that) the evil one is not able to get any hold upon him. — (c) The words *ὁ πονηρὸς οὐχ ἔπιεται αὐτοῦ* may remind us of John xiv. 30: “he has nothing in me.” They indicate that the evil one does not touch the man who is thus guarded or kept, so far that any defilement of the soul, or any power of sin in the soul, is the result. — (d) The first part of ver. 19 sets forth the fact that “we,” i.e., the Christian readers, are of the class of persons of whom the words *begotten of God* can be predicated. The second part of the verse presents the fact, in contrast with this, that the unconverted world lies within the sphere and under the power of the evil one. That *τῷ πονηρῷ* means the *evil one*, and not *evil*, is rendered almost certain by the preceding *ὁ πονηρός*. — (e) *δέ* (ver. 20) is perhaps equivalent to *moreover*, but perhaps it is adversative, expressing a contrast to the last part of ver. 19. The fact that the Son of God is come and has given, etc., is the means by which we pass out of the sphere and dominion of the evil one into the new life, in which he has no power over us, and is thus the means by which, as born of God, we do not sin. — (f) *ἦκει* presents the incarnation as a permanent fact on which Christian faith and life depend. The word *διάνοια* means understanding; “the divinely empowered inner sense by which we judge of things divine,” as Alford says. This inner sense has been given to believers, that they may know Him who answers to the true idea of God. As the result of this knowledge, we are in Him that is true, instead of being in the power of the evil one. The expression *ἐν τῷ νῷ αὐτοῦ* can hardly be an appositional explanatory phrase, defining the *One who is true* to be the Son. This is clear from the fact that the Son is declared, in the beginning of the verse, to have been the means of our coming to know Him that is true, and also from the *αὐτοῦ*, which must, as it would seem, point back to *τὸν ἀληθινόν*, *τῷ ἀληθινῷ*, as its antecedent. The expression must, therefore, be equivalent to *even in His Son*, or *inasmuch as* (Huther) *we are in His Son*; by virtue of (Alford) being in His Son. In either case, the idea in the writer’s mind seems to be this: that we come into the realization of an indwelling in God, so soon as, and through the fact that, we are in the realization of such an indwelling in His Son. — (g) The reference of *ούτος*, in the last sentence of ver. 20, to Christ, is to be rejected, because of the distinction made

in the preceding clauses between *ὁ ἀληθινός* and *ὁ υἱός*, and also the distinction carefully maintained throughout the Epistle between God the Father and Christ. It is also to be rejected, because of the similarity in the general thought of these verses and that of John xvii. 3, where the only true God and Jesus Christ are spoken of in their distinction from each other. The difficulty in the way of referring *ούτος* to God the Father, which arises from the fact that God has already been declared to be *ὁ ἀληθινός*, and that thus there would be a tautological sentence here, is removed when we consider that these words are a kind of formal closing of the whole thought of the Epistle, — a setting-forth, as it were, of the truth which the Epistle rests upon. God as the possessor and revealer of the light-life, which is the eternal life, — this is the thought upon which all the other thoughts are founded. It is not strange that the author should say at the end of these last verses, and as preparatory to his final exhortation: This One who is true, who is brought to our knowledge through Jesus Christ His Son, is the true God, — the one only God who answers to the true and complete idea of God; and He is eternal life, in the sense that He has it in Himself, and we attain to the possession of it by coming into the knowledge of Him. — (*h*) The last verse of the Epistle contains an exhortation which might readily follow after the last sentence of ver. 20. The idols are referred to, it would seem, as representative of heathenism. They are the false deities, as opposed to the true.

THE SECOND EPISTLE OF JOHN.

XLIX.

Vv. 1-13.

1. The designation *ὁ πρεσβύτερος*, which is found in the second and third Epistles of John, is peculiar, as compared with the absence of any designation whatever in the Gospel and the first Epistle. It can hardly be insisted upon, however, that a writer — and even one who has such striking individuality of style and expression as the author of the Gospel and First Epistle has — shall always completely hide his personality. If these two letters were addressed to individuals, as the third Epistle evidently was, it might be very natural for the writer to give himself the title here employed, with which, as knowing him, they would be familiar. Peter in his first Epistle (v. 1), speaks of himself as *συμπρεσβύτερος*, in connection with an exhortation to the elders in general. In the region where John lived, and especially in the period of his old age, he may readily have been reverentially known as the elder, and may, by reason of his position as the last survivor of the apostles, have spoken of himself, with a certain distinction from all others around him, as *ὁ πρεσβύτερος*. If the general characteristics of the books can be regarded as in harmony with the authorship by the Apostle John, the fact that we find this title in these Epistles, and the name John in the Book of Revelation, can hardly be regarded as inconsistent with such authorship. — 2. As to the question to whom the second Epistle is

addressed, the writer of this note is disposed to give the answer: It is a Christian woman by the name of Kyria, who was in relations of friendship with the apostle. The arguments urged by Huther against this view do not seem to be decisive. On the other hand, the fact that Kyria is a known proper name; the great similarity in forms of expression between this Epistle and the third, which was evidently addressed to an individual; the allusion to the elect sister, and to the children of the two; and the applicability of the expression, *I have found of (some of) thy children walking in truth*, to members of a family, part of which only might be Christian, rather than to a body of Christian believers, seem strongly to favor the idea that the letter was written to an individual, and not to a church. — 3. The phrase *ἐν ἀληθείᾳ* of ver. 1 seems to be adverbial in its character, and to mean *in truth*, i. e., with a love which truly deserves the name. In ver. 4, on the other hand, it draws nearer to the phrase *ἐν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ* (3 John 4, comp. 3 John 3). — 4. The phrase, *all those who know the truth*, is probably to be referred to those in the writer's neighborhood when he wrote. The love which is spoken of as going out from the Christians to these Christians is declared to be on account of the truth which abides in all Christians (*ἡμῖν*); and, the writer adds, it (the truth) shall be with us forever. The character of this sentence and thought is Johannean.

5. The words of ver. 4, as Westcott remarks, "appear to refer to an experience of the writer in some other place than that to which the 'lady' belonged." — The explanation of *ἐν ἀληθείᾳ* and of the *καθώς* clause, in its relation to this phrase, which is given by Huther, is better than that which Westcott gives, who makes *ἐν ἀληθ.* adverbial, and connects *καθώς* with *περιπατοῦντας*, and not with *περ. ἐν ἀλ.* — 6. The correspondence of the thought in vv. 5, 6, with what we find in the First Epistle, is very striking, and is of such a character as to show sameness of authorship. — 7. At ver. 7, the thought turns, as in the First Epistle iii. 24–iv. 3, from the keeping of the commandments, as summed up in love to one another, to the deceivers and antichrists who do not confess that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh. The participle *ἐρχόμενον* is present and descriptive, *coming*; *ἐληλυθότα* (1 John iv. 2) is perfect and temporal, *having come, that he is come*. — 8. The exhortation of ver. 8 evidently refers to the danger arising from the possible evil influence of these deceivers. This exhortation looks to a negative and a positive end — on the negative side, not to lose the results in Christian development, etc., which had been wrought for them by the apostle and his helpers in the preaching of the gospel; on the positive side, the reception of the full reward which such Christian development, if it should go on to perfection, would secure in the future. — 9. The participle *προΐγων* (ver. 9) is taken by Alford as meaning *going before* as a teacher or leader; R. V. marg., *take the lead*. It seems better, however, to regard it as meaning *going forward beyond*, and not abiding in (*μένων*), the teaching which comes from Christ. — 10. Vv. 10, 11, add to the exhortation to be on their guard against suffering the evil influences of the false teachers to affect their Christian life and growth injuriously, a bidding that they should not give a hospitable reception to any person who should come to them not bringing the teaching of Christ. The class of persons here referred to are those who come with another doctrine, and with the design and purpose of subverting the gospel. The energy of the language is to be explained in connection with the denial, on the part of these persons, of that which the apostle regarded as the fundamental Christian truth; see the First Epistle. — 11. On ver. 12, see notes on 3 John vv. 13, 14. — 12. The fact that the children only, and not the elect sister herself, are spoken of in

ver. 13 as giving the salutation, is regarded by some as favoring the idea that the letter is addressed to a church. But this fact seems to be easily explained if the elect sister was no longer living, or if her children only were in the place where the apostle was; and, if thus explicable, it affords no evidence that the letter was not written to an individual.

THE THIRD EPISTLE OF JOHN.

L.

Vv. 1-15.

1. The words *περὶ πάντων* are to be explained as Huther explains them, *in respect to all things, in all things*; *εὐδοῦσθαι*, in the passive, means *to be prosperous*, as in Rom. i. 10; *ὑγιαίνειν* may possibly refer to bodily health, but more probably it is used in a figurative sense, as further carrying out the idea of *εὐδοῦσθαι*; *καθώς*, the measure and standard of the prosperity which the apostle desires for his friend, is that of the prospering of his soul in the Divine life. The verb *ἐῤομαι* near the beginning of this sentence may mean *wish*, and it may mean *pray*. Not improbably, R. V. is correct in giving it the meaning *I pray*. — 2. Ver. 3 is introduced as a ground or reason for ver. 2. The joy which the apostle had in learning of the Christian walk and life of Gaius is a fact which justifies his statement of his wish or prayer for the prosperity of the latter as his soul prospers. The participle *ἐρχομένων* may perhaps be explained, with Westcott, as meaning *when they came from time to time*; but it may also be regarded, with Alford, as timeless, and merely conveying the reason of *ἐχάρην*. — 3. The phrase *ἐν ἀληθείᾳ*, in ver. 3, seems to be equivalent to the same expression in 2 John, ver. 4, and not to the same words used adverbially in ver. 1 and 2 John, ver. 1. *Truth* is here equivalent to *the truth*, only that it is expressed in a more general and less definite way. — 4. The true text in ver. 4 probably reads *χαράν*. Westcott and Hort, with B, read *χάριν*. If the latter reading is adopted, the meaning of the word is probably *favor*, or gift of the Divine grace.

5. The first matter for the setting-forth of which the letter seems to have been written, is that of hospitality to Christian brethren. The apostle begins this by expressing his approval of Gaius for what he has done or is doing in this way, and then he commends to him the duty as one befitting the Christian life. The words of approval begin with *thou doest a faithful work*: the word *faithful* here seems to mean *in accordance with Christian faith*. — 6. Ver. 6b intimates that these stranger-brethren are about to go back in their missionary journeying to Gaius. The account of the aorist participle with the future verb seems to be this: that the apostle conceives of his friend as immediately fulfilling the duty of hospitality indicated by the participle, so soon as there is a call for it, and with this thought he says, *thou wilt do well in having discharged this duty*. —

7. Ver. 7 gives the reason for ver. 6*b*. It is the common reason for Christian love: because those towards whom the love is exhibited are united with Christ, are living and working for Him, and loving Him. *The name* here is, doubtless, the name of Christ. But in addition to the going forth on behalf of His name, the writer adds, as a ground of the hospitable reception and kindly service, the fact that these men took nothing from the Gentiles; they were working for Christ, and would receive nothing from those who did not believe in Him.

8. The second main point in the letter is the case of Diotrophes, and the suggestions connected with it. In this part of the Epistle, vv. 9–12, the following points may be noticed: (a) *ἔγραψα*, ver. 9, refers to a letter already written to the church of which Gaius was a member. — (b) On *φιλοπρωτεύων* Westcott remarks: “It is of interest to compare the two sources of failure noticed in the two Epistles, *προύγειν* (2 John 9) and *φιλοπρωτεύων*, the undue claims to intellectual progress and to personal authority. There is nothing to indicate that Diotrophes held false opinions; his ambition only is blamed.” Whether Diotrophes was a presbyter or not, is uncertain; but it seems evident that he was a prominent man in the church to which Gaius belonged, and that he was disposed to assume prominence and authority. — (c) The word *ἐπιδέχεται* in verse 9 means *receives*, apparently in the sense of *recognizing the apostle’s authority*. The same word in ver. 10 is used in the more ordinary sense of *receiving*, as in the way of hospitality, etc. — (d) The verb *ικβάλλει* is indicative of special authority, or at least of special influence, as belonging to Diotrophes. — (e) In ver. 11, on the foundation of the case of Diotrophes, the apostle urges Gaius in general to imitate, not what is evil, but what is good; and then apparently brings forward the example of Demetrius as illustrative of the latter. — (f) The closing parts of vv. 11, 12, are characteristic of John; and they are so artlessly so, that the candid reader will not fail to see in them an evidence of the Johannean authorship of the letter.

9. The end of this Epistle corresponds very closely with that of the Second Epistle. The verb *εἶχον* here, as distinguished from *ἔχων* in 2 John, seems to call attention to the fact, somewhat more definitely, that he had the things to write before he began. The expression of the things omitted, he leaves for a personal communication. *γίγνεσθαι* of 2 John 12 involves the idea of *coming to*; *ιδεῖν* of this Epistle, that of being with and seeing. The friends are, apparently, personal Christian friends. There is no salutation at the beginning of this Epistle, as there is in the second. It is given here at the end: Peace be unto thee.

THE EPISTLE OF JUDE.

LI.

Vv. 1, 2.

1. That the Judas who wrote this Epistle was one of the four brothers mentioned in Matt. xiii. 55, Mark vi. 3, is beyond any considerable doubt. That these four brothers were brothers, and not cousins of Jesus, is probable, by reason of the fact that they are called *ἀδελφοί*, and are found in the narrative of the Gospels in connection with Mary, the mother of Jesus, as if they were members of her family. The probabilities of the case, in every respect, seem to favor this view. They were, thus, sons of Joseph and Mary, or of Joseph by a previous marriage. The James, accordingly, whose brother this Judas was, is the James mentioned in the Acts as the head of the church in Jerusalem, and the James who wrote the Epistle which is assigned to a person of this name. Judas was apparently, from the order in which the names of the brothers are given in the lists, younger than James. The reason why, although being a brother of the Lord, he does not speak of himself as such, is the same with that which is mentioned in the notes on Jas. i. 1. The fact that he speaks of himself as *brother of James*, seems to indicate that he stood on an inferior position, or was less known and recognized, than James, who took rank with the leading apostles.—2. It can hardly be doubted that *κλητοίς* is here the substantive word to which the participles belong as descriptive adjectives. The called are beloved and preserved. They are beloved in God the Father; the preposition *in* denotes, strictly, the sphere within which the love takes place or has its being, but the usage of the N. T. writers shows that the one *by whom* they are loved is God. The suggestion of this peculiar phrase seems to be, that as they are by their Christian life in that sphere in which God inspires, and, by His Spirit, dwells in the man, they are also the objects of that love which abides in God, and moves outward from Him to holy souls. They are kept for Jesus Christ; the dative here denotes, apparently, the one in whose behalf, and for whom, as a permanent possession and glory, they are preserved by God. The love of God will secure for those who are called the blessing of the future,—the called will be glorified, as Paul intimates; but they will be thus glorified, because of the relation of God the Father to His Son,—they are kept for Jesus Christ.—3. The salutation is peculiar in that it omits the word *grace*, and adds the word *love*. There can be but little doubt that *mercy* refers to that which goes forth from God to man, and that *peace* indicates the state of the human soul which follows upon the experience of the Divine mercy, and which belongs to the relation of the soul to God. *Love*, as following after these words which speak of God's movement towards man and man's position towards God, may, not improbably, be intended to suggest the idea of the relation between man and man, the abounding of love being essential to the perfected Christian state. It is possible, however, that *love* may be added as taking up the thought of the participle *beloved* in the preceding verse, and may refer to the love of God to men, one special manifestation of which is mercy. Huther prefers the latter view, if *ἡγαπημένους* is to be adopted as the true reading in ver. 1.

LII.

Vv. 3, 4.

1. These two verses, following the salutation, form a kind of introduction to the Epistle, and they give the special reason which led the author to write it. This reason was the appearance, on the stage, of certain false teachers who were endangering the faith of Christians. The great similarity between the characteristics of these false teachers and those of the heretics described in the Second Epistle of Peter is manifest to every careful reader. They have evidently already appeared at the time of the writing of this Epistle. In the case of 2 Peter (see Notes on that Epistle), there seems to be a sort of double statement, — now, as if they had already appeared (ii. 17 ff.); and again, in the way of prophecy, that they were to be expected and would appear in the future (ii. 1 ff.). If the statement of 2 Peter can be properly regarded as altogether relating to the future, a strong argument may be found, in connection with this fact, in favor of the view that the date of the Epistle of Jude was later than that of 2 Peter. — 2. The correspondence thus indicated between the two Epistles would seem to show that they were addressed to substantially the same circle of readers. In neither of the two is there any special designation of the readers as to their residence, the only indication in 2 Peter being that which is found in iii. 1, which points towards the same persons as those addressed in 1 Peter, who were residents of the region of Asia Minor. In this Epistle, the readers are simply addressed as *ἀγαπητοί*, which word marks them as Christians, but gives no further hint respecting them. — 3. In order to the understanding of ver. 3, we may notice, that, inasmuch as the phrase *ἔσχον ἀνάγκην, κ.τ.λ.*, evidently contains the main thought of the verse, the participle *ποιούμενος* must be determined, in its time, by the verb *ἔσχον*. It was while or when he was giving diligence to write to the readers of the Epistle respecting the common salvation, that he felt constrained. The pres. part. goes back, as a continuous present, to the time of the verb, and covers that time, but does not pass forward beyond the limits of that time. The writer seems to imply, therefore, that he had had, for some time, a desire, and was at the point of putting that desire into action, to write to them a letter with regard to the common salvation. This term is a general one, and, as such, is possibly inclusive of all which might with propriety be covered by it, whether in the matter of fact, or doctrine, or method, or explanation of any sort. While in this state of mind, the presence and working of the false teachers made him feel it to be necessary to turn his exhortation into the line of thought which he now follows. It became the readers, in view of the existing dangers, to contend earnestly for the faith.

4. *The faith which was once for all delivered to the saints.* This passage is the strongest one in the N. T. favoring the view that *ἡ πίστις* has sometimes the strictly objective sense, the system of faith, or Christian doctrine. If this is the meaning intended by the writer, this fact would tend to show that the Epistle was written in the later, rather than the earlier part of the apostolic period. The word *faith*, in almost every case of its occurrence in the N. T., means subjective faith. The movement towards the objective sense was, naturally and necessarily, a gradual one. It is, indeed, doubtful, whether the full objective meaning is intended in this verse. More probably the word, as here used, appears in what may be considered a transitional state; and the view of Huther is substantially correct, that it means not *system of doctrine*, but *the*

objective contents of faith, that which Christians believe. The reference is rather to the fundamental essential truth of salvation by Christ, than to the collection of doctrines making up what is commonly called a theological system. — 5. The word *ἀπαξ* apparently carries with it the idea of *once for all*, because of its connection with *παράδοθίση*, and the contrast implied in the context. The participle, by reason of what is said in ver. 17, is probably to be completed in its thought by the words *by the apostles*. — 6. The evil or danger indicated in ver. 4 is clearly one lying in the moral region. The men alluded to were themselves ungodly; and they were turning the grace of God, not into some wrong belief, but into wrong conduct and life. These persons are spoken of as coming in among the Christian body in a secret and stealthy way, by a side-door, as it were (comp. Gal. ii. 4); and this idea is, by the position of the words, set forth with especial emphasis. The insidious character of the evil influence, as well as its existence, is that which constrains the writer to address the Christian brethren on this subject.

7. The words describing what the false teachers do and teach are those of the two participial clauses which form the last part of the verse. But before stating this, the writer inserts a phrase which marks their character and destiny. It is not quite certain whether a comma is to be placed before *ἀσεβεις*, as Huther and several commentators hold, making this word an independent designation; or whether, on the other hand, no comma is to be inserted, and *ἀσεβ.* is to be immediately connected with *οἱ προγεγρ.* The emphasis is greater if we take the former arrangement of the sentence. In view of what follows in later verses, and also of the strict and proper meaning of *προγεγρ.*, it can hardly be questioned that this participial phrase refers to these persons, not as predestined to condemnation in the eternal counsels and purpose of God, but as corresponding with cases mentioned in the O. T., and thus being of the number of those with regard to whom the O. T. utters its predictions; comp. 2 Pet. ii. 1. The words *this judgment*, which evidently here suggest the idea of condemnatory judgment, refer to what is indicated or set forth in the following verses. Vv. 5-16 suggest the condemnation, while they, at the same time, describe the characteristics of the persons, and they do so by calling attention to the O. T. times.

8. *Turning the grace of God into lasciviousness, and denying our only Master and Lord, Jesus Christ.* — There are evidently two points presented here, but the two things mentioned have a close relation to each other. The grace of God must, as it would seem, by reason of its contrast with *ἀσέλγεια*, mean here, not the doctrine of grace, or of the way of salvation through faith, but the actual Divine grace or favor itself. They turned this grace itself, which came to them in the offer of forgiveness, into a means of indulgence in gross immorality. The progress of error had passed from doctrine into life. These persons also denied the Lord. Rejecting the right idea and influence of the grace which Jesus revealed, it was a natural sequence that they should move onward to the denial of Jesus Himself. As the word *θεόν*, following *δεσπότην*, is to be omitted from the text by reason of the preponderance of external evidence against it, we may connect *δεσπότην* with Jesus Christ. The arguments on both sides of the question are suggested by Huther in his note. The very close correspondence between this Epistle and 2 Peter, and the fact that in that Epistle (ii. 1) the word is undoubtedly used of Jesus, seem, on the whole, to overbalance the suggestions of Huther on the other side. Both possibilities of explaining the words which follow *ἀρνούμενοι* should, however, be recognized, as they are in R. V. text and marg. This word *ἀρνόμ.* seems to denote a denial both in

doctrine and practice ; but, so far as it is the former, it is rather a denial of Him as regards the truth which He taught, and the revelation of God which He made, in their bearing upon life, than a denial of His Messianic office, or of His Divine nature, or peculiar relation to God.

LIII.

Vv. 5-16.

1. The writer begins this passage, as Huther remarks, by referring to three examples of judgment which may serve to set forth the character of the κρίμα mentioned in ver. 4. These three examples are drawn from the history of the Egyptians, from the case of Sodom and Gomorrah, and from that of the fallen angels. In 2 Peter, where similar examples are cited for the same purpose, the case of the Egyptians is omitted, and that of the people at the time of the flood is inserted. This change would, in itself, be a slight indication that the one writer did not copy from the other, or at least did not depend on the other, but only a slight one; for, in case of such dependence, it is evident that the later of the two might feel that the substitution of one historical occurrence for another would be more adapted to his purpose, or more impressive. — 2. The word ἅπαξ is probably best translated *once for all*; and the participial clause in which it occurs intimates that all this past record was fully known to them, so that they needed only to be reminded of it, in any of its parts, in order to appreciate the force of its application. — Huther regards the reading Ἰησοῦς, in ver. 5, as possibly correct, though he admits its strangeness. It would seem to the writer of this note, that, while its presence in some very ancient authorities may be easily accounted for by reason of the allusion to Jesus in ver. 4, this reading is quite improbable for two reasons; namely: First, because this O. T. record is much more naturally connected with God than with Christ; this is the connection generally found in the N. T., and it seems to be found in the remainder of this Epistle taken as a whole; and secondly, because there is manifestly no such occasion here, as we find in 1 Cor. x., for bringing forward Christ as the One who was with the Israelites or the O. T. saints. If we read ὁ κύριος without the addition of Ἰησοῦς, the reference is, no doubt, to God. — 3. The adverbial word δεύτερον is well explained by Dr. Angus, in Schaff's Pop. Comm., as *the next thing he did*. Huther is probably correct in giving a somewhat extended reference to the dealing with those who did not believe, but the passage in Num. xxv. 1-9 may, nevertheless, be prominent in the writer's thought.

4. The words respecting the angels are slightly different from those of the corresponding passage in 2 Peter, where the passage (ii. 4) reads: *If God spared not angels when they sinned, but cast them down to Tartarus, and committed them to pits [or chains] of darkness, to be reserved unto judgment*. For the word *sinned*, Jude uses the expression, kept not τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἀρχήν; this expression may probably set forth what their sin consisted in, or that by which it was accompanied. That ἀρχή has here the meaning *dominion, principality*, rather than *first estate, original condition*, is now admitted by many, or most, of the best commentators. This meaning is, as Huther remarks, the ordinary meaning of the word in the N. T., when it is used of angels; and it is, to say the least, as fully consistent as the other interpretation with the clause which follows. The reference in this following clause may probably be to what is

mentioned in Gen. vi. 1 ff.; but the language used in the remainder of the verse is so connected with that of the Book of Enoch, and of other writings outside of the O. T., and it is of such a poetic or figurative character, that the interpreter is called upon, by this fact, to exercise much care in his explanation and application of the words. — 5. The word *αἰῶνις*, in this sense, does not occur elsewhere in the N. T., except in Rom. i. 20, where it is applied to God. It is derived from *αἰ*; but, so far as the statement of the verse is concerned, the *always* idea may be limited to covering the period until the day of judgment. The keeping or guarding of these angels fast-bound, so that there may be no escape, until the time when condemnation is passed upon them, is the thought in the author's mind. Whether they are to be kept bound in chains after that time, or whether some other result of the condemnatory judgment is to befall them, is not stated; and it is natural that it should not be, for the purpose of the passage is to show, by these examples, the certainty that condemnation will come, and not what the particular final consequences of it are to be. In 2 Peter, according to what may be the best text, they are said to be committed to pits of darkness in reserve for judgment. The word *Tartarus* is used only in 2 Peter. Professor Salmond, in Schaff's Pop. Comm. on that Epistle, says, and apparently with reason, "Peter has in view [in the use of this word in the passage in question] neither *Hades*, the world of the departed generally, nor *Gehenna*, *hell*, in the sense of the place of final judgment, but the intermediate scene or state of penalty."

6. The fact that Sodom and Gomorrah are spoken of as having in like manner with these given themselves over to fornication, and gone after strange flesh, is favorable to the view that the reference to the angels is connected with Gen. vi., but also especially with the Book of Enoch. In 2 Peter we do not find this special designation of the sin of Sodom. This is to be accounted for, no doubt, in connection with the different purpose of the two writers, and the fact that in 2 Peter the allusion to Sodom does not follow immediately after that which is made to the angels. The word *αἰώνιος*, as used by Jude with reference to Sodom, is employed in a sense kindred to that in which we speak of the everlasting hills. The endless fire of the future, as that expression has been sometimes used with reference to final Divine punishment, is manifestly not intended here; for the reference is to the destruction of earthly cities, not of souls. The expression of Jude is substantially equivalent, no doubt, to that in 2 Peter: *turning them into ashes, condemned them with an overthrow*. Through this overthrow, and the suggestions which it was calculated to give, God made (2 Peter) them, set them forth as (Jude), an example. — That the words of *eternal fire* depend on the word *punishment* in Jude (R. V. text), and not on the word *example* (R. V. marg.), is held, as Huther remarks, by most expositors. The reasons which Huther urges in favor of the other view are worthy of serious consideration; but they do not seem to be sufficient, in view of the fact that these cities were destroyed by an actual fire, which, so far as their longer existence was concerned, was perpetual in its destructive power; and the word *endless*, as used of the angels, is descriptive only of what precedes the judgment; eternal fire after that is only hinted at, not declared in terms. The corresponding passage in 2 Peter, which reads, "turning the cities into ashes, condemned them with an overthrow," bears also in favor of the view that the fire in Jude is the actual (earthly) fire which destroyed, and thus constituted the punishment of, Sodom and Gomorrah, and not the fire of Gehenna. The suggestion of Huther, that *πῦρ αἰώνιον* always designates hell-fire, can hardly

be insisted upon, when it is remembered that this expression occurs but three times in the N. T. (the other two instances being Matt. xviii. 8 and xxv. 41, in both which cases the phrase is *εἰς τὸ πῦρ τὸ αἰώνιον*).

7. The word *μέντοι* in ver. 8 is translated *yet* by R. V., as if this verse were in contrast to what precedes, and as if the thought were: notwithstanding these warning examples. But more probably the view of Huther is correct, that it serves for a strengthening of the expression: "these men actually do the same thing as the Sodomites." — 8. The word *ἐνπνευαζόμενοι* seems to refer to the thoughts and imaginings of these men in their sin and opposition to God, which are connected with and result in the pollution of the flesh, and the despising of dominion, etc. The argument of Huther with respect to *κυριότητα*, as referring to God or Jesus Christ, is forcible, and this view of the word seems to be correct; but the suggestions which he makes with regard to *δόξας*, as referring to evil angels because of ver. 9, are not to be considered as a sufficient support for that view. The repetition of the *δέ* may be accounted as following the line of the *μέν . . . δέ*, and not as indicating a marked difference in the two sentences: *set at naught dominion*, and *rail at dignities*. More probably, *δόξας* refers to the angelic powers (good angels), as connected with the Divine lordship (*κυριότητα*). — 9. The reference to the action of Michael, here spoken of, is apparently for the purpose of showing the impropriety of the conduct of these men by calling to mind the fact that the great archangel did not act in this way even towards Satan. The story here alluded to was probably a Jewish tradition, familiar to the writer and the readers. Whether true in fact, or not, it fully answered the writer's purpose as an illustration; that it was a tradition having no foundation in fact, may not be affirmed, but it was legitimate for Jude to use it as a well-known story. The corresponding passage in 2 Peter seems to refer to the bringing of a railing judgment either against these daring persons or against the *δόξαι*, and in either case it has a more general character than this in Jude, but may be, in some way, connected with the same story. The explanation of *κρίσιν βλασφημίας* given by Huther is doubtless correct. — 10. Ver. 10 presents the attitude and action of these false teachers in relation to two points, which answer to what is said of them in ver. 4. These men really rejected, in their general discourse and action, the authority of God, and gave themselves up to lust and sensual indulgence. They combined the self-conceit of scepticism with its tendency to immorality, when it works towards its worst results. What belonged to the region above their intellectual sphere, they reviled and despised; but not only this: what lay within the region of their earthly apprehension, they used only for the lowest ends, as if they were mere animals.

11. Ver. 11 comes in at a later point in the description of these persons given in 2 Peter, and apparently more in the natural order. Here, in the vehemence of the writer's denunciation of them, he breaks in with these words as the ground of pronouncing a "woe upon them." The allusion in 2 Peter is only to Balaam, that to Cain and Korah being omitted. Dr. Lumby regards this verse in Jude as having in it a sort of climax, and possibly his view is correct. He says: "These teachers were [so the writer of the Epistle would affirm] envious of men and perverse towards God, like Cain; they were teachers of error, and willing to work evil and lead others to it, for gain's sake, as was Balaam; and their ambitious self-seeking led them to resist all authority, after the manner of Korah." It may be, however that the general resemblance to these persons is intended, without the idea of a climax. The word *perished*, in

the last clause of the verse, seems to be used as anticipatory of their final fate; they had given themselves up to the course indicated so wilfully and completely, that the final result for them was, as it were, already secured and become a reality.

12. The correspondence, in the description which immediately follows this denunciatory passage, with 2 Pet. ii. 13, will be noticed; and yet there seems to be a kind of compression in the language here and elsewhere in Jude's description, and an indignant intensity, which surpasses what we find in the other Epistle, and which suggests the thought that the writer of this letter had seen the life and workings of these false teachers, towards whom the author of the other Epistle had only looked forward as likely to arise in the future, or, at the most, as in the beginning of their development in the matter of the evils indicated. — 13. The word *σπιλάδες* (ver. 12) takes the place in Jude of *σπίλοι* in 2 Peter, according to the best authorities, and the word *ἀγάπαις* in Jude has in some manuscripts *ἀπάταις* substituted for it in 2 Peter. *σπιλάδες* is generally understood to mean *rocks*, and this seems probably to be the correct meaning of the word. That the word may, however, be substantially equivalent to *σπίλοι*, can hardly be doubted (see Huther's note), and the R. V. is justified in inserting the alternative meaning *spots* in the margin. If the former signification of the word is adopted, the suggestion of the idea of *hidden rocks* is not improbably contained in it; and thus the idea of danger from these men, and from the character of their influence, is set before the reader's mind. The other meaning, being adopted, only brings to mind the thought of defilement and disfigurement. The love-feasts are alluded to, apparently, at the times of a sacred fellowship among the Christian believers, when they were observed with the right feeling and spirit. What is here referred to is a far greater development of what was manifested in Corinth: see 1 Cor. xi. 20ff. In 2 Peter these persons are spoken of as revelling in the love-feasts, if *ἀγάπαις* is the true reading there; or in their deceivings, if *ἀπάταις* is to be regarded as the correct text (so Sin., A*, C, K, L, P, and some other authorities). The reference in both Epistles, whatever be the true text, is clearly to what occurred at these feasts, in which the members of the churches united, and which, in their right use and purpose, were holy meetings. Only with the reading *ἀπάταις* they are represented as gaining their ends, etc., by deceit. The word *συνενωχούμενοι* is common to both Epistles; *ἑμὴν*, however, is added in 2 Peter. R. V. translates in the same way in both cases, and this is very probably correct; but evidently, as Huther intimates, the *συν* in Jude may mean *together*, or with each other. *Without fear* indicates the bold manner in which they took this course, having no fear of God's righteous displeasure or punishment. Whether *ὑπόβως* is to be connected with the participle which precedes it, or that which follows it, is uncertain. R. V. gives the latter connection, and perhaps this is the preferable way of understanding the words. It would seem that the word *ποιμαίνοντες* must point to the position of these men as in some sense professed teachers or leaders, who act solely, and possibly in the way of deceit, for their own advantage.

14. In the following words, by a fourfold figure, the writer represents these men as empty, restless, useless, destructive teachers of the worst sort. *Clouds without water, carried along by winds*: these words indicate their emptiness, and the fact that, being thus empty, they are borne along anywhither, and consequently are unsafe to follow. Nothing comes from them, and they move in no one direction. *Autumn trees without fruit, twice dead, plucked up by the roots*: the idea of no good coming from them is presented again here, and it is

added that the life-power which gives the possibility of fruit is gone. They are fruitless: they have lost the life-principle out of themselves, and they have become as trees which, because they are fruitless and also lifeless, are plucked up by the roots. The utter impossibility of any good spiritual result proceeding from them is thus most emphatically set forth. *Wild waves of the sea, foaming out their own shame*: this strong figure seems to represent the restless movement of these men in the course of immorality, wherein they show forth, by the excess of lust and evil, their shameful character, as the tossing waves break forth into foam. *Wandering stars, for whom the blackness of darkness has been reserved for ever*: whether the writer refers here to comets which appear for a time and then pass away from sight, is not certain; but not improbably this is the case. Perhaps the reference is to meteors. The strong and intense poetic rhetoric of these expressions, and the fact that in all the preceding cases the figure is carried throughout all the words, may lead us to doubt whether the last phrase, *for whom [which]*, etc., is to be referred to the false teachers, except so far as an application of them is thus made as part of the figure. More probably, it would seem that the writer represents these stars which break their way across the heavens, as going down to endless night, and being utterly extinguished. But, in the way of application of the figure, there must be some force in these words, as indicating the final result for these men. — By these four figures, as Dr. Angus says, “all that is mischievous, useless, disastrous, in sea or land or sky, becomes in turn the symbol of the character and destiny of these men.” — 15. R. V. translates *τούτους*, of ver. 14, *to these*; but it is quite commonly understood in the sense of *with reference to these*, as Huther also takes it, comparing Luke xviii. 31. This construction in such a sentence is undoubtedly peculiar and uncommon. The writer closes these denunciatory figures by applying to the false teachers the prophetic words of Enoch, which, through their position as following the last clause of ver. 13, make the most solemn application of that clause. The question as to the origin of these words — whether they are derived from the Book of Enoch, which we now possess, but with the language of which they do not perfectly correspond, though they are very strikingly similar, or whether they belonged to an oral tradition which came down to the apostolic times, and brought words spoken, or supposed to be spoken, by Enoch — is one of considerable difficulty. To the writer of this note, the derivation from the Book of Enoch seems more probable.

16. Ver. 16 seems to be an additional description of the false teachers suggested to the writer, in the excitement of his feeling against them, by the closing words of the quotation from Enoch's prophecy. *They are murmurers*, he says, *complainers, walking after their own lusts*. The word “complainers” strictly conveys the idea of dissatisfaction or fault-finding with their lot, and, in connection with *γογγυσται*, can scarcely have any other reference than to murmuring and complaining against God (comp. the preceding verse: “hard things spoken against him”). — The remaining words of this verse present again the idea of their lust and immorality, their self-conceit and vanity, exalting themselves, as Huther says, “in contrast to the humility of the Christians submitting themselves to God,” and their readiness to give honor to persons of high position, etc., from whom they might hope for some good for themselves. They utter complaints against God, and refuse to have that humility and submission before Him which they are ready to have, in outward show and form at least, in the presence of those who are exalted in the world. The selfishness of this respect for men is distinctly expressed: *for the sake of advantage*.

That there is a nervous energy, and a vehemence of denunciation also, in this whole passage, as compared with the passage in 2 Peter, the words of which are so largely similar, the attentive reader who looks carefully at the two will, as the writer of this note cannot doubt, be ready to admit. Whether this characteristic of Jude's style is due to the character of his mind, or whether it is to be explained, on the other hand, by the fact that he was in the presence of these men, while the other writer was only speaking prophetically of the future, is a point more difficult of determination.

LIV.

v. 17-23.

1. The writer opens this passage with a call upon the readers to remember the prophetic words of the apostles, respecting persons of the character of these false teachers. This prophetic declaration, being borne in mind, would tend to strengthen them against the evil influence of these men. The words *ὑπὸ τῶν ἀποστόλων* seem, as Huther suggests, hardly consistent with the supposition that Jude was himself an apostle. Certainly the expression is less easily reconciled with such a supposition, than are the words in the Book of Revelation (xxi. 14) and in 2 Peter (iii. 2), which are sometimes compared with them. In the passage in Revelation, the writer is looking forward to the future and final blessedness of the Church, and is writing in the prophetic-poetic style. That in such a passage he should speak of the twelve foundations of the new Jerusalem as having upon them the names of the twelve apostles of the Lamb, can scarcely be regarded as strange, when we consider the well-understood and universally acknowledged prominence of the apostles as the leaders of the whole Christian company, — a leadership which, of course, they were conscious of themselves, and which they did not hesitate to claim. In 2 Peter, on the other hand, where the language is very nearly what it is here, the difference in the expression is such as to make the use of it by an apostle less improbable, if we read *ἑμῶν* in the text, as we should, according to the great majority of the authorities which have most weight. "The commandment of the Lord and Saviour given by your apostles," is an expression which Peter or John might have used, it would seem, as one of a body of bishops might speak of "your bishops." But Jude's language: "The words spoken formerly by the apostles of our Lord Jesus Christ, how that they said to you," is of a different sort. This language, however, if it be admitted that it proves Jude not to have been an apostle, does not prove that the writer of the Epistle was not Judas the brother of James, who was the Lord's brother. The bearing of the verse, in this respect, would be only on the apostolic position of the two brothers, and so on the exact relationship which they sustained to the Lord. — 2. The probability with respect to the text in ver. 18 favors *ἐσχάτου τοῦ χρόνου*, and, if this be correct, the meaning is: at the end of the time. The expression sets forth in another form the same idea which is found in 2 Pet. iii. 3, *ἐπ' ἐσχάτων χρόνων*. The closing days of the ante-Messianic age were a time when these developments of evil were anticipated by the N. T. writers, as connected with the words of Christ in the eschatological discourses, etc. The presentation of the matter in 2 Peter is slightly different, the words respecting the mockers being made dependent on a participle *γινώσκοντες*, so that the readers are exhorted to remember the words spoken by the prophets, etc., knowing that the mockers will appear in the last days. This

difference in the manner of representation is, perhaps, indicative in some slight degree of the relation in time between the two Epistles; Jude writing after they had appeared, and Peter before. — The words τῶν ἀσεβειῶν form a descriptive genitive, *lusts of impieties*, as more emphatic than an adjective.

3. In vv. 19–23, the writer adds a brief conclusion, in which he sums up what the readers should do with regard to their own life, and in respect to those who were, or might be, misled by the false teachers. This passage he opens by a repetition, in a summary statement, of the characteristics of these teachers themselves. The word ἀποδιαιρίζοντες is placed first, and probably means *causing divisions*. This occasioning of divisions, or making of factions, was the natural result of their doctrines and action; and it was the point which might properly be made most prominent, as, in bringing his Epistle to its close, the author desired to tell his readers what to do in maintaining the real life of the Church. The word ψυχικοί is explained by its connection with πνεῦμα μὴ ἔχοντες; and both of these expressions, one on the negative and the other on the positive side, set forth, in a general and comprehensive way, their unchristian character. They belong in the sphere which is outside of the teaching, influence, and power of the Divine Spirit, and in the sphere of the animal or sensual, or the natural as distinguished from the spiritual. This adjective ψυχική occurs in Jas. iii. 15, where it is placed between ἐπίγειος and δαιμονιώδης; in the present case, by reason of the language used, in earlier verses, in describing these persons, it possibly borders more nearly on the idea of the latter of these two words than the former, but more probably it has its more general meaning. They lived only in the earthly natural life. — 4. Ver. 20 stands in a kind of contrast to ver. 19, ἡμεῖς being opposed to οὗτοι. The two participial clauses which are found in ver. 20, as well as the one in ver. 21, are subordinate to the verb τηρήσατε, though not in precisely the same way. The one beginning with ἐποικοδομοῦντες expresses the antecedent condition, on the basis of which they were to keep themselves in the love of God; that which follows, *praying in the Holy Spirit*, sets forth the means, or a means, by which the end was to be secured; and the one in ver. 21, *looking for the mercy*, etc., presents an attendant circumstance or accompanying state, — they should keep themselves, etc., with an attendant waiting for and expectation of the mercy of the Lord. — 5. The word πίστει, in ver. 20, is regarded by Huther as used in an objective sense, but apparently as denoting the objective contents of faith rather than the system of doctrine. If this is the correct view in ver. 3, it is so, not improbably, here also. But it does not seem necessary, if we consider this verse in itself alone, to give the word this sense, for the character and life can certainly be built upon subjective faith, and subjective faith may properly be described by the adjective holy, or most holy; faith is a holy thing. — The emphatic position of ἐν πν. ἁγίῳ may be accounted for as connected with the πνεῦμα μὴ ἔχοντες predicated of the false teachers. Perhaps, however, the writer reverses the order of the two participial clauses on mere rhetorical grounds. — The *love of God* here spoken of is probably, but not certainly, God's love towards them, rather than theirs towards Him. It is, as Huther remarks, in God's love to us, that the hope of the future mercy of Christ has its ground. — The connection of εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον with τηρήσατε, which Huther favors, is, perhaps, the most natural one, but possibly Alford is right in joining the phrase with the combined idea of τηρήσατε and προσδεχόμενοι.

6. Vv. 22, 23, add to the exhortation addressed to the readers with reference to the growth of their own life in the present exposure to the dangerous influence of these false teachers, a series of exhortations respecting the manner

in which they should deal with persons who might be affected by that influence. The three classes of persons alluded to, are apparently arranged according to the measure in which they are supposed to be influenced, beginning with those in whose case the measure is least. This must, at least, be held to be the true view, if *ἐλεῖτε* is the correct reading in ver. 22, as opposed to *ἐλέγχετε*. With the other reading, the question of the order is more doubtful. According as the former or the latter text is adopted, the meaning of the participle *διακρινόμενοι* will, or may, vary; in the former case, this participle must probably have the meaning *being in doubt* (R. V. text), but possibly it may mean, as R. V. marg., *while they dispute with you*; in the latter case, the latter meaning is almost certainly the true one. The verb *ἐλέγχετε*, if read, is to be translated *refute* (A. R. V. marg.) or *convict*, including the idea of overcoming in argument, and a consequent rebuke and condemnation. This latter seems to be the sense of the verb in ver. 15. The most natural progress of the sentences here, as well as what may be regarded as, on the whole, the preponderating external testimony, favors the other text-reading. The verb *ἐλεῖτε* being adopted as the text, and the participle being understood to mean *being in doubt*, we may understand the writer's exhortation to be as follows: that the Christian readers should have compassionate feeling and corresponding action towards those of the first class; as they were in a state of doubt and wavering only, such an attitude towards them might bring them to the right course: secondly, that they should save those of the second class by snatching them out of the fire; these persons had gone much farther astray than those of the preceding class, and more vigorous measures were needed for them, yet still measures prompted by compassion: thirdly, that they should have a compassionate feeling toward those making up the third class; but this feeling should move or be exercised in the sphere of fear, with a hatred of that which was defiling them, and which would defile all who have any share in it. These last-mentioned persons are, by reason of these added words, presented as those with whom even compassionate intercourse was attended by a certain danger. — 7. With respect to the individual words or phrases in vv. 22, 23, it may be said, (a) that the use of *διακρινόμενος* in ver. 9, where it undoubtedly means *disputing*, favors the view that it is used in the same sense here; but the well-known use of this word, elsewhere, in the other sense (*doubting*) justifies sufficiently its use by Jude with this meaning, and the progress of the sentences, as explained above, is favorable to this use of the word, with the reading *ἐλεῖτε* or *ἐλειρε*. (b) The phrase *snatching them out of the fire* seems to indicate, on the one hand, the great difficulty, and, on the other, the possibility, of rescuing the persons referred to. The word *fire* is only indicative of danger and deadly evil, and of the difficulty of rescue, and has apparently no direct reference here to eternal fire or the punishment of the future world. (c) The last clause of ver. 23 is correctly explained by Huther. The *χιτῶν*, the undergarment, "is to the author the symbol of whatever, by means of external contact, shares in the moral destruction of those men." In this connection, the reference is, as we may believe, to the greater, rather than the minor evil of this sort. Huther, however, disagrees with the view expressed in this note respecting the three classes, and would rather regard them as arranged in a reverse order to that which has been suggested here. — Wordsworth supposes that there may be some connection between the last clause of ver. 23 (so far as the suggestion of the thought and the expression are concerned) and Zech. iii. 2-4. This, however, is doubtful.

LV.

Vv. 24, 25.

1. The Epistle closes with a doxology which, in its general form, resembles that at the end of the Epistle to the Romans (Rom. xvi. 25*a*, 27), and which, in its opening thought, is nearly related to the thought of this whole Epistle, and particularly of the last preceding verses (20-23). In its resemblance to Rom. xvi., we have the words, *to Him who is able to guard you (stablish you, Rom.), to the only [wise] God our Saviour through Jesus Christ be glory (to the only wise God through Jesus Christ, to whom be the glory, Rom.)*. The word σοφῶ in Jude is omitted by the best authorities, and the words δὲ Ἰ. Χρ. τ. κυρ. ἡμῶν, which are not found in T. R., are supported by the weightiest evidence. — 2. The word ἀπταιστος, which is not found elsewhere in the N. T., is particularly adapted to this place; and the consummation at the end, for which this φυλάξαι ὑμᾶς ἀπταιστωνος prepares and preserves the Christian readers, is presented in the following words. The preposition ἐν before ἀγαλλιάσει denotes the sphere or condition in which the στήσαι ἡμῶν will have its action or result; and so the condition in which the persons who are thus set before God blameless, will be in connection with, and as the issue of, the στήσαι. — 3. Huther takes δὲ Ἰ. Χ. as belonging to σωτήρι ἡμῶν, *our Saviour through Jesus Christ*, and this is not improbably the correct view. — 4. The fulness of the form of the doxology is noticeable, as compared with other doxologies in the N. T., and particularly the fulness of the form of expression πρὸ παντὸς τοῦ αἰῶνος καὶ νῦν καὶ εἰς πάντας τοὺς αἰῶνας. The past, the present, and the future are united, — from everlasting and to everlasting. With respect to the verb to be supplied in the doxology, — whether ἐστί or ἔστω, — the prayer or wish-element, which belongs to the very idea of a doxological sentence, and the probabilities appertaining to most such sentences, favor the supply of ἔστω; while the argument urged by De Wette in favor of ἐστί, that a prayer that glory may be before all time is out of place and fitness, is worthy of consideration. It is doubtful, however, whether the sentence is to be looked at in this way. Not improbably, in giving his thought and desire an extension over all time or eternity, he simply offers his prayer that, throughout all, glory may be given, without thinking of the accurate fitting of his words in the manner supposed.

DATE DUE

~~MAR 2 9 1957~~

~~FACULTY~~

~~MAR 2 9 1957~~

~~FACULTY~~

~~MAR 2 9 1957~~

~~MAR 2 9 1957~~

~~MAR 2 9 1957~~


~~DEC 1 1 1956~~

~~MAR 2 9 1957~~



BS2344 .M613 1884 20
Critical and exegetical handbook to the

Princeton Theological Seminary-Speer Library



1 1012 00012 6864