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HISTORY OF METHODIST MISSIONS
IN FIVE VOLUMES

HISTORY OF METHODIST MISSIONS

In Five Volumes

EARLY AMERICAN METHODISM

VOL. I. MISSIONARY MOTIVATION AND EXPANSION, 1769-1844

VOL. II. TO REFORM THE NATION, 1769-1844

THE METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH

VOL. III. WIDENING HORIZONS, 1845-1895

VOL. IV. TWENTIETH-CENTURY PERSPECTIVES, 1896-1939

IN PREPARATION

VOL. V. THE MISSIONS OF THE METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH,
SOUTH, THE METHODIST PROTESTANT CHURCH, THE
EVANGELICAL CHURCH, AND THE CHURCH OF THE
UNITED BRETHREN IN CHRIST

Barclay, Wade Crawfords

HISTORY OF METHODIST MISSIONS
VOLUME IV

Twentieth-Century Perspectives

(The Methodist Episcopal Church, 1896-1939)

by

J. TREMAYNE COPPLESTONE

*The Board of Global Ministries • The United Methodist Church
New York, 1973*

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Author's Dedication



To the Memory of
LEWIS O. HARTMAN

Preface

We carry forward here the work begun in three earlier volumes of this History, which were written by the late Wade Crawford Barclay. The publishing agency has remained essentially the same during the course of the over-all project, but its corporate designations have changed. Volumes I and II were published by the Board of Missions and Church Extension, and Volume III by the Board of Missions, both being agencies of The Methodist Church. The present volume is being published by the Board of Global Ministries, which is an agency of The United Methodist Church, successor to The Methodist Church.

Parts II, III, and IV of the present book rest upon foundations laid in the earlier volumes, especially Volume III. Appreciation of these Parts will be enhanced by reading of relevant passages in those volumes. Part I, however, stands by itself, for it presents Methodist missions established after 1895. This accounts in part for the fuller treatment given in some sections of Part I.

The foreign missions (now called world missions) are presented mainly in field narratives in Parts I, II, and IV. All references to agencies, officials, and sources connected with these Parts should be interpreted in that context unless otherwise indicated. The work of home missions (now called national missions) yields a far less varied body of fact and a far more restricted body of usable original sources. Therefore it is presented in the organizational section of the volume, namely, Part III. This Part describes the larger administrative patterns of both home and foreign missions. In all four Parts, the terms *Methodist* and *Methodist Church* refer to the Methodist Episcopal Church unless the context indicates broader application. Incidentally, the term *District Superintendent* replaced *Presiding Elder* part way through the period covered by this book; I use throughout the later term.

Long as this book is, it has been necessary nevertheless, because of the vast amount of source material lying back of it and because of the large number of fields described, to select and compress to a degree that may disappoint particular readers at points of peculiar interest to them. I have been compelled to renounce all pretensions to narrative completeness for particular fields. Even the longer treatments necessarily are limited in coverage, the emphasis falling not on their completeness but on their delineation of certain patterns of missionary development that are advantageously displayed in them. The element of compression in the book also has made it impossible to men-

tion many dedicated and fruitful missionaries, to say nothing of giving full credit where credit might otherwise be due.

It has been necessary to renounce also the attempt at general evaluation of the Methodist missionary enterprise as a whole or even in summary views of particular fields. Such attempted evaluation would run beyond my own studies and knowledge and would suffer, even at the hand of many a better informed writer, from the pervasive subjectivism of missionary source materials and the lack of sufficiently broad independent evidence as well as of universally accepted norms of judgment. Such judgments as I have made are modest in application.

Volume IV, as compared with the earlier volumes, has benefited immeasurably from the availability of the extensive resources of the Correspondence File of the World Division, which includes the field and administrative correspondence of the Board of Foreign Missions and of the Missionary Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church. The citations in the printed Sources hardly more than suggest that thousands upon thousands of letters of missionaries and administrators have been viewed and studied in the preparation of this account. They tremendously undergird its reliability. Next to these, Annual Conference Minutes and Annual Reports of the Missionary Society and of the Board of Foreign Missions have provided the most copious relevant materials. The original writings in the sources have been so informal, however, that the literal accuracy of all names of persons and places cited cannot be vouched for.

I am thankful for the assistance given me by the late Dorothy C. Woodruff, by Elsie Lund, Madeline Brown, Dr. Eugene L. Stockwell, and by my three successive assistants J. Franklin Moist, Deanna Gomez, and Ann Scoville Ehrenberg. Mrs. Gomez' devotion of her typing, linguistic, and research talents to the work for eight years was an outstanding contribution. Mrs. Ehrenberg's editorial work at the latter end of the period was invaluable. And I am indebted to my wife, Eleanor Dinmick Coplestone, for her help with language problems and with preparation of the manuscript in its final stage.

I am also grateful for the latitude given me by the Board of Missions in the writing of this volume. Neither its Committee on the History of Missions nor its staff has imposed on me, either by suggestion or direction, any restriction at all as to its content. In the process of selection and treatment, I have been perfectly free of any pressure except that of my own responsible judgment.

J. Tremayne Coplestone

Contents

PART I. BREAKING NEW GROUND, 1896-1919

1. Americans in Africa	
<i>The Methodist Connection</i>	3
<i>Advance Into Rhodesia</i>	6
<i>Adopting Madeira</i>	49
<i>Pausing in the Cape Verde Islands</i>	59
<i>Foothold in North Africa</i>	60
<i>Forging the Congo Link</i>	92
2. Immigrants in Sarawak	114
3. Expanding Into the Netherlands East Indies	
<i>Sumatra</i>	135
<i>"Java for Jesus"</i>	144
<i>West Borneo</i>	157
<i>Bangka</i>	167
<i>Netherlands Indies Mission Conference</i>	169
4. Following the Flag Into the Philippines	170
5. Evangelizing the Philippines	204
6. "On to Bolivia"	240
7. Probing Ecuador	261
8. Entering Central America	
<i>Panama</i>	279
<i>Costa Rica</i>	306
9. New Missions in Old Europe	
<i>The Continental Pattern</i>	315
<i>Austria-Hungary</i>	322
<i>France</i>	339

PART II. CONTINUING MISSIONS, 1896-1919

10. European Missions Without Missionaries	
<i>Switzerland</i>	355
<i>Germany</i>	360
<i>Finland</i>	362
<i>Russia</i>	366
<i>Denmark</i>	372

<i>Sweden</i>	374
<i>Norway</i>	376
11. Conflict in Italy	378
12. New Leadership in Bulgaria	443
13. Warring Europe, 1914-1918	479
14. Africa	
<i>Liberia</i>	519
<i>Mozambique</i>	547
<i>Angola</i>	569
15. Eastern South America	581
<i>Argentina</i>	582
<i>Uruguay</i>	583
<i>Paraguay</i>	584
<i>Brazil</i>	586
16. Western South America	
<i>Chile</i>	589
<i>Peru</i>	610
17. In Revolutionary Mexico	627
18. In Awakening China	646
19. Autonomy in Japan	724
20. Captive Korea	741
21. Malaysia	765
22. India: Imperial Design	777
23. India: Mass Movements	787
24. India: Person-Centered Missions	834

PART III. THE AMERICAN FIELD, 1896-1919

25. Home Base and Home Missions	862
---------------------------------------	-----

PART IV. GROWTH AND ADJUSTMENT, 1920-1939

26. Liberia	898
27. The Belgian Congo	912
28. Portuguese Africa	
<i>Angola</i>	930
<i>Mozambique</i>	942
<i>Madeira</i>	951
29. Africa North and South	
<i>North Africa</i>	961
<i>Union of South Africa</i>	965
<i>Southern Rhodesia</i>	971
30. Europe Between Two Wars	
<i>The Continent</i>	975

<i>Germany</i>	976
<i>Austria</i>	989
<i>Yugoslavia</i>	991
<i>Hungary</i>	996
<i>Bulgaria</i>	998
<i>The Baltic States</i>	1000
<i>Russia</i>	1002
<i>Finland</i>	1015
<i>Scandinavia</i>	1016
<i>Switzerland</i>	1017
<i>France</i> ..	1018
<i>Italy</i>	1020
<i>Spain</i>	1024
31. Latin America	1034
32. Bolivia	1040
33. Central America	1083
<i>Panama</i>	1084
<i>Costa Rica</i>	1097
<i>Central America</i>	1116
34. Mexico	1121
35. India	1130
36. Southeast Asia	
<i>Malaya and Singapore</i>	1156
<i>Sarawak</i>	1160
<i>Netherlands East Indies</i>	1163
<i>The Philippine Islands</i>	1168
37. Eastern Asia	1176
<i>Korea Mission, 1920-1930</i>	1176
<i>Korea: Union With Autonomy</i>	1180
<i>Japan Mission, 1920-1939</i>	1184
<i>China Mission, 1920-1936</i>	1184
<i>Methodists and the Japanese State, 1935-1939</i>	1194
<i>Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1939</i>	1199
<i>Methodism and the Far Eastern Conflict, 1937-1939</i>	1202
—•••••	
SOURCES	1205
INDEX	1253

Part I

BREAKING NEW GROUND

1896-1919

1

Americans in Africa

TOWARD EVENING ON 26 JANUARY 1897, the sound of a ship's cannon announced to the people of Monrovia, the capital of Liberia, that a steamer had arrived offshore and was dropping anchor beyond the bar. Early the next morning, a dozen Methodist preachers and leading citizens of the city made for the fog-shrouded ship to welcome Bishop Joseph C. Hartzell, who was aboard. Later that day, when he and his party had been rowed ashore by African oarsmen and finally escorted to their lodgings, Bishop Hartzell wrote to the men in the Mission Rooms in New York, "I am occupying the room Bishop Taylor was accustomed to occupy."

More than that, indeed, Bishop Hartzell had come to Africa to occupy the episcopal post Bishop William Taylor had held for twelve years, until the General Conference of 1896 retired him at the age of seventy-five. The 55-year-old Hartzell, for fourteen years engaged in Negro work in the United States as a Corresponding Secretary of the Freedmen's Aid and Southern Education Society, was the new Missionary Bishop for Africa. He now was making his first official tour of the Africa field following his election by the recent General Conference. He came with a double purpose—both to carry forward the African enterprise formerly supervised by the veteran missionary pioneer and to reorganize it along lines agreed upon by the General Conference and the General Missionary Committee.

The Methodist Connection

Up to this time, all the denomination's official missionary activity in Africa had fallen within the jurisdiction of the Liberia Conference and had been administered jointly by the Missionary Society and the Bishop.* But Bishop Taylor also carried on solely on his own initiative and responsibility the remaining units of what were widely known as Bishop William Taylor's Self-Supporting Missions, staffing them with workers he himself sent out from the United States and supporting them in part with special funds raised by his own efforts. Beyond that these missions depended upon

* See Vol. III, 894-931.

measures of "self-support" undertaken by the missionaries themselves. Some of these stations were inside Liberia, but there were four clusters of them beyond her boundaries. Taylor informally attached the latter to the Liberia Conference Appointments for 1896 as the Angola, East Angola, Congo, and Zambezi Districts. By the time Bishop Hartzell came to Liberia, Bishop Taylor had transferred all his African self-supporting missions to the Missionary Society, which recognized them as regular missions of the Methodist Episcopal Church. They were to be administered henceforth by the Missionary Society and the Bishop acting in concert.

A week after arriving in Monrovia, Bishop Hartzell convened the annual session of the Liberia Conference and at its close added to the official Conference appointments about a dozen of Bishop Taylor's former self-supporting missions, plus a few substations, all of them located within Liberia. Among them were the Barraka, Gola, Fortsville, Grand Sess, Ebenezer, Vey, Bexley, and Wah stations. At the same time, he reduced the formal scope of the Conference by organizing it on the basis of a revised Disciplinary definition assigning to it all the work on the west coast of Africa north of the equator. In harmony with that provision, Hartzell dropped the four extra-Liberia areas from the Liberia Appointments, leaving the Liberia Conference functionally, if not technically, a more nearly Liberian organization. The only exception was constituted later on by the addition of the Madeira Islands Mission District, representing the small mission Hartzell acquired while stopping over in Funchal, Madeira, in 1898.

Bishop Hartzell's next formal move in the course of this visitation of the Africa field was to organize the Congo Mission Conference, to which the General Conference had assigned all of Africa south of the equator. He accomplished this in a session at Quiôngua, Angola, in June. The charter members were men transferred from the Liberia Conference, and the charges were the stations on the four so-called Districts just detached from it. The new Conference briefly included Vivi, on the lower Congo River, one of the two Taylor stations remaining in the Congo out of a group that had absorbed the energies, in some cases the lives, of fifty-five men and women in missionary service. Hartzell soon transferred Vivi, the only Taylor station of continuing value, to a Swedish mission and sold the *Anne Taylor*, the steamer Taylor had brought to Africa to ply the waters of the Congo between his once active missions. The closing out of this work meant that there was no continuity between this effort in the Congo and the mission opened by John M. Springer in the interior of the Belgian Congo in 1910. Thus, almost as soon as it was established, the Congo Mission Conference became a Congo organization only in name.

Bishop Hartzell organized the activity of the Congo Mission Conference into the Angola and the Zambezi Districts, the former including locations

on the west coast of Africa and the latter linking a few stations in Mozambique, on the east coast. To these two, however, the Bishop soon joined the Mashonaland District, the new mission he opened in Southern Rhodesia in 1898.

In 1900, the General Conference ordered the division of the Congo Mission Conference so as to provide separately for the work on the west and east coasts of Africa below the equator. Bishop Hartzell thus organized the East Central Africa Mission Conference in November, 1901, its two components being the Mozambique and the Southern Rhodesia missions. He organized the West Central Africa Mission Conference in May, 1902, to care for the stations in Angola, to which now was transferred from the Liberia Conference the mission in Madeira.

John M. Springer's new mission in the Congo became, in 1910, a part of the West Central Africa Mission Conference and remained so until Bishop Hartzell organized it separately in 1915 as the Congo Mission. Two years later, it became the Congo Mission Conference.

The Rhodesia mission was separated from the East Central Africa Mission Conference in 1915 pursuant to an enabling act of 1912. It became known as the Rhodesia Mission Conference. The remaining component of the former Conference was reorganized in 1916 as the Inhambane Mission Conference. It remained a Mozambique enterprise only, until in 1919 it extended its work into the Union of South Africa.

A new African missionary unit appeared in 1910, when Bishop Hartzell formally organized as the American Mission in North Africa the work he had inaugurated in Algeria and Tunisia in 1908. It became the North Africa Mission Conference in 1913 and in 1916 was assigned for episcopal supervision to the Bishop in charge in Europe.

Bishop Hartzell remained in charge of the entire Africa field until 1904, making a number of journeys between the United States and Africa, and traveling extensively along the coasts and into the interior of the continent in which lay his missionary responsibility. In his first quadrennium, he covered 70,000 miles, traveling in almost every kind of craft from ocean steamer to native African rowboats, moving about Africa by railroad, stagecoach, and ox wagon, and on one trek covering a thousand miles of Angolan trails mostly by hammock, with intervals on bullock-back and afoot. Though his stays in Madeira were brief and scattered, he made Funchal his official African residence.

In 1904, the General Conference elected a second Missionary Bishop for Africa, Isaiah B. Scott, Editor of the *Southwestern Christian Advocate*, the journal published for the American Negro constituency of the Methodist Episcopal Church. Bishop Scott, himself a Negro, was assigned to residence in Monrovia and to episcopal responsibility for the Liberia Conference. He

was the first Negro Bishop elected by the General Conference for service in Africa; Bishops Francis Burns and John W. Roberts, who also were American Negroes, had first been elected by the Liberia Conference and then consecrated in the United States. Bishop Hartzell remained in charge of the rest of the Methodist work in Africa. The two men kept these assignments until they both were retired at the General Conference of 1916.

Upon the retirement of Scott and Hartzell, the General Conference proceeded to elect two more Missionary Bishops for Africa, having resolved, as petitioned by the East Central Africa Mission Conference, that one of them should be of African descent. So it was that Alexander P. Camphor, President of Central Alabama College since 1908 and previously an American missionary member of the Liberia Conference, was elected by balloting conducted "for the election of a Missionary Bishop of African descent for Africa." Whatever tacit understanding there may have been about the election of Bishop Scott in 1904, no racial designation had appeared in the official record of the balloting; he was elected under the same category as Bishop Hartzell had been. The General Conference of 1916 also elected, as a "Missionary Bishop for Africa," Eben S. Johnson, a white man, who was a District Superintendent in the Northwest Iowa Conference. Camphor was assigned to residence in Monrovia, with responsibility for the Liberia Conference, and Johnson was assigned to the rest of the Africa jurisdictions, with official residence in Umtali, Southern Rhodesia. Unfortunately, Bishop Camphor did not serve out the quadrennium; he died at the end of 1919, when he was in the United States to assist with the Centenary campaign.

Advance Into Rhodesia

A few weeks before he was elected Missionary Bishop for Africa in May, 1896, Joseph C. Hartzell carefully prepared for a literary club in Cincinnati, Ohio, a paper on the "Partition of Africa," thus becoming familiar with a complete outline map of Africa. He had this map in his mind's eye during the brief address he made to the General Conference advocating the election of a successor to William Taylor, the retiring Missionary Bishop for Africa. Distinctly impressed upon his mind during the applause that followed the announcement that he himself was elected to succeed Taylor—so he testified later on—were the words, "Somewhere in South Africa in the midst of the advancing waves of Anglo-Saxon civilization northward, and under the British flag, American Methodism should have missionary work." Still later, he declared that the clear and positive conviction that came to him in that form and at that time was of God.

"Somewhere in South Africa" became for Bishop Hartzell, in 1897, a pair of highland valleys in Southern Rhodesia. Landing at the port of Beira, at

the mouth of the Pungwe River, in Mozambique, he turned inland, traveling 175 miles to the end of the railway, then ten miles by hand cars and afoot to Macequece, and finally twenty-five miles more by horseback and afoot, until he came to Umtali, Southern Rhodesia. This, he decided, was the place of his prophetic vision in Cleveland.

A few weeks earlier, writing in London, Hartzell had expanded upon that first quick impression, directing the attention of the Missionary Society's executives to the million and a half white people and the many more millions of "natives" in South Africa. He described this "aggressive white civilization" as steadily pushing northward into Central Africa in a manner crucial for missionary strategy. He declared:

Everything is now permanently settling in Africa for the future. National and colonial boundaries are being distinctly marked and guarded; the great, and what are to be the permanent, future highways of commerce are being fixed; the diplomatists of England, Germany, France, and other smaller nations, are all striving for the best things for their governments. It is the hour of transition in Africa from discovery and loose occupation to that of permanence in control and development. The Church that is to have any recognition or success in the future in Africa must avail herself of these conditions, and so locate her bases of operations as to insure the largest opportunities for the future with the smallest outlay in missionaries and money.

Umtali, the first concrete focus of Hartzell's expansionist thinking, was a white town only recently established by Cecil Rhodes's British South Africa Company, which was responsible, under a charter from the British government, for the practical administration of the Colony. The town was soon to become the junction of the new Beira and Mashonaland railways. Because of the impracticability of running the railroad into "Old Umtali," which lay eight or ten miles away over a high pass, the Company had resettled the older community's several hundred people here on the railroad line. Said Hartzell, "December 10, 1897, I rode into Umtali a stranger, weary and hungry, soaked with rain and bespattered with mud . . ." Two days later, on a Sunday evening, he preached to one woman and thirty-five men in one of the rooms of an Umtali business establishment.

In Umtali, Hartzell learned that over in Old Umtali were abandoned government offices as well as a church, that might be secured for missionary purposes. He consulted the Umtali government Administrator and also entered into negotiations with the Administrator of Rhodesia (the fourth Earl Grey), with Cecil Rhodes, and with others both by correspondence and in personal conferences in London. On 21 March 1898, the Bishop received from Earl Grey a letter notifying him that the British South Africa Com-

pany would grant the Methodist Episcopal mission property in both Old Umtali and the new Umtali free of charge.

Earl Grey wrote to Bishop Hartzell in proffering the real estate grants:

My colleagues and I view with great satisfaction your desire to establish an important center for your Church in Rhodesian territory. We heartily welcome the co-operation of your countrymen, and are particularly glad to receive your assurances that it is the wish of the United States to take an active part with England in her endeavor to establish the rules and security of Anglo-Saxon civilization in territories which have hitherto been submerged by barbarism.

Grey penned these cordial words eighteen months after the suppression of the latest hostile rising of Rhodesia's Matabele and Mashona tribes and eighteen months before the outbreak of the Boer War.

FOUNDING

Since the Congo Mission Conference included, by definition, all missionary work in Africa south of the equator, the General Missionary Committee's approval of the mission made possible by the Rhodesian land grants was unnecessary; technically, the Southern Rhodesia venture was not a new mission. Bishop Hartzell promptly began recruiting missionary personnel to go to the Umtali area, for the Company's real estate offer was good for six months. Because he was asking no funds for the first missionary's salary, the Bishop experienced no delay in securing the Board of Managers' approval of the candidate he proposed. He was able, therefore, to get his first man onto the field in October, 1898, just in time to take up the option extended by the Company.

The man was Morris W. Ehnes, who arrived in Umtali in October, accompanied by his wife and M. H. Reid, a volunteer. During the next three years, fourteen more missionary workers came to the field: (1899) Mr. and Mrs. James L. DeWitt, Mrs. Anna Arndt, Herman Heinkel, A. C. Hammett, M.D., and Alice J. Culver, a nurse; (1900) Eddy H. Greeley; (1901) John M. Springer, Harriette E. Johnson, Mrs. Helen E. Rasmussen, George M. Odlum, Mr. and Mrs. Robert Wodehouse, and R. Emory Beetham.

Before the work was very far along, several of these workers left the field. Reid was the first to go, in the summer of 1899. In October, Dr. Hammett was compelled to return to the United States in order to cope with family problems, and Bishop Hartzell's plans for hospital work at Old Umtali thus being broken up, Miss Culver also returned home. After recurrent periods of ill health, including malaria, Morris Ehnes went on furlough in the summer of 1901 and did not return to Africa. James DeWitt also

was hard hit by malaria; he had to leave for home in 1902 in order to conserve his health.

By coming to Umtali, Ehnes took up a grant of four lots of land reserved for the Mission in the center of the new town of six hundred people. The Company was holding twenty acres more for the Mission's future needs. One of the conditions of the grant was that the Methodists should maintain a school for Europeans—a requirement Ehnes met a month after his arrival, when he took over, and opened under the Mission's auspices, a school for white children that had been operated by an ailing white woman. Before long, Ehnes got the school housed in a building that also included living quarters for himself and his wife. The dozen pupils paid tuition, and the government matched the Mission's current expenditures for the project by providing an annual subsidy that soon amounted to from \$1,600 to \$2,000. As time went on, Ehnes added to his activity a small weekly prayer meeting and also a Sunday evening service for the railway men. But eventually he was unable to keep up this general religious work because of the illness that finally made it necessary for him to be furloughed in 1901.

While Ehnes was getting started in Umtali, M. H. Reid was preparing the ground for Methodist occupation of the Old Umtali site, where the Company expected the Methodists to develop a "Native Industrial Mission." The grant included a tract of 13,000 acres, about eight by six miles wide, a dozen brick buildings with corrugated iron roofs and verandas, and a small brick church with Gothic doorway and windows. For six months, Reid cared for the property and held religious services for the Company police who remained quartered there for some time. James DeWitt joined him in April, and in the summer, Herman Heinkel (already in Old Umtali assisting Mrs. Arndt) began to work with him, about as Reid was leaving for home. For several months, DeWitt and the others labored to put in condition the buildings assigned to the Mission, roofed over four more for future use, tore down the remaining structures, salvaged building materials, and carted away rubbish.

DeWitt then turned his energies into the agricultural and manual arts activities out of which the projected industrial mission was expected to grow. By the end of the second season, he had cleared, plowed, and planted more than twenty acres, harvesting a corn crop of 375 bags. He started a herd of cattle, raised hogs, and kept sheep and goats, with some profit at market. In this work, as in the preliminary clean-up operation, Herman Heinkel, who served as overseer of the African laborers employed, was the man directly in charge—getting a hundred thousand bricks piled up, building three miles of fence, doing farm work, and for a period of four months, driving the ox team "until," as he said, "my throat was nearly used up."

DeWitt set up the "Mechanical Department" of the industrial mission in a building formerly used as a store. He equipped it with seven benches—for

carpentering, tinning, shoemaking, and harness making—and gradually acquired tools through special gifts from the United States. During the first year or two, he thus got various buildings repaired and made a certain amount of furniture, mostly for the Mission itself. He also started a small blacksmith shop. Some local boys received informal instruction in carpentering, but DeWitt was too busy to keep the "Mechanical Department" operating steadily in an organized way. It is not clear that very much of the manual work up to the end of 1901 was definitely educational in character.

Mrs. DeWitt began the first school work at Old Umtali, undertaking to teach some of the Africans on the mission estate to read the Bible. A few months after his arrival in 1900, Eddy Greeley picked up Mrs. DeWitt's informal teaching project and organized a day school that built a cumulative enrollment of twenty-seven "boys," who attended for various periods of time. The attendance was small and irregular, and little could be accomplished with the older pupils, who were grown men. Twice, a night school was started and maintained as long as there were boys to teach. Morning prayers were held each day for the school and the farm boys. Doubtless this work of Greeley's was handicapped by the fact that he was unable at first to use the language of the Mashonas and after fifteen months on the field was proceeding with his language studies only under difficulties.

DeWitt held Sunday preaching or Bible study services for the missionaries and occasional visitors whenever his health would allow, and John M. Springer helped him beginning in 1901. But Sunday services for Africans were begun by Greeley, who used English (occasionally with interpreters) except for such elements as the Lord's Prayer, the Decalogue, the Gospel According to Mark, the Catechism, and certain songs, which had been translated into local dialects. Attendance at the African services sometimes ran as high as fifty, "boys" coming not only from the vicinity of the mission, but also from other places. Others came in as they were passing through the area. DeWitt also started a fortnightly Sunday school for Africans in February, 1901, with some of the boys aiding him between sessions in translating Bible portions.

Mrs. Anna Arndt also joined the Old Umtali team, beginning an "orphanage," in November, 1899, by taking on the care of two young African children. She and her charges lived in the Mission Home—it was formerly a hotel—of which she was already the matron, caring for missionaries in residence and for visitors to the mission. Although she kept the two children for some years, Mrs. Arndt did not develop this small beginning into full-fledged children's work; her marriage to Eddy Greeley in April, 1900, disqualified her for service under the W.F.M.S., which normally supported specialized activity with children and women on foreign fields. Mrs. Helen Rasmussen, who came in 1901, was the first to go to work in Southern Rhodesia under the auspices of the W.F.M.S.

Unlike the missionaries in Old Umtali during these first few years, Morris Ehnes and his wife carried on without missionary colleagues during most of their stay in Umtali. Although the Methodists thus made a minimum investment of personnel in Umtali, Bishop Hartzell told the Missionary Society that "this development of the work among European white people who represent the wealth and government and business interests of the country is of great importance. It secures their influence and co-operation in the larger work to be carried on among the natives." Concretely, the white school, for which Ehnes hired two teachers, constituted practically the entire work when Robert Wodehouse and Emory Beetham came to Umtali in the spring of 1901 to take Ehnes's place. "Nothing was being done for the native," said Wodehouse.

By November, when the Mission Conference opened in Umtali, Wodehouse and his wife had several beginnings to report. For the whites—a more or less transient population—Wodehouse established Sunday morning and evening services in the school building, and his wife developed a Sunday school that finally reached, at its peak, about thirty children. The very small white congregation was organized as St. Andrew's Methodist Episcopal Church. For the Africans in the vicinity, Mrs. Wodehouse started a night school, teaching quite illiterate "boys" (she finally gathered as many as fifty) to read. With this informal school as a base, Wodehouse began African evangelistic activity, which centered in a "wattle and daub" church building that was made of poles and sticks "the natives" brought in from the forest and was furnished with boxes to sit on. This group was reported as Umtali's "Native Church," with five probationers.

The first place the Southern Rhodesia mission held in the Methodist connectional system was that of the Mashonaland District of the Congo Mission Conference (1899), with Morris W. Ehnes as District Superintendent. This associated the new mission with the work in Angola and in Mozambique. When the General Conference of 1900 divided the Congo Mission Conference, it put the Southern Rhodesia and the Mozambique missions together to form the East Central Africa Mission Conference, covering all East Africa south of the equator. Bishop Hartzell, who had spent four months in Old Umtali in 1900, returned to Southern Rhodesia late in 1901 and organized the Mission Conference in the school building in Umtali on 16 November, with Morris Ehnes, James L. DeWitt, and one of the Mozambique missionaries as charter members.

Before moving on to Old Umtali, where the Conference met from 20 to 25 November, Bishop Hartzell dedicated the chapel built by Wodehouse and his African constituency—"the first native chapel erected by the Methodist Episcopal Church in Rhodesia," the Bishop called it. He referred to it as the center of "a work of preaching and teaching that reaches a large number of kitchen- and storeboys." The African group contributed fifty dollars towards

the building costs, the Bishop emphasizing the point that the chapel work was for them and should be supported by them in the future.

At the Mission Conference sessions, John M. Springer and one of the Mozambique missionaries became Conference members on trial, and R. Emory Beetham was received in full connection. Among the appointments Bishop Hartzell made for the Southern Rhodesia work, which was now called the Umtali District, were those of Wodehouse to St. Andrew's Church (Umtali), Beetham to be principal of what soon became known as Umtali Academy (Umtali's white school), Charles Yafele (an African) and Harriette E. Johnson to teach with Beetham, Springer to the Industrial Mission (Old Umtali) for church and mission work, George Odlum to agriculture and the "Experiment Farm," Greeley as "Teacher and Botanist" (Old Umtali), and Helen Rasmussen to the W.F.M.S. Girls' Home in Old Umtali.

OUT INTO THE KRAALS

After lengthy discussion of "the native problem," the Mission Conference decided at its first session to endeavor to secure the confidence of "the natives" and to increase the number of them on the Old Umtali lands. Since the Bishop had appointed no District Superintendent, it fell to the initiative of John Springer and Helen Rasmussen to implement these goals.

In the spring and summer of 1902, Springer spent four months out in the stockaded African villages (kraals), giving special attention to the nearest one—eight miles from Old Umtali—which belonged to Chikanga, a daughter of Umtasa, "king" of the Manyika tribe. There he built, with Chikanga's approval, a mission hut that saw a good deal of use by workers from Old Umtali. Early in June, accompanied by Shakeni, an African girl of eighteen who had become both her pupil and her invaluable assistant in all her work, Helen Rasmussen went out to live in the hut. Her entree into the community stemmed partly from her reputation as a healer.

Chikanga was free with her hospitality, introducing Mrs. Rasmussen to numerous social happenings, which often were beery, noisy with drums, and pulsing with dancing. The missionary had some opportunity to use her medicines and to begin friendly contacts with the girls of the kraal, some of whom she involved in an informal way in simple services of worship. After a fortnight, Chikanga learned that her father was seriously ill, and at her insistence, Mrs. Rasmussen at once traveled a day's walk to Umtasa's kraal to try her hand at curing him.

She told her fellow missionaries:

The next day I was taken to the sick king, who was in a tiny, dark, miserable hut, like a rat in his hole. He was ill with a noisome disease ["an advanced state of syphilis," said John Springer], his whole upper lip and chin one putrid mess of sore, which I had to dress daily for weeks.

Twice a day for nine weeks, she tended the king. Most of the king's harem of some twenty wives also were suffering from syphilis, and Mrs. Rasmussen set to work to heal them too. She busied herself the rest of the time with daily morning devotional services, "many little services" during the day, and two or three on Sundays—playing the organ, leading hymn singing, and working out Scripture lessons with the girls and women who came to her. Some of them would enter her hut when she was alone and would "ask to be taught." Among the women she met was Muredzwa, another daughter of Umtasa's, who like Chikanga was an influential chieftainess with a kraal of her own.

The elderly king (he was in his sixties) got quite well under Mrs. Rasmussen's ministrations, but appreciative as he was, he was incapable of protecting his health by giving up his dissolute way of life. When he finally celebrated his improved health with a three-day binge, his missionary "doctor" gave up the case as hopeless and walked the dozen miles back to Old Umtali. During the past three months, she had made a good beginning towards realizing two special objectives that motivated her venturing into the kraals—pursuit of her language studies, and development of contacts that ultimately would bring girls into Old Umtali to the boarding school she hoped to establish.

Mrs. Rasmussen, later provided with a donkey, made additional trips to nearby kraals, especially Chikanga's. Other missionaries also put in some time at kraal work, including visits to Umtasa's kraal, where the king would not allow a mission hut to be built, although he gave them lodging for weeks at a time. Samuel Gurney, an American physician and minister who joined the Mission in March, 1903, spent six weeks at Umtasa's village, not only "studying the manners of the people, their religion, their attitudes to the whites, etc.," but also treating as many as twenty patients a day. Medical activity, believed Springer, was an especially important factor in securing the acquaintance and confidence of the kraal people. He reported to the Mission Conference, meeting in Umtali in 1903, that kraal visitation had been so successful that the countryside was now open to the extension of new missionary work as rapidly as it could be provided.

Dr. Gurney spent the next two years in pioneering medical activity, laboring almost entirely among the Africans, visiting the kraals and finally receiving many patients at the Old Umtali mission. During most of this time, he was unable to secure recognition of his medical credentials (he was a graduate of Yale Medical School) by the Southern Rhodesia authorities. When finally it was granted, however, Bishop Hartzell's original plan to have Gurney undertake full-fledged medical work centered in a hospital to be located in Umtali was given up due to lack of funds to build, equip, and maintain a hospital for whites and also due to the desire to avoid competition with one already in operation in the town.

For four years following the Conference of 1903, Eddy Greeley was

thoroughly engrossed in the labor of developing and extending the Mission's kraal work. In April, 1904, he settled in a hut in Kuguta, the kraal of the younger Umtasa (the old king had died), the largest African community in Manyikaland. He stayed for several months—receiving villagers daily at morning and evening prayers in his “filthy little hut,” and leading Christian songs and offering Christian teachings in the vernacular of the people who crowded the hut and pressed up to it on the outside each evening. Drawing upon instruction and experience with Doctor Gurney, he gave Umtasa's people six hundred treatments for ulcers, burns, cuts, and various chronic and acute illnesses. After a good start with this group, he moved on to Bokoto (eight miles west of Umtali), where Doctor Gurney had been working until interrupted by malaria. Greeley stayed for several weeks in the Bokoto mission hut and also made repeated visits to ten friendly lesser kraals in the neighborhood. Then came a trip to Gonde (seven miles northwest of Old Umtali) in answer to repeated requests—a visit that put him in touch with a dozen small kraals that were ready for Christian teaching. By Conference time in May, 1905, Greeley also completed a forty-mile journey northwest to visit Makoni, the chief of the Waungwe, calling at a number of his large but isolated kraals along the way.

At this Conference, Greeley received an appointment that made him the first of the Rhodesia missionaries to reside steadily on a station at an African town. Bishop Hartzell sent him to the reserve of the chief Maranke—a tract of 9,000 square miles, with a population of 7,000, surrounding the chief's kraal on Mt. Makomwe, forty miles southwest of Umtali. He went out with four African boys and camped under the trees for three months, until he got a mission house built on a plateau just below Maranke's kraal.

For nearly a year, Greeley devoted the largest room in his house to church and school activities. Then came a new building for the church, in which Greeley developed a school that taught reading, geography, English grammar and composition, arithmetic, writing, and studies in the local language to forty-eight boys and girls, with two African boys assisting as teachers. All the boys who lived in mission quarters worked for their food—tending gardens, carrying loads from the railroad, herding sheep, doing mission chores, or (some of the older boys) building a dormitory for themselves.

Greeley began medical work at Mt. Makomwe as soon as he arrived, and it caught on so well that he eventually rated it as the most important facet of the mission. Along with all his other work, which included steady attention to translation of hymns and Bible portions, he treated as many as fifteen medical cases a day. Each patient was expected to bring a pole or a bundle of grass as payment for his treatment, the mission thus accumulating material for the building of a dispensary and later a hospital. “The chief is kindly disposed to this sort of Mission work,” reported Greeley, “which even heathen eyes can understand.”

All Greeley's activity here was laced with evangelism. He won twenty converts in the first year, among the first being the daughters of the chief. By the end of the second season, his church had three full members and sixty probationers. Young people converted at the mission school quickly started going out to the kraals as bearers of the Christian message, more or less regularly touching as many as fifty communities. The mission was the center of an expansive movement that Greeley hoped would permeate the entire population of Maranke's Reserve.

After the Conference session that sent Eddy Greeley into kraal work (1903), John Springer was largely confined for two years to assignments that prevented his plunging into the larger geographical expansion of the Mission. But he vigorously grasped his opportunity to further it when in 1905 he became superintendent of the Old Umtali District, which was oriented towards the large area north of the Umtalis. He made a number of the arduous exploratory trips that typically prepared the ground for the Mission's stations and settled circuits.

Riding donkeys and accompanied by ten young Africans, Springer and his wife (he had married Helen Rasmussen six months earlier) trekked deep into the District in June and July, sometimes traversing sections previously unvisited by the Methodist missionaries. They rode twenty-five or thirty miles northwest out of Umtali for an evangelistic visit to Gandanzara. A week later, they were still farther to the northwest, in the densely populated Mrewa country, which lay as far north as Salisbury. From Mrewa they traveled forty miles northeast, crossing the Nyaderi River, to Mtoko. Then they moved southeasterly through the Inyanga region, "a country entirely empty of natives but full of ruins and ancient terraces"—calling at Rhodes Estate, ascending to the heights of Inyanga (altitude 8,000 feet, and very cold in that "coldest part of the southern winter"), moving down to the thousand-foot falls of the Pungwe River, picking their way along a high ridge and down over pathless terrain into the Honde Valley, climbing out of the valley (mostly afoot through wet grass that stood knee high) over six difficult ridges—and finally rode through more familiar territory near Umtasa's kraal and on home to Old Umtali. During these weeks, they had steadily visited kraals, preaching when it was welcome—sometimes it was not—and endeavoring to establish friendly relations that would open the way for regular teaching and preaching in the future.

The Springers struck out again, on 10 April 1906, on a more extensive exploration of the broad area allocated to his District. Heading northward on donkeyback, they made their way to Mrewa, revisiting the kraals along their earlier route. From Mrewa, they rode on through Mt. Darwin, over the Zambezi Escarpment at 4,200 feet, and across the Mkumvura River into Mozambique. Here they penetrated the dry, hot valley of the Zambezi River, traveling many miles through rough dried river beds, until after several

days they came, a day's journey west of Cachombo, to the Zambezi itself. On a route covered by David Livingstone a half-century earlier, they followed the Zambezi downstream, though leaving the riverside for a thirty-mile stretch to bypass the "rugged canyons of the Kabrabasa Rapids," to Baroma and Tete, which was the head of navigation from the ocean. From Tete to Senna, the Springers traveled by steamer. Upon landing, they started out on the last leg of their journey—a hundred miles southwestwards over hot lowlands, into the thickly populated region on the northern side of the Gorongosa Mountains, on to the valley of the Honde, and home to Old Umtali by 5 June.

These arduous journeys of the Springers' (the second one must have covered close to a thousand miles) were important contributions to the broadening of the Mission's rural evangelization program. Springer came back to his station thinking and talking about the Old Umtali District as actually extending—it was nowhere delimited on paper—from the Beira-Umtali railroad north to the Zambezi and from the Inyanga River into Mozambique to the Indian Ocean. He told the March, 1907, session of the Mission Conference that to occupy the District thus defined, it should establish seven new principal stations—Mrewa, Mtoko, Katareta, Inyanga, Kabrabasa, Senna, and Gorongosa—from which outstations should be extended "until the whole field is covered."

Springer's journeys resulted more immediately in initiating some of the processes that actually forwarded the evangelization program both for the near and the farther future. He and his wife did not visit simply places, but kraals, with their chiefs and their people. They conversed with them, they preached, they elicited invitations to send preachers and teachers, they made the people aware of the missionary centers and their workers, they planted the first seeds of confidence, they asked the kraal people to send their young people to Old Umtali for training. Thus they not only opened up many kraals to later evangelistic visits, but also made a beginning at recruiting the African workers upon whom the Mission would have to depend when it got to the point of establishing permanent evangelists in the new fields that were opening up. This extended through additional and longer channels the two-way flow between kraal and mission center that already was moving in the area closer to Umtali.

As soon as he could, Springer began exploiting some of the possibilities opened up by his field explorations. In October, 1905 (between the two major trips), he made a two weeks' "flying visit" to Mrewa's kraal, accompanied by Shirley D. Coffin, a young missionary only a few months on the field. In December, he sent Coffin back to the same area on what turned out to be a five weeks' itineration over seven hundred miles, for Coffin pushed on to the north beyond Mrewa and Mtoko, through part of the Fungwi country, across the Mazoe River, to the Mozambique border. As he went

along, Coffin preached—using an interpreter, of course—in from 125 to 150 kraals. Likewise, Springer followed up his second major journey by sending two African evangelists into the Gorongosa country, where they spent a month visiting kraals already touched by Springer and entering many new ones. Springer's direct effect upon the District's expansion ended, however, in November, 1906, when he left Old Umtali to go to the United States on furlough, but not to return to Rhodesia as a missionary until many years later.

EXPANSION

Robert Wodehouse completed the trio of early missionaries—Greeley and Springer were the others—who were chiefly active in originating and then progressively extending the evangelistic work beyond the two Umtalis. His base of operations was Umtali, where he organized both the white and the African congregations in 1901. As the African church in Umtali grew, Wodehouse chose from its baptized members seven exhorters who by 1903 were going out regularly to preach in seven kraals in the vicinity. In November, 1902, Wodehouse reached out still farther, making a ten days' exploratory trip due south of Umtali, arousing a number of chiefs to ask for Christian workers.

The objects of Wodehouse's first attempts to establish settled rather than itinerant work beyond Umtali were Beira, on the Mozambique coast, and Penhalonga, a gold-mining town not far north of Umtali.

Wodehouse reported to the 1903 session of the Mission Conference that Methodist services had been held in a public hall in Beira. Dr. Samuel Gurney had preached in the coastal city several times. Wodehouse counted the long-range strategic importance of Beira to lie in its large population of Africans from various tribes in the interior. At the Conference session, Bishop Hartzell appointed to Beira Glenn A. Baldwin, a recently recruited missionary—but only as an afterthought when the original plan to assign him to the white church at Umtali became impracticable. The immediate target of the entrance into Beira was the English community. Baldwin stayed in Beira only five or six months, finally reporting that in the transient white population there was no realistic base for Methodist work. Although Beira continued to appear among the Conference appointments until 1912, it was regularly listed as "to be supplied," and no substantial or lasting evangelistic work was done there.

Penhalonga, unlike Beira, became a permanent and functional part of the Southern Rhodesia mission. Wodehouse, with the co-operation of John Springer, initiated Methodist services in the growing mining town sometime before the Conference met in 1903, but continuous work evidently did not begin until sometime in 1905. By then there were two thousand African miners in the town, with more yet to come. At the Conference session in May, Robert Wodehouse already having prepared the way (he found the

manager of the mines encouraging and co-operative), Bishop Hartzell appointed Charles Yafele, an African mission worker in Umtali, to "Native Work" in Penhalonga and announced that the "European Work" there was to be supplied.

Yafele became resident in Penhalonga in January, 1906, and was joined late in the year by another African worker, James Vilika. They built a rough church for Africans at the Penhalonga mine compound and another at the neighboring Rezende compound. By the time the Conference met in Umtali in March, 1907, Yafele and Vilika were preaching at other compounds also, evangelizing several kraals in the vicinity, gaining converts, and making potentially fruitful contacts with miners who later would return to their home kraals in many and widespread places. Yafele reported that the preaching was reaching as many as three thousand people each Sunday. He also had a day school for children and a night school for "boys" of working age. At this Conference, the two African preachers were appointed to the Penhalonga and Rezende "native" churches. The response to their efforts increased steadily (there were now 4,500 Africans in the Penhalonga valley and 2,000 in nearby kraals). A new, large church was erected at Rezende, and Vilika started a school there. At Penhalonga there were a hundred probationers and one full member in the church, and at Rezende there were forty-six. At the fall session of the Conference, the Bishop reinforced Yafele and Vilika by appointing three African teachers to assist in their school work. Penhalonga was now well established as a radial point for evangelism among the African population.

Simultaneously with the African developments at Penhalonga, Robert Wodehouse gathered there a white constituency, which met in what he called "a pretty little church . . . erected for the white community" at a cost of \$4,000. At first, there were good congregations, but the church developed no permanent or substantial strength, and no resident pastor was appointed to it.

At the Conference session of May, 1905, at which the widening Circuit developed by Wodehouse became the Umtali District, with Wodehouse himself as Superintendent, he reported fifteen stations under his care as "being worked and having the Gospel preached to them regularly." By this time, his exploratory trips were carrying him well beyond the nearer countryside.

Three shorter journeys south by Wodehouse early in 1905 won from the chief Mutambara an invitation to open a mission station in the Matambara Native Reserve, a tract extending about sixty miles along the banks of the Odzi and Sabi Rivers. For the next few years, Wodehouse and his African evangelists kept in touch with the friendly chief and his people, and the Mission acquired a 3,000-acre farm site, on which were located Mutambara's kraal and two or three others. Matambara became a full-fledged station through the constructive efforts of Abraham L. Buchwalter and his wife,

who arrived on the undeveloped site from Inhambane (in Mozambique) in April, 1908. Said Buchwalter, "Our goods were piled by the roadside in the tall grass and we began mission work at the beginning." A month later, Edith M. Bell, thirty, a teacher in the Umtali Academy, joined them. Much of the time, two paid African mission workers reinforced their efforts.

Buchwalter began by pitching a tent to live in. Within a year, he and his helpers built (mostly of poles and grass) a mission house, a chapel, a house for Edith Bell's work, a farmhouse, and a barn. They dug a mile-long irrigation ditch from the Umvumvumbu River, cleared and plowed (with oxen) eighty acres, harvested sizeable field and garden crops, and manufactured five hundred brooms for market. They built up a Sunday congregation of a hundred people, won seventy publicly professed converts, organized a church of five members and three probationers (they were conservative about receiving members from the large convert group), developed a Sunday school of sixty children, gave as many medical treatments as their supplies of medicines would allow, provided day school classes for boys and girls, made many kraal visits on foot (Mrs. Buchwalter and Miss Bell especially) within five miles of the station, utilized their African evangelists to press the kraal work beyond their own coverage, and carried out (Mr. Buchwalter) several longer missionary trips as far as from the Odzi River to the far side of the Mozambique border. But the Buchwalters' stay at Matambara was brief; in January, 1910, they became so ill that they had to leave the station and return to the United States.

Edith Bell, who already had made a major contribution to the mission's development, especially through the practical activities connected with the girls' school, now shouldered the weight of the mission's entire program for eight months, until a new missionary couple was appointed at the Conference session. She not only kept the church services going, but even had some of the girls (not so long ago, she had called the African girls and women who pressed about her "wild" and "savage") preach in the church on Sunday and join the teams of young people that went out weekly to preach in from seven to ten kraals. In May, she headed a contingent of sixteen boys and twenty-eight girls that went on an evangelistic trip among the kraals in an area never before reached with Christian teaching. Improved buildings were needed on the mission grounds; so—"I decided to have a try at brick-making. I had never seen a brick made, but took the school boys and a few men living on the place and tried my luck." The result—laboriously accomplished—was 50,000 bricks prepared for firing. "Also," she reported, "have cleared a hundred acres of land to get the wood for burning the bricks, and the ground for my gardens." There was hardly anything she would not tackle.

In November, Edith Bell herself had to go on furlough for her health's sake. She wrote to the New York office before leaving:

I want to avoid this season of rain if possible. I have heavy fevers and another illness that will not be serious if taken in time. The present house of grass is unfit for human habitation. The rain comes in, the floors are muddy, and the grass is so decayed that the air is foul. The mud floors are [so] undermined by animals that they have fallen in several times. Once when I went in chair and all, as I fell I caught the writing desk made from boxes. It fell on top of me and there was a general collision. [She once described this house as "infested with venomous reptiles and insects."] My work, from the time of the going away of the Buchwalters until Conf. in Aug. has been of the nature that I am on the verge of a nervous breakdown.

At this time, she had thirty-six boarders and ninety day pupils in her girls' school. Except during equable weather, their activities were compressed within the 14-by-16-foot area of a single room made of poles and mud. For building improvements and for the support of her boarding pupils, the Mission budget allowed her no funds. Scholarships promised by Bishop Hartzell failed to come through, and in the summer of 1909, she was feeding and clothing eleven girls at her own expense. During most of her stay at Matambara, Edith Bell supported the school project mainly from her own resources, spending almost all her own salary. But in spite of the wearing work load, abrasive living conditions, and financial distress, she found her activity with the girls inspiring and hoped to be able to return from furlough to her work in Africa.

Although she left a few months after their arrival, Edith Bell's efforts held the Matambara mission together until Thomas A. O'Farrell and his wife, a new missionary couple transferred from Mt. Makomwe, could take charge in September, 1910. Thus Matambara became a permanent part of the Southern Rhodesia mission.

The year after his first approaches to Mutambara in 1905, Robert Wodehouse, accompanied by Eddy Greeley and others, toured the Victoria-Ndanga district, which lay west of the Sabi River below its junction with the Odzi, in the hope of adding that area to their expanding mission field. They entered many kraals preaching wherever they could, making friends with the people, cultivating the favor of chiefs, and seeking opportunities to open new centers of Christian teaching. Discovering a chief's son, Johannes Chimene, preaching Christ in the kraals (he had been converted some years earlier in the Transvaal), Wodehouse received him into the membership of the Methodist Episcopal Church and appointed him to continue his preaching under the auspices of the Methodist mission.

This was a good start, but some of the chiefs were reluctant to grant sites for permanent mission stations or to receive resident missionaries. Several additional trips had to be made during the next few years in order to complete negotiations and provide the Mission with a secure position locally.

In the summer of 1907, Wodehouse suddenly and urgently pulled Greeley

out of the Mt. Makomwe mission for a follow-up tour of four months through the Victoria-Ndanga area. There he moved about among more than a hundred kraals, not only evangelizing as usual, but also spotting potential mission sites and trying to get close to the chiefs. Wodehouse joined Greeley in September and, acting upon the results of the latter's survey of the region, selected three sites for Methodist centers—"At king Mazungunya's great place, and at Jire's, and at Johanis' kraal in Budzi's country." Wodehouse also discovered another converted African, Charles Ndimba, and engaged him as a Methodist preacher.

But arrangements made in 1907 did not stay nailed down and Wodehouse and Greeley had to continue in the following year their search for a missionary location. This time John R. Gates of Umtali and Dr. Samuel Gurney went along with them. "The Doctor's presence was a great help and blessing to us at every kraal," said Wodehouse; "the lame, the halt, and the blind came or were brought out to be treated by the Great White Doctor." The party conferred with the government's Native Commissioner and with a number of paramount chiefs, and Wodehouse was able to report to the Board office that they "secured eight splendid mission sites from as many chiefs begging us to go in." But the concession they wanted most, a well located site at Mazungunya's place, where negotiations supposedly had been successfully concluded the previous year, they secured only with considerable difficulty. They then went on from the Ndanga Reserve to the town of Victoria and north into the Gutu Reserve. Here they acquired, again only after difficult negotiations, a government grant of an excellent 5,000-acre farm site that included the "great place" of Denere, the most influential chief in the district, and a number of his kraals.

Returning north, the missionaries left behind them as the Mission's only workers two African preachers who a year later, according to Wodehouse, were carrying on with a good deal of success and were winning converts. But in this field—so difficult to open up—the Methodists could progress no further than that, and after 1910, the records of the Mission's activities no longer showed any trace of work in the Victoria-Ndanga district. This region was fresh in memories of the armed insurrection of 1896, during which 10,000 natives of Matabeleland laid siege at Bulawayo to the white imperialist invaders sponsored by the British South Africa Company.

While the Penhalonga, Maranka, and Matambara projects were developing under Wodehouse's direction, he had another one coming along at Muradzikwa's kraal, much nearer to Umtali. By mid-1905, David Ntuli, the African preacher stationed there, was able to report forty conversions and a registration of a hundred children in day school. When the friendly chief died and the kraal was moved five miles away according to custom, the mission workers moved along with the people, erecting a new church, several huts for the evangelistic workers, and "a little house for the Bishop." Ntuli (he was suc-

ceeded by William Yafele) from the first made his assignment not simply a station, but a circuit. In 1907, workers were preaching regularly in seven neighboring kraals.

The broad territory scouted by John M. Springer to the north of the two Umtali stations remained, when he left for America late in 1906, to be penetrated with functioning missions. Springer's successor in charge of the Old Umtali District for a year afterwards was James E. Ferris. But he being busy mainly with the principalship of Umtali Academy, it was Shirley D. Coffin who energetically and successfully pursued the actual field work out in the kraals. Coffin's appointment was "Old Umtali Native Circuit."

Coffin first established three outstations relatively close to Old Umtali. The first was at Munyarara's kraal, about five miles out. Two years after he made his first visit there in the summer of 1905, the Munyarara station had, under the direction of Philip Palanyi, a fully organized Methodist church of two dozen full members and four dozen probationers, a Sunday school, a day school of sixty children, a sizeable Sunday congregation of its own, eight other preaching services at places near by, and a church and a pastor's house of its own. A similarly lively enterprise developed at Chikanga's kraal under the preaching and teaching of Joni Nsingo Solomon, beginning in May, 1906. The original friendly relations with Chikanga that John Springer and Helen Rasmussen had won in 1902 had evaporated. Only after many unsuccessful attempts was Coffin able to regain her confidence and begin work among her people. She finally brought Coffin "her club formerly used in spirit worship, also the spirit charms (little bits of goat horn) which had been given to her by her father, the old king, Umtasa," publicly announcing that she had no more use for them and wanted to know the true God. The third outstation in the vicinity was begun at Mandiambara's kraal at about the same time, with the assistance of the chief's son, "our right hand man."

Coffin also opened in 1907 two stations farther out, in the Makoni Reserve, two dozen miles and more northwest of Old Umtali. In January, in the office of the Native Commissioner in Rusapi, he consummated with the chief himself negotiations for a permanent arrangement to enter Gondanzara's kraal, which lay three miles inside the Reserve. Shortly afterwards, the African preacher Daniel Caplen and his wife went to the kraal to live and soon had a large Christian following and a well developed mission center, from which he extended Christian preaching to three more kraals. In response to the people's invitation, Coffin also started a similar evangelistic project at Tswikero's kraal, to which Stephen Mari was assigned.

Contiguous with the Makoni Reserve to the east lay the Manyika Reserve, and there Coffin set up two stations. Early in the year, Stephen Mari, who later went to Tswikero, took hold of a previous beginning at Mkawana's kraal with the friendly approval of the chief. For the time being, the church

and school building was only a grass-and-pole shelter, but in less than a year, Mari gathered a listening constituency of five hundred people, brought the day school registration to well over a hundred, and organized a church with four dozen probationers. "Many believe, become converted, stop to drink the beer," reported Mari. From Mkawana stemmed a new project, at Vumbunu's kraal, half a dozen miles away. To the new location, Coffin sent his interpreter, Samuel Matimba, who quickly made Vumbunu a flourishing independent mission and then a point of departure for preaching in other kraals.

At long last, in 1907, east of the Makoni and Manyika Reserves and not far away, the Methodists got a real foothold among the people under the influence of Umtasa, the son and successor of the old Umtasa once doctored by Helen Rasmussen. He had stood off the missionaries for years, and no permanent Christian activity had grown out of the early Springer-Rasmussen-Gurney approaches. Only after many interviews with the chief did Coffin receive an invitation to plant a mission at his kraal, "this great seat of heathenism." For the mission site, Coffin secured a 2,000-acre farm with three kraals on it close to the Umtasa Reserve. He accepted one of the king's sons to be trained as a mission teacher and sent Philip Palanyi, who had assisted in the preliminary negotiations, to man the mission.

On the new site, which was named Nyakasapa, numerous buildings were erected during the next few years, and it soon became the training center and headquarters for a string of new stations that were organized as the Umtasa Circuit. In 1909, Pearl Mulliken, a 35-year-old Kentuckian, came to Nyakasapa to take charge of day school activities and some of the evangelistic work, thus beginning a ministry of thirty years as a Rhodesia missionary. The Methodists penetrated the Umtasa Reserve itself only after the government decided, late in 1909, to grant mission sites there. Then, at Kugute, Umtasa's own kraal, they started a church-and-school project located so close to Nyakasapa that Miss Mulliken was able to teach in both places.

Roughly simultaneously with the Nyakasapa opening, Muredzwa's kraal, some ten miles to the north, opened up to the Methodists. Muredzwa was a sister of both Chikanga and Umtasa and had shared their reluctance to have preachers stationed among their people. A son and a daughter of hers studied, however, at the Old Umtali mission school, and the latter married one of the African pastor-teachers. Upon going to visit the young couple, Muredzwa came to see the value of mission activity among the village people and finally asked to have a preacher for her kraal. The preacher who was sent turned out to be a popular choice—Muredzwa's own son Vurungu. He had prompt success with the church and school work he founded.

A new mission was beginning at that time in Shikuru's kraal, well to the north of Umtasa, in the Inyanga country, and was winning a ready popular response. Shikuru was an aunt of Umtasa and of his two influential sisters.

Most of the new stations through which Coffin greatly expanded the out-

reach of the Old Umtali District in 1906-7 remained permanently active and served as bases for later extensions of evangelistic and educational work into still more kraals, as did the stations opened in the southern part of the Mission.

From 1908 to 1910, the Southern Rhodesia mission was administered as a single District, with Robert Wodehouse as District Superintendent. The growing number of stations and of kraal preaching places were organized into larger Circuits, with missionaries, and sometimes African preachers, in charge.

During this period, the farthest extension towards the north was accomplished by the penetration of the Districts of Mrewa and Mtoko by Dr. Samuel Gurney. Mrewa, the government center for the Mrewa District, was 140 miles from Umtali, 60 miles from Salisbury, and 40 miles from the railroad; the center for Mtoko was 40 miles east of Mrewa. John Springer and Shirley Coffin had explored the area several times a few years earlier, hoping to introduce missionary work. But at that time, the major chiefs were opposed to the settlement of missionaries among their people, and government policy forbade granting land for a mission site without the consent of the paramount chief. Gurney having returned from the United States, it was now decided to send him into the north country in the hope that the ministrations of a doctor would evoke a more favorable response.

Edward L. Sechrist, the agricultural man at Old Umtali, went up in advance of Gurney, however, in the summer of 1908. Although he gained a more or less ready hearing as a visiting evangelist, he really was kept at arm's length; his only base during his three months' stay was a hut he was allowed to put up on a farm that was adjacent to the native reserve but, significantly, outside it. Traveling about among the kraals, he found, as Gurney did later on, that many of the people were opposed to the founding of permanent mission stations. They were suspicious and fearful of white men and largely unfamiliar with the scattered whites in their part of the country.

The Minutes of the Mission Conference in session in Umtali in July, 1909, illuminated the Africans' fears of Europeans who were acting like members of a master race. At the suggestion of Shirley Coffin, the District Superintendent made a statement to the Conference on "the Whitlaw and other cases in which natives had been brutally murdered by white men and the juries refused to convict the criminals in the presence of ample evidence of their guilt." Present at the Conference were twenty-seven non-voting African evangelists and teachers from Southern Rhodesia and Mozambique (there were eighty more who were absent). The Conference adopted a resolution condemning the failure of the juries to do their duty in these cases and commending Lord Selborne, the British High Commissioner for South Africa, for "his public disapproval of such unjust action on the part of said juries and for his sympathetic and just attitude toward the natives of

South Africa." The following session of the Mission Conference, in a resolution beginning, "Whereas, There have been many cases of grievous wrong to the native people of this country by their being whipped by the white man," commended the Southern Rhodesia government for enacting laws forbidding the striking of a native by a white man, and also declared to all the Mission's native helpers that "we will not violate this law ourselves, and will not sanction their doing so."

The missionaries' principal antagonist in the Mrewa territory was Mangwendi, the paramount chief. The nature and background of his hostility is suggested by a comment written by one of the missionaries who visited him:

Mangwendi has been a very bad native, having taken a leading part in past rebellions, but he seems to have reformed now. One can hardly wonder at his fear. He has seen but few white men and most of them were bad ones. He has been some eighty years on earth but only once had been to a white man's town, the occasion of that visit being his arrest after which in court he had through an interpreter learned that these white folks were discussing whether or not they should hang him.

Gurney made a dual effort in the north country—to launch permanent missions among the Africans and to minister to the white settlers.

The white men in the two Districts were at first unresponsive to Gurney's presence and activities, for he tried to bring them the gospel as well as medicine. Some were hostile; the Native Commissioner was reputed to have commented on Gurney's expected arrival, "Hitherto we have been spared two evils—East Coast fever and missionaries." Securing a place for religious services was very difficult, and getting anyone to attend was almost impossible. But almost at once, Gurney began making his way successfully as a man and as a physician, readily traveling long distances in the rain (at first, on foot) and crossing swollen streams to tend urgent cases, spending great amounts of time and energy both to doctor and to nurse his patients. Before his first year was out, public opinion about the new missionary took a strongly favorable turn. He won a reputation as an invaluable life-saver, thus creating a demand for the Mission to occupy the Districts permanently. After less than two years' work, he reported, every white home was open for his meetings, with people traveling twenty, even forty, miles to attend. Among the area's government officials, all of whom finally respected him, he found an especially firm and friendly, even life-long, ally in the very Native Commissioner who at first deplored his coming. How Gurney's close rapport with the whites affected his relations with the Africans is not known, but it is clear that it put into his hands the instrument he finally used in order to pry open the Native Reserves for his missionary work.

Although some of the Africans overcame their fears enough to begin coming to Dr. Gurney for treatment, Mangwendi persisted in excluding him from the kraals. "The ministry of healing has no influence with him," said

Gurney, "for he is afraid of it, will have nothing to do with it, and does all he can to keep his people from it." Gurney did his best to win the chief over, but failed. Then the Native Commissioner (this was the Doctor's second season on the ground) "very kindly offered to aid in securing his consent." Several long conferences in the Commissioner's office, with the government official's arguments and great prestige playing upon him, did not budge Mangwendi: "My heart does not want a missionary in my country." The problem was then referred to the government's Native Department and finally to the Administrator for Southern Rhodesia. The Department secured authority to overrule the paramount chief in this particular case—and did; Gurney got a grant for his first mission station and went ahead with his plans in spite of the continued opposition of Mangwendi and certain forces allied with him.

Gurney laid out his first station near Kenyasi's kraal, a day's journey north of the Mrewa government center, in an isolated area containing three dozen small kraals scattered about within half a day's travel. But the isolation was soon to be broken by a road running close by from the busy new mines in the Pfungwe section south to Mrewa. Gurney erected a stone house, part of it for the missionary's residence and part for dispensary and school purposes, along with several other buildings. Impatient to get at his medical work, he sometimes felt that he ought "to employ his time more profitably than in hewing timbers and breaking stones, but the buildings were a necessity, and there was no one else to do the work." He tried to carry on a school for African children, but his own absences and the opposition of Mangwendi limited its regularity and usefulness and his attempts at preaching and healing tours among the kraals were frustrated by his repeatedly responding to special calls to the houses of the whites and the huts of the African villagers to care for the most critically sick. But before long, the work of the dispensary began to take hold among the Africans. Showing far more eagerness for the doctor's medicine than for his teaching and preaching, they began to press in to the station whenever he was there.

When Dr. Gurney came to Conference in August, 1910, he had two missions to report—the one at Kenyasa and one recently opened close to the government camp at Mrewa. The following year, his Mrewa Circuit included three more points—a station at the "Mrewa Location," about fifteen miles south of Mrewa; one at Marimesa's kraal, three miles from Mrewa's; and one in the Mtoko District, forty miles east of Mrewa. By about 1912, the African worker then caring for the Kenyasa mission was walking five miles out each day to serve a new Methodist station (Zonga), and work also was under way at Nyagwisa's kraal.

The mission at the Mrewa government camp was strategically located. Here, only half a mile out, Dr. Gurney took possession of an abandoned trader's post (a store, a four-room dwelling house, and several small houses,

all made of poles and grass and mud) given him by the government for only one pound, "the usual price of a lease for a mission site." He moved down from Kenyasa and made this the central station for his 200-mile Circuit. Since all the chief roads that ran through the two Districts met in Mrewa, hundreds of Africans came in from all parts of the Mrewa District to deal with the Native Commissioner's office. Many others came to the mission station because it became, upon Gurney's appointment as District Surgeon (he served for about two years, 1910-12), the government's medical center for the Mrewa District. Also, through Mrewa came large numbers of workers from Nyasaland and other parts of East Africa whom the government was bringing down to work on the farms and in the mines of Southern Rhodesia. Gurney hoped to spread gospel influence far afield through these men, for they would return to their various communities after a while.

Africans from places far back in the country would stay here for days or weeks, for treatment or recuperation, in contact with Gurney's presentations of the gospel. The mission also held evangelistic services and a school for the government messengers and "native officers" who had their homes in Mrewa but ranged through the District to its remotest reaches (and there was a school for their families too). The same geographical centrality of this station that brought so many people there within reach of Gurney's ministries also served him well when he embarked upon his evangelistic and medical tours through the kraals in the mule cart provided by the government.

Opening a mission alongside the "Mrewa Location" to the south also was strategically significant, though after a different pattern, for by this move, Gurney penetrated an important African community. The location was Mrewa's kraal, where some of the missionaries claimed to have counted a thousand huts, which would make it, said Gurney, "probably by far the largest kraal in Southern Rhodesia." Mrewa, a chief less hesitant than most, gave his consent to the opening after witnessing Dr. Gurney's performance of a major operation that saved his child's life. Mrewa proved friendly enough to the new project—school work and evangelistic services—but it took several years to win over his people, whose fears were kept active by the witch doctors. At one time before the general hostility faded away, one of the kraal people burned down the small school-church house.

Most of the further spread of the Mission through the country to the north of Umtali up to 1912 was accomplished under the immediate leadership of Shirley Coffin. He became superintendent of the Zambezi District, which included at that time not only the Umtasa Circuit, much enlarged, but also the Mrewa, the Penhalonga, and the Headlands Circuits.

Through the Headlands Circuit, organized in the Conference year 1909-10, Coffin thrust Methodism into a populous unevangelized section lying between the Mrewa and Umtasa fields. In the vicinity of Headlands, some seventy-five miles northwest of Umtasa, he opened a number of stations and manned

them with African preachers. This was about twenty-five miles from the railroad to Salisbury and close to the Weya Reserve, where the government granted the Mission 1,200 acres. Under enforcement of the "native location ordinance," a number of large kraals were being compelled to relocate, and they purposely moved close to the mission site, which was expected to become an important center of Christian activity. Within a year or two, the Circuit grew to seven stations and became influential in many surrounding kraals.

At about this time, Coffin developed an eight-station Inyazura Circuit, halfway between Headlands and Old Umtali, and a nine-station Inyanga Circuit, the latter including Shikuru and Muredzwa. He also reported a Katerera Circuit with two stations—Katerera and Mukwakwanura. These two, about 150 miles' travel from Umtali, well above the Inyanga area and close to the Portuguese border, were the Mission's northernmost outposts, except for Mtoko.

While the Mission was developing new fields in the north country, no comparable extension occurred south of the Umtali neighborhood. Growth in that region, as well as in the sections close to Umtali, came rather through local expansion than through adding new, more distant fields.

The Matambara mission, which reached out into many kraals and also had a few outstations associated with it, remained the southernmost head station. In 1911, all the southern and central work was organized as the Umtali District, under the superintendency of John R. Gates. The District was divided into three Circuits—(1) Matambara, with stations listed at Matambara, Chitara, Gwawawa, Matanda, Munyarari, Mt. Makomwe, Muchibago, and Mutsago; (2) Old Umtali, with stations at Mandiambira, Marara and Mundenda, Munyarara, and Chikonga and Mayenzanisi; (3) Umtali, with stations at Chirakativa, Gutukunurwa, Muradsikwa, Vumbo, and North Vumbo.

The Penhalonga Circuit also was a part of this grouping until the termination of Robert Wodehouse's superintendency in 1910, when it was assigned to Shirley Coffin's Zambezi District. Penhalonga maintained a steady ministry in spite of the transiency and instability natural to such a mining area. St. Paul's Church ("white"), which had many difficulties, eventually and briefly (May, 1909 to January, 1911) had a missionary pastor, Frederic Conquer, a young Englishman who had lived in South Africa for five years. The preaching at the Penhalonga compound remained in the hands of Charles Yafele, and the congregations at the Rezende compound grew as the mining activity drew still more workers into the community. In 1911, the Circuit also included a station at Nyamkarara and a newly opened one at Ripundu.

By this time (1911), about a decade after John Springer, Helen Rasmussen, and Samuel Gurney first penetrated the kraals of Chikanga and of the

old Umtasa, the expansive movement had brought the permanent geographical pattern of the Rhodesia mission roughly to completion.

UMTALI AND OLD UMTALI (1901-11)

While this was being accomplished, the work among Africans in the original centers, Umtali and Old Umtali, not only grew locally, but also contributed significantly to the larger expansion.

The African church in Umtali rose from its very modest beginnings in 1901 to a position of influence throughout the Mission. Almost from the start, its pastors were Africans; but Umtali was Robert Wodehouse's residential base to the end of his later more farflung ministry, and he kept in close touch with the Umtali congregation, spotting the more promising converts and directing their training for permanent religious work. It was his policy to get them promptly to work in the kraal preaching associated with the local church. By 1907, he felt justified in calling it the mother church because of its priority as a supplier of indigenous workers and leaders to stations throughout the Mission.

In contrast, Umtali's white church (St. Andrew's), hampered by the transiency and indifference of the town's non-African pioneer population, consumed missionary money (it was provided with a \$20,000 church building) and personnel, but developed no record of valuable service in helping to lay the broader foundations of the Mission's future. And the white school (Umtali Academy), though it was practically self-supporting, with pupil tuitions and government subsidy, was too short-lived as a Methodist institution to affect the Mission creatively; in 1909, in response to community opinion that a public school should replace both the Academy and a school the Anglicans had started, Umtali Academy was handed over to the government, which had financed the Methodist school building by grant and by loan.

Old Umtali stimulated the Mission's growth more directly than did Umtali, for the station at the older site not only developed its own church for Africans, along with an evangelistic thrust into the larger neighborhood, but also majored in educating Africans rather than whites.

In 1903, Helen Rasmussen took over the boys' school from Eddy Greeley, under whom the program of studies had remained simple—little more than the three R's. Under her influence, the school was more thoroughly organized and the curriculum was expanded, Bible and religion being more strongly emphasized. Although English was in use in the school, Mrs. Rasmussen insisted that all pupils study the regional vernacular. While she was operating the school, she also was preparing a dictionary and a grammar of the Chikaranga tongue, as well as translating Bible portions and hymns. Copies of her Chikaranga Handbook, published in the United States, reached Old Umtali by July, 1906. (Eddy Greeley also did a good deal of translating of similar materials at his Mt. Makomwe station.)

John Springer, when he was available for it, taught in the Old Umtali school at this time, drilling the boys in Catechism and Bible memory work, conducting a class in Bible, and giving the older boys special theological instruction. By the time he and his wife left Southern Rhodesia in 1906, some of the older youths, having had evangelistic experience in the nearer kraals, were nearly ready to be established in outstations as residential teacher-evangelists.

Mrs. Springer's successor in charge of the school—James E. Ferris, who for two years had been principal of Umtali Academy—further enriched the curriculum, especially expanding the study of the Bible in English and in the vernacular, pressing forward as far as possible with the latter under the handicap of working with people who until recently had been without a written language. Ferris's objective in the Bible work was not simply to inculcate an intelligent piety, but to produce a better grade of African Christian workers who would be efficient bilingual interpreters of the faith to their own people. Mrs. Ferris conducted teacher training classes for some of the older boys. During Mrs. Springer's time, the enrollment in the school rose to about seventy-five pupils; under the Ferrises it nearly doubled.

Herbert N. Howard, who succeeded Ferris as principal in 1909, made the school into a central training unit to serve the personnel needs of the Mission as a whole. With the co-operation of the missionaries at Matambara and Mt. Makomwe and on the northern Circuits, small groups of boys selected for their individual promise and for the extent of their education in the other schools came to Old Umtali to train as Christian workers. For the work with these trainees, Howard dispensed with the African teachers formerly employed by the school and used only "European" instructors (from 1906, there usually were six to eight missionaries resident at the station). The school emphasized Bible work more strongly than ever, and the "Bible department" made much of correct theological interpretation. Left to his own reading of the Scriptures supplemented by what he heard of the talk by unchristian whites, said Howard, the African's "theology is very curious. His teachings are often ludicrous." Some workers had been known to teach that God was the God of the white man, not of the black man. One taught that men would be saved, but women probably would not be. Concerned for the future of the Mission, Howard not unnaturally believed that the interpretative and normal training in Bible was the most important part of the work.

But when he claimed that it was more beneficial to the pupil than the development of his general reading was, he began to provide evidence that the school was not essentially pupil-centered, but Mission-centered. The pupil was not being educated primarily to become an African man, but to qualify as an effective agent of the Methodist missionary program. This purpose

became more than an overtone in Howard's report to the Mission Conference in 1911:

We believe in and are carrying out a policy of paternalism with the boys in our school. [Mrs. Ferris once said, "Of course, these are really young men, tho' we do speak of them as 'boys.'"] They need to be guided. They are children with childrens' reasons, "I want," or "my heart tells me to." We do not accept reasons such as these. We believe that the utmost pressure ought to be brought to bear on these boys to keep them in the mission. The pull of the outside world is strong and is a natural sequence of the broadened mind. Nevertheless, so far as we are aware, no boy who has gone away to work in any of the large towns has ever returned to our school. If they should they would not be nearly as useful as if they had stayed in the mission work. There is not much uplift for the native outside of the mission, therefore the native worker should be kept under the tutelage and training of the mission. Moreover the demand for workers is growing more urgent every month. If we are putting time and money into the training of the native we must insist that he stand by and help.

Allied with the Boys' Training School at Old Umtali was the girls' school that eventually grew out of Helen Springer's informal efforts to organize a home for African girls under the sponsorship of the W.F.M.S. To be sure, her first efforts were abortive; for several years after her beginning in 1901, she was unable, in spite of her friendly contacts with the people in the kraals, to induce girls to come to Umtali and place themselves under her care and tutelage. She was blocked by the opposition raised by their families, for whom the girls' marriage prospects and arrangements were urgent social and economic concerns. Only Shakeni, her valued helper was free to come and stay; some taboo had rendered her unmarriageable.

The first break came in 1904, when the government enacted legislation withdrawing legal sanction from the practice of forced marriage. The missionaries already had advised some of their training school boys to seek in marriage girls who would come to Old Umtali for education under Christian influence. John Springer felt that it was important for the young teacher-evangelists who soon would be settled at outstations to be married to such girls. With the law on the books, girls began to come, and the angry parents who followed them in from the kraals could not legally force them to return home; the mission successfully solicited the intervention of local government officials on behalf of girls who wished to remain in the town and marry mission boys. Among the first to stay were a daughter of the chieftainess Chikanga and one of the chieftainess Muredzwa. In one of her several attempts to fetch her daughter home, Muredzwa appeared in Old Umtali accompanied by her brother Umtasa the younger, the new king, who brought armed men with him. The first girls to stay at the mission were introduced into the regular school and, Helen Springer by this time being married, were cared for by an African couple.

The Girls' School emerged as a separate project in the summer of 1905, when Virginia R. Swormstedt, a W.F.M.S. missionary teacher, was transferred from Mozambique to Old Umtali. To accommodate the School, Bishop Hartzell turned over to the W.F.M.S. one of the original Old Umtali buildings along with some forty acres of land, half a mile from the rest of the town. Mrs. Springer named the building Hartzell Villa and renamed the hill behind it Mt. Hartzell. Miss Swormstedt organized for her nine girls a curriculum of elementary academic subjects, homemaking, and gardening, as well as giving them Christian teaching and seeing to it that they were well habituated to the systematic practice of religious devotions. When she left the school in March, 1907, because of her marriage to Shirley D. Coffin, she was succeeded by Coffin's sister, Sophia J. Coffin, who had just arrived in Southern Rhodesia.

At first, almost all the girls in the school were runaways from home who were trying to escape from the imposition of marriage agreements made for them by their families. The voluntary marriage law was no protection to them until they decisively resisted the severe pressures forcing them towards marriage. Outraged parents and disappointed holders of broken marriage contracts still kept storming into Old Umtali to persuade or coerce the girls, if they could, to come away. Some girls gave in; most did not. In some cases, the School thought it best to relinquish the girls, either because they actually had been married previously or because their being allowed to remain at Mt. Hartzell "would create such opposition to missionary work among the kraals," as Miss Coffin said, "that it would be more difficult in the future." This tension over the marriage question marked the Girls' School as the only wing of the Southern Rhodesia mission that was in direct and specific conflict with a deeply rooted and important practice in African community life.

Nevertheless, the School flourished; by 1908, having more girls than she could care for, Miss Coffin felt compelled to cut back the enrollment of sixty-five pupils by about a third. But with the coming of an additional W.F.M.S. worker, Emma D. Nourse, the girls soon again numbered close to seventy. Also, by 1911, the curriculum was better developed than at the beginning. But the School's greatest success, as far as fulfilling the Mission's basic policy for it was concerned, was that it actually turned out a satisfactory number of girls who made appropriately trained Christian wives for the young evangelists and teachers manning the Mission's multiplying stations. And still other girls, after returning to their kraals, became informal Christian workers—assisting in evangelism and also teaching home arts to girls and women in the kraals.

During the decade when Wodehouse, Springer, Greeley, Coffin, Gurney, and the others were energetically expanding the Mission outwards from Umtali and Old Umtali, they were at the same time founding a Church that displayed, by 1911, measurable organizational dimensions. Methodism

had become active through sixty-four African stations, with their auxiliary work in numerous outlying kraals, and two white churches. The missionaries reported, also, 11,500 "adherents," though it is not clear what constituted being an adherent. Associated with the stations, or charges, were 762 members of the Church (58 were whites) and 1,938 African probationers. Among the various stations, there were fifty-nine weekday schools, which served four thousand pupils. The Mission's work force included nine men missionaries, ten women missionaries (two worked under the W.F.M.S.), three non-African teachers, two African probationary Conference members, seventy-nine African teachers (many of these also functioned as preaching evangelists), and well over a hundred other helpers.

PERENNIAL TROUBLES

Effective as it was in its pioneering ventures in evangelism in the north-eastern part of Southern Rhodesia, the early Methodist missionary group succeeded, less happily, in generating within itself an extraordinary amount of distrust, personal friction, administrative dissension, mutual retaliation, scandal, and half-scandal.

When Bishop Hartzell formally organized the East Central Africa Mission Conference in 1901, he gave it Disciplinary legitimacy but left it to flounder administratively. He not only appointed no superintendent for the combined Mozambique and Southern Rhodesia enterprise, but also failed to appoint one for either of the component Districts. The Bishop felt that he had no one available to serve as District Superintendent for the Rhodesia work; the missionary appointees that fall were rank newcomers to the field, only Eddy Greeley, a layman, having any experience in the Mission at all. Thus when Hartzell himself was not in Southern Rhodesia, the Mission had no authoritative field supervision, at a time when the very greenness of the workers—to mention no other factor—made such direction especially desirable.

By the time Bishop Hartzell returned for the Conference session of 1903, the Mission was in plenty of organizational trouble. Much to the fore was the conduct of the Mission's treasury by Robert Wodehouse. Other missionaries complained to the Bishop that Wodehouse was not properly disbursing within the framework of the appropriations the funds sent him from New York. A particularly sore point was his failure to pay missionary salaries on time—a complaint that traveled all the way to the desk of Secretary Leonard in New York.

Faced with the accusations against Wodehouse, the Bishop made a careful study of the Treasurer's accounts. He found that they were well kept but that the pattern of classified appropriations had become warped over a period of two years. The Bishop explained to Secretary Leonard in detail how Wodehouse had been grappling with a set of extraordinary expenses that he himself had not foreseen. It was in the course of trying to keep up with

demands for payment—"in his extremity," as Hartzell sympathetically put it—that Wodehouse had got \$1,000 in arrears on missionaries' salaries and also had incurred some current debts.

Hartzell more briefly related to Leonard the fact that the Mission also was suffering from the division and damaging force of running conflict between Emory Beetham, head of the Umtali academy, and Wodehouse, who served as head of Umtali's white church. The Academy people sided with Beetham, and the St. Andrew's Church people sided with Wodehouse. By Conference time, all the missionaries but one formed with Beetham an anti-Wodehouse faction. The exception was John Springer of Old Umtali, who remained sufficiently independent of the factional strife to be able, upon occasion, to defend Wodehouse from unfair attack.

By the time the Beetham faction conveyed its criticism to the Missionary Society three months after the Conference adjourned, it had become a pattern of complaints not only about Wodehouse but also about Bishop Hartzell and the general administration of the field. In addition to leveling at their superiors a variety of limited charges, the complainants pointed accusingly to an all-pervasive condition of "endless confusion and disputes." They laid its existence to the absence of a functioning superintendency—a more radical interpretation than Hartzell's more personalized reference to the Beetham-Wodehouse feud. They declared:

Having no supreme authority, each Missionary has felt himself to be supreme in his own work, and when departments have lapped the authorities have clashed: (a) Criticism has developed into ill-feeling and abuse and later grown into actual slander whereby the reputation of the Mission has suffered greatly in the community. (b) These contentions have wasted the energy which should have been spent in aggressive Missionary enterprise. After five years' work and large expenditure of money we have not yet occupied a single native town in Rhodesia!

Indicating that fifteen of the twenty-three missionaries sent to Rhodesia had returned home, they claimed that in most cases, whatever the "pretexts" given, the real causes had grown out of the confusion and strife of the unsupervised Mission.

Bishop Hartzell acted on his own initiative to recoup the strength of the Mission (he remained in Rhodesia for four months), but the measures he undertook hardly went to the roots of the trouble—new instructions for the Treasurer and an emergency injection of \$2,500 into the Treasury itself. After many weeks on the field, Hartzell still seemed to be approaching the Mission's problem rather as a two-man feud than as a deeper condition necessitating organizational reform. "The problem," he wrote to Leonard on 21 October, "is still to have working relations between Beetham & Wodehouse." And when he left a month later, he wrote, "My plan of solving the difficulties—personal and otherwise—at Umtali has been to have. . . . Wodehouse

and Beetham remain in charge of church and school, but live in separate houses, and each go on with his work where each has wrought well."

But the critics forced the Bishop to grapple with the administrative problem on a broader basis. At its September session (1903), the Mission Conference requested him to appoint a District Superintendent. When he declined to do so at that time, the Conference adopted a resolution prefaced "*Whereas*, the lack of a centralized authority on the field has wrought great damage to our interests in Rhodesia and been the occasion of more or less contention among the workers. . . ." The resolution requested the Bishop to appoint an Executive Committee of three Conference members, plus the Treasurer as chairman without vote, that should "act as final authority on the field during his absence." The Minutes showed that the resolution was adopted unanimously, but "unanimously" did not include Wodehouse and Springer, who were probationers and therefore without vote. The voting membership at that session was identical with the Beetham group, which included Beetham himself (the only full member present when the session opened) and Samuel Gurney, Glenn A. Baldwin, and John H. Dimmitt (all announced on the first day as transfers in from other Conferences). Baldwin and Dimmitt had been on the field only five or six weeks (the latter was transferred back to his former Conference on 21 October).

Although Bishop Hartzell acceded to the request of the Conference for an executive committee and appointed Beetham, Springer, and Dimmitt as its members, the new arrangement did not yield the Beetham clique the power it hoped to have in order to accomplish financial reform. Criticizing it as illegal, Wodehouse refused to work with it. Secretary Leonard agreed with him that the Committee had no power to supervise the expenditure of money received from appropriations, and the Bishop then chimed in with Leonard's declaration. Even when Hartzell yielded to further pressure from the clique and had Wodehouse dropped from the treasurership by the Board of Managers, their satisfaction was short-lived, for the man Hartzell nominated as successor turned out to be John Springer, who was not a party to their complaints and maneuvers. Springer also became District Superintendent, and the Bishop transferred to him the administrative responsibilities earlier assigned to the Executive Committee by Conference vote.

Wodehouse now voiced his own complaint against the administration, claiming that he had been unfairly cast aside, and without reason given, when his only offense had been to try to make the best of financial confusion created by the bypassing of the Treasurer's office by the Board, the Bishop, and two or three treasurers of separate accounts. He told Leonard that it was time "to put a stop to the interference with regular missionary appropriations; there has been in the past too much juggling with our finances [,] which has embarrassed your treasurer considerably at this end. . ." Citing this

and the resultant delays in salary payments, Wodehouse said that "the bishop must answer for that himself."

Beetham and his friends charged that being a probationer disqualified Springer to serve either as District Superintendent or as Treasurer. They held that the Bishop's new measures only thrust the Mission back into the old vacuum of authority, which would be filled by the same old confusions and conflicts, "by the impracticable schemes and extravagant expenditures of former years."

Still dissatisfied, then, the critics held a private "called meeting of the members" of the Mission Conference at Umtali from 26 to 30 December—a description that excluded, of course, the probationers Wodehouse and Springer and the layman Eddy Greeley. Out of this meeting came a long document—it was signed by Gurney and Beetham—setting forth the entire case against the financial and administrative arrangements maintained under Bishop Harzell's direction of the Mission. Having got nowhere with Hartzell in their drive for reforms, the protesters now not only addressed themselves directly to the Board of Managers, but also plainly criticized Hartzell *ad hominem*:

We do not wish to be understood as complaining of our Bishop or in any way trying to weaken the confidence of the Church in him. We regard him as a man of pure motives and, when in his normal condition, of sound judgment and in every way worthy of the high esteem in which he is held by the Church. But it was very evident while he was here that his health is seriously impaired, and this has produced a mental confusion and indecision which renders him incapable of safely conducting the affairs of the Mission. So seriously [*sic*] has this nervous disturbance become that during the entire three months of his recent visit here it was impossible for him to obtain sleep without resorting to powerful hypnotics each night. We fear that unless some way shall be found of temporarily relieving him from the heavy responsibilities and burdens which he now carries, there is danger of a permanent loss of his valuable services.

The Umtali communication to the Board ended with a request for appointment of a Finance Committee in accordance with the regular practice of the Missionary Society—"a part of the machinery" of the Society of which they said they had become aware only after Bishop Hartzell's departure. On 19 January 1904, the Board appointed such a committee for the Southern Rhodesia mission ("Umtali District")—Springer (chairman), Beetham, Baldwin, Gurney, and Dimmitt (Dimmitt already was gone from the field). This was not a response, however, to the critics' request; Leonard had taken the initiative a month earlier, sending out to the Mission a careful statement of the Society's financial procedures, including the functions of the Finance Committee, which he recommended for Southern Rhodesia. He thus acted constructively to provide means of filling the previous lack under Bishop

Hartzell's informal management and of replacing the unacceptable device of the Executive Committee.

The Mission now had a District Superintendent and a Finance Committee; this should have marked the end of strife among the missionaries, but it did not. The Beetham party, which formerly had been anti-Wodehouse, recently had become anti-Hartzell, and now was anti-Springer, persisted. They finally brought before the General Conference in May charges against Bishop Hartzell's episcopal administration, alleging that he first had failed to appoint a District Superintendent and then later had appointed a probationer to the office. The General Conference adopted reports backing Bishop Hartzell on both points; the failure to appoint was justified as a legitimate exercise of practical judgment on a disorganized field, and the appointment of a probationer was declared legal.

Confronted with the hostility of active rebels against his authority, and hearing only indirect reports of the representations made to the Board by the "called meeting," Springer reluctantly broke his silence and his neutrality in the Mission controversy by writing Secretary Leonard, on 29 March, his view of the entire affair. He presented no unqualified brief for Bishop Hartzell's policies, but he did defend him on a number of points. Upon coming to Umtali for the Conference, the Bishop had endeavored to reconcile Beetham and Wodehouse. Wodehouse had been willing to drop past grievances but Beetham, said Springer, was bound that Wodehouse be ousted from the Mission or at least severely reprimanded. Since the Bishop could not conscientiously treat Wodehouse that way, Beetham "planned to humiliate the other [Wodehouse] and subject him to petty interference and supervision." This purpose, under Beetham's quiet but potent influence, had generated the Beetham-Baldwin-Dimmitt-Gurney bloc in the Mission Conference, which had deliberately voted as one on major issues and minor, in loyalty to a policy of "Conference Control."

In his anti-Wodehouse campaign, claimed Springer, Beetham had subjected the Bishop to many manipulative harassments as the latter attempted to resolve the conflict and at the same time protect the continuity of the work by keeping both missionaries on the field. The very men who finally charged Bishop Hartzell with mental confusion and nervous instability, said Springer, were themselves "largely responsible for the nervous condition that he was in because of the worry and harassing they gave him." Beetham was so recalcitrant that Springer felt that there was a time when the only thing left "for the Bishop to do was by main power and sheer authority to cluck him out." But the Bishop remained forbearing under the pressure of this clique that, actuated by animosity, had carried on for many months a ruthless and obstructionist drive toward partisan control. And when Springer declined to go along with them, he himself had become first a target of the animosity

and later, as District Superintendent, the object of the same kind of coercive pressures employed in the effort to control Bishop Hartzell.

Emory Beetham dropped his principalship at the Academy at the beginning of April, at a time when the teaching staff was badly depleted by recent withdrawals, and Springer had to leave his work at Old Umtali and run the Academy for the next nine months. Beetham left for Beira and home in May. This desertion of his post in violation of a recent agreement dispelled Bishop Hartzell's long tolerance of Beetham; the Bishop initiated his transfer to his earlier Conference in the United States.

This was the end for the Beetham clique on the field, for Baldwin also left for home at the same time. He had reacted negatively to conditions in Beira, strongly disagreeing with Bishop Hartzell's estimate of the missionary possibilities there. When Springer withdrew him from the charge, he declined any other work actually available, declaring for one thing that he did not feel "inclined to enter the native work." Therefore he and Springer and the Bishop agreed that he had better return to the States. Baldwin made it clear to Secretary Leonard that his sharp lack of harmony with the Hartzell administration of the Mission was one of the factors rendering his continuance in Rhodesia inadvisable, and the Bishop in turn cited Baldwin's opposition as a reason for recalling him. Leonard, who hardly could keep track of the frictions in Southern Rhodesia, was troubled; he wrote to Hartzell, "There have been so many persons leaving the different missions in Africa that the impression is likely to go out that our missions in that country are largely a failure."

The breakup of the Beetham clique did not bring peace to the Mission; a fresh cycle was begun even before Beetham left Umtali. This time the lineup was Wodehouse and Gurney versus Springer, these three being the new Finance Committee. The conflict grew up out of problems involved in transferring the Treasury from Wodehouse to Springer. It took Springer two months to get Wodehouse to pass over the books. When he got them, they were not in good order, and Springer experienced repeated delays over more than nine months in his effort to get Wodehouse to straighten them out—many unposted items, many unexplained expenditures, and a few substantial cash discrepancies. It became impossible for Springer to administer the Mission's finance efficiently or to prepare his annual report to the Finance Committee at the end of 1904. As time went on, Dr. Gurney began sharply criticizing what he took to be Springer's delinquency in reporting, and he and Wodehouse joined in opening and maintaining fire on Springer on numerous points, including the financing of his own department, the Industrial Mission at Old Umtali.

"It seems that as yet you have no end of trouble in the East Central Africa Mission," wrote Secretary Leonard to Bishop Hartzell; he had been reading a batch of communications from Southern Rhodesia that gave him,

voluminously, both sides of the controversy—a Finance Committee “majority report” from Gurney and Wodehouse and an answering “minority report” from Springer along with a copy of his long letter to Wodehouse. Bishop Hartzell was soon on the ground for Conference, in May, and ready to tackle the difficulty. He rebuked Gurney and Wodehouse for pushing Springer too hard and defended Springer on most points both to his fellow Committee members and to the Board. He rather revealingly pointed out to them that some of the financial conditions for which they blamed Springer could not have been rectified until he himself was on the field in person to supply information about certain aspects of the outside financing of the Mission. “When I had been with the Finance Committee half an hour,” he wrote later on, “the financial bugbears, real and imagined, were provided for or passed away.” After laboring to reconcile Springer and Wodehouse, the Bishop consummated his peacemaking effort by appointing the two men as superintendents of the two Districts into which he now divided the Southern Rhodesia field—the Umtali District (Wodehouse) and the Old Umtali District (Springer). Then he reported to Leonard, “You will be pleased to know that the friction in the Rhodesia Finance Committee—Wodehouse and Gurney vs. Springer—has all been settled, and the new year opens with peace among the workers. . .”

Shortly before the Conference session of 1905, Dr. Gurney sailed for the United States for surgical treatment, and because of the troubles of the past two years, it took him four years fully to regain his position on the field.

Gurney soon received from Bishop Hartzell a letter frankly criticizing him for “two unfortunate peculiarities affecting administration”—the Doctor’s extreme resistance to supervision both as to his own medical “department” and as to other matters, and his uninhibited and irritating persistence in criticizing the work of others. But it was more than Gurney’s thorny temperament that bothered the Bishop; he found him decisively unsatisfactory as a missionary because of his substantial opposition to the administration of the Southern Rhodesia mission, including not simply Hartzell’s appointees but also Hartzell himself. Conferences with Gurney in New York (partly in Secretary Leonard’s presence) in February, 1906, convinced Hartzell that Gurney’s aggressive and unco-operative attitude remained unchanged. Therefore, when Gurney made known to the Board his desire to return to Africa (his furlough was to expire in May) the Bishop notified the Board that it was impossible for him to consent to Gurney’s return. Gurney appeared before the Committee on Africa to defend himself, but action was deferred pending arrangement of a meeting at which both the Bishop and the Doctor should be present. In pressing for such a confrontation, Dr. Gurney treated the Committee’s work as not simply the consideration of his own relation to

the Rhodesia mission but an investigation of Hartzell's administration, to "determine who has done wrong—the Bishop or his missionaries."

When the showdown occurred, on 12 June, Gurney freely acknowledged to the Committee that he had been out of harmony with the Bishop's Administration. But he interpreted it in his own way: "My justification for this lack of harmony," he said, in a long written statement submitted to the Committee, "is that the Bishop's administration is out of harmony with the laws and usages of our church; and that his representations of the work, as published in our church papers, are out of harmony with the facts." He backed this double charge by presenting a seventeen-page attack on the administration, signed by himself, Glenn A. Baldwin, R. Emory Beetham, Mrs. Beetham (formerly Harriette Johnson), John H. Dimmitt, and Frank D. Wolf (of the Inhambane District), who he claimed really were voicing the views of all the missionaries returned from Southern Rhodesia.

The critics led by Gurney, extensively but selectively citing the Missionary Society's printed Reports and its periodicals (Hartzell was the chief source of the accounts and also the official responsible for rectifying faulty publicity), accused Hartzell of misrepresentation of field conditions by exaggeration and inaccurate reporting. They pointed their allegations at statements about the growth of the white work in Umtali, Penhalonga, and Beira; the financing of St. Andrew's Church, Umtali; the status and financing of Umtali Academy; "hospital work" and the supposed freedom of American physicians to practice in Rhodesia; the nature of the large Old Umtali land grants; the popularity of the Old Umtali school; the accomplishments of the "Industrial Mission"; the number and quality of African converts, church members, and evangelists; and the amount of the Mission's debt. They not only challenged the truth of Hartzell's picture of the Southern Rhodesia mission in action, but also briefly criticized the soundness of the Mission's close involvement with the British South Africa Company (its handling of native affairs had been open to ethical criticism), the contribution of administration policies to the extreme shortness of missionary tenure in Rhodesia, and functional relations between the Mission Conference, the Finance Committee, and the Board. Although their statement was an obviously partisan document and open to rebuttal at various points, Bishop Hartzell's habitual fulsomeness in describing the Mission's current successes and its promise for the future gave them a good deal of material to use against him. His eagerness to find support for the Mission—his enthusiasm as a promoter often was not matched by realism in administration—had betrayed him into carelessly optimistic and ultimately embarrassing overstatement.

The Bishop parried the attack as well as he could at the Committee meeting and defended himself more at length in correspondence with the members and with Secretary Leonard. He labeled the document itself an attempt to discount the whole work of the Mission—"a monstrous misrep-

resentation permeated by a spirit of unfriendliness, not to use a stronger word." He made sharp *ad hominem* criticisms of Gurney, Baldwin, Dimmitt, Beetham, and Wolf and then went on to try to set the record straight. But before the Bishop got his detailed defense into the picture, the Board of Managers, upon recommendation of the Committee on Africa, voted (19 June) not to approve the return of Gurney to Rhodesia as a missionary. And it made no move to pursue any further investigation of the Bishop's management of the Southern Rhodesia work. This ready support hardly could have deeply qualified the confidence in his own course out of which Hartzell wrote to Leonard a year later :

There has never been a single hour, since I rode into Umtali on horse back alone in October 1897, that that work was not worthy of commendation, either in its administration or practical results, barring the minor mistakes incident to human conditions, especially such conditions as attend the inauguration of a large and difficult work in a new land.

After spending a year as a pastor in the New York East Conference, his home Conference, Dr. Gurney took the supernumerary relation in April, 1907, and sailed for England to take a three-month course in tropical medicine. He was determined to find some way, under some auspices, of returning to Africa as a medical missionary. In August, at the invitation of Bishop Burt, he went to Zurich to meet Bishop Hartzell, with whom he achieved a full reconciliation, pledging his sincere co-operation for the future. The Bishop fully backed Gurney from that time on, promptly requesting the Board to reinstate him as a missionary and asking Bishop Goodsell to transfer him to the East Central Africa Mission Conference (through a fluke, his transfer in 1903 never had been consummated technically). With Hartzell's approval, Dr. Gurney then went off to Southern Rhodesia, where he was welcomed by the missionaries and soon was busy at medical work.

Having Hartzell's approval, however, failed to win Gurney reinstatement as a Board missionary. For the past two years, the Bishop had pressed upon the Board as a major impediment to the Doctor's returning to the field the scandal of his living apart from his wife who had left him, to return to the United States, shortly after their arrival in Rhodesia in 1903. The Bishop claimed that it seriously embarrassed the Mission in the general community and that the other missionaries did not want him back. Gurney had defended himself at length against such charges when he appeared before the Committee on Africa in 1906. The Committee found in this area no reason to question Gurney's character, but the members were impressed by the difficulty the Bishop had raised. And they remained impressed; once the Bishop became satisfied with Gurney's intention to co-operate with his administration, he quickly discarded the separation issue, but the Board and its Committee clung to it for two years longer.

In October, 1907, the Committee on Africa, taking note of the request of Bishops Hartzell and Burt that Gurney be reinstated, recommended that the Board raise no objection to Hartzell's employing the Doctor on his own responsibility, but that it declare its inability to recognize him as a missionary at the present time. Even this qualified approval of Gurney was recommitted to the Committee on the initiative of Homer Eaton, Treasurer and member of the Board. Although the Board maintained the public position that it was not passing moral judgment on Gurney, behind the scenes Eaton, who had been in contact with Mrs. Gurney, was causing the Doctor personal damage within the Board by advancing a prejudicial interpretation of the marriage problem. Bishop Burt withdrew his sponsorship of him, and Secretary Leonard took a firm anti-Gurney stance, assuring Hartzell that if Gurney's Annual Conference "knew the inwardness of the case," he would be subjected to disciplinary action. To Hartzell's renewed request on Gurney's behalf, Leonard replied that the marriage question was an insuperable obstacle and that the case should be considered all but closed; to appoint Gurney now, he claimed, would bring the Board itself under censure. Some of Gurney's relatives rose to his defense, several times protesting to the Board, in person and by correspondence, against its condemning him unheard in the face of Eaton's mischievous allegations. Leonard was far short of full frankness when he informed one of them that he held against Gurney's reinstatement only "the one fact that he and his wife are not living together."

On the advice of Bishop Hartzell, Gurney finally sought clarification of his standing by resorting to his own Conference; at his request, the New York East Conference raised a Committee of Inquiry at its session of April, 1908, to consider his case. On recommendation of the Committee, the Conference passed Gurney's character—under these circumstances, no mere formality—and he remained a supernumerary member of the Conference. Even now, the Board took no action favorable to him, and in August, his brother, J. B. Gurney, a Methodist layman, charging that certain members of the Board were guilty of statements and acts tending to defame the Doctor's character, asked Bishop Goodsell on his behalf to secure for him a hearing before the Bishops or some impartial committee and stated that otherwise civil court action would become necessary. Several times that fall, the Board and its Committee took up Gurney's case, only to decide, in December, to postpone it until Bishop Hartzell could return to Southern Rhodesia, study the situation, and again make recommendations to the Board.

Some months before this, Gurney had been transferred to the East Central Africa Mission Conference, and at its session in July, 1909, Bishop Hartzell gave him a formal appointment to the Mrewa work that he actually had begun many months earlier. Two weeks later, upon Hartzell's cabled request, the Board finally recognized Gurney as a medical missionary, thus ending the long interruption in its sponsorship of the only Methodist medical mis-

sionary in Africa. Bishop Hartzell, the official closest to the Gurney situation, had found it easy to set aside the question of Gurney's family affairs once the two men got their administrative lines untangled, but the Board had remained preoccupied for three long years with moralistic rigidities and respectabilities that impaired its ability to deal justly with a valuable missionary and to meet the needs of an undermanned mission.

When Samuel Gurney got back to Old Umtali in 1907, he found the Mission personnel involved in a new series of troubles, the most serious of which were connected with a fresh batch of complaints a number of the missionaries were making about Robert Wodehouse's handling of the Mission's finances—arrears in salary payments, failure to remit known special gifts, long delay in presentation of Treasury accounts for auditing, disbursements other than as appropriated, lack of adequate financial reporting, and so on. Wodehouse not only once again was Treasurer of the Mission, but also was superintendent of the Umtali District, and the leading critic of his fiscal conduct was James Ferris, now superintendent of the Old Umtali District.

By Conference time in March, 1907, the tensions within the small missionary company were severe, and neither the efforts made at that session of the Mission Conference (Bishops Hartzell and Burt both were present) nor the appointment of Wodehouse as the single District Superintendent at the fall session dispelled them. Indeed, they increased. Ferris not only came into sharper conflict with Wodehouse, but also got into trouble with Bishop Hartzell, to whom he had been complaining about Wodehouse. The Bishop supported Wodehouse and in June, 1908, asked the Board to provide a furlough for Ferris on the ground that he and his wife had been on the verge of nervous breakdown for two years. Hardly had the Board acceded to this, when it received a letter from Ferris asking for a furlough because of his trouble with the Bishop over missionary administration and because of his desire, therefore, to find some other field of labor. This letter brought Secretary Leonard his first inkling of the trouble Ferris detailed to him. As before, Hartzell had turned a deaf ear to missionary critics, had accepted the story of the accused official, had concealed the dispute from the New York office, and had acted—this time, with obvious lack of frankness—to remove the chief dissident. Leonard cabled Ferris to stay on the job and wrote the Bishop, "I fear that if the real situation had been stated [by Hartzell] the furlough would not have been granted."

Upon receiving further complaints from the field, the Board warned Wodehouse in November that he would be removed from office as Treasurer if he did not report on Mission finances without further delay to both the Board itself and the field Finance Committee.

For more than six months after that, the Wodehouse case was talked out in correspondence to and from the New York office. Wodehouse accepted

from Leonard his words of understanding but none of his chastening directions. He promised financial reports—but sent none. He also made a radical personal attack on Ferris. But Hartzell continued his apparently unquestioning support of Wodehouse, his comments substantially echoing what Wodehouse had to say.

Ferris pressed hard for action to correct the mishandling of the Treasury, but he got no remedial results. Finally, in February, 1909, he wrote so caustic and uncompromising a criticism of Hartzell's partisanship and of the Board's inaction that Leonard concluded that he should be removed from the field. A week later, on Leonard's initiative and Hartzell's recommendation, the Board granted Ferris a terminal furlough, this time on the ground of his disagreement with the administration of the Bishop and the District Superintendent. The motion Leonard drafted for the purpose stated that Ferris also was requesting a furlough for the same reason, but it failed to state that this involved the reactivation by Leonard of the application made by Ferris eight months earlier. Before he heard of this action, Ferris made a final brief and pointed complaint involving special gifts; he wrote to Leonard, "How long are you going to permit this gross carelessness in handling trust money to continue? The present conditions of the work of the Treasurer point to criminality."

When Bishop Hartzell arrived in Umtali in July, he at once initiated a fourteen-day study of the Treasurer's accounts by the Finance Committee (one of the members was Ferris, who did not depart until after the Mission Conference session later in the month). The Committee's report, set forth under ten heads numerous respects in which Wodehouse had improperly administered the Mission's funds and kept the Treasury accounts over a period of nearly three years. It also stated the Committee's belief that Wodehouse had had no intention of wronging the Mission. A few weeks after Conference, Wodehouse resigned as Treasurer and soon was succeeded by John R. Gates. The Bishop, his confidence in Wodehouse apparently still unshaken, kept him on as District Superintendent, hopefully assuming that the financial controversy now was probably at an end.

It was a vain hope he held. A new Finance Committee, headed by Gates, endeavoring to bring order into the Mission's scrambled finances, more thoroughly investigated Wodehouse's dealings and finally brought formal charges against him at the session of the Mission Conference in Old Umtali in August, 1910.

After disposing of unspecified countercharges Wodehouse brought against Gates, Coffin, and George A. Stockdale, the Conference took up the Wodehouse case, with George Stockdale acting as attorney for the plaintiff (the Finance Committee) and Dr. Gurney representing the defendant. The general charge against Wodehouse was "immoral conduct"; the major specifications were embezzlement, forgery, presentation of false vouchers, and disobedience

to the order and discipline of the Church. With particulars added, the Committee's statement of charges ran to eight printed pages, covering Wodehouse's dealings as Treasurer with fellow missionaries, African mission workers, the Finance Committee, the Board's New York office, and Rhodesian business concerns. The trial went through eleven sessions in seven days.

The prosecution succeeded in painting a thoroughly convincing picture of chaotic mismanagement of the Mission's finances over about three years' time. Wodehouse's accounts were hardly more than raw materials for a financial record of his administration of the moneys committed to his care. He offered explanations, admitted errors, and cited extenuating circumstances. But neither he nor his accusers really could make head or tail of his incomplete and unclear materials. His essential defense was that his heavy burdens and vicissitudes as Treasurer, District Superintendent, and pioneering missionary spending himself in the cause had led him into great carelessness with his bookkeeping—a deficiency so compounded by procrastination that he finally simply could not straighten things out ("I can't understand this; I make no excuse for it, but I tell you I can't understand"). And he insisted that he had not dishonestly served his own financial interest to the detriment of the Mission.

The prosecution presented, however, plenty of damning prima facie evidence. The members of the Conference evidently found themselves unable to interpret the many delinquencies and irregularities as symptoms of the desperation and confusion of a careless and harried man caught in a web of trouble self-spun out of his temperamental unfitness for financial administration. They took a harder line; by a vote of six men, the Conference found Wodehouse guilty of three of the major charges (forgery excluded) and then voted him leave to "withdraw under charges" from the ministry and membership of the Methodist Episcopal Church.

This termination of Wodehouse's membership was tantamount, in Methodist usage, to expulsion. In fact, in order to avoid technical expulsion, he had to sign a paper acknowledging that the Mission Conference's three-point verdict was "just and true." The Southern Rhodesia missionaries and Bishop Hartzell were bothered for six or seven years by one result or another of the Wodehouse case, particularly because of Wodehouse's continued proximity to the work, his residence being a farm contiguous to Matambara. The more immediate aftermath of the trial lasted for a year, with Bishop Hartzell remaining in Rhodesia for some weeks in an endeavor to repair the damage done the Mission in the white community. Before the year was out, Wodehouse paid the Mission about \$1,000 on the \$6,000 that was determined to be the sum embezzled, and this was accepted in final settlement of his obligation.

Ironically, three months after the Wodehouse trial, the man who had prosecuted him before the Conference, and had done so much to Bishop

Hartzell's satisfaction, was himself in the bad graces of the Mission. George A. Stockdale left the field, as John R. Gates reported to the New York office, "under formal charges of immorality of the gravest nature (adultery, or attempt at such, with a half-caste [*sic*] native woman) . . ." In June, 1911, the Mission Conference, though not bringing him to trial, permitted him to withdraw under charges.

Though the Mission later underwent tensions enough, this was the end of its decade of internal trouble—trouble compounded of immaturity, temperamental and wrongful behavior, and uninspired attitudes on the part of various missionaries and of poor administration by the Missionary Bishop in charge of the field. Thanks largely to Bishop Hartzell's optimistic publicity practices, there appeared in the missionary literature of the period no bad split in the Mission's facade of spirituality, unity, and progress. But its inner life obviously was damaged, and its work was hampered. Nevertheless, it was this group of imperfect men that managed somehow to lay the foundations of the continuing Methodist mission in Southern Rhodesia.

INTO THE SECOND DECADE

When Robert Wodehouse's work as District Superintendent was terminated in 1910, John R. Gates and Shirley D. Coffin followed him in office, Gates taking the Umtali District and Coffin the Zambezi District. Both soon were furloughed—Coffin in midsummer, 1911, and Gates in the spring of 1912. They were succeeded in December, 1912, by Charles A. Kent, a missionary recruit from the ministry of the Southern California Conference, who served as the superintendent for the entire Mission until sickness in his family necessitated his return to the United States in the summer of 1915. Then Gates, returning to the field, succeeded Kent in February, 1916, and continued in office for the rest of the decade.

Part way through this decade, the Mission severed its Conference tie with the three Mozambique Districts. On Bishop Hartzell's recommendation, the General Conference of 1912 adopted an enabling act under which the Southern Rhodesia mission became in February, 1915, the Rhodesia Mission Conference. Its first separate session was held in February, 1916, with Gates presiding in lieu of Bishop Hartzell, who was to retire a few months later. The new Mission Conference boundaries included, by definition, Northern and Southern Rhodesia and the very large section of Mozambique lying north of the Sabi River. Its operative Circuits, of course, were actually in Southern Rhodesia.

During this decade, the church work among white people—at best, never easy or productive—became unmistakably one of the Mission's problems, not the asset it was planned to be. Gates, who had been close to St. Andrew's Church (white) in Umtali, was familiar enough with the difficulties that kept the white churches from advancing or from even holding their own.

Nevertheless, he still believed in this part of the Mission's activity. He therefore strongly disapproved a proposal received from the Presbyterian Church of South Africa in July, 1912, that St. Andrew's Church be sold to the Presbyterians, who otherwise would build a church of their own. The Presbyterians, backed by Scottish Presbyterianism, had been active in Umtali for two years. Their representative offered their plan as an alternative intended to obviate "the scandal of an undue multiplication of ecclesiastical edifices in a small community." Gates felt that the true scandal was the intrusion of the Presbyterians into a community already well churched. The other religious groups in Umtali, in order of strength, were Church of England, Presbyterian, Dutch Reformed, Wesleyan Methodist, Muslim, Roman Catholic, and Greek Catholic—all among a population of a thousand white people. Since almost all the whites in Umtali were British, only a British church, declared the Presbyterians' moderator, could "hope to meet the real and sentimental requirements" of the British population, and only his church had a real chance of appealing to the British evangelicals (non-Anglicans) in the town. Bishop Hartzell, Secretary North, the Rhodesia Finance Committee, and the lay leadership of St. Andrew's all joined in repelling the Presbyterian proposal, and in October, the Board of Managers officially declined it.

Charles Kent also grappled, in his turn, with the problem of Methodist work for Rhodesian whites, fairly soon coming to a conclusion about its viability that was contrary to Gates's. He reported to Secretary North: "There is no future for the white work under Americans in this country." Bishop Hartzell—directly responsible for the initiation of the white work and always strongly favorable to it—still wanted to see it strengthened in Penhalonga and in Umtali. Before long, however, Kent became more outspoken, bluntly recommending that the white work in both Penhalonga and Umtali be closed and the church properties be disposed of.

In St. Andrew's, in Umtali, the pastorate of Hartzell's last appointee ended in May, 1913, in the face of an embarrassing deficit in the church's finances. Kent, who was impressed with the fact that \$30,000 beyond salaries had been expended for the Mission's two white churches over fourteen years, found it impossible to persuade the St. Andrew's laymen to assume responsibility for their local expenses, including interest on the church's debt. Everybody knew, of course, that the African congregations, especially the one in Umtali, were making progress toward self-support. The Africans were poor, but the Umtali whites were not. Some were men of means. Kent, who had been supplying the St. Andrew's pulpit, cited in his report to the Conference of 1915 both St. Andrew's failure in self-support and the status of its congregation as a mere handful of Methodist regular attendants in a well-churched community. "In the light of these facts," he said, "what is the duty of Methodism to the white people of Umtali? I answer, unequivocally,

it is to discontinue the appropriation of missionary money." Kent's view prevailed, and St. Andrew's was dropped from the list of projects supported by Board appropriations, though it still was in existence as late as 1939.

Hartzell's last attempt to save the white church in Penhalonga also failed. The Wisconsin minister whom he appointed to the post in October, 1913, could not by his most conscientious efforts revive the church. Therefore, at a time when the congregational attendance ranged from two to twelve people, Kent terminated the services and had the church building put up for sale. Later the church was pulled down.

One aspect of Kent's approach to the St. Andrew's problem—his expressed lack of interest in merely keeping Methodist denominationalism alive in Umtali—was determined by a touchstone of basic policy that he brought to his supervision of the Mission more urgently than had any of his fore-runners; he strongly believed in the desirability of observing comity with other churches. In this respect, he was in harmony with his official correspondent in New York, Secretary Frank Mason North, who was applying to his high denominational post a mind firmly oriented toward interdenominational amity and co-operation. Of course, Kent did not originate the Mission's interest in co-operative relationships; Robert Wodehouse and Helen Rasmussen had represented it at the first meeting of the General Missionary Conference of South Africa in Bulawayo in 1904. The Mission Conference in 1910 began exchanging fraternal delegates with the Wesleyan Methodists, and with the Presbyterians in 1911. The session in the latter year raised a committee to confer with a committee from the Wesleyan Synod on "methods of practical co-operative work between the two bodies." In 1912, the Mission Conference elected a delegation to attend the General Missionary Conference at Cape Town. Taking up a proposal advanced by Kent in 1915, the Mission Conference explored with the Wesleyans the possibility of establishing a union training school for African teachers and evangelists, finally approving a concrete plan that was sent to the Board for approval in 1917. However, the plan never was realized.

Kent's interest in the practice of comity included a continued endeavor to arrive at more specific understandings with other missions about the previously somewhat hazy boundaries between the areas reserved for the various denominations. He made progress in this respect with the Wesleyans, but he was frustrated by actions of Church of England leaders who did not recognize the apostolic legitimacy of the Methodist mission and were responsible—consistently, he thought—for building stations close to Methodist sites and then drawing followers from kraals cultivated by the Methodists. Kent confessed in 1913 that in some instances in the past, the Methodists similarly had been intruders. Indeed, when he arrived on the field, he found, to his distress, that fellow Methodist missionaries were planning to send mission workers into northwest Rhodesia, where Wesleyans, French Pro-

testants, and Primitive Methodists already were settled. From that time on, Kent threw his influence in favor of more deeply cultivating Methodist work already begun and against expanding into areas occupied by missions of other churches. He believed that Methodist expansion, if the time for it should come, should move into the unoccupied territory stretching out toward the Zambezi and into Mozambique—an area reserved for the Methodists by comity understandings. In this attempt to curb the “considerable eagerness toward the extensive at the expense of the intensive” that he discovered among some of his colleagues, Kent was supported by Secretary North.

Although the white church dropped away, African evangelism kept winning converts and training churchmen. By 1919 there were more than twenty-four hundred church members—triple the number enrolled in 1911—and over seventeen hundred probationers stood on the threshold of full membership.

A number of other aspects of the Mission's activity either remained static or diminished. The original period of geographical expansion was over, and the pattern of Circuits, though displaying somewhat different names, remained roughly the same and covered essentially the same area: Chiduku, Gandanzara, Headlands, Mtoko, Maranke, Mrewa, Matambara, Umtali, Old Umtali, and Umtasa. The Circuits included half a dozen more stations and were manned by a dozen fewer teacher-preachers. The missionary corps had increased by one; it included seven men and thirteen women, six of them W.F.M.S. workers. Although the Mission had many needs and never was so strongly undergirded by the Board as the missionaries believed essential, perhaps the most serious static aspect of its condition was the fact that it had not yet raised up a single ordained African minister. In the composition of its formal ministry, the Rhodesia Mission Conference was an all-white Conference.

Adopting Madeira

While traveling from South Africa to Liberia early in 1898, Bishop Joseph C. Hartzell unexpectedly founded a new mission of the Methodist Episcopal Church, in Funchal, on Madeira, the largest of the Madeira Islands, a Portuguese group lying off the Atlantic coast of Morocco.

Since no steamship line offered direct passage from Cape Town to Monrovia, the Bishop had taken a mailboat to Funchal in order to board a ship running back down the African coast to Liberia. In Funchal, Hartzell and his wife stayed in the home of William G. Smart, who with his wife and three sisters-in-law, conducted a small independent Protestant mission. Smart's father, a Briton, had established the mission in 1876. The son came out in 1878 to assist him, and within a year married one of five Newton sisters, who long had devoted themselves to temperance work and to teaching. They were Madeira-born daughters of an English businessman.

At the time of Bishop Hartzell's visit, the younger Smart was engaged, as he had been for twenty years, in constant evangelistic visitation of the sailing vessels, steamers, and naval craft anchoring in the Bay of Funchal. Ashore, he kept a Sailors' Rest for seamen from the fifteen hundred ships touching at Funchal each year. Close by was his family residence, a 25-room house called Park House, which he leased when it was built in 1890. Here Mrs. Smart entertained, as paying guests, missionaries and other visitors to Funchal.

Back in the mountains that Hartzell saw crowding down to the sea, Smart and his family had two other mission stations. In Santo da Serra, five miles from Santa Cruz (on the eastern coast), was a mission house built by Mrs. Smart four years before. There Lucy Newton conducted a school, and there quiet evangelistic work went on. The other outlying station was in Machico, at the mouth of the Machico River, eight miles across country from Santo da Serra, and a dozen miles from Funchal along the eastern coast. The Machico mission was a modest enterprise, to which the Smarts had devoted a good deal of effort for at least two years, beginning in 1893, not without benefit of "many showers of stones" and numerous petty harassments from the opponents of Protestantism. The five Newton sisters once had carried on a Portuguese school in Machico as early as about 1870. These two missions were directed towards the white Portuguese-speaking country people—chin-whiskered men and full-skirted and kerchiefed women, many of them dressed in homespun—who worried a meager living out of little hand-cultivated terraced gardens on the steep hillsides.

The population of Madeira was Roman Catholic, and Smart had suffered strong opposition from Roman priests. The Roman Church, under Portuguese law, enjoyed a preferred status; the Protestant mission had to pursue its evangelistic work privately and in only small gatherings. The previous August, Smart had narrowly escaped death from a shower of large stones thrown down at him from a precipice near Santo da Serra—an attack he was convinced was the result of weekly violent discourses by the parish priest. When Hartzell came to Funchal, the mission school at Santo da Serra was inactive—closed two months before by authorities in Lisbon on the initiative of Madeiran priests.

Smart needed money and protection for his three-point mission. Hartzell, whose interest in it had first been aroused the year before, when he made a one-day stop in Madeira on his first Africa tour, felt that he needed some kind of episcopal residence strategically located for his travels to and through his widely spread African mission field. He also was on the lookout for a health resort for temporarily incapacitated Africa missionaries. The two men regarded this conjunction of interests as providential, and so decided to join forces. After carefully studying the situation, Hartzell decided then and there

to take the Smart group and their mission into the Methodist Episcopal Church.

The Bishop's first step was to organize a Methodist Episcopal church in Funchal, at a service held on 23 January 1898. The charter group—some received on profession of faith, some on probation—included Smart and his wife, three Misses Newton, several other English-speaking people, and nearly twenty converted Portuguese-speaking Madeirans. At the same service, Hartzell licensed Smart, who was a layman, as a Local Preacher.

The second step soon followed; early in February, the Liberia Conference, acting at Hartzell's request, received Smart on trial and elected him to Deacon's and Elder's Orders under the Missionary Rule. The Bishop then appointed Smart as superintendent of a newly constituted Madeira Islands Mission District. Upon returning to Funchal, he ordained him, on 6 March.

Hartzell expected to justify this opening of a new mission—if challenged—by pointing to his episcopal jurisdiction over the Liberia Conference, which the *Discipline* defined as embracing the western coast of Africa north of the equator; "and does not that include the adjacent islands?" he asked. Hartzell's move did not go unchallenged. James M. Buckley criticized it in a *Christian Advocate* editorial ("this peculiar action," he called it), and in the General Missionary Committee on November 15.* The General Committee demonstrated, implicitly, its recognition of the value of work in Madeira, when it increased the appropriation for the New Bedford Portuguese Mission, which Bishop Hartzell had supported on the ground that New Bedford converts returned to Madeira carrying the gospel with them. When Hartzell secured adoption of Smart and his wife as regular missionaries a week later, he asked the Board of Managers, curiously, to accept their names as additions to those "of missionaries accepted from Bishop William Taylor's work, which were omitted in the names previously submitted." They never had been, of course, participants in Bishop Taylor's work.

The Mission was transferred, in the spring of 1902, from the Liberia to the West Central Africa Mission Conference, in which it was formally associated with the Angola field and, for several years, with work in the Congo also.

When Bishop Hartzell took Smart's mission under Methodist jurisdiction, he bought the property in Santo da Serra, and gave the mission there a new name—Mount Faith. In Funchal, Smart gave Bishop Hartzell and the Missionary Society full use of the facilities of Park House, the building being renamed Methodist Episcopal Church House. It became both the Methodist mission center and the official residence of the Methodist Missionary Bishop, until 1912. In 1908, Hartzell purchased it from its Roman Catholic owner for the Board for \$20,000. Although the Board loaned the Mission \$12,000 for the Church House transaction, and made regular appropriations

* See p. 178.

for the continuing work, the Madeira project perennially was financed mainly through special gifts sent to the Board, and through gifts gathered by an independent group of British sponsors of "Bishop Hartzell's Missionary Work in Madeira Islands," which had a treasurer in London.

The pattern of mission work in Funchal changed little during the two decades following its adoption by the Methodists. Smart moved the Sailors' Rest into the Church House, and continued ship-to-ship visitation (he had occasional assistants) as before, with financial co-operation by the American Seamen's Friend Society and the British and Foreign Sailors' Society. He made over a section of the Church House into a Church Hall in which religious services were conducted. Portuguese and English classes for Madeiran children were held in the Church House, with two of the Newton sisters as the first teachers. The Mission soon published and used a handbook of Methodist Episcopal doctrines and hymns, which was also used in the Angola mission.

A little group in the Funchal mission had prayed every morning for two months that God would reopen the school at Mount Faith. And "he answered our prayer," said Smart, "making America once more the instrument in his hands of checkmating Rome." Bishop Hartzell opened the school on 3 March 1898, with Lucy Newton in charge, and went to tell the Governor what he had done. When the Governor said, "You know the law, I suppose," Hartzell boldly replied:

Yes, sir, and I do not intend to violate it or that any of our missionaries should; but I am here as an American citizen to do the work of a Christian missionary, and to give the Bible and schools to Portuguese citizens who of their own accord desire to receive them. When we violate the law it will be time enough to arrest us, but otherwise I desire that there shall be no foolish interference.

The school remained open—permanently.

The Mount Faith mission also got a new start in evangelism—holding religious services, having conversions, and gradually building a small congregation. Smart's earliest assistant was an elderly Madeiran, Matthew Furtado, who had served as Bible reader. Before and after each Sunday service, large groups of the mountain peasants gathered where the old man sat reading aloud from the Scriptures. Later, several such humble Bible readers as he, extending this activity to weekly cottage meetings, became regular members of the Madeira mission's evangelistic personnel. Bishop Hartzell promptly buttressed the school project and the congregation by buying more land and having a two-story mission house erected.

Mount Faith received further reinforcement, ultimately, through Bishop Hartzell's transferring George B. Nind from the Cape Verde Islands to Madeira in 1901. When he first arrived, Nind alternated with Smart between Funchal and Mount Faith on a circuit plan; but when, in 1904, Smart had

to stay in Funchal to conserve his health, Nind settled permanently at Mount Faith, there suffering from cold and dampness much of the year.

The mission in Machico, though reported by Bishop Hartzell in 1898, evidently was dormant at that time. Hartzell and Smart made an effective new beginning there in 1905, when they took over from the Free Church of Scotland a little church group in Ribeira Grande, a section of Machico three miles back in the river valley from Machico Village itself. The Ribeira Grande people, at first only an outdoor congregation, entered a new cottage-like chapel in October, 1906. Two months later, Benjamin R. Duarte, a Portuguese-speaking native of Brava, Cape Verde Islands, who had been converted under George Nind in the New Bedford Portuguese Mission, in Massachusetts, came to Madeira as a missionary, and soon manned the Ribeira Grande mission. There he stayed permanently, except for brief service in Angola. In Ribeira Grande, Duarte found already in operation a school with a Portuguese teacher. In 1908, he began evangelistic services in Machico Village, where he lived in a house rented by the Mission.

A number of lay workers—Bible readers, teachers, and several Local Preachers—emerged from the Mission's Portuguese constituency, to assist Smart and his missionary colleagues. Their most notable assistant among the earlier workers was Braulio F. da Silva, a former colporteur of the British and Foreign Bible Society, who received Deacon's Orders in 1910, and who preached for the Mission for about six years, before withdrawing in 1913 to enter evangelical work in continental Portugal.

The Madeira mission thus had an unusual advantage for so small a foreign mission—three missionary leaders, in addition to other workers, all of whom spoke the language of the people out of long familiarity with it. This facilitated, for one thing, the publication, with some financial assistance by the Board of Sunday Schools, of a Portuguese-language monthly called *Voz da Madeira*, which beginning in 1908, carried Sunday School lessons and Protestant propaganda both to the Madeira constituency and to Portuguese readers abroad.

Ribeira Grande, Santo da Serra, and Funchal remained the chief foci of activity. But during the Methodist mission's first dozen years, Smart's small corps of workers touched more or less lightly with their evangelical message a number of other communities scattered across the 34-mile-long island—Trapiche, Currul Velho, Câmara de Lobos, Ribeira Brava, Fajã da Ovelha, Calheta, Ares da Calheta, São Martinho, São Gonçalo, Pasto, and others. Later on, Julio G. Viterbo Dias, who began to work for the Mission in the spring of 1917, developed a permanent congregation at Ribeira Brava, west of Funchal, on the southern coast.

The Mission had not only to win, but also to fight, its way on the Island. Madeira was rockbound with a repressive variety of Roman Catholicism but little eroded by the winds of modernity. Ecclesiastically inspired harassment

of Protestants and of inquirers about the evangelical faith—sometimes intense enough or sustained enough to justify the missionaries' use of the word *persecution*—significantly hampered the growth of the Methodist group on the Island, and sometimes caused the Mission to restrict its evangelistic efforts. Among the instruments of harassment or opposition were public and private threats, priestly espionage, coercive manipulation of the power to withhold the Sacraments, aggressive preferment of legal charges, public Bible burnings, incitement to hostility through sermons and public denunciation, and disruption of Protestant meetings.

Although the police often had to be called to protect Methodist meetings in Funchal, the Machico mission, especially in the Village, generally took the brunt of Roman Catholic hostility. For more than four years, Duarte and his wife seldom walked the few miles from home to chapel except to an accompaniment of public unpleasantness—shouts, whistling, beating on tin cans, shattering blasts from horns, even stone-throwing. Opposition from the Jesuit-led Catholic community delayed inauguration of Duarte's evangelistic meetings in the Village for two years. When he finally began them, "in the midst of fiery antagonism," people at first flocked to his house to hear the Protestant message. But intensified clerical pressure cut down the attendance, and kept it low. When in 1911, Braulio da Silva, temporarily replacing Duarte, held more numerous and more open meetings, with some increase in numbers, threats of personal violence broke up a new Bible class, and rowdies insulted and roughed up attendants at services as they approached the mission house, and noisily interrupted the proceedings inside. Da Silva himself felt the intimidating effect of observing night prowlers around the house.

The Protestants in Machico (there were only a half dozen families) were in serious danger from mob violence in December, 1910, when the town revolted against the anticlerical republican government, and against its sanitary measures for the control of a cholera epidemic, two months after the new regime was proclaimed in Lisbon. The Protestants aligned themselves against the revolt, telephoned to Funchal for troops, and themselves received military protection, as requested by Smart. The advent of the Republic divested the Roman priests of their political power and deprived them of their opportunity to subject the Protestants to legal embarrassments. But the priests and their partisans only the more energetically manipulated the ecclesiastical and popular forces left at their command. They lost so much under the republican Constitution, said Smart, "that their blood is up, and any harm they can do us, they do." By March, 1915, the opposition of the priest made it impossible to continue services in Machico Village. In 1918, Viterbo Dias and his band of thirteen church members kept their strenuous position in Ribeira Brava only by holding up under a prolonged barrage of public hostility (Smart called it persecution) directed by the parish priest,

who repeatedly denounced the evangelicals from the pulpit, calling them "all dogs" and declaring that Dias should be treated as a dog.

When in spite of the hostile atmosphere in Roman Catholic Madeira the Methodists won converts, emigration to the United States and to Latin America sometimes depleted the small congregations. About 1904, for instance, nearly fifty constituents left for Jacksonville, Illinois, home of many refugees from persecutions of Madeiran Protestants in the middle of the nineteenth century. By 1919, the modest evangelistic, educational, and colportage activities of the Mission, pursued without significant innovation, resulted in a church membership reported as numbering less than a hundred persons. There were four Sunday schools, with about 150 pupils; and three elementary day schools, with an enrollment of less than a hundred children.

Bishop Hartzell continued as the episcopal administrator for Madeira until his retirement in 1916, when Bishop Eben S. Johnson succeeded him, with official residence in Untali, Rhodesia. Largely because of wartime sailing difficulties, but also because of the administrative priorities he recognized, Bishop Johnson failed to come to Madeira for several years after his election as Missionary Bishop for Africa. Four years and a half without episcopal visitation was too long for the health of the Madeira mission, which was deteriorating because of a serious internal weakness—William Smart's long-standing, but now critical, unfitness for the Mission superintendency.

Smart's direction of the Mission had long been less than heroic; he was not himself a heroic figure. Pounded by waves of Roman Catholic opposition, he had not gone down, but was inwardly defeatist, habitually riding in the trough of the wave, not on the crest. He constantly sprinkled his letters to the Board with complaints about Catholic "persecution" and chicanery, and reduced the calibre of his preaching by perennial reiteration of uncreative anti-Catholic emphases. After forty years in Funchal, he felt no essential rapport with the common people of the Island. He centered his energies in a pet project, the work with transient sailors. His warmest associations were with prominent visitors to Madeira and with members of Funchal's British and American circles. The rest of the Mission's work in Funchal, both educational and evangelistic, was integrated with the ingrown interests and habits of the Smart-Newton ménage, which too often dealt in petty projects and petty largesse. Domestic frictions arising among the families living in Church House (there were three such families, plus some individuals, in 1918) disturbed the Mission, and the now senile Mrs. Smart caused serious difficulty by constantly interfering in its direction. Both she and her husband played favorites among the workers and alternately lapsed into negative personal attitudes that undermined morale.

Smart seldom visited the hill stations for which he was responsible as Superintendent. He felt isolated and insecure among his fellow workers within the Mission—suspecting their actions and their motives, resenting their

taking initiative, and fearfully desiring to control them, but not knowing how. For years, the Mission suffered from lack of leadership because of Smart's indecisiveness, his habit of consigning his administrative problems to frequent, and finally almost whimpering, letters to the Board Secretaries, instead of grappling with his difficulties on the field.

The phase of Smart's administrative ineptitude that finally brought the Mission to a critical pass was his reaction to the personality and activity of Viterbo Dias, the dynamic young man who was his latest recruit for mission service. Dias had studied for the Roman Catholic priesthood in the Funchal seminary for six years. He came under Smart's influence in September, 1916, not long before he was due for ordination, and soon was deeply and fervently converted to evangelical Christianity.

Smart counted Dias a great find. He quickly gave him an opportunity to preach, added him to the Mission's paid staff, took him and his bride into the Church House to live, and even wanted to organize a "theological school" with Dias as head. Smart was so taken with Dias's possibilities, that Corresponding Secretary North cautioned him against thrusting so recent a convert from Romanism into such a post without longer testing.

When Dias came to the Mission, he was conducting a boys' school of his own. His desertion of the Roman Church brought a sharp decline in the school's patronage, but he kept it going in spite of financial straits and succeeded in raising it again significantly above its lowest ebb. Into the school, he introduced daily worship and evangelical teaching of the Bible, also organizing extracurricular social and religious groups for his boys and for others. Dias made the school practically—though it was never officially accepted—an evangelistic arm of the Mission; he converted most of his boys, brought them into the life of the Funchal church, won the sympathies of some of their parents, undertook the special training of two of the boys for Christian work, and even took groups of schoolboys with him on evangelistic excursions. One of his teen-age disciples, Luis Dias, became a helper in Miss Newton's day school, and the other, Anselmo Figueira, set up a school of his own in the vicinity of Funchal, and guided a band of country boys in secular subjects and Christian teaching. Dias even taught these two boys how to prepare sermons.

Except for the time given to his school, Dias devoted himself wholeheartedly, humbly, and sacrificially to the Mission's work. He preached in season and out of season—in the Church House in Funchal, in private houses, in the Ribeira Grande and Mount Faith chapels, and in back country locations, some of them not previously evangelized. In Funchal, where the congregations increased under his preaching, he also carried on Sunday school work and led numerous week-night meetings. In Ribeira Brava, Dias drew large gatherings—150 to 200 people, mostly Catholics—until priestly pressures, including excommunications, cut them down to less than two dozen. Although

fiercely opposed there, he continued, at some risk to his life, to visit this little company, and in July, 1918, started a church with seven probationers.

Dias displayed initiative and perseverance in his double work of evangelism and education. Neither his initiative nor his \$25.00 a month from the Board sufficed, however, to keep him from poverty, even hunger, or to maintain his school without two temporary closings in 1918. In the spring, with Smart's permission, he reopened the school in the "parlor" of the Sailors' Rest. Late in the the year, he decided that he no longer could conduct the school there because of frequent interruptions by visiting sailors, now coming in greater numbers at the end of the war. Because of financial stringency, he hoped to have other rooms in the Church House for the purpose, feeling that otherwise he would have to discontinue the school.

Dias got nowhere with Smart in the attempt to realize this hope. Far from opening up other rooms for the classes, Smart forbade the boys the use of the Church House garden because the noise of their play disturbed the peace. The neighbors complained, he said, and the Smarts themselves got "terrible headaches" from it. Smart asked Dias to remove the school from the building altogether, even offering to help pay for a room outside.

At the beginning of Dias's affiliation with the Methodists, George Nind had advised Secretary North that it would be advantageous to incorporate his school into the Mission organization and house it in the Funchal headquarters, where he felt there was plenty of room for it. He spoke highly of Dias's spirit and capabilities, but predicted that "the superintending missionaries" would not welcome any radical readjustment in Church House accommodations and that friction would result once the school was located there. In January, 1919, Nind reported to North that the predicted friction had occurred and that Dias had taken his school out of the Mission quarters. The trouble was bad enough, held Nind, to demand handling by Bishop Johnson; and ominous enough, felt the furloughed Duarte, following the situation through letters reaching the United States, to threaten a great blow to the Mission.

From this time on, Dias's name was firmly written down in the Superintendent's bad books. Smart sent off to the New York office a series of more than a dozen letters complaining about his assistant—variously accusing him of destroying harmony, acting headstrong, corresponding abroad behind Smart's back, behaving with intolerable treachery, working to usurp control of the Funchal mission ("... he thinks he is the Pope!"), spreading rumors of Smart's imminent retirement and of his own succession to leadership, disobeying directions and rules, losing his temper, and even striking a woman servant of Smart's. Also, evidently failing to appreciate the potential of the boys Dias was striving to ally with the Church, Smart thwarted his attempt to organize them into a Y.M.C.A. What Dias was thinking during this period is lost to us, for he had contritely stopped sending letters (fine-spirited and

devoted to the Mission, they were) to the Board Secretaries when informed that he was not observing official channels of communication.

In letters from New York, Secretary Thomas S. Donohugh tried to calm the Mission's greatly troubled Superintendent, advising him not to stifle, but to try to channel, Dias's initiative. But Smart, accustomed to looking upon Madeirans as people to be patronized rather than developed into colleagues, remained chiefly concerned, and aggrieved, that Dias would not simply "come into line and do as all others do, submit to the rules of the Church." He tried to explain the situation to Donohugh: "The population here are white, not black, but they need great discretion in dealing with them as they are very peculiar in many ways." His concept of discretion with native workers was "to be very cautious and hold them strongly."

Smart lapsed into self-pity, helplessly waiting for the Bishop to come to solve the Mission's problems. "I am in great anxiety," he complained, "with the men conspiring against me in the house, and in the Mission. It is enough to have the constant pin pricks of the Jesuits and the opposition of the indifferents and sceptics. Opposition inside is cruel." He simply wanted Dias out of his way. Shift him to Ribeira Brava, transfer him out of Madeira, drop him from the Mission—these were his various suggestions for Bishop Johnson's handling of Dias. But above all, he wanted Dias (and also Julio da Freitas, his other assistant) out of the house; he could not bear the thought of living under the same roof with his former protégé until the Bishop's long-postponed arrival.

Bishop Johnson finally reached the badly demoralized Madeira Mission at the very end of 1919. He found both Nind and Duarte ready to testify that the responsibility for the Mission's destructive lack of unity was not onesided, as Smart tried to make it appear. Before leaving Madeira, after a stay of more than a month, Johnson appointed Dias, his school evidently now having gone by the board, to the Ribeira Brava church. There his work was to be overseen by Duarte, from Machico. This was perhaps the best that could be done as long as Smart remained in charge in Madeira.

Bishop Johnson and Bishop William F. Anderson, who was with him during part of his visit to the Island, decided that Smart was not capable of directing the work effectively, and should be removed as Superintendent. When he understood that he was slated for replacement, Smart protested to Secretary North, voicing his amazement that he and his wife should be expelled from the Church House after living there for thirty years. "Naturally," he wrote, "we say 'an enemy hath done this.'" But his fears were somewhat premature. Three months later, Bishop Johnson was no longer the Bishop in charge of Madeira. No further administrative changes were made in the Mission, and it settled down, with its essential sickness unremedied, for another long wait for the Bishop (a new one) to come.

Pausing in the Cape Verde Islands

Each time Bishop Hartzell sailed from Europe to the west coast of Africa, his steamer put in not only at Funchal but also at Brava, in the Cape Verde Islands, a Portuguese archipelago fifteen hundred miles south of Madeira and three hundred miles west of the westernmost bulge of Africa into the Atlantic. The Bishop was the first official Methodist traveler to come to the Islands; yet Methodism was there before him—a far-reaching offshoot of a home missions project in the old whaling city of New Bedford, Massachusetts.

In New Bedford, in the New England Southern Conference, was a small Portuguese Methodist mission founded in 1890. Many of the numerous Portuguese in the city were natives of the Cape Verde Islands; hundreds of people were moving from Brava to New Bedford each year. Some of them, becoming converted in the mission there and returning to their birthplace, carried their religious enthusiasm home to Roman Catholic Brava, and began laboring for the conversion of their families.

When they tried to evangelize other families, they got into trouble. Three of them—young men—were imprisoned in 1896 for their religious activities. Upon their release, they returned to the United States. But the work went on in spite of opposition; other New Bedford converts kept evangelistic services going on Brava. In 1898 and 1899, the magistrate, acting under the instigation of a Roman priest, repeatedly harassed the lay evangelists and the people who opened their homes to them. Three of the young leaders finally came to public trial charged with defaming the priest and his religion; but the court acquitted them. The evangelical cause grew in favor throughout the small, densely inhabited island, especially when a dozen more workers, including three licensed Exhorters, came home from New England—among them one of the three men jailed in 1896. Benjamin R. Duarte, a Methodist convert in the New Bedford missions, was ordained by the Advent Christian Church of Providence, Rhode Island, and began missionary work on Brava, his birthplace, early in 1890.

Over four years, across the water to New Bedford went many appeals for a missionary from America. When economic necessity drove the Methodist lay evangelists back to the United States in 1900, leaving the Brava group leaderless, Bishop Hartzell decided that the appeals must be met.

The Bishop believed that the Methodist Episcopal Church was under obligation to care for the Bravan "child of our New Bedford mission." He also saw Brava as the key to a missionary opportunity—the 120,000 souls in the ethnically mixed Cape Verde archipelago, "upon whom the light has not yet dawned." And he saw it as a potential missionary reservoir out of which might come missionaries equipped, presumably linguistically, for work in Methodist missions in Mozambique, Angola, Madeira, Brazil, and

the United States. Therefore, describing the Cape Verde Islands effort as a natural part of the Madeira work and as conveniently nearer the missions on the west coast of Africa, Hartzell requested the Board to appoint a missionary to the Cape Verde Islands without any expense to the Missionary Society.

Hartzell found the money and enlisted the man—George B. Nind, an experienced Portuguese language missionary, first in Brazil and more recently as the head of the New Bedford mission for several years. Nind, quickly elected to Elder's Orders by the Cincinnati Conference under the Missionary Rule and approved by the Board, arrived at Brava in January, 1901, ready to organize the three dozen converts awaiting him there and to take up evangelistic work among their sympathizers.

Nind's stay was brief. Bishop Hartzell soon transferred him to the Madeira mission, where he started work in September. Notwithstanding the Bishop's substantial reasons for urging the opening of the Brava mission, Nind's transfer ended the Missionary Society's venture in the Cape Verde Islands.

Foothold in North Africa

A decade after Bishop Hartzell led the Methodists into Rhodesia, he led them into North Africa, on the shores of the Mediterranean.

In preparing for this new advance, Bishop Hartzell relied substantially upon information gathered by his wife during a two months' sojourn in Algiers while he was on tour in southern Africa with Bishop William Burt. On 8 May 1907, Bishop Hartzell and his wife were reunited, when he landed at Algiers from the *Romanic*, on which he had sailed from Gibraltar as one of a large party of American delegates, including fifty Methodists, to the World's Sunday School Convention, soon to meet in Rome.

In Algiers, the Bishop sponsored a gathering at which the entire delegate group from the *Romanic* and from an accompanying ship met the handful of Protestant Christian workers active in that part of Algeria. Here in the capital city, according to the Bishop, the American visitors "were brought face to face, most of them for the first time, with the degradation and fanaticism incident to Mohammedan countries." They saw, he said, the sad results of fifteen centuries of Mohammedan rule, including "what Mohammedanism has done, especially for women and children, and how false are the ideas of God and moral purity which prevail."

Whatever Hartzell felt constituted the delegates' confrontation with Islam and its results, it was accomplished in only half a day in port, for the *Romanic* and its consort, with the Hartzells and all the other delegates aboard, steamed away from Algiers the same day. That night, amid rising evangelistic fervor, Mrs. Hartzell addressed a large interdenominational meeting in the saloon of the *Romanic*, describing conditions in Algiers and setting

forth the providential challenge for some great church to begin missionary work in North Africa. Later, as the *Romanic* neared Genoa, the Methodists held a separate meeting to consider the responsibility of their own church for North Africa and appointed a committee of two laymen and a minister to draw up a statement expressing their concern. When they reached Rome, where the Sunday School Convention met from 18 to 23 May in the auditorium of the Methodist Episcopal Mission center, the Methodists from the *Romanic*, along with seventy-five more from the *Neckar*, held two further meetings. At the first one, they adopted the report of the three-man committee, which declared:

. . . The Methodist Episcopal Church should enter that city [Algiers], and the country of which it is the capital, with a strong work of evangelization. In the providence of God Bishop Hartzell, our bishop for Africa, joined our company at Gibraltar, and Mrs. Hartzell at Algiers . . . What we saw during our visit with them to Algiers touched our hearts with the great need of the people there . . . the opportunities for immediate coöperation and success are wonderfully providential.

We feel led of God to urge the heeding of this call.

Leaders of all the other denominations represented at the Convention concurred in the conviction that the Methodists should take missionary initiative in North Africa.

Bishop Hartzell told eager inquirers that the right approach to the new work would require at least \$25,000 a year for five years as a beginning. He also made it clear that the Board of Foreign Missions could not be counted on to take any financial responsibility for the North Africa field during those years. A number of Methodists attending the Rome meetings pledged sums running as high as \$5,000, even \$10,000. A Baptist from Chicago promised \$2,500, and the Congregationalist president of the Sunday School Convention made a conditional gift of \$5,000. Before leaving Rome, Bishop Hartzell had pledges for \$50,000, to be paid in five annual installments, and a permanent committee was already organized to aid in securing the balance of the desired \$125,000 to support the new mission during its first five years.

Later in the summer, before making formal application to the General Committee for Foreign Missions for permission to inaugurate a mission in North Africa, Bishop Hartzell visited London, Paris, and North Africa.

In London, in July, the Bishop conferred with members of the North Africa Mission Conference, the nondenominational sponsoring group for the North Africa Mission, some of whose missionaries he had met, and was yet to meet, in North Africa. This mission had rather loosely organized work in several North Africa areas. Hartzell gave the Council a detailed account of what had been set afoot at the Rome convention, and he told them of his hope that the Methodist Episcopal Church would become active in North

Africa, locating the headquarters of the new movement in Algiers. After this conference, Bishop Hartzell evidently initiated no further direct contact with the Council itself.

In Paris, he studied the political status of Algeria, investigated methods of holding property there, and spent some time enlisting the interest and co-operation of American and French evangelicals in the Methodist plan for Algeria. With the co-operation of the American Ambassador, he had "a very satisfactory" interview with the French Premier, Georges Clemenceau, although he had to pledge that he would not reveal the occurrence of the interview to the press, because of the sensitive conditions under which the government was endeavoring to implement the recent separation of Church and State in France. Clemenceau assured the Bishop that he would encounter no hindrance to Methodist work in Algeria on the part of his government, for it was committed to the policy of full freedom of thought, worship, and action for such religious enterprises. Hartzell realized the importance of this assurance, for he understood that Algeria was politically part of the Third Republic, with representation in its bicameral Parliament.

On his trip to the proposed new field itself, in September, Bishop Hartzell visited "a large section of North Africa," touching both Algiers and Tunis, and everywhere finding a welcome by the few scattered missionaries—"the few heroic and consecrated men and women who were standing for God in the midst of heathenism and superstition." On the basis of his experiences there, including helpful visits with government officials, Hartzell came back to the Continent enthusiastic about the country and convinced that the "opportunities for the inauguration of aggressive mission work are many and excellent."

Since he was off again to parts south in Africa in October, Bishop Hartzell communicated to the General Committee through the mails his desire to open a North Africa mission. He declared that there could be no question of the need and the "providential call" for such a mission, which would be chiefly a response to the twentieth century's greatest foreign missionary problem—giving the gospel to the world's 200 million Muslims, half of whom had "never heard the precious Word." Hartzell believed that the times were more favorable than ever before for success in overcoming the "fanaticism" of Islam and removing its 1,300-year "blight" on North Africa. He took courage from the Europeanizing and modernizing forces he observed were spreading, under British and French military and political dominance, through Egypt and the areas to the west. He pointed particularly to the indigenous Berbers, who had been Christians in the days before burgeoning Islam replaced the Christian churches clear across North Africa. The Berbers were, of course, followers of Mohammed, but Hartzell believed that they

are accessible, will listen to reason, and, with established government guaranteeing their religious liberty, the Berber millions of North Africa are the door through which the followers of Christ are to spread the Gospel among the vast millions of native [black] Africans North of the equator.

Calling attention to the fact that North Africa was unoccupied by any "great missionary society," but only by a limited number of nondenominational or independent missions with modest resources, the Bishop wrote to the General Committee:

Into this open door God calls the Methodist Episcopal Church. Here she should have her share in accepting the challenge of Islam for the conquest of Africa. The supreme question is, shall Christ or Mahomet rule in Africa?

Acting upon Bishop Hartzell's request, in which Bishop Burt heartily concurred, the General Committee authorized "a Mission among Mohammedans in North Africa, under the direction of the Board of Managers, and without appropriations." This action was not accomplished, however, without vigorous debate, in which the opposition took the stand that new fields should not be opened while financial support for the old fields remained inadequate. Secretary Adna B. Leonard, upon whose support Hartzell had counted, was among the opponents.

It was no accident that the General Committee responded affirmatively to Bishop Hartzell's anti-Islam appeal. Prejudice against Muslims was no mere quirk of the Bishop's; it ran deep in the folk feeling of American Methodists, as it did in the attitudes of other religious and social groups in the Western world.

Following the General Committee vote, it took Bishop Hartzell two years and a half to get the mission in North Africa fully organized. But even before approaching the Committee, the Bishop had started enlisting personnel for his new missionary corps.

While vacationing in Baden-Baden, Germany, in August, 1907, Bishop and Mrs. Hartzell entertained Frederick Roesch, the scholarly 24-year-old son of the Methodist preacher in Strassburg, and his sister Stefanie. In addition to his native German tongue, Roesch, who was a graduate of Strassburg University, counted himself thoroughly schooled in Latin, Greek, French, Hebrew, ancient Egyptian hieroglyphs, Coptic, Syriac, and ancient Arabic, somewhat proficient in Little Ethiopic, cuneiform texts, and Phoenician, and familiar with English (he knew it very well, in fact), modern Arabic, Italian, and Danish. The Bishop promptly invited the two young people, whom he met through a young American named William E. Lowther, to join the North Africa enterprise. Roesch soon applied for missionary status, then served a year in the German army, and finally received appointment as a missionary in December, 1908.

Shortly after the Roesch visit to Baden-Baden, Stefanie Roesch married

Lowther, who was a missionary on leave of absence from the Malaysia Conference. Before leaving the field in 1906 because of failing health, he had served for four years, in the Anglo-Chinese School in Ipoh, Federated Malay States, and among the Tamils in Penang. With the Board's approval, the Bishop appointed the Lowthers to Algiers in the fall of 1909.

In the course of inquiring about Christian missions at the British Consulate in Tunis during his September visit, Bishop Hartzell met J. H. Colpais Purdon, the acting Vice Consul. Purdon, a native of Dublin, Ireland, and with nine years' experience at the law, turned out to be a former missionary in Tunisia (1899-1906) under the North Africa Mission (London). The Bishop arrived at an unofficial but purposeful understanding with Purdon and his wife and, under a general authorization by the Board (April, 1908) to employ other than regular missionaries for North Africa, he finally put them on the roster as mission workers, beginning in May. This resulted in the Methodists' gaining also the services of Mohammed El-Beddai, a converted Tunisian who was doing informal evangelistic work in Purdon's Bible depot. Along with the Purdons, Hartzell met Annie Hammon, who was still with the North Africa Mission after two years' service in Algeria and eleven in Tunis. Miss Hammon later resigned this post, and accepted employment with the Methodist Episcopal mission at the same time as Mr. and Mrs. Purdon.

Utilizing the same authorization under which he employed the Purdons, Bishop Hartzell took on three women mission workers in Algiers in 1908. When the Bishop engaged them that summer, two of them—Emily S. Smith and Ada D. ("Dora") Welch, both of them born in London—had been connected with the North Africa Mission (London) for more than fifteen years, first in the mountain country of Kabylia and then for a dozen years in Algiers. The third, Mary A. Anderson, born on the British island of Mauritius, but educated in France, where she lived for twenty-five years, joined the others in Algiers in the fall at their invitation.

Not until early in 1909, when Secretary Leonard felt that a full start in North Africa was overdue, and some of the large subscribers to the North Africa Fund were becoming restless at the delay, did Bishop Hartzell find the leader for his new missionary team. He brought to the post, by transfer from the superintendency of the Gujarat District of the Bombay Conference, the able and proven Edwin F. Frease. Frease came to Algeria in April for a month's exploration of the field, traveling more than four hundred miles along the coast from Algiers to Tunis and back into the highlands of Kabylia. He conferred with the few workers already active under Methodist auspices, attended a nondenominational missionary conference in Algiers, inspected a number of independent mission stations, and became well acquainted with all the missionaries and their problems. Then, after a similar visit in Morocco, he returned to the United States ready to present to the Board his recommendations for the development of Methodist missionary strategy in North

Africa and to busy himself for the rest of the year with interesting the churches in Africa in connection with the Methodists' Africa Diamond Jubilee.

On the single day he spent in the Algerian city of Constantine, half way between Algiers and Tunis, Frease completed an arrangement by which two experienced missionaries, James L. Lochhead, a Scot, and Percy Smith, an Englishman, with their wives, identified themselves with the Methodist Episcopal Church and its work in North Africa. The two men had been working together in Constantine under the North Africa Mission (London), Lochhead having started in 1893 and Smith in 1899. In Algiers, Frease met Saïd Flici, a converted Kabyle who was in touch with Emily Smith and Dora Welch. Following up a meeting of Flici's with Bishop William Burt and Frederick Roesch, Frease arranged to have him become a Methodist mission worker. Thus by the time Frease's exploratory tour was over, the selection of the initial members of the new Methodist mission was practically finished.

Frease returned to Algiers from the United States in February, 1910, accompanied by his wife and by William E. Lowther. Mrs. Lowther arrived from Germany some weeks later.

Bishop Hartzell convened the session of the American Mission in North Africa in the city of Algiers on 1 April 1910 in the presence of Secretary Adna B. Leonard and of more than a dozen non-Methodist missionaries and other visitors. The field thus officially organized was understood by the Board of Foreign Missions to be coextensive with the historic Barbary States (Morocco, "Algiers," "Tunis," and Tripoli), extending along the Mediterranean from the Atlantic Ocean to Egypt, a stretch of about twenty-four hundred miles, and southward for about two hundred miles from the coast.

Eighteen persons were recognized as members of the Mission—the Freases, the Lowthers, the Lochheads, the Smiths, the Purdons, Mary Anderson, Annie Hammon, Frederick Roesch, Emily Smith, Dora Welch, Mohammed El-Beddai, Saïd Flici, and Miriam Richards, an assistant working with the Misses Smith and Welch. While in Tunis, on his way to the Mission session, Bishop Hartzell had proffered to Marian B. Grissell, who had a record of twenty-two years in Christian work among Muslims, a kind of associate membership in the Mission without vote, which would enable her to participate in the Mission's labors and fellowship without surrendering her membership in the Church of England.

The Mission session began the assimilation of some of the non-Methodists into the Methodist ecclesiastical system by licensing Purdon, Lochhead, Smith, Saïd Flici, and Mohammed El-Beddai as Local Preachers. It then went on to recommend Purdon, Smith, and Lochhead to various Annual Conferences for reception on trial and for election to Deacon's and Elder's Orders under the Missionary Rule. Bishop Hartzell was able to ordain Lochhead

and Smith before leaving Algiers, but Purdon's ordination had to be delayed until a later visit, in February, 1911.

Bishop Hartzell's opening address to the Mission briefly reminded the members that the purpose of the work they were taking up together was "the evangelization of the Moslem world." Later the same morning, Edwin Frease, the Superintendent, read a report that developed some of the thoroughly aggressive implications of this rather mild phrase of the Bishop's and of his statement of 1907 to the General Committee.

Frease saw the decision to enter North Africa as providential selection of the front on which the Methodists would make a "direct, aggressive attack on the main position of Islam." He described Islam as standing for "an absolutely autocratic, unapproachable god; for the impossibility of an incarnation of the divine; for absolute fatalism; for a religion of outward forms and ceremonies, and . . . [with] no place for a divine atonement for sin." He portrayed it as the historic foe—bigoted, fanatical, intolerant—of Christianity, crushing out the Christian Church across North Africa in the seventh century, perennially despising and hating the Christians, holding religious and political supremacy throughout the region for twelve centuries, sharing in atrocities and piracies that provoked American naval intervention early in the nineteenth century and then the extensive political penetration of the area by France, and producing "awful" effects upon the people's morals and general way of life. Contemporary Islam Frease viewed as the most aggressive non-Christian religion, with a definite purpose to realize its dream of becoming the world religion. And the aggressiveness and effectiveness of Islam's missionary policy in North Africa were hardly to be equaled, he judged, anywhere else in the world.

Methodism as Frease presented it to his colleagues not only stood in a position of radical theological contrast to Islam, but also was itself an aggressive religious force. Giving Wesley's famous words a twist of his own, he said, "The declaration of John Wesley that 'The world is my parish' is its motto; its vision is world-wide, its purpose world conquest." He believed its century of growth in the midst of the historic development of the North American continent, as well as what he described as its marvelous conquests in many lands abroad, made the Methodist Episcopal Church the "best fitted in teaching, in organization, in experience, and in aggressiveness for leadership in the attack on Islam."

Frease pointed out for his fellow missionaries the crucial relationship of the confrontation between their Mission and Islam to Methodism's broader strategy for the evangelization of Africa, where there were Methodist missions in Liberia, Mozambique, Southern Rhodesia, and Angola. He said:

The relation of the Moslems of North Africa to the pagan black races of Central and Southern Africa and their incessant, comprehensive and suc-

cessful efforts to win them to Islam constitute perhaps the most acute missionary problem of the age. Islam must be checked or Africa will be Mohammedan in less than a century.

A similar, though more fully articulated concern with the urgency of coping with Islam in North Africa was soon to be voiced in reports and discussions at the World Missionary Conference scheduled to meet in Edinburgh two months after the close of the Mission session in Algiers. (Frederick Roesch was an official delegate of the Board to the Edinburgh Conference, and he wrote a comprehensive article for *The Christian Advocate* in November that well reflected the views expressed there on the dual necessity of counteracting the Muslim advance southward in Africa and of penetrating the belt of Muslim countries extending from the eastern Mediterranean to India and thus separating Europe from the Asian mission fields.)

Frease, rather inconsistently undertaking to read what he called the "in-scrutable workings of Providence," was happy, as was Hartzell, to see in the general results of European imperialism in North Africa (it was mainly French) the manipulating divine hand laying Islam more directly open to disintegrating social forces there than anywhere else. Citing the process of Europeanization and modernization affecting the area through European government, commerce, communications, education, transportation, and immigration, he saw it all as "a tremendous influence in wearing away and modifying the intolerance and fanaticism of the Mohammedans," as a combination of "forces at work breaking down the defenses of Mohammedanism and rendering it more vulnerable to our attack."

Believing that God was calling the Methodist Episcopal Church to become the representative of Evangelical Christendom in a timely advance towards simultaneous solution of the African problem and of the Mohammedan problem through its North Africa Mission, Frease concluded:

we should undertake this great work as direct from God, and go forward in His strength, in the implicit confidence that we shall see the workings of His mighty power through His Spirit in redeeming grace among those Moslem peoples, and the dawning of the day of Islam's overthrow.

The workers to whom Frease gave this challenge received, at the close of the Mission session, appointments to four widely separated places. To Algiers the Bishop appointed the Misses Smith, Welch, Anderson, and Richards, along with the Freases, the Lowthers, and Saïd Flici. To Constantine he appointed the Lochheads and the Smiths, and to Tunis the Purdons, Annie Hammon, Marian Grissell, and Mohammed El-Beddai. Frederick Roesch he assigned, *in absentia*, to Kabylia. In October, Miss E. K. Lochhead, evidently James Lochhead's sister, returned from a stay in Scotland to join the Constantine group.

Although this new move was the beginning of fully organized Methodist

activity in North Africa, some of the appointees had been working less formally under Methodist auspices for nearly two years. When Emily Smith and Dora Welch came to their agreement with Bishop Hartzell in the summer of 1908, they brought with them into the Methodist fold the missionary project they had been operating for some years in affiliation with the North Africa Mission (London). So it was that the Board's Annual Report for that year recorded the existence in Algiers of a Methodist mission center conducting evangelistic and educational work among women and girls, most of them from Muslim homes. Since the two women missionaries had worked in Kabylia for six years, they gathered this constituency of theirs, naturally enough, from among the Kabyles living in Algiers.

The four women missionary workers, along with a handful of girls they harbored and trained, occupied a house at 68 Rue Rovigo, in the French quarter on the slope above the business section. For their Kabyle work they rented a room in a house in the Kasbah (the native quarter), sharing an inner court with fourteen families. Here they maintained a schedule of classes for older and younger girls and for women from some of the same families, enrolling at various times well over a hundred participants. The classes included regular religious instruction as well as appropriate handwork, such as sewing and lace making for the older girls. The workers developed the practice of distributing simple medicines when women in the classes began requesting them, and finally secured the services of a young French physician, who was beginning to make house calls on the more serious cases and to treat some in his own office.

In the summer of 1910, with the financial backing of the Philadelphia Branch of the Woman's Foreign Missionary Society, the Smith-Welch team succeeded in renting the entire house where the Kabyle work was located and were able to have it thoroughly cleaned and repaired, at the same time arranging new classrooms and securing greater quiet by reducing the tenants from fourteen to four families. During the same year, the W.F.M.S. assumed the financial support of Emily Smith and Dora Welch, also taking over the responsibility for Mary Anderson the following year. These moves by the W.F.M.S. were in harmony with one of Edwin Frease's original recommendations for the North Africa field, that the Society be invited to co-operate with the Board's enterprise there.

In their house on Rue Rovigo, the women missionaries conducted a mission for French girls and women, who naturally were Roman Catholics. It had originated spontaneously in visits Miss Smith and Miss Welch made to some of their poor French neighbors in 1897 when they were experiencing great difficulty in getting the Kabyle work started. "A few French Roman Catholic children gathered round a little crippled girl on our roof, was the beginning of all our present work," Dora Welch explained to the members of the Mission in 1910. And by that time, the French project that grew out

of that modest beginning was comparable in program and in size with the Kabyle work in the other quarter. It was this French activity that Mary Anderson entered when she came to Algiers to assist the others.

During the months following the April session of the Mission, the work in Algiers developed along two new lines—approaches to Kabyle men and boys, and the founding of a church among the French.

The overtures to the Kabyle men and boys were a renewal of efforts made by Frederick Roesch and Saïd Flici in 1909. Roesch came to Algiers early that year, and in June he took on Flici as his assistant for both language study and evangelistic work. The two spent the summer in Kabylia assisting in non-Methodist missionary activity. In September, they returned to Algiers and gathered, in a hall belonging to a missionary to the Jews, more than a dozen Kabyle young men, who met with them from time to time for discussions on a variety of subjects, including religion, and for hymn singing, games, and coffee. But after some months, the group dispersed, and Roesch was not in Algiers when the Mission met.

Edwin Frease himself was appointed, in addition to his superintendency, to the Muslim work in Algiers. It was represented by at least a skeletal church organization, for Frease and others had organized a Quarterly Conference immediately prior to the opening of the Mission's first session. Evidently, the organization soon lapsed, and the few members involved in it were absorbed into the membership of the French church.

When Roesch returned after a number of months spent on military duty in Germany and at the Edinburgh Conference, he—not Frease—became the leader of the new Kabyle work in Algiers instead of moving on to Kabylia as originally planned. In August (1910), he rented two rooms on the Boulevard de la Victoire, near the Kasbah, not far from where the Kabyle women's activity was centered, and opened Sunday meetings mainly for young Christians from Kabylia who were working in the city. He and Flici, who was in everything the German missionary's right-hand man, later added to the overtly evangelistic meetings a series of lectures "not of an aggressive religious character," thus reaching a select group, including students, that did not take to evangelistic gatherings.

In October, Roesch opened a small training school for Christian workers. For the school's activities, for lodgings for the boys, and for his own residence, he rented a small house on the Boulevard Laferrière, putting Fatima, a young Bible woman, and her husband in charge. The pupils were five youths from Kabylia, all of them previously trained by one of the non-Methodist Kabylia missionaries, with whom Roesch had excellent relations. Assisted by Saïd Flici, and part of the time by William Lowther, Roesch taught the boys the Bible (in French and Kabyle), Bible history, French and Kabyle grammar, mathematics, history, Catechism, Arabic, geography, and a little natural science.

There were early signs that the Sunday meetings and the programs for the better educated young men would attract only small or moderate numbers of attendants. Not content to reach so few, Roesch endeavored to draw boys off the streets of the Kasbah into simple afternoon religious classes, using Flici and the Training School pupils to help him make contacts. Flici described the boys as mostly bootblacks or errand boys. Roesch identified them with probably the worst youthful element in all Algiers—parentless, homeless, tough—the pool from which were “recruited the numerous cutthroats that are a specialty of Algiers.” While engaged in contact work with them, Saïd Flici once was mobbed in the Kasbah in what Roesch called “the classical style of old Methodist days.” One thing they all had in common—they were poor and often hungry. “So Dr. Roesch gives them each a piece of bread when they come regularly, and which they receive with joy,” Flici reported to the Mission’s Annual Meeting in February, 1911. And he added, “I believe that it is not the bread that attracts them.” Roesch himself said, “We give them in addition to food for their empty stomachs a good hearty Sunday School lesson.” Within two months, with two dozen boys enrolled in the classes, Roesch was having to turn away sometimes more than he took in.

Following out an earlier recommendation by Edwin Frease, William E. Lowther announced at the Mission’s first meeting (1910) that a regularly organized French Methodist Episcopal Church would be started in Algiers at the earliest possible moment. Methodism must be brought to the Europeans in North Africa, he declared, not only for their own sake, but also to provide “an aid to the attack upon Mohammedanism.” He pointed out at the Second Annual Meeting (1911) that Roman Catholicism was strong in the region, but never had made any significant conquests in Muslim territory. Methodism’s task, therefore, was “to prove to the indigenous races that Christianity and Catholicism are not synonyms.” Frease stated two further considerations. He claimed that “were even a considerable portion of the European population genuinely and aggressively Christian,” the effect upon the problem of evangelizing the Muslims would be resistless and immediate. He also held that in view of the character of French legislation affecting religious work, it was important to establish strong French churches in North Africa.

The French church announced by Lowther was formally organized in June, with sixteen probationers. Lowther himself, having spent several months in intensive French language studies (he was a man of great linguistic facility), became the pastor. The church got under way with some difficulty and uncertainty, partly because of Roman Catholic opposition and partly because of the lack of any earlier work with French men. Lowther opened regular Sunday services in September in a rented apartment out of which he created a pleasant meeting hall. He organized a Sunday school class and a Thursday class for boys and also taught English to a small group of boys. Mrs. Lowther, developing contacts made through the earlier work with French women,

organized a small Ladies Aid Society, which moved some of the women from the status of recipients of missionary attention to some consciousness of independent responsibility as church women. The larger standing work with French women and girls came under increased Roman Catholic pressure during the year, because the emergence of the French Church identified the earlier activities with organized Protestantism more overtly than had been so when they appeared only as the interest of a few independent women missionaries. French mothers were subjected to social pressures, and Catholic classes were opened to draw the children away from the Methodists. Although the new church's constituency developed slowly during the first season, both Lowther and Frease could report progress at Conference time. The membership then stood at twelve full members and nineteen probationers, including the young Kabyles in the Training School and the few nonministerial missionary workers.

In Constantine, to which Bishop Hartzell appointed the other Algeria team, the missionary activity also antedated the formal organization of the Mission. But only in April, 1910, did it become a part of the Methodist movement, when James Lochhead and his co-worker Percy Smith went on the Board's salary list. The two men brought with them into the Methodist system a church of about twenty members, with its own mission hall, which had been opened in 1906 after earlier operation of all the mission classes and meetings in the missionaries' own homes. In 1910, Lochhead and Smith were holding classes for about a hundred Arab children, conducting meetings for Arab men (there was one Arab church member), cultivating the interest of French people and Italians, maintaining home visitation of Arab women by the missionaries' wives, and themselves visiting Arab men in Constantine and in outlying villages. Although Smith labored mostly among the Arabic-speaking Muslims, he was endeavoring also to reach some of the many Jews living in the city.

In addition to his outreach to the people, Percy Smith had been working incessantly for five years translating the Scriptures, with the co-operation of others, into modern spoken Arabic. Luke was already published, and John and Acts were well along. The Mission was introducing into its meetings and into people's homes similarly translated hymns, the intended nucleus of an Arabic hymnal. Smith was counting heavily upon the use of these written materials to enable Christian workers to "steal a long march on Islam," to win the neglected Muslim masses away from their leaders.

The Constantine mission took three new steps in the first Conference year under Edwin Frease's direction. Early in June, the congregation became formally a Methodist Episcopal church, with about eighteen full members and a few probationers—thirteen French, five Arab, two Italian, three British. In November, Lochhead hired a small hall in Kroub, a railroad junction some ten miles south of Constantine. Here Louis Campy, a privately supported

French evangelist who was assisting not only in the Constantine church but also with the visiting in outlying towns, conducted regular weekly meetings. These meetings, along with classes for children, were continued the following year by Paul Villon, the French worker (he also spoke Arabic) who succeeded Campy in Constantine. In November, also, the mission established in rented quarters in Constantine a hostel that soon harbored some ten boys and the young man Mostafa Djeddar, who resigned as a muezzin in a prominent mosque and entered training as a Methodist worker.

The work in Tunis to which the Purdons and Annie Hammon returned after the Mission's organization meeting in 1910 already had been under Methodist auspices for two years, as had that in Algiers. But it was on 7 March 1910 that its Quarterly Conference was established, with Bishop Hartzell in the chair and Edwin Frease in attendance. The three missionaries were the charter members.

From 1908 to 1910, J. H. C. Purdon continued and expanded the informal missionary activity he had been conducting while engaged in his secular occupation. He was still maintaining a pattern of social meetings, discussions, lantern lectures, personal conversations, evangelistic meetings, and a limited amount of colportage. The social gatherings, which he counted his most promising methods, were typically held in his own home at 204 Rue de la Kasba. The other foci of the work were two Bible depots, which were strategically useful not only for distributing the Scriptures, but also for making potentially evangelistic contacts, with passersby and with men entering the store from the streets. The larger of the two depots, which Marian Grissell transferred to the Mission in 1909, was located on a prominent street connecting two large Arab quarters and had a small hall where Purdon held most of his varied meetings. Here Mohammed El-Beddaï was the active assistant, with Miss Grissell continuing as business manager. In all his activity, Purdon was endeavoring to reach the Muslims but also was cultivating, more fully than other Methodist missions in North Africa were doing, the interest of the Jews, whom Frease reported as numbering more than half the population figure for the Muslims. Purdon held regular Saturday evening gospel meetings for Jews.

Through Annie Hammon, the mission in Tunis had access to about a hundred Muslim homes, contacts she had built up in the course of thirteen years' work in the city. Soon after her arrival, she opened, with the cooperation of other independent Christian workers, a small school for Arab girls. In 1907, the French authorities put into effect a law closing all schools conducted by teachers lacking French diplomas. This measure forced the closing of the girls' school and restricted Miss Hammon to house-to-house visits to Arab women and children and also to informal classes for women. Mrs. Purdon assisted her in the visitation.

The women's project was expanded, towards the end of 1910, to include

a weekly clinic held by a medical doctor acquainted with the Arabs' language and customs. The clinic's *raison d'être* obviously was its potential usefulness as an evangelistic tool. Mrs. Purdon revealed the hope that it would dig up new recruits for the women's classes. Edwin Frease said, "Of course, evangelistic work accompanies the medical." But the women who came to see the doctor were not entirely malleable material. Annie Hammon found some of them "terribly wooden-headed and trying." Mrs. Purdon found it "amusing, though sad" to observe the fear and suspicion some of them showed when first entering the house of "these infidel (!) Europeans." But in reporting on this new activity, the missionaries voiced no spontaneous humanitarian interest in the patients as sick and troubled people simply looking for healing. The purpose to evangelize and convert was dominant to the point of exploitation and coercion. Mrs. Purdon reported to the Mission :

While the patients are waiting for the Doctor a short simple meeting is held for them, but to this some greatly object, doing their utmost not to hear what is said and some few even refused to stay at all. Many of them object to give the address of their homes and even give false names, so fearful are they that we may perhaps visit them and bring some terrible curse on them and their families. This dread and prejudice can only be overcome slowly as they come to understand that they get no evil by their intercourse with the missionaries, and we hope that in time they may come to believe our true desire to help them and be drawn to know the love of the Great Physician.

Early in 1911, the local mission set aside certain rooms in a rented Arab house in order to provide socially sheltered lodgings for a modest number of youths and boys who were under the care of the mission or were in training as potential workers in the outreach to the Muslim community. This project began as an expedient to remove from his non-Christian environment El-Arbi Khodja, a recently baptized convert who was to be trained as a Methodist worker. To care for him and for others to come, the mission put Khodja's mother, Lilla Fatauma, in charge of the new home. Khodja's original sponsor, James J. Cooksey, a missionary with many years' experience in North Africa, came from Sousse in May, 1911, accompanied by his wife and several members of his former mission household, and entered service with the Methodist Episcopal mission in Tunis. In December, moving to a house rented for the purpose, the Cookseys took over the informal hostel work developed by Lilla Fatauma, and thus brought under direct supervision of a missionary the three or four older boys now in the workers' training class, and two younger orphan boys.

The Mission in North Africa extended itself for the first time, in 1911, into localities where the new work did not owe its existence to the activities of the Methodist missionaries during their pre-Methodist service in North Africa ; it established posts in Oran and in Kabylia.

To Oran, more than two hundred miles west of Algiers, Bishop Hartzell

sent, in February, William E. Lowther. His appointment was "Spanish Work." It reflected the Mission's awareness of the almost entirely unexploited opportunity for evangelization among the some hundred thousand residents of Oran, three-quarters of whom were Europeans, the majority of the latter being Spaniards.

Lowther started from scratch in Oran—having no house to go to, knowing only a single family in all the surrounding region, having no working knowledge of Spanish, feeling poorly equipped for his task. But Jean Paul Cook, a French Protestant chaplain with the Foreign Legion, took the Lowthers in until they secured their own quarters. And some weeks after arriving in Oran, Lowther met Estansilas Lopez Llorca and his family, Spanish Wesleyan Methodists from Barcelona, who gave him great encouragement and assistance in planning the new mission and starting its activity. Lowther also had a working ally in his wife, who went out and scouted all Oran. "With my baby in her carriage," she told the Third Annual Meeting of the Mission, "I walked every street and quarter of the city and the suburbs, studying conditions, getting acquainted with the town, and looking for the best place to begin work." Dissatisfied with his speed in acquiring Spanish, Lowther attended the summer session of the University of Burgos, in Spain, for intensive language work.

Returning to Oran in the fall, Lowther and his wife—she again "with my little girl in her buggy"—found and rented a ground-floor apartment in a Spanish section and then arranged it for evangelistic work and religious classes by knocking out a partition and fitting out the enlarged room with a plain table, some kitchen chairs, a portable organ, and some hymn books. In October, he began regular preaching in Spanish, persevering under a number of attempts by gangs of rowdies, who sometimes even invaded the hall, to break up his meetings. These encroachments were met in part by Mrs. Lowther's serving as doorkeeper and also as "policeman," walking up and down the street appealing for quiet and trying to avert disruption of the services. Mrs. Lowther also conducted Sunday and Thursday classes for children and taught reading and French once a week to a class of Spanish girls.

Once the Spanish meetings were under way, Lowther received requests for French meetings and responded by holding two sessions a week for young men, with some assistance from Chaplain Cook. Since French was being used in the public schools, the Lowthers realized that the Oran mission might eventually become a French-language project. But their stay in Oran was too short for them to develop any substantial French work.

Lowther extended the Spanish work, in 1912, to Saint Eugène, a prosperous suburb of Oran, to which he had moved his family. He was joined, but for less than a year, by William Poole, a young evangelist, English in descent, but born and educated in Spain, who started Spanish evangelistic

services in Saint Eugène, while his wife continued Sunday and Thursday classes for children. The Spanish-language activity developed well enough to produce the organization of a Spanish church for Oran in December. Superintendent Frease declared in the Board's *Annual Report* for 1912, that the work earlier had been hindered "by a fierce Romanist attack," but Lowther mentioned in his own annual reports no general attack from Catholic sources. Mrs. Lowther, however, pointed to the existence of informal Catholic pressures designed to discourage attendance at her children's classes.

Though desiring it from the beginning, Lowther did not gain his first opportunity to open a ministry to the Arabs of Oran until 1913. Largely in response to the persistent solicitation of Mrs. Lowther, the Methodist Deaconess Society (Bethanien Verein) of the North Germany Conference sent to Oran Sister Theodora Hanna, who arrived on 31 March. She and the Lowthers rented a hall, and equipped it as a clinic-dispensary for her outreach to Arab women and children. Sister Theodora—a native of Beirut, a Turkish subject, for some years resident in Alexandria, a nurse trained and experienced in Germany—spoke Arabic as her native tongue, understood the Arabs' ways, and even looked, to the Arabs, like one of themselves. She quickly won their interest and confidence.

When Bishop Hartzell sent William Lowther to Oran early in 1911, simultaneously he dispatched Josiah T. C. Blackmore, an Englishman, to Fort-National, in Kabylia. Blackmore, who was a relative of the author of *Lorna Doone*, had been serving a kind of mission apprenticeship in Tazmalt, Kabylia, as assistant to a Plymouth Brethren missionary, so as to become well versed in the French and Kabyle languages before starting a mission station of his own. When he was ready, after five years, to begin work by himself, he could secure from the home organization of the Plymouth Brethren, in Britain, no response to his appeals for assistance with his plans. Therefore, conferring with Edwin Frease in July, 1910, he welcomed the opportunity to enter Methodist service. Thus Blackmore became the Methodists' first settled worker in Kabylia, Frederick Roesch finally having done most of his Kabyle work in Algiers.

Blackmore already was familiar with Fort-National as a French garrison town in the hills about sixty-five miles east of Algiers—a location strategic for missionary contacts with many Kabyle villages, in spite of its being somewhat suspect by the Kabyles because of its military character. Blackmore went there accompanied by Saïd Abouadaou, a young Kabyle who had been studying in Roesch's training class in Algiers for five months. Blackmore's bride, a daughter of Eugène Cuendet (the Swiss missionary who translated the Bible into Kabyle), joined him in May.

Far from aiming first to build a solid mission enterprise in Fort-National itself, Blackmore quickly made his way out through some thirty surrounding villages, preaching and sometimes distributing "a few simple medicines."

The preaching made the people of the countryside aware of his presence as a Christian teacher, and the medical dispensations won him initial good will. Blackmore hoped that this broad outreach would help him get a foothold for more settled work in some of the villages and also draw people to his Fort-National mission house when they came to town for the weekly market.

But even after itinerating through the villages month after month and year after year, even after extending his contacts into as many as fifty communities, Blackmore found it impossible to establish mission stations in any of them. He found people who were willing to listen to Christian teaching, but also many strong opponents. Muslim landlords, either through conviction or because of social pressures by their fellow religionists, would rent him neither rooms nor buildings. Even friendly Kabyles refrained from letting their own houses become recognized centers of Christian activity. And of course, Blackmore had no money available for the purchase of real estate.

In 1913, a new French administrator questioned Blackmore's right to hold classes in the Kabyle villages. When the official checked the point with his superiors, however, their decision was favorable to Blackmore's activity. Blackmore even received written authorization to conduct boys' classes "for religion only." He then managed to secure a six months' lease of part of an empty house outside the village of Taourirt Amoqran and started a class. Then "the storm broke," as Blackmore put it. The boys who attended were beaten, locked indoors at home, and warned that Blackmore was only attempting to recruit soldiers for French military action in Morocco. The village headman called an assembly to organize popular resistance to Blackmore's project. Under the pressure of this opposition, Blackmore had to surrender the class work and be content to go to Taourirt Amoqran only to distribute medicines to women and girls. At about the same time, he was granted the use of a house in Thablabalt for a similar purpose. But this is about as far as he could go in the direction of settled work in any of the villages.

Even after five years' effort, Blackmore could write to Bishop Hartzell concerning the scores of villages he could see from his residence in Fort-National:

. . . We are known in them, our sick people come from them. We visit them; we have meetings there for men and boys. In half a dozen of them my two native workers hold regular fortnightly meetings—yet I repeat that we have not really begun *work* in any of them.

Blackmore explained to the Bishop that lack of fixed stations in the villages was blocking progress towards stable work. All the meetings were held in the open air. During the long, inclement, often snowy winters at high altitude, this limited his efforts. And at other times, it made the meetings vulnerable to hostile men, who often drove off all the boys or even more often spoiled

the effectiveness of the gatherings by remaining in attendance. As far as the country work was concerned, then, the missionary pattern Blackmore adopted at the beginning as merely introductory strategy became, perforce, the continuing approach, disappointing and unfruitful as it was.

Although it too yielded meager evangelistic results, the mission in Fort-National itself developed more nearly in conformity with Blackmore's original expectation. After much difficulty in finding and keeping rented quarters, he finally hired a very small house outside the walls of the fortified area, and squeezed into it his family, his dispensary, and such religious services and classes as he was able to organize. Before leaving England, Blackmore had studied medicine briefly and informally. Now, in the cramped little dispensary, he gave medicines and minor treatments to Kabyle women and girls, who would not enter the Fort, where the French physician had his office. This work caught on very well, and after a time, many hundreds of women and girls came to Blackmore each year from some fifty towns in the region. And when they came for medicine, they heard something about the Christian gospel before they left.

At Fort-National, Blackmore also developed contacts with soldiers from the military post, with a certain number of Kabyle men in the neighborhood, and with numerous boys who came to him on market days for classwork. But all these general evangelistic efforts taken together constituted only modest mission activity compared with the medical work among the women. As late as February, 1916, Blackmore reported only six church members in connection with his entire mission in Kabylia.

With Methodist workers settled in Oran, Algeria, Fort-National, Constantine, and Tunis, the first, founding phase of the American Mission in North Africa was over, and this distribution of stations provided the geographical skeleton for its future growth.

The first addition to this structure was Taourirt Abdallah, in Kabylia, some four hours' walk from Fort-National. There, late in 1917, about two dozen Kabyles of the Ouadhia tribe joined the Methodist Episcopal Church as probationers. They were converts from Islam under the influence of a Roman Catholic order long established in their neighborhood. Becoming dissatisfied with that affiliation, they put out feelers towards the Methodists over a period of two years, and finally asked to have a Methodist mission among them. Blackmore, still at work at Fort-National, was able to purchase a dilapidated little house for the meetings of the new group, and Jules Zedam, a blind man, their former catechist under the Catholic order, was made Blackmore's assistant for Taourirt Abdallah.

The next addition occurred in 1919, when the Board of Foreign Missions responded favorably to a proposal by the Evangelical Methodist Church of France that the Methodist Episcopal Church take over its Kabylia mission in Tunisia. The mission site was near the town of Il-Maten, high on the

slope of a river valley lying half way between Constantine and Tunis. The French Methodists offered to transfer both the mission property, which included four buildings on six to nine acres of ground, and the staff, which consisted of a missionary and his wife, with three women mission workers, all of them Europeans. The enterprise was well known throughout the region because of its presence there for more than twenty-five years. Émile Brès, the missionary in charge, was received into the ministry of the Methodist Episcopal Church and remained at the head of the II-Maten mission.

Plans for the third addition to the string of Methodist Episcopal mission stations were crystallized late in 1919, when Bishop William F. Anderson transferred James J. Cooksey from Constantine to Sousse, a town seventy miles south of Tunis on the northeast coast of Tunisia. After barely settling there, Cooksey departed on furlough, but returned to Sousse late in 1920 and began mission work in earnest.

In 1911, the American Mission in North Africa not only had achieved its basic geographical spread, but also had completed the enlistment of its original missionary corps. By that time, the Frease-Roesch-Lowther-Lochhead-Smith-Purdon-Blackmore-Cooksey-Campy-Villon team was at work, complemented by the Welch-Smith-Anderson-Hammon-Grissell-Lochhead group of women's workers. The Mission's personnel was proudly recognized in Methodist missionary circles, and also acknowledged beyond them, as a group unique in experience and talents for a missionary combine founding a mission. All together, they could account for many years in service in North Africa, which gave them the advantage of firsthand knowledge of the region and its people. Also, they knew the African and European languages most useful for their contacts with the indigenous inhabitants of Algeria and Tunisia and with the ruling and immigrant Europeans.

The unusually high calibre of the missionary staff was largely the result of the enlistment policy established by Bishop Hartzell and implemented by Edwin Frease, the first Superintendent—a policy that made room in the Methodist work for mission workers already long active in North Africa under other auspices. Bishop Hartzell undoubtedly did not realize, in the beginning, how far that policy would carry him, but he and Frease fully appreciated, as it evolved, the strength it was bringing to the Methodist enterprise.

In August, 1910, the North Africa Mission Council wrote from London to the Board of Foreign Missions, in New York, complaining against Bishop Hartzell as the promoter and administrator of the American Mission in North Africa. It charged him with unethical conduct in deliberately undermining their Mission by "taking workers and their work from the North Africa Mission at several stations in North Africa."

Writing to the Council from Cape Town in April, 1911, Hartzell denied that he had made any raid upon the field resources of the London-based

mission. He claimed that he and Frease had been scrupulous about not pressing the various workers into any irresponsible desertion of the North Africa Mission, and that the initiative to change their affiliation had come from the workers themselves, not from the Methodist officials. Hartzell pointed out that the basic cause of their joining the Methodist mission lay in the unsatisfactory relations between them and their London sponsors; both the workers and their work were in dire straits because of the failure of the Council to give them adequate support. To this effect, he was able to quote a resolution adopted in February by the Annual Meeting of the Mission, the majority of whose voting members were themselves former workers with the North Africa Mission. The resolution stated in part:

That every missionary who has united with this Mission on the field has done so entirely on his or her own initiative; the conviction being that the conditions under which they were laboring were such as to render it impossible to efficiently continue and develop the work.

The missionaries in question made it quite clear that they had turned to the Methodist Episcopal Church believing that its large, connectional missionary organization would afford them surer financial and psychological backing. Their evidently uncalculating individual statements in reports and personal correspondence were quite coherent with this united public defense of Hartzell.

The first missionary Bishop Hartzell enlisted was also the first to withdraw from the Mission. Frederick Roesch felt called to his work in North Africa, but became unhappy in it. He was convinced, after a few years in Algiers, that true evangelistic work with the Kabyles and the Arabs was at a standstill, not only for the Methodists, but to some degree for other missionaries. He believed that it was practically hopeless to attempt to convert the Muslims. At one time, he also felt dissatisfied with the French work but eventually cordially assisted Louis Campy in the French Church in Algiers. Roesch was quite self-consciously a patriotic German, and he faithfully responded to occasional calls to return to the Fatherland for tours of duty with the Army. As he neared the end of his work in Algiers, after desiring for a year to be gone, he wrote to Bishop Hartzell, "A great deal of my sufferings might be traced to the insurmountable difficulties a German has to deal with in trying to live with equally patriotic Frenchmen." He made it clear to Frease that this nationalistic friction constituted a real and increasing incompatibility that in itself would have justified his surrendering his work.

After attempts to find a Methodist teaching post somewhere in the United States, Roesch finally left Algiers in April, 1913, to take an archaeological position in Cairo under the German government. Little more than a year later, he was killed in action within weeks after the outbreak of World War I.

Bishop John L. Nuelsen, writing to inform the Board of his death, commented:

What a mockery on our Christian faith that the German Roesch and the Frenchman Campy, two Methodist missionaries, laboring for a while shoulder to shoulder in our North Africa Mission at Algiers, preaching the Gospel of Christ to the Moslems, should be compelled as Officers in hostile armies to lead their companies against one another.

William and Stefanie Lowther left Algeria near the end of September, 1914, under pressures generated by the outbreak of World War I. Existence in Oran became annoying and dangerous for them during the weeks following the first declarations of war. "Every foreigner," said Lowther "is suspected of being a German, and Germans have been mobbed to death in the streets of Oran . . ." French police searched the Lowther home, insisting that his name was German. To be sure, his wife was a German, his brother-in-law was a German officer, and his Deaconess worker, Sister Theodora, was a Turkish subject and a member of a Deaconess Society in Hamburg, Germany. As Lowther moved about the city, he was shadowed by a plain-clothes man. Soon came another search of his home, the municipal chief of detectives and four policemen spending three hours ransacking every nook, corner, trunk, and book in the house. They even tapped the walls for secret cavities where Lowther might have concealed plans of the French forts. He had been accused not only of saying in English in a public street, "The French are pigs," but also of signaling out to sea by flashing colored lights from his upstairs windows. Hence, the searchers were delighted when they discovered his magic lantern. They finally went off carrying a two-handled clothesbasket loaded with every scrap of writing they could find—letters, mission accounts, everything they could not read.

Tension ran high in the city, no relief from harassment was in sight, mission work had to be dropped, Mrs. Lowther's health was poor, the news of her brother's death at the front weighed heavily upon her, and the Lowthers already were scheduled for a furlough in the near future. For these reasons, Lowther and Frease decided (the Board agreed) that the Lowthers should leave Oran. Once the decision was made, Lowther and his wife and two small children, accompanied by Sister Theodora, abruptly embarked for Marseille, but not abruptly enough to escape close attention by a secret police agent on the crossing to France. Upon landing, Lowther was arrested, and hustled off to the police station, where he was held incommunicado. After being joined there by the rest of his party, he managed to slip out unobserved and telephoned the American Consulate, which finally arranged for his release. Late that night, Lowther put Sister Theodora aboard a troop train headed for Switzerland (her Deaconess garb was her passport, said Mrs. Lowther), and the next morning, a representative of the Consulate

got Lowther and his family onto a small French steamer carrying contraband and a few passengers to New York.

Lowther hoped for the day of his return to Oran. Although he had not been deported from Algeria, six months later, Edwin Frease reported to Secretary North that the Prefect of the Department of Oran had told him that Lowther's return to any part of French North Africa would be unwise, and that the government would oppose it. "Moreover," said Frease, "public sentiment is so strong, and likely to remain so for years, that they should not return to this field." Frease, Bishop Hartzell, and Lowther all regretfully accepted the situation.

It was not until 1914 that some of the chief workers, important as they were to the development of the Mission, were granted the status of regular Board missionaries. They had been engaged by Bishop Hartzell under the Board's general authorization of 1908. In May, 1914, the Board voted to receive as fully appointed missionaries J. H. C. Purdon, James L. Lochhead, J. T. C. Blackmore, Joseph J. Cooksey, Percy Smith, and their respective wives, along with Annie Hammon and Nora Webb. Miss Webb had joined the staff in Constantine two years earlier under what Edwin Frease described as an amicable understanding with the North Africa Mission.

By this time, the Mission had changed its connectional status. On 16 May 1913, Bishop Hartzell, as directed by the General Conference of 1912, re-organized the work as the North Africa Mission Conference. The General Conference defined its sphere as North Africa, although the Board's *Annual Reports* designated it, more concretely, as Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Tripoli. Citing Morocco and Tripoli simply represented, however, Methodist hopes for later expansion. The charter members of the new Mission Conference, transferred from six different Conferences, were Cooksey, Frease, Lochhead, Lowther, Purdon, Roesch, Smith, Blackmore, Campy, and Villon. These men, plus their wives and various other workers (including North African Local Preachers), made up a working group of thirty-nine people. Most of them became members of the North Africa District Conference, which Bishop Hartzell organized on 17 May to meet organizational needs the local Quarterly Conferences were too fragmentary to handle.

As the Mission expanded its staff and its work, it also increased its annual budget. Everybody concerned was aware, from the beginning, of Bishop Hartzell's repeated statement that sound development of the enterprise would require about \$25,000 a year. Hartzell and the field administration managed always to keep the budget below that figure. The amount estimated for 1908, the first year of full mission activity, was \$10,000. Two years later, the figure for prospective expenditures rose to \$16,000. From 1911 to 1913, it was running at about \$20,000 but went up to \$22,000 for 1914 and \$24,000 for 1915. During 1916, with the Board repeatedly directing the field administration to

keep within \$20,000, the North Africa Finance Committee kept insisting that it required \$22,000 for the work.

Part and parcel of the original authorization of the Mission in 1907 was the provision that it should be operated without appropriations. But it soon became evident (some saw it from the beginning) that appropriations would have to be made in spite of the initial restriction. Having itself already approved the assignment of three men to the field as full missionaries, the Board appropriated \$3,000 to North Africa for the year 1910. For 1911 and 1912, the appropriations were about \$4,000. The figure rose to about \$8,000 for 1913, and finally stood at \$10,000 from 1914-16.

Upon Bishop Hartzell fell the responsibility of providing the money to get the Mission started and to fill in what soon became the perennial gap between budget and appropriation. Particularly explicit was the understanding that he would care for the five-year period covered by the pledges and plans (the over-all goal was \$125,000) made by the interested parties at the Rome convention in 1907. The pledges of \$50,000 made then finally yielded only \$40,000. Long before these five-year pledges expired, Bishop Hartzell was raising thousands of dollars annually in special gifts for North Africa. After the General Committee of Foreign Missions doubled the appropriation in November, 1912, Hartzell wrote Edwin Frease about the Committee's discussions:

. . . to me personally it was a great gratification that there was not the shadow of criticism on any of the steps that I had taken. You know under ordinary circumstances that a Bishop who would make a Budget of \$20,000 on an appropriation of a little less than \$4,000 [as in the year closing] would be ruled out of court. I went in detail over the principal steps and showed how the demands of providence were imperative. The Committee put itself thoroughly behind North Africa.

Bishop Hartzell continued to carry the load of special financing throughout his last quadrennium as Missionary Bishop and even, to some extent, after his retirement in 1916.

There were times when, in spite of the Board's occasionally providing ameliorating fiscal accommodations, the field organization was drastically short of funds. This was a condition more cramping for North Africa than for some foreign missions, because the Superintendent found it impossible to obtain credit in Algeria to help tide the Mission over temporary financial shortages. When essential funds did not come from the United States, the missionaries sometimes suffered quite concrete hardships, even going without salary for months on end. There was cutting irony in this, as in the occasionally looming objective threat that the Mission's work would have to be curtailed; many of the missionary workers had joined the Methodists because, as we have seen, they were impressed with Methodism's power to provide sound and permanent support for both its missionaries and its missions.

In 1915, the W.F.M.S. announced that it had become the beneficiary of a bequest of \$25,000 by Mrs. Francesca Nast Gamble for work among Muslim women and girls in North Africa, the fund to be received in five annual installments. The Society decided to use part of the money by taking up sponsorship of the women's work in Constantine to the extent of \$2,000 a year. In this way, the Misses E. R. Loveless and Nora Webb, the Board's missionaries in Constantine, became W.F.M.S. missionaries. Before this, the Society, through its work in Algiers, was putting some \$4,500 a year into the North Africa cause. Some of the proceeds of the Gamble bequest were reserved for the acquisition of mission property in North Africa.

Up to this time, the legal competence of agencies of the Methodist Episcopal Church to take title to real estate in North Africa had remained clouded. The Mission suffered two initial handicaps—its foreignness and its status as a religious group. The latter subjected it to the current special legal restrictions upon property-holding by religious organizations—restrictions stemming from France's controversial separation of Church and State in 1905.* The former meant that the Mission's purposes and its organizational character sometimes were misunderstood by French officialdom. It took about three years' persistent study and negotiation by the Superintendent to work out methods of owning real estate that were satisfactory to the Board, acceptable to the Algerian and Tunisian administrations, and permissible under French law as interpreted in Paris.

In January, 1915, having made official declaration of its purpose and organization, as required by the French law on religious associations, the W.F.M.S. received from the Algerian government (with final confirmation in Paris) the right to operate in Algeria and to buy, hold, manage, and sell real estate there for its legitimate purposes. The Board of Foreign Missions received similar recognition in April. The W.F.M.S. at once purchased Les Aiglons, the residence occupied by the Girls' Home in Algiers since 1913. In 1916, the Board purchased, in the Oran suburb Saint Eugène, the mission property originally taken by William E. Lowther in his own name in 1913, his wife having advanced for the purpose, and without guarantee of repayment, a personal loan of \$600. Thus was established the legal process by which the Methodists acquired several properties in Algeria by the end of the decade.

With the valuable assistance of J. H. C. Purdon and others, Frease succeeded in November, 1915, in clearing up the property question in Tunisia, where the political administration was somewhat more independent of Paris. Here it was necessary to establish a separate legal entity, a branch of the Board of Foreign Missions. It had its own set of members and officers, which included no member of the New York Board, and no missionary of

* See p. 347 f.

the Board except in an individual capacity. The Board of Foreign Missions approved the charter and constitution of the Branch, and the two groups agreed upon a permanent pattern defining their mutual relations and thus guaranteeing the responsiveness of the field organization to the parent Board. The Branch thus became the ecclesiastically approved, and legally authorized, medium through which the Board acquired and held real estate in Tunisia. It was actually more than a year, however, before the Mission bought its first piece of property under this arrangement.

More than property was involved in the arrangements the Mission made with the Algerian and Tunisian governments in 1915. Although that was the specific focus, the missionaries felt that, more broadly, they had won essential recognition as a movement with legal status under French law, thus largely removing the handicaps of ecclesiasticism and of foreignness. From 1912 to 1915, the Methodist workers and their leaders, who at first had counted the French government as unfavorable, sometimes even hostile, to missionary work in North Africa, experienced what Frease characterized as a remarkable change on the part of French administrators in the direction of favorable and co-operative relations with the missionaries and their various projects. The property-holding agreements and the legal recognition they involved were the larger, general fruits of an increased understanding that was concretely expressed in local administrative decisions affecting medical, evangelistic, and hostel activities. The Methodists attributed this in part to the waning of what they described as the political power of Islam, which they tended to equate both with the political power or prestige of Turkey and with the predominance of Muslims elsewhere in government in North Africa, particularly in Tunisia. The Methodists themselves, however, under the leadership of Bishop Hartzell, took a good deal of initiative in trying to develop friendly relations with French government officials. Frease and his co-workers pointed to the immediate government of the Tunisian protectorate itself, which was manned by Muslims, as the only remaining political obstacle of any account. In 1918, he quite bluntly criticized it as a political anachronism badly frustrating to the achievement of French political aims and of Christian progress.

Two important changes in the ecclesiastical administration of the North Africa Mission Conference occurred in 1916. First, Bishop Hartzell, the Mission's founder and chief promoter, retired from active service at the session of the General Conference. Anticipating this event, the Mission Conference memorialized the General Conference to make North Africa "a separate bishopric," declaring that the African continent was too vast and varied a field for effective supervision by a single Bishop. The General Conference elected two Missionary Bishops for Africa, namely, Eben S. Johnson and Alexander P. Camphor, but instead of assigning one of them exclusively to North Africa, it enacted the substance of the Mission Con-

ference's alternative proposal that North Africa be included among the Conferences to be supervised by the Bishop in charge of Europe. This was the second change—severance of North Africa from its association with Africa.

Normally, this would have placed North Africa under the care of Bishop John L. Nuelsen, resident in Zurich, but war conditions made it impossible for him to act in French-held territory. Therefore, Bishop William F. Anderson, resident in Ohio and responsible for six Conferences in the United States, was assigned to supervise North Africa along with much of Bishop Nuelsen's European work. Bishop Anderson presided at sessions of the Mission Conference in 1918 (April) and 1919 (February and December). Since Edwin Frease presided at the session of February, 1916, the Conference had no Bishop in attendance for more than three years, which covered most of the difficult war period. The new tie with Europe was reflected in the action of the Board in merging the appropriation for North Africa for 1918 into the appropriation for Europe.

During his eight-year leadership of the North Africa cause, Bishop Hartzell did not modify his commitment to the anti-Islam strategy for Methodism that he had set before the General Missionary Committee in 1907 and before the Mission itself in 1910. As the Mission got well under way, it became clear that its opposition to Islam was more than formal or official strategy; it was a deep and abiding bias in the attitudes of the missionaries who actually were in touch with the North African Muslims and engaged in trying to win converts from among them. Their working view of Islam and of what they called the Muslim character affected their developing conclusions about the future of their mission to North Africa. It also determined, to some extent, their evangelistic methods.

If Edwin Frease's view of Islam as he expressed it to the members of the Mission in 1910 was couched in strategic, theological, and historical generalities, it was empirical enough in tone when he voiced it to Secretary North by letter in 1913. He attributed to the influence of Islam (his statements usually were quite coherent with those of the other workers) all that he found deplorable, even shocking, in the Arabs and Berbers of North Africa now that he had been on the field for a few years. He specified:

Sodomy is widely practiced. Bro. Blackmore found it unsafe to try to send Saïd Abouadaou, his worker, out alone as he was in constant danger of being waylaid for being used for this purpose—as he was clean! We have had to send away some of the older boys from the Hostels owing to their already having contracted this unspeakable vice. It is stated by those who are well informed that the shepherds actually have intercourse with the female sheep, goats, etc. . . . once steeped in these horrors it is a most difficult task to secure good results from adult converts. Indeed with 80% of the adult population syphalitic [*sic*] is it any wonder?

Frease's implicit etiology of such practices was quite simplistic, evidently including no attempt to distinguish between conditions native to pastoral life and factors originating in religious teaching. It was like attributing to the Puritan theology of the Massachusetts Bay theocracy in the seventeenth century the bestiality of farm boys described in John Winthrop's *Journal* and the records of the General Court.

But it took more than a few items of sexual practice, more than the category of sexual delinquency as a whole, to measure Frease's disillusion about Muslim morality and the Muslim personality. He told North that honesty, truthfulness, and faithfulness were "equally absent." Indeed, his printed comments, recurring from time to time in his reports, showed that his disenchantment was complete. "Mohammedanism," he said in 1913, "blights, warps, and deadens the moral and spiritual nature more than even idolatry or paganism. The resulting depravity is almost unthinkable." Frease saw Islam as an evil amazingly, disastrously, almost irrevocably powerful in determining the mentality of its people. Only long and intimate contact with it would even partially reveal to an outsider, he said, "its full evil effects on human nature."

The missionaries not only supplied numerous uncomplimentary judgments about individual Muslims with whom they dealt, but also—some of them—drew within the circle of condemnation the religious teachings of Islam. They described the Muslims' opposition to Christian teaching, or their imperviousness to it, as perverse, even sinful. J. H. C. Purdon entertained a literal devil-theory of Islam. He once wrote to some donors to the Mission:

The Devil has many projects afloat with which to deceive mankind, the most ably conceived and successful of which without contradiction is Islam—the greatest masterpiece of deception that has ever been fabricated. . . . To merely potter about this bulwark of Satanic strategy with a missionary or two to every hundred thousand souls can but provoke from the Evil-one a smile of disdain. He is so perfectly aware of the effective measures adopted by himself to render his captives impervious to every appeal to repentance and true faith that he does not fear in the least the present apathetical and wholly inadequate effort of God's people . . .

Purdon also described his work in Tunis in 1911 as a continuing attempt to use Christian surgery to combat the disease of Islam that infected its devotees. "Active and malignant growths have taken possession of their souls," he said, "and should they be allowed to develop will eventually destroy life."

The general missionary view hardly conceived of Islam as having any religious, cultural, or historical legitimacy at all. There was no need to explore its values, no accommodation was to be made to it, no bridges for mutual understanding or co-operation were to be built to it. It was a disease to be excised, a false faith to be put down, an evil way of life to be uprooted, a power to be destroyed. The Methodists had hardly any sympathetic basis

at all for a broad approach to the followers of Mohammed. They were in North Africa to fight Islam as militantly as the Balkan states fought the Turks in 1912-13.

Seldom did any deviation from this line appear in the statements of the missionaries, although William E. Lowther, for one, was a man of discriminating intellectual habits, and Percy Smith devoted a good deal of careful study to Islam and professed respect for individual Arabs he met. In fact, he eventually wrote to Secretary North, in 1919, describing the necessary missionary approach in terms unique to come from the pen of a North Africa missionary and remarkably progressive among Methodist missionaries in general at that time. He said:

Generally the missionary is so much absorbed in the prosecution of his direct work that he does not get that contact and sympathetic touch with the native mind and life—that understanding of the mentality, aspirations, joys and sorrows, of the native—that would suggest new means of giving the light of the gospel. To study the mind, the life, the outlook, the “human” side of the people we wish to gain one needs to have real interest and sympathy. I feel we are very, very far from this at present. Dr. Macdonald in his “Aspects of Islam” has written very wisely on the subject. . . . “Sympathy, then, the being able to enter into their ideas; knowledge, the having soaked himself in those ideas; intelligence and courtesy to adapt himself to them and their ways—these are among the first essentials for the missionary. . . . These . . . he cannot possibly have, unless he is genuinely in love with the people of his field; likes them and theirs; is in many respects one of them. . . . *The paradox, in truth, of the missionary's life is that he must have a liking for his people and their queerest little ways even while he is trying to change them.*” *

As the workers actually confronted Islam in North Africa in the name of Methodism, certain practical inconsistencies appeared in their over-all interpretation of the field to the Board and to their supporters in the United States. They never surrendered the original claim that God had called the Methodists to enter and conquer North Africa for Christ. They believed that they were striking at a time of special opportunity because of the broad social and political forces that were tending to implement God's purpose by modifying or undermining the conditions of Islamic society. They continued to call upon the Church to take advantage of these current opportunities by throwing fuller resources into the great fight against Islam. But strangely contrasting with all this public optimism was the operating pessimism of the missionaries, who were disappointed and distressed by the meagerness of their evangelistic results—a condition typical of missionary labors among Muslims everywhere in the world. Frease and his colleagues believed that the moral horrors of Muslim life and the false teachings of Islam permanently damaged its

* See Note, p. 113.

devotees, leaving Muslim adults almost entirely incapable of shaking off the results of their early training. He predicted in 1913 that direct efforts to convert them would "not yield many results for years to come."

This pessimism about Muslim adults was the chief cause of the Mission's developing a strong emphasis upon maintaining hostels for residential care of boys and girls. As Frease pointed out at the Mission Conference session in 1911, to attempt to provide a full program of Christian education for the Mission's future workers by establishing schools was out of the question; the government would have required the employment of French teachers and the acceptance of various other restrictions. The Mission, therefore, was beginning to give certain parents a measure of financial assistance to send their boys to public school for secular education, with religious education provided daily at the mission center. Such an arrangement would keep a boy "effectively under our influence and control," said Frease, "while he may remain with his parent or parents, and influence the home." And hostels would take care of boys who could not live with parents. As soon as the home-school-mission-hostel pattern began to take shape, as it did in Constantine at about this time, Frease saw superior, long-range advantage especially in the hostel plan. He became excited about the possibility of turning out, before long, an annual quota of "young fellows . . . trained in the knowledge of Christ, *not away from* the blight of Islam, but without ever really having experienced it!"

Frease declared that it was absolutely necessary to get hold of the children "at a tender age to keep them from the moral cesspool" of their Muslim environment. J. H. C. Purdon wanted to get to the young before "the Moslems instil into their minds those pernicious doctrines which, in after life, cling around their souls like so many moistened grave clothes and render them impervious to the warmest influences of the gospel." That it was truly unformed children the missionaries hoped to isolate and indoctrinate is demonstrated by the ages of the boys in the Constantine hostel in 1916, five years after its founding: one boy aged 17; two aged 14; two, 13; four, 12; four, 11; four, 10; three, 9; two, 8; two, 7; three, 6; and one, 5. Scanning the photographs of all the hostel groups for that year clearly shows that admissions were predominantly and heavily concentrated within the elementary and primary school groups, with even some children that were hardly old enough for a kindergarten.

Whether such youngsters became Christians or not was hardly a matter of open choice by them; this was a program of assimilation by conditioning, not by conversion. Because of their psychology of radical conflict with Islam, evidently it did not occur to the Methodists to have qualms about endeavoring to undermine the other faith by drawing away its children—a method they undoubtedly would have condemned as unscrupulous proselytizing had it been directed against any Methodist church or mission by any Christian or

non-Christian group. Not unnaturally, no part of the Mission's program aroused sharper opposition than did the hostel projects; the Methodists had to defend themselves against numerous counterattacks intended to break, legally or extralegally, their hold on the children under their care. Regardless of the kindness the missionaries may have shown their charges in person, the children nevertheless became Methodist pawns in a bitter interfaith competition.

So far were the missionaries from treating the children primarily as ends in themselves that the ultimate function of the hostels clearly was not even to bestow upon them the presumptive blessing of their becoming Christians, but to train mission workers to infiltrate the Muslim community. The Mission urgently needed North African workers, who would be able to approach the people as fellow countrymen and as former fellow believers rather than as ethnic and religious aliens. But there were few adult converts from Islam, and they generally were not promising. Frease analyzed the situation in reporting to the Board in 1915:

The adult convert from it [Islam] is not only difficult to assimilate and develop along spiritual lines but the making of workers from among them is slow and very uncertain. The surest, as in the end the quickest and most economical method, is to get hold of the children before the contamination of Islam has seized them in its fatal grip and to bring them up as Christians, selecting the choice spirits among them for training as Christian workers.

Frease had in mind the products of the hostels. And he counted upon this source not only to provide trained workers for the Mission staff, but to meet the need for the influence of Christian homes located among the Muslims. "These young people," he said, "are sure to seek their husbands and wives from the same Homes—thus Christian families established among the Muslim population as an unanswerable witness for Christ."

If Frease and his workers had any doubts as to whether these young people would be well prepared not only religiously, but also socially and psychologically, to evangelize the Moslem community after being largely isolated from it, they did not discuss them in public or in missionary correspondence. The hostel program was generally counted as the most important and promising part of the Mission's work. By 1913, Bishop Hartzell was calling it "the key to the whole situation." "The Moslem Child for Christ" was the dominant theme of a report on the Muslim world that Hartzell, as a committee chairman, presented at the current triennial session of the World's Sunday School Convention in Zurich, at which the Methodists' hostel scheme for boys and girls in North Africa, he said, was highly commended. By May, 1916, when the program was well under way, but as yet hardly beginning to produce the end-results expected of it, Frease was interpreting it to the Board as a success sufficient to justify the entire existence

of the Mission. He said, "When our work was started in North Africa, Moslem work here had seemed almost to have come to an *impasse*. The success of these Homes has put new life and hope into the whole working force."

The effective beginnings of the hostel program were the openings in Constantine late in 1910 and, shortly afterwards, in Tunis. By 1913, there were six hostels, and a year later the permanent pattern of their distribution was in effect; Algiers, Constantine, and Tunis each had a unit for boys and one for girls. Although there were Muslims who attempted to thwart the hostels' growth, the Mission was able to gather in enough children to tax the adequacy of both their budgets and their lodgings; the number under the missionaries' care increased from a dozen in 1912 to ninety (fifty-seven boys, thirty-three girls) at the beginning of 1916. At that time, Edwin Frease reported, "The output has already commenced," and he cited as products of the program four new preachers, three boys working at trades, a boy studying on government scholarship, and two girls married to Christian men.

What lifted the enrollment in the hostels to the level of ninety was a phase of the Mission's response to the hardships and destitution that World War I imposed upon its constituents and upon the people whom the missionaries were attempting to influence. Within five months after hostilities began, the hostels took in some thirty children. As the war years ground on, the Mission's workers came under increasing pressure to receive more children, and they desired to do so. Only a few weeks before the Armistice, Edwin Frease wrote the New York office, "I am feeling more and more strongly that we ought to be authorized, somehow [the homes hardly had room enough], to receive say twenty or thirty additional boys. . . ." A week after the Armistice was signed, he urged upon Secretary North an extensive enlargement of the hostel program that would have required additional living quarters; he wanted to receive a hundred children each into the boys' homes in Algiers, Constantine, and Tunis.

Frease viewed this kind of activity as genuine emergency war relief work with humanitarian significance, but he never lost sight of the potential function of the hostels' young wards in the Mission's over-all strategy for its evangelistic attack upon Islam. He looked upon the availability of large numbers of young war victims as "a unique call and opportunity . . . of accomplishing in our Moslem work what might otherwise take many years, in securing the young material for training . . ." But the Mission's general financial condition and the minimal amounts of money allotted to hostel work from North Africa's share in the general War Relief Fund made impossible any such expansion as the missionaries hoped for. There were still only ninety hostel children in 1918 and only seventeen more by the end of 1919.

Although Algeria and Tunisia did not become theaters of war, they were

so closely implicated in the French war effort and so affected by general war conditions that the period of the great conflict and its aftermath brought them turmoil, deprivation, and the straining of longstanding social patterns. Naturally, these were difficult years for the Methodist mission. Its constituents suffered the impact of high prices, near-starvation, and family emergency that were common among the general populace. Removals, furloughs, and the military service of some of the French preachers somewhat reduced the availability of mission personnel. The workers were overburdened, and the Mission was handicapped in its power to press forward with the task of evangelization, except for some fresh opportunities to reach French soldiers.

As a converting agency organized for the purpose of penetrating the Muslim population and overthrowing Islam, the North Africa mission accomplished little during its first decade. Its measurable results with adult Muslims were more consonant with the missionaries' disillusioned talk about the difficulties of the field than with the flamboyant promotional providentialism to which they and their leaders were given from time to time. In spite of the clarion to battle with Islam in response to which the North Africa venture was begun, the Mission developed from the beginning a body of church members that was predominantly European, not ex-Muslim. In 1911, the French churches in Algiers and Constantine had twenty-eight members, and the Muslim work had only five. Throughout the decade, the Europeans were from three to five times as numerous as the Arab-Kabyle group. In 1919, fifty-five of the eighty-eight full members of the Church were affiliated with the two French churches and with the Spanish congregation in Oran. Not counting the members at Il-Maten—so recently received by transfer from the Evangelical Methodist Church—there were only nineteen members associated with the Arab-Kabyle work.

Citing even this small membership somewhat amplifies the real gains the Methodists made through adult conversions in their attack on Islam. Up to 1919, the Mission enlisted eleven Arab or Kabyle Local Preachers. But five of them were converted before they became affiliated with the Methodist Episcopal Church. Another, Mostafa Djezzar, was converted by the Constantine missionaries and almost at once given a place as a mission worker, but his two brothers Khodja and Omar, who came into the Methodist fold with him, were so young that they really were products of the hostel program as were three more of the Local Preachers. From 1914 to 1919, this group (there were also three Exhorters in 1914) accounted for a third of the non-European membership in any given year.

Adult conversions from the general Muslim community certainly were highly reportable signs of the desired victory over Islam, but only very infrequently were they mentioned in the missionaries' reports. During the entire period, the Methodist workers conducted only twenty-nine adult baptisms among indigenous North Africans. With the hostels largely supplying

the pool of preparatory members, many of the so-called adult baptisms obviously were those of children or youths. The membership of the Arab-Kabyle congregations, even beyond the corps of Local Preachers and Exhorters, evidently was closely tied to the Mission's lay personnel and to the hostels. Seldom were there more than half a dozen church members associated with any of the missions to Muslims in Algiers, Constantine, Tunis, or Fort-National. The membership figures for the four stations in 1919 were 3, 5, 5, and 6, respectively. Wartime dislocations had somewhat slowed down the Muslim work, especially in Algiers and in Tunis, aggressive evangelism at these two stations being practically suspended at times. But a number of the Methodist missionaries had been laboring in North Africa for many years, and the meagerness of results substantial enough to be reflected in church membership represented basically the chronic inability of the Mission seriously to penetrate Islam's stronghold in North Africa. Invading Methodism had barely a foothold in the vast territory it was committed to take for Christ.

Forging the Congo Link

"We walked into Kazembe's village about three o'clock on July 26, 1911, hot, dirty, dusty, and very weary. The chief came out and gave us a hearty welcome and so did his people and we were exceedingly thankful to be at the end of our toilsome trip covering two months." Thus John M. Springer described his arrival at the Lukoshi River location four hundred miles northwest of Lubumbashi (Elisabethville) where he and his wife opened Methodism's permanent mission in the Belgian Congo.

The prelude to the Springers' advent to this new mission field actually was far more protracted than the immediately preceding weeks of their arduous travel in the southern region of the Belgian Congo. Behind it lay years of yearning and planning and many thousand miles of journeying. The process began in 1903, when Springer was a bachelor missionary in Southern Rhodesia. It was then that he started dreaming of helping to provide the final span of a geographically continuous Methodist missionary enterprise that should reach across Central Africa from Mozambique, on the Indian Ocean, through Southern Rhodesia and the Congo to Angola, on the Atlantic. The idea was pressed into his consciousness by Dr. Wilson S. Naylor, a visiting Lawrence College professor, who told him that in 1888 Bishop William Taylor, thinking of the twenty-five hundred miles of almost completely unoccupied territory stretching from the Methodist mission in Angola to the one in Mozambique, had declared, "We will develop a chain of missions right across the continent." Naylor voiced an intimation that Springer himself would share in that pioneering extension.

Springer made his first move to forge the Congo link in the chain in November, 1906, when he started home for a furlough in the United States.

By that time, he and his wife, the former Helen Rasmussen, were convinced that "God had called and definitely commissioned and peculiarly prepared us to spy out the intervening territory." Therefore, instead of traveling down to Cape Town, they went across Southern Rhodesia by train to Bulawayo and then north beyond the Zambezi River to Broken Hill, Northern Rhodesia, the frontier town that at that time was the railhead of the projected Cape-to-Cairo railroad. Intending eventually to go across country to the Atlantic, they stayed in Broken Hill until the following May, waiting out the rainy season, accumulating supplies, engaging carriers, making contacts with men who were going in and out of the Congo directly to the north, and gathering information about the region that would be useful in starting the mission they fully intended to found there. They also did missionary work among the Europeans and among the Africans in the mine compound.

Although Springer believed that he had God's backing in taking the long overland western route, he did not have Bishop Hartzell's. The Bishop doubted the financial feasibility of the plan and feared for the Springers' health, but he conceded their right to choose their own route. His strongest disapproval he reserved, however, for Springer's mission work in Broken Hill. He wrote from Cape Town that it was contrary to his well-known policy against extending the work from Southern Rhodesia across the Zambezi or into Northern Rhodesia at that time. He wished first to consolidate the missionary position in the relatively new Southern Rhodesia field and to extend the evangelistic effort directly from the two Umtalis. "We are not responsible for the salvation of the whole African continent," he said, "but we are responsible to so use the limited resources which we have, in workers and money, as to do the greatest good . . ." Hartzell wanted Springer to get home to the States as soon as possible, not remaining in Broken Hill to commit or compromise the Church by unauthorized activity there. But Springer managed somehow to squeeze out of the Bishop's letters the makings of a claim that the Bishop approved what he was doing, and as the months went by, he was confirmed and strengthened in his conviction of God's leading.

Secretary Adna B. Leonard, who also disapproved of Springer's initiative in the area, expressed his view of it in a letter to the Bishop:

He states very frankly that he is pursuing a plan which was against your advice and was very strongly disapproved by the Mission at Umtali [Southern Rhodesia]. He defends himself on the ground that the Divine leading was clearly indicated that he ought to do this, saying that he felt compelled to disregard all human advice and follow the Divine impulses, as he considers them.

And with an eye to possible administrative difficulties in the near future, Leonard added, "I am afraid he is in a state of mind which will make him

utterly intractable and eventually disqualify him for work with us. I hope it may not be so."

On 13 May 1907, with a caravan of fifty carriers, the Springers began a wearing 1,500-mile journey along native trails to the Angolan coast, exploring on the way a 200-mile strip of the Southern Congo. Because of tribal warfare to the north, they could only skirt the southern part of the Lunda country, an unevangelized area as large as Michigan, Illinois, and Indiana combined, which lay half in Angola and half in the Congo. The trip from Broken Hill to Luanda, Angola, consumed more than three months' time. The Springers landed in New York in October.

During more than two years in the United States, Springer kept steadily to his purpose to see a mission started in the Lunda country. He devoted much of 1908 to writing—"as propaganda for the new mission"—*The Heart of Central Africa: Mineral Wealth and Missionary Opportunity*. In June, the Board extended his furlough, but since he wished to remain free to go later to the Congo, he had to give up the salary attached to the acceptance of work in Rhodesia. At the same time, Secretary Leonard complained to Bishop Hartzell that Springer, without proper authorization, was raising money from the Methodist constituency for new work in Africa. In 1909, he joined the promotional campaign of the Africa Diamond Jubilee led by Hartzell and used it as a means of presenting to American audiences the claims of the Africa project that was nearest his heart. As the year progressed, Hartzell agreed that various pledges of designated and undesignated gifts received during the campaign could be applied to the new Lunda mission. In December, Hartzell went so far as to request the Board of Managers to authorize Springer's return to Africa, with his support to be provided by special gifts, it being understood that he was going out to a new assignment—not the East, but the West, Central Africa Mission Conference. The Managers agreed, but "with the distinct understanding that no new mission shall be opened in Central Africa without the consent of the General Committee," thus endangering Springer's hopes, for the Committee would not meet until November, 1910.

But on his side Springer now had Bishop Hartzell and pledges of \$4,000 a year for five years for work in the interior of Africa. The Bishop reopened the question of the Board's restriction by telling its members in February that he desired to send Springer four hundred miles into the interior, beyond all previously established work, into the Lunda territory, and described the strategic relation of the new move to current missionary activity in West Central Africa. He also assured them that Springer's special gifts would keep the new project off appropriations for five years. Hartzell's proposal, even with this proviso, did not win unanimous acceptance; it was by a vote of 12 to 7 that the Managers agreed that its previous action did not prevent "the establishment of a mission among the Lunda people in the eastern part

of the Province of Angola." It is not clear, however, whether the Managers intended this resolution to cover a mission to the Lunda people in the Congo.

But with precisely that objective in mind, Springer and his wife sailed from New York at the end of February, 1910. On the way, they spent three weeks in Sweden speaking in churches on their work in Africa. They reached Broken Hill, by way of Cape Town, on 2 June. From this time on, they traveled afoot or by hammock (Springer himself sometimes used a bicycle) over footworn trails and stretches of unimproved road, always moving slowly in caravan, always burdened by great quantities of supplies, plagued by problems of enlisting and keeping scores of carriers, faced with potential—often real—food shortages, in danger from man and beast and perilous terrain, roughing it night and day as Livingstone and Stanley and others had done, now and then struck down by sickness. And all this for more than two years, over many, many hundreds of miles on important journeys, preparing for final penetration of the Congo country where the new Methodist mission was to be founded.

After four weeks' delay to assemble baggage and carriers, Springer moved northwards out of Broken Hill for the copper mining camp of Kansanshi, which he had visited in 1907, two hundred miles away, just south of the Congo border. There he arrived on 18 July, but only to be delayed for two months by baggage difficulties, occupying meanwhile an old camp abandoned by a charcoal burner and engaging in informal evangelistic work. Here he started the Fox Bible Training School (funds for eventual erection of a station for it came from Dr. and Mrs. C. Vernon Fox, Dakotan benefactors), "with but six pupils, with only the sky for a roof, logs for benches, and a very limited supply of books." This school, devoted to training the native African preachers and teachers Springer believed were essential to the evangelization of Africa, was to move with him along his route into the area where he would set down his mission stations. In mid-September, he was on his way again, headed for Kalulua, some 150 miles to the northwest and ten miles from Kalene Hill, which he had visited three years earlier.

He reached Kalulua, which was ten miles from Angola and six miles from the Congo, on 1 October. There he took possession of a set of roomy, nearly empty buildings belonging to a recently abandoned government station offered him by a British administrator. Knocking together some furniture from discarded boxes, sticks, poles, and bark rope, he settled in for the months of the rainy season that was just beginning. On 3 October, Herman Heinkel, a former colleague in Southern Rhodesia, having come back from the United States to Africa on his own initiative, joined Springer as a volunteer helper, Bishop Hartzell later authorizing his being added to the mission payroll. Two weeks after his arrival, Springer reopened the classes of the Fox Bible Training School, with thirteen pupils, from nine different tribes, among them being four of his caravan who already had received some training in the

Methodist school at Quiõngua, Angola. Heinkel not only assisted in the Bible school, but also instructed the pupils in gardening and other manual work.

When the West Central Africa Mission Conference met in Luanda late in December, the members heard a very brief report from Springer that was written before he left Kansanshi. Bishop Hartzell told the Conference that his instructions to Springer directed him to "locate somewhere in the highlands of the watershed between the upper Kasai and Zambesi." He also announced Springer's transfer from the East Central Africa Mission Conference and appointed him and his wife to "Lunda Country."

During the early months in Kalulua, the Springers became acquainted with the village people who came in occasionally to sell food. They also regularly visited them in their villages both on Sundays and on weekdays, soon gaining their confidence. Of their "gloomy religious condition" Springer said, "The adult men and women are bound fast in the snare of their fetichism and their constant terror of evil spirits." He observed numerous instances of the influential ministrations of their "witch doctors." They felt insecure about the many changes occurring in their country, but welcomed the opportunity to bring their children for the missionaries to teach. In January, Springer opened a religious school in one of the villages of Kachila, the friendly local chief, placing Jacob Maweni, one of his pupils, in charge of this first such venture among the Balunda (Lunda people). Many adults came and listened in on the children's classes.

But Springer did not intend to put his stakes down permanently in the Kalulua neighborhood; he had not yet pierced the larger Lunda territory across the border in the Congo. In March, accompanied by an evangelist and three other students, he trekked seventy-five miles to the northwest, seeking information about the Lunda country from Kazembe, the nearest important Lunda chief. Few white men—and no missionary—had been this way before. Springer and his companions were welcomed by the people in the villages, and Kazembe urged him to secure the permission of the Belgian government to settle near his village. With this in mind, Springer traveled many miles to two Belgian posts (Kayoyo and Chimbundji) in succession, but only to be told that he must apply in Lubumbashi, the capital of Katanga Province. He decided upon Kazembe's location, which was on the Lukoshi River, because it seemed inadvisable to move just then any farther away from his base of supplies and on into the unknown territory to the north. Therefore, he returned to Kalulua and prepared to move away.

In May, Springer left Kalulua for Lubumbashi, a three weeks' journey more than two hundred miles eastward. There he received cordial assistance from the Belgian officials in matters of transport and future land concessions, with the more immediate privileges of settling at Kazembe's location on the Lukoshi and of leasing a few acres for building purposes there. Then came

the Springers' trouble-ridden, exhausting journey with sixty Northern Rhodesian carriers—twenty-six days and four hundred miles to the northwest from the Lubumbashi railhead—to the Lukoshi River site, where they arrived on 26 July, to establish the first Methodist base in the Congo. They were making this new beginning some six hundred miles east of Malanje, the Methodist station farthest inland in Angola.

Depending almost entirely upon the labor of the Fox Bible Training School boys who came with them, Springer and Heinkel built a pole-stick-and-thatch mission house, a schoolhouse, and two dormitories about a mile from the chief's village. Almost at once, Springer had to make long trips foraging for food—to Infunba, thirty-five miles southwest; to a trading post ten miles inside Angola; to a group of villages to the north of the mission. He often scoured the nearer country also for food as well as for carriers to bring in supplies, many of which were ordered from Bulawayo, a thousand miles away. For the first several months on the Lukoshi, the Springers and Heinkel, now eighty miles from a doctor, fought through a series of severe malarial attacks; Springer had a devastating, nearly fatal case of blackwater fever. Yet they promptly reopened the Training School and also began to develop general school work. They put up small school shelters in the vicinity and within a year had schools at or near a dozen of Kazembe's villages. By the end of 1911, the missionaries had regular evangelistic services going in the villages for three miles around the mission and had visited all the villages within thirty miles to the south and to the northwest. Some of the boys from the Training School also went out into the villages to teach school, buy food, and hold services. At the station by the river, Springer and his wife, with the help of a number of African volunteers from various places, conducted language studies and modest translation projects in Luunda.

Springer maintained the Lukoshi station throughout 1912, but from May to July, he was off on a round trip of six hundred miles to Musunba, the capital town of Kazembe's father, Mwata Yamvo, whom the Belgian administrators recognized and utilized as the ruling chief of the Balunda. Mwata Yamvo's town was six miles from the village of Kapanga and its government post, more than two hundred miles north of Kazembe. To reach this location had been one of Springer's goals for the past two years, indeed ever since his cross-continent journey of 1907. Mwata Yamvo gave the Springer party a friendly welcome and agreed to allow the Methodists to build a mission close to the town. He specified his desire to have a medical missionary sent there. Springer came away convinced that the administrative importance of Musumba and its many contacts with various parts of the Lunda world would make the proposed location strategically very valuable for the extension of missionary influence.

With the Musumba visit behind him, and drawing upon information gathered by himself and Heinkel on separate visits to the district and sub-

district Belgian posts, Springer decided early in 1913 to make two strategic moves—establish missions at Musumba (Kapanga*) and at Kambove, 250 miles east of Kazembe. Partly as a consequence of this decision and partly because of unsatisfactory local conditions—food was scarce, there was much strife and violence, Kazembe was troublesome and oppressive, whole villages were moving away from him—he also determined to close down the mission on the Lukoshi.

The missionaries left Lukoshi for good at the end of March. Heinkel, taking with him all the mission's equipment, led a party north to Kapanga, which he reached on 5 June. Springer started for Kambove, arriving on 19 April. On 6 June, the rails of the Cape-to-Cairo line from the south were laid in Kambove, thus enabling Springer to utilize his new mission station as a base of transport overland to Kapanga, more than four hundred miles to the northwest.

Kambove, where the Springers had spent a Sabbath on their 1907 trek, was a copper-mining camp just becoming a town and undergoing rapid development. The settlement itself consisted, said Springer, of a number of mud-and-pole houses plus "one saloon, a butchery, and a bicycle shop and two general stores." Everywhere about the neighborhood were camps maintained by contractors working on the mine, on the railroad, and in the busy, growing town. It took a month to find a mission site (the Belgian authorities were co-operative in granting land concessions both here and at Kapanga), which turned out to be only half a mile from the rail depot. Scraping together a few tools—scarce items in Kambove—salvaging scrap iron left by work crews, cutting timber on the mission site and shaping it up in a saw pit, making adobe bricks, and assisted by the Training School boys and a changing crew of African volunteers and hired hands, Springer at once began a building program that was well under way by the end of the year and that yielded twelve buildings by the close of 1914.

The construction activity was demanding, but at the same time, Springer plunged as deeply as he could into evangelistic work among the whites and the Africans in the ever-shifting labor corps in and around Kambove. He began holding regular services in as many camps as he could reach, soon having eleven meetings each Sunday, with many tribes represented in the audiences—one day as many as thirty-five. Since they too represented a variety of tribes, he used some of the boys in the Training School as interpreters and as teachers in a number of camps where he was able to start afternoon schools. Thus Springer reached out widely with the gospel among the four or five thousand African laborers in the neighborhood.

Meanwhile, Herman Heinkel was inaugurating the mission at Kapanga. In his party were two valuable African workers: Jacob Maweni, who con-

* See Note, p. 113.

tinued the Luunda translation of the Gospel According to Mark on which Springer had started him; and a mature young man named Kayeka Mutembo, a native of the Lukoshi Valley. Kayeka, who was a son of a former chief Kazembe, had been stolen when a boy by native slavers from Angola and sold, eight hundred miles away in Bihe, to an African master, who permitted him to attend an American Board mission school. There he was converted, and for a number of years, he earnestly prayed for a Christian missionary to be sent to his Lunda people and even tried to persuade the Angola missionaries to commission him for the purpose. In December, 1910, Kayeka appeared at Springer's Kalulua mission house. He had made his way into the Angolan interior to a point 150 miles from Kalulua on a trading venture to earn the redemption price for his emancipation. Hearing there of the presence of the Methodist missionary, he had walked all the way to Kalulua to scout out the possibility of becoming a missionary to the people of his Lunda homeland. Coming quickly to an understanding with Springer, he returned to Angola, finally secured his freedom and that of his family and, after three months on the trail, caught up with Springer again at the Lukoshi mission in January, 1913. With him he brought a small party of emancipated and repatriated slaves, who also accompanied him when he went to Kapanga with Heinkel two months later.

Unfortunately, Heinkel's stay at Kapanga was short, for he suffered a relapse into the ill health that had troubled him before he undertook his rugged pioneering work as Springer's right-hand man in the Congo. But he remained long enough to get the first buildings erected on the new mission site. Then he put Kayeka in charge of the school work and the preaching and started south to Kambove, which he reached in mid-November on his way home to the States.

In 1914, Springer welcomed to Kambove the first reinforcements from America since Heinkel came to his side in 1910. Mrs. Josephine E. Miller, Mrs. Springer's recently widowed mother, arrived on 7 March for a year's stay, entering heartily (she was over sixty years of age) into the mission work as a volunteer. A week later arrived Arthur L. Piper, M.D., and his wife, Board appointees sponsored by the Epworth Leagues of the Detroit District. At the end of April, the Pipers started the long journey north to Kapanga, where they relieved Kayeka of the direction of the mission on 22 June. On that same day, Roger S. Guptill, a young and enthusiastic minister from the New Hampshire Conference, reached Kambove accompanied by his wife. The Guptills at once went to work there under Springer's direction.

In April, just before Piper went north, Springer took the train down to Lubumbashi, less than a hundred miles south of Kambove, in answer to a call to baptize a Belgian child. He had been there in 1911, when the town was beginning to boom, and also on a visit from Kansanshi in 1910, when he had seen men beginning to fell trees on the wilderness site of the as yet unbuilt

town. Now in 1914, Lubumbashi had a population of from three to four thousand Africans employed in mining and about the town, plus a thousand Europeans. Returning to Kambove, Springer had a young African evangelist and colporteur work his way through the various mining camps at Lubumbashi investigating the potential missionary situation. The scout finally brought back to Kambove a petition signed by two dozen young Christians from Nyasaland, asking Springer to come to Lubumbashi and organize them into a church. There were more than a hundred such mission-trained young men in town, a number of them holding letters of church membership. The only local church was Roman Catholic, and they had no place even for informal services except outdoors in front of their small huts. In November, Springer hired a hall for religious meetings and immediately struck an encouraging response. He soon set up a night school, which also flourished. Since Springer still lived in Kambove, he put in charge of the Lubumbashi work the petitioning group's own volunteer leaders, Joseph Jutu and Moses Kumwenda. Jutu, who was employed on the local newspaper *L'Étoile du Congo*, was an Elder in the Scottish Presbyterian Church. On 27 December 1914, Springer, accompanied by Roger Guptill, went to Lubumbashi and organized out of a circle of Presbyterians and a few Congregationalists a Methodist Episcopal Church with eight full members and twenty-five carefully selected probationers.

On New Year's Day, 1915, Bishop Hartzell came to Lubumbashi, was met by Springer, and after a quick tour of the neighborhood, went on to Kambove. The next day, at the dining-room table in the mission residence, he formally organized the Congo Mission, setting it apart from the West Central Africa Mission Conference. Present at the two-day session of the Mission were the Guptills, the Springers, and Mrs. Miller. The Pipers were at Kapanga. Springer announced that on 13 May 1914, King Albert of Belgium had issued a decree granting the Methodist Episcopal Church legal status in the Belgian Congo, this dispensation giving the Congo Mission a recognized basis for holding property and pursuing its work. The Mission's first set of resolutions expressed gratitude

For the government's hearty reception of our Mission into the Katanga Province of the Belgian Congo, and for the cordial co-operation of all officials dealing with our work.

For the cordial relations existing between the Mission and the general industrial agencies of the country.

At the close of the session, Bishop Hartzell appointed Springer, who from the beginning had guided the Lunda enterprise in the capacity of Treasurer, as Superintendent of the Congo Mission. Shortly afterwards, Springer went to the United States on what became a two-year furlough. He left Joseph

Jutu in charge in Lubumbashi, Roger Guptill in Kambove, and Dr. Piper at Kapanga.

As the missionary in charge at Kapanga, Dr. Piper served not simply as the director of a small mission station, but as the leader of a new African village, a mission colony. The nucleus was the dozen or more freed slaves who went north with Herman Heinkel and Kayeka Mutembo. Added to the nucleus were the young Africans—as many as Springer could spare from the school in Kambove—who went to Kapanga with Piper himself. After them, came about forty constituents of the Kalene Hill mission of the Plymouth Brethren that the Springers visited in 1907 and 1910 in the extreme northern corner of Northern Rhodesia. Members of this group went back to Kalene Hill the next season and brought some of their friends north to Kapanga. Many former slaves came from Angola, most of them people evangelized by the missions of the American Board and of the Plymouth Brethren at Bihe; emancipation of slaves was under way in Angola following the declaration of the Republic of Portugal in 1910. A group of 125—men, women, and children, returning to their original home in the Lunda territory—reached Kapanga in October, 1915, after walking for nearly four months. All these arrivals, most of them Christians or under Christianizing influences, clustered about the Methodist mission, finally creating a settlement of close to three hundred persons—more than in the typical African village in that area.

Piper thus had much more on his hands than he expected—greater demands upon his slim resources, more opportunities, and more help. He had to do what he could to help the repatriated Lunda people get settled, he had direct responsibility for conserving their Christian life, and he had to serve as head man of the village, mediating between the settlers and the Belgian administration such practical concerns as payment of taxes. But among the newcomers there were many skilled workmen as well as mission-trained teachers, evangelists, and Bible women. These religious workers were a boon to him in his general evangelistic efforts with the local population.

But even before the mission community began its unexpected expansion, Piper's work was many-faceted and demanding. He began by tackling Heinkel's uncompleted building program. Two years later he had to rebuild the station, at the behest of a new Belgian administrator, on a new site just outside the newly extended boundary of Musumba. He maintained a boarding and day school (there soon were seventy-five pupils), developed gardens, managed the community's business, doctored patients, and carried forward the evangelizing activity begun by Kayeka.

Piper's evangelistic program on Sundays included early chapel, a church service at the mission settlement, a series of services at several points in Musumba, and preaching and gospel singing in some of the smaller villages that could be reached in one day. In all this, he was supported by Mrs.

Piper, by Kayeka, by some of his pupils, and by a growing number of the able African newcomers. Piper could not project the evangelistic activity as far afield as he desired to, for he was tied too close to the station by his time-consuming work projects and by his conviction that he must give priority to the pastoral care of the families in the mission's own growing village. Piper appreciated the protective value of what distance there was between the mission's African community and Mwata Yamvo's village, Musumba. The chief, who was rumored to have some two hundred wives, was friendly enough to the mission, but Piper found him no sterling exemplar of moral or physical health and deplored the attraction his large village held for the mission school boys. "He is certainly living a fast life," reported Piper, "between the women, strong drink, and idleness. He does not exert a muscle, will not walk a hundred yards, drinks maloof excessively." Though he was not sure of the inner meaning of their Christian profession, Piper drew a contrasting picture of the habits of a group of mission villagers converted in a series of his evangelistic services:

but surely a good part of them are living lives of which we can be proud, as compared to those in the villages round about. The people of the Mission do not drink, do not smoke, do not hold dances, do not practice polygamy, they work much more diligently for themselves, and for their employers they are more faithful than those outside the Mission.

So many of the newcomers brought with them to Kapanga letters of church membership that it was easy to organize a church. By March, 1917, there were forty-eight full members and sixty-nine probationers.

Although Dr. Piper was the Mission's answer to Mwata Yamvo's request for a medical missionary, he was unable to develop his medical work at Kapanga as fully as originally he had hoped. Nevertheless, even though handicapped at times by limited supplies of medicines, he made a good beginning, gradually becoming familiar with the incidence of various diseases locally and the kinds of medicine needed, fairly soon being able to report hundreds of cases treated in daily clinics, even at times as many as forty patients a day. One of his patients—seriously ill—was Mwata Yamvo himself. But even after three years on the field, Piper had no hospital, thus being limited to medical treatments. Internal medication, he believed, was valuable, but as far as publicity was concerned, its results were "quite prosaic." He said, "It takes the romance of the surgical work to spread abroad, far and wide, the achievements of the foreign doctor, and it is this that opens to him the largest opportunity for spiritual results, I am convinced. And I am very anxious to get into it."

In 1917, Piper at last was able to devote himself chiefly to medical work, for he had three new missionary colleagues, Mr. and Mrs. Thomas B. Brinton and C. Marie Jensen, a native of Denmark. He built and opened a dis-

pensary and a small hospital, using funds donated by Mrs. Piper's family as a memorial to her mother. Miss Jensen, who was both nurse and midwife, assisted him. Brinton took over the educational and evangelistic activity, thus not only releasing the doctor for the medical work, but also making possible a substantial expansion of the mission's work in surrounding villages. For this, several more or less experienced African evangelist-teachers, with their families, went out to live in central villages.

During his two years in charge at Kambove with no superintendent to turn to, Roger Guptill became a well-trying missionary. Between 1915 and 1917, he developed the station well beyond Springer's beginnings. In addition to carrying forward the school, he cleared ten acres of forest for gardens and erected three sizeable buildings, two of them made of brick. "It was necessary to practice with dominoes until I was sure how to make the corners come right." Guptill also ran a bookstore, sent out young colporteurs, and even taught himself printing. On the press set up before Springer went on furlough, he turned out a Luunda hymn book based on materials provided by Mrs. Springer and as many as fifty varied vernacular helps for evangelistic and teaching activities. He kept the Mission's books and cared for all its business arrangements, which included organizing as many as five caravans to be sent up to the Kapanga mission. Starting with the regular services in the Kambove copper mines and nearby compounds, he extended the evangelistic program to eleven villages within fourteen miles of Kambove. Indeed, he was sorry that he was not appointed, in 1917, to purely village work. "I love the work in the villages," he said. "The life in the town seems so unnatural, but in the village one gets the native as he is, a dirty, ragged, congenial and lovable person, whose soul is precious in God's sight. I have had many a happy hour teaching these people . . ."

Jutu was not able greatly to augment the Lubumbashi enterprise during Springer's absence. But with the assistance of Moses Kumwenda and with occasional supervision rendered by Roger Guptill, he carried on a night school and Sunday services in an iron-and-wood Kaffir trading store. The school had its ups and downs, but its enrollment finally numbered fifty fee-paying pupils, and the attendance at the Sunday meetings taxed the capacity of the rough quarters in which they were held.

Springer returned to the Congo in February, 1917, in time to be in Kambove when Bishop Eben S. Johnson, on 28 March, reorganized the Mission as the Congo Mission Conference, with boundaries coinciding with those of the Belgian Congo.

At this first session of the Mission Conference, the members declared their opposition to the advance of Islam. As early as February, 1913, Springer had written Secretary Frank Mason North that the Congo mission already was confronting Islam through Muslim workers and traders and that the imminent completion of Africa's network of long-distance rail communication

threatened a potent invasion by the "Mohammedan menace." The Conference pinpointed the "menace" in 1917 by referring, in one of its reports, to groups of hundreds of Muslims brought into the Katanga mines from the east coast, an incursion of Muslim traders in the northeastern section of the Congo field, and three small villages of "followers of the false prophet" established near Lubumbashi. "We add this," declared the Conference, "as another urgent reason for the early and general occupation of the area by the Christian Church."

Under the new Mission Conference form of organization, John Springer continued as Superintendent, resident in Lubumbashi. Bishop Johnson appointed Roger Guptill to Lubumbashi and sent to Kambove Mr. and Mrs. Coleman C. Hartzler, Board missionaries who had come out from the States with the Springers. To Kapanga he appointed Thomas B. Brinton to take the evangelistic and school work, with Dr. Piper assigned to the medical work, assisted by Marie Jensen as nurse.

About a month after the close of the Mission Conference, Springer started north from Lubumbashi to lay the groundwork for a mission among the Luba people, the large tribe living north and east of the Lunda country. His purpose was to implement a hope he had been holding before him for four years. A group of Luba ex-slaves taught by the American Board missionaries in Angola had heard Kayeka tell of the Methodist missionary who had come to the Congo. When Kayeka went to see Springer again, in 1913, these people sent with him a Luba named Kaluwashi to see what could be done to secure a missionary for their native country. After conferring with Springer at the Lukoshi station, Kaluwashi went on to his homeland several hundred miles to the northeast, where he was reunited with his father and his boyhood friends. He told them of his conversion to Christ and soon was preaching informally to deputations of Baluba that came in from long distances. In August, he visited Springer in Kambove and told him that the people in his home neighborhood desired to have a missionary. Then, believing implicitly that the missionary would be sent in answer to prayer, he returned to Angola to guide his Christian friends back to their Luba homeland to establish a Christian colony there.

On a summer day in 1916, on furlough in Evanston, Illinois, Springer got a letter from Kaluwashi telling of his return to Angola and of a second journey to the Luba country—in all, he had tramped nearly 5,000 miles. With him were a few other Christian workers and their families from Angola who were ready to join a Methodist missionary there in the Lufungoi Valley, west of Lake Tanganyika, assist in building a station, and work as teachers and evangelists. "Where is my missionary?" asked Kaluwashi. As a result of Springer's telling the story of Kaluwashi's efforts, a single missions supporter pledged \$2,000 a year for five years to maintain a Board missionary on the Luba field. Hence, when Springer went north from Lubumbashi in

1917, accompanied by his wife, his new young secretary Roy S. Smyres, and a Luba mission worker named Saul, he was off to find Kaluwashi so as to open the way for the hoped-for mission.

They found Kaluwashi early in June at a Pentecostal mission at Mwanza, a dozen miles from Kikondja. Together they traveled several days' journey northwest to Kabongo, a high, healthful village of three thousand people—among them close relatives of Kaluwashi's—in the heart of the Luba country. There they were welcomed by the important chief Kabongo and the resident Belgian official, Mr. Van de Velde. With their encouragement, Springer quickly selected a site near the chief's village and the neighboring government post and sent off an application to the district commissioner, one paper bearing the thumb marks of four chiefs to attest to their desire to have the mission placed there. Twenty men who had come with him helped Springer bring nearly to completion a three-room house for the man he hoped to send there, leaving the construction to be finished by the village people under the direction of Van de Velde, who earlier had befriended Dr. Piper at Kapanga. After more than a fortnight in Kabongo, the Springer party was off again; Smyres returned south, Kaluwashi went to Mwanza to finish some construction work and to fetch his family, and Springer "slogged" westward for three weeks, to Kapanga.

When Springer got back to Lubumbashi in September, after a round trip of fourteen hundred miles by train and by trail, he found that no one had come from the United States to take up the Luba work. Therefore, in October, he sent the enthusiastic and adaptable young Guptill, with his wife and four-months-old son, to Kabongo to open the mission and to maintain it until relieved by a permanent appointee. Although Springer was convinced of the high potentiality of this penetration of the practically virgin missionary territory inhabited by the widely distributed Baluba, his views of them were not romantic. He characterized the heavy-drinking chief Kabongo as the most dissolute, degraded chief he ever had met, citing his harem of two hundred women, whom he sold off as he tired of them—"a constant stream of girls pouring in, and of debauched, wretched women going out." Of his impression of the Baluba as he passed among them outward bound from Kabongo, he later reported, "I do not recall ever before having such a sense of being surrounded by a vast, odiferous swamp of rank, sensuous, sensual and rampant heathenism." Governmental control of the area was new and tenuous, and cannibalism was practiced in villages not too far away from Kabongo. In fact, the chief himself was somewhat suspect, and he at least winked at the occasional cannibalistic lapses of some of the people in his vicinity.

In a modest way, the mission Guptill opened among these people had, like that at Kapanga, a colonizing nucleus. It included the Luba worker Saul, Kaluwashi, three couples from near Bukama, and forty Luba men,

women, and children who in August had transferred from the Kapanga mission, where they had been staying since arriving from Angola. This provided Guptill with a number of Christian workers. After starting a school in Kabongo village and another at the mission station, he quickly thrust out into the surrounding villages, before long visiting a dozen of them himself and sending some of his Luba workers to investigate still others. Almost from the first, he worked by a plan that called for ten outstations within a radius of forty miles, running right up to the edge of the overtly cannibal country to the north. He actually got five of them going, with evangelistic work centered in local day schools, four of which had schoolhouses built by the people. At Kakalwe, Tombo, Kavula, and Kitabele there were resident evangelistic teachers. Kimi, five miles from Kabongo, Guptill tended himself. A few small schools near by were taught by workers living with him at the station. Guptill hoped thus to develop a radiating Christian influence within a fairly compact area, with a central training school located at Kabongo. But the Guptills' stay was short; they left for Lubumbashi at the end of May, 1918, eight days after their successors, Wesley A. Miller and his wife, arrived at Kabongo. Miller was the missionary chosen to be financed by the five-year special gift elicited by Springer's presentation of Kaluwashi's story while on furlough in the States.

In September, 1918, Springer once again left the Congo for the United States, having been called home to engage in the Centenary movement. Roger Guptill then became the acting head of the Mission, although his position was not formalized until Bishop Johnson appointed him District Superintendent seven months later. Dr. Piper went on furlough a month after Springer departed. Roy S. Smyres, after stretching out his original short-term commitment, returned home a year later to finish his studies at Garrett Biblical Institute. Guptill took his furlough in the fall of 1919. But reinforcements came to the field. Indeed, Edward I. Everett, a probationer in the New England Conference, already had been at work for eight months by the time Springer left, having come to the Congo with Wesley Miller of Wyoming. William Erle Shields of Indiana and his wife arrived in June, 1919. Mr. and Mrs. John N. Dana came in April, 1920, in the company of Dr. Piper, who was returning from furlough.

When Springer went home, he left behind him, seven years after entering Kazembe's village on the Lukoshi, a well-established Congo mission, the fulfillment of his original unbending purpose. Out of his planning and his strenuous pioneering explorations had grown the Kambove-Lubumbashi-Kapanga-Kabongo combination, rootage sufficient for Methodism to hold a permanent place in the Congo.

The missionaries at all four stations were in touch with large numbers of Africans, but the nature of the contacts at Kapanga and Kabongo varied from those at Kambove and Lubumbashi. Each of the northern posts was at

the heart of an African community of its own, with an important African village close by and many others not far away. The stability of the population facilitated continuity and cumulative results in Christian cultivation. Each of these stations ministered to a single people—Kapanga to the Balunda, Kabongo to the Baluba—an advantage that simplified the linguistic demands upon the missionaries. Lubumbashi and Kambove, however, as Roger Guptill once pointed out, were white men's towns, and the nearest genuine African villages were six to fourteen miles away. The missionaries' chief function was to evangelize the thousands of African boys and men who came in from all over the Congo, and often from outside, to work in the mines and on local contracting jobs. They reached in this way many more people than did their colleagues to the north, but they labored under additional handicaps. The African workers spoke a variety of languages; in the Lubumbashi congregations were Baluba, Babemba, Basanga, Balunda, Bakaonde, Bawishi, Bangoni, Bahenga, and Banyanja. Learning even one African language was enough of a linguistic problem for a single missionary, and most of the time, neither Lubumbashi nor Kambove had more than one Methodist missionary in residence. The other handicap was the high transiency of the African population. More than three-quarters of the laborers generally moved on home after six to nine months, and those who did not shifted about from one mine location to another. The two southern missions seldom were able to maintain their influence over individuals for more than year or two. Even the boys who entered the Fox Bible Training School at Kambove did not stay long, being lured away by the wages they could make in the vicinity.

Although Springer's founding work was done, the workers who carried on during his sojourn in the United States nevertheless were pioneering missionaries. The railroad lines were continually lengthening out, but sooner or later all the missionaries tramped many hundreds of wearying miles and, both when abroad and when on station, experienced some hardships and many galling inconveniences. Even in Lubumbashi and Kambove, which for white men still were in many ways raw frontier communities, life was rough enough, and everywhere the work was exacting both physically and socially.

Roger Guptill and Roy Smyres carried on at Lubumbashi, assisted at first by Joseph Jutu (now working full time as pastor and teacher), with Edward Everett joining the staff in the months before Guptill's furlough. In the fall of 1918, Jutu was one of the first to die in an epidemic of Spanish influenza that swept the neighborhood, killing sixty whites and twelve hundred Africans, hundreds more dying unlisted in the forests. Guptill offered the church building as a hospital for both whites and blacks, and Smyres volunteered his services to the government, eventually being decorated by the King of Belgium for his organizing work in the hospital for Africans. Smyres not only served as the Mission's secretary and bookkeeper, but also preached in Chibemba, which he had rapidly learned. With only one regular missionary

in residence most of the time, the Lubumbashi mission nevertheless managed to remain active at twenty-five places at mine compounds and farms outside the town itself. One of the most important was the Star of the Congo Mine, some miles to the east, where services were opened in 1918. At that location, an African teacher maintained preaching, day and night schools, and an evangelistic program reaching out into neighboring villages.

Kambove was manned in rapid succession by Coleman Hartzler, Edward Everett, Roger Guptill, and William Shields. It had no steady missionary leadership and no steady expansive growth outside the town. However, occasional itineration yielded fresh contacts in outlying villages, and some beginnings in preaching and school work were made at Likasi and at Panda, a booming copper mining and processing center a dozen miles southwest of Kambove. Shield's appointment at the Conference of September, 1919, included Likasi, and two African villages that also came under his supervision were listed. Under Shields, the evangelization of villages lying in several directions began to pick up. At Likasi and Panda especially, it included ministries to white men.

Kabongo admittedly was a hard field, and Wesley Miller, the inexperienced missionary who followed Guptill there hardly six months after the station was opened, found it so. He was perhaps temperamentally less suited to the demands of such an outpost than was Guptill, who threw himself into such primitive situations with gusto. Miller had to finish the building program started by Springer and Guptill, enlarge the gardens cleared on the edge of the jungle, ward off sickness in his own family, practice simple medicine with distressed Africans who appealed to him, struggle against wretched sanitary conditions even in his Christian village (the people were filthy, he said, and knew nothing of hygiene), conduct a school at the compound and at Kabongo, train evangelists, and wrestle with the task of overcoming a complex, and what seemed to him an almost immovable, cultural barrier between him and the Baluba. The work was so demanding and so unpredictable that the Millers believed it was mutually unfair for the Mission to place a new missionary in a new and isolated post; first he should have six months' service with an experienced missionary.

Miller's idea of the radical opposition between the Christianity of the white missionary and the "cult" of the Baluba was no abstraction; he found their paganism dynamically concentrated in a real antagonist:

The witch doctor, that devil incarnate, exercises over them a power which no royal despot would dare assume. He not only cheats and robs them in every conceivable way, but condemns scores of them to slavery and a violent death every year. His influence is as baleful as the atmosphere of Hell. He is the most perfect representative and type of Satan that I know of. But the superstitious black man bows down and trembles before him.

Miller saw himself and his wife as lone missionaries sent to Kabongo to "join battle with these powers of darkness."

Like Springer, who sent him into the area, Miller had no delusion that he was not working among "raw heathen," and like Springer he cited the presence of cannibalism as evidence:

Within twenty miles of the Mission cannibalism is rampant. One is likely to find human bones on the floor of any hut one enters in that region. The flesh has been cured and stored overhead for future use. Scores of men and women are killed and eaten every year in this vicinity. Even in Kabongo, one mile from the Mission, human flesh is eaten secretly.

How much direct evidence Miller had to support his claim he did not state.* But this represented his understanding of the scene of his work. In all this, however, he did not feel personally threatened. White men generally were not harmed by the cannibals, and "I am the missionary" was enough to gain him immunity. Even the most benighted savages, he said, knew that the missionary was their friend.

Most of Miller's work and results were confined to the immediate vicinity of the mission station and Kabongo. Largely because of the failure of several of the teacher-evangelists originally settled in outstations by Guptill, Miller closed all but the one at Kitabele and did not succeed in reopening them. He found it too difficult to do enough out-country itineration either for evangelistic or for supervisory purposes. Therefore, Guptill's ten-town plan for outstations was discarded. Especially when Coleman Hartzler came to Kabongo in the fall of 1919 to work with Miller, the school work at the mission compound showed good development, as did girls' and women's activities under Mrs. Miller's leadership.

With Dr. Piper gone on furlough in 1918, Marie Jensen took over as much of his medical work as she could handle, though like the doctor, she was hampered by lack of medicines. When Piper left Kapanga, Miss Jensen was off for two months on a trip to the north to serve as midwife to the wife of Jacob Mawene, the teacher at Kayembe Mukulu. She traveled with twelve carriers and an African assistant. Each day on her week's journey outward, she dispensed medicines to villagers who came to her tent and then gave gospel talks, with the aid of her interpreter, to the sick and the curious who clustered about afterwards. Taking a different route home, she spent a fortnight making similar contacts in both Lunda and Luba villages along her trail. The influenza reached Kapanga the following March. Although she had almost no medical resources with which to fight the disease, so many people crowded her hospital that Miss Jensen, working from 7 A.M. to 1 A.M., lost count. There were only two deaths at the mission. After that, with an African teacher assisting in treating sores, the clinic went back to a

* See Note, p. 113.

twelve-hour schedule, handling at least fifteen or twenty, often as many as sixty, cases a day. In addition to all this, Miss Jensen specialized in work with girls, developing a day school of thirty-five pupils. A boarding school for girls was built by April, 1920, and opened after Dr. Piper's return in June. In connection with this school, Miss Jensen began directing biweekly forays of Bible women into out villages.

While Marie Jensen was fighting sickness and disease, her co-worker Thomas Brinton was doing what he could for the slaves who came to his door one by one begging him to help them procure their freedom. It was reported that perhaps half the population of Musumba were slaves of Mwata Yamvo or of some of his court. Even the Belgian administrators had to move slowly in carrying out their policy to root out slavery, for if Mwata Yamvo were pressed too hard, he could escape Belgian interference by moving to a governmental no-man's land across the Kasai River in Angola. Brinton had to use endless tact to plead the cause of the slaves without having an open break with the chief and his entourage. Mwata Yamvo and his people were persuaded in 1918 to build a Christian school and a chapel in his village, and the missionaries counted on the influence of this school rather than on strict law enforcement to better social conditions in the neighborhood. Meanwhile, the mission's medical services always were available to sick, discarded slaves.

In the year before Marie Jensen and the Brintons went on furlough, in the spring of 1921, Thomas Brinton spent much time translating New Testament portions and other needed materials into the tongue of the Balunda. His evangelistic efforts over a longer period so extended the mission's outreach that he was able, in his last pre-furlough Conference report, to point to ten pastoral charges, each staffed by an African evangelist and an African teacher. In addition to Musumba and the village of Kapanga, there were Kayemba Mukulu, Mwini Chitasi, and Mwini Chiyung to the northeast, and to the south there were Mwini Dikamba, Muteba, Sandamoka, Mwini Matanga, and Mbakou, which was across the Lulua River from Sandoa. Bishop Johnson designated this expanding group of stations in September, 1919, as the Lunda-Chiokwe District, with Brinton as Superintendent. At the same time, he constituted the rest of the stations as the Luba District, with Edward I. Everett as Superintendent.

During 1918 and 1919, the Mission put much effort and some money into a plan to develop a fifth station, to be known as the Congo Institute, which would train African workers and leaders to man and empower the expansion of the entire Congo mission for the future. Acting on his own initiative—that is, without any authority from the Mission or the Board—but with the subsequent approval of the other missionaries, John Springer undertook early in 1918 a contract to develop an excellent 1,500-acre farm site at Mulungwishi, ten miles north of Kambove. Under the agreement, which he made legally in his own name but in intention for the Mission, he

took over from Joseph P. Ellis, a Catholic friend of his, a contract with the government to improve 120 acres by 30 April 1920 and to pay \$600 for full and final title to the property. Springer intended to meet the development condition by engaging the Institute's pupils in an immediate work-study program at Mulungwishi.

To Coleman Hartzler, assisted at times by Edward Everett, fell the task of developing the Mulungwishi project. In February, he got a work crew of boys onto the new site to begin clearing the land. In July, he moved the Fox Training School boys from Kambove to Mulungwishi, making them the nucleus of the Congo Institute's school. He took up his residence in a roofless two-room house and opened the school outdoors in the shade it cast. In a little more than a year, Hartzler was running a day school with a dozen pupils and a night school with thirty and was supervising three outstations taken from Kambove and attached to Mulungwishi. Under his direction the Institute boys and hired workers—sometimes as many as sixty all together—put up nine mission buildings and forty African huts and houses, cleared and planted twenty acres, and cleared fifteen more acres from "the veritable forest" of thorn trees.

But at Conference time in April, 1919, the Mission's Finance Committee, which consisted of Guptill, Hartzler, and Everett, regretfully voted to liquidate the Mulungwishi enterprise. A chief reason was that the Governor-General of the Belgian Congo had signified in writing that he did not wish the Methodists to establish themselves at Mulungwishi and would not support their request for final occupation of the concession there. The Committee believed that only by subterfuge or by deliberately bypassing the Congo administration could the Mission acquire the Mulungwishi site from the Brussels government. This was counted impossible, because the Mission Conference had just publicly expressed its desire to co-operate with the government in developing the Katanga region. The shortness of the time left for clearing the remaining acres and doubts about the further financial viability of the project also were factors in the Committee's decision. The members were reluctant to cut down on expenditures for the established stations in order to float the Mulungwishi venture. This was a time of generally severe financial difficulty in the Mission, and Bishop Johnson testified that it fell so heavily upon individual members of the Conference that some of them were not able even to afford an adequate diet. Bishop Johnson and the Centenary Deputation then surveying the field concurred in the Finance Committee's action.

John Springer, who was in the United States at the time of the Finance Committee vote, was greatly distressed at the action and pressed as hard as he could to have the Board of Missions reinstate the Congo Institute program at Mulungwishi. He realized, as did the other missionaries, that it was crucially important to be able to train up a corps of African teachers and evangelists if the Mission was to project its Christian message deeply into

the life of the Congo. At this time, the mission at Kapanga especially needed more helpers, for its original group had turned out to have more Luba than Lunda workers. Springer wanted to have the Methodists hold on at the Mulungwishi site in the hope that there would be a new Governor-General who would be more favorable to their efforts. He strongly charged that the incumbent official was acting out of pro-Catholic prejudice and was cooperating with Roman Catholic missionaries in their attempt to block the development of a well-founded Methodist mission that would compete with them in the same territory. As he had done before, he invoked the Holy spirit as sanction for his proposal:

I claim very definite divine leadership in all moves in connection with the Congo Mission and I can give what I believe is convincing proof to the ordinary mind that such has been the case in most things in regard to this Mission. And I must say that there have been few things in which the divine provision, leading and indications were clearer than they were in regard to this Concession on the Mulungwishi as a site for the Congo Institute.

But the Board stood by the decision of the Finance Committee and did not attempt to reactivate the Mulungwishi station.

The Congo Institute idea did not die, however, but was embedded in a well-articulated, eight-page statement "Policy of the Congo Mission Conference" that was adopted at the Conference session in September, 1919. No new site for the Institute was discovered at this time, but its educational work was kept alive at Kapanga and at Kabongo, to which Coleman Hartzler was transferred. The schools at these two stations were considered departments of the Congo Institute. The Fox Bible Training School was continued at Kambove.

Bishop Hartzell's original assurance that special gifts would keep the new Congo Mission off appropriations for the first five years had turned out to be well founded. Not until 1917 did its financial support become a combination of appropriations and special gifts. The Board appropriated \$500 for the Congo Mission Conference for that year and followed it with \$1,000 for 1918 and \$3,650 for 1919. The statistics that measured the growth of the Mission's constituency were equally modest, though they reflected the virtue of the Congo policy of restraint in acquiring church members and in counting them. By 1919, there were 161 full members of the church and 36 probationers as well as 784 apparently regular "hearers." The most numerous constituency was that at Kapanga, where there were 92 full members, 5 probationers, and 580 hearers. At the same time, fifteen African teachers and evangelists were under formal appointment in the work of the Mission Conference.

NOTES

Page 87. See Percy Smith to F. M. North, 13 April 1919. Smith quotes from Duncan B. MacDonald, *Aspects of Islam* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1911). MacDonald's book presents a broad, balanced, and sensitive appreciation of Islam and describes the patient, creative, non-judgmental attitude he believed Christian missionaries should hold toward it. His work is directly antithetical to the restricted and radically unsympathetic view generally held by the Methodist workers and leaders related to the work in North Africa.

Page 98. This new mission location is variously referred to in sources as Mwata Yamvo, Mwata Yamvo's, Musumba, Florence Station, and Kapanga. In the rest of this chapter, we refer to the mission and its locality in general as Kapanga. Musumba will refer specifically to Mwata Yamvo's town. The village of Kapanga will signify the African village of that name. We distinguish as necessary between the missionaries' residential station and the mission's African village, which were separate but near each other.

Page 109. For an independent treatment of the prevalence and practice of cannibalism among the Baluba, see Sir Harry Johnston, *George Grenfell and the Congo* (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1908), Vol. I, pp. 398 f. and 404 ff. It is coherent with Miller's account.

Immigrants in Sarawak

METHODISM FIRST ENTERED SARAWAK, on the island of Borneo, in 1901, through a combination of immigration from China and missionary extension from Malaya.

In the summer of 1900, Wong Nai Siong, a Methodist entrepreneur from Fukien Province, came to Sarawak by way of Singapore, visiting Kuching, the capital of Sarawak's storied White Rajahs, and the Rajang River town of Sibü. Charles Brooke, the reigning Rajah, was concerned at that time with stimulating agriculture in his domain by importing Chinese farmers, and Wong was looking for an opportunity to gather and resettle abroad a company of Chinese hard pressed by conditions in Fukien. The two men met, talked terms, and entered into a contract calling for the introduction of a thousand adult Chinese into the Rajang area within two years.

Returning to China, Wong, who was a Methodist, soon enrolled, within a hundred miles of the port city of Foochow, about five hundred Fukien provincials. Most of them were Christians, most of them Methodists from the Foochow Conference. Times were hard. Wong's recruits were reconciled to such a move as promised relief from the cumulative distresses of drought, floods, poor harvests, high prices, scarcity of money, and dangerous popular antagonism toward Christians. Wong would pay their passage to Sarawak, and each adult would have at least three acres of land free of rent for twenty years, with a monthly cash allowance provided by the Sarawak government for the first six months.

Wong's party sailed from Foochow in two seagoing junks in the middle of December. William A. Main, superintendent of the Ku-Cheng District, wrote the Missionary Society in New York that the Methodist pilgrims were on their way to Sarawak to start a Christian colony and would need supervision by the Malaysia Mission. While in Singapore late in February, 1901, presiding over the Malaysia Mission Conference, Bishop Frank W. Warne read an excerpt from Main's letter in the current number of *The Gospel in All Lands*. He also heard about Wong's company direct from China, perhaps from Main himself. Following hard upon this news, the two junkloads of emigrants from Fukien, blown two thousand miles down through the South China Sea by the northeast monsoon, arrived in Singapore.

Bishop Warne searched out the sea-worn travelers, and engaged in long conferences with them. At their urgent request, he finally decided to accompany them to Sarawak to assist in the arrangements for their settlement and to organize a Methodist circuit among them. He postponed his planned sailing to the Philippines, boarded one of the junks from Foochow, and shared with the refugees a rough passage east across three hundred miles of the South China Sea to Kuching, and then on through sixty miles of stormy seas north to the Rajang River.* There, twenty-five miles upstream, on the night of 16 March, the exhausting months of misery in the confinement of the battered junks came to an end at the island town of Sibu, the seat of government for Sarawak's Third Division. Riddled as their company was with sickness and debility, the long-discouraged pilgrims began to sing Christian hymns as they approached the landing place near the sites of their future homes. Once ashore, they were made comfortable in large, commodious houses built by the government for their temporary use.

On Sunday morning, using an interpreter, Bishop Warne held a preaching service for the new arrivals. Filling the veranda outside the building, blocking the doorways, standing in a row around the Chinese audience, and pressing in close to the Bishop on either side, stood some of the local Dayaks—naked but for bracelets and loincloths, their loose black hair falling down their backs, and most of them carrying parangs, knives used in the headhunting for which the tribes in Borneo had been noted. Thus surrounded, Bishop Warne made the first Methodist evangelistic appeal given in Sarawak.

As a result, that night at a second service, the Bishop baptized twelve non-Christian adults, who had come across the sea with their Fukien Christian neighbors, and two children. Then he held a love feast, administered the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper, and finally appointed, from among the newly arrived Methodists, a supernumerary member of the Foochow Conference named Ding Chin Seng to serve as preacher-in-charge, to be assisted by four out of about twenty Local Preachers who were available. Three days later, having done all he could for the morale of the fearful colonists, Warne was back in Kuching, leaving behind him on the Rajang an organized Methodist circuit of the Singapore District of the Malaysia Mission Conference.

As he returned to Singapore and journeyed on to Manila to consolidate the new work there, Bishop Warne carried with him the memory of some of the Chinese immigrants at Sibu, disconcerted by the savage-looking Dayaks, asking him to use his influence with the authorities to secure their protection, and entreating him to send them an American missionary to intercede for them.

Bishop Warne promptly instructed Ling Ching Mi, pastor of the Singapore Foochow Church, to visit the settlers in Sarawak. When Ling arrived in

* See note, p. 134.

Sibu in June, accompanied by Wong Nai Siong, he found that many of the settlers were ill, some of them dangerously so—a residual effect of the rigors of their months at sea. He busied himself night and day tending the sick and assisting Wong with the settlers' problems. During the month he spent in the vicinity, Ling devoted his Sundays to preaching and administering Communion at three places where the Fukien people were now located. He realized that since the four hundred church members and probationers were now gathered in clusters scattered many miles apart in a country where there were no roads, but only rivers, through the engulfing jungle, preachers were needed for a number of places.

In March, 1902, Benjamin F. West, Superintendent of the Singapore District, spent five days in Sarawak, traveling by rowboat out from Sibu, where there were a few Methodist constituents, to the five outlying Chinese settlements—Sing Chhu Ang, Siong Pho, Au Pho, Chung Pho, and Ha Pho. In each of them he preached and administered Communion, and visited all the immigrant houses. West found that the colonists were now better acclimated to the jungle-covered country, serious sickness no longer plagued them, good crops were coming along, their own houses were replacing company houses, and their spirits were good.

Shortly after West left for Singapore, Wong's colonization company brought another five hundred immigrants into the Sibu neighborhood from Fukien Province. Many of these, as in the case of the first group, were Methodist constituents. They too suffered severe hardships during their first year in the colony, and when West returned to Sarawak late in October, accompanied by a Malaya missionary colleague, John R. Denyes, he found much sickness among them.

West found that in spite of a threatened factional split over the continued leadership of Ding Chin Seng which he had succeeded in overcoming through correspondence, evangelistic progress had been made since the spring visitation. Daily devotional meetings were being held, and fifty-two people were presented for baptism as a result of preaching by Local Preachers and others. There was a general demand for schools—a demand the government was anxious to help the Methodist leadership meet. At one station a school was already under way.

West had little money to spend for the Sarawak circuit, but what he had—an appropriation of \$300 and a gift of \$155 from his home town, Crawfordsville, Indiana—he used chiefly to encourage the erection of church buildings. He was able to count upon the co-operation of the Rajah, who hospitably entertained him and Denyes in Kuching and expressed deep interest in the Methodist mission. The government contributed in five- to ten-acre lots, all the land that was needed for church and mission purposes. West and Denyes spent a whole day paddling about in the rain to stake out sites at Siong Pho, Tiong Pho, Sang O Chong, and Sing Chhu Ang. Since he observed

evidence of growing prosperity among the earlier settlers (they were now building houses for themselves), West allocated a hundred dollars to each building project on condition that the people would contribute like amounts.

At the Malaysia Conference in Singapore the following February (1903), Bishop Warne appointed James M. Hoover, just ordained Elder, to the "Borneo" circuit of the Singapore District—the founder of the Sarawak mission thus sending it its first settled missionary.

Hoover—thirty years old, single, six feet tall, and weighing 160 pounds—was a teacher in the Anglo-Chinese School for boys, in Penang, Straits Settlements, and also pastor of the Tamil Church there. His preparation for missionary life in the jungle country of Borneo also included boyhood on a Pennsylvania farm, an active church life, graduation from state normal school, lay preaching, Y.M.C.A. work, evangelistic work in the county jail, and nine years as a public school teacher. In March, 1899, he had read, in the current issue of *World-Wide Missions*, "A Call to Our Young Men," by Bishop James M. Thoburn. He promptly volunteered, on Bishop Thoburn's terms, to be one of twelve young men to go to India or Malaysia as missionaries for four years on salaries not to exceed three hundred dollars, and he was accepted by the Missionary Society.

Hoover came to Sibu on 26 March 1903, accompanied by West, his District Superintendent. At Sing Chhu Ang, about four miles from Sibu, the two missionaries found the church building already completed, its frame of bilian wood standing two stories high and eighty by forty feet, the roof and sides thatched with leaves of the nipa palm (atap). West and Hoover made a tour of the four other stations, holding an enthusiastic service at each place and inspecting the four church buildings that were under construction. Each of the structures put up by the settlers was worth three or four times the \$100 West had given towards it the year before.

After about three weeks on the field, West returned to Singapore, and Hoover was on his own. He took up residence a few miles from Sibu, in Sing Chhu Ang—a single American in a community of sixty or seventy Chinese whose language he did not share, in a jungle area pierced by only four miles of road, limited to traveling by boat to reach his other posts. In order to save for the Mission his thirty dollars' monthly rental allowance, Hoover established his living quarters in two small rooms partitioned off at the end of the new church.

Hoover began itinerating on his river circuit on a three-week plan, reaching two posts each week—holding services, visiting the people, tending the sick, superintending the church-building activities, interpreting legal questions, and giving instruction in farming ("my old job") and pig raising. "This is real missionary work and I am delighted with it," he said, in spite of the hard and time-killing work of traveling by rowboat, his only means of transportation until he secured a gasoline launch nearly two years later.

By the time Hoover began his work on the Rajang, the thousand immigrants from Fukien Province had shrunk to about seven hundred; 250 of them (probably from the second group) had returned to China sick and discouraged, and seventy had died. Among the remaining colonists were twenty Catholics, sixty Anglicans, and three hundred Methodists. The rest—already under the influence of the Christian element—were still non-Christian, but easily accessible to evangelism. "I have not seen an idol in the settlements," Hoover reported. From among these people Hoover expected his first converts to come. And he had hopes of reaching eventually some of the 5,000 Dayaks and 2,500 Sibus who lived near the half dozen mission stations—people who seemed "to have as little religion as it is possible for man to have," said Hoover in a first hasty comment upon the all-pervasive animistic beliefs and practices of the tribesmen. Upriver from Sibiu, there was also a settlement of two or three hundred Cantonese whom Hoover wanted to evangelize.

Hoover's first move, after beginning his scheduled itineration, was to open a school. It was a hurried move, partly a defensive action; for after West's visits in 1902, Roman Catholic brothers had started a school in Sibiu that was drawing practically all the children among the Fukien immigrants. The Catholic school was providing free books, clothing, board, and lodging for the youngsters, whose parents were eager to have them learn English. West and Hoover saw all this as a threat to the future of the Methodist mission among the Chinese. They at once got the Methodist parents to take their boys home from the Catholic school, and Hoover set to work to have the rest of the Fukien children withdrawn. He was determined to win them all away from the Catholics, for "we claim as ours," he said, "all the people in those six settlements." To compete with the Catholics, Hoover had to meet them on their own ground; the non-Methodist parents did not wish to withdraw their children unless other provision should be made for their schooling. Therefore, by the end of his second month on the Rajang, Hoover started a school for boys in the church building at Sing Chhu Ang, taking responsibility for boarding twenty-five of them because of the distance and the economic condition of most of their homes. When West visited Sarawak in December, Hoover had thirty-one boys in the new school, learning English and Chinese.

When the Malaysia Conference met in Singapore in February, 1904, it heard reports on the Sarawak mission that credited it with 7 preaching places, 5 church buildings, 4 Sunday schools (with 145 pupils), an affiliated group numbering 183 full members of the church and 158 probationers, and a total of baptisms (47 children and 37 adults) greater than for all the rest of the Singapore District.

At this Conference session, Bishop James M. Thoburn appointed three Chinese supply pastors to assist Hoover with the church work in the river

stations. Until the Foochow Christian community expanded in the second decade of the century, Hoover continued, generally, to have three such preachers ministering to the half dozen churches in his care. One of the men, Uong Keng Huo, was ordained Deacon and received on trial in the Conference in 1904, and later became an Elder and a full member of the Conference, preaching under Hoover's leadership until 1918.

Hoover also brought back with him from Singapore another assistant—his bride Mary Young, stepdaughter of George F. Pykett, superintendent of the Penang District. Mrs. Hoover, experienced as a teacher in the Anglo-Chinese Girl's School in Penang, became a special worker with Chinese women and children in Sarawak, sometimes being assisted by one or two Chinese Bible women. Returning from Conference in Kuala Lumpur the following year, the Hoovers brought with them Florence E. Archer, a trained nurse sent out from the United States by the Missionary Society to work among the women of the Foochow colony. For reasons of health, however, she stayed hardly three months.

At the same time, the Hoovers moved out of the rooms in the Sing Chhu Ang church into a large house in Sibü, which provided quarters for the boys' boarding school, a day school of a dozen girls started by Mrs. Hoover, and Sunday preaching services. In the summer of 1908, the Hoovers moved again, into a newly constructed mission house on land donated by the Rajah's government. Here they had four rooms for themselves, accommodations for the Chinese preacher, one room each for the boys' and the girls' schools, and a roomy chapel for church services, with outbuildings adjoining the main house.

Not long before his removal to Sibü, Hoover had come into a new relationship with the Foochow community that determined the position of the Methodist mission in Sarawak for many years to come.

From the beginning in 1901, Wong Nai Siong, the entrepreneur who brought the Foochow immigrants to Sarawak, was recognized by Rajah Brooke's government as the headman of the new Chinese communities. By 1904, the settlers had repaid Wong more than \$30,000 on the financial advances he had made to them in the early days, but Wong had defaulted on his own payments on \$40,000 in loans he had received from the Rajah. Called to account, he proved to be quite insolvent. The Rajah came to Sibü in the summer of 1904, investigated Wong's management of colonial affairs, and promptly ordered him to leave Sarawak by the first boat. Wong's banishment stuck consternation into the Chinese, who were themselves dissatisfied with Wong but feared that his departure would leave them defenseless before the far more numerous Dayaks and Malays.

The Rajah now made Hoover virtually the headman of the Foochow colony, the recognized intermediary between the settlers and the government, which Hoover later described as a beneficent absolute monarchy dedicated

to improving the condition of the people and protecting them from exploitation. A "sort of oligarchy," as Hoover put it, was organized to manage the colony. Two men were appointed at each of the five Foochow settlements, "to settle all troubles that might arise," and Hoover was designated as the arbiter of all difficulties that were too much for the local leaders. He was expected finally to report to the government any problems he could not resolve.

As the colony's chief magistrate, Hoover at once found dumped into his lap a three-year accumulation of cases not satisfactorily handled by Wong. During this period, he managed to settle all but a single case, one involving a man outside the Chinese community. "If many a lawyer had the practice we have," he wrote, "he would not give it up for a seat on the Supreme Court bench."

The leader of the Methodist mission and the administrator of the Foochow community were now the same man. Naturally, the new role bestowed on him by the Rajah enhanced Hoover's prestige up and down the Rajang; he was now an important public official. It is not strange that he soon acquired the name that clung to him in Sarawak for the rest of his life—Tuan Hoover.* The Mission also benefited from the blending of Hoover's missionary and civil functions. Although it was not an identification that made Methodism the official religion, it gave that church an unusually strategic position among the people out of whom it was building its religious community.

The Dayaks Hoover and his wife at first found accessible. Some of them were especially eager to have schools, even if they had to take Christian teaching along with them. In the very article in *The Malaysia Message* that first announced his appointment as headman for the Chinese, Hoover had optimistically detailed some of the gradual penetration of Dayak circles by the Methodists. "We are fast getting an entrance into these people's homes and hearts," he said, "and feel sure that in due time, we shall be able to extend the Kingdom among them." Evidently influenced by a stereotype that did them less than justice, Bishop William F. Oldham, visiting Sarawak in May, 1905, wrote from Sibü that "our hope is that through our Chinese settlers and by direct preaching and teaching the gospel may begin to soon find its way among the strange and bloody-minded people who have made Borneo a synonym for savagery."

It was a vain hope that Hoover and Bishop Oldham shared for the evangelization of the Dayaks—a hope that foundered on economics and politics.

The Chinese farmers, now beginning to get onto their own feet economically, and starting to develop variety in their crops, enjoyed a year of great prosperity following Wong's dismissal. They began to cut their clearings

* *Tuan* is a Malay term of respect equivalent to *Sir*.

farther into the jungle, at the same time, unlike the Dayaks, continuing to replant indefinitely all the land cultivated in previous seasons. Hoover participated fully in this Chinese agricultural expansion, and particularly in the land question. With the government's Resident, he devoted much time and hard work to surveying the Chinese holdings and setting up boundary posts.

The surrounding Dayaks saw the growing Chinese economy as an aggressive force, and resented it. Compounding their resentment was the feeling of being crowded, also, by thousands of other Dayaks (Hoover's estimate) who were leaving an area of tribal hostilities farther up the Rajang and settling along the previously almost uninhabited banks of the Igan River. Although Hoover tried to keep the Chinese advance from working concrete injustices to the Dayaks, misunderstanding and disappointment were inevitable. And since in the eyes of the Dayaks, Hoover was now the Foochows' man, he had to bear some of the onus of Dayak resistance to the encroachments of the increasingly prosperous Chinese.

It is not surprising, then, to find him saying in another *Malaysia Message* article, just a year after taking office, "While I am talking about Dyaks, I may as well say that our relations with them are not so cordial as last year." He predicted that the rising economic conflict between the two peoples was only the beginning of more such trouble, and acknowledged that it would produce a cleavage between the Mission and the Dayaks. But Hoover was essentially reconciled to that result; he had developed a bit of missionary philosophy to cover it:

. . . there is nothing else to be done. This colony is the beginning of the Kingdom of God on this island, and it must succeed; and as Secretary Shaw* once said in an address, "A fiat seems to have gone out to all the people of the world—you must either move on [progress] or move off." The Dayak has heard it, and seems unwilling to move on, so has but one other thing to do.

With this confession, instinct with the spirit of the muscle-flexing imperialism then enjoying a certain popularity in the United States, Hoover revealed the true foundations of the mission he led. Whatever it might ultimately contribute to the people of Sarawak as a whole, its evangelistic aim was directed first of all toward the Chinese community, its permanence was dependent upon the prosperity of that community's group interests.

During these years, Hoover became not only the Chinese colony's advocate, but also its practicing agricultural adviser, intimately concerning himself with the development of new methods and new crops. At a time when there was a strong demand for rubber on the world market, he encouraged the local farmers to start rubber plantations, using Pará rubber trees instead of

* Undoubtedly Leslie M. Shaw, a prominent Methodist then serving as Theodore Roosevelt's Secretary of the Treasury.

the wild vines from which only small amounts of inferior rubber could be made. When Bishop Oldham returned to Singapore from a visit to Sibu in 1905, he sent out to Hoover two thousand rubber plants, with a loss of 25 to 40 per cent of the seedlings in transit. "I am putting in the whole lot around the Ha Pho Church," wrote Hoover, evidently implying that the proceeds would be added to Mission funds. Later, he planted two thousand seeds sent him by Dr. West. In less than a year, the colony had several thousand rubber trees coming along, and imported eleven thousand seeds while Hoover was on furlough in 1906. This was a development evidently not at first to the liking of the government, which had brought the colonists into the country primarily to grow rice. But rubber trees stayed planted, and producing rubber eventually assumed economic importance in Sarawak.

When Bishop Oldham visited Sarawak, in June, 1909, he secured from Rajah Brooke three important concessions advantageous to the Chinese. First, he won unconditional cancellation of the Wong debt of \$25,000, for which the Rajah's government was holding the colonists responsible. The Bishop, once a surveyor in India, also secured the Rajah's promise to have the colonists' lands surveyed, thus removing causes for boundary disputes among the Foochow people, and guaranteeing long-term rights to measured plots. And finally, he persuaded the Rajah to grant the colony definite boundaries within which the Foochows would be expected to move—thus establishing a pattern ending land troubles between the Chinese and the Dayaks.

The Rajah's definitive land grant to the Chinese hardly could be expected to win friends for the Mission among the Dayaks; the Foochows were now given a twelve-mile frontage of good land on either bank of the Rajang River. Hoover himself thus described the announcement of the Rajah's decision:

On one of the Rajah's visits he called into the local Fort [in Sibu] the head men of the Malays, Chinese, and Dayaks and said to them: "The colony is here. We will not discuss whether it is a good thing or not, but since it is here, and there is abundant land for everybody in this district, I am going to set aside certain areas for the Foochows, out of which they will not be allowed to settle and into which no others will be allowed to go. All Dyaks, Malays, and others now living in these areas must move out at once." He then had a large map hung on the wall, and he himself, with a blue pencil marked points on the river banks showing the extent of the grants.

That was that—another echo of Secretary Shaw's "move on or move out." It gave impetus to the "manifest destiny" of the Foochow community, but raised all the higher the barrier between the Methodists and the Dayaks. Perhaps tacit acceptance of that fact underlay Hoover's report to the Malaysia Conference in 1910: "The colony is now established, and the principal work now is to hold what we have, and look for immigrants."

In 1910, about five hundred more Chinese came up the Rajang from the

distant homeland—an increase equivalent to the size of the original pilgrim band of 1901. This substantial augmentation of the colony resulted in a major clearing of new agricultural land in the area marked off the year before by the Rajah. Another five hundred arrived in 1911,* lifting the population of the Foochow colony to about three thousand, and seven hundred more came in 1913.

In 1912, the Methodist Chinese community received an increment of immigrants from a new source, south of Foochow—the Hsinghua section of Fukien Province. About a hundred Hsinghua-speaking farmers (including twenty-one boys from the Rebecca McCabe Orphanage), accompanied by a Hsinghua preacher, arrived in Sibu in May and were settled on land the government assigned them on the Igan River and adjacent to the Foochow holdings.

This new colony was a product of the initiative of William N. Brewster, missionary-in-charge on the four city Districts of the Hsinghua Conference, who was concerned about the losses to the Methodist fold that occurred when converts emigrated to Malaysia and entered areas where they were without pastoral care by people speaking their own dialect. After preliminary moves by Brewster and by Bishop Wilson S. Lewis, Bishop Oldham, on a visit to Borneo, secured from the Rajah of Sarawak a concession of land and an initial financial grant for the project. Brewster then went to Sarawak, completed negotiations with the Rajah's government, and upon returning to China, organized the first company of what he hoped would become a very large removal of Chinese Christians to the agriculturally promising island realm.

The Hsinghua group arrived in Sarawak on 22 May 1912, following only by weeks the coming of a newly appointed Board missionary, Charles E. Davis, to work with Hoover. Davis, thirty-two years old, had behind him some experience in farming and in public school teaching and had taken special training in agriculture during the brief period following his application to serve in Sarawak. The Hsinghuas were real farmers and were quickly successful in planting, harvesting, and marketing crops. Much of their success in the first year was attributed, however, to the guidance of Davis, who gave the new project close attention, living on the Hsinghua location part of the time.

Brewster's broader hopes for the colony remained unrealized. Through a combination of causes, emigration from Hsinghua to Sarawak did not become a great stream, but quickly dried up. The original company was followed, within weeks, by only thirty-nine compatriots, including a number of boys from the McCabe Orphanage whose presence became a problem rather than a reinforcement. The manager of the rice plantation planned by

* See note, p. 134.

Brewster for the benefit of the Orphanage soon returned to China, and some of the Hsinghua land, remaining unworked, was turned back to the Malays by the government.

In the summer of 1912, after visiting the government's outstations, the Rajah announced in the *Sarawak Gazette* that settlers were wanted to make the Baram River region a center for growing of rice, pepper, sago, and rubber. "The American Mission will be approached at once, and their assistance asked in finding Chinese immigrants whom the Government will be prepared to support for say two years as well as assist in felling old jungle, and making homes," wrote the Rajah. This proposal reflected warm official approval of the Mission's accomplishments during its first decade. Hoover was excited by it and asked the Rajah to arrange for him to visit the area. "There is no reason why we should not annex this whole country now, when we have the chance," he wrote to Bishop Oldham.

In April, 1913, Hoover and Davis spent several days exploring a section of the Baram River valley by boat. They were impressed by the possibilities of the land, but disillusioned by seasonal difficulties affecting the navigability of the river.

The Baram River proposal received its *coup de grâce*, however, when Hoover, who came home from the arduous trip to the north exhausted and ill with fever, suffered a nervous collapse a few days later and had to leave for Kuching and the United States on an emergency furlough that lasted for sixteen months.

Hardly had Hoover left Sibü, when the Rajah visited the island town, and made Davis a new colonization offer—a land concession on the Sarikei River, a tributary of the Rajang about thirty miles below Sibü. Davis quickly got some twenty men to work on the new site. On Thanksgiving Day with seventy-two colonists now on the ground and a church already established, Davis visited the Sarikei with an official party out of whose inspection of the neighborhood came confirmation of a grant of a ten-mile river frontage.

Hoover's sudden departure from Sibü had interrupted Davis's concentration upon the plans for opening an agricultural-industrial school for the Chinese community, the project for which, principally, he had come to Sarawak. The Rajah was interested to the extent of making an annual grant-in-aid of \$500 and donating a valuable 250-acre site on the Rajang River ten miles below Sibü. Here—Bukit Lan the place was called—Davis and his wife had been living since returning from the Annual Conference session earlier in the year. He had got fifty acres of jungle cut over and ready to burn for fall planting, and the day he rushed to Sibü because of the sudden news of Hoover's collapse, the contractor began erection of the school building, which was to be called Ely Hall in recognition of a Kansan benefactor who had pledged \$5,000 for the purpose.

When Hoover left for the United States, Davis had to give up immediate

oversight of the Bukit Lan activity, curb his Chinese language studies, move to Sibü, and assume leadership of the mission Hoover had been building for a decade. This included direct responsibility for the boys' and girls' boarding schools, eight churches, seven day schools, "a dozen and one rubber gardens" in which the Mission was interested in one way or another, a rice mill, the finances of the Mission's entire enterprise, representation of the Chinese to the government, mediation work in "all sorts of squabbles" involving the colonists, and caring for the interests of the new Hsinghua colony, in addition to launching the Sarikei project and the Bukit Lan school. Mrs. Davis endeavored to maintain the women's and children's work and the girls' school carried on by Mrs. Hoover.

In addition to all this, Davis started a revival among the churches—something the Chinese Christians had not known since their transplantation to Sarawak. Some seventy revival services were held in the churches outside Sibü in July and August. The campaign ended in mid-November with a series of twenty-four services in Sibü, featuring evangelistic preaching, altar calls, personal testimonies, and pledge-signing to renounce tobacco, opium, liquor, and gambling. They were well attended not only by the Foochows, but also by the Hokkien-speaking Chinese of the Sibü bazaar and by other non-Christians.

The immediate results of the revival among the church people were stirring, but it is not clear that it had any significant lasting effect; Davis remained impressed by the materialism of the Foochow colonists.

In spite of the heavy load resting upon him during Hoover's absence, Davis managed to get Ely Hall finished. He opened the school in May, 1914, again taking up residence at Bukit Lan, and moving the boys of the Sibü boarding school into Ely Hall to make them the nucleus for the new educational program. The average enrollment for the first year was thirty; in 1915 it rose to fifty. Among the pupils were several juvenile delinquents sent out from the government prison in Kuching for rehabilitation. Small lots were assigned to the boys to cultivate as gardens. Davis began clearing most of the land and planting it to rubber, which was expected to bring income for the support of the school. The curriculum combined simple academic studies (Chinese was the chief language) with instruction in agricultural methods and with work on the school plantation.

After about a year with Davis at the head of the Bukit Lan venture, a board of education demanded by some of the Chinese was elected by the District Conference and assumed control of the school. It gradually edged Davis out of the courses he was teaching. He was told that it was better to have the boys taught by Chinese-speaking teachers. A real, but less explicit, factor was the unwillingness of Ling Chung Huak, the Chinese preacher-teacher stationed at Bukit Lan, and some of the other Chinese, to serve in a capacity subordinate to a "European," in this case Davis, the American. Be-

cause neither the boys nor their parents were enthusiastic about the work program, the board gradually reduced it—nearly to the vanishing point, Davis felt—and even took the supervision of the boys' work groups out of his hands. By about the beginning of 1916, wrote Davis "they had just about crowded me off the scene."

Fortunately for Davis's continued usefulness at Bukit Lan, his first real opportunity to work with Dayaks fell into his hands at just that time, and he found himself free to exploit it. He said:

Seven boys came straight from the jungle, and jungle life and customs, coming out into the open with barely clothing enough to make them presentable at a boy's swimming hole, and with hair which was long and bushy and knew not the use of a comb. These boys didn't know one word of English and knew less of American customs and the Christian religion. We, upon the other hand, were about as ignorant of the Dyak language and fully as ignorant of their beliefs and customs. You can quickly see that this made an interesting combination . . .

For the rest of the term—about four months—Davis ran a school for these boys and for a few others, teaching them according to his own bent and ability language studies, Bible, "numbers," writing, spelling, drawing, wood-working, gardening, and drill. The boys were happy and responsive in the school and their experience and progress won the favorable attention of surrounding Dayaks. At the close of the season, Davis was assured that many more Dayak boys would be enrolled at Bukit Lan as soon as there was room for them.

The Dayak work was not popular with the Chinese group now controlling the school. When Davis refused to cut down his activities with the new Dayak recruits, Ling Chung Huak announced that the people in the Sang O Chong and Siong Pho settlements intended to build a school of their own, which would dispense with manual work and teach only academic subjects.

Hoover, who returned to Sarawak in December, 1914, was deeply committed to the agricultural growth of the colony, and according to Davis, favored agricultural-industrial schooling. When the opposition to the Bukit Lan school came out in the open in the spring of 1916, both Hoover and Davis decided to surrender the Chinese pupils rather than the practical emphasis in the Bukit Lan curriculum.

In midsummer Davis had to be furloughed to the United States because of illness. The Chinese pupils at Bukit Lan were transferred to schools located in the various settlements, and a new boarding school was built at Siong Pho, where courses on the high school level were offered. By the end of 1917, the enrollment at Siong Pho reached one hundred. The work for the Dayak boys at Bukit Lan was suspended in spite of increasing interest on the part of the Dayaks; and because Davis did not return to the field, it was not resumed.

In the spring of 1917, Hoover received an inquiry from George S. Miner, one of the senior missionaries in the Foochow Conference, about the possibility of taking up land in Sarawak for a rubber plantation to earn income for the educational and orphanage work in Fukien Province in which he was interested. Hoover replied with alacrity and enthusiastic approval. On Miner's behalf, he quickly secured from the government the free use of a 200-acre tract abutting on the school property at Bukit Lan; and for possible use by future Chinese immigrants, he took up an additional three hundred acres under the auspices of the Mission.

Miner also moved quickly to solicit backing, but not with unalloyed success. The Foochow Mission, the Conference's relatively small but powerful inner group of missionaries, turned him down even though he advanced his plan as a source of financial benefit for the Conference system of lower primary schools, the Foochow Boys' Higher Primary School (and its orphanage), and the Conference Sunday school work directed until about that time by Wallace H. Miner, his son. Although the proposal won some support among the Chinese members of the Conference, Bishop Wilson S. Lewis declined to co-operate so as to facilitate Wallace Miner's going to Sarawak as manager of the rubber enterprise. And the Board of Foreign Missions also withheld its approval of the plan.

These were only temporary setbacks. The younger Miner succeeded in obtaining the active support of William T. Cherry, superintendent of the Singapore District. Then, being listed as on furlough, he attended the sessions of the Malaysia Conference in Singapore in February, 1918, and gained its approval of an enterprise to be known as the New Foochow Christian Industrial School, which would have its economic base in the operation of rubber plantations in the Bukit Lan neighborhood. The constitution embodying the scheme declared that the aim of the project was to give "training for and employment in a suitable and respectable livelihood for orphans, destitute and worthy Chinese young people"—a shift from the stated aim advanced to the Foochow Conference. It was understood that this aim referred to the Christian Herald Fukien Interdenominational Homes, an orphanage agency of which Wallace Miner was an employee and his father was treasurer. At one point or another, the Conference, the Cabinet, and the Sarawak mission were to be responsible for maintaining the organizational apparatus back of the field project. The missionary in charge was, of course, Wallace Miner, who was transferred into the Malaysia Conference later in 1918. A Board of Trustees that, but for two members, represented the investors had the power to distribute profits. The nucleus for the prospective rubber operation itself was the tract reserved for the Miners just north of Bukit Lan, and the Bukit Lan mission property itself was loaned to the project, with a nominal rental to cover repairs. The promoters were understood to have about \$10,000 initial capital.

After the Conference session, Miner went to Sarawak accompanied by some men and orphans he had brought from Foochow. He settled in the parsonage at Bukit Lan, opened a small elementary school in Ely Hall, and began planting rubber trees. By the summer of 1919, he set out 25,000 plants, and his father was looking forward to bringing two hundred orphans from Fukien to Sarawak under Wallace's direction. But to the embarrassment of the Malaysia Conference, the scheme that seemed so promising in speech and on paper went badly awry in less than a year, leaving Hoover amazed and angry.

Evidently Miner, who had no experience as a man of affairs, found his financial undertakings too complex for him to handle. When he came to Sarawak, he and Hoover had become business partners, acting as agents for the sale of the Chinese colonists' rubber to a Singapore firm. Hoover soon withdrew from the arrangement, partly because it absorbed too much of his time and partly because he suspected that Miner was not delivering all the rubber for which Hoover, as one of the agents, was paying out the cash advanced by the Singapore dealers. Miner's relations with the Singapore concern then deteriorated; he had neither the rubber nor the cash to meet his obligations to it, and finally was threatened with a lawsuit. He antagonized the Rajah (Charles Vyner Brooke, who succeeded his aged father on 24 May 1917) and his officers by two injudicious attempts to get large unsecured government loans, and by a request for a free grant of fifty thousand acres of land. His original standing monthly credit of \$500 with the local Resident, which was arranged for him by Hoover, was doubled without Hoover's knowledge. As Miner floundered about financially, trying to escape bankruptcy and the loss of his plantation concession, the expedients to which he resorted were sufficiently disingenuous, both overtly and implicitly, to lead Hoover finally to charge him with dishonesty.

Cherry, the District Superintendent, now tried to dissociate the Mission from Miner's indiscretions in a letter to the Rajah. Acceding to a peremptory request by the Rajah, the Presiding Bishops, Homer C. Stuntz and John W. Robinson, did not renew Miner's appointment to the School when the Conference met in February, 1919. Bishop Robinson instructed him to return to Sarawak, pack his goods, and leave the country at once. When Miner delayed his departure from Sarawak for several months, the Rajah finally ordered his immediate deportation.

After Miner left, correspondence with representatives of the Christian Herald Fukien Interdenominational Homes convinced Hoover that the organization was only meagerly involved in the plantation scheme and that Miner had deceived him and the Malaysia Conference leaders on that point. Evidently, the basic financing of the project involved partnership between Miner personally and several financial backers, including his own family. Thus the Malaysia Conference had somewhat carelessly approved a promotional venture

that was less the missionary activity that at first it seemed and more the "stock company" that Bishop Robinson finally called it. This unfortunate lapse, all apart from Miner's extraordinary business conduct, was potentially highly damaging to the status of the Methodist mission in Sarawak, for the Rajahs had for many years banned private economic exploitation of Sarawak's resources by Western entrepreneurs, except for a few controlled concessions.

Hoover forwarded his charges against Miner to the Malaysia Finance Committee, which reviewed the situation with Miner in July. The Committee reserved the right to criticize his business methods, but stated that it had no doubts whatever as to the uprightness of his intentions—a view not shared by Hoover, who was absent. When Miner intimated that he might seek redress in the civil courts for his ouster from the Industrial School project, the Committee countered by declaring that it would instruct Hoover to turn the rubber concession back to the Rajah unless Miner immediately signed a disclaimer of his intention to sue. Miner signed. Hoover, by arrangement with the government, undertook the management of the disputed rubber concession; for the Malaysia Conference leaders hoped eventually to garner some returns for the original investors.

When he was on furlough in the United States in 1920, Hoover visited the Pennsylvania family that had invested substantially with Wallace Miner, and secured the free transfer of their rights in the plantation to the Malaysia Mission. For several years (the Conference formally located Miner at his own request in 1920), the rubber holdings remained a center of severe contention between the Mission and George Miner, with the shadow of threatened lawsuits falling across the affair. The project never came to the point of operation on the originally professed plan—that is, for the benefit of China orphanage work and the employment of orphan boys from Fukien—although the Miner fiasco left Hoover still believing in the soundness of the idea. The plantation itself remained in the care of the Mission.

Miner's abortive endeavor failed, of course, satisfactorily to fill the vacuum left at Bukit Lan when Charles Davis went on furlough, but it held the scene long enough to become a factor in blocking Davis's return to continue his schooling of Dayak boys. Other factors were Davis's delayed recovery of his health and the stringent financial condition of the Malaysia Mission, the latter making Davis unwelcome there unless he came bearing gifts to pay his own salary.

Hoover hardly was enthusiastic, to begin with, about having Davis return to the Dayak work, or even to have it otherwise provided for. Writing as the head of the Sarawak mission as early as December, 1916, to explain to the New York office that it was unnecessary to include Sarawak's needs in the Centenary askings, he had tossed off the question of Davis's Dayak work with

the brief advice, "About the work at Bukit Lan, I am not prepared to make any proposals. Mr. Davis is at home [in the United States]—ask him."

In the early stages of the negotiations with the Miners, Hoover took the initiative in suggesting that Davis be returned only if he could provide for his own salary for five years, and advised Cherry, the District Superintendent, to cable the Board to delay Davis's coming until that could be done. "I don't see any likelihood of his doing it," Hoover assured Cherry. He also made it clear to the Cabinet of the Malaysia Conference, in the fall of 1917, that Davis would be automatically shut out by the appointment of any other man to work at Bukit Lan. Of course, Hoover and Cherry were committed to Miner's plan, and Hoover was ready to sacrifice Davis in order to have Miner. Cherry also decisively favored Miner as against Davis and argued strongly against Davis's return to Bukit Lan even if he should be sent back to Malaysia. Miner, of course, was eventually installed in Davis's former parsonage and school building, and Davis remained in the United States.

After Miner's promotional bubble burst, Hoover suggested that Davis might come back to Bukit Lan to take over the work representing the interests of the investors in the Miner project. Davis found this proposal something less than seductive. "Now if Hoover meant," he said, "that I'm to look after 500 acres of rubber trees, then I'm not for it. I want to have some time to work with folks." None of the officials concerned with the Bukit Lan station showed any concern for Dayak work, and for many years afterwards, no attempt was made to reach them as Davis had been beginning to do.

However badly the Miner plantation scheme turned out, it was not unnatural for Hoover to have been hospitable to a venture in rubber. By 1917, he had been influential in developing the Chinese colony basically on a rubber economy, and the Mission's educational and church work depended directly upon rubber planting.

Each local church planted a small rubber garden, thus supplying a measure of self-support. Hoover also planted enough rubber for the Mission as a whole to yield about \$500 a month. He used money from this source for grants-in-aid to the local churches and schools and for opening new work. Some of it was offered as incentive gifts for building projects, as had been done by Benjamin West when the first churches were erected. In addition, Hoover planted twenty acres to rubber in his own name, hoping eventually (it did not come about) to remove his own salary from the Mission's budget. He also was receiving a return of up to 15 per cent on a thousand dollars he had invested on a fifty-fifty profit plan in a rubber company in Malaya that was formed by some of the missionaries in partnership with the Malaysia Mission itself. Hoover was thoroughly informed about, and impressed by, the extensive dealings of that mission in rubber. Of its rubber-financed orphanage at Sitiawan, he commented, "It has money to burn."

The Sarawak mission had other sources of direct revenue besides rubber,

namely, rice-hulling mills, a pepper garden, an ice-making plant set up in 1917, and rentals from two houses in the Sibü bazaar which were purchased in 1913. From the early years, special gifts constituted the next most important source of current income. Three times, loans were received from the treasury of the Malaysia Mission. One, for about \$1,000, evidently was advanced under the superintendency of Benjamin West (the account was called "West's Borneo Investments"). Another, for about \$4,500, covered the cost of the rubber plants sent over by Bishop Oldham in 1905. The third loan was for \$3,000 towards the purchase of the two houses in Sibü.

Another source of the financial strength of the Mission was the favor Hoover and his work found with Rajah Charles Brooke (and later with his son), who died in 1917 at the age of eighty-seven, after ruling for nearly fifty years. Hoover testified:

The Rajah has been most gracious to our Mission. . . . We never asked for help financially that we did not get. When he visited Sibü, he always asked most carefully about our work and us. We met him many times in the fourteen years we have been in Sarawak—in the Astana [the Rajah's palace], in the office, on his yacht, on the street, and at his home in England. He was always the same kind, courteous and dignified gentleman . . .

The Rajah's friendliness was evidenced by his annual cash grants to Davis's Bukit Lan project and to Mrs. Hoover's girls' school. Most important of all, neither for its general mission properties and plantations nor for the holdings of the local churches and schools, did the Mission have to buy land. All the sites that were required were granted by the Rajah's government either quite gratuitously or under merely nominal rentals. Thus the congruity of the kind of mission developed by Hoover with the economic and settlement policies of the government gave the Mission an incalculable advantage.

Throughout the first two decades of the Sarawak work, Hoover's salary was derived from the Malaysia appropriations made by the Missionary Society and by the Board of Foreign Missions. Charles E. Davis's salary came from the same source, but he was sent out on the understanding—imperfectly realized—that his salary would be covered by special gifts. (Florence E. Archer, who stayed so briefly, was to have been supported by special gifts, as was E. T. Brewster, a mission helper without missionary status who served in 1914 and 1915.) Appropriations for the Sarawak evangelistic work were small—generally from three to four hundred dollars—and by the second decade, they had ceased. In this respect, the Sarawak work was self-supporting. Only one appropriation—a special one of \$2,400, granted by the General Missionary Committee in 1904—was given specifically for the development of property. This was used for the new mission house in Sibü.

Although the Chinese colonists helped to support their own churches and schools by personal contributions, their giving during the first decade and a

half was meager. As late as March, 1916, Bishop Oldham wanted Charles Davis to tell him "why these people cannot pay their own way, after the earliest years of a prosperous colony have passed . . ." Davis responded, out of disillusionment arising in part from his endeavor to collect tuition fees, that he was becoming convinced that it was wrong to take money from the United States for the church people in Sarawak. "I tell you Oldham," he said, "these people are rich. . . [one settlement] is shipping out thousands of dollars worth of rubber every month . . ."

By the time Davis wrote to Oldham, however, the Chinese were beginning to give more liberally. The last Quarterly Conferences in 1915 generally adopted the plan of voluntary proportional giving by the church members based on the amount of rubber they sold. In December, 1916, Hoover reported to New York that the work was now growing, more money was being spent, local self-support was nearly complete except for new work, and the year was ending with cash in the treasury. It was at this time that he declined to put the Mission in line for Centenary askings.

Because the Chinese community was close to sole dependence upon rubber productions, the Mission itself was vulnerable to the impact of the community-wide depressions occurring when prices dropped on the world rubber market. Hardly had Hoover left for the United States in 1913, when Charles Davis found Mission funds running dangerously low because of unfavorable rubber prices. The slump, which hit the people hard, continued through 1914, and they finally suspended their contributions completely. This shifted the entire burden of ministerial support, for a time, from the churches to the Mission, whose own profits practically vanished. Davis could not pay the preachers' salaries in full, but only "enough to keep the wolf from the door." The second depression came in 1918, with falling prices producing falling contributions as early as 1917. School children were kept at home to replace plantation workers whom the rubber growers could no longer afford to hire. As a stop-gap, rice growing was increased. Financially, mission work had to be cut to the bone. But conditions soon improved, and at Conference time in February, 1919, the Mission was prosperous enough to pay off the \$5,000 due on the Bishop Oldham Borneo Investments.

During the first two decades, there emerged a single institution that spanned the various settlements included in the Sarawak mission. It was the Girls' School in Sibul, founded, directed, and largely taught by Mrs. Hoover. Beginning in 1904 with day pupils, she received a few boarders into her home in 1909 and established the work as a full-fledged boarding school in 1911. By 1916, the enrollment reached fifty-eight, and Mrs. Hoover was steadily raising the School's academic standards. She also developed it as an evangelistic instrument, and successfully. Its support came from tuition fees, special gifts from Epworth Leaguers in Pasadena, California, and grants by the Sarawak government.

In addition to her school work, and as fully as her teaching duties allowed, Mary Hoover visited Chinese women in their homes—winning their friendship, introducing them to the Bible and Christian teaching, persuading them to attend services, and paving the way for their entrance into church membership. This activity was particularly strategic as an approach to the Hokkien-speaking Chinese who lived in Sibu. Sometimes she was assisted by a Bible woman or two, especially in reaching the outlying settlements. Sometimes preachers' wives assisted. This work effectively stimulated church attendance by women, which finally sometimes outstripped the attendance by men. In 1916, as many as 162 of the 460 church members were women, and 42 women were baptized that year—a good record considering the fact that there were few women in the colony in its early years.

With Hoover managing the Mission's business affairs and superintending the churches; with church societies promptly appearing in the new settlements, and church buildings soon rising under the sponsorship of the new societies; with a number of appointed Chinese preachers, assisted by a generally larger corps of Local Preachers, carrying the responsibility for local pastoral care and evangelism; with Chinese preachers and teachers laboring in the vernacular day schools that typically followed the establishment of the churches; with Methodists coming in from China, Sarawak-born Methodist children growing to maturity, and numerous adults being baptized into Christianity year after year—under the impact of all these activities and in spite of the return of numerous settlers to China, the Sarawak mission grew, by 1919, into a largely self-supporting religious enterprise including 711 church members, 239 probationers, and numerous other followers.

This Methodist constituency was organized into thirteen charges, led by ten salaried and twelve unsalaried Local Preachers, and housed in fourteen church buildings. In addition to the boarding schools in Sibu and Siong Pho, there were seven day schools serving some 265 boys and girls. Seven Sunday schools cared for 371 pupils, and there were more than 600 baptized children under nine years of age.

After being assigned to various Districts, the Sarawak mission, which by 1919 accounted for more than a fifth of the members in the Malaysia Conference, then became the Sarawak District, with James Hoover as District Superintendent. In spite of some slacking off of immigration during the years of World War I, Hoover was confident of the District's power to keep growing. He counted upon the children of the Sarawak Methodist families to swell the membership, and trusting to the economic potentialities of the country, looked forward to renewed immigration in the postwar period. Always hard-working and habitually exuberant in his reports on the Mission, Hoover wrote to Dr. North, "Wait till I see you. I will show you things for extending the Kingdom that will make your eyes stand out—immediate

results and money back if not satisfied. We have no corpse on our hands that needs reviving—we are raising a boy.”

NOTES

Page 115. That Bishop Warne met the Chinese travelers in Singapore and journeyed with them from there to Sarawak is conclusively demonstrated in our Sources for this chapter (see p. 1212). Numerous other, secondary accounts incorrectly state that Warne met the travelers in Hong Kong and shared with them the much longer journey from that point clear across the China Sea to Sarawak. A number of informal accounts to this effect undoubtedly stem from the one in Frank T. Cartwright's well known biography *Tuan Hoover*, 1935. Cartwright evidently got his information on this point from James M. Hoover or others during a visit to Sarawak in 1935 just before Hoover's death. (See Cartwright's *Some Highlights of Service in Asia*, a report made to the Board of Foreign Missions in 1935.) Unfortunately, Cartwright was misinformed, perhaps by Hoover himself, whose article in *The Christian Advocate* for 14 May 1914 contains the error in question. Of course, Hoover did not arrive in Sarawak until 1903. In general, Cartwright's book should be used only cautiously as to specific historical data.

Page 123. This figure may represent a second reporting of the figure for 1910; the language of the source is not quite conclusive. See *Minutes, Malaysia Conference* (1911, 1912), pp. 39 and 40, respectively.

3

Expanding Into the Netherlands East Indies

Sumatra

TWICE IN 1904, GEORGE F. PYKETT, superintendent of the Penang District of the Malaysia Conference, left his District to explore territories untouched by Methodist missionary effort. First he went northward along the coast above Penang to visit several small Malay states that were under Siamese protection. Later, he crossed over to Sumatra and visited Medan, a city on the northeast coast. He knew well enough that there were no Methodist missionaries in all Sumatra, and in the area he visited he found no Protestant mission stations and no evidence of any but occasional visits by Roman Catholic workers. Earlier visits by Benjamin F. West on behalf of the Malaysia Mission Conference and by the Woman's Foreign Missionary Society missionaries Sophia Blackmore and Elizabeth E. Ferris had resulted in no settled missionary project.*

In Medan, Pykett met several people from Penang who, as a result of preaching heard on the Peninsula, were interested enough in Christianity to urge him to send a missionary to Sumatra. Among them was Hong Teen, a young Baba Chinese who had been a student in the Methodists' Anglo-Chinese School in Penang and who now was conducting a school of his own enrolling about a hundred boys. He and his wife wanted Pykett to baptize them at once. Pykett, however, advised them to come to Penang for further instruction, which they did. As a result of these contacts, Pykett returned to Medan in 1905, accepting Hong's invitation to inspect and organize his boys' school.

Pykett actually managed the school for several months while Hong Teen was away on business. He accepted the responsibility on condition that he be allowed to introduce daily Bible work and to install two Christian teachers. To fill these two posts, Pykett sent over from Malaya, later that year, a Chinese teacher from the Anglo-Chinese School in Penang and Solomon Pakianathan, a Tamil engaged in Tamil work on the Penang District. Pykett remained the school's supervisor even after returning to Penang.

* See Vol. III, 658 f.

Pakianathan made good use of his position in Medan to promote Christian teaching. He opened religious services in English and promptly organized a Sunday school class for young English-speaking Chinese, who in turn organized a young men's association among themselves. Upon meeting a Chinese Christian layman and a Chinese shopkeeper named Lim Hoai Toh, who formerly preached for the Methodists in Singapore, Pakianathan arranged for the two men to hold regular Sunday services in Chinese. He also did what he could to reach his fellow Tamils but was handicapped by the fact that they generally lived out beyond the city, most of them on estates. Pykett estimated that by the end of the year, almost every English-speaking Baba in Medan was attending Pakianathan's meetings. As a result of his work and that of his Chinese fellow workers, a number of converts were prepared for baptism.

Medan appeared as an appointment on the Penang District for the year 1906, with Pakianathan assigned as the supply preacher in charge. Later he was joined by a Chinese preacher sent over from Malaya. Pakianathan developed, during the year, a separate Tamil church of two probationers and one full member, with a Sunday school of ten pupils. The Chinese congregation had three full members and a probationer. In addition to supporting himself by his regular teaching in Hong's school, Pakianathan raised thirty dollars a month to help support the Chinese preacher and earned money teaching night school to pay for furnishing the church.

In 1908, with Pakianathan and Ng Koan Jiu serving the Tamil and Chinese churches, respectively, Medan became a part of the new Netherlands Indies District, under the superintendency of John R. Denyes. When Denyes made his first visit to Medan, in February, 1908 (George Pykett at first supervised Medan for him), he abruptly severed the Mission's association with Hong Teen's school, having learned of conduct on Hong's part that made that step seem imperative.

After filling in temporarily in the English School in Bogor (Buitenzorg), in Java, Pakianathan returned to Sumatra at the end of March. This time, he was sent to Palembang, fifty-four miles up the Musi River, near the southeastern end of the island, some six hundred miles from Medan. Denyes followed him there two weeks later. He visited among the Chinese, Tamil, Malay, and Arab residents of the city, secured the Dutch Resident's permission for educational and evangelistic work, won the good will of the Dutch pastor, and laid plans for the establishment of an English school. Denyes visualized Palembang, where he found no other Mission at work, as the future center of Methodist activity in Sumatra.

Settled in Palembang, Pakianathan opened a school on 1 May, and quickly moved it towards self-support, so that in 1910, it was yielding a monthly profit and accumulating a modest building fund. There were both day and night classes and a special school for Arabs. The enrollment kept increasing

until, in 1912, there were more than a hundred pupils under the tutelage of Pakianathan and two assistants. Early that year, the Methodist school began providing a Tamil teacher of English for a Tiong Hwa Hwe Koan school* on the other side of the river, and it was arranged that Pakianathan would "observe" [inspect?] the work of the Chinese school.

Along with his school work, Pakianathan maintained a measure of evangelistic activity. When John Denyes visited Palembang in 1909, he organized, on 25 July, a church with two full members (Pakianathan and Sundara Raj, his assistant) and five probationers (Pakianathan's brother, his cook, a Mr. Eng Keng, and Eng Keng's wife and eldest son). Denyes later called the church "a small beginning of a Chinese-Ambonese-Tamil church." It remained small.

At the Conference session of 1910, Denyes pointed out that the Mission, now at work in Medan and Palembang, had an opportunity to extend its influence into Batakland, in the middle section of Sumatra. There lived many thousands of animistic people who were still unreached, after nearly fifty years' labor, by the successful Rhenish Mission, and who were only beginning to feel the impact of Islam. Occasional Batak travelers returning home from Penang and Singapore, had brought news of the Methodist schools and churches in Malaya, and for some months, invitations had been coming out of Sumatra for the Methodists to take up work among the Bataks. Two of the invitations came from chiefs in northern Batakland, each with a thousand followers or more, offering land and personal influence to Methodist workers. "Methodism ought to go to these people before Islam has laid its blight upon them," said Denyes.

In the spring (1911), Denyes made a six weeks' tour of Sumatra and, under instructions from Bishop William F. Oldham, traveled and lived among the Bataks for two weeks to appraise the missionary situation. Oldham and Denyes developed an active concern over the fact that very large areas of Batakland were barren of Christian missionaries of any communion. The Bishop began negotiating with the Rhenish Missionary Society for a division of the northern part of Batakland that would assign to the Methodists an area where they would be free to evangelize the Bataks. He also began a wide search for a suitable man for the new work and found him at last in William T. Ward, formerly of Bastar, India. Bishop Oldham transferred Ward from the Bengal Conference to the Malaysia Conference, and in November, 1911, put him in charge of the English Church in Penang pending the raising of enough money—the Bishop appealed for \$1,000 a year—to send Ward over into the Batak territory in Sumatra.

Ward, feeling that he was in a rut in the English Church in Penang, was eager to get out into the "pioneer" work in Sumatra. While he was straining

* See pp. 151 ff.

to be off, the two Chinese supplies in charge of the church in Medan and of the Anglo-Chinese School one of them opened there in 1910, abruptly left their posts. With the approval of the Malaysia Finance Committee, Pykett took Ward to Medan in the summer of 1912, and installed him in the places vacated by the two Chinese. This move solved Pykett's administrative problem of the moment—a personal one too, for there was deep friction between Ward and Pykett—and it put a regular Board missionary into the Sumatra work for the first time. But it did not project Ward into Batakland, and it fell far short of establishing a new station among the Batak petitioners.

In 1913, Ward's mother, widow of the pioneer India missionary Charles B. Ward, came from the United States, at the suggestion of Secretary Oldham, to assist her son in an unofficial capacity. Mrs. Ward, who referred to herself as "about the last of the Wm. Taylor 'root hog or die' missionaries," now in her sixties, not only helped in the day school, but turned her hand to women's home evangelism. In 1914, a Chinese supply preacher was appointed to assist Ward, but during most of his term in Medan, he was assisted by local preachers and exhorters developed by himself.

The Anglo-Chinese school that came into Ward's hands demanded the major portion of his time and energy. He made it for the first time clearly a Mission school, for until he took control, its ownership rested with the founder, Huay Ginn, and authority was significantly exerted by certain influential Chinese Presbyterian patrons. Ward soon built up the enrollment, so that during most of his administration, it included well over a hundred boys and girls, mostly Chinese. The pupils and their four Chinese teachers were crammed into three narrow, ill-ventilated shop houses (the church also met in one of them), between two of which stood a washerman's steamy and unfortunately pungent laundry. The School was frankly and positively a Christian school, and in Ward's opinion, the registration would have risen higher but for this unconcealed emphasis, which aroused parental fears about Christianity as a competitor of ancestor worship. As it was, the pupils all were involved in Bible reading and Bible study, many attended services, the members of the brass band organized by Ward played at evangelistic meetings, and several dozen boys and girls were converted to Christianity.

Because of the pressure of the school work in Medan, Ward had to decline, from the beginning, the requests that came to him to visit outlying towns. But by 1914, he was able to reach out beyond Medan effectively enough to establish a small school in each of four towns—Pangkalanbrandan (fifty miles northwest of Medan), Tandjungpura, Pulaukumpai, and Tebingtinggi (fifty miles southeast of Medan). Two of the schools were taught by young Chinese baptized by Ward. The Tebingtinggi school was fully operated by the Mission, but it was financially shaky, and teachers were not steadily available. Only in a sketchy way were the others to be described as Mission schools; while the Mission chose the teachers, its authority was qualified by the influence of

local sponsors. The schools constituted, of course, a slight and tenuous web of Christian influence. But overt evangelistic measures in the towns were proscribed by the terms of Ward's government permit for missionary work (September, 1912), which covered only the municipality of Medan. Even so, a few people trickled into the Medan church from the surrounding country.

In Medan, Ward threw himself energetically into Chinese evangelism, for that was already the direction of the local church's outreach into the city at large. He introduced street preaching in order to attract public attention to Christianity and to draw prospective converts within the orbit of the church. He wrote, in 1915:

We hold one service in the street each week. This is a new thing in Medan. Were you to come around some night you would see a post with a large gas lamp suspended from it, and around it boys and girls from our school. There are our bandsmen also [Ward organized and taught the band], composed of school boys. All around these children, stand the audience. Sometimes we have chairs for the speaker, but usually all have to sit on logs and boards, which are piled up at hand. The service is conducted in Malay, Cantonese, and Hokkien.

The street audiences often ran up to two hundred people, and the audiences at the little shop-house church so taxed its capacity that people sometimes had to be turned away.

Ward also worked for converts by seeking out individuals. He realized that mass-movement techniques familiar in India were not practicable in Sumatra, that his converts had to be "hand-picked." He was successful in winning numerous educated young Chinese, many of them married. In 1915, he guided the establishment of a Y.M.C.A., which rented rooms suitable for evangelistic and social work.

Over four years, Ward baptized 119 adults—a record that made Medan one of the most fruitful stations in the Malaysia Conference. He finally brought the church to a membership of sixty-five persons, with one hundred and twenty-three probationers. In spite of its growth, the church, as John R. Denyes described it in 1916, was made up of such diverse elements that it could be only simply organized; there were "Hokkiens, Hakkas, Cantonese, Hylams, and Battaks, and no one race predominates to such an extent that it can give its name to the congregation."

The Batak membership in the Medan church was only a fringe on a Chinese fabric. It finally appeared that Ward, originally enlisted by Bishop Oldham for pioneering among the Bataks, was destined never to open a Batak mission.

The possibility of Ward's developing Batak work depended, from the beginning, upon two factors beyond those of the administrative exigencies and strategic plans of the Mission itself. In order to carry on a mission beyond Medan, out in the Batak field for which he and Bishop Oldham were con-

cerned, Ward needed a territorially broader government permit than the one he had. This grant by the colonial administration would normally depend, in turn, upon the existence of satisfactory territorial agreements with other Missions relevantly interested—in this case, primarily the Rhenish Mission (German), which had built up, according to Ward, a constituency of 117,000 Batak Christians. Soon after arriving in Medan, Ward discovered, and reported to Oldham, that the Rhenish and the Dutch missionaries were opposed to Methodist penetration of East Coast Batak areas, which they regarded as a Rhenish preserve.

Early in 1913, Charles S. Buchanan, superintendent of the Netherlands Indies District, counting on good will generated at an interdenominational conference held in Singapore in January under the leadership of John R. Mott, visited German and Dutch missionaries in Medan and elsewhere in the East Coast Residency with the purpose of working out a definite comity agreement for future work by the Methodists in Batak territory. Buchanan, leaving Sumatra, felt that the visits were fruitful, that he had achieved a real, though officially tentative, agreement about Methodist penetration of the East Coast Residency, much of which he explored during this visit.

But a year later, Buchanan had received no official confirmation of the agreement from the Rhenish Mission, and was left in a quandary about the situation. Nevertheless, he applied to the colonial authorities for permission for Ward to conduct evangelistic activity in the East Coast Residency outside Medan, and in three Residencies in South Sumatra.

The Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies finally issued an extension of Ward's original permit towards the end of 1915. As revised, it covered an area running for about two hundred miles along the east coast, north and south of Medan, and reaching inland to a maximum depth of about forty miles—a substantially smaller portion of the East Coast Residency than Buchanan had asked for. The government reserved decision about the three South Sumatra Residencies of Palembang, Djambi and Lampung.

Ward never had an opportunity to use the new permit, for by the time it was issued, he was planning to leave the field on a health furlough, and with no intention of returning. An important factor in his unwillingness to come back was the very handicap of having to confine his evangelistic efforts to Medan. Secretary Oldham, in faraway New York, received a copy of the new permit from John R. Denyes on 23 November 1915. At the Conference session in Singapore, on 5 January 1916, Ward had an official understanding with the Finance Committee that he was to leave the field permanently, and he approved a written minute that included a Finance Committee request to the Board that he not be sent back to Malaysia. Earlier the same day, Denyes, Ward's District Superintendent, had read his annual report to the Conference, citing the two-year delay of the permit, but making no reference to its having been finally granted. This withholding of strategic information from the Con-

ference as a whole evidently was matched by its being withheld specifically from Ward, the missionary directly concerned.

As late as 14 February 1916, Ward wrote to Secretary Oldham, "When I came here I felt that here I could do pioneering work such as I had done in India. The Dutch put a stop to it and will not allow it now." He told Oldham that Denyes' original impressions about the possibilities for widespread missionary work in Batak territory were mistaken, and had "entirely misled" the Church; consultations with Dutch officers, he said, easily would have set Denyes straight and avoided the Mission's long restriction to Medan. Whether Ward would have consented to bind himself to permanent withdrawal if he had been told of the Dutch government's reversal of its permit policy we do not know. Two or three months after writing Oldham, he was gone from Sumatra, and his successor was in Medan.

The obvious manipulation of Ward's severance from the Mission revealed the desire of his District Superintendent and the Finance Committee to be rid of him. In later correspondence with Secretary North, Harry B. Mansell indicated that there had been disharmony between Ward and each of the District Superintendents under whom he had served, the fault allegedly being Ward's. North refrained from judging Ward, but conceded that the latter had made it fully clear to him in conversation that he did not highly regard the missionary work the Methodist Episcopal Church was doing in the Netherlands Indies. When in 1916 the Board requested of the Malaysia Finance Committee a definite statement of its handling of Ward's case, the Committee's reply failed to refer to any of its tensions with Ward over regular missionary administration and instead portrayed him as an undesirable political agitator:

During the time of Mr. Ward's services in India, he was charged by the Govt. with causing political unrest, and pressure was put upon the Mission to withdraw him from that country. Mr. Ward was transferred to Penang. While there his influence was very harmful. He was given another chance by being transferred to Medan, Sumatra, a station where we have no other missionary. In that field he was in some respects successful, but on the whole this success was neutralised by his hurtful influence in other directions.

After leaving Medan, Ward had started for the United States by way of Saigon and South China. Proceeding no farther than Yunnan Province, then in rebellion against the weakened Yuan-Shih'kai regime, he returned to Malaysia, much to the distress of the Methodist leadership. The Finance Committee charged that in Yunnan he had associated himself with the "revolutionary party" and was back in Medan as an adviser for it and as a money-raiser for Kunming's Red Cross Society. It declared that Ward was "a man of restless impulsive disposition, with a strong bent toward political intrigue which renders him a source of continual anxiety to us, and an object of

suspicion especially to the Govt. of the Netherlands Indies." It asserted that Ward was an embarrassment to the work of his successor in Medan and an obstacle to fund-raising by the Mission for educational purposes. Nearly a year later, Harry Mansell warned the Board carefully to consider Ward's political record before engaging him for further missionary work. But by mid-1917, Ward had resigned as a Board missionary, and in 1918 the Malaysia Conference recorded him as withdrawn from its membership.

After so long a delay by the government, the Mission itself now proved slow to branch out into Batak evangelism after Ward's departure. There was a stronger reason than the further inapplicability of Ward's 1915 permit, which was made out to him alone and lapsed upon his leaving. Leonard Oeschli, formerly pastor of Wesley Church, Singapore, who took up the work in Medan on 14 April 1916, did not have to wait long for a permit of his own, for he soon was preaching and baptizing far out in the Batak country. But his first efforts, significantly, were not directed towards the Bataks.

During the years of waiting, the Mission's policy had gradually veered away from the urgent concern about Bataks that at first moved Oldham, Denyes, and Ward; it now was shaped by preoccupation with the Chinese. Ward himself, thrust perforce into Chinese work, developed a great love and admiration for the Chinese people, for whom he had an initial liking. He became enthusiastically immersed in their interests—their religious future, their status as an ethnic minority in Sumatra, their public charities, and even the general political aspirations of the more progressive among them who were oriented towards the current awakening on the Chinese homeland. The schools he established beyond Medan were Chinese schools based on contacts with Chinese people. His most original piece of missionary exploration was a twenty-day trip into the northernmost part of Sumatra, to Atjeh, a semi-pacified area as yet unopened by the government to any Mission, where Denyes had said, a few years earlier, safety "did not extend much beyond rifle range." Here Ward sought out everywhere the Chinese minority and their leaders and secured from the local Dutch administrators permission to make public addresses to Chinese audiences. With the predominant Gayo and Atjehnese inhabitants, he had only few, brief, and apparently uncreative contacts. It was among the Chinese, rather than among the others, that he was looking for openings for the Methodist Episcopal Church. After returning to Medan, he received the names of more than two hundred Chinese who desired to become Christians. By mid-1915, his desire to secure a broader missionary permit in the East Coast Residency had become mainly a desire to get out among the Chinese, not among the Bataks.

The administrators also allowed the Batak plan to peter out. Bishop William P. Eveland, Bishop Oldham's successor as supervising Bishop, who visited the Batak country in June, 1915, apparently was not especially concerned for the opening of Batak missions. Buchanan and Denyes, the two

successive District Superintendents, like Ward, finally seemed to be expecting to use the long-awaited broadened missionary permit as a key to unlock opportunities for Chinese mission stations, rather than for Batak projects.

Harry B. Mansell, after supervising the North Sumatra work for a year, made the reversal of Batak policy complete and explicit. Reporting to the Conference session of 1918, he set forth a three-point policy for evangelism in North Sumatra: (1) prime recognition of the fact that the Chinese work needed greatly increased resources; (2) strict confinement of missionary efforts to the Chinese until the needs of the present work should be met; (3) extension of the Chinese mission if resources for new work should emerge, and finally extension of missionary effort to the "unreached tribes" of Atjeh. Mansell failed even to mention the Batak field in the East Coast Residency, from which had come many appeals. This omission appears all the more egregious in view of his reference to Atjeh's unevangelized "population of three quarters of a million"; among Atjeh's indigenous peoples there was no demand for Christianity, and the Dutch authorities were to continue to bar all missionaries from that region for many years to come.

In view of this shift in policy, it is not surprising that Leonard Oeschli did not push out from Medan into Batak work, but itinerated among the Chinese. In the first six months of his two-year stay in North Sumatra, he preached in seven towns, baptizing a number of converts and delaying the baptism of others because he could not provide for their instruction and pastoral care. Oeschli continued Ward's close association of the Mission with the interests of the Chinese community, speaking in a number of towns at memorial services for General Hoang Hseng and other generals. Usually he preached a patriotic sermon at these affairs and upon invitation followed them up in the evenings with gospel sermons. A group of twenty baptized Christians was developed in Tebingtinggi, where the day school was now stabilized and strengthened. A new group, similar in size, was formed in another town—Bindjai, west of Medan—where the people rented a house for a hoped-for school and raised money for the support of a preacher. In 1918, organized churches were in operation in both Tebingtinggi and Bindjai. Counting the activity both in the outstations and in Medan, where the school and church work showed progress over the two years of his leadership, Oeschli found in North Sumatra an opportunity for extensive work among the Chinese that he believed was not to be found even at Sibu, in Sarawak.

Throughout Ward's tenure in Medan, and during Oeschli's first year there, Solomon Pakianathan, who was received into the Conference on trial in 1915, remained in charge of the mission in Palembang, maintaining it on a self-supporting basis. The school, which limited Pakianathan's availability for evangelistic work, flourished under his direction, but the church began to gather strength only with the coming of Ding Hong Sek from Java in September, 1917, to work with the Chinese. Both Pakianathan and his District

Superintendents believed that the potentiality of Palembang as a strategic missionary center could be significantly exploited only by the assignment of a regular missionary to the field—a step that was not taken until 1917, when Earl R. Hibbard was sent to Palembang from Singapore. After a few months there, however, Hibbard had to leave for the United States for the sake of his health.

“Java for Jesus”

“Java for Jesus’ is ringing in my soul.” Thus wrote a German Methodist whose arrival in Singapore as a missionary recruit was awaited in 1889 by William F. Oldham, Superintendent of the Malaysia Mission. Oldham himself wanted “Java for Jesus,” and he recently had visited Djakarta (Batavia), the capital, to investigate the opportunity for missionary work on the huge offshore island. For a decade and a half afterwards, the Mission remained consciously oriented in that direction but failed to focus its attention upon any concrete plan to enter Java. In 1904, however, suddenly there was a plan.

Early in 1904, John R. Denyes, a 35-year-old Malaysia missionary on furlough in the United States, worked briefly on a project at the Missionary Society’s New York headquarters with Miss Elizabeth Harper Brooks, missionary secretary for the Epworth League of the Pittsburgh Conference. To her he communicated his burning desire to start a mission in Java. It had sprung from his interest in the Chinese boys from Java who were attending the Anglo-Chinese School in Singapore during his several years there as a teacher. Denyes felt this as a divine call to action, but the Malaysia Mission had no money to use for such an extension of its effort.

A year earlier, a strong mission study movement among the Pittsburgh Conference Epworth Leagues had inspired each of the five Districts to pledge an increase of its giving to missions by \$1,000 a year. By the time Miss Brooks met Denyes, four of them had decided to pool their gifts, to support a single mission; and she was earnestly searching for a project upon which to concentrate their giving. Hearing Denyes’ story, she quickly became convinced that the Pittsburgh Conference young people should sponsor him as a missionary to Java.

Elizabeth Brooks and John Denyes joined forces. She secured the backing of the four District Epworth Leagues for the Java plan, and a committee representing them was authorized to consult the Malaysia Mission leaders. At a missionary convention in San Francisco, Miss Brooks won the support of Bishop Warne. Soon afterwards, during the General Conference, discussions involving Bishop Warne, Assistant Secretary Oldham (soon to become Warne’s successor in charge of Malaysia), Benjamin F. West (superintendent of the Singapore District), Denyes, and Miss Brooks, resulted in the decision

by Bishop Warne, later confirmed by Oldham, to open work in Java under Denyes' direction.

In November, 1905, the General Missionary Committee, accepting assurances given by the Pittsburgh Conference young people that they would contribute \$4,000 a year for five years, increased the Malaysia appropriations to allow for the proposed Java work. (The Epworth Leagues kept their pledges, and their lively interest in Java found expression in financial support for missionary activity there for a decade and a half.)

Funds having accumulated in the meantime, Bishop Oldham, at the Malaysia Conference session in February, 1905, appointed Denyes as "New-Work Missionary" on the Singapore District, with the tacit understanding that he would endeavor to establish a mission in Java. Denyes said that the wording of his appointment was "left ambiguous so as not to create opposition until we can go to Java." The admission of nonresidents, particularly of missionaries expecting to settle in the Netherlands Indies, was strictly supervised by the Dutch colonial authorities; proper permits had to be secured.

Three weeks after Conference, Denyes went to Java accompanied by Benjamin West, the District Superintendent. They landed at Djakarta, the colonial capital, at the western end of the island, secured temporary entry permits, and soon departed on a hasty tour of the beautiful, mountainous country. They visited mission stations in Surabaya (the large trading center near the eastern end of Java), Modjowarno, Semarang, and Jogjakarta.

Just before returning to Djakarta, Denyes and West visited, and were impressed by, the famous mound-shrine of Borobudur, a marvelously constructed and embellished memorial to Buddha in the Sultanate of Jogjakarta, in Central Java. "As we looked at what had at one time been a magnificent temple now abandoned, we felt," said West, "that the time would assuredly come when the people would forsake their present religion and become followers of the Lord Jesus." This meditation suggested a radical, aggressive attack not upon Buddhism, of course, but upon Islam, the overwhelmingly dominant religion of Java, the faith of some thirty million people. Four years later, Bishop Oldham, who was in close touch with Methodism's earliest efforts on the island, affirmed that "the main reason of our presence in Java is Mahomedanism."

But when West formally applied to the government on 31 March for permission for the Missionary Society to inaugurate missionary work and for recognition of Denyes as the missionary in charge, he made no reference to the followers of the Prophet. He advanced the Society's contacts with people of the Netherlands Indies in the Straits Settlements, especially with some of the Chinese there, as the basis for the petition; "and so," it read, "we crave permission to follow up our work within the Territorial bounds of the East Indian possessions of Her Most Gracious Majesty, Queen Wilhelmina."

West asked specifically for permission to open work among the Chinese in Djakarta, who were not Muslims.

Denyes and West chose Djakarta for this initial approach because of its status as the seat of government, its easy accessibility from the older Methodist stations on the Malay Peninsula, and its potentiality as a later supervisory center for work to be opened in Sumatra and in Bangka. They decided upon the Chinese because, said Denyes, they "promise to be the way of least resistance." Another advantage was that with the Chinese they could make an immediate start. Denyes, who knew the Malay speech used among the Singapore Baba Chinese, would be able to acquire the variety of Malay prevalent among the Javan Chinese. To make any headway with the Muslim masses would have required first learning Dutch and then, through Dutch materials, learning the language of the Sundanese, the Muslim people composing the majority of the population in West Java.

On 3 April, West returned to Singapore. Denyes, remaining in Djakarta, began cultivating the acquaintance of the Chinese, including former students at the Singapore school, and also took up the pastorate of a church ministering to the small English community. Until West preached there upon his arrival with Denyes, no services had been held in the church for many years. At the end of May, Denyes also returned to Singapore, to bring over his wife and children.

Denyes, with his family, was back in Java by midsummer. A sick spell he had while in Singapore confirmed an earlier decision of his that it would be advisable to reside not in Djakarta, as originally planned, but in Bogor (Buitenzorg), a town thirty miles south of Djakarta by rail. Lying at an altitude of 800 feet, Bogor offered a more healthful environment. Settling his family there on 2 August, Denyes got to work on his language studies and followed up the numerous appointments involved in seeking permanent residential and mission permits.

Before the month was out, Denyes made an informal beginning. He became acquainted with a man named Esser, assistant manager of a furniture factory, who had received cordial hospitality while on a business trip in the United States. Esser began tutoring Denyes and his wife in the Dutch language, at the same time learning some English from them. One day while he was at Esser's factory helping him install some new machinery, Denyes caught the attention of Pang Ek Poi, the Chinese foreman, who followed him clear to his door trying to persuade Denyes to teach him English. Denyes finally yielded to the man's importunity, on condition that half the study time be spent on Dutch Malay (for Denyes' own benefit) and half on English, with the Bible and the Hymnal as texts. Pang Ek Poi rented the Denyes garage to live in and started his studies, and before long, his wife and a cousin of hers were studying with Mrs. Denyes in this rude home. A few weeks after beginning his lessons, Pang Ek Poi came to Denyes'

study and asked if he might become a Christian at once—thus taking the step that made him Methodism's first convert in Java.

A fortnight later, Denyes received an official missionary permit covering both Chinese and Sundanese work. This enabled him now to cultivate other humble beginnings like the one with Pang Ek Poi and to hold Sunday evening services in his own home. He wrote in his diary for Sunday, 24 September, the day after the permit came, "Three more Chinese came tonight to learn of Christ. Thank God."

At the service on 5 November, Denyes organized the first Methodist church in Java, with his wife as the sole full member and with six Chinese probationers, among them Pang Ek Poi, his wife, and her cousin. Two weeks later, the Sunday services were transferred to a rented building in the Chinese quarter, where three week-night church school sessions were added to the program. By 10 December, Denyes could write, "Chinese Church tonight, 34 Chinese present. I have never known such a hopeful church. The crowd is regular in attendance." The class held by Mrs. Denyes now became a women's training school with one pupil, Pang Ek Poi's wife's cousin, forty-seven years old and widowed, whom Mrs. Denyes boarded in her own home in order to train her as a Bible woman.

On 12 November, Denyes took over a small independent Chinese church in Karet, on the outskirts of Djakarta, baptizing eleven adults. A Christian Malay had built it up out of the families of boys and girls for whom he had started a little school. The Malay preacher remained with the church. Mrs. Denyes began teaching a small group of women to read and enrolled one woman to study as a Bible woman. Here also was enlisted an eighteen-year-old boy who went to Singapore with Denyes in January, 1906, to enter the Jean Hamilton Memorial School for theological training.

After five months' labor in Java, Denyes reported to the Malaysia Conference in January, 1906, one full member and twelve probationers in the Bogor church and fifteen full members and eleven probationers in the Karet church.

In the spring, Denyes opened two churches in Weltevreden, a section of Djakarta—one in Pasar Senen, the other in Tanahabang—in each place renting a house for religious services. The Pasar Senen congregation of Hakkas, Babas, and Javanese was put in charge of Balok Arpásad, a Malay; and a Malay-speaking school of twenty-five boys and girls, including some of Muslim parentage, was developed. Since the people surrounding the Tanahabang church spoke Hokkien Chinese and knew little Malay, a newly engaged young Hokkien worker was soon appointed to lead the church.

Not long afterwards, Denyes brought into the Methodist fold a congregation of about seventy Malays in the village of Pondokgede, some fifteen miles from Djakarta. The origins of the groups were Muslim, but a number of years earlier, they had become Christians under the influence of a devout

and active former Dutch Resident named Anting, who took them into the English church in Djakarta. Upon his death, they went over to a Dutch mission, later turned Roman Catholic when the Dutch church split, became dissatisfied after five or six years, and were ready to leave by the time the Methodist mission began. Denyes granted their request to be admitted into the Methodist fellowship, but cautiously received them as probationers rather than as full members of the church. Here in Pondokgede he also received direct from Islam six women and some children. He found for the newly acquired Methodists a Malay preacher named Nathaniel, who began preaching to them in a shed used for drying rice during the cutting season.

In February, 1907, just before leaving for the Annual Conference session in Penang, Denyes opened his first mission planned specifically as an approach to Muslims. During his early weeks in Java, he had learned that there was a consensus of missionaries on the island that fruitful work among Muslims required a colony where Christian converts could find work. Since the land was tilled not by individuals, but by villages, the proceeds being divided among the workers, to turn Christian would deprive a man of his economic opportunity as a member of the village group. Not being able to rent land individually, he would have to leave the countryside and be swallowed up in the city. This difficulty made Denyes wonder how he could "teach the way of life, without inviting people at the same time to starve to death."

The answer was Tjisarua, a 17,000-acre plantation (for coffee, cinchona, and rice) rising from three to nine thousand feet above sea level, a dozen miles out in the country beyond Bogor. It was owned by a Dutch Christian family with whom Denyes had become acquainted in May, 1905. More than three thousand Sundanese, among them six or seven Christians, lived on the estate, and ten thousand more were located within a few miles. On the estate itself, the Christian Sabbath was enforced, as was a ban on the presence of Muslim booksellers and teachers. Arrangements for employment of the village groups protected Christians against being put out of work because of their religious allegiance. "All these things combine," Denyes wrote to his Pittsburgh Conference supporters, "to reduce the difficulty of evangelization by nearly one half."

Seeing here "the opportunity of a lifetime," Denyes came to an understanding with Bruno Bik, the proprietor, who was concerned for the religious welfare of the people on the estate. So it was that in mid-January, 1907, Denyes finally rode up to Tjisarua, after earlier visits, and formed into a Methodist church a little company of seven Sundanese Christians, with one of them appointed to conduct the services. Early in February, a school was opened in a small bamboo building erected at Denyes' direction, and by the end of the first week, it had fifteen Muslim children.

It was not Denyes, however, who carried forward the new Tjisarua mis-

sion. The relationship of the Java work to the Malaysia Conference was changed at the Conference session in February, when the Netherlands Indies District was established, with John Denyes as District Superintendent. He and his family moved from Bogor to Djatinegara (Meester Cornelis), in the vicinity of Djakarta, and because of the necessity to travel his three-island District—Java, Sumatra, West Borneo—he no longer carried any local pastoral duties.

To Tjisarua, in the spring of 1907, came 38-year-old Charles S. Buchanan, an Ohioan with a record of ten years as a missionary in the Malaysia Conference. The physically slight Buchanan—he gave his height as four feet seven inches and his weight as ninety-four pounds, when he applied for missionary status—took up in the surrounding villages what Bishop Oldham called a "ceaseless itinerary among the people, with his pockets filled with medicine." In their first months' acquaintance with the villagers, he and his wife cared for hundreds of sick cases, seeing as many as fifteen or twenty people a day. When they could, they followed up the patients in their homes and used their medical ministrations to make openings for religious teaching. Their labors brought modest advances in the activities started by Denyes.

The Bik-Keuchenius family generously aided the mission at Tjisarua, which Denyes hoped eventually to make the center of the Java work. One of the Biks helped Buchanan in his struggle to learn Sundanese, and another translated into Sundanese some twenty-five hymns and most of the Methodist ritual. Bruno Bik and his manager, Edward Keuchenius, provided a rent-free residence for Buchanan and the Sundanese preacher who conducted the services.

On 21 November, Denyes held at Tjisarua the first formal Quarterly Conference in Java. Mr. and Mrs. Buchanan, Denyes, and the Sundanese preacher—just these four—"solemnly went through the whole program."

Shortly after coming to Tjisarua, Buchanan went with Denyes to see an ailing and aged widowed sister of Nathaniel, the Pondokgede preacher. They tramped barefooted for miles through the rice fields to the little village of six houses occupied by the children and grandchildren of the old woman—all of them Javanese-speaking people who had migrated from mid-Java to Tjisarua some years earlier. Denyes described the incident like this:

For three hours the claims of Christ were urged upon these people by ourselves and the Javanese preacher. The people were persuaded to take a stand and the whole village of fourteen adults and ten or twelve children were enrolled as inquirers. We baptised the old grandmother that afternoon. It was a strange service and perhaps it lacked some elements of dignity. The candidate sat cross-legged on a mat on the front veranda of a bamboo hut. Behind her were ranged in a semi-circle all her people dressed as they had come from their work. The rain was pouring in torrents and a flock of goats were crowding up under the roof to keep dry. Mr. Buchanan and I stood on the ground just off the veranda, dressed in wet and dirty khaki clothes with

trousers rolled up above the knees. Thus translating the Discipline from memory into Malay which was again translated into Javanese we baptised this widow, poor and old and sick, and formally established the first Javanese congregation of the Methodist Episcopal Church.

By becoming Christian inquirers, these people broke with Islam. Nathaniel began going weekly to the village to teach one of the young men who spoke Malay, and he in turn conveyed Christian teaching to the rest of the people in their Javanese tongue. Occasionally a Javanese teacher from Djakarta was sent to them for a day or two.

There were now three centers of Methodist work—Djakarta, Bogor, and Tjisarua—and during the rest of Denyes' District Superintendency, which continued to the end of 1911, occasional additions were made to the preaching places or small churches in the three neighborhoods, in much the same way as the Javanese congregation had been developed near Buchanan's Tjisarua residence, and Pondokgede out of Djakarta. These three neighborhoods, of course, were all in West Java.

In June, 1909, Denyes supervised the extension of Methodist work to Surabaja, at the other end of the island. In Denyes' judgment, almost nothing was being done for the evangelization of this important commercial city of 150,000 people, in spite of the fact that the Netherlands Missionary Society was soon to report forty stations and substations, with more than thirteen thousand members, in East Java. The Methodist move involved the appointment of a Chinese preacher, who opened a church for Hokkien Chinese in a room holding hardly twenty-five people, in "a very dirty little shop house in a very narrow and very dirty blind alley." The preacher was Diong Eng Seng, who had come to Djakarta's Tanahabang church from Sarawak in 1908. This was the only primarily evangelistic extension of Java Methodism beyond West Java during the District's connection with the Malaysia Conference.

It was not in evangelism, but in education, that the Java mission made its strongest effort to expand, at least as far as mobilization of missionary personnel was concerned. The effort was financed not by increased appropriations in the United States, but by arrangements made on the field.

The first of them was worked out in Bogor where in January, 1908, a wealthy Chinese made Denyes a generous offer towards the support of the Methodists' small Anglo-Chinese school, which for a year and a half had been handicapped by inadequate funds and interrupted leadership. Tan Guan Huat pledged a five-year subsidy sufficient to guarantee the salary of a teacher from America. Denyes quickly relayed the offer to Bishop Oldham, and in March, Otto A. Carlson of Brooklyn, a young unmarried missionary recruit from the Eastern Swedish Conference, a recent arrival on the Federated Malay States District, came to Bogor to head the school. A year later, Burr J. Baughman, a new missionary in Singapore, succeeded Carlson when

the latter left for the United States for reasons of health. Carlson died of dysentery in Colombo, Ceylon, on the way home.

This advance at Bogor was followed by several others in which Chinese financial aid was the determining factor. Beginning in 1910, the Mission made a series of agreements with officers of the *Tiong Hwa Hwe Koan*, a Chinese cultural movement for the education and improvement of the Chinese communities in the Netherlands Indies. Local branches of the *Tiong Hwa Hwe Koan* maintained about a hundred Mandarin-speaking schools and, where they could afford it, added English departments. In several places, the Mission entered into three-year contracts to supply teachers for these English departments, with the *Tiong Hwa Hwe Koan* paying the Mission sums equivalent to regular missionary salaries. The T.H.H.K. engaged Denyes as its inspector for the English schools conducted by the Methodist missionaries.

The Mission co-operated with T.H.H.K. schools in Djakarta, Surabaya, Sukaradja, and Purbolinggo. The contracts involved the services of both men and women missionaries: Charles M. Worthington, Edwin F. Lee, Berton O. Wilcox, Burr J. Baughman, Harry C. Bower, Carl C. Underhill, James P. Cole, Erik W. Allstrom, Albert H. Fisher, Armin V. Klaus, Pauline Stefanski, Lee Edna Nichols, Rita M. Kinzly (later, Mrs. Berton O. Wilcox), and Mrs. Erik W. Allstrom. Raymond L. Archer, who came from the United States to the Methodists' English School in Bogor in 1911, apparently was the only missionary who did not serve in a T.H.H.K. school.

Less than a year after the signing of the first *Tiong Hwa Hwe Koan* contract, which brought Charles Worthington to Djakarta, Denyes and his Chinese associates began planning for a high school that would offer the T.H.H.K. boys four years' further work in English, in addition to the usual course of four years in Mandarin plus five years in both Mandarin and English. Because the original intention was to make it a Methodist institution with Chinese financial backing, Denyes was eager to consummate the plan; it would give the Methodists, he said, "the care of practically all the future leaders among the Chinese of Java." The outbreak of the Revolution in China in 1911 greatly reduced the originally generous pledged gifts from several Chinese sources, and the new Middle School opened on only a modest basis in June, 1912, as Djakarta's second T.H.H.K. school, under the direction of Burr J. Baughman. For lack of funds and lack of sufficient students, the school nearly collapsed before the year was out; but it proved steady enough to keep going through 1913 under Albert H. Fisher, and beginning in 1914, its direction was combined with that of the regular T.H.H.K. school under Armin V. Klaus.

At the same time that it was developing this pattern of introducing its own missionaries into the T.H.H.K. schools, the Mission was serving as an employment agency to bring Chinese teachers from China to work in

the Mandarin-speaking departments of the T.H.H.K. While returning, in 1911, from an emergency trip to the United States, Denyes had visited China in the interests of the Java Chinese educational work and arranged for the Methodist mission in Tientsin to find Chinese teachers for the T.H.H.K. on three-year contracts. Five teachers came to Java under this plan during the first season.

The Tiong Hwa Hwe Koan was non-Christian, and made no concessions to Christianity in its co-operation with the Malaysia Conference. The Methodist teachers were not allowed to teach or celebrate Christianity on the schools' premises. The T.H.H.K.'s sole interest in the arrangement was English-language studies, and its leaders were not unmindful of the fact that missionary salaries were low enough to make hiring the Methodist workers a good bargain for their schools.

In answering a rhetorical question about the advantage to be gained by the Mission under these limitations, Denyes stated at the Conference session of 1911, "The answer is that if the missionaries were not in these schools, they would not be in Java at all, for there is not enough mission money to bring them out." It is true that this arrangement enabled the Methodist mission to augment its Java missionary corps without increased appropriations from the Board. In 1907, there was only one man holding a Conference appointment in Java. By 1912, there were six; and for several years afterwards, there were from five to seven. All but one of these drew his support from Chinese school work. By 1912, there were also two women missionaries primarily engaged in T.H.H.K. work; and from 1914 to 1917, there were three T.H.H.K. women workers at a time.

Denyès trusted that their T.H.H.K. responsibilities would leave the Methodist teachers enough time for directing evangelistic work in their several neighborhoods, so that around each teacher there would grow up as many Chinese and native churches as he could supervise and the Mission could pay for. But in practice, the school men were severely handicapped as evangelists because of their heavy teaching program. Denyes also banked—indeed, far too hopefully—on the eventual evangelistic possibilities of contacts between the Methodist teachers and the many thoughtful and progressive Chinese leaders they would meet in their association with the T.H.H.K. "When they have come to realize," said he, "that Christianity stands for all that is highest and best in life there will be no question of urging religion upon them, but they will themselves call upon us to show them and their children the way of truth."

The Woman's Foreign Missionary Society was another source of missionary personnel. Its first representative in Java was Esther Naomi Ruth of Indianapolis, whose first appointment was given her by the Board in 1908. She came to Java when Elizabeth Brooks, Denyes' earlier collaborator on the Java plan, had to withdraw only a few weeks before sailing time because

of serious illness in her family. Although the W.F.M.S. was not ready to accept responsibility in Java when solicited in 1907 and 1908 by Pittsburgh Conference leaders, it took over Naomi Ruth from the Board in 1910.

From 1912 on, the W.F.M.S. generally maintained two missionaries in Java. They included, in addition to Naomi Ruth, Pauline Stefanski (she married Charles Worthington in 1917), Hilda C. Holmberg, Lydia Urech, and Ethel Young.

Among the concerns of the W.F.M.S. women was educational work, but not in the Tiong Hwa Hwe Koan schools. When Naomi Ruth first came to Djakarta, Mary Denyes was still conducting her tiny Woman's Training School for Bible women in a servant's room in her own establishment. In 1911, the school moved to a new brick-and-wood cottage with two dormitory rooms and a classroom, erected on the Mission property through the use of funds gathered in the United States by Miss Ruth's father, who was an evangelist of the National Holiness Association. When Mrs. Denyes went to the United States in April because of illness, Naomi Ruth inherited her place as teacher of the three women in the Training School. In the same year, she started, with five pupils, a boarding school for girls that evidently was essentially an orphanage school.

Pauline Stefanski carried the work of the Woman's Training School during Naomi Ruth's extended health furlough, from 1914 to 1916. When the latter returned to Java in 1917, she resumed direction of the Training School, which was then moved to Bogor's more salubrious climate. Here Hilda Holmberg joined her as a co-worker in the School. Until 1912, the enrollment did not exceed three; in 1914, there were twelve students; and at the end of 1917, there were twenty-four—generally girls rather than mature women. Up to this time, the School was producing only a few pupils who worked as Bible women upon finishing their training. Some of them, however, were capable of great usefulness in evangelistic outreach; one Bible woman, in Djakarta, made 3,220 calls in 1915.

There were periods when the W.F.M.S. workers shared in the general women's work associated with the churches. In this they were joined with the Tiong Hwa Hwe Koan women teachers, missionary wives, and the few Bible women. In their efforts to win women and girls, the women workers—who often were assigned to the city churches, but sometimes got into the outlying village parishes—engaged chiefly in home visitation, informal individual and class instruction in reading and Christian teaching, and Sunday school work with children. The responsiveness of the women they reached was comparatively quite encouraging.

Responsibility for most of the Mission's general evangelism and church-centered educational activity rested upon two groups of men: the missionary teachers, who had to take it up beyond their academic schedules; and the corps of generally deficiently trained Oriental supply preachers, this group

being the more numerous. In 1912, for instance, Charles Worthington had oversight of five churches in the Djakarta neighborhood, and Burr Baughman worked at a sixth; but that same year, the six churches were served by six supply preachers. Raymond Archer supplemented his Bogor school work that year by preaching, but there were also three supply preachers among the Bogor Circuit's five preaching places.

The Java mission had no consistent or substantial program for training nonmissionary preachers and actually carried nobody clear through preparation for the ministry. It sent its few Java-produced candidates to the Jean Hamilton Training School in Singapore. In that institution, also, were trained the few men brought now and then from China, as well as the four Sumatran Bataks who entered Java work in 1911 and 1913. The Conference transferred the School's Malay department to Java in 1913, settling its instructor, Lamsana L. Tobing, in Bogor. There he conducted, along with preaching duties in the vicinity, the very little training (one student was reported for 1914) that went on for the next two years. The school was then transferred to Djakarta, and in 1916 and 1917, the enrollment ranged from seven to four. Tobing was still assigned to the work, but the practical responsibility for it fell upon Joseph B. Matthews, a new contract missionary, a good linguist whom Harry Mansell, the District Superintendent, judged the right man for the job. Unfortunately Matthews had too much to do in T.H.H.K. and Methodist school work and in the churches, and could give the Training School only a modicum of time.

From the end of John R. Denyes' District Superintendency to the establishment of the Netherlands Indies Mission Conference (that is, 1912-18), the pattern of church work and evangelistic outreach in the Java Mission remained essentially the same as it had become in 1909—three circuits in West Java and a single station in East Java.

Sending teachers to Sukaradja (1912) and Purbolinggo (1916) in Central Java constituted no substantial evangelistic penetration of that area. During their consecutive three-year terms in Sukaradja (1912-17) Carl Underhill and Erik Allstrom found their time and energies so consumed by T.H.H.K. teaching as to make evangelistic work impossible. From 1913 to 1915, they maintained a preacher to the Javanese in Purwokerto, about five miles away. After 1917, the T.H.H.K. contract for Sukaradja was not renewed. In Purbolinggo (entered in 1916), the Methodists deliberately refrained from general evangelistic work that would encroach upon the "very good work, medical and evangelistic," maintained there among the Muslim Javanese by the mission of the Reformed Churches (Dutch). Neither did the Methodists initiate any Chinese work there.

Shepherded successively by two Foochow supply preachers, sometimes held back by the transiency of men constituents from China, and benefiting from acquiring a better church property in 1916, the Chinese church in

Surabaya grew moderately from a dozen members in 1911 to about fifty members five or six years later. The church developed a Cantonese wing that became strong enough for the membership to be divided into Cantonese and Hokkien churches in 1917, each with its own pastor, but both using the same building. The Sunday school finally enrolled 130 pupils.

The missionaries—chiefly Harry Bower, who served for five years—buttressed the Chinese work with whatever practical contributions they were able to make with the leavings of their time, which was almost entirely given to carrying an intolerable teaching load in the T.H.H.K. school and to supplementing their income through extra teaching chores. In addition to being deprived of the full force of missionary leadership, the Surabaya mission was restricted in another way; it was, for most of Surabaya's population, a foreign-language mission, not even carrying on in the Malay speech that was familiar to the more settled Chinese. Furthermore, it was confined to the large port city's tightly delimited Chinese quarter. Thus the Surabaya enterprise could figure hardly at all in any implementation of the Java mission's larger aims for the evangelization of the country.

When Charles Buchanan became District Superintendent in 1912, six charges were reporting church membership to the Annual Conference from the Djakarta neighborhood.

Three of them were in Djakarta itself—Tanahabang, Krukut, and Kramat (the Pasar Senen church under a new name). Kramat was enjoying a new 250-seat church and school building opened in June, 1911, to replace the rented "dirty little shop-house" to which the congregation had been resorting. The new building was located on a large piece of land (about 87,000 square feet) acquired by the Mission in 1910, where also stood the Woman's Training School building, four houses to rent out, a brick house serving as a mission home, and a parsonage for the Kramat preacher. The Krukut church had been started in Djakarta's Old Town in 1908 as an outstation from Pasar Senen.

The other three charges were in the country, within twenty miles of Djakarta—Kampungsawah (the Pondokgede church, renamed about 1910), Bodjong, and Kebantenan.

In 1912, these six charges, with a few outstations, harbored 184 of the Java mission's 267 church members. In 1917, this group (Krukut was now renamed Manggabesar) was still functioning at approximately the same strength, and it included two newly added stations—Palmerah (two full members) and Djati (fourteen probationers), the latter being a village about twenty miles west of Djakarta.

By 1912, the Bogor church founded by Denyes in 1905 had fifty-five members. It held services in a large brick building purchased in the center of the Chinese quarter three years earlier. Here, also, it centered its educational work, which now included the Anglo-Chinese day school founded in

1906, a small boarding school (1909), and a Malay-language boys' school (1909). Spreading out into the villages of the densely populated agricultural environs was a network of some half dozen outstations (the points named in the Conference reports varied from year to year). Only two stations besides Bogor proper reported church members—and these only one apiece. But there were also a few embryonic churches as yet technically unborn according to the *Discipline*. As in the Djakarta network, so in and around Bogor there were a number of Sunday schools and Malay-language day schools. Except for the organization of a small day school for girls in Bogor in 1916, there was little change in the neighborhood pattern of churches, nascent churches, and schools up to 1917, and little further growth in the constituency.

After more than a decade, the Tjisarua project showed painfully little evangelistic success, in spite of a number of years' full time work by Charles Buchanan and in spite of the advantages (Sundanese language materials, land, buildings, Sabbath regulations) of patronage by the Bik-Keuchenius family. The original small, reorganized group of Christians proved to be a less than vital nucleus. The mission remained circumscribed by the boundaries of the Bik estate, and the large Muslim population was almost monolithically unresponsive. The church at Tjibeureum, the central preaching station, had only thirteen full members and six probationers in 1917. Here also were a day school, a Sunday school, and a very small boys' preparatory school begun in 1915 to feed pupils into the Training School in Djakarta. Still less had been accomplished in the immediately surrounding villages. In the Chinese church begun at Leuwimalang in 1915, there were two church members; at Djodjogan there were fifteen probationers. At Leuwimalang and at Tegoe there were small day schools. Denyes' dream for Tjisarua—and Buchanan's—was still far from fulfillment.

The beginnings of a new ministry at Tjisarua were emerging, however. Dr. Raymond G. Perkins (M.D., Syracuse University, 1911), who settled at Tjisarua in May, 1914, was laying the groundwork for a hospital. When Buchanan was in the United States on furlough in 1910, he had secured special gifts for a modest hospital that was expected to cost no more than \$2,000. Upon Bishop Oldham's recommendation and his explanation that introduction of such a hospital into Tjisarua's populous Muslim neighborhood would be "a great help to evangelism," the Board gave its approval, with the specific reservation that the Board itself would assume no financial obligation for construction of the hospital or for supplying a doctor. A few years later, Perkins became the doctor for the project under a three-year financial sponsorship by three parishioners of George A. Miller, pastor of First Church, San Jose, California.

Another financial factor, however, served to expand the extremely modest proportions of the original plan; Buchanan took advantage of the Dutch

administration's policy of liberally subsidizing Western mission hospitals among the native populations of the Netherlands Indies. Dr. Perkins was able to plan his hospital with assurance that the government would provide three-quarters of the purchase price of the site and of the cost of erection. With the assistance of the owner of the Bik estates, Perkins acquired his hospital site in 1915, and by Conference time, February, 1917, the government subsidy of \$17,000 was in hand, and construction of the hospital buildings was well under way.

Dr. Perkins was in charge of the entire enterprise at Tjisarua, including the evangelistic and the educational work. Without waiting for the hospital to go up, he added to the mission's activities such medical services as he could provide in temporary quarters and by visiting in the villages. Harry B. Mansell, his District Superintendent, reported that Perkins had treated not less than 2,500 cases in 1915. His evangelistic work finally became incidental to the medical practice and the development of the hospital buildings. By 1917, the construction program quite thoroughly absorbed the doctor's attention.

West Borneo

With missions barely begun in Java and Sumatra, Methodists from the Malaysia Conference made a third beginning in the Netherlands Indies by entering West Borneo in 1906.

The man who first focused the attention of the expansion-minded leaders of the Malaysia Mission upon West Borneo, and later refocused it there, was Benjamin F. West, the first Methodist missionary explorer in Sumatra.* Dr. West explored West Borneo too, early in 1890, traveling 250 miles eastward from the coast, mostly along the Kapuas River, which reaches from the equator far back through the jungle into the heart of the island. Accompanied by his colleague Henry L. E. Luering, West made friendly contacts not only in Malay and in Chinese villages but also in Dayak longhouses remote from the mouth of the river. He was optimistic about the missionary possibilities in the area, especially among the Dayaks, for "they have no ancestral religion to hold them fast, and are not yet entangled by the false prophet's [Mohammed's] followers."

Some weeks after his trip, West brought to the session of the Malaysia Mission an informative report on the opportunity in the Kapuas River region, where there appeared to be no effective missionary activity except for several large Roman Catholic congregations among the Chinese. In an open forum discussion, led by Bishop Thoburn, on the most suitable places for missionary expansion in Malaysia, West recommended that after Penang and Malacca, Borneo be designated as a place for opening new work. "The Dutch authori-

* See Vol. III, p. 658 f.

ties will not allow Catholics and Protestants to occupy the same territory," he stated, "and so everything seems to call for us to go over quickly and possess the country."

Methodist missionaries did go over quickly, but not to the *western* part of Borneo—nor did they possess the country. By the time Bishop Thoburn adjourned the following annual session of the Mission, in April, 1891, Dr. West's able and optimistic report on West Borneo had been effectively pigeon-holed. Although John C. Floyd, the Mission's new Superintendent, soon sailed to Borneo to find a location for a mission, he and his traveling companion, Henry Luering, instead of journeying to the Kapuas River valley—well explored by the West-Luering expedition and demonstrably accessible—conducted their search in the unfamiliar territory of British North Borneo, nearly a thousand miles by sea from Singapore.

From the Mission session, at which Floyd and Luering's excursion was decided upon, Bishop Thoburn wrote to Corresponding Secretary J. Oramel Peck, in New York, "The brethren of the mission are men of conservative views, and will do nothing rash, but they have faith in God, believe in their call, and expect to go forward, walking close behind the pillar of fire." In this case, apparently, the movement of the Shekinah had been detected with the aid of high officials of British North Borneo (Thoburn's rapport with the British was perennial) who advanced to Bishop Thoburn encouraging offers of land, protection, and general assistance for any mission the Methodists might establish in that remote area.

Upon arriving in North Borneo, where the Anglicans and the Roman Catholics occupied the only promising fields in the sparsely populated country, the two missionaries pitched upon the Limbawang area as the only place where it would be possible to reach very many people from a single center. Limbawang was three days' journey from the coast over mountains and through streams and thick jungle. Floyd returned to Singapore. Luering spent nine months in North Borneo, but never reached Limbawang, first because of floods and later because of an official ban imposed during police action to suppress riots in the interior. He marked time in Kimanis, on the coast, speaking daily to eager listeners in three languages—Chinese, Malay, and Dusun. But within a day's march of Kimanis there were no more than about five hundred people all told, and these were divided among five different tribes and languages.

Evicted from the government building that sheltered him during the rainy season, Luering had to build himself a house—cutting timber, hauling it through the jungle, floating it on the river, and then superintending the digging, carpentering, and roofing for the structure. All this, with the labor of planting, used up a great amount of his time and was carried out on a rice-and-pancake diet relieved once in two months by rations of beef or buffalo meat. There were no roads in the area, and transportation of goods was

all but impossible. Even to go to the post office was a five days' journey by water. "It is perfectly impossible to walk more than a quarter of a mile without wading through swamps, and swimming rivers which are full of alligators," reported Luering, "and the promenade through the primeval jungle is not always a recreation." The diligent and uncomplaining Luering was able to baptize no one during his stay in Kimanis, and he received as a probationer only his Chinese servant.

The Mission did not send Luering back to North Borneo for a second season. In explanation, *The Malaysia Message* (March, 1892) cited the difficulties he encountered, described the far more obvious missionary possibilities in the southern part of Borneo, and (with no suggestion that it was correcting any earlier perception of the "pillar of fire") tacitly pulled the report of the West-Luering expedition out of its pigeonhole by concluding:

and so it is in South or South West Borneo that we shall next seek an opening. What folly it would be to bury a missionary at Limbawang where our work could never spread out and grow. Let us plan for success and plant our Missions at strategic points whence we may bring the knowledge of salvation to many people.

The Malaysia Methodists made, however, no further early move towards Borneo. Bishop Thoburn voiced in his diary in 1896 his hope to reopen the mission there, but he found no further opportunity to inaugurate work in Borneo before he surrendered active direction of Malaysia affairs in 1900.

That opportunity fell to Benjamin West, who, as superintendent of the Singapore District, reminded the Conference members, in both 1902 and 1903, of the as yet unanswered need for Methodist missionaries in the Kapuas River region. In 1904, Pontianak, which was located near the mouth of the river, appeared on the list of appointments, "to be supplied." There turned out to be no money for a preacher for Pontianak, but West sent over a scout, a Chinese preacher named Giam Ah Chiam, who brought back a report that there were people in Pontianak and in Sambas, more than a hundred miles to the north, who were ready to receive a Methodist missionary. West also received requests to send missionaries to British North Borneo, to Sandakan and to a settlement near Jesselton. "But," said he, "the Kapuas river with its 200 miles of villages appeals to me yet even more strongly than when I myself visited the place fourteen years ago."

In November, 1905, accompanied by Kingsley E. Pease, West again went exploring in West Borneo for himself, on a three week's visit to Pontianak and to Singkawang, farther north along the west coast. In Pontianak, he found several Methodists formerly associated with the church on the Peninsula and a number of Christians from China. They pressed upon West their desire for a church and a school, and some of the Chinese residents, both Christians

and non-Christians, promised a substantial sum of money for mission buildings and salaries.

In Singkawang, West found U Chim Seng, a Chinese doctor, a former member of the church in Bukit Mertajam, on the Penang District. U Chim Seng had come to Singkawang some four years before, intending to open a druggist shop. When it was discovered that he was a Christian, he faced a rental boycott in the town and had to set up his business in a little thatched shed just outside the town limits. Here people came to buy medicine, and here he talked with them about Christ. A good many became interested in his message, and he soon was able to secure a shop in the heart of the Chinese quarter. After a time, the small group of Protestants who made up his following met rough opposition from a gang of Singkawang rowdies reportedly incited by Roman Catholic missionaries who had entered the area.

But U Chim Seng's sales and his Christian influence steadily expanded. Within a few years, he was employing ten or a dozen salesmen who traveled through the villages for a hundred miles inland. Along with his supply of drugs, each worker carried a few Testaments and Methodist hymnals for sale. At night, the drug salesman would become an informal evangelist, reading to the people from the Bible and singing Methodist hymns. Thus thousands of people who were quite unacquainted with any missionary heard at least a little of the story of Jesus Christ. As a result, letters and committees went all the way from Borneo to the Methodist mission in Singapore to ask for missionary assistance.

Benjamin West's presence in Singkawang late in 1905 was the first phase of the Malaysia Conference's response to these importunities. He and Kingsley Pease, undoubtedly straining the civil regulations on missionary activity, held services among the Chinese Christians for ten days, baptized ten adults and two children, enrolled more than fifty probationers, and arranged for a meeting place for these prospective church members.

The missionaries left U Chim Seng encouraged, but he soon was in fresh trouble. The news that a Methodist missionary might be sent to Singkawang aroused severe persecution against him and some of his fellow Christians. For months, his property was unsafe and his life was in danger. His house was broken into. On one occasion, native policemen battered down the door, trying to force him to keep his shop open on Sunday. He was waylaid, beaten, and stabbed. But he could not be stopped.

Several months later, following the adjournment of the Malaysia Conference in February, West was back in Singkawang once more, this time being accompanied by Charles M. Worthington. West granted U Chim Seng a Local Preacher's license, contingent upon his receiving the approval of the civil authorities for the kind of work it implied. Two years later, he was still the only Local Preacher on the field; and John R. Denyes then said of his leadership among the Chinese that "in spite of sickness and persecution he

has been the mainspring of the whole movement, and is a man who is worthy of greatest honour and praise for his sterling integrity and blameless life."

West's chief business in Borneo on this trip was to install Worthington in Pontianak, thus making him the first Methodist missionary, at long last, to Dutch Borneo. Worthington, a bachelor, recently had been attached to the Anglo-Chinese School in Penang. In the Appointments, his "New Work" assignment was put down simply as "Borneo." It was recorded that way, said Worthington later on, "so that I could get into Dutch West Borneo without the government officials knowing that I wanted to begin mission work." He came into the country as a tourist, and got a permit (later renewed) to stay for six months.

Worthington actually remained in Borneo for three years. He could not at once plunge unhampered into a full program of missionary activity, for it took more than two years for him to receive a full missionary permit. The obstacle to ready permission was the presence of Catholic missionaries, who were in the country by this time in such strength as to raise in the minds of the Dutch officials the possibility that Catholic and Methodist missions might overlap—a kind of competition they discouraged throughout the Netherlands Indies. In Methodist quarters, the delay was attributed also to Catholic initiative in cultivating the reluctance of the Dutch administration. Until the permit came, Worthington could not preach, administer the sacraments, or perform any other ministerial function. Therefore he began as a school teacher, securing in August, 1906, a permit to teach Chinese children in Pontianak and establishing, under the sponsorship of influential Chinese originally cultivated by West and Pease, an English day school with a night department for Mandarin Chinese.

The school provided Worthington a foothold, but a precarious one. The monied men who had made liberal financial promises to West not only begged off from contributing for the erection of a school building, but also failed to provide teachers' salaries. As a result, Worthington himself got no salary from the school. The Malaysia Conference did what it could to provide emergency funds for him, but at the end of the first year, he had to absorb personally a deficit in his salary. John R. Denyes, superintendent of the Netherlands Indies District, came to Pontianak in 1907 and managed to transfer control of the school from the hands of its secular sponsors (the leader was a Tjong Hwa Hwe Koan man*) to the Mission itself. Even then, Worthington found it advisable to pad out his salary by teaching, for part of the year, a number of Dutch residents of the city.

Worthington was not content to confine himself to the work of the Pontianak school. While his superiors pressed for the permit, Worthington himself seized every practical opportunity within the law—sometimes he

* See pp. 151 ff.

barely skirted trouble with it—to lay the groundwork for the coming Methodist Episcopal Church in West Borneo. He early accepted an invitation to preach in the seclusion of a wealthy Chinese home, where the host's family and friends were gathered. For two years, he and the elderly head of the house alternated in preaching at Sunday services, Worthington speaking in Malay, his sermon being translated into Chinese. During his first year, he taught at least sixteen days a month but spent the rest of the month visiting towns and villages outside Pontianak. Outdoor preaching was strictly forbidden, and police and government officers often warned Worthington not to read the Bible or to preach to more than six people under a single roof. But he got under every roof he could, persistently exercising the privilege of talking with the people and praying with them. Although he was forbidden to organize a church, he prepared for future churches by enrolling numerous preparatory members.

Methodist progress quickened in Worthington's second year. Persecution in Singkawang slacked off. In August, 1907, the local Christians won an official ruling that they could worship as they chose. Announcement of the decision gave them new strength, even though the foreign missionary still was not permitted to preach or lead congregational worship. A similar ruling was made in Pamangkat, twenty miles from Singkawang, and Ah Liong, a young farmer, began serving as volunteer preacher at services held in a house made available by a Chinese Christian. In Sambas, the Dutch pastor gave the Methodists a lift by baptizing a sizable company of candidates. Most significant of all, Worthington got his first missionary permit early in June, after presenting to the government a list of five hundred Chinese who were Christians or who wanted to become such. To be sure, the permit limited Worthington to work in the Mampawah district, about midway between Pontianak and Singkawang. But it was a beginning, and Worthington quickly grasped it, while John Denyes followed it up with a new request for permission to work in all West Borneo.

With the new opening authorized by the government, Worthington's appointment was changed, for 1908, from Pontianak to Mampawah, where he settled in February, after placing the Pontianak Anglo-Chinese School under the direction of a young assistant. Then came regular services at Mampawah, formation of a church, and visitation in surrounding villages. From that time on, with some assistance from two Chinese preachers (one of them was stationed in Mampawah) Worthington was almost constantly on the move—traveling by boat, by bicycle, and afoot—organizing, teaching, and encouraging the people. In the spring, he even baptized three impatient Chinese of Singkawang, though he could not obtain official permission to perform such a function. He hired a fishing boat and, with two Chinese preachers and the three candidates, rowed three and a half miles out to sea, where they observed

with exquisite legality, on their knees in the rocking boat, the Sacrament of Baptism.

Such stratagems, however, shortly became unnecessary, for on 21 July the government at last authorized Worthington to extend his missionary activity into the rest of West Borneo. Now came an outburst of enthusiasm, of evangelistic activity, of plans for church-building and for outreach to new locations. To be at the center of it all, Worthington moved, in the fall, to Singkawang.

After trying for months to shape up the informal constituency gathered during the two years and a half of waiting, Worthington reported, at the end of the Conference year, five churches scattered north from Pontianak for a hundred miles, with 80 full members and 192 probationers. They were located in Pontianak, where the Anglo-Chinese School now was offering Christian teaching, and in Mampawah, Singkawang, Sempadung, and Sambas. In addition to these organized churches, there were a number of informal congregations. And beyond them were hundreds of Chinese who had been reached by the Mission during its underground period. Many of them were friendly to Christian teaching. The evangelistic possibilities were promising.

Just at this crucial time of need and of potentiality, the West Borneo mission sagged at the center. Worthington went home on furlough in 1909, and the Malaysia Conference had no replacement ready. For many months, no resident missionary was at work in West Borneo, and the man who finally came, William E. Horley, stayed for only a few months at the end of the year, before being transferred to another District. U Chim Seng was away in China, and only a couple of inadequate Chinese preachers were available as leaders. A new missionary, 23-year-old Abel Eklund, a native of Sweden, was assigned to the field in 1910, but he was handicapped during his first year by the burden of language study and by demands involved in supervising the Pontianak school and a Singkawang school opened in 1909. "All of this means," reported Denyes at the Conference session of February, 1911, "that what might have been made a very great movement has proved to be but a passing spasm. The converts are largely discouraged and it will take heroic effort to arouse them again." Certainly the membership statistics did not draw the sting from this description; they were down to 114 probationers and 25 full members.

Eklund, being the sole missionary on the field, and unaided except for two or three Chinese preachers, was unable, during the three years he stayed in Singkawang, to make much more of the West Borneo mission among the Chinese than it was when he came to it. The Pontianak school was discontinued because of lack of local support. An attempt was made to salvage something of the deteriorating Pontianak congregation by negotiating with the Dutch Protestants in the city for the erection of a union church. But this proposal hung fire, and the Methodist work almost entirely disappeared. A few new names appeared in the listing of organized churches elsewhere, and

two congregations acquired church buildings; but earlier hopes for strong missionary growth remained unrealized. Half way through his West Borneo service, Eklund was so impressed by the Mission's limitations as to personnel and facilities that he could see no prospect for its success. "I am nearly convinced," he said, "that it is not worth while to carry on the work in he way we now do. Better close it up altogether."

Eklund desired, however, to push out beyond the Chinese to the Dayaks, and early secured Denyes' promise to look for some young Sumatran Bataks to work among them. To find a strategic location for a Dayak mission, he and Denyes explored two hundred miles of back country in November, 1911. They decided upon the southeast section of the Sambas district and chose for headquarters Bengkajang, a small Chinese town about forty-five miles east of Singkawang, with more than twenty Dayak settlements within six miles and many more Dayak locations farther back in the jungles and the mountains. Here, they realized, in an area unreached by any other mission group, they could reach many Dayaks, Malays, and Chinese all together.

In July, 1912, Eklund and Charles S. Buchanan, the new District Superintendent, took Willie H. Galung, an able Sumatran Batak, in to Bengkajang to start the Dayak project. They did not strike east from Singkawang, but took a circuitous route, some forty miles north to Sambas and then two days' journey up the Sambas River in a gold miner's launch, to Ledo. With young Eklund trundling provisions and clothing on his bicycle, and the diminutive but energetic Buchanan striding along "unarmed except with a paper umbrella," the two missionaries went twenty-six miles across country from Ledo to Bengkajang, leaving Galung and his family and the mission goods to be poled and rowed for another two days' journey southward. After settling Galung in his new quarters, Eklund and Buchanan returned to the coast at Mampawah, south of Singkawang, Buchanan having walked eighty-five miles on the round trip, thirty-two of them barefoot because of pinching shoes.

Galung at once started a school in Bengkajang, and soon had thirty pupils, half of them Dayaks. But before the end of the year, the population of the whole district rose against the Dutch administration, and Galung had to close down his school because of rioting and guerrilla warfare. Since he was living at the fort, where a large unit of native soldiers was now stationed, his family was safe, and he was able to keep up a measure of itinerant religious work.

Eklund was succeeded in 1913 by another young missionary, Berton O. Wilcox, who also struggled purposefully under an impossibly heavy load and in an unsettled period. The situation in Pontianak showed no improvement, and the Malaysia Finance Committee finally voted down the union church agreement when it was discovered that the Dutch had raised their share of the building fund by running a lottery. Wilcox managed to arrange for the Singkawang school work in a way that left him free to be much away from home

itinerating among his extensive constituency, but that activity slowed down the movement towards a church building for Singkawang.

Only one field letter from Wilcox remains in Board archives—a request for a motorcycle. No wonder! Describing his field to Secretary Oldham in July, 1914, he said:

Our work extends over a piece of country about 150 miles long by 75 miles broad. There is now in existence or in course of construction over 300 miles of roads good for cycling. On or near these roads there are more than 40 Chinese villages with populations of from 100 to 3,000 souls, not counting the city of Pontianak which has about 30,000 inhabitants. In 20 of these places we already have Christians! To take care of them and gather in others we have a force of one native man from Sumatra, myself, and—God. All these people are accessible. Where we have work the people are impatient because they are so neglected. They wish to hear more and be better.

Mrs. Wilcox commented, a few months later, "It is a sin to wear out a man's strength on mere pedalling when a few dollars would do away with the necessity for it." Charles Worthington had said of his West Borneo parish, back in 1908, "I need a flying machine to visit all the places." Wilcox was ready to settle for a motorcycle.

Already the hard-driven young missionary—trying carefully to shepherd the people, to develop an intercommunity aid program for church buildings, and to arrange a system of class leaders in default of trained workers—was worn down and ill. Three months earlier, he had begun to "feel queer dizzy sensations accompanied by strange feelings of unreality of things and a faraway sound to voices that I heard." But far from being able to resort to complete rest from his work, Wilcox had to carry on amid unusually dangerous and troubling conditions.

Late in July, a serious armed insurrection of Chinese and Dayaks broke out in the Mampawah district over the issue—so it was reported in *The Malaysia Message*—of the inauguration of forced labor. The Mampawah police head and his men were surrounded and killed, the civil governor's house was burned, and the governor himself was compelled to flee in a boat, mortally wounded. Soldiers were dispatched to key points to keep the outbreak from reaching the dimensions of a general uprising, people in remoter places sought safety in the principal towns, and Europeans and Eurasians were asked to take up arms and join the military. Wilcox directly concerned himself with the difficulties of the Methodist people caught in the turmoil in various localities, but he finally saw the regular work of the Mission brought practically to a standstill.

Late in August, Wilcox collapsed, was ordered to Java to rest, and suddenly, in Singapore en route, died of a cerebral hemorrhage at the age of twenty-nine, leaving his young wife with a nine-months-old baby, and a child yet to be born. The double blow of the young missionary's death and of

the insurrectionary troubles fell heavily upon the West Borneo mission, to which Bishop Eveland at once sent Charles Worthington to pull things together.

Worthington gave way, in March, 1915, to another 29-year-old missionary, Floyd H. Sullivan, who stayed on the field for three years. Singkawang remained the chief mission center. There Sullivan saw the church membership grow, opened a new church building erected by the local congregation after years of delay, and built a mission home to replace the rented quarters he and his wife at first had shared with numerous bats, moles, bees, rats, and black squirrels, to say nothing of neighborly nested serpents and two-foot-long lizards. Outside Singkawang, roads were improving, Christian contacts remained numerous, and Sullivan itinerated as steadily as he could among the Chinese communities; but the Mission was still seriously undermanned, and there was little growth in membership in the handful of small churches.

The Dayak work, so rudely broken off at the time of the insurrection, began to show progress. Willie Galung again opened a Dayak school in Bengkajang and soon had more than 120 of "these little jungle people," as Mrs. Sullivan called them, attending. Since the government was beginning to show some interest in developing Malay schools for Dayaks, Galung's school received a public subsidy in 1916.

Co-operation with the government went still further. The official plan called for the Dayaks to put up their own primitive school buildings and to pay modest tuition, with the public authorities recruiting the teachers and providing financial subsidies. Before leaving the superintendency of the District, Charles Buchanan projected the Methodist mission into this movement by convincing the Dutch official originally promoting the scheme that it would be bad policy to use only Muslim teachers, as he had contemplated doing. In 1916, the mission recruited four Christian Batak teachers from Sumatra for government-subsidized schools. Harry B. Mansell, Buchanan's successor, hoped in this way to infiltrate the Dayak school system with a corps of Christian teachers who would influence their pupils toward accepting Christianity.

During the first season, twenty pupils in the Patengahan school, one of the first in which the Methodists participated, were enrolled as probationers, thus demonstrating the possibility of what Mansell had in mind. By the end of 1917, the Mission was so intimately associated with six of the new vernacular schools—Lumar, Patengahan, Phakmengtioh, Sebalau, Sempadung, and Temu—as to list them, along with Bengkajang, as Methodist schools. The schools, of course, were small; by 1917, all seven together had 170 pupils.

It is not possible to estimate reliably in terms of assimilated converts the evangelistic results of Methodist influence among the Dayaks. On all seven Methodist charges there were, in 1917, only 176 full members, with

58 probationers. By far the larger proportion of this membership was still Chinese.

Bangka

The Methodists planted their fourth Netherlands Indies mission in 1911, on the island of Bangka, which lies close to Sumatra, opposite Palembang. When John R. Denyes went to the session of the Malaysia Conference in Singapore in February, he had signed a contract to supply a teacher for the Tiong Hwa Hwe Koan school in Pangkalpinang, the capital of the Residency of Bangka, midway along the eastern coast of the island. This particular contract and the Methodist penetration of Bangka involved in it grew out of general negotiations between Denyes and leaders of the Tiong Hwa Hwe Koan in 1910, when the Malaysia mission was beginning to supply missionary personnel for T.H.H.K. schools in a number of places in the Netherlands Indies. The signing of the Pangkalpinang contract led to the appearance of the caption on the list of appointments for the Netherlands Indies District for 1911, "to be supplied."

The man secured to fill the post was Mark Freeman, thirty years old, unmarried, with a little experience as a teacher in a night school for Japanese and in a Y.M.C.A. class on the Pacific coast of the United States, and freshly graduated from Oberlin College in June. After being enlisted by Denyes, who was in the United States for a short time, he hastily set out for Singapore to become a three-year contract teacher in Java, but he ended up in Pangkalpinang on 30 July, to become the first Protestant missionary in Bangka. Here he found himself in a hot, humid, sparsely settled country about the size of Connecticut, peopled predominantly by Malays, and by a few aboriginal tribes and a large Chinese minority. Freeman went to work in the English department of the well-housed Tiong Hwa Hwe Koan school, carrying a heavy teaching schedule, studying Malay on the side, and at first feeling somewhat overwhelmed by the unfamiliar situation in which he found himself, isolated and ill schooled in what to expect. Two years later, he wrote to Secretary Oldham, "I must say that I believe that to station a new man entirely alone on a remote field is a positive *sin*."

His early difficulties, however, did not sour or block Freeman; he became a hard and dedicated worker. His contract did not allow him to propagate Christian teachings in the course of his school work, and he won the respect of the Tiong Hwa Hwe Koan officers by scrupulously observing this agreement. For the first nine months, he had no missionary permit to teach religion in the community at large, but once it was granted, he labored hard, beyond the limits of the demanding school schedule, at evangelizing the large number of resident Chinese. His methods were those of a layman, for he had no

ministerial status until he became a member of the Malaysia Conference, on trial, in February, 1913.

He gathered a small Sunday school for children by calling on the fathers at home. By the end of his second year in Pangkalpinang, Freeman had ninety-four children under his guidance. At the same time, he developed a well-knit group of a dozen men who studied the English Bible on Sunday nights. Later came a midweek evening prayer meeting and even a small prayer group for children. Night classes for men became a school of twenty steady attendants. While he was making these missionary beginnings, Freeman's department in the Tiong Hwa Hwe Koan school grew to 160 boys and girls. Far from resting content to complain about his early difficulties, Freeman summarized his attitude at the end of two years, by concluding his letter to Oldham—"This life always!"

Out of the influences generated in the Sunday school and the Bible classes came a church, which Charles S. Buchanan, the District Superintendent, organized on 31 October 1913 with ten probationers. Caring for the small church, which a year later had eleven full members and six probationers, were three lay leaders and stewards, "three very faithful men," to whom Freeman gave weekly guidance in the Catechism.

Freeman enjoyed happy relations with the Tiong Hwa Hwe Koan; some of the men were influenced by the church, and by the time Freeman left the field, all the officers were Christians. His three-year contract was renewed in 1914, and his fiancée, Gwen Jones, a young American Board missionary in India, was added to the T.H.H.K. staff. The church meetings were held in the schoolhouse, but rather than rest upon this privilege, Freeman received from the government, through the good offices of the Resident, an inexpensive but desirable strip of land for the erection of mission buildings.

Freeman was able, on his own part, to be helpful to the Resident, an active Christian who was sufficiently concerned about public morals to abolish public gambling (this meant a considerable loss of revenue), to establish strict controls on opium smokers, and to work against the liquor traffic. In April, 1915, the Resident prohibited the sale of alcoholic beverages to the Malay population and began to move towards liquor control for the Chinese and other foreigners. At his request, Freeman had the Board send out from New York copies of state liquor laws in use in the United States, where the movement towards national prohibition was sweeping towards its climax. These materials were gratefully received and became a valuable factor in the second phase of the Resident's antiliquor program.

Freeman worked very hard, under unfavorable climatic conditions. Both he and his wife paid a toll of recurring ill health over several years. Both of them broke down temporarily in 1914, and in 1916 an attack of sprue, following a six-week holiday forced by his succumbing to malaria, necessitated Freeman's return to the United States in September. When he left,

he was in the midst of the work of erecting a church building in Pangkalpinang. The church was nearly paid for from local sources. Behind him Freeman also left a church membership of twenty-two people, a number of less formal adherents to the Christian group, and much good will in the Chinese community. All he accomplished had been done without drawing upon appropriations by the Board.

Although Freeman was succeeded briefly by a lay teacher on contract with the T.H.H.K., his ministry was the last substantial Methodist work conducted in Bangka.

Netherlands Indies Mission Conference

In 1918, the Methodist missions in the Netherlands Indies severed their administrative connection with the Malaysia Conference, to which they had been tied from their beginnings. For a decade, they had constituted its Netherlands Indies District, being associated with Districts centered in Singapore and the Malay Peninsula. In themselves, the four missions—Java, Sumatra, Bangka, and West Borneo—constituted a farflung field, and the fact that they lay at their closest points several hundred miles from Singapore by slow steamer travel made it even more difficult to maintain Conference and supervisory relations with them from Singapore and the rest of the Peninsula.

In February, taking up an option authorized by General Conference enabling acts of 1912 and 1916, the Malaysia Conference, meeting in Singapore, voted to divide by setting off the Netherlands Indies District as the Netherlands Indies Mission Conference. The new Conference operated during the ensuing year as a separate organization, with Harry B. Mansell as Superintendent. Under the joint presidency of Bishops Homer C. Stuntz and John W. Robinson, it held its first annual session in Bogor, Java, in February, 1919. Its ministerial charter membership was composed of twenty ministers (five Asians and fifteen missionaries) transferred from the Malaysia Conference. The combined membership of the churches in the four missions totaled about seven hundred.

4

Following the Flag Into the Philippines

AS APRIL WAS BLENDING INTO MAY IN 1898, Basilio Augustin y Davila, Spain's governor-general in the Philippine Islands, issuing a proclamation in Manila, declared:

A squadron manned by foreigners, possessing neither instruction nor discipline, is preparing to come to this Archipelago with the blackguard intention of robbing us of all that means life, honour, and liberty. Pretending to be inspired by a courage of which they are incapable, the North American seamen undertake as an enterprise capable of realization the substitution of Protestantism for the Catholic religion . . .

This was hardly an objective description of Commodore Dewey's fleet, which then was steaming from Hong Kong to Manila Bay. But that it expressed an issue, nobody could deny—least of all, the American missionary leaders who sprang to acknowledge Dewey's sinking of the Spanish fleet on 1 May as a providential stroke signaling an historic opportunity for Protestantism to enter the Philippine Islands.

Two weeks after Dewey's victory at Manila, the Presbyterian General Assembly, meeting at Winona Lake, Indiana, unanimously and enthusiastically adopted a statement that demonstrated Governor-General Augustin's acuity in smelling on the wind a whiff of advancing Protestantism:

In addition to fields already occupied, we cannot be deaf or blind to the startling providence of God which is just now opening up new and unexpected fields for foreign mission work. The peace-speaking guns of Admiral Dewey have opened the gates which henceforth make accessible not less than 8,000,000 of people who have for 300 years been fettered by bonds almost worse than those of heathenism, and oppressed by a tyrannical priesthood only equalled in cruelty by the nation whose government has been a blight and blistering curse upon every people over whom her flag has floated, a system of religion almost if not altogether worse than heathenism. . . . We cannot ignore the fact that God has given into our hands, that is, into the hands of American Christians, the Philippine Islands, and thus opened a wide door and effectual to their populations, and has, by the very guns of our battleships, summoned us to go up and possess the land.

Dr. Arthur J. Brown, Foreign Secretary of the Presbyterian Missionary Society, stirred his society to prompt acceptance of the challenge. As early as 6 June, the Presbyterian Board received from its Executive Council, and passed on for committee work, a paper on opening a mission in the Philippines. On 20 June, the Presbyterian Board directed its Executive Council to hold an early conference with representatives of a number of other missionary groups, "with a view to a frank and mutual understanding as to the responsibilities of American Christians for the people of Cuba, Porto Rico and the Philippine Islands, and an agreement as to the most effective distribution of the work among the several Boards, if it shall be found expedient and practicable to undertake it." The Board, declaring that it appeared to be the sentiment of the Presbyterian Church that American Christians should "consider the duty of entering the door which God in His providence is thus opening," stated that there were rumors that the foreign mission boards of other churches had the same disposition.

One of the rumors—and quite sound it was—came from the New York headquarters of the Missionary Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church in the next building down Fifth Avenue from the Presbyterians. The day after the Presbyterian action on prospective comity arrangements, the Board of Managers acted for the Methodists, appointing Adna B. Leonard, James M. Buckley, Charles H. Payne, Henry K. Carroll, and Edward L. Dobbins as a committee to confer on comity agreements to govern missionary work in the Philippines (and in Cuba and Puerto Rico), and to make recommendations on the expediency and method of beginning Methodist work there. The preface to the resolution adopted by the Board took up in part the providential theme:

Whereas, there are strong providential indications that through the agency of the navy and army of the United States, the Philippine Islands and the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico will be open at an early day to Protestant missionary endeavor . . .

Adna B. Leonard, one of the Corresponding Secretaries, was no less impressed than was his Presbyterian counterpart by the religious and missionary augury of Dewey's success in battle. He believed that through the operations of Dewey's squadron, the United States was thrust out into the Philippines by an overruling Providence, to break the power of Spanish despotism and to advance the missionary cause. He pictured Dewey as suddenly overtaken in Hong Kong by the outbreak of the war with Spain, thrust out of port by the neutrality laws, and steering towards Manila because he "must conquer a place for the sole of his foot and a harbor in which to anchor his ships." In this Leonard saw the hand of God—not the hand of Theodore Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, who had schemed, several months before the declaration of war (25 April), to get Dewey put in charge of

the Asiatic Squadron and had cabled Dewey (behind the back of the more conservative Secretary of the Navy, John D. Long), as early as 25 February, to concentrate his squadron in Hong Kong and keep it there with coal bunkers full. "In the event of declaration of war Spain," the cable ran, "your duty will be to see that the Spanish squadron does not leave the Asiatic coast, and then offensive operations in the Philippine Islands." When Dewey sailed for Manila, he departed on specific orders from Long to make the Spanish fleet his target.

But Leonard was unaware of Roosevelt's machinations; like many other Methodist leaders, he believed that the incident in Manila Bay and its lengthy politico-military sequel were of God. He appealed to the Methodist constituency, somewhat in advance of specific Board action, for \$10,000 to open a new mission in the Philippines, declaring that missionary income must increase "if our Church is to keep step with the other great division of the Lord's army." And he asked, "Must the Lord's treasury remain unreplenished and his army stand unshod and unarmed, while by the clash of fleets and the thunder of battle his voice commands an advance?" A little later he declared that the Christian church must follow the army and "occupy the territory conquered by the war power of the nation."

In May, while the news of Dewey's exploit was still fresh, Abraham J. Palmer, one of Leonard's two Secretarial colleagues, prepared an editorial rejoicing in the new partnership between the armed state and the Church:

Assuming that he [Dewey] has captured Manila and the flag of our country is today floating there, we are no longer compelled to go to a foreign country to seek raw heathen. When patriotism and evangelism can go hand in hand, the one strengthens the other. If it should result that the Philippine Islands are to remain under a protectorate of this country for years to come, it will be our immediate duty to establish a Mission there. And how glorious it will be to think that we have one Mission in the heathen world with the starry flag above it!

As far as the public was concerned this statement—appearing in an official organ of the Missionary Society before any confirming action by the Society, even before the Board's substantially noncommittal vote of 21 June—put the Methodist missionary organization on record in favor of a mission in the Philippines.

The Methodists were prepared to respond favorably to an invitation to consultation sent out by the Presbyterian Board on 29 June to a number of American and Canadian missionary groups, and their representatives attended a conference held at the Presbyterian Board rooms on 13 July. Representatives of five denominations were present. It was agreed to organize separate comity committees on the Philippines, Cuba, and Puerto Rico, with the various denominations participating according to their interest in the respective fields. The Methodist Board of Managers, meeting on 19 July,

appointed two members to each committee, assigning Secretary Leonard and Henry K. Carroll to the committee on the Philippine Islands. The Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. and the American Baptist Missionary Union were the other organizations most actively interested in entering the Philippines.

At the meeting on the 19th, the Methodist Board's Committee on India recommended that Bishop James M. Thoburn be requested to make an exploratory visit to the Philippines to provide information on the practicability of opening a Philippine mission and on desirable locations for missionary occupation. Bishop Thoburn's name was suggested in view of the "fact that these islands constitute a part of the Malaysia group, of which Bishop Thoburn has episcopal supervision. . ." The Board, however, deferred action on the Committee's resolution until its September meeting and then took no action. Thus it failed to recognize, as it might have done, Bishop Thoburn's jurisdiction over Methodist activity in the Archipelago.

Secretary Leonard, however, grasping the initiative in the matter left dangling by the Board, at once wrote Bishop Thoburn, asking him to go to the Islands. Thoburn replied that it was as yet too early for such a visit; it was not at all clear, he said, that the United States intended to do more than hold a coaling station somewhere in the Philippines (he was writing only seven days after the armistice with Spain was signed on 13 August). He felt that in such an event, with Manila finally left either to the Spaniards or to the Filipinos, conditions would not be favorable for missionary work.

Leonard did not misunderstand the cautiousness of Thoburn's response to his request. In temperament and in policy, Bishop Thoburn was Methodism's missionary expansionist *par excellence*, and he already had voiced his lively and aggressive interest in the overturn of Spanish power in the Philippines. From the early years of his episcopal tenure, he had been earnestly looking forward to missionary occupation of the Philippines as a phase of that general spread of Methodist missions through Malaysia to which he remained steadily committed. In 1892, he described the dictatorship of the Spanish Catholic theocracy in the Philippines, and called the Islands "as needy a field for missionary effort as any of those farther south, where Christianity is wholly unknown." At about the same time, Thoburn said to a small company of his co-workers, "God will some time open our way into the Philippines, so suddenly that the world will hold its breath." When at last Dewey sank Montojo's ships in Manila Bay, Thoburn saw it as the work of God to extend the gospel in the Orient; and when two months later Sampson and Schley destroyed Cervera's fleet off Santiago, the jubilant Bishop's private comment was, "God is in all these changes." The caution Thoburn expressed to Leonard, however, was dictated by uncertainty as to whether the United States would implement Providence by retaining the Philippines.

President McKinley had not yet decided, in the summer of 1898, what to

do about America's permanent position in the Philippine Islands; not until 26 October was he ready to instruct the Peace Commissioners in Paris to acquire the entire archipelago. A year later, McKinley—a Methodist, and proud of his Methodist heritage—in a White House interview on 21 November with a five-man committee of the General Missionary Committee, then in session in Washington, described how his indecision came to be resolved. As the committee was about to withdraw, the President held them back:

Hold a moment longer! Not quite yet, gentlemen! Before you go I would like to say just a word about the Philippine business. I have been criticised a good deal about the Philippines, but don't deserve it. The truth is I didn't want the Philippines, and when they came to us, as a gift from the gods, I did not know what to do with them.

. . . I sought counsel from all sides—Democrats as well as Republicans—but got little help. I thought first we would take only Manila; then Luzon; then other islands perhaps also. I walked the floor of the White House night after night until midnight; and I am not ashamed to tell you, gentlemen, that I went down on my knees and prayed Almighty God for light and guidance more than one night. And one night late it came to me this way—I don't know how it was but it came; (1) That we could not give them back to Spain—that would be cowardly and dishonourable; (2) that we could not turn them over to France or Germany—our commercial rivals in the Orient—that would be bad business and discreditable; (3) that we could not leave them to themselves—they were unfit for self-government—and they would soon have anarchy and misrule over there worse than Spain's was; and (4) that there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God's grace do the very best we could by them, as our fellow-men for whom Christ also died. And then I went to bed, and went to sleep, and slept soundly, and the next morning I sent for the chief engineer of the War Department (our map-maker), and I told him to put the Philippines on the map of the United States [pointing to a large map on the wall of his office], and there they are, and there they will stay while I am President!

The President had not been entirely without Methodist help in becoming sensitive to the direction that divine "light and guidance" might take. Secretary Leonard, once again acting in advance of any recorded vote by the Board of Managers, wrote to President McKinley, on 6 September 1898, in the interest of a handling of the Philippine problem that would create a condition essential to Methodist missionary endeavor in the Islands. He said:

On behalf of the Board of Managers of the Missionary Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church I beg to say that we are deeply interested in the outcome of the peace negotiations with Spain, particularly as they may relate to the question of religious liberty in the Philippine Islands. There is a strong feeling among the people against returning those islands to the political control of Spain, and there is a sentiment that amounts to a demand that in any event, there must be complete religious toleration . . .

Leonard told the President that the Board of Managers doubtless would memorialize him on the Philippines question. Instead, the Board addressed its appeal on behalf of Methodist missions to the Peace Commission treating with the Spaniards in Paris. On 20 September it ordered the following communication sent to each of the five commissioners:

Disclaiming all desire to interfere with the prerogatives of the United States Government in determining the political destiny of the Philippine Islands, we nevertheless and most earnestly urge that in the future there shall prevail in those islands absolute religious liberty. Having large and important missionary interest already established among Malay populations,* we most earnestly desire that such guarantee of religious liberty in the peace negotiations now pending between the United States and Spain may be secured as shall render the intolerance of the past absolutely impossible in the future.

The communications to the President and to the Peace Commissioners, guardedly worded as they were, could leave little doubt in the minds of the recipients that their Methodist petitioners would welcome annexation of the Philippines by the United States; how else could the desired religious freedom be guaranteed by American action? By this time there was an influential and growing body of opinion in the Methodist Episcopal Church that favored annexation far more forthrightly than did the letters the missionary officials sent to Washington and to Paris. Indeed, both in support of the Spanish-American War and in advocacy and justification of annexation, Bishops, secretaries, church editors, preachers, and other Methodists in significant numbers talked and wrote like full-blooded imperialists. On their tongues and by their pens, Christian ideals became not commands to bring American jingoism and expansionism under ethical condemnation, but pious sanctions for aggressive military action and territorial aggrandizement by virtue of conquest. They felt little tension between the demands of militaristic patriotism and loyalty to Christ.

From the very beginning of the war, Bishop Thoburn had advocated occupation of the Philippines by the United States, and soon after the Dewey triumph, he rejoiced—in common with all Protestant missionaries, so he believed—that American public opinion was rapidly accepting the idea that the occupation should be permanent. He felt that no other honorable course lay open to the American people. The only thing to do was boldly to assert that the Americans were in the Philippines for the good of the Filipinos, to Christianize them and elevate them in the scale of Christian civilization. With the Philippines as a base, he held, the United States would be in a position, with British co-operation, to use its influence in eastern Asia. So strong was this drift in his thinking that two years later, during the siege of Peking by the Boxers, he portrayed the United States as destined by

* See note, p. 202.

Providence to become the chief naval power in the Pacific and held that therefore it should intervene directly in Chinese affairs. Concretely, he urged dispatching five or six of the strongest United States warships to the China coast, along with an army detachment, so that the world should recognize the United States as a great world power. Just as God had given America the Philippine Islands, so God had high purposes for China under American responsibility, said Thoburn.*

Frank W. Warne, soon to have missionary jurisdiction in the Philippines as Thoburn's successor, viewed the United States as a hermit nation that was being lulled to sleep by its remoteness, until it was awakened by the electrifying event of the Dewey victory. Speaking of the United States as "the divinely appointed arbiter of the archipelago," Warne affirmed, "We are morally bound not to surrender a charge which was evidently laid upon this nation as a chosen agent." He warned, furthermore, that to retreat from the Philippines would be to lose a vantage point in Far Eastern power politics, and would react detrimentally upon Methodist missions in the East and upon American commerce.

William F. Oldham, who in turn was to inherit the Philippine jurisdiction from Bishop Warne, declared that the roar of the American cannon was the voice of Almighty God announcing that the Philippines should be free. But in Oldham's view, this meant free from Spain, not free from the United States. It was clearly God's purpose, he maintained, to have the United States keep the Islands so as to give the Filipinos freedom of religion. And while effecting this beneficence, the United States would remain in a position to carry out, as Oldham desired, a strong policy in the Pacific; in a world where injustice and cruelty were still current, the just must be served, he held, by "the strong hand and the rapid foot." Oldham stated in September, 1898, that the missionaries of the Methodist Episcopal Church were crying as with a single voice, "Keep these Asiatic Islands." Nothing should deter us, he said, from our "manifest destiny."

In *World-Wide Missions* for October, William T. Smith, the third Corresponding Secretary, though in tones more muted than generally were employed by imperialists in and out of the Church, declared that the United States should keep the Philippines—"ours by conquest"—and that the Missionary Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church should promptly enter the Islands. Bishop Thoburn, feeling the pulse of the Church's decision-makers from far away in India, wrote in his diary on 28 October, ". . . Bishop Walden is opposed to entering the Philippines, but the general thought and feeling are strongly in favor of advance."

The first to act to project Methodism into the Philippine Islands was Thoburn's perennial antagonist in missionary and ecclesiastical councils, Bis-

* See note, pp. 202 f.

hop Charles C. McCabe. Although resident in Fort Worth, Texas, Bishop McCabe presided, in September, 1898, over the Puget Sound Conference, meeting in Tacoma, Washington. On the 12th, less than a month after the first American forces entered Manila, in a move that contained an implicit challenge to Thoburn's jurisdiction over the Philippines, McCabe announced through the reading of the Conference appointments, the establishment of the "Philippine Island District. Presiding Elder to be Supplied." This new District of the Puget Sound Conference had a single charge—Manila. And to this charge the Bishop appointed Charles A. Owens, who once had been a missionary in Liberia under Bishop William Taylor.

This appointment emerged against a background displaying a curious *mélange* of pacific sentiment, uncritical militarism, Christian idealism, and imperialistic impulse that was not alien to the churchmanship of the time. Only two weeks earlier, Czar Nicholas II of Russia had issued a call for universal disarmament, which later resulted in the first Hague Peace Conference. On 9 September, the Puget Sound Conference unanimously adopted a resolution (co-sponsored by Crawford R. Thoburn, the Bishop's son) that hailed the Czar's appeal with delight. The resolution continued with a demand for an international attack to destroy the power of Turkey and with a direction to the Presiding Bishop to wire President McKinley the Conference's congratulations "on his statesmanlike conduct of our late triumphant war for human progress." "After the vote was taken," records the Conference Journal, "inspiring remarks were made by Bishop McCabe and Dr. Palmer [Abraham J. Palmer, Corresponding Secretary of the Missionary Society]."

The next day, the Conference heard the telegram Bishop McCabe sent the President:

The Puget Sound Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church, now in session at Tacoma, request me to extend to you their heartfelt congratulations upon your statesmanlike conduct of the war for Cuban liberty. And they entreat you to seek authority from Congress to send Dewey and Sampson to Constantinople to demand religious liberty for the Armenians, upon the dread alternative of war with the United States. And after that is fairly won, that you join with the Czar of Russia in his noble effort to secure universal peace.

Later in the morning, the Conference adopted a report of its Committee on Missions that acknowledged the imperative duty in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines with which "the short but glorious war just closed" confronted the Church. The report concluded:

. . . and that the fruits of holy sacrifice and blood may be fully secured, a free gospel should be sent as this nation's best gift to those who lately sat in chains and darkness.

And the bearer of the gospel gift (no gifts of money were involved) from

the Puget Sound Conference to the Filipinos was Charles Owens, who sailed for Manila some weeks after Bishop McCabe read out his appointment.

The appointment—accomplished without consultation with the Board, and quite devoid of Disciplinary standing—was widely announced in the press as the opening of a Philippine mission by the Methodist Episcopal Church. James M. Buckley, editor of *The Christian Advocate*, strongly deplored this result of McCabe's action and introduced at the November meeting of the General Missionary Committee a resolution intended to uphold, as against the Bishops' powers, the prerogatives of the Committee as the only authority with Disciplinary jurisdiction over the opening of new foreign mission fields. In the course of the discussion—which also referred to missionary beginnings in Honolulu, Madeira, and Alaska—McCabe arose to defend his appointment of Owens, claiming that he had sent the man to Manila at his own expense and that he had a right to do so. He had got out of the book of resolutions, he said, and into the book of the Acts of the Apostles. And he believed that the United States would hold the Philippines forever.

McCabe did not come through the discussion unscathed; his appointment of Owens was criticized as illegal and as embarrassing to the Committee. Buckley finally withdrew his resolution (it does not even appear in the Committee's official Minutes) when the members unanimously, but unofficially, agreed that no Bishop could, prior to action by the Committee, rightfully start a foreign mission or station a missionary in a foreign country not already designated as a foreign mission. The effect of this understanding, as Buckley pointed out—not on the floor, but from his editorial chair—was to withhold from Owens's work recognition of any standing as a mission of the Methodist Episcopal Church or of any claim for its support from the Society's appropriations.

The General Executive Committee of the Woman's Foreign Missionary Society had already recorded, at its recent annual meeting, its intention to make an appropriation for Philippine work whenever the General Missionary Committee should open the way. But with the Peace Commissioners still negotiating in Paris with the Spaniards, and the future relationship of the Philippines to the United States still in doubt, the Corresponding Secretaries did not press for decisive action by the latter Committee. They could not foresee any likelihood of increases in regular appropriations to cover a new Philippine mission. Bishop Thoburn, in a letter read to the Committee on 12 November, stated that while he recognized the Philippine Islands as a part of the Malaysian field, he thought it would be madness to begin any work there within the framework of unexpanded regular appropriations.

To open the way for later action, however, Secretary Palmer introduced a resolution authorizing the Board of Managers to start work in the Philippines, on condition that the Secretaries secure special contributions for it. But there was opposition, and the Committee adjourned without acting on

the proposal. In reporting this outcome, *World-Wide Missions* for January, 1899, continued, apparently with approval :

Meanwhile, as we go to press, the American soldier is landing on all those islands [Puerto Rico, Cuba, the Philippines] with the stars and stripes in the socket of his stirrup. A bright lady said the other day, in our hearing, "The stripes are for those who don't behave, and the stars for those who do."

Two days after the General Mission Committee ended its session in Providence on 15 November, the interdenominational committee on the Philippine Islands met at Presbyterian headquarters in New York. Both the Methodists and the Baptists reported that for financial reasons, they could not enter the Philippines during the coming year. The Presbyterians, having received funds for the purpose, announced that they were planning to move forward at once, probably by establishing stations in Manila (on Luzon) and Iloilo (on Panay). A few days later, the Presbyterian Board, taking a more confident view of the possibility of permanent occupation by the United States, voted to negotiate a transfer to Manila of the man who later became their first missionary to the Philippines. For the time being, no further efforts towards interdenominational comity in the Islands were made.

Presbyterian optimism about the outcome of the peace negotiations soon was justified; the Treaty of Paris was signed on 10 December, ceding the Philippine Islands to the United States. Without waiting for ratification of the Treaty, and while the still operative peace protocol of 13 August formally confined United States jurisdiction to "the city, bay, and harbor of Manila," President McKinley issued, on 21 December, a proclamation that treated the transfer of sovereignty, unilaterally, as a *fait accompli*. He directed that the United States military government was "to be extended with all possible dispatch to the whole ceded territory." It became clear—to the Filipinos, who by the time Dewey arrived had bottled up Spanish power within Manila, it was made painfully clear—that the Philippines were not to be free, but were to continue indefinitely under the sovereignty of the United States, at whose sufferance they were to hold such privileges as should be granted them or maintained for them by the new owners of their land. President McKinley declared that it would be the duty of the commander of the military government to let the public know that the Americans were coming not as invaders or conquerors, but as friends. Their purpose was to protect the people in their homes, in their employments, and in their personal and religious rights. But the Filipinos were to be given no option :

. . . All persons who, either by active aid or by honest submission, cooperated with the Government of the United States to give effect to these beneficent purposes will receive the reward of its support and protection. All others will be brought within the lawful rule we have assumed, with firmness if need be, but without severity, so far as possible.

The now emerging revelation of the American purpose to keep the Islands—a purpose about which the Filipinos had been kept in the dark—sharply heightened the tension that had been rising, since early in the summer, between the American army, which was confined to Manila and its immediate environs, and the Filipino army, which held continuous lines just beyond the American forces, thus containing both the city and its military rulers. The Filipino forces represented the independent government of the Philippine Republic, headed by Emilio Aguinaldo.

Behind this regime lay the anti-Spanish revolt of 1896, its revival early in 1898, the practical destruction of Spanish control of the Islands prior to American intervention, Aguinaldo's proclamation in May of a temporary dictatorial war government with himself as President, the issuance of the Philippine Declaration of Independence on 18 June and the prompt replacement of the emergency government by a provisional cabinet, and the founding of a national government in September at Malolos, twenty miles north of Manila.

The Filipino army had provided the American troops with their original peaceful landings, but the American command had denied the Filipino soldiers access to the capital city for joint occupation along with the United States forces. Although the Filipino government was widely accepted and supported by the people—it was the only effective supralocal government outside Manila—the United States military government entirely ignored it as a civil regime and treated the declared independence of the Filipino people as nonexistent. And now at the close of 1898, the United States was hastening to carry out annexation without consultation or consent of Filipinos. Just as in earlier stages of American intervention, of which President McKinley said, "We were obeying a higher moral obligation which rested on us, and which didn't require anybody's consent," once again Filipino consent evidently was being discounted as unnecessary.

On 4 February 1899, while ratification of the Treaty of Paris was still pending in the United States Senate, fighting broke out between the closely juxtaposed American and Filipino armies in the environs of Manila. This was the beginning of a war between the United States and the Filipinos that ended, three years later, in the subjugation of the Philippine Islands to American authority. By the time it was finished, more than 4,000 Americans were killed, nearly 3,000 were wounded, and \$600,000,000 were spent on the conflict. More than 20,000 Filipinos were killed, about 200,000 civilians died of pestilence and disease, and the country was agriculturally impoverished. Thus was consummated what President McKinley and many Protestant churchmen viewed as the entrusting of the Philippine Islands to the hands of the United States by the providence of God. And thus was established part of the background against which Methodism entered the Islands and gained its foothold there.

On 6 February 1899, the United States Senate, with only one vote to spare, ratified the Treaty of Paris. Three weeks later, Bishop James M. Thoburn landed in Manila from Hong Kong. He arrived as the result of a one-word cable—"Go"—he had received in Bombay late in January from Corresponding Secretary Leonard. This was Leonard's prearranged signal requesting Thoburn to travel to Manila to gather material for a report to the Board on the missionary outlook in the Philippines.

"It gives me a peculiar feeling," wrote the Bishop of his approach across the Bay to Manila, "as I try to realize that we are in American waters, and shall soon set foot on American territory." Thoburn found Manila quiet enough under its American military patrols, but widely blackened by the fires lighted in the February fighting, and wearing the air of a city besieged. American or not, the territory was disputed; the threat was palpable—hostile Filipino forces pressing back against Manila from the positions to which they had been driven, only seven or eight miles beyond the inner city. On his third day in Manila, crossing the Pasig River, recently pink with the blood of swimming retreating Filipino fighters leisurely picked off by American marksmen ("it was like shooting fish in a barrel"*), Thoburn saw the threat for himself, as he recorded in his diary:

At 3 P.M. drove out to the lines, some six miles, through a region all burnt over, and among trees full of bullet holes. Met Major Maxwell, of Kansas and reached a point from which we could distinctly see the Filipino lines. War is an awful scourge.

The Bishop had tasted some of the bitter fruits of war the day before, when he visited one of the American military hospitals:

Spent some time among the wounded men, and then visited the wounded Filipinos in a field hospital near by. About 200 were comfortably cared for. The visit was a little trying, as the men like to talk about their wounds, some of which were horrible.

During his stay in the city, the noise of distant firing was not an unaccustomed sound; and Thoburn even heard his own preaching punctuated by rifle fire from the roof of the building in which he was speaking.

Among the people Bishop Thoburn met in Manila was Chaplain George C. Stull, of the First Montana Volunteers, a member of the Montana Conference. On Sunday, 28 August 1898, a fortnight after the capitulation of the Spanish in Manila, Chaplain Stull, rising early from his bed in a mortuary chapel in Cavite, down the Bay from Manila, had gone looking for a place in which to hold a service. The best he could find was the dark interior of an old Spanish dungeon facing the Bay. "But the sun was shining," he wrote

* Leon Wolff, *Little Brown Brother*, p. 224.

later that day, "and the men [soldiers] came, and the natives sat about on the outside and near the door and barred windows." Here his congregation of fifty sang, here he preached on the power of God, here eight people responded to his postsermon evangelistic appeal. This was generally acknowledged to be the first distinctly Protestant religious service held ashore in the Philippine Islands.*

When Bishop Thoburn met him, Stull had been acting, of course, not as a Methodist, but within the framework of his military chaplaincy. But Thoburn also found in Manila Bishop McCabe's man Owens, who was working as a Methodist, but unofficially. Owens's work since arriving in November had been confined to barracks preaching among soldiers and to a series of tent meetings sponsored by the Y.M.C.A. On Thanksgiving Day, he had organized among the soldiers a religious group to which he referred not long afterwards as a Methodist church. Undoubtedly he was using the term quite loosely, for Bishop Thoburn found that Owens had been unable to go beyond the stage of collecting the names of Methodist soldiers stationed in the city. Furthermore, the personnel was utterly fluid, and troop movements thoroughly scattered the men who had been the makings of a congregation.

By the time Bishop Thoburn hunted him up, things were not going too well with Owens. Living costs had gone up sharply, the quarter where he and his wife lived had been seriously exposed in the fighting and the fires of the February outbreak, only one financial remittance had come from Bishop McCabe, he was getting no letters from his episcopal sponsor, was anxious because of the uncertainty of his status, could see no way of doing settled work until the war was over, and was suffering ill health. (Thoburn found him, one day, "shaking with chills and fever.") Concluding, after several conferences with him, that Owens was not the man for the work yet to be started, Thoburn advised him to write to Bishop McCabe that he was returning to the Puget Sound Conference. "Having once suffered severely from African fever," Thoburn wrote to Secretary Leonard, "it was perhaps not quite judicious to send him to a tropical climate like that of the Philippines . . ." Secretary Leonard made it clear to Owens that because of the unofficial nature of his "premature" appointment, he could not use Missionary Society funds to relieve him in his financial straits. "As Bishop McCabe has appointed you, he is responsible and should see you through and not permit you to suffer." And to Thoburn the Secretary made it clear, a little later, that the Society could not even pay Owens's passage home: ". . . we could appropriate money for bringing home a soldier just as easily . . ." By whatever means he finally secured, Owens was back in the United States by mid-summer.

Bishop Thoburn spent two busy weeks in Manila, maintaining a crowded

* See note, p. 203.

schedule of visits and personal conferences. With the permission of the American military government, he hired the Filipino Theater, on Calle Echague, on the north bank of the Pasig River, and held two public preaching services in it, on Sunday mornings, 5 March and 12 March. In the afternoons of the same days, he conducted hospital services. Evening services were out of the question; the city was wrapped up each night in a seven-o'clock curfew. On the first Sunday morning at the theater, Thoburn recorded, "we went in and somewhat slowly over seventy persons came in and took seats on the main floor, while from thirty to 50 Filipinos stood without the railing." At the service on the 12th there were about a hundred people—"only four or five ladies, the rest of the audience being composed almost exclusively of soldiers."

When Thoburn departed for Hong Kong on 14 March, the Methodist mission in the Philippine Islands was under way. The Bishop had provided for continuance of weekly services in English in the theater where he had preached, securing Chaplain Stull's consent to be responsible for them and designating this congregation as a charge in connection with the Singapore District of the Malaysia Mission Conference. He also had laid plans for the opening of an institute for soldiers and sailors to minister to the recreational and spiritual needs of the military personnel constantly flowing through Manila.

Aboard ship in the China Sea a week after sailing from Manila, Thoburn composed a long letter reporting to Secretary Leonard his impressions and recommendations. "It seems to me that we should enter the open door now presented to us in Manila without any further delay," he wrote. He believed that at the beginning, the chief channels of missionary effort should be Anglo-Spanish schools, for English-language instruction was in great demand among Manilans since the arrival of the Americans in force. He particularly emphasized the promising field for a girls' boarding school. "I trust," he said, "that our sisters of the Woman's Foreign Missionary Society will lose no time in looking into this most important question." The other early approach that the Bishop felt should be made was the distribution of Christian literature—a measure that would prepare the way for the preachers who would come later.

Concretely, Bishop Thoburn recommended an annual appropriation of \$5,000 for the support of workers and a limited series of \$5,000 annual appropriations for property. He wanted to have the Missionary Society provide an educational missionary and two or three assistants. Beyond this, so he felt, the new mission could extend its work by funds garnered from indigenous sources. The ultimate aim should be to open four or five central mission stations among the Islands—an aim whose implementation could await pacification of the country. The Bishop was especially definite in his recommendation that no work should be started with the Muslim minority and the primi-

tive pagan tribes until a considered policy could be worked out under peacetime conditions. His immediate program was a program for Manila, to which his firsthand investigations had been limited. Disappointed in what he had found out about the Chinese residents in comparison with the receptive Chinese the Methodist workers had met with in Malaya, Thoburn was unready to recommend extension of the missionary effort even to the Manila Chinese.

The mission Thoburn hoped to develop would be one consciously directed toward Roman Catholic Filipinos. After referring to the current tensions between the people and their priests and to the bitter popular hostility towards the friars, who had "oppressed and wronged the people for centuries," he offered Secretary Leonard his estimate of the basic religious situation, an estimate perhaps essentially unchanged by later Methodist workers:

The mass of the people, however, while opposed to their priests, must still be regarded as Roman Catholics. Their religion is, to a great extent, a mere superstition. Their religious teachers have long been noted for their amazing ignorance, and, as might be expected, the mass of the people have not been able to take a position in advance of their leaders. In contemplating missionary work among them we must bear in mind constantly that, if not priest-ridden, they are still extremely superstitious, and, so far as I was able to learn, are not much concerned about possible errors in their religious views.

Here was a description which, however hastily arrived at, was realistic at least in its blunt recognition of the fact that the new Protestant missions made possible by annexation would be pointed not towards "raw heathen," but primarily towards Christians.

During the months following Thoburn's sojourn in Manila, Arthur W. Prautch and his wife became important factors in conserving and developing the new mission. Prautch, the first Methodist Thoburn met in the Philippines, was a Local Preacher who formerly had been active as a mission worker in the Bombay Conference and recently had entered business in Manila. He gave the Bishop ready assistance in his two weeks' probing of the city, especially in searching for quarters for the proposed institute that both men felt was badly needed for the American service men away from home in a city where, at that time, liquor and prostitutes were among the commodities easiest to procure.

By the end of May, Prautch found and rented a suitable, centrally located building with a hall seating 150 persons, where the Soldiers' Institute was opened under local financial sponsorship, with Mrs. Prautch (already appointed by Thoburn) as hostess. Here, on a corner of Calle Carriedo and the present Avenida Rizal, soldiers and sailors could find meals, "temperance drinks," games, lodgings, general social contacts, and daily religious services. Naturally, the Institute assumed an American tone. Prautch proposed a

celebration of Decoration Day, 30 May, that brought a reported four thousand people to "Battery Knoll" to decorate the graves of 150 American soldiers. The flags prepared for the observance—the first American flags produced in the Islands—later were used to adorn the Institute. On 4 July, the first formal celebration of Independence Day—the American one—was held in the Institute, with Col. Charles Denby, a member of the Philippine Commission, as chairman.

The Sunday services instituted by Bishop Thoburn were held in the public theater for more than two months, with Chaplain Stull conducting most of them. But on the first Sunday in June, they were transferred to the Institute, and when Stull left for the United States a few weeks later, Prautch assumed responsibility for them, doing some of the preaching himself, and utilizing chaplains and other helpful acquaintances to supplement his efforts. A Christian Endeavor society and evening services were added to the program. In October, Jay C. Goodrich, a young Methodist minister newly arrived to represent the American Bible Society, took charge of the morning services.

In mid-June, Prautch made the Mission's first approach to Filipinos—an advertisement in Manila's Spanish newspapers announcing a Sunday afternoon Spanish-language service in the Institute. About a dozen persons attended the first meeting: Stull played the piano, the worshipers sang from Spanish hymn sheets, and an interpreter mediated, rather unsatisfactorily, the sermon. Although they were labored affairs, Prautch and his helpers persevered in holding meetings; after four Sundays, they had a congregation of thirty.

On a Sunday in July, the interpreter failed to appear, and Prautch asked one of the congregation, Paulino Zamora, to speak. Zamora did so briefly and then bowed out in favor of his son Nicolas, who he said could speak better than he. Young Zamora came forward, and surprised the small group by delivering an eloquent and effective sermon. His preaching was so impressive that Prautch placed the Sunday afternoon services in his hands.

Zamora was no ordinary name in Manila. About 1870, the stranglehold of the friars on Philippine life was briefly relaxed, at least politically, by a more liberal colonial administration reflecting the temporary dominance of republican forces in Spain. These forces were soon blocked, however; a reactionary governor arrived in Manila, and the friars undertook reprisals against their opponents, who had become more overtly active during the interim of freer expression. Taking advantage of a soldiers revolt in Cavite against new tax impositions, the administration, abetted by the friars, arrested a large number of Filipino advocates of reform and executed forty-one participants in the Cavite protests. A month later, on 28 February 1872, three Filipino secular priests—José Burgos, Mariano Gómez, and Jacinto Zamora—charged with subversion (at least two of them were reformers) were taken to the scaffold and put to death by the slow tightening of iron collars about their

necks. These three became the nation's popular martyrs. Their deaths became important psychological foci of the demand for national independence that produced the strong and aggressive Katipunan ("patriots' league"), the serious revolt of 1896, the revived insurrection of 1898, and the thorough undermining of Spanish power by the Filipinos by the time Dewey performed his better publicized feat in Manila Bay. Father Jacinto Zamora, who was generally believed to be quite innocent of public offense, was Paulino Zamora's uncle.

The Zamora family became bitterly antifriar, and Paulino, breaking the Church's tabu against private reading of the Bible, secured a copy of the Scriptures from a sea captain, read it, became a Protestant, moved out of Manila in order to pursue his Bible studies in safety, and began introducing the Bible to his neighbors. Discovering his evangelical activity, the friars instigated his arrest; he was taken to Manila and thrown into Bilibid Prison. During the revolt of 1896, he was exiled to a Mediterranean island off the coast of Africa. He returned to Manila after the signing of the Treaty of Paris, and when he began attending the services at the Soldiers Institute, he already was a zealous advocate of the evangelical cause.

Nicolas Zamora, just under twenty-five when he preached his first sermon, had studied in Santo Tomas University, a Roman Catholic institution in Manila. Spurred by correspondence with his father, he too studied the Bible privately and became a convinced evangelical. Thus through this first Protestant Filipino preacher and his father, the Methodist mission received an infusion from that stream of Philippine aspiration towards independence which, in one of its religious aspects, in a measure fertilized the ground for Protestant teaching and, in its political aspect, produced Aguinaldo's freedom fighters, who were fiercely resisting "pacification" by American troops.

Soon after his first efforts as a preacher—and he turned out to be a compelling one—Nicolas Zamora began devoting all his time to study and pastoral work. Under his leadership, the Spanish-language congregation at the Institute began to grow, until by October there were 130 attendants. This increase was won in the face of public opposition from Roman Catholic sources. Prautch reported to the Board:

The Roman Catholic guns have been trained on us for four months, and while a few ceased coming through fear of the scarlet woman, ten new attendants and friends are made for each one lost. We have no controversy with Rome; we let them foam at the mouth, and keep right on "sawing wood." . . . Rome never changes—crafty, unprincipled, tricksters ever.

At this point, Prautch and Zamora started a second Filipino congregation, in a private house in San Miguel, beginning with forty attendants. Zamora did the preaching, and an exhorter was engaged for house-to-house teaching and to invite people to the services. The Institute's Filipino congregation

paid the salary of the exhorter, and the English-speaking congregation supported Zamora.

Seven months after Bishop Thoburn's visit to the Philippines, then, there was a Methodist mission in Manila that was working through a service men's institute and three congregations. But as far as definitive action by the Missionary Society was concerned, the mission had no officially recognized status. Thoburn went to the 1899 session of the General Missionary Committee in Washington, D.C., in November, resolved upon full recognition of the Philippine mission. His own justification for having started the work was his belief that the Philippines fell within his episcopal jurisdiction by Disciplinary definition of the Malaysia Mission Conference, which included "the Malay Peninsula and all the adjacent islands inhabited by the Malay race." Up to this time, Thoburn had deliberately avoided possible controversy by refraining from pressing the point.

On 18 November, Thoburn reported fully on the Philippine work to the General Committee, asked for recognition of the Mission as under his jurisdiction, and requested an appropriation. He got what he asked for. "To my surprise," he recorded in his diary, "the Committee took up the Philippines this A.M. and after an animated discussion made a small appropriation and recognised my superintendence of the field. We get \$2,000 cash, and \$5,000 'conditional.'" The Committee classified the Philippine work as a foreign mission, and in this category it remained permanently.

During the General Committee's meetings in the Capital, cordial relations existed between Foundry Church, where the sessions were held, and the White House, which was occupied by the country's most prominent Methodist. President McKinley tendered a formal reception to the Bishops and other members of the Committee—a receiving line in the Blue Room, a guest list that included Admirals Dewey and Schley, refreshments in the state dining room, music by the Marine Band. Bishop Thoburn had a special invitation to the White House on 18 November, a few hours after the Philippines appropriation was approved by the General Committee. The President and the Bishop conferred at length, apparently on the Philippine situation. "Some of his views impressed me deeply," Thoburn wrote that day. "I was surprised to detect, as I thought, a recognition of the possibility, and even the probability, of our possessions in the East being further extended in the not remote future."

Three days later, a delegation from the General Committee called on the President to thank him for the White House reception. It was on this occasion that McKinley made his famous statement about how he made up his mind to keep the Philippines.* The spokesman for the delegation read the President

* See p. 174.

a paper (spread upon the General Committee's minutes) that covered more than thanks for social courtesies:

The Methodist Episcopal Church believes in the history, the dignity, and the destiny of this Great Republic, as a Providential institution among men,—to uplift, and civilize, and christianize our fellow-men,—and will continue to labor for its honor and welfare. We believe President McKinley to be actuated by lofty motives, and hail him as a worthy successor of the illustrious men, who have preceded him in the Presidency. We greet and congratulate him on his able administration of our public affairs, both at home and abroad. And as a broad-minded patriot, as a christian gentleman, as a devoted husband, and a God-fearing American Statesman, may heaven bless and preserve and guide him in the execution of his great office.

The scope of these fulsome praises evidently was broad enough to take in President McKinley's apologia for the administration's Philippines policy in his speech in Pittsburgh on 28 August. There McKinley made it clear that he regarded American authority and sovereignty in the Philippines as absolute. "It became our territory," he declared, "and is ours as much as the Louisiana purchase or Texas or Alaska." He interpreted the current war with the Filipinos as simply the result of an unwarranted attack upon American authority by a "body of insurgents, in no sense representing the sentiment of the people of the islands . . ." Announcing the government's readiness to send more men and munitions to the Philippines to put down the "rebellion," McKinley declared, "They assailed our sovereignty, and there will be no useless parley, no pause, until the insurrection is suppressed and American authority acknowledged and established."

Evidently the Methodist missionary leaders still were unimpressed by any incompatibility between America's new call to conquest and Methodism's call to foreign evangelism. The Missionary Society had as yet dispatched no missionary to the Philippines, but many Methodists—chaplains and laymen—were in the military forces deployed from Manila. Bishop John F. Hurst, a member of the delegation rendering thanks and praises to President McKinley, himself had a son who was serving as an infantry lieutenant north of Manila and was involved in hunting down members of the Filipino armed resistance and burning the nipa palm huts that were supposed to belong to them. It was undoubtedly too soon for a man like Bishop Hurst to go back on his statement of a year earlier—"We have *got* to enter the Philippines for God, and American bravery has so ordered it . . ." Immediately preceding these words of the Bishop's as quoted in a resolution adopted by the California Conference (he was presiding) in September, 1898, came the statement, "As the Roman eagle in the early history of our church so the Stars and Stripes in these days pave the way for the spread of the Gospel of Christ." This nice adjustment between State and Church apparently still appealed to Methodism's missionary policy-makers in 1899.

Current Methodist interpretations of the function of the Church in the new era opening in the Philippines under the impact of American rifle fire tended towards the grandiose; by comparison the Missionary Society's first steps there were strikingly modest, almost casual, certainly improvised rather than realistically calculated. The \$2,000 appropriation was a meagre investment in missionary personnel, and was practically exhausted within six months. The first missionary actually sent out under it—hastily recruited on Bishop Thoburn's recommendation—was a thirty-year-old unmarried student from Albion College, a Local Preacher with no ministerial training or record. After the young man, Thomas H. Martin, sailed from New York for Manila in mid-January, 1900, Secretary Leonard wrote to Prautch, whose encouragement he solicited for Martin, "He has had no experience, of course, in the kind of work he will be required to do . . . I am very much interested in our new mission in the Philippines and I hope we may have great success."

The Board's second missionary to the Philippines, who followed Martin to Manila on 9 May, was equally new to foreign missionary work. He was Jesse Lee McLaughlin, a thirty-year-old recent graduate of Boston University School of Theology, a Deacon in relationship with the Upper Iowa Conference. His original assignment had been Singapore, where he was to have replaced John R. Denyes, a missionary with two years' experience there, who was expected to be transferred to Manila. When Denyes did not go, McLaughlin, with his wife, was directed to push on to Manila. He was appointed District Superintendent of the Philippine Islands District of the Malaysia Mission Conference, and shortly afterwards was made treasurer of the Philippines Mission. Thrust into strange surroundings thus unexpectedly and all unprepared, McLaughlin made his sense of bewilderment felt through his early letters to Secretary Leonard. Later on, he reported to the Conference, "With inexperience in mission work and ignorance of the language, we were almost appalled at the problems which presented themselves."

The Woman's Foreign Missionary Society was a little slower than the Missionary Society in deciding to send missionaries to the Philippines, but it actually got its workers on the field before Martin and McLaughlin arrived there. In spite of a plea for action made by Bishop Thoburn at the annual meeting of the General Executive Committee of the W.F.M.S. in October, 1899, no Philippines appropriation was then determined upon; the money was not available. But the women soon raised enough money beyond appropriations to send out a team of four missionaries: Julia E. Wisner, a Burma missionary of fifteen years' standing; Mrs. Cornelia C. Moots, formerly active in evangelistic work with the Woman's Christian Temperance Union; Mary A. Cody, a kindergarten teacher; and Dr. Anna J. Norton, a New York physician. These missionaries landed in Manila on 26 February 1900.

The four women were on hand when Bishop Thoburn, now ailing, made his second visit to Manila, early in March on his way home to the United

States and General Conference. With him was Frank W. Warne of Calcutta, who substituted for the Bishop in preaching and in all but his official episcopal functions.

Bishop Thoburn was impressed by Nicolas Zamora—by his preaching ability and by his success as an evangelist—for Zamora was the leading spirit in the Filipino work that now was being conducted in seven congregations in Manila and its vicinity. Thoburn decided to receive him into the Methodist ministry and cabled Secretary Leonard to arrange for him to be voted Conference relationship and ordination by an Annual Conference in the United States. Responding to a request from Bishop Edward G. Andrews of New York, the South Kansas Conference, meeting in Chanute, Kansas, received Nicolas "Seamora" on trial and elected him Deacon under the Missionary Rule. Bishop John H. Vincent, presiding, then transferred Zamora to the Malaysia Mission Conference and notified Thoburn by cable. On 10 March, a few hours before leaving Manila, Thoburn ordained Zamora a Deacon, thus making him the first Filipino to become an ordained Protestant minister.

The week after he helped expedite Zamora's ordination, Bishop Vincent presided at the Southwest Kansas Conference in Wichita. The Conference unanimously and enthusiastically requested the Bishops and the Secretaries of the Missionary Society to make a call for 500,000 volunteers for the "Expansion Army of the Methodist Episcopal Church," to raise \$500,000 a year for ten years, to evangelize the island dwellers brought "under the folds of our glorious flag" by God's providence through the Spanish-American war. Each volunteer was to pledge a dollar a year to send the gospel to the Puerto Ricans and the Filipinos. Immediately after the vote was taken, more than a hundred people signed up as Company A of the First Kansas Regiment. The Secretaries at once picked up the suggestion—issuing the call, asking pastors to serve as recruiting officers, and planning to organize the "army" in companies and regiments. "The American army and navy," they said, "have cleared the way at great cost of suffering and blood; let the Lord's army, the Church militant, enter and hold the territory that has been won." This mild verbal militancy—the plan itself could have been financially productive—failed to stir the Church to action; six months later, Secretary Leonard had to confess to Bishop Warne that the "Expansion Army plan that we have been holding before the church moves slowly."

Frank Warne remained briefly in Manila after Bishop Thoburn's departure, but long enough to organize out of the English-speaking congregation the first Quarterly Conference and Official Board in the Islands, to establish a class meeting with Mrs. Moots as leader, and to lead a series of union evangelistic services in which more than fifty American soldiers professed conversion.

Early in August, Warne was back in Manila for a second visit, in his new capacity as a Missionary Bishop for Southern Asia. This time, he had

more of a look at Luzon, traveling 150 miles north of Manila. On 28 August, he convened a session of the Philippine Islands District Conference. Among the participants were McLaughlin and his wife, the four W.F.M.S. missionaries, Prautch, Zamora, Jay C. Goodrich (the American Bible Society agent), and E. W. Hearne, the secretary of the Y.M.C.A.

The District Conference worked out plans and goals for the expansion of the Mission, granted Exhorters' licenses to two Filipinos, asked the Missionary Society for \$10,000 in appropriations for 1901, and appealed to both the Missionary Society and the W.F.M.S. for additional personnel.

Of the several phases of Methodist activity in the Philippines in 1900, the efforts of the W.F.M.S. recruits suffered the most from being inspired by premature and superficial recommendations made by Bishop Thoburn after he reconnoitered Manila in 1899. Julia Wisner's instructions were to open a boarding and day school for Filipino, Spanish, and mestizo girls of the better classes. Assisted by Miss Cody and Dr. Norton, she opened school in May at 168 Calle Nueva, Ermita, in Manila, but with a disappointing enrollment.

All Miss Wisner could scrape together from non-American sources was a little group of two Spanish girls and six Filipinas (four of the latter were supported by Arthur Prautch) for the boarding school and two Filipinas and three mestizas for the day school. The new school reached its peak of thirty pupils in the first few months only by enrolling seventeen American girls. By October, all had left but twelve Americans.

It did not take Julia Wisner and Mary Cody long to make a realistic appraisal of the situation. They concluded that their attempt at school work was premature and that a successful educational venture among Filipino girls could not be expected until there was an established Filipino Protestant constituency to create a demand for it. The most direct way of reaching the women and girls, they decided, was to work out a pattern of Bible-woman work, house-to-house visiting, and Sunday schools.

In October, Mary Cody left Manila for more urgently needed kindergarten work in Singapore, and at the end of the Conference year, Julia Wisner was transferred to work in the Bengal Conference, thus closing out the W.F.M.S. school project in the Philippines.

Teaching in the girls' school took most of Dr. Norton's time. The W.F.M.S. had provided her no medical outfit, instruments, books, drugs, or office or dispensary room. But even so, when she was free to undertake the general practice she would have accepted, few patients came to her. She found that considering both resident and American doctors, there was no essential lack of medical services in Manila and that people did not take readily to being treated by a woman doctor.

In October, another woman physician, recently arrived from India, persuaded Dr. Norton to co-operate in running a dispensary in the slums (this

had been one of her original intentions). Only fourteen patients came to the dispensary in six weeks, and the two doctors made only thirty home calls. Even here, Dr. Norton discovered, there was no radical medical deprivation, for the government was ready to provide free treatment and nominally priced medicines to the poor upon application. Confirmed in her opinion that medical missions among the Filipinos were neither needed nor strategically instrumental in Christian evangelism, Dr. Norton soon left the slum dispensary for what she felt was more pressing work.

Except for this interval in the dispensary, Dr. Norton increasingly devoted her time to house-to-house evangelism and to Sunday school teaching with women and children, which she had begun in April, when she organized in a private house the first Methodist Sunday school in the Islands. Her many Sunday and informal weekday class sessions and services took her into several parts of the Manila area.

Mrs. Moots, the fourth member of the W.F.M.S. group, ministered to Americans, who were almost entirely soldiers, mainly in the United States military hospitals, which were filled with casualties of tropical sickness and of the fierce warfare with the Filipino fighters. In one of the hospitals had died her own son, a seventeen-year-old soldier. In addition to constant and extensive personal visitation among the hospitalized soldiers, many of them boys in their teens, Mrs. Moots participated in services and assemblies for the patients, conducted a class meeting and a Bible class, and distributed religious literature. Her regular schedule included visits to the four large hospitals in Manila and vicinity, but she also reached the hospital ship *Relief* and hospitals in Dagupan, Calamba (on Laguna de Bay), and Corregidor.

Thomas Martin, the first Missionary Society man in Manila, found the situation there too much to handle. Acting on Prautch's suggestion, McLaughlin sent Martin in July to Dagupan, Pangasinan Province, 150 miles north of Manila. There Bishop Warne visited him, and confirmed his assignment. This first extension of Methodist evangelism beyond the Manila area could not have occurred even eight months earlier. American troops had entered Dagupan late in November, 1899, in the major military operation that pushed Aguinaldo across the Benguet Mountains into northern Luzon. As 1900 opened, the guerilla warfare continued; no American civilian dared venture into the countryside without a military escort, for as an American journalist put it, American control extended only about as far as a Krag could throw a bullet.

But when Martin came to Dagupan, the city was garrisoned by 350 soldiers, and the populace was quiet. Martin's first step was supposed to be to open a school, but he found no demand for English instruction that would justify such an approach. The people could be reached successfully only in the Pangasinan language. Because Martin did not know that tongue and because Filipino preachers were not to be found (it was partly because of

distrust of Americans), his first season's work had to be confined largely to efforts among the soldiers.

When Jesse McLaughlin took charge of the Philippine Islands District in May, he attempted to devise plans to carry out "Bishop Thoburn's injunction to open school work," but could not find out where to begin. When Bishop Warne was in Manila in August, he acknowledged that announcement of the government's plans for public education made it impossible to consider opening a Methodist boys' school. McLaughlin therefore turned to the evangelistic work.

McLaughlin found that the English-speaking congregation at the Institute numbered thirty or more on Sunday mornings. It had the form of a Methodist Episcopal church, with a recorded membership of fifty—most of them soldiers, sixteen of them (including the missionaries) being civilians. The church was not prospering; there was no steady pastor for it, the meeting place was unsuitable, the military members were transient, and the general activity of the Institute was ebbing because of Mrs. Prautch's absence on account of illness. McLaughlin kept the English-speaking congregation going but, with Bishop Warne's approval, deliberately marked time until a pastor should be found for it.

In the fall, the Mission assumed responsibility for a Sailors' Bethel on Calle San Fernando, Binondo, run by an evangelist named John MacNeil, who found himself unable to continue without financial reinforcement. McLaughlin raised funds for the Bethel from Manila business concerns and a New York seamen's society and kept MacNeil in charge of it. The Methodists kept the project going until 1902, when it was turned over to the Manila Sailors' Home Association, which was organized by several missions and business firms, with the Methodist mission continuing as property-holder. The Bethel program included evangelistic services, provision of lodgings for seamen, and assistance to unemployed sailors in finding jobs.

McLaughlin devoted himself mainly to the spreading Filipino work, in which the chief forces up to this time had been Zamora, Prautch, and the spontaneous efforts of some of the newly won Filipino worshippers. In addition to the Filipino group at the Soldiers' Institute and the one in San Miguel, there were mission congregations in Rosario, Pandacan, Trozo, San Sebastián, and Bacoor.

When McLaughlin landed in Manila, the congregation in Pandacan, where Zamora preached regularly, already had become Methodism's first organized Filipino church. It soon rented the site of a house burned down the year before in fighting between the United States and the Filipino soldiers and built for a few hundred dollars, using in part materials salvaged from the burning, a simple thatch-roofed chapel that held about a hundred people. With Bishop Warne officiating, this became, on 12 August, the first formally dedicated Protestant church in the Islands.

Bishop Warne, not without pleasure, observed in the little Pandacan church, planned and decorated by the people and their pastor, signs of anti-Catholicism. He found the interior liberally adorned with Biblical mottoes in Spanish that were so chosen and placed as to be pointed substitutes for the images and symbols customary in Catholic churches. Of the framed New Testament slogans in the positions usually occupied by the pictorially dramatized Stations of the Cross, Bishop Warne wrote, "Truly this was a hard blow against the Roman Catholic priests." When the Bishop entered the building with Zamora several days before the dedication, they saw that the people had painted a cross on the wall behind the pulpit. As soon as he spied it, Zamora loudly exclaimed, "Roman Catholic! No! no! no!", and ordered the cross removed. On the day of dedication, Bishop Warne saw in its place a freshly painted motto—"God is a spirit. . ." Things Roman Catholic evidently were anathema to Zamora; and the Bishop himself, as he heard the people sing Protestant gospel songs a few days later, was moved at the sight of the newly housed congregation "rescued from the curse of Romish darkness."

McLaughlin had observed—but not happily—that the preaching in the Filipino work under the Zamora-Prautch leadership was characterized by antifriarism as distinguished from essential Protestantism. Both leaders were not only antifriar, but undoubtedly anti-Catholic—a currently popular approach. Jay Goodrich reported, for instance, that the Pandacan community was thoroughly Protestant "because of the immoralities of the priests." As McLaughlin worked his way into direction of the evangelistic movement, he began to shift the emphasis to positive Protestantism, somewhat to the detriment, he thought, of attendance at the Filipino services. But he was not blind to the aggressive opposition of the Roman church to Protestantism in the Philippine Islands.

During the early months of operation by the Methodists, the Sailors' Bethel in Binondo was an important center for the spread of Filipino evangelism. Arthur Prautch was appointed to conduct Filipino preaching services there, and twice a week the street-level assembly room (previously a saloon), close to the passing crowds out of which the singing drew people inside, was packed to the door.

One evening, a ragged, consumptive fisherman named Honorio Feliciano heard the singing, entered the meeting, heard fellow Filipinos testifying in his own tongue, and was converted. He went home to Barrio Bancusay, a community of fishermen in the nearby Tondo section and, against the bitter opposition of the friars, formed an evangelical group. Prautch responded to an invitation to hold services with them, and José Bautista was assigned to preach in Bancusay. Four outdoor meetings followed, with the sails of fishing boats shading the gatherings from the sun. The fishermen, led by Feliciano, quickly subscribed to a building fund and put up with their own

hands a nipa-and-bamboo church. On 5 November, with some five hundred people pressing inside the building and surrounding it eight or ten deep, McLaughlin dedicated the church, which was named St. Peter's Methodist Episcopal Church in recognition of the people's vocation.

Feliciano, the church's founder, died within a week of the dedication and was buried in Tondo Cemetery with a Protestant committal service attended by several hundred people. Because Feliciano had died unconfessed and unabsolved of his Protestant activity, the Tondo priest ordered the body exhumed. Arthur Prautch warned that molestation of the grave would be reported to the civil authorities. The priest then had a bamboo fence placed around Feliciano's grave to separate it from "consecrated ground" and proclaimed the little enclosure a Protestant cemetery.

A number of other Sailors' Bethel converts provided the initiative for starting Filipino evangelistic missions, and some of them became Local Preachers or Exhorters.

One of them, Enrique Cortez, a simple hard-working boatman who turned out to be a fiery speaker, became an Exhorter, and started evangelistic meetings on Calle Principe and at the Farola. His activities, like those of other Protestants, met harsh resistance by Roman Catholic priests. When he officiated at the burial of his brother's infant child in a public cemetery claimed by the Roman church, priests ordered the body disinterred on the ground that the child was a heretic. The body was thrown out, picked up by the Board of Health, and interred in the potter's field. Both Cortez and Prautch became embroiled in an inefficient and troublesome investigation, which was followed by another that finally vindicated their position.

Felipe Marquez, a bookkeeper, became a Local Preacher, inaugurated Methodist preaching in Aguila and (with the co-operation of a missionary) in Dulumbayan and other sections, and carried some of Zamora's preaching schedule when the latter went to the Annual Conference session in Singapore.

Luis Ocampo, a washerman, gave up his work, became an Exhorter, and went with his wife, who was a better preacher than he was, out to Gagalagin, two miles from Manila, and formed a Methodist congregation of two hundred people, beginning with their own relatives. As in other communities the people, in breaking away from the Roman clergy, were claiming the local churches as community property to be used as the citizens wished, so the new Gagalagin Protestants claimed the former Roman church as their own. They made a Methodist church of it and formally assigned it to Methodist use in a document signed by forty leading men of the town.

José Salamanca, a fifth Sailors' Bethel convert, the leading druggist of Cavite, became the founder of Methodism there and in the two adjoining cities of San Roque and Caridad. When Prautch went down to Cavite on Sunday, 16 December, on Salamanca's invitation, he found about seventy people gathered in the druggist's house to hear the gospel expounded. A

church was quickly organized in each of the three cities, with Salamanca finding the stewards and leaders. On the following Sunday, taking up the offer of the owner, the Cavite Methodists held a preaching service in the large local cockpit, with more than a thousand listeners. The manager of the theater in Caridad offered another unconventional preaching place; following the first act of a dramatic performance, he rang up the curtain for Prautch to preach to the audience of five hundred. Sunday services followed, and the theater audiences soon reached fifteen hundred. The tri-city movement progressed rapidly.

On 9 January 1901, four active Protestants were arrested on suspicion of insurrection against the American regime. Among the four were the Caridad theater manager, the owner of the Cavite cockpit, and José Salamanca. A little later, a Filipino who provided the organ for one of the preaching places and served as organist was arrested as a suspect. Salamanca's personal associates and Methodist co-workers, as well as he himself, were convinced that he and his fellow prisoners were victims of reprisals by the friars. The Methodist leaders were so confident of Salamanca's innocence and integrity that the District Conference confirmed his Exhorter's license while he was in jail. Prautch interceded with the American authorities for a quick trial, but none was granted. Salamanca was lodged successively in three or four different jails. At last, on 22 April, he was released without being furnished specifications on the charge of insurrection and without being brought to trial. The whole affair was a violation of his liberty and an attack on his reputation.

In addition to these two beginnings beyond Manila—in Gagalagin and in the Cavite area—Methodism also reached out to Malibay, a city of ten thousand people four or five miles south of Manila, where Nicolas Zamora began holding services. When he had to discontinue the meetings because of his work load, the mayor of Malibay headed a committee that petitioned the Mission to have them resumed. McLaughlin got the services going again, first in the mayor's home, then in the local cockpit. There was an old stone church in the town—weather-beaten, battered by firing between Filipino and American troops, and roofed in corrugated iron. It long had been used for Roman Catholic services. But now the people of the town, unable in any other way to obtain redress of their grievances against the friars, had decided *en masse* to leave the Roman Church for affiliation with the Methodists. On the recommendation of the mayor, the Methodist services were transferred to the old church, and the congregation renamed it Iglesia Metodista Episcopal.

Four times priests came to repossess the old church, only to be told that they were not wanted in Malibay and then to be unceremoniously hustled out of town. As McLaughlin described it to the Annual Conference, "each time the plucky Presidente [mayor] has informed the emissary of the scarlet

woman that it is now a Protestant church and if Rome wants it she must repay the people all the money they put into it." One priest became so aggressive in his attempt to pursue parochial functions in Malibay that he was forbidden by court action to enter the community until quieter conditions should prevail.

In Malibay, the secret weapon of the informer—so easy to wield in an area under United States military government and with even Luzon not yet entirely pacified—evidently again was raised against the Methodists by the friars. On a morning in January, American troops surrounded the town, and arrested 148 Protestant men, including Nicolas Zamora, who had stayed overnight after coming from Manila for a funeral. McLaughlin, the District Superintendent, hurried out from Manila to visit them. A quick appeal to the military command in Manila brought a prompt telegraphed order of release for Zamora. Twenty-four hours later, all the others were set free after an examination found them quite innocent of subversion. This harassment by false denunciation to the American authorities failed to halt Methodist progress in Malibay; the Sunday after the arrests, the local Methodist constituency was augmented by the baptism of ninety-seven men.

In February, 1901, a Philippines delegation for the first time attended the Malaysia Mission Conference, which met in Singapore. On the opening day, Bishop Warne introduced Jesse McLaughlin and his wife, Nicolas Zamora, and Thomas Martin. Using an interpreter, Zamora later in the week gave an address in Spanish on the Philippine mission. The Conference also heard McLaughlin report that the evangelistic movement spurred by Zamora, Prautch, and himself, benefiting from the hospitality and zeal of the newly affiliated Filipino lay people, was maintaining religious services at sixteen different points, with twenty-five or thirty meetings a week attended by an aggregate of five thousand people. A thousand probationers already were enrolled.

In reporting that the number of probationers stood at a thousand, McLaughlin pointed out that none had been granted full membership in the church; the leaders desired to keep the people under instruction until their beliefs, their habits, and their personal experience should be harmonious with their overt profession of the evangelical faith. This conservative procedure was coherent with McLaughlin's sensitivity to the existence of anti-friarism as a component of the freer religious temper in the Philippines—a condition that made it possible for the Methodists to catch Filipino adherents on the rebound from Catholicism without making true Protestants of them.

One phase of the antifriar reaction that recommended the Protestant movement to the people on a secondary level was the willingness of Protestant missionaries to marry couples without exacting unreasonable fees. Under the Spanish regime, there had been no civil marriage, and the hatred friars, who had a monopoly on performance of the religious ceremony, frequently

demanded exorbitant marriage fees—an exaction that fell heavily upon the poor. When the friars' demands were not met, they refused to marry the unsubmitive applicants. As a result, great numbers of families were established without formal marriage, but only by mutual agreement between man and woman. Thus the emergence of marriage under Protestant auspices made the wedding ceremony financially feasible for new couples and enabled already joined couples to regularize their relationship. McLaughlin reported that 150 couples applied to him for marriage in his first eight months on the field. By the end of his first complete year, Methodist missionaries married over eight hundred couples. In three years, the total rose to two thousand, half of them men and women previously living together without formal marriage.

McLaughlin reminded the Conference session in Singapore of the warfare still scourging the Philippines. (The capture of Aguinaldo was still a month away; the country remained under military rule, with the installation of the first civil governor still four months off.) McLaughlin said that in spite of the fighting, which he deplored, "the principles of religious freedom have stirred the people, and have aroused a broad faith in us and in our work." Nevertheless, he had sensed during the year the tension among the Filipinos vis-à-vis American soldiers. He recognized the desirability of a center for Filipinos for purposes of worship, study, and leadership training other than at the Institute, which was decked with the Stars and Stripes. He said, "We need sorely . . . a place we can call Filipino headquarters, where we can hold services away and apart from soldiers. . ."

The mission workers could not impart, to those they desired to win, any special immunity to the atmosphere created by the occupation and by the process of "pacification." From the beginning, soldiers from the United States had shown contempt for Filipinos. An American officer wrote in an official report:

Almost without exception, soldiers and also many officers refer to the natives in their presence as "niggers" and natives are beginning to understand what the word "nigger" means.*

More radically—Filipinos, even though antifriar or pro-Protestant, could not be expected to feel warmth for members of any army that by the end of 1900 killed some fifteen thousand of their fellow countrymen who were fighting for freedom. It was a peculiarly harsh war; both sides committed atrocities beyond the prime atrocity of the active fighting itself. The number of Filipino dead ran higher than the number of Filipino wounded by 5 to 1—an extraordinary reversal of the proportion that might have been expected; American troops often killed all the enemy in sight and deliberately took no prisoners.

* Quoted in Wolff, *Little Brown Brother*, p. 100.

Torture of suspected or actual sympathizers with the "insurrection," usually in order to gain information about arms and the Filipino fighting bands, supplemented the lethal work of American rifles. The favored method was the "water cure":

A blend (in the words of an observer) of Castilian cruelty and American ingenuity, it consisted of forcing four or five gallons of water down the throat of the captive, whose "body becomes an object frightful to contemplate," and then squeezing it out by kneeling on his stomach. The process was repeated until the *amigo* talked or died.*

Six months after McLaughlin's report, the Philippines were much nearer the decisive subjugation that finally cost the destruction of a sixth of the population of Luzon. His successor as District Superintendent then admitted, more bluntly and brutally, that when gathering for worship, "Filipino people do not like to go where they see too much of the American soldier." † He explained:

They have been whipped. The American soldier has done it. But the feelings of a conquered people for the soldiers of the conquering army are not to be expected to be those of warm admiration.

This atmosphere was unfavorable to evangelism under American sponsorship, but it already was partly overcome in the Manila neighborhood, even before the war ended; anti-American feeling there was neither universal nor always violently entertained.

The Philippine Islands Mission entered its second year under missionary direction freshly undergirded by increased appropriations; the General Missionary Committee assigned it a regular appropriation of \$7,500 for 1901, with a conditional allotment of \$10,000. By this time, Nicolas Zamora was being supported by a special gift solicited by Bishop Warne at Roseville Church, Newark, New Jersey. The Philippines work remained a District of the Malaysia Mission Conference, after an unsuccessful attempt in the 1900 session of the Committee to detach it administratively from the Central Conference of Southern Asia on the ground that the Philippines were United States territory and could not be administered by a Missionary Bishop. In rebuttal of his colleagues Bishops Fowler and Hurst, Bishop Thoburn had maintained that the Islands were essentially foreign territory, and advised leaving final classification of the Mission to be decided by the General Conference.

Three additional missionaries received appointments to the Philippine Islands District for the new Conference year. William G. Fritz, a young layman with a preaching license from the Christian and Missionary Alliance

* Wolff, *Little Brown Brother*, p. 253.

† H. C. Stuntz, *The Gospel in All Lands* (Oct., 1901), p. 451.

and with some experience among Spanish-speaking people in South America, had been on hand since 31 January. Two more arrived in Manila by the end of April—Willard A. Goodell and Homer C. Stuntz. Goodell was a 24-year-old probationer from the Upper Iowa Conference. Stuntz, a member of the same Conference and a former missionary in India, came to head the English-speaking church in Manila and to serve as District Superintendent, in place of McLaughlin.

Stuntz got to Manila just in time for an inter-Mission conference that formally revived in the Philippines the co-operative purpose inspiring the New York comity meetings of 1898. By this time, several other churches had sent missionaries to the Philippines or were preparing to do so. The Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. was the first—James B. Rodgers, transferred from Brazil, took up residence in Manila on 21 April 1899. The Northern Baptists placed Eric Lund (formerly a missionary in Barcelona) on Panay on 2 May 1900. E. S. Eby and S. G. Kurtz came to Manila for the United Brethren in Christ on 1 April 1901.

From the first, the Methodists and the Presbyterians had enjoyed close and cordial relations. In 1900, the Presbyterian mission proposed that when the work should be extended, the Methodists move north from Manila and the Presbyterians south. But the freshmen missionaries McLaughlin and Martin, feeling that they had no authority to bind the Mission for the future, declined to commit the Methodists to the plan, although Martin soon did go north to Dagupan. The Methodist men became members of a Ministerial Alliance organized, on 11 June 1900, to enable the ministers in Manila to achieve mutual helpfulness in their common cause. The Alliance held regular meetings and discussed local mission work. At the September meeting, James Rodgers read a paper on mission comity, pointing out difficulties that already had emerged in inter-Mission relations and calling for a practical plan of co-operation. On 22 April 1901, at a time when Bishop Warne and J. C. R. Ewing (a prominent Presbyterian missionary leader from India) were in Manila, the Presbyterians issued a formal invitation to the other evangelical groups to hold a conference to discuss specific agenda for co-operative action.

Two days later, in the Y.M.C.A. building on Calle Real, Intramuros, representatives of the Methodists, the Presbyterians, the United Brethren, the Christian and Missionary Alliance, the Young Men's Christian Association, the British and Foreign Bible Society, and the American Bible Society began a three-day conference. It was time they did; although the Missions were only modest beginnings and had reached only a few places beyond Manila, Methodist and Presbyterian activities already were overlapping there, and the Presbyterians and the Baptists both were at work in Iloilo, on Panay. And Iloilo, although not actually occupied by the Methodists, had been listed as a Malaysia Mission Conference appointment ("To be supplied") a year earlier. At least minor cases of friction already were coming up.

The conference created the Evangelical Union of the Philippine Islands, whose object was "to unite all the evangelical forces in the Philippine Islands for the purpose of securing comity and effectiveness" in missionary work. The bylaws provided that the associated Missions should name their new Filipino churches *Iglesia Evangélica*, relegating denominational names to parentheses when it was necessary to use them. This provision was not put into practice. The structure of the Union as expressed in its constitution did not go beyond the federal principle, which appealed to Bishop Warne, who made the motion that founded the new organization. In defense of this principle as against that of possible fusion of the Missions, Warne said, "We have to recognize the fundamental fact that we are all representatives of different denominations." Warne was perhaps less concerned about reaching territorial comity agreements than were the Presbyterians. Confessing that in India he never had favored "hard and fast" territorial divisions, he conceded that on the Philippine scene "the islands and the dialects make the situation different here." Along with the Union's constitution, the conference adopted a set of resolutions accepting the principle of territorial division of missionary responsibility and assigning the various Missions to specific areas.

In addition to the founding groups, the Baptists (they missed the conference because of short notice) and the Disciples of Christ soon joined the Evangelical Union, which elected as its first president Major Elijah W. Halford, a prominent and active Methodist layman, whom Homer Stuntz called "the Captain Webb of Manila Methodism." The Christian and Missionary Alliance dropped out because it was withdrawing from the Philippines. The mission of the Protestant Episcopal Church did not become affiliated.

The Episcopal mission stayed out of the Union because of the reluctance of its leader, Bishop Charles H. Brent, who became resident in Manila in August, 1902—an ironical hesitation on the part of a man who was to become an important leader of the gathering ecumenical movement. But it was Brent's ecumenical perspective that made him withhold formal co-operation; his chief consideration was disagreement with the policy of proselytizing Roman Catholics, to which the Union groups were devoted. Bishop Brent wished for the reformation of the Roman Catholic Church in the Philippines—he was not sanguine about its probability—and hoped for ultimate reconciliation of the Protestant and Catholic segments of Christendom. He directed the activity of the Episcopal mission mainly towards English-speaking and Chinese groups, social service (not evangelism) among Filipinos, and the evangelization of non-Christian tribes. Brent was correct in his presumption that the other Missions would engage in proselytizing Roman Catholics. Homer Stuntz, defending the Union's policy, declared, "The Churches in the Evangelical Union are a unit in believing that the Catholic Church in the Philippines will never lead the Filipino people out of sin into lives of righteousness."

In 1904, the General Conference ended the connection of the Philippine

mission with the Malaysia Conference by voting to establish the Philippine Islands Mission Conference. Bishop William F. Oldham formally organized the new Conference on 11 March 1905. Pursuant to an enabling act of the same General Conference, it became in March, 1908, the Philippine Islands Annual Conference. Becoming an independent Conference, however, did not gain for the Mission a resident Bishop of its own.* Missionary Bishop William F. Oldham, resident in Singapore, had episcopal supervision of the work until 1912. It then came under the jurisdiction of Bishop William P. Eveland, until an emergency arrangement went into effect following his death in July, 1916. After its organization as a Conference, the Philippine Islands work remained formally a component of the Southern Asia Central Conference, but the distance from India, where the sessions were held, radically restricted attendance by Philippine delegates.

NOTES

Page 175. The entire church membership of the Malaysia Mission in February, 1898, was only 351. Only twenty-eight members were reported from a specifically Malay church. The rest belonged to ten small English, Chinese, and Tamil congregations. The largest specific Malay interest was a thousand pupils in thirty-eight Sunday schools.

Page 176. On the mornings of 22 and 23 May 1902, a week after lunching with President Roosevelt and Secretary of War Elihu Root, who wanted him to appear before "the Committee" (see the Bishop's diary), Bishop Thoburn testified before the U.S. Senate Committee on the Philippines.

He stated that it would be a crime to withdraw American authority and power in favor of a native government. Acknowledging that his observation of the Islands was limited to a total of three weeks inside Manila (1899 and 1900), he declared the Filipinos incapable of self-government, treacherous, intellectually and morally inferior to the Americans, and not fit for amalgamation with Anglo-Saxons. Such an amalgamation would produce a "mongrel" group. The Bishop believed that the Filipinos should receive the benefits of the American Constitution, as they already had, but should be granted no participating citizenship. Training for independence would take about seventy-five years. The Filipinos should be held as "a subject race under fixed rights that are assured to them."

Upon being questioned, he indicated that he would be happier with the term *protected race*. Then he declared his belief, evidently with approval of the situation, that the world trend was toward the establishment of protectorates on the British Empire plan for "all outlying uncivilized or half-civilized countries" under the five or six great governments that will exist in and dominate the world, America being one of them.

* See p. 765.

One of the Senators sharply questioned Bishop Thoburn as to the meaning of his conviction that God put the United States into the Philippines, clearly exposing the fact that Thoburn picked and chose from among various international developments the ones to be attributed to the rule of Providence, which he designated as "another name for God." Some of the theological and moral implications of Thoburn's view came out in the following exchange:

[Q] Is it your opinion that the hand of God leads great powers to send their armies to the lands of semicivilized people to subjugate them and bring them under the dominion of the great powers?

[Q] . . . is it your theory that if a nation comes to the assistance of a barbarous or a semibarbarous people or a people of a higher degree of civilization and intelligence than semibarbarous, then because they came to the assistance of that people that they have a right to override against the will of that people, take possession of their country, and kill and burn as much as may be necessary for the purpose of that possession and permanent occupancy?

[Thoburn] You ask that question seriously?

[Q] Indeed I do.

[Thoburn] It is very difficult to answer it seriously. Every case would depend on itself, on its own merit; what might be right in one case would be very wrong in another . . .

[Q] Does man determine what is right and what is wrong, or does Providence determine what is right and what is wrong?

This note is based on *Affairs in the Philippines; Hearings before the Committee on the Philippines of the United States Senate*. 57th Congress, 1st Session, S.D. No. 331 Part 3, pp. 2671-2705.

Page 182. Stull referred to this service in a letter of 6 July 1903, printed in *Minutes, Montana Conference* (1903), p. 21, as the start of the Methodist Episcopal Church in the Philippines. In his personal journal entry for 28 August 1898, evidently written that day, he specifically renounces any intention to start a Methodist church as the result of the response in that day's service.

5

Evangelizing the Philippines

THE EVANGELICAL UNION'S comity agreement assigned to the Methodists a group of seven contiguous provinces north of Manila: Bulacan, Pampanga, Tarlac, Pangasinan, Bataan, Zambales, and Nueva Ecija. Through the first four of these ran the Island's only railroad, the Manila-Dagupan line. Manila, with its surrounding province (shortly to be named Rizal Province) was reserved for no single denomination, but new work in the capital was to be started only by mutual agreement or after arbitration by the executive committee of the Evangelical Union.

With more missionaries available and with the more experienced Homer Stuntz at the head of the Philippine Islands District, the Methodists now moved quickly to extend their evangelistic efforts as far as they could out into the northward provinces allotted to the Mission through the comity agreement, keeping in mind the strategic importance of entering the provincial capitals. By this time (1901), conditions in these provinces were more settled; by the time of the District Conference held by Bishop Warne (30 April), five of them already had civil governments organized by the Philippine Commission. The two others, Nueva Ecija and Zambales, also soon were organized, and on 1 September, a complete central civil government was established, with William Howard Taft as governor.

Before sending its men out into the provinces, the District Conference decided upon a more permanent form of organization for the assimilation of the Mission's Filipino converts. The members believed that a fluid evangelistic movement that was only informally and loosely organized would not make for lasting results. Confident that the Methodist system worked out in the United States was adaptable to the Philippine mission, they voted to begin immediately organizing the Filipino congregations in accordance with the provisions of the Discipline. This meant that Filipinos would now be admitted into full membership in the Methodist Episcopal Church, local boards of Stewards would be formed to encourage and administer financial self-support, and the Filipino preachers would be divided into two classes—locally supported pastors in charge of congregations or circuits; and evangelists assigned to the advance work and supported locally as far as possible. The

missionary leadership would be expressed by the appointment of provincial missionaries-in-charge.

This plan involved something more fundamental than mere operational methods. It was a clear signal that whatever the national complexion of the membership and ministry of Philippine Methodism might become, its basic structure would not be determined by forces indigenous to the Philippines. The new movement would have to grow within a constitutional framework generated by American Methodism. The emerging Philippine church would be controlled by ecclesiastical legislation framed by the General Conference, in which Filipino churchmen would have at best only the meager representation belonging to a very small minority on the periphery of a world-wide church with its center of gravity located in the United States.

The planned thrust beyond Rizal Province carried Methodism into three new provinces in 1901 and reached some thirty miles northwest of Manila.

To Bulacan, which lay immediately north of Rizal, went Willard A. Goodell, one of the new missionaries, and (for three months) José Bautista, a Filipino evangelist. They began in Hagonoy, with a church of thirty members that the Presbyterians transferred to the Methodists in an exchange that gave the Presbyterian mission the Methodist work in Cavite, south of Manila. By Conference time, the congregation achieved self-support, acquired a building for a chapel, gained a hundred new members, and completed its organization under a Quarterly Conference.

To Pampanga, which shared the western border of Bulacan, went William G. Fritz, to take up residence in San Fernando, the capital. He too began with mission work handed over by the Presbyterians. The San Fernando church, under his leadership, became fully organized and began building a large chapel. In nearby Angeles, Fritz bought an old billiard hall and made it a chapel. By the end of the year, he was directing two Circuits, with ten regular preaching appointments.

To Tarlac, immediately north of Pampanga on the railroad, went Thomas Martin. Assisted by an evangelist, Felipe Marques, Martin built up, in the first Conference year on this new field, a Circuit with thirteen appointments and an average weekly attendance of a thousand people.

North of Tarlac, and north and west of Bulacan, lay Nueva Ecija, one of three provinces entered by Methodist workers in 1903. The pioneer was Joaquin Tison, a youthful Exhorter, who ministered to a small group of evangelicals who had come together in San Isidro, the capital, fifty miles from the nearest missionary. Without any financial assistance from the Mission, Tison visited the people and preached at night in their bamboo cottages, holding the little company together for a year, until a missionary should settle in their area. Twice during the year, Arthur Chenoweth came up from Baliuag, Bulacan, to visit them, organizing the group, on his first visit, into a church of forty-six members.

A fresh beginning was made in 1903 in Pangasinan, where Thomas Martin had worked for a time, in Dagupan, without lasting results. To Dagupan Bishop Warne now sent Ernest S. Lyons, whom he transferred from Singapore. In this first year, Lyons traveled throughout the Province, organized churches in twelve places, enrolled nine hundred probationers, and gathered "nuclei" of adherents for future work in more than twenty other centers.

The Mission made its third advance in 1903 in response to urgent invitations from Bataan, west across the bay from Manila. Willard Goodell, working in western Bulacan, made several trips to towns in Bataan where evangelical sympathizers lived. In Dinalupihan, he prepared a small group for baptism, and a chapel was erected. In Orion, a Filipino woman made several converts. In Orani, about twenty-five people were ready to affiliate with the church.

Up to this time, the Methodist missionaries had entered only successively contiguous provinces. But in 1904, they leaped over two or three provinces just north of Pangasinan, to open mission centers in Ilocos Sur and in Abra, about 150 to 250 miles above Manila. These two Ilocano-speaking provinces—earlier assigned to the United Brethren, but not occupied by them—were reallocated to the Methodist mission by the Evangelical Union's executive committee. In August, Berndt O. Peterson, newly arrived from Kansas, settled in Vigan, capital of Ilocos Sur, as missionary in charge of the Ilocos Sur-Abra field. Peterson quickly reached, through Bible class work, about a hundred students in Vigan's Provincial High School, Ilocano University, and Ilocano Institute. From among the students came the nucleus for a church in Vigan and contacts for evangelistic beginnings in other towns. Peterson built up a 110-mile circuit south of Tagudin and a 100-mile circuit east into Abra, traveling hundreds of miles by horseback. Assisted by Filomeno Galang, a Local Preacher appointed as evangelist, he spread his preaching ministry, within seven months, to thirteen places in Ilocos Sur and seven places in Abra, organized churches among 117 probationers in four Ilocos Sur communities, and enrolled 346 additional adherents in Ilocos Sur and 201 in Abra.

The following year, Ernest Lyons, now a District Superintendent resident in Lingayen, Pangasinan, three times traveled the newly opened Juan de Verde trail east into Nueva Viscaya, to start mission work in the far north, in Cagayan, Isabela, and Nueva Viscaya—the three provinces in the valley of the Rio Grande de Cagayan, Luzon's largest river. (These provinces had been added to the Methodist field in a supplemental comity agreement in January, 1902.) In August, Lyons and Filomeno Galang visited most of the Valley's towns, preaching, selling Bibles, and distributing tracts. In November, Galang settled in Aparri, at the mouth of the river, far north in Cagayan. Exhorters were set to work in Tuguegarao (Cagayan), in Ilagan

(Isabela), and in other southern Valley towns. More than two hundred probationers entered the church in Aparri.

Also sometime in 1905, a lay evangelist began Methodist preaching in Zambales, the narrow coastal province north of Bataan. Once a month, he walked twenty-two miles through the mountains to preach to a group in Olongapo, the site of a new United States naval base, on Subic Bay, close to Bataan.

With the advances made in 1905, the Mission's initial penetration of the provinces on Luzon was finished, except for a beginning in Ilocos five years later. Methodist evangelists were active in all the provinces lying north of Manila but four—Tayabas (this eastern coastal area was a Presbyterian comity assignment), La Union (eventually, it was intensively cultivated by the United Brethren under comity), and Benguet and Lepanto-Bontoc (these were areas in which the Episcopalians worked extensively among non-Christian tribesmen).

In 1905, as the Mission rounded out its planned extension into the provinces, its administration was for the first time divided into two Districts—the North District, with Ernest Lyons supervising Ilocos Sur-Abra, Pangasinan, and Tarlac; and the Manila District, with Homer C. Stuntz supervising the rest of the Methodist-occupied provinces in addition to serving as superintendent of the Mission as a whole. In 1906, with Methodism now active at the mouth of the Cagayan River, three hundred miles north of Manila, a three-District plan was adopted—the Manila District (the city of Manila, Rizal, Bataan, and Zambales), the Central District (Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, and Tarlac), and the Northern District (Pangasinan, Ilocos Sur-Abra, Nueva Viscaya, Isabela, and Cagayan). This scheme of Districts remained substantially unchanged until 1910, when Ilocos Norte came into the Northern District.

While the Mission was carrying out its five-year penetration of the northern provinces, evangelistic activity continued in Manila and its suburbs.

When Homer Stuntz assumed the superintendency of the Philippine Islands District in 1901, Bishop Warne appointed him also as pastor of the American Church. Stuntz found the congregation no longer worshipping at the Institute, but at the Y.M.C.A. headquarters, an old Spanish barracks in Intramuros. In the fall, Stuntz quickly raised a building fund of \$4,250 from members and supporters, and the church purchased a lot at Calle San Luis and Calle Nozaleda, in Ermita, which was a residential quarter. There the congregation erected a temporary tabernacle seating two hundred people, and opened services on 22 December as Central Methodist Church.

To make sure that the purchase of the site for the church would not be blocked by the influence of the friars, Stuntz had concealed the ultimate purpose of the transaction. Furthermore, Protestant organizations had no legal means of buying, holding, or conveying real estate. The church site

was bought, therefore, by two of the church trustees acting as individuals. Stuntz soon had a brief interview with Governor William Howard Taft and described the legal difficulties facing the Protestant missionaries. Taft called his stenographer and, reported Stuntz, "without so much as moving in his chair or pretending to consult a book dictated a law perfectly meeting our need as Protestants, and had it before him in typescript within ten minutes!" The next day, the Philippine Commission put the new law into effect.

In endeavoring to give the American congregation a place in Manila as a regular church, Stuntz was consciously following the pattern of English-speaking church work developed by the Methodists in the larger cities of India. He did not apply it simply to the needs of military personnel, for soldiers actually were being removed from Manila at this time in such numbers as, in part, to bring about the closing of the regular work for soldiers at the Institute. He also had in mind civilians engaged in business, government, and public education. The heart of his first appeal to sympathizers in the United States for support for the church's building plans for the future was an emphasis on the importance of a church-away-from-home for all Americans in Manila:

Only the good God whose Spirit led us hither can foresee what it means for the thousands of mothers' sons and fathers' daughters away from home, in the hot furnace of temptations peculiar to the white race in the tropics; that here, where the social pace will be the fastest, and where resorts of vice will be decked with all the witchery of the luxurious East, there is established a church with wide open doors to our own flesh and blood . . .

The entire American population was highly transient; this remained one of the chief problems confronting Central Church. In 1906, for instance, the District Superintendent reported that almost the entire membership of Central Church had changed within eighteen months. And the pastor declared the same day, "Nine-tenths of the Americans in the Philippines expect to return to the United States as soon as possible. We minister to a swift flowing stream of humanity."

Transiency in the American congregation was matched by transiency in the pastorate. As soon as the tabernacle was opened, Homer Stuntz, after only eight months in the Islands, was off to the United States to engage in promotional work for the Board. Major Halford supplied the pulpit for five months, and the rest of the year was covered by William A. Brown, a new missionary, from the St. Louis Conference. Then Stuntz was back as pastor for 1903, confessedly spending much of his time and energy preparing his 500-page book *The Philippines and the Far East* and doing little church work but the preaching. In 1904, Stuntz was off again for most of nine months, attending conferences in Madras, Singapore, and Los Angeles, leaving Marvin A. Rader to supply the pulpit. When Stuntz returned from

General Conference in October, with him came George A. Miller, an experienced and effective young pastor from Fresno, California. Miller served Central Church for two years, until he returned to the United States in September, 1906, because of ill health. In January, Isaac B. Harper of the Northwest Indian Conference came to Central Church, and remained in charge until March, 1910. Thus the church was led under seven different arrangements in nine years.

During those nine years, the size of the membership fluctuated erratically, as the reported figures show—72, 95, 90, 129, 142, 85, 175, 136, 251. But Central Church early achieved self-support, developed a pattern of church organization like that of typical churches in the United States, and moved towards the erection of a permanent church building.

At first, the building program was ambitious. Although the Methodist constituency in the Islands was overwhelmingly Filipino, Bishop Warne wanted to see "a Methodist cathedral on this lot for the whole Philippine Conference." Major Halford, who appealed for building funds in the United States, also envisioned the prospective church as both symbol and center for the entire Philippine work—"a building that shall, in some fair and adequate way, interpret to the Filipino people Protestant Christianity as the members of the great Methodist Episcopal Church of the United States appreciate it, and as they desire their brown brethren and sisters in the Philippines to understand and enjoy it." At a time when congregations numbered no higher than 175, Stuntz wanted to spend \$50,000 for a church to seat five or six hundred people, with auxiliary seating for two or three hundred more. George Miller twice scaled down the original building plans, carried through the building campaign, and left under construction, when he went home in 1906, a modest church of concrete and wood, 40 by 60 feet, that cost about \$13,000. It was opened just in time for the March session of the Conference of 1907 and was dedicated by Bishop Oldham six months later.

The spring session of the District Conference of 1901 heard a report from Jay C. Goodrich on the outlook for evangelizing the Islands' Chinese population. The Chinese had been in the Philippines for many centuries, but frequently under severe tension because of their perennial status as an unwelcome minority. They were thoroughly entrenched in the retail and commercial business of the Islands, and about half of them—21,230 among Manila's population of 219,941, according to the 1903 census—lived in Manila.

Deciding to go ahead, the Mission secured the transfer of Paul H. C. Ciong from the Foochow Conference in October. Shortly afterwards, and before Ciong got on the field, two men began holding Sunday services in the chapel at Sailors' Bethel, in Binondo near the Chinese quarter, for a congregation of about forty Chinese. The leaders were Ben G. Pay, a young Chinese graduate and convert of the Anglo-Chinese College in Foochow, who had

come to Manila as interpreter for the Chinese consul in Manila, and Paul Barnhart, an agent of the American Bible Society, who was a Local Preacher in the American Church. Ciong came to the Chinese congregation (it included a few Christians from Foochow) early in the new Conference year, and began a two-year ministry. At the end of his first year, the church had forty-one probationers and five full members, with an average of sixty attendants crowding the small chapel room.

When Ciong left in 1904, Ernest S. Lyons, who had been principal of the Anglo-Chinese School in Singapore for three years, came from Dagupan to fill the vacant post. In September, he opened a night school, and from the tuition paid by the Chinese students, he took in enough money to rent a preaching hall in the center of the Chinese community. The attendance—some Cantonese now were interested—went up, and the membership increased to fifty-one probationers and twenty-five full members.

In 1905, Daniel H. Klinefelter, a young man just arrived from the United States, succeeded Lyons. He soon started a boarding school for Chinese boys and a night school to supplement the work of the day school in the Chinese quarter. Through these three schools, whose curricula included religious instruction, Klinefelter was in touch with as many as a hundred Chinese boys. Among the evangelistic activities, Klinefelter found particularly vital a Chinese congregation and Sunday school at First Church (Filipino), on Calle Rosario, Binondo.

The Chinese project as a whole, however, was not productive enough to last. Even some of the Chinese who became church members proved undependable. Klinefelter reported that Roman Catholic assimilation of the Chinese under the Spanish regime had schooled them in nominal affiliation with that church for social advantage. Some of them had transferred their allegiance to the Methodist Episcopal Church on the same level, fancying that social advantage now would accrue to them from affiliation with an American church under an American political regime. Furthermore, Klinefelter observed that regardless of their enrollment by the Roman Catholic Church, "one needs but to visit among them to learn that the heathen religion of their fathers is still theirs." Klinefelter could not depend, of course, upon any freshening of his constituency by an influx of Christians from Fukien and elsewhere, as other Chinese missions in Malaysia could do; the Philippines now lay under the restrictions imposed by the Chinese Exclusion Act originally passed to keep Chinese from immigrating into the United States.

In 1907, Klinefelter being transferred to one of the provinces, Ben Pay was appointed to supply the Chinese charge. But the work evidently lapsed during the ensuing Conference year.

The Filipino Methodist movement in Manila was unhampered by limitations like those inherent in the work with the American and the Chinese minorities; with Jesse McLaughlin as its most consistent missionary leader,

with Nicholas Zamora as its influential Filipino figure, and supported for a time by Arthur Prautch, it gathered momentum during the years following the strategic District Conference of April–May, 1901.

McLaughlin, appointed to the Filipino work in the city, with Zamora seconding him as itinerant evangelist, reorganized the evangelistic activity into a single Circuit. Upon the closing out of the Institute's program for military personnel and the removal of the American church to Ermita, the Institute became, for a time, the center of the Filipino work already under way at numerous points in the city. The Filipino congregation meeting at the Institute took the name First Methodist Episcopal Church (Filipino), and early in September, celebrated the gathering of ninety-six probationers into full membership. These were the first of many hundreds that were to be received in Manila proper in the months and years lying just ahead.

In 1902, McLaughlin again reorganized the expanding Manila mission and administered it for three successive years under an arrangement of from three to five Circuits—including, at various times, Tondo, Binondo, Sampalok, Santa Mesa, and Pandacan—and a number of separate churches, among them First Church.

First under the pastorate of McLaughlin in 1902 and then under three years of strong leadership by Zamora, First Church began to emerge both as one of the significant permanent Methodist churches in Manila and as a stimulus to evangelism in the city at large. In 1903, the Philippine Islands Mission leased from the government a lot at Calle Cervantes (later Avenida Rizal) and Calle Lope de Vega, Santa Cruz, close to Bilibid Prison; and there in June, First Church opened regular services in a quickly constructed temporary chapel. Few of the members lived near the chapel; the majority came from the Tondo, Binondo, San Miguel, and Sampalok sections of Manila. By 1904, when the membership was approaching 350 (with 154 probationers and 300 adherents in addition), First Church was extending its influence abroad in the city through an active corps of Exhorters. They conducted many services in La Torre, Diaz, Magdalena, San Lazaro Hospital for lepers, Tayuman, Lico, Tondo, Binondo, San Miguel, and Sampalok, and even in two places in Bulacan Province. Zamora's activity also was far from parochial; in addition to his ministry at the Cervantes church, he preached nearly seventy-five times in 1906 in more than twenty-five places in and beyond the capital city.

Nearly five years after entering its temporary chapel, First Church opened at the same location, on 8 March 1908, a new \$40,000 steel and concrete church building. Designed to seat as many as fifteen hundred people, it was intended to serve both as a parochial and as a central convention church, and to stand out from among Filipino Methodism's humble thatched chapels as an impressive symbol of the significance of the movement. The church now

took a new name—Knox Memorial Church—after the grandfather of a soldier in the early occupation army of the United States.

On the same day that Knox Memorial was publicly opened, Bishop Oldham dedicated St. Paul's Church, another building larger and more substantial than the usual chapels, which was erected on Calle Moriones for the central congregation of the important Tondo Circuit. The work of this active Circuit was carried from 1902 to 1905 almost entirely by Filipino Local Preachers and Exhorters under the direction of the District Superintendent.

Midway in 1903, Tondo Circuit developed a focal point by engaging for weekly services the Rizal Theater, the scene of many patriotic and community gatherings, on Calle Ilaya. The Sunday morning congregations, generally directed by the Filipino workers, quickly reached the level of five hundred attendants, the members afterwards scattering for meetings held, later on Sunday or on the following week nights, in the chapels throughout the district. The Circuit grew at every point, and workers from Tondo even started a new station in Caloocan, north of the city proper, where Nicolas Zamora dedicated a chapel on 1 January 1904. By Conference time, in March, the Circuit was a well-organized combination of twelve preaching places, including at least seven regular churches. The appointments for the new Conference year sent preachers into Aguila, Bancusay, Bilbao, Caloocan, Galgalangin, Lechero, Palumpang, Santa Monica, Tayuman, and Tutuban.

For three years, beginning in 1906, Zamora served as head of the Tondo Circuit. When the new St. Paul's Church, a 600-seat structure, whose erection was underwritten by an anonymous gift of \$5,000, was opened in 1908, the Circuit had grown to a constituency of more than 700 full members, 500 adherents, and 350 Sunday school pupils. Zamora's chief co-workers were fifteen to twenty lay preachers enlisted from the ranks of Tondo's clerks, bookkeepers, tailors, barbers, carpenters, and day laborers.

At this time, the rest of the Filipino work in Manila was organized under the Santa Mesa and Santa Ana Circuits, north and south of the Pasig River, respectively. Counting these two Circuits in with Knox Memorial Church and Tondo Circuit, the Filipino constituency in Manila had now grown—less than seven years after the first full members were received—to 2,500 full members, 750 probationers, 900 Sunday school pupils, and 1,650 adherents. Shepherding the Methodist following, were fifty-five lay preachers active at eighteen chapels and churches and in other, less formal preaching places.

As Manila Methodism grew, the Methodist constituency in surrounding Rizal Province kept growing—always closely associated with the work in the capital through missionary and Filipino leadership, and often connected with it in Circuit and District organization.

Of Methodism's three early outposts in Rizal, one (Cavite) was transferred to the Presbyterians as we have seen, one (Galgalangin) became a continuing charge, and one (Malibay) became the head of a strong Circuit.

On Christmas, 1901, more than two hundred Filipinos joined the Malibay church, four hundred received Communion, and a group of leaders organized a Quarterly Conference. The church quickly achieved self-support—the first Protestant congregation in the Islands to do so. Two years later, barrio meetings were opened. After occupying the former Roman church for five years, the central congregation vacated it in 1905, and built a church of its own. By 1908, there were over five hundred church members and three chapels on the Circuit.

Another strong Circuit grew up in Malabon, just north of Manila, where in the first year of expansion into the provinces, Methodist preaching won the attention of a thousand hearers, and a wealthy adherent built the new congregation a chapel. In October, 1902, Jesse McLaughlin, the District Superintendent, and Nicolas Zamora, Province Evangelist, attended the dedication of a chapel in Barrio Julong Duhat in the presence of about a thousand people. In May, 1903, Marvin A. Rader, fresh from a pastorate in Denver, Colorado, moved to Malabon, and found three Exhorters caring for several hundred members gathered about four chapels. By the next Conference, there were eight Exhorters and seven chapels, and the Circuit's appointments included Julong Duhat, Tangos (Tongos), Sepoc, Tonsuya, Ibaba, Muzon, and Tinijero. In his second year, working also in Manila's Central Church, Rader and his zealous Exhorters received requests for night preaching from nearly every barrio in Malabon, and held more than a thousand open-air meetings. The membership rose to more than eight hundred. The Circuit effort also resulted in new work and three new chapels outside Malabon—in Bagumbayan, on the outskirts of Manila; and in Polo and Obando, in Bulacan Province. Simeon Blas, the outstanding Filipino worker in Malabon, was put in charge of the Circuit in 1906, but spent most of his time in Bataan as Province Evangelist. A second Filipino, Serviliano Castro, headed the Circuit in 1907 and reported at the end of the year a membership of 649, with twelve hundred probationers and adherents.

A third important Circuit emerged in Rizal in 1906, when Serviliano Castro, a Conference probationer, was appointed to Navotas, a municipality adjacent to Malabon. Methodist activity in Navotas had begun three years earlier in Tangos, one of its barrios, then on the Malabon Circuit. The first year's effort in the Tangos charge garnered 96 members and 246 probationers. The work continued to prosper; at the close of its first year as a separate Circuit, Navotas had 650 members, and a year later (under Candido Magno, another Conference probationer) its three churches served 725 members.

While the three major Rizal Circuits were developing out of Malibay, Malabon, and Navotas, Methodism won converts and founded congregations in a number of other places in the Province. Among them were Caloocan (1902), Mandaluyong (1903), and Marikina (1903). All the stations

opened, up to the time of the Conference session of 1908, however, were close to Manila; the outer reaches of Rizal remained uncultivated.

Missionary residence in the provinces, however, lagged far behind the extension of the evangelistic movement. Conference appointments for 1906 assigned a total of six missionaries to residence in only five of the provinces beyond Rizal. As the year unfolded, only four centers, in four of these provinces, had resident missionaries—Tarlac, in Tarlac; San Fernando, in Pampanga; Lingayen, in Pangasinan; and Vigan, in Ilocos Sur. Obviously, the missionaries had to travel widely, and often across provincial lines, in order to cover the entire field of thirteen provinces.

Equally obviously, the missionaries could not effectively evangelize and cultivate singlehandedly or through single traveling companions the large territories they opened up to Methodist work. Although they engaged in popular evangelism wherever they were stationed and wherever they went, their chief strategic function was supervision of the work of a growing corps of Filipino lay evangelists and pastors (Local Preachers and Exhorters).

These Filipino workers gave body and permanence to the movement projected into the provinces by the larger strategy and initiative of the missionaries. The native lay preachers—generally poorly educated, only sketchily trained for religious work in short-term Bible institutes, unpaid or meagerly paid, ill equipped for travel, yet close to the people, speaking the local vernaculars, and earnestly committed to the spread of the evangelical message—were everywhere at work conserving initial gains made by the missionaries and branching out into the localities that spread around and beyond the major lines of penetration by the missionaries. In scores of towns, in hundreds of barrios, they won the people to the expanding Church—conversing with them individually on road or in street, visiting them at home, preaching and praying in open-air meetings, holding services in private houses and other informal preaching places, taking up invitations to preach in unevangelized towns. Through such activities, they caught up or piqued popular interest in the new gospel, leading people to personal commitments, molding them into congregations, guiding them into baptism and church membership, holding Sunday school classes for their children, inspiring them to contribute to the support of the church, and challenging them to build the simple bamboo and nipa-thatched chapels that sprang up in the wake of Methodist evangelism.

“Such reports as these men write!” Ernest Lyons once exclaimed at a session of the Annual Conference. “An ordinary exhorter in North Tarlac reports: ‘I have preached 232 times, conducted 11 Sunday schools, made 166 prayers, made 6 visits on the sick, received 59 members and have had a total hearing of 6813 during the year.’ This brother . . . has travelled over the greater part of the Tarlac province on foot; has a wife and a large family and draws the princely salary of five pesos (\$2.50) per month.”

At the beginning of the northward expansion, in 1901, there had been

only nine Filipino lay evangelistic workers. Two years later, they were a body of fifty-two. In 1905, on the threshold of the advance into Zambales and the Cagayan Valley, more than 160 lay preachers were under appointment to local congregations or circuits, and several were serving as evangelists with wider itinerant assignments. By 1908 there were more than five hundred.

Out of this lay group slowly emerged a small company of ordained men who entered the ministry of the Methodist Episcopal Church as probationers or full members in the Conference. Nicolas Zamora, the first of the line, was ordained Elder and became a full member of the Malaysia Conference in 1903. Felipe Marquez, the second Filipino to come forward as a Methodist minister, joined the Conference on trial the same year, later was ordained Deacon, and became a full member of the Philippine Islands Mission Conference in 1905. Teodore Basconcillo was ordained Deacon and received on trial in 1904.

Although the Filipino workers were the backbone of the Mission's broad evangelization program during these years and suffered innumerable burdens and sacrifices, the American missionaries also pressed forward in the work at great cost to themselves and their families. It was illness that took the heaviest and most frustrating toll. Year after year, the annals of the Mission carry numerous notations of severe sickness striking the missionaries and their wives—temporarily incapacitating them, demanding heroic efforts to keep going, reducing their effectiveness, necessitating premature health furloughs, terminating their service on the field or increasing the work load of those who kept on their feet. As early as 1906, Harry Farmer recorded in his journal a report that the Missionary Society was astounded at the fact that twenty adult missionaries already had returned to the States presumably to stay. Ill health, as always, was the paramount factor. Fifteen years later, so many missionaries still were going home sick that the Conference session commented:

The large number of complete breakdowns of American Missionaries, and the debilitated condition of many of the remaining ones, is a loud call for the need of rapid development of Filipino talent for every department of the Church in this trying climate.

When Bishop Oldham visited Manila in September, 1909, he was shocked to observe the physical condition of members of the missionary group. He wrote to Secretary Leonard:

. . . the men are almost all either broken or breaking. It is heart-breaking to merely look at them. Teeter . . . can only last till Confce. by keeping strictly indoors and practically neglecting his district.—Lyons . . . limped in yesterday nearly dead. 13 carbuncles, fever, dysentery. Koehler I saw yesterday and was dismayed to see a man with no spark of light in his face. It was the face of a man of eighty . . . ready to break. They tell me Klinefelter is

not well. Huddleston is miserable. Dr. Leonard how can we take this land with a handful of invalids. . . . God help us. The sight of these wan bleached faces brings the tears to my eyes . . . I have seen missionaries in many lands, but I have never seen so gallant, so courageous, so utterly worn and spent a band as this . . . the work is killing these men.

By the time the Annual Conference was organized, in 1908, the combined labors of this small missionary corps (there were a dozen men and their wives on the field) and of the more numerous Filipino mission personnel had built a Philippine Methodist Church of 12,500 members and 15,000 probationers, with 33,000 recorded in the looser category of "adherents."

At the first session of the Annual Conference, an effort was made to forestall any possible move that might be made in the General Conference of 1908 to reclassify the Philippines work as a home mission of the Methodist Episcopal Church. The question had been raised in 1904 by parties insisting that the Mission would have to be so treated because the Islands were United States territory. The General Conference of 1904 determined, however, that the category of foreign mission was a technically legitimate classification for the Philippines, but it did not declare either classification constitutionally mandatory. In 1908, therefore, the Philippines Conference adopted a memorial asking that it be permitted to remain as it was—a foreign mission—and the General Conference failed to order any change.

Among the several practical reasons advanced by the Philippines Conference, the most prominently expressed was this:

That any attempt to change our present status to that of a home field, might be construed by the people as inimical to the cause of independence, which is dear to the heart of every Filipino, and would thus work great harm to the progress of our cause in these Islands.

If this was anything more than a self-protective argument on the part of the missionary group, if it was a bona fide concession to the nationalist sentiments of the Filipino Methodist preachers and lay members, it was a gesture uncharacteristic of the Mission's leaders during these years of the Roosevelt and Taft presidential administrations. Seldom did the missionaries seriously consider the social psychology of their Filipino constituency, and when they did, they typically justified almost *in toto* the political realities offensive to the Filipinos, patronized them as a people, or flouted their feelings. They did not move essentially beyond the pseudo sympathy in Homer Stuntz's comment upon the meagerness of the applause by Filipino listeners at Governor Taft's address when he took charge of the American civil administration in 1901:

Filipino sympathies can hardly be expected to be at high temperature when their armies have been scattered or captured, their cities taken, their fathers and brothers shot, their houses burned, and their industries paralyzed by

even a necessary war. We have conquered them. I am one who firmly believes that it had to be done, even in their own interests; and that it has been done with as little needless cruelty as possible. Nevertheless, we have conquered them, and they are human. They respect our power, but can scarcely be expected to go into ecstasies over their defeat.

Stuntz's eyewitness account of the inauguration appeared in the *New York Christian Advocate* in August, 1901. But when four years later he wrote an editorial explaining the almost oppressive silence with which a group of Americans and of leading Filipinos heard Taft, now Secretary of War as well as Governor, give another address, it was published in the Mission's official journal, the *Philippine Christian Advocate*. The address was an important declaration of American policy decisively announcing that the United States would retain sovereignty in the Islands until the work of preparing them for self-government was completed, be it a generation or even three or four generations hence. Stuntz attributed the silence of the Filipinos to disappointment at the killing of their hopes of independence in the near future, and the silence of the Americans he attributed to good taste. Stuntz's lengthy editorial unreservedly accepted the American pronouncement and thus identified the Mission categorically with denigration of Filipino patriotic leadership, with the claim that the Filipinos were thoroughly unfitted for self-government, and with the judgment that the independence movement now was rightly and effectively condemned to frustration by the power of the United States. Though he gave lip sympathy to the Filipinos in their disappointment at Taft's unequivocal statement, Stuntz unmistakably showed primary satisfaction with the comfortable situation it guaranteed for the American administration, American capital, and American missionaries. "Capital will now feel," he wrote, "that it is at no hazard in seeking outlets in the Philippines." And he pointed out that missions and supporters of missions could now confidently throw all their resources into the work of moral and spiritual improvement in the Islands, for the continuance of American administration would yield the time required in order to carry them out.

The Mission's anti-independence bias kept appearing in its press. Later in 1905, for instance, the *Philippine Christian Advocate* turned a highly publicized incident in which an excited Filipino schoolboy stabbed an American principal to death into commentary on the existence of "such lack of self-control in the Filipino as unfits him for self-direction in matters of government." It also called upon the American educational authorities to capitalize on the affair by rescinding their previous order abolishing corporal punishment of Filipino children. In passing, it reduced the current bad relations between Americans and Filipinos that were featured in the Filipino press to the minor proportions of an evil maintained only by a few score loud and arrogant Americans and a Filipino "agitator class." In October, 1907, the *Philippine Advocate* countered the acknowledged "cry for Independence"

with the assurance that no form of independent government whatsoever would give the Filipinos the security, liberty, and freedom from excessive burdens that they were enjoying under the American regime. Six months later, the *Advocate* editorially expressed its satisfaction over the uniquely favorable conditions under which the Mission was able to work in the Philippines. And it described the essential sanction underlying those conditions:

American Constabulary officers with an armed force behind them are everywhere maintaining peace and quiet. Sympathetic American officials are in the provincial centers, administering the laws and guiding affairs.

This sanction understandably could have tarnished for Filipinos the *Advocate's* accompanying expression of pleasure at the presence in the Islands of the American flag with its constitutional rights and of a thousand American teachers with their "ideas of personal liberty and progress."

In August, 1908, the American Methodist community in Manila celebrated the military foundation of American control and influence in the Philippines. Central Methodist Church held a Sunday morning service in commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the American occupation, with "a goodly representation" present from the Veteran Army of the Philippines and from the Army of the Philippines. According to the *Advocate*, the pastor spoke on "Some Ethical Phases of the American Occupation." Two months later, the *Advocate* rejoiced in the arrival in Manila Bay of the sixteen vessels of the American fleet touring the world on President Roosevelt's orders to demonstrate the naval power of the United States—a spectacle "well calculated to inspire a feeling of honest pride in the heart of every American in the Philippines." The Methodist editor obviously did not include the Filipino constituency when he continued, "They are ours. *Sixteen magnificent arguments why all nations should think twice before refusing to live in peace with Uncle Sam.*"

Repeated and symptomatic expressions of American chauvinism like these—sometimes unconscious, sometimes deliberate; sometimes official, sometimes individual—were part of the background of several challenges to the missionaries' administration of the Methodist movement that were raised during the Mission's first decade by Filipino Methodists whose spirit of independence fired them with discontent. Such dissatisfaction was not a phenomenon peculiar to the Methodists; it arose from the common life of the Filipino people at a time when they were aware that American aggression was robbing them anew of their freedom just as they were striking off the shackles of three centuries of subjection to Spain. The unhappiness of many Filipinos with their position in the structure of the Methodist Episcopal mission sprouted and grew in soil fertilized not only by the continued secular resistance concentrated in the movement for political independence, but also by the Agli-

payan rebellion against the ecclesiastical authority of the Roman Catholic Church.

The leader of the Aglipayan rebellion was Gregorio Aglipay, an independent-minded Roman Catholic priest of Philippine birth, whose original and deepest opposition was directed toward the Spanish Catholic hierarchy and the foreign friars for their subordination of the Filipino clergy and their exploitation and subjugation of the people. He sympathized with the cause of national independence and became closely associated with Aguinaldo and other revolutionary leaders during the months following Dewey's attack on the Spanish fleet. His major preoccupation, however, was with the religious future of the Islands. He wanted to break the political power of Spain because he believed that that would break the power of the Spanish ecclesiastical machine that controlled the Catholic Church in the Philippines. Assuming that an independent Philippine government would retain the traditional alliance between Church and State, he was convinced that the achievement of national independence would compel the pope to recognize the Filipino church as a bona fide Filipino institution and to implement its right to function under its own Filipino leadership.

In the fall of 1898, Aguinaldo appointed Aglipay Military Vicar General, calling upon all military and civil authorities to recognize him as the revolutionary government's liaison man for Church affairs. Since the Spanish regime no longer was operative, the hierarchy's management of the Church was thoroughly disrupted, and Aguinaldo's government was the only public authority widespread in the Islands, this appointment made Aglipay the functional head of the Catholic Church in the Philippines. Shortly afterwards, the Bishop of Nueva Segovia, imprisoned by the Republican government and concerned for the stability of his large northern diocese, appointed Aglipay its Ecclesiastical Governor, thus buttressing the latter's general position by giving him the sanction of canonical status in a large area. But in May, 1899, Archbishop Nozaleda (he was confined to Manila, behind the American lines), observing the progress of the American campaign against the forces of the Republic, severed his unofficial previous contact with Aguinaldo through Aglipay and formally excommunicated the restive priest from the Roman Catholic Church because of alleged usurpation of ecclesiastical power prior to his appointment by the Bishop of Nueva Segovia. In October, encouraged by the Aguinaldo administration, Aglipay convened at Paniqui, Tarlac, an ecclesiastical assembly to implement a manifesto of his that he had issued to the clergy a year earlier calling for the establishment of a Filipino national church. The priests answering his call adopted a temporary Constitution for the national church, prepared to seek recognition by the pope, and elected Aglipay President *pro tempore* of the Council that should govern the Church in the interim.

Hardly had the Paniqui plan for a national church been put down on

paper and announced to the world, when military events forced Aglipay to suspend its inauguration. Aguinaldo and his colleagues, reacting to increased pressure by the American army of occupation, decided to take up guerilla warfare, and Aglipay thereupon became a General of guerillas in the Ilocos region. After a year and a half as an active and popular freedom fighter with a price set on his head by the American army, he surrendered in May, 1901—the last of the guerilla leaders to do so, two months after the capture of Aguinaldo. Although Aglipay's absorption in military action against the Americans resulted, for the national church cause, in lost time, it was not irrelevant to the problems of such a future church. It was clear that if the Americans should succeed in imposing their rule upon the Philippines, the American policy of separation between Church and State would leave the independent priests no hope of any alliance with government that would give them leverage in negotiating for papal recognition of the national church.

Aglipay again turned his energies into the movement for religious independence, but took no decisive step until the fall of 1902. By that time, he and his associates realized that the pope, in spite of a number of representations on behalf of Filipino Catholics, was rigidly opposed to making any substantial modification of the Catholic system in the Philippines, had no intention of raising up a bona fide Filipino clergy and giving it ecclesiastical control, and would not recognize the nascent national church. Finally spurred by a declaration by the General Council of the Democratic Labor Union led by Isobelo de los Reyes—it called for formation of a Filipino church and nominated Aglipay as its head—Aglipay acted. He announced the establishment of the Filipino Independent Church, signified its renunciation of the government of the Roman Catholic Church (this included the papal authority), was inaugurated as its Supreme Bishop in the Tondo district of Manila, and was formally consecrated Bishop by independent priests on 18 January 1903.

Aglipay was an immensely popular leader, and the Filipino Independent Church soon won a massive following among people who never had known any church but the Roman Catholic Church. At a time when the population of the Philippine Islands was about 7,000,000, the Independent Church soon developed a membership that was variously estimated at from 1,500,000 to 3,000,000 people—the most phenomenal concerted exodus from the Roman Catholic Church in modern times. It was not a protest against Catholic dogma or worship, but a rejection of Roman Catholic rule. Neither was it a merely personalized movement responding to the challenge of a charismatic leader. The new church was a strong expression in the religious sphere of the national spirit of the Filipino people. Just as the Filipinos had risen against their foreign political masters and oppressors, they rose against their foreign ecclesiastical masters and oppressors. The Republic having been overwhelmed by American military force, the Filipino Independent Church remained as the

supreme vital and inescapable product and focus of the spirit of independence among the people of the Islands.

The Methodists showed no signs of appreciating the genius of the Aglipayan movement when the Independent Church was aborning. Homer C. Stuntz, the Mission's chief administrator and spokesman, included in *The Philippines and the Far East*, his 500-page book on the Islands and their religious development, a superficial, inaccurate, even garbled account of the Church's genesis under Aglipay's leadership. Although Stuntz described at length the repressiveness of the Roman Church under the friars and sketched the history of Filipino resistance to it, he assigned to the Aglipay movement no truly dynamic function in the continuation of that insurgency. Rather, he treated it as a schism worked up by an excommunicated priest as the result of a personal grievance against the Roman Catholic hierarchy. He did acknowledge the anti-friar line the new church took, but he gave it no credit for its position, treating it instead as simply an evidence of the movement's basic and inadequate negativism.

Stuntz was fully convinced that it was God's purpose to bring about the downfall of the corrupt ecclesiastical tyranny of the Roman Catholic Church in the Philippines, and he detailed in print the process through which the Holy Spirit long had worked—and recently through the barking guns of American naval vessels—to accomplish it. In this line of divinely manipulated events and divinely selected instruments stood Bishop James M. Thoburn (Methodist), William F. Oldham (Methodist), Bishop John F. Hurst (Methodist), two British and Foreign Bible Society workers, Commodore Dewey, two American Presbyterian leaders, Chaplain Stull (Methodist), Arthur W. Prautch (Methodist), Paulino Zamora, Nicolas Zamora (Methodist), and finally the arriving Protestant missionaries, who of course included Homer Stuntz himself and his Methodist and Presbyterian field colleagues. This Spirit-approved list of saving instruments, which nicely and uniquely validated the Protestant missionary incursion into the Islands, evidently so impressed him as carrying the stamp of full authenticity that it became either theologically or psychologically impossible for him to entertain the thought that Gregorio Aglipay, sprung from the womb of Catholicism, also was acting, like the others, under God.

About a year before he took his final plunge into rebellion against the Church, Aglipay solicited and held with a group of Protestant missionary leaders a secret meeting to discuss the plan he was contemplating. He met in the office of the American Bible Society, in Manila, Jay C. Goodrich, the Bible Society agent, James B. Rodgers, the Presbyterian missionary, Jesse L. McLaughlin, Methodist, and Homer Stuntz. After rather fully revealing his interpretation of the current religious situation and his intentions toward Rome, Aglipay invited the groups represented by the conferees to make common cause with him. According to Stuntz, he proposed that the Protes-

tant missions "should all merge our work into his, gain the immense numerical strength which he was confident he could command, and then leaven it with the truth as we saw the truth as rapidly as we could." Stuntz and the others countered by suggesting that he throw his strength, rather, into the Protestant movement. They told him that it was impossible for them to unite with any movement so negative as his own and one that made so little of the primacy of the Scriptures for doctrine and for life. When they advanced as essential certain religious and moral reforms that were coherent with the positions of their own missions, Aglipay pleaded, said Stuntz, "the necessity of not going too fast for his constituency, the danger that they would think it a Protestant movement . . ." Stuntz felt sure that all that Aglipay was promising his followers was "freedom from Rome, and a Church of the Filipinos, by the Filipinos, and for the Filipinos." The proposed movement would not give the people a true idea of Christ and his power to save; that task would remain, said Stuntz, for "a pure form of Protestantism to do."

Evidently, no further serious attempts were made to bring the two anti-Roman movements together, and the Protestant missionaries were content not to undertake any shaping influence within the independent church during its formative stage. They thus failed to sense the potential adaptability of the Aglipayan church, which later was able to change sufficiently to go through a modernist and Unitarian theological phase and then enter into association with the Anglican communion. The only Methodist who saw the possibilities in working within Aglipay's group was Arthur Prautch, who, though he was a licensed local preacher, nevertheless was very much of an independent figure. Prautch founded and edited *La Verdad*, the official journal of the Independent Church, and evidently became an influential adviser of Aglipay's. The Methodist District Conference of 1903 renewed Prautch's license only after much hesitation about his Aglipayan involvement had been allayed by his explaining his motivation. As Stuntz put it, probably none of his fellow Methodists "could have done what he has in sailing shoal channels and in beating up into the eye of the wind with a craft wholly new, and not yet proven seaworthy." Stuntz and the others preferred to work for a church of the Filipinos and for the Filipinos, but by the missionaries.

What reconciled his fellow Methodists to Prautch's association with Aglipay was their view that he was thus helping to split Romanism in the Philippines and to sweep out of it perhaps 2,000,000 Filipinos, leaving them open to Protestant teaching. Bishop Warne reported that the Protestant missionaries generally believed that Aglipay would "shake the Roman Catholic tree and the Protestant Missions will gather the fruit." Homer Stuntz spoke of the "loosening effect" of the Aglipay movement. Bishop Oldham, in a joint statement with James B. Rodgers, found in the results of Aglipayan activity an opportunity for much service on the part of Protestant missions: "His followers, pried loose from Rome, are forced by their hunger of spirit to

seek the fuller instruction which we can give." Although the Methodists who held these views underestimated the actual survival power of the Filipino Independent Church and overestimated the strength of the swing to Protestantism by Filipinos dislodged from the older church by Aglipay's rebellion, they none the less opportunistically held themselves ready to benefit from both the current effectiveness and the supposed long-range deficiencies of Aglipayanism. They were more or less grateful to the rebel leader for paving their way, seemingly, and also for drawing away from their workers for a time the persecuting fire of the Catholics. Hence, rather than being hostile to the new church, the Methodists were patronizing toward it, sometimes at least moderately contemptuous, and never quick to credit it with any sound contribution to the life of the Filipino people. And they were so secure in their consciousness of the spiritual superiority of Methodism and of its providential uniqueness as a missionary force that they showed no sign of being nagged by doubt as to whether their choice of noninvolvement in Aglipayanism was an opportunity defaulted.

Within a few years, fraternal relations developed between Aglipay and the Methodists, and in 1905 Bishop Oldham welcomed him at the organizing session of the Philippine Islands Mission Conference. By that time, Aglipay was beginning to move away from Catholic dogma; he was able to say to the Conference, "I feel we are very much at one, for we, too, stand for an open Bible, from which must come all that teaching and light by which the individual is saved and the Church purified." In the presence of the Conference, Oldham took him by the hand and congratulated him for his brave fight against a powerful and crafty foe [the Roman Church] and assured him of the Methodists' sympathy so long as he should maintain a significant practical emphasis upon the teaching and use of the open Bible. But even in this complimentary exchange, Oldham spoke to Aglipay with perhaps unconscious condescension, when he said, "You have not come so far toward the teaching of the evangelical religion as we have, but . . ." Oldham, pointed out, however, the historic aspect of this meeting between the first presiding officer of the Methodist Mission Conference and the "reform leader of the Catholic Church in the Philippines." In this remark there was unintended irony, for at that very time the Methodist mission was beginning to find within its Filipino following rebels against itself.

The first break came in the church in Baliuag, Bulacan Province, not far from Manila. When Arthur E. Chenoweth, the missionary in charge, returned after a brief absence in September, 1904, he found in the church a new society called Living Christians. The moving spirit was Manuel Aurora, a Local Preacher. Living Christians became an intensely self-conscious group highly competitive with the regular church organization. It held its own unauthorized public meetings, sometimes at the church hour, and heard from Aurora a proposal that it elect and support preachers of its own. Chenoweth felt

from the first that Aurora was trying to create a division within the local church and later became convinced that his aggressive promotion of the society at the expense of the church augured schism. He finally charged Aurora with breaking discipline by lying, improper conduct, and causing dissension, and had him summoned to appear before a committee of investigation composed of Local Preachers. Before the committee could meet, the society reorganized as a church, elected Aurora as its head, chose personnel for its ministry, and ordained Aurora as a minister. Chenoweth pointed out to Stuntz, his District Superintendent, that the separatists all were uneducated and also were Protestant Christians of not more than three years' standing. Four were Exhorters and one was a Local Preacher, but two of the five, noted Chenoweth, were "discredited." Their ages ranged from eighteen to twenty-five.

By the early weeks of 1905, the leaders of the Baliuag schism made contacts with all the Methodist congregations in eastern Bulacan, penetrated Nueva Ecija Province, and reached at least one church in western Bulacan. In one of the churches, a sixth of the members left to join the Living Christians, and nearly all the members in two distant churches numbering fifty and thirty, respectively, went out. In Baliuag itself nearly all the 150 members had been members of the society before the schism, and about a third of them withdrew when the break came. The movement picked up little momentum, caused the Mission little damage numerically, and before long died out.

Chenoweth attributed Aurora's rebellion to salary trouble and to his desire to be a *cabeza*, a head man. Stuntz, accepting the view that personal spite and revenge were involved, described the appearance of the Living Christians in Baliuag as "our first crop of trouble with insubordination and incipient heresy." He looked upon it as the natural result of the new wine of religious liberty, which he said had a tendency to make people a trifle dizzy at first. He also reported, "Sin is at the bottom, we believe." To explain this comment, he told Bishop Henry W. Warren that it was feared that two of the leaders were affected by a close associate of theirs who had confessed to adultery. In addition to such *ad hominem* interpretations—this was often the missionary approach to understanding rebels on other Methodist fields—Stuntz declared, more generally, "There is a vein of restlessness and fondness for change in this people." But no attempt appears to have been made to get at the source of the restlessness.

When the Committee of Investigation on Aurora's conduct met, however, it was testified that he had declared that his faction would separate and form their own church because "they had been slaves to the Spaniards and now were slaves to the Americans." Chenoweth said, "I find in my recent investigations that everywhere the leaders have tried to stir up the latent but ever present race hatred, urging the people to organize their own church and forsake the American's Church." Evidently, this approach was associated with

what Chenoweth shortly afterwards described as the influence of Aurora's "argument of 'Independencia' in church affairs."

A more serious rupture in the name of independence threatened the Mission in the Manila neighborhood in 1906. In the Conference year 1903-4, the constituents of the Tondo church had organized a missionary society, Ang Katotohanan, whose members began contributing monthly toward evangelistic efforts in the provinces. During 1904 and 1905, Ang Katotohanan maintained two evangelists in Bulacan Province. By the end of the second Conference year, however, it had generated a local by-product—a divisive, then schismatic, force in the Tondo Circuit. According to Marvin A. Rader, the superintendent of the Manila District, the whole membership was planning, under the leadership of the Local Preachers and Exhorters, to leave the Methodist Episcopal Church and establish a new church, which would ordain its own ministry. Aware of the trouble brewing and responding to the dissidents' request for a Filipino preacher, Bishop Oldham put Nicolas Zamora in charge of the Tondo Circuit for 1906.

The leaders of the prospective secessionists offered Zamora a large increase in salary if he would go out with them, but he declined. When their attempts to enlist the Tagalog preachers just received into Conference membership showed signs of success, Rader asked Zamora to act against the separatists, who already were trying to substitute the Katotohanan treasury for Disciplinary financial channels. By judicious but firm application of the Discipline, and after a protracted and difficult struggle, Zamora succeeded, before the end of the year, in breaking up Ang Katotohanan and holding the secessionists within the Church. More positively, he maintained an effective preaching ministry in the Rizal Theater and also opened an intensive evangelistic campaign in the Circuit's eleven chapels, preaching incessantly in a series of meetings that were held every evening for three months and a half. Zamora brought the Circuit through that trying year measurably strengthened, particularly by the accession of more than a hundred members. The Manila District report to the Conference of 1907 included a compliment to Zamora for his sturdy loyalty to the Methodist system.

When Bishop William F. Oldham made his first official visit to the Philippines, in March, 1905, to organize the Philippine Islands Mission Conference, he sensed in the life of the Mission the potentiality of broader trouble than the discontent stirring in the Tondo church. He felt that the missionary field administration not only was unaware of the sources of it, but was largely responsible for it. He was convinced that the Filipino Methodist workers felt that they had no voice in the work of the Mission; therefore they were uneasy. The Bishop wrote twice to Homer Stuntz, the Mission's Superintendent, to try to awaken him to the danger he observed. He told him that he himself was very uneasy because Stuntz was not in close touch with "our Filipino men" and that secessions or rebellions might arise at any time with-

out the officials' being forewarned. The discontent among the Filipino brethren came, he said, from lack of sufficient consultation and close manifest sympathy with them. He was apprehensive about Stuntz's having too optimistic a view of the situation. Oldham himself was troubled:

Zamora sulks, every Filipino leader in Manila is more or less troubled. Our summary cutting down of wages without conference or consultation with the native brethren was a grave error. I did not know the race or the situation. I hope never to be involved in such a blunder again. Your men [Filipino] need to feel that we are *near* them. The feeling Filipino *vs.* American is already strong. We must see that it grows no stronger.

Bishop Oldham not only suggested devices for full and free consultation and fraternization with the Filipino workers, but also called upon the missionaries to divorce themselves completely from the attitude of supercilious superiority to the Filipino people held by the average American resident or official (he called such people un-American). He warned, "The time is fast coming, when the Missionary must be in a class by himself in the native thinking, or be forced to bear all the odium of race cleavage in addition to the offence of the cross." The missionaries, he declared, needed to win not only the Filipinos' esteem, but also their affectionate regard.

In spite of Bishop Oldham's admonitions, the gap in sympathetic communication was not closed up, and two years after the Katotohanan affair, the Mission was severely damaged by the two-edged sword of nationalism, both Filipino and American. And again, Tondo was the scene of the trouble.

Nicolas Zamora, not for long—if at all—content with his role as defender of the Methodist Discipline, again became restive in his position as a Filipino minister under American missionary direction and after a time identified himself with the very influences he had sought to curb by suppression of Ang Katotohanan. For several years, he had been chafing under the American Methodist harness. He was a preacher of extraordinary effectiveness, and the missionaries were quite happy to have his talents available, but within limits set by themselves. Like the other Filipino preachers, he had been bound for years by a missionary field policy that forbade using funds from appropriations for the purpose of paying salaries to Filipino workers. His own financial situation was better than that of the others only because he had been successful in receiving special gifts from parties in the United States. Zamora, who was especially influential among the Tagalog people, was an able and well trained man. He was recognized as the outstanding Filipino Protestant minister in the Islands. Nevertheless, the Tondo Circuit was the highest ministerial post to which he was appointed. Filipino patriot that he was, it did not sit well with him that all his ecclesiastical superiors were Americans.

More broadly, Zamora was sensitive to the inferior position of the entire

Filipino corps of Methodist workers. Although the evangelization of the Methodist field on Luzon had been carried out mostly through their efforts, their sacrifices, and their acceptance of hardship and persecution, even the ordained men among them had no determining voice in the ruling councils of the Mission. Policy was fashioned and administrative decisions were made by the missionaries. The District Superintendents all were Americans, and serving under them were supervising Americans designated as missionaries-in-charge, who directed the activities of all the Filipino preachers and other workers involved in the evangelistic advance, covering areas as large as a province. Even the newest arrivals and the least prepared among the American missionaries—men practically ignorant of the country, the people, and the languages and sometimes possessing little ministerial experience of any kind—were given this status. But not until 1910 were one or two Filipino ministers given comparable supervisory status, under the title pastor-at-large. When the Conference session of 1908 opened, Zamora, Teodore Basconillo, and Felipe Marquez still were the only Filipinos enjoying full membership. Five others were added at that session, making a minority of eight Filipinos in a membership of twenty-six.

In 1908, the Filipino Local Preachers were reminded of their ecclesiastical inferiority to their American counterparts by being arbitrarily deprived of a significant privilege attaching to their office. The Philippines Annual Conference voted that no Local Preacher should be considered as placed in pastoral charge anywhere within its bounds. This was done after a long discussion of the right of a Local Preacher to celebrate marriages. The Discipline provided that a Local Preacher "shall be" so authorized when the civil law permitted, and the Filipino Local Preachers already actually and customarily served as pastors. Therefore, the Conference vote was obviously a technical subterfuge intended to withdraw from the Filipinos—illegally—this mandated Disciplinary power. The Conference followed through by voting to memorialize the General Conference to make the Disciplinary provision permissive rather than mandatory, but this the succeeding General Conference did not do.

Once Zamora decisively identified himself with those who were discontented with the Filipinos' second-class position in the Church, he naturally became their leader. And in that capacity, he finally took many of them out of the Methodist Episcopal Church with him in rebellion against its governing system. While Bishop Oldham's steamer was coming into harbor at Manila on Sunday, 21 February 1909, Zamora stood in the pulpit of St. Paul's Church, Tondo, bidding his congregation farewell. He told them that he was about to leave the ministry and membership of the Methodist Church. Immediately following the service, the Local Preachers and Exhorters who were his fellow workers gathered to hear him amplify his declaration. His position was that he cherished the doctrines and customs of the Methodist

Church but had decided to sever himself from it and start a new church. It was time for the Filipinos to control their own church life. Bishop Oldham heard reports that speakers at the workers' rally made hot speeches condemning the administration of the Church by American missionaries to the exclusion of Filipino leadership. Almost all the assembled lay workers at once voiced their determination to follow Zamora out of the Methodist Church and proceeded to turn in their licenses.

Zamora, already having announced that the first service of the new church would be held in the Rizal Theater on the following Sunday, parried an offer of reconciliation made by Bishop Oldham and formally notified the Conference, which was meeting that week, of his withdrawal. Three of the remaining seven Filipino members of the Conference did likewise, though one of them quickly yielded to an offer of reconciliation. The Conference voted to allow Alejandro Reyes and Diosdado Alvarez to withdraw from the ministry under a provision carrying no formal prejudice as to their good standing. But rather than treating Zamora's case as a simple withdrawal, it terminated his Conference membership under a punitive Disciplinary category captioned "By Refusal to do Work Assigned."

Out of the days of confusion, excitement, and harsh charges and counter-charges that followed Zamora's secession emerged a new church, *La Iglesia Evangelica Metodista en las Islas Filipinas*, which Zamora headed until his death in 1914. Into it went during the first year, in addition to the Conference members who withdrew, twenty-five evangelistic workers (about a fourth of those engaged in full-time work) and fifteen hundred church members and probationers (about 5 per cent of the total for the Conference). The work centered in St. Paul's, Tondo, suffered the most radically; the exodus practically stripped the Circuit of members, and in spite of evangelistic efforts launched in the neighborhood by the missionaries after the withdrawals, the number of members and probationers in 1910 was down from 669 to 80, only 20 full members being recorded. The secession movement initially drew its following almost entirely from Tondo ("That Tondo crowd has always been hard to deal with," said Marvin A. Rader) and the other Tagalog areas in and near Manila. Inroads upon the Methodist constituency farther out in the provinces were made as time went on, with reports of defections coming in as late as 1913. *La Iglesia Evangelica Metodista* soon began to extend its original membership, and Jesse L. McLaughlin reported to the American Bible Society a year after the break that the new church had three thousand members. It became and remained the largest independent Protestant denomination in the Philippines.

In general, the reactions of the missionary leaders to the Zamora schism—they found it a jarring experience—partook of the same attitudes of ecclesiastical and nationalistic superiority that were among the underlying causes of the division itself. Except for a few frank admissions in private letters, they

had little fault to find with the Mission's handling of its Filipino ministry and lay constituency, but many denigrating statements to make about the Filipino people and especially those who broke out of the Methodist system.

The missionary organization—its chief spokesmen were Bishop Oldham; Marvin A. Rader, superintendent of the Manila District; Harry Farmer, Rader's substitute while on furlough; and Bishop James M. Bashford, who was called to Manila for consultation on the crisis—attempted to preserve the Mission's public image and to justify its position in the religious life of the Philippines by undermining Zamora's reputation as a churchman. These men bore down heavily on Zamora's alleged temperamental failings, described him as refractory under the proper requirements of Methodist polity, portrayed him as overly concerned about wages and wage scales, and accused him of harboring episcopal ambitions. Homer Stuntz, who by 1909 had a Secretarial post in New York, writing to Harry Farmer about the stir the schism caused in the Board office, referred to Zamora as insubordinate in spirit, religiously shallow, and capable of switching his ecclesiastical allegiance for "loaves and fishes." Zamora also was smeared with assertions about supposed questionable practices in connection with his performance of marriage ceremonies—charging exorbitant fees and giving aid to couples entering into marriages that were considered imprudent or just short of illegality. Bishop Oldham—generally a fair-minded man—gave publicity to these allegations even though he acknowledged that such standing charges against Zamora had not been proved. The critics of the secession drew under pressure of the crisis a grossly incomplete and partisan portrait of Zamora.

Bishops Oldham and Bashford both claimed that the secession was precipitated by Zamora's angry reaction to an interview in which the District Superintendent undertook to call him to book for his irregular marrying practices. The disciplining official was Harry Farmer, whose attitude toward Zamora was expressed in a letter of Oldham in 1908: "Nicolas is the great I AM as ever and likes to be left alone." Oldham privately acknowledged after the incident that Farmer lacked "the quiet of manner & poise of mind best fitted to deal with headstrong & high-g geared Filipinos like Zamora."

In addition to trying to make the emergency of *La Iglesia Evangelica Metodista* look like an illegitimate and poorly founded response to the capricious action of a self-serving and egotistic leader, the Mission's advocates laid the susceptibility of the seceding Methodists to Zamora's leadership to anti-American, pro-Filipino feeling. In his first quick letter to the Board about the secession, Bishop Oldham's initial reaction was that there was no specific cause for the exodus of the Tondo people—"just the question long brewing, of a Filipino administration for Filipinos . . ." He wrote Secretary Leonard that "a natural insurrecto, anti-American spirit has, from the beginning, been in Tondo church." And he accused the Zamora group of appealing to race prejudice, of using hot, angry words of opposition to

Americans as such. Bishop Bashford reported to New York that the ferment that caused the separation was generated by the current demand for political independence. Marvin Rader found in the schismatic movement the very force that was back of the thwarted nationalistic Ang Katotohanan of several years earlier.

The missionaries' stated case rightly pointed to the nationalistic aspect of the secession movement. But since their purpose was thus to damn it rather than simply explain it, their description of the Zamora-led church and its genesis failed to set forth the reality of the crisis in full perspective. They made no attempt to present factors tending to extenuate the rebelliousness of the Filipinos. Hence they gave no weight at all to the irritations and indignities inflicted upon Filipinos by the arrogant crudities of American residents, by the presence of the American military, by the standing identification of the Mission with American policy and power, and by the expressions of American chauvinism continuing to seep into the speech and the conduct of missionaries from inner springs of felt superiority. Though they were capable of understanding and praising the brave resistance of the Filipinos to the alien Spanish and the foreign-controlled Catholic Church, Oldham and his colleagues failed to appreciate the same spirit of sturdy national self-assertion when it went into opposition to the alien Americans and the foreign-controlled Methodist Church.

Indeed, the Mission's spokesmen granted the demand for national independence no relevant legitimacy at all. Instead of seriously acknowledging its naturalness and accepting their consequent obligation to endeavor sympathetically and assiduously to meet its natural and just demands, they sharply minimized it. They treated it as an aberrant, irresponsible, erratic, childish ignorant, and destructively passionate force in Filipino life. Only lightly conceding, in the course of argument, that racial self-assertiveness against alien tutelage and direction was in itself praiseworthy, Bishop Oldham held that in the Filipinos who resisted American control this feeling was crucially adulterated; he declared that there was "mingled with it a certain lack of judgment, a headiness and a touch of arrogance that the present ability to manage affairs scarcely warrants." With such touches Oldham brushed off the necessity for the Mission substantially to adjust itself to the aspirations of the Filipinos who did not pocket their patriotism as conceived by themselves.

Oldham went even further; writing in mid-March for the Methodist constituency in the United States, he tried to show that the secessionists' anti-Americanism was not rooted in authentic patriotism, but in the selfish interests of a reactionary and vested "Spanishized" class dwelling near Manila that was attempting to hold back American-introduced progress, which would break up old patterns of Filipino life upon which rested their dominance. This was Oldham's interpretation of the Tagalog people, to whom all the Zamora

faction belonged. He found them, in general, poor material out of which to build the Islands' future, trusting instead in the current generation of English-speaking pupils in the schools established under American initiative. At the moment, he associated the Tagalogs—and the secessionists—with labor agitation, strikes in Manila, and the necessity for armed guards on Manila street-cars. He also linked them with Dr. Dominador Gomez, the outstanding Filipino labor "agitator," who was in jail for allegedly threatening a business concern. Gomez was a cousin of Zamora's whom he privately called "a born firebrand." Oldham ultimately crossed off the Tagalogs as constituting only an unrepresentative minority of 25 per cent of the Filipino people. His ultimate perspective was:

America is in the Philippines to bless the people—all the people—even against the protest of a Spanishized class that fears this very uplift of all the common men. And the Methodist Church is here to bless the people—all the people of our section—even if some of those in and near Manila do not approve remaining with us in our supervision of the work.

Although the Zamora crisis soon was over, there remained with the Mission the problem of achieving true Filipinization of the Philippines ministry. Some of the missionaries—Marvin Rader, superintendent of the Manila District, was one of them—began to see this. The process of bringing Filipino ministers into fuller leadership went forward during Bishop Eveland's administration (1912-16), but the Bishop moved in that direction without much taste for it. To be sure, he knew that "the native workers" were variously restless—"just the sort of thing out of which came the Zamora schism." And he shared with Secretary Oldham his realization that there was a strong "feeling among some of the native men that the missionaries are getting all of the cream and leaving them very thin skim milk." But he repeatedly expressed in private his skepticism as to the competence of the Filipino ministers and feared that the work would suffer badly from their advancement into positions of greater responsibility. Oldham, however, not only earnestly favored Filipinization, which he held had been his policy while he was the Bishop in charge, but also repeatedly urged it upon the men on the field as a necessity. He wrote to Rader in 1913, "There is now absolute need for it, and you older missionaries can render your largest help by nursing this opinion throughout the ranks of the Americans. Whether you like it or not, the Filipino must either be given larger place or the Mission will be wrecked."

The Filipino ministers made substantial gains in number and in status from 1909 to 1919. In the former year, twelve Filipinos were members of the Conference as against sixteen Americans. For three years thereafter, the Filipinos had a slight edge in number, and in 1913 there were twenty-four Filipinos and seventeen Americans. By 1919, they outnumbered the missionaries by thirty-three to twenty. At the same time, the general participa-

tion in Conference affairs increased. By 1913, seven Filipinos were serving as pastors-at-large, with supervisory functions. The first Filipino District Superintendents were appointed in 1915. They were Catalino T. Santos, for the Bataan District, and Lorenzo Tamayo, for the Paniqui District. By 1918, four out of eight District Superintendents were Filipinos. One area of official and practical influence remained a missionary preserve; only missionaries served on the Conference Finance Committee, whose members were nominated by the Cabinet. This still was true in 1919. And during the entire period, no Filipino minister was elected a delegate to the General Conference.

In order to avoid foundering on the rock of ecclesiastical nationalism, the Mission also had to skirt dangers in political waters. The movement for Philippine independence was growing. The Mission's problem was to contain simultaneously the hardly compatible hopes of the Filipino ministers and laymen for political independence and the predominant conviction of the missionaries that independence should not be granted in any near or concretely definable future. The latter believed that any such radical change would seriously cripple all the Protestant missions. Compounding the difficulty domestically was the attempt of religious independents to brand the Methodist Church as unpatriotic—pro-American and anti-Filipino—because of failure to support the independence movement. This pressure was reinforced by the appealing example set by the existence of free Methodists in *La Iglesia Evangelica Metodista*, which offered a port of asylum to Filipinos disenchanted with American-sponsored Methodism. Bishop Eveland wrote to Secretary Oldham in 1914, "We are having our little defections from time to time."

Compounding the difficulty from abroad was the expression of actually or allegedly anti-independence views by Methodist figures in the United States. This became troublesome as public discussion was focused on the Jones Bill, which finally was enacted in 1916. It abolished the Philippine Commission, created an elected Senate, granted greater powers to the Philippine government, and promised independence contingent upon the achievement of political stability in the Islands. But it did not set a date for the consummation of political autonomy. Bishop James M. Thoburn, the Mission's founder, now retired, bluntly characterized President Wilson's proffer of eventual independence as "unwise and impracticable as a dream of the night." Continuing his perennial insistence upon the Philippines' lack of national unity, he wrote in *The Christian Advocate* in 1914, "Considered in the mass, they are not intelligent enough to assume the duties which pertain to self-government." The *Advocate* also carried in 1913 and 1914 articles from Lieutenant Colonel Elijah W. Halford, formerly influential in Manila Methodism and now a prominent member of the Board of Managers, strongly favoring indefinite retention of the Philippines by the United States. In the summer of 1913, Edwin A. Schell, President of Iowa Wesleyan College,

wrote an *Advocate* piece demanding that the Philippine Assembly be abolished because of alleged persistence in failing to enact penalties for the practice of peonage and slavery. His article was preceded some weeks earlier by one by Bishop Homer C. Stuntz that began, "It would be a serious mistake to grant independence to the Filipino people in anything like a near future." Stuntz then strongly developed this mild expression of his theme, using arguments derogatory of the Filipino people, stressing the inferiority of any Malay people to Anglo-Saxon United States, pleading the necessity to protect the Filipinos from themselves and potential international attackers, and buttressing United States policy with an appeal to general imperialist ideology.

Such statements by Methodist or other Protestant leaders in the States made their way—quoted, paraphrased, stripped of context, or distorted—into the Manila press and became the basis of commentary inimical to the Protestant missions. Reacting protectively, the Philippine Islands Conference resolved in January, 1914:

That we ask our Bishop Eveland to make known to the Ministers of our Church in the United States, that by the love which they bear to their brethren here in the Philippines, they refrain from speaking publicly either in favor or against the independence of the Philippine Islands.

Several months later, both Bishop Eveland and Harry Farmer felt impelled to call this resolution to the attention of Secretary Oldham because a newspaper interview of his in New York made prominent headlines in American newspapers in Manila, presenting him as a violent opponent of the Jones Bill because of its proposal of eventual independence. Actually, he had given measured support to the bill, taking a middle-of-the-road position on this particular issue.

The Philippines Conference itself, which included both Filipinos eager for independence and missionaries opposed to it, tried to avoid public misunderstanding and attack by adopting for its ministers a policy of neutrality. This involved soft-pedaling the independence question, and since it was impossible to engage in politics without dealing with that question, the Conference banned political or partisan activity by its preachers. Speaking as a missionary, Ernest Lyons said in one of his reports to the Conference, "As a Church we do not presume to meddle with politics, nor with this question which is all absorbing to the Filipinos." Such a restraint rested more heavily, of course, upon the Filipino ministers than upon the missionaries from abroad; it constituted a limitation of their political freedom as Filipinos that they were expected to accept as the price of serving in the Methodist Church. The policy was set forth in a resolution offered by Lyons in 1911 and then adopted by the Conference after debate:

Years of observation and experience have shown that preachers of the Gospel cannot mix in party politics without loss of spiritual power and in-

fluence among their people; that because of the changing political conditions in the Islands and the tendency of politicians to use our church for political advantage, it is the sense of this Conference:

1. That our preachers shall not ally themselves with any political party.
2. That if any preacher shall permit his name to be used as candidate for any public office, he shall be liable to have the matter brought to the attention of the Conference.

Evidently resolutions were not sufficient, however, entirely to curb the patriotic political impulses of the Filipino preachers, for reports at a number of later Conference sessions, even up to 1919, admonished the preachers to refrain from their continuing political activism.

Considering the standing of the Philippines Annual Conference as one of the Methodist foreign missions having the largest membership, the Philippine enterprise was remarkably lacking in missionary institutions, especially as far as the work of the Board of Foreign Missions itself was concerned.

Had it seriously entered the education field, the Mission would have been in highly unequal competition with public education, which was strongly stimulated by the American civil administration. Bishop Henry W. Warren suggested the weight of resources the government could command for the English-speaking schools it promoted, when he reported that it inaugurated its program by landing in the Islands within a few days a thousand American teachers. But aside from this factor, the Mission entertained an internal reason for renouncing institutional development. It chose to channel all its modest resources into evangelistic work and therefore deliberately avoided tying up its missionary personnel in institutions. Homer Stuntz later took the credit for this. He wrote in 1910, when he was a Board secretary, "In the Philippine Islands I stood squarely against the organization of a single institution for the first five years of our existence . . ." And he claimed that his continuing influence kept the number of institutions to a bare minimum. Indeed, except for its Publishing House (an organizational instrument), the Mission had as late as 1919 only one general institution under Board sponsorship—the Union Theological Seminary, in Manila.

The Methodist component in Union Theological School was developed from short-term Bible Institutes for training preachers that were held in Manila and in Dagupan beginning in 1903 and 1904, respectively. In 1906, these two projects—there were a number of other Bible Institutes for evangelical workers—were designated as branches of a prospective Florence B. Nicholson Seminary and expanded their work into courses that ran for a number of months. In 1907, the two branches were merged in Manila under the leadership of Harry Farmer, with the Presbyterians' seminary furnishing space for classrooms and dormitories (at first) and assisting with the teaching program. This informal co-operative arrangement between the Methodists and the Presbyterians was enlarged in 1911 to include the United Brethren.

By 1913, the Methodists disposed of their separate building in Colocoan, and plans were under way for a formal organic union of the three co-operating seminaries, with the hope of raising funds and erecting a large seminary building in Manila. Consummation of the merger was delayed by the inherent difficulties involved in framing a constitution for it and by the influence of Bishop Eveland, who opposed and discouraged Methodist participation. In 1916, the work of the Union Theological Seminary was under way as a fully united institution, but legal incorporation was not accomplished until the academic year 1919-20. The Disciples of Christ made the fourth fully merging group, and all the Missions associated in the Evangelical Union were co-operating to some degree.

It was the missionaries of the W.F.M.S. who developed the Mission's institutional services. Winifred Spaulding, a deaconess, arrived in Manila in 1903 and opened a school that became known as the Harris Memorial Deaconess Training School. It trained girls as deaconesses and injected them into many phases of the Mission's general evangelistic and Sunday school activity, with special emphases on women's and children's work. In answer to a plea by Miss Spaulding, another deaconess, Louise Stixrud, came to the Philippines for a similar purpose. In 1908, assisted by Candida Meija, a graduate of Harris Memorial, she opened in Lingayen, more than a hundred miles north of Manila, the Bible Training School for Women, which put its pupils to work in evangelistic projects in the vicinity while it trained them. For a number of years beginning in 1910, W.F.M.S. missionaries associated with the Lingayen Training School were involved in caring for the boys and girls in the Mestizo Orphanage in Dagupan, a group of two dozen evidently illegitimate children of American men and Filipino women. Mrs. Ernest Lyons first received the children there from the government. Later they were transferred to quarters at the Lingayen School. Mrs. Lyons's comment in the Philippines report to the General Executive Committee of the W.F.M.S. in 1911 was:

Oh, if our friends could hear the little tots say "I like see my mamma," and then try to teach them to forget the mamma who is not dead but bad! If they could see these boys and girls develop from scared little animals into bright and good American children, the future leaders of a people! It stirs the heart to see them wave the flag and sing "The Star Spangled Banner" and "Three Cheers for the Red, White, and Blue."

By 1916, the remaining children were moved to Malabon and were cared for henceforth under broader auspices, with the Methodists co-operating. The W.F.M.S. also developed dormitories for girl students—Hugh Wilson Hall for students at the University of the Philippines in Manila and dormitories for secondary school pupils in San Fernando (Pampanga) and in Vigan (Ilocos Sur).

The W.F.M.S. also took the lead in medical services. In 1907, Dr. Rebecca Parish and Gertrude I. Dreisbach, a nurse, opened in Manila a hospital and dispensary for women and children, using temporarily quarters in the Harris Memorial Training School. The hospital, already serving a large constituency and training eleven Filipina nurses, entered a new building of its own in the Tondo quarter in 1908 and continued under the name Mary J. Johnston Memorial Hospital.

The activities of the W.F.M.S. missionaries were not exhausted within institutional walls; they also served abroad in Philippine communities and churches, taking up stations in the provinces, carrying out many projects for the training of women Christian workers, engaging in direct evangelism among women, leading many of their trainees in evangelistic field work, and itinerating widely under harsh traveling conditions. Ernest Lyons reported in 1909 of one of them, Elizabeth Parkes, who worked on the Northern District:

Miss Parkes has ridden all kinds of conveyances and has suffered the perils of the sea and of robbers. She has been nurse, doctor, Bible woman, and teacher. Her experiences while traveling vary widely from being carried for miles by a native through the rice fields to riding in a mudboat trailing at the heels of a carabao. On one occasion she was fished out of the Cagayan river having fallen overboard in landing from a steamer. She has served cheerfully and well.

The efforts of the Society's missionaries were seconded by married women from among the missionaries of the Board of Foreign Missions.

By 1919 there were seventeen W.F.M.S. missionaries assigned to the field, with eight on active duty—a working group nearly as large as that of the male missionaries. They led a corps of Filipina workers that numbered forty-nine deaconesses, forty-eight Bible women, and five nurses. Thirty-eight graduates of Harris Memorial and twenty-two from the Lingayen Training School were in service. The Mary J. Johnston Memorial Hospital had thirty-five student nurses in training and forty-four graduates at work, and its ninety beds were serving as many as nineteen hundred patients a year.

Aside from the W.F.M.S. program, the Mission made three moves toward the establishment of medical work, but all of them were aborted. It secured in 1907 a building in Tarlac that was to become the center for a proposed Tarlac Hospital, which it was expected the Methodists would operate on the basis of staff work by local Filipino doctors. Rosa E. Dudley, a W.F.M.S. nurse, came to the Philippines to open the hospital, but the project never was consummated. In 1908, Dr. Milton H. Schutz took up itinerant medical work in the Northern District, but two years later he contracted tuberculosis and had to return to the United States before the end of his intended term.

He was not replaced. Dr. Arthur G. Nickles went to Aparri, in Cagayan Province, in 1914, but he returned to the United States in 1915 for family reasons.

At the end of its second decade, the Philippines mission was securely in command of its position as the third largest missionary constituency among the single-country foreign missions of the Methodist Episcopal Church. Among these, the Philippines membership of 24,000 was exceeded only by India's 70,000 and China's 38,000. On a continental basis, only Europe's membership of 64,000 was greater. This represented a doubling of membership in the latter decade of the Mission's activity, with its body of 27,000 probationers showing nearly a doubling during the same period. Fresh evangelistic growth still continued, with the number of adult baptisms in 1919 still a little ahead of the number of child baptisms. In addition to the W.F.M.S. personnel, fifteen male missionaries of the Board (almost all were married) were assigned to the field. Working with them were a thousand Local Preachers and Exhorters and more than thirty ordained Filipino ministerial members of the Conference and a dozen Filipino probationers.

The Methodist mission remained throughout this period one of the co-operating groups joined in the Evangelical Union, and its expansion through the provinces proceeded in accordance with the territorial pattern established by the Union.

The only severe problems for the Methodists that developed under the comity agreement involved relations with the Disciples of Christ mission. From about 1913 to 1920, largely fruitless attempts were made to resolve difficulties that the Methodists complained arose from the aggressive tactics of certain Disciples missionaries who would not abide by territorial lines and actually made raids upon Methodist congregations. The motivation of the Disciples was significantly inspired by their theologically grounded conviction of the essential truth of the primacy of baptism by immersion. The Disciples were typically co-operative in missionary work in other parts of the world, and the Board officials of the two denominations in the United States experienced no great trouble in coming to agreement. Disciples polity, however, was sufficiently permissive to result in less co-operative attitudes and practices by particular missionaries in the Philippines.

Methodist participation in union projects included, in addition to its sharing in Union Theological School, joint publication of two missionary papers: a Tagalog journal brought out in co-operation with the Presbyterians and an Ilocano journal issued by the Methodists and the United Brethren. These two ventures were initiated in 1912. In October, 1914, the congregation of Central Church (American) united with the Presbyterian congregation in Manila to form an independent church known as the Union Church of Manila. Neither of these churches had been fully denominational in the composition of its congregation, for the attendants from the American com-

munity originated in various church backgrounds. Another factor making for this parochial union was the gradual weakening of the two churches by the departure of Americans for home as government departments employed an increasing number of Filipinos. An American Methodist, Bruce S. Wright, was brought to Manila to serve as the first pastor of the new church. The Central Church facilities remained in Methodist hands and soon became the continuing center for religious work among English-speaking Filipino students.

Out of the same impulse that created the co-operative work of Union Theological Seminary emerged in 1911 a proposal for the founding of a union Christian college to be sponsored by the Protestant groups active in the Philippines. Methodists participated in the preliminary investigations—Harry Farmer was especially active—but the Mission drew back from acceptance of the plan in 1914, evidently under the influential opposition of Bishop Eveland, though Secretary William F. Oldham was sympathetic. General promotion of the college idea subsided, not to be revived for several years to come.

In 1914, the Philippines Island Conference voted to enter into committee exploration with the Presbyterians and the United Brethren of the development of a plan for union of these three churches in the Philippines. This move soon led to the formation of a Union Church Council to consider steps toward organic union of all the evangelical churches. A number of the Methodist missionaries—Farmer, Berndt O. Peterson, Joshua F. Cottingham, Edwin F. Lee, and Marvin A. Rader among them—were favorably inclined toward union, and the Conference maintained its official relation to the Council, whose efforts bore no effective results during the remainder of the decade.

Harry Farmer was distressed by laggard attitudes on the part of certain Methodists including Bishop Eveland. He wrote to Oldham:

The Methodists could do much toward union if they would; but we hesitate because we are so big and so successful, and we love to make great reports, and we must satisfy our Board and the people at home who support us and who want to see Methodism grow. We do not like to give up a Church or a district of Methodists—in other words we are trying to build up a Church instead of THE CHURCH.

Oldham, whose ecumenical instinct was sharp, appreciated the kind of lag that bothered Farmer; from his experience in the New York office, he replied, "You should know that matters of union with other denominations are opposed by some members of the Board, and that therefore they have to be carefully worked out on the field." He indicated that he had to move gingerly when reporting to the Board of Managers even on the limited union church proposal for the Manila American congregation. But Oldham himself, though

for the time being somewhat trammled by the exigencies of Secretarial responsibility, was in favor of constructive progress toward missionary union on foreign fields. He said to Farmer, "I can assure you that the growing belief amongst real students of missions is that we must not perpetuate amongst strange peoples these divisions which have arisen for historic reasons, with which foreign peoples are neither acquainted nor concerned."

6

“On to Bolivia”

WILLIAM TAYLOR'S FIRST MISSIONARY PARTY landed on the western shores of South America in 1878. More than twenty years later, no representative of Methodism's missionary thrust yet was established in Bolivia, whose territory runs down to less than a hundred miles from the coast of Chile. In February, 1901, Bishop Charles C. McCabe, presiding at the Western South America Conference, in Iquique, Chile, acted officially to extend the work of the Methodist Episcopal Church into Bolivia. He appointed Carl G. Beutelspacher, a German-born preacher as superintendent of a newly designated Bolivia District and as preacher in charge of the station at La Paz, the *de facto* capital of Bolivia.

Beutelspacher had long desired to venture upon religious work in Bolivia. In 1901, he was finishing the third year of his second pastorate in Antofagasta, Chile. Antofagasta, itself a Bolivian city until it was occupied by Chile in 1879, in the war that stripped Bolivia of all her coastal territory, still functioned as one of the landlocked republic's chief seaports. Beutelspacher naturally met there many people from Bolivia and from along the railway that linked Antofagasta with Oruro, in Bolivia. Members of the Antofagasta church worked on the railroad, which was slowly being extended northward from Oruro toward La Paz. Some of them were earnestly attempting to spread the gospel by personal witnessing and by distributing religious literature along this route. Thus Beutelspacher's evangelistic outlook quite naturally was oriented towards Bolivia, where not a single Protestant missionary had settled until 1898.

Beutelspacher found his opportunity in the fall of 1900, when the American Bible Society was on the lookout for a man to stabilize its work in the Bolivian highlands. In October, he agreed to become the Society's colporteur and subagent for western Bolivia. Bishop McCabe approved the arrangement with the Bible Society and gave it the status of a special Conference appointment, thus complementing Beutelspacher's new regular appointment. "He wanted to go," said Bishop McCabe, "and I was glad to send him."

McCabe believed that it was imperative for the Methodists to have a missionary center in every South American capital. Therefore, he gave the signal

to advance to La Paz in spite of the fact that Bolivia did not grant universal religious freedom. "We cannot wait till religious liberty is proclaimed; we go ahead of the proclamation," he said, "and are there to welcome it when it comes."

On 20 April 1901, Beutelspacher and his family arrived in La Paz, 12,000 feet above sea level, in a bowl-like depression in the long and barren Andean plateau known as the Altiplano. There they were welcomed by Robert Routledge, a Canadian Baptist missionary, who helped them find a house in the suburbs. Beutelspacher got out into the city as soon as the family was settled, and went to selling Bibles. On his third Sunday in La Paz, he held his first religious meeting for people from outside his own home, with five adults and seven children attending in addition to his own family. It was a quiet affair, but after a meeting or two of this sort, news of what was going on got into a La Paz newspaper. Routledge and the United States minister became alarmed by such public attention to a Protestant service, and they hurried over to warn Beutelspacher not to invite suppression of Protestant activity.

The root of the danger was the fact that it was illegal for Protestants to preach in public. Since the adoption of the national Constitution in 1826, following the country's liberation from Spain, the Roman Catholic Church had continued to enjoy a privileged and exclusive legal position in Bolivia. The Constitution recognized Roman Catholicism as the religion of the Republic, and banned the public exercise of any other religion.

This provision was buttressed by the national penal code, which had a section entitled "Crimes Against the Religion of the State." The Code stated, "All who conspire directly to establish another religion in Bolivia, or to cause the Republic to cease professing the Roman Catholic Apostolic religion, are traitors and will suffer the penalty of death." Severe penalties also were designated for blasphemy and acts of desecration. Here were handy legal tools for rigorous suppression of all Protestant missionary activity.

The national administration itself was no threat to freedom of religious expression. The President, José Manuel Pando, elected in 1899, was a liberal. His party was tinged with anticlericalism and leaned towards religious toleration. What gave the religious prohibitions their bite was the ease with which popular feeling, unschooled to any other form of religious expression or authority than Catholicism, could be inflamed against agents of Protestantism. Eighty-four per cent of the Bolivian populace was illiterate. Only a small minority had more than rudimentary education; still fewer had felt the tug of the currents of social and intellectual liberalism that moved through America and Europe during the nineteenth century. Both physically and culturally, most Bolivians were isolated from world contacts and world opinion. Roman Catholicism never had faced a frontal challenge of any kind in Bolivia. Among

the common people, and among the women of all classes, there was much uncritical and tenacious devotion to the Church.

Reactionary clericals who knew how to channel the force latent in this reservoir of devotion could convert it into hot antagonisms, social pressure, and violent outbreaks against Protestants. Some of them did not hesitate to do this. Regardless of the tacit policy of the national government, local officials could not be counted on to resist ecclesiastical schemes to hobble Protestant workers. When they were disposed to collaborate with clerical wire-pulling or popular attacks on Protestants, these officials were able to lean heavily on the Constitution and the Criminal Code.

Beutelspacher knew all this; and he could appreciate the perils it held for Protestant missions. He was familiar with the tough opposition met by American Bible Society workers touring Bolivia. Between 1883 and 1898, fifteen men had made eighteen trips through the country under the Society's auspices, circulating tons of Bibles in all the chief towns and interesting many individuals in Protestantism. Again and again, priests had fought them, and local officials had hampered them.

The priests of La Paz soon assailed Beutelspacher, denouncing him in all the churches. Foreseeing roadblocks in the way of his work, he applied for an official license to carry on his colportage, and by November, he had it, signed by the President himself. This order was so drafted as to protect Beutelspacher's personal rights under Article IV of the Political Constitution. Carrying the document with him on his Bible-selling trips helped to keep him out of trouble, complementing the tact and personal courage he habitually displayed.

It hardly could be said that Beutelspacher *settled* in La Paz. The capital city was mainly the center from which he ranged abroad in every direction on long treks devoted to selling Bibles and scripture portions. It was slow and arduous work. The people he reached were far from spontaneously receptive; general ignorance and illiteracy made them unpromising prospects for booksellers. Transporting his Bibles by muleback, Beutelspacher slowly plodded from town to town, sometimes riding a horse, often astride a mule, sometimes on foot. The roads were precipitous, rough, muddy and rutted, washed out, and cut short by rivers that often were forded only with difficulty. Beutelspacher had to carry his food with him. He slept in any hovel open to him, and often spent the night outdoors. His privations were many, but he toiled on, selling his books, giving magic lantern talks, and witnessing to his evangelical faith.

In 1902, Beutelspacher traveled more than two thousand miles, mostly on muleback, but two hundred miles of it on foot. He visited over fifty towns and cities, from Oruro, about a hundred miles southeast of La Paz, to Cuzco, ancient capital of the Incas, which lay across Lake Titicaca and nearly two hundred miles northwest into the Peruvian mountains. Never before had

a colporteur succeeded in selling Bibles in Cuzco. In February, Beutelspacher rode his mule over six hundred miles to the coast, to see Bishop McCabe in Iquique. There he impressed the Bishop with his heroic quality. McCabe was always raising money independently for causes he cherished; so he was able to give the itinerant from La Paz enough cash to support him for many weeks, and also another mule, strong enough to carry both him and his Bibles. Beutelspacher asked McCabe to advance a thousand dollars to purchase a La Paz property he thought would make a good parsonage. But he also offered to match the Bishop's thousand with a like sum, which had come to him from his father's estate.

Not all of Beutelspacher's difficulties overtook him when he was on the road. He had to have shelter for his family and for his supplies in La Paz, and at this point he was vulnerable. Clerical influence got a rental boycott started against him. "During the past year," he wrote of his second season in La Paz, "I have hardly known what it was to have a tranquil home; twice, on account of fanaticism, I had to move my family, and at last had to build myself a humble dwelling."

Beutelspacher's first setback in his La Paz work came from a backlash of anti-Protestant activity loosed by the conversion of a prominent priest, Eloy Rodríguez. Rodríguez, a graduate of the Catholic Seminary, was a well-known deacon of the Cathedral of La Paz. After conversations with the local Protestant missionaries and fresh study of the Bible, he turned to the evangelical faith, and notified the Catholic authorities that he had found salvation and committed himself to Christ as the only true head of the Church. On 3 May 1903, he was publicly baptized by immersion by the Baptists. This defection caused a sensation among the Catholic leaders. Every effort was made to try to re-convert him, and he was severely harrassed for joining the Protestants. For some weeks he held steady, but on 10 July retracted the declaration of his new allegiance. He announced in the press his return to the Roman Church and publicly criticized the activities of the Protestant missionaries.

While Rodríguez was still holding out against his assailants, the affronted Catholic clergy made a fresh move against the La Paz Protestants. Evidently, the evangelistic efforts of Beutelspacher and of his current Baptist colleague, Archibald G. Baker, had crossed the hairline that separated private from public religious activity. The Bishop of La Paz complained to the police. In June, the prefect issued an order closing down the meetings of the Baptists and the Methodists. With the order came a threat of banishment from the country. To protect the future of Protestant work, Beutelspacher and Baker closed their gospel meetings, but launched into negotiations to have the ban revoked. The national administration sympathized with them but could not rescind the police order. Some months later, the missionaries received private

assurances, however, that the order would not be carried out. They quietly reopened their meetings and carried on *sub rosa*.

Although Beutelspacher was a solitary itinerant for long stretches during these exhausting years, he was not the only Methodist worker to penetrate the Bolivian fastness. After the first year on the job, he was relieved of District responsibility, and La Paz was briefly included in the Lima District, with Thomas B. Wood as Superintendent. Some of the men from Beutelspacher's old church in Antofagasta were now reaching into Bolivia as the railroad came farther inland. Some of them worked on the railroad or in the mines by day, and at night and on Sundays preached the evangelical gospel. An Exhorter named Barbosa worked under Beutelspacher in Uyuni, about three hundred miles south of La Paz; and two others, named Petit and Carlos G. Reyes were active in Oruro. These men organized classes, and in Oruro, where Reyes was the leader, a Sunday School was started.

In 1903, Reyes became Beutelspacher's Bible Society colporteur, assisting him at La Paz, Oruro, and other points. Support also came from Wilbur F. Albright and Roberto Olave, successive pastors in Antofagasta, who visited the Methodist workers in Bolivia as far inland as Oruro. In 1904, Olave, both pastor in Antofagasta and superintendent of the Iquique District, to which Bolivia was now assigned, made two visits to Bolivia. Mrs. Olave wrote Bishop McCabe about the hope of starting in Antofagasta a Methodist boarding school that could extend its religious influence into Bolivia by bringing Bolivian lads down to the Chilean port as pupils. "Our watch cry is 'On to Bolivia!'" she wrote.

In spite of Mrs. Olave's stirring slogan, the work in Bolivia slacked off before the Conference year was out. The Exhorter assigned to Uyuni withdrew abruptly, the other lay workers followed their shifting employment into other localities, and Reyes took an appointment in Chile. Beutelspacher shortly went down to the coast to fill the pastoral vacancy in Tacna and Arica; three years' struggle with the high altitudes and the rough terrain of Bolivia had worn his health down to the point of danger. Nevertheless, he made two or three return visits to La Paz by muleback in 1904.

The lay workers in Uyuni during the past three years had developed a small, more or less continuous congregation. Olave called Uyuni the "cradle" of the movement to regenerate Bolivia. But in 1904 there was no hand to rock the cradle; Uyuni was without a Methodist pastor. Indeed, so was all Bolivia; only a traveling Peruvian colporteur-preacher was at work under Methodist auspices.

At the first session of the newly organized Andes Conference in February, 1905, Bishop Thomas B. Neely restored the pastoral link with Bolivia by appointing John P. Lewis, a first-year probationer, to serve the Uyuni-La Paz charge, with his residence in Uyuni. Lewis reported at the 1906 Conference in Valparaíso, presumably for Uyuni alone, seven probationers, one

full member, and a Sunday school with an enrollment of twenty-three. Thus, five years after Beutelspacher's appointment to Bolivia, Methodist work there was running in a thin stream.

Bishop Neely made a fresh attempt, however, to vitalize the mission to Bolivia; he appointed Francis M. Harrington, an able and experienced missionary, to the La Paz charge, in addition to making him the superintendent of the newly organized Northern District of the Andes Conference. The District included five charges in Chile, along with La Paz, Oruro, and Uyuni in Bolivia. Lewis was reappointed to Uyuni, and Oruro, which was left to be supplied, remained unfilled.

Bishop Neely sent Harrington to the La Paz post because he believed that the Constitution of Bolivia would soon be amended to grant the religious liberty that was essential to any full-fledged Methodist mission in Bolivia. The Bolivian Congress had voted, on 14 September 1905, formal proposal of an amendment to the Constitution, that would remove the longstanding ban on the public exercise of non-Roman worship.

Harrington and his family arrived in La Paz at the end of April, 1906. They did not know a soul in the city. Nowhere in La Paz was a Methodist to be found. Carl Beutelspacher had been too busy moving about on his Bible tours, and too much hampered by the ban on Protestant work, to be able permanently to enlist Methodist members. In May, the new Methodist appointee started, in his own quarters on the edge of the city, a small Sunday school for his own and other English-speaking children. One by one, Bolivian pupils started coming. In June, Spanish services were added—still in the privacy of the parsonage.

In August, Bishop Neely's forecast about new legislation on religious liberties was confirmed in fact; the National Congress amended the Constitution as proposed. The revised article, proclaimed by President Israel Montes on the 27th, maintained the state's traditional recognition and support of the Roman Catholic religion; but it struck out the prohibition against public exercise of other religions and put in its place a specific guarantee of that liberty. A year later, the Congress revoked the part of the Criminal Code referring to offenses against the religion of the state. All this was encouraging—the more so because the new order would be administered under a current liberal regime that was essentially, but not radically, anticlerical. The new government policy, however, did not sound the knell of all opposition. Francis G. Penzotti said some years later that liberty of worship existed in Bolivia in theory, but "the people are slow in understanding it; and the clergy, gnashing their teeth, act as if they never would understand it."

Harrington acted at once to capitalize upon the new Constitutional status enjoyed by non-Roman religious work. On 19 August, eight days before the Constitutional amendment was formally proclaimed, he organized a Methodist society in La Paz, with six full members and five probationers. On the follow-

ing day, the Quarterly Conference was organized, and granted James H. Wenberg, an American Bible Society worker, a local preacher's license.

From this time on, the Sunday school and the preaching services increased in interest and attendance. Since Harrington found rents exorbitant, he had to resort to hiring a preaching place that was approached by a long flight of stone steps leading to a small room at the top of a house hidden away on a little-frequented street on the heights of La Paz. There, with simple furnishings and bad lighting, the congregation, which before long reached the room's capacity of sixty persons, worshiped amid foul odors from an eating house downstairs.

Bishop Neely had still another opening in view when he sent Harrington to Bolivia. From the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions had come a suggestion that the Bolivian government might be willing to negotiate with the Methodists for the development of a government-supported educational program.

Dr. Webster E. Browning, principal of the Presbyterian boys' school in Santiago, Chile, had unexpectedly received such an offer in 1904 from Bolivia's Minister of Instruction. The Minister proposed that Browning start a string of government-supported evangelical schools like Browning's Santiago institution, one in each of the principal cities of Bolivia. The Presbyterian Board regretfully turned down the offer. Browning told the Bolivians that he could not leave his work in Chile, and he also expressed the view that Bolivia's lack of religious liberty would be a hindrance to the development of the educational project the administration was proposing.

The readiness of the Bolivian administration to deal with Protestant groups for co-operative educational work augured no swing towards Protestantism itself. The liberals who were just beginning their efforts to shape the future of the nation were strongly committed to forging a modern national system of free education under government control. As a beginning, they hoped to have private enterprises like the Protestant missions start educational pilot projects. They hoped, also, to use such schools to break the dominance of the Roman Church over the country's educational life—hence the overtures to the Presbyterians, and certain approaches that were also made to the Baptists.

Francis Harrington hardly was settled in La Paz before he began exploring the school question. By June, he was able to write the Missionary Society in New York that he had a tentative offer from the Bolivian government of a three-year contract for Methodist operation of a boys' school, with financial aid provided by the state. Harrington was convinced that the Society should accept the offer. The Minister of Instruction had suggested to him that the success of the venture might place the higher schools of the nation in Methodist hands. "The country needs the liberalizing influence of progressive Protestant schools," wrote Harrington, "and this is an opportunity to enter at but little expense to the Society."

Three days after the religious liberty amendment was formally announced, Harrington had a firm offer covering two prospective schools. The government was ready to pay him 15,000 Bolivian dollars (\$6,000 U.S. gold) to establish a school in La Paz under the control and direction of the Missionary Society and Bs. 25,000 (\$10,000 U.S.) to organize and staff the government high school in Oruro. Henry K. Carroll, Corresponding Secretary, had written Harrington earlier in the month, expressing approval of the school proposal as he understood it in application, in its earlier form, to the La Paz project. Evidently neither Carroll, Harrington, nor Bishop Neely was inclined to regard the American principle of separation between Church and State as an item for export to the foreign mission field.

Formal approval by the Missionary Society could not be secured for many weeks to come. Resting, however, on Carroll's encouragement and the Bishop's original interest, Harrington took the responsibility of signing a three-year contract covering both schools, notified the Society's New York office, and began to plan for the opening of school, originally scheduled for December. He engaged his brother, John C. F. Harrington, to come out from the United States to superintend the two Bolivian schools. John Harrington, a man with experience both in teaching and in business, enlisted several American teachers and bought supplies for his school work before sailing for Bolivia in December. It took Francis Harrington four months to find quarters that he could rent for the La Paz school. The building for the high school in Oruro, Colegio Bolivar, was furnished by the government. At the turn of the year, both schools were opened under teachers newly arrived from the United States and others enlisted from Chile.

Among the seventy boys enrolled in the Methodists' new American Institute in La Paz were sons of Cabinet officers, Senators, Deputies, and of officers of cities, provinces, and departments. Francis Harrington believed that from among children such as these would come future rulers of the nation. Not being a nationally owned school, the Institute was free to conduct its classes in English and to adapt its curriculum (which included the usual Bolivian public school subjects) to patterns common in Methodist preparatory schools and public schools in the United States. Although the school belonged to the Missionary Society, propaganda against Roman Catholicism, still the state religion, was forbidden under pain of cancellation of the government contract. Religious services were not held in the school, but the Bible was taught without imposed conformity to Catholic teaching. Harrington felt that the religious character of the Institute compared favorably with that of schools in the United States—"just as much Protestantism, just as much religion."

The situation at Oruro was somewhat different. Since it was a nationally owned school and was simply operated by a staff provided by the Methodists, it had to meet fuller government requirements. The courses were taught in Spanish, and the curriculum was keyed to the official Bolivian program. The

requirements with regard to religious teaching were similar to those governing the La Paz Institute.

Francis Harrington's responsibility for the two schools was made more burdensome for him by his not knowing for sure until three months after sessions were started whether the Missionary Society would accept the La Paz Institute as its own school. Even when Secretary Carroll, on 21 March 1907, reassuringly answered Harrington's anxious questions about it, speaking of the Institute as "a missionary school," his letter carried some ambiguity about its exact status.

When Harrington opened the schools in La Paz and Oruro with doubt about the Board's support nagging at him from within, he was also under sharp attack abroad in the two cities. The Jesuits, who had a stake in the Bolivian educational system, opened heavy warfare against the two Methodist projects. Throughout the first year, Harrington had to face a sapping operation through political activity and a barrage of open propaganda. In spite of the substantial support Harrington enjoyed on high levels of the government, the agitation was successful in bringing about cancellation of the Methodists' three-year schools contract at the end of the first scholastic year.

The fathers of the boys in the American Institute got up a petition protesting termination of the contract and advocating its continuance. Harrington drafted a new educational law in favor of privately operated colleges and had it presented to Congress by an influential Senator. This counter-attack was successful; Congress passed Harrington's bill by an overwhelming vote, and the Minister of Instruction agreed to renew the American Institute contract. But the resistance of the Jesuit party was still lively. Its sympathizers influenced the Minister to attempt to cut down the subsidy for the Institute to two-thirds its previous level. Harrington's friends again got busy with the Congressmen, and Congress unanimously voted the original sum. (By 1910, the Methodists fared so well in this interplay of interests that the government, after withdrawing its subsidy for the Jesuit school in La Paz, voluntarily increased the American Institute's subsidy by 42 per cent.)

Evidently Harrington made no fight to retain the Oruro school, and it did not continue under Methodist administration beyond 1907. But Harrington was content with the outcome of that first critical year. "Thus we seem to be more firmly established than before," he reported at the 1908 session of the Andes Conference, in Santiago, Chile. "God has used the wrath of our enemies to produce more publicity in all parts of the Republic and fuller acceptance with those who are in authority."

If Francis Harrington found it difficult to operate a Protestant school in La Paz, neither did he find it easy to get results there through Protestant evangelism. He felt the drag of Bolivia's religious past, with its isolation from evangelical teaching and its history of hostile legal bans. The church room was far from the center of the city and did not even have a doorway

opening on the street. But Harrington had plenty of reinforcements for his evangelistic efforts during 1907. Moses Merubia, a young Bolivian protégé of Harrington's who had been educated in Chile and the United States, was appointed to work with him and helped start Spanish-speaking services. Samuel Torregrosa, a young Chilean of Italian parentage, helped out for a few months when he arrived in La Paz. José M. Soley, a former member of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, of Brazil, also assisted, as did James H. Wenberg and Dr. C. W. Foster, a dedicated American physician. The church increased during the year to a membership of seventeen, with fifteen probationers.

In the surrounding Department of La Paz were 300,000 Indians who spoke the Aymará tongue entirely or by preference. Harrington enlisted the former priest Eloy Rodríguez, now converted to Protestantism for the second time, to work among them. Rodríguez was a man of literary competence, Spanish-speaking, and almost without a peer in his handling of the Aymará language. In June, he began teaching Indians three nights a week to read and write Spanish and to do simple arithmetic. One night a week, he preached to them in Aymará. Some of them stayed with him throughout the Conference year: six of them were baptized and became probationers in the church. At the session of the Andes Conference in February, Rodríguez entered the ministry of the Methodist Episcopal Church as a probationer.

In 1907, the Bolivia work was made a District by itself, with Harrington as Superintendent. At the end of the year, he submitted a comprehensive District report that thrust upon the attention of the Conference the numerous strategic cities and towns across Bolivia that he believed should enter into Methodism's plan of occupation—Oruro, Viacha, Cochabamba, Santa Cruz, San José, Potosí, Sucre, Sorata, and others. Various invitations had come in to him from Senators and Deputies, and he believed that these scattered centers should be entered while the gates were thus held open in good will.

On 19 February 1908, Mrs. Harrington informed Secretary Carroll that her husband, long in precarious health, was critically ill as a result of his long, hard journey to and from the Conference session in Santiago, Chile. Four days later she wrote again; her husband was dead. Thus the Bolivia mission lost the only man at work on the realization of a comprehensive dream for the evangelization of the country. Indeed, the Mission was now left with no missionary of the Board of Foreign Missions.

George M. McBride, a member of the now disbanded Oruro faculty, was already in charge of the American Institute at La Paz. The Board of Managers also appointed him acting Treasurer of the Mission. This made McBride, until recently a Presbyterian, the key man on the field until he was furloughed in the spring of 1909. McBride and his wife were formally accepted as missionaries of the Board on 20 October 1908. A month later, J. Carleton Field and his wife, also formerly on the Oruro faculty, were

accepted. When McBride left for the United States, Field became both acting Director of the Institute and acting Treasurer of the Mission.

The District was without a superintendent for a year, but Harrington's two protégés, Merubia and Torregrosa, carried on the church work in La Paz. Merubia was ordained Deacon early in 1909, when Bishop Frank M. Bristol, newly assigned to South America, visited La Paz. Rodríguez made strides forward in his work with the Indians, reporting eighty probationers and twenty full members to the 1909 Conference session.

In the spring of 1909, Gerhard J. Schilling, returning to South America after a furlough from service in Chile, came to La Paz and took up both the pastorate and the superintendency of the District. As a native of Germany, whose education reached the college level before he left his homeland, Schilling was able to add German preaching services to the English and Spanish work, he himself preaching in all three languages. He rented for the three congregations a well-lighted, carpeted, and furnished room at the junction of five streets. The smelly back-street room first used by Harrington was now turned over to Rodríguez and his Indians for their night school. Under Schilling's leadership, La Paz remained the scene of the Mission's most effective and consistent evangelistic work.

In fact, little had been accomplished outside La Paz up to the time of his coming. When John Lewis surrendered his Uyuni pastorate at the Conference of 1907, he could report, after two years' labor, only three probationers, one full member, a tiny Sunday school, and no organized church. By November, no services were being held at Uyuni, which had made a Circuit with Challapata and Pulacayo, two towns to the north and the east, respectively. Church work had not been developed at Oruro, as had been hoped. Harwin B. Shinn, a member of the Chile Conference and a brother-in-law of Harrington's, was assigned to Oruro in 1907, but held no public services there. No money was available to rent and furnish a preaching room, Shinn had no time left from his duties as director of Colegio Bolivar, and his connection with the school would have invited sniping by the Jesuits had he done public evangelistic work. Mission work planned for Viacha and Sorata, which lay south and north, respectively, of La Paz, never got beyond the stage of irregular visits by Eloy Rodríguez and James H. Wenberg, the latter being primarily engaged in work for the American Bible Society.

Gerhard Schilling's administration was hardly a year along, when it came under criticism by Homer C. Stuntz, whose election as Corresponding Secretary followed a missionary career in India and the Philippines. Now in charge of South American affairs, he expressed his disappointment at Schilling's concentration on the capital city alone and his failure "to get out more generally over the Republic." He advised Schilling to aim, during his second year, to visit at least a dozen leading Bolivian cities, to establish friendly relations with half a dozen families in each center, thus getting

"our leaven into the widely separated measures of the Bolivian meal." Firm believer that he was in "the plan of having the missionary force on foot or on wheels a great deal of the time," he wrote to Schilling:

I am fully convinced that the plan of the New Testament is a plan which must be adopted more largely on all our mission fields if we would secure the full cooperation of the Holy Spirit and of the native convert in extending the Kingdom. That plan was to go from city to city, organize new converts into little companies with the more intelligent and spiritual of their members as officers and teachers and then "commend them to God and the word of His grace," and go right off and leave them to "work out their own salvation with fear and trembling" until the missionary could return, as Paul revisited Lystra, Philippi and Ephesus, giving counsel and encouragement as the circumstances demanded.

This was hardly an empirical approach to the task confronting a Bolivia missionary. A field worker based in La Paz might well have wondered whether the Secretary in New York had thrown into the balances, along with axioms from Asia and patterns from Paul, an awareness of conditions in Bolivia itself. Six months on the ground might have led the Fifth Avenue official to give more weight to the stonelike stolidity of the coca-chewing Indians of the Altiplano; the socially approved drunkenness prevalent among the masses of chicha-drinkers; the country's massive poverty, overwhelming illiteracy, general lack of education, and cultural isolation; the language barriers against communication with the large Indian population; the vestigial pervasiveness of the Indians' ancient religion, Catholicism's still profound traditional and social force, and Protestantism's rootlessness in Bolivia; the novelty of legal toleration of public worship for non-Roman faiths; the sparseness of the continent's smallest population, scattered across its third largest national area; the slow-rolling trains on the country's limited railroad lines; the enormous difficulty of traveling on the precipitous and unbelievably primitive roads, where there *were* any roads; and health problems such as *soroche* (the mountain sickness afflicting people unaccustomed to the country's extreme altitudes), along with the nonexistence of even elementary public sanitation and hygiene.

Whatever Schilling may have thought of Stuntz's desk-chair expectations, he believed that the extension of Methodism in Bolivia should be evangelistic rather than educational. He actually made several trips into the interior of the country during the Conference year 1910. But he had to turn down invitations that came his way to make still other visits; more evangelists were needed.

In spite of his effort to branch out, Schilling's constructive work remained confined almost entirely to La Paz. In 1910, he lost the services of Moses Merubia, who returned to the United States when his wife died. He was unable permanently to replace Merubia, for the American Institute absorbed

the new evangelistic missionaries who came out from the United States. In 1911, Schilling also lost Eloy Rodríguez, whose Indian work reached out as far as Viacha. Finally losing confidence in Rodríguez, Schilling had asked him to withdraw from the Methodist ministry. Rodríguez rejoined the Roman Catholic Church. The Mission's influence in La Paz was growing, but progress in expansion of the church was modest.

In 1911 appeared Methodism's second important educational opportunity in Bolivia. A number of Bolivians high in the government had repeatedly tendered George McBride, head of the La Paz institute, their political support for a government-sponsored Methodist school in Cochabamba. McBride believed that it was a timely offer; the political tide was still running in favor of the liberals. McBride, with the Board's permission, started negotiations with the government. Assisted by John E. Washburn, a young La Paz faculty member, he solicited the personal support of nearly every member of Congress. Congress acted favorably, and by November, McBride was able to send the Board a copy of a ten-year contract binding the Board to establish a private school in Cochabamba.

The contract, signed by Washburn, called for primary, secondary, commercial, and manual curricula modeled on the plan at the La Paz institute, to be taught chiefly in English. American teachers, and Bolivian teachers for certain subjects, were to be supplied by the Board, and the government was to have the right to send forty free boarding pupils to the school. The government promised to pay Bs. 12,000 (\$4,800 U.S.) to cover installation costs, and an annual operating subsidy of Bs. 28,800 (\$11,520 U.S.). The teaching of religion was not mentioned in the articles either negatively or positively.

On 3 November, John Washburn and Grace W. Judd, married in La Paz three days earlier, started on a four-day wedding trip up onto the cold Altiplano, over the eastern Cordillera at 14,000 feet, and down into the pleasant Cochabamba Valley, to the city of Cochabamba, where they were to direct the projected Cochabamba Institute. Archibald Reekie, a Canadian Baptist missionary, took the Washburns into his home on a corner of Plaza Colón and for some weeks devoted all his time to getting them started.

Six weeks before school was scheduled to start, Washburn rented quarters for the Institute—the Reza house on Plaza Colón. Since the building had to be cleared of its occupants and remodeled, all the registrations for the Institute were taken in the Baptist parsonage.

By the middle of December, Washburn was swamped with pupils. "They crowded in like cattle around a water-tank in July," said Washburn, who came from the American Midwest. He tried to stop the registration at 150, but parents clamored for their children to be admitted, and the government superintendent of schools pressed for their acceptance. The pupils were chiefly from the leading families of the city and state of Cochabamba. Boys came

from the homes of the governor, the mayor, the chief of police, leading merchants, and of all the Congressmen of the surrounding country. When school began, on 1 January 1912, the enrollment was pushing towards 300. Washburn started classes with books for 150 and seats for only 50. Among the 250 boys enrolled were 70 boarders (50 boarders had to be declined). Fifty girls were signed up for a daily hour of instruction in English.

When the Institute opened, the Washburns and Ernest F. Herman were the only missionaries ready to go to work. Assisting them were three Bolivians—a poet, a young graduate of the La Paz Institute, and a young Cochabamba girl who neither spoke nor understood English. Moses Merubia, who arrived shortly, became an invaluable reinforcement. Born in Cochabamba, he had the high confidence of the educational authorities and of the local people.

The Institute's unexpectedly large enrollment entailed increased expenses that threatened a bad deficit. Washburn asked the government for a supplementary appropriation to cover the higher installation costs. It took plenty of political activity to get it. Washburn secured the aid of the United States Minister in La Paz, with his co-operation interviewed President Eliodoro Villazón and other executive leaders, and lobbied with influential Congressmen—all during a September trip to the capital. Back in Cochabamba, he and his wife invited and entertained every government official, Senator, and representative of Cochabamba, as well as every public man passing through the city on the way to Congress. In November, Washburn and his wife went to La Paz on their vacation and did some more lobbying. On the 17th of the month, Congress voted the Institute some \$7,000 to cover the deficit that was troubling Washburn.

In 1913, Washburn threw all the resources of his remarkable political talents into an exhaustive lobbying campaign to have the government subsidize a Methodist-operated girls' school to be established in Cochabamba. Congress declined, however, to appropriate the \$25,000 required to start the school and the \$16,000 to maintain it. "They haven't the money," Washburn bluntly explained to William F. Oldham, Corresponding Secretary. In spite of this disappointing setback, Washburn and his colleagues went ahead in 1914 and started a day school section for girls, hoping that it would be self-supporting.

Cochabamba Institute soon won many friends and supporters in the press and in influential circles both locally and in other cities. Indeed, its initial success soon won for the Institute in La Paz a new contract with terms similar to Cochabamba's. But during its first two years, the Cochabamba school had to make headway against sharp local opposition from some quarters. The Washburns at once sensed the intensely Catholic character of the city. The atmosphere was far less liberal than in La Paz. During the Institute's first year, the Bishop of Cochabamba excommunicated men whose

sons attended it, and priests refused confession to the mothers. Hostile Catholic interests were constant sources of unfavorable rumors about the school. The rector of the national university located in Cochabamba also did all he could to run down the reputation of the Institute and to cut its registration.

While Washburn was inaugurating the extension of Methodist education to Cochabamba, a new District Superintendent was making a fresh effort to carry Methodist evangelism beyond La Paz. In 1912, Corwin F. Hartzell, a teacher at the American Institute, succeeded Schilling both as the head of the Bolivia District and as pastor in La Paz. When he took charge, there was no evangelistic activity outside the capital city.

The first move in Hartzell's expansion program was to transfer James A. Brownlee, a slender young six-footer from Kentucky, from the American Institute to an evangelistic assignment in Cochabamba in October. An earlier evangelistic venture in Cochabamba had proved abortive. In 1908, Harwin B. Shinn was sent there to start both evangelistic and educational ("The English Institute of Cochabamba") work. In 1909, he was appointed to evangelistic work only. But neither year did Shinn receive sufficient financial support from the Mission to enable him to turn from teaching to evangelism.

Hartzell also turned his attention to Viacha, to which he brought in November, 1912, Juan Cabrera, a Conference probationer, who had been active among the Aymarás following the loss of Rodríguez. Cabrera formally opened evangelistic work there on 30 March 1913, with Hartzell on hand to give a magic lantern presentation of the life of Christ. During the Conference year, Cabrera received fourteen probationary church members.

Viacha was not far from Hartzell's La Paz headquarters; during 1913, he went much farther afield, partly at the urging of Homer C. Stuntz, now a Bishop and assigned to South America. Before he got going, he received letters from the three towns of Chulumani, Irupana, and Coroico, asking for evangelical preaching.

On 5 May, Hartzell and a Bolivian companion started off on foot. On a hired pack mule they carried their sleeping equipment, Bibles and scripture portions for sale, and a magic lantern for slides on the life of Christ. In Coroico, the capital of the province of North Yungas, they held two well-attended meetings in the municipal hall. In Coripata, an important small town, they could secure no public place for a meeting. But the leading man of the community, father of a pupil at the La Paz Institute, invited them to a banquet he was holding at his home, and gave them lodgings overnight. At the banquet were the leaders of the town and the provincial representative to Congress. They listened attentively as Hartzell talked intimately with them about Jesus Christ and his power to save.

After preaching in Juan Cabrera's home town, Chulumani, capital of South Yungas, and selling scripture materials in Irupana, fifteen miles away, Hart-

zell was back in La Paz by 23 May, having covered 250 miles on foot. With him he brought from the rich Yungas region memories of occasional inhospitable name-calling, but also of generally friendly welcomes and of urgent requests to come back again, or to send a pastor. He was discouraged because he had nobody to send.

Three weeks later, Hartzell was in Cochabamba, where he preached twice in Brownlee's cramped chapel.

From Cochabamba Hartzell journeyed more than two hundred miles east to Santa Cruz. There in that ancient city, which was surrounded by dense jungles, was Kate Russell Olave, Methodism's lone advance agent. Originally a missionary in Chile, later a teacher in the American Institute in La Paz, she had for the past year been teaching in a government school for girls in Santa Cruz. Hartzell knew that her unannounced purpose was to pave the way for the coming of a Methodist missionary, and she herself wanted to prepare the ground for an American school. The best Hartzell could do was to go to the city himself to explore its missionary possibilities, and then come away again simply to report that some of the people in Santa Cruz were ready for gospel preaching.

What Hartzell learned on his travels—on foot, on muleback, and by eight-mule coach—to survey the need and readiness of the interior communities for evangelical preaching, he converted into requests for increased appropriations. He asked the Board for money to provide for more supervisory travel, to establish a preaching post in Chulumani, and to begin work in Santa Cruz. "Those people are losing faith in the Roman Church," he wrote to Secretary Oldham, "and yet they know no other faith. They are turning to Atheism and Infidelity. Now they are susceptible to our teachings, five years hence it will be more difficult to reach them. Let us act NOW."

In 1914, Hartzell three times walked the ninety miles from La Paz down to Chulumani—once to find a parsonage and a preaching place for Nestor Peñaranda, once (in May) to help Peñaranda inaugurate regular services, and once to see how he was getting along. By early summer, Peñaranda, a Conference probationer originating among the Aymarás of La Paz, had a good following of interested listeners in his small, chairless chapel. No doubt some of them came under some psychological stress, for as Peñaranda reported to Hartzell, the parish priest threatened to withhold from attendants at the Methodist chapel the Sacrament of Baptism for their children and the Sacrament of Extreme Unction for their dying.

When a much-needed furlough terminated Hartzell's superintendency, he was succeeded by James Brownlee, who followed up during 1915 and 1916 the openings made by his predecessor. Regular visits to Irupana and Ocabaya—monthly and weekly, respectively—by Juan Cabrera, Peñaranda's successor in Chulumani, were instituted. Services in Cochabamba were dropped after

September, 1915, and no work was begun at any points beyond those reached by Hartzell.

While Hartzell was laboring to extend the evangelistic mission, John Washburn was fighting to keep Cochabamba Institute open. By tact and hard work, he had succeeded in overcoming much of the earlier opposition spawned by general prejudice. But in 1914, vested educational and ecclesiastical interests made fresh attacks upon the Institute with the aim of closing it down. Rumors that the government was trying to freeze out the Methodist institution by holding back subsidy payments went round the city. Public opinion began to swing against the Institute. Wartime scarcity of money and exaggerated fears of an expected crop failure in the Cochabamba Valley enhanced the damaging effect of the growing opposition. Parents began to transfer their boys from the tuition-plan Institute to free public schools. Enrollment for 1915 and 1916 showed a serious drop.

The rumors about subsidy payment were not wide of the mark, for financial relations between the two Methodist institutes and the government were actually on the verge of crisis. Cochabamba Institute received only a quarter of its 1914 allowance; La Paz received only a half. In July, 1915, the Methodist school authorities learned that there would be no subsidies for 1915 and 1916, in spite of the fact that neither Institute contract was scheduled to expire until 1921. The President of Bolivia declared that suspending the subsidies was dictated not by bad faith, but by inability to pay. It was a plausible excuse, if not the real one; the government was in severe financial straits because of the injurious impact of the European war upon the Bolivian economy.

The two Institutes suffered devastating effects from suspension of the subsidy payments. In La Paz (enrollment dropped there too) and in Cochabamba, teachers' salaries went long unpaid, rents became overdue, grocery bills piled up, and lack of cash necessitated uneconomical buying. The teachers remained sacrificially patient and uncomplaining, determined to keep the schools going. With creditors pressing hard, the Methodist leaders tried to solve as much of the schools' problem as they could within the framework of Mission finances. But they also persevered in seeking financial satisfaction from the government—lobbying with Congressmen, negotiating with government officials, and pressing for intercession by United States diplomatic representatives in Bolivia. In spite of their unflagging efforts, the government's position was still unchanged when Bishop William F. Oldham, now a General Superintendent assigned to South America, arrived in La Paz in December, 1916.

Bishop Oldham expected to find this problem a hard knot to untie, but what he heard in La Paz showed him all at once, as several years' missionary correspondence had not done, that there was far more to the subsidy question than recalcitrance on the part of the government. At the interdenominational

Bolivian Missionary Conference held there on 11 and 12 December, he heard a young Bolivian lawyer candidly and severely criticize the mission schools' administrative policies, the quality of their teaching staffs, and the almost exclusive use of English in the classes. He also heard the missionaries discussing an exhaustive and impressive written critique of the Institutes that had been prepared by Archibald G. Baker, the Canadian Baptist missionary.

Baker warned Bishop Oldham and his colleagues that as far as the successive national administrations were concerned, the tie between the Institutes and the government had never been more than a marriage of convenience, which soon would end in unilateral divorce on the government's initiative. For eighteen years, all the liberal administrations had earnestly pursued the objective of an effective free educational system under the government. Drawing upon European sources for guidance, they had been able to make a number of important advances, and others were in prospect. The government schools were improving; public approval was turning their way. The government, said Baker, no longer felt the need to bolster up its school system by arrangements with independent groups like the Methodists. Termination of the contracts would be not a secondary maneuver, but a deliberate policy move.

Baker was a friend of the Institutes; he and his colleague Haddow had helped with the teaching at La Paz. But he did not hesitate to stress the Methodists' part of the responsibility for the government's growing negative attitude. The government executives, he declared, had expected the Methodists to provide specialists and trained educators, and to maintain model institutions for emulation by other Bolivian schools; but the Methodists had let them down. In nine cases out of ten, he said, the teachers had received no normal training before coming to South America. Baker attributed the Institutes' academic deficiencies to four main faults: (1) educational goals tailored to the requirements of commercial life rather than to training students for cultural and political leadership; (2) confusion about the relationship of the Institutes to the Board of Foreign Missions, resulting in defective recruitment practices and poor faculty morale; (3) the grievous vulnerability of the Institutes to the special defects of successive Directors enjoying too highly concentrated power; and (4) frequent smugness about the supposed superiority of North American materials, methods, and results as against actually slipshod classroom work and the undertraining of students in Bolivian materials and articulateness in Spanish.

Anybody reading the perennial grist of reports and letters from the leaders of the Institutes would have been unprepared for Baker's many searching criticisms. The more serious deficiencies of their institutions, and their essential insecurity as components of the Bolivian educational system, escaped them. They trusted that hard work, more money, more teachers, and well-mended political fences would keep them satisfactorily entrenched in the

favor of the nation, and would frustrate those they counted their enemies. The missionaries' attitude toward opposing forces often was romantically combative rather than realistic.

For instance, there is no evidence that the Institutes' administrators—or the Board executives, for that matter—ever were concerned about the possibility that the North American cast of the curricula could be counted a serious flaw in their approach to the needs of Bolivia. Before returning to the United States late in 1915, Washburn solicited from Americans who had been in Bolivia, letters of commendation of the La Paz Institute which he believed would be useful in raising funds in the States. Two of the letters he thought worthy of transmitting to the Board set forth the view that the pro-American slant of the American Institute's work and results was important for the improvement of political and trade relations between Bolivia and the United States. The third letter, from Horace G. Knowles, a former American Minister to Bolivia, who had gone into the mining industry there, unmistakably revealed the American bias of the Institute:

. . . The hundreds of students of the Institute here and in Cochabamba are being taught and instructed just the same as they would be if attending schools in the United States. Every [*sic*] teacher is an American and every class instructed in English. American songs are sung and American games played. The air and atmosphere of the Institute is intensely American and the students are greatly influenced by it. Without feeling, knowing or resisting the work of the leaven they become in thought and spirit thoroughly American. To such an extent is this true that I am certain the coming generation of ruling class of Bolivia will be decidedly American and with the result that in both a commercial and political way Bolivia will be the strongest pro-American (United States) country of all the South and Central American countries. If this fact was only known to the rulers of our country I am sure they would immediately plan to establish American Institutes in every one of these Latin-American countries.

What Washburn and his associates could not see was clear to Archibald Baker, who said of the American Institute in La Paz, "In a word, the whole institution has been exotic, and has failed to place itself in harmonious alignment with prevailing conditions. Bolivia can never and will never become another State in the Union; it naturally wishes to unfold its future according to its own ideals."

On 14 December, the Bishop had a conference with President Ismael Montes. Washburn, now back from the United States, and Hallett Johnson, American chargé d'affaires *ad interim*, sat in on the discussion. The issue was subsidy payments to the two Institutes. The President extended it to consideration of the future status of the educational contracts themselves. He vehemently declared that the contract relation between the schools and the government must be broken. Bishop Oldham, now better oriented than when he arrived in La Paz, cheerfully consented, and asked when the break

was to be made. The President, using his hands as though sawing through a rope, replied, "Today. Today. Let us terminate this relation today."

The President agreed, in response to the Bishop's questions about arrears, to instruct the Ministry of Public Instruction to move to have Congress recognize the debts to the schools and arrange for their payment. When Oldham left the President's office, bearing assurances of the government's moral support for prospective extension of the work of the American Institute of La Paz, he felt relieved to be rid of the contract, and confident that the government would clear its debt to the schools. He wrote to Thomas S. Donohugh of the Board's New York office that what had happened was largely the Methodists' own fault; Bolivia had come to them for educational help, and they had bitterly disappointed her. "We never have filled the bill," he said.

One of Bishop Oldham's motives in promptly assenting to President Montes' intention to cancel the school contracts was that it would clear the way for negotiations with the Canadian Baptists with regard to their entering into united support and operation of the institutions in La Paz and Cochabamba, for the Baptists were opposed to financial entanglements with the government. Bishop Oldham at once followed his interview with the President by conferring with Archibald Baker and his colleagues. On 16 December, the Methodist school leaders formally invited the Baptists to co-operate in managing, financing, and manning the two American Institutes.

The missionaries of the small Bolivian Baptists Conference, with one exception, recommended the Methodist proposal to their Board in Toronto. Both denominational Boards appointed, a few months later, committees for mutual conference. The two committees, however, never met together. In the fall of 1917, the Canadian Baptist Foreign Mission Board decided not to take up the Methodist invitation to co-operate in the La Paz and Cochabamba schools. The Baptist group drew back from commitment to the educational merger because of wartime uncertainties and financial inability.

The Bolivian Missionary Conference, which Bishop Oldham found very useful in approaching the problem of the Institutes, had grown out of planning begun as early as the spring of 1914 by missionaries of the various Protestant denominations at work in Bolivia. It was indefinitely postponed, however, because of shrinkage in the finances of the Missions by the outbreak of the war in Europe. The plan was revived as a result of decisions made by a committee of the Panama Congress of 1916. When the Conference met in December in La Paz, it included representatives of the nondenominational Bolivian Indian Mission, the Canadian Baptist Church, the Methodist Episcopal Church, and the nondenominational Peniel Hall Farm project, along with two independent missionaries. Bishop Oldham was among the speakers who helped forge the Conference's linkage with the larger movement towards interdenominational co-operation in Latin America.

The Conference heard and adopted a number of committee reports that offered proposals for a common approach to missionary work in Bolivia. The most important of them was an agreement designating the territorial spheres to be occupied by the various co-operating missions. The Methodist Episcopal mission was assigned, in addition to points already held, the territory in western Bolivia along the Arica-La Paz railway; the Chulumani District, which lay in the Yungas country to the east of La Paz; and Santa Cruz and surrounding territory, far to the southeast from La Paz. The Baptists were allotted an area around the southern end of Lake Titicaca; the country from Oruro, Potosí, and Sucre, south to the Chile-Argentina-Paraguay frontier; and certain towns in the neighborhood of Cochabamba. San Pedro, Department of Potosí, was confirmed as the center for future extension of the Bolivian Indian Mission.

Bishop Oldham's chief official act, during his busy stay in La Paz, was to organize the Bolivia Mission Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church, with eight full members. The sessions were held at the American Institute from 13 to 15 December. The Conference was a new departure; never before had the Bolivia Mission been officially quite on its own. Authorization for a Bolivia Mission Conference had been granted by the General Conference of 1908. When the option was not taken up by the Chile Conference, the enabling act expired in 1912, but was renewed in 1916 at its request. The Republic of Bolivia was designated as the field for the new Conference.

Although the missionary enterprise in Bolivia now could boast the dignity and autonomy of a Mission Conference, it remained for some years afterwards unimpressive for outreach or inclusiveness. It had two schools, whose staffs were built around a dozen missionaries. The schools enrolled 331 pupils, but relatively few of the boys and girls, or of their parents, could be counted as full-fledged members of the Methodist community. There were only four pastoral charges announced at the first session of the Conference: Cochabamba; Chulumani Circuit (Chulumani, Ocabaya, and Irupana); La Paz and Viacha; and Corocoro Circuit, which was about to be opened south of La Paz. Assigned to these charges were three native Bolivian preachers and two North American ministers. Under their collective care were six Sunday schools, with 278 pupils; and on all the charges together, there were only fifty church members and sixty-eight probationers. These were the simple dimensions of the Bolivia Mission fifteen years after Carl Beutelspacher took his commission at the hand of Bishop McCabe, and ten years after Francis Harrington went to La Paz.

Probing Ecuador

ECUADOR IN 1896 WAS, as always since establishing its independence sixty-six years earlier, an overwhelmingly Roman Catholic nation. The primacy of the Catholic religion was embedded in the national Constitution, and all other religions were banned. Nowhere in his country could an Ecuadorian confer with a Protestant religious worker, attend a Protestant church service, or go into a store and buy a "Protestant Bible." Protestantism did not exist in Ecuador in any form. And woe to the intruding Protestant from abroad who might endeavor to change that condition!

In 1886, Andrew M. Milne and Francis G. Penzotti, two preachers under special appointment in the South America Mission of the Methodist Episcopal Church to serve as American Bible Society agents, attempted to penetrate the Ecuadorian fastness. Approaching Ecuador in the course of a tour of ten South American countries, Milne and Penzotti began selling copies of the Scriptures to traders and visitors who boarded their ship as it stood successively off four coastal towns north of Guayaquil. Then at Guayaquil, they tried to get customs clearance for nine cases of books (they weighed about a ton) awaiting them there. But they found that official permission was not to be had without the approval of the ecclesiastical council, which of course was a Roman Catholic body. While Penzotti went out and sold three dozen Spanish Testaments that the two men had been allowed to bring in with their baggage, Milne tried to unravel the red tape hampering their attempt to get their large consignment of Scriptures released for distribution. The Church officials finally vetoed clearance of the books and even demanded that they be confiscated. The two agents managed, nevertheless, to keep possession of the rejected volumes and had them shipped on to Peru. But the ban on the Bibles quashed Milne and Penzotti's earlier plan to go up to Quito to sell Bibles there; they soon moved on to Peru.

Their efforts in Guayaquil had been abortive not only as to results but also as to timing.* The national government was in the hands of conservative, pro-Church forces in a period of reaction following only five or six years of

* See Note, p. 278.

anticlerical reform. The Republic was functioning as a theocracy; it was officially dedicated to the Sacred Heart of Jesus, and religious affairs (and many civil interests, such as education) were governed by a concordat with the pope. Under the Concordat, the Ecuadorian government was bound to protect the rights and prerogatives of the Roman Catholic religion and to forbid the existence of any dissident cult or society condemned by the Church. The experience of the two Bible Society men indicated that it was not yet time for any formal or frontal projection of Protestant activity into the country.

Within a few years, however, evangelical workers were making scattered and informal attempts to breach the Ecuadorian wall of exclusion. Penzotti and a fellow colporteur named Fernandez visited a number of port towns in 1892, carrying Bibles in their personal baggage. In one town, even this technique failed; the inspector angrily declared, "While the Chimborazo [Ecuador's 20,000-foot peak] exists, this class of books will not enter Ecuador."

At Guayaquil, Penzotti and his companion tried, unsuccessfully, to get a substantial lot of Bibles through customs. Again, all they could take in were the books in their luggage, and these they sold publicly in the city. There they found a Peruvian family named Castro that courageously opened its home for evangelical services led by Penzotti and Fernandez. News of the meetings, which were private, spread through the city, causing some excitement. Since the two men were not staying long—it was long enough for them to make some converts—they were not molested in this activity. The ecclesiastical authorities went no further than securing confiscation of a stock of hymn books Penzotti and his friend had left in the customs house.

Thomas B. Wood, superintendent of the Peru District of the South America Conference, stopped in Ecuador in 1893, en route to the United States, and visited evangelical sympathizers there. He held a service, baptized a child, and promised the opening of regular religious work. This visit was the first purely Methodist contact with Ecuador, except for J. G. Price's brief stay in 1880.* In 1893, also, Zoilo E. Irigoyen, a Bible Society colporteur born in Ecuador and converted in the Methodist mission in Peru, was active in the Peruvian provinces close to the border of Ecuador and evidently was doing some quiet work in Ecuador itself.

Both Wood and Penzotti visited Guayaquil in 1894—Penzotti on his way north to take up his new post as the Bible Society's agent in Central America and Wood evidently on his way back to Peru from the States. Wood was the official bearer "to the people and authorities" of Ecuador of a petition adopted by resolution of the Board of Managers of the Missionary Society in December, 1893. The petition called upon the sovereign power of Ecuador (along with the republics of Peru, Bolivia, and Chile) to reform its Constitution

* See Vol. III, 807 f.

"in favor of religious liberty." It is not clear whether Wood made any formal presentation of the petition in Ecuador. Certainly the time was not ripe for sympathetic reception of such an appeal from such a source.

But in 1895, Charles W. Drees reported from South America, "The eyes of our missionaries in Peru are turned longingly toward Ecuador, where the triumph of a liberal revolution seems likely to result in the breaking down of that inquisitorial and jesuitical control that has for so long made the country a papal paradise, hermetically sealed against the word of God and the truth of the Gospel." What cheered the missionaries was that the regime of the current conservative dictator, García Moreno, had been overthrown, and Eloy Alfaro, an anticlerical, had come to power. Alfaro was to become the nation's dominant political figure for the next sixteen years.

Alfaro only gradually concretized his anticlericalism and gave it legal effect. A new Constitution, promulgated early in 1897, recognized the traditional position of the Roman Catholic religion as the religion of the state and declared that it was to enjoy public respect and official protection, but also liberalized the provision under which other cults should be banned. It defined the norm for proscription as their being "cults contrary to morality." The Constitution forbade the functioning of foreign-born prelates, priests, and monastic administrators and prohibited the introduction of new religious orders from abroad—measures calculated to curb the Roman Church. But it granted the privilege of immigration and the protection of the Constitutional guarantees to individual foreigners who respected the law of the land. Among these guarantees were respect for individual religious belief and expression, prohibition of religious tests for the exercise of political and civil rights, and freedom of assembly and association.

The American Bible Society acted promptly to take advantage of these improvements in the outlook for Protestant advance into Ecuador. Andrew M. Milne, the head of its La Plata agency, came to Peru, and soon sent off to Guayaquil a large consignment of Bibles and two colporteurs, Zoilo Irigoyen (now a probationer in the South America Conference) and Federico Antay, both native Ecuadorians. With these arrangements made, Milne departed from the West Coast, leaving Thomas Wood in charge of Bible Society work in both Peru and Ecuador for the next two years.

Wood had for some time been eager to have the Methodists venture into Ecuador, but he still had to be content with writing urgent letters to New York to get the Missionary Society started on establishing a mission. In October, he heard from Corresponding Secretary William T. Smith; the answer was that it seemed impossible to induce the Board of Managers to take up new work in Ecuador because of the incubus of debt resting upon the Society.

Nevertheless, Wood was functionally concerned with what Irigoyen and Antay already were doing on the field. The two colporteurs moved through

the country's principal cities, preaching publicly both on the coast and in the highlands and selling some thousands of Bibles. They encountered strong clerical opposition. In Quito, priests instigated the public burning of Bibles sold by Antay. In Guayaquil, the Bible Society men formed two evangelical congregations that were considered as Methodist. One of them, through financial need, soon transferred its affiliation to the Gospel Missionary Union, whose missionaries had begun arriving in Ecuador from the United States late in 1896. The other congregation, being able to pay its own expenses, continued with the Methodists. The colporteurs, of course, drew their salaries from the Bible Society.

The Methodist Episcopal mission in Ecuador was formally opened in 1898, without benefit of any directive or appropriation by the Missionary Society. It was done by constituting two pastoral charges for inclusion among the appointments of the Western South America Mission Conference, which by definition included all potential work in the western countries of the continent. Bishop Henry W. Warren appointed Irigoyen to Guayaquil, to the congregation already gathered there. The charge also included Tumbes, a Peruvian town near the Ecuadorian border. The other new charge was Quito, the Ecuadorian capital, and Ayabaca, Peru. The appointee to this charge was Antonio Viteri, another native Ecuadorian probationer in the Conference. Viteri had earnestly desired for a number of years to return to Ecuador from Argentina to preach to his countrymen. The missionary workers in Argentina contributed out of their own salaries the passage money required to get him from Argentina to Chile, on his way to Ecuador. The two Ecuadorian charges were assigned to the Lima District, of which Thomas Wood was superintendent, and Ecuador remained in this jurisdiction until it became a part of the North Andes Mission in 1904.

It is not clear what Irigoyen and Viteri were able to accomplish as missionary evangelists. There is no official record of Viteri's having converted his formal charge into an actual congregation. Viteri certainly had a hard time in Ecuador; unpaid by the Missionary Society and rejected by his family, he was reduced to all but complete poverty. As a result, he was compelled to return to Chile at the end of the year. "Would to God," wrote Wood, "that we had the resources to maintain the heroes God is providing in the field . . ." Irigoyen survived, for he remained on salary with the Bible Society, continuing for some years (except for an interval in 1900-01 when he was needed in the Methodist work in Callao) to cultivate the Guayaquil area both as a Methodist evangelist and as a Bible Society colporteur. But he did not report any Methodist church members or organizations to the Mission Conference.

Bishop Henry W. Warren, en route from New York to Santiago early in 1899 to preside at the Western South America Mission Conference, visited Guayaquil just in time to see the city celebrating—with troops and bands and flags—the suppression of one of the armed revolts mounted, over several

years, by the reactionary political and clerical forces inimical to Alfaro's liberal regime, which was moving towards separation of Church and State by gradual imposition of restrictions upon the privileges of the Church. Thomas Wood came to Guayaquil late in the year, accompanied by Andrew M. Milne—Wood traveling for the Methodist Episcopal Church, Milne for the American Bible Society. They made an arduous 170-mile journey north to Quito, taking a week or more each way, traveling by steamer, horseback, muleback, and horse-drawn coach, and enduring many hardships as they moved through the mountainous terrain in the early days of the rainy season. They arrived in the capital in time to participate in the final meeting of a conference of the Gospel Missionary Union workers active in Ecuador—a dozen of them. Wood preached, and all joined in a Communion service. Later the same day, the two Methodists and the Gospel Union people united in an evangelistic service attended by a number of Ecuadorians, with a promiscuous crowd listening from outside the doorway.

Wood and Milne enjoyed a cordial interview with President Alfaro, upon the personal introduction of the United States Minister, Archibald J. Sampson, who was consistently friendly to the new evangelical missions. The President not only reaffirmed his administration's practice of facilitating the activity of evangelical workers under the law, but revealed that he was even ready to collaborate with them in developing a system of public education for the country. He discussed with Dr. Wood the possibility of opening normal schools (with associated model schools) staffed with teachers from the United States. A few days later, one of Alfaro's ministers concluded with Wood a formal contract under which the latter was to supply American teachers for a number of the projected normal schools. That Alfaro had in mind broader objectives than educational efficiency alone is suggested by Wood's interpretation of the arrangement a year later. He wrote that the evangelical teachers he supplied were :

welcomed by the government not only as educational reformers under its employ, but also as religious reformers under its toleration; not that the men in power wish to become Protestants, nor are they yet ready to put Protestantism on a par with Catholicism, which is still the official religion, but they wish to *exemplify religious liberty*, advertise their sincerity and persistency in adopting it, attract Protestant capital and immigration, train their posterity in religious freedom, and emancipate their land forever from the dominancy of Romish priestcraft.

The school project both was and was not a Methodist enterprise. The Ecuadorian field clearly fell within the Disciplinary definition of the boundaries of the Western South America Mission Conference. Wood himself was, of course, a regular Methodist missionary and the superintendent of the Lima District, and he habitually reported the school venture along with the general work of the District. Almost all of the teachers he enlisted had been con-

nected with Methodist missions or the Methodist ministry; and the school assignments of the Conference members among them appeared for several years in the Appointments printed in the Conference Minutes, the men being retained in full Conference relationship. But the Board of Managers declined, from the beginning, to recognize the normal schools project as a part of the Missionary Society's work; they considered it essentially a personal undertaking resting upon Wood's private contract with the Ecuadorian government.

The Board's stance towards the work was determined by the fact that the schools were institutions of the Ecuadorian government, not of the Methodist Episcopal Church or its Missionary Society. The government hired and paid the teachers and directed their educational activities. Since they were not in any way subject to the direction of the Board, the Society recognized no responsibility for them. "Under the circumstances," Secretary Henry K. Carroll wrote to one of them, "I do not see how you can claim that you are in the work of the Society." The Board held that when any missionary entered the service of the government of Ecuador, he automatically surrendered his status as a missionary of the Society. This point came home to a number of the missionaries distressingly late; only after they arrived in Ecuador did they discover that Wood had not adequately described to them what their standing with the Society would be. Wood's repeated requests that his teachers be recognized as missionaries failed to budge the Board from its position.

To secure the teachers and to order equipment for the projected schools, Wood traveled to the United States in 1900 with his expenses paid by the Ecuadorian government. From the States, he brought down to Ecuador three teachers—William T. Robinson, Charles M. Griffith, and Merritt M. Harris. From Chile he brought three more—Henry L. Williams, Alice H. Fisher, and Rosina A. Kinsman. He put them to work in three newly organized normal schools. Robinson and Williams worked in the Quito normal school for boys, and Miss Fisher and Miss Kinsman in the Quito normal school for girls. Griffith and Harris were assigned to the school in Cuenca, a city about seventy miles southeast of Guayaquil. Later, Harry Compton and his wife, experienced missionaries enlisted from the South America Conference, and Mary Robinson joined the group.

It fell to Secretary Carroll, as the New York office's correspondent for South America, to communicate and clarify to Wood and his co-workers the Society's policy on the normal school personnel. He also repeatedly expressed to them his personal sympathy with the work and his hopes for its success. Adna B. Leonard, the Corresponding Secretary, however, was strongly opposed to the whole plan when Wood brought it forward for approval in the summer of 1900. In a mixed analysis of missionary resources and of political conditions in Ecuador, he declared in a letter to Ira H. La Fetra, superintendent of the Santiago District:

I do not think we want any Methodist work in Ecuador at the present time. Of all the South American States that one is the most unstable. Revolutions seem to come in regular order. The party in power now may be out of power three months hence, and the system of schools they are trying to establish be annihilated. It seems to me that our policy should be to strengthen our work in Chile, rather than deplete it, and that we should not spread ourselves out over states where at present we have no work.

Leonard's reference to Chile was occasioned by Wood's intention to take teachers from the Chile mission into service in Ecuador. Wood had asked the Board to release for that purpose Alice Fisher and Rosina Kinsman, who were then on duty in Concepción College and the American College in Temuco, respectively. The Board, in June, 1900, rejected the request, indicating its willingness to co-operate with Wood as far as practicable in facilitating his enlistment of teachers for Ecuador, but declining to surrender to the new project experienced teachers at work elsewhere in South America. The Board felt that it could not afford to exchange them for the inexperienced workers who would have to be put in their places. Both Leonard and Carroll were in agreement with the Board's decision.

A month later, the Board reversed itself, and released Miss Fisher and Miss Kinsman, but only because Wood urgently renewed his request, at the same time representing to the Board that the two women were honor-bound by contracts already made with the government of Ecuador. (These were the only missionaries released by the Board.) It later appeared that the Fisher and Kinsman contracts were probably only tentative agreements still subject to confirmation.

The fact that the contracts had been signed prior to consultation with the New York office was only one item in Wood's bypassing the Board in soliciting his volunteers for Ecuador. Secretary Carroll complained to him that he had concealed from the Board the extent of his involving Chile missionaries in the new venture. Wood even continued to hold a post open for Buell O. Campbell, on furlough from Chile, after the Board adopted a resolution declaring that Campbell should return to Chile. Carroll characterized Wood's enlistment activities as a raid on the Chile mission. And it is true that except for Merritt Harris, all in the first group of workers gathered by Wood were associated with Chile either on duty or on furlough. In October, after Wood was gone, Secretary Leonard wrote to Goodsil F. Arms, superintendent of the Concepción District, that it was "a great mistake to allow Dr. Wood to tear up our work in Chile by taking our teachers in the midst of the year."

Although Wood's staffing of the schools in Ecuador left the Secretaries grappling with what turned out to be, as they had feared, serious difficulties in finding suitable recruits for Chile at a crucial time, his understanding with the government authorities in Ecuador did yield some financial relief in the situation. The government paid the transit expenses of missionaries that the

Board sent out to Chile specifically to replace the workers diverted to Ecuador under the Wood plan. The handling of these funds—"the Ecuadorian Fund," in the Board's records—constituted the Missionary Society's only operational involvement with the Wood enterprise and the Ecuadorian government.

When Plaza Gutiérrez (1901-5) succeeded Alfaro as President, the schools conducted by the Wood appointees remained in favor with the government. The new administration, which pressed still further with anticlerical measures, renewed the contractual arrangement by which Wood provided direction for the schools. President Plaza tried, by direct intervention in 1902, to insure official protection for Protestant workers in a manner that would demonstrate "that the Catholic monopoly has come to an end." More drastically, his administration issued decrees closing the Jesuit college in Quito and confiscating its premises for public use. Plaza also asked Congress to bar members of monastic orders from all grades of teaching.

From their opening in 1900, the normal schools and their Methodist staff members became targets of intense public enmity in spite of their government status.

Feeling ran especially high in Cuenca. Early collapse of the Cuenca school seemed almost inevitable. The teachers, Charles Griffith and Merritt Harris, quit at the end of the first season. Harry Compton and his wife picked up the work in the fall of 1901, unexpectedly finding themselves the only Protestant teachers in an extremely hostile situation. Upon arriving in Cuenca to start school, they were heavily stoned by a furious street mob.

At first, Compton was left high and dry in Cuenca, with no orders from the government to reopen the school and with his salary running two months in arrears. When he telegraphed Wood for instructions, he received the reply, "Have infinite patience," Compton finally opened the normal school on his own responsibility. Finding out that it would be impossible for him to do any preaching capped his discouragement; so he sent off to Secretary Carroll a gloomy letter voicing his unwillingness to remain in Cuenca and asking for work somewhere else in South America. He wrote a similar appeal to Bishop Charles C. McCabe.

Carroll tried, sympathetically, to have Compton transferred elsewhere, but his effort came to nothing. At the Conference session in Santiago, Chile, in February, 1902, Bishop McCabe took the initiative—so said Wood, who shared in the Cabinet discussions—in keeping Compton in Ecuador under special appointment to Cuenca. Sorely tried in faith and endurance, the Comptons stayed on. Local conditions improved somewhat during the next two seasons, but public antagonism still beat heavily upon the school and its two Methodist teachers. In 1903, under the stimulus of visits by nuns and priests to all the homes from which the normal and model school pupils came, opposition was still strong. The conditions surrounding the Comptons' lone efforts were so oppressive that they even shaped the pattern of Wood's written

encouragement from Peru—"You were not buried alive in that place for nothing."

The teachers sent to Cuenca were not the only ones hard pressed; similar difficulties beset the Methodist workers in Quito. Henry Williams was so disillusioned that, like Compton, he wrote Bishop McCabe for an appointment that would take him out of Ecuador. He chafed particularly under the ban that denied him any opportunity for evangelism.

Dr. Wood claimed in 1901 that his Methodist teachers would be as free for "Gospel work as those in Chile," where they were under Methodist control. If they had comparable real estate for church purposes, "they could show," he predicted, "results that would make our whole Church rejoice." He desired to have \$50,000 made available by the Missionary Society for mission buildings through which this potentiality could be developed. Alice Fisher declared that but for lack of physical facilities, the Methodist workers would be free to do as much church work outside the school schedule as their time and strength would permit.

But Henry Williams had a different story to tell. He actually tested the possibilities, and found himself barred from evangelistic activity, not because of any prohibitory clause in his contract, but by what was, as far as he could learn, a clear understanding between Wood and the government that the teachers were to do no missionary work. Williams made several requests for permission to venture into it, but was emphatically rebuffed. Government officials told him that the Methodist Episcopal Church was free to evangelize on its own, and would receive legal protection, but that political considerations forbade their allowing any teacher—that is, any government employee—to conduct public evangelism. This dictate of caution sprang from the government's awareness that it was still dangerously vulnerable to attack by organized pro-Catholic reactionaries. It was proceeding purposefully enough to implement its intention to abolish entrenched Catholic political power, but it was moving only step by step. Therefore, at the same time that it restricted the activity of the Methodist teachers outside the schools, it still permitted Ecuadorian Catholic teachers to give daily instruction in Catholic catechism and to conduct Catholic devotional exercises inside the schools.

When Wood visited Quito in January, 1902, Williams charged the Superintendent with having lured him to Ecuador by falsely describing his appointment as important self-supporting missionary work—preaching the gospel in Spanish on Sundays and teaching for the government on weekdays. Wood admitted that he had not been frank about the evangelistic situation but had hoped to talk Williams into accepting it once he got him onto the field. Williams begged Wood to facilitate his transfer to some South American field where he would have an evangelistic opportunity. But Wood declined to help him, and Bishop McCabe reappointed him to Quito for 1902, leaving him stuck in "secular teaching in a strictly Catholic school."

There were no active charges to correspond with the listing of Cuenca, Magdalena, and Quito in the Lima District appointments for 1901. Henry Williams felt (it must be remembered that undoubted antagonism developed between the two men) that Wood was misrepresenting to the Church the true condition of the evangelistic enterprise in connection with the government school project. Williams knew that the church in Quito was only a little company of North American Methodists—Alice Fisher, Rosina Kinsman, Mrs. Williams, Mrs. Robinson, and two children. This “church” held short Sunday morning services in the Robinson home, with William Robinson himself as pastor. Magdalena’s only connection with Methodism was simply that it was the suburb of Quito in which Williams resided. And of course, in Cuenca, Harry Compton was hamstrung as an evangelist. The three charges were not listed in 1902, but Cuenca and Quito reappeared in the Appointments for 1903 and 1904. And Wood maintained his optimistic posture until as late as October, 1902, when he wrote Bishop McCabe, “All things now favor my plea for \$50,000 to equip the republic with Methodist churches.”

Secretary Carroll stated in May, 1904, that regardless of the contractual situation, the teachers actually had been able to do no preaching or missionary work. And he expressed doubt that such activity would have been either wise or right. It would have tended, he held, needlessly to excite the animosity of the priests and their followers against the teachers and the schools. And, he said, “it would hardly be according to our ideas of right for these teachers to engage in the propagation of a religion that is contrary to that of the State under whose auspices they are laboring.”

Doctor Wood, returning to his base in Lima in January, 1903, after traveling through Bolivia and southern Peru, found discouraging letters from William Robinson in his mail. Robinson strongly feared that government decrees banning monastic orders from public school teaching were to be so drafted that they would also exclude ministers of all denominations. That eventuality, of course, would eliminate Robinson, Williams, and Compton—all of them Methodist ministers. Wood saw that it would bring his plans for Ecuador to “smash.”

Robinson and Williams acted to avoid being ousted from their posts and marooned in unemployment in Quito. Robinson, who enjoyed good relations with the District Superintendent, decided to ask for a regular missionary appointment in South America that would protect his ministerial status and enable him to resign before the ax fell in Quito. Williams, whose relations with Wood had become embittered and who apparently could not count upon the Superintendent’s assistance, decided to surrender his ministerial status in order to protect his government job. Compton, isolated in Cuenca, was not heard from.

The impending ban did not actually fall. But within a few months, before the threat implicit in it was clearly removed, Bishop Joyce had appointed

the Robinsons to Iquique College, in Chile, and Williams had formally withdrawn from the Methodist Episcopal ministry at the Conference session held in Concepción in February. The Comptons went to Quito to replace the Robinsons, and the Methodist contact with Cuenca thus was broken off. Alice Fisher left Ecuador the same year, returning to the United States for the sake of her health. Rosina Kinsman stayed on at least for much of a year longer, but there is no trace of her having worked in Ecuador after the early part of 1904. Eventually, only Williams (his wife went home in 1903) and the Comptons remained, until they severed their connections with the government schools in 1907.

In spite of Wood's original responsibility for the teacher procurement program, he provided no replacements for the teachers who dropped out from 1901 to 1904. Obviously, he could not tap for a second time the source from which he had drawn his workers; he could not expect the Missionary Society gladly to surrender another string of badly needed missionaries to this "secular" work. And Wood carried numerous other administrative responsibilities, which left him free neither to go to the United States to search for new teachers nor, after January, 1902, to visit Ecuador to keep in close touch with his workers and with the Ecuadorian ministry of education. He spent much time at home and afield in Peru and also visited Panama, Bolivia, Colombia, and Venezuela. From early in 1905 to midway in 1906, he was engaged in opening the new mission in Panama. After that, he never resumed any administrative work that would have justified his being active in Ecuador.

Even had Wood not been compelled to surrender direct contact with Ecuador, still there was a period when the political trend was not auspicious for the reinforcement of the educational venture. Although he had reported some lessening of hostility to the schools in 1902 and 1903, he reported in 1904 that conservative political elements friendly to the Roman Church were becoming more aggressive, that there were even rumors of revolution against President Plaza. Indeed, in September, 1905, with the accession of Plaza's elected successor, Lizardo García, a man with earlier liberal affiliations, the clerical-minded conservatives came to power again. This was no time for a Methodist to do business with the national administration.

But García did not last long; an armed revolt led by ex-President Eloy Alfaro threw him out of office in January, 1906. Alfaro became chief of state *de facto*, and in October, a Constitutional Assembly convoked by him designated him as provisional President. Then on 1 January 1907, he became President under the new Constitution.

This Constitution, which was promulgated in December, 1906, upsetting Ecuador's long tradition, effected substantial separation between Church and State, by failing to include any reference to the preferred position of the Roman Catholic, or any other, Church and by guaranteeing to the citizens of the state liberty of conscience, freedom of thought in speech and press,

and freedom of assembly and association. It also required that public education be essentially secular and laical—thus eliminating Catholicism from public schools.

The new Constitution also provided an opportunity for increased Methodist collaboration with the government in the field of education. Evidently, since primary education was now to be compulsory, the administration needed to plan for more training and for more primary schools and teachers. In November, some weeks before the Constitution went into effect, the Minister of Public Instruction solicited the dispatching of a good number of Methodist-sponsored teachers from the United States. Some would be put in charge of the country's normal schools. Others would be given land and adequate facilities to start new schools. All were to be given the fullest protection of the government. Thomas Wood no longer being in the picture, the invitation went direct to the Corresponding Secretary of the Missionary Society. It included a statement that the Minister was aware of the noble and progressive work carried on by the Society and desired to introduce all elements of progress into Ecuador and to improve the country's educational advantages. The invited personnel were expected to be representatives of the Society, and apparently the schools to be built were intended to be mission schools.

Replying for the Board of Managers on 15 January 1907, Secretary Carroll wrote that it would not be possible for the time being for the Missionary Society to enlarge its work in Ecuador. But he offered, as agent of the Board, to select qualified teachers and send them out to Ecuador, with the understanding that the government would be completely responsible for their travel expense, assignments, salaries, and supervision. Carroll so drafted his letter as to eliminate from the Board's own adopted statement elements that might have left the relationship of the teachers to the Society a little clouded in ambiguity. He made it clear that they would be government employees, not employees or missionaries of the Society.

The Missionary Society, after having remained carefully aloof from the earlier teacher procurement plan, which it insisted was Wood's individual undertaking, now was indicating that it was ready to enter into an official working relationship with the Ecuadorian government in the field of education. It is not clear what caused this readiness. Obviously, the Board of Managers had no deep inhibitions against helpful contacts between Church and State—at least between a non-Roman church and a foreign state. At that very time, it was beginning to implement a twofold pattern of collaboration with the government of Bolivia; it was sending teachers to participate in a government-owned high school in Oruro, and it was opening a Methodist school in La Paz under government subsidy. The factor determining the Board's readiness for co-operation in both countries may have been not abstract principle, but timing; for 1906 was the year in which each of the

two countries adopted new Constitutional law showing marked advances towards guaranteed religious liberty.*

However, the Board having taken its co-operative stance, never sent any teachers to Ecuador under the new proposal. Methodist records give no evidence of what went awry.

Although the Wood plan lapsed and was not renewed either by him or by the Board, it made a contribution, as far as it went, to Ecuador's new departure in education. Harry Compton reported that other normal schools were organized in different sections of the country by graduates of those established by Wood's Protestant teachers. By the time Compton gave up teaching in 1907, graduates of the second series of normal schools were in demand in municipal schools. Compton also described the Methodist-directed normal institutions as exerting a liberalizing influence in their community.

But from the beginning, the Methodists concerned with the success of the normal schools were primarily committed not to educational reform for Ecuador, but to their own ulterior goal—the Protestant evangelization of the nation. Compton, for instance, considered his penetration of the Ecuadorian school system as an opening wedge for a later, fuller thrust of Methodist evangelism into the national life. He seemed gratified, as did Dr. Wood, that the government, not the Missionary Society, was footing the bill for this preparatory activity. When Compton's government service was over, he looked back upon it as a valuable means of getting a grasp of the country's religious problems "so as to mold them for Protestantism."

But if Thomas Wood's Methodist teachers made no effective evangelizing penetration of Ecuadorian life, neither did Methodist workers assigned to direct evangelism during that period thrust very deep. Much of their work, in pattern or in substance, was hardly to be distinguished from that of the American Bible Society.

Zoilo Irigoyen returned to Guayaquil in 1902, under appointment to Guayaquil and Tumbes, but still employed by the Bible Society and still residing in Tumbes, on the Peruvian side of the border. He traveled in both Peru and Ecuador, distributing the Scriptures and doing the informal and itinerant kind of evangelism typical of the colporteurs throughout South America. In 1903, he spent nearly five consecutive months in Ecuador. On into 1904, his Guayaquil appointment was little more than formal recognition of the fact that he sold Bibles and held meetings with small companies of evangelicals in Guayaquil and adjacent areas. From his base in northern Peru, Aristides Castro, another Methodist worker for the Bible Society, intensively canvassed the highlands of southern Ecuador, reaching the provincial capitals of Loja, Cuenca, and Azogues. In Cuenca, where anti-Protestant hostility had lessened since Harry Compton's earliest difficulties, but still produced open threats of violence and death, Castro was able to labor for some weeks

* See p. 245.

without coming to harm. In 1903, Bishop Joyce appointed him to Loja and to two places in Peru. He again reached Cuenca, that year, but political and other conditions frustrated his attempt to do much in Loja.

Bishop Thomas B. Neely, newly assigned to South America, spent a day or two in Guayaquil on his way to Lima to organize the North Andes Mission in January, 1905. He found that the only "mission work" in Ecuador was "a little influence on the edge" of the country. Under Neely's stimulus, the Mission adopted the policy of pressing the evangelistic work more vigorously. Secretary Carroll, who accompanied Bishop Neely on his journey south, agreed that it was time to follow up the preparatory work of the colporteurs by beginning "direct and open evangelistic work in Ecuador."

Implementing the new policy, Bishop Neely placed Irigoyen's Guayaquil charge on a resident basis. Although his appointment formally included Tumbes for two years more, Irigoyen concentrated upon Guayaquil and its vicinity, especially the towns along the railway then being extended northwards to Quito. He hired a meeting hall—"a poor place," Bishop Neely called it—on the muddy outskirts of the city, organized a church, and enlisted twenty-five probationers in the first year. By this time Arístides Castro was no longer in the Methodist work.

Bishop Neely looked still further ahead, hopefully preparing for the day when Harry Compton would be released from the restrictions imposed by his government employment. With the Bishop's approval, the Finance Committee of the North Andes Mission got the Board of Managers to agree, in 1906, to recognize Compton as a missionary as soon as he should begin ministerial work for the Mission. Early the next year, Neely took another anticipatory step—establishing a separate Ecuador District and appointing Compton as District Superintendent months before he left his teaching position. Preparatory budgetary allocations also were made, several hundred dollars being assigned, for instance, to the securing of "evangelistic premises" in Quito.

His government contract having expired at the end of the 1907 school season, Compton gave up his teaching post, took up the role of a Board missionary, stocked a rented room with secondhand chapel furniture bought from a Baptist missionary returning to the United States, and organized a Methodist church in Quito, with a congregation consisting mainly of normal school students. The church program included both preaching (in English and in Spanish) and a Sunday school. It at once aroused bitter opposition, some of the opponents first visiting the services and the Sunday school to spy out who was there and then visiting the attendants' homes to dissuade them from further association with the Methodists. To counteract the strong hostile pressures upon the Methodist children in the city's day schools, Mrs. Compton opened a small free-tuition day school for youngsters attending the Methodist church and its Sunday school. By the end of 1908, the new church

had half a dozen members and half a dozen probationers, with fifty persons listed as adherents.

In 1909, an enthusiastic revival began in the Quito church immediately after Compton returned from Lima from the January session of the Mission. Groups of converts came forward each Sunday for a number of weeks. The constituency expanded, until it included, at the end of the year, 26 members, 106 probationers, and 120 adherents. Two Ecuadorian preachers assisted Compton. He also led a successful revival in Guayaquil.

Ten hours' hard ride north of Quito was the town of Malchingui, where lived a number of converts won through the revival in Quito. There was a hot time in the mountain town when the converts withdrew from the Roman Catholic Church and Compton received some of them into the Methodist Episcopal Church in Malchingui itself. For three successive days, the parish priest called his people together and preached against the heretics, even inciting his followers to attack Compton. But the attack did not come until later.

Towards nightfall on 12 April, Compton and his wife and 12-year-old daughter rode into Malchingui on muleback, leading a pack mule carrying a violin (for Compton's use), a portable organ (for his daughter), and a week's provisions brought along to cope with the boycott on sales to the missionary that the priest had ordered his people to observe on pain of excommunication. Compton planned to hold a series of services and to install as pastor of the local Circuit Benjamin de Torre, a resident of Malchingui.

The Comptons were awakened that night by savage yelling. A mob inflamed by the priest was storming a house in which de Torre had taken refuge. The attackers, shouting brutal threats, hurled large stones against the door. Their worst threats fell to the ground with the stones, but de Torre did not escape until they had beaten him up.

The hostile crowd, which numbered about five hundred, also surrounded the Comptons' lodgings, yelling, "Kill the Protestants, drive out the infidels, down with the Free Masons." Their shouted threats were reinforced by two shots fired through the door. They finally got the missionary family mounted on ponies with the saddle girths unfastened, and then drove them down over the steep mountain trails leading out of the town. No thanks to this form of assistance, the Comptons got away alive.

Eight days later, in New York City, a messenger delivered to Secretary Homer C. Stuntz a cablegram signed by Harry Compton—"Mobbed [by] five hundred fanatics. Advise Washington." Stuntz sent off a special delivery letter to Philander C. Knox, Secretary of State, soliciting his intervention "for the protection of this American citizen from violence." As a result, the United States consul in Quito investigated the mobbing that had occurred eight miles away in Malchingui. The town quieted down enough for Compton to resume his visits to supplement the efforts of the Malchingui pastor. By

the end of the year, the charge was reaching thirteen probationers and thirty adherents.

In Guayaquil, in the meantime, Zoilo Irigoyen continued as pastor until the beginning of 1909, finally being able to move his congregation from its location "in the center of a frog pond on the outskirts" to a more central place. Following the January session of the Mission, Gonzalo J. Cortés, a new Chile Conference probationer from Lima, recently inspired to give up his business career for the ministry, came to Guayaquil as Irigoyen's successor. Irigoyen was appointed to Riobamba, but retired from the ministry a year later. By the end of Cortés's first year, the Guayaquil church had two full members and sixty-eight probationers.

Hardly had the Methodist mission in Ecuador begun to glow with a light all its own, when it began, in 1910, to fade out. First, the Comptons went to the United States on furlough early in the year and did not return to Ecuador. Cortés continued in Guayaquil for another year, but in 1911 began working out of Lima as a Conference evangelist. After the session of 1909, Malchingui disappeared from among the appointments of the North Andes Mission Conference, and Riobamba received no further mention after the session of 1910. From 1911 to 1913, the Ecuador District appeared in the Appointments, but with no personnel designated for pastoral charges. From 1909, the Conference Minutes carried forward for three additional years the Statistics for that year—174 probationers, 28 full members, 100 Sunday school pupils. Practically, the mission was extinguished.

As recently as 1908, Harry Compton had called for the investment of \$30,000 in mission property as a move that would "call attention to the fact that our church has come to Quito to stay." But early in the same year, with Compton barely started upon his direct evangelistic work, Secretary Carroll was urging Bishop Neely to send Compton to Bolivia to head the American Institute in La Paz. He suggested that the Quito work was small enough to be handled by an Ecuadorian preacher. He preferred giving up Ecuador entirely to making any transfer that would cripple the older Peru enterprise. In midsummer, 1909, Carroll's successor, Homer C. Stuntz, alerted Compton to the possibility that serious and extended discussions that had been going on in New York for some time might soon bring about discontinuance of the work in Ecuador. Financial stringency and the related desirability of concentrating the Board's resources elsewhere on the West Coast were the chief factors in the discussions. Compton felt that the Quito-Guayaquil work was far more important than many another mission enterprise in South America, "and must not be abandoned." At this time, the Ecuador mission was working under an appropriation of \$3,580. In the fall, the General Committee for Foreign Missions left the figure unchanged for 1910.

Stuntz's views crystallized more rapidly than those of the General Committee. By January, 1910, he was openly declaring his conviction—he said

that it was shared by Secretary Leonard and members of the Committee on South America—that the work in Ecuador should be held in abeyance for several years in order to reinforce the mission in Peru. The Board took a partial step in that direction in April, when it ordered the year's appropriation for Ecuador transferred to the credit of Peru. In November, the General Committee adopted Stuntz's recommendation that the appropriation for Ecuador remain for 1911 an undesignated share of a joint Ecuador-Peru budget. "It seems best," Stuntz had advised the Committee, "to concentrate our expenditure of effort and money upon Peru until such time as our finances warrant doing really effective work with an adequate force in Ecuador." The provision for Ecuador remained thus merged—one might well say submerged—in the Peru budget until, in the appropriations for 1915, there appeared no reference at all to Ecuador.

That Harry Compton would not return to Ecuador became clear when Bishop Frank M. Bristol appointed him, in 1911, to superintend the Panama Mission. The Bishop was discouraged from endeavoring to send a replacement to Ecuador not only by the financial problem involved, but also by the violent and somewhat chaotic political events of 1911 and 1912, in the course of which former President Alfaro, the liberal leader, was killed by a mob in Quito.

Compton did visit Ecuador briefly in 1914 as interpreter for James M. Taylor, the Secretary of the Department of Special Gifts and Missionary Evangelism, who was making a South American evangelistic tour. They held services along the coast and in Quito, where Compton was seriously ill with yellow fever, evidently caught on the way north from Guayaquil. Compton and Taylor found a number of Methodists in Quito who were still maintaining their Protestant allegiance in spite of social pressure. They implored Taylor to use his influence with the Board of Foreign Missions to have a Methodist missionary sent them. Taylor, who independently raised funds for missionary projects, promised them as much as \$10,000 and the support of two workers if the Board should reopen the work within a few months and put a superintendent in charge.

Taylor repeated his offer to Homer C. Stuntz, now the Bishop resident in South America, and urged reoccupation of Ecuador by the Methodists. Bishop Stuntz opposed the move and communicated his opposition to Secretary William F. Oldham. He felt that Ecuador was a relatively barren evangelistic field, a very unhealthy area, a politically disordered country—hardly to be considered as against the increasing opportunities in Panama and Peru. "I would greatly hate to see my son appointed there as a missionary, knowing of the great exposure" on these grounds, he said.

The Board never picked up Taylor's offer. Indeed, both the Board and the General Committee soon tacitly accepted Stuntz's essential position by passing

along, without opposition, for review by the Committee on South America a paragraph prepared by Secretary S. Earl Taylor:

Support the policy of the Resident Bishop in withdrawing our forces from Ecuador and from Paraguay and withhold further effort until [political] conditions become more favorable, but . . . plan to enter them strongly at some time in the future, or turn them over to some other evangelical organization which is able to carry the work forward.

The only reaction of the Committee was simply to cut Ecuador off the list of recommended appropriations.

Thus, in 1914, except for the implicit inclusion of Ecuador in the Disciplinary definition of the North Andes Mission Conference, the Ecuador mission was technically as well as practically extinguished. In 1919, the Board's Executive Committee voted to approve the reopening of the Ecuador mission as a measure of expansion under the expected impetus from the Centenary drive, but the authorization never was carried out. Early in the 1920's—as earlier, in 1916—missionary occupation of Ecuador became a subject of discussion in the Committee on Co-operation in Latin America. William E. Reed, the Kansas Gospel Missionary Union missionary who was in Ecuador when the first Methodist appointees arrived more than twenty years before, was still at work as an independent, and the Christian and Missionary Alliance was enlarging its activity. Ecuador made its last verbal appearance in the Conference boundary definitions in the *Discipline* for 1928.

NOTE

Page 261. Non-Methodist evangelicals had made similar efforts in the eighteen-twenties and eighteen-thirties—James Thomson (British and Foreign Bible Society), John C. Brigham (American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions), William Wheelwright, Luke Mathews (B.F.B.S.), and Isaac Wheelwright (American Bible Society). They established no permanent mission.

Entering Central America

Panama

On 3 November 1903, the province of Panama broke away from Colombia and set up an independent government. Only three days later, Theodore Roosevelt's administration announced recognition of the new republic by the United States. Twelve days after recognition, Roosevelt's Secretary of State, John Hay, signed a treaty with the Republic of Panama, guaranteeing Panama's independence and establishing the Canal Zone. That was fast work, but hardly faster than the reaction of Thomas B. Wood, the veteran missionary in charge of the Lima District of the Western South America Conference.

When Wood heard the news of the revolt, he took the first boat out of Callao, Peru, for the Isthmus and seven or eight days later was in Panama. He had been there occasionally before, keeping in touch with the evangelical activity under the direction of Francis G. Penzotti, a member of his own Conference, who was serving as the American Bible Society's agent for Central America. This time, Wood remained long enough to sample public opinion about the outlook for the new state, interview public officials in the interest of religious liberty and public education, preach in English and in Spanish, and cable the Board's New York office for a small appropriation to start Methodist work in Panama. Then he returned to Peru.

Because it had no power to open new Missions, the Board sent Thomas Wood no money for Panama. But in November, 1904, Thomas B. Neely, elected Bishop in May and assigned to episcopal supervision of South America, asked the General Missionary Committee for an appropriation and got it—\$250, plus \$350 for property! Both Neely and Wood branded the Committee's response as far too small.

In the first week in January, 1905, Bishop Neely, accompanied by Henry K. Carroll, the Board's First Assistant Corresponding Secretary, who was making an official tour of the South American mission fields, arrived in Colón, on the Caribbean side of the Isthmus. They traveled by railroad for forty-seven miles south and east, to the city of Panama, at the Pacific end of the ten-mile-wide Canal Zone, scouting for likely preaching places along the

route. In Panama they met Thomas Wood, who had preceded them by some weeks.

On Sunday, 3 January, Bishop Neely preached to a small congregation in the chapel of the United States hospital in Ancon, close to Panama, and following the service, announced the intention of the Methodist Episcopal Church to establish a mission on the Isthmus. At the same time, he initiated steps for the formation of a Sunday school in Ancon itself. Then, every day for a week, Neely and Carroll, under Dr. Wood's guidance, tramped through the intense and heavy heat of Panama City, the Republic's capital, looking for real estate that might be purchased for mission buildings. The next Sunday, Bishop Neely sent off to the Board a full report on the evangelistic need and opportunity in Panama, with recommendations for action by the Missionary Society.

Bishop Neely found that large numbers of Protestant, English-speaking Negroes had been brought in from Jamaica for earlier canal-digging work under the auspices of the French entrepreneurs. The Wesleyan Methodists, having followed some of their people from Jamaica, were at work among these colored people, as were the Anglicans and a recently arrived post of Salvation Army workers. Neely decided that as a matter of fairness and of economy, the American Methodists should not compete with the Wesleyan and the Anglican work among the Negroes.

The Bishop felt, however, that there was a field for evangelical work among the predominant Spanish-American people, who were almost exclusively Roman Catholics. He reported being informed that "there is a tendency on the part of some of the men to break away from the domination of Rome."

The Roman Catholic Church in Panama no longer held the privileged position as state church that it previously had enjoyed under a concordat between the Vatican and the Colombian government. Under the Constitution of the Republic of Panama (1904), Church and State were separate. The people were free to profess any religion and to practice any form of worship, subject only to the limitations of respect for Christian morality and public order. The Constitution recognized as a matter of fact—not of privilege—that the "Catholic Religion" was the religion of the majority of the inhabitants and, presumably on this ground, authorized legislation for aid in founding a Roman Catholic conciliar seminary in the city of Panama and Roman Catholic missions to the aboriginal tribes.

The way was legally clear, then, for Protestant missions in the Republic. But no Protestant church maintained any mission devoted to reaching the Spanish-American population, which, outside the Zone, numbered nearly 250,000.

The many hundreds of American personnel—military officers, engineers, marines, clerks, nurses, and others—coming to the Canal Zone to work on the great construction project were the object of Neely's sharpest concern.

He found fifteen hundred of them already on the scene, including five hundred marines encamped near Culebra Cut. Near at hand were gamblers, saloon-keepers, and prostitutes, but no American Protestant church workers at all. The uprooted and transient Americans needed the spiritual ministries, the moral undergirding, and the social fellowship of the Church while they were away from home. Neely believed that the Methodist Episcopal Church was both peculiarly fitted to take up this challenge and obligated to do it without delay.

Neely concentrated upon the small American minority in Panama to the point of narrowing the base of appeal for financial support of the Panama mission. A year later, when asking for special gifts for it, he stated in *The Christian Advocate* that it was technically a foreign field but practically a home mission field, "for the people we seek are mainly Americans and the territory is under American control." And before he finished his article on "Conditions in the Canal Zone," he drove this distinction home to a practical conclusion: "People who do not care for foreign missions can give to this as practically a home mission; and those who do not care for missions among the Spanish may contribute for the benefit of the Americans."

After sending his first Panama report to the Board, in January, 1905, Bishop Neely, accompanied by Carroll and Wood, went on to Lima, Peru. There, at the first annual meeting of the North Andes Mission (it became the North Andes Mission Conference in 1910), the jurisdiction to which work in Panama belonged by Disciplinary definition, he appointed Wood temporarily as preacher in charge in Panama. He also assigned Carl N. Vance, principal of the Callao High School for Boys, to start a school in Panama City.

Vance, a slender young six-foot-four layman, with little experience as a schoolman, arrived in Panama by the middle of April, three weeks in advance of Wood, who had been instructed to precede him to make arrangements for his settling in the capital. Nothing was ready for Vance, but he rented a building and opened his mission school. When he started, the funds to the credit of the Panama mission in the New York office came to \$250 appropriated by the General Missionary Committee plus a special gift of \$500. He was expected to make his school substantially self-supporting.

Vance's stay in Panama was brief and difficult. Living in quarters furnished with little except pieces knocked together out of boxes, Vance, his wife, and their baby were laid low by one serious illness after another. The Isthmus had not yet been subjected to sanitary transformation by Gorgas and his public disease-killers. General George W. Goethals said later, "The reputation of Panama as a pesthole made the recruiting of labor a difficult undertaking . . ." Vance felt that he had to leave for the United States in order to save his child's life. Finally, at "almost the only time in the three months

that we were all well enough at the same time to leave," Vance closed the school and took his family home to the States.

When Thomas Wood reached the Isthmus, he devoted himself to itinerant evangelistic work, preaching in English in eight or nine places on the Canal Zone, and eventually held some services in Spanish in the city of Panama. In addition, he became a government chaplain at the United States hospital in Ancon in October.

Secretary Carroll found the attempt to administer the field under Wood's superintendency exasperating. Wood's activity in Panama during 1905 and 1906 was interrupted from time to time by visits to Peru. Being a ruggedly independent veteran missionary, he did not fancy writing to Carroll, whose position in the New York office was a step lower than the top. He often simply did not answer Carroll's letters. For months on end, Carroll could not discover where Wood was or what he was doing or how he was spending the Mission's funds. Not until the Board of Managers voted in October, 1906, to dock Wood's missionary salary, could the Secretaries even find out how he was handling the salary from the Ancon chaplaincy, which was supposed to be turned into the Mission's treasury. Wood's connection with the Panama mission ended early in 1907, when Bishop Neely placed the administration of the fields composing the North Andes Mission under localized District superintendencies instead of under a single superintendency, as previously.

Carl Vance's successor came to Panama from the United States at the beginning of 1906. He was John C. Elkins, a young man recruited from the student body at Drew Theological Seminary following an address there by Bishop Neely. Elkins took up residence and work in the building rented by Vance the year before. There he found Mariano de la Cruz, a probationer in the Andes Conference, who was conducting, under temporary orders from the Bishop, Spanish preaching and a Spanish Sunday school. Elkins reopened the general school abruptly closed by Vance, renting larger rooms in the fall.

De la Cruz soon departed, leaving Elkins, who did not speak Spanish, with the Spanish evangelistic work on his hands. Before the year was out, Elkins was teaching in the school four nights a week, serving as chaplain at the United States hospital at Culebra, and preaching in English at seven places on the Zone, evidently taking up the itinerant circuit surrendered by Thomas Wood. By this time the evangelistic activity in the capital city, which was not on the Zone, had achieved the form of a regular congregation and Sunday school. And by this time, also, Elkins and his wife no longer were living under the ubiquitous threat of tropical disease that had hovered over Vance's family only a year and a half earlier. There was only one yellow fever death in the Canal Zone in 1906; specifically tropical diseases already were practically conquered by the United States' sanitary engineers.

Bishop Neely landed in Colón at the end of December. Before moving on to South America, he sponsored a new educational move; as Elkins put it,

the Bishop "ordered the beginning of a day school in the city of Panama for high-class whites." (Up to this time, Elkins had been holding night classes.) Neely said, "I have also been daring enough to start a school to be called 'The American College of Panama'—'El Colegio Americano de Panamá.' It starts in a small way but so does the oak."

Elkins and his wife became the missionary faculty for this educational acorn. By springtime, 1907, it was doing well enough financially for Elkins to guarantee from school income the salary and outgoing expenses of an assistant. The Board accepted his offer, and early in August, Charles W. Ports came to Panama to fill the post. Ports was a 31-year-old layman with missionary experience in Chile, where he was foreman of the press in Santiago. He was to be the one missionary consistently attached to the Panama mission throughout the following decade, taking up from time to time whatever responsibilities were left behind by departing or furloughed superintendents. He taught steadily in the Colegio during those years, became its perennial director, and being proficient in the use of Spanish, generally was in charge of the Spanish church in Panama.

Bishop Neely not only sponsored the Colegio, but also, beginning with his first recommendations from the field in 1905 and steadily seconded by Secretary Carroll, pressed for the acquisition of mission property in Panama City and the erection of a church. He carried his case to the Board of Managers' session in November, 1905, and came out of the meeting with a conditional authorization of \$20,000 in purchase money. It was to go into effect when \$10,000 of the required sum should have been raised from special gifts. This fund-raising burden rested upon Neely, as did the responsibility for raising a \$4,000 conditional appropriation for current work that the General Missionary Committee attached to the regular appropriation of \$1,000 for 1906.

No grass grew under Bishop Neely's feet; he went out and raised \$3,800 for Panama property within a month. But neither then nor later could he persuade the Board to liberalize the condition the General Missionary Committee had laid down. Although the General Committee had now twice approved the maintenance of the Panama mission, there were Board members who remained unconvinced that there should be such a mission. Therefore Neely had to hew to the line. In spite of his persistent efforts to raise money for the purpose, it was not until December, 1906, that his campaign met success. The following April, John Elkins concluded negotiations for a lot that ran down to the sea wall fronting the Bay of Panama, and took possession on behalf of the Mission. The erection of a combined church-school-parsonage building was soon under way.

Three superintendents in succession headed the Panama mission in 1908. Early in the spring, Elkins's health caved in, and he went home to the United States. His replacement, W. Waldo Weller, arrived late in April, but less than a month later, he too was on his way home—a fever victim. William W. Gray,

forty years old, equipped with six years' pastoral experience in Michigan, but with no knowledge of Spanish, landed in Panama in October to take charge of the field.

During that unsettled year, Charles Ports had to grapple with the necessity of carrying the Mission's entire program—to serve as school director, pastor in the city of Panama, preacher on the Zone, hospital chaplain, Mission treasurer, and emergency superintendent. Not least among his difficulties was the building rising on the sea-wall site when Elkins went home; the contractor left the job unfinished, the work was faulty, funds had run out, a new contract had to be let. But Ports managed to get the building ready for occupancy in August.

Bishop Neely, who dedicated it eight months before it was opened, called the plain, pseudo-Gothic structure the first American Protestant church, and the first Protestant church for white people, to go up on the Isthmus. Badly designed as it was, the Methodist superintendents counted it a fine advantage to have located their \$25,000 cement-block church opposite the new and comely \$450,000 government center of the Republic, at the foot of the city's main street. Both physically and financially, the building remained a problem for a good many years. For one thing, only constant maintenance of a retaining wall kept the tide from washing in under the floor. One of the New York secretaries commented, when consulted about fire insurance coverage, that the missionaries were "much more liable to be swept away by a tidal wave than burned up." But the new structure afforded the mission a far more usable center than the meagre quarters previously in use, when the preaching had been done in a small upstairs back room.

Almost in the wake of the ship that carried William Gray towards his new post in Panama sailed one bearing a letter of instructions and inspiration from the Board's First Assistant Corresponding Secretary, Homer C. Stuntz. It declared:

It will be yours, on the behalf of Methodism, if God preserves your health, to build a great religious bridge upon which the moral influence of this North American Continent may find easy passageway to the heart of South America. I pray for nothing on your behalf so earnestly as that God may give to yourself and Mrs. Gray at the very beginning of your career wide sky-lines and a mighty perspective of the task.

With his "brushes of comet's hair" still in hand, Stuntz began to paint in the wide sky-lines of policy the new superintendent was to find beckoning him on. Gray was to "magnify the American work"; at least for the years immediately ahead, this was to have priority. Through the outreach of his church in Panama, by exploiting every opening for Sunday and weeknight preaching in the various nondenominational halls on the Zone, by the righteous example of his own life, by the influence of his home, and by grasping his social op-

portunities, Gray was to become "an inspirational force for the cause of purity, sobriety and evangelical piety among all the hundreds and hundreds of restless exiled Americans." Mrs. Gray, through her home, was to "be helpful to scores upon scores of individuals of good brain and fine advantages 'whose feet have well nigh slipped.'"

Realizing the transiency of the American throngs, Stuntz portrayed a broader, grander vista:

In the ultimate reach of things your largest influence will be among the Spanish peoples in the Republic of Panama in all their provinces and in the outlying country in Central America to the west and in South America to the east. I would counsel that you secure very early a first class map of all that part of the world and as time goes on that you familiarize yourself with the cities and the populations east and west of you. I would lay my plans deliberately to raise up an intelligent, converted and edified Spanish-speaking membership there in Panama, and with that force as an agency, push out east and west, north and south.

Stuntz expected Gray to proceed by renouncing reliance upon any hand-to-mouth policy, in favor of long-range planning, starting a training school for workers in connection with the Mission's school, praying for the co-operation of the Holy Spirit, establishing close friendly relations with the President and other officials of the Republic, and by cordially assuring the Minister of Education of his readiness to help solve the educational problems of Panama.

To generate all this, Gray was to be supplied, as Stuntz soon notified him, with an appropriation of \$2,500 (a year later, it was cut to \$2,100). Stuntz was concerned to help Gray conserve this financial resource for the building of the "great religious bridge" between the continents. He cautioned against unnecessary or premature repairs to the sea wall, questioned the size of his water bill, advised him to hold out for a reduction in his freight bill on the ground that his hospital chaplaincy at Ancon made him a United States Government employee, and urged him to try to get the Mission's electric light bill taken over by the Isthmian Canal Commission on the same ground. "In case you cannot get this through," he wrote, "I suggest that you use lamps and cut off the current. You cannot afford \$14.70 a month for electric lights."

Stuntz plainly told Gray that he could promise him no additional remittances to complete the appointments in the church building. But he gave Gray a practical correspondence lesson on missionary promotional methods. Bishop Frank M. Bristol, recently assigned to succeed Bishop Neely in South America, was due to lecture for the Y.M.C.A. in Panama on his way to his residence in Buenos Aires. Said Stuntz:

Magnify your work to him. Get up a great meeting with the Spanish people and get him introduced, socially if possible, to the Spanish people as well as

to the Americans. If some kindly disposed Panamanian would open his home for a reception for the Bishop it would be a good card to play. Let me exhort you that you leave no stone unturned to impress the Bishop's mind with the magnitude of your opportunity both among Americans and the native people.

Gray had been asking for money for a decorative window for the church; so Stuntz brought his lesson to a point:

Bishop Bristol has confided in me that the Y.M.C.A. people offered him \$200 for his lecture down there. Let me in perfect confidence give you a suggestion. Write him in advance asking him for that \$200 for this window. Of course you must not say that you know he is to get that sum or any other sum for lectures or for anything else. Plead hard for the \$200 for the leaded glass window.

Confronted with the broad missionary mandate issued by Stuntz, Gray had little money to work with, a bi-lingual field, only one language he could use, a single missionary colleague, no apparent educational resources to offer the government of Panama, and a mission center that was, in Charles Ports's opinion, questionably located.

When Bishop Bristol visited the Isthmus in January, 1909, he found in the new church building "our great little college" occupying the first floor, the room for church services on the second (there he ordained Charles Ports as Deacon), and the parsonage on the third. Before he departed, he arranged to have a stained-glass window installed in memory of his daughter.

The Colegio—not confined to the "high-class" pupils for whom Bishop Neely founded it—had finished its second year, with the enrollment standing at ninety-one. The children came from Panamanian, American, Jewish, Italian, Spanish, and Dutch families. Ten of them were Jewish, twenty-four were Roman Catholic, fifty-seven were Protestant. Ports and Rosa Pena, the Colombian young woman who had served in the school from the beginning, and whom Ports was soon to marry, carried the bulk of the teaching load. The school was so sparingly equipped that Bishop Bristol sent home a plea for donations of maps, charts, and even a globe. And "with what joy would they welcome a microscope!" he wrote.

Bishop Bristol's stay was brief, and his opportunity for firsthand investigation of religious conditions was limited. But he left the Isthmus with far less inflated missionary hopes than those Stuntz had shared with Gray. He saw a great evangelistic opportunity and responsibility in the thirty to forty thousand people he understood were working on the Canal enterprise. "But what are we doing for the redemption of Panama?" he asked the readers of *The Christian Advocate*. ". . . Poor, long-neglected Panama! Cannot, will not our rich and glorious Methodism give more than \$2,000 a year for your evangelization?" Further, he emphasized the great difficulty of the task

taken up by the Panama missionaries. Recalling the unreasonable early demands hurled at the builders of the Canal, he said, "So in this mission work, too, many are impatient to see the 'dirt fly' before the conditions are ready for dirt to fly." Recalling his attempt to look into the forbidding Panamanian jungle, but also probably voicing his preconceived perspective on religion in South America, he said:

So is it with this moral jungle, this matted, almost impenetrable jungle of superstition and bigotry, swarming with the poisonous insects and reptiles of immorality and vice. To plant the seed of spiritual truth in these Romanized countries and reap an immediate harvest of Protestantism in a day is impossible. . . . Be patient until the "good ground" appears in the jungle of Romanism.

Gray and Ports could feel some relief, but perhaps little comfort, at Bishop Bristol's readjustment of the tempo of evangelistic expectation.

During Gray's term as Superintendent, the pattern of the Mission's activity remained essentially what Elkins and Ports had made it. And there was no addition to the missionary staff, no increase in appropriations.

Shortly after Bishop Bristol's visitation, Gray and Ports saw an opening for possible extension of the Mission to an additional ethnic group. Ports baptized two San Blas Indian children, sons of a tribal chief—the first baptisms in the Seawall Church. Another chief brought his son to Panama, and put him in Gray's care to be educated. Gray had to defend his guardianship of the boy, for certain Roman Catholics seeking to open work among the San Blas people got possession of him and held him until forced by the police to relinquish him to the Methodist superintendent. In May, the two chiefs, accompanied by four other San Blas representatives, came to the mission center to ask that a school be opened in their territory, along the Carribean coast of Panama, northeast of Colón.

The San Blas Indians, by vigorous opposition to foreign settlement over four centuries had kept their racial purity and their independence unimpaired, some of them speaking English, but most of them using their own unwritten language. "Up to this time," reported Ports, "no white man has succeeded in penetrating their country and coming out alive"; they had recently driven out a Smithsonian Institution expedition, inflicting some loss of life. For a number of years, however, some of them, after favorable contacts with traders from the United States and a visit to the States by two of their men, had come to think well of Americans; hence their request for a school, to be run by the Methodists, that should teach their children the English language and American ways.

Gray called this a great opening, a providential one. Ports sent a report on the San Blas people to the Board office in New York. Secretary Stuntz acknowledged it with thanks, but simply turned it over to the editors of

World-Wide Missions to be used at their discretion; current missionary offerings were down somewhat, and he saw no prospect of sending a missionary to the San Blas area. New personnel for the Spanish work would have priority. It remained for two independent English women missionaries to begin, about four years later, evangelization of two or three islands inhabited by the San Blas people.

The Spanish-speaking congregation at the Seawall Church became an organized church, with ten members, early in 1909. English-language services were added at about the same time, and a Sunday school and a Woman's Foreign Missionary Society were developed. Americans began augmenting the church membership by presenting letters of transfer. By the end of Gray's term, it included fifty-one in the English congregation and fourteen in the Spanish. The American members and other interested Americans provided financial support which, along with receipts from tuition in the Colegio, padded out the Mission's income from Board appropriations. The United States government's Isthmian Canal Commission provided, until electric cars were installed a few years later, a bus to transport Zone employees from the Ancon neighborhood to Seawall Church.

The growth of the Panamanian segment of the Seawall constituency was hindered by the importation of racial separatism from the United States. It fastened on the Mission "the necessity of drawing the color line and making the church and school a white institution," as Gray put it. He reported that no other church drew the color line in the capital city, whose Spanish-speaking people were "a mixture of all nations and all colors." Gray evidently saw segregation as the price that had to be paid for the assured attendance and patronage of American whites; he felt that the damage it caused might be overcome, but only partly, "by opening in another part of the city and allowing no lines of demarcation to be drawn."

Except at the Seawall Church, the Mission undertook little evangelistic work in the territory of the Republic. Sunday services were begun in the old Chiriquí Penitentiary, at the end of the Panama City sea wall, and eventually were attended by an average of 150 prisoners. On the Caribbean coast, Gray visited Portobelo, northeast of Colón, early in 1909. "I found that the church was without a priest," he said, "was the habitation of goats and chickens, and was full of filth." As a result of his visit, the Methodists started services among the town's Spanish-speaking Canal workmen, and also established a congregation and a Sunday school in nearby Nombre de Dios.

Charles Ports, who was in charge of all "native" work, carried the Mission's Spanish preaching program onto the Zone. Once a week, he traveled by canoe to the Palo Seco leprosy colony on the Bay of Panama. An impassable jungle cut the colony off from access by land, but approached from the Bay, the site was beautiful, an inviting combination of sandy beach and tropical fruit trees. "But nobody accepts the invitation," declared a later co-worker of

Ports's, "except lepers, doctors, and Methodist preachers." Among Palo Seco's thirty isolated patients, Ports organized a church of eight members. Not far from Panama City, in Pedro Miguel, a congregation and a Sunday school were started in the home of an East Indian. As often as schedule and strength would allow, Ports also held evangelistic services in some of the Zone's labor camps, which included many European workers—ventures that promised no permanence.

William Gray, assisted now and then by American volunteer preachers, traveled through the Zone as the Mission's evangelist to the English-speaking population. As Elkins had observed earlier, "Unionism is in the air because the people are here only temporarily and do not want to sever their connections with the home churches." There were so few people of any given denomination that co-operative work appeared to be more promising. Therefore Gray took full advantage of opportunities to preach to the union congregations in the construction towns scattered between Colón and Balboa. The preaching places themselves were provided by the Canal Commission, which gave priority to the Y.M.C.A. and to local nondenominational groups. Methodists among the Y.M.C.A. leaders facilitated the Methodist mission's participation in the general religious and morale-building work favored by the Commission. And Gray had access, of course, to the United States government hospital in Ancon as visiting chaplain for the Canal Commission, a position that eased the Mission's pinched treasury by affording him a cash salary as well as commissary and other privileges, including free transportation.

Gray resigned as a Board missionary early in 1911, and Harry B. Compton, transferred from Ecuador, soon succeeded him as superintendent of the Panama District. A year later, the administrative team in charge of the mission on the Isthmus also was changed; Homer C. Stuntz, newly elected Bishop, assumed episcopal direction of the field, and the former Bishop William F. Oldham, now elected a Corresponding Secretary, supervised the Board's interests.

Looking ahead in November, 1912, Secretary Oldham believed that the American work must soon disintegrate. A year later, a returned Canal Zone chaplain whom he consulted told him that it would be better to divorce the American work in Panama City from the Seawall Church, for there was great prejudice against worshipping in the same church where "native Spaniards" held their services. A new church, for Americans, should be built, the chaplain advised, much nearer the neighborhood where most of them resided. Oldham's reaction was to entertain the possibility of asking the Committee on Religious Needs of Anglo-American Communities in Mission Fields, of the Foreign Missions Conference of North America, to take over the erection of such a church, and to appoint its pastors, as a union enterprise, rather than to maintain a merely Methodist pulpit. Bishop Stuntz

wrote Oldham that he was wholeheartedly in favor of a separate American church, and of "uniting with all the forces in the Zone and in the States to carry out an aggressive Union English Church policy."

The opening of the Canal in 1914 thrust upon them the necessity to evaluate, and fix the course of, the work among the Americans. The American labor force in the Zone was radically reduced, with only 5,000 remaining in the employ of the Canal and the Panama Railroad by September, 1913. The American church constituency took a comparable drop, which was reflected in the English-language congregation of the Seawall Church. The Mission had to enter 1914 without the two \$480 salaries that were coming to Compton and Ports as Commission chaplains, because only two chaplains in all were being retained for the Zone's American personnel. This occurred at a time when Board appropriation for Panama was \$3,800.

A permanent union church organization was then rising from the string of local church leagues that had been active during the canal-building days. The Union Church of the Canal Zone was founded in February, 1914, under the leadership of a group of laymen. Its chief purpose was to conserve and cultivate the religious life of Americans during their stay in the Zone, where, as one of the first pastors said, there were large possibilities "of people getting away from God, forgetting their church relationship, and drifting, until the finer side of their natures has become paralyzed." The Union Church made no attempt to launch a new denomination; it was a "federation for Christian service," said one of the Methodist workers. It raised no doctrinal shibboleths, and did not require its members to sever relations with their home churches. It established four chief congregations in the Zone—in Balboa, Pedro Miguel, Gatun, and Cristóbal. With the co-operation of the Committee on Anglo-American Communities, which was supported in part by Methodist Board of Foreign Missions, the Union Church brought to its churches, from the United States, a number of pastors, among them several Methodists. The American congregation at Seawall Church was not, however, discontinued in favor of Union Church work, as originally envisioned by Oldham and Stuntz.

As the potentialities of the American work began to diminish, the Spanish-speaking field began to show modest advances under Compton's superintendency. The Mission opened Sunday schools in the Zone communities of Balboa and East Balboa in 1911. The latter, to which children were brought in a bus provided by the Canal Commission, held its sessions in both Spanish and English; the former was closed in 1912, when the community was removed to make way for the building of new canal locks.

The Spanish work received a fresh impulse from a series of revival services held nightly in Seawall Church for several weeks early in 1913 by James M. Taylor, independent Methodist missionary evangelist. "The old-fashioned mourners' bench was brought out of the Methodist attic, and freely used in these meetings," reported Compton. Both Spanish and English-speaking con-

verts were won. Enthusiasm ran high in Seawall Church. Compton, backed financially by Taylor, announced a church building project for a lot which he had secured gratis from the Panama Railway many months before, in Guachapalí, a densely populated working-class district in Panama City on the other side of the railroad tracks from the Seawall Church. This step partly removed the ground of Ports's reiterated complaint that Seawall Church was located in a pleasant, aristocratic neighborhood too far removed from the common people "among whom we always have to work in these countries."

Seawall Church members began holding street meetings in Guachapalí. Donating both money and labor, the Spanish congregation eagerly supported the building project. The new church, erected largely under Ports's direction, was a simple structure—lined inside with beaver board, and outside "plain enough to satisfy the most conservative Quaker." Bishop Stuntz dedicated it, debt free, on Sunday, 7 December, in the course of a week-long series of Seawall Church revival meetings. Cabino Arandilla, a Spaniard and a former Roman Catholic priest, who had been brought into the Methodist Episcopal Church by Compton in 1912, and who had been assisting Ports with the prison work, became the pastor of the Spanish congregation in the Guachapalí church, where both Spanish and English preaching was maintained. As a result of the year's activities, the Seawall Spanish congregation itself was strengthened, the full members increasing from thirteen to twenty-six, and the probationers from eleven to seventy-eight.

James M. Taylor came back to Panama City in January, 1914, for a month's revival meetings—this time in the Guachapalí chapel. As many as fifty Spanish-speaking Panamanians were converted. This gave impetus to the emergence of the Guachapalí mission as a Methodist Episcopal church, as did the heightened evangelistic activity of the Seawall members, who again were holding gospel team meetings in the streets of Guachapalí and were supplying teachers for the new Sunday school there.

During the revival, Compton took Taylor across the Isthmus to Colón to inspect a three-lot site, made available by the Panama Railway, on which he hoped to build a church. Taylor agreed to pay for the framing and roofing of a modest building. Compton rushed the structure to the point of bare usability and brought Taylor back two weeks later for revival meetings, with Taylor preaching in English and Compton himself translating into Spanish. Over a hundred persons professed conversion. Gabino Arandilla, financially supported by Taylor, traveled over to Colón several times a month to care for the Spanish group in the new church. But such nonresident leadership could not hold all the new constituents, especially in the face of heavy house-to-house Roman Catholic tract campaigns provoked by the Methodist revivals in Panama and Colón.

Compton's initiative in making the Guachapalí and Colón openings har-

monized with what Bishop Stuntz was about to enunciate, in April, 1914, as his long-range policy for the Mission—the primacy of Spanish work, conceived as an expansive movement reaching out into new centers in Panama and also serving as a base for general “occupation” of Central America and of Colombia.

But Compton's new ventures quickly brought the Mission into contact with an additional racial group—the West Indian Negroes, originally left by Bishop Neely, in 1905, to the care of the British Wesleyan Methodists. As many as five thousand West Indians were packed into the tenement area immediately surrounding Guachapali's small Methodist Episcopal church. Naturally, the Methodist street meetings drew their attention, and Mrs. Compton, busily engaged in intensive house-to-house visitation during the Taylor revival, became fully aware of their presence in the area. Since they spoke English, Compton opened a regular weekly service for them, and they began joining the church.

The new activity among the West Indians began, by 1915, to go forward more surely than the Spanish work. Whereas the latter depended largely upon the direct but not undivided efforts first of Arandilla and then of Ports, several Local Preachers and various English-speaking members of Seawall Church were available as workers among the West Indians. In December, the new effort reached out to Red Tank, a small new settlement in Pedro Miguel, where Compton started a congregation and a Sunday school, meeting at first on the porch of one of the larger buildings. Compton hoped to begin another West Indian church by building on a lot he had secured in La Boca, the port for Balboa, where the Wesleyans also had recently acquired land. At the end of 1916, the West Indian constituency in Guachapali had so far outstripped the Spanish following that the church was reported by the Board as “Guachapali English (West Indian) Church.” It then had ninety-seven full members (nearly half the total for the Panama Mission) and an attendance (150 to 200) that equaled the capacity of the church building.

From its beginning in 1914, the church in Colón also attracted West Indian Negroes. James M. Taylor undertook to supply a worker for the West Indian congregation that began to develop in the half-finished building. Taylor's man, however, did not stay very long, and by the end of 1915, the Colón Negro group badly needed a competent pastor. For lack of one, the work was discontinued in 1916.

When Bishop Stuntz became aware that the Negro work was taking hold, he reiterated, in midsummer, 1914—perhaps prodded a little by a polite letter of inquiry from the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society about Methodist Episcopal policy on West Indian work on the Isthmus—his conviction that the Methodist Episcopal mission in Panama, and in Central America generally, should be oriented chiefly towards the Spanish-speaking people.

The Bishop strongly urged the Board not to plan anything like a general

movement among the West Indians anywhere on the Isthmus. They clearly were not the most promising material, he held, for permanent and valuable missionary work in Panama, especially considering their migratory tendency. In view of the Mission's limited resources, it would be better in the long run not to divide its energies between the West Indian and the Spanish populations.

The Board, however, took no position on the West Indian question. Both the Board and the Bishop lost the initiative to Compton, who became strongly committed to evangelizing the West Indians as he observed their growing response and constant need. By the end of 1915, he was eager to get a building onto the church lot in La Boca "before some one else gets ahead of us"! And never having got much by tugging on the Board's purse strings, Compton was turning for encouragement directly to James M. Taylor, who was outside the Board's organization. By finding and supporting workers for Compton and by assisting with building funds, Taylor helped make the Mission's West Indian work a fairly successful *fait accompli* before which the generalized and not too conclusive policy of Compton's absentee superiors had to give way.

Taylor's most valuable contribution to the Guachapali project was Elsie J. Keyser, whom he sent to Panama in April, 1915, at Compton's request and with final approval by the Board. Miss Keyser, formerly a Lutheran deaconess, had lived in her brother's family in Ancon for two years (1911 to 1913), attended Seawall Church, and taught in a rural Methodist Sunday school on the Zone. At Christmastime, 1911, she wrote home:

You should see Guachapali, the colored section, where are housed in a congested tenement district the West Indians who were brought here by Uncle Sam to help dig the big ditch. Here the streets swarm with piccaninies [*sic*] as bare as the day they were born. They somehow don't look so bare with their black, satiny skins, and they don't need clothes in this country to keep them warm. . . . I have wanted to be a missionary since I was knee high to a hop toad. These little rascals interest me very much and I think it would be fun if I could spend the rest of my life here. I wonder?

Elsie Keyser's wonder became a commitment; she served the Methodist mission in Panama for thirty-four years, until her retirement in 1949.

Two months after returning to Panama City in 1915, she opened a day school in the Guachapali church, and in August engaged to assist her Alice Lamb, a James Taylor convert, whose salary was paid by English-speaking Seawall Church people who monthly slipped five-dollar gold pieces into Miss Keyser's hand.

Seawall members also helped with the Sunday school that was thriving alongside the day school. Both schools met in the church auditorium—the day school much to the distress of some of the church workers, who felt that its

presence would desecrate the place of worship. This had to be the center not only for the congregation and the schools, but also for the large Epworth League, the Loyal Temperance Legion, the social events, and the soup kitchen for day pupils that became elements in Elsie Keyser's Guachapalí program. At the end of 1915, the day school had seventy pupils, most of them West Indians, but some of other, varied strains. (Two seasons later, there were a hundred pupils, as many as forty being turned away for lack of room.) "Although it is hot . . . and steamy and crowded in the little church, I would rather be there than anywhere else in the world," declared Elsie Keyser, who also confessed to James Taylor, "I love my work and would not exchange places with a queen."

The hundred children in the Guachapalí day school (there were more in the Sunday school) were gathered out of the some five thousand children of school age in the two working-class districts lying close by the church. Out of all these, only about twelve hundred were in school—hardly four hundred in public schools, the rest in private schools taught mostly by incompetent teachers under deplorable conditions. There were easily two thousand boys and girls in Guachapalí itself who were not in school. Poverty pressed in about them all. Their fathers earned about \$23.00 a month, and paid exorbitant rents and high prices. Their families occupied single rented rooms ten or twelve feet square, which they usually divided into two by stretching a curtain across the middle, sleeping huddled together at night on one side of it, and living on the other side in the daytime, always without benefit of fresh air. Only the general smallness of the families made these wretched cubbyholes usable at all; although the birth rate was high, infant mortality was excessively high. The children swarmed the crowded, turbulent streets. When they came to school, they came hungry and often troubled. Elsie Keyser tried to bring them, in a Christian setting, a measure of education and of compassionate understanding; and the Guachapalí church tried to give their elders religious undergirding to enable them to resist the currents of degraded moral and social life that coursed through the area.

In 1916, the Panama mission all at once found itself close to the center upon which all the major Protestant missionary interests in Latin America temporarily focused their attention—the Congress on Christian Work in Latin America, which met in Ancon from 10 to 20 February.

When the forthcoming sessions of the Congress were announced in Panama in 1915, the Methodist Episcopal mission, which was beginning to enjoy modest success in winning native Panamanian adherents, already was under fire in a partially effective Roman Catholic campaign to reduce attendance at the Methodists' Colegio and to draw away Catholics converted to Methodism. But now the Mission felt the brunt of a fresh attack on Protestantism by Guillermo Rojas, Catholic Bishop of Panama. The Bishop broadcast urgent warnings against the Protestants and their Congress, forbidding any Catholic

under his jurisdiction to attend its meetings even out of curiosity. He denounced the name (it originally referred to missionary, not "Christian," work) and purpose of the Congress as a not surprising insult to all Latin Americans, pointing out that the height of customary Protestant oratory was to attack the Catholic religion and the pope, to injure and slander the priests, and to ridicule and repudiate Catholic religious practices. He predicted that the Congress speakers would employ the usual defamatory language to spread the usual Protestant propaganda line:

that all our people find themselves in a pitiable condition of ignorance due to their being Catholics, that the Roman Catholic Church is the main responsible [*sic*] therefor as she keeps our people in such an awful condition of barbarism and abjection . . .

He protested against what he held to be the proselyting purpose of the Congress:

that is to say, to evangelize us, for, according to the opinion of those protestants, we are but a lot of ignorants: to moralize us, as they consider us a bundle of miscarried [misguided?] beings, and, finally, to push us along the ways of civilization, for they think of us as wild savages wandering amidst the darkness of barbarism. . . . Can there possible exist a greater insult and humiliation for us?

Bishop Rojas easily could have studied his public protest with quotations and citations from Protestant writers and speakers, including Methodists. It would not have been necessary to falsify in order specifically to portray the Methodists as aggressive invaders of Catholic domains rather than as Protestant missionary pioneers. Bishop Thomas B. Neely, the man who founded the Panama mission, accepted the aggressive image, laying heavy blame on the Roman Church for leaving the people of South America unenlightened, politically unliberated, superstitious, and idolatrous. He saw the missionary to South America in battle posture, taking his part in an historic, essential conflict. He proclaimed to the General Conference in Baltimore in 1908:

The battle between Romanism and Protestantism has not ended and there is no essential change in the Church of Rome. Romanism carries on its war even when Protestantism is passive, for Romanism always is aggressive. Now the battle for the western hemisphere is on. It is a battle between Romanism and evangelical Protestantism.

The General Conference of 1912 itself voiced its duty to press the missionary work in Roman Catholic countries more zealously and made a target of the "teachings and practices of Romanism [, which] deprive the people of the Bible, pervert many of the fundamental doctrines of Christianity, and foster superstitions which alienate the thinking classes and bind heavy burdens upon the poor . . ."

To be sure, Bishop Rojas was defending a vested institutional interest; and on their side, Protestant missionaries had many legitimate grievances against the hostile treatment given them by Catholic priests and some of their followers. But Protestant missionary propaganda was rife with categorical, often bitter, assaults on the Roman Church, especially for its asserted failure to improve Latin American conditions—moral, social, religious, and economic. Arrant criticism of the Church itself was frequently buttressed with thoroughly derogatory descriptions of Latin American culture and embellished with not too well muted claims of the superiority of Anglo-Saxon, North American, Protestant culture.

The planners of the Congress, however, actually made an extraordinary effort—which Secretary Oldham favored and Bishop Stuntz protested—to prevent its sessions' becoming a sounding board for aggressive anti-Catholicism and patronizing North Americanism. Their professions of good intentions were neither early enough nor moving enough to forestall Bishop Rojas's opposition. This gave the Congress a temporary setback. In the spring of 1915, the Panamanian government had granted the use of halls in the National Institute and the National Theater for meetings of the Congress. In his broadside of 22 September, the Bishop called on the President to cancel the license, interpreting its issuance as permission to use public buildings for religious propaganda repugnant to most tax-paying Panamanians. The President promptly withdrew the license, having been visited by both the Bishop and Catholic laymen, who brought accusations against the superintendent of the Methodist mission and against the Congress. Harry Compton himself called upon the President, and found him unhappy about having withdrawn the license, but evidently not disposed to reverse his decision. As a result, the Congress ultimately met not in Panama City, but in the Hotel Tivoli, in Ancon, on the Canal Zone.

The Congress, which was sponsored by the Committee on Co-operation in Latin America, brought together there in the heart of overwhelmingly Roman Catholic Panama three hundred delegates and scores of official visitors. They represented fifty ecclesiastical and missionary organizations interested in achieving co-operative evangelical progress in Latin America. William F. Oldham and John R. Mott, Methodists, were prominent in Congress activities. Fourteen persons, including three Bishops, represented the Board of Foreign Missions at the sessions.

Although a number of participants in the Congress did not hesitate, now and then, to call a spade a spade, the speakers were loyal to a remarkable degree to the announced policy of conciliatory comment on Latin American life and religion. The Panamanian government, having received further explanation of the purpose of the meetings, made certain friendly gestures. Two Panama newspapers gave the Congress substantial news reports and favorable editorial interpretation. The Protestant cause also received a good

deal of publicity when Congress personalities joined with missionary workers to make an extraordinary concentrated presentation of the evangelical message, in dozens of meetings in churches, halls, clubhouses, and military posts throughout the Zone as well as in Panama and Colón. As a part of this effort, Seawall Church held nightly evangelistic services.

The Methodist Episcopal mission benefited, both during and after the event, from the good will the Congress won in the liberal and secular communities, but the Bishop of Panama remained hostile. Pamphlets attacking the "Congress of Missionary Guerrillas" appeared. The clergy preached sermons against the Mission. They and their partisans continued campaigning against patronage of the Colegio by Catholic families, threatening both ecclesiastical sanctions and social ostracism. Two years later, the Bishop was still attacking—publishing in the press an edict against a new mission opened by the Methodists in the interior city of David, and declaring that he would excommunicate parents sending children to the new school there.

The Panama mission felt in 1916 not only the impact of the Panama Congress, but also the influence of several changes in its organization. Harry Compton, in spite of his missionary initiative, had appeared to Bishop Stuntz not to have the stature required by his own large views of the future of the Mission. Therefore he told Compton, who went on furlough in April, that he would not be bringing him back to Panama, but would see that he was transferred elsewhere. In May, William F. Oldham was elected Bishop, and succeeded Bishop Stuntz as the episcopal administrator for Panama. The General Conference at the same time separated the Panama enterprise from the North Andes Mission Conference and officially constituted it the Panama Mission, which was formally organized on 16 November. George A. Miller, an experienced pastor from San Francisco and formerly a missionary in Manila, now took up the superintendency of the Mission, succeeding Compton. When Bishop Oldham enlisted Miller for the Panama post, he frankly told him he would have to go out and raise his own salary (Stuntz had had the allowance for Compton's salary allocated elsewhere). Miller did raise his own salary; he promptly got it underwritten by the Epworth Leagues of the California Conference, and came into the Panama Mission like a northern breeze, breathing vigor, competence, and genial largemindedness.

In the aftermath of the Panama Congress, the Methodists' Panama mission began to work for the first time under a comity agreement—an informal one. Samuel G. Inman, executive secretary of the now permanently constituted Committee on Co-operation in Latin America, came to Panama in April, 1917, a year after the seven major Regional Conferences called to implement the consensus of the Congress that the time had come to develop interdenominational agreements on co-operative field projects and occupation of territory in Latin America. Inman met with some forty white Protestant missionary workers in a session that established a Committee on Co-operation for Panama

and the Canal Zone, of which Charles Ports became secretary. This group appointed a Committee on Survey and Occupation, and from the latter's consultations, informed by a field survey made by Inman, emerged an understanding that the Methodist Episcopal Church would be the recognized group responsible for the Spanish evangelical work in the Republic. The West Indian work was left in what George Miller called its "unorganized, but friendly, confusion."

In another co-operative advance, Miller soon deliberately bettered the Mission's relations with the Union Church people, which had suffered from Harry Compton's sourness towards the Union movement's first church, in Balboa. Instead of accepting realignments in the parochial affiliations of individuals as inevitable, Compton accused the Union Church of stealing the Methodist Episcopal Sunday school in Balboa. And when the Union Church absorbed part of the Seawall American congregation and all of the Seawall American Sunday school children, he regarded it as proselyting. But George Miller at once established cordial and co-operative relations with the Union Church pastor in Balboa, agreeing to preach at the evening services of the Balboa and Pedro Miguel Union Churches alternating with the Union Church man. He continued to give part-time service, especially during later vacancies in Union pastorates. Under Miller's leadership, the services conducted by the Panama Mission became so undenominational in tone that after two years, he could declare that many of the Methodist church members scarcely knew the denominational name under which they were worshiping. Although the Seawall Church was not far from the Balboa Union Church, the two organizations became deliberately noncompetitive, and the former was considered informally as "one link in the chain of churches extending across the isthmus."

Miller's entente with the Union Church group gave him an opening for projection of a second aspect of his (and formerly Stuntz's) policy for the Mission—the development of missions in the interior of the Republic. In David, capital of Chiriquí Province, from thirty-six to sixty hours by cattle boat west from Panama City, lived Eliseo Pena, father of Mrs. Charles W. Ports, who for five years had been holding a Sunday school in his own home. Pena, visiting Panama shortly after Miller's arrival, informed him about religious conditions in the vicinity of David and pleaded for the Mission to send a missionary as soon as possible. Miller presented the opportunity to the Union Church leaders and secured their pledge to support a missionary in David, with the Methodists operating the project. Indeed, the Union Church turned all its benevolence contributions over to the Methodists for work in the Republic.

Late in 1917, a ten-ton shipment of carved and gilded images of saints to be used by Catholic churches and worshipers was routed through Panama City, consigned to David. Miller wrote to the States :

After six months' search, we still have no man there to accompany and counteract ten tons of "saints." Ten tons of gilded superstition, and not one man to preach the white gospel to the Panamanians in their native tongue.

But a man was found at last—Chauncey W. Leonard, a thirty-year-old bachelor with less than a year's missionary experience in Iquique College, in Chile, but with a command of the Spanish language. He reached David at the end of March, soon rented a house, started a Sunday school, began evangelistic work, found the people "ignorant and superstitious," and therefore opened a day school to "influence the coming generations for good."

Since Leonard had no equipment, the Union Churches sent him a ton of furniture and other items. In spite of his meager resources and in the face of Roman Catholic hostility sparked by a visit to David by the Bishop of Panama, Leonard made a good, if small, beginning. But his morale ran low, and he quit the post in January, 1919, resigning as a missionary later in the year. He was succeeded in the spring by Newman M. Powell, a young married man with two years' experience as a student pastor while in Garrett Biblical Institute. Powell, speaking Spanish fluently, continued Leonard's church and Sunday school work and soon raised the day school enrollment to twenty-eight pupils.

Not long after Miller came to Panama, the Mission was tendered, and then lost, an opportunity to open an agricultural mission. The Panamanian government signified its willingness to turn over its agricultural schools, with seventy-five acres of cleared land and several buildings, for the establishment of an experiment station to be directed by the Mission. The Board and Miller himself tried for a number of months to find a trained agriculturalist to head the station, but before they could get a man on the field, the offer lapsed. Bishop Oldham turned down an alternative tender of a valuable piece of unimproved land because to clear and develop the site would require, he said, an initial outlay of \$10,000, plus \$1,000 a year for maintenance.

Miller made a number of exploratory trips on horseback far into the back country in 1917 and 1918. From his observations on these travels came many pages for his book *Prowling in Panama* and also plans for missionary beginnings at specific points, particularly at Santiago and Aguadulce, in southwest central Panama. However, for lack of resources to put additional personnel on the field, the David mission remained the only implementation of this aspect of Miller's policy for the Panama Mission.

Miller moved quickly to realize a third line of policy—a strong emphasis upon education in Panama City, agreed upon with Bishop Oldham before Miller left the States. For several years, the day school attendance at Colegio de Panamá (its new name) had run close to 125, with the pupils still jammed into the basement of the church, and twenty-five or thirty being turned away. There no longer were any American children in the Colegio; the pupils

were almost all Spanish-speaking Panamanians, a number of them receiving free scholarships because of their poverty. Many of the children attended church and Sunday School. Some professed conversion. Miller saw great potentialities in the Colegio, hoping eventually to raise it above its current pre-secondary level and make it a boarding school with a normal department, thus attracting and training young people from the surrounding republics. He was convinced that in the meantime, the school had to be modernized, for some of the methods in use there would "shock an old time district school out of countenance."

When Bishop Oldham came to Panama to organize the Panama Mission, in November, 1916, Miller proposed that the Board be asked for a \$15,000 loan to erect a new building for schoolrooms and missionary quarters close to the rear of Seawall Church. Oldham approved; and the Board co-operated. By mid-April, construction of a three-story building affording an outdoor gymnasium, three classrooms, and residential accommodations for the superintendent's family and for additional teachers was nearing completion. The expanded facilities made possible expansion of the staff, regrading of classes, the opening of a well-equipped kindergarten, and a start on organization of a music department. The day-school attendance rose to 180, and a new night school enrolled fifty pupils. In 1919, the Colegio graduated its first eighth-grade pupils.

Another strain of policy agreed upon by Oldham and Miller at the time of Miller's assignment to the Isthmus resulted in extending the Panama Mission beyond its Disciplinary jurisdiction. In 1917, Miller opened a mission in the neighboring republic Costa Rica, which fell within the purview of the Bishop administering the Mexico Conference. Miller's superintendency was stretched to cover the new enterprise, which became a phase of the Panama Mission, under the Bishop assigned to South America. This functional extension of the Panama Mission came at the very time that it was cut away from the North Andes Mission Conference and given independent status because of its practical remoteness from the rest of the Conference. The maintenance of missionary personnel in Panama was for some years complicated by the sharing of workers, in one pattern or another, with Costa Rica. Its administratively unorthodox relationship to two episcopal areas became practically confusing.

A further extension of the Mission's activity—this time unplanned—occurred in 1918, when the Chinese National League sought George Miller's assistance with the education of their children, some of whom had been attending the Colegio. The League wanted to have them learn both Chinese and English. Miller co-operated in opening a day school in the League's own rooms, assigning his college-age daughter Evelyn as the first teacher in charge of the English classes. By the end of the year, there were twenty-five pupils in the day school and nineteen in an evening section for adults.

Capitalizing on this new contact, Evelyn visited the homes of her pupils and organized a Chinese Sunday school reporting seventy-seven attendants. Miller felt that this was a promising opening and that the Board should generously undergird the work among Panama's 3,000 Chinese by supplying school equipment and personnel. In 1919, the Board sent down Grace L. Alvord to succeed Evelyn Miller in the Chinese school in Panama.

The Mission arrived at no definitive policy on West Indian work. Since the future of the West Indian population could not be clearly defined, Bishop Oldham favored a co-operative approach that would make little distinction between the British Wesleyan and the American Methodist work—an "honest commingling of our joint endeavors, carrying out a program settled by joint counsel." Oldham's chief interest in the West Indian mission seemed to lie in the potentiality of the English-speaking West Indian evangelicals as "an immediate channel of religious communication with the Panamanian people" in general in the ultimate evangelization of the country. As long as both denominations continued their work, the American Methodists should confine theirs, believed Oldham, to the strategic West Indian center in Guachapalí and to locations outside the Zone where West Indian life should clearly be found merging with Panamanian society. Corresponding Secretary Frank Mason North concurred without reservation in Oldham's view.

Miller, however, moved in the opposite direction. He already had renewed the Methodist effort in Red Tank, in 1917, through the efforts of a West Indian lay preacher named Artemus Odle and of Esther Macomber, a new American teacher at Panama College. Miller had secured, from the Canal Zone authorities, a site for a church in Red Tank, the mission meetings in the meantime being held in the local schoolhouse. And he already had visited, in April, 1917, the headquarters of the Board of Home Missions and Church Extension, in Philadelphia, asking for Church Extension aid for "Black work" on the Zone and in Colón and Panama City, which were just off the Zone. He wanted funds particularly for building small churches on the Mission's lots in the segregated towns La Boca and Red Tank. Miller's case for intervention by the Department of Church Extension was that the West Indian work, including that in Colón and Panama, was essentially Zone work, and so lay within the sphere of the United States government—the usual criterion of eligibility for Church Extension aid. Instead of justifying West Indian work by its eventual usefulness in evangelizing the general population, as Oldham did, Miller claimed that it was a problem separate from that of the mission to native Panamanians.

In spite of the deliberate hesitation of the Bishop and of the Corresponding Secretary, Miller, whom the latter characterized as "an effective missionary and minister who when he wants anything, wants it," continued to campaign for Church Extension aid by firing at the Philadelphia office a series of what David D. Forsyth, Corresponding Secretary of the Home board, called "red

hot" letters. Since Forsyth and North both were cool to Miller's more or less abusive promotional tactics and also to his proposal, no Church Extension funds became available for "Black work" (Miller's term). Miller also sought special gifts for his West Indian projects, but aid came too late. Early in 1918, the Zone authorities, at the instigation of the Episcopal rector in Ancon, withdrew the use of the Red Tank schoolhouse from the Red Tank church—now grown to a membership of fifty, with a hundred Sunday school pupils and a strong Epworth League. The Mission, said Miller, "had to abandon the field, to our shame and disgrace." Similarly, the plan for work in La Boca had to be discarded, and part of the mission property in Colón was taken back by the Zone authorities as a result of Methodist failure to reopen the Negro work there.

But through all, the Guachapalí undertaking, except for one interim, maintained momentum. Even Oldham became loyal to it, though on his visit to Panama in February, 1916, he had broached, in Mrs. Harry Compton's hearing, the possibility of terminating it. Mrs. Compton earnestly protested, defending the Guachapalí mission by appealing both to the volume of unmet spiritual need among the Guachapalí Negroes and to the opportunity for Christian evangelism and teaching it offered to American Methodist laymen, who were useless in the approach to the Spanish community. And she pointed to a minority of Spanish-speaking West Indian parishioners, as well as some Spanish pupils of Elsie Keyser's who would someday serve (was this the seed of Oldham's later view?) as a bridge for the evangelical message to the Spanish population. George Miller brought Oldham down to Guachapalí on his first episcopal visit later in the year, and what the new Bishop saw there clinched—policy or no policy—his interest in the work centered in the crowded slum church building. He and Miller decided spontaneously to send Elsie Keyser to the States in 1917 to raise money for desperately needed building expansion.

The new building addition, which provided two schoolrooms and a teacher's room, was ready in time for the opening of the school year in May, 1918. The attendance kept up well; in 1919, there were four teachers in charge of 110 pupils. The English and Spanish Sunday schools reached even more children—as many as 341 in 1918.

It was the congregational life of the Guachapalí church that suffered serious interruption, by a defection inspired by George N. Tylerbest, the personable young Negro preacher from Trinidad who became its pastor in 1915 under the sponsorship of James M. Taylor.

Tylerbest was a good preacher and built up church attendance. But he was an egotist who rated himself far above the rest of the West Indians in Guachapalí. He affected the aristocratic style—dressing well, avoiding all appearance of doing menial labor (he would not even carry a parcel), and declining to eat with his own parishioners. For his colleagues and their work he had

frequent criticism and was especially quick to complain that the Panama Mission was treating him badly. Evidently it was difficult to get any work out of him outside the pulpit. His three successive superintendents (Compton, Ports, and Miller) found him hard to handle, for Tylerbest knew that James Taylor, not the Board, paid his salary.

Although Tylerbest treated them like servants, he won firm allegiance from his Negro parishioners. Elsie Keyser testified, "The people love him and wait on him hand and foot." To them he carried his complaints about the Mission. According to Ports, he was given to talking about the white God as against the black God and to acting in other ways that accentuated the race question.

By the spring of 1918, Tylerbest was leading a "revolution" in the church, as Miller put it. Miller ordered him to go home to Trinidad and offered him passage money. To try to terminate what had become a disgraceful and otherwise incurable congregational row, Miller suspended services, hoping that Tylerbest would leave town. Instead, Tylerbest broke his promise to depart, gathered his followers under his personal leadership, and took them out of the Mission and organized an independent movement. This exodus drew off nearly the entire church membership, thus contributing to that feature of West Indian church life on the Isthmus which Samuel G. Inman characterized in 1917 as "the disadvantage of a number of little, irresponsible movements which come and go."

Miller and his Mission colleagues reopened services after a few weeks—the Sunday school and the day school had not closed—and began building a new congregation. By the end of the summer of 1919, the badly depleted membership rose to thirty-four, and the church (it was now called Grace Church) was beginning to make a comeback.

In the spring of the same year, however, George Miller had reversed his position, at least temporarily, on the advisability of conducting West Indian mission work on the Isthmus. He suggested to the Board the possibility of trading the West Indian mission there to the British Wesleyans in return for their practically defunct mission interests in Haiti, which was then under a kind of protectorate by the United States. Influenced, at least in part, by the troublesome prospect of having to administer the weakened Guachapalí project without Elsie Keyser, its acknowledged mainstay, who was being sent home on health leave, Miller said, "I would be glad to exchange our Panama W.I. work [for] almost anything." But such a swap was never realized; some of the denomination's leaders entertained the presumption that Haiti was more naturally a home mission field, and the initiative on the Haiti question, furthermore, was taken up by the interdenominational Committee on Co-operation in Latin America.

During Miller's administration, the Methodist mission, the only one in touch with the Spanish-speaking population, made some progress in Spanish

work close to the Zone. To be sure, it petered out in Colón in 1917, after Gabino Arandilla, appointed pastor in 1915, went to the United States in 1916 to attend Taylor University. And the work was revived only briefly in 1918 by Raymond E. Marshall, a Methodist serving as pastor of the Union Church at Gatun. But in 1917, Marian Eastman and Mary E. Oakes, two young American teachers recently brought to Panama College by George Miller, went into the crowded Santa Ana working-class quarter of Panama and by house-to-house calling and contacts on the streets, rapidly built up a new Sunday school. The Wesleyan Methodists granted the young women the use of the school building devoted to their own West Indian work. Charles Ports reinforced this new beginning by starting a Sunday preaching service. Spanish preaching also was renewed in the Guachapalí church in 1917.

The Spanish group at Seawall Church gradually became more fully organized, taking on the shape of a typical Methodist church in the United States. In 1917, it added to its staff a Bible woman, Mrs. Maria Mendieta, a convert from Catholicism, who visited from house to house reading the Bible and praying. The Spanish membership was tripled; in 1915 there were 38 members, in 1919 there were 122. At the same time, the English-speaking membership declined to 23 persons.

When Charles Ports, the church's perennial Spanish-language preacher, went home to the United States in 1918—as it turned out, not to serve again in Panama—he relinquished the responsibility for the Spanish preaching schedule to Julio Paz Rodríguez, a newspaperman from Venezuela, who had been converted under his influence. Rodríguez, who had taken up teaching bookkeeping in the Colegio, did some of the preaching himself. From this time on, the Spanish congregation's preachers generally were men whose native tongue was Spanish. The first of them was Gabino Arandilla, the converted priest, who became available when he returned from the United States in the summer of 1918. The second was Eduardo Zapata, the member of the Mexico Conference who had helped George Miller project Methodism into Costa Rica in 1917. Zapata came to Seawall Church as the Spanish pastor in the spring of 1919.

Spanish work thus was under way at three different centers in Panama City—Seawall Church, the Santa Ana mission, and Grace Church, Guachapalí—each with a preaching service and a Sunday school.

For a third of his tenure as Superintendent (a little more than two years and a half) George Miller was absent from the field. In April, 1917, he sailed for the United States to consult the Board on Panama policy and to raise funds to supplement the regular appropriation for Panama. Returning to Panama late in August, he was off again, in October, for the fortnight's exploration of Costa Rica during which he and Eduardo Zapata prepared for the opening of the new mission there. Less than a year later, he spent six months in the United States participating in the Centenary campaign. During

this absence, Ulysses S. Brown, an experienced member of the Northwest Kansas Conference, served for several months as Superintendent *ad interim*. Miller came back to Panama in mid-April, only to leave again two months later, to become Area Secretary for South America in the Centenary movement. Brown returned from the States in August, 1919, and succeeded Miller as Superintendent of the Panama Mission.

Miller's two visits to the United States were financially productive for the Panama Mission. Harry Compton, his predecessor as Superintendent, had gone to work in Panama in 1911 on a \$2,300 appropriation. In 1914, the appropriation rose to \$3,800, and it remained at that figure through Miller's first year. When the appropriation went up to \$4,500 for 1918, and \$5,700 for 1919, it covered not only the enterprise on the Isthmus, but also the new activity in Costa Rica. Except for the independently derived funds handled by James M. Taylor, special gifts did not significantly enhance the Mission's financial position until Miller's time. But Miller, drawing principally upon Methodist sources in California, raised enough money in special gifts from outside Panama to enable the Mission to budget far larger sums than the amounts appropriated by the Board. In 1919, for instance, the planned expenditures for Panama and Costa Rica together were based, along with other factors, on special-gift pledges amounting to \$13,000, compared with the regular appropriation of \$5,700.

When Miller left the Mission in 1919, its constituency still was small; fourteen years after Carl N. Vance opened his little mission school, there were 179 church members, 65 probationers, and 447 Sunday school pupils in all. But the supplementary financing supplied by Miller's direct efforts made it possible for him to increase the Mission's staff to maintain it. When he arrived in Panama, the Mission had six missionaries and one other worker; when he left, there were a dozen missionaries and five other workers.

Miller's term indeed was short, but it was the beginning of what ultimately became a long personal association with the Panama Mission and its interests. Although Miller attributed some of the weakness of the Mission at this period to its own inadequacies, he was far from optimistic about the human material at hand in the native Panamanian population. After eight months on the field, he had told Secretary North that he agreed with Bishop Oldham's view that "in Panama, we have the Latin-American at his worst." Miller saw the Panamanians in sharp contrast with the Costa Ricans, who were "white, intelligent, progressive and energetic . . ." When he complained that the Mission had not produced a single Christian worker in a decade, and would not produce one in Panama "in a thousand years, without some miracle now unforeseen," Miller was thinking about the quality of the people available. For Miller, there were at this time two *raisons d'être* for the Methodist Episcopal mission in Panama—the strategic location of the Isthmus, and "the desperate moral depths and degradation of the people."

Costa Rica

Central America first appeared in the *Discipline* of the Methodist Episcopal Church in 1896, when the General Conference augmented the definition of the Mexico Conference by providing that "it shall also include Central America." But no official Methodist missionaries appeared in Central America until George A. Miller, superintendent of the Panama Mission, and Eduardo Zapata, a member of the Mexico Conference, went to Costa Rica in 1917 to reconnoiter that small republic for its evangelical potentialities.

Of course, even earlier than 1896, there had been unofficial Methodist forerunners of Miller and Zapata.

For about five years, beginning in 1881, John E. Wright, a young minister from the East Maine Conference, labored in San José, the Costa Rican capital, under the initial sponsorship of William Taylor, Methodism's globe-trotting independent practitioner of "self-supporting missions." In addition to developing a school, Wright held the pastorate of Costa Rica's first Protestant church, the interdenominational, English-speaking Church of the Good Shepherd, founded in 1848 by the city's small community of American and European Protestants. Another Methodist, Andrew J. Church, an experienced member of the New England Southern Conference, served as pastor of the church for two years, 1892-94.

From 1892 to 1907, a third Methodist, Francis G. Penzotti, the veteran American Bible Society colporteur and agent, made annual visits to Costa Rica, scattering Bibles, and preaching, through the country—the first consistent effort to bring the Bible to the people. On his first visit, he allied himself with William W. McConnell, who had arrived the year before as a missionary of the Central American Mission, recently founded by Cyrus I. Scofield, editor of *The Scofield Reference Bible* and teacher of the dispensational interpretation of the Bible. With Penzotti's encouragement, McConnell, who could speak little Spanish, opened Spanish-speaking services in the San José home of a Costa Rican liberal. Penzotti preached at the first meetings, and won many converts. This was the first move of its kind made in Costa Rica by a foreign missionary group. From this time on, Penzotti and McConnell worked closely together in spreading the evangelical message through the rest of the country.

When the Methodists finally came officially into the picture in 1917, they and the other evangelicals benefited alike from the Constitutional toleration accorded non-Roman Catholic religious groups in Costa Rica. From the time of the first national constitution (1844) and even earlier, although the Roman religion was recognized as that of the state, tacit toleration of other cults was in effect except for a Constitutional ban on public exercise of non-Roman religion that was enacted in 1847 and revoked in 1848. From 1869, the policy

of toleration was expressly stated in the Constitution. The revision of 1882 provided:

Article 51: The Catholic Apostolic Roman religion is that of the State, which contributes to its maintenance without hindering the free exercise in the republic of any other cult that does not oppose universal morals nor good customs.

The Constitutional latitude thus granted to Protestants and evangelicals was a product of the power of the liberal movement in nineteenth-century Costa Rican politics. Though not disestablishing the Roman Church, the liberals' anti-clerical energies had drastically curbed by the last quarter of the century the public powers exercised by the Church in the colonial period. And the liberals had early supported religious toleration as a condition of encouraging immigration from Protestant countries, which they believed was valuable for the economic development of the country.

Quadrennium after quadrennium, Central America retained its formal position in the *Discipline*. Both as Secretary and as Bishop, Homer C. Stuntz hoped for eventual Methodist expansion in Central America from Panama (not from Mexico, which John W. Butler of the Mexico Conference claimed was the preferred base for such a movement). But neither he nor any other official planner for the Board of Foreign Missions brought any concrete project for Costa Rica to the point of active consideration by the Board. Secretary S. Earl Taylor, after discussing Central America with Bishop Stuntz, brought to the General Committee in November, 1914, a working paper on South America that included a none too definitely articulated statement of a strategy for Central America. But the paper remained unprocessed in the hopper of a subcommittee of the General Committee.

Evidently, the Costa Rica mission was conceived on the spur of the moment in a public meeting in California in the summer of 1916. Dan B. Brummitt, editor of *The Epworth Herald*, was standing on the platform at an assembly of the Asilomar Epworth League Institute. Beside him was a blackboard, and on the board a chalk map of the Panama Canal. Before him were five hundred Epworth Leaguers and their leaders, from both the Northern church and the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, volunteering pledges to finance sending George A. Miller, their fellow Californian, as a missionary to Panama. As the pledges were announced, Brummitt chalked off sections of the Canal at \$25.00 a mile. Miller wrote later:

The Southern Methodists made the first subscription and we were soon across the Isthmus and out in the Atlantic Ocean. "Where do we go from here?" Dan wanted to know and no one had the answer 'till he said, "Well, let's go to Costa Rica and start a mission there!" And we nearly reached Port Limon with over thirteen hundred dollars in good pledges. The total amount required, of \$1,800, was subsequently paid. No one had heard of

the country, but within a year and a half I was there founding the Costa Rica Mission.

Beginning at Asilomar, George Miller became the carrier of the Costa Rica idea. He conveyed it first to Bishop William F. Oldham. Upon hearing of the financial assurances given at Asilomar, the Bishop had at once revived a previously suspended plan of his to make Miller the superintendent of the Panama mission. The Board promptly authorized Miller's outgoing, but took no cognizance officially of any plan for Costa Rica. Miller came to an understanding with the Bishop, however, that it might become desirable for him to make a move from Panama into work "in Central America."

Home from Panama, Miller presented the case for work in Costa Rica at a meeting of the Board's Executive Committee in New York in April, 1917. The Committee authorized the opening of a Costa Rica station, provided that both the station and its missionary could be supported from sources outside the Board's regular appropriations. The Committee acknowledged that any such mission would belong, by Disciplinary definition, to the Mexico Conference. But it recognized that the new mission would be more closely related geographically to Panama, whose Methodist leaders were supplying the initiative for its founding. In attempting to reconcile these two factors, the Committee largely forsook technicality for supposed practicality; it arranged to have the new mission established and operated as an extension of the Panama Mission, leaving it to the Corresponding Secretaries and the two Bishops concerned—Francis J. McConnell for Mexico, and William F. Oldham for Panama—to make appropriate administrative adjustments. Thus, formal responsibility for the Costa Rica project was divided among administrators resident, respectively, in New York, Denver, and Buenos Aires, but the task of practical organization fell to Miller as superintendent of the Panama Mission.

Miller at once began to line up personnel for Costa Rica. He took up an offer by Bishop McConnell to release Eduardo Zapata, an able and experienced Mexican preacher, from his duties as superintendent of the Oaxaca District in Mexico and to assign him temporarily to Costa Rica under Miller's supervision. Miller also secured, with Bishop Oldham's approval, the appointment of Sidney W. Edwards, a former missionary in Puerto Rico, as missionary evangelist for Panama and Costa Rica under contract with the Board. It was agreed that Zapata's support should be provided by the Mexico Conference, and his transit expenses by the Board. Secretary Frank Mason North arranged to have transferred to the Costa Rica work a special gift of \$1,000 at first offered for Mexico.

Bishop McConnell's cabled appointment of Zapata to Costa Rica caught the Oaxaca superintendent by surprise. Four of his colleagues brought him three encyclopedia articles, thus briefed him on the unfamiliar country to the

south, and persuaded him to accept his assignment. Leaving his family in revolution-torn Mexico, Zapata went down to Panama City in mid-September, helped out with evangelistic work there for a month, and then sailed from Colón for Costa Rica with George Miller.

After two days, the two missionary scouts landed in Puerto Limón, Costa Rica's chief seaport, in the eastern coastal lowlands. The region was inhabited largely by West Indian Negroes, among whom Zapata and Miller did not linger, for they already were well evangelized by Baptists and by British Wesleyans. Zapata and his companion pressed on by rail into the central uplands, to San José, the national capital, arriving there on 14 October.

Their first move, begun the next day, was to seek a co-operative relationship with the 61-year-old head of the Central American Mission, Francis W. Boyle, an impressive and attractive personality, a well respected figure among evangelicals. Dr. Scofield, the Mission's leader in the United States, had assured Secretary North, in answer to a friendly letter, that Boyle would give Zapata a warm fraternal welcome.

Boyle did receive Miller and Zapata with a measure of cordiality at first. The three men held three conferences within a week. At the beginning, Boyle was willing to entertain a plan for dividing the country into two areas of missionary occupation on a north-to-south axis running through San José. But he confessed his fear that Zapata and the capable Spanish-speaking preachers he thought might follow Zapata from Mexico would capture the members of his own congregation; for Boyle realized the disadvantage of his being neither a Latin American nor a fluent speaker in Spanish. He also feared that the Methodists would form churches whose ceremonies and pastoral ministries would draw away his people. His fears were not entirely groundless; Zapata preached twice to Boyle's San José congregation, and aroused much interest in Methodism among attendants not wholeheartedly committed to the theory or the practice of Boyle's own type of dispensationalism.

The conferences with Boyle finally became heated. He withdrew his tentative assent to the idea of territorial comity, and announced his disapproval of all movements looking toward union of program or work. Boyle claimed that he was one of the world's few trustworthy interpreters of the Bible, described his church as the sole depository of faith and truth (so Zapata reported), and accused all the evangelical denominations of heresy and apostasy. He trained his fire on the Methodist Episcopal Church in particular, charging it with showing a trend toward unbelief and with including in its Disciplinary course of studies for preachers materials making for godless religion. Boyle predicted that friction and discord would result from Methodist intrusion into Costa Rica. Conceding that Miller and Zapata were not coming as religious aggressors, Boyle frankly stated that the trouble would probably come from his side, for he would feel bound by conscience to oppose them and the work they might establish.

Zapata and Miller made an earnest and patient effort, during the week of conferences, to find some basis of co-operation with Boyle, but finally were frustrated by his intransigence.

Through no fault of their own, Zapata and Miller's overture to Francis Boyle had been badly timed. The leaders of the Central American Mission were currently estranged from the developing co-operative missionary movement as represented, for instance, by the Panama Congress of 1916. On the field, Boyle himself, since his succession to leadership in 1912, had made dispensationalism a more radically exclusivist and disruptive religious influence than it had been under William W. McConnell's eighteen years' service. Boyle promoted an extensive elaboration of dispensational ideas known as Hyper-Dispensationalism, or Bullingerism, which set up divisive reactions both within his own mission and among evangelicals outside it. The Boyleites held to their unorthodox views of the Church, their premillennialism, and their peculiar and intricate eschatological position so intensely and dogmatically that they became habitual attackers of more orthodox churchmen and churches. They were given to branding the others as formalists, legalists, and Judaizers. And to cap it all, Francis Boyle—significantly for Zapata and Miller's hope for co-operation—was at odds just then with the Central American Mission's sponsoring board in the United States.

Zapata and Miller did not confine themselves to negotiations with Boyle, but sought other contacts, exploring Alajuela and Heredia to the west of the capital, and Cartago to the east. In Cartago they met J. A. Dunkum, a self-supporting Nazarene worker, formerly a minister of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South and an employee of the American Bible Society on the Panama Canal Zone. Dunkum cordially welcomed the two Methodists and put them in touch with a number of local secular liberals and evangelicals. He and his friends also sponsored several evening evangelistic meetings presenting Zapata and his colleague in Dunkum's home, with police protection provided by the Provincial governor on the missionaries' request. Daytimes, he and Zapata visited homes in Cartago, and also surveyed the neighboring towns on horseback, envisioning the preaching circuits that could be laid out in the area. When they left Cartago, they carried with them an urgent invitation from the Dunkum coterie and others to begin public evangelism in the city at once.

Miller parted from Zapata in San José on 27 October, riding muleback through the jungle to Almirante, Panama, and there taking passage to Cristóbal by fruit boat.

The two men had learned a good deal about Francis Boyle's plans and methods. He expected to evangelize the country in about three years, and he wanted to have the field quite to himself while doing it. But to him, evangelizing Costa Rica meant simply giving every Costa Rican an opportunity to hear the gospel preached—if only once. What happened among the hearers

after that would be each man's own spiritual responsibility; in Boyle's missionary strategy there was no room for a serious, continuing effort to assimilate, organize, and educate converts.

For this reason, therefore, and others, Miller and Zapata did not hesitate to recommend the establishment of a Methodist mission; missionaries would be warmly welcomed by numerous unorganized evangelicals, a number of liberals were receptive, the Constitutional guarantee of religious tolerance would make for protection of Methodist mission activities, and religious "fanaticism" was confined, insofar as it existed, mostly to country districts. Miller himself, who believed that the Costa Ricans were a choice people among Latin Americans, reported to the Board that Costa Rica was a uniquely open and promising field—"dead ripe" for quick results.

Zapata spent six weeks more in Costa Rica after Miller's departure, making San José his base of operation. Here Francis Boyle and his closest co-workers repeatedly attacked the Methodists, declaring that they had the spirit of false prophets, of the anti-Christ. These attacks backfired; they aroused curiosity about Methodism on the part of people who had heard Zapata preach in Boyle's own church. As a result, visitors began appearing at Zapata's hotel room, pursuing their interest in the Methodist movement and finally showing their enthusiasm for it. When Zapata's room could no longer accommodate the growing number of inquirers, he accepted an invitation to hold meetings in the home of a man named Modesto Le Roy. There Zapata directed Bible study and explained Methodist teaching, the value of the Methodist discipline, and the strength of Methodism as a world movement. Attendance rose to a peak of fifty-two at the final session.

On Sunday mornings, Zapata traveled out from San José to Cartago by train to continue preaching in Dunkum's home, where the small company inside the house was augmented by listeners standing in the street outside the windows. Zapata also visited the towns of Desamparados, San Pedro, Guadalupe, San Rafael, La Goría, Santa Cruz, Turrialba, and Siquirres, as well as the ports of Puntarenas (on the Pacific) and Puerto Limón (on the Caribbean).

Everywhere he went, he found evidence of diligent work by the colporteurs of the American Bible Society. In Santa Cruz, he was invited to return to start a church and a school. The Negro Baptists in Turrialba offered the use of their church building for inauguration of Methodist work among the Spanish-speaking people. And back in San José, some of Zapata's informal following, being content neither with a non-Roman movement centered in Boyleism nor with public education that included Roman Catholic teaching, pledged support for an evangelical mission under Methodist auspices. Twenty-eight of them signed a petition, framed by Modesto Le Roy, asking the Mexico Conference to establish a Methodist church in Costa Rica.

On 1 November, Zapata's explorations were briefly interrupted by an un-

explained arrest and confinement in the military prison in Cartago, where he was held incommunicado. Through the intervention of the mayor, an evangelical who responded to an appeal by Francis Boyle, Zapata was released some hours later and then was ordered deported from Costa Rica. The order was withdrawn, however, when the Mexican Legation vouched for Zapata. Some of his evangelical friends attributed the arrest to the machination of some Cartago priest turned informer—an interpretation Zapata evidently was content not to press to a conclusion in his own mind. It was a turbulent moment in Costa Rican politics, and Zapata undoubtedly was only an incidental, temporary victim of the attempt of a highly security-conscious governmental regime to protect itself against the numerous foreigners it felt were serving as subversive couriers.

Confirmed in his view that the Board of Foreign Missions should go forward and evangelize Costa Rica—"Divine Providence has called Methodism to take up this glorious work"—Zapata left Costa Rica for Mexico on 16 December. His funds were low, he was committed to the Costa Rica assignment for only a few months anyhow, and he was bothered about possible difficulties in wartime travel by sea.

There was no lag in implementing the Zapata-Miller recommendation to the Board. Sidney W. Edwards, already lined up by Miller some months earlier, got off the train in San José at four o'clock on Tuesday afternoon, 22 January 1918, found himself a hotel room, went out and looked up Modesto Le Roy, went back to the hotel for supper, returned to Le Roy's at eight, and held a prayer meeting with five people. The next night, Edwards held another prayer meeting in the Le Roy home, with twelve present. Following a careful explanation of membership in the Methodist Episcopal Church, all twelve stepped forward and stood in a semicircle around Edwards to signify their candidacy for membership—"twelve as bright conversions as I have ever seen," said Edwards, who also saw the streets and alleys of San José as "just full of humanity needing salvation." This he called the beginning of the Methodist Episcopal Church in Costa Rica. Prayer meetings continued nightly at Modesto Le Roy's, winning more converts—young men and women—until on his first weekend in Costa Rica, Edwards received twenty-five probationers.

Edwards then left for Cartago, where he held several services, won a few converts, and formed the nucleus of a second congregation. He made his third opening shortly afterwards in Heredia, beginning preaching services in a hall supplied rent free by a local sympathizer. Seven or eight "bright conversions" occurred there.

In San José, Edwards soon rented a house, and fitted it out with benches, tables, and other equipment useful for church activities. Expenditures for these and other necessities completely exhausted his supply of cash. (Essentially because of bungling in the New York office, Edwards was left in

Costa Rica for three months without a remittance from the Board.) By the middle of April, the small hall could hold hardly half the people attending services, the rest of them clustering outside the door and the windows to listen. There were now more than a hundred candidates and probationers associated with the San José church.

Secretary North found reports of Edwards' fervent and successful evangelistic activities rather disconcerting. "While we greatly desire immediate results in all fields," he wrote to George Miller, "the laying of substantial foundation is rather more important." Possibly he did not give due weight to the fact that almost all Edwards's "conversions" during these months were not from Roman Catholicism, but from a position of friendliness to the evangelical cause. A hundred rapid conversions straight from Catholicism would indeed have made the most hopeful—or skeptical—Protestant administrator sit up and take notice. Miller shared the Secretary's anxiety about Edwards's "tremendous evangelistic activity." He replied to North, "That sort of work is sure to smash, unless organized and trained most carefully . . ." And he did not expect Edwards to work carefully.

But when Miller visited San José, in May, he got a completely different slant on Edwards's work methods, and observed to Secretary North:

He is doing one of the finest bits of organizing and training work that I have seen anywhere. He is following the discipline literally and developing a church on strictly old-fashioned, John Wesley, class-meeting lines. He has seven classes with leaders and the leaders report every week on every member and collect the contributions.

Edwards inaugurated this class meeting system at the very beginning of the San José enterprise. And he complemented it with a Bible class for the small number of young men who began offering themselves as preachers and special Christian workers. Miller found that Edwards had enlisted half a dozen men who were promising material for Local Preachers. Three or four of them were already going out into the country to preach, meeting some of the requests early brought to Edwards by visitors from towns near San José. Before long, there were Methodist beginnings in Alajuela and San Sebastián.

The chief aim of Miller's trip to Costa Rica was to see what could be done about buying a suitable mission property in San José. He found a new club building, excellently located on Central Avenue, which he believed was admirably adaptable to the needs of the mission, including space for developing missionary living quarters. Miller took an option which provided for immediate occupancy, and ownership was accomplished for \$4,000 two months later on the basis of an advance of \$5,000 from the Board towards purchase and improvements. The Board planned to cover the total requirement for the property by including \$10,000 in the Centenary askings.

To the acquisition of the new mission center Miller attributed an en-

couraging development of interest in Methodism by a number of civic, academic, and commercial people who came from a large group of better educated men who already had broken inwardly with the faith of conventional Roman Catholicism. Their emergence compensated for the recent hostile departure of a dozen former attendants of the Central American Mission services who at first had gone along with the Methodists. Miller, who counted their exodus as an unmixed blessing, reported that it left in the Methodist group not a single person ever connected with any other Costa Rica mission.

Charles W. Ports and his wife came to Costa Rica as missionary reinforcements at the end of April, 1919, following a furlough from service in Panama. He became the financial officer for the Costa Rica enterprise and pastor of the San José church and also was assigned responsibility for developing educational work in the capital city. Sidney Edwards, although continuing to reside in San José, now concentrated his efforts on the mission activity outside the capital, which was referred to in the Panama Mission's list of appointments as the Cartago Circuit.

Edwards traveled to Panama City in August for the session of the Panama Mission, which was attended by George Miller, the retiring Superintendent, and Ulysses S. Brown, his successor. Reports showed that preliminary missionary work was under way in Heredia, and organized work in Alajuela, Cartago, and San José. Cartago reported four probationers and a Sunday school enrollment of thirty-eight pupils. San José had thirty-five probationers, twenty-four full members, and seventy-nine Sunday school pupils.

Shortly afterwards, Brown visited San José and held Costa Rica's first Methodist Quarterly Conference. Brown found that in addition to the members and probationers, the San José church had a number of candidates and more than two hundred adherents. The Quarterly Conference licensed three Exhorters, and a Costa Rican woman was engaged for informal social, or deaconess, work in connection with the San José constituency. At this period, Edwards had a young Costa Rican assistant in residence in Cartago. In the fall, he started a small day school. Both Miller and Brown reported "persecution" of Methodist workers in this city, but did not describe the nature or extent of it.

New Missions in Old Europe

The Continental Pattern

In Europe, in strongholds of three powerful communions with many millions of members and deep historical roots—Roman Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, and Protestant—there lived in 1896 about forty thousand members of the Methodist Episcopal Church. They were natives of Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Russia, Switzerland, and Bulgaria, but their religious persuasion was a relatively late importation from England by way of the United States, the first Methodist missionary to the Continent having arrived there less than fifty years before. These scattered Methodists were organized in Conferences or Missions under the authority of the General Conference developed and controlled by the American Methodists.

Five of these groupings (North Germany, South Germany, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland) were full Annual Conferences that hardly wore the appearance of foreign missions. They had no corps of American missionaries to link them to the New York headquarters of the Missionary Society or to exercise control or responsibility in their affairs. European District Superintendents supervised the work, and European pastors had local responsibility for it. To be sure, a visiting Bishop from the United States presided over the Conferences and made the ministerial appointments, but he was a General Superintendent, not a Missionary Bishop. From 1900, when the Bishop became resident in Europe, his assignment to Zurich differed only geographically from that of a Bishop assigned to residence in Boston or in Buffalo. Each European Annual Conference enjoyed the same kind of autonomy under the Discipline as did the Kansas or the Kentucky Conference.

The single practical mark of the foreign mission status of these five Conferences was their common financial dependency upon the resources of the American church—a typical vestigial condition of otherwise matured missions. The Conference Treasurer and the Finance Committee were the symbols of this relationship; they were designated not by the Conference, but by the Board of Managers in New York. In this respect, at least, the Annual Conferences in Europe lacked the full measure of autonomy possessed by

similar Conferences in the United States. The substance of this transatlantic dependency was the regularly recurring appropriations allocated by the General Missionary Committee. But even these were not unique to foreign missions, for financial allocations and grants constantly were flowing into the home missions fields in the United States.

A sixth Annual Conference, the Italy Conference, differed from the others in being augmented by the presence of a missionary corps from the United States, which was headed by an American serving as Superintendent. The Finance Committee, appointed by the Board of Managers, here was under the dominance of the missionaries from abroad. The Bulgaria mission, which was organized as a Mission Conference, also was directed by missionaries according to a similar pattern. The Denmark and the Finland and St. Petersburg enterprises received no missionaries from America at this time. Since they were designated as Missions, their ecclesiastical powers were few, but they also were free of direct and continuing foreign dominance. They were partially supported, however, by appropriations from the Missionary Society, as were all the missions in Europe.

A few adjustments were made in the organizational arrangements during the first two decades of the twentieth century, but the most significant change was the penetration of three countries not previously cultivated by American Methodists. Austria-Hungary became a Methodist Episcopal field in 1897, France in 1907, and Spain in 1919.

The quadrennium beginning in 1896 was the last in which the European missions were administered by nonresident Bishops. Bishop Daniel A. Goodsell, resident in Chattanooga, visited them in 1896 and 1897. Bishop John M. Walden, resident in Cincinnati, came in 1898 and 1899.

Bishop John H. Vincent became in 1900 the first residential episcopal leader of the Europe missions. The General Conference designated Zurich, Switzerland, as the episcopal residence, and the Board of Bishops assigned Vincent to it for the quadrennium. Following him, in 1904, came Bishop William Burt, elected Bishop that year while serving as a District Superintendent in Italy. His successor, in 1912, was Bishop John L. Nuelsen, born in Switzerland and educated in the United States. These men, unlike their predecessors, were able to concentrate upon the needs and the opportunities facing the European missions and to serve as informed liaison between them and the American church.

Improvement that it was, the new residential plan could not remove, however, certain difficulties inherent in the post. The Bishops all had language problems. Burt could handle Italian and knew some German, and German was a familiar language for Nuelsen, but sooner or later each of the three men had to work with Conference and Mission personnel whose language they could not share. By 1920, full communication would have required communication in at least Norwegian, Swedish, Danish, Finnish, Russian, Ger-

man, French, Italian, Bulgarian, and Spanish. Also, even under the new arrangement, the Bishop was resident, strictly speaking, in only one of the countries under his supervision. This had some advantages for a leader expected to bring international orientation to the various missions, but it also left him, for almost all his missions, an outsider and a man still somewhat far away. The full unfortunate potentiality of the multinational character of European Methodism burst into reality about the head of Bishop Nuelsen in 1914, when suddenly the World War broke up his one jurisdiction into nationally inspired groups of Methodists variously loyal to the Allies, to the Central Powers, and to neutral governments.

The desire to enhance the unity of Methodists in Europe that produced the Berlin session of the Central Council of the Methodist Episcopal Church in Europe in 1895* also brought about two other non-Disciplinary meetings of representatives of the various Conferences and Missions. The Second Methodist Episcopal Church Congress for Europe met in Zurich in September, 1903, under the chairmanship of Bishop Vincent. The Third European Congress of the Methodist Episcopal Church met in Copenhagen in September, 1907, under the chairmanship of Bishop Burt, a strong original sponsor of the earlier meetings. The session of 1907 memorialized the General Conference to authorize organization of a regular Central Conference under the standing provisions of the Discipline. The General Conference adopted the appropriate enabling act in 1908.

Bishop Burt organized the Central Conference of Europe in Rome on 16 September 1911, all the Conferences and Missions having approved the move and elected delegates. The only apparent practical lines of division were lingual; the papers and addresses to which much time was devoted were presented in English, Italian, Swedish, or German, with some being rendered into a second language either by full interpretation or in summary. Otherwise, the delegates had no essential difficulty in discussing the problems and opportunities of religious work in Europe or in arriving at consensus on numerous subjects. The chief binding factor was a common loyalty to the classic Wesleyan tradition of evangelical Christianity—this more than membership in a single ecclesiastical organization branching out from the United States. European nationalisms caused no trouble; the Archduke Francis Ferdinand had yet three years to live. Before adjournment, the members adopted a resolution enthusiastically endorsing the movement for universal peace and also settled upon Stockholm as the place for the next session of the Central Conference, which the Discipline required to be held by 1915. But it never convened; it was permanently postponed by the bomb that killed the Archduke in Sarajevo.

Near the turn of the century, both European antagonists and American contributors were challenging Methodism's maintenance of foreign missions

* Vol. III, 1059 f. See also the Council's *Minutes*.

in Europe. The European peoples were neither pagan nor primitive, but Christian and civilized. In every European country penetrated by the American church, some form of Christianity was the traditional or the established religion of the state. What, then, was the justification for Methodist missions on the Continent? Bishops Goodsell and Vincent were among those who took up the challenge, especially with regard to the predominantly Protestant countries.

In their defense against the charge of invasive aggressiveness, both Bishops advanced an historical argument, claiming that in most cases the Methodists were invited to enter Europe. Undoubtedly, this argument appealed to European Methodists more than to critics in the established churches, for the invitations had come from individuals or small groups already influenced by contacts with Methodism in the United States, not from large representative European interests, and certainly not from the leaders of organized Christianity. But Bishop Vincent appealed to the basic Christian missionary commission to bear the gospel into all the world, giving it special relevance by pointing out that in Europe the Methodists were in touch with part of "the vast population not reached" by the state churches.

In Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Germany, and Switzerland, the traditional and dominant churches were Protestant. As far as formal affiliation was concerned, their popular outreach was very wide. The Methodist claim as to their insufficiency turned on a critique of the quality of church life within them. Bishop Goodsell's view of German Lutheranism contained the essence of this critique. He found the firm bond between Church and State a corrupting relationship that made church administration a process of power politics, with indifference, coldness, and subserviency characterizing leadership that should have been independent. The ministry was "very largely infected with academically generated skepticism," tending to make ministers "state-hired, time-serving functionaries." Popular religion had degenerated into observance of festival days, "and the people mostly have," asserted Goodsell, "no vital inward Christian spiritual life." Most concerned Methodists undoubtedly held similar views. It is not so clear that most of them spontaneously would have said, as Bishop Goodsell did, "The Church is associated with a social system favorable to the few and rich and resting as a burden on the heavily taxed, landless, and exploited poor, resulting in hopelessness and coldness towards the Church."

In contrast, Methodism was to the two Bishops and to the other defenders and interpreters of its mission an expression of vital, experiential religion. "We try," said Bishop Vincent, "to represent the pure, simple, free, primitive, unadulterated Christian faith." And Bishop Goodsell portrayed the Methodist minister, in contrast with the established clergyman, as democratic, warmhearted, and Christ-inspired. Methodist missions, then, aimed to bring to the spiritually needy a fresh new vital force that would enliven the churches

and save the people. Goodsell and Vincent claimed—and cited numerous pieces of evidence—that Methodism already had been influential enough in Europe during the past half century to validate this declaration of missionary purpose.

Although its judgments upon the traditional Protestant churches sometimes were harshly couched, the Methodist Church generally was not in deliberately chosen overt conflict with them. The Methodists' only publicly aggressive acts were measures they felt compelled to take in order to secure or defend their religious liberties, and even these usually were carried out with maximum prudence. To be sure, the earlier informal clusters of Methodists had become a distinct and fully articulated ecclesiastical organization enrolling adult members and winning sympathizers almost entirely from among people originally holding formal membership in the state churches. But the Methodists had no express purpose to compete with the older institutions or to undermine them. "We do not antagonize the State Churches," said Bishop Vincent. "We are stirring them up to do better work. And we are succeeding in this." The Methodists influenced many people they did not enroll and stimulated churches they did not attempt to displace.

These elements composed Methodism's stereotype of itself in relation to the traditional Protestant churches in Europe—a stereotype cast from nineteenth-century molds. Whatever interpretive or propagandist validity it once may have had, Methodist leaders came to accept it too uncritically; it finally became an expression of their own parochialmindedness. This unfortunate result was revealed when the men in charge of the new France Mission, launched in 1907, dusted off the same old claims to serve as partial contemporary justification of Methodist penetration of France.* They grossly underestimated—even ignored—the significance of French Protestantism and unrealistically overestimated their own movement as a vital force truly likely to arouse, satisfy, and win the French. Missionary enthusiasts grasped at the stereotype instead of directly and openlymindedly surveying the field.

In Bulgaria and Russia, the Methodists were on territory traditionally held by Eastern Orthodoxy, toward which they held essentially the same attitude they had toward the Protestant churches. Their condemnation of it, however, was more thoroughly derogatory, and they saw no hope of its regeneration. It was Orthodoxy as expressed in the Bulgarian National Church that the Methodists most categorically denounced and rejected.† Although Bulgarians generally considered it an act of patriotism to defend the Church, both missionaries and Bulgarian-born ministers of the Methodist Church were strongly anti-Orthodox. In Imperial Russia, however, where Methodism was very weak and had no mouthpiece until it gained its first Superintendent from the United States in 1907, the Orthodox Church was not openly at-

* See pp. 343 ff.

† See pp. 451 ff.

tacked. In the immediate pre-War years, Mission strategy dictated giving no occasion for arousing antagonistic reactions on the part of unsympathetic public officials. George A. Simons, who called himself the only American missionary in Russia, told the Central Conference in 1911 that it was inadvisable to initiate any noticeable, even peaceful, confrontation with Orthodoxy. He said, "Knowing the temper of the Russian Government and the Russian people in their attitude toward all things foreign, it seems to me wise for the time being not to send so-called missionaries into Russia."

In Austria, France, and Italy, the Methodists confronted Roman Catholicism. Repeated questioning elicited from William Burt, arrived home from Europe in 1902, a *Christian Advocate* article under the title "Why Do We Send Missionaries to Roman Catholic Countries?" But he and his colleagues in European mission work hardly felt that this question urgently demanded answering. As Bishop Vincent wrote of the Italy mission in the Missionary Society's *Annual Report* for that year, "I need say but little . . . Where Romanism is, Methodism should be. We represent and stand for precisely what Romanism antagonizes." The perennial and innumerable statements of Methodist leaders about Romanism were less a prolonged and reiterated apologia for Methodist missions than the habitual expression of a long-nurtured attitude of radical hostility.

The chief spokesman for this combative anti-Catholicism was Burt himself, who had been the leader of Methodism in Italy for sixteen years before becoming the Bishop in charge of Methodist interests in all Europe. In June, 1906, Bishop Burt declared to the Irish Wesleyan Conference, in Belfast, "Somehow I have a firm faith that Methodism is destined of God for the overthrow of Rome." And he prophesied that God would provide for the delivery of Ireland from its bondage to Romanism. A month later, the Bishop addressed the Wesleyan Conference, in Nottingham, England, interpreting Methodism as a spiritual force bound to run counter to the hierarchical tyranny of the Roman Catholic Church. He declared:

It [Romanism] is just as bad in any country as the external circumstances and influences will permit it to be. In Rome and so-called Roman Catholic countries it is pagan in proportion as it has been uninfluenced by Protestantism; pagan in thought, in practice and in its ultimate result on human character. There is nothing Christian about it but the sacred names which it arrogantly bears. Look at the poor deluded people . . .

And he filled in the picture with a number of bathetic illustrations of Catholic devotions. He briefly restated the essence of this view in his book *Europe and Methodism*, published in 1909.

In Copenhagen, in September, 1907, chairing the Third European Congress of the Methodist Episcopal Church, Bishop Burt told his fellow workers that the Protestant world should be given a fuller insight into the hopeless

stagnation of the Roman Church, a condition that rendered illusory all expectation of any reformation or improvement in its system. In his Sunday sermon, the Bishop reiterated the theme of the deadness and paganism of Romanism, whose "doctrine and system he declared to be nothing less than a crowding out of Jesus Christ of his central place in the plan of salvation."

Felice Dardi, an able and representative Italian pastor, also addressed the Third European Congress, hailing Methodism's application of its energies to the struggle against Rome, and declared that the most competent judges of Catholicism were Roman Catholics converted to Protestantism, among whom the gradations of opinion "start with those who look upon Catholicism as an apostasy and end with those who regard the Pope as the real personification of the anti-Christ."

The Congress, whose printed Minutes carried Dardi's address in full, adopted a resolution sympathetically identifying itself with those of its members who were engaged in carrying the gospel to the people living "in the deep shadows of superstition and ignorance" in Catholic-dominated countries. This resolution was somewhat milder than the anti-Catholic pronouncement of the Congress session held in Zurich in 1903, which deplored a recent trend in Protestantism towards insufficient assertion of the principles of the Reformation against "the machinations of the Roman Catholic Church" and also the current practice in the secular world, even in Protestant countries, of "an unbecoming and inexcusable obsequiousness towards the Papacy which we know to be the enemy of all liberal institutions and of all progress." How wide a departure from such obsequiousness the Zurich session of the Congress was willing to tolerate may perhaps be suggested by the fact that its *Minutes* included a statement from the pension officer of the Norway Conference that attempted to set forth an updated Ezekiel-like vision in which appeared the armies of Protestantism, Roman Catholicism, and Greek Catholicism:

Foremost in the first is Methodism. The cross in its banner is clear. Its standing is firm against all the adversaries of true Christianity. Its aim is by the grace of its dear Lord to beat the beast with the seven heads and the ten horns. It does not merely meddle with it. No compromise. Its aim is to kill it. No mercy for any of the heads. Call it Heathenism, Muhamedanism, Greek- or Roman Catholicism, Secularism, Agnosticism or a false liberalism. Down! down! is its aim.

Anti-Catholic feeling was common to all European Methodism, even though it was largely irrelevant to the current religious situation in the predominantly Protestant areas. In and on behalf of the mission to France, where the Catholic Church was strong but now disestablished, the enmity of the Methodists was definite but not loudly expressed. In Austria, where police action often impeded for Methodist churches, it was carefully muted. But in the case of the Italy mission, the segment of world-wide Methodism that was in

most direct geographical and social confrontation with the Roman Church, the voice of aggressive Methodism was strident and the language of attack was uninhibited.

Taking its mission as a whole, however, European Methodism saw its own image well reflected in a portion of Bishop Vincent's report to the General Missionary Committee in 1902:

We preach a vital Gospel to a formal Protestant Church; a complete Gospel to the Roman and to the Greek Church . . . We revive the spirit of Luther in the land of Luther. We give the only answer to Rationalism which is complete and final—personal experience of the living presence of Christ. We stand for Christian democracy in the presence of an infidel socialism. We furnish superior pastoral oversight.

Austria-Hungary

The Methodist Episcopal Church entered Austria-Hungary in 1897, neither spontaneously nor deliberately, but automatically, as the result of an ecclesiastical merger. In Vienna at that time there was a society of Wesleyans belonging to the Mission of the Wesleyan Methodist Church of Britain in Germany. When the larger mission entered the Methodist Episcopal Church in Germany,* the Vienna society was included in the transfer, and at the June session of the North Germany Conference, Vienna became an appointment on the Berlin District.

AUSTRIA: VIENNA

The Vienna group already had a history of more than twenty-five years under Wesleyan auspices. It began when the Wesleyan Missionary Society sent Christian Dieterle, a German minister, to the Austrian capital in 1870.

The Wesleyan missionary activity at once became, and much of the time continued to be, an underground movement. Austria was overwhelmingly Roman Catholic. Emperor Franz Josef, through the Protestant Patent of 1861, granted certain recognized Protestant churches (they were Lutheran and Reformed) equality with the Roman Church in dealing with the state. The Parliament, enacting fundamental law on the general rights of citizens, in 1867 recognized the full religious liberty of the people under law. But only gradually during the rest of the century were Protestant groups able to win conversion of their formal equality into an approximation of fully functioning religious liberty. State sovereignty stood supreme above all the churches, but the agencies of the government often were susceptible, in practice, to Catholic influence. The Wesleyans had no recognized group status and so enjoyed no ecclesiastical privileges at all.

Dieterle found it impossible to hold public meetings; the little society he

* See pp. 360 f.

formed met in his own study. His successor, who came in 1876, tried to hold meetings in private rooms in different parts of the city, but the civil authorities soon shut them down. For three years in the eighties, the society was allowed once a week a single meeting limited strictly to listening to an address. Small private meetings based on personal invitations by the minister also were allowed. In 1884, the magistrates banned even these restricted activities. After some months, they permitted delivery of addresses before specially invited guests, but required the minister to file the subject of his discourse and to pay a small cash fee before each meeting. Under these arrangements, the church apparently was dealt with as a secular society and was accordingly limited in activity. In 1887, finding that they could not progress under such a system, the little group of Wesleyans decided to give up their preaching hall. They went back to meeting in the minister's quarters.

After two painfully discouraging decades, the society received strong reinforcement and stimulus in the person of a new recruit, who had been raised in the Lutheran Church. The Baroness von Langenau, widow of a former Austrian diplomat, became converted under the influence of the Wesleyan meetings and heartily threw herself and all her resources into the support and extension of the mission. The Baroness opened a Sunday school in her own house, began a mission for postmen, founded a home in which more than a dozen underprivileged girls were educated under the guidance of a Wesleyan deaconess, provided board and room for a group of deaconesses engaged in a quiet new project for nursing the sick and assisting the poor, and donated to the Wesleyans, early in 1891, a fine stone-faced building at Trautsohgasse 8 to be used as a center for the church's activities.

Baroness von Langenau's social standing erected no sure barrier to action against the Wesleyan Methodist enterprise. Declaring that it was "immoral, and therefore unlawful," the magistrates in December proscribed all Methodist activity in Vienna under threat of prosecution. The charge of immorality was occasioned by their scanning a pamphlet in which a Methodist Bishop (he must have been an American) wrote approvingly of an article of religion attacking the Roman Catholic view of the Mass. The Wesleyans, of course, subscribed to no such article. But in spite of their dogmatic innocence, their new chapel had to be closed for more than a year. The society met secretly in a back room of the von Langenau residence until, in 1893, the pastor decided to ignore the decree openly and began preaching again in the chapel.

For three years the Wesleyans flouted the civil prohibition, and the magistrates evidently winked at their disobedience. But suddenly, in April 1896, "like a lightning from the unclouded sky," as their new pastor, H. Robert Möller, put it, the city official renewed the ban of 1891. Möller was forbidden to preach or otherwise to exercise the ministerial office. Even household services—normally allowable under the law—came under the renewed ban. The society carried an appeal from the decree clear to the Ministry of Public

Worship. Meanwhile, a "very high imperial official" seeing to it that they were not molested, they maintained their group worship and were joined by an increasing number of people. Not until April, 1897, did the Wesleyans receive official clearance, when a magistrate, responding to the intervention of the Prime Minister, annulled the longstanding prohibitory decree and authorized them to carry on again under only the usual regulations governing unrecognized churches. This was only three months before the Wesleyans united with the Methodist Episcopal Church.

With this background of public difficulties in mind, Robert Möller attributed the very limited nature of the mission's development during its quarter of a century in Vienna to a hindering combination of political and religious conditions, with the severest obstacles being raised in "times of persecution by the Romish clergy, who found a suitable weapon in the laws of the land." This interpretation, which he offered to his new Methodist Episcopal associates, overlooked, however, the fact that the Wesleyans had never attempted to take advantage of their opportunity to operate under the protection of the law. In 1874, the Parliament established legal methods by which any religious denomination could apply for and secure governmental recognition. By never choosing to take up this option, the Wesleyans left themselves critically vulnerable to the very "Romish" attacks against which they complained.

Baroness von Langenau, who had been an influential factor in the unification of the missions of the British Wesleyans and of the American Methodists in Germany, came into the Methodist Episcopal Church along with the other Viennese Wesleyans, and remained a strong financial and personal supporter of the work until her death in England in 1902. The society also kept their pastor, Robert Möller, who was reinforced by the appointment of a second preacher for Vienna, Paul Dietze.

Möller and Dietze led a fresh expansion of the church in the capital city. Although it reached mostly German-speaking people, beginnings already had been made among Viennese Bohemians and Slovaks just before the restrictive decree of 1896 was issued. Now in September, 1897, the Methodists opened preaching halls in three new sections for both German and Bohemian-language evangelism. By the next July, they were holding weekly ten German meetings, four meetings for Bohemians, and one for Slovaks. Under the leadership of a young ministerial assistant who spoke their language, the Bohemians began to develop their own group. The church membership increased markedly during the year, rising to 114 full members and 27 probationers. There were two hundred children in two Sunday schools, and the church was reaching about eight hundred people.

Methodism in Vienna was achieving its modest growth at the expense of the Roman Catholic Church, which was the religious affiliation of 78 per cent of the Austrian people. Möller informed the New York office of the

Missionary Society that 95 per cent of the Methodist church members in Vienna were converted Catholics and that only a few people in the general congregations were not then or formerly "Romish Catholics." And so, he wrote, "a living work of God stands before our astonished eyes in the land of dark clericalism and Mariolatry."

AUSTRIA: TRIESTE

The second local Methodist mission in Austria itself resulted from a move made not in Vienna, but in Italy. When the Italy Conference met in Turin in May, 1898, the superintendent of the Bologna District called attention to what appeared to be a promising opening for Methodist work in the Austrian port city of Trieste, which lay opposite Venice across the northern end of the Adriatic Sea. The Conference already had distributed Methodist literature there, and Felice Dardi, one of its pastors, a citizen of Austria and a native of Trieste, had numerous friends and acquaintances among the city's large Italian population. Indeed, he even enjoyed the confidence of the long-time pastor of a Lutheran church in the German-speaking community that had sent the Methodists an official invitation to make a beginning in Trieste. This church offered the use of an old mortuary chapel that it owned next to a long discontinued Protestant cemetery. At the close of the Conference, Bishop John M. Walden announced Trieste as a charge on the Bologna District and appointed Dardi its first pastor. Bishop Walden acted, of course, in harmony with the Disciplinary provision that the Conference should include not only the kingdom of Italy, but also the parts of contiguous countries where Italian was spoken.

Dardi moved from Rome to Trieste, rented the old chapel, put it in usable condition, began holding Methodist services in it, and on Christmas organized there a Methodist Episcopal church. A year later, the new group was a company of twenty-seven members and a few probationers, with a small Sunday school and several dozen informal adherents.

The new Methodist church, which began holding its chapel services openly, early ran into trouble with the law. Naturally, its converts and its prospects came almost entirely from the Roman Catholic Church, and priests began receiving requests for certificates of withdrawal from the Catholic Church in order to affiliate with the Methodists. In May, 1899, the parish priest complained, a police detective investigated, and the magistrates banned the services as illegal. After three months, having appealed to higher authorities, the Methodists were permitted to resume services, though on condition that they meet in private and under the law—the same law as the one governing the church in Vienna. Dardi reopened the meetings, legally or not, in the chapel.

Sometimes aided by another preacher, Dardi remained in the Trieste pas-

torate for eight years, doubling as District Superintendent during the last two. In spite of the prohibition of public services and in spite of the heavy legal red tape that hampered the transfer of religious affiliations by either children or adults, the church expanded its activities and made some headway in extending its membership. It bought and dedicated its chapel building in 1900, and by 1905, when it had its next scrape with the law, it had 130 members.

Evidently, Dardi resumed practically public congregational services in the chapel after the interruption in 1899. For a long time, the authorities were lenient with him. But eventually, he took further legally risky steps, and in January, 1905, the chief magistrate formally enjoined Dardi to give strict adherence to the law on unrecognized religious groups. Concretely, he forbade Dardi to sign, seal, or annotate public papers for the church, to use publicly the title of evangelical pastor, to perform pastoral functions in cemeteries or hospitals, to provide religious instruction for any child under fourteen who still belonged legally to a state-recognized religion (in this situation, chiefly the Roman Catholic), to hold congregational meetings, indeed to exercise the ministerial office in any way. Dardi was allowed only to hold strictly family services in his own house.

Dardi and his associates trimmed their sail to this chill wind, but not closely. Moving cautiously—meeting behind closed doors and admitting only known Methodists—they took the risk of continuing their chapel services. Religious education of the children was continued under the personal direction of Miss Elaine Fraisse, a Bible woman employed for Trieste by the Woman's Foreign Missionary Society. The danger on this course came to the surface a few months later, when the church's Local Preacher conducted a simple graveside ceremony for a deceased member of the congregation. For this the local court fined him ten crowns. But the case did not stop there; Dardi himself had to appear in court. He was charged with responsibility for the other man's offense and also with holding illegal meetings in the chapel in defiance of the recent restraining order. Detailed evidence on the chapel meetings was provided by police agents who had stood outside week by week and counted the attendants. The court sentenced Dardi to pay fifty crowns or serve five days in jail. Apparently, not until this second incident occurred, did the Missionary Society officials learn of the January affair.

A time of greater tension than ever followed Dardi's court appearance. He lost his first appeal from the decision of the local court, and the chapel had to be closed. But he and his people kept fighting for their existence as a church. The congregation split up into small groups and met secretly in more than a dozen houses. "But we fear that the police may find us out also in the houses," wrote the Trieste pastor.

With the encouragement of his Bishop, William Burt, Dardi renewed his appeal on a higher level, carrying his case, with its several facets, to the

Home Ministry in Vienna. In the name of religious liberty in Austria, he called upon all European District Superintendents, the European and American religious press, and the Missionary Society to protest to the Ministry on his behalf and to ask that his sentence be revoked. Bishop Burt urged the Missionary Society to send vigorous protests to the Ministry in Vienna and to the United States Secretary of State.

In September, the Board of Managers protested to Secretary Elihu Root against what it believed was the religious discrimination against Dardi in Trieste. Root referred the complaint to Bellamy Storer, the United States Ambassador to Austria-Hungary, who reported from Vienna that since Dardi was not an American citizen, there was no basis for United States intervention on his behalf in the Trieste case.

Storer listed for Secretary Root the religious groups that were legally recognized by the Austrian government—the Roman Catholic, the Greek-Oriental (Eastern Orthodox), the Evangelical (including the Lutherans and the Reformed), the Evangelical Brotherhood, the Armenian, and the Jewish bodies. He pointed out that any other religious body could apply for and normally expect to be granted recognition by the state. His report stated that not only had the Methodist Episcopal Church not applied for recognition, but also Dardi and his associates had decided that it would be too expensive to obtain the preferred legal status. Instead, said Storer, they had proceeded to act in violation of specific provisions of the statutes, meanwhile benefiting from “a large leniency” on the part of the local civil authorities. It was true that the Methodists had not sought legal recognition, but Dardi’s explanation of this omission was that the “conditions are so numerous and of such a nature, that the life and spirit of a church, consenting to them, would be entirely paralyzed by them.” Dardi’s judgment of this danger was quite likely exaggerated; certainly it was a subjective determination that the Austrian government hardly could be expected to allow to supersede its own basic religious law.

Storer surmised that the Missionary Society had not been given full and accurate information on the legal realities surrounding the Trieste case. He was not wrong. Such information as had come through the years from the leaders of the Austrian Methodists had been given and received somewhat less than objectively. Little attention was given to the historical evolution of Austrian ecclesiastical law, which had not involved sheer capitulation to Roman Catholic power, but—quite the contrary—had curbed Catholic influence, recognized the principle of religious liberty, and developed a legal apparatus to provide non-Roman religious groups with equality in Church-State relationships. This body of law was neither anti-Methodist nor anti-Protestant in intent, but basically administrative. Some of its provisions became anti-Methodist tools upon occasion, but only when ecclesiastical antagonists of the Methodists or officials manipulated by them pressed for legal

action for alleged infractions of the law. But the Austrian Methodists' leaders habitually interpreted the entire situation as an extreme expression of the repressive political power of Catholicism. They cried persecution, and their American co-workers, finding it easy to believe evil of the Roman Church, quite naturally responded by beginning themselves uncritically to wave the banners of religious liberty.

Secretary Leonard, however, evidently finally realized, after hearing from the State Department, that the Trieste Methodists had no firm ground for a categorical legal and moral protest. His letter of thanks to Secretary Root acknowledged that "it seems very plain that Rev. Mr. Dardi has not complied with the law, and therefore has no special reason to make complaint. Our missionaries are always instructed to comply with the laws of the countries in which they labor." A copy of this letter went to the American embassy in Vienna, where it was seen by Bishop Burt when he visited the capital in March, 1906, to try to expedite the acceptance of Dardi's legal appeal, which had remained unresolved all these months.

Burt found Leonard's statement an astonishing admission and immediately wrote to tell him so. He accused Leonard of thus helping the Embassy to wash its hands of the whole affair. Minimizing the presumed fact that Dardi had gone beyond the law "at one or two points," he condemned the Austrian religious law as "one of the most iron-clad on the books of any civilized nation." Burt insisted that the issue in Trieste was persecution—that the stakes were the interests of the Church, the usefulness of an able Methodist minister, the peace and happiness of hundreds of people (presumably the Trieste Methodist constituency), and liberty of conscience.

Although he had urged Leonard to turn to the State Department for assistance, Burt now sharply criticized him for accepting the Department's report on the situation, claiming that Ambassador Storer was prejudiced because he was a Roman Catholic and that the vice consul in Trieste (Storer had consulted him) was prejudiced because he was a relative of the Trieste magistrate who was clamping down on Dardi. Burt reminded Leonard that Storer had been recalled from Austria because of his Catholic connections there (he and his wife were charged with playing intra-Church politics). "No Roman Catholic," he said, "can justly represent our country to a Roman Catholic country. No matter how good his intentions may be he hasn't the power." On the report of such a biased man, he held, Leonard had condemned Dardi, the Trieste Methodists, and himself: "In this way we would be kicked out of every Roman Catholic country in the world."

Even after Bishop Burt's effort in Vienna, Dardi evidently received no satisfaction in his appeal to the Ministry. Nor did he wait that long before making a new effort to break the mission's bonds. As early as October, 1905, he again deliberately forced the legal situation by switching from the small meetings in the parishioners' homes to congregational services in the chapel.

The church also pressed on with its Sunday school of forty children. A small number of new converts came forward for church membership, and a German-language midweek meeting was started for a small group of Bohemians living in Trieste.

But the handicaps involved in operating a legally unrecognized, undercover mission were serious and damaging. New converts experienced more difficulty than ever in securing certificates of withdrawal from the Catholic Church preparatory to joining the Methodist Episcopal Church, for the magistrate became unusually zealous in seeking to block and embarrass them. About thirty members left the church because of its unhappy legal and social position, some joining the German Reformed church, some returning to their original Catholic allegiance. There was a good deal of tension in the church's life, and the necessity of preserving a sufficient measure of privacy cramped the congregational activities. For a time, some of them were camouflaged by being carried on under the auspices of a specially organized secular society properly registered with the civil authorities.

The church persevered—but permanently curbed, always having carefully to watch its step to see that it did not move too far outside the restrictive pattern of the decree of January, 1905. In one respect, however, the official pressure was relaxed. By the spring of 1906, the local authorities had become more lenient with regard to the chapel services. Evidently, they had dropped back to a tacit policy of overlooking these unauthorized meetings so long as the church people kept them reasonably well out of sight and refrained from aggressive promotion and extension of the work. Thus the crisis gradually was dissipated, but hurtful and hampering tensions remained.

Burt's definition of the issues, in his indignant and somewhat supercilious letter to Leonard about the Trieste case, as well as his resorting to secondary and *ad hominem* arguments, revealed him as clinging to the persecution theory, the Catholic-devil theory, of Methodism's unhappy position in Austria. To this he held throughout his European administration, which lasted until 1912. He was ready to identify, condemn, and combat "persecution," but neither he nor the Board showed any sign of an attempt to remedy or scale down the trouble as it affected the Methodists in either Trieste or Vienna by seeking recognition from the Austrian government.

Neither he nor the Board men (except Leonard, momentarily) seemed to question either the principle or the degree of practical wisdom involved in insisting upon the Mission's unconditional right to public activity in Austria according to its own unilaterally approved patterns. These leaders were Americans promoting the missionary designs of a church organization located in the United States. They were administering their missions in Austria through organizations established in Germany and in Italy. In Trieste, they were working chiefly among Italians in an area rife with the Irredentist movement for the transfer of Trieste and other Austrian territories to Italian

control. Their mission constituents were Austrians obligated to observe Austrian law. But instead of tempering their expectations by such factors, and rather than seeking to accommodate themselves reasonably to Austrian ways, they chose to remain in Austria on their own terms and to dash their small following against the historical realities of Austrian society even to the point of subverting Austrian law. In their official records and public statements appears no substantial attempt concretely to demonstrate the impossibility of operating healthily and effectively in Austria under legal recognition.

HUNGARY

Turning back, for the moment, to Vienna, we find Robert Möller and his people stirred by the impulse to carry the evangelical faith beyond their own city. Because of the multinational character of their constituency, they hoped for opportunities to reach into Bohemia and Moravia, which were Austrian territories. In 1898, their interest found expression through a Bohemian student at the theological school in Frankfort on the Main, in Germany, who spent his holidays in missionary activity in Moravia. Requests for preaching came from Bohemia also, but no permanent work developed in either area.

Looking even beyond Austria, the church in Vienna began praying for an opening for gospel work in Hungary, the other wing of Franz Josef's Dual Monarchy. Responding to many invitations, their pastor traveled the 135 miles to Budapest, the Hungarian capital, in January, 1898, and held evangelistic services there, preaching ten times in five days. Encouraged by receiving an enthusiastic response, Möller resolved to open settled work in Hungary as soon as he could. Karl Schell, his District Superintendent, reported Möller's Budapest experience to the members of the North Germany Conference in July. Declaring, "We see the finger of God pointing us to Hungary," he exhorted the Conference to begin a permanent mission among Hungary's Catholic population. Acknowledging the soundness of the view of Möller and his Budapest friends that nothing could be done there until Magyar-speaking preachers should become available, Schell announced that the first effort would be made in a Hungarian city where Germans were sufficiently prevalent. It probably was Bratislava (Pressburg) he had in mind, for within a few months, Möller was preaching there, about thirty miles from Vienna.

Möller received earnest invitations "from all parts of Hungary" to begin Methodist activity—from Sopron, Kosice, Ujverbász, and Budapest. Before the end of the year he was doing preliminary work in southern Hungary among the numerous German-speaking Swabians living in the Backa region, which lay in the fork of the Danube and Tisza Rivers, close to the north-western border of Serbia. In Vrbas, he was welcomed by a schoolmaster who had invited him to visit the town. Some time earlier, the teacher had come

across a copy of *Der Christliche Apologete*, the journal published in Cincinnati for German-speaking Methodists, and had been interested enough to become a subscriber. He formed a reading circle of his friends and neighbors and read to them weekly from the *Apologete* and other Methodist literature he secured. Pursuing this interest, he finally learned of Möller's activity in Vienna, and wrote asking him to come.

The next July, the question of Hungary again came before the Conference, with Möller reporting in person on his spadework. The Conference received requests from three towns in Hungary for a minister, and in response Bishop John M. Walden appointed a young man named Franz Havránek, attaching him technically to the Vienna charge under Möller's supervision, but actually assigning him to residence in Srbobran (Bács Szt. Tamás), in the Backa. Havránek's superiors sent him south in full confidence that in Hungary a Methodist preacher or parish would have the benefit of complete religious liberty under the law.

Havránek met with encouraging initial success, establishing growing congregations in the three large towns where he focused his efforts—Srbobran, Ó-Verbasz, Ujverbász. Ironically, his first setback came when police cracked down on his work, banning Methodist gatherings. The people countered by resorting to secret meetings. But the police hunted out the conventicles, and though they failed to trap Havránek himself, they succeeded in catching three Methodists and having them fined ninety crowns apiece for their participation in the clandestine activities. The men barely escaped going to jail for non-payment of the fines. These harassing measures brought the public expansion of Havránek's work almost to a stop. But the people already gathered kept together. There were 120 people in Havránek's congregation at Srbobran. In Ó-Verbasz, thirty-five people continued meeting in secret, as did a group in Ujverbász. As a nucleus for the development of church membership, Havránek gathered fourteen probationers.

A new man, F. H. Otto Melle, a young preacher not long out of theological school, took over the mission in December, 1900, to work independently of the Vienna pastor.* In Srbobran, where he established residence, Melle found the congregation meeting in a hired hall that could hold a hundred persons. In Vrbas, where there was a much larger potential constituency, he found Methodist worshippers using a little back room in a small one-story house thatched with reeds. Into a space that looked large enough for only twenty or thirty people they eventually packed ninety or a hundred. There they sat, said Melle, "not only on raw benches, but upon the window sill, on the chest of drawers, on two beds which are standing along the wall, and in the corner behind the Swedish stove, built of brown clay; and they sit in the hot air for hours, and seem not to become tired in hearing the Gospel of our Great Saviour."

* See note, p. 351.

Soon after his arrival, Melle conducted a revival that won numerous converts and added thirty-four persons to the church. But during his first winter in Srbobran, he was locked in continuous struggle with the forces that had hampered Havránek before him. Möller already had identified as the source of interference "Lutheran clergymen, who saw their monopoly and idleness threatened by the work of a Methodist." Although about half the population of Hungary were Roman Catholics, and the Lutherans came to less than a tenth, the latter were to be reckoned with in localities where there were concentrations of Germans, as there were in the Backa. Melle encountered the magistrate who had sicked the police onto the Methodists for the clergy. Melle learned that these local presiding judges held great power in their own neighborhoods, sometimes ruling tyrannically. He knew that the Methodists were in the clear legally; Hungary guaranteed full religious liberty. But he discovered that the magistrates were strong enough to nullify, at least temporarily, local application of the national policy of freedom of worship.

When young Melle, attempting to run his meetings openly, went to the Srbobran magistrate to give him his schedule of services, the man responded harshly: "What are you doing here in Hungary? There is religion enough in my district; we need no foreign missionaries here, and I tell you that I will never allow you to preach." Two of his constables appeared at the next stated meeting of the local Methodists with a written order prohibiting all services, sermons, lectures, or devotional exercises of any kind. The services continued in spite of this dictate. "When in our meetings we were engaged," said Melle, "in singing and praying, and the door was opened, all heads turned expecting to see the constable." After a time, a superior official, to whom Melle appealed, overruled the magistrate and bade him not to interfere with the religious liberties of any of the people. This blocked the antagonistic clerics. And the magistrate even began to give Melle his friendly co-operation.

Melle was a German and could preach only in German. Thus he had to continue the policy of working for some time to come with German groups only. The Germans made up a little more than a tenth of Hungary's varied population of Hungarians, Germans, Rumans, Croats, Serbs, Slovaks, Bulgars, Ruthenians, gypsies, and others. In Srbobran there were only a few hundred Germans living among many more Hungarians and Serbs. But Melle did not regard laboring with the German minority as more than a temporary limitation. The German young people spoke Hungarian. Therefore Melle did not bother to learn "the difficult Hungarian language" himself, but set out to convert Germans, to enlist young converts for the ministry and so, ultimately, to reach the Hungarians through the Germans.

But the Germans Melle actually had to depend on as co-workers in building and extending the Hungary mission were ministerial assistants and pastors from Germany itself. The first to come to his side was Hugo Georgi, appointed

in 1902 after Bishop John H. Vincent personally undertook to find funds for his support. Within a few years, the North Germany Conference was maintaining as many as three or four preachers at a time in Hungary. Among the early workers in addition to Melle and Georgi, were Ernst W. Voigt, H. R. Albert Reinsberg, and Otto Hänel.

Georgi's arrival to serve as his assistant enabled Melle to begin carrying the Methodist message beyond Srbobran and Vrbas (in the latter there was now a single congregation, in Ujverbász). Several new preaching points emerged during the first year, among them Kuczura and the city of Novi Sad (Ujvidék; Neusatz). The evangelistic activity spread until, by 1907, Melle and his co-workers were preaching in twelve places. Eleven of them were in the Backa region, including recently established stations in Szeghegy and Feketchegy. The twelfth was Budapest, where Melle began building a congregation in 1905. Here he took up his residence, about 150 miles north of the Backa. In the southern area, Srbobran, Ujverbász, and Novi Sad were, from time to time, the places of residence for the preachers. The Ujverbász congregation, which very early had moved out of its original stuffed and stuffy thatched "chapel" into an ampler building finally purchased in 1903-4, was the only one owning a church property.

Bishop William Burt, like his predecessor, Bishop Vincent, believed in the great potentialities of the work in Hungary. When he made his own episcopal visitation of Backa Methodism in 1904, he was impressed with the timeliness of the Methodist effort to evangelize Hungary, to stir it out of what he regarded as its ingrown, nominal Christianity—Christless Roman Catholicism and dead Protestantism. Describing the Hungarians as an oriental people, "combining in themselves Western refinement with the Eastern character," and living on the boundary between the Orient and the Occident, Bishop Burt looked for an evangelized Hungary to open a new epoch of missionary activity in "the Orient." He followed up this large view of the Hungary field by calling for an additional appropriation of \$1,500 to supplement the small current Methodist investment made through the North Germany Conference.

Burt ended his appeal with the exhortation, "Let us remember, too, that the evangelization of Hungary will react with blessings on our own country." When the appeal was shaped up for action by the General Missionary Committee later in November, coupled with a reference to the urgent demands of the expansion of the work in Hungary was the clause, "Whereas, there is a growing demand in the United States for preachers who speak the Hungarian language. . ." This was the beginning of the practice of including a thousand dollars or more in the North Germany Conference appropriations, for extension of the work in Hungary.

AUSTRIA: VIENNA

When Robert Möller relinquished his responsibility for the mission in Hungary in 1900, he was in his last year as the Methodist leader in Vienna, and was participating in reorganizing the work there into two societies, with about 150 and twenty-five members, respectively.

The larger society, which became known as First Church, continued to occupy the original chapel, with Theophil Mann succeeding Möller as pastor in 1901. The Bohemian work, under the leadership of the assistant, Friedrich Paroulek, continued under the aegis of First Church, and the dozen deaconesses usually domiciled in the same building with the chapel were closely aligned with First Church.

Jürgen A. W. Rasmussen, who had been associated with Möller during the year before the division, became the first pastor of Second Church. His congregation had to meet in a basement beer hall for more than two years, until it was able to rent a well located and convenient meeting hall at Christmas, 1902.

As long as Baroness von Langenau lived, generously using her wealth to undergird the Methodist enterprise in the capital, the mission there was nearly self-supporting. But when death removed her encouraging presence in 1902, the two churches felt an unaccustomed financial pinch. Up to this time, the Missionary Society had provided only minimal support, earmarking for Vienna about \$200 of the 1900 and 1901 appropriations to the North Germany Conference. And with the von Langenau resources no longer available, the Vienna Methodists had to work their way through their financial problems essentially on their own. The Missionary Society made no substantial new provision for them, and indeed the \$200 item for Vienna was only tacitly included in the appropriations beginning in 1902.

During its remaining years as a part of the Berlin District, the mission developed only slowly, and all its progress was hard-won. The Methodist workers found the climate of Catholic Vienna fertile in difficulties. Even though they won more or less steadily a measure of response to their evangelism, the numerical gains in membership unfortunately were reduced by emigration of Methodist families from the city, and new and stable families were only laboriously recruited. By 1907, the total number of church members had receded a little from the level of the year 1900, to 131 for First Church and 37 for Second Church.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY COMBINATION

The charges in Vienna and in Hungary remained in the Berlin District until June, 1907. Since having the District Superintendent visit them from Berlin cost too much time, money, and effort, they were then organized into an Austria-Hungary District, with F. H. Otto Melle as superintendent.

Melle continued as pastor of the Budapest church and supervised the District from that point. This gave him oversight of four or five preachers and 287 church members—120 in Hungary, 167 in Vienna.

After the District was organized, the Backa work in Hungary, especially on the Bács Szt. Tamás [Srbobran] Circuit, showed some further expansion. At New Year's, 1909, Martin Funk, the Srbobran preacher, began services in two new German villages. During the Conference year, his assistant, a Hungarian named Kuszli, established two new stations, in Stari Becej (Óbecse) and Backo Gradiste (Földvár). In addition to these two and Srbobran, the list of preaching places reported to the Conference that year for Funk's Circuit included Riskér, Sóvé, Cservenka, and Sivac (Uj-Szivacz). At this same time, L. Alfred Mehner's Ujvidék [Novi Sad] Circuit had outside preaching points listed for Tiszaistvánfalva and Tiszakálmúnfalva, while Herman Melle's Ujverbász Circuit listed outstations at Szeghegy, Feketchegy, and Kuczura. In the summer of 1908, a beginning had been attempted, but not carried through, at O-Ker.

The identity of the new Austria-Hungary combination was recognized by the General Conference in 1908, when it authorized the organization of "the work in Austro-Hungary" into a Mission Conference. The Board first recognized the new District as a financial unit when it appropriated \$3,295 for its work for the year 1910.

Bishop Burt organized the Austria-Hungary Mission Conference on 4 May 1911 in Vienna. Otto Melle continued as Superintendent, but changed his residence to Vienna. In addition to Melle, the charter members of the Conference included five other ministers transferred from the North Germany Conference, one from the South Germany Conference, and one (Felice Dardi) from the Italy Conference. Dardi's new Conference relationship reflected the fact that the work in Trieste was now joined with the rest of the Austria work, in the new Mission Conference. The Conference began its separate activity under a Board appropriation of \$3,500, which was raised to \$5,030 for 1912, and then to \$6,211.

The three Austrian churches—two in Vienna, one in Trieste—brought into the Mission Conference 291 church members and 212 pupils belonging to five Sunday schools. Hungary's Budapest and Backa charges contributed 197 church members and 300 pupils in eighteen Sunday schools. The new organization, extensive by definition, was thus in numbers a small Conference of 488 members.

It inherited several problems that Otto Melle had found distinguishing the Austria-Hungary District from the Methodist movement in North Germany.

The people of the Dual Monarchy, claimed Melle, showed little interest in religious questions. Rather, in Austria all classes and all ages plunged excitedly and continually into the waves of passionate political discussion

churned up by the country's various and often angrily contending national groups. Hungary, similarly disturbed within, also harbored anti-Austrian feelings and the desire for independence. And, of course, the Italian complexion of the Trieste mission added its own nationalistic pressure to the ones Melle cited. Such currents as these ripped across the evangelistic courses set by the Methodist preachers. In Hungary, the preachers were especially compromised by the fact that uniformly they were Germans. This made them dangerously vulnerable to charges by their ecclesiastical antagonists that they were pan-Germans at work in Hungary to popularize the German language and promote German nationalism. They easily became embroiled with civil authorities sensitive to such accusations. New missionaries had to learn to steer clear of even inadvertently political utterances. As aliens, they always had to earn public confidence when they went on the field.

A related difficulty lay in the mixture of tongues in the two countries, particularly for a mission hoping to evangelize the people at large. "We preach in three different tongues—German, Hungarian, and Bohemian—but we should be able to work in ten," said Melle in 1909. Later he would have included Italian, to cover Trieste. Melle was convinced that a missionary could not successfully gain rapport with the people on the field unless he could use their own language. This had been demonstrated by hard experience in the Bohemian work in Vienna. Converts among the ethnic groups were not coming forward fast enough to supply the needed preachers in the appropriate languages. Difficult as it would be to do so, Melle felt that the Germans preaching in Austria-Hungary should be dedicated enough to become bilingual. He himself had by now changed his earlier decision and had undertaken to learn Hungarian. His own charge, while he was in Budapest, had been developing a Hungarian congregation and was producing a modest Methodist periodical in the Hungarian language. But only in a few instances had Melle been able to get any Hungarian or Bohemian preaching done in the mission at large. Melle also pointed out to his North Germany colleagues the peculiar difficulty of trying to win converts in a predominantly Catholic (he meant both Roman and Greek) area. "Brothers," he said, "a Protestant orthodoxy, even when it is without life and spirit, is still a hundred times better than the hierarchy and the enslavement of conscience of Catholicism. It is very difficult to find a true point of contact with Catholics." He complained that Catholics spiritually awakened under Methodist influence typically turned away at last because of their inability to overcome the counter-influence of their priests.

In 1911, the Mission Conference reached out to the first new city in Austria to be entered by the Methodists since Felice Dardi went to Trieste in 1898. Bishop Burt sent Hinrich A. Bargmann to Graz, about 140 miles southwest of Vienna on the direct rail line to Trieste. Here in this important

city of more than 150,000 people, about 95 per cent of them Roman Catholics, Bargmann founded a small congregation.

During the years before World War I, the slowness of the Austria movement to grow internally and to put out fresh shoots by founding new congregations was natural enough. To be sure, no serious official blow had fallen upon the Vienna Methodists since 1896, and the worst of the legal troubles in Trieste were over by 1907. But the Methodists' freedom to evangelize remained severely inhibited by the prohibitions holding them down to private meetings. In 1908, they sent Emperor Franz Josef a message of allegiance and felicitation on the sixtieth anniversary of his accession to the throne of Austria and later followed it up by addressing to him a petition for freedom of worship. Hopes of presenting it to him in person were frustrated; at Conference time the next June, Melle was obliged to report that the petition was stuck in the office of the Cabinet. Hinrich Bargmann, making an inquiry at the appropriate Ministry, was advised that the Methodists should be satisfied simply to have the authorities close their eyes to the real character of the Methodist gatherings. It was suggested that if they did not press the petition, an indefinite postponement of the issue would allow them to operate in peace. Importunity, Bargmann was warned, could only bring the Methodists into collision with the fact that the Emperor could not change the Constitution singlehanded.

Hence the official ban remained in effect, the Methodists continued side-stepping it, and the authorities continued ignoring the maneuvers that carried the meetings far beyond bona fide privacy. When, for instance, the organizing session of the Mission Conference met in Vienna in 1911, the Methodists hired a public hall for a Sunday afternoon "Family Song Service" that was attended by 350 people. "Of course on the program we dare not announce Bible readings or prayer, or religious addresses. In all these we said 'declamation,'" Otto Melle explained to some of his European colleagues later on. Thus Bishop Burt did not preach that afternoon; he was down for a "declamation"—No. 7 on the program. And he took for his subject the Bible verse, "We have seen Jesus" [*sic*]. "I think," said Melle, "our people will never forget this musical entertainment."

Well attended services were held in the regular meeting places also. Yet no Methodist church could even display a conventional name sign; instead, on the chapel door would appear an inscription reading, "Only for Invited Guests." It is understandable that Melle reported that when Bargmann went to Graz to open his mission, "he began in a quiet way, using much tact and wisdom."

In spite of the more liberal religious policy that the Methodists repeatedly cited to Hungary's credit, the early workers there felt the impact of more directly repressive attacks than did their contemporaries in Austria. Otto Melle did win out over his antagonists in the winter of 1900-1901, but new

accusations were leveled, new hostilities were launched, against the Backa Methodists. In 1904-5, non-Methodist pastors (Protestants) were active in preferring damaging charges with the magistrates against Methodist work and workers. Because of these attacks, the services of some of the congregations were interrupted for months on end. The District Superintendent reported to the Conference in June, 1906, that Melle and Albert Reinsberg were then under sentence—evidently not carried out—of fine and imprisonment.

The attempt to form a congregation in O-Ker in 1908 was aborted by police action. "No one is allowed to preach here in German, as that will Germanize the people," the German-speaking evangelist was told. When Kuszli, the Hungarian lay preacher, having given due notice, began preaching in Hungarian, policemen interrupted his service. They ordered him to be silent and, when he failed to obey, arrested him at pistol point and took him before the magistrate, who promptly fined him and sentenced him to jail. His case was successfully appealed, but the incident was enough to cause abandonment of the Methodist effort in O-Ker.

Kuszli also ran afoul of the police magistrate not long after opening his mission in Backo Gradiste during the same Conference year. When local Catholics began to take his preaching seriously, the priest denounced the "godless" Methodists in church and awakened popular opposition. The police struck one day when Otto Melle was preaching. Two of them blustered in and broke up the meeting. Kuszli returned to Backo Gradiste, nevertheless, and made another attempt to preach. He was warned that he would be killed if he did not leave town. The local magistrate and his district superior, in spite of liberal Ministerial decisions in similar cases elsewhere, forbade Kuszli to hold services. Their ban was effective for some time, for as a high Ministerial official told Melle, public feeling had to be taken into account, and the Ministry had to delay its overruling of the lower officials.

Nevertheless, the appeals the Methodists carried up from the lower courts from time to time were regularly if sometimes belatedly decided in their favor. Melle did rather well in his contacts with the higher civil officials. After 1909, stories of public difficulties stirred up by local vested ecclesiastical interests, Protestant or Catholic, disappeared from Conference reports from Hungary. In 1911, Melle was able to assure the members of the Central Conference of Europe that police troubles had died out. When the Austria-Hungary Mission Conference assembled in Budapest in 1913, the atmosphere was sufficiently relaxed for most of the newspapers to report the gathering at length. And Bishop Nuelsen was heard by a large audience when he lectured in the hall of the old Hungarian parliament on "Methodism and the Social Question."

By the time the Mission Conference held its second session in Novi Sad in August, 1912, the Hungarian churches were functionally, as well as legally,

freer than those in Austria. And except for the beginning in Graz, the more important reported items of progress originated in Hungary. The members were meeting in a new chapel and residential building dedicated ten months earlier—the first Methodist church erected in Hungary. Not far away, in Szeghegy, the second one was nearing completion, with its dedication date set for October. Budapest was able to report the establishment of a modest book concern and the opening, under Martin Funk's guidance, of an apartment home for young men.

There was much evangelistic activity in all parts of the dual field during the next two years. But when the outbreak of the World War forced Bishop Nuelsen to cancel the session of the Mission Conference about to open in Vienna, it was still in its Hungarian section that the Conference was showing the greater growing and expanding power. During the last pre-War year, the workers in the Backa opened two or three new preaching places, including Szeged, an important Magyar center on the Tisza River. Two new preaching projects grew out of the Budapest work—in Budakesz and in Nagyszékely. This brought the preaching posts in Hungary to a few more than twenty. In the Mission Conference as a whole there were 624 church members and 327 probationers.

France

The "Providential time seems to have fully come for extending our work into the Republic of France . . ." Thus declared the General Missionary Committee on 15 November 1904, meeting in Boston one street removed from the site of the city's eighteenth-century French Protestant church. What were the maturing signs of Providence, and who was the watchman who first spied them and pointed them out to the Committee, the record does not tell. But someone so well convinced the Church's missionary policy-makers of the divine challenge to project American Methodism into the French scene that they voted to respond. The Committee authorized the Board of Managers to make the new departure as soon as it should secure a satisfactorily recurring gift of \$5,000.

The now hidden persuader undoubtedly was William Burt, the Bishop resident in Zurich. Burt not only was present at the Boston meeting, but also had attended, in 1895, the Berlin session of the Central Council in Europe that voted to memorialize the General Committee to open work in France as soon as possible.* Indeed, he was the man who presented to the Central Council the report advocating that step. The General Committee took no cognizance of the receipt of any such petition, but Burt himself eventually acted to penetrate France. In the first session of the Italy Conference over which he presided, in May, 1905, taking advantage of the Disciplinary def-

* See Vol. III, 1059.

inition of the Conference boundaries, he appointed an Italian preacher to Marseille to develop an Italian-speaking Methodist church there.

Burt again was on the *qui vive* when the General Committee met in Brooklyn in November, 1905. Acting on a motion of his, the Committee reaffirmed its resolution linking the proposal for France with Providence and again held the door ajar for a donor with an implementing contribution. This time, Burt actually had a donor standing in the wings ready to respond to the cue to enter. He was a New York man, John S. Huyler, the wealthy ice cream and candy maker, whom Burt had met twenty years earlier when he was a young Brooklyn pastor—an acquaintanceship that had yielded donations for Burt's work in Italy. Within a week, the Board of Managers recorded a pledge by Huyler to give \$5,000 a year, for at least two years, to open Methodist work in France. It also requested Bishop Burt to investigate for it how and where and when the new mission should be started.

A year later, Burt was ready to ask the General Committee for final and formal recognition of France as a mission field. Apparently, there was now more uncertainty among the members as to the Providential character of the proposal—or perhaps uncertainty only now found its voice; for Bishop Burt's earnest request touched off a spirited debate. The opposition contended that the lines of the Society's foreign missionary endeavor were sufficiently extended and that intensive cultivation of fields already entered should be the aim of current policy. The proponents argued: France needs Methodism; France is ready for Methodist evangelism; the money for a start is available; let us go ahead now and discuss future support and expansion later on. The proponents (or shall we say Providence?) won the debate; the projected mission to France was stamped as official.

Two weeks later, Bishop Burt sailed for a short stay in Europe and then a tour of several months in Africa, with no intention of inaugurating the mission in France until springtime. But that was not fast enough for Bishop Charles C. McCabe, a vocal supporter of the French venture. He had a man he wanted to send to France—Achilles H. Lambert, a French-speaking native of Belgium, for more than twenty years a Roman Catholic priest, and recently returned from several years' work as a Methodist missionary in Puerto Rico. McCabe promised to support Lambert through the first quarter of the new year and sent him off to France on 1 December. Burt finally, and reluctantly, agreed to appoint to Marseille the man McCabe thus pushed onto the projected mission. Before the month was out, Bishop McCabe died, and Lambert soon began receiving remittances from payments made on the Huyler pledge. But because he and his family were variously and seriously ill in Marseille, Lambert could attempt little as a missionary during the early months after his premature arrival in France.

Bishop Burt formally organized the France Mission on 23 May 1907, not in France, but on Rue Calvin (!) in Geneva, Switzerland. Geneva was a

natural choice for the first gathering of the Mission's personnel, for most of Burt's preachers for France were to come from the Switzerland Conference,* which stretched away northeast of the city, along Switzerland's French and German borders. At Geneva, the Rhone, emptying from Lake of Geneva, begins its southwesterly flow into France, to run at last due south from Lyons into the Mediterranean not far from Marseille. The course of the Rhone thus marks off the southeastern region of France, that lies up against Italy and the portion of Switzerland south of Lake of Geneva. Burt chose five cities in this region for the first evangelistic stations of the new Mission: Marseille, the country's great commercial port; Avignon, on the Rhone, fifty miles from Marseille; Lyons, the famous silk manufacturing center; Grenoble, about sixty miles southeast of Lyons, on the Isère River; and Chambéry, some fifty miles east of Lyons.

Bishop Burt's appointees were all at work by September, each having found living quarters for his family and a hired hall for preaching services. Lambert, of course, was in Marseille. In Avignon was Arthur J. Langlois, born in the Channel Islands, educated in America, and recently returned from missionary service in the French Congo. In Lyons was the mature Swiss minister Charles Thielé, who in 1908 was appointed superintendent of the Mission. The Bishop sent to Grenoble a younger Swiss preacher, Gustav Lieure, and to Chambéry, Eduard Vidoudez, formerly a Wesleyan. This team of preachers was remarkable among Methodist missionary groups for the ability of all its members to speak the language of the people they were sent to evangelize. Burt expected each man to make his station the head of a large Circuit, all the Circuits ideally growing until someday they should cover the entire Rhone Valley.

Two months later, Bishop Burt was in Seattle reporting these beginnings to the General Committee and pointing out their promise. The Committee, gratified and encouraged by what he had to say, strongly endorsed the new work and commended it as worthy of support by special gifts. But out of the Seattle sessions came no regular appropriation for France. All Burt and his men could be sure of was the Huyler money.

By now, it was becoming clear that the separation of Church and State in France, which became law on 9 December 1905, was counted by some of the official advocates of Methodist penetration of that country as the providentially timely factor in the founding of the Mission. They welcomed this historic change, for they saw it principally as a massive recession of the fortunes of the Roman Catholic Church in France—a God-given opportunity.

Landing in New York in October, 1906, Bishop Burt had said in an interview for *The Christian Advocate*:

* See Vol. III, 997, 1003 f., for earlier Swiss effort in France.

The Pope can never recover his hold upon the people of this republic [France]. His followers in France today are the reactionaries and the ignorant. The intelligence and the loyalty of France are in rebellion against him. Now is our chance, now or never.

Evidently echoing Burt, Secretary Henry K. Carroll told the General Committee a year later that the new departure in France was occurring at a favorable time, because "the separation of church and state, followed by a conflict between the government and the Church of Rome, disposes many to listen to representatives of evangelical religion." When the Bishop appealed to the Methodist constituency through *World-Wide Missions* in March, 1908, to contribute to the work of the France Mission, he hinged his case on the Separation. Against that background, he wrote, "The door is wide open. . . . Help us to evangelize France."

A strong anti-Catholic like Bishop Burt* needed no further justification for the creation of the France Mission than such a weakening of Catholic power as he found in the Separation. Writing from Europe a few months later, he cast the Roman Catholic Church in the role of destroyer of religion in France—an enemy whose baleful influence Methodism must endeavor to counteract. As late as 1912, addressing the General Conference, he reiterated and elaborated his view of the challenge:

When one reads the history of this wonderful country and sees the centuries of deception, political trickery, persecution, and debauchery carried on in the sacred name of the Christian religion, he sees in the attitude of the people to-day the revolt of a nation deceived and seduced and betrayed up to the point where all feeling has gone and only indifference remains. Everywhere secularism and infidelity are dominant.

The Papacy, oppressive, grasping, and antidemocratic, has almost strangled the religious life of the nation, . . .

This was Burt's measure of the need for Methodism in France.

Secretary Leonard pointed both to the dereliction of the Roman Catholic Church and to the spiritual vacuum left by the dissipation of its influence in France when he addressed himself, in 1910, to the question, Why plant missions in France; is not France a Christian nation?

Yes and No, with the emphasis on the No. France is religiously stranded and is in danger of spiritual shipwreck. The people, weary of being offered a stone when they needed bread, have on a tremendous scale repudiated the Roman Catholic Church and those who have not become atheists and materialists have largely ceased to be in any true sense religious. Breaking away from the Papal Church, France is also departing more widely from Christian morality and rushing after material wealth and worldly pleasure.

Leonard believed that the shrunken Catholic congregations were simply observers of ritualistic services and seldom, if ever, heard the gospel preached.

* See pp. 320 f. and 378 ff.

Statements by the officials who promoted the France Mission and interpreted its *raison d'être* tended to generate among their constituents in the United States two false and related impressions. For one thing, they so pointedly emphasized the pivotal function of the Law of Separation in their decision as to suggest that France was practically shut against Methodism before 1905 and the immediately preceding years. And they also made such meager references to French Protestantism as to suggest that there was no significant non-Catholic religious movement in France before the American Methodists came in.

But Protestantism had been indigenous to France for centuries. Neither Catholic influence, on the wane for decades, nor French ecclesiastical law would have barred the possibility of Methodist Episcopal evangelism prior to the Separation. Since the time of Napoleon, Protestantism's strongest combinations, the Reformed Churches and the Lutherans, had been legally established churches, with their ministers paid by the government and their preaching places provided at public expense. Even certain Free Churches, Methodists associated with the British Wesleys,* Baptists with American connections, the popular McAll Mission, and various evangelistic enterprises long had been active in France though not belonging to the establishment. When the Methodists decided to move in, French Protestantism, numbering about half a million adherents and 1,200 churches, was a strong and increasingly vital element in the nation's religious life.

Bishop Burt and his colleagues did not take this movement seriously enough to consult with its leaders before starting their own mission. They held no thought of sending Methodist workers into France to serve as reinforcing allies of the French Protestants. When upon occasion they made scanty reference to the French churches, they seemed to be citing them only to denigrate them as poor instruments for the salvation of France. When he condemned Catholicism as the strangler of French religion, Burt declared in the same breath, that French Protestantism, "often weak, selfishly narrow, and rationalistic, has failed to measure up to its opportunity to lead the people back to their original simple faith." When the Bishop got his first superintendent from the United States into the France Mission two years after its beginning, the new man arrived quite ignorant of the Protestant life in France. He was capable of hastily categorizing the native Protestantism as "timid, unaggressive, stagnant." And he seemed satisfied to write to the New York office, "I have been told that for the last couple of decades it has been dying. An evangelical minister told me the other day that the reason why the work was not advancing was because the church was dead." †

The objectivity of the entering Methodists as critics of French religion undoubtedly was somewhat impaired by the confidence they had in the purity

* See Vol. III, 1059 n.

† See note, p. 351.

and power of their own kind of Christianity, which they regarded as Wesleyan, experience-centered, evangelistic as well as evangelical, and warmly converting. They looked upon themselves, as preachers of this religion, as possessing unique spiritual ability to meet France's need as expressed by Bishop Burt, who held, "The need of the hour is the simple gospel preached in the power of the Spirit."

The confident expectations of Homer C. Stuntz, the Board Secretary assigned to European affairs from 1908 to 1912, were almost unbounded:

Methodism exalts religious experiences. . . . French people are known to have their full share of emotionalism. Once let a few hundreds of French men and women come into the experience of forgiven sin, and we shall see in France such a stirring among the dry bones as will surpass anything of its kind since the revivals of the time of the Wesleys. . . . It is not unreasonable to expect a Methodism in France numbering a million of souls within the next quarter of a century. Given the French temperament, Methodist doctrine and polity, and the Disestablishment of the Roman Church and this result is a glorious possibility.

Ernest W. Bysshe, the Superintendent sent from the United States, was the man eventually to have the most to do with what actually was accomplished on the field. He was a 32-year-old Canadian whom Bishop Burt enlisted out of a four-year pastorate in a Connecticut church of a hundred members—his first ministerial appointment. Only two years a full member of his Conference, with no experience as a missionary, and enjoying no working knowledge of the French language, Bysshe was expected to develop and administer a new mission in a far from backward country and to superintend French-speaking, European preachers who in some cases had more experience than he. His only special orientation for the task was to be such as he might pick up during six months as interim pastor of the American church in Rome en route to France. This was the man to whom the Bishop and the Board entrusted the leadership of Methodism's professedly high cause in France. Secretary Stuntz could not help having strong misgivings.

Bysshe's assignment to France was the result of no upsurge of giving for the French work. To be sure, the Mission went on regular appropriations in 1909 for the first time. But the \$5,840 appropriated for France included the continuing Huyler contribution of \$5,000, previously classified as a special gift. Bishop Burt undertook to raise additional funds through his own special contacts. And of course, the France budget gained some relief by Burt's sending Achilles Lambert back to the States before Bysshe took charge in France. The Bishop had found Lambert ill adapted to the situation in Marseille and ineffective in the work.

Bysshe established his headquarters in Grenoble in the summer of 1909, with five preachers under his direction. One of them was Charles Thielé, who became District Superintendent of the Lyons District under Bysshe's

Mission superintendency. Another was Edoardo Tourn, formerly superintendent of the Switzerland District of the Italy Conference. Vidoudez and Lieure were still under appointment. For the next five years, the preaching corps remained approximately at this numerical level, though with some changes in personnel.

Chambéry, Grenoble, and Lyons still had resident pastors. Toulon, the naval center thirty miles from Marseille, also now had its own pastor. These four remained active heads of Circuits most of the time up to 1914. Marseille did not appear among the Italy Conference appointments after 1909; only in 1905 and 1906 had it had a stated appointee from that Conference.

When Bysse took charge, the Mission's evangelistic enterprise was only inching along. The large cities and towns first entered already were proving difficult and unfruitful fields. People were coming only in small numbers to the preaching halls upon which the workers were relying in the effort to disseminate their message. Bysse quickly became convinced that the Mission could not grow unless he and his men took a lively initiative in outreach.

He first tackled the problem of getting people into the preaching halls wherever the Mission maintained them. Typical of his approach was what he did in the town where the work was going the hardest, where the pastor never had more than "a handful of folks" for an audience:

. . . this winter I had him start in with a publicity campaign visiting from house to house, leaving a tract and having a word of prayer where they would welcome it, and inviting the people to our services. We have two stereopticon outfits now as a part of the equipment and I lent him one for a couple of weeks. The result of his campaign is that he has had his Hall filled, has gotten hold of new people and in short seems to be on the way to make a success . . .

More broadly, Bysse put the Mission on the road, gradually moving it out beyond its earliest urban centers and into new communities, from which smaller towns and villages, with their generally more responsive people, were accessible. He directed the extension movement through a Society of Evangelization organized by the Mission—a device that enabled him to solicit the co-operation of sponsors, workers, and other interested parties without the handicap of keeping the name of the Methodist Episcopal Church always prominently in the foreground.

When the Society entered a town, its first move was not to hire a hall, but to put up a tent. Across the front was boldly printed (in French):

WE PROCLAIM
LIBERTY THROUGH THE TRUTH
EQUALITY UNDER SALVATION IN JESUS CHRIST
FRATERNITY THROUGH LOVE OF GOD AND OUR NEIGHBOR

Inside the tent, often crowded to its capacity of 250 people, Bysse and his

workers would nightly preach the message of salvation through Christ, continuing for weeks on end, even for as long as three to six months. Bible-selling, distribution of evangelical literature, and visitation supplemented the tent preaching.

The gospel tent scheme was Bysse's own idea. As soon as he became aware of the Mission's difficulties in building up audiences for its preaching, the young Superintendent had appealed to Secretary Leonard for suggestions about how to reach the people. The best reply Leonard could muster was that he did not know Bysse's situation well enough to offer any but random advice. Random it may have been, general it was. "I suppose," wrote Leonard, "the only way to get to the people will be to 'go for them.'" Bysse did not ask for Stuntz's advice; Stuntz volunteered it, liberally. But on the question of the Mission's program, it was as general as Leonard's—an urgent exhortation on "the necessity of following almost exclusively an evangelistic program during the early years of our mission." When Bysse broached his plan for tent evangelism to Stuntz, however, the Secretary's reaction was definite enough; he unhesitatingly endeavored to quash the proposal.

Perhaps forgetting his earlier reliance upon the evangelistic potential of what he regarded as the emotionalism of the French, Stuntz now told Bysse that tent campaigning would greatly cheapen and hinder the Mission's approach to the French people both because of "the exalted ideas of church order" prevalent in Europe in general and because of the French penchant for "propriety and dignity in the service of religion." He regretted that he could not "see how evangelism, such as might be satisfactory in Indiana or Colorado, would be acceptable for France." Appealing to an even more remote guide to evangelistic methodology, he advised Bysse to use "the Apostolic method of establishing the church in the houses." He urged, "Preach in the houses that are open to you. Preach in such halls as you are able to open and respectably furnish. Magnify the personal touch."

But Bysse persisted. He knew that in twentieth-century France, great numbers of men no longer loved churchly ways and places, and people like these were the ones he hoped to win. He got his gospel tent—the demountable chapel, he preferred to call it at first—from a friendly Englishman in France, who donated it to the Society of Evangelization on condition that the Methodists finance its use. By putting up an argument, Bysse got Stuntz to relax his original opposition, but won from him no promise of specific financial aid. In April, 1910, the Board of Managers turned down a request by Bysse for a special grant of \$500 for literature to be used in his first tent campaign. Trusting that Stuntz would somehow supply the money he needed, Bysse finally went ahead with his tent work without authorization for the financial obligations he incurred. He was able to keep the project going with special gifts that gradually began to come in.

Bysshe mounted a fresh tent campaign each summer, cultivating the northern Departments in the region first staked out by the Mission and keeping his workers out of places where the Wesleyans were active. Finally, towns in the department of Savoie became the almost exclusive targets of the drives, and Bysshe and others began to refer to this activity as a Savoie enterprise. They refrained from entering Haute-Savoie, immediately to the north, for they and the Wesleyans worked under an agreement to divide the two Savoyan departments between them. Wherever they pitched their tent, the Methodist campaigners stimulated enough religious response and public interest to open a continuing preaching program in the aftermath of the special services. Gradually, here and there, new congregations resulted.

As the tent evangelism began to make itself felt as the Mission's chief expansive force, the pattern of preaching appointments became more inclusive. A number of places were thus associated with the four permanent centers at various times from 1907 to 1914. Associated with Chambéry were Moutiers, Culoz, Albertville, and Bourgneuf. Connected with Grenoble were Vienne and Voiron. Lyons was the center for Saint-Étienne, Villefranche-sur-Saône, and L'Arbresle, while the Toulon charge included La Garde, La Seyne-sur-Mer, and Pou du Las. Some of these places became more important preaching posts in their own right—notably Albertville and Bourgneuf, both of them opened up by gospel tent teams. Other places appearing in the Appointments at least briefly were Bandol and Ollioules (near Toulon), Trévoux (north of Lyons), and Grésy-sur-Isère (near Chambéry). Notre Dame de Millières also became a center of Methodist activity in Savoie.

During this period of expansion, the Mission remained a modest and simple organization. Its practical character changed very little from its being elevated to the status of a Mission Conference, which occurred in May, 1910, under the presidency of Bishop Burt. The charter members of the Conference were Bysshe, four preachers transferred from the Switzerland Conference, and one (Edoardo Tourn) from the Italy Conference.

Although from the beginning, the Mission had received its new affiliates and converts into church membership, formal organization of the laity as responsible participants in the work lagged. The new ecclesiastical law of 1905 not only disestablished the churches formerly supported by the government, but also fastened upon all church groups a decentralized pattern of legal organization. The rights and responsibilities involved in supporting religious worship and maintaining church property were lodged in local religious associations (*associations cultuelles*) of laymen. The Mission completed the legal requirements early in 1911, establishing five associations of twenty-five members each, in Lyons, Grenoble, Chambéry, Albertville, and Toulon. These groups constituted the legal membership at the various stations, which did not always correspond numerically with the "private"

membership. This move gave the Mission legal status through its local units and granted the churches property-holding powers and a favorable tax situation.

Co-ordination of the religious associations with the Quarterly Conference system of the Methodist Episcopal Church began as late as 1913, starting with Savoie. First came formation of a religious association to cover the Department as a whole, with local committees for the respective charges. Bysshe called the local committees together at Grésy-sur-Isère and out of them formed the Mission's first Quarterly Conference, which confirmed the relevant action of the religious association and the composition of the local committees. The new Quarterly Conference at once began acting Methodistically by granting Local Preacher's licenses to two colporteurs already at work in Savoie. Bysshe expected the development of the Disciplinary form of organization to help bring forward an aggressive, spiritual laity that would, along with a consecrated, apostolic ministry, be "destined to wield a mighty influence in the next twenty-five years in the regeneration of France."

The only institutional expression of the Mission's influence was a hostel for foreign girls studying at the University of Grenoble. In the fall of 1909, the Woman's Foreign Missionary Society, responding to Bishop Burt's initiative, transferred to her native France Suzanne Delord, for eleven years a teacher at Crandon Hall Institute, in Rome. Miss Delord opened in Grenoble, in rented quarters, a residence that soon harbored girl students from more than a dozen countries. The W.F.M.S. paid Miss Delord's salary, and Bishop Burt made himself responsible for the rest of the financing of the project until he left the Zurich Area in 1912. Although the hostel was partly self-supporting, it then became a financial problem for Bysshe. Miss Delord's transfer to Grenoble had been a bit of ecclesiastical academic politics devised to adjust an intramural situation at Crandon Hall to suit the directress, Bishop Burt's daughter Edith. The W.F.M.S. had had no spontaneous, firm interest in the Grenoble experiment, and wanted to discontinue paying the Delord salary after Burt left. The women did keep up the salary payments, but successfully resisted the efforts of the Board's representatives to have them put the Grenoble Women Students' Hostel on W.F.M.S. appropriations. The residence was kept functioning, however, up to the outbreak of the War.

From the beginning, and perennially, Bysshe's responsibility for the France Mission involved him in always difficult, and sometimes intensely discouraging, financial struggle. The Mission already was running a not generally recognized deficit when he took charge in 1909. Being a young man without well developed financial contacts, Bysshe felt handicapped as to his ability to raise large sums in special gifts. Modest but troublesome deficits continued to dog him, because he could not secure sufficient increases in special gifts and appropriations to enable him both to catch up with the continuing money needs

of the Mission and to cover the moderate new expenditures that had to be made in order to grasp the emerging opportunities for evangelistic extension. Secretary George Heber Jones said in 1913 that the outlook was so bad at one time that Bysshe seemed to have been "appointed in charge of a missionary soap-bubble which he was expected to keep from bursting."

One of Bysshe's early requests for financial help elicited from Secretary Stuntz a letter largely devoted to an attempt to argue away one of the Mission's basic functional needs—funds for workers' salaries. "The theory that you must hire men to propagate our work in France is fundamentally erroneous," wrote Stuntz. Developing his argument, he said :

If Whatcoat and Asbury had landed in the United States [*sic*] prepared to hire preachers to propagate the Methodist doctrines among the Colonists, the work never would have spread as it did. It is upon the volunteer labor of men and women whose hearts are set on fire with the love of Christ that you must rely upon [*sic*] for the conversion of France. I said this to you before you went out. I fear it made no adequate impression.

Stuntz expected Bysshe to be impressed and convinced not only by this reference to John Wesley's two American missionaries, but also by citation of successful use of unpaid volunteers by the Methodists in the Philippines, by the early Church as recorded in the Acts of the Apostles, and by the Church Missionary Society in Uganda.

Stuntz's approach was doctrinaire. He was arguing from his categorical belief that complete reliance upon dedicated volunteers under the control of the foreign missionary was the only successful method of large-scale evangelization on any field. It was easy, then, for him to brush lightly over the numerous pragmatic factors differentiating backwoods America under George III, cities in the Mediterranean Basin under Nero, Uganda under Victoria Regina, the Philippines under Teddy Roosevelt, and France under Aristide Briand as areas for missionary cultivation. Thus he could tell Bysshe :

I have not a shred of doubt that we can take France for Christ by relying upon this method, and on the contrary, I have no particle of confidence that large results can come from this scheme so underscored and capitalized in your letter, that we must pay money to capable French workers. I do not believe it. I can never be made to believe it. I have studied the question too long to leave the door upon [open] for question of doubt.

Secretary Leonard, however, did not share his colleague's informal approach to the development of leaders for the France Mission. He told the General Committee in 1910 that a theological school to train young men for the French ministry was an immediate necessity. He believed that theological schools were more critically needed in Roman Catholic Europe than in the United States. "Young men who have been reared under the influence

of the Roman Catholic Church, and have its teachings woven into the warp and woof of their intellectual and moral makeup," he said, "need not only spiritual regeneration, but also biblical instruction on all moral and religious questions." Naturally, a theologically trained ministry would be a paid ministry.

Bysshe's own sense of urgency about the Mission's personnel requirements was forged neither from theory nor from guesswork. Experience quickly showed him that he had to have high-grade preachers; when the men were inadequate, as in some cases he found them, local missions lagged or sagged. And he found that paid, if not always thoroughly trained workers, were essential to evangelistic growth. He needed them for his tent campaigns and for the preaching stations the campaigns produced. Indeed, he actually engaged extra workers for preaching and colportage from time to time, especially as the more expansive movement began to gain results. But to do this, he had to depend largely upon uncertain special gifts, some assistance from the Geneva Evangelization Society (1912), and small amounts from the American Bible Society. The financial difficulties were discouraging, not only to Bysshe, but also to his sometimes overworked and unreinforced preachers. In the face of open opportunities, evangelistic extension had to be undertaken slowly, and new work sometimes had to be curtailed, occasionally coming almost to a standstill. Of course, related needs also had to be ignored. In 1913, Bysshe complained to the New York office that the year's final allotments included "nothing for education of our young men, nothing for anything except the absolute low-water limit of evangelistic work."

Although Stuntz and Leonard, and their immediate successors, were favorable to the France Mission, there were elements in the Board that constituted a perennial opposition. Secretary George Heber Jones bluntly declared in 1913 that every November, when appropriations were made, "found someone at the General Committee Meeting with a big club under his coat for France." This not only discouraged Bysshe, it discouraged increases in appropriations.

The increases that did come were limited and belated. In 1909, the General Committee added \$840 to the \$5,000 contributed by John S. Huyler. Unfortunately, Huyler's support ceased after his death in 1910, and when the Board had to fill the \$5,000 gap, it added only a thousand dollars more, to make an appropriation of \$6,400 for 1911 and 1912. The next increase (to \$8,100, for 1913) was essentially a bookkeeping raise based on the rate of recent special gifts received. It took cautious manipulation by the Secretaries, who used a condition attached to a \$40,000 pledge for property in Grenoble as leverage, to raise the appropriation to \$10,000 for 1914 and \$12,000 for 1915. Even then, the desired increase of \$3,900 had to be negotiated in these two annual stages for fear that the Secretaries could not, all in one year, get the entire advance past certain General Committee partisans of

light financial commitments in Europe as against non-Christian areas. With this somewhat enlarged financial plan in effect, Bysshe nevertheless still found the planned funds falling short of what was needed in order to pursue the numerous promising evangelistic openings, especially in Savoie.

But Bysshe persevered—keeping the Mission going in spite of the financial drag, learning to speak French, improvising as to methods, resolving tensions with his European preachers, broadening his associations with other Protestants, resisting community pressures from Roman Catholic and politically reactionary sources, and developing a French Methodist constituency. The constituency, to be sure, was small. When the Mission Conference met in Toulon in May, 1914, under Bishop John L. Nuelsen, the five Circuits—Albertville, Bourgneuf, Lyons, Grenoble, and Toulon—reported 322 probationers and 216 full members. Only in Bourgneuf itself was there a Methodist-owned church, a simple building dedicated in 1913.

NOTES

Page 331. Accounts drafted after 1900 almost completely ignore Havránek, the founding of residential missionary work in Hungary often being attributed, erroneously, to Melle. Bishop William Burt referred to Havránek, but not by name, in *The Christian Advocate* (1904), p. 1789, as simply a preacher who was sent to the Hungarian charge but “proved himself to be unworthy, and did the work much harm.” Melle wrote in *The Christian Advocate* (1913), p. 750, that Havránek had to be dismissed, but gave him no credit for the three-point work out of which Melle built the first three Backa Circuits. Havránek was discontinued as a probationer by Conference action in 1901. But whatever may have been his deficiencies on the field, he did have the record of experience in the Backa that is set forth in our text above. Our account is based on contemporary Conference notations and, notably, on R. Möller’s letter to A. B. Leonard, 25 Oct. 1900.

Page 343. Ernest W. Bysshe to A. B. Leonard, 12 Aug. 1909. John R. Mott, less involved in the Methodist missionary system, entertained a much more discriminating and appreciative view of French Protestantism than did Burt or Bysshe. See Mott, *Addresses and Papers* (New York: Association Press, VI (1947), p. 278.

Part II

CONTINUING MISSIONS

1896-1919

European Missions Without Missionaries

Switzerland

Swiss Methodism in 1896 included a full-fledged indigenous Annual Conference and a few small outposts maintained under Italian auspices. The six thousand German-speaking members of the Switzerland Conference lived in cities and towns scattered clear across western and northern Switzerland, from Lake of Geneva on through the Jura Mountains and the Alpine lakes region north of the high Alps themselves to Lake Constance. The heavily overshadowed group of 150 members shepherded by workers from the Italy Conference lived at four points along the northern crescent shore of Lake of Geneva, within the bounds of the Switzerland Conference.

The two enterprises overlapped only geographically; each was defined by a standing Disciplinary provision. The Switzerland Conference officially included the work "in Switzerland and those portions of France where the German language is spoken." The Italy Conference covered not only Italy itself, but also "those parts of contiguous countries where the Italian language is spoken."

ITALIAN MISSIONS

The Italian groups were in Geneva, Lausanne, Vevey, and Montreux.

The Geneva work was entering its second decade under the Italy Conference. Originally gathered by a theological student named Teofilo D. Malan and for several years supported by personal friends of his in Scotland, the church had been received into the Conference, along with its pastor and on its own petition, in 1885.* Malan stayed in Geneva until 1889, when he went to the United States and inaugurated a mission among the Italians in Philadelphia. In 1896, Edoardo Tourn was completing his sixth year as pastor.

The mission among the Italians was extended from Geneva to Lausanne, Vevey, and Montreux in 1893, all four points being combined to constitute Tourn's pastoral charge.

* Vol. III, 1049.

At the Conference session in June, 1896, Geneva became a separate appointment, and Tourn, who already lived in Lausanne, was appointed to the Lausanne-Vevey-Montreux charge. During the year, the Italian mission reached out fifty miles northeast of Lausanne, to make a beginning in Bern, the national capital. Work also was started in Zurich, Switzerland's largest city, sixty miles farther in the same direction. This was the beginning of a period of mission expansion, with invitations from local residents or committees often preceding the advent of the Italian evangelists.

The Conference heard at its Bologna session in 1899 the results of a two months' evangelistic mission by Giovanni Pons in the area north of Lake of Neuchâtel. Pons was successful in starting Methodist groups in Neuchâtel, La Chaux-de-Fonds, and other places in the area. Bishop John M. Walden formed them into a Circuit based on Neuchâtel and put Risorgi Carrari in charge of it. With Edoardo Tagliatela in Geneva and Tourn in Lausanne, the Italy Conference now had three of its preachers at work in Switzerland. For the ensuing Conference year, but only for that year, the Italian mission was organized as the Lausanne District, with Tourn as superintendent.

At the end of the year, Tourn gave his fellow Conference members, gathered in Milan, a detailed view of the expanding character of the work. For the Lausanne Circuit, he reported new preaching stations in Veytaux, Aigle, Gryon, Villars, Chesières, Ollon, Cully, Morges, Echallens, La Sarraz, and one or two other places. Among the new stations he reported for the Neuchâtel Circuit were Saint Blaise, Travers, Môtiers, Bonvillars, Noiraigue, and Le Locle.

For four years after this year apart, the Swiss charges were administered from Italy. Then for five Conference years (1904-9), they constituted by themselves the Swiss District. Edoardo Tourn served as District Superintendent until he left Switzerland to enter the France Mission. Upon his departure, in 1909, the Swiss work again was merged into successive Districts composed of churches in Italy. From 1904 to World War I, the Italy Conference appointments in Switzerland generally included five Circuits or chief charges, with the same number of preachers. In 1904, the appointments were Geneva, La Chaux-de-Fonds, Lausanne, Neuchâtel, and Zurich; in 1914, they were Geneva, Lausanne, Neuchâtel, Vevey, and Zurich.

Through the years up to the War, still other places were reported as scenes of Methodist activity in one degree or another. Of them all, only Nyon lay near Geneva. Nearer the western end of the Lake were Chexbres, Grandvaux, Renens, Vaulion, Bussigny, Malleray, Payerne, and others, with Lausanne as head of the Circuit. Among those in the Lake of Neuchâtel region were Couvet, Buttes, Fleurier, Orbe, Vallorbe, Saint Sulpice, Baulmes, Sainte Croix, Balleghé, Colombier, Bôle, Peseux, Marin, Saint-Imier, and Biel. Between the Neuchâtel area and the vicinity of Zurich, the Mission established no preaching stations. But Methodist evangelism reached into

Bülach, Saint Gall, Schaffhausen, Oerlikon, Horgen, and Thalwil, on the Zurich Circuit. In 1914, the Italian preachers were active in about thirty-five places.

The factor determining the areas into which the Italian mission spread from its original base in Geneva was the purpose of the Italy Conference to evangelize Italian immigrants into Switzerland. Most of them were manual workers who came there for employment in manufacturing and on public works such as tunnel construction. Following the workers into the places where these opportunities were available, the mission automatically became active in the French-speaking cantons of Vaud, Fribourg, and Neuchâtel, and in the neighborhood of Zurich. Conversely, the Methodist preachers did not enter Ticino, Switzerland's only predominantly Italian-language canton; for Ticino, being underdeveloped in manufacturing, had no labor market to lure laborers from Italy. Incidentally, whereas the Italian enterprise overlapped areas occupied by the Switzerland Conference, the latter's greatest development occurred outside the cantons where the Italian preachers were most active.

Non-Methodist and non-Italian Protestants sometimes significantly encouraged the Italian preachers. A good many Swiss Protestants were on the sponsoring committees that invited them to come to preach to the various local groups of Italians. Some of the Swiss leaders realized that linguistically the Italian preachers could do what they themselves were not prepared to do for the immigrants from the south. Financial contributors appeared, church organizations helped. In 1905, for instance, a committee of the Free Church of Vaud pledged six months' salary for an additional Methodist evangelist who was put to work visiting the Italians. And in 1913, the Evangelization Committee of the National Church was involved in the support of two Methodist preachers for the Italian work in Vaud.

There were also forces that worked against the success of the Methodist evangelists from Italy. Among their antagonists they sometimes found certain other Protestant churchmen who were cold or hostile to their work, some of them treating it as invasive competition. Much more aggressive and more disturbing were the atheist or secularist anarchists and Socialists whose antireligious propaganda was rife among the Italian workingmen at the turn of the century. It was often rigorously difficult for the preachers to make headway against it. Feeling the impact of the radicals' atheistic attacks, Edoardo Tourn became pessimistic about the outlook for any but slow evangelical growth. He declared to his Conference brethren in 1906, "We must not delude ourselves; the mass of our workingmen are becoming skeptical, indifferent, and fanatically atheistic." This atmosphere and also the Catholic background of the immigrants the Methodists reached produced a result that baffled Tourn—the almost complete absence of a "conviction of sin" among his fellow countrymen. This deficiency cut away, of course, one of the essen-

tial, and also strategic, bases of the traditional Methodist evangelism evidently still in vogue with European Methodist preachers.

The Mission's most persistent, aggressive, and concretely effective opponents were the Roman Catholics who tried to thwart or undermine it. To be sure, Fribourg was the only traditionally Roman Catholic canton in which the Italian Methodist evangelists worked. But attacks by Catholics (undoubtedly they considered them counterattacks) on Methodist cultivation of the immigrants were not limited to Fribourg. The source of their power to block or disrupt Methodist influence was neither the presence of a heavily Catholic population in a given place nor any privileged position of the Roman Church before the law. It was rather the vulnerability of the Methodist recruit or prospect to pressures whose sanctions lay in his traditional social and psychological subservience to the priests in his homeland. To be sure, the Italian laborer was away from home, but even in Switzerland a priest was a priest, the Church was the Church. The Catholic-bred worker still was responsive to priestly denunciations of the Church's enemies, the Methodists included, and sensitive to personal pursuit and intimidation by Catholics because of his associating with Methodism. In 1906-7, the anti-Methodist attacks of a priest in Bülach, near Zurich, were effective enough to bring about suspension of the Methodist work there. As late as 1913, a priest and his followers seriously retarded and all but stamped out, the response to Methodist preaching in Renens, a small industrial city near Lausanne.

These various forms of opposition, as well as the frustrating transiency of the workers from Italy, tended to limit the growth of Methodism among them in terms of settled churches and reportable membership rolls. In 1914, at the close of three decades of evangelistic labors, the five Circuits had 286 church members. Alongside these were 59 probationers, and in six Sunday schools there were 445 pupils. Only in Zurich and Lausanne did the Italian Methodists possess their own church buildings.

SWITZERLAND CONFERENCES

All the limited Italian work of 1896 and almost all the southwestern area the Italian preachers traversed during the next two decades lay within the Bern District, later called the West District, of the Switzerland Conference. But in 1896, the Bern District not only had about twenty preaching places in these southwestern cantons of Geneva, Neuchâtel, and Vaud, but also reached out into the cantons of Bern, Solothurn, and Basel, to more than fifty points where Swiss Methodists preached the gospel in German. This spread of the Bern District toward the northwest, carried it up to the region covered by the Zurich District, which had about eighty-five preaching places in the canton of Zurich and nine in Aargau. Beyond the Zurich District, and along the eastern borders of the country, ran the St. Gallen [Saint Gall]

District, later called the East District, which had thirty preaching posts scattered through four cantons—from Schaffhausen in the far north, through Thurgau and Saint Gall along Lake Constance, into the vicinity of Chur in the southeastern canton of Graubünden.

When it observed the fiftieth anniversary of its work at the session of 1906 in Lausanne, the Switzerland Conference looked very much like a well-established church. Like the other European missions, however, it was dependent upon appropriations by the General Missionary Committee. During this period, the annual amount usually exceeded \$7,000, but only once reached \$8,000.

In three cities, the Conference had deaconess centers, begun with assistance from the movement in Germany. Two deaconesses had started work in Saint Gall in 1885, just before the division of the Germany and Switzerland Conference. Zurich had been added in 1887, and Lausanne in 1890.

Two new deaconess projects were opened before the World War—one in Geneva in 1908 and one in Lucerne in 1911.

"We hope that the mother Church in America will pray for her little sister in Switzerland, and help her to build chapels in every city of our beautiful country, to the honor of God and for the salvation of men," ventured the superintendent of the Zurich District in 1897 in his contribution to the Missionary Society's *Annual Report*. The "mother Church" did help; from 1896 to 1911, the appropriations for Switzerland included about \$500 to \$900 to enable the Conference to carry the debts arising from its earlier and its current erection or purchase of chapels. Occasionally the Board sent additional aid for a specific project, as when it made in 1901 a special allocation of \$10,000 towards acquisition of a property in Lausanne for joint use of the Swiss and the Italian groups. And so chapel-building went on throughout the period on all three Districts, with the result that the number of Methodist-owned chapels was more than doubled. By 1914, there were seventy-nine of them.

The Board hoped to wean the Switzerland Conference, and other established European Conferences, from continued reliance upon remittances from New York. In 1906, Secretary Henry K. Carroll sounded out Leonhard Peter, the treasurer for Switzerland, about the possibility of beginning in two or three years' time annual reductions in appropriations by a certain percentage. "Would it or would it not in your opinion be likely to result in the development of the resources of the Conference so that the work would ere long become self-supporting?" he asked.

The Conference accepted self-support as a goal, preferring first to attempt reductions in the amounts asked for the regular work, recognizing the greater difficulty of getting along with less money for financing chapel-construction, which was a heavy and still urgent need. The man who wrote the Conference report to the Board for 1907 declared that its people, who

belonged to "the laboring classes," were doing all they could to meet the need. Undoubtedly in further extenuation of Switzerland's remaining on appropriations, he declared that the ministers were living with the utmost economy, on salaries ranging from \$320 to \$700. Their income had been the same for twenty years, but the cost of living had increased 25 per cent.

Efforts to achieve self-support brought increased giving by the church members. But the increases evidently were absorbed by the ever developing requirements of the work of the churches, for the amounts of money received from the Board did not slack off appreciably. R. Ernest Grob, the Conference treasurer, was being somewhat sanguine retrospectively, but realistic about the immediate future, when he reported to the Board in 1914, ". . . we were on the way of realizing our dream [of self-support] when the European war broke out and has greatly complicated our efforts. I fear the whole question will have to be postponed for years."

The pre-War workers in the Switzerland Conference did not exhaust their energies in erecting and paying for chapels. They also kept increasing the number of preaching places; it crept up to 197 in 1897, to 224 in 1899, to 241 in 1901, to 244 in 1903, to 266 in 1905. This phase of their activity demonstrated the fluidity of the movement, as the new chapels symbolized its stability. For the readers of *World-Wide Missions* in the fall of 1905, August J. Bucher, a Swiss faculty member at the Mission Institute in Frankfurt on the Main, described the carriers of the evangelistic venture in action:

The Lord is with our fifty brave pastors as they labor on Sunday afternoons in the valleys, on plains, or in the mountains, in our fifty-seven chapels and two hundred rented rooms, halls, and cottages, or at the open-air meetings in the forests. It would be impossible for these comparatively few pastors to care for so many charges, were it not for the faithful supplementary work of one hundred and seven local preachers and exhorters.

Bucher pointed out that along with this outreach to adults went the development of Sunday schools involving 21,156 pupils.

By this time, the evangelistic effort had raised the membership of the churches to more than 8,100. Further gradual, unspectacular growth made the Switzerland Conference by 1914 a church of about 9,500 members meeting in more than 275 preaching places.

Germany

The Methodist Episcopal Church in Germany, which was organized as the North Germany and the South Germany Conferences, experienced in 1897 an increment in numbers and a lift in morale by receiving by transfer the members, ministers, and property of the Wesleyan Methodist Church in Germany and Austria. The Wesleyans were sponsored by the British Wesley-

an Church through its Missionary Society. The proposal for union came from Wesleyan sources, particularly from the Germans themselves, although sentiment in favor of the union of all German Methodists had existed for some years among communicants of the Methodist Episcopal Church.

The General Missionary Committee enthusiastically endorsed the proposed union in November, 1895, and recommended that the General Conference prepare the way for it by legalizing such a transfer. Responding also to a memorial to the same effect from the Germany Conferences, the General Conference of 1896 adopted a general measure authorizing Annual Conferences to receive like-minded church bodies into the Methodist Episcopal Church. The Methodists and the Wesleyans shared of course, the historic Wesleyan tradition and common doctrine and church usages. The chief difference between them was that of polity; the Methodists operated under an episcopal system, but the Wesleyans without benefit of bishops. The German Wesleyans were quite ready, however, to come in under the Methodists' episcopal plan. Indeed, many of them felt that they would become more effective by sharing its connectionalism. Some were impressed by Methodist growth in Germany in contrast with their own. And they felt a more natural affinity with the American denomination than with the British because of the former's German constituency in the United States and its decades of transatlantic intercourse with the German Methodists.

The union was consummated in June, 1897, at sessions of the South Germany and of the North Germany Conferences in Stuttgart and Cassel, respectively, with Bishop Goodsell presiding. Nearly twenty-four hundred laymen and thirty-one ministers (one declined his transfer) thus were transferred from the Wesleyan to the Methodist Episcopal Church. This enabled the Methodists to count their membership at 12,337 at the end of 1897.

Into the South Germany Conference from the Wesleyan communion came twenty-four ministers and some two thousand church members. This added twenty-one new Circuits to the Stuttgart District, so enlarging it that it was divided into two new units, the Stuttgart District, reshaped, and the Heilbronn District. The Conference also received church property valued at \$200,000. Into the North Germany Conference came six ministers and about 350 members constituting five Circuits—Cottbus, Glogau, Görlitz, Magdeburg, and Vienna (Austria)*—which were assigned to the Berlin District. But with them came no property, for on these Circuits, the Wesleyans had used rented preaching halls. To carry the new work, the General Committee made an additional regular appropriation of \$12,500 for the Germany work as a whole.

The Wesleyans brought with them into the enlarged church a deaconess enterprise that had been organized in 1888 under the Martha and Mary Society of the Wesleyan Synod in Germany. At the time of the union,

* See pp. 322-39 for Austria-Hungary.

the Society's deaconesses were at work in Nuremberg, Munich, Magdeburg, and Vienna. Although its affiliation was now Methodist Episcopal, the Society remained a separate organization and continued expanding its service.

The Methodist deaconess work had been organized in 1874, when there was a single Germany Conference, which included work in Switzerland. In 1897 there were deaconess establishments in Frankfort on the Main, Hamburg, Berlin, Neuenheim, and Strassburg.

Between 1897 and 1914, both Societies together extended their work, successively, into Heilbronn, Pforzheim, Cologne, Karlsruhe, Chemnitz, Siegen, Stuttgart, Düsseldorf, Plauen, Heidelberg, Donndorf, Wiesbaden, Leipzig, Dresden, Saarbrücken, Halle, Darmstadt, Pirmasens, and Stettin. The deaconess work was chiefly a nursing and hospital ministry, but some of the women were engaged in parish and child care work.

Once again, eight years later, the Methodist constituency was augmented by denominational union, but more modestly. This time, the melding group was the mission of the United Brethren in Christ, a church closely associated on American soil with early American Methodism. The North Germany Conference received 376 United Brethren members on the Berlin District and about 150 on the Leipzig District, where they had buildings in Zeitz, Poesneck, Weimar, Apolda, and Eisenach, places having no Methodist congregations. Part of the membership of a small United Brethren circuit centered in Hof, in Bavaria, joined the Heilbronn District of the South Germany Conference.

All aside from the accessions of Wesleyans and United Brethren in 1897 and 1905, the membership of the Germany mission grew strongly during the eighteen years before the World War. It more than doubled, from 9,500 in 1896 to 22,000 in 1914. This increase occurred in spite of the fact that police harassment, administrative bans, legal obstructions, and hostility by the clergy of state churches continued to strike more sharply at the German Methodists than at those in any other mission in Europe. Expansion into new localities produced some of the increase in membership. The North Germany Conference had forty-two charges in 1896 and seventy-three in 1914. The South Germany Conference had forty-seven in 1896 and seventy-two in 1914.

Finland

In 1896, Finland was a thinly populated semi-independent grand duchy of some three million people within the Russian Empire, with the Tsar as grand duke. In 1896, the Methodists in Finland were a scattered company of about six hundred members organized into a dozen charges under the Finland and St. Petersburg Mission, with N. J. Rosen of Helsinki as Superintendent.

Some of the charges conducted their activities in the Swedish language, others in Finnish. Distant from all the rest was a charge in Leningrad (St. Petersburg), Russia. The people worshiped in a score of inconvenient rented halls and in four churches of their own, under the leadership of a dozen preachers. The work was supported both by the people themselves and by an annual appropriation of \$4,000 by the Missionary Society in the United States.

Because Finland Methodism was until 1892 an arm of the Sweden Conference, little had been done until then to win adherents among the Finnish-speaking people, who made up about 90 per cent of the population. But in 1896 there were Finnish charges in Helsinki, Kotka, Tammerfors, and Vyborg, with some Finnish activity in the Abo and Bjorneborg churches. Approximately a third of the Mission's church members now were Finns, and efforts were being made to extend that part of the work, which Bishop Goodsell characterized as "the most important future" Methodism had in Finland. The Book and Magazine Concern was publishing, in addition to Swedish material, the Finnish monthly *Rauhan Sanomia* (The Messenger of Peace) and a Finnish Sunday school paper and other literature for Finns. In an endeavor to increase their strength, the Finnish charges were organized into a separate District in 1898.

To supply trained leadership for the Finnish-language constituency, the Mission opened a theological school in Tammerfors in 1897. In urging the Missionary Society to support this measure, Bishop Goodsell stated that it was necessary thus to have the candidates for the Finnish ministry taught in their own language and not by the Mission's Swedish-speaking ministers. He also held that failure to provide a soundly oriented seminary would condemn the Society to wasting money by developing among the Finns—he called them an independent and strong but passionate people—"a bastard Methodism, ignorant, fanatical and heretical." The Theological School's first principal and teacher was J. William Häggmann of Pigeon Cove, Massachusetts, a native Finn and a graduate of Boston University School of Theology. Häggmann returned to Finland as a Board missionary under an increase in the annual appropriation for the Mission, but for the School itself and its needy students there was not a stick of equipment or a single Finnish Mark in cash. Häggman himself had to go out and raise the money to keep his school going. By the time it was moved to Helsinki in 1907, it had prepared twenty-eight young men for the Methodist ministry.

The increasingly Finnish character of the Mission produced in its Annual Meeting of 1899 a memorial asking the General Conference to grant it the status of a Mission Conference. The change would mean that the Mission's ministers would then hold their individual membership in a Finland-based Conference and not in the Sweden Conference. And Finland Methodists would be able to speak for themselves and shape their own policies. The

Mission's request was granted in an enabling act adopted in 1900, but Bishop John H. Vincent refused to sanction organization of the Mission Conference because of strenuous opposition from Methodist sources in Sweden. A later overwhelming vote by the Mission's ministers brought about the desired change, however, in August, 1903.

Eighteen Finnish preachers strongly stated the necessity of a Finland base for the Finland and St. Petersburg Mission Conference when, in March, 1904, they sent to the General Conference a long memorial designed to block a move by a few Swedish-speaking ministers to have the new Conference divided by assigning the Swedish churches in Finland to the Sweden Conference. The petitioners warned that because of current political conditions and the tensions and uncertainties centered in the Russo-Japanese war, the Russian government would look with suspicion upon any influence in the Methodist Church that appeared to originate in Sweden. The Mission's work had shown good growth, they held, after its severance from the Sweden Conference in 1892. They claimed that the Finns long had been "one people though speaking two languages" and that Methodism in Finland would thrive best functioning as one unconfusing organization. Looking to the future, they declared that although their Methodism had come into Finland from the west (Sweden), its greatest victories eventually would be won by "its onward march eastwards" into Russia. Their watchword was "Not back to Sweden but forward to the Empire with which Providence has connected us."

The petitioners evidently did not look upon their American connections as damaging to the *bona fide* Finnishness of their position; they counted the Methodist Episcopal Church as a world-wide organization "international in its principles," not simply as an American denomination. Bishop Vincent wrote in 1900 that the Russian government did not hinder the Missionary Society's work in Finland, because it was not antagonistic to the Russians. "We are neutral in politics," he said, "and have to do only with the Kingdom of Christ in Finland. The secret emissaries of Russia in our services hear no word from our ministers or teachers to excite their distrust. Our men preach the simple Gospel of God."

In the decade following 1896, the Finland mission's modest growth was burdened chiefly by lack of money. This was the subject of most of its leaders' correspondence with the Missionary Society. General economic conditions sometimes were difficult, cutting into even the churches' current income, the effect of the famine year 1903 being especially bad. But the perennial financial problem was funding the erection of the church buildings the local societies so badly needed. Occasionally, the Missionary Society made small special grants, which generally gave relatively little relief. With only two decreases, the annual appropriations increased to approximately \$8,000 in 1906 and 1907, including in each of these two years \$1,000 for property de-

velopment in Helsinki. Indeed, the appropriation was stabilized at about this point up to 1913 in spite of an especially earnest appeal by the Mission Conference in 1910 for increased funds because of financial troubles among the churches and privations among the preachers.

The Mission Conference continued under Finnish District Superintendents until 1907, when it received its first American leader, George A. Simons, a young native of Indiana and a graduate of New York University and of Drew Theological Seminary, who was sent to Europe to serve as Superintendent. He made his first tour of the Finnish churches in the fall, but did not establish residence in Finland. He settled instead in Leningrad (St. Petersburg), not far south of the Russo-Finnish border, for one of the chief purposes of his appointment was to enlarge the Conference's modest, but now more substantial, work in Russia. Bishop William Burt chose the Russian capital as the strategic point from which Simons should direct his new development while still supervising the churches in Finland.

George Simons served as Superintendent of the Mission Conference for four years, tending the whole field, but especially stimulating and strengthening the Methodist effort in Russia. Until that time, Russia proper had been, practically speaking, an outpost of the Finland mission. But since 1892, the General Conference actually had defined the field of the Finland and St. Petersburg mission as "our work in the Russian Empire." From 1907 to 1911, Simons raised the purpose implicit in that definition off the printed page and put it into action. Indeed, the trend went so far that in 1911 the Methodist endeavor in Russia was separately organized as the Russia Mission, and the Conference from which it was severed became the Finland Annual Conference, with its jurisdiction confined to Finland itself. The District Superintendents again became the chief leaders of the Finland churches.

The Mission Conference session of 1908 set off the work in Russia in a separate District, with George Simons as District Superintendent. It continued the organization of the Finland churches on a language basis, the two groupings being more nearly comparable in strength than a decade earlier. The Swedish District, under J. Melin, had about six hundred members in a dozen charges. On the Finnish District, under H. H. Aulankho, there were four hundred members.

Although the chief emphasis in the activity of the churches was evangelism, an interest in social ministries began to evolve. When George Simons came to Finland in 1907, he found that three Methodist young women were ready for deaconess service and three more desired to enter deaconess training. In 1908, the Mission Conference approved the organization of a Bethany Deaconess Society for the purpose of educating deaconesses who should serve under its auspices "by nursing the sick in private homes, in hospitals and similar institutions, and perform Christian charity among the sick, poor, and needy." The Mission Conference also elected its own official Deaconess

Board. From this time on, the Finnish churches kept sending young women to Frankfort on the Main, in Germany, for training. That fall, a few Finnish deaconesses became the nucleus of a deaconess home opened in Leningrad. In 1910, Emmanuel Church, Helsinki, started a modest deaconess home in its church building. It was headed by Sister Ida Dahlstrom. An orphanage was started in Epilä in 1910 and was installed in a villa outside the city of Tammerfors two years later. Another orphanage was opened in Grankulla in 1912, and a third was active in Vyborg. These homes cared for fourteen, thirty, and sixteen children, respectively. In addition to such institutional work, the local societies typically were doing "a Christian social work among the poor and needy."

By 1914, a decade after the separation from the Sweden Conference, there were twenty-three Methodist charges in Finland. Fifteen of them had their own church buildings. Twelve of them were Finnish-speaking, and their members made up about 70 per cent of the Conference's total membership of thirteen hundred. The Board of Foreign Missions was contributing an annual appropriation of \$7,850, including \$1,000 designated for the Theological School.

Russia

"It seems to me a great chance to kindle a Methodist fire by the side of the Greek and Russian churches, and show hungry souls in Russia how magnificently and lovingly our God and our Father saves sinners, and tells them of it." On a day in January, 1890, when it was considering a request for \$250 to aid in maintaining Methodist preaching in Leningrad (St. Petersburg), the Board of Managers heard this quotation from a letter from Bishop Charles H. Fowler, who had been supervising Methodist interests in Europe.

The Board granted the request, but \$250 made no more than a fagot, and only a feeble fire could be fed with such fuel. Bishop Fowler and Bengt A. Carlson, superintendent of the Finland District of the Sweden Conference, had made preparations when visiting Leningrad in 1889.* They had started a small Methodist society there, and Carlson had preached in the Russian capital several times. Now, having secured this small contribution from the Board, he set up in a rented hall an independent Methodist lay preacher he had found in Leningrad. Carlson continued to visit the society from time to time. Although this modest beginning was conceived as an extension of the Finland District because it reached out to Finns and Swedes living in Leningrad, some members of the Board of Managers were disposed to count it an unauthorized opening of a new mission. The problem was resolved, however, in 1892, when the General Conference divorced the Finland churches from

* See Vol. III, 979.

the Sweden Conference and put them into a new grouping, the Finland and St. Petersburg Mission, with its scope defined as the Methodist work in the Russian Empire.

For more than a decade and a half, the Methodist flame in Leningrad barely flickered. For want of money, the society lost its hall in 1891, and the Missionary Society made available no funds for a new one or for the support of a stationed preacher. The lay preacher held occasional meetings in his own house, but little else was done. Bengt Carlson, who became a District Superintendent in Finland, complained in 1903 that under the methods employed, what little money was being spent in Leningrad was money wasted. Citing the existence of other evangelical churches in the city, which had legally recognized and strong congregations in good church buildings and under the care of regular ministers, he called for a change in Methodism's investment of its resources there. Another District Superintendent, J. William Häggmann, reported in 1905 that the Methodists had an excellent opportunity in Leningrad and vicinity to preach in Russian, Finnish, and Swedish. They had "also men for the same," he said, "but not money."

Later that year, the General Missionary Committee moved to secure the money; it added to the Mission's appropriation for 1906 a thousand dollars for work in Russia, with the proviso that it be raised in special gifts. In August, 1906, Bishop William Burt supplied the man, appointing as pastor in Leningrad a Russian-speaking minister named Hjalmar F. Salmi, a native of the Russian capital itself who had been educated in Finland and had served as a pastor among Finns in the United States. Salmi's coming met one of the conditions for legally recognized public activity by the Methodist society in Leningrad, namely, the presence of an ordained pastor in charge. Seven months later, in March, 1907, Salmi received a license to hold public meetings "in the Government of St. Petersburg [Leningrad], on condition that he, Salmi, must not discuss *political questions* in these meetings, and in general must *fulfill all demands* of the law."* Under the influence of recent decrees issued by the Tsar, Nicholas II, this was a time of somewhat greater toleration of non-Orthodox churches than previously, but it also was a time of high political turbulence, with various liberal and revolutionary forces pressing hard against the general autocracy the Tsar was striving to maintain.

Although the small group in Leningrad was Salmi's nominal charge, his productive preaching in his first season was among the "Russian-Finns" in the villages of Handrovo and Sig-navelok, in the Ingria district (Ingermanland), a number of miles outside the city. There he succeeded in stirring a strong revival whose influence spread into neighboring villages.

A decade after Bengt Carlson carried Methodism into Russia from Finland, on the north, Heinrich Ramke brought the Methodist message into Russia from Germany, to the west. Ramke was a minister of the North Ger-

* Source of italics unknown.

many Conference stationed in Königsberg, East Prussia. In 1900, Ramke began visiting Kaunas (Kowno), which was in Lithuania (a forcibly Russified former independent grand duchy), to preach among residents of German extraction. Preachers from Königsberg continued the program of evangelistic visits until 1905, when the North Germany Conference settled George R. Durdis in Kaunas as a regular pastor. In 1906, Durdis reported thirty-eight church members in the new charge.

That same year, Durdis extended his preaching into two other Lithuanian localities—Virbalis (Wirballen) and Vilnius (Wilna)—each of them about three hours by rail from Kaunas. In Virbalis in 1907, he organized a Methodist society.

Methodism in Russia—its foci now were Kaunas, Virbalis, Vilnius, and Leningrad and environs—received a fresh impulse in 1907, when George A. Simons, son of a pastor in the East German Conference (United States), came from Brooklyn to the Superintendency of the Finland and St. Petersburg Mission. He took up residence in Leningrad in October, associating himself with Hjalmar Salmi, who was reappointed as pastor. He preached his first sermon in Russia out in Handrovo, but turned his attention mainly to the possibilities for growth in the capital city. Already established there besides the Russian Orthodox Church Simons found an Anglican church, a British-American chapel, and about thirty well organized Lutheran and Reformed churches, with forty pastors.

Simons was not at all impressed with the calibre of the Methodist nucleus he found in Leningrad—a dozen Swedes, nearly all old and poor, non-members of the Methodist Church but constituting "our 'Methodist Society,' " cared for by an old Local Preacher, and existing at a "poor, dying rate." Nor was he satisfied with the only preaching place he could hire—a hall in an old, dilapidated building in the section of the city known as Vasili Ostrov. He felt that it was indispensable to have acceptable leaders, suitable property, strong Methodist literature, and sufficient funds if the Methodists were to do work of any value. He wrote to the Board that he was sure they did not "expect Simons to merely help at the obsequies over the few un-Methodistic Swedes . . . almost at their journey's end." He set himself at once to break out of that pattern.

He and Salmi began by publicly advertising and holding an expanded program of services under the name First Methodist Episcopal Society in St. Petersburg, with preaching in Russian, Finnish, and Swedish. A year later, Sunday services were being held in Estonian, German, and English also. By that time, the Methodists were preaching outside the capital in eighteen villages besides Handrovo and Sig-navolok, these two having organized Methodist groups. In Leningrad, five young deaconesses from Finland were at work out of an apartment dedicated as Bethany Deaconess Home. Their leader was Sister Anna Eklund, who had been trained in the Deaconess

Institutes of Hamburg and Frankfort on the Main and who spoke Swedish, Finnish, and German and a little Russian. The women began their nursing ministry in the midst of a severe cholera epidemic in the fall of 1908.

At the end of his first year, Simons not only gave the Board an enthusiastic evaluation of the current new Methodist emphasis in Russia, but also pointed to Methodism's opportunity as a fresh impulse among the 150 million religiously deprived people of Russia, perhaps only 3 per cent of whom, he estimated, ever had heard a real gospel sermon. He reported:

The Russo-Greek Church does not preach. Hers is a religion of male singing, ritual, and image-worship. Like other branches of paganized Christianity she offers a stone to those who are hungering for the Bread of Life. . . .

The old Russia is practically a thing of the past. The Greek Orthodox Church has lost her grip upon the people. Large numbers are drifting away from this pagan institution into agnosticism and licentiousness. Now is the time to go to them with a gospel of life, light, liberty and truth.

Simons portrayed the Methodist Episcopal Church, in contrast, as a revival and missionary church that encouraged lay preaching as did perhaps no other group, thus being "pre-eminently adapted" to minister to the spiritual needs of the Russians. And he concluded, "Methodism has a glorious future in Russia."

At its session in August, 1908, the Mission Conference received George R. Durdis by transfer from the North Germany Conference. With him came the Methodist work in the Lithuanian region of Russia. Durdis's appointment was Kaunas and Virbalis, but he also began work in Landwarova and was maintaining a preaching program in Vilnius in Russian and German. Virbalis and Vilnius had only three or four full members each, but Kaunas had about seventy. By their own labor and with their own funds, the little group in Virbalis built a brick chapel—the first Methodist Episcopal church in Russia—which was dedicated early in 1909.

In 1908, under the sponsorship of Simons and Bishop William Burt, three young ministerial candidates from Russia went to study at the Martin Mission Institute in Frankfort on the Main, and one was attending German Wallace College in Ohio. By the end of the year, Pekka Lattu, an enthusiastic young graduate of Helsinki (Helsingfors) University, was traveling on foot, by boat, and on horseback through Karelia (the territory east of Finland and north of the Leningrad region), preaching and organizing Methodist classes. Later on, upon being appointed preacher-at-large in Karelia, Lattu went on a missionary evangelistic tour accompanied by a seminary student and two women school teachers. Before long, they were arrested by Russian police and forced to walk 180 miles north to Arkhangelsk, where the authorities concluded that they were "political agitators under the mantle of religion." When Simons finally heard of their detention, he appealed to the head

of the police organization and to the Prime Minister. They then were speedily released. But that was the end of the Karelia work for a number of years.

As a result of making exploratory visits, Simons projected Methodism into several new places during the Conference year 1909-10. Lodz, in Polish Russia, appeared in the Appointments for 1909. Riga, Latvia, was listed in 1910, and George R. Durdis moved there from Kaunas in 1911 and began preaching in a hired hall. He became acquainted with Alfred Freiberg, pastor of an independent society of Lettish Protestants in the important port city of Lepaya (Libau). The group's religious background was Moravian. After corresponding with Simons, who was in Leningrad, Freiberg began reading *Christiansky Pobornik* (Christian Advocate), the *Discipline*, Wesley's sermons, and other Methodist literature. The interest of Freiberg and his people in Methodism advanced to such a stage that they sent three young men to Simons to be trained for Methodist evangelism among the Letts.

In 1909-10, Simons also prepared openings in Estonia. He engaged as evangelist-at-large an experienced colporteur of the British and Foreign Bible Society named Wassili Täht. Täht concentrated his highly successful preaching efforts upon Sarema (Oesel), a large island off the coast of Estonia. He not only gained a wide general hearing, but soon gathered a group of steady followers—converted Estonians and Germans—among whom a Methodist society was formed in Kuressare (Arensburg) on 27 August 1910. For the first two years (in 1911, he gained Martin Prikask as assistant), Täht met sometimes dangerous resistance, at least twice escaping murderous assault by opponents only because there were hearers at hand who defended him. Pastors of the Orthodox Church tried to block his preaching by appealing to the Governor of Livonia (Livland) on the ground that he was a false teacher and a popular agitator. The Governor investigated, and gendarmes attended Täht's meetings, so that as he said, "for eight days I preached among bayonets." But he convinced both gendarmes and Governor of his genuineness and was able to go on with his work on the Arensburg Circuit, as it was called.

When Kuressare appeared in the Appointments for 1910, it was one of three freshly started Estonian charges. The others were Tartu (Dorpat) and Tallin (Reval). It had been easy for Simons to make promising contacts in Estonia, as in Latvia, among members of a few score Moravian societies whose prayer houses gradually had been closing down under pressure from Lutheran pastors. For many years, they actually had been known informally as Methodists.

Methodism's farthest thrust from Leningrad extended its message into Mariinsk, Siberia, some two thousand miles southeast of the capital. In February, 1910, a Russian-Estonian, August Karlson, who was a British and Foreign Bible Society colporteur, came to Methodist services in Leningrad and spent ten weeks with Simons, attending class meetings and carefully

studying Methodist history, polity, and doctrine. He then returned to Mariinsk and began delivering sermons of John Wesley's at sizable gatherings in a number of villages. He followed this up by organizing Methodist classes.

During these few years, the Russian work grew sufficiently to provide practical grounds for establishing the Russia Mission as an enterprise separate from the Finland Conference. The reorganization occurred in 1911, with Simons relinquishing supervision of the larger work in Finland and concentrating upon the progress of the new Mission.

In 1912, the Mission established two Circuits on the railroad line running west from Leningrad to Tallin. They were based on Volosovo and Kingisepp (Yamburg). In 1913, Tapa, an Estonian town east of Tallin, was formally recognized as a charge at the Annual Meeting held in August, and a third charge in Ingria, the village of Haitolovo, was added later in the Conference year.

The developing Mission suffered, during these years, no serious impairment of its liberty to operate publicly. To be sure, the effectiveness of the Tsar's proclamation of religious liberty in 1905 gradually was diminished by the actions of provincial governors who were hostile to all religious groups but the state church, for Nicholas' ukase was not implemented in law. In the few years before the World War, strong political reaction and accompanying religious repression caused more or less trouble for all Free Churches. As George Simons wrote early in 1912, "The past two years the reactionaries seem to have had their way in almost everything." The Methodists, however, were fortunate. Except for the difficulty in Karelia, their activity was interrupted in only one place; there was temporary police action in 1913 in Tartu. According to Simons, the cause was energetic opposition by a "fanatic" Pentecostal movement that got the Methodist preacher in trouble because he was not a Russian subject and thus was not qualified to preach within that jurisdiction.

As the World War came on, George Simons was supervising an evangelistic enterprise in fourteen charges. Closest to his Leningrad headquarters were the two Ingrian circuits Handrovo and Sig-navolok. Along the way to Estonia were Volosovo and Kingisepp, and in Estonia itself were Tallin, Tapa, Tartu, and Kuressare. South of Estonia, in Latvia, there was Riga, and in Lithuania were Kaunas and Virbalis. Still farther south was Lodz, the sole Polish station, and far to the east from Lodz was Mariinsk, in Siberia. Formally appointed among these charges in 1913 were two ministers in full connection, namely, Simons and Leo P. Heinrich (Hjalmar Salmi had returned to Finland, and George Durdis to the North Germany Conference). There were also eight probationers, who held their Conference relationship, as did Simons and Heinrich, with the Finland Conference.

In terms of conventional missionary strategy, the Mission's charges theoretically were well placed for evangelization of half a dozen different ethnic

or regional groups. But these were not all potent centers of missionary dynamism, and the Russia Mission as a whole was almost the smallest in Methodism's world field, only France and North Africa numbering fewer members. Although there was a larger general constituency, the Russia Mission had only 245 church members and 207 preparatory members. Its annual appropriation of \$6,000 was the smallest made by the Board of Foreign Missions. From the beginning of his Superintendency, George Simons kept pressing upon the New York office the impossibility of maintaining the work or of moving forward in it without more money. The only substantial aid given by the Board was a \$1,500 grant in 1911 towards purchase of a printing press for the Book Concern and an emergency property loan of \$7,500 for Kaunas in 1913.

The local societies were small, but five of them put up church buildings of their own without grants from abroad—Virbalis, Kaunas (a chapel and a large church), Kuressare, Handrovo, and a village near Mariinsk. The Mission itself supported its continuing deaconess service among the sick and the poor in Leningrad and also the Otilie Children's Home opened in Handrovo in 1913 and named in memory of Simons's mother. It was a modest orphanage kept by a deaconess from Leningrad, who also conducted a day school of thirty village children and a Sunday school of a hundred pupils. Leningrad, and indeed the entire Russia Mission, received the benefit of a gift of \$50,000 by Mrs. Fanny Nast Gamble for the purchase of a building to serve as Methodist headquarters in Russia.* Simons thus was able to purchase headquarters property in the capital, at Bolshoi Prospect 58, Vasili Ostrov, in the summer of 1914.

Denmark

"There are no missionaries in Denmark sent by the Methodist Episcopal Church in the United States," declared *The Gospel in All Lands* in 1895. But there were Methodists in Denmark—twenty-five hundred of them full members of the church. Their ministers served nineteen charges and held services in some 130 preaching places. They were organized as the Denmark Mission, with J. J. Christensen as Superintendent. They remained in this relation to the Methodist Episcopal Church until the Mission was reorganized as the Denmark Mission Conference in 1901 and as an Annual Conference in 1911.

The membership of the Denmark mission remained small, and its growth was very moderate. Until 1900, the membership increased by an average of 135 annually, but from 1901 to 1906, the total increase was only forty-five. From 1907 to 1914, the total increased by an average of sixty persons a year, until it stood at 3,732 full members. From 1895 to 1914, the number of charges

* See Note, p. 377.

(some included two points) increased to twenty-five. The Board of Foreign Missions did not vary its financial sponsorship greatly; it ran between seven and eight thousand dollars annually. For 1914, the regular appropriation was \$7,600, with \$2,000 added for property in Copenhagen.

Danish Methodism's distinctive development appeared in its leadership of all the foreign missions of the Methodist Episcopal Church in general social work as distinguished from disaster relief. This emphasis was all the more significant for its being inaugurated not by foreigners under the direction of foreign leaders, but by the Danish Methodists themselves. It was essentially home missions work flowing from local churches. And the Danish Methodist parishioners and their fellow countrymen provided the financial support for it.

The first service project was Stormly, a retreat for alcoholics that was built in Odense in 1897 by members of St. Jacob's Church under the leadership of its pastor, Anton Bast, who became an elected member of Odense's city council. Increasingly, other churches were beginning to do local charitable work among the needy, as in Randers, where the pastor was able, in 1901, to bring aid to a hundred families. In Vejle, the church extended its social concern, in the winter of 1900, to the relief of poor children. As a result, a home for orphans was opened there in 1905. Among the churches giving aid to the needy members of its own congregation and Sunday school was one of the three located in Copenhagen, St. Mark's Church, which in 1909 took a step into general community service that soon made it Methodism's leading general social service enterprise in Europe.

Assisted by a group of volunteers, the St. Mark's pastor, Anton Bast, opened in the basement of the church on 1 January a shelter for destitute men. Some were derelicts, many were unemployed or chronically poor. The men slept in the church at night, had access to reading rooms by day, were served two meals daily, and sometimes received clothing. There were daily religious services and occasional entertainments. The Shelter quickly achieved wide publicity and won financial support from people outside the church, including King Frederick. With this beginning (temperance rescue work was a part of the program), St. Mark's social ministry, which became known as the Central Mission, gradually widened the variety of its services to slum dwellers and other underprivileged people.

Late in 1912 and in 1913, the Central Mission added to its program a Babies' Home for sick mothers and little children, a home for aged and poor people in one of the Copenhagen hospitals, a Vindication of People's Rights Society, a Bureau for Adoption, an orphans' home outside the city in Espergærde, and a fresh air colony for boys and girls from Copenhagen. In the latter half of 1913, the Central Mission provided, through several outlets, over 200,000 meals for children, individual adults, and families. More than 9,700 men received night shelter, and 150 families were able to weather temporary unemployment by selling *Fyrtaarnet* (The Lighthouse),

the Central Mission's own socially-oriented weekly paper. The Mission itself supplied 11,000 days' temporary employment and found 5,000 days' work outside. Several hundred people who benefited from these expedients thus were enabled to go on into permanent employment. In addition to finding homes for children through its adoption office and teaching many others in the kindergarten, the Mission provided 2,700 days' nursing at the Babies' Home. Sick and aged people received 1,600 days' institutional nursing. Social workers made 6,000 home calls among the sick and the poor, and other church members went out into the slums to make 39,000 home calls. Not all the contacts were individual; there were hundreds of meetings for men and for women. As the general program developed, there were religious conversions among the people touched by the Mission, and the church membership increased, but the dominant motivation in the total effort was humanitarian service, not the maintenance of a centripetal feeder for formal church membership.

The Central Mission's publicity and income were greatly enhanced, beginning in the spring of 1912, when Bast secured government permission to sell throughout the country for a single day each year a small three-cent celluloid souvenir called the Spring Flower. The proceeds of the first two campaigns financed the current expansion of the Mission's facilities in and near Copenhagen and also made it possible to open two orphanages in Odense. With the Vejle home, to which a new building was added in 1913, this gave the Denmark Conference five children's homes. Unfortunately, the Central Mission headquarters burned in January, 1914, but the social service movement went forward among the Danish Methodists in spite of the loss.

Sweden

Living in Sweden in 1896 were two ministers, Johan P. Larsson and Bengt A. Carlson, whose experience linked the matured Sweden Conference with its beginnings in the eighteen-fifties and sixties, for originally they had been missionaries assigned to Sweden by the Missionary Society. They saw Swedish Methodism, once a small company, now grown to a membership of close to fifteen thousand people, who were worshipping in more than 160 regular meeting places. The membership, which was larger than that in Germany, where there were two Conferences, included a quarter of the Methodist members in Europe.

After several decades, the shape of the Conference was well stabilized, but it still was extending itself here and there. In one part of the country, it entered in 1897 a distinctly new area, venturing above the Arctic Circle into Lapland, in the upper section of Norrbotten, Sweden's largest and northernmost province. First a Local Preacher, Matts Mattson, and later two ordained men, August Rockberg and Johannes Roth, began preaching at Malmberget,

Gällivare, Luleå, Boden, and nearby places. In 1899, this pioneering activity in a pioneer region was designated the Norrbotten District, with Roth as superintendent. This small combination kept its District status until 1903, when it reported 163 church members and then was absorbed into the larger Northern District. In 1902, when Roth was ready to erect a chapel at a place called Kiruna, the Conference sent him three young men to assist in building up the work in the new area.

The financial support for this evangelistic team was provided by the Home Missionary Society, an organization to which the Methodist people on the other Districts were beginning to contribute in 1900. Its purpose was to supplement ministerial support in new or struggling churches. It very soon was assisting half a dozen stations, and by 1909, it was undergirding the work in fifteen localities. The effort, through the Society and other means, to increase the number of places reached by Methodist gospel preaching was successful in nearly doubling the pastoral charges. In 1896 there were eighty-eight, some including two congregations; in 1914 there were 128.

In 1904, the Conference added a second innovation to that of the Home Missionary Society; it inaugurated deaconess work in the western port city of Göteborg. Four deaconess nurses began ministering there, and three others were in training in Hamburg, Germany. Five years later, there were twelve deaconesses in service, and more were being demanded. By 1912, sixteen were in action, and six were in preparation in Germany.

Just as the Deaconess enterprise was getting well started, the Conference began molding a third fresh pattern of endeavor. A visit to Sweden by Bishop Hartzell in 1907 ignited a livelier interest in foreign missions that soon made the Swedish Methodists outstanding among the constituencies outside the United States for their support of missions to other countries. They already had been sending special gifts to India for some years, but now the Conference gave impetus to the new movement by resolving at its summer session in Norrköping to support two missionaries in Africa. Volunteers for missionary service began to come forward, and within a year, Sweden had its first missionaries on foreign fields. Among those sent abroad by 1911 were four who went to Mozambique: Josef A. Persson, C. H. Gottfrid Runfeldt, Henny Andersson, and Ellen E. Björklund. Abel Eklund and Olga Petersson, a deaconess, took up work within the Malaysia Conference, and Anna C. Lindblad and Maria E. Larsson went to West China as W.F.M.S. missionaries. The Conference maintained in its annual *Minutes* a roster of numerous other missionaries of the Methodist Church who were Swedish in origin. The Conference not only met its denominational apportionments for missions, but also gathered substantial special gifts for projects in India, Malaysia, China, Korea, and Bulgaria. Women members established an auxiliary of the W.F.M.S., and by 1911, it had over two thousand members in thirty or forty local societies.

While making its new beginnings in home and foreign missions and in deaconess work, the Sweden Conference still struggled with financial difficulties. Many churches were striving toward self-support or paying for the erection of church buildings. Many were partially dependent upon the annual appropriations disbursed from New York. Not counting allotments for such special causes as the Theological School in Upsala, they ranged from \$16,000 in 1896 to \$13,500 in 1914 for the Mission as a whole. Notwithstanding this continued financial dependence, substantial progress toward self-support was being made.

In contrast with this improvement, and in spite of its broader geographical spread, the Mission failed, however, to develop a markedly larger membership. Beginning with 14,817 full members in 1896, the Conference slowly rose to its peak of 16,161 in 1909 and then steadily declined to 15,403 in 1914—a net gain of less than six hundred members. In 1914, the membership thus stood again at the numerical level of the year 1899. In spite of its comparative bulk among the Methodist missions in Europe, the Sweden Conference had come, in this respect, to a standstill.

Local revivals stimulated various local churches from time to time. But Karl A. Jansson, Rector of the Theological School, pointed out in 1911 that not for twenty-five years had any general revival come to swell the membership of the church as a whole—a condition facing all the churches and evangelical groups in Sweden. Jansson wrote:

One of the reasons is that a suffocating wave of unbelief has rolled over Sweden in the wake of extreme Bible criticism, of which the papers have written and which has taken hold of great masses of the people, who now deny everything spiritual and consider the Bible, the churches and the ministers as the greatest obstacle to progress of the workingmen and to the solution of the social problem. These crowds now live for pleasure and enjoyment and sink lower every day in lust and degradation.

Norway

The Norway Conference, like the Methodist Church in Denmark, became involved in social service during the two decades before World War I. Unlike that of the Danish Methodists, it took the special form of the deaconess movement, which was an official auxiliary of the Methodist Episcopal Church at large.

In 1896, the movement existed in potentiality; two Norwegian women were in the Deaconess Hospital in Hamburg, Germany, training for deaconess service. A year later, three deaconesses were consecrated in Norway. Thomas B. Barratt, one of the Oslo (Christiania) pastors, became superintendent of deaconess work for the Conference and in 1898 was able to report three deaconesses at work in Oslo, three in training in a state hospital, and five en-

listed for training. From then on, enlistment advanced so well that forty-four deaconesses were at work in 1904, and the Conference had its first deaconess home in operation, in Oslo. The deaconesses found wide acceptance among physicians and in the general community. Some worked as parish deaconesses in the state church. By 1907, several public hospitals were wholly staffed by Methodist deaconess nurses. In 1910, a second deaconess home was in operation in Bergen, with fifteen sisters in residence. Forty-nine were affiliated with the home in Oslo.

Except for the deaconess development, the Norway Conference penetrated no essentially new areas of the national life during the two pre-War decades. Neither did its constant evangelistic efforts through steady preaching programs and revival yield much numerical growth in its own life.

Occasionally, substantial numbers of converts were won, and a fair number of them became preparatory members, but generally they stayed within the state church and often found their way into the informal evangelical groups that were growing up within it. Few adults in the larger Methodist constituency became full members of the church. Many of the new members were trainees from the Methodist Sunday schools. Between 1896 and 1914, church membership increased from 4,920 to 5,412, representing a slowly accumulated addition of 10 per cent. Two Districts—Trondhjem and Bergen—grew by about 40 per cent, but through the same years, the Christiania [Oslo] District suffered an over-all membership loss of 12 per cent.

The Conference supplemented the financial resources of the local churches by distributing annual appropriations from the United States that generally were over \$12,000. In 1909, it organized a Home Missionary Society to help provide preaching in remote rural districts. Over the entire period, about half a dozen new charges were established.

But this was not a time of marked advance for Norwegian Methodism; it still was struggling under financial and social handicaps similar to some of those that pressed down upon it in its earlier decades.*

NOTE

Page 372. The Gamble donation was part of \$175,000 constituting the largest single gift by an individual in the Board's history. The total included also \$50,000 for Budapest, \$25,000 for William Nast College in China, and \$50,000 as a permanent fund for the Board's administrative expenses. See George Heber Jones to George A. Simons, 18 February 1914.

* See Vol. III, 939-46.

Conflict in Italy

METHODIST VERSUS CATHOLIC

The Methodist mission in Italy was conceived in an atmosphere of aggressive opposition to the Roman Catholic Church, whose world center was in Rome.

Seven months before the troops of the Kingdom of Italy entered Rome, on 20 September 1870, and wrested control of the city from the hands of the pope, a special committee urging the Board of Managers to open a Methodist mission in Italy declared:

The Methodist Episcopal Church in Italy, with its center at Bologna, the nearest approach as yet possible to the city of apostasy would make the Pope and his associates see, as they never otherwise will, the handwriting of God against their idolatrous counterfeit of Christianity. We shall move thence to the walls of Rome, and renew that land of apostolic labor and martyrdom . . . in the apostolic faith. . . . We shall, also, thus oppose the power of the Man of Sin in our own land, and hasten his downfall.

In August, 1871, Leroy M. Vernon, the first Methodist missionary to come from the United States, arrived in northern Italy. Two years later, the new mission was in action in several cities, and three years after the epochal 20 September, the Methodist Episcopal Church had its "gospel standard" planted in Rome itself.

In 1896, with Leroy Vernon in retirement for the past eight years, William Burt, his successor, was giving Italian Methodism's continuing anti-Catholic orientation more radical and open expression than it ever had received from the Mission's strong but urbane founder. Indeed, from his earlier years as a Methodist superintendent (he came to Italy in 1884), Burt's reports to the Missionary Society carried hostile and derogatory interpretations of the pope and of Romanism.

In 1887, he equated evangelical work among the Italians with God's "liberation of this wonderful people from the tyranny of the papacy." In 1888, asserting that the sense of sin had been almost completely obliterated in Italy, he blamed that condition upon the past servitude of the people to the

"Romish" Church. "We have therefore to meet," he said, "not only the lion (Leo XIII) of popery in his lair, but also that for which popery is responsible—the total indifference and almost universal infidelity of the people."

In 1889, when for the first time he reported as superintendent of the whole Italy Mission, Burt renewed this charge and made a blistering general denunciation of the immorality of the motivation and methods of the Roman Church in its efforts to keep the people Catholic. He charged:

It matters not to Romanism how deep one may wallow in the mire of superstition or to what extreme he may be an infidel as long as he does not become an evangelical Christian. Romanism is the enemy and curse of Italy, as it is of every nation that it touches. It is wonderful, however, to see how divine Providence is limiting the power of the Beast and hastening forward the day when its career shall end. It is being destroyed by its own creatures, indifference and infidelity. . . . It has also reduced and holds today the great mass of people in extreme poverty.

The Methodists, Burt asserted, were in Italy to save the people and teach them a better way.

In 1891, he branded Romanism as completely and unscrupulously political in spirit, aim, and *modus operandi*—the greatest political machine in the world. In 1893, he reported that almost all people of culture, "brought up under the blighting shadow of the papacy," had renounced the Roman Church, turning away from it in ridicule and disgust at the same time that the Church, operating as a world-wide machine, was trying to effect a revival of its sheer temporal power in Italian life. In 1896 and 1897, Burt described the position he and his colleagues held in Roman Catholic Italy as being "in the enemy's camp."

During his tenure as a missionary in Italy, Burt openly displayed his antagonism toward the incumbent popes, Leo XIII and Pius X, by devoting to each a long critical magazine article. In *The Methodist Review* for January, 1900, he interpreted Leo as a creature of the Jesuits—undoubtedly as bad a pedigree as he could ascribe to him—and as an ecclesiastical and political reactionary whose national and international political influence was such as to merit Burt's saying of the pope's headquarters, "The storm center and war center of this world is in the Vatican palace, amid the conscienceless intrigues of the Jesuits." And Burt confessed in the same article that in an interview with King Humbert in 1899, he had frankly expressed to His Majesty the belief that the Italian government should take a more radical attitude toward the pope than it had, so as to make it clear to all the world that there was but one king in Rome. He went even further in accusation and incitement:

The Italian government has been zealous in trying to counteract the work of the socialists and of the extreme radicals, while it has left the real subverters of the nation who are preparing a revolution in secret, making use of the cross for their diabolical propaganda, which threatens the nation's existence. The pope is a pretender to a lost throne, and as such ought not to be allowed to remain in the country any more than his contemporaries, the Bourbons.

Hardly had Leo's successor, Pius X, got the tiara settled on his brow, when on 10 September 1903, Burt's name appeared in *The Christian Advocate* at the head of a highly patronizing, critical, and denigrating article on the new pontiff as a man and a churchman and as to his potentialities as pope. Referring to Pius and to one of the runners-up in the recent election (Cardinal Rampolla), Burt ended his article with, "It makes no difference whether Rampolla or Sarto is Pope, it is the Jesuit who rules at the Vatican."

During all but two of William Burt's twenty-six years in connection with the Italy Mission as missionary and as Bishop, Adna B. Leonard was active in the Board's New York office as a Corresponding Secretary. His attitudes generally were as significant of important trends in Methodist missionary thinking as a whole as Burt's were for field policy in Italy. Like Burt, Leonard was openly antagonistic to Roman Catholicism. He made no effort to conceal his conviction that a Methodist mission in a Roman Catholic country was there as a militant force dedicated to breaking the power of Catholicism and destroying or overcoming its influence.

Writing back home to the readers of *World-Wide Missions* from Rome in April, 1901, Leonard pointed to the function of every Protestant church and Sunday school in Italy as a center of gospel agitation contributing to the slow but irresistible process of disintegration of the Roman Church. And he proceeded to issue what was substantially a declaration of total war against the Catholic Church everywhere, and especially in Italy:

Protestant Christianity must not relax her efforts in Italy, but on the contrary multiply her agencies. To attempt to conquer or reform Romanism by confining our efforts to countries where she had gained her strongest positions, while Italy and Rome remain undisturbed, would be a sad mistake. While the war must go on in the outlying provinces, the seat of the evil must be vigorously assaulted. To paralyze the heart is a thousand times more important than to amputate a foot or a hand. The paralysis here at the heart is already apparent, and Romanism in all the world is feeling the effect.

Writing just after visiting the ruined palaces of Pompeii, Leonard prophesied that "God has an earthquake and a Vesuvius for the Roman Church if she does not reform."

The proneness of these missionary leaders to attack publicly the Catholic Church and the Catholic way of life was not unmatched by the efforts of their lesser colleagues. For instance, Frederick H. Wright, pastor of the

American Church in 1899 and then for several years a District Superintendent in the Italy Conference, writing in *World-Wide Missions* in December, 1902, on "Blind Devotion in Italy," blamed the Catholic Church for inducing and tolerating in its people a combination of mechanical religious devotions and defective morals. The only difference between the Catholic worshiper and the "heathen Tibetan" with his prayer wheel, said Wright, was that the latter, perhaps more excusably, turned the crank and the former counted beads. Criticizing the incumbent pope as a special patron of the Rosary, Wright said that "the ecclesiastical machinery revolves, and one seems to hear under all the ceremonies the groans of the people as they cry for bread while the priests give them nothing but husks."

One of Wright's successors at the American Church, Adna Wright Leonard, the Corresponding Secretary's son, also wrote, during his incumbency in Rome in 1902, a *Christian Advocate* article attacking Leo XIII. He described Leo as one "who fosters and encourages superstitions of a most repulsive sort, and gives his sanction to the grossest acts of idolatry," and whose "own words and acts condemn him, and prove that he has worked against, rather than for, the best interests of society."

Probably nowhere in the world did Methodist missions so boldly express antagonism to the Roman Catholic Church by open and deliberate attack as in Italy, once the arena of its temporal power and still the center of its influential world-wide ecclesiastical system. Confronted with Catholic power in other countries, Methodist missionaries sometimes were capable of observing much prudential restraint or even of adopting legal subterfuge in order to keep going. But here in Italy, where the papal organization was most sensitive and watchful and where presumably it could be expected to engage most readily in denunciation and reprisal, Methodist aggressiveness was most flagrant. The motivation hardly could have been pure crusading principle. Rather, the Methodist leaders calculated that it was safe to be bold in Italy because of the chasm between the Italian government and the Vatican and because of the numerous secular and social forces that were arrayed on the side of the House of Savoy *versus* the papacy. Although the government granted the Catholic Church status as the state church, the alignment of these hostile forces was so strong that Methodism's essential freedom to operate in Italy was nourished by a favorable political and social climate unusual in a Catholic country.

Indicative of the liberal public atmosphere were William Burt's visits to the royal palace in 1902 and 1903, when he was the Methodist District Superintendent resident in Rome. In January, 1902, he had a private interview with King Victor Emmanuel III, from whom he received a sympathetic hearing for his description of the Methodist movement in Italy. In May, Burt was back at the palace for a garden party. In March, 1903, he returned to be decorated by the King with the Order of St. Maurice and St. Lazarus

and heard the monarch speak in high appreciation of the work of the Methodist Episcopal Church. The Methodists' confidence was nourished by the conviction that they were on the winning side in modern Italy.

In 1896, they did not depend on words alone to express their challenge to Romanism. They had just erected a concrete and enduring symbol—their new headquarters building on Via Venti Settembre and Via Firenze, in Rome. With this in mind, "Chaplain" Charles C. McCabe, one of the Board's Corresponding Secretaries, rhetorically addressed Pope Leo in a *World-Wide Missions* editorial in March, 1895. First reminding his American readers that the Pope recently had bewailed, in an encyclical on Christian unity, the pressure of the Protestants in Rome, McCabe continued in an outburst of his customary ebullience:

Ah, yes, Leo! and the Methodists at that. We are coming to make you and your successors a long, long visit. The fact is, we never go away. We are coming to give Italy the Gospel—the real Gospel—the Gospel that Paul and Luther and Wesley preached. It will do your own soul good to hear a rousing Methodist hallelujah once in a while.

Two years earlier, when the building was only a project on paper, William Burt, its promoter, already was thinking of using it to strike against the Catholic Church. Soliciting a \$100,000 gift for it from his friend John S. Huyler, he wrote of its being located in Rome, "the seat of the greatest ecclesiastical power that has ruled and does rule the world," as a measure of high strategy. "This power," he said, "the Methodist Episcopal Church is destined if not to overthrow, to so modify that it will never again be recognized for what it has been."

The Methodists in Rome deliberately accentuated the antipapal symbolism of the new structure by dedicating it on 20 September 1895, the twenty-fifth anniversary of the capitulation of papal Rome and of its integration into the finally unified Italian state. The city was alive that day with celebrating crowds of Italian patriots, with flag-waving and band-playing deputations of oldtime Garibaldians come from all Italy to cheer at the dedication of a monument to the revered leader of the Red Shirts. As the parade moving along the old victory route came up Via Venti Settembre to the Methodist building and the marchers saw Old Glory and the flag of Italy flying from it side by side, "the cries became deafening and the enthusiasm became wildness itself," reported Bishop James N. FitzGerald, who was present to address the Methodist gathering. "It was a great day," he continued, "for Methodism, and for Protestantism, and for Christianity, as well as for the Italian people." For the Vatican, however, it was a day of offense. For twenty-five years, the pope had given neither recognition nor co-operation to the emergent Italian state, which he counted as an enemy of the Church.

CATHOLIC VERSUS METHODIST

If Methodism in Italy was hostile, both in utterance and in evangelistic purpose, to Roman Catholicism, so also was the Catholic Church hostile to Methodism. The chief general media through which the Church both broadcast and pinpointed its public opposition were the Catholic press and pronouncements by the clergy. The words and actions of parish priests often were the inciting factor arousing Catholic townspeople to threatening demonstrations against Methodists as well as to quieter actions restricting their social and economic freedom. To organize their own people against Methodist influences or institutions, the priests reinforced their broader attacks by exploiting the preventive and punitive sanctions lying ready to hand in the Church's regular and authoritative discipline of its individual communicants.

The missionaries perennially complained of "persecution." Often the concrete acts of persecution were unspecified, sometimes they were petty harassments of preachers or of laymen, sometimes more serious offenses. Catholic manipulation cost a good many Methodists their jobs. Now and then a man took a beating for consorting with the Methodists, occasionally a Methodist dwelling or a preaching hall came under attack, and here and there a noisy street demonstration set up cries of "Kill the Protestants." Catholic pressures typically delayed or prevented the rental of halls, or the purchase of building lots, for churches. Priests tried, seldom with much success, to embroil Methodists with the police. In a few cases of some consequence, the clericals turned to legal obstructionism, succeeding in delaying court decisions in favor of Methodist financial and property interests.

From 1896 to 1911, the Mission reported to New York a scattering of hostile incidents. There was a priest-led parade and Bible-burning in Spinazzola. The little church in San Marzano was dedicated after Catholic elements did "everything possible to hinder the work and to persecute the workers." A Local Preacher newly assigned to Atessa had to withstand repeated threats: "Whenever he appeared on the street he was followed by a howling mob." Priests obstructed Methodist attempts to get the use of a hall in Canelli. For several years, the Methodists in Calosso suffered "trials and persecutions at the hands of the clericals," whose object was to drive the evangelical workers out of town. Spells of trouble broke out in Santo Stefano di Camastro, where Catholic partisans at one time attacked the house of a recently appointed preacher. A priest worked up an anti-Protestant riot in Palombaro. Two visiting friars put in a fortnight publicly assailing the Methodist congregation in Perano. For a time, "severe persecutions" occurred in Castello. The police chief in Pesciano arbitrarily suspended the preacher's colporteur's license, and the chief in Spinazzola subjected the local pastor to annoying legal prosecution for a technical offense, both officials motivated by the desire to curry favor—so the Methodists said—with the Catholic

clergy. Such charges were reported fairly steadily up to 1905, but from then on, troubles of this order were mentioned less frequently and less seriously.

Most of the Catholic aggression against the Methodists in particular localities occurred on the initiative of local priests, and little of it went on in the larger cities, where the secular anticlerical forces were most influential. About the turn of the century, however, the Vatican itself took a hand in a significant attempt to block the effectiveness of the International Institute for Young Ladies maintained in Rome by the W.F.M.S. Catholic leaders initiated numerous social and ecclesiastical measures to denigrate the Institute in the public mind and to discourage Catholic families from patronizing it. The Institute's missionaries reported in 1899 that their work was under attack by a new League for the Preservation of the Faith that was organized, in pursuance of the wish of Leo XIII, to oppose and curb its influence. A Jesuit leader publicly launched the League with an accompanying bitter denunciation of the Institute for its corrupting effect among the more influential classes. "We must destroy this school," he declared, "before it has placed deep roots, for all the girls who are drawn toward this heresy will easily influence their whole family [*sic*] and will themselves become mothers of families radically Protestant." Without accepting his purpose, but acknowledging his realism about its function, Martha Vickery, the Institute's founder, said, "The farseeing Jesuit is right."

Persecution in gross or violent forms was diminishing in the last decade of the nineteenth century; in the first decade of the twentieth century, it was petering out. Leroy Vernon, who had observed it when it was heaviest and most hurtful, reported it to the Missionary Society from time to time, but not copiously, and with no great emphasis on its virulence or effectiveness. During his first decade as head of the Mission, William Burt also reported persecution, sometimes concretely, but also more generally, with an evident purpose to have the Mission's backers in the United States see and evaluate it in a certain perspective. He portrayed the work against a background in which loomed a dark persecuting force always poised in massive readiness to destroy Italian Methodism and striking from time to time to block its progress. Burt wrote to New York in 1889:

Our difficulties here are far greater than our friends at home imagine. The great Romish Church, with all its centuries of prestige, immense wealth, and Jesuitical cunning; three hundred thousand priests and monks connected in some way with nearly every family in the land, with the consequent influence of such a relation; millions upon millions of money at their disposal for maintaining in lucrative positions their friends or to be given in benevolences; every art and diabolical device that the human imagination, inspired by Satan, is capable of conceiving is used to persuade, persecute, and deprive of position, means or reputation, anyone who confesses himself an evangelical Christian.

Especially during the years when he was promoting the Rome headquarters building project, Burt kept touching up and filling in the picture of the brave Methodist minority fighting the Roman Church, the world's "greatest political machine" against great odds. It was a picture calculated to allay current criticisms of the Mission (they did exist) by Board members, to influence the General Committee to loosen up on appropriations, and to attract donors of special gifts to help Methodism fight the Catholic evil in Italy.

The persecution theme apparently had such good promotional possibilities that William Burt used it in preparing a long article on "Roman Catholic Fanaticism in Italy" for *The Gospel in All Lands* in 1901. In it he passed on a firsthand account of an exciting and dangerous time for the Methodists in Spinazzola, in southern Italy, during a serious drought. For seven days, the priests organized processions carrying images of the saints through the streets and into the countryside in order to enlist supernatural aid in bringing rain. But the main object of the demonstrations, asserted Burt's local informant, was "to instigate the superstitious people to wage war against us Protestants." The parish priest stirred up the townspeople by telling them that the Protestants did not want the rain to come and did not believe in the saints. On one of the processional days, the suppliant crowd became a mob raising angry cries—"away with the Protestants . . . burn their church . . . kill their leader!" Wrote the Spinazzola Methodist, "It was a terrible moment, because wagons of straw were already at hand for the fire." But the police came, the mob was checked, the priest was successfully denounced to the authorities. For some time, however, the streets of the town held danger for Protestant sympathizers, until the campaign of incitement collapsed through exposure of a false healing miracle exploited by the clergy. Burt brought his colorful article to a climax with an appeal, approved by Bishop John H. Vincent and Secretary Adna B. Leonard, for \$1,650 to provide an urgently needed Methodist-owned church for Spinazzola, the special gifts to be sent to 150 Fifth Avenue, New York.

Regardless of the number of newsworthy cases of special hostility or attack, Methodist churches and people in any way associated with them lived in constant sharp tension with the Catholic community. In the few years just before 1900, after decades of recession following the overthrow of the pope's temporal power, the Church was attempting to make a comeback as a public force. It was devoting itself energetically to popular Catholic action, still holding to its general boycott of participation in national political life, but entering strongly into municipal affairs and organizing a variety of groups and projects that brought the Church closer to the customary concerns of the people. The Church was endeavoring to form, as reported by an unsympathetic writer quoted in one of the Methodist missionary periodicals, a nationwide network of parochial and diocesan committees, congresses, university clubs, young men's guilds, pilgrimages, workers' societies, banks for small

loans in rural areas, co-operative stores, circulating libraries, newspapers, soup kitchens, soldiers' recreation rooms, lodging houses, nursing associations, and so on. The Jesuits were active in this manifold work, and William Burt accused them of inflaming the Catholics against Protestant adherents by making incendiary speeches at the various Catholic group meetings. All this activity generated increased family and social pressures upon Methodist people and heightened the general tension between the Methodist and the Catholic community.

By assertion or admission, apologists for the Italy work sometimes qualified the seriousness of the hindrance raised by Catholic persecution. Beginning in Leroy Vernon's administration, but particularly as the twentieth century came in, the missionaries, including William Burt, would affirm now and then that persecution could be weathered successfully. Some of it left the Methodists a more disciplined company, less handicapped by timid hangers-on, or even enjoying new friends among those in the community at large who found offensive the harassments Catholic partisans practiced upon the Protestant minority. And the missionary interpreters also would advance the claim that the Catholic Church was suffering from a massive withdrawal of loyalty by the Italian people. They pointed to this as a factor of openness in the situation that contradicted any assumption that defeat for Methodist evangelization would be only natural and inevitable in such a thoroughly Catholic country. But then, not entirely consistently, they described the very religious indifference and "infidelity" they found accompanying the Catholic recession, as itself perhaps the greatest obstacle blocking Methodist progress. These qualifying interpretations apparently failed to inhibit, however, their willingness to accept any promotional or strategic advantage to be wrung from references to Catholic troublemaking.

The tendency to play up the hampering function of Roman Catholic aggression found one sharp critic among the missionaries. Everett S. Stackpole, who evaluated the issue more realistically and consistently than the others, wrote a book entitled *4½ Years in the Italy Mission*, which was published in 1894, after his return to Maine from service in Italy. In it he said, "The bare mention of the Jesuits is sufficient with some to account for all failure." He charged that objective, public opposition by the Catholic Church had been greatly magnified. He was dispassionate enough to acknowledge that the Church's use of its traditional disciplines to try to seal off its own people from Methodist influences was the reaction to be expected, in this situation, from a religious institution on the defensive against an encroaching movement. As for specific or overt Catholic attacks on the Methodists and their interests, Stackpole did not deny that they occurred, but he minimized both their volume and their deterrent effect upon the Mission's progress. He pointed to a prior consideration—the easier times, the more favorable public climate, prevailing towards the end of the nineteenth century:

The cry of "down with the Papacy" is now popular. The Protestants have the protection of the Liberal party as against the Clericals. All Protestant worship is tolerated and protected by the government. A large proportion of the people have no sympathy whatever with the Papal Church. They have forsaken the confessional and the mass. The Pope has more influence over his Catholic subjects in America than in Italy. The nearer to Rome one gets, the more disgust one finds with Popery. To ascribe, then, our lack of success to the oppositions of Catholicism is a vain excuse.

Stackpole attributed the meagerness of the Mission's evangelistic results to the general religious indifference of the population and also—he was quite alone in this—to the internal deficiencies of the Mission itself, holding that the latter kept it from mounting an effective spiritual challenge to the increasingly secular national community.

Catholic opposition not only did not radically injure or impede the Methodist enterprise, but also did not fundamentally generate the anti-Catholicism of the American-oriented leaders of the Italy mission. The missionaries brought their categorically harsh feelings about the Catholic Church along with them in the judgmental baggage they packed in the United States. They simply imported into Italy patterns of thinking that were vestigial products of nineteenth century American nativism. They did not become familiar with Catholicism only after arriving in Italy; they already knew it, or thought they did. They simply subsumed what they observed of it on the field under headings belonging to the general interpretation of the Roman Church that they already held. Thus their antipathy for the Church may not be interpreted as substantially the natural reaction of a religious minority to opposition or oppression by an entrenched ecclesiastical system. The latter belonged rather to the inheritance or the experience of the native Italian evangelicals.

BLOW FOR BLOW, 1910

In 1910, the Italy mission suddenly became involved in a noisy, double-barreled controversy that rudely exposed as no earlier event had done the essential conflict implicit in the co-existence of Methodism and Catholicism in Italy.

On a weekend in February, Charles W. Fairbanks, a Methodist layman, formerly Vice-President under Theodore Roosevelt, was visiting Rome, ready to follow a schedule calling for an audience with King Victor Emmanuel on Saturday, an address to the congregation of the American Methodist Episcopal Church on Sunday, and an audience with Pope Pius X on Monday. The Vatican made it known, however, that it would be impossible for the pope to receive Mr. Fairbanks if he carried out his plan to speak in the Methodist Church. This was an embarrassment for Fairbanks, but not a radical dilemma; he chose to keep his appointment with his fellow Methodists at the cost of losing his audience with the pope.

A few weeks later, Roosevelt, who was heading towards Europe after hunting big game in Africa, wrote the United States ambassador in Rome requesting him to arrange for him an audience with the King and with the pope. When the former President arrived in Cairo late in March, he received the following communication from the Vatican, relayed to him by the Ambassador:

The Holy Father will be delighted to grant an audience to Mr. Roosevelt on April 5 and hopes that nothing will arise to prevent it, such as the much regretted incident which made the reception of Mr. Fairbanks impossible.*

The *London Times* later commented that in presenting this issue to Mr. Roosevelt, the pope's advisers "exhibited an ignorance of human nature, and more particularly of Rooseveltian human nature . . ." Roosevelt had no plans to address any churchmen while in Rome, but he declined to make any stipulations limiting his freedom of conduct during his stay there. The pith of the Vatican's reply was, "The audience cannot take place except on the understanding expressed in the former message."* Roosevelt promptly answered that the proposed audience was, "of course, now impossible."

These two incidents set off a controversy, both ecclesiastical and secular, that got wide attention in press and periodicals on both sides of the Atlantic. Fairbanks and Roosevelt did nothing to play up the issues. Indeed, both of them issued excellent statements endeavoring to curb sectarian excitement and intolerance. But numerous partisans with various affiliations—variously inspired by religion, patriotism, or libertarian principles—promptly sprang to arms and fired away on their own. Champions of the pope, for instance, far from letting his two gaucheries pass without further underscoring, followed them up with explanatory frontal attacks on the Methodist mission in Rome.

Archbishop John Ireland of St. Paul, Minnesota, immediately projected himself into the Fairbanks affair with a vigorous accusation that the Methodists in Rome were proselyters. Methodist preachers, editors, Bishops, and church groups shot right back in both rebuttal and counterattack. Secretary Adna B. Leonard took his part, balancing off Ireland's charge of "pernicious proselyting" with the claim—"then the same charge should apply against the Catholics in America, where Catholic proselyting is pernicious." He said that the incident showed "the intolerant spirit of Romanism when it feels that it can safely assume that attitude."† The *New York Herald* later stated (4 April) that at the time of the Fairbanks affair, there were "thousands both in Europe and America who immediately unloosed a storm of criticism against the Catholic Church."

Roosevelt visited Rome the first weekend in April without seeing the pope, and on 4 April the whole story exploded in the American press. That day,

* *New York Herald* (4 April 1910).

† *New York Herald* (9 Feb. 1910).

the entire front page of the *New York Herald* was devoted to it, with jumps to inside pages.

Once again, Archbishop Ireland was quick to enter the fray. His contribution included the statement:

Of one thing I am certain—the Methodist propaganda in Rome is so vile, so calumnious in its assaults upon the Catholic faith, so dishonest in its methods to win proselytes, that the Holy Father, the supreme guardian of the faith, is compelled by the vital principles of his high office to avert at all cost the slightest movement on his part that might, directly or indirectly, be interpreted as abetting the propaganda or approving, even by implication, its purposes and tactics.*

Promptly rushing in to confront Archbishop Ireland came Bishop Robert McIntyre, head of the St. Paul Area of the Methodist Episcopal Church, who said in a public telegram:

He calls my people vile, dishonest and calumnious. I bore the Fairbanks slander from him without reply, but my patience is now exhausted. I hereby brand John Ireland a double tongued falsifier of God's people, a cowardly accuser of men better than himself, who are offering Italians the free grace of God without any terms of priestly monopoly.

I also challenge him to debate the question in American fashion in the open forum when I reach St. Paul. I have great Christian love for the Roman Catholic people but the papal machine has a blood red record that stains centuries of history.†

And the Archbishop parried by saying, "The message received from Bishop McIntyre is beneath my notice. I run away from slingers of mud." †

When the Fairbanks trouble broke out, Secretary Leonard, in addition to making his own contribution to the controversy, reacted in general with something closer to delight than to dismay. He saw in it bad publicity for the pope and excellent publicity for the Methodist mission in Rome. "Nothing has occurred in a quarter of a century that has brought our work in Italy so prominently before the people of the United States," he wrote to Bishop Burt. "I think our people in Italy are to be congratulated." And to Bertrand M. Tipple, President of the Methodist Boys' College, he exclaimed, "What a splendid advertisement this Fairbanks question has given us!"

But when the furore over Vatican protocol went into its Roosevelt phase, Homer C. Stuntz, the Assistant Corresponding Secretary, who was then manning the New York office in Leonard's absence, found developments more disturbing. One of the most distressing factors was the activity of Bertrand Tipple. During Roosevelt's brief stay in Rome, Tipple and two of his American Methodist colleagues requested, and were given, an interview with the

* *The Christian Advocate* (7 April 1910), p. 492.

† *New York Herald* (6 April 1910).

former President. The conference itself was friendly, but Tipple gratuitously provided it with a sequel that angered Roosevelt; he promptly gave the Associated Press a statement of his own that presumed to interpret Roosevelt's part in the boiling controversy. Tipple paired off Roosevelt, versus the pope, with Emile Loubet, former President of France, who while still in office in 1904 made a controversial visit to the King of Italy, the pope's political enemy. Loubet's visit had provoked the Vatican to diplomatic protest to the Catholic powers and was soon followed by the recall of the French ambassador to the Vatican and by the initiation of the legislation resulting in the separation of Church and State in France in 1905. Tipple linked Roosevelt and Loubet together as two political figures who had "put the Vatican where it belongs." And casting Roosevelt in the role of an aggressive champion of the great principal of toleration, he declared, "Mr. Roosevelt has struck a blow for twentieth-century Christianity."

Roosevelt hardly could be expected to relish having Tipple come forward as his advocate and fellow crusader in a release that contained such a passage as this:

The Vatican is incompatible with republican principles. This is a bitter dose for patriotic Catholics in America to swallow. I wonder how many doses of this sort they will take before they revolt? Is Catholicism in America to be American or Romish? If Romish, then every patriotic American should rise to crush it, for Roman Catholicism is the uncompromising foe of freedom.*

No wonder that Secretary Stuntz could pick up the *New York Herald* for 6 April and, turning to the latest front-page story on the Vatican controversy, read such heads as these:

Roosevelt Wrath Now is Turned on Rome Methodists Incensed at Attack on Vatican Cancels Reception at Embassy

Roosevelt did cancel an announced Embassy reception because, in the face of Tipple's sharpening of the conflict, further unpleasantness might arise over who would attend and who would refrain from attending. In announcing his decision, he aimed his statement so pointedly at the Methodist community that it was clearly a rebuke to Tipple. He referred all who tried "to bring about and inflame religious animosities because of what has occurred between the Vatican and myself" to his own explanation of the Vatican affair that he cabled on 3 April to Lyman Abbott, editor of the *Outlook*. The cable read, in part:

* *New York Herald* (5 April 1910).

Bitter comment and criticism, acrimonious attack and defense are not only profitless, but harmful, and to seize upon such an incident as this as an occasion for controversy would be wholly indefensible and should be frowned upon by Catholics and Protestants alike and all good Americans.*

Stuntz found Tipple's statement inflammatory. James M. Buckley, an active member of the Board of Managers, and no crypto-papist, gave Tipple a sound editorial spanking in *The Christian Advocate* for issuing such a denunciatory and anger-breeding release and for involving Roosevelt in it. Tipple's act drew heavy criticism from numerous non-Catholic, even Methodist, sources. The Board office became the object of strong pressures for official disavowal of Tipple's declaration, and even for his recall from the Italy field, where he had been stationed for hardly six months. Stuntz favored neither action. He told some of his correspondents that to recall all missionaries who made even serious errors of judgment on the field might seriously cut into the Church's list of active foreign workers. But he did unite with Buckley in cabling Secretary Leonard, who was scheduled to reach Rome by that time, to warn him of the disfavor with which Tipple's indiscretion was being received throughout the Methodist Episcopal Church in the United States. He also sent Tipple a letter about the seriousness of the situation at home, but only rather mildly rebuked him for his precipitate and questionable outburst. The Board itself, however, never took any action on any aspect of the Fairbanks-Roosevelt-Vatican affair. Indeed it took cognizance of it only long enough to vote down, in March, a recommendation of the Committee on Europe that Secretary Leonard should be asked to prepare, when visiting Rome, a public defense of the Methodist mission against charges made in *The Pilot*, a Catholic paper published in Boston.

What chiefly bothered Stuntz about Tipple's hot words was their effect in tending to upset what the Secretary felt was a balance of publicity favorable to the Methodists. Stuntz believed that the Vatican controversy, if allowed to take its natural course, could only redound ultimately to the credit of the Methodists and the discredit of the Vatican itself. He wrote to Charles W. Drees:

Out of it all we shall emerge with the most unanswerable evidence which could be offered to the intelligence of this nation that the Papacy retains unabated all its civil pretensions and all its medieval intolerance.

Stuntz, along with a number of colleagues whom he consulted, feared that challenges hurled too vigorously in the direction of the Vatican might boomerang. Evidently, Claudius B. Spencer, editor of *The Central Christian Advocate*, wired the Board urging it to demand that Archbishop Ireland furnish proof of his statements denouncing Methodist activities in Italy. Stuntz re-

* *New York Herald* (4 April 1910).

mindful Spencer that getting the Archbishop "stirred to fighting pitch" might have two results that would play into his hands and "harm us far more than silence." One was the considerable damage that could come from his publishing some of the statements and some of the "immoralities" of certain priests who professed conversion to Methodism in the earlier days of the Italy Mission. The other was the harm that could be done if Ireland should, "with Jesuitical cunning," make use of attacks on the administration of the Mission that he had only to lift from *4½ Years in the Italy Mission: a Criticism of Missionary Methods*, the book published in 1894 by Everett S. Stackpole, William Burt's former colleague on the Italy field.

This ticklish necessity to maintain, if not improve, the public image of Methodist missions in Italy was the chief problem left in the Methodist camp as the broader controversy fairly quickly faded from the secular press. Fairbanks and Roosevelt came off the field in good condition, with neither the Protestant nor the Catholic community lined up against them, and with the American principle of the mutual independence of Church and State forcefully reaffirmed. But the Roman Catholic Church and the Methodist Episcopal Church were left embattled, each mounting both defense and counterattack against the other.

The Board of Bishops made the only official move on the Methodist side. From their semiannual meeting in May they issued a general denial of the Roman Catholic accusations that was as dignified as Bishop McIntyre's personal blast had been pugnacious. But they contributed no important clarification of the issues standing between the two churches. The Bishops criticized the accusers for not reducing their charges to specifications that could be evaluated by public opinion, attributed to Methodism a high innocence of any but pure gospel methods on mission fields where it confronted a dominant Catholicism, and tried to cast the Rome Methodists in the simple role of scapegoats for the Vatican's failure to handle its problems of political protocol. In passing, the Bishops' statement unwittingly handed to Archbishop Ireland a free debating point by declaring, as though it constituted exoneration of all fault, "That the methods of our mission in Italy, now for the first time thus publicly condemned, are the same that have been pursued from the beginning, almost forty years ago."

The debate continued into the fall in the pages of *The North American Review*, an important journal of opinion. It was there, in July, that Archbishop Ireland picked up the item of acknowledged continuity in Methodist missionary methods and utilized it to broaden the attack on Italian Methodism by declaring that the mission's current aggressive anti-Catholicism had been characteristic of its entire history and that earlier internal defects in the operation of the mission had not yet been removed. The Archbishop advanced what he considered to be adequate documentation of his claims in largely Methodist sources, citing especially Stackpole's *4½ Years in the Italy Mis-*

sion; Bishop William Burt's little book *Europe and Methodism* (1909); *Cenni Storici Chiesa Metodistica Episcopale*, an historical treatment of Methodist activities in Italy; and *L'Evangelista*, one of the Italian Methodist periodicals.

Among the items he culled from Stackpole's book *Archbishop Ireland* included the quotation, "The Gospel in Italy must be accompanied with mighty power. A style of Christianity that verges upon fanaticism is needed."* Fanaticism indeed was raging in Italian Methodism, Ireland claimed. In this connection, he especially condemned *L'Evangelista*, which except for articles from the pen of Bishop Vincent, he said, teemed with insults to the Catholic Church and the pope, making the Church "the harlot," and the pope "the beast," of the Apocalypse. From *L'Evangelista* for 17 September 1909, Ireland picked one of his more extreme examples of what he characterized as Methodism's bold and virulent war upon the Vatican. It was a front-page cartoon that he described as follows:

Christ, scourge in hand, stands on a high throne, whence the Pope has been driven. A Bible opened to the page upon which the words appear, "My Kingdom is not of this world," lies in the chair where heretofore the Pope was seated. The Pope, cowering and dismayed, in drunken scowl, rolls down the steps, across which scatter broken fragments of tiara, mitre, chalice, thurible and other insignia of the pontifical office.*

While attempting thus concretely to fill in his earlier, more general charges about Methodist methods and operations, the Archbishop also portrayed the Rome mission as a close and consistent ally of anticlerical, Masonic, and political forces obnoxious to the Vatican. He interpreted the Methodist headquarters building as a center and a symbol of this alliance. Not irrelevant to this pattern was his later accusation, in a follow-up article in the *September Review*, that the Rome Methodists were patently attempting to associate themselves with everything American, "to gain for Methodism a hearing under the cover of the flag of America, under the spell of the prestige of America." Apparently both the Methodists and Archbishop Ireland appreciated the extent to which the streams of Italian nationalism, American libertarianism, and Methodist evangelicalism melded to press against the dike of political Vaticanism.

Two Methodist defenders and challengers rode into the lists set up by *The North American Review*—S. M. Vernon, brother of the founder of the Italy Mission, in August, and Bishop William Burt in October. Grant Perkins, once briefly the American pastor in Rome, came to the defense of his Roman friends in *The Methodist Review* (July), and Richard J. Cooke, Book Editor of the Methodist Episcopal Church, followed up his effort with a 33-page supplement to the September issue of the same periodical. Bishop Burt made

* *The North American Review* (July, 1910), p. 18.

the most direct attempt of all to counter the more specific charges made by Archbishop Ireland, but in general the Methodist partisans put up defenses that essentially were only more or less effective debating points. They made many casuistic strokes such as, in Catholic champions, Methodists were accustomed to call Jesuitical. Indeed, they majored in this far more than did the Catholic Archbishop, who—right or wrong, accurate or inaccurate—attempted mostly to make a substantial case on the basis of his natural Catholic presuppositions. The Methodist defense denied that the Rome mission practiced unscrupulous and unjustifiable proselytism, denied that Italian Methodism slanderously or aggressively campaigned against the pope and his Church, minimized as irrelevant or as products of their Roman Catholic origins the deficiencies in the personnel of the earlier Mission, stressed the intolerance of the Catholic Church as freshly demonstrated by the Vatican's position in the Fairbanks-Roosevelt affair, and portrayed the Methodist work as an important contribution to the spiritual salvation of Italy.

Curiously, with the Catholic-Methodist argument far from resolved, *The Christian Advocate* and *World-Wide Missions* almost completely dropped the Vatican controversy from their columns within a month after the outbreak of the Roosevelt phase. Except for publication of the Bishops' official statement in both magazines, and a superficial article by Bishop Earl Cranston in the *Advocate* on 5 May, the two papers hardly mentioned the subject for five months. The *Advocate* picked it up again on 29 September, but then only to call attention to Bishop Burt's forthcoming article of rebuttal in the October *North American Review*. *World-Wide Missions* made a brief partisan reply in September to Archbishop Ireland's July article, but did scant justice to the extent or nature of his case against the Rome mission. In October, it called its readers' attention to certain published rebuttals of Ireland's attack, and in November, it briefly and favorably referred to Bishop Burt's article as having accomplished Ireland's total defeat. It cited Burt's effort as having accused the Archbishop of ten offenses:

First, garbling; second, deception; third, invention of facts; fourth, defending inquisitional methods; fifth, bribery; sixth, ignorant or willful misrepresentation; seventh, giving publicity to falsehood; eighth, falsehood; ninth, slander; ten, duplicity.

Providing such minor and heavily slanted tips on the progress of the debate apparently exhausted the generosity of the Methodist editors in New York towards their clientele. During all these months, they made no attempt to give their readers any full and objective statement of the Catholic case. Evidently assuming that convinced Methodists normally would trust Methodist editors and officials as against Catholic attackers, they majored in condemnatory rebuttals of the charges made by Ireland without giving the readers enough direct contact with his material for them to be able to evaluate for

themselves the seriousness or the validity of what he was saying. James M. Buckley, the *Advocate's* editor, was one of the men who helped Secretary Stuntz to decide that it would be best not to goad the Archbishop into saying too much about the Methodist work in Italy. When Ireland nevertheless went ahead and said an unpleasant mouthful, thus realizing the fears of Stuntz and his advisers, they so restricted their reporting of the controversy as not to provide this troublesome Catholic advocate with any sounding board in their own papers. Simply pointing to the articles in *The North American Review*—or even in *The Methodist Review*—could do relatively little harm; these periodicals, each directed towards an intellectual élite, were sparsely circulated among the rank and file of the Methodist Episcopal Church. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the Methodist editors were deliberately managing the news—endeavoring to protect their readers against Catholic wiles and falsities, and thus to protect the flow of contributions to Methodist foreign missions.

As an omnibus debate, badly marred as it was by partisan bias and hostility on both sides, the public argument over Italian Methodism yielded no clear victory for either side. Both sides contributed, however, in a kind of unintentional co-operation, to a single result—a more open revelation of the nature of the mission of the Methodist Episcopal Church in Italy.

The Vatican and its champions unerringly, as to the main point, if inaccurately or inadequately as to detail, identified the Italy Mission as its deliberate enemy, quite soundly holding that it was the perennial and the contemporary purpose of the Methodist enterprise to undermine and displace the Roman Catholic Church in Italy.

The Methodist advocates, though at various times pleading innocent to the Catholic charge, nevertheless clearly exposed their anti-Catholicism through what they allowed themselves to say in the very course of the controversy itself. Not content to repulse Ireland's harsh blows by offering denials fortified with evidence, they did not scruple to take up the weapon of the broad historical smear. While they dismissed Stackpole's *4½ Years in the Italy Mission* as irrelevant to contemporary Methodism because it was all of sixteen years old, they grasped the Vatican controversy as an opportunity to range back through the centuries for hurtful ammunition, memories of historic evils long associated with the Roman Church. They primed their weapon with two general theses—the claim that the Roman Church never changes, and the assumption that the papacy was responsible for all the social, economic, and educational backwardness of Italy. Thus armed, they thrust the modern popes and the modern Church into the blackest possible historical background—rife with old, old hates and prejudices—and insisted that they be interpreted as integral with all that grim vista.

Richard J. Cooke, for instance, devoted part of his *Methodist Review* supplement to pressing the contemporary Catholic Church into the evil shad-

ows cast by the corrupt and secularized pontiffs of the Renaissance papacy. He even tucked in among his other numerous citations of the Church's bad history a gross reference to the alleged (not Cooke's adjective) natural daughter of Cardinal Antonelli, the prominent papal administrator who died as recently—or as far back—as 1876, shortly after the Methodists entered Rome.

Adna Wright Leonard, the former pastor of the American Church, emerged as perhaps Methodism's most unabashed user of the retaliatory smear. In 1910, Leonard promptly got out a booklet called *The Roman Catholic Church at the Fountain Head in the Light of the Fairbanks-Roosevelt-Vatican Incidents*. Prominent in its defense of the Italy Mission was an extended bitter denunciation of the papacy's evil history, of the Catholic priesthood (described as illiterate, intellectually sterile, irrelevant, unproductive, and widely immoral), and of the Roman Catholic ecclesiastical system and way of life.

Turning to history, Leonard drew a dark picture of brutal and repressive conditions in the Papal States during the years of the popes' substantial political power in Italy. His portrayal had its lurid touches, as when he quoted what was supposed to have been seen by the first nonpapist to enter, in 1870, the familiar monument built by the Emperor Hadrian as a tomb for himself and his successors, renamed the Castle of St. Angelo and made the popes' convenient fortress during the Renaissance, and later used by the Inquisition:

Irons, hooks, chafing-pans, ropes, quicklime, trap-doors over caverns and shafts, whilst the remains of the human victims themselves, of all ages and of both sexes, consisting of hair, bones, skulls, and skeletons, were in dungeon, cellar, and shaft.

With a symbolism surely not lost on Leonard and his readers, this horrid place, he reported, was connected with the Vatican by a secret passage.

Leonard courted no risk that his readers would think the devilish doings of the papacy belonged too far in the past; one of his most telling exhibits was a portrayal of how the pope's foreign mercenaries were reported to have crushed a popular uprising in the city of Perugia as late as 1859:

They were privileged to do as they pleased with their victims. Houses were looted, and men, women, and children were horribly massacred. Young girls were first insulted by the soldiers and then killed. The Pope was so well pleased with the dastardly work of the soldiers that he sent for the cruel leader, Captain Schmidt, and thanked him personally, and then ordered a medal to be struck to commemorate the event . . .

At some points, Leonard wrote with apparent restraint becoming a churchly critic, but important stretches of his lengthy booklet betrayed its rootage in attitudes worthy of the Know Nothing movement in the United States in the

middle of the nineteenth century. The *Fountain Head* was predominantly a fiercely anti-Catholic onslaught. Bishop Burt liked it. He wrote the writer's father in July, "I procured in Rome a copy of Adna's little book and read it on the train. It is fine and I hope that thousands upon thousands of copies may be circulated." At just that time, the book was favorably publicized in *The Christian Advocate* and also was made available from The Methodist Book Concern's two main centers and six regional depositories for eighteen cents postpaid.

Upon the lapse of the more immediate blow-for-blow quarrel, the Methodists continued to declare themselves, apparently still uninhibited by any chastening sense of their own aggressiveness or by any awareness that in expressing it they were at all deficient in ethical controls. In a pamphlet published in October, 1910, Secretary Leonard characterized the Catholic charges against the Italy Mission as "absolutely without foundation," and he proved himself capable of brushing them off with a reference to the "absurd ravings of Archbishop Ireland." He apparently welcomed the fact that the incidents of the past months had brought the Methodist Episcopal Church "under the limelight" as the chief and vital champion of the evangelical cause in Catholic Italy. "That the Vatican guns are now turned on us," he said, "only serves to strengthen our position."*

The American Church in Rome by no means struck its Methodist banner after the heavy firing was over; in September, 1911, it played host to the organizing session of the Central Conference of Europe, with Bishop Burt presiding over Methodist representatives from eleven countries. Vittorio Bani, pastor of the Methodist church in Milan, read two papers. In one of them, "For the Evangelization of the Latin People," he built, as Methodists had done before, upon the thesis that Catholicism never changes, admitting as the only effective exception the restraints laid upon Catholicism by the modern powers of the political state. He insisted that contemporary Catholicism was essentially pagan, still deeply infected from the pagan revival during the Renaissance. If Nero and Paul could rise from the dead, he declared, Nero would have no difficulty in finding in Catholic worship the pagan religion of his own contemporaries, and while "Paul would search in vain for his Church . . . the idolatrous and bloody Emperor could, with a jeering laugh, re-enter his tomb, saying, 'I have conquered!'" Bani challenged the Methodists to undertake among the Catholic people an aggressive evangelism that would be grounded in this understanding of Catholicism as pagan and be expressed in a popular campaign to expose it as unchristian.

Suzanne Delord, delegate from France and former member of the Crandon Institute staff, held atheism and Roman Catholicism up to the Conference as the two influences whose presence in France demanded the countering presence

* *Methodism in North Africa and Europe*, p. 7

of Christian educational institutions. Referring to the Christianity taught in French private schools under Catholics, she said, "When we say Roman Catholic Christianity we have said all, for with these words we evoke superstition, narrowness, the annihilation of individuality, nullity of thought, servitude in the full sense of the word." Harras H. Aulanko, a Finnish delegate, pointedly—considering the place where the Conference was being held—introduced his paper with perhaps more effective anti-Catholic overtones:

From Rome has gone forth good, very much good, but from Rome has gone forth also evil, very much evil. Here St. Paul. . . . but here also the antichrist has built his throne and a monster has arisen with the keys of the kingdom in his hand, persecuting the friends of Jesus in every way and everywhere. . . . Now have the followers of John Wesley lifted the standard above the people and have begun a crusade in the name of Jesus against the present darkness of superstition and unbelief.

And George A. Simons, delegate from the Russia Mission, savoring the possibility of establishing a residence for a Methodist Bishop in Rome as a symbol of continuing Methodist challenge to the Vatican, said at a Reeder Seminary banquet held during the Conference, "Think of it, brethren, what it would mean to have it known throughout the world that Methodism, already strongly entrenched in the very centre and hotbed of Roman Catholicism, makes Rome the residence for one of her General Superintendents."

That Bishop Burt's view of the role of Methodism as a prime antagonist of Roman Catholicism remained unmodified, after the events of 1910, became indubitably clear when he stood before the General Conference in 1912 to report on the work in Europe at the end of his quarter century's activity there. Here in this forum, for the second time in four years, he denounced the papacy for having nearly destroyed the religious life of France. But he also fired away directly at the Roman Church in Italy, reiterating the charge that Catholicism was paganism "in its conceptions, doctrines, traditions, fears, hopes, and promises." Directly echoing Vittorio Bani's Central Conference declarations, he accused the Church of toleration of certain festivals that still retained "the characteristics of Bacchanalian feasts." He said to the General Conference members, "If the horrid crimes once connected with these feasts are not now openly committed, it is simply because of the presence of the civil authorities." And in his final official justification of the Italy Mission, Bishop Burt said:

Our mission to Italy is to show the people that Roman Catholicism, against which they have rebelled is not Christianity, to preach in its simplicity the evangel of the Christ, and to manifest it in a pure life.

INTRAMMISSION POLITICS

Everett S. Stackpole's view that the Italy Mission's worst enemy was not the Catholic Church, but the combination of deficiencies that knotted it up

on the inside, was not popular in missionary circles, especially when he lined it out in the great concreteness that characterized his book *4½ Years in the Italy Mission*. Considering the relative smallness of the Mission, as well its centralized organization, it is difficult to probe its history, however, without realizing that this major thesis of Stackpole's remained soundly relevant to Italian Methodism for a good many years after his departure from the field in 1892.

One of the Mission's serious internal weaknesses was dissension among the missionaries and the ministers. In 1896, the destructive process had been at work for more than a decade, and the Superintendent, William Burt, was himself thoroughly implicated in it.

The first blow on the wedge of dissension was the Ravi case of 1882. S. Vincenzo Ravi was the gifted but highly temperamental pastor of the church in Naples and originally an independent evangelical preacher who had broken away from the Roman Church. Coping with his erratic pastoral and administrative behavior absorbed no end of patience on the part of Leroy M. Vernon, the District Superintendent. Ravi managed to get himself into much hot water in Naples, provoking unpleasant reactions that included rumors of his acquiring property by questionable methods. Believing that he was the intended victim of a plot to break him out of his church, Ravi pressed Vernon to take punitive action against the men he suspected were his attackers. When Vernon failed to respond to his excited and difficult demands, Ravi impatiently accused Vernon himself of persecuting him and of conniving with parties seeking to undermine his position by circulating anonymous letters that libeled him and his family. Both Vernon and Bishop William L. Harris tried to pacify the excited and accusing pastor, but fruitlessly.

The trouble finally resulted in Ravi's making a full-dress challenge of Vernon's administration, and the Annual Conference became the arena in which it was fought out. When Bishop Harris, the Superintendent, and the ministerial members of the Conference arrived at the Naples church in April for their annual session, they found themselves locked out by Ravi, who personally owned the property and had rented it to the Mission to be used for Methodist services. Forced to find other quarters for the meetings of the Conference, Vernon then proceeded to bring Ravi to trial according to the Discipline.

As Vernon said later on, "Under the general imputation of immorality, he [Ravi] was charged with (1) defamation, (2) maladministration, (3) rebellious violation of the Church's rights, (4) embezzlement, etc., in thirteen specifications." The dozen Conference members heard all the charges and countercharges, convicted Ravi under the main heads, and expelled him from the ministry and membership of the Methodist Episcopal Church.*

The dispute was now continued in a public arena, for Ravi had Vernon haled into court on a charge of "defamation and public abuse" because of

* See Note, p. 441.

Vernon's initiation and prosecution of the ecclesiastical processes by which Ravi had been turned out of the Methodist ministry. Ravi here so broadened his complaint as to convert it into a serious legal test of the amenability of Italian Methodist ministers and churches to the provisions of the Discipline of the Methodist Episcopal Church. The court's verdict completely vindicated Vernon's official actions and thus bestowed upon the Methodist connectional polity a legal standing it had not previously enjoyed in Italy. The official Methodist reaction was that the legal decision had enhanced the Church's public image. But the Ravi affair as a whole was a serious breach of Mission unity.

The second divisive blow—more serious in its eventual consequences—was the Hargis affair, which followed in 1884. James H. Hargis, a member of the Newark Conference, came to Italy in January to assist Vernon in the work of the Mission. Three months later, Vernon was off to the United States to attend General Conference, leaving the new man in charge of Mission affairs, including the office of Treasurer. Unfortunately, Hargis egregiously exploited his temporary trust. Undertaking a personal probe of the Mission and its activity, he soon molded enough ammunition to supply a broad attack on Vernon and his administration of the field as superintendent and as Treasurer. He not only freely criticized Vernon in Mission circles in Italy—"with a mouth to every open ear," said Vernon—but also dispatched to the Board's New York office a series of letters leveling damaging charges against him.

When at length Vernon discovered what was going on, he returned to Rome in August and confronted Hargis, who for nearly three weeks obstructed Vernon's resumption of his duties, refusing to surrender possession of the Mission's funds and retaining official papers necessary to the transaction of Mission business. Hargis even clung to Vernon's own office, continuing to rummage through the records for additional suspicious or damaging items to relay to New York. "Had I known they were doing this," Vernon wrote to Secretary John M. Reid, "I have no doubt I should have caned them out of the house." But Vernon moved carefully, trying to avoid open scandal, "as every shuffle of discord here thunders on the tympanum of the public ear." But he did have to act, for the protection of the Mission and its cause and to clear the minds of Methodist ministers and laymen from "doubt, distrust and apprehension."

Receiving from New York copies of Hargis's latest letters, but no guidance on how to handle the difficulties created by the man's conduct, Vernon finally announced his intention to bring the whole affair to a head by putting Hargis on trial before the Italy Conference for lying, defamation, rebellious interference with the functions of the District Superintendent and Mission Treasurer and for clandestine removal of documents from the Mission office. In December, Hargis's allegations on various aspects of the Italy Mission were

reported to the Board of Managers. Focusing upon his charges of financial mismanagement, the Board requested Bishop John F. Hurst to conduct, in the light of them, a thorough investigation of Vernon's administration of the Mission treasury. Meanwhile, Vernon's plan for a trial had resulted in full consultation between him and Hargis. When the Board met in February, 1885, it had in hand a joint statement signed by Vernon and Hargis, as well as letters from Hargis, in which the latter conceded that every important item charged against Vernon had been a matter of misapprehension on his part. The Board then rescinded its order for the audit of Vernon's accounts. Hargis's trial, of course, never came off. But his transfer to the Philadelphia Conference was announced before the spring session of the Italy Conference, and he returned to the United States that same year.

This was not the end of Vernon's difficulties, however; too many questions had been raised, too few settled. In spite of the Board's February vote, some of the missionary leaders, including Secretary Reid, would have preferred to see the audit go forward once the Hargis charges were no longer formally in effect. And as much as seven months after the vote, the Board of Managers lengthily discussed a paper from Vernon explaining certain property transactions criticized by Hargis, but then indefinitely postponed action on it. In November, the Board acceded to a request by Vernon himself to order a thorough investigation of his financial transactions and accounts. Bishop Cyrus D. Foss and John F. Goucher went to Italy and carried out the audit, but not until October, 1886, did the Board finally approve the Foss-Goucher report.

This action took account of the existence of numerous minor errors in Vernon's accounts, but exonerated him of all suspicion of financial wrongdoing and acknowledged the good judgment and business ability he displayed in acquiring Methodist realty holdings in Italy. The decision criticized Vernon on two counts—that he failed to maintain dual bank accounts for the Mission's funds and his own, and that he bought four properties with his own money and then rented them to the Mission for church purposes. But even with regard to these unapproved projects, the Board recognized Vernon's fairness and his success in turning them to the practical advantage of the Mission.

Yet no matter how the charges about property and accounts might be handled, Vernon's reputation also had to absorb, simultaneously, the impact of the numerous general criticisms Hargis had hurled against him and his fellow workers. The nature of some of the broader allegations is suggested by the description of Hargis's attack that Vernon himself sent to Secretary Reid:

His complaints that the M.E. Church does not exist here, that there is no organization, that there are no Qur. Conf. [Quarterly Conferences], that the preaching and work is done with expectation of immediate results, etc., are unfounded in fact, are grievously injurious & unjust in spirit. . . . the bitterest

of our enemies, infidels, priests, etc., have never berated us in the midst of the hot fight of faith against the flesh, the devil & the Pope, like this new Apostle to the Gentiles.

It was to be expected that such accusations, and the specifications and rumors in which they took shape and wing, would provoke emotional ecclesiastical reactions by some of the Church's self-consciously Methodist leaders. Their circulation in the United States along with the colder, less spiritual questions about money, contributed, not surprisingly, to a recession of confidence in Vernon's general administration. It reached even into the Board of Bishops as a body.

Led by Bishop Foss, who later was to participate in the financial investigation, the Bishops determined to send two missionaries to the field. That these men were not to be merely reinforcements for Vernon became quite apparent through the manner in which the *Annual Report* for 1885 explained the General Missionary Committee's recently announced co-operation with the Bishops' plan:

This will secure a closer supervision, some variety of American Methodistic thought, and a larger penetration of the mission by the evangelistic spirit of our Church. Dr. Vernon founded this mission, and has all these years cared for it, superintended, and ministered to it almost without aid.

By the method chosen to implement this plan, the Board and the Bishops together struck the third blow on the wedge of disunity in Italy. Upon organization of the Italy Conference in 1881, Leroy Vernon's official title had been changed automatically from Superintendent to Presiding Elder (District Superintendent); yet his functional superintendency of the Mission as a whole had remained unimpaired. But when, in May, 1886, Bishop Foss gave the first of the two new missionaries his Conference appointment, he divided the Conference into two Districts, and put the new man, William Burt, in charge of one of them, at the same time assigning Vernon to the other. This was a demotion for Vernon. After twenty-six years in the ministry, including nine years on the field, the mature, well-tried founder and developer of the Italy Mission thus was made merely co-ordinate with a freshly arrived young preacher who did not speak Italian and whose ministerial record covered only five years as a pastor in Brooklyn.

Since Bishop Foss, the Bishop technically in charge of Italy, was resident in Minneapolis and the Board's executives—*Corresponding* Secretaries they certainly were—kept their offices in New York City, the formal reorganization of the Italy Conference quickly resulted in a real division in the administration of the field. Nobody in Italy was in charge of the Mission as a whole. Even Vernon's office as Treasurer was so delimited as to give him no real Conference-wide power. The Annual Conference itself had no organic strength capable of resisting or reconciling divisive influences. On the field, the power

was in the hands of the missionaries, and if their hands were not joined in genuine co-operation, the Conference was bound to lack unity.

Co-operation, indeed consultation, between the two men appeared to be at a minimum, even on routine Conference business. Consideration of important projects such as property developments requiring special financing, and determination of Conference goals in such important areas as theological education, were handled largely by unilateral correspondence with Secretary Reid or by independent representations to the Bishop. Vernon and Burt, especially in view of their achieving little genuine or relaxed sharing of purposes, saw very wide of eye-to-eye on a number of issues, both major and minor. This condition developed so quickly and so sharply that the Board seemed almost to be dealing with two missions, one led by Vernon and one led by Burt. Because of the separateness of their approaches to the Board and the Bishop, the two District Superintendents became essentially competitive in their relationship with the missionary administration in the United States.

There, at home, Vernon's stock went down. With adoption of the Foss-Goucher report delayed for many months, with the Mission and its founder under continuing and increasing fire because of criticisms raised or reinforced by the Hargis attack in general, and with official disillusionment with Vernon's work overtly motivating the Bishops' reinforcement measures for Italy, Vernon naturally was vulnerable. At the same time, Burt's stock was going up. Already familiarly and favorably known to Secretary Reid when he was sent to Italy, coming as the obvious vehicle of the Bishops' plan for "penetration of the mission," and his expressed views on Mission policy soon being recognized as significantly variant from those of the vulnerable Vernon, Burt quite naturally became the repository of the sympathies and the hopes of those who wanted the Italy Mission to be something different from what they believed Vernon had made it.

Burt left little to unaided nature. He consistently and effectively dissociated himself from the substance of Vernon's missionary philosophy and practice. And from the very beginning, he made sure that his official stature was thoroughly recognized both in Italy and in New York; he showed himself aggressively touchy about his prerogatives as a District Superintendent, little inclined to give Vernon the benefit of a doubt when administrative hitches occurred, quick to complain to New York, and rigorously insistent upon running his own District with a minimum of recognition within it of the older missionary's position in the Conference. By his rigid, essentially hostile stance towards Vernon, as well as by his active and independent cultivation of official support for his own proposals for the development of the Mission, Burt projected into missionary circles at home an image of himself as the man to be reckoned with in shaping the future of the Italy Mission.

Burt gave body to this image by becoming the instigator and leader of an attempted reformation of Italian Methodism, especially the Italian ministry.

His attack on conditions as he saw them was coherent with the general charges made by James Hargis, and Burt sounded somewhat like an echo of Hargis when he later described some of the targets of his crusade to Secretary J. Oramel Peck:

When I arrived here three years ago there was no Methodist Episcopal Church. None of our chapels or halls were named such. Those who served as ministers did not call themselves such. Many of them laughed at our "foolish fanatical methodistic customs." The membership as reported represented a number of very poor people brought together for a variety of motives, *very few* of whom were ever soundly converted. The whole thing was a bubble.

The spearhead of the reform movement was the effort to eradicate the use of wine and tobacco by the Italian ministers—a practice Burt condemned as a scandalous departure from the Methodist way of life. Burt claimed that the traditional General Rule prohibiting the use of liquor by Methodists had been "placed in the Italian edition of the Discipline in a footnote as a thing of the past and a rule of their own substituted simply prohibiting 'drunkenness and the immoderate use of wine and liquors.'"

Later on, Burt characterized his activity from 1886 to 1888 as that of a man quietly suffering evil conditions and prudently and privately protesting, at the same time winning the sympathy of the best elements in the Conference. That was something of an understatement. Burt actually went about building up a reformist faction. His program called for imposing upon the Italian workers and the Italian churches a strict pattern of made-in-America Methodism, without regard for the national social background, the religious idiom, or the psychological readiness of the Italians themselves—factors to which Vernon, however, was sensitive. Burt freely larded his critique of the *status quo* with condemnation of the ministers who were ex-priests (with these he was severest of all) or had some Waldensian background. To their permeating influence he largely attributed what he considered the unhealthy condition of the Mission. As Burt pressed his cause, it became clear that he was bent upon a purge that would clear out of the ministry all the men who did not accept and observe the particular Methodist norms championed by him and his partisans. Thus Burt succeeded not only in winning some ministers to his side, but also in so thoroughly antagonizing others that he drove them together into a second faction, whose members naturally gathered about Vernon.

Becoming aware of Vernon and Burt's differences of opinion about the Italian ministers, Secretary Reid expressed to Bishop Foss, as the time for the Conference session of 1887 drew near, the hope that "our foreign missionaries in Italy will never permit the native church to discover that they do other than see eye to eye." But by this time, the factional struggle was so

far along that Bishop William X. Ninde, the visiting Bishop, came to the Italy Conference in April with grave fears of serious trouble because of rumors that had reached him. In fact, he actually faced—successfully, he thought—irritating and divisive differences demanding adjustment. Incidentally, Bishop Ninde, who spent a month among the Italian Methodists, came away very favorably impressed with the general calibre of the Italian ministers, including both the ex-priests and the former Waldensians.

Unfortunately, Bishop Ninde accomplished no real pacification of the Conference. The troubles in Italy and the attacks on Vernon in the United States continued. In the rising conflict, Secretary Reid, the key man on Italy Conference affairs in the New York office, strongly favored Burt and repeatedly and explicitly showed his bias in that direction. He said to Bishop Foss, "I feel a little stronger every time I hear from Bro. Burt. He helps me wonderfully in respect to Italy." By summertime, Vernon finally felt compelled to defend himself against the complaints and "gross misrepresentations made four thousand miles behind my back." He printed and sent to his brother, Rev. S. M. Vernon, for private and discreet use, a letter of reply. Exactly what he said we do not know, but how he felt about the situation is clear; a year later he wrote to Dr. Goucher :

The authorities manifestly hold some *absolutely* erroneous opinions & impressions as to matters here. . . . Strange & marvelous things have been said of myself & of things here: we have neither changed, nor denied the faith, nor lost our wits, because some strangers have arrived in Italy, do not find America here & find themselves in an orgasm until Italy be turned upside down!

Burt's consistent blows on the wedge of discord finally, two years after his arrival on the field, split the Italy Conference wide open. Two decisive incidents occurred in 1888, one of them out in the open in Italy, the other hidden from view in the United States.

The first was a severe factional fight, with no Bishop present, at the session of the Italy Conference in March. The heart of the struggle was a two-day trial of William Burt, with Leroy Vernon serving as the presiding officer elected for the session. Burt had brought charges of improper words and "tempers" against one of his preachers, Guido Palmieri (the man was a wine cask, said Burt), in an effort to oust Palmieri from the ministry. Palmieri countered by bringing charges of maladministration against Burt for his handling of the case. Burt claimed that "the mere hirelings" in the Conference, "knowing that their day of judgment was coming," had plotted to bring him to trial. Everett S. Stackpole, just arrived on the field from the United States, declared that Vernon had instigated the trial of Burt—a charge he withdrew in the book he wrote on the Mission several years afterwards. According to Burt, a bloc of seven ex-priests voted against him on all specifica-

tions. Stackpole described the trial as "an attempt to get rid of a man against whom a portion of the Conference was prejudiced for other reasons." However it was instigated or initiated, once it was under way, the disciplinary trial became a dynamic trial of strength between the two factions.

The move against Burt failed, but he was acquitted by a margin of only three in the votes by the Conference. Palmieri then was granted permission to withdraw from the ministry under charges, and he did withdraw. In the vote for delegate to the General Conference, the result was Vernon 13, Burt 10. Thus Burt won vindication in his trial, and Vernon won the election. But it was clear that the Italian ministry was almost evenly divided between the two opposing factions.

The second decisive incident was authoritatively forecast a month after Conference by Stackpole, who while en route from the United States to Rome, had spent two days in Milan as Burt's invited guest, receiving so thorough a briefing on the Italy Mission that he landed solidly in Burt's camp before even meeting Vernon. Stackpole wrote to Secretary Charles C. McCabe on 17 April:

Dr. Vernon will represent the Italy Conf. in the General Conf. and Bro. Burt will also go to America to represent the affairs of this Mission before the Missionary authorities. Their representations are likely to conflict. Bro. Burt goes by my advice and at the call of proper authorities. I have written to Bishop Foss my impressions and convictions concerning the work of this Mission. . . . Dr. Vernon wishes him [Burt] away. This will never do. He wishes Dr. Vernon away permanently. I think this would be the result of a thorough investigation into the affairs of this Mission. . . . I do pray that something will be found for Dr. Vernon to do in America. If he remains here another year I see not how a trial can be avoided, and that would be damaging to him and to the Mission. . . . We must have a quiet revolution in this Conf. The spirit of Methodism, i.e. the power of the Holy Ghost is conspicuously absent.

A few weeks later, Burt did go to New York, where Vernon was attending the sessions of the General Conference in the Metropolitan Opera House. Sometime by the first week in June, there was a showdown on Italy Mission affairs, evidently involving Burt, Vernon, Bishop Foss, and others. The result was to force Vernon out of the Mission. The public was allowed to believe that Vernon had resigned, but the Minutes of the Committee on Western Europe and of the Board of Managers cited no presentation of a resignation by Vernon, nor any acceptance of it. The Committee simply recorded on 7 June the fact that it "is now understood that Dr. Vernon intends to leave the Mission . . ." Three weeks later, the Board of Managers made a similar notation, and elected Burt to the Treasury vacancy left by Vernon.

Thus the first phase of the "quiet revolution" Stackpole hoped for was accomplished—very quietly indeed. Vernon went back to Italy only long

enough to fetch away his family and his household goods. Burt went back to Italy with *carte blanche* to complete the revolution.

J. Oramel Peck, recently elected as a Corresponding Secretary and assigned to cover Italy affairs, strongly seconded Burt's purpose to purge the Italian ministry. Peck protested against the "burning shame that these Italian ex-priests and monks should feed on our missionary treasury," thus consuming the offerings made by widows and orphans, and by other sacrificing Methodist contributors, "upon their lusts in wine and tobacco." Peck, who occasionally referred to them as "the natives," advised Burt to pass along to the Italian ministers the official warning that they might "prepare to either reform their habits and give themselves wholly to God and to a vital Christian life, or in the near future be ready to surrender their work into more worthy hands . . ." Peck acknowledged that the Board's New York office could not jeopardize the Conference relations of recalcitrant ministers, but threatened to get at them through the Missionary Society's control of funds for Italy. If the Church at large should become aware of the unfortunate facts about the Italian ministry, he said, "I am quite sure there will be another year, a disposition to withhold appropriations for the support of men who are evidently unfitted for the Methodist ministry."

Armed with this official bludgeon, and fully assured by Peck of general approval of his new regime on the part of the missionary powers in America, Burt continued pressing for his Methodistic reforms. His obvious victory over Vernon greatly enhanced his prestige in the Conference, and although for the first year there was a second District Superintendent, Burt was now the prime mover in the Italy Conference. Two ministers, Alceste Lanna and Teofilo Gay, of Rome, dropped out of the active ministry during the year, clearly protesting against the squeeze perpetrated on Vernon and rebelling against the inflexibility of Burt's reformist campaign.

In the spring of 1889, Burt was appointed the sole District Superintendent, thus becoming in effect, as Vernon once had been, the superintendent of the entire Mission. The new Italian edition of the *Discipline*, translated from the American edition in 1888, came out in the fall. As it was being distributed, Burt sent a confidential circular letter to all the ministers, admonishing them to study "this little book from beginning to end" and to observe its rules both in letter and in spirit in all points affecting both their private and ministerial conduct and their administration of their churches. "Thus we shall all be in perfect harmony," he said, "otherwise it will be impossible to be in accord." Burt soberly bade all who could not conscientiously abide by the provisions of the "little book" to be gone from the Methodist Episcopal Church. Considering all that had happened, Burt's letter could not fail to carry more force with its recipients than might be suggested by the dispassionate language in which it was phrased. At the Conference session the following April, three men withdrew from the Methodist ministry because

of their lack of sympathy with the new order. But that was about as far as the actual purge of ministers went. The roster of the Conference of 1890 looked not too much different from that of 1887 and that of 1888, before Vernon was ousted.

The reformist emphasis was continued in one degree or another for a few years, but there is no solid evidence that it either deeply reformed or renewed ministerial or church life in Italy. The one decisive and permanently influential result of the factional struggle that so sharply split the Mission in 1886-88 was to put William Burt, the missionary neophyte from Brooklyn, on top in the Italy Conference. There he stayed for sixteen years—single-handedly charting the course of the Conference, successfully resisting every challenge to his control, and steadily building a reputation as the leading Methodist missionary in Europe.

Unity did not return to the Italy Mission. To be sure, William Burt's formal report to the Board for 1890 asserted:

The ministers were never so united as now, and, with few exceptions, they are consecrated to the work of saving souls. Among the members there is a true *esprit de corps*. They begin to realize their mission as members of the Methodist Episcopal Church, and to love our doctrines and methods.

Burt's claim hardly allowed for the distinction between true *esprit de corps* and conformity to a discipline externally imposed in an atmosphere of coercion, for the most binding force at work actually was Burt's personal domination of the Mission. Between him and his fellow missionaries soon developed severe tensions that introduced fresh discontent and dissension into the Italian ministry. From 1888 to 1904, Burt had five missionary colleagues in the Italy Conference, not counting short-term appointees to the American Church in Rome. They were Everett S. Stackpole (1888-92), Elmer E. Count (1889-93), Elmer E. Powell (1890-96), N. Walling Clark (1893-1904), and Frederick H. Wright (1899-1904). Three of these men left the field permanently, and one of them temporarily, because of Burt's tight control of the machinery of the Mission. In addition, S. Vincenzo Ravi, who had been reinstated in the work in 1889, withdrew from the ministry in 1895 for the same reason.

The first to go was Stackpole. Although he roundly supported Burt's puritan and Methodistic reforms, Stackpole bored more deeply and realistically into the Mission's weaknesses than Burt did. He became convinced that Italian Methodism had to undergo fundamental financial and administrative reconstruction. But Burt had no radical intentions. He pressed even his superficial reforms only to a certain point. And then building upon the foundations of the Mission substantially as he found them, he put his hope in creating evangelically fruitful educational institutions and poured his energies most strenuously into expressing the challenge of Methodism in

Italy in the form of his well advertised Rome building project. Stackpole felt that this was a betrayal of the vision of a revitalized Mission that Burt shared with him when he first came to Italy. He became disillusioned with Burt's aims and his methods, and within a year after the coup by which the two men got rid of Leroy Vernon, Burt and Stackpole were overtly at odds over Mission policy.

Stackpole's strong and searching critique of the Mission carried an implicit threat to Burt's position. As the differences between them came out into the open, Burt defended himself by letting it be known among missionaries and ministers that he expected them to be loyal Burt men, not Stackpole men. Stackpole dispatched his views on Mission policy to the United States in letters to Bishop Edward G. Andrews and to the Board's Secretaries. Although he never received replies to any of these communications, he gathered the impression that the New York office kept Burt conversant with them. Thus Burt was able to defend himself in New York, and also to attack Stackpole's reliability as a critic, while Stackpole had no opportunity for pointed rebuttal.

The tension between the two men continued into 1892, a General Conference year. Again, as in 1888, Burt came to the United States for the May sessions of the Conference, again he made representations in official quarters about his chief colleague, and again the colleague—this time it was Stackpole—was permanently recalled to the United States. It was all decided before Burt left New York to return to Rome. With the knowledge of the Board, but without any vote of record by it, Bishop Andrews chose Burt over Stackpole, and summarily transferred the latter from the Italy Conference to the Maine Conference. Stackpole finished his work at the Theological School and left Florence in June.

When Stackpole came home to the United States after spending a year in study and travel, he succeeded in securing in New York no genuine consideration of his frontal criticism of the Italy Mission. He won, after a time, only a grudging offer of a hearing before Bishop Andrews, who already had judged his case and dismissed him from the Italy work, and Secretary J. Oramel Peck, who had proved quite unresponsive to Stackpole's earlier attempts to bring about a fresh official evaluation of the Mission. Stackpole found such a hearing patently unsatisfactory. He turned instead to writing a book, and in 1894, he published *4½ Years in the Italy Mission; a Criticism of Missionary Methods*.

The book strongly criticized the system of episcopal supervision by visiting Bishops, as well as the accuracy of the Bishops' reports; it portrayed the Mission as substantially a failure because of manifold and deep faults, developed in the earlier years, but persisting unrelieved, or even enhanced, under the current administration; and while not citing William Burt by name, nevertheless it so described his many functions in the Mission as to expose

it as a harmful one-man dictatorship. The book characterized Italy policy as erroneous. "Let the mistakes of the past be acknowledged and rectified," Stackpole urged. "It is far better to abandon some fields than to continue a fruitless policy." And then he directly touched an especially sensitive nerve: "This book may lead some to distrust the fullness and accuracy of missionary reports and speeches. There is ground for such distrust."

Among the endorsers of Stackpole's book were Elmer Count, his colleague in Italy for several years, Gaetano Conte, an experienced Italy Conference minister who transferred to the New England Conference in 1893, Prof. George S. Innis of Hamline University, who had made a close study of the Italy work on the ground, and a number of American ministers. The *Western Christian Advocate* and *Zions Herald*, an independent Methodist journal, gave $4\frac{1}{2}$ Years favorable attention.

To be sure, the book was subjective and fallible in some respects, but it is not surprising that it won a measure of support. Taken as a whole, it was a responsible piece of work, objective and penetrating, an unusually thorough-going examination of a given mission by a man devoted to the cause whose implementation he was bringing under radical criticism. Stackpole raised important questions that not only applied to the Italy Mission of that time, but also carried long-range implications for missionary strategy in general. Coming as it did out of such a romantic period in the interpretation and administration of missions, his book remains, after many years, an impressive attempt at realism about missionary aims and methods. It was worthy of full-dress attention by the Missionary Society.

But that would have demanded a great deal of the Society's leaders, especially the Secretaries. They were missionary promoters—men who had to win disputed appropriations, solicit special gifts from the Methodist public, and defend unpopular missions from attack. Asking them to take Stackpole's book seriously would have been tantamount to asking them to entertain the possibility of publicly acknowledging that they had long been extraordinarily misinformed and mistaken about what they had so urgently promoted and administered. Evidently, they found this too disturbing a challenge.

Secretary McCabe wrote for *Zions Herald* a column uncomplimentary both to the book and to the author, without equipping himself (a friend of Stackpole's claimed that McCabe confessed to this) by reading the book. The New York *Christian Advocate*, which generally stood close to the Missionary Society line except when its editor, James M. Buckley, was off on a tangent about a particular question, carried on 1 November a long antagonistic review. It never coped with Stackpole's major criticisms of the Italy Mission or with the main body of fact he offered, but advanced a largely *ad hominem*, casuistical rebuttal that picked away at discrete and secondary deficiencies on Stackpole's part. "The Catholics, of course are delighted with it," declared the *Advocate's* editorial reviewer of the volume. Two weeks later, the *Advo-*

cate pounced on a published statement of Stackpole's on a minor matter, to defend an unnamed missionary Secretary from criticism by him and, by innuendo, to cast doubt on his accuracy in describing the Italy Mission.

World-Wide Missions, edited by Secretaries McCabe and Leonard, ignored, at least as to explicit statement, the existence of Stackpole's critical volume. In November, however, the magazine ran a wordy general editorial on "Criticizing the Missionary Society," which passed on to its readers not a word of Stackpole's critique and mentioned neither his name nor the title of his book but obviously aimed at blunting his influence with the Society's constituency, to say nothing of attempting to whitewash the Society of all criticism from all quarters. It blandly admitted that the Missionary Society had made many mistakes. But the mistakes conveniently were not specified; the editorial declared, "Men who are experts as failures themselves will point out these mistakes to the public eye." It fulsomely praised the Society's administration and the Methodist supervisory system, intimated that no unworthy missionaries or native workers remained unpurged from its world-scattered missions, categorically dismissed all critics as harmful and irrelevant, gave blanket endorsement to the reports of all superintendents and Bishops covering the various fields, and trumpeted a call to close ranks and march to victory. The Secretaries' statement ended with the comfortable and tolerant words:

It is a blessed fact that, notwithstanding all criticisms and faultfinding, the great army marches on to victory and all the destructive critics go to the oblivion they deserve. It is to be hoped, however, they will turn up in Heaven, for the Lord's mercy endureth forever.

The New York Secretaries' unswerving support of Burt was a key factor in his ability to maintain his tight control of the Italy Mission. It was operative under Secretary John M. Reid while Burt was engaged in unseating Vernon, and it became almost unrestrained under Secretary J. Oramel Peck (1888-94) during the Stackpole affair. Interlocking with it was the support of the Bishops in charge of the field. Peck's sympathy was not only official, but also personal, for he had been a fellow pastor of Burt's in Brooklyn before they secured their respective posts under the Missionary Society. The episcopal sympathy was a continuation of the support given Burt when he first came to Italy as the Bishops' man against the Vernon regime, as well as a result of the heavy dependence of the visiting Bishops upon Burt for their information about Mission personnel and affairs. This meant that Burt had the real power to send packing from the Italy Mission any missionary who became unacceptable to him. Burt knew this, and the men with whom he was unsympathetic knew it too. It became most clearly evident during the trouble Elmer E. Powell and Elmer E. Count had with the system.

These two young colleagues of Burt's were not long in Italy before they

found themselves out of sympathy with his administration, and then running afoul of it. Count's first misstep was to decline, within the first two months, to become an acknowledged partisan of Burt's, declaring that he would reserve the right to individual judgment on Conference affairs. Powell's first error of record was to criticize the very large discrepancy between his salary and Burt's when writing to the Board in December, 1891, about a desired raise for him and Count.

In the course of the few months following Everett Stackpole's dismissal, in 1892, Powell wrote Bishop Edward G. Andrews two letters firmly, but unaggressively, advocating important changes in the financial and evangelistic administration of the Italy Mission. His views, which were similar to Stackpole's, were implicitly out of harmony with some of Burt's major emphases, including the primacy of the Rome building project. On 28 November, the day on which he acknowledged receipt from Powell of a copy of his second letter to the Bishop, Peck wrote William Burt a friendly letter urging him to undertake fuller efforts towards effective popular evangelism and increased self-support by the churches—suggestions patently reflecting what Burt must have known to be Powell's views.

Early in January, both Powell and Count applied separately to the Board for a salary increase of \$120 to compensate for their no longer being given free living quarters previously leased by the Mission. Count's application was in no way sententious with regard to Mission affairs, but Powell again injected into his letter the question of the injustice involved in the relatively large salary paid Burt. Most of what he had to say was not especially sharp, but he closed on a spirited note: "I repeat that if there is any reason for treating Bro. Count and me as mere camp-followers who are to be content with the scraps pitched to us at will from the table of Commander-in-chief, I ought to know it." A copy of this letter, and one of Powell's second policy letter to Bishop Andrews, Secretary Peck sent off to Bishop Joyce, Italy's newest visiting Bishop, characterizing them as "troublesome." He smoothly called the Bishop's attention to Powell's attitude towards Burt and at the same time solicited from him (successfully) a letter that he could use in committee to show that the Bishop was standing by his original official estimate that the salary increase of \$120 was unnecessary. Peck kept this solicitation of the Bishop's view to himself, and also later told Count and Powell a white lie concealing the fact that Burt had written him confirming his concurrence with the Bishop's view and alerting the New York office to the fact that the two missionaries nevertheless were going to ask for an increase.

This was the beginning of a series of attempts by Powell and Count not only to secure what they felt was financial justice for themselves but also to gain a hearing in New York for their views on Mission policy. They

found the missionary establishment—Burt, Board, and Bishop—solidly arrayed against them in interlocking resistance to any effort of theirs to assert themselves. Secretary Peck harshly rebuffed them, betrayed them to Burt, and cast them in a bad light in the eyes of the Bishop. They found Peck impervious to any request for consideration of their appeals or their charges and realized with increasing frustration that there could be no effective criticism by members of the Mission of Burt or of any course upon which he was set. They became more sharply critical of his dominance of the Mission and the results of it. Peck finished one of his letters to Powell by delivering him a strong, sarcastic rebuke for presuming, youthful as he was, to criticize policies approved by the authorities, Powell's "eminent seniors." Within two days in February, 1893, Peck wrote Burt suggesting the possibility of severing Count and Powell from the Mission if they did not behave loyally and also wrote Powell a letter containing a thinly veiled threat :

Some of our Bishops have told me of embarrassments to the Superintendent in the past and you know what has been the result as to the sustainment of the Superintendent and the release [*sic*] of other parties, from Dr. Vernon to later years.

Peck, who had been threatening to both young men, let this latest warning stand.

Elmer Count, finding Secretary Peck willing only to whitewash Burt's administration and completely deaf to criticism of it, left the Mission in 1893. By the end of that year, Powell had given up his effort to change things by open opposition to the Burt regime. He stayed on the field for a few years and then took a supernumerary relationship with the Conference, not afterwards resuming his work with it. When he made his final break with the Mission in 1897, he sharply reiterated to Secretary Leonard, who apparently did not take them seriously, his charges about the operation of ecclesiastical politics in the Italy Mission and once again branded William Burt as the man at the center of it.

N. Walling Clark sympathized with the young rebels against Burt. Though at first he was quiet about it, his discontent with the Burt system began in the early eighteen-nineties. But by the turn of the century there existed between him and Burt antagonism that was overt and mutual, with partisans aligned on each side. The Conference session of 1901, finally, was a scene of struggle between the two parties, the focus being charges raised by Clark about Burt's conduct as the Mission's treasurer. The Burt group sharpened the conflict by trying to jettison the Theological School, of which Clark was President. And when Clark went on furlough not long afterwards, Burt obstructed his return to Italy, successfully delaying it until later on.

Financial unsoundness, which sometimes was intertwined with the problem of disunity, was another of the Mission's severely inhibiting troubles. One phase of it, the inadequate financial support the Italian Methodists gave their churches and their ministry, was well established before either William Burt or Everett Stackpole came to Italy. Stackpole pointed out that in 1890, the Italians were paying only half the running expenses of their local churches. The Missionary Society paid the rest. He wrote:

Our Missionary Society has spent \$700,000 in Italy, and we have not a church that does more than pay its current expenses. Every preacher we have in Italy draws his full salary from America. How long must this continue?

While he was by no means alone in deploring this condition, Stackpole was especially thorough in describing it as a ramifying evil stunting and sapping the vitality of the whole Methodist movement in Italy. For him, the meagerness of self-support achieved by the churches was not simply an unfortunate drain upon the always easily exhausted financial resources of the Missionary Society, but a far more radical defect; it was a form of unintentional missionary corruption that prevented the development of either an Italian laity or an Italian ministry thoroughly committed to the life and growth of the Methodist Church as its own responsibility. Stackpole attributed the churches' failure to show spiritual fervor and evangelistic initiative, and the self-seeking churchmanship of many individuals, to exaggerated dependence upon the willingness of the faraway Missionary Society to continue underwriting local expenses the church members should take upon themselves.

The problem of lagging self-support was still with the Mission as it moved into the twentieth century. Early in 1899, Secretary Leonard pressed his concern about it upon both William Burt and John M. Walden, the Bishop assigned to visit Europe. Leonard was constantly meeting the embarrassing inquiry, Is there any promise that the work in Italy will ever become self-supporting? "It has now been about twenty-six years since our mission was founded in Italy," he reminded Burt, "and there are not only no self-supporting churches, but not one I believe, that furnishes even a small part of its pastor's salary. I know of no other mission in any part of the world of which such a statement can be made." Leonard's concern was expressly related to his realization of the practical impossibility of extending the work either in Italy or in other fields unless funds could be saved through some advance towards indigenous self-support where Methodism was already established. At the turn of the year, in a protracted session of the Italy Finance Committee attended by the two American and two Italian District

Superintendents, Bishop Walden already had tried to get something done about the problem. The District Superintendents agreed to launch a new financial system that would include increased local responsibility for local current expenses and the inauguration of contributions to pastoral support by all the churches. "At no time in the history of the mission," the Bishop wrote to Leonard, "have the members and adherents been asked to contribute toward the pastors' support and the pastors have not expected to present this as a duty."

Little progress was made, however. When George Heber Jones visited Italy for the Board in 1913, he almost echoed the earlier statements by Stackpole and by Leonard when he described the meagerness of self-support in the Italian churches. He found them still ranking lowest among all the churches of the world-wide missionary enterprise in apparent ability to approximate payment of their own current expenses. Every member of the Italy Conference still drew all or some of his salary from the Board's appropriated funds. The churches (including the frequently well attended church in Rome) were so deficient financially that Jones doubted they could resist collapse if they should have to get along without their payments from New York. He said:

As far as the Italian public is concerned, our pastors must appear to them to be simply the employed agents of a foreign corporation, with its headquarters in New York City, rather than Italian leaders of Italian societies engaged upon a programme of effort which is purely Italian in its inception and not related to alien and foreign influence.

Like Stackpole, Jones saw foreign support undermining the evangelistic effectiveness of Italian Methodism.

Upon this base of financial insufficiency in the local churches, the Mission leadership raised a superstructure of larger financial obligation that made the Italy Conference as a whole even more heavily, perhaps inextricably, dependent upon American Methodism. In all its planning, the field leadership gave strong priority to the Mission's real estate needs. Educational and evangelistic efficiency, the vulnerability of congregations depending upon rented quarters in Catholic-dominated communities, and the requirements of public prestige—these factors, it was believed, demanded Methodist-owned buildings for the local churches and for the Conference-wide enterprises. Naturally, congregations that could not, or did not, pay their own pastors or pay their own bills, could not be expected to buy or build their own churches or parsonages, to say nothing of financing the Mission's institutional properties. Therefore the building funds had to be provided or guaranteed by the Board. The attempt to implement this policy not only deepened the financial dependence of Italian Methodism, but also, permeated as it was by financial mismanagement by the missionaries, created a severe administra-

tive problem for the Board and erased any possible margin of creative planning for emergent needs in Italy.

Ironically, the erection of the Rome headquarters building, the very symbol of Methodism's challenge to the Catholic Church, was close to the center of this difficulty. A glance at a letter from Secretary Charles C. McCabe that William Burt opened in Rome in September, 1895, makes the irony all the sharper. McCabe wrote at a moment when money for the building was coming hard:

Keep a brave front toward the outside world. Do not let anybody have the slightest idea that you are in short rows financially. It will serve to lessen the effect of this achievement in the city of Rome, if they imagine we have to strain hard to do it.

Pursuing an earlier express condition that the headquarters should be erected and completed for not more than \$90,000, the Board authorized Burt, in June, 1893, to go ahead with the project under arrangement with a builder who would complete it for \$84,000. The actual operation was to begin only when Burt had in hand as much as \$40,000. "That means," Secretary J. Oramel Peck wrote to Burt, "that the building must not progress one step further than money is in hand to pay for it." He explained that the Missionary Society should not at any time be encumbered with any debt except for the purchase of the building site itself.

In August, 1896, nearly a year after the building was dedicated, Secretary Adna B. Leonard received from Burt a letter stating that the debt on the Rome property was \$86,000, and that he needed \$13,000 at once in order to pay a note and a bank overdraft involved in it. "It fairly takes my breath away," Leonard wrote to McCabe. "I do not know how to understand it." And later he wrote Burt that presentation of his debt statement to the Board of Managers "did not quite produce a panic, but it did occasion a decided sensation." Reactions of Board members moved from surprise to severe criticism of the excess of the Rome debt over any amount it ever had authorized. Although Leonard wrote him in a consistently friendly tone, Burt felt discouraged by the "showers of criticism" that fell on him, including a threat in *Zions Herald* of a "day of judgment" to come upon the Italy Mission.

Bishop Goodsell (he was in Rome), acting at the request of the Board, thoroughly investigated the financial phases of the project from its beginning. His report, which the Board began processing in January, 1897, established the debt figure at \$87,539. The Board's Finance Committee later increased it to about \$100,000 (an amount Leonard found appalling), having discovered that Secretary McCabe, borrowing money in his own name and not recording the transactions in the Board's accounts, had raised an additional \$12,500 and sent it to Burt. It eventually appeared that the total cost of the project

had been over \$180,000. A three-year mortgage expiring in May, 1899, accounted for \$40,000 of the debt, leaving \$60,000 to be paid in 1897.

As if he were not already in enough hot water (he was keenly sensitive to its temperature), Burt revealed to the Board, in two further stages, two additional unauthorized financial involvements for property in Italy.

At its December meeting (1896) the Board received from Burt a request for authority to execute a mortgage for \$6,000 for the erection of a church building in Turin. With the Rome debt question at a boil just then, the Board had Bishop Goodsell twice investigate this new development. It brought Burt under severe criticism by Board members, not so much because of the amount of money involved, but because of his having flagrantly bypassed the Board. It turned out that he not only had failed to ask for the required initial authorization to build, but even had let the construction contract before coming home for General Conference the previous April. The building was practically completed before Burt first approached the Board, and it actually was dedicated in June, 1897, hardly a month after the Board took final, formal action on the mortgage.

Questions asked in Board meetings finally dug out of Burt, through Secretary Leonard, the information that another unauthorized church building, in a Piedmontese village named San Marzano, would be ready for dedication in midsummer, 1897. It was costing \$3,000, and all but a few hundred dollars was to be paid by the time of dedication. As Burt related it to Leonard, the erection of the church made a story of brave initiative on the part of a handicapped and humble group of parishioners who started putting up the church with their own hands while Burt was in the United States. But Burt unfortunately never had tried to clear the project with the Board officially. Evidently nobody recalled that he had also failed to get authorization for the purchase of the San Marzano lot itself in 1889.

The Board tacitly left the San Marzano item—a smaller concern—in Burt's hands and, without too much delay, took the first step towards permitting him to cover the Turin property with a mortgage. At the latter point, some members acted under protest, allowing their intense feeling in the matter to be overridden only by the urgency of saving the Methodist holding in Turin and of keeping up Protestant prestige there.

The Board's handling of the Rome question, however, dragged along for many months. Although preliminary decisions began to shape up in the spring of 1897, there were Board members who continued to bear down heavily on Burt and on the Italy Mission as operated under his leadership. The situation became so touchy that even Leonard, Burt's firm friend in the official family, wrote to him with unusual plainness about the exacerbating effect upon it of his dereliction in managing the Turin business as he did. The Board itself dealt sharply with Burt. As late as July, it adopted formal resolutions which in effect called him on the carpet to give an exhaustive

report on the entire span of the Rome headquarters undertaking, requesting him "to state fully upon what authority, if any, he exceeded the limitation put upon him by this Board." The General Missionary Committee thoroughly investigated the Rome debt in a closed session in November, and a month later, the Board confirmed its intention to finance the miscellaneous \$60,000 of the debt by bonded loans. As with the \$40,000 mortgage, which was paid off when it came due in 1899, the loans were made by the Board's own Annuity Department from its funds available for investment—a measure of internal financing that made it unnecessary to carry the whole matter to the public.

Burt was very much upset by the whole affair, and more than once asked for permission to come to the United States for a personal effort at raising money to lift the Rome debt. For several practical reasons, the Board declined his request—a decision that Burt deplored. But he felt that it relieved him of future responsibility for the debt. "Now it is registered here and in the Office," he wrote from Rome, "that my offer was not accepted and I am free. No one can justly say that William Burt left the debt on the Building."

Shortly after bringing the debt out into the open, Burt also tried to minimize his responsibility for its accumulation—partly by trying to shift some of the onus for it onto former Secretary McCabe. He claimed that when he ran short of money, McCabe instructed him to push forward with the construction of the building, assuring Burt that he himself would raise enough money in the United States to bring the project through. Burt later touched McCabe on a sore spot when he wrote him that he had gone ahead "hoping all the time that the money you sent me was being covered with gifts."

It is true that McCabe's office administration of the Rome project was elastic at a few points; he did borrow on his own notes money that the Board later had to repay, and he did on one occasion remit to Burt an advance of \$7,000 on regular appropriations with the suggestion that it could be used for the time being to pay construction bills. It is true that McCabe was temperamentally a plunger into good causes, and he had strongly encouraged Burt when completion of the building was threatened by lack of funds. It is true that McCabe was much too sure of his ability to "sweep off the debt" by gathering in \$10 pledges.

But Burt was by no means a simple victim of the Secretary's well-known spontaneity. McCabe did everything he could to raise money for the new headquarters and to keep it moving into Burt's ever emptying treasury in Rome. But neither he nor his predecessor at the Italy desk, J. Oramel Peck, urged Burt deliberately to build beyond his current financial resources. In fact, Peck took great pains to warn Burt that he must not do this, and he repeatedly reminded him that a conservative approach was necessitated by the impact upon the Board's income of the general economic depression in the United States in the early nineties. McCabe's responsibility was limited

by the fact that his official connection with the Italy Mission began upon Peck's death in the summer of 1894, when construction was very well along and dedication of the building was only a year off. Any questionable financial measures undertaken by McCabe came only when the building was nearly completed. And his letters to Rome by no means left Burt in the dark about the part of the building account managed by McCabe in New York. In any event, the debt McCabe incurred was hardly more than a quarter of the unauthorized obligations Burt himself was piling up in Italy.

Far from McCabe's having led Burt to overextend the building operation, it was Burt who really went too far. Burt was the one influential missionary on the field; he was Superintendent, he was Treasurer, and as Treasurer he carried on without a Finance Committee. Burt made the important decisions in the Italy Mission. Burt alone controlled the actual progress of the construction in Rome. McCabe mainly tried to keep pace with the financial exigencies created by Burt's not slowing down when there was not enough cash in sight to pay the bills.

Burt also tried to shift onto McCabe responsibility for the secrecy shielding the amount of the debt from scrutiny by the Board. His implicit accusations against McCabe were somewhat ambiguous. Certainly, what the Secretary wrote him in 1895 about financial concealment was intended only to protect the Methodists from embarrassment in the face of Catholic critics. Yet Burt irrelevantly faced McCabe with this as an excuse for his overbuilding, in spite of the additional fact that he received McCabe's letter only just before dedication day. Burt also let it be known in missionary circles that he kept the extent of the debt secret as long as he did because when he came to General Conference in May, 1896, McCabe influenced him not to report it. Whatever conversation McCabe had with Burt in this vein (it was at this session that McCabe was elected to the episcopacy), he told Secretary Leonard months later that Burt was completely mistaken in thinking that he wanted the matter kept from the Church. And he added, "In anything I said to him I never dreamed that the debt would be so large."

Reading the correspondence between Burt and the men in the New York office over the years 1892-96, it is difficult to conclude that any of the Secretaries realized to what levels the debt in Rome was climbing. It is evident that Burt made no effort to keep them informed. Even his formal financial reports to the Board's Treasurer failed to reveal the true condition; the New York office's bookkeeper complained, indeed, that he could not understand the Italy accounts because they omitted required statements about appropriations, deficits, unexpended balances, and other items. Only Burt himself knew how far behind he was financially at any given time. It is impossible to say what figure he cited to McCabe in May, 1896. Two facts remain—that McCabe disclaimed any knowledge of the real extent of the debt, and that Burt did not clearly reveal it to the Board until he faced an

urgent need for some \$13,000 cash in order to meet his obligations in Rome.

One of the most immediate results of Bishop Goodsell's report on the debt crisis was a change in the pattern of financial administration for the Italy field. In March, 1897, acting on the Bishop's suggestion, the Board appointed a Finance Committee composed of N. Walling Clark, Eduardo Stasio (an Italian minister), and Burt. In the aftermath of the debt revelation, and considering Burt's custom of making unilateral financial decisions for the Mission, including unauthorized changes in the redistribution of appropriations and unauthorized use of unexpended balances, Secretary Leonard heartily approved this action. Now for the first time in years, there was a committee charged with responsibility for sharing decisions on money matters in the Italy Mission.

In spite of this improvement, the next few years remained a time of trouble in Italy Mission affairs, largely because a few bothersome financial chickens of Burt's came home to roost on the budget. One of them was the combined interest charge on the Rome debt, which amounted, at first, to about \$5,000 a year. There it stayed, beginning in 1898, eating up money that Burt and his colleagues on the new Finance Committee earnestly desired to have for the field work. Instead of receiving the increase of \$6,000 they asked for, the Italy committeemen had to accept a cut of several hundred dollars for that year, sharing in a general reduction of appropriations clear across the Society's foreign missions field. Already upset by news of the critical statements about the Italy work that were made in the General Missionary Committee session reviewing the debt problem, Burt wrote off to Secretary Leonard the day after he got his notice of the amount of the appropriation (2 December 1897), "I must confess that when I read your letter yesterday the nervous shock was so great that I was nearly ill, and last night could not sleep." And he went on to agonize over almost impossible retrenchments that would have to be made just at a time of opportunity for expansion.

Burt's sense of shock was heightened by another oppressive weight settled upon the Mission's finances. Burt could see it, but Leonard could not—until Burt decided to point it out four years later. Then, when Leonard was going over Burt's notes on the annual estimates for Italy, in October, 1901, he found him reporting an accumulated current expense deficit of \$5,000 in the form of bank overdrafts in Rome. This caught Leonard quite by surprise, the more so because he had heard nothing about it when visiting Rome only a few months earlier and had then recommended the action by which the Board had sent over a supplementary special grant of \$2,612 to pull the Mission through the current year. The freshly revealed amount of \$5,000, plus the requirement for carrying the Rome building debt, contributed heavily to the figure of \$46,964 that represented what the Italy Finance Committee asked in appropriations for 1902. The General Committee appropriated \$36,968, leaving a potential deficit of about \$10,000 for 1902. Advised by Leonard that

Italy undoubtedly would be expected to stay within the appropriations, Burt wrote back that the news "makes me wild with despair."

Reporting to the Board in January, the Committee on Europe declared "that a financial crisis exists in our Italy Mission." The Board ordered an investigation by a five-member Special Committee on Finances in the Italy Mission. The Special Committee set the figure for the old current expense deficit at \$5,352. But by the time it reported to the Board in March, it had heard from Burt that there was also a previously unreported deficit of \$2,870 on the 1901 account. This additional amount, even as late as 28 November 1901, Burt had given no sign at all of anticipating. The Committee also learned from Burt that he had recently given personal notes for \$4,000 towards providing new machinery for the press in Rome—an indebtedness that was a potential responsibility of the Board's. Thus there was an actual deficit of over \$8,000, with a possibility of \$4,000 more.

The Committee turned up the fact that the Italy Mission had for many years been carrying a concealed and shifting deficit on current expenditures, the figures varying from \$4,058 in 1891 to a minimum of \$495 in 1894 and a maximum of \$11,455 in 1895, with the year-end deficiencies thereafter generally remaining above \$3,000. Burt explained that this condition had originated in the difficulties he faced when scrabbling for funds to build the Rome headquarters. He also pleaded extenuation by reason of reduced appropriations and increased current expenditures, as well as the recurrence of actions at Annual Conference sessions which carried the Mission beyond the budget scaled to the appropriations made many months earlier.

In reviewing what had happened, the Board did not lay the full blame on Burt, for it recognized that the Board and the Bishop also had administrative responsibility for the Italy Mission. Therefore it requested Bishop Vincent's co-operation in working out a plan that would obviate embarrassing financial dislocations because of *de facto* budget revisions created by Annual Conference actions. But the Board did blame the Italy Mission for not making official requests for financial relief by the Board, thus allowing the deficits to ride along uncorrected. And it specifically blamed Burt for failing, over the years, to report the year-end deficits as the rules of the Board required. It directed Burt to incur for the Italy Mission work no further unauthorized financial obligations beyond appropriations.

When the Board got down to handling the financial crisis itself, it adopted an initial threefold program; it forwarded over \$3,200 to relieve the most immediate pressure from the bankers, reduced the interest rate on the Mission's property loan from the Annuity Department, and required the Italy Finance Committee to hew to the line set in the appropriations schedule by making adjustments and reductions totaling some \$8,000. The Committee made a serious effort to bring the year's planned expenditures substantially within the limitations suggested in detail by the Board. The most sizable

cut had to come out of the salaries of missionaries and Italian preachers. A number of preaching places were closed or left without preachers. The Boys' College had to carry on without a director, and the Italy Conference adopted a proposal to close the Theological School, this last measure originating in Italy, not with the Board. Interestingly, considering the Board's plea for episcopal co-operation, Bishop Vincent did not carry out, at the Conference session of 1902, its suggestion that the Naples and Bologna Districts be merged.

Efforts such as these brought into Italy Mission finances every now and then a measure of order. But lack of system was chronic.

Even while the Board was trying to clear up the major problems arising from the substantial financial surprises sprung on it by William Burt, it was hampered by confusion in the Mission's accounts as maintained during Burt's tenure as Treasurer. One of the points of confusion that tried some of the New York officials was an apparent cash discrepancy in the treasury that had come to light when Burt transferred the accounts to his successor in office.

When Burt went on furlough in mid-1899, N. Walling Clark took the Mission treasurership under Board appointment and was retained in office until July, 1901, a year after Burt's return to the field. Clark found what he became certain was a gap of \$1,630 between the amount of money in the treasury and the amount the Treasurer's accounts called for. Clark called the matter to Burt's attention. But new as he was to the Treasurer's work, unsatisfied by his colleague's explanations, assuming that he himself was filling the office only temporarily, and more or less coerced by the time element to sign a hasty acceptance of the accounts before Burt left for America, Clark remained silent but dissatisfied. Early in 1901, Secretary Leonard asked Clark for a statement of the Mission's financial obligations that compelled Clark to reexamine the question of the true balance in the treasury. Again he approached Burt for an explanation; again he was unconvinced. The only result was unpleasant exacerbation of an already unsatisfactory relationship between Burt and Clark. When Secretary Leonard visited the Italy Conference session in April, Clark tried to enlist his help in resolving the moot question. Leonard, unable to assimilate the conflicting explanations given him, suggested calling in an expert accountant to inspect the books and make a report. "This was not acceded to," Leonard told Bishop Vincent later on. The Secretary then suggested to Clark that when he relinquished office, he turn the books over to Burt showing the deficit as he originally found it in 1899, leaving to Burt the responsibility for reporting to the Board the status of the Mission's debts. When Clark did this in June, all the two missionaries could agree on was to include Clark's suggested deficit figure in the written settlement under the innocuous caption, suggested by Burt, "Debt on Old Account, June 30, 1899."

This did not end the embarrassment; when in January, 1902, Burt responded to a request from New York for a report on the recently revealed overdraft problem, he evidently professed ignorance of the true nature of the troublesome "Debt on Old Account" item, choosing to rest back instead upon the hastily signed transfer settlement of 1899. Being in the United States early in the year, Clark was consulted by the Special Committee for explanations of many points in Burt's report and for assistance in framing suggestions for retrenchment in expenditures on the Italy field. These contacts of Clark's in New York led to further discussion of the disputed discrepancy. In June, Secretary Leonard, who earlier had been absent for four months through illness, wrote to Clark in Italy, taking up his offer to give his view of the matter. "The discrepancy must be found and solved and if you can give any light, I shall be glad to have it," wrote Leonard. Clark replied in voluminous and circumstantial detail, still holding that Burt owed the Mission \$1,630.

On the same day he wrote Clark, Leonard expressed his rather serious concern about it all to Bishop Vincent. Although Burt had had long and ample opportunity to clear up the confusion, he had come out with nothing that Leonard considered an explanation. And upon inquiry, the Secretary found that the unexplained figure was being carried along submerged in the stated deficit in the Mission's current expenses. He also found that after committee investigation in the spring, the whole question had been referred to the General Missionary Committee. But he still saw no way "to straighten out the trouble" except by having the Mission's books audited by an independent expert. Affirming that the discrepancy certainly should be cleared up, Leonard said to the Bishop, "I think it might be well for you to suggest to Dr. Burt the importance of having the investigation thoroughly made for his own vindication, if indeed such vindication is possible, and I hope it is."

Whether Bishop Vincent passed this suggestion along to Burt or not, he did advise him to make a trip to the United States in the fall for the good of the Italy work. Evidently Vincent felt that a strong effort would have to be made to avoid having the recent dislocations in Italy Mission finance turned into General Committee action adverse to the Mission's interests. During the summer, the outlook did not brighten; Secretary Carroll had to write to Burt because he could not understand the latter's recent report on financial readjustments being inaugurated in Italy, the Board's accountant reported at length on the confusion and unorthodoxy displayed in Burt's annual Treasurer's report, and the Board formally requested Burt to make a complete and satisfactory report in accordance with its rules. And in the fall, Leonard sharpened the difficulty of Burt's personal position by writing him—a most extraordinary request to make of a mission treasurer:

May I suggest that you bring with you to the United States all the treasury books that will throw any light upon the question that was in dispute between you and Dr. Clark when I was in Rome, and that remained unsettled, as I understand, when the books were passed over to you by Dr. Clark.

Burt was headed for potential trouble.

Somehow he managed to avoid it, at least as far as the Methodist public was concerned. Burt arrived in New York a fortnight before the General Missionary Committee met in mid-November, and then went on to Albany for the sessions. With him he had his Treasurer's books. On the third day of the sessions, a Committee on Europe was appointed, with Bishop Vincent as chairman, and later in the day the Committee reported its recommendations for appropriations. In the course of a supporting speech, Bishop Vincent spoke glowingly of Methodism's challenge to the Roman Church in Italy, of the Methodist agencies there, and particularly of the Rome headquarters building. *The Christian Advocate* reported:

He spoke of Dr. Burt as a man of large ideas, to whom the Church is greatly indebted for the advanced ground we now occupy in Italy. The Bishop said that he knew Dr. Burt had raised through his personal efforts and put into the property as much money as the Missionary Society had paid him in sixteen years. He pleaded for \$45,000 for Italy . . .

But while adopting all the other recommended appropriations for Europe that day, the General Committee did not at that point vote anything to Italy.

Four days later, on the last day of the sessions, after all other appropriations had been made, the General Committee finally turned again to the Italy Mission. William Burt, who was not a General Committee member, was invited to the platform and made a careful, comprehensive, and vigorous presentation of his work, closing by asking for an Italy appropriation of \$45,000, an amount \$8,000 higher than for the year then closing. Secretary Leonard, Bishop Vincent, Bishop Charles H. Fowler of Buffalo, James M. Buckley, editor of *The Christian Advocate*, and Gen. James F. Rusling, prominent New Jersey layman, rose one by one to reinforce Burt's plea, speaking enthusiastically of the Methodist work in Italy. The General Committee then voted the requested \$45,000 for Italy—amid applause.

If serious attention was given at Albany to the complaints about Burt's financial administration, and if the \$1,630 question was resolved (were the books audited; was Burt exonerated, did Burt have to pay up; was the question compromised and the disputed figure allowed to be blended in the Mission's general deficit?), a good deal of work must have been done behind closed doors. No reference at all to administrative difficulties with the Italy Mission crept into the Minutes of the General Committee's Albany sessions, or into the *Christian Advocate* reports. Nowhere in the records of the Board of Managers or in the official correspondence of the interested parties is

there any reference, after the Albany meeting, to the manner in which the problem of the alleged treasury discrepancy was disposed of. All that is evident is that somehow the trouble that threatened as Burt came to the threshold of the General Committee was dispelled, Burt was given a prime platform opportunity, was publicly supported by a battery of Methodism's big guns, and came through with colors flying.

This successful piece of promotion at the Albany sessions, and the adjustments in field work that preceded it, brought into the finances of the Italy Mission, however, no real orderliness or stability. Even after all the embarrassing scrutiny that recently had been applied to this treasurership, William Burt showed no sign of dispatch in straightening out his accounts to the satisfaction of the Board. Nine months after the General Committee vote, Secretary Leonard, who always made every possible allowance for Burt, had to write him, rather sharply, to drop all other work and prepare for the New York office long overdue reports essential to completion of the Board's quadrennial statement. Said Leonard, "I find that our account with your treasury has not been balanced and closed since 1900; no report was received for 1901. Our accountant says that this delay is occasioned by the lack of necessary information from your end of the line." Ten months after that, Burt's treasurership came to an end—he had been elected Bishop.

After William Burt's replacement as Treasurer in 1904, effective financial control of the Mission was no longer so fully in the hands of one man, although N. Walling Clark, as chairman of the Finance Committee, was for some years especially influential and sometimes showed himself capable of unilateral action. The Finance Committee itself became more of a factor than before. But the same financial bad habits that characterized Burt's one-man dominance of the Mission's money matters persisted under the less unified administration that followed it. Year after year there still were attempts to budget beyond appropriations, current overexpenditures, unauthorized property debts, bank overdrafts, deficits, incomplete accounting, and slowness to inform the Board of the extent of the accumulated indebtedness. The fact that William Burt, so familiar with all Italy's problems, was now the supervising Bishop, resident in Zurich, not too far away, evidently did not give the Mission any decisive impetus towards the elimination of these serious inefficiencies.

Two able men, Ernst Peter (appointed in 1904) and Arthur W. Greenman (1908) tried hard to systematize the Mission's financial affairs. But Peter, who was both young and a layman, deliberately was made little more than a disbursing officer acting under direction of the several District Superintendents. He, especially, found it difficult to maintain sound practices in the face of the pressures and powers exerted by the Superintendents, the Finance Committee, and the Conference. Secretary Leonard protested to Peter about the continuing irregular procedures, warning him in 1906 that the policy

of overexpenditures had been in force so long that the Board of Managers was becoming irritated, and Leonard himself feared that he had reached the limit of his ability to secure extra appropriations for Italy. Leonard repeatedly warned the Finance Committee against operating on the basis of overdrafts and of unsatisfactorily processed property loans, and in 1909 he gave Greenman still another warning, that this practice "means simply to pile up wrath against the day of wrath." He told Greenman that he was alarmed at a total of \$20,000 or more in recently acquired irregular debts in Italy.

After his European trip in 1910, Leonard, while discussing with the Board of Managers the European debt situation as a whole, expressed special concern over Italy, which had little potential income from rentals, but was responsible for a debt of \$133,000, including \$76,000 on the Rome building. In spite of his awareness of the Mission's essential financial problems, Greenman was unable to give the Board all the assistance he wanted to. While endeavoring to provide it with a full description of the over-all situation, he confessed in 1911 that three years' effort had not been enough to enable him to unravel the tangled skein that had been put in his hands as Treasurer. Greenman advised the Board to assume no further permanent obligations until the current financial condition should be rationalized. The Board determined, but fruitlessly, to adopt that policy. When Bishop John L. Nuelsen, assigned to Europe in 1912, took the Italy Mission in hand, he made a frontal effort to straighten out its confused affairs, but little could be done before Italy and all Europe were plunged into the War.

AT THE CENTER IN ROME

The new headquarters building in Rome was more than a mere symbol of Methodist confrontation of the Roman Catholic Church; it housed several local and Conference-wide operations that were by implication activities aimed at the position of religious power held by that Church.

Here the mission in Rome installed its two worshipping congregations, the Italian and the American groups meeting in separate chapels. The excitement of rearing the new building so close to the world capital of Catholicism gave a lift to the expectations of Methodist missionary circles both in Italy and in the United States, but the Italian church centered there failed to generate any dynamically progressing evangelical movement among the people of Rome at large during the pre-War years. Over these eighteen years, however, the parochial strength of the church, tended by its Italian pastors, gradually rose from about 125 members to 350, with some of its services drawing attendance in excess of the number of members. The American Church, begun under the leadership of Elmer E. Powell as early as 1892, took more definite form in this period, becoming a distinct society

under the Discipline in 1900. It ministered to numerous American residents and visitors in Rome and brought the missionary work in Italy to the attention of people returning to the United States, the base of its continuing support. The actual membership, of course, remained very small, never exceeding two or three dozen. The pastors were American ministers, generally brought over from the United States for the purpose and sometimes assigned to serve also as teachers or as District Superintendents. Among them were Adna W. Leonard, Frederick H. Wright, and Bertrand M. Tipple. Tipple served from 1909 into the wartime period.

Into the new building on Via Venti Settembre also moved the Conference theological school, which prepared young men for the ministry in both Italy and Switzerland. Under the continuing leadership of N. Walling Clark, a changing group of American, English, and Italian instructors endeavored to approximate the curriculum of the typical American seminary. The student body, which included a preparatory department, was always small: in 1900 there were fourteen regular students; by 1902, the group was down to four.

Through the correction of an unfortunate omission, the School got a new name in 1901. The Board of Managers ordered that it be known henceforth as the Reeder Theological School, thus honoring a contract the Missionary Society had made some years earlier with Mr. and Mrs. Glezen A. Reeder of Penfield, Ohio, who gave a 160-acre Nebraska farm to be sold for the benefit of the Rome building project. A year later, while Walling Clark was absent on furlough, the School was closed by vote of the Annual Conference. (From 1906 to 1909, the Conference met part of its need for evangelistic workers by maintaining a training school in Florence, where the Theological School had originated two decades earlier.) The Theological School remained closed until the fall of 1908 chiefly because of the lack of funds. Clark then made a fresh beginning with a nucleus of only three students. Bertrand Tipple succeeded Clark as President in 1911. By that time, the School's very small graduating classes were having the cumulative effect of helping to produce a ministerial corps significantly realizing the need and aim of the Conference to raise up its own preachers, as against the earlier reliance upon former Roman Catholic priests and upon ministers transferred from other evangelical churches. Clark stated in 1914 that more than half the members of the Italy Conference were graduates of the Reeder School.

Walling Clark also took into the Rome headquarters, in 1896, a second educational project of which he was director—the Methodist Boys' College, at first called the Boys' College, and sometimes the Boys' Institute. Until its home was established there, it hardly could be counted as a school; the boys were only boarded together under Methodist supervision in rented quarters and were taken daily to the public schools. But in 1896, the upper floors of the Methodist building were devoted both to boarding the boys

and to developing a curriculum that would take them through the subjects covered in the public schools on the elementary and gymnasium levels. In the last year under the old hostel plan, fourteen boys were enrolled. In the first year under the new arrangement, there were thirty-three, thirteen of them entering the College's own beginning classes. In this form, the College eventually became a perennial source of entrants into Reeder Theological School. With an increasing enrollment taxing the space available for it on Via Venti Settembre, the College was moved for two years (1900-02) to a castle-like building just outside Porta Pia. But it was an unfortunate move; the enrollment dropped to a dozen students, and the work had to be brought back to the central church building.

As successive Directors, several men made significant contributions to the College's development, which was renewed both numerically and academically after the Porta Pia interlude. Walling Clark served for a second term (1902-3). Aristide Frizziero was in charge from 1898 to 1901. Edward B. T. Spencer, who came to Rome from the faculty of Denver University in 1905, directed the work for six years. He was followed (1911-14) by Amedeo C. Autelli, a young converted priest who had been a valuable factor in the operation of the institution for a number of years before becoming the Director. In this office, he was associated with Bertrand M. Tipple, who was appointed President. During Tipple's presidency, the Board of Foreign Missions purchased, early in 1914, on Monte Mario, within sight of the Vatican, land for the erection of buildings that would provide for a significant expansion of the College.

Sharing the facilities at the Rome headquarters with the two schools and with the two congregations was the Methodist Publishing House, which maintained both its offices and its printing plant there. This enterprise had been built up by William Burt, who served as Director of Publications from 1890 to 1898. Ernst Peter, son of Rev. Leonhard Peter of the Switzerland Conference, guided the press (Tipografia La Speranza) from 1902 to 1907 in the capacity of Director of the Press. From 1908 to 1913, Carlo M. Ferreri, an Italian minister, was the director of the Publishing House. These Directors worked from time to time in various combinations with a number of editors and under review of their work by Conference committees. One of the most important workers was Rev. Eduardo Tagliatalata, who contributed substantially to the output of the press both by writing and translating. The publishing enterprise continued circulation of the weekly paper *Evangelista* (founded in 1889) and also issued *Vita Gioconda*, a paper for children. It produced numerous books, tracts, pamphlets, hymnals, evangelistic aids, Sunday school materials, and official items such as the annual Minutes of the Italy Conference, and it maintained an extensive job printing business. Its work was supplemented by the more modest activity of the press connected with the Industrial Institute of Venice.

WOMAN'S FOREIGN MISSIONARY SOCIETY

The Woman's Foreign Missionary Society did not depend upon the Via Settembre building to house its activities in Rome. Its Girls' Home School* had its own home on Via Garibaldi, and the Society's continuing Bible woman work reached out into the city. In 1896, under the guidance of Mrs. N. Walling Clark, the W.F.M.S. opened a new center, the Isabel Clark Crèche, named in memory of the Clarks' infant daughter. The Crèche, jointly sponsored by the Society in the United States and by a W.F.M.S. group organized in Rome, cared for the children of poor working mothers. In December, 1907, a German deaconess, Eliza Hurter of the Bethany Society, came to Rome and opened a small W.F.M.S. deaconess home in a rented house. With her came two Italian young women who had been sent to Hamburg by Bishop Burt to train in the deaconess hospital there. In their new center outside Porta Pia, the small corps of deaconesses cared for a limited number of convalescents; and from this center, they went out to nurse the sick in private homes, particularly among the poor. (They also became responsible for nursing activity in a hospital established by Gen. Ricciotti Garibaldi and his wife at Maddalena, Sardinia.) The work was short-lived, however; a few years later there were no reflections of it in Methodist records.

In 1896, the W.F.M.S. made a new venture into the field of education. In rented apartments not far from the central Methodist building, M. Ella Vickery, who was in charge of the Girls' Home School while Emma M. Hall, its founder and director, was on furlough, opened a second school for girls. The new Young Ladies' School (later called the Young Ladies' College; still later, the International Institute for Young Ladies) deliberately sought an upper class clientele. It appealed especially to families desiring to patronize neither convent schools nor charity schools, the Girls' Home School being counted among the latter because of its liberal use of scholarships. Academically, the Institute became oriented towards a general cultural education. But the Girls' Home School, whose pupils were taxing the capacity of its 200-year-old convent building on Via Garibaldi, now became more expressly the Methodist school for girls from the lower social and economic classes. To be sure, it endeavored to raise its curricular levels by introducing higher grades, including normal training classes for older girls. But it remained most of the time basically an elementary school and purposely trained its pupils not for cultural enrichment for its own sake, but for gainful and practical occupations, "for happy, useful lives."

Religiously, the Institute was a quietly aggressive, essentially proselytizing agency; it was deliberately and expressly an instrument of Methodist evangelization among girls acknowledged to be almost entirely daughters of Catholic

* See the Home and Orphanage, Vol. III, 1049 and 1056.

families. It aimed to wean away from the Roman Catholic Church superior young women of a type the Institute's promoters considered strategic for the preservation of that church's position in Italian life. To stimulate the girls' sympathy with Protestantism, and to open the way for their conversion to it, the Institute involved them in Methodist religious education and worship, finally making participation compulsory. Institute reports repeatedly cited encouraging results harvested from this cultivation of the pupils' religious life. Although they conducted their religious propaganda judiciously, the Institute people consciously and consistently endeavored to make a cultural contribution to Italian youth not for youth's sake alone, nor for general culture's sake, but in order ultimately to undermine Catholicism and erect a Protestant culture on its ruins.

Their basic thinking was anti-Catholic, and their literature reflected it. In the United States, the Institute's attractive 28-page promotional brochure for 1905 was well stocked with anti-Catholic quotations. It even raked in and printed an accusation Mazzini leveled at Pius IX in 1865 in his papal role:

You are condemned by the impotency of 600 years: the desertion of every precept of Jesus, the fornication with the evil princes of this world, the idolatry of the form substituted for the spirit of Religion, the systematic immorality of the men of your court, the negation of all progress, recognized by yourself as a necessary condition of your existence.

It was through successful development of the Institute that the W.F.M.S. made its strongest advance in pre-War Rome. In spite of its clearly Protestant pattern, and in spite of active Catholic opposition, the demand for its educational services was sufficient to build its enrollment to more than a hundred pupils by 1899. Compelled to rent more space, the school, at this time called the International Institute for Young Ladies, bought property on Via Veneto, and in 1900 it opened a four-story building of its own, which was named Crandon Hall in honor of Mrs. Frank P. Crandon, Corresponding Secretary of the Northwestern Branch. Almost at once, the name given the building became attached to the school itself; it was known henceforth as Crandon International Institute. Again the enrollment grew, until the capacity of Crandon Hall cut it off in 1909 at about 260 pupils. The Institute then bought a new site, on Via Savoia, in a new residential suburb, and erected two new buildings—a second Crandon Hall and a Villa Massey (named for Chester D. Massey of Toronto, who donated \$35,000 for it)—and started work on a third. The Institute moved to the new site in November, 1910.

Through the pre-War decades, Crandon Institute was successful, to one degree or another, in several ways other than in pursuing its religious aim. It was financially healthy, for instance, substantially achieving self-support

except for capital outlay. This condition arose from its ability to gather its student body—as it had set out to do—from an elite class. As early as 1903, its backers could boast that the majority of the pupils came from “the best families in Rome.” Among the Crandon girls at that time there were, to be sure, two daughters of the Prime Minister, a granddaughter of Garibaldi and one of Mazzini, and daughters of generals, of members of the parliament, and of other high officials. Enough girls came from foreign countries, also, to justify the word *International* in the Institute’s name. The curriculum and the faculty were gradually enriched and expanded, taking the girls from kindergarten clear through to the finishing school level. During this period, next to Martha Vickery (1896–1906), Edith Burt (1907–1913), daughter of Bishop William Burt, served longest as Crandon’s director or co-director.

The Girls’ Home School, under the direction, successively, of Emma Hall, Eva Odgers, Italia Garibaldi (granddaughter of the Liberator), and Mary B. Sweet, generally maintained an enrollment of about forty girls, until the W.F.M.S. closed it in 1914. The decision to close was part of a new educational policy worked out in Rome at the time of an official visitation by Mrs. F. F. Lindsay, the W.F.M.S. correspondent for Europe, in July, 1914. Those who conferred with her in Rome confirmed Mrs. Lindsay’s conviction, arrived at before leaving home, that the Society had no cultural mission to Italy. The conferees, though publicly reporting no sharp disillusionment with the finishing school aspect of Crandon Institute’s program, now believed that their former policy of working with the higher classes and with the lower classes should be given up for concentration upon an upper middle class clientele. The Society hoped to gather from this group a better yield of leaders and teachers to stimulate and to prepare the way for the effective evangelization of Italy—its supreme aim. From the “great middle class,” believed the conferees, would come a functional Protestant elite—intellectuals, doctors, bankers, ministers, lawyers—for a nation ready to move out from under Catholic hegemony. Therefore, the W.F.M.S. not only closed the Girls’ Home School, but also lowered the tuition at Crandon Institute to a level that would attract middle class girls and laid plans for new courses in Bible and in social service calculated to integrate the Institute’s curriculum more closely with the requirements of Methodist church growth in Italy.

CONVERTED PRIESTS: SAVONAROLA INSTITUTE

The Methodist leaders in Rome became interested in one institution that was not Methodist, but interdenominational. Earlier unfortunate experiences with ex-priests serving as Methodist ministers had not completely disillusioned William Burt about the potentialities of men leaving the Roman Catholic priesthood, some of whom came to him, from time to time, for counsel about

their future. Burt for several years advocated establishing a home for former priests to give them refuge during their days of readjustment. Two Englishwomen, Constance M. Ward and her sister, finally took up his idea, and gave and solicited the funds necessary to implement it. With this backing, Burt initiated a sponsoring committee which, in 1899, opened a Home for Ex-Priests in a house outside St. John's Gate. The home later was renamed Savonarola Institute for Ex-Priests—hardly a change to make the project more palatable at the Vatican!

The Institute harbored a small number of former priests at a time. Some of its beneficiaries entered the Methodist Episcopal ministry in Italy, and a number of others went into other Protestant churches, in Italy and in the United States. For several reasons, including the ill health of one of the faithfully supporting Ward sisters, the Institute finally closed its doors in 1909.

Priests kept applying, however, to N. Walling Clark, superintendent of the Rome District, for counsel and help in, as he put it, "escaping from the bondage" they were in. Faced with these recurring requests, Clark set about trying to get the Savonarola Institute reopened. At his suggestion, the directorship of the Institute, even while it was closed, became a special appointment under the Italy Conference from 1910 to 1913. Upon his further initiative, a new advisory committee that included members from half a dozen denominations was formed, Constance Ward deeded the Institute property to the Board of Foreign Missions, money-raising in England was renewed, and the Institute was reopened in November, 1912, under the general oversight of Clark and the active direction of Carlo M. Ferreri, an Italian member of the Conference.

Both Clark and Miss Ward were sensitive to the transitional personal needs of the priests coming out of the Catholic Church, but they also saw the helping-hand policy as a desirable form of attack on Catholicism. Miss Ward wrote to Bishop Nuelsen in 1914 that the Institute's director should be one "whose fixed object is to break down to some extent, through her converted priests, that mighty fabric of error, which for centuries has exercised such a baneful sway in the land." Clark believed that the Institute's work was:

absolutely indispensable in carrying on any work of evangelism in Italy. We are set in Italy, as I understand it, for the conversion of the people, the large majority of whom are Roman Catholics, and we cannot turn away with indifference from the Roman Priests when they have been brought to a knowledge of the truth through the Gospel we preach to their people.

William Burt naturally remained a backer of Savonarola Institute after becoming the Bishop resident in Europe, and Bishop John L. Nuelsen, his successor in 1912, voiced to Constance Ward his high appreciation of what

was done through the Institute for the ex-priests, "those unfortunate men, who stand so much in need of guidance and help."

But Frank Mason North, who had barely entered office as a Corresponding Secretary when the Board took title to the Savonarola property, had personal reservations about the work. He politely chided Walling Clark for using his name as a reference for the Institute in its 1914 report. He made it clear that the Board's relationship to the Institute should be considered little more than that of legal owner of the property. He told Clark that nothing should be done to represent the Board as being a definite advocate or supporter of the institution. He went even further; said he, "I have serious misgivings concerning the advantage of even a nominal relation between a refuge of this type and the constructive work which we are set to do in Italy." His misgivings may have been enhanced, if not provoked, by a scary letter Bertrand M. Tipple wrote from Rome to tell him about an ex-priest resident in the Institute who had gone out into the cemetery and killed himself with a pistol. Tipple pointed out "the perils we run" in maintaining such an institution under Methodist auspices.

In a passage unique in the Board's administrative correspondence with field workers, North took pains to indicate that the Board's official position did not reflect his personal opinion. He said that he had no desire to be put in the position of endorsement of what, in his own judgment, he could not fully commend. It was Walling Clark, however, who took the initiative, in the summer of 1915, in recommending the suspension of the Institute's activities, because of wartime cessation of contributions from England and because of his own prospective absence from Italy. Finally, in 1927, the Board authorized the sale of the Institute property, which was no longer in use.

Only a few converted priests came into the Methodist Episcopal Church during the years before World War I. But few as they were, they came in through no side door. About 1902, Amedeo C. Autelli, a well educated priest of some standing in the Catholic Church, read out before the Methodist congregation in the Rome headquarters a formal renunciation of his Roman Catholic faith. In December, 1908, a thousand people crowded the same church to hear an address by Giovanni Sforzini, a Catholic editor and Canon of the Cathedral at Macerata. He too told the story of his conversion from Catholicism. Walling Clark reported that it caused a profound sensation in Rome and won copious attention in the public press. In January, 1910, Augusto Giuliani, a priest well known as one of the best Catholic preachers in the country, stood before another capacity audience in the Methodist church, and impressively related a conversion story similar to the others. These men became members of the Methodist Episcopal Church, entered Reeder Theological School, and received licenses as Local Preachers. Autelli became a full member of the Italy Conference and by 1910 had served for some years

as vice director of the Methodist Boys' College. In 1910, Sforzini was supplying a charge on the Turin District.

INSTITUTIONS: VENICE, NAPLES, PISA

Although the Mission concentrated most of its institutions in Rome, it also acquired institutional interests elsewhere in Italy, beginning in Venice in November, 1895, when Mrs. Anna Rose P. Hammond, an Englishwoman, donated an industrial school to the Methodists. The Venice Industrial School was the outgrowth of welfare and educational work with poor boys that was begun by Mrs. Hammond in 1881. She and a group of fellow sponsors bought in 1887 the quarters the School was occupying when it was turned over to the Mission. Through the years, almost all the boys were cared for quite free of charge, the work being supported by appropriations, special gifts, and the sale of furniture produced in the shop. The pupils received both general schooling and shop training in wood carving, carpet making, shoemaking, printing, bookbinding, and blacksmithing. The enrollment grew to forty-five to fifty boys.

After Mrs. Hammond relinquished supervision of the Venice Industrial School to an Italian layman in 1899, the institution drew no great amount of attention from the Board for more than a decade. Then suddenly it provided the Italy Mission with a flagrant scandal.

Late in 1913, Corresponding Secretary Frank Mason North got an unofficial tip from a friend of the School that there was a serious lapse in its financial operation that would bear investigation. Joined by Bishop John L. Nuelsen, he promptly ordered a probe, which was carried out by Bertrand M. Tipple, acting treasurer for the Mission, and N. Walling Clark, the District Superintendent.

The story that began to come out was rooted in financial irresponsibility by the Director and in the Mission's precarious financing of the School. The latter was so touchy that it was seriously responsive to the loss of well over a thousand dollars (\$1,600 in 1908) through failure of the School to receive in 1912 its usual privilege of selling off at each General Conference the carved wooden table it produced for the use of the Conference's presiding Bishops. At the same time, income was down because of shrinkage in special gift receipts, partly due to deaths of donors, partly due to the Mission's failure to follow up leads on potential gifts. The Director, who had come into some money personally and had unwisely overspent and unwisely invested, had begun using personal funds to meet School expenses and using School funds to try to escape from his personal financial predicament. Nobody audited books for 1912, and an ambiguous report by the District Superintendent at the Conference of 1913 created an impression that concealed this omission. By summertime, the Director was appealing to New York for extra funds

beyond appropriations. The District Superintendent, however, evidently took no cognizance of financial trouble in Venice until that fall and did not clearly and specifically report the true condition to the Board until the very day he received North's cabled order for an investigation.

When Clark and Tipple arrived in Venice to investigate, they found the School's affairs in a mess—the Director fled to Milan to escape clamoring creditors, his wife gone to Holland to raise money to cover his defalcations, the School's stock of manufactured furniture attached and removed from the premises, the institution's prestige damaged by the accumulation of a pile of unpaid bills, and nowhere any accounts accurately reflecting the School's financial condition for many months past. The Director at once returned to Venice, but was made to resign. Tipple and Clark had to scurry around "to the butcher and the baker, the paper man, the milkman, and other creditors" under nineteen different categories in all, securing statements and paying up what they could on account. They had to grapple with demands arising from \$4,400 worth of unpaid School bills and of personal notes given by the Director. It all ultimately required an emergency loan of \$3,500 by the Board to pull the School through the more immediate financial crisis.

More shocking than the financial delinquencies reported by Tipple and Clark were the living and operating conditions discovered by Bishop Nuelsen and Carlo M. Ferreri when they inspected the School in January. They found that in spite of the School's being equipped for the industrial training publicized as its distinctive feature, its twenty-nine boys were receiving no industrial instruction at all. For their general education, formerly developed in their own classes, they were being sent out to the public school. The Industrial School held no chapel exercises and gave the boys no religious teaching at all, even the Bible work attempted by the local pastor having been undermined by the boys' lack of respect for the Director on account of unpleasant rumors about his home life. Discipline hardly existed. "Having no more supervision," said Ferreri, "the boys were found just like little savages, left to themselves and without any care."

"I personally inspected the Venice Institution as thoroughly as possible," Bishop Nuelsen wrote to Secretary North, "and I must confess that what I saw and heard there made my heart sick." He was thinking not simply of the complete subsidence of the School's program, which he felt made its name a misnomer and a farce, but also of the condition in which the boys (most of them between eight and twelve years old) were kept. He said.

I made a thorough examination of the Dormitory and found the following: None of the rooms can be heated. It was cold when I was there and the boys looked cold and uncomfortable. On examining some of the beds I found that the sheets were filthy. There were not enough blankets or covers to keep the boys warm. The stone floor of the wash room and toilet rooms was covered with a thin crust of ice owing to deficient plumbing. The kitchen is

a small untidy room. I went into the diningroom when the boys were at dinner and found that they received bread and soup as their dinner. Both Brothers Bani and Ferreri said that the boys were not sufficiently fed and not sufficiently clothed. Two of them were sick in bed in consequence of these conditions. I do not think I ever visited an Institution where the evidence of carelessness and negligence were so manifest as here. I stated to the Finance Committee that I think we have every reason to be thankful that the Institution was not inspected by some hostile newspaper reporter. He would have found sufficient material for a very sensational article.

Carlo Ferreri's report, written in fuller and more unsavory detail than the Bishop's, offered an even blacker picture of wretchedness and neglect. One of its sparest, but eloquent, items was the School's diet for the boys:

Morning: a cup of milk with bread
 Noon: a soup with bread
 Evening: vegetables and meat three times
 a week

The quantity of bread was fixed.

(Tipple's financial report showed, by the way, that the School's baker's bill was the largest of the delinquent accounts and unpaid for more than two years.) Bishop Nuelsen appointed Ferreri interim Director and instructed him to give the boys enough to eat and to see that they were kept warm enough. "Of course this costs money," he said, "but we cannot see these boys suffer."

Secretary North joined Bishop Nuelsen in thoroughly deploring the breakdown of the Venice school. Both men saw the emergence of the trouble as largely the result of inexcusable administrative failure on the field. The School could not have run down as far as it did, Nuelsen wrote North, if it had been properly inspected. Both men naturally turned towards the District Superintendent, Walling Clark, as the responsible administrator. North found "simply astounding" Clark's long delay in investigating the first signs of financial disarray in Venice. Clark went to great lengths in an endeavor to wash his hands of responsibility, claiming personal confusion as to his relation to the School and attempting to shift blame for the damaging financial inefficiency onto the Conference Treasurer, Arthur W. Greenman, who was in the United States when the scandal broke. Greenman strongly rebutted Clark's position and sharply criticized Clark's resistance to his own early suggestions about avoiding potential deficit, as well as Clark's failure to keep in close and steady touch with developments at the School. Greenman's own responsibility with regard to the institution was simply that of technical and legal administration of the property. Neither the Bishop nor the Secretary showed any disposition to accept Clark's case. They were one in their distress at the Mission's poor administration of the School and at the dissension among the officials associated with it.

It was clear to all that the Industrial School would have to be discarded or radically reconstructed. The Mission, with the Finance Committee taking an early lead, adopted the latter course. Plans were made to make room for the true financial needs of the institution in the annual appropriations. Carlo Ferreri made a thorough study of its curricular needs and possibilities and presented recommendations for the restoration of its educational process, both general and vocational. The Conference session in May gave special attention to the School's affairs and took action fixing responsibility for administrative oversight of the Conference's educational institutions upon the respective District Superintendents, with Conference committees being assigned to inspect the Boys' College in Rome and the school in Venice. Before the year was out, the Industrial School was reorganized, offering general elementary classes and instruction in three vocational subjects. Bishop Nuelson relieved Walling Clark of District responsibilities, and appointed him to search for special gifts for the Venice Industrial School.

In Naples, the Italy Mission developed an interest in an orphanage for boys and girls that sprang spontaneously from the compassion of Riccardo Santi, himself an orphan formerly under the care of the Venice Industrial School. On his birthday, in June, 1905, Santi, for two years past the minister of the Naples church, suddenly came upon two little beggar children in a public square. Years later he said:

They did not utter a word, but whilst they themselves kept silent, suddenly some one spoke in their stead. I heard in the innermost recesses of my heart a Divine voice which said these words: "These two waifs belong to me, they are my very own, my dearly beloved. I want you to take them with you. Keep them and take care of them. Tenderly love them for my sake for I did not abandon you when you were a poor helpless orphan. Do to them what has been done to you in part at least. As for means and money I will help you and bless you.

Santi obeyed the voice; he took the two children home with him and made them members of his own family. Almost at once, he began finding and adopting as his own other homeless children—victims of a Calabrian earthquake in 1905, youngsters orphaned by an eruption of Vesuvius in 1906, sufferers from an earthquake in Reggio Calabria in 1909, and others. As his family thus expanded, Santi and his wife found it necessary to move to a larger apartment and finally move into a separate house. They supported the children with their own funds and with the proceeds of gifts from people in Italy and abroad. Their care of the children extended to every part of their life; in 1909, Santi was maintaining and directing a school for their general education. The orphanage and its school became known as Casa Materna (Mother Home).

Santi continued for a long time as both pastor of the Naples church and director of Casa Materna. Although the Conference sometimes included the

latter among its Special Appointments, the institution remained for some years financially and administratively independent of the Methodist Episcopal Church. In 1912, however, the Mission took Casa Materna under its wing by providing quarters for the orphanage-school at a time when it was caring for some fifty children. Santi's enlarged family moved into the three upper stories of the general mission headquarters purchased by the Board on Via Duomo, the rest of the building being devoted to apartments for missionary residence and for Santi, a gospel hall, and rentable commercial space. In purchase price and reconditioning, the building cost the Mission \$66,000, which was covered by the use of a \$15,000 Messina earthquake orphan fund raised some years earlier under Board auspices, supplemented by loans secured in Italy. The Board eventually advanced as much as \$43,000 from New York to dispose of the balance of the external debt.

For somewhat less than a decade, the Mission enjoyed a close but officially independent association with the Carruthers Institute for girls in Pisa. In 1905, a Major Carruthers, a resident of Scotland, who inherited the Institute from his aunt, its founder, offered to donate the school and its site in Pisa to the Methodist Episcopal Church. Because of the extent of its financial obligations, in Italy and the haste in which a decision was required of it, the Board declined Major Carruthers' proposal. N. Walling Clark, the District Superintendent, expressed great disappointment; he felt that the Institute and the two country schools connected with it were vitally important to Protestantism, especially to Methodism, in Pisa, and he knew that there was danger of their being closed. "The Leaning Tower may fall," Clark declared, "but the Carruthers Institute *must stand* . . ." Eventually Clark himself saw that it did stand, though not so long as the famous Tower. He became the president of a committee of three trustees to which Carruthers legally transferred the Institute in 1906. Agostino Pierotti, the Methodist pastor in Pisa, became both secretary of the committee and principal of the Institute.

The Institute program included daily study of the Bible, and although the management observed no official sectarian alignment, the teachers and the majority of the girls attended Pisa's Methodist church. In 1913, the Institute personnel numbered ten teachers and 150 pupils. Many of the girls became church members, and the association between the Institute and the church bolstered the latter's Sunday school and youth work. This relationship—and undoubtedly the Institute itself—failed to survive the death of Pierotti and the emergence of wartime conditions in the Conference in 1914.

THE FREE CHURCH TRANSFER

The most significant expansion of the Mission's field occurred within a single year, when in 1905 it absorbed roughly half the work of the Italian Evangelical Church (also known as the Free Church). This church, which

was an outgrowth from among Plymouth Brethren adherents already active in Italy in 1871, was one of the four groups participating in the abortive approach to church union in 1885.* In 1904, the Free Church proposed transferring its work to the Wesleyan Methodist and the Methodist Episcopal missions, and opened negotiations with them to that end. When, in March, the Board of Managers authorized completion of the preliminary negotiations, it designated the Italy Finance Committee as the official agent for the purpose. Since the Finance Committee was not amenable to the Italy Conference, but to the Missionary Society, this act coldly illuminated the relative unimportance of the Conference body. The formal agreement between the three groups (the Wesleyans took the other half of the Free Church work) was signed on 20 January 1905, to be effective as of the first of that month.

N. Walling Clark, who headed the Methodist Episcopal negotiating team, estimated that the merger was bringing into the Mission about five hundred members and two hundred probationers. It also added eight ministers, sixteen preaching stations, three schools, and church properties located in half a dozen cities or towns. The most valuable properties were in Livorno (Leghorn), where there had been no Methodist Episcopal work, and in Venice, where the congregation had been without any church building of its own. The new mission posts were strung out from Udine, sixty miles northeast of Venice, to Scicli, in southernmost Sicily, though the majority of them were in central and northern Italy. The full list included stations in Bassignana, Bussoleno, Ronco Canavese, Savona, Torino (Turin), Udine, Venice, Livorno, Pisa, Pistoia, Pontasserchio, Naples, Mottola, and Scicli. All the new stations, except for Venice and Pisa, were in places where there was no earlier Methodist Episcopal activity.

Practical integration of the Free Church activities with the Methodist Episcopal mission was worked out soon enough; the new ministers were formally received on credentials at the Conference session in Pisa in May, 1905, and the new churches appeared among the appointments read out by Bishop William Burt for the forthcoming year. But it took more than four years to unknot the copious legal and bureaucratic red tape in which title to the properties passed over by the Free Church were ensnarled. Vigorous opposition (sometimes annoyingly hidden) by certain Catholics, former Free Church members, and Waldensian partisans, in Italy and in Britain, more seriously lengthened the protracted and complex legal process. After the Council of State, the highest relevant governmental body, disapproved the granting of the Royal Decree authorizing the Mission to receive title from the Free Church, Clark had to resort to intensive lobbying. He enlisted the good offices of the United States ambassador, approached the key Cabinet Minister accompanied by an influential Deputy who was the Minister's intimate friend, and in the face of increasingly bitter opposition, kept applying

* See Vol. III, 1049.

the strongest possible political pressure to the authorities. Finally, in 1909, the Royal Decree was issued, and the Mission took title to seven former Free Church properties. Up to this time, its plans to make advantageous adjustments in its real estate situation had been thwarted by its legal inability either to receive or to sell any of the holdings in question.

There was a further hampering delay. The Free Church corporation was not liquidated when the Royal Decree was promulgated. It still held a valuable property in Rome which was to be sold for the equal benefit of the two successor missions. Unfortunately, this piece of real estate (known as the Ponte Sant' Angelo property) could not be disposed of because of a long-withheld decision of the Municipality of Rome on its possible expropriation in connection with a city improvements program in the neighborhood.

Solution of this difficulty lagged for more than a decade, keeping alive a bothersome financial problem and a serious financial threat. The Board of Foreign Missions, having recognized its new standing financial responsibility even before the merger was consummated, had originally undergirded it by advancing more than \$6,000 as early as 1905. But lacking the proceeds of the hoped-for sale of the Ponte Sant' Angelo property, the Mission developed a debt of more than \$9,000 arising directly out of the expenses and special responsibilities tied up with the merger. (This seemed serious enough at a time, 1910, when the Italy Mission was also carrying a general debt load of \$133,000.) The Free Church deficit included expenditures for property transfer taxes, salaries and rentals for Free Church ministers not at first covered by appropriations, advances to former Free Church pensioners, Free Church corporation business, legal and court costs, interest on loans, and the process of getting the Royal Decree through the Ministry of Grace and Justice and the Council of State, including—behold! Walling Clark so reported it—"compensation to prominent Deputy of Parliament." The threatening factor resided in certain mortgage loans for which the Methodists and the Wesleyans became jointly responsible and in potential claims and law suits against the Free Church corporation on the part of pensioners.

Expensive litigation over pension claims did finally arise, additional obligations came to light, and the debt related to the Free Church involvement more than doubled. The Methodists and the Wesleyans, whose representatives worked patiently and co-operatively together on the problem, were unable to extricate themselves from the Free Church corporation pattern until 1917. They accomplished it by jointly purchasing the Ponte Sant' Angelo property in Rome. The Free Church corporation then used the proceeds of the sale to lift the mortgage on the Ponte Sant' Angelo property and to liquidate outstanding Free Church pension responsibilities. The Italy Mission's remaining financial obligations under the Free Church merger were at last thus brought within the framework of the Methodist missionary organization. While under joint ownership, the Ponte Sant' Angelo property was for several years used

for evangelistic activity by the Wesleyans, who finally purchased the Methodist Episcopal interest in it in 1925.

VIGOROUS CHALLENGE; LIGHT IMPACT

In the perspective of its own propaganda of vigorous spiritual challenge for priest-ridden Italy, pre-War Methodism looked like a sweeping force, but the perspective of its membership rolls showed it producing only the most modest change in the religious affiliations of the Italian people. In 1895, the Conference counted 996 members in Italy itself. By 1914, the membership stood at 2,926, an increase of 1,830. But counting out the equivalent of some five hundred members received by transfer from the Free Church, the growth by evangelistic and parochial cultivation of the original field came to about 1,400, a yearly average of 75 members. Considering the fact that the Mission was now in its third and fourth decades, this did not constitute rapid growth.

The Mission's workers accomplished a roughly comparable development in the number of charges in which they organized their activity. By 1914, the charges increased from twenty-four to a net total of forty-nine, with the Free Church merger accounting for six of them.

The pattern of geographical distribution of the Mission's active centers in Italy remained essentially unchanged.* To be sure, the transfer of Udine from the Free Church extended the Mission to the northeast more than sixty miles beyond Venice, close to the Austrian (now Yugoslavian) border. And at the other extremity of the Peninsula, there were three new charges on the toe, ball, and instep, respectively, of the Italian foot—Reggio di Calabria, Cantanzaro, and Mottola (a former Free Church point). But in Sicily there still were no more than two charges. And there still was only a sprinkling of charges along the section of the Adriatic lying across from the west coast port of Naples, and a scattering of charges not far from Rome. To be sure, the Naples District of 1914 included seventeen charges, making it the largest of the four Districts. But this District was only a shallow administrative basket holding charges spotted across the country from Sicily to Perugia, more than eighty miles north of Rome. Methodism still expressed itself most substantially in the more populous urban and industrial areas of northern Italy, in the twelve and fourteen charges of the Milan and Florence Districts as aligned in 1914.

NOTE

Page 399. The *Annual Report, M.S.* (1882), p. 139, refers to the "moral defection of Signor Ravi" as the ground for his expulsion. Volume III of

* For the Mission's Swiss charges see pp. 355 ff.

this work, p. 1048, resting on this reference, states that Ravi was removed "on a charge of immorality." These two highly condensed interpretations compound a practical distortion of the record; in such a framework, "immorality" customarily has meant sexual delinquency, and there is no evidence that this was in any way involved in the Ravi case. See Leroy M. Vernon's full statement of the charges in *The Christian Advocate* (28 September 1882), p. 613.

12

New Leadership in Bulgaria

GEORGE S. DAVIS, SUPERINTENDENT OF THE BULGARIA MISSION, included in his report for 1896 a quotation from a current publication of the Bulgaria National Church :

We are waiting impatiently to see whether Americans will stop giving money for mission purposes in the East, and when they will cease to rely on the statements of five or six perverts [not "converts"] and misguided Americans, who deceive the American Churches, in order to secure the money . . .

And Davis cited another National Church paper as joyously hailing every attempt "to close up the Protestant Methodist Mission in our fatherland" and all other such Protestant missions, holding that they were not needed in contemporary Bulgaria and were pursuing general goals irreconcilable with the "Bulgaro-Slavic heart."

Such defenders of Church and Fatherland would have been encouraged in their hopes could they have observed the General Missionary Committee's handling of the Bulgaria question in Detroit in November. Failure of the most recent previous attempt, in 1894 and 1895,* to wash Methodism's hands of its Bulgaria mission, by trying to have the American Board (Congregational) take it up, by no means broke up the long-standing opposition within the Committee to the continuance of the Mission; it still was observably active at Detroit. Holding that the effort in Bulgaria had been too fruitless to justify the expenditure of the Society's money, the opposition supported, but lost, a motion to discontinue the Mission. The staunch friends of the Bulgaria work who beat back this attack were not strong enough, however, to defeat a proposal to cut the Bulgaria appropriation for the second successive year, this time from \$15,485 down to \$11,371. Feeling humiliated and defeated because of the tone of the Committee's discussion of Bulgaria and because of the cut, George Davis soon resigned as Superintendent and, after some months, left the field.

The Bulgaria Mission came under fire in succeeding sessions of the General Committee. The Corresponding Secretaries and the episcopal visitors to

* Vol. III, 1037.

Bulgaria, although they were altogether too realistically aware of the Mission's many shortcomings, never were among the snipers or the would-be bombardiers. They generally desired to see the work more strongly undergirded as to both money and personnel rather than undercut. Nevertheless, no new missionaries went out from the United States, and the financial reductions continued for a number of years.

The appropriation for 1898 was dropped to \$9,000, which was more than \$500 less than the amount recommended by the Board's standing committee on Europe. This prompted Trico Constantine, superintendent of the Ruse (Rustchuk) District, to comment caustically, in a letter to the New York office, on the recent practice of cutting the appropriation for Bulgaria and then sending "us a benediction accompanied with the good wish for abundant success."

Just before the General Committee met in November, 1898, Bishop John M. Walden, assigned to episcopal supervision of Europe, came out with two substantial *Christian Advocate* articles devoted to the case for the Bulgaria Mission and outlining a constructive six-point program for reinforcement and development of the work. But the General Committee provided no financial implementation for any of Bishop Walden's proposals. The Bulgaria Mission, defended by Bishop Daniel A. Goodsell as being in better shape than it had been for years, won from the General Committee nothing but a continuation of its \$9,000 appropriation, and even this only after the defeat of a motion to chop it down to \$7,000. A similar attempt at reduction was made in 1899, with James M. Buckley, the Mission's arch-enemy in the General Committee arena, calling Bulgaria "a great Serbonian bog into which we have poured missionary money for years"—a process in which he could see little hope of success. But again the reducers failed; the appropriation was held at \$8,868, the amount of the previous year's actual disbursement.

In 1900, pointing to the Bulgaria Mission's meager results from the cumulative investment of \$500,000 in its work (it had little over two hundred church members), Buckley led an attack that was more successful. Acting on a subcommittee proposal already reducing the appropriation to \$8,200, the General Committee adopted a motion by Buckley to lower it still more, to \$7,868. The members of the Committee all had received from Bishop John H. Vincent, the new resident Bishop for Europe, copies of a printed appeal directed especially towards themselves on behalf of the European work and had read there his support of a further experiment in Bulgaria on the basis of an increased apportionment. Their vote showed that the majority were inclined to take the Bishop's admission of difficulties and defects in the Mission more seriously than his expression of hope in the vital "remnant" he found in it. Bishop Walden, though opposing such reductions as the one adopted, evidently read the signs that appeared in the debate and in the

vote as omens of a nearing victory for the advocates of withdrawal. He moved that the General Committee request Bishop Vincent to confer with the American Board and with "the native Protestant Church" about the possibility of taking over the Methodist mission and its property. The General Committee adopted Walden's proposal, but with the additional provision, put forward by Buckley, that Bishop Vincent be approached through a committee of three. This committee, to which Bishop Walden and Buckley both were named, later was authorized to correspond directly with the American Board.

Perennial supporters of the Bulgaria Mission now were becoming discouraged about the prospect for its permanence. Corresponding Secretary Henry K. Carroll, hitherto a firm supporter of Methodist work in Eastern Europe, finally lost hope, convinced that the Church's faith in the Mission was so nearly destroyed that it could not be reawakened. He wrote to Bishop Vincent, "I believe if we had had a hundred thousand dollars extra to appropriate this year, the Committee would not have been willing to give ten of it to Bulgaria." He felt that under those circumstances, it would be better to close out the work altogether. "The amount we have been giving," he said, "is too small for success and too great for failure."

Carroll's pessimism was a little premature; the drive to get rid of the Bulgaria Mission failed to move the next annual session of the General Committee and soon afterwards proved to be a spent force. In November, 1901, Dr. Buckley reported for the special committee that the American Board would not consider taking over the Methodist mission unless the Missionary Society agreed to continue financial assistance over a period of years in the form of decreasing grants. It recommended no change in the Mission's status or basic appropriation for 1902, but asked for extension of its own life in order to make a more detailed investigation of all phases of the Bulgaria question. Secretary Leonard, who had visited Bulgaria during the year, rose and offered to present to the General Committee a written report on the Mission that could be read in fifteen minutes—perhaps tacitly a rebuke to Buckley's committee for the factual thinness of its own report. By a margin of one vote, Leonard failed to gain the floor under suspension of the rules to give his report (he printed it in *World-Wide Missions* two months later). And then, again by a single vote, the General Committee declined to extend the life of Buckley's special committee. Except for an 8 per cent cut that affected all missions, the Bulgaria appropriation was continued as before.

Buckley's investigation was dead, and so was the American Board proposal—but not Buckley! Back he came to the attack in 1902. With the special Committee on Europe recommending that the appropriation be lifted to \$10,000, with Bishop Vincent pleading the Bulgaria Mission cause and declaring that there was not a single argument for abandoning the

field, Buckley succeeded in provoking a prolonged discussion, which his own magazine called the greatest debate of the session. He himself spoke at considerable length in opposition. Citing the Mission's history and its membership and financial statistics, he declared that he was unwilling to advance the appropriation by a single dollar. Secretary Leonard and Bishop Goodsell rose to defend the Mission, but Buckley's view prevailed, and the appropriation remained unchanged.

After the Annual Meeting of 1903, Secretary Leonard wrote, "Dr. Buckley was not at the Committee this year and so there was no special debate when the Bulgaria appropriation was under consideration." Bishop Vincent, Leonard's correspondent, also was absent, but he had addressed a strong formal appeal to the General Committee members to make a definite and final decision about Bulgaria. "You have discussed the field so often and so long!" he said. He asked for a small financial advance in order to begin a new constructive approach to the Bulgaria work. The General Committee lifted the appropriation by \$261, but only to cover payment of back taxes and other mandatory charges. With this in mind, Leonard wrote Bishop Vincent that the Bulgaria cause still was being held back by the many Committee members who would like to do away with the Mission if only it were possible to effect it.

Although Dr. Buckley and his fellow opponents did not win their fight to close or transfer the Bulgaria Mission, they did present a strong case against its continuance. The Mission escaped liquidation because the Missionary Society did not actually shape and implement its policy on Bulgaria in accordance with the norms customarily employed in identifying various fields as successful and worthy of support. Although some of them felt that the Society had been niggardly in its support of the Mission just when it should have reinforced it, there was no question among the missionary executives and policy-makers that Bulgaria was a forbiddingly difficult and nearly fruitless field, and that the Mission itself had long been defective and largely ineffective. Indeed, the Mission's attackers easily could have found enough ammunition for their assaults upon it by catching up the unhappy admissions made by its official defenders.

Secretary J. Oramel Peck, who held the Bulgaria desk in New York, did not hesitate, for instance, to tell a Bulgarian correspondent that the "poorest work and poorest results from the use of missionary money in any field of our Society is in Bulgaria." One thing that disturbed him was the quarreling prevalent among the Mission's preachers. He vigorously condemned it, and warned that it might kill off the willingness of the General Committee to spend any more money on the Bulgaria work. He particularly criticized the complaining and accusatory letters, filled with charges and countercharges, that kept coming to the Board's office. George S. Davis, the Superintendent, evidently took Peck's warning seriously enough to introduce into the 1894

session of the Bulgaria Mission Conference a resolution disapproving "unauthorized and irresponsible parties communicating directly with the Missionary Office concerning difficulties that may arise in the Mission." The Conference unanimously adopted the resolution, but the letters still kept coming to New York.

Secretary Charles C. McCabe, who became the Board's correspondent with Bulgaria shortly afterwards, repeatedly deplored the quarreling in the Mission. Like Peck, he not only discounted the evangelistic potential of a bickering ministry in Bulgaria, but also feared the impression that would be made on the General Committee. He was aware of James M. Buckley's alertness to reports of the dissension. "He was in yesterday inquiring about it," he wrote George Davis in June, 1894. "I think he is going to make another drive at the next General Committee meeting to blot out the Bulgaria Mission." Early the next year, McCabe turned over to Bishop James N. Fitzgerald complaints signed by a number of the Bulgarian preachers raising charges against Davis and against Mindo G. Vulcheff, an American-educated Bulgarian preacher. McCabe again warned Davis that such a situation threatened the very life of the Mission (this was the year transfer of the Mission to the American Board was first under study).

Internal dissension was also among the numerous unfortunate aspects of the Mission that Bishop Daniel A. Goodsell, perhaps the most realistic advocate of the Bulgaria work, observed and criticized during his two years' careful episcopal supervision of the field in 1896 and 1897. He found that many of the complaints that were rife pointed towards the absence of an equitable salary scale for the ministers. Only part of the men were supported in accordance with any uniform scale of remuneration. Salaries for the others were controlled by the Superintendent—to reward industry and faithfulness, said he; "to reward his favorites and punish independence," declared some of the others to Bishop Goodsell in 1896. The Bishop commented, "No more successful plan for financial dependence on the will of a sup't could be invented."

Trico Constantine—partly because of this pattern (he was Davis's intimate friend), and partly because, though Bulgaria-born, he was an American citizen and a Board missionary—received \$1,200, almost as much as Davis did, whereas some of the others got as little as \$500 or \$400. Bishop Goodsell was sure that there could be no peace in the Mission while Constantine had this advantage. To be sure, the Bishop did not think too highly of the preachers in general. He said of them, "They are the hungriest lot of men and doing the least for what they do get, with one or two exceptions, I ever knew. All of them get twice as much as they would in any Bulgarian calling." Nevertheless, in 1897, Goodsell effected some adjustments in salary payments, increasing them for several of the men he felt had been unjustly treated "apparently because of their criticism of Dr. D. and Bro. Constantine."

The Bishop knew that these adjustments were overdue, for he was aware of the fact that when the Mission Conference adopted, that spring, resolutions complimentary to Davis and Constantine, there were a few negative votes as well as a good deal of hypocrisy on the part of men whose names were listed in the affirmative. Further action to cope with this problem came in 1898, when the Board of Managers recommended to Bishop John M. Walden that he make an adjustment in Constantine's salary, and tell him, in case of his unwillingness or inability to accept a reduction, that the Board would furnish him passage back to the United States.

The American opponents of the Mission based their view that Methodist missionary money was wasted in Bulgaria on the disappointing membership statistics turned in by the Superintendent. Bishop Goodsell knew these figures well enough (184 members and 34 probationers in 1896), but when he wrote to New York, "It is painful to see how money has been wasted," he was thinking of something quite concrete—the unwise and inefficient utilization of the Mission's funds for particular expenditures on personnel, property, and administration. The Bishop found the Bulgarians inclined to be spendthrift with Mission money and prone to turn local needs or desires into special pressures upon the Superintendent. And he found the Superintendent himself given to impractical expenditures and to circuitous methods of acquiring property that ultimately created a financial drain upon appropriations, left property titles clouded, and raised serious questions about the responsible use of special funds. Davis's financial management was confused, and his accounts were unclear. Bishop Goodsell felt compelled to advise that the Board should make a careful investigation of expenditures in Bulgaria for four years past and should demand strict accounting in the future from those handling the Mission's money. He was so concerned about the looseness of the administration in Bulgaria and about the hasty conclusions that could be drawn from his reports, that he marked a number of his letters to the New York office "private," "personal," "confidential," or "in strict confidence."

The Mission's most obviously questionable expenditure, as Bishop Goodsell saw it, was the \$2,600 that went into the combined salaries of Davis and Constantine, who were the appointed District Superintendents. Although Davis, having been on the field five or six years, could understand the Bulgarian language, he could not preach in it. Indeed, when he attempted to address the Mission Conference sessions in the national tongue, his remarks needed interpreting as much as those of the English-speaking Bishop. He could actually carry out little but the business functions of the District Superintendency. Therefore, although Davis remained technically the Superintendent of the Mission, Bishop Goodsell combined the two Districts in 1896 and made Constantine the single District Superintendent. When Davis returned to the United States in 1897, the two-District system was restored, but the two Superintendents, Constantine and M. D. Delcheff, were also

given assignments as full-time pastors—a stroke of economy. Bishop Goodsell really believed that all the supervisory work for Bulgaria could be done by one man. In fact, he told Secretary William T. Smith in the summer of 1896 that the field would be better administered by the Bishop in Europe working in co-operation with the New York office. He wished then that he could take radical action to simplify the Mission's administration, but felt that precipitate action would be inadvisable. Of course, Davis later resigned. But considering both the administrative needs and the deplorable friction in the Mission, Bishop Goodsell even would have arranged for Constantine's return to the States following Davis's departure had it not then been impracticable for secondary reasons.

Examining the conditions on the field, Bishop Goodsell thus came to a middle position in the controversy over the Missionary Society's basic policy on Bulgaria. He did not want to see the Mission closed, for he felt that in the work already built up, there was something worth salvaging. But he believed that simply salvaging and maintaining the project required neither the preservation of the former level of appropriations nor the presence of American missionaries as resident workers in Bulgaria. Bishop Goodsell held that the work could continue on an appropriation of not more than \$10,000, but did not want to see that figure lowered, because of what he feared would be a detrimental functional retrenchment on the field. For Goodsell, the crux of the problem was not the level of expenditures in itself, but the possibility of developing a creative program for Bulgarian Methodism. With that possibility in mind, he continued to support the attempt to keep the Mission going.

Although Bishops Walden and Vincent successively proposed concrete measures for advance in the work, not until the residency of Bishop William Burt in Europe did the Bulgaria Mission undergo any planned new beginning. By that time, its affairs were being conducted more economically, and moderate improvements in evangelistic response were observable, sufficiently so to renew Secretary Carroll's conviction that the Missionary Society should hold on in Bulgaria and endeavor to develop what appeared to be a more hopeful opportunity. After full and sharp debate at its session in November, 1904, the General Committee paved the way for a stronger effort by adding \$1,000 to the appropriation, in order to facilitate the dispatching of a new superintendent from the United States.

The new man, Elmer E. Count, a former missionary to Italy, arrived in Bulgaria in time for the April session of the Mission Conference in Varna, replacing on the Mission roster Trico Constantine, who was transferred to the States.

Starting off as Superintendent, Count headed a corps of two District Superintendents, resident in Ruse and Lovech, and over a dozen preachers. In order to "pull them all out of the ruts and give them a new start in

new fields" under the New Superintendent, Bishop Burt moved to new charges all but three of the preachers, even switching the two District Superintendents, Pavel Todoroff and M. D. Delcheff. The preachers had in their care 320 church members and 81 probationers, organized in very small societies. The charges listed in the Appointments for 1905 were Hibili, Lovech, Orchanie, Pleven, Sevlievo, Shumen, Trnovo, Vrattsa, Hotanza, Lom, Ruse and Kossui, Svistov, Varna, Vidin, and Voyvodinovo. Several of these charges functioned as rural Circuits, with settled or shifting preaching places and with pastors making irregular evangelistic visits into the countryside. The names of some of the charges were changing from year to year, representing the rise and fall of points of strength or hope in the work among the thinly spread constituencies.

Voyvodinovo, Vidin, and Vrattsa were recent fresh beginnings. The Methodist interest in Vrattsa, a town in the mountains sixty miles north of Sofia and ten miles from a railroad, grew out of a small group of non-Protestants who came together as the result of reading a set of pamphlets by Bishop John H. Vincent on the fourfold Christian life. The Bishop had written them for his new Society of the True Life, a fellowship of about a thousand people sympathetic with Methodist ideals but unready to commit themselves to church membership. Hearing from the group in 1903, Pavel Todoroff, superintendent of the Lovech District, first sent them advice by mail, then visited them, and later in the year sent them a pastor. Vidin, an old fortified town in the extreme northwest corner of Bulgaria and close to the Danube River, was opened to Methodist work at about the same time by the personal religious activity and influence of a single tradesman who had moved there from Lom, where he had attended the Methodist church. Voyvodinovo, a village near Lom, was appearing in the Appointments as a separate charge for only the third year. It was a community of industrious Bohemian Protestant immigrants, who in a few years built up their own town on a barren site assigned them by the government. When Trico Constantine, visiting them as Conference evangelist, drew them within the Methodist orbit, they displayed great responsibility in developing their local church and by 1905 had seventy full members, by far the largest Methodist church in Bulgaria.

The W.F.M.S. was maintaining two educational projects. It had forty-six pupils from fifteen cities and villages in its Girls' School in Lovech, which was headed by Kate B. Blackburn, assisted by Dora Davis. The School's six graded classes were taught largely by Bulgarian women. The primary school in Hotanza was still at work—and continued to be for four or five years more—with fifteen or twenty children under the instruction of a Bulgarian teacher. The Conference was just finishing a year of augmented use of W.F.M.S. Bible women in local communities, the W.F.M.S. in Bulgaria having added a worker to the one already supported by the parent society.

The last trace of the Missionary Society's boys' school (the Literary and Theological Institute)* had disappeared some years before Count's arrival in Bulgaria. The plan to move the Institute from Svistov to Ruse was completed in 1894, but there it quickly lost its character as a full-fledged school, became instead a student hostel (the Students' Home), and passed from the Mission scene when George S. Davis returned to the United States in 1897. Particularly with the need for a trained ministry in view, for more than a decade, the Mission Conference annually but fruitlessly brought to the attention of the Board the Mission's "crying need" for a boys' school that would include theological studies.

The Mission's charges were scattered through northern Bulgaria, between the Danube River and the Balkan Mountains, which ran clear across the country from Serbia to the Black Sea. The Methodist Episcopal mission originally had taken this area for its field as the result of an understanding reached in 1857 with the American Board, whose European Turkey Mission took up the evangelization of Bulgarians living in an area to the south.† By Disciplinary definition, the Bulgaria Mission Conference included, in 1905, "the Principality of Bulgaria north of the Balkan Mountains, with its central station at the city of Rustchuk, on the Danube River."

As Superintendent, Elmer Count inherited, in 1905, not only this geographical definition of the Mission, but also a working philosophy of its purpose and a pattern of religious confrontation of which all the Methodist workers were aware. It was rooted in response to the divine imperative to preach the gospel of Christ, involved the judgment that the dominant Bulgaria National Church (Eastern Orthodox, or "Greek") was a defective and ineffective gospel instrument, and came to a practical point in the conviction that the Methodist Episcopal Church was called by God to preach the pure gospel to Bulgaria. George S. Davis, Count's predecessor, said to the Mission Conference in Lovech in 1896:

Were the thirty thousand gods of heathen mythology stationed in temples, grove and hills about us, our task could not be more formidable than penetrating the indifferentism of a church whose clergy neither practice nor preach the Gospel, and whose sole service to the people is comprised in baptising its infants, marrying them when older and burying them when dead, all at so much per capita.

He obviously was thinking of the Orthodox Church when he spoke to the Central Council of Europe, the year before, of that "entailed legacy of sacerdotalism, ritualism, and prostration before icons" that he could not bring himself to equate with the gospel. Describing Orthodox beliefs and customs at length before the 1903 session of the same group, Stephen Thomoff,

* Vol. III, 1028-36, *passim*.

† See Vol. III, 1019 f.

editor of the Mission's periodical *The Christian World*, declared that the Orthodox Church had given the Bulgarian people a completely formalistic idea of religion. In 1901, Secretary Adna B. Leonard found Bulgaria universally sunk in spiritual apathy, declaring to the readers of *The Gospel in All Lands*, "In this regard the Greek Church is as far gone as the Roman Church." He asserted that the people did not understand or live by the fundamental teachings of Christianity, and characterized the condition in which the Orthodox Church had left them as "utter spiritual destitution." Dora Davis wrote of Bulgaria in 1904 as "this land of pagan Christianity."

William Burt, who became the Bishop in charge of Bulgaria in 1904, went even further than Davis and Thomoff; he made his public description of Orthodoxy harshly denunciatory. While criticizing the "Greek Church" and its obscurantist and tyrannical hierarchy at the Wesleyan Conference in Nottingham, England, in 1906, he said:

The Greek Church has become degenerate and corrupt, void of the spirit of evangelical Christianity. The study of God's Word has not only been discouraged but often forbidden. Mass is substituted for the gospel, penance for repentance: the Virgin Mary and saints for Christ. The simple people actually believe in the saving power of the superstitious practices allowed, encouraged and used. Religion and everyday life are regarded as separate affairs. The conception of God is that of an austere Judge whose anger must be appeased by the constant repetition of prayers, and chanting in an unknown tongue. . . . It is pagan in all but name.

Methodism's chief confrontation of Orthodoxy was occurring, of course, in Bulgaria.

Elmer Count accepted the customary Methodist denigration of Eastern Orthodoxy and gave it exhaustive and categorical expression in a paper he presented at the Third European Congress, in Copenhagen in 1907. Alongside his detailed attack on the "Greek Church," which he stigmatized as a "religion without Christ" and hence "a non-Christian religion," he laid a point-by-point proclamation of Methodism as the exemplar and teacher of the prime religious values and truths held to be so starkly absent from Orthodoxy. It was Methodism's mission, then, to fill this yawning spiritual vacuum in Bulgaria. Count said, "As Methodism, true to her divine instincts and scriptural faith, confronts this situation, she feels herself the very antipodes of this. In one respect I am a Calvinist. I believe God has raised her up to undo all this."

Count's thinking about the Mission's responsibility in the Methodist-Orthodox confrontation had a geographical dimension that carried it beyond Bulgaria. He viewed Bulgaria not as a field to be evangelized solely for its intrinsic value, but also as a strategic base offering opportunities for missionary thrusts into a number of other Slavic countries. He reported to New York in 1907 that the Methodists in Bulgaria had been requested to

start evangelical work in Romania, and he cited the strategic significance of the church in Vidin, near both the Romanian and the Serbian borders, which was influencing a number of Serbs who came there to trade and to work. "We ought to enter Roumania right away," he wrote Secretary Carroll, "and Servia in the very near future." Even earlier, in 1897, Stephen Thomoff had pointed to the strategic importance of Bulgaria for evangelization of Serbia and Romania.

Count also had his eye on southern Russia, to which many Bulgarians went in the summertime as laborers. After three requests out of Russia for an evangelical preacher, Count dispatched one of his ministers for a three-week effort to preach to the Bulgarians away from home and to reach out to the Russians. But the Russian government refused the Methodist preacher a visa to cross the border. Said Count, "Bulgaria Methodism ought to be permitted to attack Russia on the south while Finland Methodism performs a similar attack on the north." At about the same time, a delegate from an evangelical movement just beginning in Albania came all the way to Ruse to solicit Count's interest and co-operation in what they were attempting there.

When Count said of Methodism, "God swings wide open the door to her today," he visualized four countries—Romania, Serbia, Russia, Albania—as being evangelized by Methodist influences flowing from Bulgaria.

This enlarged geographical concept was reflected in the *Discipline* in 1908, when the General Conference, evidently responding to Bulgarian initiative, redefined the formal boundaries of the Bulgaria Mission Conference to include both the Principality of Bulgaria north of the Balkan Mountains, as before, and also, "other contiguous countries of the Balkan Peninsula lying north and west of said section." The expansive approach to Bulgaria as an evangelizing center for the entire Balkan group, including Greece, persisted in the thinking of the Mission's leadership. Interpreting the religious and the international situations for his Central Conference colleagues at Rome in 1911, Elmer Count reiterated his conviction that "the strategic work of the evangelical cause in the Balkan Peninsula must be done in Bulgaria." In his first annual report to the Board after the outbreak of World War I, but before Bulgaria's embroilment in it, he went so far as to offer the establishment of evangelical Christianity in the Balkans, with Bulgaria as the original radiating center, as the way to overcome the traditional hatreds between Balkan peoples, to unify the Peninsula, and to bring peace not only to that area, but perhaps to all Europe. "The Greek Catholic Church and Mohammedanism have completely failed to do this," he said. "Evangelical Christianity has it within her powers."

Bishop John L. Neulsen indicated early in 1914, however, that the Methodists were not ready to endeavor to implement such broad hopes for Bulgaria. When Secretary North asked his advice on an inquiry from the American

Board as to whether the Methodists intended to enter Serbia, into which one of its own Bulgarian stations had been separated by the realignment of international boundaries, the Bishop replied that the need for fuller expenditures elsewhere in Europe forbade the Methodists' starting anything in Serbia at that time.

Into statements justifying missionary work in Bulgaria there crept, now and then, suggestions of an anti-Islam, anti-Turk function for the Mission. American Methodists were united in their loathing of the Turks. When Bishop Goodsell traveled through Bulgaria in 1896, becoming everywhere observant of the presence of Turks and their mosques, he wrote into his *Christian Advocate* narrative, descriptions of earlier Turkish atrocities and prophesied, "And until the Turk is banished from Europe, Bulgaria must be in appalling uncertainty as to its future. She must yet know war before the final peace." He hoped for the day when the Powers would no longer keep the "great assassin" on his throne. When Turkey and Greece went to war in 1897, Secretary Adna B. Leonard wrote to Bishop Goodsell, who was en route to Ruse, "I hope the Greeks will crush the Turks—I was going to say, out of creation—they deserve to be." To another Secretary, Homer C. Stuntz, Turkey was, as to so many Americans, "the Unspeakable Turk."

With Bulgarian Methodists, whose nation had for so long been under Turkish control and whose countrymen in Macedonia were bitterly repressed by their Turkish masters, denunciation of Turkey was far more than a long-distance religio-political moralism. In a country where Bulgarian nationalism and the primacy of the Bulgarian National Church were the two essential poles of patriotism, it was natural that Bulgarian Methodists should evaluate their relatively new religious allegiance in terms of its contribution to the national destiny. Thus when Stephen Thomoff told the Zurich Congress in 1903 that God's providence was at work in the missions in Bulgaria, he was speaking both as a Methodist and as a Bulgarian. God would bring the entire range of Bulgarian life under the influence of the gospel and deliver the Christians of Macedonia "from the galling yoke of the unspeakable Turk." Under Providence, Thomoff believed, Bulgaria would "soon be called to play in the Balkan peninsula the part Piedmont played in Italy" during the forging of its unification forty years earlier. He saw the Methodist Mission preparing God-fearing and daring men who would "use their efforts to unite all the Slavs in southern Europe in one great Balkan confederation." Thus projecting God into Balkan politics, Thomoff pointed out that the success of the great work for country and for God required reinforcement of the Mission by its American sponsors.

Elmer Count, whose feelings about the Turks were not atypical of those of American Methodists and who before long wholeheartedly identified himself with the Bulgarian national cause, expressed more sharply than anybody else the anti-Islam ingredient in this blend of piety and patriotism. He

viewed the activity of the Methodist and the American Board missions in Bulgaria as led by God in a "flank movement upon the citadel of Mohammedanism." By 1913, when Bulgaria was fighting Turkey in the First Balkan War, Count was able to describe that conflict to Secretary North as, on the one side, "the Devil's beaten battle in defense of Mohammedanism" and, on the other, a war inspired by the Christian God. In this setting, Count made an extraordinary attribution of success to the two Missions; he declared:

had there not been any more of evangelical thought and spirit in Bulgaria than there is in Servia or Greece or Montenegro or Roumania there would not have been any war. . . . Bulgaria is greatly different from these other countries and she is thus different because of the evangelical truth that these two Missions have given to her.

This view was not entirely consistent with the hope Count expressed in his Board report a year later for peaceful conversion of the Muslims in Bulgaria itself through the evangelical purification of Bulgarian Christianity. Nor was it fully coherent with Count's accompanying analysis and prophesy of evangelical Christianity as a peacemaking influence among the nations. But at least it showed where his heart was and revealed something of the character of his practical theology. Thomoff put God into politics; Count mobilized God for war.

Far more modest than any of these broader considerations, was even the most significant geographical extension of the Mission carried out under Count's leadership. In the fall of 1908, Count moved to Sofia, in western Bulgaria, thus bringing the Mission into the nation's capital and also shifting the Methodists' headquarters from Ruse. The General Conference had formally recognized this move in advance to the extent of dropping from the definition of the Mission Conference its previous citation of Ruse as the Mission's administrative center. Many months passed before Count could find a place in Sofia for holding regular evangelistic services.

Executing this new move, however, was simpler than preparing for it. To plan for Methodist entry into Sofia was to risk bringing on the first break in the friendly relations existing between the Methodist Episcopal mission, on the one hand, and the American Board missionaries and their Bulgarian evangelical associates, on the other—a happy relationship that had continued since the founding of the two missions in the eighteen-fifties.

Count's move was not the first Methodist approach to Sofia to jeopardize this good relationship. Inter-Mission harmony had been threatened in 1892, when Bishop Isaac W. Joyce appointed Stephen Thomoff to Sofia, expecting him not only to serve as the Methodist agent for contacts with government officials, but also to start a Methodist Episcopal church. American Board missionaries at once protested that this was a breach of comity that was

all the more unpalatable to them because no consultation between the two Missions had preceded the appointment.

Unfortunately, the American Board workers and officials misunderstood the nature of the original "comity" plan to which they appealed.

The Methodists had entered Bulgaria in November, 1857, at the repeated prompting of the American Board and some of its missionaries in the Near East. The American Board missionaries took up work in the country in 1858. In December, 1856, when the Methodists were committed to establishing a mission in Bulgaria but had as yet appointed no missionaries, Rufus Anderson, the American Board secretary in Boston, wrote John P. Durbin, the Methodist secretary in New York, about the possible, but by no means planned, formation of American Board stations "among the Bulgarians of Adrianople [Edirne] & Philippopolis [Plovdiv], or anywhere in short south" of the Balkans. On the basis of previous approaches to the Methodists, Anderson evidently considered Bulgaria clearly a Methodist missionary preserve. He wrote, "We have no thought of going into Bulgaria; that field we would by all means leave for your immediate & full and successful occupation." He asked whether Durbin would deem this possible, but not actually proposed, extension of their mission from Turkey as "any interference with your own Mission. . . ."

Durbin replied on 13 December in a letter marked by the kind of cordiality that characterized the relations of the two Boards and their Bulgaria missionaries for decades afterwards. He assured Anderson of the undoubted willingness of the Methodist board

to approve of your extending your Missions to the Bulgarians dwelling south of the Balkan range of Mountains and we shall rejoice at your finding the men & the means to do this quickly and effectually while we hope to occupy strongly & without unreasonable delay Bulgaria proper, to which you have so kindly and cordially invited us. Should both these projects take effect, you at work on the south of the Balkan range and we on the North we may hope to rekindle among that interesting people the life of the Evangelical Gospel . . .

This response of Durbin's is the basic document concerned with the original "comity" agreement between the two Boards. It was by no means a formally negotiated statement, but only one of the items in this two-letter correspondence. It was relatively loose in its delimitation of respective fields, and made no reference to exclusive occupation of any given territory by either party. Following this limited exchange of letters came Cyrus Hamlin's explorations for the American Board of an area south of the Balkans, in May, 1857, and the sending of Wesley Prettyman and Albert L. Long to Bulgaria to take up work for the Methodists.*

* Vol. III, 1019.

The north-south pattern very early became current in missionary correspondence and publications. But it was so far from being a matter of urgent operative concern in the 1850's that Durbin, its author, did not even mention it in the well-articulated letter of instructions he gave Prettyman and Long when they started for Bulgaria in July, 1857. The pattern had no contemporary context of missionary competition or of any necessity to guard against it, but expressed an uncalculating, friendly division of missionary labor. In its fullest scope, it was to be applied not to work in Bulgaria, but to work among *Bulgarians* in European Turkey. The Methodist field was mutually recognized to be Bulgaria (Durbin and others called it "Bulgaria proper"). The prospective American Board work was to take the form of missions to Bulgarians living outside of Bulgaria, in a less well defined area to the south. The American Board's first planned objectives, Edirne (Adrianople) and Plovdiv (Philippopolis), lay in the region called Rumelia. Here was established, under the Treaty of Berlin, in 1878, the political jurisdiction of Eastern Rumelia, which was not united with Bulgaria until 1885. Durbin originally used the terms "north" and "south" quite informally, and for the time being, the two Boards had no practical need to work out any more precise definition of the two mission fields to which they were turning their efforts.

The comity agreement met its first functional test in 1862, when the American Board desired to establish a mission in Sofia. Sofia, which lay not far east of Serbia, was a part of Bulgaria and had been for centuries. That fact placed it, under the major provision of the Anderson-Durbin correspondence of 1856, within the Methodist field, although the Methodist missionaries had undertaken no work there. The American Board naturally applied to the Methodist board with a request for its consent to the opening of an American Board mission in Sofia. Durbin replied for the Methodists on 18 September 1862:

I have procured the concurrence of Bishops Simpson & Janes to your request that the American Board may occupy Sophia in Bulgaria, with our consent. They have charge of our Bulgarian Mission, & cordially consent. I, on behalf of the Board, concur. So that if its geographical position admitted of question between the two Boards, the possibility of such questions rising is *extinguished*.

Evidently, the customary references to the two fields as lying north and south of the Balkan Mountains had by this time aroused some question on the part of the American Board people as to whether Sofia might be counted as part of their own field on the ground that it appeared to be south of the Balkans. They did not press the question upon the Methodists, however, and by acceptance of Durbin's letter as the basis of their new position in Sofia, they recognized, substantially, that the geographical question concerning Sofia

was secondary, not determinative in the partition of the larger field the two Missions shared in their approach to the Bulgarians. Notifying Long of the new arrangement, Durbin put it very simply: "At the request of the Am. Board, we have consented to their occupying Sophia. This was done because you, as a Mission advised us to consent." The American Board sent missionaries to Sofia later that fall, and maintained a station there for about six years.

Durbin himself had held no intention that his letter of 1856 should assign Sofia to the American Board. He had discussed Sofia as a prospective Methodist base with three American Board Near East missionaries (Messrs. Riggs, Dodd, and Parsons) as early as March, 1855. He also included Sofia as a preferred center for the new mission in his official instructions to Prettyman and Long in 1857. This fact must have been known to the American Board missionaries in Istanbul (Constantinople), with whom they thoroughly discussed the problem of where to locate the Methodist mission, and particularly to E. E. Bliss, the American Board missionary who accompanied the two Methodists on their exploratory trip into Bulgaria. Long and Prettyman having settled elsewhere, Durbin very positively urged Sofia upon them, in a letter from New York in March, 1858, as the best center for the Mission. In July 1858, Long was quoted in *The Missionary Advocate* as looking forward to missionary work in Sofia. As late as 1860 appeared the *Annual Report* of the Missionary Society for 1859, which cited Durbin's original instructions about Sofia. There could have been little substantial doubt in 1862 that Sofia really belonged within the Methodist sphere.

But thirty years later, the American Board missionaries who charged the Methodists with violating comity by assigning Thomoff to Sofia took the categorical position that the Methodists had no rights there at all. Their spokesman, H. C. Haskell, interpreted the Anderson-Durbin exchange of 1856 as a hard-and-fast, formally negotiated compact clearly marking out areas of exclusive occupation for the missionaries of the respective Boards. Appealing to his memory of Durbin's letter of 1862, which he said he had seen in the American Board's Boston office within a few weeks after it was received, Haskell asserted that through that letter, the Methodists had "explicitly renounced all claim to that city which they might be supposed to have." And Haskell and his co-workers believed that that claim was of no value; on their behalf, he revived the geographical question about Sofia, and stated that the disputed city was clearly south of the Balkans, and thus conclusively and exclusively a part of the American Board field. N. G. Clark, the American Board secretary in Boston, associated himself with the missionaries' view, but not passionately, and took up the question of Thomoff's appointment with the Methodist secretaries in New York.

It immediately became clear that neither Bishop Joyce nor George S. Davis, the Methodist mission superintendent newly arrived in Bulgaria, knew

anything about the crucial correspondence out of which the long-standing comity pattern had been erected. In their ignorance of it, they had acted in good faith in sending Thomoff to Sofia. The Methodist officials in the New York office knew as little of the history of the Bulgaria inter-Mission plan as did the men on the field. J. Oramel Peck, Corresponding Secretary for Bulgaria, even had to write to the American Board's Boston office for a copy of Durbin's letter of 1862. Indeed, the New York office was not even cognizant of the Thomoff appointment until Bishop Joyce made it and the American Board then complained.

Peck gave the American Board case a careful hearing, and was inclined at first to accept it, bringing it promptly to the attention of the Bishops of the Methodist Episcopal Church. In the light of the Durbin letter on Sofia, both Peck and the Bishops readily acknowledged the legitimacy of the American Board complaint against unilateral revision of any such understanding without full and frank correspondence. The Bishops asked Bishop Joyce to withdraw Thomoff from Sofia out of regard for the feelings of the American Board officials and missionaries. This he effected as soon as was practicable, but not soon enough to prevent the American Board missionaries' seriously questioning the stated intention of the Methodists and sharply returning to the attack on the entire Methodist position and procedure. (The men in Boston and New York were far less excited about the whole question than their missionaries in Bulgaria.)

As the Methodist officials studied the Sofia problem, they became less certain of the conclusiveness of the American Board's comity case, and in advising Thomoff's withdrawal, they reserved for review later on the question of the essential right of the Methodists to enter the Bulgarian capital. Bishop Joyce in particular finally concluded that the Methodist right to missionary occupation of Sofia remained unimpaired and ultimately was to be qualified only by considerations of fraternal consultation. Peck notified the American Board that negotiations about Sofia might possibly be opened at some time in the future. Thus the brief potential dispute between the two Boards was suspended on a note of fraternal accommodation, with the essential questions about the so-called comity agreements still unresolved.

On the field, there was no breach in formal fraternal relations between the two Missions, but these never constituted official relations between the Methodist mission and the Bulgarian Evangelical Society, the association in which the churches developed from the American Board's missionary enterprise were united. The Mission Conference deliberately underscored the difference in 1895, when it responded to letters from a man appointed as the Society's fraternal delegate to the Conference. On motion of George S. Davis, a special committee reviewed the whole question of relations between the Conference and the Evangelical Society. The Conference then declined to exchange fraternal delegates with the Society, offering both a contingent

reason and a Disciplinary reason. The latter reason was the lack of harmony between the aims and efforts of the Society "viewed from a practical standpoint" and Methodist Episcopal church government, and the former reason was the missionary territorial division "as understood and practiced in the Mission South of the Balkans." The Methodists' adopted statement was blunt, perhaps even smug, but it was essentially a reaffirmation of the *status quo* as between the two groups. There is scattered evidence, however, that the Bulgaria Mission Conference had some disposition, from 1896 to 1906, to rethink its relations with both the American Board mission and the Bulgarian Evangelical Society.

The Sofia question did not become an occasion of negotiation between the two Boards for more than a decade,* if for no other reason than that those were not years propitious, in official Methodist missionary circles, for promotion of any kind of expansion of the Bulgaria Mission. Under the initiative of Elmer Count and Bishop Burt, it first reappeared for open discussion by the Methodists in the April, 1906, session of the Bulgaria Mission Conference, in the presence of the fraternal delegate from the American Board mission. Bishop Burt took the position that the Methodists had a clear right to enter Sofia, but stated that he would withhold any appointment to Sofia at that time, hoping for a decision that could be achieved "in a brotherly way," with consideration for the feelings of the men in the other Mission.

The Board office in New York did not enter the discussion until it received an inquiry from the American Board's secretary, James L. Barton, late in 1906. Then Secretary Henry K. Carroll replied to Barton, "Why our representatives should consider it necessary to be in Sofia I do not know. I only know that Bishop Burt thinks it very desirable."

At Carroll's request, Count outlined the case for the contemplated move. Sofia, he said, was now the true administrative capital of all Bulgaria, as it had not been in 1857 and 1862. The Methodist mission needed, fairly frequently, to approach government offices in the capital directly, thus incurring expensive and time-consuming travel from Ruse, where Count resided, some two hundred miles away. Count was even then preparing for a trip to Sofia in an effort to block what he believed was illegal conscription of the Vidin pastor into three year's military service. One of the young preachers had just returned from a similar period in the army, the Mission having been unable advantageously to press his case. The Methodists needed to have an agent conveniently on the Sofia scene and also the supporting prestige that could flow from maintaining an observable Methodist enterprise there. Count had in mind not only organizing a church, but also opening a hostel for students attending the University of Sofia, so as to keep close to the educated young people who would make desirable recruits as leaders for the Methodist community. Sofia also would afford a better base for the development of co-

* See note, p. 477.

operative projects with the American Board mission in such activities as publishing.

Count advanced one consideration of strategy that was germane to the long-depressed fortunes of the Bulgaria mission as a seeker of funds and moral support from the General Missionary Committee; he emphasized the point that General Committee members and other influential Methodists visiting Europe and traveling the main railroad line through the European capitals from Vienna to Istanbul by way of Sofia passed through Bulgaria without ever seeing any Methodist work in the country at all. He also informed Carroll that the morale of the Mission's Bulgarian workers was affected by their resentment at being unfairly excluded, as they put it, from the national capital that had so much patriotic significance for them.

In supporting this case as to its controversial background, Count affirmed, more decisively and clearly than any Methodist official had done before, the right of Methodism to be established in Sofia. Recognizing the original division of labor among the Bulgarians by the two Boards, Count nevertheless stated that historically Sofia had always been regarded as a part of northern Bulgaria, or Bulgaria proper, as the earlier missionaries called it. At the close of the Russo-Turkish War (1878), he noted, Sofia became the capital of the northern territory (the Principality of Bulgaria) at the same time that Plovdiv was recognized as the capital of the southern territory (Eastern Rumelia). Touching on the geographical question, Count asserted that Sofia lay neither wholly south of the Balkans nor wholly to the north of them, but was located between two spurs of the Balkans which ran north and south of the city.* He believed that there thus could be no doubt of the legitimacy of the original Methodist claim to Sofia. And he quite rightly read the Durbin letter of 1862 as in no way essentially evacuating this claim or permanently excluding the Methodists from the city.

The two Missions were beginning to evolve a solution to the Sofia question even before Count got his case down on paper for the New York office. The personnel of both groups had got together at a summer school session in Varna some months earlier and thrashed out its practical and spiritual implications. Neither side wanted to impair the spirit of co-operation between the two Missions, and both desired so to accommodate their differences as to pave the way for establishing joint educational and publishing projects. Discussion brought better understanding. The advantage of having common ground in Sofia began to appear. Count reported that the entire group finally agreed that the Methodists had as good a right to be in Sofia as any other mission did. And he even was able to write to Carroll, "Some of the brethren of the other Mission are enthusiastically in favor of our going to Sofia."

* See note, p. 477 f.

Undoubtedly it was not Count's persuasiveness that effected this better understanding, but the Methodists' willingness—this time—to consult and to wait, along with the emergence among the American Board men of a more pragmatic approach to the Sofia issue. They all had opposed the unilateral action of the Methodists in 1892. But once Thomoff was recalled from Sofia, differences of opinion developed among them. Some of them sympathized with the Methodists' desire to have a station in Sofia and favored inviting them to come in. Better to have them come by invitation, it was held, than eventually and inevitably to have them enter against the express opposition of American Board interests. Therefore, in 1896, the European Turkey Mission voted, 4 to 3, to recommend to the Prudential Committee in the United States that it sanction joint occupation of the Bulgarian capital. The non-voting Bulgarian representatives present at the meeting all opposed the recommendation.

By 1906, the American Board missionaries were discussing the matter with fresh urgency; they were facing serious financial trouble in their publishing activity, particularly in the continuance of *Zornitza*, the evangelical journal founded decades before by Albert L. Long, who originally had entered Bulgaria as a Methodist missionary. Evidently they believed that they could have Methodist co-operation in education and publication only at the price of conceding the legitimacy of Count's Sofia plan. In a referendum held in August, the American Board missionaries once again voted favorably, asking the Prudential Committee to invite the Methodists. Once again the Bulgarian workers opposed the move, but this time in a split vote, 11 to 15. Even after the recommendation was formally adopted, there was strong residual feeling against having the Methodists appear in Sofia under the Methodist label, thus injecting a fruitless American sectarian distinction into an important Bulgarian city where the church working with the American Board was called Evangelical, not Congregational.

Now came, for Count and Burt, a year of waiting. The American Board's Boston office was slow in responding to inquiries from Secretary Carroll and in processing the recommendation from the field, and the Methodists' New York office delayed expressing support for the projected move. Carroll at one point reminded Bishop Burt, who was beginning to grow restive, of the reluctance of a conservative element in the Board of Managers to contemplate any enlargement of the Bulgaria Mission. But in October, 1907, the Prudential Committee voted in favor of inviting the Methodists into Sofia, and the General Missionary Committee soon tacitly approved the Bulgaria Mission's plan to open work here as described to them by Carroll.

Negotiating the terms of joint occupancy was left to Dr. Carroll and Dr. Barton. Barton suggested six points for mutual acceptance: (1) the appearance of sectarian rivalry in Sofia should be avoided by minimizing denominational differences; (2) Methodist quarters should be located in another section

of the city from the Evangelical Church; (3) the Methodists should not move south of the Balkan Mountains in the neighborhood of Sofia; (4) the two Missions should agree upon a common salary scale for preachers and workers so as to avoid competitive hiring; (5) it would be desirable to develop educational co-operation through the school currently maintained by the American Board in Samokov, so as to train young Methodist mission workers; (6) it would be desirable to enter into co-operative publishing activity, particularly in the production and distribution of *Zornitza*.

Barton and Carroll corresponded cordially and positively enough, but it was Bishop Burt's co-operation that was required in actually processing the suggestions made by the American Board executive. Burt, through Secretary Carroll, readily agreed to Barton's first three points, which covered simple comity arrangements. He had his doubts, however, about the feasibility of a common salary scale, but stated that Methodist field policy would have no place in it for hiring preachers associated with the other Mission. He foresaw difficulties, also, in attempting co-operation in the Samokov school, because it seemed to imply training Methodist workers in an American Board institution. And Burt pointed to the difficulty involved in uniting on publications; he did not want to abandon the Methodists' own journal for Bulgaria. At this stage, Bishop Burt's denominational consciousness appeared to be operative as he commented on Barton's last two points.

Fully public Methodist services finally were opened in Sofia in August, 1909, and before the Conference year was out, the new congregation became a regularly organized Methodist Episcopal church. After experiencing a good deal of difficulty in finding any meeting place at all, Count had been obliged to settle on an ill-smelling hired hall, located near the business district, which also served, under other auspices and inconveniently enough for the religious work, as a dining room for more than a hundred of Sofia's poor school children. The first pastor was Ivan Setchanoff, an able minister who had been received into the Bulgaria Mission Conference the year before from the ministry of the Evangelical Church.

By opening in Sofia, the Methodists did not actually come into direct evangelistic competition with the American Board mission as such. That Board's only local project was a kindergarten school operated by a woman missionary. The American Board considered Sofia an outstation of their mission in Samokov, where their nearest evangelistic missionaries lived. But there was in Sofia an Evangelical Church long associated with the Board. With the missionaries and the Evangelical pastors in general the Methodists had no real difficulty, but with the local Evangelical pastor, who stirred up a certain number of other people, they had no little trouble at first. He showed great antagonism to both Count and Setchanoff and insisted on treating them as hostile sectarian interlopers and competitors who were not going to keep to the simple comity provisions about the location of the Methodist

preaching place. Although there were other Evangelical and American Board people who regretted his actions, he made enough of a fuss to elicit a letter of complaint about Count from Secretary James L. Barton to Adna B. Leonard.

The New York office desired peace, but it did not really call Count to book. In his preparations for the new mission in Sofia, Count had tried to act prudently and to prevent misunderstanding of his spirit and his plans. And when misunderstanding arose, he and Setchanoff went far out of their way to allay it. Count had always made it clear that there was one thing he could not do; he could not set up the new congregation under any other name than that of the Methodist Episcopal Church. Indeed, no promise to do so ever had been made. Actually, the sectarian aggressiveness charged against Count seemed, perhaps in the form of mere parochial defensiveness, rather to have infected the behavior of the officially nonsectarian Evangelical pastor. He made no allowances for Count's handicaps in seeking a location for the mission and unreasonably and prematurely denounced Count's preparations to launch Methodism on its ministry in the capital.

More serious than this passing and partial frustration of inter-Mission co-operation was the inability of the Methodist and the American Board groups to come to any practical understanding, during the pre-war years, on the opportunities for joint action in education and publications. For the American Board missionaries, there was a special irony in this latter failure, for it was largely the hope of progress in these fields that led some of them to rethink their Mission's earlier insistence upon a strict construction of the comity agreement as they had conceived it.

In spite of Bishop Burt's denominationally minded response to Secretary Barton's overtures, the two Missions began corresponding in the fall of 1908, upon the initiative of the American Board group, on the possibility of co-operation in the publication of *Zornitza*. Until its suspension in 1897, this evangelical journal had been published by the American Board mission, and upon its resumption in 1902, it was published under a Bulgarian editor in co-operation with the Bulgarian Evangelical Society, with the Mission officially underwriting about two-thirds of the publication budget. The preliminary correspondence about *Zornitza* was unsatisfactory. In May, 1909—a time of good feeling between the Missions—the Bulgaria Mission Conference, responding to a proposal for joint publication brought to its session by the fraternal delegate from the American Board mission, voted to enter into joint publication of *Zornitza* beginning in 1910. It also left the continuance of its own monthly paper *The Christian World* in the hands of a committee with power to act in case an inter-Mission agreement should be successfully negotiated. Actually, the Methodist vote embodied a counterproposal as far as the implementing details were concerned. Some months later, the American Board mission rejected the Methodist plan, and the unproductive negotiations

were not resumed. *Zornitza* continued under the same sponsorship. The Methodists went forward with *The Christian World*, but for financial reasons did not convert it, as they had contemplated, into a weekly.

Back of this failure of the two Missions to resolve the *Zornitza* question lay the fact that they confronted each other as representatives of two radically different forms of missionary and ecclesiastical polity.

The American Board was from the beginning a substantially nondenominational missionary agency that was not organically a part of any particular denomination. Along with Congregational churches in the United States it had very early counted Presbyterian and Reformed churches among the supporters of its missionary activities—churches that were essentially either presbyterial or purely associational in their ecclesiastical relationships. Written into the Board's charter was the basic provision that it was not to be an ecclesiastical organization and should not itself exercise any ecclesiastical functions on the foreign field. Even when the Presbyterian and Reformed churches terminated their association with it after some decades and only Congregational churches were left, the Board retained its nondenominational character.

The American Board's purpose in Bulgaria, as elsewhere, was to preach the gospel, win converts, and then assist them to form churches. These Bulgarian churches were quite independent of ecclesiastical control by the American Board or any of the American denominations. The missionaries (they were not all Congregationalists) gave the churches money and counsel, but kept their mission organization so definitely separate from the Bulgarian ministry that the Bulgarian preachers were not voting members of the Mission that administered the resources sent from the United States. The churches were known by no American denominational name, but only as Evangelical Churches, which in 1875 had developed their own association, the Bulgarian Evangelical Society. This, in its turn, was not an authoritative ecclesiastical body, but a kind of voluntary home mission society maintained by autonomous local churches and their ministers.

Unlike the American Board, the Methodist Episcopal Board of Foreign Missions was a completely denominational agency whose powers were defined by the General Conference. It was closely integrated, in its missionary operations, with the Methodist ecclesiastical system, a tight connectionalism exerting over local churches controls that were quite foreign to the life of the Congregational churches. The Methodist missionaries abroad were representatives of the Methodist Episcopal Church, and those who were ministers functioned under strict Disciplinary provisions as to their ecclesiastical acts. Unlike the Bulgarian pastors associated with the American Board, the Bulgarian pastors working with the Methodists became Methodist ministers, members of a Methodist Mission Conference, and appointees of Methodist presiding Bishops. There was only one kind of church a Methodist

minister or District Superintendent could organize or maintain, namely a Methodist Episcopal Church. Ecclesiastically, his prime duty was to protect and advance the interest of the Methodist Episcopal Church—a yoke that chafed some men more than others but essentially determined the degree of extradenominational co-operation open to Methodist missionaries.

Both Missions were evangelical, rather than formal or doctrinal, in their basic emphases, and they had a long record of mutual good will and general co-operation. But their differences in polity could and did become obstacles to ready adoption of a form of co-operation that involved or approached any kind of official merger of activities. When they faced the *Zornitsa* problem, both Missions acted and reacted to concrete proposals under impulses naturally generated by their respective familiar forms of organization. Each group was conscious of a vested interest it had to protect, and each drafted its proposals without using enough imagination to take account of what the other normally could be expected to accept. The Methodists felt that the American Board plans called for a crucial surrender of Methodist identity and of the furtherance of the interests of the Methodist churches in Bulgaria. And they could not agree to work with the Bulgarian Evangelical Society under a plan predicated upon acceptance of the American Board view of the Society and its churches as being fully nonsectarian and non-Congregational in nature. The American Board mission felt that it could not admit denominational (that is, Methodist) concerns into *Zornitsa*, whose success was held to be due to its studious avoidance of sectarianism and of foreign intervention in Bulgarian church life, and it could not think of itself as an ecclesiastical body merging part of its activity with that of another ecclesiastical body.

The Missions unfortunately dealt with the problem too much by correspondence rather than through direct conferences and did not stay together on the problem long enough to achieve real mutual understanding of what had to be done to bring two such differently organized missionary groups into an official working relationship. The project failed because men of good spirit proved incapable at that point of coping with their missionary machinery.

They got together much more successfully, however, in an effort to protect and improve the legal status of the Protestant missions and churches in Bulgaria. The essential guarantee of religious liberty still resided not in the national constitution, but in the Treaty of Berlin (1878), by which the European powers established the Principality of Bulgaria. And the realized value of this guarantee still depended upon the whim of the national government as it responded variously from time to time to pressures from the hierarchy of the Bulgaria National Church in the atmosphere of prejudice rising from the prevalent identification of Bulgarian patriotism with loyalty to the Church. Sometimes this meant fair dealing, sometimes it meant harassment and handicap. The evangelical leaders, including the Methodists, undertook late in 1909

to draft a proposed law on church government, usages, and privileges that would be acceptable to the current Cabinet and to the Parliament. In this undertaking, which they hoped would result in genuine government recognition of their churches and would curb public operation of the popular prejudice against them, they had some initial encouragement from the national administration.

Most of the work on the drafting committee's extensive formulation was carried out in Elmer Count's home. Naturally, the committee had to draw up articles that would take account of both the episcopal and the congregational polities governing the respective churches. The committee presented its report to a five-day convention of about a hundred ministers and laymen that met in Sofia in November—forty-four from the American Board group, forty-eight from the Methodist mission, and two from the Baptists. The convention adopted the report substantially as drafted, elected the pastor of the Sofia Evangelical Church and Setchanoff (the Methodist pastor) as the convention's official representatives, and conducted inspirational meetings that helped to generate greater good will and harmony among the Protestant groups represented. There was even tentative hope of the convention's achieving some permanent organization that could take over publication of both *The Christian World* and *Zornitza*.

This was a time of measured optimism in the Protestant community, for there had been signs of some softening of public prejudice against its churches and even signs of sympathy with Protestant teaching among some of the clergy and adherents of the National Church. But towards the end of 1910, before the new religious law proposed by the convention could be formally introduced into Parliament, the Protestant leaders got wind of the intention of the Prime Minister to have enacted instead a law, inimical to Protestant interests, that had been inspired by the National Church hierarchy and pressed upon this very ministry that had so recently encouraged the Protestant effort. Evidently, the Prime Minister intended to railroad the "Bill for the Non-Orthodox Faiths in the Kingdom of Bulgaria" through Parliament before its contents should be fully known. It was printed, deposited in the archives of the National Assembly, and made unavailable for normal distribution; even foreign legations were refused copies. Somebody with government connections, however, secretly loaned a copy to Count and a few of his friends. Count had the bill in his house for two days—long enough to have its forty-five articles copied for distribution in both Bulgarian and English. When Count and his associates read the bill, they found their misgivings amply justified.

The bill's many restrictions were so drafted as to fall heavily, either actually or potentially, upon the churches sponsored by the Protestant missions and the Bulgarian Evangelical Society. It provided a full set of legal instruments for the most severe obstruction of public evangelism, building programs, church finance, the enlistment and maintenance of the ministry, and other phases of

Protestant activity. For instance, no new church was to be organized in any community where there were less than seventy-five families ready to affiliate with the proposed Protestant church, and no already existent church smaller than this was to be permitted to erect a church building. Count estimated that no more than 10 per cent of the evangelical churches in Bulgaria had that number of families. Two other aspects of the bill were especially vicious: the creation of many risks to the Protestants because of loose definitions of requirements and offenses; and the provision of highly punitive legal penalties, which in some cases even involved confiscation of property. Fundamentally, the bill was completely retrogressive in purpose, for it was so framed as to lead the country into repressive religious practices that the Protestants never had suffered even under Turkish administration. It embodied a gross practical renunciation of the principle of religious freedom. Count and some of his friends were convinced that this radically reactionary proposal grew out of the realization by some elements in the National Church that Protestant teachings actually were beginning to gain a sympathetic hearing on the part of many Bulgarians.

Count and his non-Methodist friends quickly became co-workers in a campaign to stop the bill. For his part, he sent copies of the offensive legislation to all the ministers in the Mission Conference and informed the Secretaries in New York of the danger to the Protestant churches. Secretary Stuntz, co-operating with the American Board administration, then applied to the Secretary of State, Philander C. Knox, in Washington, for the employment of his good offices in the situation. The United States diplomatic agent for Bulgaria was the American Minister to Romania. On behalf of both the major Missions, Count sent off to the Minister, in Bucharest, an analysis of the Bill for Non-Orthodox Churches and an appeal for his intervention to protect the interests represented by the Protestant churches. Protestant pleas for help went also to the various foreign legations located in Sofia, and they generally co-operated in exerting pressure on the Minister of Faith, who was also the Foreign Minister, against enactment of the bill.

The Cabinet Ministers began to think better of attempting to implement the desires of the National Church group that had spawned the repressive measure. The churches so effectively stirred up public opinion to a degree unexpected by the politicians, and the legations made such a strategic impact, that early in January the bill to control the churches was withdrawn. The Prime Minister evidently was piqued at what had happened; Count told Secretary Stuntz that the Minister had let it be known that he was of a mind to retaliate by not proposing to Parliament any law at all to regulate Protestant affairs. This reported attitude certainly was coherent with what actually happened—the death of the legislation the Protestant convention of 1909 had drafted. The Protestant groups thus remained dependent, as before, upon the caprice of political administrators for whatever liberties they had in Bulgaria.

Greater troubles were on the way, however. Political independence (it was proclaimed in 1908, recognized by the Powers in 1909) came to Bulgaria without losing secular forces unsettling to the Methodist Mission. But in August, 1912, Elmer Count had a premonitory experience, of which he wrote:

Two nights ago an earthquake shook Bulgaria and aroused Mrs. Count and myself from a deep sleep. The suspended electric lights swayed back and forth like the pendulum of a clock. But then we are constantly living over volcanic ground geographically, politically, internationally and religiously. We are constantly wondering what is going to happen next. The next few weeks may bring interesting developments.

Within weeks, indeed, the Counts were witnessing a general mobilization of the Bulgarian army that created extraordinary public excitement, for it gave body to rumors of imminent war between Bulgaria and Turkey. With his own house in Sofia listed for possible quartering of soldiers, Count wrote to Secretary Frank Mason North, "I do not wish to figure as an alarmist. But no one can say that a general conflagration of war will not be ignited here in the Balkan states that will set on fire other European powers."

By 18 October, the countries of the Balkan Alliance (Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, and Montenegro) all declared war on Turkey—the First Balkan War. So it was that here, in Bulgaria, the foreign missions of the Methodist Episcopal Church first felt the impact of the gathering demonic forces that soon were to race through all Europe and far beyond—the catastrophe of World War I and its aftermath.

Mobilization and war swiftly, radically disrupted the operation of the Mission, subjecting Count's leadership to a barrage of emergency demands. With the army absorbing the entire population of able-bodied men, the first sudden necessity was to keep the churches going without their male constituency and, in some cases, without their pastors. Anxious and over-burdened, Count labored until late each night in an effort to keep pace with the fresh concerns pressed upon him by the crisis, at the same time endeavoring to inform the New York office of all that was happening. His letters during those hectic days and afterwards revealed him as an excellent reporter of public events and political developments even though he was thoroughly pro-Bulgarian in his point of view. Bishop William Burt, nine times a visitor to Bulgaria, also took the Bulgarian side, declaring, "If ever a war was justified this was."

Count made repeated time-consuming visits to the War Ministry, soliciting release from army duty for two of the Methodist preachers and succeeding after many days in freeing the pastor at Lovech, where there remained only one Methodist man not swept up by the draft. From Lovech, Kate B. Blackburn, the director of the Girls' School, and her W.F.M.S. colleague Dora Davis sent worried appeals for counsel. Twenty miles from the railroad and deprived of any dependable news, they felt isolated and fearful, troubled by

flying rumors, especially by the report that numerous Turkish prisoners were to be sent into North Bulgaria from the southeastern front. Those were the days of "the Unspeakable Turk," a stereotype of horror that came easily to the minds and tongues of Europeans and Americans. To many, Turks meant atrocities; and to the two women missionaries, almost frantic with anxiety, the rumor about the impending influx (there were already local Turks) was enough to call up visions of rampage and rape in a girls' school. It was trying enough to have 250 Bulgarian soldiers quartered on the School's premises at the beginning of the mobilization. Late one night in October, Count received an urgent telegram from Miss Blackburn, summoning him to the School. Leaving in his typewriter an unfinished letter to Secretary North, he started off early the next morning to travel to Lovech, by train and afoot, to reassure the troubled teachers, who faced a hard fight to find cash, food, and fuel to keep the school going.

From then on, Count seldom was long in Sofia until the country settled down after the Balkan wars were over.

Soon after the Bulgarians' important victories over the Turks at Kirkklareli and Lüleburgaz, in Eastern Thrace, Count left Sofia for the southeastern front early in November as interpreter for a British Red Cross field hospital unit. For nine weeks, he worked side by side with the doctors, nurses, and stretcher-bearers stationed at Kirkklareli, ministering to the wounded and the dying, constantly immersed in the stream of raw suffering that flowed from battleground through hospital, concerned for his own family and for his churches' families back home, but helpless to carry on more than the most fragmentary correspondence with Sofia.

The day Elmer Count left for Lovech, his wife Viette, simply turning up two double spaces in the letter to Dr. North that she found standing in her husband's typewriter, went on to write three pages more, not only discussing field-to-office business, but vividly describing for the men in New York the abnormal conditions exploding upon the Mission and its people behind the lines. And when, days later, her husband went off with the Red Cross party, Mrs. Count quietly and courageously stepped into his place and became the emergency head of the Mission.

To her came letters from pastors and their wives, relating in pitiful detail the privations and anxieties of the families in their neighborhoods. Many departing soldiers, with only pittances coming to them while in service, had been compelled to leave their wives and children without any financial resources. The government had early requisitioned the food supplies in the hands of the village people, leaving country women dependent upon food purchases when they had next to no cash to make them with. Fuel was expensive and scarce. Many families were destitute, turning desperately to their Methodist pastors for the most meager assistance. And all the time, there was depressing news of the wounded and the dead, a distressing lack of news of

many other soldiers at the front, and horrifying rumors of Turkish atrocities in Macedonia. Communities throughout North Bulgaria, the Mission's special field, were suffering drastic deprivation. The pastors, already doing their best to make the Church a fellowship of comfort and relief, appealed to the Mission headquarters in Sofia for funds to carry on their social services.

Mrs. Count had hardly anything to send them, but out of her husband's typewriter she dispatched answering letters establishing, in spite of the chaotic communications, a network of encouragement and counsel for the beleaguered parochial workers. She sent to some of her financially able friends appeals for money for the emergency work, and to New York she sent descriptions of the popular suffering calculated to start funds towards Bulgaria.

Elmer Count returned to Sofia on 10 January 1913 and soon afterwards severed his Red Cross relationship. He said, out of his war experience, "Suffering? May the remaining years of my life never uncover the horrible reality of what the last 11 weeks have brought to my eyes and ears! And yet the sad tale of woes continues!"

The day after his return, Count was at the railroad station at four in the morning to greet Bishop Nuelsen, arriving for a week's visitation of the war-ripped Bulgaria field. The Bishop came to investigate conditions calling for the use of relief funds, to study the outlook for the Mission's future in the perspective of the war, and to demonstrate the vital interest of the Methodist Episcopal Church in its Bulgarian members and in the suffering Bulgarian people at large. Count, who had used the strategic removal of the Mission's headquarters to Sofia to good advantage, was by this time well and favorably known among influential public figures and now especially sympathetically because of the wartime services performed by his wife and himself. He introduced Bishop Nuelsen to the Protestant-bred, socially-minded Queen of Bulgaria, to the two most important Cabinet Ministers, to the highest ranking general left in the capital, and to other influential men. But he also conducted Bishop Nuelsen on as extensive a tour of the Methodist churches as possible considering the badly disrupted facilities for travel.

This was a period of armistice between Turkey, Greece, and Serbia, but the Bishop saw enough to be able to draw for American Methodists a fuller picture of Bulgaria's "sad tale of woes" than even the Counts had done. He realized that the Bulgarian Methodists would continue for a long time to be oppressed by a share in the nation's sufferings. While still in Sofia, Nuelsen cabled Secretary North:

MUCH SUFFERING INCREASED BY DELAYED PARCELS
SNOW SEVERE COLD SAD CASES OF DISTRESS IN MOST
CHURCHES MORE FUNDS NEEDED.

Two months earlier, following a presentation in person by Bishop Nuelsen, the General Committee had adopted a warmly humanitarian appeal to all Meth-

odists for contributions to help relieve the plight of the Bulgarian populace. Moneys already had reached Mrs. Count's hands, and the Bishop brought still more with him. After he left Bulgaria, he spoke on the country's troubles everywhere he went in Europe, and Methodists from Sweden to Austria (the relations of the latter country with the Balkan allies were strained) spontaneously donated money for relief.

A fortnight after Bishop Nuelsen's departure from Sofia, armed hostilities were renewed. The Bulgarians took Edirne late in March, the belligerents arranged an armistice in mid-April, and the First Balkan War ended formally on 30 May with the signing of the Treaty of London. The Treaty represented a victory for the Balkan allies, who had succeeded in sweeping the Turks almost completely out of Europe.

During March, April, and May, Count was away from home on two trips of several weeks each, distributing relief supplies throughout North Bulgaria. This area north of the Mountains was not ravaged by battle or even threatened with invasion, but since it supplied the larger part of the Bulgarian army in the field and had been thoroughly stripped of surplus foods by official requisition teams, it was filled with hungry and bitterly impoverished families. Count and his group of Methodist churches offered the only apparatus available for relief work in North Bulgaria, and the funds he administered were almost the only ones sent into that area from abroad. His money came not only from Methodist sources, but also from the Friends, who without him would have been unable to do anything for the people in the North.

"Conditions are indescribable," wrote Mrs. Count to Dr. North. But she went on to put into searing words pictures of the utter want in the countryside, where "many have starved or frozen or died of disease caused by lack of food, and many others have barely managed to exist"; and scenes from Sofia itself, where troop movements involved men who looked "more like corpses than like soldiers ready for a new fight," where wounded and mutilated soldiers just out of the hospital were begging their bread on the streets, and where hundreds of desperate women organized an antiwar demonstration at the War Ministry. Later on, Elmer Count reported to the Board how he and his helpers went about doing what pitifully little they could to alleviate the suffering:

Our churches were made centers of distribution. Together with the pastors we would buy up numerous bags of flour and dressing ourselves for the work, we would begin our examination of the applicants for help. My duty was that of inquisitor. The questions would be colored with Christian sympathy. Many a time I would take the opportunity to explain just from where and how the help came to them. A slip of paper stating the quantity of flour to be given them was placed in their hands and oftentimes a tract with it, and the applicant would retire to an adjoining room to secure the flour.

In some of the places the clamor of the hungry women was so great that we would be compelled to suspend work. We needed no advertising. Our presence soon became known all over the city.

In the middle of June, at a time when the country was under attack by epidemics of typhus, typhoid, cholera, scarlet fever, and smallpox, a new blow rocked all Bulgaria. Elmer Count, not long returned home from his latest relief expedition, felt the ground violently trembling under his feet as he walked down a Sofia street. It was the first impact of an unusually heavy earthquake that was centered in the neighborhood of Trnovo, the nation's earlier capital, 125 miles across Bulgaria to the east. The government rushed relief trains into the ravaged area. Unable to make contact by wire with Ivan Todoroff, the Trnovo pastor, Count quickly secured a government pass to travel for relief purposes and got aboard one of the emergency trains. The track abruptly ended six miles short of Trnovo; the quake had ripped up the rails. Said Count:

I soon took up the march with a company of soldiers through the more ruined section of the earthquake zone. The bright moonlight pictured a weird scene of ruin and disaster as we picked our way in the midst of debris in the nearer towns before reaching the larger city of Tirnovo. There was not a home that was left intact. Ruins and demolished houses were everywhere! Out of the debris the people had pulled some old carpets and rugs. With these they had improvised shelter, while fires burned in front of the openings of these rude tents, to temper the cold of the night. Great boulders weighing hundreds of tons had been loosened from the high precipices and rolled down into the highway.

Challenged by soldiers as he was searching for Todoroff and his family, Count was directed to the open fields at the edge of the city to find shelter for himself. And there sometime after midnight, when a friend recognized his voice out of the darkness, he was given a place for the night in a roughly rigged tent in which a number of people had taken refuge.

The next day, Count searched out Ivan Todoroff, who showed him the Methodist church, lying completely ruined, and the parsonage, with only a few cracked walls still standing. Out in the yard, the pastor had thrown together a shallow shack just wide enough and high enough to take a double bed. There Count spent his second night in Trnovo. None of the city's twelve thousand people were sleeping in houses; with earthquake shocks continuing and houses collapsing now and then, most of the buildings were unsafe for occupancy. Well over a hundred people had died the day the houses first came crashing down, and many others were removed to Ruse for hospitalization. Touring nearby towns with Todoroff, Count found the overwhelming devastation in Trnovo matched, perhaps even exceeded, by that in Gorna Oryakhovitsa and Lascovitza, two towns lying six miles out. In Trnovo there was food, at least bread, for all; but in the smaller communities there was great

need. Count purchased large quantities of flour and with Todoroff's help distributed it to the townspeople. Thus he did what he could to project the Mission's ministry into the heart of a disaster so extensive and so shattering that news of it was rigidly censored for fear of its effect upon civilian and military morale.

It was a fearful time; on Bulgaria's western border, the first tremors of a new war were beginning to beat a dread antiphony to the ground shocks that leveled Trnovo. And then, consuming the month of July, the Second Balkan War broke fully out into the open. With Austria and Russia interfering in the division of the territorial spoils, the victors in the first war had fallen out with one another, and Bulgaria all too confidently had allowed herself to drift into war in order to keep the stake she had won. This time, enemies confronted her on all sides—Greece, Serbia, Montenegro, Rumania, and Turkey. The result was disastrous defeat for Bulgaria. Before the month was out, Greek troops to the south and Serbs and Montenegrins to the west were dangerously converging on Sofia, and the Romanian army was inside North Bulgaria, advancing to within twenty miles of the capital. In the southeast, the Turks succeeded in retaking Edirne and Kirkklareli. Bulgaria sued for peace and took the territorial consequences.

When the Romanian army entered North Bulgaria, war came to the territory of the Bulgaria mission in a new form. Methodist churches lay directly in the path of the invaders. During the first war, women turned to the Methodist churches and parsonages for food and encouragement; now women and girls flocked to them for safety. Bishop Nuelsen related what happened in Voyvodinovo: "Brave Brother Rohachek stood day and night on the threshold of his parsonage door braving the threats and sabres of the Roumanian soldiers while dozens of women and girls trembled and prayed that God would protect them." In Pleven, when "the plucky little wife of our preacher" called out to the Romanian soldiers demanding admittance to the parsonage, "This is an American house, this is an American house," she and her charges remained unmolested.

Fortunately for Kate Blackburn and Dora Davis, the Girls' School was not in session when the Romanian army entered Lovech. And the soldiers refrained from setting foot on the school property, for the women took the defensive precaution of raising Old Glory over it. During the initial occupation, the Romanians kept a relatively small garrison in the town. But when the victorious army evacuated the Sofia area at the close of the war, it moved large numbers of troops towards the Danube by way of Lovech. Here is Miss Blackburn's picture of what happened:

Now, in the heat of summer, come these thousands upon thousands of Roumanian soldiers with their cholera patients. They have a cholera-camp just outside the city. They pollute the entire water-supply (the city is supplied

by spring-water), bathe and wash their infected clothing in the river, the water of which many use for domestic purposes, and in two days there are one hundred cases of cholera in the homes, with a mortality of 50 per cent. Almost the entire population have their bread baked in public ovens. Now these ovens are all seized for the use of the evacuating army. Day after day, night after night these soldiers pour through the city, leaving behind them only the victims of disease, unable to continue their march . . . The city is quarantined, and we are once more without mail. With no facilities for correspondence and no means of communication with our patients . . .

Although it was all an ordeal for the two missionaries, the quarantine only delayed, but did not prevent, the fall opening of the School.

Just as this second war was declared, Elmer Count had left Sofia on 4 July for Zurich to attend the World Sunday School Convention, but mainly to confer with Bishop Nuelsen. Once arrived in Switzerland, he could neither establish communication with his family in Sofia nor return to beleaguered Bulgaria, for the Serbian and Romanian armies stood between him and home. Five weeks after his departure, he "crept into Sofia" with credentials as a special messenger to the United States consul. But it was long before he could resume normal mission work. Once again, Count went to work with the Red Cross, joining a new unit from England in tending the wounded and the sick. Later, he became heavily involved in refugee work, reporting to the Board that the large sections of Macedonia and Bulgaria left desolate by the second war had thrust upon the nation responsibility for 200,000 refugees. Count became the treasurer of an American committee organized to administer refugee relief funds sent from the United States. "Though it was not directly evangelistic work," he said, "It was decidedly Christian . . ."

Because of cholera, quarantines, and difficult and only partially restored rail transportation following the close of the war, Bishop Nuelsen postponed the session of the Mission Conference scheduled for September. As he looked forward to holding the Conference, he realized that the war had left the work of the Bulgaria mission in some ways demoralized, with some of the church properties destroyed and requiring a good deal of money for restoration. He raised with Secretary North the question of continuing the work, but not in the vein in which the matter had been discussed a decade earlier. He classed Bulgaria with the other older European missions, which he believed should now be taken off the hand-to-mouth system of support by annual appropriations and thus be relieved of the perennially irritating running criticism of results. As with the others, Nuelsen felt that the Board should soon decide whether it desired to make a substantial effort for future development of the Bulgaria mission. The alternative would be "to be content to make some temporary makeshift in the expectation of consolidating our work with that of the American Board."

The Board was not ready for either alternative. After standing at \$9,500 for six years, the appropriation for Bulgaria had risen to \$10,700 for 1913,

and now, for 1914, went up only \$500 more. The only advance in the Mission's program that Bishop Nuelsen could effect for that year was the inauguration of deaconess work, but the initial expenses involved in that new departure were taken up by the German Bethany Deaconess Society. President Henry Mann and the Society's head deaconess came to the postponed session of the Bulgaria Mission Conference, in Sofia (6-9 February 1914), ready to start the work with a German deaconess from Frankfort on the Main and two Bulgarian girls trained in Frankfort.

Of Bulgaria's crucial current need for aggressive evangelization, and of the openness of the people to gospel preaching, Bishop Nuelsen was strongly convinced. Presiding at the Conference session, he found it imbued with a hopeful spirit and was moved by the reports of the pastors, who related their efforts to meet the emergencies of the many months of national disruption and suffering. They had done their best to continue church meetings, had grasped special evangelistic opportunities among the soldiers, and above all had quickly converted their churches into centers of compassionate social ministry to the war-stricken families in their communities. He found the Counts high in the esteem of the Conference and of the general public because of their unremitting efforts to serve the Mission and the nation during the wars and their aftermath. The churches were finding a good public response to their meetings, and under the impact of the war experience, Orthodox people were beginning to lose their prejudices against the American-based Methodist mission. Methodism was becoming nationalized.

Whatever its potentiality, the Mission was still far from impressive numerically, although it had shown growth during Elmer Count's superintendency. By 1910, the full members had increased from 320 to 531. When the First Balkan War broke out, there were 563 members, and only slightly fewer at the close of the Second. During the same period (1905-14), Sunday school enrollment increased from 436 to 786. All but one (Vratsa) of the charges that were active when Count assumed leadership were still active in 1914, and to the Appointments had been added Berkovitza, Dobnik, Etropole and Lupen, Murtvitza, Sofia, and Gabrovo and Trevna. Although Count's plans for church property in Sofia remained unrealized after five years, twelve of the churches had their own buildings, as against seven in 1896. Half of the sixteen preachers under appointment also had been at work in 1896—M. D. Delcheff, Anastas Meshkoff, Stephen Getcheff, Bancho Todoroff, Pavel Todoroff, Ivan Dimitroff, Z. G. Dimitroff, Ivan Todoroff.

Although the Bulgaria mission was small and also battered by two wars, Elmer Count still believed in its vitality and wanted the Methodist Episcopal Church to think in large terms of the function of Bulgarian Methodism in making evangelical religion a living force in the Balkans. He observed in the aftermath of the wars a certain disillusionment among the Bulgarians with the Orthodox faith because of its status as the religion of their late enemies.

But he did not welcome talk among serious-minded Bulgarians of swinging the whole country over to Protestantism. Count said: "Some of us missionaries held our breath in fear that the attempt might be made . . . We believe that evangelical teaching should be received because of sincere conviction and not by any act of Parliament."

Count took much more seriously a more limited and spontaneous development in his own Mission during 1914—the outbreak of a revival that, for him, made it the most remarkable year in the history of missions in Bulgaria. The revival began in Sofia, when Abraham Silverstein, a young layman converted from Judaism, who had been in America, aroused the church members to pray for a revival and then became the leader of a series of evangelistic services that were strikingly successful. The movement was interrupted for a time by cancellation of the Methodists' use of their accustomed preaching hall. After moving to an old rented theater, they found their regular Sunday evening services crowded. Tsvetan Tsvetanoff, who was both pastor of the Sofia church and superintendent of the Sofia District, "catching the spirit of the revival fire," conducted special evangelistic meetings throughout his District. He met success everywhere especially in Lovech, where there were many conversions both in town and School. In less than six months, the church in Sofia received 60 new members, and the Sofia District added over 150. By the end of the year, reported Elmer Count, the Sofia membership was quadrupled as a result of the revival. Silverstein, who had started it all, also went down to Varna and sparked there an extraordinary popular religious response. Thus the Bulgaria mission appeared to be coming into its greatest evangelistic success when Bulgaria was exhausted by the Balkan Wars and while the countries all around were hurtling into World War I.

NOTES

Page 460. Volume III of this work, p. 1035, suggests both in text and footnote that the two Boards or their Missions remained in controversy from 1892 to 1907. Further research shows, rather, that the inter-Mission controversy no longer was significantly active as such after the withdrawal of Thomoff in 1893. This statement is not seriously qualified by the fact that George S. Davis, the Superintendent, remained far from satisfied with what happened and waxed caustic in his correspondence with the New York office; see J. O. Peck's letter of 21 June 1893, in which he rebukes Davis for keeping the issue alive. Further, the inter-Mission contacts with regard to Sofia from 1906 to 1909 did not constitute a full-blown controversy.

Page 461. The further research done for this volume necessitates dissent from the interpretation of the Sofia claims expressed in Volume III, p. 1035, second footnote, of this work. Careful inspection of earlier and modern maps of Bulgaria (physical, political, and historical) under the guidance of Mr.

Drazniowsky, Curator of the Map Department of the American Geographical Society, substantiates Elmer E. Count's essential statement of the status of Sofia historically and geographically. Sofia had indeed for centuries been counted as part of Bulgaria proper. It also is true that the minor mountain chain running immediately south of Sofia is a part of the total Balkan range, and not an element belonging with other mountains lying a little farther to the south. It is understandable, however, that early missionaries, and even later ones, along with their Board officials, easily could have been genuinely confused about the geographical facts when consulting contemporary maps.

The statement in Volume III that Sofia was "definitely within the territory of the American Board and previously had always been so regarded," evidently rests upon acceptance of conclusions drawn by William W. Hall, Jr., in his substantial book *Puritans in the Balkans*. Unfortunately, Hall's work on the Bulgaria comity question appears to be based on no sufficient direct search of Methodist primary sources; therefore leans too heavily on American Board sources only; cites hardly any crucial sources at all earlier than 1892; at an important point rests (Hall, pp. 127, 16) upon a single questionable source for the 1857 agreement, namely, Cyrus Hamlin's *Among the Turks* (1878), pp. 262 f., in which Hamlin ambiguously and inaccurately reminisces twenty years after the events; and at another crucial point (p. 128) apparently depends upon H. C. Haskell, who, thirty years after the event, evidently calls upon his own memory of the Durbin letter of 1862.

Hall's treatment, therefore, includes certain minor inaccuracies but also insufficiently supports an unfortunately categorical presentation of the American Board case as stated by some of its workers.

Warring Europe, 1914-1918

SUDDENLY, IN EUROPE, IN AUGUST, 1914, the vortex of world war sucked the Methodist Episcopal Church into a four-year trial of its character as a world-wide church with one Lord, one faith, and one Discipline.

Within five days, four countries harboring Methodist missions—Germany, Russia, France, and Austria-Hungary—were in deadly conflict, as was Great Britain, the birthplace of Methodism. Nine months later, Italy had become a belligerent, and by October, 1915, Bulgaria also. They fought in two combinations, the Allies and the Central Powers, thus pitting German, Austrian, Hungarian, and Bulgarian Methodists against French, Russian, Finnish, and Italian Methodists; for everywhere, the followers of Wesley went to war under the flags of their particular nations.

Nearly half the Methodists in Europe lived in the belligerent countries—five thousand under the Allies and twenty-three thousand under the Central Powers. Five thousand of them, including 150 ordained ministers, were reported under arms by 1916. The majority, however, lived in the four neutral nations Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Switzerland.

In episcopal residence for all Europe when the war broke out was Bishop John L. Nuelsen, in Zurich. The continental explosion shattered the unity of his European constituency, thrusting upon him an administrative task more demanding in its complexity and sensitivity than any faced before by a Methodist Bishop on a foreign field. Simultaneously, war-induced crises in all the Missions required his presence and leadership, and difficulties in communication and travel across international borders rose to hamper him. In a time when public passions, international misunderstanding, and uninhibited propaganda were powerfully thrusting men apart, it was his mission to endeavor to hold them together. Upon his shoulders rested the burden of attempting to preserve some ground of ultimate unity among European Methodists. This he immediately understood:

I want my brothers, whether they be French or German, Austrian or Russian, to know that not even the forces of hell, that are let loose in this wicked war, are strong enough to tear asunder the bonds of Christian love and fellowship that are twined around the hearts of the Methodist folks.

Oh the tragedy, that Methodist preachers and missionaries should be compelled to shoot upon and kill other Methodist missionaries and preachers!

Bishop Nuelsen's first critical wartime problem leaped the Atlantic, from the United States to Germany and to Switzerland. Strong pro-Allied and anti-German sentiment found almost instantaneous expression in the Methodist press and among denominational leaders and rapidly became predominant among American Methodists. The official Methodist English-language press included *Methodist Review*, *The Epworth Herald*, and eight regional Christian Advocates. A number of these periodicals promptly blamed Germany for the war, variously denouncing the German nation, the Kaiser, the government, and the army and questioning the religious sincerity of the German people.

Only five days after Germany declared war on Russia, the New York *Christian Advocate*, which was pre-eminent among the others, rushed to press with an anti-German editorial. Under the title "The European Horror," the editor, George P. Eckman, at once fixed upon the Kaiser, Wilhelm II, sole responsibility for its outbreak. He wrote:

The devil is in the saddle on the other side of the globe and certain crowned heads are his willing lieutenants. The civilized world is stunned by the suddenness and the enormity of the international crime and finds it impossible to name any justification for the frightful outbreak. The German Kaiser owes an apology to the human race. . . . He might have prevented the colossal conflict. . . . Apparently he was not satisfied to have his reign completed without a demonstration of his martial lordship. . . . it seems as if nothing more monstrous or diabolical had occurred in modern times.

* * * * *

May God save the people of Europe, and forgive those who are accountable for the deluge of blood which has begun, and speedily bring to naught the machinations of cruel men.

In the *Advocate's* fourth wartime issue (27 August) appeared an article by James R. Day, Chancellor of Syracuse University, that was dated in London on 12 August. Day likewise stressed the sole guilt of the Kaiser:

the plain truth seems to be that the German War Lord is guilty of this awful crime of war.

* * * * *

In one brief week William has poured out the blood of more men than fell at Waterloo in his attempt to cross the territory of one of the smallest kingdoms in the world. In the spirit of a bullying braggart he invites the world to fight him. Blinded by vanity and ambition, crazed by the passion of war, he cannot see his doom.

Although he, like others, tried to practice forensic discrimination by separating the German people from their Kaiser, this was the tone of Day's

criticism of the German leadership. In prediction he went fast and far, foretelling the defeat of Germany, the end of the Hohenzollern regime, the return of Alsace and Lorraine to France, the restoration of Germany's "province stolen from China," the imposition of war reparations, revolution in the Reich, and a period in which "a thousand years of peace will stretch its white wings over the face of the earth."

Along with other Methodist papers expressing similar views, copies of the *Advocate* carrying Eckman's editorials and Day's article went into homes of some of the sixty thousand members of the ten bilingual German Annual Conferences in the United States. In reaction, the *Advocate* received many letters of protest from German-American Methodists, some of them warning the editor that adoption of an anti-German policy would result in so offending and disillusioning German church members as to alienate them from the Methodist Episcopal Church. The protests were so numerous that Eckman could not answer them all directly, but replied in a public defense of his position in the editorial columns for 3 September. None of the letters were published in "The Pulpit of the People," the *Advocate's* open-letter feature; it was reserved for safer subjects.

One protest, however, had to be taken more seriously. At the session of the Central German Conference held in Wheeling, West Virginia, from 3 to 7 September, the committee on resolutions brought in a unanimous pronouncement presenting the attitude of German Methodists toward the war. But the committee refrained, said the *Advocate*, "from insisting on its formal adoption out of deference to the feelings of Bishop Cranston, who made a special plea for its withdrawal." The statement, which the *Advocate* printed full length on 24 September, held that the war had been years in developing by the acts of "various governments who were engaged in bringing on, by their blundering diplomacy, this horrible carnage." Nevertheless, its sponsors felt it proper earnestly to protest against "those misinformed and biased newspaper editors—among them, we regret to say, even several of our Methodist editors—who, disregarding the timely admonitions of President Wilson to observe strict neutrality, have misrepresented and invidiously attacked the German people and their illustrious ruler." The Central German Conference men declared that Wilhelm II was not the bloodthirsty war lord his traducers made him out to be. They also defended the German people for their forty-year record of peace and claimed that, now united in the current crisis, they were going to war only because they believed their national life to be at stake.

News of the various anti-German attacks in Methodist circles in the United States reached Bishop Nuelsen in Zurich and moved him to make his own protests. He feared that such expressions, stimulating anti-German feeling in America, would help create an atmosphere unfavorable to any call for help for the Methodist community in Germany. Although he was in Switzerland,

he was corresponding closely with the churchmen in Germany. He realized in the early weeks of the war that if American Methodists did not come to the rescue of their German brothers, it would become necessary in Germany to close many Methodist churches, sell church property at a loss, and leave unemployed members and families of battle casualties to suffer intensely without relief. He urged the Board, as early as 31 August, to send out a strong appeal for contributions for special relief both in Germany and in all the European fields. "You may sign my name to any appeal," he wrote to Secretary Oldham, "that bears no political aspect and raises no accusations against any specific country."

Writing to George Heber Jones, the Board's Editorial and Publications Secretary, on 16 September, Bishop Nuelsen questioned the propriety of the New York *Advocate's* taking so uncompromising a partisan stand on the war in view of its status as "the official organ of a world wide church like the Methodist Church." A month later, referring to an "admirable" communication on neutrality that the Board had sent its missionaries, he told Secretary S. Earl Taylor that it was a praiseworthy guide that the editors of the official *Advocates* also should have received and followed. He charged that they had not remained neutral, but had succeeded in putting the Methodist Episcopal Church on record in the public mind at home and abroad as committed to the cause of the Allies against Germany.

That breach of neutrality profoundly disturbed Bishop Nuelsen because of its actual and potential impact upon the Methodist Church in Germany. Numerous letters and oral reports from German churchmen quickly showed him that trouble for Methodism was brewing there in three different kettles.

Most directly, the German Methodists themselves were hurt to the core by the attack on what they were convinced was their nation's righteous cause. While voicing their distress and indignation in their letters to the Bishop, some of them talked plainly about the subversive effect of American Methodists' anti-Germanism upon the loyalty of the membership in Germany to the Methodist Episcopal Church. Secondly, the church was in danger from popular suspicion long nurtured by the notion that Methodism was a denationalizing English importation. This feeling was aggravated by the English background and connections of some of the British Wesleyans who had come into the merger of 1897. Some of the anti-German articles in the American Methodist press were appearing, with approval, in English publications. It was clear that for these articles to be translated into German and then printed in the German press would be devastating to Methodism's public position in such a time of heightened national feeling. Thirdly, the church's status with the German government was perilously insecure. Its petitions for legal recognition in order to hold property had been rejected on the ground that the Methodist Episcopal Church was a foreign organization. For American Methodist journals to publish strong denunciations of the German

government and to be approvingly quoted in enemy England threatened to destroy government toleration of Methodism. Nuelsen was confronted, then, with the triple responsibility of preventing alienation of German Methodism from the Methodist connection, rejection of the church by German public opinion, and its suppression by the German government. What should he do?

First he went to Germany to investigate and to attempt to allay hostile suspicions. After many conferences with Methodist ministers and laymen, non-Methodist churchmen, the head of the German Press Association, and Foreign Office officials, he was confirmed in his urgent fears for the church. Some Methodists even suggested that it would be necessary to change its name in order to avoid annihilation. In the Foreign Office he saw stacks of press clippings of statements on the war that had been gathered by consuls all over the world. To convince the Foreign Office men that the Methodist Episcopal Church was not a political body but was "rigidly neutral" and "loving all mankind" was a difficult and unpleasant task. The Bishop concluded that he must act further and decisively if he was to block "the ruin of the Methodist Church" in Germany and in Austria-Hungary.

Painfully, conscientiously, Bishop Nuelsen appraised the predicament into which he was thrust by the failure of Methodist leaders and journals in America to keep neutral. He concluded that nothing would work to the preservation of German Methodism but for him to come out in favor of Germany as strongly as others had denounced her, simultaneously publicizing his statements in Germany and endeavoring to inject them into the Methodist press in the United States. He therefore wrote, in September, three articles: "Some Human War Documents," for all the Advocates in America; "Who is to Blame?," for the *New York Advocate*; and "The Powers Behind the Thrones," for *Zions Herald*, the influential independent Methodist weekly published in Boston. The first article, which stated something of the German Methodists' political case and also described their tragic human involvement in the actual sufferings of the war as it was experienced by people in all the combatant countries, appeared in the *Southwestern*, the *Northern*, and the *Pittsburgh Advocates*. The *Pittsburgh* journal consequently became the target of a vote of disapproval by the Rock River Conference for "the breach of neutrality committed by the editor." The article sent to *Zions Herald* and the *New York Advocate* never got into print.

Eckman, the *New York* editor, dropped in at the Board office very much upset by the content of the article he turned down. As a result, several Board executives (Frank Mason North was off on a tour of the foreign fields) got their heads together and attempted to muzzle Nuelsen, though conceding his episcopal authority to publish anything he desired to. S. Earl Taylor was their spokesman. He tried toward the end of September to persuade Nuelsen to refrain, for the sake of the work of the Board, from making any strong

public pro-German declaration. He warned that it would alienate the pro-English element in the United States, sacrifice the help of people otherwise willing to aid the German Methodists, make his episcopal position in Europe untenable, and antagonize many friends in the Board, the General Committee, and the denomination as a whole. Furthermore, it would be futile as to positive results. "Now, you are of German extraction," wrote Taylor, "and anything you say on that score will be discounted on the very face of it." Early in November, Secretary William F. Oldham also made a respectful attempt to quiet the Bishop for the sake of "what in this office we conceive to be the financial welfare of the Board of Foreign Missions." He warned that Nuelsen's articles in the church papers were imperiling some sources of financial support for European missions. He declared that in harmony with President Wilson's advice to all Americans, the Board was trying to remain strictly neutral and that it deprecated nonneutral statements by various Methodists not amenable to control by the Board.

Nuelsen answered at length a series of monitory letters from these men and others; he explained, he affirmed his desire to co-operate, he rebutted, but he did not yield to their importunities. He believed that the charge of exclusive German war guilt was worse than nonneutral—it was wrong. His own heritage was German, and his international thinking at this time was pro-German. "The moral responsibility for this war," he wrote Oldham, "rests upon Russia and England." The Bishop was more anti-British than anti-French or anti-Russian; indeed, he saw Britain, in her enmity toward Germany, as the chief culprit in the war crisis that was rending Christian Europe. This view of the war he did not hide; it became well known in Methodist circles in Europe and the United States. But he did not labor the question for long; in fact, until the Advocates published their anti-German views, he had not intended to speak out. Once his chief purpose was accomplished, he firmly refrained from further advocacy of his own views on the war question. That purpose, of course, was to develop in the American Methodist press a body of quotable material with which to counteract anti-Methodist propaganda in Germany. The Secretaries in New York found it difficult to take the necessity for it as seriously as they took their own problems in domestic public relations.

By the turn of the year, Nuelsen was able to cite plenty of evidence that he had correctly assessed the dangerous potentialities in Germany from failures in neutrality by American Methodist editors, Bishops, and other leaders. Interviews by some of the Bishops were reprinted in England and in Germany, and other public utterances by Bishops got into German papers. When German Lutheran journals in the United States scathingly attacked the attitude of the Methodist press, their articles also were reprinted in Germany. Repeatedly, audiences in Germany heard addresses and sermons exhorting them "to cast out the leaven of Methodism because it is English

and sides with the English." German newspapers denounced the Methodist Episcopal Church because of the attacks on Germany made by prominent American Methodists. Nuelsen's pastors in Germany told him that his writings were their only defense. Taken to editors and public officials, they served as proof that the head of the Methodist Episcopal Church in Germany had not taken up the cause of the Allies.

In March, a committee of seventeen of the most prominent men in the two Germany Conferences—eight District Superintendents, three pastors, the president and two professors of the Theological School at Frankfort on the Main, two leaders of the deaconess movement, and a Book Agent—met in Frankfort and drafted "An open letter of German Methodist-Ministers addressed to the Methodist Episcopal Church in the United States of North America." It was a solemn and highminded protestation of the reality and integrity of the patriotic unity of the German Methodists with their fellow Germans in loyalty to the Fatherland and its war cause, as well as a strong and reasoned protest against the desertion of the principle of neutrality by Methodist leaders and the Methodist press in the United States. The letter gave added substance to the major points that Bishop Nuelsen had made in his public presentation of the German position and in his correspondence with American church officials. It was published in *The Christian Advocate*—it would have been impossible to ignore it. But unfortunately for its maximum effectiveness, the letter appeared on 20 May, just two weeks after a German submarine sank the *Lusitania*, with the loss of 1,198 lives, 139 of them American. Not knowing the full story of the sinking, including the fact that the *Lusitania* was carrying arms and ammunition to Britain, American Methodists reacted to the loss as to sheer atrocity.

The letter from Germany carried, among its other declarations, impressive confirmation of the claim already modestly but firmly made by Bishop Nuelsen that by voicing the German war position, he had saved the Methodist Church in Germany. Quite in contrast to Methodism, which survived, other international organizations in Germany that were in any way associated with Britain went to pieces under the stress of wartime attitudes. The Salvation Army had to sever its British connection, and the well known British and Foreign Bible Society had to change its name in Germany. But Nuelsen acting as a Methodist Bishop retained great freedom there. He could cross the frontier quite freely, travel at large in the country, and address public meetings. He became well known in official and ecclesiastical circles and felt his power to gain recognition for Methodism enhanced by the stand he had taken. He was able to maintain this favorable position clear up to the time of the American declaration of war against Germany.

Bishop Nuelsen's involvement with the problem of German Methodism by no means exhausted his concern for the future of the Methodist Episcopal Church; he realistically perceived the nature of the crucial test the war was

thrusting upon the entire denomination in its function as a global organization. He wrote in February, 1915, to Christian Golder, a member of the General Deaconess Board:

The question is whether the Church is in fact a world-embracing organization, with a world view and a world message or whether she is after all merely a national power, looking at world issues from a limited, national viewpoint and losing, in a time of world crisis her grip on nations that in a conflict with England are on the opposite side.

The exquisite cruelty of the test was demonstrated by the ironic fact that a man who strived so nobly as did Nuelsen to rise above the conflict and to serve the Church in all Europe was himself compelled to break neutrality in order to save German Methodism to the Methodist Episcopal Church. He could not, indeed, even define the crisis without expressing it in part from the bias of his own political interpretation of the war. But Nuelsen clearly grasped the essence of the question. And concretely, no one knew better than he with what mingled patriotism and religious devotion Methodists on both sides were going out into the war directly from the altars of their common church to inflict carnage on one another.

During the first three years of the war, the Board of Foreign Missions held a stance of neutrality. From their own point of view, the New York executives of the Board who tried to silence Bishop Nuelsen were acting in the name of neutrality. As individuals acting privately or in other capacities in the church at large, the Secretaries and members of the Board of Managers undoubtedly were no more nor less neutral than other members of the Methodist Episcopal Church living in the United States. But as an official body, the Board did not take sides in the tragic conflict. Quite appropriately, the Church rather than the Board was the true target of Nuelsen's complaint about failure to keep neutrality. The Board, as Nuelsen was reminded, actually did call upon its missionaries aboard to avoid partisanship in the European struggle. In 1915, Secretary North found it necessary to warn Ernest Bysshe, Superintendent of the France mission, to avoid breaking neutrality in statements to the American press. In Bysshe's absence, the New York office actually so edited publicity materials provided by Bysshe as to alter unneutral elements. Administratively, it was practically impossible, however, to make sure that the Board's general injunction was carried out by individual missionaries far away and, often, quite independent in spirit. Certainly, the Methodist missionaries assigned to Russia, France, Bulgaria, and Italy fully revealed their sympathy with the cause of the particular countries they served. Except for his early strategic advocacy of the German cause, Bishop Nuelsen probably remained more fully neutral in his public capacity than did any of the rest—and quite significantly so, because he was the only one having

responsibilities on both sides of the battleline. But the Board as such clearly remained neutral until 1917.

The Board also recognized in the reality of the war an emergency demand upon its resources. In September, 1914, over the signatures of its President, Bishop Luther B. Wilson, and of Secretaries Taylor and Oldham, it made a public appeal for war relief funds. In calling attention to the emergency in Europe, the Board leaders also expressed the neutrality they intended to observe in the administration of the missions abroad:

Churches are dispersed, ministers and men alike forced to bear arms; families and congregations broken and dismayed. Whatever their nationality, they are ours in bonds of spiritual fellowship. The one contribution we can make is to afford spiritual consolation and gospel ministry. The prayers and help of the Church in the United States must be given without stint.

A month later, the Bishops threw their support behind the Board's appeal and asked the Methodist constituency to participate in a Thanksgiving offering for war relief, designating the Board as the collecting and distributing agency. In its turn, the General Committee of Foreign Missions indorsed both the Bishops' appeal for a single offering and the Board's earlier announcement of a continuing program of war relief. To implement the latter, the Committee made special appropriations of \$110,000 for Europe and \$115,000 for other fields it judged to be suffering from effects of the war. The European areas designated to receive specific sums were Germany, Austria-Hungary, Switzerland, Scandinavia, Finland, Russia, Bulgaria, Italy, France, and Belgium. The list of European beneficiaries was inclusive enough to reflect the Board's intended neutrality, but individual donors were permitted either to contribute to the general war relief fund or to designate the countries to which they wished their gifts to go. The latter provision allowed the donors to be as nonneutral in their giving as they pleased.

The tone of the statements through which the Board brought out its relief program was strongly humanitarian, but threaded through them were indications that its objectives also were substantially institutional and organizational. To be sure, the General Committee assured the Methodist constituency that the war relief activity would be "entirely apart from the regular work of the Board"; it was solely designed to meet the war crisis. But the crisis was defined—and subsequent administration of the funds bore this out—as "to save from the emergency of disaster people and churches whose servants we are in the Gospel of our compassionate Lord." Saving the churches came close to being the same thing as saving the Methodist foreign missionary apparatus in Europe. This implication was reinforced by the general, but not exclusive, practice of dispensing individual relief to members of Methodist families in Europe. Methodist administrators in America and missionaries distributing relief benefits abroad often were concerned for the good name Methodism

would gain in countries they touched. To be relevantly active in a warring country while the war was on was considered a measure leading toward the development of a stronger Methodist mission in the postwar period. The General Committee advised Methodist people to remit their war relief gifts through their own denomination's designated channel so as best to "serve the cause of their fellow Methodists and of Christianity at large." These aims all were legitimate enough for an established missionary organization, but except for the element of desire to relieve human distress, they ranked with the perennial tendency of the missionary enterprise to act with ulterior evangelistic and organizational purposes when healing sick bodies, befriending homeless children, or teaching the unlettered. This tendency was nowhere clearer than in promotion of relief work in France.*

The response to the initial call for contributions to war relief was rapid enough—\$24,000 by 31 October, a third of it being received through the German-language journal *Der Christliche Apologete* for use in Germany. But the income never was large. The Board's major wartime concern soon became to prepare for an extensive enlargement of its regular work when the eventual period of reconstruction should come. Therefore it did not press urgently or persistently for gifts for war relief. In the first full fiscal year, ending in October, 1915, the income was \$82,000. The following year it was down to \$11,000, while during the same period, contributions for a Self-Denial Fund directed at increased support for special needs of the regular missionary work amounted to \$80,000. For 1917, including seven months of American participation in the war, relief income was up again, to \$62,000. But in 1918, it fell to \$37,000, while \$152,000 came in for the use of the War Council. The grand total given for war relief over a little more than four years was \$217,454, which was less than the amount originally budgeted for a single year. This modest amount of money naturally had to be spread thin over the massive emergency need in Europe and elsewhere.

Channeling relief to points of need was one of the numerous activities through which Nuelsen strived, under the demands and limitations of the emergency, to make his episcopal office a pastoral and administrative ministry to as many segments of the Methodist fellowship as he could reach. Through travel, correspondence, and personal conferences, he witnessed or learned all he could of the travail of the people, alleviated it as he could, and transmitted to New York information that helped fill out the broad picture of what was happening to the people and churches of Methodism's stricken European constituency.

Considering Europe's wartime disarray, Bishop Nuelsen's access to the fields he supervised remained remarkably uninterrupted during the first year of the conflict. In the fall of 1914, he not only traveled in Germany, but also made a trip through Italy. Then he went to Paris with Ernest W. Bysshe,

* See pp. 507 ff.

superintendent in France, and on to Havre and London, in order to investigate the condition of Belgian refugees from the German invasion and to determine what the Methodist Church could do to assist them. Taking advantage of the privilege of riding on German military trains, he made his way, before the end of the year, across the German border into Lithuania, which was a part of the field of the Russian mission.

Just after the turn of the year, Nuelsen penetrated German-occupied Belgium and carefully observed the plight of the Belgian civilians on that side of the lines. On the same trip, he also visited the three Scandinavian countries, having an audience in Oslo with the King of Norway. Returning to Zurich, within a few weeks he was off again, to confer with the Finance Committee in Italy. With the involvement of Italy in the war appearing imminent, he went back in April and presided over the Italy Conference. In May, he spent three weeks in Germany and Austria-Hungary, conferring with German superintendents and Board members, traveling to Budapest with F. H. Otto Melie to investigate the purchase of mission property, and holding the session of the Austria-Hungary Mission Conference in Vienna. While in Vienna, he had to put aside urgent requests to go to Bulgaria to tend to mission problems, for he was scheduled to hold the Switzerland Conference early in June; he sent Otto Melle instead.

Late in June, the Bishop held the annual session of the Denmark Conference and immediately went on to southern Sweden for the Sweden Conference. In Sweden, he had an opportunity to confer with George A. Simons, Superintendent of the Russia mission, from whom he had been hearing only by means of souvenir postcards and brief telegrams. Simons informed him of conditions in the Russia mission on the Russian side of the battle line and accepted Nuelsen's assignment to preside at the Finland mission meeting in August, as he had done the previous summer just after the outbreak of the war. Before returning to Switzerland, Nuelsen conducted the Norway Conference in southern Norway and then journeyed into the far North—four days of the trip were spent on the water—for a ten-day tour of the Norwegian Methodist stations above the Arctic Circle. After resuming work in Zurich, he made another trip north to Copenhagen, where in mid-September he had another conference with George Simons, who had come out from Russia to report once more on Russian and Finnish affairs. The Bishop then sailed for the United States, carrying to the Board numerous papers dispatched by Simons. He arrived in New York at the end of the month en route to San Diego for a meeting of the Board of Bishops. He also attended the November meeting of the General Committee of Foreign Missions in Los Angeles and reported on conditions in Europe.

Promptly returning to Zurich, Bishop Nuelsen picked up his European duties in December and then, early in 1916, held three Conferences in Central Powers territory. He went to Sofia in January for his first session of the

Bulgaria Mission Conference since the beginning of the war. Elmer E. Count, the Superintendent, had presided in August, 1914; unsettled conditions had precluded any later session. In March, the Bishop presided over the two Germany Conferences, which had not met for nearly two years because military priorities had pre-empted the services of so many ministers.

Soon afterwards, Bishop Nuelsen left for the United States, where in May he presented his quadrennial report to the General Conference, which met in Saratoga Springs, New York.

Notwithstanding his large success in maintaining his international administration in harshly fragmented Europe, Bishop Nuelsen had been unable during the past two troubled years to close certain gaps in his coverage of the field. He learned soon after the outbreak in 1914 that the nationalistic passions heightened by the war would make it impossible for him to continue to span the streams of enmity as an ecclesiastical official operating publicly first on one side and then on the other. Administratively, he was compelled to choose sides whether he wanted to or not. Therefore, he gave priority to his relationship with the German Methodists, for he realized that no American Bishop but himself could get into Germany to represent the Methodist Episcopal Church, and he was convinced that he had a peculiar opportunity and mission to keep intact the ties of the German church with the international Methodist connection. Although his personal relations in France and Russia were excellent, he felt that if he remained close to the Germans, it would be unfair to the Methodists in those two countries to be brought under suspicion because the head of their church was in sympathy with the enemy. Having found it necessary to espouse the German war thesis publicly, he undoubtedly realized that further intimate association on his part with the Missions in countries committed to the side of the Allies would become unacceptable even to the Methodist workers themselves. Ernest Bysshe certainly sensed that this would happen in France. He wrote to one of the men in the New York office that under these circumstances, Bishop Nuelsen could not preside over a Conference in France without arousing the greatest hostility among the ministers and seriously endangering Methodist work in that country. "Our men are very sad," he said, "for they loved the Bishop." As it worked out, however, the Bishop did not preside; Bysshe served as President of the France Mission Conference in May, 1915. George Simons presided at the Russia Mission's meeting in December, 1914, and at the Finland Conference in the summer of 1915. After Italy went to war on the side of the Allies in May, 1915, Bishop Nuelsen no longer could administer the Italy Conference directly. The result of these developments was to confine his direct supervisory activity to the Missions in the neutral countries and those within the lines of the Central Powers.

In the evening of the first day of the Saratoga Springs sessions, Bishop Nuelsen delivered before the General Conference his quadrennial report on the

work and travail of the European field. He concluded with a call for close attention to reconstruction in Europe and for the development of new forms of administration and church government under which the work in the various countries on the Continent would become "still more intimately identified with the national life without losing its vital connection with our world-embracing organization." Apparently leaving behind the 1914 controversy over the neutrality of the leadership of the American church, the Episcopal Address presented the next morning generously acknowledged the effectiveness of Nuelsen's difficult labors during the war and cited the Church's debt to him for the preservation of the "integrity and connectional relation" of the missions in Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Bulgaria. The General Conference itself commended him for his excellent and faithful work "in the midst of the most distracting and delicate conditions within his war-swept area." Recognizing the continuing and increasing emergency limitations under which he worked, the Conference authorized the Board of Bishops to give him such administrative help as he should need during the coming quadrennium. It also ordered, evidently in response to a comprehensive resolution presented by Anton Bast of Copenhagen and Fredrik Ahgren of Stockholm, the appointment of a commission to study the entire field of Methodism in Europe and to formulate plans for the furtherance of the work there.

Eight months after the adjournment of the General Conference, Bishop Nuelsen's attempt to direct Methodist affairs in Europe was radically interrupted by the United States' severing diplomatic relations with Germany on 3 February 1917. The Bishop was in Berlin at the time, and on the next morning he carried out his last ministry in Germany—English-language services in a prison camp for English prisoners of war. He had to cancel his planned visitation of camps and work locations of deportees from Belgium, whose condition he had been given permission to investigate. He returned to Switzerland and was unable from then on to enter Germany because of his American citizenship. This restriction also cut him off from access to Scandinavia, for he had no passport that would enable him to travel north without going through Germany as he had been able to do up to this time. This cut down his contacts outside Switzerland to correspondence alone. "For the present I am as it were interned in Switzerland," he wrote to Dr. North. Although the Board of Bishops assigned Bishop William F. Anderson to preside at the Conference sessions in Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Finland as well as to supervise the work in France, Italy, and North Africa, he was able to cover only the southern portion of this assignment; no Bishop presided in the northern Conferences until after the war was over.

On 6 April fell the most disrupting blow of all, the American declaration of war on Germany. On that day, Bishop Nuelsen formally withdrew from direction of the churches in the North Germany and South Germany Conferences, dispatching to all the District Superintendents an official letter placing

the work in their hands in accordance with standing arrangements in the Discipline. This was an act to protect the Methodist Church in Germany from serious imputations of disloyalty to the government and from disruption of its activities. Nuelsen's move made it possible for the German pastors and District Superintendents to declare to their government that they and their churches were not under the authority of a citizen of an enemy power. For a short time, the Bishop kept in touch with them by correspondence, receiving their reports, but giving them no directions. He became swamped with letters from members of both German-speaking and English-speaking churches in America who inquired about relatives and friends in Germany and requested him to forward messages to them, while from Methodists in Germany came similar requests about their sons and daughters in the States. Upon inquiring of the American Minister in Switzerland about the lawfulness of such correspondence, he was advised to give it up, for the United States Government had issued strict orders that its citizens abroad should have no communication whatever with people in hostile countries. Therefore, Nuelsen broke off both this personal ministry and his correspondence with the German church workers. From this time on, he consciously and scrupulously kept the exercise of his ecclesiastical diplomacy strictly within the limits of loyalty to his own country. He had no further communication with Germany at all, and henceforth he got his news of the German churches only through Methodist journals and through informal reports by Swiss pastors. The South Germany Conference met in July, 1918, but not under Nuelsen's presidency, and the North Germany Conference did not meet until after the war was over, in June, 1919.

The Bishop retained his direction of the mission in Austria-Hungary until the United States declared war on that country in December, but communication was seriously hampered by delays and severe censorship. Otto Melle, the Superintendent, came twice to Switzerland to confer with him. Communication with the Methodist workers in Bulgaria likewise was extremely difficult, though it benefited from the fact that Bulgaria and the United States did not go to war with each other.

Whatever may have been the previous state of neutrality or of partisanship observed by various members, leaders, or Conferences in the church in the United States, Methodism's neutrality died with the bang of the gavel announcing completion of the Congressional vote to launch the United States into the European war as a belligerent. Indeed, James R. Joy, editor of *The Christian Advocate*, beat the gavel by a day. On 5 April, supporting President Wilson's call for war against Germany, he wrote, "Whatever have been the opinions of Americans in the thirty-two months since the war burst upon the world. . . there can now be but one purpose, the prosecution of this righteous undertaking."

A month later, the Church's senior Bishop, Joseph F. Berry, in the keynote speech at the semiannual meeting of the Board of Bishops in Grand Rapids, Michigan, declared that the people of the Methodist Church no longer were neutral, but stood squarely at the President's side. The Board of Bishops itself called upon the ministers and members of the Church, as followers of Christ, to support the government's cause in "this our greatest war for human liberty." Summoning the people to humanitarian service to war sufferers, bidding them tend the spiritual welfare of the armed forces, and bespeaking for "our American people of German origin" a loving attitude, the Board itself also affirmed its confidence that "our people will support any plan the Government may adopt for securing and training an adequate army and navy." Late in June, Bishop Luther B. Wilson, who was both Secretary of the Board of Bishops and President of the Board of Foreign Missions, issued an Independence Day statement rallying the churches to the side of the Allies against the Central Powers. "Let us support the Red Cross in its world-wide work, but let us also in behalf of our country continue to send our soldiers to the field, our nurses to the hospitals and our prayers to God."

The Methodist Church on every level soon was bursting with both spontaneous and organized support for the war. On 1 August, twenty Bishops, Board secretaries, Publishing Agents, and editors went to Washington in prompt response to an emergency call from the government's Food Administrator, Herbert C. Hoover. After hearing and approving his plans for the conservation of food, they pledged themselves to arouse the Methodist people to their duty to "save the waste and win the war." They laid plans to integrate Methodism's thousands of parishes into a vast network of local churches and synagogues intimately involved in the public relations efforts and the operational details of Hoover's program. In October, the Board of Bishops implemented its earlier commitment to the government's war plans by organizing its own War Council for war work. The members were Bishops Berry, McDowell, Anderson, Stuntz, Henderson, Leete, Thirkield, and Leonard. At the same time, the Bishops adopted their second wartime Address to the Church, in which they said, "We rejoice in the practical unanimity with which the people stand committed to the war . . ."

The Bishops very shortly broadened the significance of their War Council by converting it into the War Council of the Methodist Episcopal Church. At the call of the Bishops, representatives of all the General agencies of the Church assembled in Philadelphia in January, 1918, and agreed to pool their resources through the co-ordinating activity of the expanded War Council under the chairmanship of Bishop Berry and the executive leadership of Bishop Theodore S. Henderson. The Board of Foreign Missions thus took its place among a group of agencies that included, among others, the Board of Home Missions and Church Extension and the two Woman's Missionary So-

cieties. Bishop Wilson, the foreign Board's own president, was a member of the Executive Committee of the Council.

The War Council's officially expressed purpose was :

1. To mobilize the entire denomination through its departments and other activities to act as a unit for a comprehensive war programs [*sic*]; and
2. To place the Church, thus mobilized, at the service of the United States authorities for active co-operation with the several departments of the government.

The Council's program included several areas that could be described as spiritual and humanitarian ministries—religious work in military camps and camp zones, co-operation with the Red Cross, working with the government medical department through Methodist hospitals and nurses' training schools, and constructive religious work among peoples suffering from the war. But other aspects of its plan were explicitly nationalistic and military in their implications—a nation-wide campaign of patriotic mass meetings, patriotic education in the Sunday schools and the denominational colleges, co-operation with the Department of Justice (which acted to counter espionage) and with the Food Administration, and support of Liberty Loan and War Savings campaigns.

Bishop Henderson was released from his regular responsibilities (he was resident in Detroit) to head the work of the Council, which set up headquarters in Metropolitan Church in Washington, D.C., announcing that pastors and laymen were invited to use it as a source of information on war rumors and on methods of co-operating with the country's war activity. Bishop Henderson approached his task with patriotic intensity coherent with the spirit of the church and of the nation at war. He advised the ministers of the New Jersey Conference at Atlantic City in March to get in touch with the War Council at once if they should find people with pro-German tendencies in their communities. "Let us locate, eliminate, and exterminate every pro-German in this country," he said. At a session of the Philadelphia Conference, he said, "If there is any preacher in the Methodist Episcopal Church who doesn't see his way clear to espouse the cause of the Allies, if we can't regenerate him, we will eliminate him, and then turn him over to the Department of Justice."

As it turned out, the war had now less than a year to run, but that was time enough for the War Council to demonstrate in action as well as by announcement of purpose where the Methodist Church stood during the crisis. Since the General Conference did not meet during the months of American participation in the war, it may not be said, technically, that the Methodist Episcopal Church officially sanctioned or supported the war cause of the United States. But by its inclusiveness, the formation of the War Council constituted functional commitment of the entire administrative apparatus of the Church as a nation-wide body to the exigencies of the government's belligerency. This

also constituted commitment of Methodism, a professedly, and to some extent a functionally, world-wide church, to a national cause.

As the American Methodists marched to war along with their fellow countrymen, they coerced important elements in the church—and all Methodist laggards thereby were warned—into rendering support when their actions did not satisfy the patriotic passions sweeping through the denomination. *The Christian Advocate*, whose own columns were heavily loaded with war propaganda, signaled the existence of the pressure for conformity in October, 1917, when it brought out an editorial, "Blind Leaders," that accused the German-language press in the United States, including the religious press, of handling the war question with a Berlin bias rather than favorably to Washington. The *Advocate* charged that to the German press the obstructionists in Washington "have often seemed to be the genuine patriots, and the true representatives of democracy have been the unclassifiable La Follette and such demagogues as the Mayor of Chicago and the Jewish slackers who applaud the soapbox harangues in Madison Square." *Der Christliche Apologete*, which was an official organ of the denomination, soon was under attack, and the three Publishing Agents were attempting to influence the editorial handling of the paper in the direction of a more wholehearted advocacy of the American war cause.

At the end of January, the Publishing Agents announced that with the advice of the Local Committee in Cincinnati and of three Bishops, they had taken disciplinary action in order to redirect the editing of *Der Christliche Apologete*. They stated that they had arranged for the appointment of an Associate Editor who should have complete charge of all material in any way touching upon the war. The Editor, Albert J. Nast, son of the first Methodist missionary to Germans in America, and the Assistant Editor, Frank T. Enderis, were thus relieved of control of that aspect of the content of the paper, which Nast and his father had edited successively for seventy-eight years. The Publishing Agents grounded their action on the position that the Methodist Episcopal Church in the United States was "unequivocally against the Central Powers of Europe and whole-heartedly with the United States and her Allies in the present war for freedom, democracy and humanity." The Church desired, they said, to put its total force behind the government, just as it had done in all previous wars. The Agents considered themselves legally responsible for the utterances of a paper that had, as did the *Apologete*, the use of the mails and circulated both in the United States and abroad. Since the United States' declaration of war, the journal had shown itself "not in full harmony with the spirit of the Church and the country." It had not "rung clear" in support of the Allies or in condemnation of the Central Powers' war crimes. The Agents felt compelled to put the *Apologete* beyond all criticism as to its patriotism. "Henceforth it will sound a clear note for the utter defeat of Germany and its despotic military system and rulers, together with the other Central Powers,

and for the complete victory of the United States and France and Italy and Great Britain . . ." The accuracy of the Agents' formal statement setting forth the situation was briefly and "heartily" confirmed in a statement signed by Nast and Enderis. They also agreed to abide by the policy effected by the new arrangement.

The Book Committee, the final policy-making authority for the denomination's publishing interests, meeting in New York on 20 April for its annual session, approved the restrictions imposed upon the *Apologete* by the Publishing Agents. At the same time, Dr. Nast resigned the editorship he had held for twenty-six years, and the Committee elected in his place August Johannes Bucher, a native Swiss and a naturalized American citizen, whom *The Christian Advocate* hailed as "an enthusiastic supporter of 100 per cent Americanism." The *Apologete* was merged with the monthly *Haus und Herd*, of which Dr. Bucher had been editor. In reporting the meeting, the *Advocate* noted the fact that the government regarded *Der Christliche Apologete* as a desirable medium for promoting pro-American and pro-Allied sentiment. The Book Committee issued a formal statement, printed by the *Advocate* under the head "Methodism and Americanism; a Patriotic Deliverance by the Book Committee," that declared the members' "unimpeachable and unswerving loyalty to the President of the United States in this most pregnant hour of our national existence." Reciting the history of the Methodists in previous war crises as guardians and defenders of freedom, they placed all the publishing resources of the Methodist Episcopal Church at the disposal of the government as an instrument to mold public opinion in favor of the war effort, to search out traitorous plotters, and to conduct corrective Americanization of foreign born residents. They pledged "the support of 'the people called Methodists' to our country and our Allies for the holy task of winning the war and the redemption of the world."

The wartime impatience with things foreign, and therefore potentially un-American, that robbed the *Apologete* of its editorial freedom brought into jeopardy all the foreign-language publications of the Methodist Church. The day before the meeting of the Book Committee, the New York East Conference ordered that the Committee be urged to consider carefully whether it was not time to make a large reduction in the quantity of Methodist literature in German or even to eliminate it altogether. There was considerable sentiment at the Committee meeting in favor of the more radical measure, and some desired to bring out the *Apologete* in English. The majority were not ready for that, but they did vote to drop all German Sunday school materials for children at the end of the current quarter. And it was agreed that a careful study of the Church's entire range of foreign-language publications—German, Swedish, Danish, and so on—would be made with a view to shaping a publishing policy influenced by events since the outbreak of the European war.

In adopting the fervently patriotic report of its Committee on the State of the Church, the New York East Conference, (Secretary North's home Conference) went even further; it raised the question of abolishing all the bilingual Conferences, so as to determine Conference boundaries "by locality and not by language." It held that use of the immigrants' native languages no longer was necessary, but only traditional, perpetuating undesirable isolation from the influences of American public opinion. This was essentially an attack on one of the major products of home missions in the United States. At the May meeting of the Bishops in Pittsburgh, two men described as representing the German Methodists in the United States appeared and expressed the patriotic loyalty of their fellows in support of the war against Germany. Evidently feeling that it was needed, they reviewed the growth of German Methodism and described its value as an evangelizing and Americanizing force. In response, the Bishops adopted an appreciative and sympathetic resolution. But *The Christian Advocate* pointed out that there was nothing in the Bishops' resolution that would compromise any future stand of theirs on the currently live question as to "whether the Americanizing process is helped or retarded by the segregation of racial language groups in the organization of a Church." Two months later, Adam J. Loeppert, who had been a Methodist missionary among German-speaking people for nearly twenty years, published in the *Advocate* an extensive and masterly rebuttal of the view that the Methodist Episcopal Church should discard all foreign languages and dissolve the foreign-speaking Conferences, especially those using German. His protest against taking these steps under the stress of the wartime psychology rather than awaiting the results of natural evolution within the various language groups was provoked by his observing that this drastic action was being entertained repeatedly in press and in pulpit.

Educational institutions suspected of being nonconformist on the war question also were in danger of repressive action by Methodist authorities. To be sure, Methodist colleges and schools widely and extensively co-operated with the government's war program. Obviously, it was not necessary to curb educators who so forthrightly set the patriotic pace for students and faculty members as did President George R. Grose of DePauw University when he said, at a rally on the night Congress declared war, that traitors should be put against a brick wall "and fed bullets." And he urged his audience to "get down to the real business, which is to kill Germans." But Baldwin-Wallace College in Berea, Ohio, (a merger of Baldwin University and German Wallace College), having a German-language background, came under suspicion and coercion. Its administration was attacked for alleged lack of sympathy with the war policy of the government after America declared war. Responding to a petition signed by publicly unnamed "reputable and substantial people," the College's trustees adopted resolutions requiring the president, the faculty, and all opera-

tive department heads to make sure that the institution took "an absolute and unequivocal stand against the foes of democracy." The trustees declared that the College would retain no teacher or official who could not "stand squarely for the United States Government . . . or who would not willingly and actually, in all proper ways, teach and lead students to the most loyal type of Americanism." They then asked the Board of Education of the Methodist Episcopal Church to investigate the situation and pledged themselves to follow its recommendations.

Bishop William F. McDowell appointed Bishops William F. Anderson, Theodore S. Henderson, and Thomas Nicholson and Dr. John H. Race to conduct the probe. (Henderson and Anderson were officers of the War Council.) Although the Baldwin-Wallace president, Dr. Arthur L. Breslich, had indorsed the investigation in advance and had declared in writing his approval of purging the faculty of unpatriotic members, the inquisitors decided, after holding three meetings, that Breslich "be relieved of all relation to the institution for the present." They simultaneously designated the Religious Work Director of the Board of Education as acting president and immediately put the superintendent of the Indianapolis District in charge of the College until the new man should arrive. Then they voted to place a stenographic report of their proceedings at the disposal of the Department of Justice and earnestly requested the advice and counsel of the Department pending issuance of their own final report. The editor of *The Christian Advocate*, James R. Joy, an officer of the War Council, commented on this disciplinary action, "The principle of free speech and free thought is not involved." He made the point that individuals could hold whatever opinions they desired to, but could not be retained in faculty posts when their influence would be exercised actively or passively so as to "discredit America's course of action."

Annual Conferences also became arenas for the expression and enforcement of militant patriotism. The New York East Conference was not atypical. North himself, though he always practiced rhetorical restraint under pressure or in crisis, was on record in support of the war: "The war for righteousness will be won! Let the Church do her part." But Bishop Wilson, presiding over the Conference session of 1918, vigorously and repeatedly pressed upon the members the patriotic claims of the country's military cause. The assemblage thunderously applauded his special patriotic address, and the Conference voted to follow his suggestion that a minister's Conference membership was to be considered equivalent to a declaration of loyalty to the war enterprise of the United States and that only those of undoubted loyalty should be given Conference work appointments. The Bishop forcefully brought the situation home to the class of young ministers who stood before him to be received into the Conference; his admonitory address to them breathed the same fervent patriotism that had so moved the audience that heard his popular speech. The

Conference voted that if the patriotism of any member should be called into question, his case was to be reported to the Board of Conference Relations.

Reflecting opinion in the church at large, the Board of Foreign Missions, notwithstanding its stewardship of the world-wide character of the Methodist Church, turned right-about-face on the neutrality question in 1917-18 and renounced the very position to which it had tried to hold Bishop Nuelsen and its missionaries in 1914. Like the Publishing Agents and the Board of Education, it too exercised discipline on a nationalistic basis, now requiring its missionaries abroad to uphold the war aims of the United States before the world community. For instance, when Consular and missionary Germanophobes in China reported Dr. Carl F. Kupfer, president of William Nast College, Kiangsi Province, to the New York authorities for pro-Germanism, the Board's Executive Committee promptly acted to retire him from his post and to keep him from returning to the field.* Secretary North stated later that the Board had acted even before receiving the damning information from missionary sources; the case had been brought to a head by representations to the Board by the State Department. But North also stated that the Executive Committee would have acted on its own initiative even if it had not been approached by the State Department. It would not tolerate the alleged pro-Germanism of Kupfer and his associates in Kiangsi. To make sure that others on the field kept in line and caused no embarrassment to the Board's reputation with the government, the Secretaries were directed to write to all the higher schools in China of its desire that they express their sympathy with America's part in the war.

The Board's dedication to the purpose of prosecuting the war was further displayed by the tenor of its popular leadership in the Church. At its Annual Meeting in November, 1917—both the setting and the mood were patriotic—the Board, in response to General Conference action, took up its responsibility of launching the World Program that soon became known as the Centenary Movement. Its own share in the campaign was to raise \$40,000,000 over five years for a broad expansion of its work to meet the spiritual need and opportunity of the non-Christian world. In calling for this program, the General Conference had declared in 1916, "The time has come for us to think of ourselves as a world-wide Church and not merely a national Church with missions in foreign lands." But in 1917, under the influence of American involvement in the war, the Board changed the orientation from that of a world-wide church to that of a national church so exercising its higher patriotism as to bring the world under the command of America's war aim of democracy raised to its supreme Christian expression—"a federation of the World under the Spiritual Kingdom of our Lord Jesus Christ." It was clear from its formal statements at the Annual Meeting that it was promoting a spiritual patriotism

* See pp. 714-21.

that was an extension of the politico-military patriotism it shared with the secular community, which was so engrossed in winning the war. It fully accepted the latter form both implicitly and explicitly. Its official Address to the Church prefaced the presentation of the Church's higher patriotism with these words: "The highest type of patriotism today calls not only for unhesitating support of the flag in life and in treasure in order that the objects of the war may be realized . . ." The tone, the vocabulary, the psychology of the Board's announcements were inspired by the militant nationalism of the hour, which its members did not question. The official "Call" to the Church began, "Methodism has received the signal to leave the trenches and go over the top, and we are going."

The first ones over the top and into the fight were the Bishops and the denomination's 436 District Superintendents, who gathered in Columbus on 18 June 1918 to inaugurate the Centenary campaign. The first act of this District Superintendents' Congress was to send President Wilson a telegram acknowledging that he was God's chosen instrument to lead the nation in the war crisis and pledging the fullest support of the Methodist Episcopal Church "to the government in prosecuting the successful conclusion to this great war to the end that the world may be made safe for democracy . . ." The Presidential Address by John T. Stone, an insurance executive, developed the theme that the Centenary Program was essential to the winning of the war. Though the platform statements at the Congress emphasized the Church's responsibility to help build through the Centenary effort the world peace and brotherhood that the war by itself could not bring about, nevertheless there was an unchallenged consensus that the military campaign and the missionary campaign were phases of the one victory for humanity to which the Church was committed.

When at last its record of massive support of the American war cause was complete, the Methodist Episcopal Church in the United States stood naked of any shred of neutrality or of irenic restraint to cover the fact that it had proved itself not a genuinely world-wide church, but a national, even a nationalistic, church. It was ironical that any of its leaders should have criticized Bishop John L. Nuelsen in 1914 for his measured, strategic, and temporary desertion of neutrality in order to get the German position stated in the Methodist press. On the basis of his balanced and sensitive administration of the European field during the chaotic war years, he appeared in the end as the most consistent and creative neutral among all the leaders of Methodism. More faithfully and perceptively than any of the others, he acted coherently with the dream of the Methodist Church as world-wide not simply in extent but also in spiritual breadth and commitment.

In Europe, the impact of the war naturally fell least heavily upon the neutral countries; their people suffered least and were least involved in national or humanitarian service.

The chief detriment to the Methodist churches in the Scandinavian countries was the shrinkage of income that resulted from wartime dislocations in the national economies. These missions were peculiarly vulnerable to the effects of financial reverses among their families, for they were among the very groups in European Methodism that had achieved the highest levels of self-support and depended least upon appropriations by the Board of Foreign Missions. Impediments to sea trade, the closing of factories, resultant unemployment, high prices, and the burdens of mobilization quickly thrust the reality of the war beyond their borders upon the Scandinavian peoples, the Methodists among the rest.

Switzerland, being surrounded by warring countries—four of them—felt more sharply than the other neutrals the winds of social disturbance blowing from the areas of conflict. Though the Swiss army saw no fighting, there were Methodist parishioners who, being foreigners, returned to their own countries, entered military service there, and fought on various fronts—"Methodists against Methodists," as Ernst Grob, the Treasurer for the Switzerland Conference, put it. Some of these Methodist men were imprisoned, some wounded, some killed. Local committees of Swiss Methodists gathered funds for relief and channeled them, along with War Relief contributions from the United States, to fellow Methodists in especially needy areas. But because of the geographical position of their country and their closeness to the continental operations of the International Committee of the Red Cross, whose center was in Geneva, Swiss Methodists became more fully involved than other neutrals in caring for war refugees, serving prisoners of war, and assisting interned nationals. And as with the Scandinavians, it was only by sacrificial efforts in the face of turmoil and deprivation that local Methodist constituencies were able to maintain financial support of their churches.

In the belligerent countries, little Methodist work lay within the combat zones. Even in France, the churches were well out of direct danger from fighting. The only Methodists in Italy who lived in a region ravaged by warfare were those in Udine, far north and close to Austria. In Germany, there were Methodist charges in East Prussia and some in Alsace whose people suffered battle conditions. On Russian territory, only after the Revolution, in 1917, did Methodists in Latvia and Estonia see German military forces. Early in the war, two parishes in Lithuanian Russia were disrupted by military action.

If bullets raked few streets on which Methodists lived, and if few bombs and shells fell on their communities, destroying their homes and their churches, there was no escape anywhere from the massive bombardment of their countries by the realities of social and economic disorganization and of loss of their men by mobilization and death.

The effect of the war upon the German Methodists was immediate and direct because of the high absorption of manpower by the military forces.

The casualties began almost at once, and one of the first to fall was the young Frederick Roesch, who died from battle wounds in France during the first month of the struggle. He was buried in French soil, in the same grave with two other Germans and four Frenchmen. Many other ministers went to war, leaving their pulpits to be filled by theological students and retired preachers. When Bishop Nuelsen went to Germany in March, 1916, he wrote to Secretary North, "We had very interesting and touching sessions of the two Germany Conferences." By that time, more than a third of the preachers were in war service, as were 4,500 of the 29,000 church members. Three Conference members, several ministerial candidates, and three hundred laymen already had been killed. Others were wounded, missing, or taken prisoner. Many of the preachers at the two sessions were in uniform. Some had just come from the trenches and had to go directly from Conference back into the firing line. All but one man in the class of ordinands at the North Germany session were in uniform, and during the ordination service, "the distant rumbling of the cannons from the battle of Verdun" was heard in the church. The man who delivered the North Germany memorial address went immediately from the church to the train for the front and was killed in battle a few days later.

Though seriously drained of ministerial and lay leadership (some churches had hardly any official members left), the two Conferences took up new responsibilities generated by the all-engulfing war drive. The Theological School at Frankfort converted its new building into a hundred-bed hospital and placed it at the disposal of the government. The Methodist hospitals in Berlin, Hamburg, Frankfort, and Nuremberg were given over to the same function. Wounded soldiers filled them all. As many as a hundred deaconesses went into service in military hospitals, some of them in field stations just back of the firing line. One died in Poland, another was a prisoner in Siberia for more than a year, one was awarded the Iron cross. The army deprived many Methodist homes, along with others, of their breadwinners, and the disruption of industries threw many out of work. Both local churches and Districts organized for relief work, distributing the relief funds that at first came from the United States and providing many services and work projects for the unemployed and the broken families.

The deprivations of the war experience bore heavily not only upon the church families but also upon the churches themselves. Many families could not keep up their contributions for current expenses, and in addition the entire system of payment for church properties was endangered. The German churches, like those in Scandinavia, were especially susceptible to serious financial trouble because of the high degree of self-support they had achieved. When the United States entered the war, even the remittance of Board appropriations from New York came to an end. As *The Christian Advocate* reported from the Annual Meeting in November of that year, "The ap-

propriation for Europe aroused animated discussion, because of the delicate question connected with the work in enemy countries. Under the trading with the enemy act it was impossible to appropriate to Germany or her allies." Instead of appropriating country by country as it usually did, the Board finally allocated a lump sum to Europe as a whole, leaving the distribution to its Executive Committee.

The war hit Methodism in Austria-Hungary much as it did in Germany. The Methodist people in the Dual Monarchy suffered similar disruptions, deprivation, and burdens, and also reacted similarly with humanitarian acts and loyalty to the Church. Particularly pressing, even more so than in Germany, was the loss of the high proportion of ministers called into military service. This condition was exacerbated by the fact that a large number of the preachers were German citizens and had to return to Germany to be assigned to military duty. Even F. H. Otto Melle, the Superintendent, was in service for seven months. Half the ministers were mobilized, and there came a time when there was only one ordained minister left on church duty in Hungary, where practically all the pastors were Germans. Although Bishop Nuelsen remained officially in charge of the Austria-Hungary mission until December, 1917, he had to depend upon Melle for contact with the churches. After returning from the army, Melle labored assiduously to keep the pulpits supplied, to encourage the churches, and to channel assistance to the most needy points. Southern Hungary suffered greater handicaps than any other section, largely because of the tight military controls imposed due to closeness to the Serbian border. Some of the congregations there, however, opened their doors for the care of wounded soldiers, as did the Deaconess Home in Vienna. Hungarian Methodist women volunteered to help the poor and nurse the wounded. Such acts somewhat improved the public standing of the Methodist Church.

Bulgaria, already exhausted by the two recent Balkan Wars, joined the Central Powers in October, 1915, beguiled by promises of territorial advantages at the expense of Serbia and Greece, but only to be driven eventually into deeper economic and social exhaustion. Her people were bitterly burdened by mobilization, by the presence of German and Austrian troops, by the imposition of strict controls on civilian movements, by multiplied prices, and by serious food and fuel shortages. Mobilization stripped all the Methodist churches of their active men, leaving only the sick and the aged, the women, and the children. When Romania went to war on the side of the Allies in the summer of 1916, she bombarded the Bulgarian towns along the Danube, and the people remaining in the churches fled for their lives. Church services were suspended until the Romanians were driven back and pastors and people were permitted to return home. The fighting along the border destroyed no Methodist church properties, but many congregations remained scattered as their members sought security in places more remote from the recent battle

zone. The Methodist congregations suffering most from these causes were in the Danubian communities of Ruse, Svistov, Lom, and Vidin and in the Black Sea port of Varna. In many places, the former financial support of the churches practically vanished, and the Board of Foreign Missions and its agents experienced the greatest difficulty in getting any funds at all into the country. The inflated cost of living drove most of the mission workers into debt, many preachers were compelled to turn to secular occupations in order to support their families, and some entered military service. The church work suffered from this diminution of the amount of attention it received from its normal leaders.

The mission in Bulgaria was the only one among the Central Powers in which there were missionaries from America. Yet during much of the war period, it was unable to benefit from the American leadership to which it had been accustomed. To be sure, Bishop Nuelsen came to Bulgaria and presided over the Mission Conference as late as January, 1916. But from then on, he was frustrated in his attempts to maintain communication with the Methodist workers inside the country. Elmer E. Count, the Superintendent, who already had been through many war experiences with the Methodist people in 1912-13, departed from Europe for New York late in 1914 because of health conditions that made it advisable to carry through previously adopted furlough plans. The two W.F.M.S. missionaries in the Girls' School at Lovech, Kate E. Blackburn and Dora Davis, left Bulgaria in February, 1915, at the behest of Bishop Nuelsen and the American ambassador, lest worsening conditions make later departure impossible. The country was already seriously unsettled when they left, but the Bulgarian staff members of the School volunteered to keep the institution running. This they did under great difficulties, until lack of funds and of food necessitated suspension of classes after June, 1918.

Elmer Count, who always retained his strong sympathy with the national cause of the Bulgarian people, returned to Bulgaria in 1916, mainly to grapple with complex and crucial problems over property titles. Because of the near chaos in the country, he was able to do no normal or creative missionary work before his departure for the States at the end of the year. Indeed, he even found correspondence with the Board's New York office impossible except through muted and limited use of the courier service of the American embassy in Sofia. Count did not re-enter Bulgaria until he made a month-long popular speaking tour through the country in the spring of 1919. Although he made contacts with Bulgarian Methodist leaders, this visit was more a public relations expedition majoring in American-Bulgarian good-will than it was a true renewal of his missionary superintendency. Actually, he was making a side trip from Constantinople, where he was engaged for a number of months in relief work with the American Committee for Relief in the Near East.

The Methodists in France and in Italy suffered both human and organizational losses similar to those of their fellows among the Central Powers. Like the Bulgarians, they had American missionary leaders; unlike the Bulgarians, they did not lose those leaders during the war through withdrawal or withholding of personnel.

The only Italian Methodists living in or near a direct battle zone were those in Udine, close to the Austrian border, and in Venice, on the Adriatic. But the war unsettled the entire country. As one of the Italian District Superintendents said, the war was seen in the north and felt in the south. The Italian pulpits were not so nearly denuded of preachers as were those on the other side of the lines, and the financial losses to the church organizations were not so heavy, but the personal and social needs of both soldiers and civilians were enormous. As a result, the Italian Methodist pastors devoted themselves to an extraordinary amount of social service and war relief work in the community at large. But in many ways, the church work went forward without any serious detriment to the eventual strength of the Mission and without any marked change in its structure.

When the war began, Ernest W. Bysshe, the superintendent of the Methodist mission in France, was in the United States, but he returned to the field by the end of September to take hold of the needs and opportunities created by the international crisis.

Bysshe was no neutral; indeed, he had been reared in Canada and from the beginning supported the cause of the Allies. Stopping in London on the way to Paris, he quickly absorbed the British view of the conflict and readily swallowed the current tales of German atrocities—"such straight stories from the Front, stories that have unimpeachable authority behind them . . ." Writing to the New York office about the alleged atrocities, he said:

I have read letters from persons who have seen the individuals spoken of, telling of children whose hands have been cut off by the German soldiers in order that they might never hold a rifle again. The stories told by the wounded of the atrocities committed upon them by German soldiers are too many and too straightforward to admit of doubt. I fear that the war in its later stages will be waged with relentless fury; the Britishers already are feeling that such foes do not deserve quarter. . . .

This was a perspective far different from the interpretation of the Germans and their war cause for which Bishop Nuelsen was trying to gain some hearing in Methodist circles in the United States.

Upon reaching Paris, Bysshe soon went down to Savoie, where he found that the Mission's workers had been contending with active suspicion that the Methodist group was not loyal to France. That aspersion had been launched at least a year earlier, when Clerical and Royalist interests combined in a campaign to smear the Methodists, branding their leaders as a band of

German spies sent into France to prepare the way for the Germans and the Italians in the war they said was coming. The Mission was somewhat vulnerable to this charge because of the fact that most of its workers actually were foreigners, French-speaking Swiss. Upon the commencement of hostilities, the pastor in Albertville was subjected to official investigation after the authorities received a hundred letters of accusation against him. The probe turned out in his favor, however, especially when he offered one of the Methodist chapels for the use of the Medical Corps and volunteered his own services for any public work to which he might be assigned. The Methodists in Grésy-sur-Isère narrowly escaped embroilment with the authorities when they succeeded in foiling a Clerical plot to introduce *agents provocateurs* into their meetings in order to create public disturbances. In Bourgneuf, the Clericals leveled serious threats against the local congregation, and for a time the situation was very tense. The authorities took it all seriously enough both to warn the Methodist pastor to act quietly and prudently and to promise him heavy police protection for the chapel. In his absence, Bysshe himself had been accused of being an active German spy guilty of photographing military installations and then skipping out of the country just before war was declared. All these charges somewhat damaged the public reputation of the Methodists for the time being and also scared a small minority of their constituents away from the chapels, but the Mission's leaders soon worked their way through their troubles and succeeded in thoroughly identifying the Methodist people with the French war effort. Bysshe's leadership during the rest of the war period contributed significantly to this result.

With the backing of the Board of Foreign Missions, he and his co-workers reshaped the Mission's program so as to give welfare activities high priority over aggressive evangelism for the duration of the war. This was partly because men were not sufficiently available for the latter—some promptly volunteered for secular social service work, some were drawn into the army—and partly because the social needs of the highly mobilized and war-battered French people were so deep as to make this shift in policy almost inevitable. The Mission distributed direct relief to families near destitution, established workshops in city churches for women and girls suddenly made family breadwinners, co-operated in hospital and Red Cross projects, and provided shelter for children orphaned by the war.

Since caring for orphans called for institutional measures, plans for that work were matured and implemented slowly. It began in Grenoble toward the end of 1914, when Bysshe converted the Mission's hostel for girls (the foreign students it had served were scattered because of the war) into a home for a small group of French orphan girls, with Suzanne Delord remaining in charge. Early in 1916, Bysshe himself opened a modest orphanage project for boys, taking sixteen children into a rented château just outside Grenoble. In

mid-1918, having secured the co-operation of the Minister of the Interior, who agreed to turn over to the Methodists such orphans from occupied territory in Belgium and France as were available for placement in a Protestant institution, he opened a temporary receiving home for fifty children in a villa in Menton, on the Riviera. During the months just before and after the Armistice, fuller plans for the orphanage work, long discussed by Bysse and the Board, finally were realized. Through an association organized for the purpose, the Mission established three permanent orphanages, each of them equipped with substantial property acquired by the Board. The original girls' orphanage, for which in 1918 the W.F.M.S. finally assumed responsibility on a continuing basis, was relocated in La Tronche, a suburb of Grenoble. Two homes were opened near Lyons, whose mayor, Édouard Herriot, enthusiastically encouraged Bysse; one was a home for girls at Ecully and the other a farm home for boys at Charvieu. By the end of 1919, the three homes together were caring for over two hundred children, including provision for their schooling.

Touched as he was by the plight of the war-scarred children of France, concern for the interests of the France mission was paramount in the statements in which Ernest Bysse expressed the case for the Methodists' entering into orphanage work. And some of the Board officials shared his sense of the priorities involved.

Bysse credited Corresponding Secretary S. Earl Taylor with originating the suggestion that the France mission open a boys' hostel. It was generated by Taylor's view that if the Mission was to build a successful permanent church organization in France, it would have to develop French personnel for the work—an approach that would require beginning by training children. When Bysse returned to France in 1914, the excitement of the people over the spy scare about Methodism's foreign preachers confirmed him in his acceptance of Taylor's suggestion and made him realize that no time should be lost in reaching out for likely boys. And he found the French preachers insisting that the France mission have an orphanage patterned after those in the North Africa field.* Bysse wrote to Taylor, "We can secure bright boys whose religious education will be left entirely in our hands & over whom our control will be complete. There are many children & the number is growing daily, who are completely destitute, mother dead, father killed in the war." To Secretary George Heber Jones he acknowledged that the plan would cost money. "But [we] will have our future pastors & workers cared for." He saw similar possibilities in turning the former student hostel in Grenoble into a girls' orphanage: "An unparalleled opportunity is in our hands. God has put it there. . . . We have worked & prayed for such a chance to get hold of good class French girls & the opportunity is ours. The authorities them-

* See pp. 88 ff.

selves have sought us to help them out." Thus Bysshe and his associates hoped to bend France's humanitarian emergency and the lives of young French children to Methodist ecclesiastical designs.

Such a purpose naturally entailed selectivity in choosing the orphans to be adopted; a child's sheer need of a home was not counted a sufficient norm. When the Board gave its general approval of the proposed orphanage work in France, it had before it Bysshe's statement of the sole conditions governing the reception of the orphans, whether they be boys or girls:

they must be sufficiently interesting to make it worth our while to invest money in them. I do not feel that it is worth while for us to spend money bringing up household domestics and day labourers for the French nation. That kind of material, like Topsy, "just grows"—it doesn't need any bringing up. But I think it would be distinctly worth while for us to give to France and to Belgium young men and women thoroughly trained both intellectually and morally to take a leading part in the solving of the tremendous problems that are sure to be up for solution.

To be sure, the humanitarian aspects of the children's projects were mentioned in Board councils and displayed before the sponsoring American Methodist constituency and the observing French public. Earl Taylor, the Board's public relations man *par excellence*, asked Bysshe to be sure to send pictures to be used in "playing up relief work"; especially helpful would be an informal shot of orphans at mealtime or when being put to bed—something with "the human element in it." And when he tried to persuade the leaders of the W.F.M.S. to take over the Grenoble girls' orphanage, he deliberately made his oral appeal a sob story that reduced the women to tears. But the element of self-serving denominationalism—euphemistically phrased among the insiders and not stated at all to the outside world—nevertheless underlay the Board's humanitarian promotional presentations.

The touchstone of Methodism's disinterestedness was the question of its being willing to care for the orphans without being able to give them religious training under Methodist auspices. When the program first was shaping up, Secretary Taylor warned Bysshe that when asking the Rockefeller Foundation for a permanent endowment for the orphanage enterprise, he must not let them restrict him on the religious side so that he could not do distinctively Protestant and denominational work. "If they attempt to tie you up on that point I would advise you to have none of it." Two years later, when Mayor Herriot of Lyons was interested in having the municipality and the Methodists launch an orphanage together, he required that the project should be religiously neutral, with no pastor in charge of the children and with no religious training conducted on the premises. ". . . I told him I could not stand for that," Bysshe wrote to Secretary North. And North concurred: ". . . We have no special function in such a proposition unless we have the opportunity

to bring the Gospel to bear directly upon those with whom we are concerned."

The element of disinterestedness was more generally active as the inspiration of reiterated expressions of hope by the Board and by the Mission that their wartime public service would permanently improve Methodism's public relations in France. In describing to the General Committee in November, 1914, the pressure in France for the Methodists to undertake relief and orphanage work, Secretary William F. Oldham said, "If we are to secure the good will of the people for all time and to prove that we are a worthy addition to the religious forces of the Republic, we must show ourselves friendly and helpful at this time." Two years later, writing enthusiastically about the orphanage under his care, Bysshe declared that adequate development of it would not only greatly serve France and the French government, but also be "the means of largely enhancing the prestige of our Mission."

However mixed was the motivation at times underlying some of the Methodist wartime program for France, and beyond the good it did among the desperately needy, it was effective in turning the France mission from an almost exclusively evangelistic enterprise into one that included a strong emphasis on social service. After the close of the war, Bysshe's war relief activity and his initial orphanage work soon were followed by the launching of an ambitious program of reconstruction.

The Superintendent of the Russia Mission, George A. Simons, had a European wartime experience of extraordinary intensity and duration; he was in Leningrad when Russia went to war in 1914, and he stayed there with his work and his workers until October, 1918.

One of the most immediate threats to the Mission that flowed from Russia's state of belligerency was the intensified activity of the traditional religious and political forces, which now received, with the nation under attack, new stimulus and new opportunity. Their special target was the Baptists—always in disfavor with the government—whose most visible and vocal leader had been fighting back against courts, public officials, and the Orthodox Church for persecuting them. Headed by the Orthodox Church, the "real Russians," or "Black Hundreds," now endeavored to suppress the Baptists more systematically than ever, accusing them of being in league with the German government. The repressive results of these reactionary energies spilled over onto the other Free Churches, including the Methodists.

On the Volosovo Circuit, Wassili Täht, the Methodist preacher to both Russians and Estonians, suffered interference, largely because the police authorities thought the Methodists were Baptists. As Simons said, "To them the duck in the pond is the same as the dove on the miller's roof." Karl Kuum, the Estonian preacher on the Tapa Circuit, was convicted in the fall of 1914 of illegally holding devotional meetings and was imprisoned for three months. Alfred Hühn, the pastor in Riga, a German subject though born in Russia

and able to preach in Russian, was exiled to South Russia under prisoner-of-war conditions. Because of the strong current of antagonism toward everything German, Simons suspended all further work in Riga among Germans, and for lack of a regular preacher, he soon had to give up the work with the local Estonian group. He also suspended the Russian work in the Finnish church in Helsinki after the pastor had been attacked by an Orthodox priest as pro-German, investigated by the secret police, and finally ordered out of the city. In Leningrad (Petrograd), Simons had to endure many months of making applications, receiving refusals, and waiting without word before he could secure permission to hold services in the hall of the Mission's new headquarters building.

Though Simons himself was safe in Leningrad, the war struck close enough to him and his associates, as when Adalbert Lucas, a young preacher who served as his Russian assistant, was killed near the Russian-Austrian front in the fall of 1914. Two of the small group of Methodist theological students went off to war, two of those studying in Frankfurt were detained in Germany as prisoners of war, and other theological students had to be sent to the seminary in Helsinki. Non-Methodist interference frustrated Simons's early offer of the Methodist headquarters building and the services of the deaconesses for care of wounded Russian soldiers. But the deaconesses, under the leadership of Anna Eklund, continued active in social service work, and Methodist women assisted in Red Cross activities. Simons himself espoused the cause of the Allies and became prominently identified with various public humanitarian war relief projects. He so spent himself in an attempt to meet the unusual demands of wartime service that by the end of 1915 he was close to "nervous prostration, due to overwork and heavy responsibilities." And in all that went on, he was able to communicate with Bishop Nuelsen and with the New York officials chiefly only in not too revealing fragments of information jotted down on postcards. A notable exception was a very long and detailed letter he dispatched to the Board from Stockholm when he came to Scandinavia in the summer of 1915 to meet the Bishop. Even a letter carried by a friendly diplomatic official had to be worded guardedly; Russian censorship was severe.

The congregations in the Russian territories of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania and in Russia proper suffered economic deprivations similar to those experienced by their fellow Methodists in Scandinavia. But those that suffered perhaps most bitterly from being close to military operations were those in Kaunas and Virbalis, in Lithuania. George Simons, not being able to visit them, received much of his information about them from Bishop Nuelsen.

Nuelsen had visited ravaged Virbalis at the end of 1914, after it was taken by the Germans. Before being driven out earlier in the winter, Cossacks quartered there had crossed over and raided the neighboring German com-

munity, reported Nuelsen, looting its liquor stores and burning it to the ground. Then in drunken confusion, they had ridden back across the border and blindly burned down most of Russian Virbalis, leaving untouched only a few houses in which now was left not a stick of furniture. Among the few structures still standing, Nuelsen found relatively undamaged—inside, he pocketed a bullet that had broken a window—the little Methodist chapel in which he had presided over a session of the Russia Mission the year before. Of the Methodist members, he could discover only a single family and an unattached widow; all the rest had fled. To conserve the chapel property and to minister to the congregation when the others should return, he placed Virbalis under the care of the superintendent of the Berlin District.

Early in the war, the Russian government accepted Simons's offer of the use of the Kaunas chapel for a Red Cross hospital, in which it was hoped that Methodist deaconesses could be used as nurses. The plan was canceled, however, for Kaunas being a fortified place, the entire civilian population of the section containing the chapel was ordered to move out. Among the few permitted to remain was the old, rheumatic sexton of the Methodist chapel. The first Methodist to enter the abandoned community was one of Bishop Nuelsen's German pastors, who was with the military unit pursuing the fleeing Russian army in 1915. He informed the Bishop in midsummer that several hours' search on his part had revealed not the slightest trace of the Methodist congregation. Only real property remained to mark the Methodist presence. Finding the Methodist parsonage still standing—the German bombardment had not been heavy—the pastor climbed in through a broken window and saw that the rooms were entirely vacant. Nuelsen already had asked the Berlin District Superintendent to go to Kaunas, as to Virbalis, to conserve the property interest and to serve returning parishioners.

Most of the Virbalis and Kaunas Methodists being of German extraction, their names stigmatized them with the Russian authorities. Some were arrested as German spies and were imprisoned or exiled to Siberia. Many fled to Vilnius and other places looking for work, for all were impoverished by this turn in their fortunes. In a suburb of Vilnius, the former pastor at Kaunas drew together a congregation of Methodist refugees from various communities. George Simons was able to put modest relief funds in his hands before the city was captured by the Germans. On his side of the lines, Bishop Nuelsen got relief money into Virbalis and Kaunas. Although some parishioners did not return, the congregations in both places were re-established by the German preachers working under the Berlin District, the Virbalis group becoming active by the end of the summer of 1915. By October, 1917, Nuelsen reported to the Board that though the people themselves were economically distressed, both churches were active, with congregations of a hundred and of 160 persons in Kaunas and Virbalis, respectively. In their joint concern for the Methodist groups in this disputed area, George Simons on one side

and Bishop Nuelsen on the other, with the Board co-operating financially, came as close to making the Methodist Church function as a true international agency as was achieved anywhere across the disrupting lines of battle.

Continuing his work under great stress in the midst of deteriorating social and economic conditions, Simons was still in Leningrad when the city boiled over in the Revolution in 1917. Indeed, he forecast its coming in his report to the Board in July, 1915:

While at the beginning of the conflict there was considerable patriotism & enthusiasm among the soldiers & people at large, the feelings have since changed, so that there is now little or no patriotism among the new soldiers, due no doubt to all kinds of discouraging reports of heavy losses (concerning which the press is quite silent) & the general dissatisfaction among the wounded soldiers who have returned from the front. The latter are very bitter against their officers. The poor fellows look dreadful. There is a general feeling that as soon as the war is over, and possibly before, a revolution may break out. Various events have pointed that way, for instance, the recent *pogrom* in Moscow & the driving out of a hundred thousand Jews from the Kowno [Kaunas] Gouvernement a few weeks ago. There is a lot of dishonesty in official circles, yes even in the Wint. Pal. [Winter Palace] in Petrograd. For heaven's sake don't quote me & don't let any part of this letter get into the press!

Simons attributed many of the internal troubles of Russia to the Black Hundreds ("Russian Church party") because of their continuing and intensified reactionary program. Pointing out that they controlled the government, he claimed that they were chiefly responsible for "the rank persecution" of Russian subjects of German extraction or name in the Baltics and in South Russia, of "the poor Jews" in western areas, and of Baptists, Stundists, Menonites, and Lutherans. "It makes one's heart bleed to see all this. Instead of creating goodwill and patriotic enthusiasm among the various nationalities in Russia, an insane hatred is being stimulated against all who are not of Russian blood & of Russian Orthodox faith!" Simons reported that the Methodists were singing the national hymn, "God Save the Tsar," at every meeting and were praying for the Imperial House, the Russian army and fleet, and the speedy return of peace. "We Americans in Russia," he said, "are on the side of the Allies—but still we are not blind to what is going on." He predicted that these internal troubles would "weaken Russia's chances for success in the military operations—and after the war, O God, be merciful to poor old bleeding Russia!"

Simons's disillusion with the administration of the Imperial Government did not run to the point of his advocating any action profound enough to propel Russia into radical social, economic, and political revolution. Naturally enough, as a member of a religious minority that had to walk warily in order to avoid being suppressed, he was eager mainly for a moral and libertarian renaissance. In that vein, he felt encouraged when the United States severed

diplomatic relations with Germany in February, 1917. He confessed that it was "morally refreshing to see President Wilson finally doing the right thing to that incorrigible Cain among civilized nations—Germany. It was certainly high time Uncle Sam showed the Kaiser that America was not to be trifled with any longer, especially by a power that has become the modern exponent of diabolical Machiavellism." In the same vein, he enthusiastically welcomed the establishment of the Provisional Government, which took control upon the abdication of the Tsar in March, for he observed the Russians enjoying within two months an almost incredible exercise of public freedom and the initiation of many reforms. The people at the Methodist services in Leningrad were jubilant. Simons dispatched to New York an article hailing "the truly miraculous resurrection of this great Slavic nation, almost two hundred million strong, rising in power and majesty from the gloomy tomb of despotic tyranny and medieval terrorism into the joyous light and life of freedom and democracy." He trusted that what he was witnessing was the emergence of the "second largest Christian democracy in the world." He said, "The New Russia has risen! the dear, long-suffering Russian people have become free at last and herein we surely see the almighty hand of God."

But the sealed railroad car bearing Lenin and the other Bolshevick leaders from Switzerland via Germany had only just arrived at Leningrad. Simons saw during the rest of 1917 far more exciting and tumultuous events than before. By November, the Provisional Government itself was overthrown, the Bolsheviks came to power, and the more radical revolution that ultimately transformed Russia into a Communist country was at work. This revolution Simons did not welcome, for it ended his libertarian dream. He refrained, as an American, from meddling in political affairs, but sympathized with the Russians who believed in democratic government and therefore resented "the ideal, the spirit, and the tactics of the bolsheviks." On Washington's Birthday, 1918, at a time when American business and diplomatic personnel were leaving for home, Simons smuggled out to Secretary North a letter in which he expressed his devout wish that the people would rise and end "this terrible nightmare." Simons now referred to the country as "the so-called *new* and *free* Russia." But he kept at work in Leningrad—remodeling the interior of the Methodist headquarters, conducting religious services, working with some two hundred Russians in the Mission's English School, gathering forty members into a group for the study of English and American literature, directing relief work, and making himself useful and encouraging to the dwindling American community (soon no more than a dozen and a half remained). It was a cruel time, and Simons was a close witness of the prevalent violence and starvation. One evening, he looked out his own window and saw Red Guards shoot down three evidently hungry thieves—a soldier, a marine, and a civilian. "It was a most gruesome sight. The dead bodies lay there for over an hour."

For many months, the New York office, though continuing to send relief remittances to Simons through diplomatic channels, heard little from him. After the Bolshevik seizure of power, even Simons's typical postcards stopped coming, and then there were only intermittent cryptic cablegrams. Letters and cablegrams sent him were returned to 150 Fifth Avenue as undeliverable. Secretary North was concerned for Simons's personal welfare in the midst of the disturbed conditions in Russia. Bishop Anderson cabled him in December, 1917, to return home, but he did not go. "I answered the Bishop's cable in such a way as I thought best," he wrote North. "No doubt you will all understand that it was quite impossible and unadvisable for me (as well as sister) to leave our post at such a critical time." He was determined not to abandon the Methodist work in Russia, and he kept dodging Secretary North's attempts to have him leave for the United States.

Toward the end of August, 1918, Simons got letters out of Russia by courtesy of the Norwegian Legation in Leningrad, which was looking out for the interests of American citizens now that the United States diplomatic officials had been withdrawn. Economic conditions daily grew appallingly worse, he informed the Board. Many members and constituents of the Methodist Church in Leningrad were impoverished and starving. Simons felt the obligation to help, but had no food, no funds for food. He enclosed a copy of an earlier cablegram that expressed his final motivation in delaying his departure for home:

Earnestly request American friends send flour, milk, sugar, cereals, butter, coffee, canned goods for our preachers, Deaconess home, Girls school, Refugee Home, also twenty Americans . . . Having food relief assured could leave post with good conscience, lighter heart.

The church work and property remained intact under the Bolshevik regime. The authorities were extremely kind to the American Methodists, though they were bitterly antagonistic to the Orthodox Church and its schools. Simons was doing the best he could under current limitations to preserve the Methodists' emphasis on social service. He found atheism and agnosticism rampant among the working people, who directed their strong anti-Christian feeling chiefly toward the Orthodox Church because of its potentiality as a reactionary agency. Simons prayed that threatened pogroms against the Jews would be averted: "Poor bleeding Russia has already suffered enough untold agony under terrorism of rabid socialism." Privately, he hoped to see Russia turn again into a united country, a Christian democracy. And meanwhile, he was concerned that the friendly relations between Russia and the United States might not be put to too severe a strain "by Lenin, Trotzky [*sic*] and company."

By early September, reactionary forces had risen against the Bolshevik regime, the "Red Terror" had been mounted to suppress them, the Imperial

family had been executed, the Allies had landed troops at Murmansk, Archangel, and Vladivostok, the Germans were attacking in the South and West, and severe measures had been taken in Leningrad against British and French civilians and some Americans. Though assuring Secretary North by letter that he was feeling quite safe, Simons nevertheless admitted that "unspeakably terrible things are taking place here." He appealed to Grigori E. Zinoviev, head of the Leningrad soviet, for a letter of protection for himself and his sister and for the Methodist property in the city. But he intended to leave Leningrad for Scandinavia at once if he received a negative answer. The letter failed to come, but a friendly commissar assured him that he could feel quite safe in remaining. The commissar asserted that the authorities in Leningrad and Moscow, holding friendly feelings toward the United States, hoped that nothing would happen to create a state of war between the two nations. He added that so long as America was not aggressively active on Russian territory (American troops already were among the forces landed at Archangel), American citizens residing in Russia would not be considered prisoners of war.

Although he was reluctant to the end to do so, Simons finally left Leningrad, the generative center of the Revolution, because he felt bound as an American citizen to obey orders relayed from Washington by the United States Consul in Moscow to leave the country at once. Behind him when he departed on 6 October he left Sister Anna Eklund, whom he placed in charge of the Methodist property and other Mission interests in Leningrad. The last messages he sent to New York, from Stockholm, concerned a plea for the Board to cooperate in a plan to send food to Leningrad for children starving there. One cable read in part: "Famine conditions Petrograd [Leningrad] appallingly critical moral effect such work would result increasing Russias esteem for America." Simons still was deeply committed to Russia and her people in spite of the fact that he was out of sympathy with the latest form the Revolution had taken—"the brand of socialism which is now strenuously opposing everything that stands for freedom and openly announces its program of the dictatorship of the proletariat." In November, 1919, he recommended to the Board that no less than \$250,000 be expended for relief supplies for "Bolshevik Russia" to be distributed in Leningrad and Moscow alone.

Simons's return to the United States ended direct and effective administration of the Russia mission by the Board. When he went to northern Europe in 1919 and 1920 to assist in Methodist relief and reorganization, he was not able to enter Russia proper and received only indirect word of what was happening to the mission in and near Leningrad. He heard that Anna Eklund was still carrying on in the former capital, though under grave financial difficulties, being reduced to selling Mission furniture in order to buy food. Lack of food also drove two of the Methodist preachers out of Russia into Finland. Simons was ready to send some relief into Russia for the preachers and for

Methodist families, but channels were not available. Bishop Nuelsen remained completely out of communication with the Mission in Russia until he received in 1920 what sparse news Simons then had to offer him.

Although Bishop Nuelsen finally had been cut off from all the Missions but the one in Switzerland, he immediately reasserted his leadership of European Methodism upon the signing of the Armistice. While President Wilson was steaming across the Atlantic toward Europe in December, the Bishop was writing a comprehensive and masterly report and forecast on the church in Europe, which was published in the Board's *Annual Report* for 1918 under the title "The Situation at the Close of the War and the Prospects for the Future." Taking account of the war experience of the various Missions, the destructiveness of the war, and the needs associated with the social, economic, and political upheavals then occurring in Europe, he challenged the Church not only to participate fully in the work of relief and rehabilitation, but also to develop a greatly expanded and more relevant continuing mission in postwar Europe. Acknowledging that the Methodist Episcopal Church was overwhelmingly an American church, he nevertheless declared that America was bound "to exert an ever widening influence in Europe. The days of our isolation, our provincialism are past. For better or for worse, we are, as a people, mixed up with European affairs, without being able and without wishing to extricate ourselves and leave a half-finished work that would inevitably slide into chaos." He was convinced that the Methodist Episcopal Church was divinely called to the endeavor to establish among the Christians of the various countries of Europe a practical basis of Christian fellowship that would undergird the new and creative American leadership on the Continent, which in his mind was represented by Wilson's inspiring advocacy of the self-determination of peoples and of the projected League of Nations. Nuelsen brought to the exposition of his hope for the future his own special wisdom and his direct experience of the European scene, but the essence of his challenge to the Church was harmonious with that with which the Board already was beginning to confront the Methodist constituency as it planned for concrete and immediate relief projects and also pressed toward the large goals of the Centenary movement.

In evaluating the usability of the administrative organization of the Methodist Episcopal Church for the future development of the multinational European mission, Bishop Nuelsen returned to the problem of the American Methodists' ambivalence about the international character of their denomination's connectionalism. He declared that important administrative changes must be made in order to retain the advantageous unifying factors inherent in a so-called world-wide church and at the same time so to adjust that aspect of Methodism to the European situation as to recognize "the legitimate nationalistic tendencies in each country."

The Bishop was thinking not simply of the Central Powers, but particularly

of the neutral countries, Switzerland and the Scandinavian nations. A strong national spirit that resented even the appearance of foreign interference existed in these countries, as it had even before the war. A Scandinavian Methodist minister once had said to Bishop Nuelsen, "Our greatest hindrance is that we are looked upon as a foreign institution." During the war, Methodists in the nationally sensitive neutral countries were greatly embarrassed by strong statements and actions emphasizing the Americanism of the Methodist Episcopal Church and committing the whole denomination unconditionally to the war cause of the United States government. Methodist pastors in the neutral countries actually had received copies of the official appeal to mobilize the local churches in support of the Methodist War Council in its co-operation with the government and had even been sent statistical blanks on which they were to report their war activities. In some places Methodist pastors were suspected of being agents for spreading American political propaganda. European Methodist leaders had to explain to the public authorities and in the press that though their churches were organic parts of the Methodist Episcopal Church, they were loyal to their own governments and not committed to any policy inconsistent with that loyalty. They made their point well enough, but as Nuelsen pointed out, "the impression that the Methodist Episcopal Church is not an international church, but a specifically national, American institution that maintains dependencies or colonies in foreign countries" would not easily be eradicated.

Nuelsen reminded the Church that everywhere in Europe there was a powerful revival of nationalism that would have to be faced by the Methodist Episcopal Church. He believed that continuation of the colonial pattern would condemn Methodism to a strictly limited fruitfulness that would in no way significantly shape the religious, moral, and social future of the European nations it counted as its mission fields. He pointed to the establishment of fully autonomous national Methodist churches like the one in Japan as being coherent with the demands of Europe's current potent nationalisms, but he feared that such churches would suffer the narrowing and shriveling effects of isolation from the stimulus of membership in the larger, world-wide Methodist connection. Nuelsen favored endeavoring to meet the need for "the correlation of Nationalism and world consciousness" by giving the European missions the financial and administrative independence that would make them truly national churches while at the same time maintaining their organic union with the international Methodist Episcopal Church. He suggested that the Centenary movement might be made the instrument for achievement of the necessary financial independence. And he proposed that the new relationship of the European churches to the church in the United States might be implemented by enlarging upon the current pattern of Central Mission Conferences so as to create a system of regional General Conferences with powers closely approximating those of the one traditional General Conference. He

suggested that representation in the one unifying General Conference be based upon membership in it of both American and European regional General Conferences. Realizing that implementation of such a plan would require careful study, Nuelsen nevertheless believed that the church must quickly reorganize its administration in recognition of the fact that it would be both wrong and futile to try to repress the spirit of nationalism. He said :

The peace of the world and the safe development of the peoples depends upon developing national consciousness in such a way that the very best and largest achievements in character and production that each nation is capable of be called out, while at the same time and with the same enthusiasm cultivating world consciousness so that all national achievements be made subservient to the world.

Africa

Liberia

WHEN BISHOP HARTZELL CAME TO LIBERIA IN 1897, almost the entire leadership personnel, lay and ministerial, that was working directly under the Conference organization was Liberian. The only exception was Eddy H. Greeley, a white lay teacher, the sole appointee of the Missionary Society to arrive in Liberia from America in twenty years past. By 1898, however, the roster of Conference workers was lengthened by the Missionary Society's recognizing as regular missionaries to Liberia a group of men and women originally enlisted and sent out by Bishop Taylor acting independently: John G. Tate, James B. Robertson, John Harrow, Agnes McAllister, Mrs. Jennie Hunt, Mrs. Frederika Smith, D. E. Osborne, and W. L. Walker.

Prior to Hartzell's administration, most of the lay constituency of the Liberia Conference was drawn from among the some twenty thousand Americo-Liberians scattered up and down Liberia's 300-mile coast. Only a small minority had come into the Methodist fellowship from among the native Liberians, or "the native heathen," as the Methodists called them, and the Conference was doing little consistent mission work with this element of the population. But most of the William Taylor mission work in Liberia had been directed toward the native people. By integrating that work with the regular Methodist work, therefore, the Church increased the native constituency of the Liberia Conference and expanded its responsibility for the evangelization of the native tribesmen.

Before Bishop Hartzell left for Africa in 1896, Bishop Taylor had confided to him that he was disappointed with the results of his self-supporting missions among the Liberian natives. And upon making his own field studies, Hartzell found himself dissatisfied with the larger situation in Liberia. He realized that for a generation, little attempt had been made to educate teachers or preachers. He found that the educational work in Monrovia, for instance, consisted simply of a primary school with only one teacher and that Methodist youths were being educated in the schools of another denomination, many of them leaving the Methodist Church and thus not taking their places in its service. Even the seminary building itself was dilapidated, and the

equipment of the mission press was ruined and its building fallen into decay. Bishop Hartzell concluded:

Pauperized in former times by extravagant appropriations, and in later years discouraged by absurdly small support, the comparative failure of self-supporting stations among the raw heathen[,] and the final loss of income to support them at all—the Liberia Conference presented a sad picture of results after more than sixty years of missionary endeavor.

The membership count for both the Americo-Liberian group and for the Conference and Taylor missions to the aborigines combined, as it was reported to the Conference of 1897, was 2,598 full members and 442 probationers, dispersed among forty-one churches and stations.

Bishop Hartzell settled upon a two-fold policy for revitalization of the Liberia Conference, linking together the two types of mission that previously had been administered separately: First, the work among the Americo-Liberians would be pushed with all possible vigor—especially as to self-support—so as to make it a factor in maintaining the mission to “the multitude of adjacent heathen.” Secondly, the effort among the heathen would be concentrated in a smaller number of stations than before (about thirty actually were occupied in some way when Hartzell came out), which would be located as far back in the interior as possible. These centers would develop, he hoped, a manifold pattern of evangelism, industrial training, schooling, and medical services and would be maintained partly by practical self-support methods like those Taylor originally planned for his missions. From these stations among the native people ultimately would spring substations to be manned by trained native workers supported by the people they served.

The key to Bishop Hartzell's strategy for revitalizing the Liberia mission was his determination to reinforce the missionary personnel, partly in order to give the current work a direct injection of fresh leadership, but also in order to develop for the long run a body of more adequately trained African leaders. So it was that the Bishop brought with him, even on his first trip from the United States, two new missionaries, Alexander P. Camphor and W. N. Fowler, M.D.

Sickness compelled Fowler to return home, but Camphor, a well educated man with four years' experience as a professor of mathematics in New Orleans University, remained and became the principal of Monrovia Seminary, which he reorganized during his first year in charge. He revised and developed the courses of study after American models, raised the standards of instruction, renovated the seminary building, attempted to introduce a paid tuition system for self-support, and planned a three-level structure for the school—grammar, Biblical, and seminary departments. He hoped that the new plan would make it possible eventually to provide Liberian young people with their basic schooling and their secondary studies as well as with education for the ministry.

The Conference of 1898 voted to make the school the central training institution for the entire Conference and also, in recognition of the planned new departures under Camphor's stimulus, to rename it the College of West Africa.

Alexander Camphor and his wife were the first in a line of twenty young American Negroes whom Bishop Hartzell enlisted from Methodist schools in the South for missionary service in Liberia during his two quadrenniums in charge of the field. The first group to follow the Camphors across the sea included Joseph A. Davis, Miss Amanda Davis, and three married couples—Joseph C. Sherrill, James A. Simpson, and F. M. Allen and their wives. Because of the long service record of some of them, Bishop Hartzell's enlistment of the corps of Negro workers he sent out between 1897 and 1904 made not simply an immediate, but also a long-range, contribution to the Liberia mission. Transportation of the American Negro population to Liberia no longer was entertained as a potential solution for the racial problem in the United States. But Bishop Hartzell saw the African republic as a creative outlet for Negroes with vocational service motivation. In 1904, reviewing before the General Conference his leadership in Africa, he said of Liberia:

It is the open door for secular and missionary work for educated and enterprising negroes from this country. . . . From among our 300,000 negro communicants in America should go ministers, teachers, and tradesmen, to become a part of that Christian nation and participate in the work of extending its influence in the region beyond.

In spite of Bishop Hartzell's enlistment policy for Liberia, the years of his administration of that field showed no marked general progress in the work. To be sure, enrollment doubled at Cape Palmas Seminary and at the College of West Africa, and the latter somewhat expanded its teaching staff and improved its methods. But the rest of the educational program lagged, and at Conference time in 1904, the Committee on Education reported that attendance in a number of day schools was down and that eight or more schools had been closed. Sunday school enrollment had not moved forward, and full membership in the Church had grown by only 150. There were nine more ministers in full connection with the Conference, but only half a dozen more lay workers. A few church buildings had been put up, and here and there were congregations that had improved in self-support. Bishop Hartzell brought to the General Conference, however, an optimistic report. "A new era of efficiency and hopefulness has come to this our oldest foreign mission," he declared.

The Liberia Conference under the administration of Bishop Hartzell, as under that of Bishop Taylor, had one radical and relentless critic, Mary A. Sharp,* the independent Methodist missionary who had been laboring in

* See Vol. III, "Mary A. Sharpe" [sic].

Liberia since 1879. Her work was among the Kru people, especially in Krootown, the native section of Monrovia. She occupied a house on land belonging to the College of West Africa, and thus strategically located, she maintained a live but caustic interest in the Liberian enterprise of the Missionary Society, under whose auspices she originally had come to Africa. When Bishop Hartzell took charge of the field, Mary Sharp continued sending to the Society's offices in New York a series of unsolicited letters compounded of evangelistic concern and categorically harsh criticism.

She roundly condemned the Americo-Liberian church as morally and religiously degraded, utterly unfit to carry out the evangelization of the country. Repeatedly she branded the ministry in general as variously a drunken, lewd, materialistic, parasitic, self-seeking, indolent, and sexually immoral and irresponsible lot, men who were lacking in qualities of leadership and devoid of desire to spend themselves for the extension of Christianity in Liberia. Again and again, she named names and cited cases and also attacked the church as a whole for its tolerance of what its more undesirable members and leaders were practicing year in and year out. And she also pointed to the inefficiency, corruption, and decadence of the individual churches.

One of Mary Sharp's reiterated convictions was that the Liberia work would never progress under its "colored" leadership. She was sure that the future of the Mission demanded reinforcement of its efforts by the appointment of at least a few reasonably well qualified white men from the United States. She had acquired a low opinion of Negro religious leadership in her earlier service in South Carolina, which was so soon after the issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation that undoubtedly the trained and proven leaders among the Negroes she knew were all too few. Evidently, nothing in her experience at that time compelled her to overcome the influence of the traditional stereotype of the Negro, so widely entertained by whites who were genuinely committed to his advancement, that he was a child-man needing to be led by the hand into his own better future. But her disillusion about the Negro leaders in Liberia hardly could be attributed simply to general race prejudice; she found grounds for it in what she actually observed there of their gross and perverse delinquencies. She acknowledged that the Negro missionaries brought to Liberia by Bishop Hartzell were morally superior to the Americo-Liberian ministers, but unfortunately some of them appeared to her to be so immature, so unaggressive, or so easily overcome by the general tone of Liberian church life that she also generally took little stock in their possibilities either.

Mary Sharp was impressed neither with the administrative leadership of Bishop Taylor nor with that of Bishop Hartzell. In her view, they came occasionally and quickly went, never really understanding the condition of the Liberian church and hardly affecting the situation by anything they did. She claimed that as soon as the Bishops were out of sight of the Liberian

ministers, they were out of mind also. She felt about both of them what she actually said about Taylor: "The Bishop's influence here has no more than a feather's weight." Evidently, she had been unable to arouse Bishop Taylor to any remedial action and never was able to impress upon Bishop Hartzell the reality of the church's decadence and ineffectiveness. Hartzell kept making optimistic reports to the church in America, as he habitually did when describing his various foreign fields for supporters at home. Even his more conservative observations on the state of religious activity in Liberia showed no sign that he ever heard anything of what Mary Sharp was trumpeting into the collective ear of the missionary administration.

She, on her part, wondered in 1898 who was launching in America the glowing reports that the very ministerial corps whose failings she criticized were carrying on excellently. "Everything here lately has been 'boomed' beyond recognition." And in 1901, she called for truly residential supervision for the Liberia mission. "To know Africa & her needs one must *live here*, move among them." Simultaneously she showed her impatience with the overtones of the grandiose in accounts citing the Bishop's contacts with Cecil Rhodes and expressing his identification of the Methodist missionary strategy with the advancement of the civilizing function of the British Empire:*

If Bp. Hartzell would cease *hobnobbing* with the English with headquarters in London, and devote his energies to the extension of the *Empire of Our King*, something *would* be accomplished in the spiritual kingdom. Rhodes may be an "Empire Builder," but he has *no duplicate*. Perhaps it is well for the world that he has not.

Corresponding Secretary Adna B. Leonard, a perennial recipient of her letters was by no means a man blind to the failings of human beings in the missionary movement, but generally had little patience with unofficial critics of the administrative establishment. He wrote Mary Sharp in the course of a decade only two or three letters, which were essentially unresponsive. In one of them, he brushed aside her complaints by saying:

I suppose it is quite impossible for us here to understand the embarrassments with which missionaries must contend in Liberia. It is barely possible that too much is expected of the people of Liberia. Their opportunities for civilization have not been equal to those enjoyed in our country and they cannot be held to so high an accountability, and yet there ought to be in that country by this time a Christian population that would fairly represent Christianity.

I do not know to what extent your criticism of Bishop Hartzell is justified. I am very sure that he has upon his heart the interests of Africa and whatever he is doing has in view the welfare of the people of the Dark Continent.

Mary Sharp remained for many years a true thorn in the tender flesh of defensive missionary officialdom. In Liberia, attempts were made to portray

* See pp. 6 ff.

her as an unscrupulous, scandal-mongering troublemaker who was trying to tear down the work of the Methodist Church. To be sure, she had a tart tongue and undoubtedly was not always completely accurate in her description of the particular alleged delinquencies she attacked. She may have been exacting in her expectations of ministers and missionaries, for she was rigidly puritanical as to codes of conduct. But she knew better than New York executives and visiting ecclesiastics the truly extenuating factors in missionary life in Liberia, and her puritanism was hardly to be distinguished from that of the general run of American Methodist ministers and missionaries. Her barbs were biting, but they were not poisoned; they were dipped neither in sheer spite against individuals nor in general maliciousness. Basically, she meant business as a missionary, and for the sake of the cause, she would not speak softly of those who in her mind were betraying it by low conduct or by failure to take administrative responsibility for elevating the Mission's standards. Her purpose obviously was not to damage men or Mission, but to state facts and secure correction. That her criticisms were not all smoke without fire was demonstrated, at least in one respect, by the number—unusual in a Methodist Conference—of cases of alleged moral delinquency and dereliction of ministerial duty that were dealt with by sessions of the Liberia Conference and cited in one way or another in its official records during, before, and long after Hartzell's administration.

What made the question of the soundness of Mary Sharp's general criticism of the Mission crucially important was her allegation of gross neglect of the evangelization of the native people, whom she considered the best human material in the country, the hope of the future of Christianity in Liberia. She knew, as had Bishop Taylor, but perhaps more realistically than he, that his missions among the native Liberians had largely petered out by 1896 and that the stations among the people in the tribal areas were measurably nearer the coast than they had been two or three decades earlier. But Taylor kept this knowledge pretty much to himself except for speaking to Bishop Hartzell of his disappointment. Hartzell realized in 1897 that the native work was in such a bad way that a new policy and a new effort were imperative. But by 1904, either he knew too little of the meagerness of the then current effort among the aborigines or he glossed it over when reporting to the church at large. Said he to the General Conference, "Another hopeful sign in Liberia is in the ambition of the Conference to make a forward movement among the millions in the farther interior." But neither in his report nor in the various reports at the Annual Conference sessions in Liberia was there any evidence that the evangelization of the tribes was being conducted any more adequately or successfully than usual or that any new thrust had been made into the back country where these people were most numerous. He cited only the "ambition of the Conference" in that direction. Since he ignored the lag in the program of evangelization, naturally he offered no explanation

of its causes. But Mary Sharp did her best to expose its existence and to identify its chief cause.

She believed that the spiritually corrupt condition of the Americo-Liberian church was directly responsible for this long-continuing and current failure. As she viewed the Conference, it had no "ambition" at all to accomplish the conversion of the natives. In fact, the Liberian preachers not only were unqualified for the task, but also were thoroughly indifferent to the need and the opportunity, had no intention of making a serious effort to carry out such a program, and actually were doing practically nothing about it even in the Kru communities close to their Americo-Liberian churches, to say nothing of reaching into the interior. Neither ministers nor laymen were taking any responsibility for the movement. The new Negro personnel introduced from the United States was not being significantly utilized to help create effective interior mission stations. Placement of missionaries, of course, was Bishop Hartzell's responsibility, but the Conference, on its part, allowed to the few ill-supported white missionaries left over from Taylor's time who were working out nearer to the native villages no leadership in Conference affairs, no real opportunity to stimulate the fashioning of a more aggressive missionary policy for the Conference.

By the last year of Bishop Hartzell's administration, Mary Sharp evidently eased up her attack. But a new critic, Alexander Camphor, still President of the College of West Africa, soon took up her essential theme that the native work was being neglected and that new leadership and a strong fresh purpose to address the task with vigor must be created. In 1903, Camphor still felt optimistic about the progress made in the College and about the "many and new openings among the heathen," with the people calling the Methodists to come out among them. But two years later, though without verbally blasting the Liberian ministry as Miss Sharp so often had done, he began communicating to the Missionary Society's New York office what he now considered to be the failure of the Mission's native policy. In his newer, and more critical view, the Methodists, after nearly seventy-five years in Liberia, were just beginning to enter the field as far as reaching the natives was concerned. "We have not touched a single native language, have not built up a vigorous native ministry and membership, have done practically nothing toward creating a strong Christian community among the natives." Camphor felt that the Methodists were not doing their duty toward the heathen and that it was time they did. He pointed out that commercial interests were becoming more active in Liberia, with foreign traders threading the interior in an intensive drive to wrest fortunes from their sales to the natives. "I cannot see why the missionary should be less active than the trader."

Camphor believed that the only future for the Church was among the natives, for the Americo-Liberian work was practically at a standstill, and the coastal area was barren of any promise of evangelistic results. "There we

simply hold what we have . . . In our revivals we work for the most part upon backsliders and nominal Christians, while the more inviting fields lie untouched and uninvaded." The itinerant system, which might have got the Methodist preachers out into tribal areas, said Camphor, was a "dead letter" with the Liberian ministry. The preachers divided their time between church work and secular pursuits—largely the latter. In partial explanation of this division of their efforts, Camphor indicated that self-support in the Liberian churches was working so badly that the preachers simply were not paid enough to make a living without turning to trading or to secular jobs. "Our work in the meantime is suffering." Large sections of Liberia were as yet untouched by gospel teaching, and the best part of the country—both its lands and its peoples—were unoccupied by the Church.

Camphor also was disappointed with his own College of West Africa; after ten years, he found it poor in results for the improvement and evangelization of native life. Its curriculum was limited to the primary level because of the proximity of the government college—it was only a mile away—which the Liberians felt should do the more advanced educational work. As the native pupils in the College of West Africa finished the primary grades, they were siphoned off into the government institution by offers of fuller financial assistance while in school and of government jobs after graduation. As they became fifteen to seventeen years of age, the native boys and girls under the Mission's wing actually were spoiled, complained Camphor, by the dandyism and the spiritually destructive atmosphere of Americo-Liberian Monrovia—"this barren seaport town, with its officialisms, its worldliness, its distractions and vices." The result of their experience in the capital was not to train them to help their own people, but to educate them away from them.

After discussing his ideas with Bishop Scott and a number of the Liberian ministers, Camphor proposed to the Missionary Society that it make a new approach to the Liberian enterprise. He advised pulling the Mission's general program out of its current stagnation by letting the old work in the Conference maintain itself, the Society's appropriations being reserved entirely for new work in the sections populated by the unevangelized natives—"purely missionary work." And the men appointed to such new projects should be given enough financial support to enable them to spend their whole time in evangelistic endeavor.

As for the College, Camphor believed that it should leave Monrovia, where it had little support, and go a hundred miles back into the interior among the "strong and promising indigenous tribes." He favored a location near the Sierra Leone border and close to a section that had just been penetrated by a rail line built by the British. There the Mission could establish the institution as a big school capable of reaching a thousand pupils and could develop a Christian community and a native literature, "teaching and preaching and

giving the people practical help along lines of manual labor and varied industries." Camphor believed that such a move would make the College a major instrument for native education and was so convinced of its necessity that he notified the Bishop and the Board that he would resign at the end of 1906 if he could not work in some such congenial and promising situation.

Eager as he was thus to penetrate deep into the back country, Camphor never had an opportunity to do so, for he went on furlough in 1907 and did not go back to Africa as a missionary. His return to the field was blocked at first by Bishop Scott's reluctance to receive him. The Bishop believed that Camphor's scheme was impractical, and he also entertained various grievances against him for what he regarded as his lack of co-operation with the Bishop's own administration of the field. Later, Camphor and Scott were reconciled, but by the time the Bishop's objections were removed, the Board did not have funds available to use for sponsoring Camphor's renewal of work in Africa.

Bishop Scott was not ready to support such a radical projection of the Mission into the interior as Alexander Camphor's proposals appeared to call for; he felt that the Methodists should maintain a significant position in the capital for the sake of the Church's public image and in order to avoid leaving the field to the Episcopalians. But he shared Camphor's basic view that it was important to reach the native people. In 1905, he asked the Missionary Society to grant Liberia a substantially increased appropriation, desiring to "push the work among the natives, or the work which is so situated as [to] strengthen the influences designed to reach them." He felt that failure to do more to evangelize them would render of little or no purpose much of the sacrifice and actual suffering undergone by the missionaries to Liberia. He early focused the attention of the Mission and of the Society upon the stations where natives were being converted in encouraging numbers, mentioning particularly the work of three missionaries—Joseph Sherrill of Cape Palmas, Agnes McAllister of Garraway, and Frederick A. Price of Wiseke, which lay sixty miles up the Cavally River. Though he was not on the field continuously during his first quadrennium, Bishop Scott traveled the back country extensively, more so than Bishops Taylor and Hartzell were accustomed to do. On one trek, he covered hundreds of miles by canoe and on foot, passing through the territory of tribe after tribe that evidently had not seen a missionary before and entering many towns of "raw heathen" who begged him for teachers and preachers. During these first four years, he opened a number of missions at various distances from the coast. The farthest, he reported to the General Conference of 1908, was 150 miles inland. A few of the new stations were well equipped, but some were housed in temporary structures erected by the tribesmen.

The growth of church membership for the Conference as a whole during these first four years was moderate, but Bishop Scott's two succeeding quadrenniums showed much more impressive gains. The number of church mem-

bers rose from 3,194 in 1908 to 4,317 in 1912 and then to 6,916 in 1916. At the same time, the number of probationers quadrupled. The largest gains were made in the Sinoe and the Cape Palmas Districts, in which the constituencies were heavily composed of native converts. Sinoe doubled its membership and multiplied its probationers by twenty, while Cape Palmas quadrupled its membership and multiplied its probationers by five. The latter District accounted for about two-thirds of the total growth in church membership. Hardly any of this growth, however, resulted from extension of evangelistic activity into new native areas in the interior; most of the native work was confined to the Kru coast and areas close to it.

The worker who during this period thrust hardest and most persistently into the heart of the combined opportunity and difficulty of spreading the gospel among the tribesmen of the coastal region was Walter B. Williams, a missionary from the United States. He came to Liberia in the spring of 1909 as a transfer from the mission in Angola and was appointed to Grand Cess, a coast town about fifty miles northwest of Cape Palmas. It was far from a parochial assignment. When Williams arrived, the entire Kru coast was closed to all intercourse with the outside world, for the people were in rebellion against the Liberian government, and neither traders nor Liberian officials were able to enter the area. The port of Grand Cess was under government boycott because the last official to visit it had been violently attacked and had beheld the Liberian flag torn to tatters by the enraged populace. No Americo-Liberian could go in to make peace with the natives, and the people of Grand Cess would not accept a Negro missionary for fear that he would turn out to be a government agent—hence, Bishop Scott's appointment of Williams, who was a white man. After a conference with the Bishop and with the President of the Republic, Arthur Barclay, Williams went to Grand Cess equipped with letters directing various officials to facilitate his entry into the Kru country so that he could work to establish peace and order.

Upon reaching Grand Cess, Williams investigated the local aspects of the conflict and then called the chiefs together in an endeavor to reconcile them with the government. It took months of discussion to overcome their fear of negotiating with the officials, for they suspected that arranging a peace conference would be a ruse to arrest and imprison them. The conference finally was held at Garraway, and the tribal leaders came out of it unmolested. But the government did impose a heavy fine upon them. Half of it was withdrawn, however, upon Williams' intercession, and later the rest of it was forgiven. As the result of this peacemaking effort, the Kru coast was reopened after what had been three years of rebellion.

From his base in Grand Cess, Williams now turned to peacemaking among the local tribes themselves, which were in fierce conflict with one another. The antagonisms to be resolved were so deadly that on one occasion the

Topo tribe, having captured forty young Krus returning from stints of employment in settlements to the south, had lined them up on the river bank across from their home town and treacherously cut them to pieces in sight of their relatives and friends watching helpless from the other side. Williams began visiting native towns, patiently assisting the people in the councils in which they tried to uncover the roots of tribal differences and hostilities and helping them to work out solutions. After expending much time and personal energy—settling in less than a year as many as seven fierce conflicts that otherwise would have become bloody wars—he had the satisfaction of finding his endeavor bearing fruit. Peace came to the troubled area. Williams said in *Adventures with the Krus in West Africa*, published by himself and his wife after many years of service in Africa:

Towns that had been deliberately built across highways as blockades, to prevent the tribes across the river passing, were removed. With the roads open, trade and travel were resumed. Men forty and fifty years of age told me that it was the first time in their lives they had ever moved a mile from their town.

Walter Williams did not need to go beyond his Grand Cess mission station, however, in order to find signs of group violence. Grand Cess was one of the stations Bishop Taylor turned over to the Missionary Society in 1896. It was carried on as a substation of the Garraway mission, but for years had only a small but faithful following of Kru people, who were shepherded from 1902 by G. B. Grando, a native worker. After about three years, an upsurge of interest and conversions finally won for the station a constituency of five hundred Kru Christians. As the Christian group grew, the non-Christian members of their own tribe bitterly persecuted them for their new allegiance and for breaking with various tribal customs. Converts were driven from their homes after being baptized. Some had their houses torn down and were beaten, robbed, and ousted from their towns. Others had red pepper rubbed into their eyes or their heads, and young women had their hair forcibly shaved off—a terrible disgrace. Many were hung up by their hands over hot, smoking fires with red pepper burning in the coals. When angry crowds gathered at homes where converts lived, unconverted mothers sometimes would push their Christian sons or daughters out into the street to be beaten by the mob.

Agnes McAllister went up to Grand Cess several times during 1906 to try to stop the persecution. Her efforts were frustrated; conditions became so bad that seventy-five Christians left their homes and went down the coast, some of them resorting to the Garraway mission. Since there was not room enough for them there, Miss McAllister led them to Cape Palmas and leased a house for their use. By the turn of the year, the refugees were able to go back to Grand Cess, and Bishop Scott, accompanied by the District Superin-

tendent and the American Minister to Liberia, went down from Monrovia to plead their cause with the hostile tribal king. Threateningly brandishing their rolled umbrellas, the Bishop and his companions thrust their way through the great throng that pressed about them in Grand Cess and finally made their way into the presence of the king. Their reception was inhospitable, and it was with no guarantee of safety or success that the Bishop stated his case the next day in the presence of the king, his chiefs, and hundreds of the tribesmen. It took three days of discussion, oratory, and debating maneuvers to win concessions of better treatment for the Christians and a formal pledge of friendship. This evidently somewhat improved the lot of the Christians.

But by the time Williams took up his work in Grand Cess in 1909, the local Christians again were being harassed by their unconverted neighbors, who resented the new Christian customs that made the Methodists break with the tribal ways. With the people being abused and their property being destroyed, Williams became convinced that the permanence and strength of the Christian group demanded their drawing apart into a self-contained community that would be limited to church members only. Proceeding to barter with the non-Christians, he secured land on which the Methodist people built an orderly town of attractive and improved houses, which they called New York. Then the "New Yorkers" acquired and developed subsistence farms that were so well operated that they provided surplus food for sale. Drawing people in from the vicinity, the new town grew into a strong worshipping community.

Even forging the Grand Cess Methodists into a separate community did not fully protect them from attack or from the impact of violent, sometimes deadly, tribal practices. The frequent absences of the men to tend their outlying farms left the town particularly vulnerable. The people were fearful, for one thing, of exposure to the prevalent killing of children in order to use their blood and parts of their bodies to mix with the soil in appeasement of evil spirits that the non-Christians believed otherwise would send drought to the local farms.

The Methodists' fears came to a head when one of the Local Preachers unearthed a conspiracy to sacrifice on a certain day a healthy child that he felt might well be his own. He appealed to Williams to move against the superstitious and lethal custom. Gathering signatures from a number of traders and customs officials and adding his own, Williams sent to the chiefs a communication charging them with the conspiracy and pinning on the paramount chief the responsibility to prohibit the killing. As a result, the child sacrifice was called off.

Three months later, Williams and the other signers of the letter were haled before a tribal assembly of seven or eight thousand people. Contrary to custom, the tribesmen all were armed with knives. Williams's companions, when questioned about the authorship of the letter, weakened and denied

having any knowledge of it. But Williams boldly took responsibility for it, renewed the charge it contained, faced down the tribesmen when they denied it, carefully recited the list of adults and children who had been murdered during his stay in the area, and named the places where the killings had taken place. Finally the chiefs admitted the truth of the charge. But when Williams started to walk away from the council, the armed crowd became excited and noisy. Two men leaped forward, roughly grasped him, and bloodied his neck as he struggled to be free. He was rescued only by the intervention of some of the leaders, who closed in about him and escorted him out of the angry crowd to his home. The next day, they came to him formally garbed and announced that since the secret killings now had been exposed, their tribe would practice child murder no more, though they felt that compelling the renunciation of it struck at the heart of the people they led. Privately, they told him that he barely had escaped with his life the day before.

Grand Cess itself was deep in the Kru country, but from that base Williams kept pushing farther out into the bush during the three years he was stationed there—traveling over exhausting terrain, repeatedly serving as peacemaker among the tribesmen, ceaselessly preaching Christ in virgin territory, establishing nuclei of Christian followers, and fashioning these groups into small informal missions equipped with simple buildings and shepherded by untrained African preachers. Williams set up six of these native stations in his first year in the area. At two points he started separate Christian communities like the one begun at Grand Cess.

Williams lived alone in great privation, spending himself in tirelessly supervising the building and development of the Christian towns. He invested his own money in land and buildings for mission sites and then worked on the houses with his own hands. At the same time, he guided and disciplined his converts, in order to divorce them from habits of simultaneous or serial polygamy and other practices considered heathen and incompatible with the Christian way. He held innumerable meetings and classes, fed and clothed two score boys, farmed and demonstrated farm methods. Through it all, he tensely competed with the devil doctors and juju priests, from whom he often was unable to win people because of lack of funds and men to establish pastoral care. Finally overtaxing his physical resources, he fell ill with black-water fever and nearly died.

When he departed from Liberia in 1912 on the furlough necessitated by his illness, Williams left behind him a group of native stations that made, with Grand Cess, a Circuit numbering 150 church members, 900 probationers, 350 Sunday school pupils, and a Grand Cess congregation running from 700 to 800 people on a Sunday. During his last year, he supervised the erection of ten new mission buildings, managing to secure the voluntary labor of as many as five hundred people in accomplishing the project. In one of his

last letters to the New York office, he cited for the past year 240 conversions and 223 adult baptisms.

In his own mind, not the least significant result of the work carried on by himself and his assistants was the pattern of observable changes in the social habits of the people who were under the influence of the Grand Cess missions. He valued the signs of good order that he saw among the converts, especially in the separate Christian communities: "all women properly clothed for this country, streets clean and orderly; and nice farms well cultivated, houses well kept, W.C.'s . . . roads here have been kept open for commerce . . ." Williams declared that wars had ceased in many places near the Circuit's missions. His Conference report in March, 1911, contained the item "14 tribal wars have been prevented and much bloodshed stopped." When he was preparing the ground for the church in Grand Cess, Williams found himself digging into human skulls and bones. Upon asking the people how the relics got there, he was told that the site was one of their old war grounds where they used to cut off their enemies' heads. Said Williams, "Now on this bloody spot of hatred and ill will is erected a Methodist Temple of Peace where the Man of Sorrow [*sic*] rules and the Prince of Peace governs."

Returning to Liberia in 1913, Williams took an assignment to develop the small and static mission at Nanakru, northwest along the Kru Coast from Grand Cess and Sasstown. Here had lived as an independent missionary Mary L. Allen, who through the labor of many years of privation, loneliness, hostility, and frustration won a meager and undependable following. When she died, her small estate was placed in the hands of the Methodists, to be used for missionary work in Nanakru, where she was buried. Bishop Scott finally appointed Williams to carry out this trust.

Settling on a site close to Nanakru and there building a residential station near a strategic heavily traveled regional trail, Williams once again entered an environment shot through with social practices he found superstitious, vicious, lethal, or otherwise repugnant to a Christian missionary categorically committed to the moral codes of American Protestantism. Once again he was surrounded by radically nonmonogamous sexual customs, domestic slavery, trial by poison, primitive spiritism, witchcraft, ritual murder, and tribal warfare.

Again, as at Grand Cess, Williams founded a separate Christian village for the purpose of protecting his converts from "the deadening, defiling influence of every-day heathenism." On a stretch of ocean front enclosed by mission fencing, he established Bethany, "actually a piece of bush transformed into straight roads, substantial houses whose mud walls are taken right out of the numerous white ant hills, and neat little farms of cassava, eddoes, sweet corn, potatoes, and other vegetables." The town was set apart not only by a fence, but also by observance of a required moral code. Said Williams:

It is a clean town . . . No gin enters it or other intoxicants, no tobacco, nothing unclean. Each man has one wife, and only one. The children, girls as well as boys, will be sent to school, church, and Sunday school. And having Christian parents the little girls will not be likely to be sold in infancy to any man who has the price to add them to his harem.

The town became the base for Williams's attempts to establish an outlying network of village missions and to combat, as best he could, some of the more destructive social practices in the area. The abuses he attacked never were far away from the retreat provided by Bethany. Williams was exercised over the fate of a "wee Wissipo laddie" who was held captive in the jungle for days, referring in his first published report to the Board to the boy's "mysterious disappearance—his murder and the eating of a portion of his body by witch people in the town closest to the mission—the gruesome confession, and terrible execution of his murderer." The boy had been taken on the main road within sight of the mission station. By personal intervention, Williams was able on Thanksgiving Day, 1913, to save three of the mission's followers from the sasswood poison test in a witchcraft case, and in his first eight months in the locality, he was instrumental in averting nine deaths from this time-honored ordeal.

There was peace in the Methodists' Bethany, but not in the countryside; violent attacks on persons and settlements were frequent, and warfare commonly erupted as the climax of unresolved disputes between tribes. Not long after setting up at Nanakru, Williams reported that all the tribes in the vicinity were fighting, roads were closed, and farming was suspended. No one was safe from savage assault:

One day a woman was shot down in the road, and another woman that same week brutally murdered by a soldier. In a town six miles from us a mother and five helpless children were cut to pieces. Nine young men, gifts in hand, carrying greetings to a town further away, were slain, their hands cut off and distributed among the towns in the vicinity. In an attack on the town of Soho, in our circuit, nine men were killed, their heads cut off and held as trophies of war.

Under such conditions, Williams again found a need for his services as peacemaker.

His first opportunity came when he was called out in the middle of the night two days before Christmas, 1913, to mediate a dispute between the Niffoo and the Borrah people, who were threatening to go to war with each other in spite of the pleas of eight other groups. Williams first went to Niffoo, where hours of urgent persuasion proved fruitless. Then he crossed the river to Borrah, where he was surrounded by a mob arrayed in war paint and armed with cutlasses, knives, and guns—and all excitedly clamoring for war and cursing the missionary for his talk of peace. The Borrah "Chris-

tian preacher boy" held out for peace. But his fellow townsmen would not heed him; they finally turned on him and ridiculed him, beat him, broke up his house, and carried off all his belongings. Neither would they heed Williams's arguments for peace or his warning that if they went to war, they would lose their town and be driven far into the bush.

On New Year's Day, the Borrah fighters attacked Niffoo, burning 150 houses. The Niffoo men retaliated; they burned Borrah to the ground, killed many Borrah men, and drove the survivors deep into the bush. The unfortunate young Borrah preacher finally succumbed to abuse and went to war along with the rest. He was one of those killed. Williams had failed to stop this bloody conflict, but his efforts had gained a hearing among some; a few of the Borrah chiefs had withdrawn from the town and refused to fight.

This was a single localized incident, serious enough both in itself and as an indication of the general condition of the region. But in 1915, Williams became involved in a series of events that thrust him into positions of danger not only between tribes that he tried to reconcile with one another, but also between groups of Kru Coast people and the Liberian government. Early in the summer, an African tribal leader informed Williams that the tribes on the Coast were combining at long last to rise up against the government they detested. Williams endeavored to relay to the tribes through his informant the monitory advice that for the native tribes to rebel against "a civilized government" would be futile, for the latter could always secure help from outside countries. This warning was not welcomed; a few months later, the tribes opened hostilities against the Monrovia government, German coastal traders (the purpose was to embroil the government with foreign countries), missions, and missionaries. Williams said years later, "It was not that they particularly hated missionaries, though they bitterly resented their attitude of loyalty to the Government. It was the Liberian government they hated intensely . . ."

The first trouble spot was Sanpropo, ten or fifteen miles from Nanakru. A Cabo preacher escaped from the town to tell Williams that the local Cabos were holding under threat of death two German bank messengers who had fallen into their hands. Williams promptly sent three students into Sanpropo with food and a letter for the captives, after appealing fruitlessly to the regional devil doctor and the government Kru Commissioner to dispatch an escort of soldiers with the boys, indeed even to let him lead the soldiers himself. He then demanded that a delegation representing all the towns in the devil doctor's sphere of influence be sent by him to urge the Cabos to release the Germans. In spite of prevalent bitterness toward Germans in general, the delegation went to Sanpropo and worked hard, but apparently at first unsuccessfully, to free the prisoners. Finally, after five days, the two men were released, largely because all the publicity involved in the delegation's activity had frustrated the Cabos' plan to wring money from them. They then made

their way to the Nanakru mission, where Williams gave them shelter. Discovering that hundreds of armed Cabos were assembled ready to attack Sinoe, which was twenty-five miles away, Williams warned the fugitives, when he sent them north from the mission, to keep far enough at sea to avoid being intercepted.

Angry at the mission for blocking their scheme to rob the Germans, the Cabos were determined to kill Williams and his wife, and they sent out forty war canoes from Sanpropo to accomplish it. On the way, however, the Cabo fighters entered a palaver with Wissipo tribesmen who by threatening to fight in defense of the Williamses, dissuaded the attackers from carrying out their murderous purpose. The war party also had been headed for four nearby towns to burn them down, but again Wissipo opposition prevented.

Once the war with the government started, the area erupted into violent chaos, a condition not greatly different, either in the intensity of its bloody brutality or in the pattern of attack and counterattack of group against group, from that of the Kru Coast's endemic intertribal warfare. Wildly unscrupulous figures came forward in ruthless grabs for local power. Led by American officers, the soldiers of the Monrovia government's Liberian Frontier Force embarked upon a major effort to pacify the rebellious tribes and subject them to the Americo-Liberian system of law and order. The Frontier Force itself was an aggregation of aggressive tribal fighters, who used in the service of the government the same methods of combat to which they were accustomed when back in their local settings raiding neighboring villagers.

Williams continued to do all he could to influence particular towns not to join the rebellion; he had a realistic view of the suffering it inevitably would bring them. And as the war went on, he observed the harsh consequences that fell upon those that failed to stay out. The government soldiers successfully attacked every insurgent town along the Coast, looting, killing, driving out the people, burning the villages to the ground. The harried villagers fled into the bush, where they lived without food, clothing, or shelter, exposed to the heavy rains that fell almost every night. The Frontier Force destroyed—sometimes runners brought reports to Williams, sometimes he saw the smoke and the flames not too far in the distance—Nureh, Sanpropo, Niffoo, Betu, Koba, Little Kru, Setra Kru. Thus, said Williams, they “cleaned out the Cabos and their allies” from the Kru Coast. And in addition to loosing these punitive acts of the Frontier Force upon the recalcitrant villages, the government in the end—the war extended well into 1916—executed at least sixty Kru chiefs.

Williams and the Nanakru mission became acutely involved in the suffering and confusion of the war especially through the experience of the Ble tribesmen of Nureh, the next town to the mission site. When the punitive expedition reached the mission, William warned the passing officers that there would

be trouble at Nureh, for the Ble townsmen had declared that they would fight. Williams already had reasoned and pleaded with them not to go to war. Five times on the day before the soldiers' arrival he had sent them messengers. But they would not heed his pleas. When the soldiers marched on toward Nureh, Williams went into the mission's bell tower to watch. Soon he "heard the slow bang, bang, bang of native guns followed instantly by volleys from the soldiers and soon a pillar of smoke rising in the air showed that Nureh was burning." Then he heard reports of the "town in flames, people rushing to hide in the bush, soldiers swarming all over the place busy plundering while they had the chance." And then came reports of the sufferings of the Ble people in the bush. Acting, so it was said, at the instigation of the area's devil doctor, whenever the bush people saw a Ble—man, woman, or child—they "killed him and cut off the head and hands and carried them into Nana Kru Town to the supreme devil doctor" himself. Williams sent food into the bush for the refugees as often as he could, and he also confronted the devil doctor and talked him into ordering the bush killings stopped.

On a night in December, the leaders of the Bles suddenly appeared at the mission and appealed to Williams to help them in their plight. Assuring them of his belief that the government would not kill them, he gave them food and shelter for the night and on the next day took them to the Frontier Force station at Nanakru to open negotiations with the government. There they were told to call in all their people, who would be fed and sheltered until negotiations should be finished. That night 150 Ble refugees came to the mission, and on the next day, Williams escorted them to Nanakru.

Shortly afterwards, Williams was shocked to learn that the Frontier Force considered the refugees its prisoners. The Force's officers intended to take away a number of the men, and the soldiers had divided up the women and children with the purpose of carrying them off into the interior as their personal slaves. Williams protested to the officers and succeeded in winning a promise of freedom for the women and children and for all the men but the three chiefs who had led the rebellion. Then, backed by the captain of the *U.S.S. Chester*, which was moored near by, only with great difficulty did he actually get the women and children out of the hands of the soldiers. He also fought, unsuccessfully, to keep the officers from retaining custody of twenty-five Ble men—not only the three at first designated. In the heated dispute, some Americo-Liberians from Sinoe roundly cursed Williams for depriving them of prisoners they coveted as slaves, charging him with being an Englishman (he was born on the Isle of Wight) and with stirring up the natives. He later gave Captain Schofield of the *Chester* credit for helping to save the mission's future, for "if the natives had once got the idea that we had helped to put these refugees into the *soldiers'* hands, incredible harm would have resulted." Williams was convinced that he might as well have closed down the mission, for any further opportunity for Methodist work on the Kru coast

"would have been killed then and there." Fortunately, the commanding officer of the Frontier Force group was able to honor his promise that the twenty-five men kept prisoner would not be harmed; instead of being executed, as were so many others, they were restored to their people after the uprising.

Williams's intervention on behalf of the Bles resulted in his taking back to the mission, with government approval, over a hundred refugees whom he undertook to shelter, feed, clothe, and teach. Most of them were what he called "raw heathen," and they did not fit comfortably into life at the mission. By mutual agreement, they soon went to live on the Nanakru plantations to await the end of the negotiations over the rebellion. But the mission kept the children—eighteen girls and twenty-two boys.

Especially in the early stages of the Kru Coast trouble, Williams and his wife were completely isolated from the outside world—cut off from mail service, low on food supplies, and out of contact with the United States diplomatic office in Monrovia, to which he sent word of their predicament. Being sensitive to tribal undercurrents, he realized that they were in grave danger. He sent home the mission schoolboys, stopped ringing the church bells, and generally kept quietly to the mission premises, endeavoring to attract no unnecessary attention. Opposition to the government was so fierce that some of the tribesmen were ready to kill any white man in order to embroil the Monrovia administration internationally. Williams remained vulnerable because of his part in the Sanpropo incident and because it was known that he was against violence to the Americo-Liberians on the Coast; he had publicly persuaded the Nanakru king to swear to protect them. Two of the Mission's Cabo preachers bitterly joined the rebellion, one of them attempting to develop plans to capture and murder the Kru Commissioner and other Americo-Liberians, and the other making murderous threats against the missionaries. On one occasion, a Cabo attempted violence on Williams on the mission site itself. But when finally the *Chester* arrived in port to inquire for the missionaries' safety, Williams declined to accept the captain's suggestion that the mission be closed and that he and his wife leave on the cruiser. Then Captain Schofield offered to leave twenty marines at the mission as a bodyguard for him. He wrote later:

This also I could not accept. From its beginning we had no weapons of any kind on the mission; we had carefully taught our people that if they lived true to God, God would fight for them in every need. To have had soldiers stationed there would have been an inconsistency our native people would have been quick to grasp.

Williams still was a target for hostility when after a number of months conditions eased enough to permit him to go out to visit the other stations on his District. As his party neared Settra Kru on its way north by sailboat, a fleet of war canoes containing heavily armed tribesmen attacked them and

forced them to turn back to Nanakru. The next day, they took on a number of soldiers and started north again. Again they were attacked. The three boats in the Williams group exchanged brisk fire with thirty or forty canoes, finally beating them off well enough to be able to continue passage.

Although its direct localized effects were not prolonged, the Kru war naturally upset much of the Liberia mission's work on the Coast. The most substantial loss on Williams's Sinoe District resulted from the scattering of the people of four churches, those in Sangwin, Beuah, Blubarra, and Sanpropo. This accounted for nearly four hundred church members whom Williams felt he no longer could number in the District's constituency. There were other towns where it was difficult to restore the church work to earlier levels. Frederick A. Price, superintendent of the Cape Palmas District, also reported war-caused handicaps. There was bloodshed at Barraka, which was burned by the Liberian Frontier Force, with rebellion spreading to other places. The Americo-Liberian pastor at Barraka had to leave the mission post. Another item in Price's report for the Conference year 1916-17 read, "Battu has been burned to ashes by the Liberia Frontier Soldiers and our membership there has been scattered." As late as February, 1918, Price reported that he had been out of touch with the Little Wrebo charge because the people still were in rebellion.

Such bitter experiences were not novelties in the evolution of the Liberia mission. The Mission had felt the disrupting effects of them in 1908, the year the Liberian Frontier Force was organized. Work was suspended at that time at Settra Kru, in the Sinoe District, because according to the Americo-Liberian superintendent, "the attitude of the natives" toward the government did not warrant further operation there. A year later, the same official delayed receiving candidates for baptism and church membership resulting from copious conversions at Sasstown, citing as his reason a similar hostility, which he called "a disloyal stand against the sovereignty of Liberia." He intended to wait until he felt his life would not be endangered by a visit. When Walter Williams went to Grand Cess in 1909, the entire Kru Coast was gripped by a conflict between the tribesmen and the Monrovia regime. In 1910, the Greboes were in rebellion, with mission work on the Cape Palmas District seriously affected. The District Superintendents from Cape Palmas and Sinoe did not even get to the Conference session in Grand Bassa that year, and the government billeted troops from Monrovia in the Methodists' Cape Palmas Seminary. There were hostilities on the Bassa and the Sinoe Districts in 1912.

These conflicts and the longstanding grievances and maladjustments from which they sprang lay at the heart of a major cause of the failure of the Methodist Episcopal Church in Liberia to do more than scratch the surface of its responsibility for the evangelization of the native tribes. The tribesmen perennially resisted as encroachments of alien exploiters and oppressors the

attempts of the Monrovia administration to pacify and govern them. The Americo-Liberians, on the other hand, treated the tribes as wild, recalcitrant rebels to be subjected to civilized rulers, by force if necessary. The Methodist Church was identified lock, stock, and barrel with the Americo-Liberian society and its government. The natives could not trust and accept the Liberians as religious workers because they knew them to be partisans of the hated Monrovia government and thus held them under suspicion of being its agents. The Liberian Methodists' long and deeply felt identification with the government developed in them a psychological incapacity to approach the natives with attitudes of love and respect for them; they naturally looked upon them as inferior people, to be manipulated and dominated and at best to be patronized. By and large, this psychological handicap was reinforced by their mundane recognition of their vested interest in the Monrovia government and in their continued acceptability to it. Therefore, both inherently and in the eyes of the natives, they were disqualified to serve as Christian missionaries; in time of relative peace, they could not be trusted by the non-Christian tribesmen as representatives of religious missions; in time of war, it was dangerous for them to be found in the tribal areas.

Writing to New York during the crisis of 1916, Walter Williams bluntly pointed to the natives' hatred of the Americo-Liberians and charged it basically to the injustices visited on them by the government and its representatives. He declared to Secretary Frank Mason North:

The government sends many times unscrupulous men who are absolutely ignorant of the real situation and the causes of the troubles upon this coast, and the natives, who are great readers of human character and are tricky themselves, soon find out the temperament of these men and get unjust decisions from them, and with these raw native tribes, once you have destroyed faith it is hopeless ever to regain it. This sets fires at work which it is most difficult to put out and makes the natives extraordinarily bitter, and when the government sends again to talk any troubles, the natives refuse to come. This was practically the cause of this uprising among the Cabos at this time.

Explaining that he feared his letter might be intercepted, Williams refrained from offering North many examples of the government's injustice that he might otherwise have cited. As it was, he rather strongly portrayed the results of what he believed was the hopeless incompetence of the Liberian regime to govern and improve its own country. "There are no bridges, no transportation of any kind, no manufactories, hardly any schools, no progress, no work for any native to do." In order to make a decent living, the native young men, he said, had to leave Liberia for English colonies hundreds of miles away. Seeing the progress being made elsewhere and then returning home, to pay duties and taxes levied by the Liberian government though no opportunities or benefits were given them, made the natives "very restless and bitter." Hundreds of times they had spoken to Williams of these experiences.

That the Church's Americo-Liberian partisanship disqualified it for successful mission work among the natives remained a fact unacknowledged in Methodist circles in Liberia, and evidently the Methodists in the United States were unaware of this fundamental aspect of their foreign mission in Liberia. The District reports in the *Minutes* of the Liberia Conference made remarkably few references to government-native conflicts even during the most upsetting and violent times. Those references were limited in content and never drawn together into an informative descriptive pattern. No American Methodist reader could have drawn from them any picture of the deep alienation of the natives from the government, of the government's ruthlessness in putting down rebellion, or of the position of the Church as an organ of Christian evangelism profoundly compromised by its close association with the secular forces in Liberian society. The Liberian ministers, who were not noted for the laconic character of their Conference reports and resolutions, never described this radical problem in their public statements, to say nothing of setting forth any potential solution for it. They could not have done that without severely criticizing both themselves and their political associates. Bishop Scott's reports to the General Conference in 1912 and 1916 gave a somewhat fuller suggestion of the scale of the disturbances of those years, but even he did not go to the heart of the matter.

Only Walter Williams, who knew from the beginning that the Kru Coast people were suspicious of black missionaries as potential spies from Monrovia, came close to exposing the painful central issue. But even he confined his criticism almost entirely within private correspondence with Secretary North and within the pages of *Adventures with the Krus in West Africa*, the book he and his wife published forty years afterwards. His contribution to the Board's *Annual Report* for 1916, which showed evidence of having been worked over by the fine literary hand of Mrs. Williams, may well have been cut short by an editorial hand in New York. It contained, however, not a word about the shattering conflict on the Kru Coast in 1915-16. Williams did refer to the Kru troubles in a piece he prepared for the *Annual Report* for 1917, but all he had thought and felt about it so recently was reduced and muted to the single clause, "when the Frontier Force disarmed all native coast towns following the late native rebellion." Nothing in his six-page statement was at all out of harmony with the *Report's* anonymous section on Liberia, which was so fulsome in praise of the country, its history, its government, and its possibilities as to sound like a tacitly framed promotional white-wash of a situation currently laboring under denigration. It specifically lauded the government for its friendly encouragement of Christian missions. "Grants of land, exemption from duty, protection to life and property, and aid in special cases have been given to the mission by the Government." Of the government in general it said, "What Liberia as a Government has accomplished during its 70 years of national existence, should inspire confidence

and hope." And among the accomplishments was the fact that it had "repressed those hostile tribes that disputed its hegemony to rule the country."

Whatever serious doubts Williams had about the Liberian government and however he managed to suppress them, once the Kru rebellion was over, he emerged as a strong supporter and partner of the administration in Monrovia. He clearly was proud of what was going on in the Methodist town of New York that he had founded at Grand Cess. When the rebellious towns were disarmed, the New York men were permitted to keep their weapons. Under a publicly appointed native captain, they now were engaging in military drill. Although they formerly had hated the government, now they were holding themselves loyally in readiness to serve Liberia at any call. By government order, no important native councils were to be held any longer in the non-Christian town at Grand Cess, but these palaver courts were to be conducted in New York under the presidency of its Christian men. "There is no other Kroo town in the land," said Williams in the *Annual Report* for 1917, "where Christianity has been, officially, given such prestige and power."

Evidently, Williams sensed that out of practical co-operation with the government was emerging a new pattern of potential influence for the missionary movement he represented. He was encouraged because he realized that other Christian settlements were being formed and were shaping up in such a way as to become qualified to receive grants of power from the government. He revealed in the *Annual Report* his satisfaction that the government was beginning to show preference for dealing with Christian young men as negotiators for the natives in controversies with itself, because they were more peaceable, more loyal to the government, more interested in community betterment and the development of trade. As for Nanakru, he pointed out that the mission there had rendered substantial assistance to the government as go-between in relations with the restless and sometimes turbulent tribes and as mediator among the tribes themselves. He cited official recognition of this service by quoting from a letter he had received from President Daniel E. Howard: "We thank you for the great interest you take in good government on the Kroo coast. . . . Your letters will always receive an attentive hearing. . . . Do all in your power to keep things quiet." And he quoted words of appreciation for his good work from one of the Senators, who later became Vice-President.

A year later, Williams was able to announce that the government's appreciation had taken more formal expression; His Excellency, President Howard, had conferred on him the decoration of Knight Official of the Humane Order for the Redemption of Africa. Williams also announced the formation of three new distinctly Christian towns along the coast and in the interior, declaring that the moral and religious life of these separated communities could not fail to leaven the entire coast, thus facilitating the govern-

ment's control of the natives, because the Christian townspeople were intensely loyal to the government, "as we have taught them to be."

In addition to coming out with his new strong emphasis upon co-operation with the government, Williams now reviewed the Kru conflict of two years earlier after a pattern that had in it nothing of his earlier disillusionment with the rulers of the country. He now interpreted the origin of the war not as native reaction to the government's injustice, but simply as a rebellious plot testing whether the Kru Coast belonged to Liberia or only to the native tribes, with the devil doctors cited as villains responsible for the trouble. He pointed out that from this had resulted much bloodshed, suffering, and loss of property for the natives, but he had nothing to say of the bloody, destructive acts of the government soldiers that enforced the suffering. Evidently, he found those incidents counterbalanced by the benefits he cited—clarification of Liberian sovereignty and the establishment of safe travel in Liberia from Cape to Cape. He concluded his review by identifying the saving factor in the conflict: "The crushing of the rebellion and the saving of the republic was due to the prompt and sympathetic aid given by the United States government and the presence in these waters of the U.S. Cruiser 'Chester.'"

Whatever residual inner reservations Williams may have held with regard to the government, his operational stance became so friendly that three years after he wrote Secretary North condemning its works and its lack of works, he suggested that the Board publicize in the American press and other media the public progress made in Liberia under President Howard's administration, including "the real missionary work done by a Methodist Chief Executive of a sister republic."

With the letter bearing this suggestion to New York Williams enclosed a copy of a letter of his to President Howard on the occasion of his retirement from office. In it he lauded Howard for the beneficent and far-reaching results of his administration, specifying six that he regarded as outstanding. Among them was the pacification of the natives: "As regards the aborigines, you have taught all natives to respect the Liberian flag, which is something absolutely new upon this coast, and to fear misdemeanor toward the Liberian Government." Describing Howard's administration as one to be proud of, Williams heartily thanked him and his Cabinet for the changes they had made in Liberia. He said:

Through your influence as Chief Executive, you have greatly furthered and strengthened the labors of the foreign missionary here and have earned the gratitude of the entire body known as the Methodist Episcopal Church in the U.S.A.

I write this as I have a great admiration for you and your steady hand at the helm of the Republic. Knowing the negros [*sic*] themselves are slow to appreciate valuable services rendered and excellent work done, we, as white

Americans, wish to express our gratitude to you, as Methodists and as residents of the Republic of Liberia. And if we, on our part have rendered any service to the Republic, we are real glad. That is what we have meant to do.

Williams also singled out several other government officials for words of appreciation and concluded his communication to Howard by saying that he would like to go on record in one of the President's state papers as showing what an outsider who had watched the government's progress thought of his administration.

Examination of the particular measures for which Williams praised the Howard administration in 1919 suggests the most likely cause of his jumping onto the government bandwagon from his earlier position of strong disapproval of the same administration. Among other things he pointed out were a new government ban on trial by sassawood poisoning, outlawry of the witch doctors and their practices, abolition of the system of local administration by native tribal chiefs and the substitution of a new group of native leaders chosen by the government and answerable to it, and inclusion of Christians among the new leaders wherever possible. Williams took the credit for the initiative that eventuated in some of the acts involved in these reforms. In some cases, his lobbying for them involved conferring with every Senator and Representative in the Monrovia government. He considered the measures humane acts that would be good for the future of the people. Getting rid of the traditional chieftains, for instance, he characterized as breaking up an old regime that entailed "dishonor, dishonesty, murder, bloodshed, poison, human sacrifices, and barbarities of many kinds towards the different tribes . . ."

Williams remarked, when describing to Secretary North this humane interest of his in Liberian life, "Though all our work is not understood, of course—the motives that prompt us to do things." It is impossible to overlook the fact that in all his mission in Liberia, Williams's deepest purpose was to contribute to the Christianization of the population. And it is impossible to believe that he did not realize that in breaking up social patterns and sanctions centered in the power of the witch doctors and the tribal chiefs, the government was removing the Mission's chief enemies and its strongest competitors for the loyalties of the native tribal peoples. Williams and those who worked with him now were able to move forward with their evangelization program under the umbrella of government protection, and he knew it. Therefore he had every practical incentive to maintain and advertise open friendship toward the government and to keep private any serious doubts about Liberian leadership and progress that may not have been quenched by the government's adoption of the measures he hailed.

The struggle between the now more influential Mission and the forces of traditional tribal religion was a conflict not entirely external to the framework

of Williams's own religious belief, for the witchcraft that held sway in association with the old religious practices appears to have been correlated in his mind with the work of the personal Devil of Christian theology whom he believed was the enemy of the Mission's work. Although the work at the Nanakru mission generally went well following the Kru war, Williams testified that early in 1919 a power of evil opposed all evangelistic efforts. "We did not know what it was nor where it was, this intangible but deadly influence which set itself so markedly against our work." Unrest pervaded the entire mission, until finally God lifted the unbearable strain. Said Williams:

The evil was in the mission itself—three witch women, trained in the ways of devil darkness, who had established themselves in the homes of husband and sons in our Christian town of Bethany, right in our very midst! They were quickly expelled.

But less neatly remediable tensions existed outside the mission, where the juju houses and their altars still stood intact even though the government's ban had checked the activities of the devil doctors along the Kru Coast.

Williams had an opportunity to see these tensions dramatized on his own Sinoe District. Late in the spring, a full eclipse of the sun at midday appeared in Liberia, surprising Williams (he had received no mail for months), sending the non-Christian Africans near Nanakru into panic, and projecting the converted Africans into a strong religious revival that yielded a large number of conversions. Out of the religious enthusiasm lighted by the revival came a message to the mission house: the Nanakru juju house, which was still standing, must be burned. Action followed swiftly. Williams later told in his book what happened:

A hundred Kru Christians, led by the missionary and the Nana Kru second chief, passed, singing, through the town; then encircled the juju house where all knelt in prayer after some short but searching preaching and testimony. It had rained the night before and the thatched roof of the house was very wet. For this reason some of the onlookers advised our people to simply break the building down, not to risk failure by trying to burn a wet house. Many among the onlookers believed fire had no power to burn the fetishes inside that house. Our Christian people did not hesitate, for they were not listening to men, but to God. Into the juju house they rushed and began to knock the idols about, challenging them to save themselves. The brass bell was brought out, and then fire was applied, bamboo, wet thatch, and jujus being consumed in a magnificent blaze to the glory and honor of the one true God.

A few days later, the Governor of Sinoe County picked up where Williams and his band had left off. Touring the coastal towns under his jurisdiction, he directed the destruction of all remaining jujus and juju houses. Williams and the Christians were elated, but their religious aggression also gave

Williams cause for sober reflection. He acknowledged that the iconoclastic campaign was a triumph that left thousands of non-Christian Kru bewildered, resentful, and hostile. A new day had come to the Kru Coast, but these people did not like it; they preferred the old ways that had been broken up by the Christian missionary and the conquering government. Some were so discontented that they plotted, though fruitlessly, to effect a restoration by getting rid of the missionary. Though it gave the Mission a strategic advantage by providing a socially sanctioned position from which it could continue its thrust into the native areas, the new rapport between the Mission and the government was not a creatively converting influence among the non-Christians.

Nor was this a time of conversion for the Americo-Liberian church. Appalled and discouraged by what he observed in its life, Walter Williams became its harshest critic, taking his place in the line of Mary Sharp and the ante-episcopal Alexander Camphor.

Williams's view of the moral level of the Methodist Episcopal Church in Liberia was of a piece with his view of that of the Americo-Liberian society in general. He designated the three most commonly observable characteristics of life in the Republic as "DISHONESTY, both in private and public funds, DRINK and IMMORALITY OF THE GROSSEST CHARACTER [sexual], from the lowest to the highest circles . . ." He referred to the Liberians of that time not as the present generation, but as the "present *degeneration*." Looking at the Americo-Liberian scene from the missionary point of view, he said, "The Liberians themselves are a menace to pure Christianity and holy living, and the Liberian ministry is worse than the laity, and it seems almost impossible to remedy it without a radical revolution."

Williams illustrated this deplorable condition by describing the case of a Methodist minister whose conduct he found outrageous. The man was married, so he wrote to a Board staff member in New York, to a "civilized" Liberian, but kept a native woman right in the house, often ousting the civilized woman. Recently, he had been caught in the act of adultery with a woman whose husband then shot and killed her and became a fugitive from justice, hiding out in the bush and swearing not to give himself up until he achieved the satisfaction of killing the minister who had tampered with his wife. The same minister also had committed adultery with the wife of a fellow member of his Conference. Year after year, wrote Williams, the delinquent minister was called to account by the Conference for some immorality or other and always promised to reform, but never changed his habits, remaining a disgrace to the Church. "It takes a lot of grace to sit in the Conference with such a man, and yet he is only one of a number of like character who belong to the Liberia Annual Conference." Williams found frustrating the attempt

to convey to the Board the reality of such conditions. "The state of morality existing in this Conference," he complained, "is frightful."

Williams's charge of dishonesty was relevant to his view of the Liberian-manned Conference as a self-serving ecclesiastical machine. At a time in 1917 when the Board was seeking to put together a field Finance Committee for Liberia, he told the Board Treasurer that expecting honest disbursement of mission funds by Americo-Liberians would be expecting the impossible. He declared that from Bishop Taylor's time to the present

more money has been squandered, stolen and wasted by these black men here than perhaps in any other part of the world. Men have built their own houses with these funds, opened stores in their own names, and missionaries have suffered much and have almost been starved, through this robbing of mission funds, until now there are no white missionaries hardly left in this country . . .

Bishop Scott had written Williams recently that he had incurred some dislike on the part of Americo-Liberian ministers because of his efforts to punish them for taking money drafts from the mails. The Bishop said that he had been unable to end the practice, and Williams commented, "You cannot stop stealing, no matter what you do on this field." Williams himself had worked for long periods without being able to get any money at all from Board appropriations because of the necessity of its going through the tight sieve of distribution by Americo-Liberian ministers. Men who allowed missionary funds to be diverted to private and pet purposes brushed him off with the claim that he had better access to special gifts from the United States than others, but at the same time secretly wrote to donors of his in order to secure money for their own projects.

Williams was revolted by the Liberians' financial manipulations particularly because the church organization on which they battered was unproductive in the evangelization of the tribes. That is why he wrote Secretary North in 1916, "If you lived here and saw the way some of your mission funds go and how they are used, it would make you so sick that you would want to leave the country and never put foot into it again." He accused the Liberians of being absolutely indifferent to the spiritual need of the natives; they did nothing for the indigenous people and would never accomplish their Christianization. Their attitude toward Board appropriations reflected basically wrong thinking about the evangelization of the non-Christian population:

They think the Mission money is a thing for *them* and them alone, just to do as they please with it, not to do mission work with it *but a gift that is due them from American Methodism for personal matters and not for mission work.*

In 1918, he pointed up the lack of work for the native tribes by reminding the Board that he and his wife were the only white Protestant missionaries

on the entire Kru Coast and that in the area were no American Negro missionaries and no Americo-Liberians active in evangelistic or educational work for the tens of thousands of Krus. And the bush country just back of the Kru Coast, he said, was densely populated but practically untouched by evangelizing workers. Williams appealed for funds to be devoted to training a native ministry, the method he believed was essential to winning the natives to Christ. He wrote Secretary North in 1919 that the Americo-Liberian ministers would not stay on the Coast. "They accept appointments, stay a few weeks, collect as much of the year's salary as they can get out of their District Superintendents—and then depart for civilized towns."

It was such dishonesty, lack of dedication, and unproductiveness that made Williams write to New York, "Liberia is the graveyard of mission funds."

Mozambique

For twenty months in 1896 and 1897, the Methodist mission in Mozambique was linked to the rest of world Methodism by little more than a definition. It was listed as the Zambezi District of the Liberia Conference and then of the Congo Mission Conference. But it was separated from the other Africa missions by thousands of land or sea miles, and no representative of the District was present in Monrovia or in Quiôngua when Bishop Hartzell held his first Conference there. The struggling little East Coast enterprise was so remote that Bishop Harzell did not go to visit it on either of his exploratory tours of his African episcopal jurisdiction. Nor was there a missionary in Mozambique during all those months to represent the Mission's tie with the church in America. Early in 1896, stricken with malaria, the two young missionary couples enlisted by Bishop Taylor had returned home to New Zealand after only six months' service,* and Erwin H. Richards, the Mission's superintendent, had gone to the United States to raise funds and to recruit personnel.

The Mission had three stations near the seaport town of Inhambane, on Inhambane Bay, an inlet of the Mozambique Channel, which runs between Mozambique and the island of Madagascar. Gikuki, the head station, lay five miles across the Bay from Inhambane, and the other stations, Makodweni and Kambini, were situated on a hilly ridge some thirty miles inland from the port. Associated with the three stations were a dozen church members, who were organized as a single church. During the many months without missionary guidance, a few African helpers cared for the stations and held the small congregations together.

These workers carried on very well with the Methodist following but had to cope with difficulties arising outside the Christian community. At first, their people were harassed by the Tonga chief. Later, they were distressed

* See Vol. III, 921.

by recruiting activity by the Portuguese administration, which sent soldiers out into the countryside to bring to town large numbers of Tonga men to be drafted for police duty both at home and abroad. Deserting their homes, almost all the neighboring villagers but the Methodists finally fled into the bush in order to escape impressment, the latter, however, remaining at home and at work. Erwin Richards later reported that the government had had no intention of drafting any of the Methodist group and that since they were not aware of their immunity, they therefore lived in fear. At the same time, the pattern of their employment among their now scattered neighbors was broken up.

The troubles continued after Richards' return in December, 1897. Neither people nor provisions were safe anywhere but on mission lands, and only Africans who actually lived on them and were naturally connected with the Mission could be harbored there. Richards was gratified to find the Methodist company still intact, but he wasted no sentiment over the plight of the Tonga people who were resisting service under their Portuguese masters. He declared that the government had the Mission's full sympathy, "for if the natives would volunteer to do what has to be done under every flag on earth, then there would be peace, and all would move regularly as it should." Richards felt that having to pay tax levies, rendering compulsory military service, and undergoing brief periods of forced labor for the government could constitute no serious grievance on the part of the Africans, for the government, he claimed, balanced these exactions by protecting the Tonga people from their enemies.

Richards obviously considered the question of political liberty for Africans an irrelevancy. He saw them as a thoroughly inferior breed completely lacking in the elements of human dignity upon which claims to freedom ordinarily are based. He turned to the eighth chapter of Romans for a list of radical evils to express the moral corruption of the African native—a state of degradation that "reversed the whole course of nature." Richards stated to his fellow Conference members in one of his District reports:

He is stark naked for the most part and full of leecherous [*sic*] sores and his spiritual nature is so very low that his breath would pollute the waters of the Stygian Lake,—of which it is said that it stunk so bad the birds were unable to fly over it . . . and anyone but a scientific idiot knows that there is not one item in the whole realm of the entire universe that can help this depraved and most unnatural man but the applied blood of the Christ of the Christian Bible.

On another occasion Richards concluded a description of the African's utterly miserable material condition by saying that "his possessions generally hardly amount to more than the vermin which stick to his skin." Then he continued:

His mental composition is meaner than his outward environment. His mind is so densely darkened by centuries of night, and all his feelings so leprously dead, that he is positively insensible to kindest offers of those who not only wish him well, but who seek his own highest interests both here and hereafter.

Richards brought back with him from the United States his bride of four months (his first wife had died in Inhambane in 1893). With him also came Abraham L. Buchwalter and his wife, lay missionaries who previously had served in Liberia for about six years. After six months spent together in language studies at the Kambini station, the two couples parted, Richards and his wife taking up work at Gikuki and the Buchwalters remaining at Kambini.

Because of Mrs. Buchwalter's ill health, these two colleagues of Richards' were compelled to return to the United States early in 1900. They were succeeded late in 1901 by Frank D. Wolf, a young minister recently graduated from Northwestern University, and his wife. In May, 1902, Richards started for the States on leave accompanied by his wife, who died aboard ship and was buried in the Mediterranean. Like his previous wife, she succumbed to blackwater fever. He returned to Inhambane in January, 1904, with his third wife. The Wolfs left Africa shortly afterwards and were succeeded by the Buchwalters, who returned to Mozambique in the summer of 1905 by way of renewed service in Liberia, but only to leave again two years later for reasons of health. Their departure was immediately followed by the arrival of William C. Terril and his wife, who thus began a long period of service in Mozambique. Just before them came two young missionaries sponsored by the Sweden Conference under the inspiration of a visit from Bishop Hartzell—Josef A. Persson and C. H. G. Runfeldt, one a printer and the other a bookbinder. They were assigned to the Mission press. Runfeldt soon entered the ministry but died of malaria in 1910. Persson continued a member of the Mission for many years. Richards, the founder of the Methodists' Mozambique mission, went on furlough in 1908 and did not return to the field. Among the other missionaries who came to Mozambique during this period were Pliny W. Keys (1909), Raymond L. Bush (1911), James D. Pointer (1913), Charles J. Stauffacher, M.D. (1913), Willie C. Gardner (1918), and Ira E. Gillet (1919), with their respective wives. Seldom were there more than two missionary couples on the field, and sometimes there was only one.

OUTSTATION NETWORK

Full operation of the Mission on a three-station basis began in June, 1898, when Richards established his residence at Gikuki. Working with him were Buchwalter, in charge at Kambini, and Tizore M. Navess, at Makodweni. Navess, by virtue of being ordained Deacon in 1905 and Elder in 1907,

became the first African member of the Methodist ministry in Mozambique. In less than a year's time, each of the stations led by these three men had its own separately organized church and a newly established outstation. By Conference time in 1899, a third of the District's thirty full members of the church and a comparable share of the hundred probationers belonged to the new stations. When Richards left Mozambique in 1908, the District had forty-four stations, which were organized into six Circuits. And the constituency had grown to 285 church members and 1,129 probationers, with 1,303 pupils in Sunday schools.

This growth of stations and of Christian constituency was accomplished by Richards' employing a missionary strategy that showed him trusting far more solidly in the potentialities of Africans than would be suggested by his dogmatic denigration of what he considered to be the African mentality. He based the entire movement upon the capabilities of uneducated Africans—Christian converts, to be sure, but none the less Africans—whom he enlisted as teacher-evangelists for the Mission. He drew them from among young people whom he had nurtured in the Christian faith during his earlier missionary efforts. Now that they were maturing, he was concerned for their future as men and women who should establish Christian homes and "live consistent Christian lives and shine as bright lights in the heathen world about them." Therefore he encouraged them to set up homes that would at the same time become centers for Christian teaching. The couples who joined the movement made their beginnings within the landholding system of the area into which the missionaries desired to project the teaching of the gospel. Each teacher chose his own location and then applied to the local chief to become one of his people. Being readily accepted, he then was given a plot of ground adequate for his purposes. From this site he could not henceforth be alienated, for the chief had no right to oust the teacher once he had received him. Then the teacher put up his own hut and erected simple barracks for the pupils who soon came to him. They were treated like members of the teacher's family and were expected to work in the garden to help produce the mission's food supply.

The new plan was inaugurated in 1897, when an African couple associated with the mission at Kambini were asked to go to Pakule, five or six miles away, to found a station of their own. That same season, married couples started similar stations at Dorato, about eight miles south of Makodweni, and at Gihuni, five miles from Gikuki. These were the first three outstations reported to the Conference, and this was the pattern of extension by which the Mission broadened its outreach throughout Richards' administration.

Richards had no delusions about the "diminutive equipment" of the teachers he was drawing into the work:

But one has ever been from home to study, none could pass any rigid examination in addition, or distinguish a "pug puppy from an ocean grey-hound."

But he has the true Spirit, prays a great deal and knows the Gospels very well indeed. He is fairly well read in the Zulu Bible, and in the Tonga Testament.

Religiously, these teachers could communicate the essential evangelical message; educationally, they could do little for their pupils but teach them to read the Gospels and to do a little simple arithmetic. But they were zealous and evangelistically fruitful workers.

Socially, enrollment in one of the Methodist schools was the beginning of a civilizing process for the African children. Richards described their approach to the school set up by the African teacher :

Here come the desired pupils, a lad and a lassie, he clad in the "gee-string" of his country, and she in her cloth and "soap" is an essential desideratum from the beginning. Neither ever saw a blanket of their own, or other clothing, or a bed. At seven years of age this condition may be endurable, at fourteen it is scarcely so, and at 28 it is altogether shocking. Hence from the very inception of an outstation, the pupil must be "soaped," clad, and blanketed.

The Mission allowed each teacher a monthly salary of about four dollars, which was close to the prevailing wage rate in the country. Since the children largely left their homes and boarded with the teachers, many of them had to be fed and otherwise provided for at the school sites. The Mission allotted to each station enough money to pay for the board of five pupils, but the teachers were so eager to accept the children who came to them that sometimes they stretched the allotment so as to provide for as many as ten youngsters. From their own meager salaries and such other bare resources as they could scrape together, they often cared for still more children.

Following the pupils to the mission stations came members of their families. Relatives of the teachers also came to live there. And as the stations became known in the country roundabout, various unattached people appeared at them, professing an interest in Christianity and attaching themselves to the budding Christian communities.

At Makodweni, at a time when Tizore Navess was providing for fifty-five people in addition to six who were supported by Mission funds, his sister turned up one day with her husband and children. "I have been praying for them to come," Navess told Richards, "and now they have left all and arrived here, will you let me feed my sister out of the food provided for the mission children, till they can raise a garden of their own?" And though there already was a shortage of food, Richards complied. At Nwazikari, where the mission fed ten persons and the teacher fed seven more, abruptly appeared a fullgrown man, apparently "sprung up out of the earth, without friends or habitation, being warned by something in a dream." He announced his intention to become a Christian, at once began to hoe away in the school's

garden, accepted as clothing a tight-cut woman's blouse and two yards of common oil cloth, entered the A-B-C class, started learning to read, and became a devoted follower of the teacher, mysteriously finding food somewhere at hand. At Pakule at a time when the mission was supporting six pupils and the teacher was caring for eleven persons besides himself and his wife, a young woman came in from a distant section clad only in a bit of bark kilt. "Missionary, is there no cloth at Gikuki," asked the teacher's wife, "with which to cover that woman? She is a good woman, and has come a long way to us. We have no food, but she is digging, and in three months she can eat. We can't send her away. Can't you help us at all?" Since Richards believed that Christianity existed to assist people in such straits, the woman got a covering of cheap cloth and a place on the station.

The stations thus gradually were overwhelmed with dependents of all sorts, from boys and girls to worn-out widows. The food costs, erection of houses for the station followings, payment of hut taxes to the government, and numerous other items overtaxed the Mission's financial capacity. The plan to have the station people maintain subsistence gardens by their own labor did not yield as it should have. Richards said, "While the garden brings forth they all live upon it, and in time of famine they all starve it out together." And underlying his comment was the realization, after a few years' experience, that the Africans' customary inefficient agricultural methods and unproductive plantings worked no better on a mission station than anywhere else. In 1901 came a time of drought, locusts, famine, and smallpox that devastated the whole country. The mission stations tried heroically to keep their own people going and to tide over a large number of other Africans, who turned to them from all sides. But it became brutally clear under these conditions that the Mission had no creative agricultural program even for the maintenance of its own communities.

Thus Richards learned that the proposal to expand through multiplication of these simple stations was far less workable economically than he had expected. It all meant that the Mission always was teetering on the rim of insolvency, always straining for increased appropriations and reaching for special gifts from America for the support of African pupils. Early in 1900, the four teacher-preachers then in charge of mission stations made a financial move that threatened to bring down the entire enterprise; they asked the Mission to double their proposed wages and threatened to strike if their demands were not met. They claimed (all were family men) that they were not receiving a living wage, could not dress properly, and were unable to purchase adequate food supplies. While describing the problem to the Missionary Society officials, Richards spoke very appreciatively of the teachers and their efforts, but he did all he could, nevertheless, to talk them out of their wage demands. Jesus had nothing, he pointed out to them, and was supported only by gifts from his friends, never himself asking anything to

relieve his poverty. Jesus had lived among intelligent, reasonable people, replied the teachers, whereas they themselves lived among ignorant, selfish, and unreasonable Africans. The Apostles, except for Judas, argued Richards, got less money than they did. But the Apostles, replied the teachers, never had lived among their fellow Africans. Then Richards brought forward the claim that in the early days of the Christian church, the gospel movement always had been self-supporting—a way of life in which the people who “had the most gospel were the richest people always.” Not relevant to Inhambane! was the teachers’ rebuttal. Why, asked Richards, should the teaching preachers have more income than comparable family men among the laymen? The answer was twofold: the ordinary layman did not get enough, and the preachers should have better pay than the laymen because they were worth more.

Richards acknowledged that the Africans in the Inhambane neighborhood were underpaid; wages were four times as high in Natal, to the south, and in Beira, to the north, the difficulty at Inhambane being a superabundance of laborers and a dearth of employers. “The ordinary layman cannot have table[,] chair or bread on such wages, nor does he ever taste bread, milk or tinned meat. He merely lives on the ordinary food of the country . . .” Inconsistent, to a degree, with his observation on the labor market, Richards claimed that the Inhambane people should work more, trade more, raise more, sell more, and give more, thus providing better pay for the teacher-preachers. He felt obliged to confess to the New York officials, however, that “for the most part our native laymen aim at earning nothing and spend their time in mere garden work and stop at that on the verge of a scanty sufficiency.” But he insisted that the Mission should not use its own wage scale to separate the preachers from the general laity and make them an economically privileged group. He realized that the preachers desired social status as well as more money; they wanted to sit at different tables and to be treated quite differently from laymen, one of them even asking for distinctive clerical garb. To the preachers themselves he pointed out that the missionaries in Mozambique were not paid on a scale higher than that of the average layman in America. He said:

Your missionaries here must walk and not ride; we cannot afford horse-flesh. We cannot afford fresh beef nor butter, potatos [*sic*], or onions [the only vegetables imported] . . . which items can often be had at some five to ten times the ordinary cost of them at home.

Richards and the teachers held strictly to their respective views, but he succeeded in securing from them a no-strike pledge. In the end, he passed the problem along to the Missionary Society for decision, transmitting the teachers’ case to the New York office along with his own comments. The Society granted no increase, and the teachers kept on with their work, stoically accepting what was given them, but scornfully and contemptuously

looking upon it not as a real wage, but "as a mere mouthful, not a sweet morsel at all."

In spite of its economic vulnerability and its untrained leaders, the station plan survived. William C. Terril, Erwin Richards' successor as Superintendent, reported to the Conference in July, 1909, the establishment of ten new stations that already had been active for nearly a year. He called it an increase by self-propagation, but it was the same process begun by Richards a decade earlier. Said Terril:

A native comes and wishes permission to go out and start a station. We give him a few school supplies, after we have questioned his motive and inquired into his character. We send him to begin the work with the promise of a little remuneration at the end of six months if he prove worthy of help.

By this time, the Mission had sixty-eight such workers active in seventy-one outstations.

Supervising the multiplying mission stations became one of the chief functions of the American missionaries. By the time Richards' 1902 furlough left Frank Wolf in sole charge of the field, there were eight outstations that required his attention. Once a month, each of the teachers brought him a report of his work, and every three months, Wolf went out to two of the chief stations, Kambini and Makodweni, to hold Quarterly Conference, to which came the workers belonging to the other stations. At these conferences, he checked up on the work of the teacher-preachers, held worship services, and examined the church members as to their spiritual progress. At Makodweni, he visited a chapel encircled by twenty African huts occupied by people who were either church members or probationers. It reminded him of an old-fashioned camp meeting back home in America. Candidates for membership in the church remained in the probationers' class for at least a year and then entered a six months' baptismal class.

MISSIONARIES AT WORK

Sometimes the missionaries or their wives made their residential stations centers for medical ministrations of one kind or another that reached hundreds of patients month by month. Mrs. Abraham Buchwalter, who Erwin Richards said was "equal to" a trained nurse, began medical treatments at Kambini. She always had a yardful of patients, he said. Indeed, patients were quartered, during their treatment, under the large tamarind in the yard, in the iron house used by the missionaries, and in African huts belonging to the mission community. "But soon we must have a crude native hospital . . .," Richards told the Congo Mission Conference, at the same time calling for appropriations to pay for medicines. When he settled at Gikuki in 1898, Richards himself began dispensary work, caring for as many as two hundred people a month. Realizing its potentialities, he began advocat-

ing the establishment of a properly manned and equipped hospital as a part of the Mission's program, declaring that "it would give us a national standing and an excellent reputation for good." More fundamentally he said, "We are sent here on the supposition that we will be able to relieve mental distress, and why should not physical distress be relieved first, so far as possible?"

Richards never was to see a hospital in Mozambique, but in 1901 the Mission acquired the services of a medical doctor, Edith H. (Mrs. Frank D.) Wolf, a recent graduate of medical schools in Cleveland and in New York. Patients were brought to her at Kambini and later at Gikuki from all the Mission's outstations, and requests for medicines came not only from the Africans, but also from Portuguese and Indians in the Inhambane neighborhood. By government ordinance, no fees could be charged, and all were asked to make gifts. Occasionally an African would contribute a coin worth about two cents, but usually the gifts were "a bunch of farina, sweet potatoes, sugar cane, cocoanuts, bananas, peanuts, and different fruits when in season." Dr. Wolf, in addition to caring for all the children's work on her station, conducted a daily clinic, treating many hundreds of cases in the course of a year—severe burns, various wounds, dislocations, diseases of many kinds, and especially a large number of the grievous ulcers of parasitic genesis that were common among the barefoot people of the area.

After the Wolfs returned home in 1904, little consistent medical work was done, though Mrs. Richards sometimes treated a substantial number of patients when her general duties permitted. When the Terrils came to Mozambique in 1907, Mrs. Terril devoted a great deal of time to light medical work, sometimes keeping patients on the station for months at a time. Carl H. G. Runfeldt, who was trained as a printer, and several other missionaries, successively, also engaged in nonprofessional medical activity. Terril acknowledged that these workers were not true medical missionaries, but he held that the Mission could not turn away the suffering people who came to the stations for aid. Therefore the missionaries did the best they could for these patients with such simple remedies as they had on hand and with their "inadequate knowledge of medicine and surgery." In Terril's view, this activity was one of the Mission's principal agencies for "reaching the heathen and for teaching them the inefficacy of their charms."

The missionaries and their wives also kept, at their residential stations, small combined boarding and day schools. Their schools differed little in many of their simplicities of method and of situation from those directed by the African workers, except that their superior education enabled them from time to time to enrich the content of the teaching program both academically and practically. It was more than a decade before the Mission was able to evolve boys' and girls' schools offering educational advantages on a consciously higher level. With an initial constituency of fifty picked boys,

William Terril started at Kambini in 1910 the Bodine Boys' Training School. Terril and his wife were assisted in the work of this better-developed school by Pliny W. Keys and his wife. The Terrils taught morning classes in reading, writing, arithmetic, translation, Bible, singing, and gymnastics. Eventually, the School began graduating boys who passed examinations qualifying them to receive government certification. Keys directed the "industrial" program, which was largely agricultural, but which also taught carpentry, printing, bookbinding, sawmill work, and other manual skills. Keys explained some years after the School was founded, "We are confident that this training not only fits them [the "African youths"] for making an honest living, transforming a drone into a worker, but also frequently saves a boy from returning to his heathen customs and becoming what many term 'an educated rogue.'" In 1910, also, Ellen E. Bjorklund, newly arrived from Sweden, started at Gikuki the Girls' Training School, with nearly thirty girls enrolled in academic and manual subjects.

Although the Mozambique mission was small in numbers and originally restricted in geographical outreach, its work soon involved the use of six languages. The basic missionary corps was English-speaking, a few of the missionaries and their supporting constituency in Europe were Swedish, the government was Portuguese, and the Mission's people belonged to three different linguistic groups.

Inhabiting a strip four or five miles deep around Inhambane Bay were the Tongas, a people numbering about 50,000, among whom Richards made his first missionary contacts. When the Missionary Society took over administration of the Mozambique field, Richards already had translated the New Testament into the Tonga language. While on his fund-raising trip to the United States in 1896-7, he arranged for the printing of a second edition. This 500-page volume became for the time being the only printed matter in the Tonga area.

When the Richardses and the Buchwalters took up language studies in Kambini in 1897-8, they were inside the territory of the Batswas, the three million people occupying most of the rest of the Mission's natural area between the Limpopo and the Sabi Rivers. Therefore they studied Sheetswa, the language of the Batswas. There already were available in Sheetswa at that time the Synoptic Gospels, several hymns, and a Gospel narrative. Richards soon got under way, in 1898, translations of a Catechism, a hymn book, the Apostles' Creed, the Lord's Prayer, and the Ten Commandments. In 1901, he announced completion of the Sheetswa New Testament, and some years later finished translating the Old Testament.

The Mission continued the translation work begun by Richards and eventually developed a substantial body of usable material in both these languages, including not only religious materials but also primers and textbooks for use in the schools. Although some items were printed abroad, the foun-

dation of the Mission's production of indigenous language materials was its press, which was operated for many years by Josef Persson. As time went on, the Press added publications in Portuguese and also in the language of the 100,000 Chopa people inhabiting the coastal area north of the Limpopo and on up close to Inhambane. It printed African language items not only for Mozambique, but also for the Methodist work in Southern Rhodesia and for non-Methodist missions.

EDUCATION AND GOVERNMENT REGULATION

One of the Mission's language problems was largely an educational problem and, in its genesis, a political problem. The Portuguese administration, which was still in the process of consolidating its control of Mozambique, issued in December, 1907, ordinances intended to inaugurate an educational system for the country. Among them was the requirement that only the Portuguese language be used in school work. By this time, Richards and his colleagues had their own system of teaching-preaching stations well started, with Africans teaching African children and preaching to African adults in their respective African languages. The government language decree threw the Methodist educational program into crisis, producing two or three years of confusion, interruption, and readjustment. Certain zealous local officials immediately put the new regulations into effect by closing both the schools and the church services conducted by the Methodists. These stations soon were reopened. Then came a period of enforcement during which all Methodist schools were closed. This was followed by months of mixed administration by various local authorities. Some allowed Methodist stations to reopen both schools and churches, some permitted church services only, and some declined to permit either type of activity.

The outlook improved in the spring of 1909, when the acting Governor-General, responding to the intercession of W. Stanley Hollis, the American consul in Lourenço Marques, agreed to hold enforcement of the ordinances in abeyance for a year. Shortly afterwards, Bishop Hartzell successfully intervened with the new Governor-General and worked out a plan under which the Mission would be able to maintain its educational work within the framework of government requirements. Seventy-one Methodist centers were classified and recognized by the government as stations for religious instruction only, with permission being granted to use the indigenous languages and with Portuguese to be introduced as soon as possible. The Training schools at Kambini and Gikuki were classified as schools for general instruction and were expected to meet government language and curricular standards in full. This arrangement, of course, terminated the simple secular teaching activities in the outstations. William Terril counted this no great loss: "It has done away with the teaching of arithmetic and writing, by those who know not

how to teach them, and a greater stress is laid on the teaching of simple religious truths." The missionaries set themselves to learning Portuguese, and steps were taken to improve the training of the African teachers. Bishop Hartzell believed that the Portuguese language requirement was justified and felt that the Mission's co-operation in meeting it strengthened the Methodist position in Mozambique.

Resolution of the Mission's difficulties in adjusting its school work to the government's language and curricular requirements was followed shortly by the inauguration of the republican regime in Portugal and by Bishop Hartzell's establishing direct relations with the new democratic and anticlerical cabinet in Lisbon. Terril and his associates welcomed these developments and optimistically forecast improved opportunities for Methodist missions in Mozambique. These hopes were realized only in part, particularly because of the personal amenability of certain colonial officials on the field to continuing Catholic influence.

EXTENSION AND COMITY

The Mission's outreach to the Chopa people began in the spring of 1905, when two African workers returned from Inhambane to their home territory, southwest of Inhambane Bay, to take up the task of evangelizing their own people. Erwin Richards and his wife made a trek into the area that summer, and in 1907 some of the Mission's workers pressed still farther south, into the Limpopo Valley. From this venture grew the Limpopo District, which included by 1909 twenty-five stations and outstations, organized as the Bileni, Chebutu, and Zavalla Circuits, under the supervision of Pliny Keys.

Fifteen of these stations were acquired by transfer from other Protestant groups; seven came from an independent church active in the area, and eight from the Wesleyan Methodist Church. The transfer of the latter resulted from an agreement between Bishop Hartzell and the Wesleyan authorities that the Limpopo River should serve as the dividing line between the work of the Wesleyans, to the south, and that of the Methodist Episcopal mission, to the north. A few years later, a similar agreement delimiting respective spheres of work was concluded with the American Board; the American Board missionaries were to work above the Sabi River, and the Methodists to the south.

Within the area cultivated by the Methodists, the Free Methodist Mission of North America, the Church of England Mission, and the Swiss Romande Mission were at work. The Methodists attempted to establish cooperative relations with the Anglicans, but at first found the British missionaries exclusivist and unreceptive to their overtures. In 1913, the Anglicans declined to send a fraternal delegate to a Methodist District Conference, their

clerical spokesman offering as his final reason the statement, "Fourth, in charity I say it—at present there is this difficulty to any close agreement: that in the view of our church both you [William Terril] and your bishop have a defective call to the ministry." By 1916, however, Terril was able to report that the Mission had fraternal and helpful relations with all three of the other groups. There was common agreement among them that they would locate their respective outstations at least four miles distant from those of the other organizations. Said Terril, "In previous years the stations were so close that the singing in one chapel could easily be heard in two or three others." Furthermore, at this time six hundred Mozambique Methodist members working in the Johannesburg area were being shepherded by the missions maintained there by the American Board and by the Wesleyans. "This plan will be followed," said Terril, "until our church establishes a mission in the Transvaal."

PRACTICING TROPICAL MEDICINE

Nine years after the brief medical ministry of Dr. Edith H. Wolf came to an end in 1904, the second Methodist physician, Dr. Charles J. Stauffacher, came to Inhambane direct from three months' study of tropical medicine in London. After breakfast on the morning following his arrival at the Gikuki station, William Terril said to him, "There are your patients under yonder tree." Said Stauffacher, in his first letter to Secretary North:

and such a sight it was: one similar to what our Master witnessed when he walked on this earth, the lame, the halt, and the blind. There were three lepers, several blind people with broken bones, children nothing but skeletons suffering from worms, last stages of consumption, elephantiasis, teeth to be extracted, syphilitic sores and so many with those awful oriental sores that are several inches in extent and deep, some have worked their way into the bones. These sores have been going on for years. The number of sick people coming is increasing day by day and many new diseases. Calls for help have come for miles away, many cases of surgical nature to whom we were able to give but little relief for the simple fact that we have no place to keep them. Today we have eight patients staying at the mission too sick to be moved and only a hut eight feet by ten feet made from leaves of the cocoanut trees and a sand floor.

Before long, Doctor Stauffacher set up his dispensary in an old stone building formerly used as a pilot station, on a seafront site newly added to the Gikuki property.

Ellen Bjorklund, who was trained as a nurse, also entered the Mission's medical program in 1913. It was by no means her first contact with the sufferings of the Mozambique people. At the end of 1912, when for a time she was the only Methodist missionary on the field, she endeavored in the midst

of all her other work at Gikuki to cope with stark want produced by a bitter famine sweeping the country. She reported :

Some people, unable to walk, crept to the mission on their hands and knees and knowing that our food was so scarce, asked only for a little chaff to stay their hunger. No one was turned away although we could give our own school girls only one meal a day. Those who were able worked half a day for their food. The verandah and stable were turned into dormitories. Seven babies had to be fed from bottles and all but one survived.

And now Miss Bjorklund was assigned to medical work centered in the dispensary at Kambini, treating the manifold ailments of the people who came in from the surrounding villages, sometimes at the rate of twenty patients a day. Every two weeks, Dr. Stauffacher, who became the director of the entire health and medical program for the Mission, came out from Gikuki to care for the more serious or difficult cases.

Because her own health became impaired, Ellen Bjorklund left Mozambique for Southern Rhodesia in 1915 and was succeeded at Kambini by another nurse, Mrs. Josef Persson. Mrs. Persson, who first came to Mozambique from Sweden in 1909 as Miss W. Henny Anderson and was briefly married to C. H. G. Runfeldt, had carried on the medical activities at Gikuki for a few years before Doctor Stauffacher's arrival. Mrs. Raymond L. Bush, a nurse with wide experience in the United States, took over the Kambini medical project in the summer of 1916. When Doctor Stauffacher went on furlough in 1917, the two nurses maintained the Mission's regular medical work, Mrs. Persson at Kambini and Mrs. Bush at Gikuki.

From the very beginning, Dr. Stauffacher recognized the necessity of having a hospital at Gikuki. By 1915, he was building a new dispensary that would provide room for two or three dozen patients to lay down their sleeping mats. But he declared that placing pneumonia or postoperative patients in one of these crowded rooms would be tantamount to sending them to their graves. Since the operating room was used daily for the treatment of forty or fifty people and at night was packed with sick men, thus being "simply saturated with germs," Stauffacher avoided all but the most urgent operations. He performed a number of them out in the open under a tree. The building of a hospital got under way in 1915 and was completed in 1920. Although Gikuki was the center of his work—the number of treatments ran as high as 15,000 a year by the time he went on furlough—Stauffacher traveled to various sections of the Mission's field, tended many patients outside the mission location and miles into the interior, ran a circumcision camp for African boys, and looked after the health of the missionaries. Because of his direct ministrations and his establishment of health standards for observance by the missionaries, his first term in Mozambique effected a radical drop in serious illness and disablement among the members of the missionary

corps. In all his work, he was assisted by Mrs. Stauffacher, who took special responsibility for the treatment and instruction of women.

As a doctor in action against disease and in contact with his African patients, Stauffacher was unmistakably and spontaneously a dedicated humanitarian requiring no motivation but the dynamics of that elemental confrontation. But when deliberately interpreting the function of the healing ministry among the various activities of the missionary enterprise, he held that evangelization was the chief business of every missionary and that medical work was an agency—important, to be sure—for its accomplishment. Other members of the Mission also held this view; among them was William Terril, who described the medical department as “an agency for winning the heathen from his gross superstition to Christ.” Progress toward that end was accomplished partly by direct presentation of the gospel to the patients. As Stauffacher reported, “Many practical talks can be made and driven home with conviction, as we treat ugly stab wounds due to drunken brawls or a person covered with offensive sores due to sins of the flesh.” Patients at the dispensary daily heard gospel messages in devotional meetings arranged to intrigue their interest, and Bible women were sent into the villages to follow up critical cases. When a patient left the dispensary, he was given a Christian tract and directed to the nearest Christian station at which he could worship. Every bottle of medicine that was passed out carried a Bible verse. “It is the aim of the medical department,” said Doctor Stauffacher, “that every man, woman and child with whom it comes in contact should hear the Gospel.” In addition to this direct approach, the Mission counted on its medical service gradually and naturally to undermine the influence of the witch doctors, in whose persons were combined in the native society both healing and religious roles.

THE ETHIOPIAN REACTION

Although the Inhambane Mission Conference declared in 1917 that “the greatest hindrance to the growth of Christianity among these people is Mohammedanism,” and although Islam had a large following in Mozambique, the strongest concentrated threat to the development of the Mission at that time was an Ethiopian movement that appeared in the Inhambane area. Ethiopianism was a widespread, though not closely organized, movement whose motivation was voiced in the slogan, Africa for the African. It had international contacts, especially with American Negroes—notably with William E. B. DuBois—and by the time of World War I was active in various African colonies of the European nations. It arose as a reaction against the secular imperialism of the white, European powers occupying the African land and against the ecclesiastical and moral imperialism of Christian missionaries associated with, and generally strongly committed to, the basic

patterns of white, European culture. It aimed at independence of foreign rule in both the political and the religious sphere. Politically, it remained helpless throughout this period to establish African self-government in any of the colonies. It was far easier for its followers, who generally had been affiliated with the Christian community, to throw off the missionaries' control over their church life. Therefore, the antforeign impulse generated a variety of sects and churches that were supported and directed by Africans only. They did not renounce Christianity as such, but freely and variously modified in harmony with their African experience the moral, ecclesiastical, and doctrinal forms in which it had been taught them by the missionaries.

The Ethiopians remained so markedly affected by European Christianity, however, that their withdrawal from under the control of the foreign churches or missionary groups did not constitute a full return to tribal ways. Similarly, their political goals were not oriented toward re-establishment of the full authority of the tribe; their political Africanism tended to produce essentially nontribal nationalist movements within the colonial lines imposed upon the map of Africa by the occupying powers from abroad. Except for a few insurrectionary attempts, the political pressure of these movements accumulated underground, and the new indigenous and autonomous churches served as the overt social expression of Ethiopianism.

Ethiopianism first broke out among the Inhambane Methodists in 1917 under the leadership of Muti M. Sikobele, one of the Mission's two ordained African preachers. But a thrust towards independence by the African personnel long had existed as a potentiality inherent in the relations between the Mission's African preacher-teachers and its missionaries. The African workers never were treated as full and free partners; they were subordinates, to be praised, patronized, or chastised, but always to be led or controlled. When Erwin Richards enforced his take-it-or-leave-it wage policy for the preachers in 1900, he realized that he had achieved only a temporary restraint of the impulse of independence stirring among them. He said of the current difficulty, "It will never rise again, till the time shall come when the natives shall support their own work, and then there will be a wholesale splitting off from everything white, demoralization of native forces, and a return to white supervision after a brief interval."

In the years following, Muti Sikobele, who had been one of Richards' earliest assistants, showed some independence of thought in evaluating the Mission's program. Upon his initiative the Home Mission Society, an organization of African Methodists, was started in 1907 with the purpose of raising money from the African constituency to support African preachers, thus to supplement the funds coming from the United States. The new group, under Sikobele's leadership, soon was raising substantial sums for preachers' salaries and also beginning to contribute toward the building of chapels. In 1910, the Mission Conference cited the Society's activity as a "real begin-

ning in self-support," and William Terril reported, "This native organization is a very valuable adjunct to our work." But seven years later, the missionaries, less gratefully, were citing Sikobele as having prophesied in 1908 that the Inhambane African Christians would themselves be controlling and operating the Mission within fifteen years.

In 1912, Pliny Keys called Sikobele "a sly old fox." He went still further, saying almost in the same breath, "My heart is sick of the whole lot of the natives: It seems as tho the men that we do the most for treat us the worst, and have little regard for the Church." The latter remark evidently was occasioned by the great difficulty experienced by the missionaries in persuading the teacher-preachers to give up their activity in the sugar cane business, in which nearly all of them were involved, 90 per cent of them on a commercial basis, some of them routing mission funds through their business operations, some of them becoming financially independent of the Mission's salary payments, and all of them protesting that they could not afford to work for the Mission without supplementing their income by this diversion of their energies. The missionaries' chief immediate purpose in this situation was to stop the sale of the sugar cane to parties who were making it into an African beer.

For intra-Mission relations between Africans and Americans, however, the crux of the situation was that the missionaries were thus endeavoring to impose upon people who were African-born and bred a social pattern native not to their own culture, but to the nineteenth-century puritan culture of the American Methodists who at that very time were earnestly engaged in bringing about prohibition of the liquor trade in the United States. And they were making acceptance of that pattern by the African preachers a matter of discipline, requiring them to stand by it as a measure of loyalty to the Bishop and the Church.

What brought such situations close to becoming impasses was the fact that the Africans had no voice in determining what should constitute acceptable churchmanship in their native setting. The Mission had depended upon the initiative of African teacher-preachers for the founding of many of its out-stations, and except for a small handful of missionaries, the entire evangelistic corps manning the several score stations was composed of Africans. Control of the Mission, however, was completely in the hands of the missionaries, particularly as organized in the Mission Conference, of which these lay preachers were not members. Even the two ordained African ministers, Tizore Navess and Muti Sikobele, the men William Terril called in 1910 "the backbone of our work," had not achieved full membership in the Conference; they voluntarily withdrew, after a number of years, from their position as members on trial, choosing not to pursue the course of studies arranged by the Conference. Thus the African preachers had no voice in determining the Mission's program or even the conditions under which they

themselves were to labor. In 1913, for example, the all-white membership of the Mission Conference adopted a detailed pattern of employment and compensation for the African preachers and a code of administrative sanctions for the control of the sexual morality of the African preachers and church members. Such measures variously impinged upon the personal interests of the preachers and upon the deep-rooted social customs of the African Methodist constituents, but they were adopted by the non-African missionaries, who lodged all the relevant controls exclusively in their own hands.

The desire of the African Methodists for a measure of self-determination came to a head in 1915 in a controversy over control of the Home Mission Society. By this time, the missionaries and the Bishop had concluded that the Society, which was technically independent of the Conference, was getting out of hand because of its assertion of functional independence in the application of the funds it raised. When he visited Mozambique early in 1915, the Bishop thoroughly investigated the problem, and a constitution and bylaws for the Society were worked out that brought it under the regular Disciplinary control of the Methodist Episcopal Church as represented by the Mission Conference. African teacher-preachers fought the move, but after much debate and more or less open antagonism on their part—the Bishop was far from confident of success—the Constitution was adopted in July by the Ninth Session of the Home Mission Society Conference. A dozen African leaders then sent Bishop Hartzell a conciliatory letter that claimed that the Society always had entertained none but the single purpose of raising money among the African people in order to pay the African workers.

Their compliance with the new provisions, however, was temporary. Some of them resented the missionaries' attempt to bring the Society under the control of the Conference and began to reassert their independence of action through the Society. According to William Terril, the process finally went so far that the Society was aiming at controlling the Church—attempting to control the funds raised in Mozambique, to revise the Board's appropriations, and to dispense the funds that came from the United States. The Society, claimed Terril, passed resolutions directly contrary to Methodist policy, as in the area of pastoral administration of marital practices, for instance. "The members," he said, "also went so far as to state that the Bishop had no right to make the appointments without first consulting them."

The Africans' case, of course, was not directly presented to the Board and its American constituency, and various missionary characterizations of their actions undoubtedly were not entirely objective, but in part were controversial deductions and products of hindsight. At any rate, the Mission countered the continued resistance of the independent faction by disbanding the reorganized Home Missionary Society, allowing it to remain inactive for several years. This decision provoked new protests by the African group; they declared, said Terril, that they were thus "being deprived of their rights,

powers and authority." And Terril's rebuttal was, "If not granting them all the power they desired deprives them of their just rights, the missionaries who urged the change stand guilty of the charges made against them."

The Inhambane Mission Conference first took official cognizance of explicit Ethiopianism in February, 1916, when the members expressed grave concern over its appearance in the territory where the Methodist stations were planted. Although it had not yet penetrated the Methodist fold, the Conference rejected it avowedly because of its teaching and its low standard of morals, resolving, "That we do all in our power to retard the movement in our midst and if possible compel its withdrawal from the Inhambane and Lourenço Marques governmental districts in as far as it affects our work."

Nevertheless, out of the struggle over the Home Mission Society was born the Methodist-oriented Ethiopian movement led by Muti Sikobele, which made a decisive break with the Methodist Episcopal Church but aimed at organizing the entire Mozambique Methodist following under completely independent African leadership. It began with Sikobele's apparently secret withdrawal from the membership of the Church after the session of the Conference in June, 1917, and by the early months of 1918 was out in the open. The missionaries now bluntly charged—they had not done so before—that the schismatic movement had been from the beginning the deliberate goal of the African organizers of the Home Mission Society. They saw it as an attempt to realize, some five years ahead of the original schedule, the long-planned inauguration of Sikobele's prophesied native control of Mozambique Methodism.

Sikobele's movement swiftly penetrated the Mission, almost at once bringing about the defection of five Methodist outstations to the new cause and gaining the allegiance of individuals at other stations. Sikobele promptly sent organizers south to the Johannesburg mining field in the Transvaal, Union of South Africa. There they propagandized the Mozambique Methodists living in the mine compounds—men and youths who during their stay in the area, where the Methodist Episcopal Church had no mission, came in contact with Ethiopian influence and often affiliated with independent churches. There also the Sikobele movement achieved quick success, soon emerging as a formally organized independent church (the Mozambique Independent Methodist Episcopal Church) that gathered in practically all the several hundred Methodist contract laborers from Mozambique. For the Inhambane missionaries, this development to the south sharply heightened the threat posed by the schismatics in their own area, for the men coming home from Johannesburg provided a ready supply of recruits into the ranks of the dissident Methodists. "On their return to Inhambane," said William Terril, "they bring the Ethiopian spirit with them and propagate it among those who remain at home." And during their stay in Johannesburg, their wages were

an important source of financial support for Sikobele's program in Mozambique.

Fighting back in the crisis created by the activities of Sikobele and his associates, which they earnestly believed boded the destruction of the Mission, the missionaries first attempted to get the American and the Portuguese governments to pull their ecclesiastical chestnuts out of the fire for them. They interviewed the Governor of the Inhambane District and, through John F. Jewell, the American consul at Lourenço Marques, corresponded with the Governor-General for the purpose of persuading the administration to suppress the Sikobele-led independent church. Their position was that all Ethiopian movements were primarily political and only secondarily religious and that the Inhambane movement in particular was directed toward a political goal. The authorities gave them little encouragement, declaring that the Mozambique Independent Methodist Episcopal Church, which had appeared practically simultaneously in Johannesburg and in Inhambane, was protected by the commitment of the Province to the principle of religious liberty. This was the very principle by which the Methodist Episcopal mission justified its own expectations of freedom of action in Mozambique.

The missionaries also appealed to the Board for assistance, cabling Secretary North an urgent request for an immediate opening of Methodist mission work among the Inhambane Methodist constituents sojourning in Johannesburg. Such an opening had been proposed before, but this time the Mozambique men hoped thus to execute a flanking movement against the Sikobele group that by conserving the loyalty of the absent Inhambane workers would cut off the flow of money and dissidents from Johannesburg into the schismatic venture in Mozambique. But the Board was not ready to act soon enough to affect the resolution of the crisis.

Efforts to enlist the African Methodist workers against the Ethiopians were fruitless. Their leaders demonstrated, when they were called together by the missionaries, that they would not lift a finger to defeat the independence movement. When the Mission's problem was presented at a two-day meeting of all the African preacher-teachers, the entire group "stubbornly refused," wrote Pliny Keys and William Terril, "to consider any plan that had for its end the conservation of the interests of the Methodist Episcopal Church." They were opposed to the adoption of any measure intended to block the Ethiopian thrust in Inhambane.

The missionaries then determined that all the workers holding to this recalcitrant position should be suspended as evangelists from 1 April 1918. They also agreed to stop simultaneously all missionary effort except for a very little at the Mission's headquarters.

By mid-May, work in the outstations was practically at a standstill. A number of stations, including whole villages, had gone over to the new movement. Pliny Keys wrote to Secretary North, "There is such a state of

unrest that progress is very difficult, as it is almost impossible to enforce discipline." Evidently, an effort was made to persuade individual workers to support the Mission administration, but with minimal results. A number of preachers signed a paper stating that they would remain loyal, but later some of them asked to have their names removed because they wished to join the independent church, and it was discovered that some who had signed actually were identified at that time with the Ethiopians. Terril reported:

Already this independent movement in our midst has very seriously affected our work. Practically every one of our native pastor-teachers have sympathy with it. Only three of the entire number have decided convictions against it. They are being used in leading other[s] to take the same stand. The number that are ready and willing to stand with our Mission, as opposed to this independent Ethiopian movement, is very limited. But we are thankful for the remnant and we hope that it will be a nucleus upon which can be built a reorganized work on more Methodistic lines.

In spite of this expression of hope, however, Terril and his colleagues were very pessimistic about the outlook for the future.

In midsummer, the horizon was even more darkly lowering; apparently reliable reports reached the missionaries that Tizore Navess was taking steps to organize an Ethiopian movement of his own. This was regarded as holding greater potential danger for the Mission than Sikobele's defection, for Navess was more influential among the Africans than was Sikobele. When Terril and Keys called Navess in to Gikuki in October to discuss the reports, he left them in doubt as to his intentions, indeed threatened by the live possibility that he would yield to the lure of a move into independence that appeared to him quite easy to accomplish. The missionaries were at least strongly inclined to count Navess at that time as a dissident. At the least, he certainly carried on a heavy flirtation with Ethiopianism.

Meanwhile, the Ethiopian trend continued to gather strength, though as time went on, Sikobele found that his cause was encountering greater resistance than at first. Many Methodists went over to his new church. Although some of the Methodist Episcopal circuits suffered only minimal losses in membership because of Ethiopian inroads, others were more seriously affected, and one District lost about half its members.

As Ethiopian activity increased, the Mission renewed its effort to bring the government into the arena against the independents, and evidently with enough success to anger the Ethiopian leaders. Terril reported to the New York office in September that the attempt to involve the government in the struggle was "having its good effect on our Mission and many of our workers see the folly of being identified with Ethiopian movements." By Conference time, late in February, 1919, the Mission's position had improved so strongly that it was able to re-establish discipline among the African preachers. It lost five preachers (Sikobele was one) by withdrawal, but it also discontinued

twelve, discontinued and expelled three, and discontinued one under charges. At the same time, it was able to enlist thirteen new evangelists, and more than sixty of the regular workers now were considered sufficiently loyal to the Mission to have their characters formally passed and to be given appointments for the coming year. And heading the list was the name of Tizore Navess, who evidently had been persuaded that he should stay with the Mission. At the Conference session, his District Superintendent reported that he had been working faithfully at his previous appointment as head of the Makodweni and Massinga Circuits. In 1921, he was received on trial and three years later was admitted into full membership in the Conference.

During the months when outstation activity was largely suspended because of the unreliability of the preaching corps, the missionaries had kept up direct evangelistic work at the central stations. They found the popular response to their efforts very satisfactory in spite of the Ethiopian controversy. As the Mission began to right itself after the worst of the storm, African preachers returned to duty, and they also won a good popular response, especially in areas that had not been most deeply upset by the Ethiopians. As a result, the Mission came through the crisis by no means so badly scarred as the missionaries had feared, but with a net gain in membership, and with its capacity for growth unimpaired. In June, 1917, there were 1,313 church members and 3,389 probationers; in February, 1919, there were 1,821 full members and 3,686 probationers; in November, 1920, there were 1,943 full members and 4,117 probationers.

William Terril, the Mission's chief spokesman during the Ethiopian crisis, found it difficult fully to appreciate Ethiopianism as an authentic force in African life. To be sure, he recognized it as an African phenomenon:

The principal reason for there being such a movement among the African native is because there is in his heart a natural resentment against the coming of the white man into his country, and placing him under white rule. The first that he remembers of the white man is when he came to buy or take by force his people and his land. With those even who come in contact with the white missionary and are reaping the benefits of the Gospel there is an underlying desire to be free, when the right time comes, from the rule of the white man. We state this as a general desire, even though there are some who do not crave this supposed freedom

But Terril was loath to grant the essential validity of the desire of the African for this "supposed freedom"—the desire of an ethnic group to be liberated politically and socially from the domination of its imperialist masters. "Permit it to be said," he continued, "that a wrong application of the Gospel has fostered this spirit in the heart of the native." He believed that the freedom the gospel gives men, black as well as white, is spiritual freedom and that the freedom at which the Ethiopian movements characteristically were grasping was license to further "the desires of the flesh." He attributed

the rise of Ethiopian movements in general, including the one in Inhambane, to the prevalence of a spirit of pride and jealousy. He saw unwise handling of the Africans by white men—through excessive praise or through unreasonable restriction—as the factor precipitating the movement at large.

The Ethiopian movement in Inhambane resulted, in his view, from mistakenly liberal handling of the desire for independence as it existed in the Methodist Episcopal mission a decade earlier. He blamed this—whether justifiably or not—upon the early administration of the Mission by Erwin Richards as being tainted with Congregationalist permissiveness rather than guided by bona fide Methodistic connectional discipline. The Home Missionary Society, he claimed, was an example of a progressive and evolutionary attempt by the Mission to place “power, authority, and opportunity” in the hands of African leaders—an attempt that failed. Terril and others believed that “revolutionary” measures should have been adopted in 1907 to curb the rising spirit of independence. Secretary North accepted Terril’s interpretation of the Mission’s past and shared his view that the Mission should be reconstructed, though belatedly, along more Methodistic lines. Thus the two men appeared to be advocating stricter controls within the Mission than ever in dealing with a people moved by a widespread tide of desire to throw off the white man’s domination. This was a missionary approach oriented toward familiar patterns of the larger Methodist parochialism rather than toward the folk realities of the African scene. (Indeed, speaking for the Board office, Secretary George Heber Jones wrote Terril with regard to Ethiopianism, “We hear a great deal about this movement here in America but know practically nothing about it.”) Thus it was somewhat contradictorily that North held that the future of the Mission should include representation of African leadership as far as possible.

Angola

The most impressive list published in the *Minutes* of the first session of the Congo Mission Conference, in June, 1897, was the roll of the honored dead. It named the members of missionary families who had died in Angola from 1885 to 1896, almost all of them because of health conditions caused or aggravated by residence in that country. Fourteen of the names were those of missionaries; nine were those of children or youths belonging to missionary families.

The missionaries who were present at the end of the Conference, when Bishop Hartzell read the Appointments for the coming year, were aware of belonging to a tradition of Christian service that involved great sacrifice of life. On that list were thirteen persons from the Shuett, Dodson, Mead, Withey, and Shields families; on the roll of the dead were fifteen names from the same families. The latter list was not to be lengthened so rapidly in the years lying ahead, but Angola was a field on which many yet were to

experience the crumbling of their health during missionary service, either dying or returning to the States incapacitated for further work. It was a sobering prospect that faced Bishop Hartzell's appointees for 1897: Hilda Larson, Susan Collins, Charles W. and Dr. Jennie M. Taylor Gordon, William P. and Catherine M. Dodson, Samuel J. and Ardella Mead, Robert and Louise R. Shields, John H. Mead, Amos E. and Irene A. Withey, William J. Mead, Herbert C. Withey, Mrs. William H. Mead, and Mrs. Mary B. Shuett.

Bishop Hartzell dropped from the appointments at the 1897 session two of the original five Angola mission stations founded by Bishop William Taylor and his self-supporting missionaries in 1885. Feeling the necessity of concentrating as much as possible the effort on the West Coast, the Bishop not only closed the Mission Conference's Congo stations, but also accepted the advice of the missionaries to abandon the stations at Dondo and Nhangue-ia-Pepe in Angola. No missionary had been active at Dondo for four years, and the building of a railway into the interior had undermined the economy and population of the city, which stood at the head of navigation on the Cuanza River. Nhangue-ia-Pepe had proved an unhealthy station ("several missionaries lie buried in the Mission graveyard," reported Hartzell), and the difficulties involved in attempting to develop it as a large farm mission had proved insuperable.

Bishop Hartzell retained, however, three of the original Angola stations. They were situated in the coastal city of Luanda, the capital of the province, and in the two interior towns of Pungo Adongo and Malanje. Hartzell also kept the interior stations at Quiôngua and Quessua. The Mission thus was composed of one station on the west coast of Angola and a cluster of four stations lying close together more than two hundred miles eastward and close to the Cuanza River.

This reorganization of the Angola mission by reduction of the number of stations was accompanied by a change in the administrative pattern. The Bishop put aside the self-supporting economy maintained from the beginning by Bishop Taylor and inaugurated the Disciplinary system of maintenance by appropriations and special gifts provided by the Missionary Society. This included, of course, station expenses, property requirements, and salaries and other expenses of the missionaries. The process began in 1897 with a nominal appropriation of \$1,000, and during the following years, the amounts increased to \$2,250, \$6,780, \$6,888, and \$9,388. These allotments were for the work of the Mission Conference and so were shared with the Mozambique field, until in 1902 Angola was set off by itself as the West Central Africa Mission Conference. Becoming formally an enterprise of the Missionary Society also opened the door to workers sent out by the Woman's Foreign Missionary Society, which by policy entered only areas where the Missionary Society was at work. Under the self-supporting plan, the Mission had engaged in commerce in African products such as rubber, wax, and

hides, and this business had enough momentum to continue yielding some income for the first few years under the system of appropriations.

During the period of transition from the Taylor administration to his own, Bishop Hartzell grappled with the serious need of almost the entire mission personnel for a change and recuperation. The Taylor self-supporting plan had no place in it for furlough expenses. Consequently, most of the missionaries Hartzell met when he came to Angola had been on the field for substantially longer periods of service without furlough than was normal among Methodist missionaries. Some had been at work for fourteen years by the time they went home to the United States. These had been years of heavy labor in founding and physically building mission stations and in developing agricultural and commercial projects for self-support financing. They had been years of sickness and death, with missionaries torn by their personal losses and burdened with responsibilities that were increased by the early return to the States of numerous new recruits who prematurely left Africa because of ill health. During the first few years of his administration, therefore, Bishop Hartzell saw to it that the missionaries long on the field took needed furloughs in their turn. This kept the number of missionaries actually at work in Angola measurably below the number assigned to the field.

Those who remained on location or returned from furlough still had to labor on under deplorable living conditions. The physical depletion of the Mission at the beginning of the Hartzell administration included wretched and unhealthful quarters for the missionaries. William Dodson, who was appointed District Superintendent in 1897, declared that the first, though perhaps not the greatest, need of the field was to establish the station homes on a healthful basis. Except in Luanda and Quiôngua, most of the mission property was in Portuguese trading-house style, with few windows, no glass, common close-board shutters, and grass roofs. "These have answered well enough for pioneer purposes," declared Dodson "but are in a state of decay and about worn out." Having just gone through a period of unusually heavy rains, he said of his own grass-roofed residence at Pungo Adongo that "the rotten grass receiving the rain formed in many places large filters for letting through a liquid resembling coffee, and when these places dried up they would tumble down in the shape of a black substance resembling soot." Five months before Dodson voiced this description, Jennie M. T. Gordon, M. D., wife of Charles W. Gordon, had died of a rapid attack of haematuric fever in the mission residence at Quessua. When Dodson visited the house she died in, he described what he saw as "a noble structure so far as the walls are concerned, but not a window in it of any description—having simply a door at each end." He cited this lack of light and ventilation "with the draft on opening both doors and the rotten condition of the roof" as a fair example of the old-style mission buildings contributing to the physical breakdown of missionaries he knew.

The Mission was not far along in the process of organizing its adherents as full-fledged Methodist churchmen. Scattered among the five stations were only thirty-six church members, hardly more than double the number of missionaries. In Luanda, where Methodist activities were sporadic, there were no members. Pungo Adongo had thirteen, Quessua an even dozen, Malanje five, and Quiôngua only two. Among these same four stations were fifty-one probationers.

Amos E. Withey, who finished his service as District Superintendent in 1897, soberly evaluated as premature—apparently he spoke for his colleagues in the Mission—such attempts as they had made at “the disciplinary organization of the fruits of our labors” that produced this small formal membership. To express his missionary philosophy when reporting to the Conference session in Quiôngua, he quoted liberally and with approval from David Livingstone, whose journeying once had carried him along a trail only a few hundred yards from the Conference site. Withey adopted Livingstone’s view that the pioneer missionary’s criterion of success should not be “the conversion of a few souls, however valuable these may be,” but the diffusion of a general knowledge of Christianity throughout the world. Withey found the significance of such conversions as had occurred in Angola illuminated by Livingstone’s statement, “A few conversions show whether God’s spirit is in a mission or not.” It was enough for the missionary simply to have been faithful in preaching Christ, just as Paul preached faithfully though his message was not accepted; yet God’s cause moved forward, said Livingstone, “to more enlightened developments of his will and character,” even into the nineteenth century, when “the dominion is being given by the power of commerce and population unto the people of the saints of the Most High.”

Withey also quoted with approval a biographer of Livingstone’s who cited his moving from an earlier primary interest in converting individual souls to his conviction that God was calling him to be less of a “missionary journeyman and more of a missionary statesman.” In the latter view, the larger conversion of the people of Africa would await the civilizing of the continent through removal of the inducements to traffic in slaves, through full utilization of its natural resources, and through the changing of its “whole social economy.” These changes would come about under the direction of the European powers controlling African territory—powers later more frequently and bitterly to be called imperialistic. All this, even if accomplished in a limited way, said the biographer Withey quoted, would be an immense service to the missionary, such a preparation of his way that “a hundred years hence the *spiritual* results would be far greater than if all the effort were concentrated on single souls.”

Withey evidently felt that this long-range view of Livingstone’s had its pragmatic ground in all that the great pioneer had meant when he exclaimed in 1855, “Poor, degraded Africa!” Withey himself was impressed with the

near hopelessness of expecting early spiritual results with African humanity as the missionary confronted it. "How utterly steeped in superstitions, heathenism, deceit, dishonesty, uncleanness, and ignorance the sons of Ham are," he said, "seems to be little understood by many." His substantial pessimism about the current outlook underlay even the more positive aspect of his statement of the missionary policy under which he and his colleagues had been working in Angola :

In accordance with these principles we have widely spread the knowledge of Christianity, in camp and field, by the roadside and in villages, in store, workshop, and quarry, in schoolroom and chapel, according to Paul's address to the Athenians on Mars' Hill, and we have had many evidences that the Spirit of God has attended our efforts.

As interpreted by Withey, these activities, which drew heavily enough upon the energies and resources of the men and women who carried them out, were not directed toward the same practical goals as those sought by the soul-saving activism and ecclesiastical expansionism then characteristic of much of the Methodist foreign missionary movement at large. The men leading the mass movements in India, for instance, hardly could have been happy with Withey's stated approach. His words, breathing so unaggressive a missionary spirit, must indeed have fallen strangely on the ears of Bishop Hartzell, whose concept of missionary statesmanship called for broad evangelizing movements aimed at direct and dynamic effectiveness in the face of crucial contemporary crises and opportunities.

Withey's short-range pessimism and long-range trust in God combined to produce a conservative field policy, which set the tone for his call to the supporters of the Mission to "send us missionary *plodders* who are willing to become piles driven into this mud of heathenism upon which the coming structure shall have its foundation . . ." A similar, though not so radically expressed, conservatism marked the leadership of Withey's successor, William Dodson, who described the Mission of 1898 as being "still in the transition stage," waiting for reinforcements of personnel and funds expected to result from Bishop Hartzell's presentation of the case for Angola to the church in America. Dodson did not count as clear loss the energy consumed under the Taylor self-support program, which involved burdensome subsistence farming and business activities. The restrictions they laid upon "what is commonly called, with little or no knowledge of what it implies, 'missionary work,'" constituted in Dodson's view a "healthful balance-wheel" without which the missionaries might have "run into a great deal of foolishness" in ill-advised evangelistic extension. He reminded his colleagues that there was no sadder sight than

to see unexperienced missionaries, though experiencing a sincere sense of the love of God to a dying world, overstepping in their warmth the bounds

marked out by prudence and the fear of the Lord, into that kind of enthusiasm which expects the end without the means, spreading themselves out thinly, so to speak, over a great deal of ground, making a profligate display of their kindnesses to the heathen . . . coming, perhaps needlessly, to a premature grave, not living long enough to learn how misplaced was their mistaken zeal.

As Dodson saw it, the Mission was holding itself ready for advance, but success in that direction would depend upon the exercise of prudence. Though urging the necessity of spiritual zeal, Dodson desired to see the work proceed with improved devotion—this was his chief practical emphasis—to “decency and order.”

Quite coherently with this conservative philosophy, the Mission's activity during these early years after the transfer from Bishop Taylor to the Missionary Society was not so much that of evangelistic and geographical thrust as that of pursuing the daily round in its few main stations and closely related substations. The missionaries were engaged in guidance of apprentices, day school instruction, sewing classes, manual training of various kinds, building operations, farm management, visitation of the sick, informal medical ministrations, visitation of villages for evangelistic preaching and teaching, Sunday services and Sunday schools, language studies, and the preparation of materials for printing in the Kimbindu language. Much of the manual instruction of apprentices and pupils, especially under the immediate direction of the missionaries, took the form of on-the-job labor for the Mission—construction, building repairs, manufacture of furnishings, and subsistence farming for the support of the missionary communities.

However, during Bishop Hartzell's administration, which ended in 1908, the Angola mission did extend its scope, not by sending missionaries—plodders or not—to occupy new areas, but by setting up so-called native stations. For some years, the Mission had been benefiting from the evangelistic, teaching, and manual services of a handful of native helpers. Though all of them had Portuguese names, they were black Africans. The first group mentioned in the Conference Minutes included João Garcia Fernandes, Bernardo Agosthino, Matheus P. Inglez, and Luzia Bernardo. The Mission started sending these helpers to open new stations farther out than the few substations closely tied to the chief mission locations. Established, with their families, in humble living quarters and given small salaries, they ventured upon simple evangelistic efforts, visiting nearby villages and teaching whoever would listen.

William Dodson got this new phase of mission development started in 1898, when he settled Fernandes and his family at Tomba, a place north of Pungo Adongo just across the Lucala River. In the following year, two other African helpers were put to work as independent evangelists, one at Hombo a Njinji, not far from Tomba, and one at Kimbamba kai Ngola, be-

yond Quessua. Kimbamba was replaced a few years later by removal of the mission to nearby Lengue, which in 1907 came to be known as Candemba. By 1908, Candemba was split into two missions: Misula, for the Kimbamba Ngola people, and Camôngua, for people just over the Lombe River.

The next group of African-led stations was established in 1906. Two men from Luanda were sent out to Calombaloca, which was eighty miles from the capital. Nearer the original inland stations along the Cuanza River, the Mission also started stations at Nzengele (three years later it was replaced by Ndembe) among the "less ignorant and vicious of the Malengi tribe" and at Nzembo among the "more civilized Ambaquistas." These moves brought to six—the Candemba split later made it seven—the number of native stations.

In the meantime, regular mission work at Malanje was suspended largely because of the decline of the town in population and economic importance, and the chief activities of the Methodists were transferred to Quessua, which was considered a more promising place. The loss of Malanje, however, was balanced by a more than equivalent gain at Luanda, where the work was strongly revived by Robert Shields after a reopening late in 1902.

William Dodson's District report at the Conference of 1908 was significantly oriented toward a quotation from a letter from Bishop Hartzell, who was absent from the session: "The one great fact that demands serious thought is, that after all these years [twenty-three] we have only 233 members and probationers." The Bishop was relying upon statistics gathered a year earlier that showed 95 church members and 138 probationers for Angola. Dodson realized as he read his report that the latest figures revealed a decrease in the constituency for the year just closed—117 church members and 95 probationers. Fifty of the members recorded in the latter tabulation belonged to the native stations founded since 1898, with Hombo accounting for thirty of them. On the whole, the native missions were too new and too precarious in their position among their uncivilized neighbors to add greatly to the Mission's formal constituency.

Replying to the Bishop's candid "words of kindly concern," Dodson claimed that statistics did not tell the whole truth about missionary work:

When they represent the real truth and progress at the same time[,] they are edifying, but it is a great snare to any missionary who fixes his eye on them instead of his high commission, or exchanges the real love of souls of men for writing their names in a book; and any pressure of any sort so to do is deplorable, as it may prove disastrous to real progress. It takes a long time to really get oneself into the confidence of this precious but elusive people, and a much longer time to get them to yield up to you their confidence. . . .

These were implicitly fairly sharp words to come from the lips of Dodson, who habitually expressed his doubts or complaints about the foreign missionary authorities with great restraint, even gentleness.

In speaking up for the Angola field, Dodson neither hid defensively behind his general remarks about statistics nor merely reasserted earlier statements of conservative missionary philosophy; he forthrightly admitted the shrinkage in current statistics and conceded both that the volume of the Mission's activities was not so great as twelve or fifteen years earlier and that fewer Africans were now under its direct influence than at that period. He referred instead to concrete conditions that had been creating problems for the missionary cause.

As far as the American Methodists' mission to Angola was concerned, Dodson pointed to inadequate appropriations, the large number of appointees dying or returning home, and the consequently small number of missionaries actually on the field. The average number of pastors or superintendents at work during the decade past was seven, said Dodson—less than in the Bishop Taylor period.

Some of the practical handicaps originating in Angola itself were factors centered in the financial and commercial decadence that was depleting the area occupied by the cluster of stations near the Cuanza River, causing a strong emigration of both blacks and whites deeper into the interior of the colony. The drain of the slave supply for the Portuguese island of São Tomé, sickness, and military conscription had further "decimated" the population. Dodson also referred briefly—but he might well have said much—to uncivilized practices and superstitious habits deeply ingrained in the people, which created hard obstacles for the converting missionary. He spoke, for instance of what he himself found at Nzengele, whose African evangelist, John Webba, reported a year later. Said Webba, "Since we came here we find nothing so criminal as for these people to sacrifice their children to the streams—such as might be born face downward, or as might creep at one or two months old, or cut upper teeth first. We found out six who were killed, and four who were sold. This is just what we have seen around these two villages."

Dodson was not merely defending small missionary results; rather, in the very conditions of Angolan life—"in the depth of hopelessness and abandonment of the people to the exploitation of oppressors"—and not in massive population and the consequent hope of numerical gains for the Church, Dodson found realistic motivation for a stronger missionary ministry in the colony. If Methodists were to serve those who needed them most, he declared, then they must acknowledge themselves called to Angola, which was still suffering, as a current investigation justifiably charged, an exhausting traffic in slaves. They must help Angola—

Angola, ravaged for centuries by exploiters, pests, smallpox, sleeping disease, and rum, suffering from prolonged abuse of pretended administration and the system of exhaustion, instead of developing its resources, with the kingdom of Portugal now in the throes of political revolution, and as I write, the flags at half-mast on Fort Saint Miguel in horror at the assassination of the king and crown prince—wild and dreadful event, as black as the dark foment of the sorrows of the underclass, black and white, which called it forth, however so great a monster when it appeared.

The next extensions of the Mission's evangelizing interest were made in 1910. With Robert Shields now in the District Superintendent's post, the veteran William Dodson settled in the Lubulo country, south of the Cuanza River and southwest of Quiôngua. There, at Ndungo, utilizing special gifts raised by himself while on furlough and by Bishop Hartzell, he erected and developed the only missionary-manned station begun between 1885 and 1920. Dodson stayed at Ndungo until he retired in 1915 after thirty years of missionary service in Angola. In 1910, also, John M. Springer, formerly a Rhodesia missionary, went into the Lunda country, which spanned the border of eastern Angola and the southern region of the Belgian Congo. But though Springer's pioneering activity there remained formally associated with the West Central Africa Mission Conference for several years, it did not originate in any impulse quickening the Angola mission itself, but in his own vision and commitment. It was not a newly spreading wing of the Methodist effort in Angola, but the birth process of the soon quite separate Congo mission.* However, three other bona fide Angola stations were established in 1910; they were native stations—one at Dia Nzundu, two days' march from Hombo, one at Nguxi-a-Fula, in the Colombaloca area, and one among the Songo people at Quibanda, several days' journey from Malanje.

Native evangelists developed a number of other centers for Christian teaching in the years before the World War. Among them were Matandala, Quisanda, Cahunga, Cabuta, Lutete, Samba-Lucala, Cadia-ca-Ndongo, Camulia, and Nhangue-ia-Pepe. The last of these was at the site, long abandoned, where Dodson had started when first he came to Angola. Some of the native centers were begun under the initiative of the missionaries, but in other cases it was the lay preachers themselves whose urgency brought about occupation of new locations. A few were opened up by the desire of men not previously belonging to the corps of recognized Methodist workers to teach Christianity to their own people.

Generally, each native station was not only a base for resident work by the appointed evangelist, but also a base for itinerating through nearby villages. The workers endured many difficulties, faced much opposition, and sometimes had to persevere while results of their teaching were long delayed, for the tribesmen to whom they brought the Christian message were pro-

* See pp. 92-112.

foundly rooted in pagan and primitive practices from which they could not easily be drawn away by declarations of alien religious and moral patterns. Gradually, conversions occurred at all the stations, and the converts dramatically signalized their new allegiance and their severance from pagan customs by bringing in their cherished fetishes and idols to be burned. They also received the Christian rite of baptism and were accepted as probationers for church membership, into which a smaller number of them were initiated at a conservative rate established by the Mission.

Sometimes the African preachers had the advantage of assistance by tribal chiefs who became friendly to the new faith. In 1913, two converted chiefs were so far committed to the Christian cause that they sent to the Conference session reports that were printed in the *Minutes*. D. Miguel Manuel da Silva (Chief Hombo a Njinji) was holding daily prayer meetings in his own house and accompanied the District Superintendent on visits to other mission stations. D. Francisco Paulo Quisanda (Chief Quisanda), upon going to Malanje in 1912 to answer to a summons involving criminal charges against his nephew, found himself jailed for nine months. Incarcerated with him were three other chiefs, whom he so successfully instructed in Christian teaching that when they all were released, the other chiefs and his nephew often attended the meetings held at Chief Hombo's village by the appointed worker Antonio Vieira. Chief Hombo was listed in the *Minutes* for 1913 as one of the Conference's lay workers.

Twenty-eight Africans were active at this time in the Mission's evangelistic program; twenty-five of them, including two women, were lay workers recognized by the Conference. The first African men to earn ministerial status had become Conference members on trial in 1911: Matheus P. Inglez, João G. Fernandes, and John L. Webba. They were received only after long service in the Mission. Fernandes and Inglez's record went back to 1890, Webba's to 1900. Fernandes and Inglez also were ordained Elders in 1911 and became full members of the Conference in 1913. These men were the only Africans to become ministers for another decade.

Following William Dodson's founding of the Ndungo mission in 1910, only one other resident missionary station was opened during this period. Herbert C. Withey went to Malanje in 1913 with the purpose of reactivating the long defunct mission there. He was the son of Amos E. Withey, one of the original William Taylor team. He had come to Angola as a boy, and as a youth he became Dodson's assistant at the Quiôngua station. After a thorough apprenticeship in every kind of mission activity, he specialized in translating Christian literature into the prevailing Kimbundu language. He gave several years to composing a Kimbundu version of the Gospel according to Matthew that was published by the British and Foreign Bible Society. He also compiled a Kimbundu hymnal with psalms and a catechism and completed in 1913, after seven or eight years' labor, his translation of the New

Testament. Withey taught himself printing and set up in Quiôngua in a shop erected with the help of school boys, presses on which were printed millions of pages of scripture portions, hymnbooks, mission helps, and job work, both in Portuguese and in Kimbindu. Withey continued his literary work into the nineteen-thirties. The Mission considered it so valuable that he was retained as an active member of its staff even while living for some years in Cape Province, Union of South Africa, whence he was driven in the twenties by the effect of attacks of bubonic fever upon members of his family.

Early in 1914, August H. Klebsattel, printer, bookbinder, and Local Preacher from South Germany, came to Withey's assistance in Malanje. He remained until a year later, when he and his wife were obliged, under strong persuasion from the Governor, to leave the colony because of high anti-German public feeling, rioting on the coast, and trouble with the Germans along the German West African border. With the approval of the Board of Foreign Missions, the Klebsattels went to the United States, and he did not return to Angola for more than nine years.

Withey went forward with the Malanje project, rehabilitating and extending the physical properties, reviving and expanding the evangelistic activity, and making the station the head and stimulating center of a newly organized Malanje District. The new grouping, of which Withey himself became superintendent, included, along with the Quessua missionary charge, both new and previously established native stations.

From 1913 to 1919, the network of native stations offered to view a shifting pattern—new stations emerging, active missions subsiding, some disappearing, others being relocated and renamed, but none projected beyond the general area already entered. In the latter year, Luanda, Malanje, and Quiôngua served as foci for the Mission's three Districts, which covered, in addition to the few missionary centers, about thirty stations manned by Africans. The African lay workers numbered sixty-five, including a dozen women. Only two Africans now were in Conference connection: Matheus P. Inglez, who was a full member, and John Webba, who was still a probationer. The missionary members of the Conference also were few, only half a dozen. Working with them in addition to their wives, were two W.F.M.S. appointees, Clara V. Ault and Susan Collins (the two other W.F.M.S. women, Celia Cross and Martha A. Drummer, a Negro, were on furlough).

The activity of all this corps of workers was not exclusively or narrowly evangelistic. In addition to much time-consuming and hardhanded toil expended on developing the Mission's lands and buildings, both Africans and Americans taught school. The Sunday schools kept in both the chief centers and the native stations touched more than two thousand pupils. Seven hundred boys and girls attended the Mission's twenty-eight elementary day schools, most of them small and simple projects that taught academic subjects, religion, and manual arts. Several schools were larger and better de-

veloped. At Quiôngua, for instance, the boys' and the girls' divisions of the missionary school had sixty pupils each, work was progressing in both Kimbindu and Portuguese, and the curriculum was being shaped towards government norms, with pupils coming from feeder schools to be prepared to take government examinations. Other, more fully developed schools included the W.F.M.S. Girls' School at Quessua, a large missionary school in Luanda (it included kindergarten, primary, grammar, and high school sections), and a native-taught school of ninety pupils at Colomboloca.

Slowly over the decade following Bishop Hartzell's expression of concern at the smallness of the Angola Methodist constituency, the efforts of the missionaries and of the African workers brought the church membership under their guidance to a level five times as high as in 1908; by 1919, there were five hundred full members. A similar increase in the number of probationers produced a combined formal Methodist constituency of just under a thousand persons. In spite of this numerical growth, the Angola mission remained small, lagging far behind the most nearly comparable mission fields, namely, Mozambique and Southern Rhodesia.

Eastern South America

BEGINNING IN 1893, THE ENTIRE EXTENSION of the Methodist Episcopal Church into South America—the missions in Uruguay, Paraguay, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Argentina—was reorganized as the South American Conference. This combination continued until 1897, when Peru and Chile were set apart to form the Western South America Mission Conference. This left the South America Conference, functionally speaking, an eastern South America organization, but it kept its original name until 1908, when the General Conference renamed it the Eastern South America Conference.

During the earlier years of this period, Bishops from the United States provided such episcopal supervision as could be given through visits from so far away. In 1896, the assigned Bishop was not present at the session of the Annual Conference, and Charles W. Drees presided in his stead. Five Bishops presided in succession at the next eight annual sessions: John H. Vincent (1897), Henry W. Warren (1898, 1899), William X. Ninde (1900), Charles C. McCabe (1901, 1902), and Isaac W. Joyce (1903, 1904).

Residential episcopal supervision for South America on a quadrennial basis went into effect in 1904, with the Bishops officially residing in Buenos Aires. The Bishops assigned for the remaining quadrennia of the period were Thomas B. Neely (1904), Frank M. Bristol (1908), Homer C. Stuntz (1912), and William F. Oldham (1916). Since their episcopal jurisdiction included both Eastern and Western South America, they were compelled to travel extraordinary distances in the course of their official visitations. Bishop Neely reported in 1908 of the denomination's 5,000-member South American Church:

The South American field is so vast that no matter where the Bishop may be, he is thousands of miles from other places in his jurisdiction, with impassable mountains and broad oceans between, so that to get around the continent it is easier to go to New York and take steamers from that port than to go by any other route.

Bishop Vincent's 1897 visitation, for instance, involved traveling more than 18,000 miles through Panama and South America.

Charles W. Drees, Superintendent for the entire South America mission

since 1887, completed his tenure in that office at the end of the Conference year 1896. When the Conference was divided in 1897, District Superintendents became the ranking field administrators for the various segments of the Eastern South America enterprise. Among those who served in that capacity up to 1919 were Drees, William Tallon, Samuel P. Craver, John F. Thomson, Almon W. Greenman, George P. Howard, Gerhard J. Schilling, William P. McLaughlin, William F. Rice, Charles J. Turner, Juan Robles, William E. Myers, Edward A. Brinton, Frank J. Batterson, Florentino Sosa, Juan E. Gattinoni, and Albert G. Tallon.

Argentina

Argentines made up in 1896 half the body of twenty-two hundred Methodist church members in the broad, six-nation territory covered by the Conference. They belonged to three ecclesiastical Districts—Buenos Aires, Mendoza, and Rosario. More than half these Argentinian members were attached to the Buenos Aires District, which included both the city and the province of Buenos Aires. On the Mendoza District were over a hundred members, divided among single charges in the provinces of Mendoza, San Juan, and San Luis—areas hundreds of miles to the west of Buenos Aires and pressed up against the Andes. The Rosario District's five hundred members were scattered through nine charges in the provinces of Córdoba, Entre Ríos, and Santa Fe, the two latter lying on the east and west banks of the Paraná River north of Buenos Aires, with Córdoba bordering Santa Fe on the West.

Geographically, the Mission of 1919 was roughly the same as the Mission of 1896. During the intervening years, the Methodists penetrated only one new province, entering Tecumán, whose capital of the same name often was designated by the Conference as a place to be evangelized but never was sent a pastor until James H. Wenberg, a new recruit from the ministry of the Swedish Evangelical Mission Covenant of America, was assigned to it late in 1914. Tecumán, which lay at the foot of the Andes, was more than three hundred miles north of Córdoba, the nearest Methodist charge.

Within the already occupied provinces, likewise, this was not an expansive period in Argentine Methodism. Methodist activity in the three provinces in the Mendoza District still reached not far beyond the respective similarly named capital cities Mendoza, San Juan, and San Luis, with the city of Mercedes, sixty miles east of San Luis, being the one significant addition. On the Rosario District (in 1919 it was called the Northern District) Córdoba's capital still had the only charge in the province, Entre Ríos Methodists still were at work in the cities of Paraná and Rosario Tala but not any longer in La Paz, and Santa Fe Province had six charges, mostly the same ones, instead of five. The latest additions to the Santa Fe appointments—Alejandro, near the Chaco frontier, and Arroyo Secco—were established no later than

1906 and 1905, respectively. All the rest of the churches and Circuits still were in the Buenos Aires District except for a few in the southern part of the province that now were organized as the Bahía Blanca District. And the significant extensions in Buenos Aires Province were few and initiated not long after 1896; work was beginning in Bahía Blanca in 1898 and in Chacabuco and Junín about 1902.

This general lack of expansive development both beyond and within the original provinces confirmed Argentine Methodism during the first two decades of the new century in its character as an urban phenomenon. By far the majority of the Conference charges were in cities with a population of 30,000 or more. More than half the members of the church lived in the province and city of Buenos Aires. The capital itself was a city of 1,650,000 people, and with two of its suburbs it held three-quarters of the Methodists in the Buenos Aires and Bahía Blanca Districts, the rest of them living mainly in cities averaging 60,000 in population. More than three-quarters of the Methodists outside the Buenos Aires areas were in cities averaging over 80,000. Methodist evangelists itinerated through smaller communities to a certain extent, but few Circuits had a settled rural constituency.

Proportionately, the growth of the church membership in Argentina far exceeded its geographical expansion; it more than doubled, rising from thirteen hundred in 1896 to thirty-two hundred in 1919. Dynamically, however, the growth was less impressive, for the gain of nineteen hundred members was slowly accumulated over twenty-three years. However, since the Methodists now had spent four generations at the task of evangelizing Argentina, the churches were building up their membership partly from within their own families. Thus, the penetration of the secular and the Catholic communities by conversion to Methodism was far more limited than the total of accessions to the Church might suggest.

Some expansion of the school program occurred during the same period, with more than six hundred pupils enrolled in 1919. Two of the schools offered classes on the secondary level: Nicholas Lowe Institute, Orphanage, and Agricultural School (founded in 1898), in Mercedes, and the American College and Ward Commercial Institute (opened in 1914), in Buenos Aires. There were four primary and intermediate schools and six elementary schools. Two of them were under the auspices of the W.F.M.S. In addition, Argentina shared with Uruguay the Conference's Theological School, which was located at various times in Mercedes (Argentina), Buenos Aires, and Montevideo.

Uruguay

As in Argentina, the Methodist constituency in the capital city of Uruguay numerically far exceeded the Methodist community in all the rest of the country. In 1896, there were 268 church members in Montevideo and a total

of 117 in the four other places reporting members. Twenty-three years of evangelism did not change this pattern; in 1919, Montevideo was the home of 625 Methodist members, and 271 lived elsewhere.

Almon W. Greenman, who supervised the Uruguay District in 1896, was responsible not only for three churches in Montevideo but also for charges in Santa Lucía (just north of the capital), Durazno (about a hundred miles north), Trinidad (a hundred miles north northwest), and Salto (260 miles north northwest, on the Uruguay River). Greenman's official counterpart in 1919, Juan E. Gattinoni, led a District including the same places but augmented by charges in Florida (sixty miles north of the capital), Mercedes (155 miles to the northwest, on the Río Negro), and Paysandú (some two hundred miles to the northwest, on the Uruguay). The Montevideo work now included five charges. The conclusive openings in the new places occurred in Mercedes in 1901, in Paysandú in 1910, and in Florida in 1915. All the points where the Methodists were at work lay in Departments immediately north of Montevideo or in Departments lying along the east bank of the Uruguay River. Most of them were Departmental capitals.

Montevideo's two Methodist schools continued throughout this period. In 1919, the boys' school, which had become known as the North American Academy, was offering classes on the secondary level, and the W.F.M.S. was conducting its primary-intermediate school for girls under the name Crandon Institute.

Paraguay

Paraguay figured in the mission pattern of the South America Conference in 1895 as the Paraguay District. The mission in Asunción, the nation's capital, was its only station. It included a small and struggling congregation, an affiliated Sunday school, a day school for boys, and a similar school for girls. In 1896, it lost its designation as a District and generally thereafter was administered in close association with the work in Uruguay, occasionally again being called a District.

The leader of the Paraguay mission from 1895 to 1899 was Samuel P. Craver, an experienced Mexico missionary. During his years in Asunción, the two day schools finally gained strength, and evangelistic beginnings were made in a number of other places. Among them were Itá (close to Asunción), San Bernardino and Altos (each some forty miles away), Villa Rica (nearly a hundred miles to the southeast), and Villa Concepción (125 miles to the north). Preaching also soon was under way in Yeguarizo, a rural area beyond Itá.

For six years following Craver's departure to head the Montevideo District, Paraguay was supplied by Spanish-speaking Local Preachers, there being no American missionary on the field. The evangelistic and the educa-

tional work suffered ups and downs, activity in Asunción being more than unusually handicapped by a revolution that badly unsettled the capital during 1904. Charles J. Turner served as resident District Superintendent in 1906 and 1907. Beginning in Craver's time and continuing to the end of Turner's term, the one steadily active worker was a Paraguayan Local Preacher, Carlos J. Bogado. He was responsible for the Itá work and for building up, by visitation on horseback, a hundred-mile rural Circuit that by 1907 included small congregations in Itá, Yeguarizo, Acahaí, and Quindy. Bogado was a man close to the country people, especially so because he could speak not only Spanish but also the Guaraní tongue familiar to the indigenous Paraguayans.

Although Edward A. Brinton, a newly appointed Board missionary, came to Paraguay in mid-1909 and was scheduled to take charge of the mission in Villa Rica, he was retained in Asunción to study Spanish and meanwhile to teach English. The next year, he became the head of the Paraguay District and in 1911 was reinforced by the arrival of Eulalia F. Cantwell from the United States to manage the day school activity in Asunción. Three South Americans also worked under Brinton in 1911: Enrique C. Balloch in Asunción, J. M. Ayala out of Acahaí, and Carlos Bogado out of Itá. The three charges at that time had seventy-five church members and forty-four probationers and the day school enrollment was 157.

Although the Mission was gathering strength, the year 1911 marked the beginning of a bad time for Paraguayan Methodism. As Brinton reported to the Annual Conference, "The year opened amid scenes of dissension and ended with the nation in a condition of disorder and anarchy." Paraguay was being torn by one of the worst of its civil wars. The schedule of the Evangelical Institute (the former day schools) was substantially curtailed because of the revolution and epidemic disease, holding services in Asunción was at times impossible, the country work finally was paralyzed, and severe financial troubles overtook the mission staff. It was found advisable at the session of the Conference in Montevideo in March, 1912, to suspend Methodist work in the country for the coming Conference year. Bishop Frank M. Bristol kept only Brinton on the field, hoping thereby to prevent complete dispersal of the Methodist following. Upon cessation of the war in May, Brinton began to reinstate English and Spanish-speaking services in Asunción.

Against Brinton's desire, Bishop Stuntz removed him from Asunción in February, 1913, both because he was needed in school work in Bahía Blanca, Argentina, and because of danger to the health of the Brinton family in the Paraguayan environment. The Bishop decided to replace Brinton with a European lay preacher for the year ahead. "Meantime," he wrote to the New York office, "we shall hold our property in Paraguay, and await more settled political conditions there before sending another missionary." Bishop Stuntz spent a week in Asunción in July, 1914, studying the Mission's pros-

pects. He was particularly impressed with the results of the work that had been done by the schools and felt that the Institute should be reopened as soon as practicable. It was his judgment, however, that both national and Mission finances forbade any further effort at that time. He hoped to have a missionary back in Asunción within a year, but no Methodist missionary ever again was appointed to Paraguay, and no further reports of activity in Paraguay were received by the Conference.

In 1916, the Executive Committee of the Committee on Co-operation in Latin America, dealing with Paraguay as a territory reported to it as unoccupied and needy, approved the request of the Christian Woman's Board of Missions (Disciples of Christ) to be assigned that country as a field for missionary cultivation. The Methodist Episcopal authorities being co-operative, their interests were transferred to the Woman's Board in 1917. Thus Methodist missionary responsibility in Paraguay ended thirty-one years after it was taken up, though the word *Paraguay* did not disappear from the Disciplinary definition of the Eastern South America Conference until 1932.

Brasil

The northernmost extension of the activity of the South America Conference in 1896 was the Brazil District, which included two missions far distant from each other and from all the other centers maintained by the Conference. One was in Belém (Pará), ninety miles up the Rio Pará, in the Amazon Valley. The other was in Manaus, on the Rio Negro near its junction with the Amazon, more than eight hundred miles inland from Belém.

At Belém was stationed Justus H. Nelson, who had been there since 1880, when he arrived as a missionary under the aegis of Bishop William Taylor's Self-Supporting Missions. At Manaus was Frank R. Spaulding, who had arrived in Brazil in 1893 and begun work in Manaus in 1895. Spaulding returned to the United States in May, 1897, because his financial situation in Manaus had become drastically impaired and—so he believed—completely untenable. This left Manaus, which now had a Methodist society with sixteen church members and seventeen probationers, permanently deprived of the presence of a missionary, though Nelson, the District Superintendent, was formally in charge. Nelson remained at Belém, where he led a society of thirty-eight church members and sixteen probationers and preached and wrote for a still larger group of informal followers.

The southern portion of the Methodist Episcopal mission in Brazil was in the state of Rio Grande do Sul, nearly two thousand miles south of Belém as the crow flies and much farther around by water. It was so far south that the Conference administered it along with the Uruguayan charges. It included the seaport city Porto Alegre and two outlying hill Circuits whose congregations were made up chiefly of Italians who had made homes for

themselves in an area until recently covered with almost impenetrable forests. William T. Robinson, who was appointed to Porto Alegre, also gave general direction to the outlying Circuits. The two chief points on the Bento Gonçalves and Alfredo Chaves Circuit, whose leader was Cárlos Lázare, were some 120 to 150 miles, respectively, from Porto Alegre. The Caxias and Forqueta Circuit (Caxias was sixty miles north of Porto Alegre) was in the charge of Mateo Donati.

The Methodist Episcopal Church, South, also was engaged in mission work in Brazil, on a far larger scale than the Methodist Episcopal Church. The Southern Methodists had more than twenty-five hundred church members, led by eleven missionary couples and two single missionaries and by a dozen Brazilian traveling preachers and half a dozen Brazilian local preachers. In 1900, negotiations began between the two denominations for the transfer of the missions in the Amazon Valley and in Rio Grande do Sul to the Church, South. The Northern church's Board was motivated officially by two considerations: (1) the great distance of its Brazilian centers from the rest of its work in eastern South America—even Porto Alegre was more than five hundred miles from Buenos Aires—and (2) the fact that Spanish was the language in which the Northern Methodists conducted all their work except that in Brazil, which was Portuguese-speaking. That the Southern church had a Portuguese-language publishing house in Brazil was cited as a significant point in favor of the proposed move. Transfer of the stations in Rio Grande do Sul was agreed upon on 1 August and formally implemented in January, 1901. Along with the 144 church members who now shifted their affiliation to the Church, South went the two preachers from the hill Circuits, Donati and Lázare. And with them also went John W. Price, arrived in Porto Alegre not long before to take the place of William Robinson, who had returned to the United States in 1897 because of the illness of his wife.

Finally omitted from the transfer, however, was the Methodist Episcopal work in the Amazon Valley and its lone missionary, Justus Nelson, who had requested the Missionary Society to retain his charge. He pointed out that the Southern church had no mission within fifteen hundred miles of Belém. Belém was indeed that far from São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, the two centers close to which all the Southern church Circuits were located. He also held that the Southern group was not so well suited as the Northern to deal with the race question. More positively, Nelson desired to have his own denomination hold the mission in Belém because of the Portuguese-language literature he was producing. He not only was translating Protestant materials from English into Portuguese, but also was continuing to publish his Portuguese-language journal, which he desired to see maintained as a medium of Protestant propaganda among Brazilians in the area. In spite of his plea, the Missionary Society decided to let both Nelson and his isolated mission go over to the Southern church. The latter group, however, received

only the Rio Grande do Sul charges, for it was not inclined to undertake work in northern Brazil.

Nelson therefore stayed on in Belém, supporting himself and his mission by a meager income from teaching and translating. In addition to preaching and publishing evangelical literature from his own press, he carried on a varied personal ministry through dental, obstetrical, and minor surgical treatments and through nursing and dispensing medicine. These personal services were given gratuitously to the poor among the Baptists, Presbyterians, Roman Catholics, Jews, Muslims, Chinese, Indians, and others in the city. Though he was not formally a Board missionary, he received a hundred dollars of missionary money each year through Conference channels, until for some reason unexplained to him he found after 1921 that he no longer was receiving remittances. Though he was a member of the Eastern South America Conference, he and its officials maintained during the years only a thin and sporadically flowing stream of correspondence. When he wrote to Bishop William F. Oldham, in Buenos Aires, in 1925, at the age of seventy-five and after forty-five years' service in Belém, he had not heard from his District Superintendent for four years and indeed did not know who he was. Shortly afterwards, Nelson retired and the Methodist Episcopal mission in Brazil was at an end.

16

Western South America

Chile

In 1896, the Chile mission, under the superintendency of Ira H. La Fetra, one of William Taylor's recruits of 1878, was making evangelical thrusts into predominantly Roman Catholic Chile from ten centers scattered for thirteen hundred miles along the upper half of the long feeler Chile reaches down between the Andes and the Pacific. The Mission's ministers and missionaries were active in four schools, eleven preaching charges, a publishing house, and an orphanage.

FROM TRANSIT SOCIETY TO MISSIONARY SOCIETY

Throughout the decade beginning in 1896, however, the center of fateful decision for the Chile mission was not on the field itself, but in the United States—in conference and committee rooms, in secretarial and business offices.

"Secretaries, ministerial representatives, and laymen participated in this battle royal. The field was open to all comers, and each fought as he pleased, and fought well. Lances were shivered, swords gleamed, broad-axes crashed, and armor rang again." The field of combat thus romantically described by a writer for *The Christian Advocate* was the floor of the General Missionary Committee at Central Church, Detroit, on the afternoon of 16 November 1896. The unromantic, even technical, cause of the conflict was the unsettled status of the Chile mission as a missionary arm of the Methodist Episcopal Church. The issues joined were such that victory for the colors of certain of the jousting parties could have resulted in severing the Mission from the missionary enterprise of the denomination.

The essential decision apparently already had been made. At the beginning of 1896, the Chile mission, which was founded by William Taylor in 1878 and maintained since 1884 by the Transit and Building Fund Society,* was well contained within the structure of the Methodist Episcopal Church. Its ministers and their charges constituted the Chile District of the South America Annual Conference, which they had entered in 1893, and were subject to

* See Note, p. 626.

episcopal appointment and supervision. In 1893, the General Missionary Committee, on 13 November, and its Board of Managers, on 19 December, had voted to accept transfer of the Chile work and property from the Transit and Building Fund Society and had made a contingent appropriation of \$25,000 to be covered by special gifts for Chile missions. Formal transfer of the properties was effected in 1894. Because a non-Chilean organization such as the Missionary Society could not hold property in Chile according to Chilean law, Anderson Fowler and Richard Grant, previously trustees for the Transit and Building Fund Society, were designated as trustees to hold title for the Missionary Society.

The Chile mission promptly came under the secretarial supervision of Adna B. Leonard, the Corresponding Secretary assigned to South American affairs, and the Missionary Society's Committee on Self-Supporting Missions began enlisting missionaries for work in Chile. The Missionary Society dispatched missionaries to Chile during 1894 and 1895. In November, 1894, the Missionary Society made a direct appropriation of \$7,866 and charged it to the Incidental Fund because of the meager response to the Society's church-wide appeal for special gifts for Chile. A second contingent appropriation of \$25,000 was made, for 1895; and in December of that year, the Board of Managers directly appropriated \$1,600.

Everybody involved in the acceptance of the Chile mission by the Missionary Society took it for a bona fide transaction, but it also was understood that it would not become technically complete until the General Conference of 1896 should give it either tacit or express approval. The General Conference neither approved nor rejected the new arrangement; it passed the entire question of the Chile mission back to the Board of Managers of the Missionary Society, with power to act.

This failure of the General Conference to rubber-stamp the current Chile mission agreement reflected the existence of conflict within the Missionary Society. Many of its members were by this time strongly opposed to the principle of self-support that the Society had bound itself to observe for the Chile mission as a condition of the transfer made by the Transit and Building Fund Society in 1894. According to that principle, the Missionary Society could make appropriations for the outfitting and dispatching of missionaries, for certain missionary travel on the field, for the erection or purchase of mission buildings, and for publication activities. But the articles of incorporation of the Transit Society specifically forbade (this became the center of controversy) use of its funds for salaries of agents at home or of preachers or teachers in foreign countries. Funds for salaries had to be raised by the missions on the field. This meant, practically speaking, that in Chile salaries had to be paid from the profits of the mission schools and the publishing house.

Because of this limitation, the salaries of Chile missionaries were low, the

financial plight of the evangelistic workers often produced hardships, no salaries could be guaranteed by the recruiting officers of the Missionary Society, and it was difficult to staff the Chile mission and keep it staffed. Further difficulty rose from the fact that maintenance of the Chile work as a self-supporting project set it apart from the regular process of missionary appropriations observed by the denomination. This distinction accounted, from 1894 to 1896, for the Missionary Society's policy of making only appropriations that could be covered by special gifts designated for the self-supporting Chile mission. The response to appeals for such gifts was insignificant—only \$1,437 in three years.

The Board of Managers, pursuant to the enabling vote by the General Conference of 1896, promptly addressed itself to the responsibility of defining a policy for the administration of the Chile mission. Indeed, it finally interpreted its power broadly enough to open the way to possible complete renunciation of the acts of acceptance of 1893. But William T. Smith, a newly elected Corresponding Secretary, and some of the members of the Missionary Society first approached the Transit Society directly, and pressed hard for an offer of some new plan that would eliminate the self-support feature. By this time, neither funds nor teachers were being sent out for the Chile work, and the Mission was becoming shorthanded.

The Transit Society felt that it could not renounce the self-support plan unless it should be reimbursed for the Chile mission property, which represented an investment of funds donated for self-supporting missions. The Society held that a trust principle was involved. Therefore it made an entirely new proposal, that the Missionary Society purchase the Chile property for \$100,000, thus removing it completely from amenability to the plan embedded in the Transit charter and releasing the proceeds of the sale for reinvestment in other self-supporting missions sponsored by the Transit Society.

A committee report favoring the new Transit plan was the signal for the rousing General Committee debate of 16 November. Out of the fray came a decision, by a vote of 36 to 10: (a) to recognize Chile as a mission field within the bounds of the South America Conference; (b) to recommend that the Board of Managers buy the Chile mission property for \$100,000, payable in twenty annual installments, without interest; (c) to appropriate \$20,000, to provide for the first installment and to meet the Mission's needs for 1897. A month later, the Board of Managers voted to implement the General Committee's decision, subject to correctness of property titles, and added a specific disclaimer of any obligation or intention to abide by the method of self-support.

Sanguine expectations that all would now go well with the Chile mission were soon cut off. The Board of Managers voted on 16 March 1897 to accept a committee report holding that the title to the Chile mission

properties offered by the Transit Society was not correct. On the further ground that the Missionary Society could not hold property in Chile under acceptable legal conditions, the Board decided not to implement the purchase of the Chile properties. By direction of the Board, the title papers held since 1894 were returned to the Transit Society on 25 March.

The Board next tried to rent the properties from the Transit Society, but no agreement was reached on rates. The Transit Society now owned the buildings in Chile, but the Missionary Society used them; the Transit Society had lost control of the mission activity in Chile, but the controlling Missionary Society was appropriating no money for it. To resolve this practical confusion, and to save the Mission for the Methodist Episcopal Church, the Transit Society made a final proposal, before seriously considering sale of its properties to other parties. It offered to submit the entire Chile mission question, including property titles, to binding arbitration.

With the controversy now at a point of crisis, the two societies suddenly achieved a major adjustment of their differences within five days in November. On the 9th, the Board of Managers voted, subject to their receiving title to the Mission properties, "to carry on the Mission work in Chile according to the plan of self support as originally proposed by the Transit and Building Fund Society: meaning thereby that it will not depart from the principle of self support, except in case of extreme necessity, should such ever arise." The Transit Society accepted the plan on 11 November, and the General Missionary Committee appropriated, on 13 November, \$20,000 for the work in Chile, plus \$1,440 to reimburse Messrs. Fowler and Grant for money advanced to the Mission. The latter sum was donated to the work and remained a part of the appropriation.

This agreement between the societies settled the controversy that had strained their relations for four years. It was based on a compromise on the question of self-support. That disputed principle, so vigorously fought by many members of the Missionary Society, was embedded in the agreement. But by conceding possible desertion of the self-support method under critical emergency, the Transit Society retreated from its earlier position of rigid insistence upon its cherished principle. The attempt to administer the Chile mission on a self-support basis remained a serious problem, but the trouble centered in it was now contained within the Missionary Society and the Chile mission. The inter-Society conflict was over.

Homer Eaton, treasurer of the Missionary Society, was appointed to hold the Chile properties in trust for the Society. Conveyance of the titles by the Transit Society was completed early in 1899. Since Chilean law did not provide for any such trusteeship as Eaton's, the Missionary Society authorized in 1902, at the suggestion and under the guidance of Ira H. La Fetra, the organization of a Chilean corporation to hold property for the Society. Pending its incorporation, Eaton and the trustees of properties purchased

for the Missionary Society in recent years continued to act as individual owners as far as Chilean law was concerned.

EVANGELISM, 1896-1909

While, far away in the United States, the makers of high missionary policy debated and negotiated throughout 1896 and 1897, the Chile mission's field workers were beginning to forge a dozen years of evangelistic progress.

Their first blows were far from powerful. Most of the churches were young; only four of them were more than six years old in 1896. Three of the four older societies were English-speaking churches, with naturally limited constituencies. All the churches together had only three hundred full members. All of them were numerically weak. The three English congregations enjoyed their own places of worship, but the Spanish-speaking groups generally had to resort to rented quarters. The Spanish work—the only field that was essentially Chilean—was hardly more than under way, for only as late as 1891 had the Mission established full-time pastoral ministries in it.

The evangelistic centers were organized as a single district, with Ira H. La Fetra at its head. Since La Fetra also carried responsibility for the Mission treasury, the publishing house, and one of the colleges, he was relieved of his sole superintendency in 1897, and the Mission was organized into three Districts—Iquique, Concepción, and Santiago. These groupings, which corresponded roughly with three major geographical divisions of Chile, remained basic constants in Mission organization for many years, except for occasional or minor variations in name or definition. Their first superintendents were Willis C. Hoover, La Fetra, and Goodsil F. Arms, respectively. Generally, the succeeding superintendents were pastors of churches.

The Iquique District, whose two chief poles were Iquique and Antofagasta, covered the region of the hot desert in the north of Chile, an area rich in nitrates but poor in population, almost devoid of rain, and widely barren of vegetation.

In 1896, Methodist evangelism in Iquique, the port city at the head of the District, was centered in two small churches. Parson B. Cuppett was just taking up the pastorate of the English-speaking church of a dozen members, and was following a pattern set by James P. Gilliland when the latter founded the church in 1878 and then, after a lapse of five years during the war with Peru, reopened it in 1884. On the bay, he preached at shipboard services for Iquique's visiting sailors; on shore, he ministered chiefly to members of the city's English community, who worshiped in a chapel built by Gilliland in 1885. The Spanish-speaking church of twenty-eight members, which shared the chapel, was still being served by Dr. Willis C. Hoover, a former medical practitioner from the United States, who had founded the society in February, 1891.

Doctor Hoover was just back from a year's furlough in the United States, and was engrossed in trying to rebuild the church's membership, which had been almost wiped out, during his absence, by the disastrous leadership of Alberto J. Vidaurre, the well-educated Chilean appointed to Iquique in March, 1895. Vidaurre had led members of the congregation in a wholesale walkout from the Methodist Episcopal Church, in an abortive effort to establish an independent Chilean church free from what he regarded as ecclesiastical dominance by foreigners.

Hoover resumed his work in November by scraping together a meager dozen people to hear his preaching. Early in 1896, he reorganized the church with twenty-eight members and seven probationers. Two months later, he was making an aggressive bid for new followers by pushing out beyond the chapel. People soon were filling the wooden benches on the white-sand floor of a large tent he set up for services in the heart of Iquique's worst district. He had his evangelistic sights trained on the Chilean proletariat.

Two years later there were ninety-one members, with services continuing both in the chapel and in the tent. By 1901, the original tent had been discarded, and a second one was becoming ruinously dilapidated. Hoover's efforts resulted in the dedication of a new church in February, 1902, just before he surrendered the pastorate to Francis M. Harrington, and moved south to Valparaíso.

Under Hoover's direction, the Spanish-speaking work in Iquique had spread to the surrounding desert area, the Pampa, populated chiefly by people engaged in working the nitrate mines that accounted for Iquique's exporting activity. The first inland center for the new work was Huara, about a hundred miles from Iquique. Here the Chile Mission's first chapel for Spanish-speaking work was dedicated in May, 1894, with the building fund being contributed entirely by people of the locality.

The Methodist groups in the Pampa area surrounding Iquique became neither stable nor numerically impressive. Economic depression in the nitrates region in 1897 caused drops in population and depleted congregations. The Iquique District work in the Pampa was closed in 1898, and few visits were made out there. The Iquique Spanish church itself suffered heavy repercussions from the same economic recession, for the city was dependent upon the nitrates industry.

By Harrington's time, however, Methodist efforts in the Pampa were beginning to show fresh progress, though not without difficulty. Karl Hansen became the roving Methodist pastor for the area. He also covered the field for the American Bible Society, successfully selling his Bible wares by playing a mouth organ to introduce himself to the saltpeter miners. Hansen awakened interest from Lagunas, about sixty miles southeast of Iquique, to Pisagua, fifty miles up the coast from Iquique. As the Pampa work grew,

Hansen settled in Pisagua. In the early months of 1905, new congregations were established in the vicinity, and a Quarterly Conference was formed.

But Hansen could not finish out the year in Pisagua itself. Bubonic plague hit the town, and the majority of the people fled, leaving the sick and the dying. After the plague came a fire that destroyed a large part of the town. Hansen lost all his personal goods and his Bible Society stock in the conflagration. Under the cumulative calamities in the community, the church lost all its members, by death or removal. Nevertheless, Hansen remained in the field through 1906. New families gradually moved in, with encouraging results—both in Pisagua, where a chapel was provided by one of the members in 1907, and abroad in the Pampa, where there were many small, isolated groups of evangelicals that needed shepherding by Hansen's successors at Pisagua.

At Antofagasta, the District's other outstanding evangelistic center, Carl G. Beutelspacher, who started the church in 1891, closed his pastorate at Conference time, in March, 1896. He left the church with a membership of seventy-two, the largest in the Chile mission. Two years later, "that old war horse for the Lord," as Mrs. Roberto Olavé called him, was back again. During this three-year pastorate the church finished its church building, begun in 1896, and began the reduction of its building debt.

The Antofagasta church had a vitality that, even in its earlier years, projected its evangelical influence far beyond the port city itself. During Beutelspacher's second pastorate, active members of the church were employed along the new railroad that was inching upwards towards Oruro, in the Bolivian highlands. Wherever they went, they spread the gospel by personal testimony and by distributing literature. Some of them worked on the railroad or in the mines by day and preached by night and on Sundays. By 1902, Antofagasta Methodists were active even in Oruro and Uyuni, within the bounds of the newly founded Bolivia mission. In the same year, evangelistic work along the railroad was established in Calama and Cebollar, Chile—beginnings out of which grew a permanent Calama circuit. In 1904, Mrs. Olavé, whose husband served as its pastor from 1903 to 1905, described the Antofagasta congregation as a mother church with many small offspring in the form of evangelical groups in the interior. During the pastorate (1906-8) of Roberto Elphick, a former Presbyterian preacher, the Antofagasta charge was conceived as a broad circuit, with Antofagasta itself as the center. In 1908, it was the third largest church in the Chile mission.

Newer and less influential than the mission centers of Antofagasta and Iquique was the mission in Arica, the formerly Peruvian port that lay more than a hundred miles north of Iquique in the territory in dispute between Chile and Peru since the end of the War of the Pacific, in 1883. A church was established there in 1897, with Zoilo E. Irigoyen as pastor. Its first successful year of note was 1902, when its young pastor Mariano de la Cruz

began raising funds for a church. During the same year, he started a church in Tacna, the inland city for which Arica served as seaport, and the Arican Methodists helped outfit a rented chapel room for the young congregation. In 1904, Carl Beutelspacher bought a lot and built a chapel in Arica.

For a few years, the Iquique District—renamed the Northern District in 1906—included Coquimbo and La Serena, later assigned to other districts. In 1906 and 1907 it included the work in Bolivia. Its successive superintendents were Hoover, Francis M. Harrington, Olavé, and Elphick.

The Santiago District carried Methodism to the heart of "Mediterranean" Chile, the nation's more populous and climatically more equable middle area. The District was built around Santiago, the national capital, and Valparaíso, the greatest port on the western coast of South America—two strategic cities located about fifty miles apart.

Methodism's first church in Santiago, a city of more than 300,000 people, was founded by José Torregrosa in October, 1898, following limited preaching activity by G. Noel Henri, a Frenchman, in 1897. Torregrosa's record as a religious worker reached back to his days in Spain as an evangelical teacher, colporteur, and preacher. On his Spanish record were the marks of persecution. On one occasion, his family had been left destitute while he was kept in a Spanish jail for months because of his unauthorized preaching. In the family were two sons, Samuel and Moisés, who later became ministers in the Chile Conference.

Until 1904, the Santiago church utilized rented rooms, finally maintaining preaching services and Sunday schools at four points in the city, with exhorters working under the pastor's guidance. In that year, the church purchased a well-located lot with a house providing space for Sunday school rooms and a parsonage and roofed over the courtyard to make a meeting-room for the congregation, then led by Cecilio Fenegas.

Both price and prejudice handicapped expansion to new evangelistic stations in Santiago. It was almost impossible to rent quarters in some parts of the city. In 1907, armed mobs provided with kerosene broke up Methodist meetings and threatened to burn the church property if they should be resumed. But within a period of two years, three new organized churches sprouted from the ground long cultivated by what came to be known as First Church. Second Church was founded in 1906, with William T. Robinson as its first pastor; and in 1907 appeared Third Church, led by Karl Hansen. Fourth Church was founded in 1908, and assigned to the leadership of a local preacher. Each of the new churches was started as the result of missionary efforts by workers from First Church, which became the mother church of the entire Methodist movement in Santiago.

As the new churches were begun, they in turn established minor centers for evangelistic activity. Among the points reached by Second Church was the suburban village of Montel, where a number of Methodist families bought

homes. They invited Doctor Robinson to hold services there, and in spite of the fact that the parish priest—he was also reported to be the local political boss—had thus far run out of town all evangelical workers bent on starting churches, a Methodist congregation was gathered. Under the announced threat that the priest would see that their church was burned, the Methodists nevertheless acquired a lot and began to erect a modest chapel. The priest soon died—providentially, thought some of the simple folk among the evangelicals. Third Church also had to forge ahead against difficulties, for most of the property in the northern part of the city, where their work was located, was owned by various Roman Catholic orders. The congregation had to keep moving from one location to another: when the members met in private houses, tenants were threatened with ejection; when they used rented halls, they were harassed by legal notices to vacate.

In spite of these and other difficulties, however, the early years of the capital's new Methodist churches were years of growth. By 1908, First, Second, and Third Churches had over three hundred full members.

At Valparaíso, Methodist evangelistic work was barely under way again in 1896, after two earlier efforts had been thwarted, first by the War of the Pacific and later by the revolution of 1891.

In May, 1895, José Torregrosa, who had been briefly employed by the Valparaíso Bible Society, began preaching for the Methodists in a rented room. He soon established a church, which kept growing under his leadership through 1896 and 1897. His successor, Edward E. Wilson, contributed to the steady growth of the church, during his four-year pastorate (1898–1901), a thoroughly developed system of class meetings for testimony, spiritual discipline, and parochial fellowship. The numerous classes met in different sections of the city—some of them in private homes, some of them in three small chapels supplementing a 320-seat auditorium in the old house rented for the chief preaching services. Willis C. Hoover kept and expanded this system when he succeeded Wilson in 1902.

"Dr. Hoover is an incessant preacher," Andrew M. Milne, the veteran American Bible Society worker, once said. Hoover's evangelism was not only incessant, but also highly organized and successful. Congregations grew rapidly; conversions were numerous; the membership was tripled by the end of 1904. Hoover carefully developed lay leadership for the growing parish, and directed its energies primarily into evangelistic activities. Squads of young men went out from a rented meeting-room several nights a week, engaged in house-to-house visitation, and then went back to the gospel center to hold services. By 1905, four Local Preachers and six Exhorters carried on a preaching program in four hired outchapels, and twenty-three classes met simultaneously each week. The church was thriving.

A building lot for the burgeoning society was purchased in the populous eastern section of Valparaíso in 1903 and was nearly paid for in 1905. The

latter year was a hard year. Church work could not remain unaffected by the epidemic of smallpox that swept the city for three-quarters of the year. Each new week brought hundreds of new cases. Contagious hospitals were crammed full. Thousands died. The city was hard put to it to bury the dead. Hoover saw people bringing the dead down from the hills in coffins that had to be left on the sidewalks until hearses were available. Later, he saw the sheet-covered corpses brought to the city morgue on litters, loaded onto large drays, and hauled away for burial. The pox reached forty of his own parishioners; nearly a score of them died. Isolation measures and fear of contagion cut down church attendance. But the church came through the plague with its spirit unbroken and its organization unimpaired, and Hoover never let up on his evangelistic drive.

Hard year followed hard year; earthquake followed pox. In August, 1906, a major quake cruelly racked Valparaíso and the surrounding area. Hoover wrote from a city with hills swept clear of houses, "The half of Valparaíso in which we live is absolutely, utterly destroyed . . ." The results for the property and the daily lives of the Methodist constituents, among others, were devastating. For the next seven months, with no meeting-place, the life of the church was disrupted and disintegrating, the people scattered. In March, the church finally set up a large tent amid the rubble of ruined houses on the property chosen as the site for the new church. Here the congregation met, its canvas sanctuary so insecurely anchored that it had to be closely watched whenever the wind was gusty, its extreme cold on winter evenings keeping people away from services, its hundred-degree temperatures under summer noonday sun making Sunday school attendance virtually an act of heroism.

After a year's use, the mildewed and wind-ripped tent was taken down to make way for building operations. For with their own funds slashed through earthquake losses, the parishioners had kept giving what they could to the building fund. With the tent gone, pastoral work now was disorganized anew, and parish activity was completely decentralized. But at last, at a watch night service ending 1908 and beginning 1909, the congregation was reunited in its own new church building and ready for a fresh beginning.

The Santiago District, with its two poles Valparaíso and Santiago, began expanding in 1900. At various times during the following decade, it extended Methodist evangelism north and south to San Fernando, Curicó, Guayacán, La Serena, Limache, Coquimbo, Ovalle, Quillota, Nogales, Llay-Llay, Val-lenar, Punitaqui, Chihuinto, Calera, San Felipe, Los Andes, and numerous other places. Some of these were single locations, some were heads of Circuits; some were first approached by preachers, some were activated by laymen who had known Methodism elsewhere. For 1902, 1903, and 1906, the District was divided, some of the churches being organized as the Valparaíso District. When the two segments were reunited in 1907, the District was

named the Central District, a designation that described its geographical position among the Chile Districts.

The Concepción District was based on the city of Concepción, nine hundred miles south of Iquique, in the south central region of Chile. Like all Chilean cities, it was not far from the coast—six miles up the Bío-Bío River.

When the District was organized in 1897 under the superintendency of Goodsil F. Arms, Concepción had an English-speaking church and a Spanish church and Circuit. Twenty miles south of Concepción was the seaport and coal-mining center of Lota, where Benjamin B. Keister was engaged in informal evangelistic work supported by his own salary as a teacher. Fifty miles south of Lota, in an agricultural and fruit-growing district, was Angol, which headed a Circuit that included Los Ángeles and Mulchén, the three places lying about forty miles from one another. The mission in Mulchén, started by a lay member recently moved from Angol, was so new that the visiting pastor, Carl G. Beutelspacher, held services in the layman's home. Equidistant from Angol and Mulchén, fifty miles southward, lay Victoria, the most populous town on the frontier of Chile's sparsely settled southern region. Here William Standen, an English colonist holding an Exhorter's license from the Concepción church, opened services in July, having previously begun evangelistic work among his neighbors in the vicinity, whom Goodsil Arms called "poor and neglected colonists." Standen also preached in nearby Pailahueque and Ercilla. Perquenco soon was added. The work in this neighborhood was at first a part of the Concepción Circuit, but members were received and a church organized, and the Victoria Circuit was established in 1898 as an independent unit. Another original part of the Concepción District was the Temuco Circuit, which included Temuco (the trade center thirty miles down the railroad from Victoria), Lautaro (midway between Victoria and Temuco), and Nueva Imperial (some forty miles eastward from the Circuit's two other points). Cecilio Venegas was the preacher in charge of the Circuit.

During the following ten years, the Concepción District developed a number of new churches and Circuits and built up some of the earlier ones. South of its field lay a long, sparsely populated area; so the new locations reached by the District's preachers—such places as Coronel, Curacautín, Collipulli, Yungay—essentially filled in the area already penetrated. The southernmost charge, the farthest from the rest of the District, was Valdivia.

Another District eventually resulted from the migration of two dozen members and probationers of the Iquique and Valparaíso churches in 1899 to Punta Arenas, the southernmost city in the world, the seaport midway of the Strait of Magellan, fourteen hundred nautical miles from Valparaíso and a thousand miles from the nearest Methodist churches in Chile. A Local Preacher, Tiburcio Rojas, took charge of the group, developed it into a class, and then made it the nucleus of a church. Rojas, set free for religious work

by his sons, who supported the family, labored hard and faithfully to build the Methodist community until his death in 1903. The Conference sent Carl A. Reyes, a member on Trial, to Punta Arenas in 1904 to take charge of the church. Prior to his going, Willis Hoover, who was associated successively with the Iquique and the Valparaíso churches, had made two supervisory trips to the Punta Arenas outpost. Reyes received a church that had, as the result of the efforts of Rojas and Hoover, fifty-three members and seventy-two probationers. Three years later, when Reyes left, there were 159 members and 124 probationers.

Up to this time, Punta Arenas had been assigned to several of the Districts to the north, generally under the supervision of Hoover, who maintained for a number of years an intimate interest in the far southern mission. But Reyes's successor in 1907, John L. Reeder, was appointed to Punta Arenas as superintendent of the newly designated Magellan District. In 1908, the mission already having begun to reach beyond Punta Arenas before Reeder's arrival, the District's formal appointments listed Punta Arenas (Spanish and English congregations), Porvenir, Río Seco and Tres Puentes, San Gregorio, and Tres Brazos—not a pattern of full-fledged churches, but an indication of the outreach of the evangelistic work stemming from Punta Arenas.

By 1909, the combined evangelistic efforts of the North American and the South American preachers in the Mission's four sections—Iquique, Valparaíso-Santiago, Concepción, Strait of Magellan—lifted the very small lay membership to twenty-two hundred full members and nineteen hundred probationers. During these years and afterwards, the original Districts were at various times reorganized or renamed, so that the Iquique section acquired the name Northern District, the Valparaíso-Santiago section was split under both names or designated as the Central District, and the Concepción District became the Southern District.

Although the numerical development of the Methodist constituency was accomplished in an environment in which the Roman Catholic Church was immensely and traditionally influential, political anticlericalism also was strong and had succeeded in keeping the power of the Church within bounds that left non-Catholic faiths much latitude. Roman Catholicism was declared in the Constitution to be the religion of the state, but as supplemented by the Interpretative Law of 1865, Constitutional ecclesiastical law was taken to allow non-Catholic groups to conduct worship in buildings of their own and to establish schools in which non-Catholic religious instruction was given. The Chile mission therefore did not have to labor under the handicaps imposed upon evangelicals in Peru.

INSTITUTIONS, 1896-1909

The Chile mission brought under the aegis of the Missionary Society four educational institutions and an orphanage. The schools were located in the

cities heading the three Districts organized in 1897. In the capital was Santiago College,* whose President, Ira H. La Fetra, had founded it in 1880. In Iquique was Iquique English College, whose Director was Charles S. Winans. Concepción was the site of two Methodist schools: Concepción College (for girls), Goodsil F. Arms, Director; Colegio Americano (for boys), Buel O. Campbell, President. The orphanage, known as Powell's Farm and Home, originally established in Santiago by Roland D. Powell, now was relocated in San Bernardo, ten miles from Santiago.

Although Powell opened the orphanage in 1891 with the approval and cooperation of his superiors in the Mission, and though it remained perennially a Conference appointment, it functioned very much as an independent project maintained by Powell and his wife on a self-supporting basis. Powell, who had been an orphan child in the United States, worked at it sacrificially but was not able to give it permanent financial viability. In 1900, the Conference recommended that he close the home, and this he did, taking up instead the pastorate of the church in La Serena.

The Mission's fifth school was established in 1900 in Temuco, on the Concepción District. Colegio de Temuco continued until, in 1903, the Directress' husband, Roberto Olavé, was appointed to the church in Antofagasta, far to the north.

When Roberto Olavé came to the Antofagasta church, he soon began collecting and raising funds for a Methodist parochial school. In April, 1904, bubonic plague reached Antofagasta, isolating the city for many weeks. One of the casualties of the epidemic was the director of a local private school. Olavé bought the school's equipment in September and opened in a rented house an evangelical school that became known as the Antofagasta English College or, later, Colegio Americano. In spite of their responsibility for an active parish, with seven Sunday meetings, Olavé and his wife themselves ran the school, which soon had more than fifty children enrolled. Olavé taught two hours a day, and his wife, formerly Kate L. Russell, a missionary from the United States, taught all day long. When Olavé left Antofagasta, Clarence R. Snell became the Director (without pastoral duties) and remained so until 1908, when the school was discontinued.

THE PENTECOSTAL SCHISM

In the year 1907, Willis C. Hoover and his wife felt the first faint tremor of a movement that eventually struck the Valparaíso church more catastrophically than had the earthquake of 1906. It came in the form of an eighty-page booklet, *The Baptism of the Holy Ghost and Fire*, mailed to Mrs. Hoover by the author, Miunie F. Abrams, a former W.F.M.S. missionary in India, once a schoolmate of Mrs. Hoover's in the Chicago Training School for Home

* *College*, or *colegio*, as used in the Latin American sections does not imply post-secondary status.

and Foreign Missions. Miss Abrams now was engaged in independent evangelistic activity in association with Pandita Ramabai, Indian director of a large school and home for child widows and for orphaned and homeless girls.

The booklet the Hoovers found in their mail described a spectacular revival that struck Pandita Ramabai's following in 1905, after six months devoted to daily mass prayer for spiritual power for a volunteer preaching campaign in the villages round about. Mr. and Mrs. Hoover read:

On the 29th of June, at 3:30 A.M., the Holy Spirit was poured out upon one of these volunteers. The young woman sleeping next to her awoke when this occurred, and seeing the fire enveloping her, ran across the dormitory, brought a pail of water, and was about to dash it upon her, when she discovered that the girl was not on fire . . .

The next evening, 30th June, while Pandita Ramabai was expounding John 8, in her usual quiet way, the Holy Spirit descended, and the girls all began to pray aloud so that she had to cease talking. All in the room were weeping and praying, some kneeling, some sitting, some standing, many with hands outstretched to God. Promises and words of help were of no avail. God was dealing with them and they could listen to no one else.

Minnie Abrams's account of these incidents, along with her story of other remarkable phenomena at the school, thrilled the Hoovers. It made them wonder: "Is there then an experience beyond what we have had and have been taught as the *ultima Thule* of the Christian life—Scriptural holiness?" They started corresponding with Miss Abrams, who was working and living in expectation of the imminent coming of Jesus, and with other persons in the pentecostal movement that was emerging in several countries, in both hemispheres. Testimonies from their correspondents convinced them that the Holy Spirit was making striking visitations like those of Apostolic times. A visitor to Valparaíso confirmed their conviction by accounts of speaking in tongues, visions, and other manifestations.

Hoover and his wife turned from investigation to experiment. Through fasting and prayer, they set out to capture the new experience—but not alone, for they shared their quest with the people of the church. Early in 1909, with a year's cultivation of pentecostal expectation back of them, the Hoovers began to work intensively for a revival. Results came almost at once. On the first night of a special week of prayer, Hoover was astonished to hear the whole congregation, 150 strong, "burst forth as one man in audible prayer." A week later, a humble parishioner brought Hoover news that the Lord had awakened him in the night and directed him to have the pastor hold daily prayer meetings because the Lord wanted to pour out his Spirit on the church. Hoover took the cue; he held the meetings; he saw them pick up in fervor and attendance. Individual members began to experience remarkable dreams and other apparent workings of the Holy Spirit. Mrs.

Hoover was so expectant that she announced that a certain girl would be the first to speak in tongues.

When the revival was some weeks under way, Hoover, who was then the superintendent of the Central District, went down to the session of the Chile Conference at Temuco, nearly four hundred miles south of Valparaíso. Sunday evening, 21 February, Bishop Frank M. Bristol preached on the Holy Spirit. The same night, the Valparaíso congregation, led by the Official Board, was actively seeking the Holy Spirit. The worshipers lay on their faces on the floor, "rending their hearts in repentance and confession of sins." Here they remained all night. These prayer meetings continued on Saturday nights until Easter, with thirty to fifty people attending. Later, they were held occasionally, until as many as six hundred people joined in an all-night service. The fervor of the church was constantly rising, though Bishop Bristol, when he dedicated the church in March, evidently found nothing extraordinary enough to occasion any report to the Board offices in New York. One person after another surrendered his life to God. Confessions and reconciliations multiplied. Members had ecstatic experiences that Hoover could liken, in several respects, only to what happened on the day the first Apostles began speaking in tongues in Jerusalem under the influence of the Holy Spirit. When these manifestations began to break out in the midst of the congregation, interrupting the services, the church meetings became turbulent and noisy events.

The excitement reached a still higher pitch in August, when a new leader suddenly emerged at the center of the ecstatic movement. It happened when Hoover was out of the city on a trip that included a meeting of the Chile mission's Finance Committee in Concepción and visits to churches more than two hundred miles farther south, where he promoted the new pentecostal emphasis. One day, while Mrs. Hoover was entertaining a women's prayer meeting, a beggar came to the door of the Valparaíso parsonage. The women took her in, and when she professed conversion, Mrs. Hoover installed her in the parsonage. The converted woman quickly managed to dominate the pastor's wife, the pastor's assistant, and some of the parishioners. They promptly introduced her to the congregation as a prophetess, and people began to believe that she was inspired.

The new prophetess was Nellie (Helena) Laidlaw, formerly employed in various English homes, and recently discharged by the wife of the American consul because of her drunkenness and other dissolute habits. At the services, she would rise at the front of the partly unfinished auditorium and, with eyes closed, deliver her prophetic messages. Then the people would move towards the altar rail, where she would bless them and baptize them with the Holy Spirit. The members who declined to accept this situation were publicly denounced, and some of them were driven from the church.

When Hoover returned home, far from curbing the activity of the proph-

etess, he too, as a later commentator put it, "fell into the trap," and came forward to receive the Holy Spirit at the hand of Nellie Laidlaw, who not long before had been earning her reputation as a prostitute.

The meetings now became wilder than ever. Nellie Laidlaw introduced the practice of being possessed by the Holy Spirit and falling to the floor rigid and apparently unconscious. It took on so well that people brought blankets and quilts to church, and when the Spirit struck them down, some of the men would lay them to one side on the blankets. Sometimes they remained there for hours—men, women, and youths. And upon coming to, some of them would leap and shout and roll on the floor.

During the fall months, the revival opened out into its full force and variety. In the congregational gatherings, some had visions, some reported dreams, some had laughing fits, some wrestled with evil spirits, some spoke or sang in unknown tongues, some stood entranced, some fell to the floor, some announced that they had passed beyond all need of human guidance, for they had been taken to heaven and given visions of the future and of God's plans for South America.

All this, to appropriate the words of Paul, "was not done in a corner." The uproar in the church was heard in the streets. Curiosity-seekers of all classes came to observe and to speculate. Sensational reports spread throughout the city. The late and rowdy services became a local scandal. A daily newspaper repeatedly attacked the revival, trying to promote court charges.

Early in October, Secretary Stuntz received in New York a cablegram sent by two missionaries and the American consul in Valparaiso: "Hoover criminally prosecuted. We have got judge to briefly suspend decision awaiting action by Bishop." Having had only a single letter from Chile about the extravagances in Hoover's church, Stuntz did not take the charge seriously, believing that Hoover had run afoul of some technicality in Chilean religious law. The Consul and the two missionaries, William F. Rice and William T. Robinson of Santiago, managed to persuade the authorities not to execute an order closing down Hoover's meetings. But Hoover had to sign an agreement to keep the peace at the church and to close the services by 10 P.M. (Hoover's version of the incident suggests, quite to the contrary, that the court case simply evaporated when he preached Christ to the judge and when the prosecuting attorney, who had been at the revival services, came to his defense.)

By September, Nellie Laidlaw was in Santiago at the head of a band of fifteen or twenty devotees, ready to enlarge preliminary openings already made by Hoover on earlier visits among influential people in Santiago's four Methodist churches. The prophetess and her helpers established pentecostal meetings around the nucleus won by Hoover, and her following rapidly increased, until she was ready to invade the regular church services of Methodist congregations. Moving at the head of a flying squadron of Hooverites, she attacked two of the churches on a single Sunday.

First she struck at the morning service in Second Church, whose pastor was William Robinson, a veteran missionary, one of Bishop Taylor's early workers. With much difficulty, Robinson succeeded in closing the service without letting Nellie Laidlaw and her followers seize control of it.

When he returned for the afternoon service, Robinson was accompanied by Karl Hansen, the pastor of Third Church. The Laidlaw group came bursting into the midst of the service. The prophetess herself stood up before the people, announcing that she had a message from the Lord and that those who did not fall down and receive it would be condemned. Hansen and Robinson resisted the intrusion. The mob was determined that the two ministers should be thrown down by the Holy Spirit, and some of them undertook to aid the divine power. Hansen managed to keep his feet in spite of pulling and hauling by several men who tried to drag him to the floor. Three or four men, assisted by one who jumped up to the pulpit level, tried to down Robinson. They got him to the edge of the platform, then pushed him off, making sure that he fell to the floor. In another moment, Robinson was bleeding from a bad cut where he hit his head against a door. "Is this the way to use your pastor?" Hansen demanded of the attackers. "The Lord is the pastor," they replied. Hansen, seconded by Robinson, kept talking, and after a few minutes more of confusion, the intruders went off. Robinson's cut was bound up, and the two ministers went on with the service with the few people who remained.

That night, Hansen went down to stand by Ezra Bauman, the pastor at First Church, where another attack was expected. Here the Hooverites, waiting for Nellie Laidlaw to appear, tried to blockade the entrance to the church, and when the door was opened one of them turned off all the gaslights. Soon after the District Superintendent, William Rice, arrived, in trooped the mob, with Nellie Laidlaw in the midst. Hardly had the preaching service got under way, when she stood up and demanded a hearing. The invaders yelled their support. Bauman and Rice asked her to be quiet, but she persisted in her interruption of the service. Rice, carrying out a previous warning to her, called in a policeman, pointing out the obstreperous prophetess with his cane.

Failing to wrest her from her followers, the lone officer went out to the call box on the corner, and signaled for reinforcements. Five minutes later, a large force of mounted police rode up to the church. In retaliation for the manhandling of the first policeman, the captain of the mounted squad wanted to beat up the entire mob of intruders and drag them off to jail. Rice persuaded him, though with difficulty, to settle for arresting only Nellie Laidlaw. The police finally took her away. Many of her satellites trailed along after her; but some of them stayed behind and threatened the three ministers with violent treatment. Later she was released from custody on condition that she leave the city.

Accompanied by a party from the Valparaíso church, the prophetess moved south, where she attempted similar invasions of the churches in Concepción and Temuco. She soon had to interrupt her movement, however, to go into a hospital to care for a pregnancy incurred before her conversion. Her appearances in Santiago had left permanent rifts in the local churches. Hoover visited the pentecostal factions secretly, holding private meetings, and functioning as their superintendent, in spite of the fact that Rice was the official superintendent of the Santiago District. Hoover continued to direct their plans by correspondence.

The Valparaíso church, following its invitation of the year before, was host to the annual session of the Chile Conference from 4 to 11 February 1910. Well in advance of Conference, Hoover prepared for the sessions by holding prayer meetings for the conversion of Bishop Bristol and various Conference leaders, with supplicants praying and groaning and beating themselves in the hope that the Bishop would be taken by the Spirit and would roll on the floor with them. But all was outwardly quiet by the time the Conference visitors reached Valparaíso. The services went forward in good order, to the happiness of those who had been grieved by the wild actions prevalent during past months.

The Conference session was tense, however, under the stress of the pentecostal problem. Doctrinal and administrative charges were lodged against Hoover, presumably in one of the two or three executive sessions held during the week. Part of Hoover's Disciplinary offense was his tampering with churches outside his own district. He denied, at first, having dealt with the divisive groups in the Santiago parishes, but Bishop Bristol finally made him confess it. A compromise was worked out that was intended to stop the pentecostal excesses without applying pressure that would split the Valparaíso church. Hoover promised to leave Valparaíso on the furlough already offered by the Board, but his departure was to be delayed for three months, to avoid the appearance of abrupt removal from the Valparaíso pastorate. When Hoover gave his word to go, the charges against him were not pushed to conclusion. No public renunciation of Hoover or of his acts was made by the Conference, and his colleagues voted him the usual passing of character before he read his report as superintendent of the Valparaíso District.

The report gave Hoover an opportunity to read a lengthy positive interpretation of the year's revival in his church. He cited the chief ecstatic manifestations observed in the pentecostal meetings, and spoke of the notable increase in membership and in attendance at all activities in the church. But he said not a word about Nellie Laidlaw or the disruptive tactics employed in the invasion of the Santiago churches.

It remained for Hoover's critics to introduce Nellie Laidlaw's name into the public proceedings. On motion of William Rice, who had got her arrested in Santiago, the Conference adopted a resolution condemning Hoover's more

eccentric practices and teachings, but by naming and condemning Nellie Laidlaw, not Hoover, as their sponsor :

Inasmuch as certain false doctrines, such as the teaching that the baptism of the Holy Spirit is accompanied by the gift of tongues, visions, miracles of healing, etc., and similar manifestations have been disseminated in various parts of the Methodist Episcopal Church, we now declare that these doctrines are anti-Methodist, contrary to the Scriptures, and irrational.

Our members are advised that they should not accept them as teachings of our Church.

Furthermore, since a certain Helena Laidlaw has pretended to be a prophetess, teaching doctrines alien and contrary to the Scriptures, ostensibly as an advocate of Methodist teachings, we now repudiate her, as being in no way the representative of the Methodist Episcopal Church in doctrine, method, or conduct, and we warn our members against the errors she has tried to spread among us.*

The final Disciplinary measure designed to control the pentecostal movement was revealed when the Appointments were read. Hoover was renamed as the pastor at Valparaíso, but not as superintendent of the Central District. Bishop Bristol merged the Santiago District with the Central District, and appointed Rice as superintendent.

Whether Hoover was aware, when he gave his promise to take a furlough, that the anti-Laidlaw resolution was to be introduced cannot be known from the Conference record. The fact that it was adopted may throw some light on Hoover's decision—reportedly a decision secretly arrived at before the Conference adjourned—to remain in Valparaíso in violation of his promise to leave. At any rate, it soon became clear that Nellie Laidlaw was retaining her status as a prominent worker in the pentecostal group. Hoover resumed the meetings characterized by the phenomena frowned upon by the Conference, and began to prepare his people for a break with the Methodist Episcopal Church.

By early April, now convinced of Nellie Laidlaw's sexual immorality (she was pregnant again before 1910 was out), and sensing Hoover's intention to create a schism, Bishop Bristol believed that the Board should cut Hoover off its missionary roster. Awaiting only a signal from the Board that it wanted him to assume complete responsibility, he said, disregarding possible immediate consequences, "I shall feel that I owe it to the other preachers of the Conference and to their churches, and to Methodism, to repudiate this whole nonsense and replace Hoover with any available man."

The signal never came. At no time during the controversy was Secretary Stuntz prepared to take aggressive—certainly not hasty or summary—action against Hoover. For one reason, nobody ever gave him, as he repeatedly complained, the full facts in the case. But more deeply, knowing what he did

* Translation by author.

(he was fairly well informed about the doings in the Valparaíso services), Stuntz was not so very sure that Hoover was to be condemned. "We have been very hesitant here at the office," he wrote Rice, "to condemn Bro. Hoover lest haply we be found fighting against God. There is hardly a feature of the meetings, as reported to us by visitors from there or by correspondence, which could not be duplicated in our great revivals in India, Korea, China during the last two or three years." Stuntz was inclined to sympathize with Hoover, for he was not at all convinced that the reported pentecostal phenomena were either un-Methodistic or unscriptural. "He makes a good case for his meetings," he once commented after having a letter from Hoover. "Aside from speaking with tongues I have seen every phenomenon which he describes in revivals of which I had charge and have had the meetings spoken of with contempt and opposed by all sorts of people because of their fanaticism." Therefore he did not feel impelled to crack down on Hoover; he gave the Bishop no signal to go ahead.

While the Bishop waited and the Secretary hoped for the success of "loving irenic methods," Hoover took the initiative. On Sunday evening, 17 April, after administering the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper to the people of the Valparaíso church, he read them his resignation from the membership and ministry of the Methodist Episcopal Church, effective 1 May. With this act ended the long Methodist missionary career of a valuable worker with whom, ironically, only three years earlier Secretary Carroll had been sharing his distress over the few Chilean pastors who were wandering off after the lure of Dowieism.

During the next two days, papers drawn up at the church on Sunday night were distributed among the members at class meetings and in their homes. By signing them, large numbers of parishioners gave notice of their intention to follow their pastor out of the denomination. Learning what was in the wind, Rice, the superintendent, came over from Santiago and unexpectedly appeared on the platform at the Thursday evening service in the Valparaíso church. His prompt action did not stem the exodus, but it did serve to rally the faithful remnant of the church's membership. Karl Hansen, who came over with Rice, was left in temporary charge of the church. He had to make his way, at first, with the Hoovers still attending services and still living in the parsonage rooms in the church building. Here, under the roof of the church, they continued their efforts to persuade people to give up their Methodist affiliation.

Bishop Bristol came to Valparaíso as soon as he could after hearing of Hoover's resignation. He accepted surrender of Hoover's ministerial credentials, preached in the vacated pulpit, and stayed with the broken church until he secured a replacement for Hansen. For this emergency service, he summoned Gerhard J. Schilling, an able and experienced missionary then acting as superintendent of the Bolivia District. Schilling held the church together

until Buel O. Campbell, a missionary of a dozen years' standing in South America, came from the United States in July to assume the pastorate.

Campbell devoted the remainder of the Conference year to rebuilding the church's shattered organization and replenishing its depleted numbers—and with some success. He found that more than half the membership had gone out with Hoover. Many official board members, most of the young people, and nearly all the Exhorters, class leaders, and Local Preachers were gone. Campbell visited widely in the city, and met many people aligned with Hoover's faction as well as people and leaders on the other side. He made a thorough investigation of the entire crisis, and sent full reports to the Board.

Before leaving New York, Campbell had been inclined to be tolerant of Hoover's activities, for the two men were warm friends. He tried to study the situation in Valparaíso with an open mind. But he was finally unsparing in his criticism of what Hoover had done; he concluded that Hoover's administration and final disruption of the church had been irresponsible and that some of his methods were unscrupulous. His reports contradicted Hoover's claim—advanced in his letter of resignation and repeated in writing as much as twenty-two years later—that the movement to separate from the Methodist Episcopal Church was initiated by the lay officials and members of the church, with the pastor only following them in order to shepherd them. Campbell placed the onus of leadership squarely on Hoover's shoulders, where it clearly belonged.

The people who walked out under Hoover's leadership became the nucleus of a new denomination, the Methodist Pentecostal Church in Chile, which was joined by separatist groups from two of the Santiago Methodist churches. At another Central District charge, Quillota, the pastor quit, along with a number of pentecostal partisans. The Pitrufrquén-Gorbean charge, on the Southern District, also lost members and its pastor. A number of members withdrew from the church in Concepción. The withdrawals all together constituted a serious loss in membership. In spite of evangelistic gains during the Conference year, the Chile mission suffered a net loss equivalent to a tenth of its probationers and a fifth of its full members.

Secretary Stuntz finally renounced Hoover when he learned about Nellie Laidlaw's moral vagaries and when he heard of Hoover's deliberate instigation of the schism. He predicted, "I see nothing ahead of the schismatic movement under Dr. Hoover but the fate which overtakes movements of that character always—disintegration and the scattering of those who when [went] out under him." But quite to the contrary, the new pentecostal denomination prospered. Hoover remained its superintendent until his death, more than two decades later, when the original group divided, and a second denomination, the Evangelical Pentecostal Church, was formed. By 1929, Hoover claimed for the Methodist Pentecostal Church a membership of over ten thousand.

Through the same period Methodism's Chile mission increased by less than two hundred, to 2,425. Webster E. Browning wrote of Hoover's denomination in 1930, "But whatever may be its future, it is at present the most notable movement in the evangelical life of Chile."

AFTERMATH OF THE SCHISM

The decade following the pentecostal break was by no means a period of expansion for the Chile mission either geographically or in constituency. The areas penetrated by Methodist workers remained essentially the same. In spite of occasionally enthusiastic reports of revival conversions or of accessions to particular churches, the mission as a whole showed no sign of strong recovery from the numerical losses registered in 1910. Indeed, during the following five years, the total number of church members even dropped somewhat. Beginning in 1916, the membership slowly rose, but only to the level of 2,153 members at the end of 1919, which was about three hundred more than were on the roster just after the exodus of the pentecostal group and a hundred less than before it. The number of probationers increased more rapidly, but evidently the movement from probation to full membership was slow.

Peru

In 1896, Francis G. Penzotti, the pioneering founder of the Peru mission, was not long gone over the horizon from Callao into his far-ranging service along the western coast of South America and in Central America under the American Bible Society. It was little more than four years since Thomas B. Wood had succeeded him in Callao and had become the pivotal figure in the Methodist movement. Officially, the Peru mission was the Peru District of the South America Annual Conference, and Wood was the District Superintendent. The Missionary Society was backing him and his fellow workers with an appropriation of \$7,400.

Callao, the port city, was still the Mission's operating center. The single Circuit, organized under the District's only Quarterly Conference, included both Callao and nearby Lima, the nation's capital.

A former Chile missionary, John M. Spangler, and five South American lay workers converted from Roman Catholicism had been carrying on the evangelistic effort, which by this time had gathered a Spanish-speaking constituency of sixty church members and a hundred probationers. It also had an English-language constituency of ten members and a dozen and a half probationers. The South American team, originally enlisted mainly by Penzotti and then trained by Wood, included four Peruvians (José Q. Illescas, Adolfo T. Vásquez, Manuel Noriega, José Cortés) and an Ecuadorian, Zoilo E. Irigoyen.

Enrolled in the mission's eight schools were more than three hundred pupils. Four North American missionaries were at work among them—George M. Hewey, Ethel G. Porter, and Ina H. Moses from the Missionary Society, and Dr. Wood's daughter Elsie from the Woman's Foreign Missionary Society.

The Peru mission as it was carried forward under Thomas Wood's leadership had the same Constitutional status as the earlier evangelistic enterprise led by Francis Penzotti. Article IV of the Constitution declared that the "Nation professes the Roman Catholic Apostolic religion; the State protects it and does not permit the public exercise of any other." The Penal Code implemented the prohibitory aspect of this article by providing for a year's imprisonment as the penalty for publicly celebrating any other than the Catholic religion. This had been the presumptive legal groundwork for the arrest and prolonged imprisonment of Penzotti in 1890-91. Similarly, the legal occasion for his eventual release was the Supreme Court's decision that his church meetings, which had been held in private quarters and without aggressive publicity, did not constitute public activity as banned by law.

This clarifying decision was fortunate and encouraging for the Methodists. It gained significance in the light of a fact cited by Thomas Wood several years later—that Article XIV of the Constitution guaranteed that no one could be "compelled to do what is not required by law nor hindered from doing what is not required by law." Pronouncement of the decision indicated that the judicial apparatus could not be exploited by anti-Protestant forces pressing for so-called strict constructions of the Constitution that would destroy Peru's longstanding practice of official tolerance towards non-Catholic, even non-Christian, religious groups. It made it clear that Protestantism, at least in some of its manifestations, actually enjoyed a definite Constitutional status. Furthermore, the decision set a specific precedent to which liberal or moderate officials might turn in order to justify their resistance to the importunities of repressive representatives of Roman Catholic interests. Thus, somewhat reinforced, there continued to be a measure—a half-measure—of truth in a reported remark by the President to Bishop Charles C. McCabe in 1901 that they had religious liberty in Peru, "not in the constitution, but in the administration."

Although Protestants have counted Penzotti's vindication a classic victory for religious liberty in Latin America, and although it did enhance the confidence of missionary leaders in the future of their work there, it by no means left evangelical workers in an easy position in Peru. In 1896, and for some years to come, they still could be threatened and hampered by the power of the Roman clergy to instigate popular antagonism and to harass them through charges brought in lower courts and through restrictions imposed or permitted by local officials under clerical influence. That point of vulnerability

made it ever necessary for the Methodists to take care to conduct their activities within the cramping confines of the law.

The hostility that had rained down on Penzotti's company still was pelting evangelicals in Callao. As recently as October, 1894, Wood had written from Callao:

Recent days have been full of trial . . . One of our chapels has been attacked with stones and befouled with filth. Stones have been thrown at us in the streets, one striking Mrs. Wood on the side of the face. Some of those who have thrown stones are women. Such is the hostility under which we must work.

And a year later, Wood ran into trouble when he visited the mountain city of Huancayo, where in 1892 a raging mob of six hundred had forced two Callao Methodist Bible women to leave town in order to escape being killed. Wood's companion, the American Bible Society agent Andrew M. Milne, sold Bibles in Huancayo, and Wood held Bible meetings at night in the billiard room of a hotel. The parish priest assailed them from the pulpit and exerted upon the civil authorities pressure that threatened to bring about their expulsion from the community. But the hotel keeper backed them up; the meetings continued for three weeks, with privately invited attendants and behind closed doors.

Just about the time of Wood and Milne's sojourn in Huancayo, two young Englishmen, John L. Jarrett and F. J. Peters, who had been working temporarily with Wood in Callao, were in trouble farther south, in Cuzco, a city whose priests strongly dominated both the populace and the local officials. Soon after arriving in the city to establish a British-sponsored evangelical mission, the two men were ordered out of Cuzco on twenty-four hours' notice, the prefect even declining to make allowance for Jarrett's illness with smallpox. To avoid traveling as virtual prisoners under military escort, and to escape violence at the hands of a hotly excited mob in the city plaza, Peters and Jarrett got away by back streets, and through several hundred miles of mountainous country, to Lima. But Jarrett went back to Cuzco in 1896 and began a mission with the assistance of his bride. He now received a better hearing than before, but in general still had to carry on under great hostility, a sales boycott, and repeated threats of expulsion. The populace, incited by the clergy, became so excited about Jarrett's mission that martial law was declared in the city and troops were sent from Lima to enforce it. Once again he had to flee, for he faced possible death by a mob inflamed by priests and potions. Only on a third attempt, in 1898, was Jarrett able, along with two other missionary couples, to found the Cuzco mission of the Evangelical Union of South America.

Forced to work in so hostile an atmosphere, and with the legal status of Protestantism in sensitive balance, Thomas Wood not surprisingly continued

in the mission in Callao and Lima the Penzotti pattern of closed but not clandestine meetings. The chapels he and his fellow workers used were not identified to the public by any ecclesiastical architectural style or by any signs displaying names or schedules of services. The missionaries used no church advertising of any kind. Invitations to worship were given person to person, and admission to the meetings was typically by ticket. As late as 1900, Bishop William X. Ninde presented a ticket in order to enter a prayer meeting in Callao. When Secretary Henry K. Carroll visited Callao five years later, he found Wood's prudent determination to avoid provoking hostile reactions against the mission's evangelistic activity still unrelaxed. The moderateness and indirectness of the approach to the public was well suggested by Carroll's observation, "The singing in our churches is heard in the streets and leads many from time to time to stop and listen, and even to come inside the door."

During the two quadrennia beginning with 1896, Wood established no new continuing evangelistic centers outside the Callao-Lima area. In that year, his team of South American workers was reduced by the absorption of several of the men into a freshly renewed drive of the American Bible Society to spread the Scriptures through Peru. The Society's work had been paralyzed for nearly two years by the impounding in the Callao customs office, evidently in response to Catholic influence, of a large consignment of its books from abroad. In the spring of 1895, Wood threw himself into helping Andrew M. Milne with an effort to secure the release of the books—an aim achieved after more than forty visits to government offices in a period of fifteen days. Milne reactivated Penzotti's former colporteurs and in 1896 was actively rebuilding the Society's enterprise. From the Methodist mission, he took Noriega, Cortés, and Irigoyen.

Irigoyen, Illescas, and Vásquez—by trades "a mason, a carpenter, and a gasfitter"—were elected to Deacon's orders in February, 1898, and later ordained by Bishop Henry W. Warren. Adolfo Vásquez, who was under appointment from 1896 to 1902, was the only preacher, however, who was steadily available to Wood for Spanish-language evangelistic work in Callao and Lima. For the first three years, he headed both the Callao and the Lima congregations, with José Illescas sharing the responsibility with him in 1897. From 1899, Vásquez was appointed to Lima alone. From the same time, Callao was left to be supplied, until in 1901 Zoilo Irigoyen returned to the city for a year, only to be replaced in 1902 by Illescas, who normally was assigned to school work. In 1903 and 1904, the two congregations again were placed under a single pastor, Ruperto Algorta.

Only once did Peruvian hostility to the Methodist evangelists headed by Wood interrupt their work, and that hardly more than overnight. On a Saturday evening in January, 1899, an army colonel attached to the city police force interrupted Wood while he was preaching to a congregation of fifty people at a week-of-prayer service in Lima. Wood claimed immunity

from interference on the grounds that the chapel was his private property and that the congregation were his private guests. But the colonel declared the meeting illegal, dispersed the congregation, and had Wood arrested as soon as the missionary left the building. At police headquarters, Wood spurned an offer of release on condition that he abandon his meetings; he was ready to test his rights in the courts. Later that night, Wood was paroled until Monday, and upon his second appearance before the police, he was discharged on the understanding that he would do nothing unlawful. He proffered the accusing colonel an admission ticket to the chapel, so that he could observe the meetings for himself. Then as soon as he was set free, Wood at once announced another week of nightly meetings. He learned later that for harassing the Lima Methodists, the police had been severely rebuked by their superiors and by influential politicians, both for political reasons and because of the probable detriment of such incidents to the government's efforts to promote immigration.

Encouraged, as they were, about the spiritual morale of the Spanish congregations during these years under hostile pressures, Wood and his colleagues nevertheless could report only modest statistics of church affiliation. At the beginning of 1905, there were still no more than a hundred church members, and not many more probationers, with two hundred pupils in two Sunday schools.

During the same period, the small English-speaking congregation in Callao remained small. John Spangler left the pastorate at the end of 1898 to return to the United States. After an interval of two years, Morris J. Pusey, a teaching missionary already on the field, became Spangler's successor. By 1904, upon Pusey's departure for the States, the church was again left to be supplied, and the constituency stood at 23 church members, 6 probationers, and 122 Sunday school pupils.

In spite of the fact that no congregations grew up outside Callao and Lima that were sufficiently matured organizationally to be counted as churches in the official statistics, Wood's administration was always formally oriented towards evangelization of the rest of the country. Each year, the Appointments represented this orientation by listing a number of places to be supplied—a pattern of hope for the future rather than of actual church growth. Among these places were Tumbes, Paita, Piura, Ayabaca, Trujillo, and Cajamarca, on or near the northern coast; Cuzco, Sicuani, Tarma, and Huancayo, in the mountains east and southeast of Lima; Puno, Arequipa, and Mollendo, in the southernmost region; and Chosica and Matucana, in the department of Lima.

As time went on, however, what Wood called "multitudes of nuclei of churches" appeared in many parts of Peru. The chief activating influence was the American Bible Society, whose colporteurs rode laboriously through the country from Ecuador on the north to Bolivia to the south. The Society's activity was at its height in 1903—ten men at work in Lima under Adolfo

Vásquez (released from his Methodist pastorate), and five men farther afield. In addition, Carl G. Beutelspacher, the Lima District's pastor in La Paz, Bolivia, worked through the Cuzco area for the Society. Zoilo Irigoyen and Aristides Castro, two other Methodists, but on the Society's Peruvian team, were on the move in the far northern region of Peru. For two or three years, this colporteur work of theirs was connected with the Lima District, at least formally, by their being appointed to Tumbes and to Piura and Ayabaca, respectively.

Thomas Wood attributed the failure of the Methodist mission to develop the potentialities touched by the Bible Society colporteurs to lack of funds. His budget for 1903 was \$10,667. He blamed its inadequacy upon the Missionary Society, writing to Bishop McCabe from Lima late in 1902:

Bro. Milne arrived here today, with ample authorization from the Bible House to *expand*. Hallelujah!

But oh the shame of it! that our Mis. Soc. will not let me keep pace with him. How long, oh Lord, how long!

Wood even directly charged Secretary Leonard with having held a position of avowed hostility to expansion in the North Andes field.

Wood himself actually was heavily responsible for the inability of the Mission to expand, for his views were influential in determining how the funds appropriated by the Society were used. The appropriation, which covered Bolivia as well as Peru, was supporting eight missionaries (men and women) on the field. But not one of the eight was assigned to Spanish evangelism. Nor did the Mission's budget support a single South American preacher devoted to the task of building permanent congregations beyond Callao and Lima.

This did not indicate that Wood's vision of the field to be evangelized was limited—far from it! Not only was he intimately acquainted with the activities of the Bible Society itinerants, but also he knew the North Andes region at first hand, having traveled extensively through Peru, as well as in Ecuador, Bolivia, and other nearby countries. He made two arduous and extended journeys into the mountain country of Peru, and also identified himself with Carl Beutelspacher's penetration of the Cuzco area from La Paz. Wood became sharply aware of the evangelistic challenge implicit in the presence of many, many thousands of Quechua Indians in the Peruvian highlands. But impressed as he was with the potentialities of direct popular evangelism as revealed by the Bible Society men, the budgetary and promotional priorities he erected crowded out the possibility of developing a Methodist corps of conserving evangelists to follow up the labors of the Society's trail-breaking colporteurs.

The financial priorities involved a pattern of appointments, made by Board and Bishop but recommended by the District Superintendent, that reflected

Wood's preference for the method of evangelizing Peru by building up educational institutions. The requirements of the school work were met first, and when they were covered, there was not enough money left (Wood's claim was correct on this point) to support either North American missionaries or Peruvian preachers for evangelistic extension.

Wood was of course painfully aware of the difficulty, under the Constitutional and popular handicaps hobbling Protestant movements in Peru, in endeavoring to achieve evangelical expansion by the method of multiplying worshiping congregations. His earlier ministerial and missionary background made him a man largely preoccupied with education and with measures for securing religious liberty. All these factors illuminate his statement of missionary policy for Peru:

Educational work, in a field where preaching is under legal restrictions, becomes important in a way that is out of comparison with other fields. Missions everywhere require education, but in the Land of the Incas education is destined to open the way for the gospel as nowhere else.

Wood put this policy down on paper, but he also riveted it into the structure of the Mission. He kept the entire missionary corps confined almost exclusively to school work, and made no concrete plans for fuller utilization of South American personnel in any but educational capacities. Early in 1903, he seriously considered breaking out of the Callao-Lima neighborhood by sending one of the missionaries to open a mission in Tarma, northeast of Lima. But it was not a new evangelistic center that he had in mind, but a school. At about the same time, he entertained an invitation to begin work in Arequipa, in the highlands far south of Lima. But again the proposal was to found a school. In March, in Callao, Wood took into Methodist employ Tomás Guerrero, a new and promising Bible Society worker from Argentina, whom he made an Exhorter and pastoral assistant to Ruperto Algorta. But he took Guerrero on because he had taught in Argentina and would be valuable in furthering the Mission's educational growth, not for his possibilities as an evangelist. With Wood strongly encouraging him, Guerrero successfully undertook public examinations for the highest grade of teaching certificate, secured a license to open a school in Lima, and turned to coaching other mission workers to qualify for teaching certificates. Guerrero's original and persisting hope was to dedicate himself to work with the Indians, but in Wood's mind, the possibility of Guerrero's realizing his dream took the shape of his starting a school. And the Superintendent even pressed Algorta, the Callao-Lima pastor, into intensive studies for a teaching certificate that was calculated to tie him more closely to school work.

Wood's financial askings for advance were coherent with his field policy. His most striking and fervent plea for funds at this time was for \$100,000 to build in Lima a central mission plant as impressive as the one in Santiago,

Chile. Some of his statements made it clear that he wanted the money mostly for a new women's college in Lima that he believed would constitute a strategic and solid advance for Methodism in the Peruvian society. At another time, he stressed the advantage of matching in Lima the Santiago printing plant, so as to be able to "inundate a million square miles" with evangelical literature. A letter from Bishop McCabe assuring him that some day the \$100,000 for Lima would come, seemed to Wood the encouraging voice of God. "Your idea," he wrote the Bishop, "that 'we ought to entrench ourselves in every southern capital,' seems a providential confirmation of my hopes and pleas."

The aim of Wood's missionary policy was to reform Peru, to bring it to the moral level of North American life, by thrusting the gospel into the nation through North American missionary action. He appeared to be proceeding, to a significant degree, upon the assumption that Methodism could somehow take a short cut to the accomplishment of that aim. By putting the institutional cart before the itinerant's horse, he was not bringing forward Methodist schools that were distinctively evangelical in their teaching content (he knew that this they could not be), and he was not simply counting upon turning out Methodist-educated boys and girls who would become the reformers of the nation in the Protestant image. Rather, Wood expected that Methodism could be injected into Peruvian life as an effective force among other national motive forces. And with a strange desertion of the realities of popular dynamics for abstraction, he expected this to come about prior to the emergence of a genuine and numerically significant Methodist constituency.

How was it to be accomplished? By putting in plenty of North American money, by acquiring real estate (Wood harped on the theme of mission property and the psychology of permanence), by providing progressive leadership, and by building up schools that would make good educational records, Methodism was to impress the Peruvians. And this kind of high-level public relations work was to make Methodism influential in leading the nation into its great reformation. The instrumental, essentially non-evangelizing character of this emphasis on a kind of mission-in-the-large shows through in Wood's evaluation, in 1902, of the proposed building of a woman's college:

Now is the time to thrust our work on public attention as a great benefit, in the form of a Women's College in Lima.

This would enthuse friends, discourage enemies, turn a tremendous tide of public approval in our favor, hastening constitutional reform, and putting us in the forefront of great reforms to follow.

Oh for the \$100,000.

Wood's subordinating to his more ambitious institutional and manipulative emphases the challenge implicit in the ground-breaking labors of the Bible distributors was not a measure of financial desperation alone. It was based

upon a deliberate comparative evaluation of methods. Writing about the North Andes region, ambiguously but nevertheless revealingly, he stated, "The Bible work opens more doors, but the school work opens more hearts than anything else in that field."

But more than that, even in the area of evangelism, Wood was no urgent advocate of the eventual necessity of complementing Methodism's broader, public strategy by enlisting evangelists to follow up the colporteurs with a practical, if plodding, town-by-town, person-by-person approach to the people. Rather, even when considering national reform in South America as involving, at some later time a more explicitly Protestant transformation of the people, he spoke expectantly of that hoary hope of so many North American evangelicals—the general revival optimistically (or has it been desperately?) declared to be on the way. Leaning heavily on what he believed was the common openness and homogeneity of all South America to North American influences, he said:

The *signs of the times* point to the coming of great sweeping revivals. All the work thus far is providentially preparatory to them. And when they once get started among these impulsive peoples, the mighty changes that will follow fast and far, throughout that immense homogeneous territory, promise to surpass anything of the kind hitherto known.

The popularization of the Bible in Peru, held Dr. Wood, was "preparing the Peruvian people *en masse* for the great change that is drawing nigh."

In 1905, the dominance of the missionary policy evolved under Wood's leadership came to an end. It was broken up by the coming of a new Bishop, and coincided with the establishment of a new connectional pattern for the mission in Peru.

The General Conference of 1904 had severed Peru from Chile, and ordered the creation of the North Andes Mission, which was to include all of South America outside the boundaries of the South America Conference and of the new Andes Conference (the latter took in Chile and Bolivia). Peru, Ecuador, and Panama became the active areas within the scope of the North Andes Mission. Thomas B. Wood became its superintendent. The new Bishop was Thomas B. Neely, assigned to residence in Buenos Aires, succeeding the former visiting Bishops Charles C. McCabe and Isaac W. Joyce. Bishop Neely organized the North Andes Mission on 21 January 1905 in Dr. Wood's house in Lima.

Bishop Neely at once reversed the Wood policy for the evangelization of Peru, showing evidence of his determination to go forward there in harmony with the mission strategy for South America that he set down a few years later in his book *South America; Its Missionary Problems*. Neely recognized three high priorities—first the preaching and pastoral missionary, to gather the congregation and to guide and train its people; then the native

minister, to make the Church truly a church of the country; and finally the local church building erected by the mission, to suggest the movement's permanence and to command interest and respect in the Roman Catholic community. Neely also recognized the usefulness of the day school or boarding school, providing secular education under Protestant auspices, but held that it should be not only a general liberalizing influence in the community but also a positive evangelizing agency. And he saw the press, the orphanage, the medical project, and other humanitarian agencies as valuable mission auxiliaries. The Bishop differed most clearly from Wood in his subordinating of the school to the three functions centered on popular evangelism and church growth.

Bishop Neely was spurred to act by his discovery that the North Andes Mission had only one real pastoral charge (Callao-Lima) and only one preacher (Algorta) who was doing real pastoral work. He decided that the newly organized Mission should undertake a more aggressive evangelistic program in spite of the legal handicaps inhibiting public work. Secretary Henry K. Carroll, who accompanied the Bishop to Lima, reported that Neely wanted to gather in and organize the results both of the school work in Callao and of the widely itinerant colporteurs.

The Bishop's most immediate step was to divide the Callao-Lima work into two pastoral charges, appointing Algorta to Lima and recalling Adolfo Vásquez from Bible Society work to lead the Callao church. He also laid plans to send out other preachers into the interior to gather new congregations. Even the areas of the Mission farthest from Peru felt the impact of Neely's purpose, for at this Lima session, he appointed Thomas Wood, the Superintendent, to itinerate in Panama, and also paved the way for evangelistic advance in Ecuador.* Carroll testified that Neely, having made "Evangelize, organize, develop the native ministry" the watchwords of the Mission conference, sent out the workers, both North and South American, inspired with "new courage and a larger hope."

To Huancayo, more than a hundred miles east of Lima, Bishop Neely sent Tomás Guerrero. Finally breaking out of his involvement in the Callao-Lima educational enterprise, Guerrero already had managed to spend some time in the mountain area as a colporteur traveling among the predominantly Quechua Indian population. Huancayo was a strategic center for contacts with the Quechuas; eight or ten thousand of them came in weekly to market. Guerrero's appointment came at a time when the American Bible Society was circulating as many as six New Testament books in the Quechua tongue.

Riding a mule, and selling Bibles along the way, Guerrero came to Huancayo in February to take up his charge. He started preaching in private homes, keeping within the law on public worship but admittedly countering Roman Catholic doctrines. All was quiet for two months. Then in April,

* See pp. 274 and 281.

Guerrero returned from a trip to Lima accompanied by his bride, bringing household furniture and renting a house—indications that the Methodist preacher was there to stay. Gerardo Gamarra, curate of the Parish of the Holy Trinity, who two years before had tried unsuccessfully to secure a ban on the activity of a visiting Bible Society colporteur, now started a campaign to drive Guerrero out of the city. He called a mass meeting for the first Sunday in May for the announced “purpose of taking action, before the local authorities, against the Protestant Thomas Guerrero.”

Alarmed at the potentialities of a mass meeting of Indians, especially when drunk and incited, and receiving no assurances with regard to his safety from the local subprefect, Guerrero telegraphed the provincial prefect. The higher official immediately ordered the subprefect to protect Guerrero and to prevent any public demonstration against him. The plan for the mass meeting fell through, Guerrero's position received a measure of favorable comment in the Peruvian press, and the aggressive Fr. Gamarra was replaced by a Jesuit who knew how to work more quietly. Guerrero was able to organize a congregation with a small membership and to start a Sunday school enrolling fifty pupils.

After getting his Huancayo church started, Guerrero made a few visits to Tarma, fifty or sixty miles to the north. Here he joined forces with Joseph Knotts, who had started a boys' school in Lima on the license secured by Guerrero. When the school closed in 1904, Knotts came to Tarma, as Thomas Wood earlier had hoped to have him do, and opened a small English-language day school. When Guerrero arrived, Knotts already had a Spanish Bible class going and had won the confidence of a number of young Peruvians by mixing with them in sports. Guerrero gathered a small congregation, and Knotts led a small Sunday school made up of English students of his.

Back in Lima, another advance was made, under the leadership of Ruperto Algorta. Early in the year, he established a new place of worship in North Lima, in a section called Bajo Puente. Initial opposition in the community quieted down before the year was out, and Algorta was able to report at the Mission's conference in January, 1906, a church with seven probationers and a Sunday school with thirty pupils.

One of the Methodist workers (it was probably Algorta) reached Chincha Alta, a town more than a hundred miles down the coast from Callao, at some time during 1905. The Mission's statistical returns reported a group of seventeen probationers there, and Chincha Alta was listed as a charge to be supplied for the year 1906.

Both Bishop Neely and Secretary Carroll were pleased with the general results of the year that saw the organization of the four new Peruvian congregations—Huancayo, Tarma, North Lima, and Chincha Alta. While these groups were emerging, the Bishop also acted to block the tendency to recruit new missionaries only with an eye to staffing the Mission's educational

projects. Not all the workers were happy about the new emphasis. Thomas Wood and some of his sympathizers—eventually all were native workers—remained in opposition to Neely's pressure to establish the primacy of the evangelistic effort. But Neely held to his policy throughout his four years' supervision of the work in Peru.

As Bishop Neely took command of the North Andes Mission, Thomas Wood's control of the situation in Peru diminished. Although Neely made Wood the superintendent of the newly separate Mission, his appointing him simultaneously as preacher-in-charge in Panama, and later to the Ancon hospital chaplaincy there, effectively removed him from the center of control. Wood was absent from Lima for most of 1905 and well into 1906. At the Mission's annual session in January, 1907, the Bishop abolished the post of Mission superintendent and divided the Mission into three Districts—Ecuador, Panama, and Peru. Wood was not given one of the new District superintendencies, but was assigned to educational tasks in Lima and Callao. Among other functions, he now became in fact what he had been officially for at least a year—President of the Lima Theological Seminary.

The new superintendent of the Peru District was Vernon M. McCombs, a 31-year-old six-footer, fresh from Drew Theological Seminary, and hardly six months on the field when Bishop Neely put him in charge of the District. McCombs knew no Spanish and had a brief and fragmentary record in school teaching and in religious work. He was a Local Preacher, but he had no ministerial Conference status until the Andes Conference received him on trial a fortnight after his appointment as District Superintendent was announced. He became a full member of the North Andes Mission Conference in February, 1910, just before his term in Peru was cut short by a necessary health furlough to the United States.

The three points of evangelistic advance beyond the Callao-Lima area in 1905 became permanent gospel missions.

Chincha Alta became by 1907 part of a small Circuit, which was visited by Ruperto Algorta from Lima twice a year for several years. The second point on the Circuit was Tambo de Mora, another coastal town, not far south of Chincha Alta. In 1909, Algorta and McCombs, the District Superintendent, made a preaching visit of several days to Pisco and Ica, still farther south. In Ica they left a Lima layman, who organized a number of Bible class sessions. The four places were joined in a Circuit in 1910 under the long-distance direction of Algorta, with Zoilo Torres, a colporteur enlisted through the Chincha Alta work, appointed as supply pastor. During that year, the Circuit grew to about a hundred probationers and a dozen full members.

Huancayo came under the leadership of Adolfo Vásquez, who cultivated the field until Bishop Frank M. Bristol, Bishop Neely's successor (1908), reorganized the Mission as the North Andes Mission Conference in February, 1910. Bishop Neely moved Vásquez to the highlands in 1906 to replace

Tomás Guerrero, who had to be brought down to the coast for his health's sake. McCombs, the District Superintendent, characterized Vásquez's mission as "a far outpost among the Indians"; since the railroad from Callao did not reach Huancayo until 1908, it took McCombs three days on horseback to go out to visit Vásquez.

The Huancayo pastor, like his predecessor, suffered harassment from some elements in the town. One day in 1907, he was even knifed by a "friar-incited ruffian." Funds were not plentiful, his quarters were undesirable, his family was sick. He lived in a small, cold hut and preached in an abandoned liquor distillery. Vásquez gained a following in the local prison and made many contacts in homes in Huancayo and beyond, distributing tracts by the hundreds and selling Quechua and Spanish Bibles as he went about. His visits did not carry him far, however, for he had no money for a horse. But inquirers came to him from towns lying deeper in the interior. When they returned home, some of them started informal Bible study groups that implemented some of Vásquez's suggestions. Over four years, Vásquez built up a body of more than a hundred probationers, but the church had only two full members.

During the same period, two missionaries successively manned the Tarma enterprise, directing the day school and supplementing the evangelistic activity of the Peruvian preachers who carried the church's preaching program most of the time. In 1907, Joseph Knotts was succeeded by Carl N. Vance, former principal of the Callao High School for Boys, who returned to Peru from the furlough that followed his brief and trying stay in Panama.

As in Huancayo, so in Tarma—that white-walled "charming city with its calla lilies, cock fights, fanatical papists, and unbelieving Radicals," as McCombs described it—the Methodist workers and their constituents and school clients came under organized, cleric-inspired social pressure. Its aim was to scare people away from the Tarma mission, to shrink and destroy its influence.

Hostilities developed early in 1906, and by midyear included not only priestly attacks from the pulpit but also extraordinary abuse of local police and administrative powers to threaten and penalize people patronizing the day school or attending church meetings. Under these conditions, the church was careful to admit the townspeople to its services by card only. Private as the meetings were, the head of the police for Tarma invaded one of them and arrested a youth attending service without family permission. Vance reported that the Roman Catholic parish was put in the charge of an English-speaking priest brought to Tarma to defeat the Methodists.

Although the oppressive efforts of the Catholic opposition seriously limited the mission's opportunity for free growth, they at the same time quickened a number of Tarmans to friendly interest. Vance felt that the church's progress was internally inhibited for lack of a better preacher. He said that "the one we have is a great fighter. (Fights Romanists.)" Vance himself labored to

gain the confidence of the community and after two years felt that he was succeeding to a helpful degree. Organized opposition slackened, the English-speaking priest failed and left town, and the school enrollment gradually increased to about fifty children. Although Vance and his helpers could not teach religion in the school, a satisfactory number of its pupils began attending church and Sunday school. When the Mission Conference was organized in 1910, Tarma had forty probationers, a half-dozen full members, and eighty Sunday school pupils.

The Peru mission made another evangelistic advance into the mountain region while Huancayo and Tarma were still fresh fields; Methodism reached the famous Cerro de Pasco mining district in 1907. The new activity stemmed from neither of the other mountain projects, but from Callao. Vernon McCombs made two trips to Cerro de Pasco to preach to the miners and came twice again in 1908, the second year reaching all three centers maintained by the Cerro de Pasco Mining Company—those at Cerro de Pasco, Goyllarisquisga, and Smelter (La Fundición). On one of the 1908 trips, he preached at eleven services, five of them in Spanish. Much of the work was directed towards the North Americans among the some ten thousand miners estimated to be working in the area in the course of a year.

When on a trip into the highlands in 1909, accompanied by Adolfo Vásquez, McCombs came again to Smelter, he gained the consent of the priest to let him hold services in the Roman Catholic chapel. Fifty people came to hear the preaching—result, three new members enrolled in the Methodist Episcopal Church and seven enlisted as probationers. The preachers went home, but the work went on; a man named Vargas, formerly a member of the Methodist church in Callao, kept the services going in his own home. The next year, Vásquez visited the mining locations, and a revival broke out in Cerro de Pasco, finally yielding an organized church with a rented chapel maintained by the people's contributions.

Jauja, another mountain town, just north of Huancayo, was the scene of a modest entrance by the Methodists late in 1909. McCombs held several group meetings in the house in which he stayed when there, and he received three probationers from among a number of interested young men.

In 1910, Bishop Bristol made a single Circuit of Cerro de Pasco, Smelter, Jauja, and Huancayo, appointing Vásquez as the preacher in charge. Vásquez was handicapped, of course, as to direct and consistent supervision of the Circuit, for his home was in Callao, and even recent extension of the railroad did not solve his problem. The work in Jauja and Huancayo was almost at a standstill during the year, Vásquez having been able to make only two visits. The constituents, however, numbered twenty-six full members and 166 probationers.

The church opened in North Lima in 1905 continued its ministry until 1910, when it merged with the earlier congregation known as Central Church.

Uniting in order to cope with rent increases, the combined group secured another, more favorable location for the preaching services. A second Spanish church was started in Callao—in North Callao, near the railroad shops—in 1907, and showed promise. But it was soon dropped, evidently in 1908; the shortage of Spanish-speaking preachers made it impossible to maintain preaching at the hours most strategic for reaching the young men upon whom hope for the church's growth was focused. During all these years, Ruperto Algorta was the chief pastoral leader of Spanish work in Lima. Beginning in 1906, Mariano de la Cruz, a Peruvian product of the Chile mission and of the theological course at the Mexican Methodist Institute, Puebla, Mexico, headed the Spanish church work in Callao. The only consistent pastoral attention given the English Church in Callao was three years' supervision by Vernon McCombs.

The results, after five years, of Bishop Neely's attempt to gain priority for Spanish-speaking evangelism were observable but limited. Most obvious were the gains in the formal constituency. There were now 163 full members and 430 probationers in the Spanish congregations, as against 97 full members and 120 probationers in 1905, and more than half the probationers belonged to the new charges beyond Callao and Lima. Further, Ruperto Algorta, the sole Spanish preacher when the extension program began, now had two colleagues (de la Cruz and Vásquez). But of the ten missionaries on the field, none was yet devoting his time directly to Spanish evangelism. The nearest approach to it was Vernon McCombs' exploratory and supervisory activity. The schools still had almost exclusive command of the services of the North American personnel. Even the outreach of the Spanish preachers was limited. Their charges were now five, and no longer only one, but all three preachers actually resided in Callao. The charges beyond the coastal twin cities enjoyed only periodic visitation by Algorta and Vásquez, with the rest of the responsibility for leadership falling to not more than two untrained supply appointees.

These deficiencies in the investment of leadership in Spanish evangelism were reflected even in the modest gains made under Neely's stimulus. To be sure, there was a gain in Spanish church membership, but only nineteen of the 163 Spanish-speaking members lived outside Callao and Lima. The fact that half the probationers also lived in the same areas simply demonstrated the uncovering of an evangelistic potential that the Mission could not effectively realize with the allocation of leadership that it was making. Where the leadership was resident and competent, church growth was occurring; where leadership was largely absentee or untrained, only the most evanescent kind of constituency was being gathered. That meant that the Mission still was peculiarly concentrated in Callao and Lima. Although it might be said, more expansively, that the Mission now was present in three geographical areas—Callao-Lima, the mountains, and the coastal country south of Callao—never-

theless all the regular work was within a radius of about a hundred miles from Callao.

The Neely-inspired thrust, however, imparted to the Methodist work in Peru a certain permanent shape. Eventually, even the connectional structure of the mission organization tended to come into conformity with this triple-region pattern.

Hays P. Archerd reported to the North Andes Conference in his review of the Peru District for 1910 that the climate of public life was becoming more favorable to the exercise of liberty in worship. He cited in particular a series of informal meetings held in one of the public plazas in Callao by the Salvation Army. They were gatherings devoted to evangelical exhortation in the open air and so were public events of a kind unprecedented in Peruvian practice. They were held not only with the permission, but with the assistance, of the authorities, who assigned police inspectors to them to protect them from disruption.

Another improvement already had resulted from an incident intimately related to the Methodist community. When one of the daughters of Thomas B. Wood was married in the English Church in Callao, the couple was refused legal recognition of their marriage because it was celebrated by non-Catholic clergy in a public exercise of a so-called dissident religion. The act of the civil authorities stirred wide public protest, which brought about Congressional action in 1897 relieving non-Catholics of the necessity of being married under Roman Catholic rites. The new law had been strongly opposed both by the Catholic Church and by the President, who surrounded its administration with new restrictions that fell particularly heavily upon Peruvian evangelicals. The regulations required for instance, that persons being married outside the Church prove that they never had received Catholic baptism. This handicap was removed by further legislation in 1903, though other difficulties remained.

Archerd was aware of the fact that liberal political forces favorable to the extension of religious liberties were gathering during these years. It required, however, an occasion shocking to the general public to enable them to win a major victory in that field. In 1913, the Bishop of Puno, which lies high in the mountains on the shore of Lake Titicaca, on the Bolivian border, lighted the necessary spark by instigating local persecutions of evangelicals. At one point, evangelical workers in a school for Indians were mobbed, beaten, dragged into Puno, and imprisoned. Liberals, at first spurred on by the evangelical ministers in Callao, capitalized on this egregious abuse of the protected position of the Catholic Church to call for a Constitutional reform guaranteeing religious liberty. They succeeded in arousing strong public support. Finally overcoming vigorous opposition by the Catholic Church and its supporters, the reformers brought about adoption by the Congress of an amendment striking out of the Constitution the longstanding prohibition of

public worship by non-Catholic cults. Another progressive, more inclusive advance was made in 1920, when a newly promulgated Constitution not only retained the reform of 1915, but also carried in its bill of rights the new provision, "No one may be persecuted for his ideas or his beliefs." This declaration guaranteed full liberty of conscience, both religious and secular.

The reform of 1915 did not upset the position of Roman Catholicism as the religion of the state, a civil status under which it retained many privileges. But it set the evangelical churches and missions free to operate publicly without fear of legal or quasilegal interference. These churches now were able to erect buildings recognizable as churches, to put up name signs, and to conduct their services openly.

Although the removal of the bans enabled the Methodists and the other evangelicals to breathe a freer atmosphere, the Methodist mission enjoyed, to say the least, no flood of accessions to church membership in the aftermath of the Constitutional fight. Indeed, the sharpest growth in membership came immediately before the Constitutional change of 1915, not after it. From 1916 to 1919, the level of membership changed very little, resulting in a group of 284 members. During those years, the number of probationers dropped to a point noticeably lower than the peak reached in 1914. By 1920, the Mission had 250 full members and 376 probationers. Evidently, the earlier legal handicaps were not the most potent factor delaying conversions from Catholicism or from among Peruvians not close to the Church but belonging to that country's Catholic-imbued culture.

From 1896 to 1919, the Mission's educational work developed into a system of three high schools, with 130 pupils, and five elementary schools, with 868 pupils. The high schools were a coeducational school in Callao, a W.F.M.S. school for girls in Lima, and the coeducational North American College (it was renamed the Andean Institute in 1920) in Huancayo. Seventeen Board missionaries, including three married couples, and five W.F.M.S. missionaries were on the field, and only one out of the entire group was employed in any but school work. Hays Archerd, the exception, was superintendent of the Peru District and pastor of Central Church, Lima.

NOTE

Page 589. The Transit and Building Fund Society was incorporated in the State of New York on 28 June 1884 as the Transit and Building Fund Society of Bishop William Taylor's Self Supporting Missions. Upon petition to the New York Supreme Court, the name was changed on 16 July 1894 to the Transit and Building Fund Society of Self Supporting Missions. Bishop Taylor no longer was conducting any mission work associated with the Society. As a Bishop, he was directing regular Methodist missionary work in Africa, where the Transit Society also had work. The Society's name was changed in order to avoid confusion between the two enterprises.

In Revolutionary Mexico

ALTHOUGH THE PERIOD 1896-1910 carried the Methodist Episcopal Church in Mexico well across the threshold of the twentieth century, it produced no essential change in the pattern of the Mission's development. John W. Butler and Levi B. Salmans, M.D., who had begun their missionary service in 1874 and 1885, respectively, still were working in 1910 in a setting that was familiar to them. It still was the Mexico of Porfirio Díaz, who had been ruling the country with dictatorial hand for most of thirty-five years. The Mission still was experiencing familiar problems, familiar forms of opposition, and a familiar modest rate of growth. Functionally, the decade and a half following 1896 was for Butler and Salmans and their less experienced colleagues an extension of nineteenth-century missionary endeavor under nineteenth-century conditions.

Then came the Revolution, a profound and violent upheaval of peasant, labor, liberal, antforeign, and anticlerical forces that broke up the thick crust of social, political, and economic privilege on which rested the small upper class holding concentrated in its hands the bulk of the wealth of the nation. Thus, in 1911, John Butler, resident in Mexico City, the seat of the Federal Government and the center of the Mission, saw the Díaz regime quickly swept away.

Butler was not happy to see Díaz go. His father, the Mission's first superintendent, had warmly admired the country's strong man. And as a mission leader, John Butler himself long had lived comfortably with the Díaz regime. He characterized its tenure as a period of peace, "except for local revolts, which were speedily subdued." As against the Mission's bitter antagonist the Roman Catholic Church, Butler evidently counted the central government as a protective influence maintaining a sufficient measure of public order to enable the Protestants to hold their basic position under the Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom. Díaz was not unfriendly to the Protestants, and the Methodist mission had received favors at his hand. In 1909, when news of rising political unrest was abroad, Butler apprehended "no serious difficulty especially while our 'grand old man' General Díaz is alive and well enough to hold the reins." A year later, Butler wrote for *The Christian*

Advocate an article that gave lengthy and fulsome praise to Díaz, "this wonderful man," for his massive contribution, sincerely and devotedly rendered, to the economic and material progress of Mexico. No slightest breath of political or ethical hesitation tarnished the brightness of the tribute. "The grateful people of this land," wrote Butler, "recognize that to no one, under God, do they owe more than to General Porfirio Díaz. His unique continuation in power synchronizes with the country's marvelous development." The article appeared in September. Two months later, the anti-Díaz revolution was well under way. And when Díaz resigned in May, 1911, and left Mexico City to go abroad, Butler informed Secretary Homer C. Stuntz that he had wired the deposed President a farewell message thanking him for "the many courtesies he extended to us and our mission during his long reign" and assuring him of prayers for a safe journey. Wrote Butler:

My heart goes out to him in sincere sympathy because of what he has done for the country in these thirty years. It is true that he has made some mistakes, but he is not half as black as he has been painted. If he had only retired from office last year his present situation would be so different.

Bishop Francis J. McConnell, whose episcopal responsibility for the Mexico mission stretched across two quadrenniums beginning in 1912, demonstrated many years later in his book of reminiscences *By the Way* that less charitable evaluations of Díaz' rule were possible. Acknowledging that Díaz had accomplished almost incredible results in beginning to modernize his country and develop its resources—foreign capitalists, with whom he was friendly, highly praised him for them—Bishop McConnell also pointed out that his policies were "hard as steel." He said:

He relied upon the firing squad if it was inconvenient to take more time. . . . In some labor troubles in South Mexico he brought quiet by extensive killings under the form of law. The "law of flight" was a resource ever at hand in Mexico—the law being that if a prisoner under arrest tried to get away, the guard could shoot him and simply report that he was trying to escape. In the trouble of which I speak numbers of alleged offenders barely out of childhood were killed, and it was said that Díaz justified this by the laconic and vulgar statement that "nits make lice."

Public criticisms of the moral quality of the President's governing methods by a Mission leader would have been the extreme height of imprudence. But in the privacy of his long correspondence with the Board secretaries, John Butler revealed no sense of discomfort or protest about the operations of the dictatorship.

Though he was sensitive enough to the personal situation of the unseated old ruler, Butler was, also, singularly silent about the dispossession, subjugation, exploitation, or poverty of the Indians or the mestizos (Mexico's

large aboriginal and mixed ethnic groups) under Díaz' long catering to the economic interests of the privileged upper class. To be sure, Butler was capable of declaring, as he did in 1913 when addressing the Joint Conference of Methodist Workers in Mexico, "Our mission is to the people, the hungry millions about us." But he was referring to the masses supposedly starved for want of the kind of religion the Methodists had come to give them. He was talking about spiritual hunger, not about land-hunger or belly hunger. Butler's primary concern was for the security and progress of the Mission, and his major derivative sympathy was with the regime that guaranteed the Mission's status in Mexico.

The rise and continued flow of the Revolution certainly held dangers for the Methodist mission. The first to emerge was the risk of alienation of the Díaz government through identification of Methodist workers with insurrectionary moves. Although when the Mexico Conference met at the end of February, 1911, Francisco Madero's call to revolution already was three months old, with rebel bands becoming active in various parts of the country, Díaz still was in control in Mexico City. The Conference voted to have a committee headed by Butler wait upon the President with a petition specifying instances in which Methodists had been "unmercifully persecuted" during the past year by mob action instigated by Roman Catholic clerics, in order that he might intervene, as far as his sphere of action would permit, to see that such attempts should not be repeated. The Conference thus recognized that Díaz was still the man to whom to appeal. A few days later, the Conference made another timely move, urging that all Methodist workers, in view of "the present political situation and of the serious danger which surrounds us on all sides because of the uprisings which are taking place," exercise and also recommend to their congregations the greatest prudence in speech and in conduct. "We can and we ought to have our personal opinions," ran the Conference resolution, "but in view of our ministerial character, we believe that we ought to abstain from all seditious propaganda and from expressing imprudently our opinions." Particularly the use of the word "seditious" made obvious the connection between the two Conference actions; the Methodists could not afford to appear to be snapping at the hand that was supposed still to be powerful enough to grant them protection. For the moment, then, the call to prudence was a call to maintain good relations with the government. Later, when the political situation became much more confused, it could serve as an expression of the policy of neutrality toward various competing factions.

During the early months of 1911, the insurrectionary activity that finally dislodged Díaz and put Francisco Madero in his place spread from the north-western states across the entire country. As it penetrated the area around Mexico City in April and May, it drew the Methodists close to the thick of the fighting between revolutionary bands and government troops and also exposed them to danger from rioters and rampaging criminal elements that

struck with impunity in the midst of the general turmoil. The Methodists' Mexican and English-speaking congregations in Pachuca were in one of the most dangerous situations. The approach of the recognized revolutionary forces triggered within the city a wild outbreak by men from the mining camp. They looted stores, forced open banks, burned houses, and ruthlessly shot down innocent people. The Methodist pastors and teachers were among those besieged in their houses. John Butler, reviewing the three-day reign of terror, commented, "No North Atlantic liner ever came out of a hurricane looking worse than Pachuca looks today." Hardly a building in the center of the city was undamaged. The revolutionary troops—only 150 of them—finally entered the city and restored order. Although they treated the Methodist workers well, they commandeered one of their buildings for a military post, storing dynamite on the roof and mounting guard there for days, hourly expecting the opposing forces to appear and attack. Puebla also was spared the destruction of full-fledged battle, but the city's streets were overrun with professed insurgents and Maderists who actually were hardly more than preying bandits and escaped prisoners. Butler was able to report at first hand the large popular riots in Mexico City in May that were the immediate prelude to Díaz' resignation.

Similar disorders and general disruption occurred in numerous places where there were clusters of Methodists. Here or there a preacher was victimized by insurrectionists or pseudo insurrectionists, buildings were damaged, a small church was sacked and the congregation temporarily disbanded, visits to outlying congregations had to be suspended because of roving banditti, school schedules and attendance at church affairs were upset, religious workers had to carry on under great tension, or parishioners were in economic trouble because the factories they worked in were closed down.

Whatever actually befell the people, danger frequently lay sizzling like a live wire no farther away than the doorstep of a home or the gate of a mission school. At one time during the spring, when perilous conditions were developing everywhere and Díaz was as yet unsaddled, the Board Secretaries authorized John Butler to insure the safety of the missionaries and their families by assembling them in Mexico City or by moving them across the border into the United States. They all decided, however, to accept neither option. They had little enough security, but it turned out that the worst potentialities of the harsh political chaos for the missionaries did not materialize; no missionary was killed, wounded, or even severely abused. Nor did the Mexican religious workers and the lay following generally suffer radically or irremediably during this phase of the revolution. Methodist property damage was relatively light, privations among the Methodist people were neither constant nor catastrophic, and mission work generally went forward rather well, considering the disturbed and disturbing conditions that continued in some areas for many months after the Madero regime was estab-

lished. To be sure, as the period of insurrection and armed factional struggle stretched out across six or seven years, its severities sometimes fell cruelly upon Methodist individuals or local groups. But the Mission came through it all essentially intact. Its ability to survive without being seriously weakened was determined basically by the fact that Protestantism was not in itself the butt of revolutionary passions and Protestant missions were not a target for any of the significant revolutionary factions.

Seldom during the years of the Revolution did any Methodist missionary feel the hot wind of armed violence swirl more closely and fiercely about him than did John Butler in February, 1913, in the ten-day conflict in Mexico City that overthrew President Madero and led to his death by assassination. The Mission House, where the Butlers and more than a dozen others were living, was halfway between the opposing forces and directly in the line of artillery fire and troop forays. On the first day of the outbreak, wrote Butler to his sister:

the fight in the central square of the city spread out into the adjoining streets and reached down past the Mission House. Some of the government forces were in our block for two or three hours and we saw something of the fighting. A small body of cavalry which had been defeated by the enemy dashed by our corner as if mad. At least half of the horses had no riders. It seems to be the general belief that about 700 lives were lost.

During a brief truce, Butler was able to visit Sara L. Keen College in another section of the city, where the W.F.M.S. women had gathered under their aegis the girls from the Industrial School in suburban Santa Julia, whom they were passing along to their friends. But most of the time, communication within the city, even by telephone, was impossible. Butler was confined to the area of the Mission House, out of touch with the College people and with his colleagues Raymond A. Carhart and J P Hauser (Frank E. McGuire was in the Mission House group). There, bullets frequently rained down on the building, and a shell once burst right outside the front door.

In a hotel not far away were Bishop Francis J. McConnell and his wife, who had arrived in the capital at midnight on the day the insurgent forces of Generals Bernardo Reyes and Felix Díaz opened fire on the government forces. From the hotel windows, the Bishop could observe the ebb and flow of the fighting. He saw snipers at work and also saw the victims of hidden riflemen fall dead, to lie untouched until their bodies were dragged away across the pavement or soaked with kerosene and burned. Hundreds were killed in the city and their bodies stacked in horrid piles. Sometimes when the bullet-popping streets were a little quieter, McConnell and Butler went out for a closer look at conditions. Discovering after a week's fighting that a shell had fallen on the Bishop's hotel, Butler took the McConnells into the Mission

House, where they slept in relative safety with their beds pushed up against a wall of solid masonry three or four feet thick. One of the effects of all this fighting in the capital and of disturbed conditions elsewhere in the country was that Bishop McConnell was unable to hold the regular session of the Annual Conference, which had been his chief errand in coming to Mexico at that time. He gathered a consensus of individual members of the Conference and then held a limited meeting of the Cabinet and the Finance Committee in Puebla on 25 February.

The most crucial threat to the missionaries and their mission, however, was not sheer physical danger such as Butler and McConnell found exploding all about them in Mexico City, but political danger from American sources. From the early days of the Revolution, John Butler had been anxious about the possibility that the United States would intervene in Mexico, and as time went on, this became the chief fear plaguing him and his colleagues. Considering what actually was happening in the diplomatic sphere, Butler rather strangely limited his operating concept of intervention to that of military intervention. Henry Lane Wilson, the American ambassador, strongly opposed the Madero administration and endeavored to manipulate its overthrow. He sent to Washington exaggerated and prejudicial reports on the unsettled state of the country and the supposed danger to American interests there, which were expressed in the residence of sixty thousand Americans and in American investments totaling a billion dollars or more. Wilson leveled at the Mexican government a series of forceful protests about the public disorders in the country, backing his calls for action by Madero with threats of intervention by his own government. By February, 1913, Wilson's representations to Washington resulted in heavy mobilization of American troops along the Mexican border, and he was allowed to warn American citizens to leave such parts of Mexico as he considered dangerous. Thousands of frightened Americans fled to the United States, and the American embassy in Mexico City stocked up on ammunition in preparation for a potential siege. Most of Mexico still was at peace, but these measures served to undermine the prestige of the Madero government. During and immediately after the ten days' fighting that broke Madero's hold on the government, Wilson participated in negotiations on the choice of Madero's successor among the leaders of the coup. He used his influence in favor of General Victoriano Huerta, who came out on top as Provisional President, the final arrangement between the parties actually being consummated in the American embassy. And there in the embassy, Wilson sponsored Huerta's appearance before members of the diplomatic corps called together to meet him.

About a fortnight after the rebels dislodged Madero, Woodrow Wilson was inaugurated President of the United States. Far from following the direction taken by Ambassador Wilson, the new President declined to recognize the Huerta regime, essentially on the ground that it was unconstitutional. With

this position John Butler did not agree. He had no love for Huerta, but favored recognition as a means of securing domestic peace and stability in Mexico. He hoped that the United States would be able to accomplish that end by helping to compose the differences between Huerta and his opponent Venustiano Carranza, who was known as the First Chief of the Constitutionalist Army. Butler deplored the interventionist influence of American industrial and financial interests, particularly that of the Standard Oil Company, which was in competition with British oil men for the exploitation of Mexican oil resources. But Woodrow Wilson was not set on military intervention. Indeed, a few months after his inauguration, he recalled Ambassador Wilson, with whose uninhibited movement in that direction he disagreed. He then sent a special envoy to Mexico to try to persuade Huerta to remove himself from the political scene by renouncing a regular term as President. This Huerta refused to do, even though Wilson succeeded in a diplomatic maneuver that cost Huerta the support of Great Britain. The United States then placed an embargo on the shipment of munitions to Mexico, thus cutting off consignments to Huerta. Growing Constitutionalist forces now were in the field against Huerta's reactionary and repressive rule—those of Carranza, Francisco (Pancho) Villa, Alvaro Obregón and Emiliano Zapata were the most important—and the embargo made it more difficult for Huerta to pacify the country, which also was harassed by hundreds of petty revolutionary bands.

While the American policy was undermining Huerta, however, it also in this way was heightening the broad tide of violence running through the country, thus providing the makings of an imperialist case for American intervention of a sort that Wilson long was loath to initiate. Indeed, he himself finally twice sharpened the situation. In December, he declared while addressing Congress that peace in America depended upon Huerta's surrender of his usurped power. But Wilson persisted—at least for some months in a policy of "watchful waiting," which rested upon the hope that Huerta's armed antagonists would overthrow him. Then in February, 1914, Wilson lifted the Mexican embargo sufficiently to make it possible for Constitutionalist leaders to buy munitions in the United States.

John Butler saw from the first that direct military intervention in Mexico by the United States, or any sudden anti-American uprising, undoubtedly would make it necessary to evacuate from the country the thirty-nine people—men, women, and children—in the Methodist missionary group. At his request, Secretary Oldham solicited from the State Department in Washington in the spring of 1913 an agreement to give the Board the earliest possible advance notice of any imminent intervention, so that the missionaries could be promptly alerted and enabled to take refuge in a safe port, most probably in Vera Cruz. "I take it for granted," Butler wrote Oldham, "that American gunboats would be in the port within forty-eight hours after our government

in Washington had reached such a determination." On the same day, Bishop McConnell was in New York reporting to the Board of Managers on his recent trip to Mexico. The Board at once voted to follow his advice to notify Butler that in case of an uprising of Mexicans against Americans, he was authorized to send both Board and W.F.M.S. personnel out of the country or to Vera Cruz, where they would be protected by American warships as speedily as possible. A month later, toward the end of April, Butler went down to Vera Cruz and visited two United States war vessels that were moored in the harbor under the command of Rear Admiral Frank F. Fletcher. The Admiral gave him the impression "that the presence of these boats in Mexican waters is intended rather as a tonic on the one hand and on the other a place of refuge for American citizens in case of extreme emergency." Now and always, Butler did not categorically object to the reality of American imperialism as a matter of high ethical principle, though he could state impressive arguments against it. His chief concern was that it should not operate in ways that would be detrimental to pursuance of the Methodist mission in Mexico. He was willing to come under the umbrella of American military and diplomatic influence when it promised shelter for the Mission, but wished to reject it when it appeared to cast a threatening shadow on the Mission's future.

It appeared in the summer of 1913 that the time for evacuation had come. Bitter anti-American feeling was building up and was breaking out in the press and in street demonstrations. The newspapers, according to Butler, were "venting spite on the American government and the Americans generally because of the non-action of the Washington authorities [on recognition of Huerta]." Conservative papers were promoting a boycott of American goods and renewing earlier attacks on Protestant missions. Since the overthrow of Diaz, once more there was a Catholic Party, and Catholic political action was resurgent. When there came a new outburst of anti-American passion in July, Butler saw behind it the hand of the Catholic clergy, citing as a clerical organ the newspaper responsible for a series of inflammatory articles currently stirring up the student body in Mexico City. "Yesterday upwards of three thousand of them tramped the streets, marched to the Palace and attempted to see the president in order to place before him their complaint against 'the awful Yankees.'" Official tension between the Mexican and the American governments mounted high, because the negotiations in the Mexican capital between the Huerta administration and President Wilson's envoy, John Lind, not only failed to resolve the differences between the two governments, but led to more aggressive statements on Wilson's part in his attempt to influence the Mexican political situation by measures short of military action.

Indeed, when the negotiations broke up, the American Consul General received instructions from Washington, on 29 August, to advise all American

citizens to leave Mexico at once. John Butler immediately notified the Methodist Episcopal missionaries, who were located in four places—Guanajuato, Puebla, Pachuca, and Mexico City. He called in to the capital the two missionary women he knew to be alone in Guanajuato. Then he called a conference of missionaries of four churches working in Mexico City, later cabling the Board's New York office that the American colony there resented the instructions from Washington as being unsoundly based and that the missionary conference objected to their application except in disturbed areas. Many Americans started for home (the United States government proved to be unready to transport those who arrived in Vera Cruz to take ship), but many remained. The only Methodists who returned to the States were four single women who departed largely for health reasons. The excitement soon died down, and Butler wrote to Secretary Oldham, "It does seem to us as if somebody in Washington had blundered in sending out these orders."

Eight months later came the real thing—military intervention and missionary evacuation. Many Mexicans were angry at the United States for meddling in the Mexican civil war to the advantage of the Constitutionalists. Their resentment rose in an intense crescendo when, early in April, the United States demanded that the Mexican government offer a 21-gun salute to the American flag to underline the apology with which crewmen of an American warship had been released after being held briefly under arrest by a Mexican officer for landing in a restricted area in Tampico. Huerta refused to make the gesture. The smell of war hung heavy in the air. The Mexicans feared and resented the danger of American military intervention, and the American colony believed it imminent, perhaps even to the occupation of the capital itself. Popular passions ran hot and high. Mobs attacked American buildings in Mexico City. Americans everywhere were in personal danger. The Methodist missionaries came in to Mexico City for safety and for possible further removal. On 21 April, John Butler received from the Board a cable directing him to transfer Methodist headquarters and missionary personnel to Vera Cruz. On that same day, American naval forces that had been sent into the area to enforce the arms embargo against shipments expected from Germany bombarded Vera Cruz and finally occupied it after fighting that cost the lives of more than a dozen American marines and of two hundred Mexicans. Many months later, Butler commented on the very strong anti-American feeling the landing of the marines provoked throughout Mexico, "this is not to be wondered at. Something of the kind would happen in our own country should a foreign force ever be landed in any of our important ports and their flag hung out over our public buildings." In three separate parties, the Methodist missionaries made their way to Vera Cruz under the most hazardous and confusing conditions. John Butler's party, the last of them to leave Mexico City, departed on the 28th on a train under the protection of the British flag. All American diplomatic and consular officers

had left the capital, for diplomatic relations between the two countries were quickly severed. In a note to Secretary Oldham hastily scribbled at the last moment, Butler said, "We are under British protection for we are *without a flag*—this is my first experience with such a sad fact in forty years of foreign missionary life."

Butler found it impossible to carry out his original intention to establish the Mission's offices in Vera Cruz, for he and his fellow refugees were not allowed to remain there. They boarded a transport that brought them to New Orleans in the first week in May. Two Methodists had stayed behind in Mexico. Clementina Butler, sister of John Butler, remained in Puebla until she could secure protection for the girls in the W.F.M.S. school, not leaving Mexico until the others already were in the United States. Laura Temple, one of the W.F.M.S. missionaries, did not leave the country at all, but chose to stay in Mexico City, where she allied herself with the Red Cross in order to have a secure position in Mexico during the crisis. Mexican Methodist preachers and teachers faithfully and effectively carried on the work of the churches and schools the missionaries left behind them, though it was a trying time in which thus to assume new responsibilities.

Although Huerta's regime broke up in midsummer under the pressure of Constitutionalist military successes and in the face of its weakening international position, no general return of American missionaries was possible for a number of months afterwards. The continued presence of the American marines occupying Vera Cruz kept Mexican public opinion inflamed, and the country was generally unsettled. The American forces left Mexico at the end of November. Except for one or two who went to Vera Cruz somewhat earlier, the Methodist missionaries began arriving at their posts late in December and continued returning at various times during the first quarter of 1915.

The evacuation of 1914 and the public pressures that made it necessary wrought no permanent impairment of the Methodist mission. But the missionaries and their Mexican colleagues carried on during the next few years under many trials and in the face of many dangers, for it was a time of ruthless and erratic violence, disrupted communications, economic dislocation, hunger and epidemic disease, community insecurity, political chaos, and civil warfare. After the Constitutionalist victory over Huerta, the revolutionary movement lost what unity it had manifested up to that time and broke up into competing armed factions. Carranza finally became the head of the Mexican government, but he had to fight his way to that position. Not until the summer of 1915 did he establish himself in Mexico City, and not until October of that year did the United States recognize him as President *de facto*. Even then, he was long unable either to win over to his side, or to defeat, his armed political antagonists (the Zapatistas and the followers of Villa were the most troublesome) or to control the numerous local political tyrants who corrupted the processes of government and unscrupulously victimized the people. Indeed,

though personally honest as a public official, he could not even eradicate corruption from his own administration. Nor could he put down the many bandit gangs that scourged the country, robbing and killing indiscriminately. Popular suffering was universal and abysmal, and Methodist people and societies suffered along with all the rest.

Generally, the Methodists did not come under consistent and deliberate attack specifically because of their religious associations. In fact, in some quarters they were more or less in political favor.

Raymond A. Carhart, who was transferred to Vera Cruz in February, 1915, to care for such financial interests of the Mission as John Butler could not handle from Mexico City, testified to his gratification that the Constitutionalist faction was "very friendly to everything Protestant and evangelical." Many evangelicals belonged to that party, and Carhart knew of a good number of former preachers and teachers of the different Protestant missions who had taken positions of military or political responsibility under Carranza and his colleagues. "This seems to be true more largely of those of other Missions than of our own," he said, "perhaps because until within the past eight or ten months the actual field of conflict did not to any large extent invade our territory, and our men were not compromised in the earlier struggles as were many others." Carhart judged, however, that the Mexican workers with the Methodist mission almost universally felt that the only hope for the country and for the Methodist cause was for Carranza to be successful in organizing the nation.

As Carranza made his way to power, Protestants became members of propaganda commissions sent out into different parts of the country to interpret his purposes to the people. A little later, his government sent Prof. José Velasco, a supernumerary member of the Mexico Conference, to the United States as leader of a tour of forty young Mexican teachers—five or six were Methodists—to help them gain some familiarity with American life in preparation for their participation in Mexican schools and to enhance closer relations between the two countries. In shaping up his national administration, Carranza appointed as Director of Technical Schools, including the School of Agriculture, Alfonso Herrera, formerly the Methodist pastor in Puebla, who upon entering political activity with the Constitutionlists, had taken the supernumerary relation with the Conference. Herrera, while serving as secretary to Carranza's brother, came close to being shot out of hand by the men who captured and killed his employer. Andres Osuna, a Southern Methodist, became Carranza's Director of Primary and Normal Instruction.

In the fall of 1915, with the Carranza government permanently operating in Mexico City, John Butler was receiving many indications from government officials that they desired the Methodists to increase the scope of their activities. In some cases, they were offering the Mission valuable church build-

ings, Catholic churches that had been closed for a long time. Butler desired the General Committee to make available every dollar it possibly could to enable the Mexico mission to take advantage of some of these offers in the capital and elsewhere. Evidently, the buildings were offered gratis, but he felt that it would be better in the long run to pay at least nominal purchase prices and have clear titles that would endure in case of a change in administration. Secretary Oldham quickly grasped the opportunity. He wrote to Butler:

I read your letter announcing a bargain sale of Roman Catholic churches, at a service in Santa Ana, Cal., and a lady has just sent me \$500 for the purchase of one of these churches. I will send the money on to you as soon as I hear that you can make good. I have the promise of another church, at the same rate. Please write me at once.

Nowhere were the Methodists—and Protestants generally—in a better public position than in the State of Guanajuato. All the successive military rulers had been treating the Methodists well and had utilized their humanitarian services, particularly in the hospital and in the distribution of government corn to the poor. The Mission finally was feeding as many as four hundred people. Dr. Levi Salmans claimed that by mid-1915 Protestants, though constituting less than one per cent of the population, were dominating the situation in city and state by holding almost all the important public offices. The Governor was a doctor who earlier had developed, though he was “a hater of religion,” a friendly interest in the Methodists and their school in Querétaro. The Lieutenant Governor was a member of the Methodist Church in the City of Guanajuato. Both men freely attended affairs in the Methodists’ lecture hall, and the Governor cordially expressed in public his appreciation of Doctor Salmans and of the educational work of the Methodist Church. The head of the state school system, a Protestant, invited Salmans to lecture before the State College. “For a Protestant to have the least recognition by the official public under the Díaz regime,” declared Salmans, “was unthinkable. We had protection, but we were under the social ban absolutely.”

Dr. Salmans, of course, had served in Guanajuato for a long time, and he and his hospital had earned much popular good will. He felt that the hospital’s services were helping, in the current more friendly public atmosphere, to break down longstanding barriers of antagonism toward Protestants. Among his hospital patients was a priest with three bullets in his back. Salmans had daily friendly contacts with the priests who came to see his patient. “It is a great joy to have this crowd here,” he wrote, “as this means the breaking down completely of the very citadel itself.” And he was cheered by the kindly Christian spirit in which he and the priest’s many inquiring parishioners were in communication each day.

Doctor Salmans now stood so well in Guanajuato, Methodist that he was,

that many people were insisting that "I am the real governor of the state." This he did not welcome; he feared the coming of a day of reaction when "a world of irate irrationals" would rise up against him. Everything identified as Protestant was laid at his door, for he was "the oldest well known protestant [*sic*] and propagandist in the state." That meant that what was not Protestant—"as for instance the persecution of the catholics [*sic*] by the present ultra liberals in the Carranza government"—was charged to him. Catholics in Guanajuato were not persecuted as in the surrounding states, but the government nevertheless had confiscated four large monastic educational institutions—"quite to my regret," said Salmans. He explained that the schools had been taken because they taught their pupils to hate liberal government. "But some Catholics wish to have people believe I counsel the government to banish their teachers and turn their edifices over to me." Therefore, when John Butler wrote him to inquire whether it was possible to buy cheaply an unused Catholic church in Guanajuato, he replied that it would be a fatal thing to do, "that we had since last May [1915] the standing offer of our choice of all the building[s] they are now using, and that we had positively declined." Salmans preferred to have the Methodists continue worshiping in the large clapboard-roofed shed they had been using for the past eight years. He hoped for better times and natural growth to produce the modern building the Methodists needed.

In one area the Methodists and their fellow Protestants become special targets of attack; they had trouble in the State of Oaxaca, which early in 1915 declared its independence of all revolutionary factions in the country—a position that later became tantamount to opposition to Carranza's Constitutionalist regime. For a year and a half, Oaxaca was completely cut off from communication with the outside world and thus suffered a sharpening of some of the nonpolitical troubles it shared with the rest of the country. The necessities of life became scarce, a plague of grasshoppers devoured the few fields of wheat planted near the city of Oaxaca (the capital), members of the poorer families in the vicinity died of hunger, and finally came typhus, killing hundreds, destroying whole families, blotting out entire villages. Eduardo Zapata, the District Superintendent who led the Methodists of Oaxaca during this dread time, declared in a report that finally got into the Board's *Annual Report* for 1916, that a combination of civil authorities and Catholic clergy endeavored to convert the capital into a reactionary center and a focus of opposition to Carranza's *de facto* government. They tried to drum into the minds of the people the view that the Constitutionalist revolution "is supported by the Liberals, the Masonic order, and the Protestants, all of whom are the eternal enemies of our holy religion, and are at the same time receiving great sums of money from the United States." Throughout the State, Methodist workers and constituents were abused by people hostile to the revolutionary movement. Zapata and his co-workers eventually

were alerted by friends to the formation of an anti-Protestant plot headed by a group of priests and reactionary military men in the capital. They began to prepare their resistance to the expected attack, even to the point of consulting the American Vice-Consul about protection of the mission property.

But just then came the final local confrontation between the reactionary troops and the Constitutionalist army at Ocotlán, eighteen miles from the capital. The reactionary forces were routed and ran off into the mountains. As a result, the anti-Protestant plot in the capital was not consummated. As the defeated soldiers fled, however, they ravaged the nearby defenseless towns. Having been so thoroughly inoculated with prejudice against Liberals and Protestants, when they came to places where the Methodists were active, they purposely ruined Methodist buildings and punished Methodist members. Many of the preachers and teachers lost all their personal goods, and they escaped with their lives only by resorting to the homes of friends or by getting away into the mountains. In Telixtlahuaca, for instance, the marauders destroyed the pastor's possessions and stole the horses belonging to the mission. In Parián, they set the Methodist school afire and tried to hunt out—though unsuccessfully—the principal members of the congregation. In Santa Inés del Río, they burned the church organ and furnishings, dynamited the building, and shot four church members. In Cuicatlán, they sacked the school and the parsonage. In Jayacatlán, after burning all the mission property, they came upon the pastor and shot him. Such behavior was by no means uncommon in Mexico at that time, but here in Oaxaca, the Methodists were not, as generally elsewhere, merely random objects of cruel abuses like these.

In 1916, the Mission again was threatened on the national level; as in 1914, the missionaries were caught in the middle in a conflict between the Mexican and the American governments. The source of the trouble was the unsettled conditions along the border between the two countries, where non-political Mexican bandits were crossing the line, raiding American villages, and killing many American citizens. In retaliation, American law officers were shooting Mexicans practically on sight, killing an even greater number of people who were innocent of association with the raiders. The Mexicans resented the demands of the United States government for protection of American citizens in Mexico and for restraint of the raiders. And Carranza's failure to co-operate with Washington helped launch demands by American politicians, business interests, and Roman Catholic spokesmen for full-scale intervention by the United States in Mexico. Relations between the two countries were thoroughly inflamed. The most dangerous igniting agent in this volatile and violent situation was Pancho Villa, now Carranza's foe and playing a reckless hand in his attempt to gain some measure of the national power that had eluded him. In January, Villa banditti stopped a train at Santa Isabel, in Chihuahua, one of the Mexican border states, and shot sixteen American engineers who had been aboard. In March, Villa led some of his

men across the Rio Grande into Columbus, New Mexico, and killed seventeen Americans. This exploit compelled President Wilson, who had been resisting the importunities of the interventionists, to take some decisive action. With Congressional support, he at once sent a military force commanded by General John J. Pershing into Mexico to seize Villa. Pershing's activities, which continued for many months, putting down a number of minor bandits but failing to take Villa, provoked strong protests from Carranza. There were clashes between Mexican government troops and units of Pershing's expeditionary force, and Mexico finally threatened the United States with war. Wilson did not take up the challenge, but the Mexican populace was thoroughly angered, and it appeared that the safety of the American Methodist missionaries demanded their withdrawal.

Toward the end of June, feeling that war might well break out at any time, the missionaries of the Board and of the W.F.M.S. came together in Mexico City. American diplomatic representatives were pressing urgently for departure of all Americans. By this time, Raymond Carhart was in general charge of the Mission, taking the place of John Butler, who was in the United States recuperating from an illness. The Board notified Carhart that it authorized withdrawal but left the decision to the workers themselves. Not all of them wanted to leave. Even Carhart, who engineered the final move, hesitated. But the missionary group finally went down to Vera Cruz and on 2 July boarded a transport for home. Five days later, they arrived at the quarantine station at Fort De Soto, Florida. Behind them they left Laura Temple of the W.F.M.S. and J P Hauser, who only recently had returned to Mexico by way of Texas. Hauser assumed oversight of Methodist interests in the capital during the interim. The earliest to return to Mexico were seven W.F.M.S. missionaries, who took up their posts again in September. But the Board personnel did not begin re-entering the country until early in January, 1917, a few weeks before President Wilson withdrew the Pershing expedition. For a second time, the Mission had succeeded in re-establishing itself after withdrawal of the missionary staff from the country because of severe conflict between the two governments.

The returned missionaries soon, however, found themselves beset afresh with uncertainty about the future of the Mission. They now had to grapple with various implications, for their program, of a new body of Constitutional law defining the conditions under which religious institutions would be permitted to operate in Mexico. The Constituent Congress, called by the Carranza government for the purpose of revising the nation's Constitution in harmony with the principles of the Revolution, was convened in Querétaro on 1 December 1916 and continued at work for two months. What came to be known as the Constitution of 1917 was promulgated by the President on 5 February 1917 and became effective on 1 May.

Some of the religious provisions of the new instrument constituted es-

essentially a reiteration of aspects of the nineteenth-century Laws of Reform inaugurated to guarantee religious liberty and also to restrict the temporal power of the Roman Catholic Church. These curbs to Catholic power had slipped largely into disuse under Porfirio Díaz, and the Church, though never satisfied with its reduced legal status under Mexico's application of the principle of the separation of Church and State, had been engaged in a working partnership with the Díaz system. Under the Dictator's pragmatic permissiveness, the Roman Church had achieved a massive comeback in informal political influence, land holdings, financial capital, educational activity, restoration of religious orders, and ecclesiastical extension, all the time maintaining a strong hold upon the affections of masses of the common people. The Roman Church was indebted to Díaz for infinitely more than such favors as the Methodists owed to him. Quite significantly, it had a huge stake in the socio-economic system protected by his political control of the country. Therefore the Church throughout Mexico strongly opposed the Revolution at its genesis, fearing great losses from agrarian and educational reform advocated by Madero and his colleagues. A newly born National Catholic Party, sponsored by the hierarchy and abetted by the priests, who exploited all the parochial sanctions available to them, attempted to sidetrack the Revolution by pressing energetically for the defeat of Madero in his bid for the Presidency in 1911. Later, political Catholicism welcomed the advent of the reactionary Huerta regime.

By entering thus into the political power struggle, the Church marked itself unmistakably as an enemy of the Revolution and consequently invited retaliation on the part of Liberals and Constitutionals. The reaction of these groups was all the sharper because the Church's current stance reawakened the traditional anticlericalism of the Liberals. It also drew fire from a certain number of atheists in the ranks of the revolutionists. During and after the Huerta period, violent and repressive persecution of the Church and its priests broke out in various parts of the country, but not as a phase of national policy. The counterattack upon the Church by the Constitutionals acting as a national force mainly took the shape of political restrictions they worked into the Constitution of 1917. They were able to impose their restrictive patterns because of the fact that the Constituent Congress was composed entirely of members of the Constitutionalist party. Indeed, the religious provisions of the new Constitution bore down on the Church with special severity because the Congress itself was dominated by a radical, or "Jacobin," majority that carried it beyond some of the more moderate positions originally proposed by President Carranza. The anti-Catholic motivation of this majority was largely punitive. Since the new Constitution was couched in general terms applicable to all churches, Methodists and other Protestants came under the same requirements and prohibitions as did the Catholics, even though the Congress was in no way moved by animus against the Protestants.

Among the provisions of the new Constitution that were functionally sig-

nificant for the churches were these: (1) that religious teaching in public and private schools was banned, churches were prohibited from maintaining primary schools, and ministers were forbidden to teach in colleges; (2) that no charitable institutions for the sick or the needy were to be maintained or directed by religious organizations or by ministers; (3) that the activities of ministers were to be limited to the administration of sacraments and the conduct of religious services; (4) that churches should enjoy no legal status enabling them to hold real estate and that all places of public worship and all buildings formerly devoted to the purposes of religious institutions should be the property of the nation; (5) that only native-born Mexicans could be ministers; (6) that ministers could not vote, hold public office, assemble for political purposes, or criticize in public or private meetings either the fundamental law of the country or the authorities; (7) that state legislatures should have power to limit the number of ministers active in their various local communities; (8) that religious journals were forbidden to comment upon the political affairs of the nation, the political acts of private individuals, or the acts of public officials; (9) that political associations identifiable by name as belonging to a particular religious faith were banned, as was the establishment of monastic orders; (10) that no political assemblies would be permitted in churches, and no public worship would be allowed anywhere else; and (11) that ministers were to be severely limited in their capacity to inherit real estate (this was intended to block circumvention of the ban on ecclesiastical property-holding by having individuals serve as unofficial proxies for institutions).

The Constitution also provided, in reiteration of earlier law, that there should be freedom of religious affiliation and religious practice for individuals. From the Protestant point of view, this was not restrictive, but liberating and protective. But in the perspective of classic Roman Catholic churchmanship, which called for recognition of Catholicism as the established religion of the state, the continuance of religious freedom was a serious limitation of its status.

As news of the decisions of the Constituent Congress began to circulate, and even for months after the Constitution went into effect in May, the missionaries were beset with uncertainty as to how the restrictive elements in the new pattern of ecclesiastical law would be applied to the Methodist Episcopal Church in Mexico and to their own activities. In one important respect, they soon implemented their compliance with the new system without waiting for the situation to become fully clear; the ministers among them, being foreigners, carefully refrained from exercising ministerial functions. They did not preach, they did not administer the sacraments, they did not even appear on the platform at public services. There were only two exceptions; Bruce R. Campbell, in Pachuca, and Frederic F. Wolfe, in Puebla, continued ministering to their English-speaking congregations, evidently with

impunity. The others confined themselves strictly to duties that were classifiable as nonministerial. That covered the administrative functions served by John Butler, J P Hauser, and Wolfe as District Superintendents. Raymond Carhart was free from interference in his capacity as Publishing Agent, as were Franklin P. Lawyer, as Vice-President of the Methodist Mexican Institute, and Orwin W. E. Cook, as a professor in Union Theological School. Dr. Salmans, who had deliberately withdrawn from the ministry in 1912 in order to carry on his hospital work in Guanajuato as a layman, had no problems. This arrangement of duties involved, of course, assigning all the strictly pastoral appointments and functions to native Mexican preachers. Butler observed that perhaps the new system imposed by the government should be considered "one of the ways of Providence to lead us to throw more responsibility upon national workers upon whom, in the last analysis, so largely depends the salvation of Mexico."

At the end of 1917, the American ministers felt it especially necessary to walk warily, for the government deported a dozen foreign Catholic priests for violating the law on clerical activity. The Minister of the Interior sent to all governors of States a sweeping letter calling upon them to warn all ministers from abroad strictly to obey the law forbidding them to act in any ministerial capacity. The Methodists desired above all to do nothing to invite deportation of any of their own men as "pernicious foreigners." Butler soon was told privately, however, that the letter had been sent out—and in its all-inclusive from—both because the priests were giving so much trouble by not staying in line and because the Catholic Church repeatedly was calling the attention of the authorities to the presence of the Protestant ministers from outside Mexico. Contrary to Butler's fears at about this time, Bishop Thirkield was able both to preach and to ordain Mexican ministerial candidates at the session of the Annual Conference in March, 1918, as did Bishop McConnell a year later.

Except for the missionaries' shedding ministerial work, few substantial adjustments had to be made in the Mission during the early years under the Constitution of 1917. Actually, the government neither pressed hard against the Protestants nor loosed any fierce crusade against the Catholics. The Methodists had little difficulty in meeting government expectations. John W. Butler, who had lived so long under the rule of Díaz and then had witnessed the stormy years of the Revolution, did not see the ultimate results of the Constitutional changes, for he died in 1918. Neither did those who carried forward the work after his death, for until 1926, enforcement of critical sections of the Constitution was light.

But one thing was clear by the end of the first decade of the Revolution; the Methodist Episcopal Church in Mexico had survival power. Numerically it was but a chip tossing on the angry waters of the storm-blasted nation, yet it survived. Indeed, in spite of the sufferings and violence of those

anarchic years, it increased the size of its modest following and somewhat accelerated its rate of growth between 1910 and 1920. It grew from a company of 3,000 church members to one of 4,100, with similar increases in special categories of its life. It kept alive and advanced not so much through the leadership of its handful of faithful American missionaries as through the resiliency and loyalty of the Mexican church members and their pastors, to whose faithfulness the missionaries repeatedly testified.

In Awakening China

ANTIFOREIGN ACTIVISM: EBB AND FLOW, 1896-1898

IN 1896, MABEL C. HARTFORD was in the United States on furlough. She was fortunate to be there—or anywhere—for she was almost the sole missionary survivor of the Kuch'eng Massacre. The summer before, she had left her W.F.M.S. post in Kuch'eng City, near Foochow, to vacation at the nearby mountain resort of Huasang, where she was the only American among a number of missionary friends of hers. There on 1 August, in a bloody antiforeign and anti-Christian outbreak, rioters supposed to belong to the activist secret religious society known as the Vegetarians murdered eleven members of the missionary group, Mabel Hartford escaping death only through the courageous physical intervention of a Chinese exhorter.

The year 1895 had opened with portents of violence lowering over Kuch'eng. Threats from the Vegetarians gathered such force by early spring that the W.F.M.S. closed its girls' boarding school and dispersed its pupils. Shortly afterwards, fearing that a Japanese invasion of the area was impending (the Sino-Japanese War was nearing an end), the United States Consul summoned the Kuch'eng missionaries to the foreign-controlled quarter of Foochow for their protection. The war, however, soon was over, and the Vegetarians became quiescent, so that when the assassins suddenly attacked Huasang in August, Dr. James J. Gregory* was back in Kuch'eng.

A few weeks after Dr. Gregory tended the Huasang wounded and viewed the "mangled remains" of the dead on the night of the onslaught, he wrote to Secretary Adna B. Leonard about his reactions to the tragedy. Of that night he said, ". . . murder filled my heart & I was scared at my own feelings." He bluntly wrote on 25 August, after having more time to think:

Unless foreign countries wish to force China into civilization or parcel the miserable, Godforsaken country out to more advanced nations, this massacre will prove a great hindrance to Christianity & a menace to foreign life outside of the Ports. I am absolutely certain that it will not, as is popularly supposed, redound to the advancement & glory of Christianity here. Today I am

* Vol. III, p. 394.

in favor of evangelizing China with the Krupp & Gatling, and I should like to light the first match!

By that time, Dr. Gregory had been at work for ten days on a Consular Commission composed of himself, a British missionary, the American and the British Consuls, and an American naval officer that joined with three Chinese officials to conduct a court of inquiry into the massacre. As a result of its verdicts, the ringleaders in the violence soon were beheaded. When Gregory wrote Secretary Leonard, some already had been condemned to that death, and nearly a hundred suspects were in jail in Kuch'eng. "We have good evidence that about 100 men went to Hua Sang & all of them ought to be executed," he said.

Having closed his dispensary and hospital work in Kuch'eng the day the blow fell on Huasang, Dr. Gregory, who had been in China nearly seven years, sailed for the United States when his work on the Consular Commission was done. He did not return to China. Indeed, for more than six months, there were no Methodist missionaries in the Kuch'eng neighborhood, for the United States Consul forbade any of them to leave Foochow for their posts. The Chinese workers carried on much of the regular work themselves. At first there were frequent threats of violence against the local Christians, but the only gesture toward starting a new outbreak was promptly suppressed by the magistrate. By the time the missionaries began to return, early in 1896, the area was quiet. There was general agreement among them that the summary punishment meted out to the rioters under the guidance of the Commission had won both themselves and the Christian converts some measure of security for the future. "The native Christians were overjoyed at our return and the heathen were respectful," said Willma H. Rouse of her return to Kuch'eng. She and a new recruit, Althea M. Todd, came back in February to reopen the W.F.M.S. work, and for some time, they had no men missionary co-workers in residence. By October, Mabel Hartford also returned, thus taking up her work close to the scene of her shattering experience at the hands of the Vegetarian assassins.

The Kuch'eng Massacre was the most brutal current omen of the general danger that hung over the China missionaries throughout the last five years of the nineteenth century. The Chinese everywhere still resented the forced opening of their country begun by the European powers fifty years before. Foreign troops still were garrisoned on Chinese soil; foreign gunboats patrolled Chinese waters. China was freshly suffering from the trauma and humiliation of military defeat by the Japanese in 1895—the culmination of more than two decades of external aggression by Russia, France, Great Britain, and Japan that stripped her of as many as nine neighboring dependencies. She was entering a new period of galling economic exploitation and territorial extortion by Japan and the Western powers (Germany now

was added) that ate away at her sovereignty. Social and intellectual ferment was threatening to burst the wineskins of time-hallowed tradition. Reformers were attempting, under the general stimulus of Western influence, to modernize old, old forms of government and education. Conservative forces, mainly associated with the Manchu Dynasty, were fighting back. Antiforeign feeling everywhere was rife and rising.

Christian missionaries, the most numerous and vulnerable foreigners at hand, repeatedly were under attack or threat of attack.* The adherents of their missions or churches, who were counted as devotees of a "foreign religion," also were targets of sporadic harassment by nationalistic activists and by vested local traditionalists who were able to incite mob action.

The Methodists had over 150 missionaries scattered through China for a thousand miles south from Peking to Foochow and a thousand miles west from Shanghai to Chungking. Their 300 Chinese preachers, 9,000 church members, and 11,000 probationers were organized into five major units—the North China Conference, the Central China Mission, the Foochow Conference, the Hsinghua Mission Conference, and the West China Mission. The Mission as a whole was touching Chinese life not only through direct popular evangelism, but also through numerous institutions. Among them were six hospitals. In many simple primary schools, Chinese village children were being taught. On higher educational levels, there were a dozen W.F.M.S. girls' boarding schools, two boys' boarding schools, half a dozen intermediate schools, three secondary institutes (potential colleges), an Anglo-Chinese college and a theological school in Foochow, and two universities (Peking and Nanking) with medical, theological, and cultural departments. A mission so substantial and so visible naturally received a full share of Chinese hostility toward foreign missionaries and their followers.

So it was that at the beginning of 1896, the West China Mission's property in Chengtu, eight hundred miles west of the site of the Kuch'eng Massacre, was sheer rubble. It had been ravaged the previous May by antiforeign rioting that razed all the mission buildings in the city and drove out all the missionaries.† H. Olin Cady and his Methodist colleagues and their families, as well as the other missionaries, had a hair-raising escape from death. Eight years earlier, Cady had gone to Chungking for his first China appointment, less than a year after furious rioting had destroyed all foreign property and terminated the Methodist work there. Cady was not ignorant, therefore, of the violence of Chinese mob action. His reaction to the turbulent and vicious incidents of 1895 found voice, however, not in a singleminded outburst of shock and disillusionment like Dr. Gregory's, but in an effort at temperate analysis of the manifold and complex causes of the rioting. He was sensitive, for one thing, to the factor of Chinese reaction against the coercion constant-

* See note, p. 722.

† Vol. III, p. 429.

ly used by the foreign powers in their dealings with China. He was inclined to doubt that true progress ever could be imposed on China from the outside, and he appeared to be capable of practicing, under the stress of bitter current events, a measure of cultural and historical perspective.

Nevertheless, Cady did not hesitate to reach out for the protection afforded by the foreign military and diplomatic presence in China. While the Chengtu mob was still boiling in the street outside their mission, he and his co-workers had ordered a telegram for diplomatic relief sent to the British consul in Chungking, two hundred miles to the southeast. The French, British, and American legations in Peking at once intervened on their behalf with the Imperial Government. Orders to protect the foreigners went out immediately to provincial and local authorities. The Emperor himself looked into the question of the missionaries' safety. The viceroy in Szechuan Province lost his post for lack of diligence in guaranteeing it.

Bishop William X. Ninde, who exercised episcopal supervision in China in 1894, appreciated the military implications of such intervention. Writing the New York office from Chinkiang at a time when trouble was brewing in several areas, he not only referred to the danger to the missionaries, but also expressed his confidence as to their safety because of the presence of a number of foreign gunboats at Tientsin and a German and an American naval vessel on patrol in the Yangtze River. Of the latter he said:

The presence of the two warships will have a wholesome effect in restraining a riotous spirit . . . I called on Capt. Goodrich of the "Concord" and found him strongly determined to give the best protection possible to our missionaries. Our official representatives are worthy of all praise for the manner in which they are discharging their duties in these trying times . . . I feel greatly relieved that we have one of our swift cruisers in these waters. . . .

Bishop Ninde and Cady and his Chengtu comrades were not alone in their reliance upon the gloved iron fist of foreign intervention. It was common practice among missionaries to turn to their respective legations for protection and for the recovery of damages. The legations then would complain to the Peking government, which in turn would issue preventive orders or warnings and initiate punitive action against local administrators and culprits. This did not enhance popular love for the Christian workers, but it kept the magistrates aware of the missionaries' holding a weapon they could wield in case of emergency.

While the fate of the besieged Chengtu workers still remained unknown on the Coast, a group of American missionaries in Shanghai called for United States action—appointment of an American commission to investigate the cause of the riots on the scene, insistence upon both money indemnities and punishment of the instigators, and provision by the American government

for the immediate return of the missionaries to their Szechuan stations and for the publication by the central government of "their right to reside and prosecute their work in the interior of China." The missionaries formulated these demands in a set of resolutions that were adopted on 15 July 1895 by a large number of Americans resident in Shanghai.* The American national interest was the dominant note in the four paragraphs of the preamble. The first paragraph referred to the losses incurred by the "American missionaries" and by "American citizens." The three other paragraphs stressed general American interests:

Whereas, We believe that unless prompt and adequate measures are taken by our government to bring to punishment the guilty parties, that the safety of all American interests in China will be imperiled; and,

Whereas, We find that these violent demonstrations were directed not so much against the missionaries as such, but as a part of a widespread antiforeign propaganda; and,

Whereas, The honor and prestige of the government of the United States must certainly suffer from any unsatisfactory settlement of these troubles. . . .

In appealing to the United States Government, Methodist missionaries in China were by no means embarrassing the Missionary Society. Secretary Leonard, on his own initiative, wrote the Secretary of State, Richard Olney, on 8 August, urging promptness in taking all due measures to secure the safety of Methodist missionaries in the aftermath of the Chengtu and Kuch'eng-Huasang incidents. Six weeks later, he sent to the State Department an "Appeal to the Government" adopted by the Board of Managers on 17 September:

The Board of Managers of the Missionary Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church respectfully call the attention of the Government of the United States to the serious riots which have recently taken place in China, resulting in the destruction of property, and in some instances in the murder of peaceful foreigners. The property of this society at Chentu has been destroyed, and damage, the full extent of which has not yet been made known, has been inflicted upon our mission stations in several portions of the Fohkien province. It is important that punishment be speedily inflicted upon the perpetrators of these outrages, that the treaty rights of our missionaries and of the native Christians be clearly proclaimed, and that our representatives be reinstated in the places from which they have been expelled by these riotous proceedings.

We ask that efficient protection be given to our missionaries at all the stations, and that the utmost efforts of the representatives of our Government in China may be put forth for the prevention of further loss of life and destruction of property in that Empire. While we do not ask for any governmental assistance in the prosecution of our work, we do earnestly claim for our missionaries as citizens of the United States, the protection which all

* Vol. III, p. 429.

civilized nations seek to throw about their citizens wherever they may be. This is a time when the most prompt and efficient action is necessary to prevent bloodshed, and to subdue the riotous spirit which is so rampant in some portions of the country. We confidently expect that such instructions will be given to the Legation and to our Consular representatives in China as will secure the right of our missionaries to carry on their work peacefully, and to be reasonably secure as to their lives and property.

When Olin Cady and Dr. Harry L. Canright at last went back to Chengtu in the spring of 1896 to start rebuilding and to reopen the work, they returned as beneficiaries of accumulated external sanctions. A few months after the earliest results of their appeal to Peking, five persons were executed in Chengtu for complicity in the May riots. Also, a commission with American diplomatic personnel went to Chengtu (Cady was with them) and assessed the damages to be paid to the various missions. The Methodists resumed their work against a background of many recent official declarations, acts, and gestures that demonstrated to the Chinese public the missionaries' possession of enough diplomatic and government backing to make them somewhat dangerous people to lay hands on. Not surprisingly, then, especially in contrast with the gusts of rioting that had swept through Szechuan the year before, things remained quiet in Chengtu and Chungking in 1896 except for occasional threatening rumors.

For a few years afterwards, there were no such searing and destructive outbursts as those of Huasang and Chengtu in 1895. "Persecution" appeared here and there, sometimes rising, as in the Central China Mission field, to the pitch of looting and rioting, which nevertheless was promptly put down by official action. Particular social and economic pressures made life hard for both missionaries and individual Chinese converts and reared many obstructions to mission progress, but generally within long-familiar patterns. The reports of the American and the Chinese District Superintendents were less liberally sprinkled with citations of persecution than with references to such handicaps as floods, drought, famine, plague, cholera, high prices, the personal failings of Chinese preachers, local church squabbles, and the difficulty of sifting out candidates for church membership who were motivated by hopes of personal advantage rather than by religious conversion. Yet the climate was hostile, and antagonisms remained latent or muted rather than quenched. Ever present were the all-engulfing unlettered Chinese masses, offering fertile soil for seeds of egregious rumor such as the frequent charges that missionaries and Chinese preachers were child-buyers, kidnappers, body snatchers. And as Wilbur F. Walker, superintendent of the Peking District said in 1897, wherever there was opposition to new Christian work, there the missionaries "encountered the gentry or literati, usually assisted by the secret connivance of the local magistrate."

Walker, indeed, still thinking of the Christian enterprise, claimed that "the

literati, the officials, and the government as a whole are the persistent, unrelenting enemies of Western civilization." He could not know at the moment that a major breach was about to appear in the great wall of Chinese conservative opposition. In the summer of 1898, the young Emperor, the current representative of the Manchu Dynasty, under the influence of the brilliant reformist leader K'ang Yu-wei, issued a series of far-reaching edicts aimed at thoroughly reorganizing the government and redirecting the national future along modern lines. But the change was short-lived; the Manchu Empress Dowager returned from her ten-year retirement and, by a military coup that deposed the Emperor and set herself up as regent, ended the Hundred Days of reform and put reaction in command in Peking. Some of the reformers were executed, some fled. This reactionary stroke not only blocked the reform movement in Peking, but also released new waves of antiforeign action elsewhere.

Serious trouble had broken out in the territory of the West China Mission even before the crushing of the reforms became a factor. In March, 1898, Dr. James H. McCartney stirred to anger certain elements in Kiang Peh, across the river from Chungking, when he succeeded in renting a building after the one housing his dispensary had been torn down in the night. He sent two of his Chungking medical students over to sleep in the new quarters. The first night, evidently with the connivance of the magistrate, a mob a hundred strong broke into the shop, hauled the two young men into the street, bound their hands behind them, and began beating them with carrying poles and other weapons. One of them managed to break away, jumped from the city wall, and got across the river and back to Chungking. Said Olin Cady in his report to the United States Consul:

In the meantime the other student, Tang, had been brutally beaten and strangled. A rope was put around his neck and his naked body dragged through the streets and thrown over the city wall. There we found it the next morning, having accompanied the magistrate as he went to hold inquest over the remains.

The newly rented building, of course, was demolished, and the medical project was closed down for a whole year.

Once again, as in 1895, Cady invoked the protection of the United States Government through its militarily supported diplomatic service. He told the Consul that "unless swift retribution follows, the peace of this foreign community [Chungking] and to a certain extent of all the foreign communities in this province, will be endangered." But his appeal was not so relevant as it had been three years earlier; the vicious circle of attack and reprisal—foreigners *versus* Chinese *versus* foreigners *versus* Chinese, and so on—was about to be broken by native forces the diplomats from abroad no longer could abort or contain.

Before the year was out, the work of the West China Mission was badly disrupted by public disorders, being temporarily closed down in several places. The surrounding districts of Szechuan Province were being scourged by an outlaw leader named U Mon Tse. Thousands of armed bandits were on the loose—generally pillaging, burning, levying tribute from the rich, overawing public officials, and so terrorizing the countryside that farmers took their grain and movable possessions and fled into strongholds in the hills. Foreigners and Chinese Christians were special victims of the marauders, who announced their intention to wipe out the "foreign religion." A riot in Hocheo drove out the Chinese Methodist workers and some of their lay following. The Chinese preacher in Suileng also took refuge in Chungking. The Methodists on the Tsicheo Circuit (between Chungking and Chengtu) were severely pressed. Nowhere were any Protestants killed, but many Chinese Roman Catholics lost their lives, and for several months the missionary community in Chungking fed ten thousand refugees. U Mon Tse finally was captured, and the worst of the trouble was ended, but some of the Methodist work was only slowly reopened, it was some time before it was safe to travel abroad, and the year 1899 opened to the sound of many inciting and threatening rumors about foreigners and Christians.

THE BOXER UPRISING, 1899-1900

While the rebels were ravaging Szechuan, the Boxer movement, an anti-foreign force of far larger national and international significance, was burgeoning in North China, first in Shantung, then in Shansi and Hopeh (Chihli). It had long historical roots in a secret religious society whose members were intensely xenophobic, fanatically convinced of their possession of divine aid and invincibility (foreign bullets could not kill them), and utterly ruthless in the methods used to repress or eliminate their chosen enemies. About them gathered various political activists, local rowdies, pseudo-militia groups, and members of the populace susceptible to antiforeign slogans. To extirpate the foreigners infesting China, and along with them their alien religion Christianity and the Christian loyalties and affiliation of its Chinese converts, was the purpose uniting the mixed elements. Although the Boxers were essentially reactionary, they included an element antagonistic to the Manchus, the dominant reactionary political regime; the Manchus themselves still were counted as foreigners, and they controlled the government that had repeatedly yielded to pressures exerted by the foreigners from the West. Before it reached its peak, the Boxer movement adopted support of the Manchu regime as a goal co-ordinate with destruction of the foreigners. This development was related to the fact that for many months, there had been a power struggle between a pro-Boxer faction and an anti-Boxer faction within the Imperial government. At first, Government troops were brought into

action to check Boxer activities and to penalize Boxer leaders. But the Peking regime finally was persuaded to make common cause with the movement in opposition to the foreigners.

Wherever the Boxers rose, their appearance fell upon the Christian community as a direful threat. As threats and gestures turned into action, Chinese Christians were rigorously repressed, compelled to observe the looting and destruction of their property, forced to choose between retraction of their Christian faith or death, tortured, and brutally murdered—by families, by parishes, by the hundreds. The crescendo of threats and violence finally achieved its full orchestration of terror in the spring and summer of 1900. When the North China Conference met in Asbury Church, Peking, from 28 May to 3 June, the Boxers were active throughout the surrounding province of Hopeh. Everywhere in North China, foreigners were in danger of death, and deaths of Chinese Christians were being reported. All the missionaries and Chinese preachers of the Conference's six Districts had come in to Peking for the annual sessions, thus being drawn in, at that critical time, from the outlying areas of danger. But the Boxers now were closing in on Peking and even emerging within the capital itself.

Indeed conditions were so ominous that the legations summoned some 450 European and American troops from the war vessels near Tientsin to protect the foreigners. They arrived late in May. The last train to Tientsin before the Boxers cut the rail line pulled out on 4 June. On board were Frederick Brown ("Legation Brown" he soon was to be called), James H. Pyke, J. Fred Hayner, J. Victor Martin, Nehemiah S. Hopkins, M.D., Ella E. Glover, Ida M. Stevenson, M.D., and Miranda Croucher. After this, escape to safety no longer was possible. Nor was armed relief from the outside. The Boxers were openly swarming in Peking, threatening death to foreigners.

The peril there was so great that the missionaries, with the co-operation of the United States Minister, Edwin H. Conger, designated the large Methodist Episcopal mission compound as a defense station for the city's American missionary personnel and for the refugee converts and other Chinese Christians in their care. There they assembled on 8 June—several dozen men, women, and children from the Methodist, the American Board, and the two Presbyterian missions, along with about seven hundred Chinese Christians, among whom were people whose families had been murdered and their homes destroyed in Boxer attacks outside Peking. Among the American Board people were missionaries and Chinese hastily brought in to Peking by carts sent out to nearby Tung Chou to rescue them from the Boxers, for fear of whom the Annual Meeting of the North China Congregational Mission being held there had been hastily adjourned. They carried news of the destruction of one of their neighboring churches and the killing of twenty of its parishioners. To the Methodist mission, over which the Stars and Stripes floated day and night, also came twenty United States Marines (ten more came later) sent over by

Conger to defend the compound until more troops should arrive from Tientsin. Said Mrs. Frank D. Gamewell:

Hearts beat high with patriotic pride when we beheld the boys in blue march in and take possession of the house put at their disposal. Their presence was the touch of a hand from the homeland, strong to deliver and to comfort us, voluntary exiles in a far country.

Under the ingenious leadership of Frank Gamewell, who normally was a teacher of physics in the Methodists' Peking University, the emergency community jammed within the compound walls rapidly turned their place of refuge into a homemade fortress against attacks from the Boxers' street bands—cutting up courtyard spaces with protective brick walls, barbed wire, and ditches, bricking up the windows in the various buildings, strengthening the church to serve as a bastion of last resort, erecting platforms for sentinels on the inner sides of the compound walls, filling in unnecessary outside gates with masonry, and throwing up barricades in the streets to the front and rear of the walled area. The entire daily life of the hastily gathered people was organized to the last detail—voluntarily, but with almost military efficiency—for the preservation of order, health, and life. In addition to the Marines, some twenty foreign missionaries and twenty-five Chinese were equipped with rifles, which they carried as they went about the compound or stood sentry duty. One of the Marine officers gave "these missionary soldiers," as Mrs. Gamewell called them, daily drill.

The missionaries held their perilous position for nearly a fortnight. They could hear the tumult of the mob-ravaged city. They could see the smoke and the lurid reflections in the night sky as the Boxers burned foreign-owned buildings, including the missions belonging to the American workers lodged with the Methodists. They heard rumors and meager reports of widespread violence, but got little real news. One day, the Boxers burned the Methodist street chapel located a few minutes' walk from the compound, and a small force of Marines charged up the street towards the watching mob when it showed signs of moving from the fire to the compound. But enveloped as they were by the danger that billowed about them, the tense and vigilant defenders inside at no time suffered direct attack.

On 19 June, the Tsungli Yamen, the Chinese agency for foreign relations, reacting to the attack of foreign marines upon the Taku forts, downriver from Tientsin, ordered the diplomatic corps and their nationals to leave Peking under Chinese military escort within twenty-four hours. At the same time, Boxers and government troops struck back in Tientsin by attacking the concessions—a fact not immediately known to the foreigners in Peking. On the twentieth, students brought through the barricades and into Frank Gamewell's house, severely wounded, the Secretary of the German Legation. He had been on his way through the streets to the Tsungli Yamen with the

German Minister, Baron von Ketteler. The Minister himself had been shot and killed near his destination by a Chinese official—the first conclusive public sign in Peking that the government at last was openly siding with the Boxers against the foreigners.

The Ministers decided not to submit to the order to leave Peking, but to call their nationals and the Chinese converts associated with the missionaries into the Legation Quarter, where they were determined to make a stand against any attack. Immediately after the rescue of the German legation official, the Marines and the missionaries at the Methodist compound received a message from the United States Legation: "Come at once within the Legation lines and *bring your Chinese* with you." They quickly evacuated the mission and led all their people under guard through the armed but temporarily quiet city into the international area, where they arrived by midafternoon. Here the Chinese and the non-Chinese were separated, the seven hundred Chinese Protestants joining the two thousand Chinese Catholic refugees in the palace of Prince Su, which was promptly brought within the defense lines of the legations. The missionaries became part of about nine hundred foreigners, both civilian and military, who were assigned to a dozen buildings on the British Legation's seven acres. No attack had been made on the completely vulnerable procession that moved from the mission to the legations, but late in the day, just twenty-four hours after the ouster order, Chinese government troops joined the Boxers in opening fire on the foreigners and their Chinese protégés.

The firing became incessant and, except during a limited armed truce initiated by the government, remained so for nearly two months. Fusillades of rifle fire swept the barricades and the outer walls and sent bullets whistling through the foreign-held area, cannon dropped heavy balls among the besieged people, and modern Krupp guns threw twenty-eight hundred shells into the British Legation. There were many casualties among the military men and the Chinese defenders who manned the barricades and the walls to return fire; seventy-four were killed and about one hundred and fifty were wounded. The noncombatants lived in constant danger punctuated by repeated narrow escapes from death. The Methodists lost two Chinese Christian workers, but no missionary of any mission was killed. Against the dangers of bullet and shell and sudden assault Frank Gamewell, who was appointed chief of staff for fortifications for the quarter-mile-square area under attack, erected and kept in repair an extensive system of external and internal defenses, with the Chinese supplying most of the manual labor. To meet the other necessities of their prolonged bitter struggle to survive, the leaders organized the living arrangements of the thirty-five hundred people within the lines very much as they had been ordered during the days in the Methodist compound, when, as Dr. Gamewell said later, "we were unconsciously rehearsing for the days of the Siege itself." But it was veering

winds, rather than their own almost superhuman organized effort that saved them from one of the massive fires the attackers set in the highly inflammable buildings surrounding their walled refuge. Organized foraging and severe rationing of food kept them from starving (except for a few children who died from malnutrition); they ate coarse brown bread, they ate rice, they ate seventy or eighty horses and mules. And in the midst of all their galling and fearful vicissitudes, at no time did they have any sure comforting news of the approach of military deliverers from the Coast.

Had the Chinese forces surrounding the Legation area applied to the siege all the power they had available, undoubtedly they would have overwhelmed the embattled foreigners by sheer impact of numbers. Evidently, however, some of the Manchus influencing Imperial strategy still looked to the future of China's foreign relations and therefore successfully counseled against striking the ultimately annihilating blow. Nevertheless, the foreigners and their Chinese associates, variously sustained by their religious faith and their human stamina, bravely and persistently held out as long as they had to under the conditions as they were.

Among the Methodists who went through the Siege were eight Board-appointed missionaries: Frank D. Gamewell, Harry E. King, George R. Davis, Wilbur F. Walker, George W. Verity, Alice Terrell, George D. N. Lowry, M.D., and William T. Hobart, with various members of their families. With them were six W.F.M.S. missionaries: Mrs. Charlotte M. Jewell, Gertrude Gilman, Emma E. Martin, M.D., Lizzie E. Martin, Edna G. Terry, M.D., and Anna D. Gloss, M.D. This group endured the ordeal until the foreign relief columns took Peking on 14 August.

Meanwhile, every part of the North China Conference outside Peking except one was thoroughly swept by the fury of Boxer violence. Persecution of Christians on the Shantung District was real but comparatively light, for the viceroy, Yuan Shih-k'ai, like many officials outside North China, refused to co-operate with the Boxers; and so he exerted an effective restraining influence, for which the North China Conference later officially thanked him. In North China as a whole, the Boxers killed about two hundred and fifty foreign missionaries (none were Methodists). Thousands of Chinese Christians were tortured and killed, among them being hundreds of Methodists. The destruction of property was enormous; refugees were numbered in the thousands. Wilbur F. Walker described what happened in the Tsunhua neighborhood, from which J. Fred Hayner and his associates were driven after he first escaped from Peking early in June:

Men were hacked to pieces, cut limb from limb, were disemboweled while still alive. Women were tied to stakes, wrapped in cotton, the cotton secured by wire, then saturated in oil and thus were burned alive. Babies were spitted on swordpoints, played with for a while, and then thrown into the fire to be consumed with their mothers. In various ways, about 178 Christians perished

for their faith on the Tsun Hua District. Some twelve hundred and more houses of all descriptions were either burned or torn down for these people. Our Mission compound, when I visited it in March [1901], consisted of scorched and cracking walls. Everything had been burned, the contents of the houses having been first carried off by the mob of people who entered the place. The chapels, with but three or four exceptions, were burned or leveled with the ground. In Yu T'ien Chinese soldiers utterly wiped out everything.

Walker's description was a reasonably conservative statement of atrocities matched or exceeded by many happenings throughout the region. Like that in Peking, the international quarter in Tientsin, in which were sheltered 550 Chinese Christian refugees, came under a bitter three-week siege. Among those who lived through those weeks of bombardment and blood were six W.F.M.S. women (Miranda Croucher, Ella E. Glover, Frances O. Wilson, Mary Shockley, Rachel R. Benn, M.D., and Ida M. Stevenson, M.D.), three Board missionaries (Pyke, Hayner, and J. V. Martin), and other foreigners, including the 26-year-old engineer Herbert Hoover.

During the height of the terror, Methodist leaders in the United States, gravely concerned for the missionaries in Peking and other trouble spots in China, were turning to the United States Government both for information and for action. Bishop Earl Cranston of Denver, who had just relinquished episcopal supervision of the China missions, telegraphed President McKinley on 16 June:

A massacre of Americans in China would be the catastrophe of your administration. Courage is now the first dictate of caution. Quick orders and a demonstration worthy of America may yet avert calamity. Troops as good as marines. The people will endorse you.

He supplemented this the same day with a letter "urging by political considerations, as well as in the interest of life and property and humanity, quick action be taken." Bishop Cranston was doing all he could, through the press and in the pulpit, to create public demand for effective military relief "of our people" imperiled by the uprising in China. He advised Secretary Leonard to press hard on the government for stronger armed intervention.

Leonard also heard from the field. On 9 June, he received a cablegram from Frank Gamewell and George R. Davis from Peking: "Massacre native Christians, situation foreigners critical, press Washington." On the 8th, he had begun correspondence with the State Department on the crisis, and he promptly forwarded the Gamewell-Davis message to President McKinley, urging "him to do whatever was possible for the protection of our people in Peking." In response to his series of appeals to Washington for information and protection came assurances from the President and the State Department of the government's initiative and co-operation. Secretary of State John Hay

wrote on 14 June that through the Departments of State and Navy, the President was doing and would "continue to do everything in his power to afford protection to all American interests in China, and most especially to the various American Missions there."

In all the voluminous treatment of the China crisis in *The Christian Advocate* during the summer and fall of 1900, hardly any question was raised about the legitimacy of resting the security of American Methodist missionaries on the presence or action of American military forces. To be sure, at one point, the *Advocate*, whose editor, James M. Buckley, was an active member of the Missionary Society's Board of Managers, seemed to be quoting with some degree of approval an Italian missionary whose view of the position of China missionaries differed radically from that of the Missionary Society and evidently of almost all Methodist missionaries in China:

The knot of the question is that the missionaries should not be protected. They should be, and should remain, really men of sacrifice. With protection they lose this attribute. . . . It is my opinion that only the patient, slow, and peaceful work of the missionaries, abandoned absolutely to themselves, can bring forth that immense land from barbarism.

The author of the quotation believed that in Chinese eyes, the protected missionary was tainted with complicity in foreign secular imperialism. But most of the views expressed by Buckley's contributors were coherent with the essential position taken by James Pyke when writing from Tientsin on 3 July in the midst of "some 10,000 foreign troops." Imploring "the God of battles" on behalf of the people caught in Peking, he said:

We know you are all joining us in our supplications. How slow the nations are in sending troops, especially our own government, which has plenty of men in the Philippines, only six or seven days distant!

Of course, the United States did send troops, and the General Missionary Committee, in a single resolution adopted in November, thanked Almighty God for the preservation of the lives of all Methodist missionaries during the Boxer troubles and also thanked the President and "the brave soldiers and marines who so gallantly obeyed his commands . . . for the promptness and energy with which they moved to the rescue of our missionaries and their helpless wards" in Peking.

Bishop David H. Moore, arriving at the mouth of the Hwang Pu at the end of September, to take up episcopal residence in Shanghai, gloried in what he saw of foreign military might as he drew near his China mission field:

The first glimpse I had of China included the Oregon, which was also my first sight of that renowned battleship. When the jackies told me what ship she was, and the rising sun, bursting through a dark cloud, poured his crown-

ing splendor upon her battlements, off went my hat, and internally off went three times three and a tiger "for the red, white, and blue." . . . Astern lay the Goliath, one of England's mightiest, and on every side grim monsters of war, representing the Allied Powers.

Being capable of such a gust of emotion at the sight of this array of engines of violent coercion ready to back up the missionaries, Bishop Moore found it not impossible to accept the idea of supplying arms, upon occasion, as missionary equipment. In December, after visiting Foochow and concluding that the Chinese fortifications make the city a "deathtrap" for missionaries in case of an anteforeign outbreak, he wrote the New York Secretaries:

The Consul had no arms; & as far as I can know, no plans for the protection of the missionaries. I believe that had the brethren been suitably supplied with arms, they would have stood at their posts & saved a dozen times the cost thereof in extra expense. 20 repeating rifles & a good stock of cartridges for Foo Chow would be a profitable investment for the Soc.

FOREIGN TROOPS IN NORTH CHINA, 1900-1901

Bishop Moore, patriot and veteran officer of the Union Army during the Civil War that he was, nevertheless had no three cheers and a tiger for what he saw of the works of the foreign troops in and around Peking. George R. Davis, a survivor of the Siege, already had written, only a week after it was lifted, that the foreign soldiers were looting Chinese shops. Referring to the escape of the Empress and her party, he said, "The truth is, the foreigners have been too busy looting the city, hunting for arms, and shooting known Boxers, so that no thought was given to the fleeing party." When the Bishop arrived weeks later, he found the capital indescribably desolate—not only looted and widely burned out by Boxers and by Chinese troops but also plundered and its miserable inhabitants brutalized by the military deliverers of the foreign community. Writing to the New York office from a houseboat on the Pei-ho in October, he briefly referred to what others portrayed as actually an official program involving extensive and thoroughgoing demolition, plundering, and desecration of Chinese places in Peking, even the most significant symbols and repositories of Chinese tradition, including the precincts (so long held taboo for aliens) deserted by the Empress and her entourage. He said:

Their palaces are either looted and pulled down or burned down, or are looted and occupied by foreign troops. . . . Every place has been profaned by our vandals.

The Bishop simply mentioned the Temple of Agriculture as "the camp of the Americans." He might have mentioned its disfigurement to suit the convenience of American officers, the tethering of cavalry horses at the

marble altar devoted to ancient rites celebrated by the Emperor, and the use of one of the Temple's halls as a commissariat displaying long rows of hams, cases of tobacco, boxes of army beans, and barrels of beef—"profanation and humiliation" it was all termed by an American missionary. The Bishop mentioned the Temple of Heaven as the headquarters of the British troops. He might have cited the fact that one of its halls was used as a clearinghouse for great quantities of valuable loot that were passed on daily to the British Legation for public auction. The French and the Germans dismantled and wrecked the Astronomical Observatory and carried off all its instruments. American Methodist leaders in the United States had at least an inkling of what was going on, for *The Christian Advocate* commented editorially as early as 27 September, "The looting by the allies in China seems to have stained the escutcheons of all nations but the Japanese. Next to them the Americans are clear, but evidence exists that many of them have been guilty."

Bishop Moore realized that in addition to implementing harsh official measures, the foreign soldiers inflicted upon the Chinese civilians their own spontaneous bestiality, cruelty, and rapacity, sometimes to a murderous degree. In his October letter, he declared:

The great Christian nations of the world are being represented in China by robbing, raping, looting soldiery. This is part of China's punishment; but what will she think of Christianity? Of course, our soldiers are the best behaved [he rated the Japanese next]; but there are desperate characters in every army.

The Bishop, along with two of the missionaries, himself drove out of the house of a harried Chinese an armed German soldier who was abusing the man's wife. This kind of molestation occurred hundreds of times daily, he testified. "The French are very devils at this sort of outrage," he said. And he variously called the British-led Sikhs, the Russians, and the Germans lustful, "lootful," and brutal. Bishop Moore was not the only critical observer; Major General Adna R. Chaffee, commander of the United States forces then in China, was shocked by the extensive looting by foreign soldiers in the capital. As to both property and people, the military saviors of the foreigners trapped in the Legation Quarter during the summer became, in turn, the ravagers of Peking.

Although the missionaries' reports, letters back home, and published articles were heavily weighted with accounts of Boxer atrocities and the villainies of Chinese officials, the Conference reports and the correspondence of the North China missionaries—and hence the Annual Reports of the Missionary Society—long made hardly more than a single explicit reference to the post-Siege disciplinary activities of the foreign troops. Hiram H. Lowry, who took up the superintendency of the Peking District in October, briefly mentioned in his report to the Conference a few cases of local magistrates' having been

mistreated by foreign troops on Circuits he visited. To say the least, the occupying forces were engaged for many months in a vigorous punitive campaign in areas that had been active scenes of Boxer violence. It was no mere military mop-up operation, nor even a forcible pacification program. The physical punishment it inflicted had no relation to the studied penalties eventually imposed upon the Chinese government by the Protocol of September, 1901. It was carried out by the various military contingents, which were only loosely co-ordinated by a German allied commander whose own German troops evidently were the most ruthless of all. Several dozen punitive expeditions were sent out from Peking and Tientsin, Tientsin itself having been ruthlessly ripped apart by the foreign troops and its people having been subjected to complete military dictatorship and disruption of its economic life. As Kenneth Scott Latourette summarized it, augmented "foreign forces came, notably Germans, and, under the guise of hunting down and extirpating the Boxers and of punitive expeditions to cities and communities in which foreigners had been ill-treated, instituted a reign of terror."

During the Teintsin-Peking crisis, the United States gradually moved troops from America, Cuba, and the Philippines to relieve and protect its citizens in the turmoil in China. But in the weeks following the relief of the Legations, when plans for the punitive expeditions were being shaped up, official sources were announcing the intention of the United States to pull its troops back to Tientsin from Peking and to effect their withdrawal from the country as soon as possible. Although American troops were briefly active in the vicinity of Peking, General Chaffee declined to send them out on the punitive expeditions, taking the position that they served no purpose but revenge and the display of military power. The United States announced its disapproval of the expeditions—particularly the projected advance upon Tsingyuan, the capital of Hopeh Province—as irritants that would seriously postpone the accomplishment of a peace settlement between China and the occupying powers.

This policy of restraint was not vigorous enough to suit some of the Methodist missionary personnel in China. James H. Pyke, who earlier expressed his impatience at the slowness of military reinforcements to arrive from the Philippines, wrote to Secretary Leonard from Tientsin on 12 October 1900:

You have received and seen our telegrams of last week. Besides those, we sent two to the President. Americans in Tientsin sent one and Bishop Moore one. We greatly deplore the withdrawal of U.S. troops, and America's mistaken attitude and lack of interest. We are ashamed and can't help it. The expedition of the Allies got off this morning for Pao Ting fu [Tsingyuan]—no U.S. troops!

This particular expedition eventually held an investigation that resulted in the beheading of three high Chinese officials for conniving at murders of

missionaries by Boxers. Two days before Pyke wrote to Leonard, Frank D. Gamewell and his wife were interviewed by the press upon their landing in San Francisco, Gamewell calling for effective punitive measures in China that would have a lasting effect upon the Chinese nation. When told that the Germans had demanded the head of Prince Tuan and did not propose to leave China until they got it, Gamewell exclaimed, "Good!" According to the same source, Mrs. Gamewell approved, and she added, "The Germans understand the situation, and I hope they will stick to their decision." Several months later, when resolutions calling for rigorous punishment of China had been sent to the administration in Washington, *The Christian Advocate* entered a public demurrer to the appropriateness of Christian missionaries' "showing zeal for retribution." Placing in the mouth of an hypothetical Chinese the question, Where is your doctrine of Christian forgiveness? the *Advocate* stated that "a missionary who could say, I will never be satisfied until we have the heads of the empress dowager and Prince Tuan, would be paralyzed by the question."

But Mrs. Gamewell's reaction was not inconsistent with a later, considered statement of hers that the Chinese, "a people of power, resource, deep subtlety, great intellectual development, and untiring perseverance . . . underneath a high degree of polish, are savage." She advocated (it was 1902) increasing missionary work—"before it is too late"—in order to tame and convert the savage whose power and daring made the Siege of Peking possible, a nation now holding its savage forces in leash and hidden away while turning new smiles upon the West. And Dr. Gamewell's reaction was undoubtedly coherent with the eschatologically tinged view of China's conflict with the West that he recorded in *The Christian Advocate* a few months after his San Francisco interview. He discounted as superficial explanation any reference to territorial aggression by the Western powers, to imperialistic economic penetration of China, or to missionary indiscretions.* He said:

. . . I feel in this conflict of Christianity with heathenism the issue is on. China has slammed the door in the face of Christianity. Light has come into the world, and men love darkness rather than light because their deeds are evil. . . . These things [the Western factors mentioned above] may act as surface irritants, but the reason of reasons is the opposition of darkness to the light. . . . There is no doubt as to ultimate outcome. The kingdoms of this world shall become the kingdoms of our Lord and of his Christ.

Defining the antagonist as savage and as anti-Christ, respectively, apparently blurred his status as a potential recipient of forgiveness.

In spite of missionary protests, United States troop withdrawals went into effect; and in spite of American disapproval, commanders of other foreign contingents continued sending out punitive forces. They not only occupied

* See note, p. 722.

Tsingyuan, but eventually concentrated there some fourteen thousand troops for forays into surrounding territory. Arthur H. Smith, a longtime American Board China missionary, wrote of the major expeditions and of the many minor raids from the military centers:

There have been times when it has seemed as if the foreign troops had come to northern China for the express purpose of committing within the shortest time as many violations as possible of the sixth, the seventh, and the eighth Commandments ["kill . . . commit adultery . . . steal"]. The combined result has been such a state of chaos in many districts as is at once incredible and indescribable. Of the promiscuous murder of noncombatants there is overwhelming evidence. . . .

Of the looting and wholesale robbery with violence . . . it will be long before the whole terrible catalogue of crimes is known. Long lists of the exactions made on Chinese officials and cities could be (and have been) made out, showing that the total sums extorted for alleged "protection" and "ransom" have been sufficient to impoverish the country for a long period. . . . and the fact that the expeditionary "spheres of influence" have been vaguely defined and imperfectly regarded, so that the same city might be raided by different sets of soldiers has made the condition of large regions more or less anarchic.

The raiding parties often exacted the payments of "ransom" by threats such as to burn down a village, and many villages actually were burned for failure to pay.

Smith cited a few items in the long catalogue of ruthlessness that he did not attempt to compile in full. There was Tsangchow, sixty miles south of Tientsin, where German troops plundered the quarters of the magistrate, broke down all constructive local Chinese authority, and reported their own looting and their killing of forty-three men as activities carried out against an allegedly hostile Chinese general, a man who actually was strongly anti-Boxer and friendly to resident foreigners. There was Yung Ch'ung Hsien, between Tientsin and Peking, where German troops killed some 150 Chinese under barbaric conditions that aroused the British to an attempt to counteract the effect of their atrocities. And there was Nantung, where the Boxers had driven out the American Board missionaries and destroyed foreign properties. The foreign troops quickly looted and burned the city with a thoroughness that left large areas of it in ruins, and a huge powder explosion soon extended the devastation. Said Smith:

A correspondent entering the city tried to find a house which had not been looted in which to spend the night, and where he hoped to secure a bedquilt. He did indeed find three in succession in the same building, but each one contained a dead Chinese woman, who evidently had been first outraged and then cut open, and covered with her own bedding! The miseries of the people for leagues about T'ung Chou and for all the following month [-s], from the brutalities of the foreign soldiers will never be known.

A month after the capture of the city the apparent population, aside from the attendants upon the foreign troops, amounted to but a few hundreds of persons.

The city was desolate, its normal life utterly disorganized and depressed. And the horror as Smith described it extended beyond the city itself:

Over the whole twelve miles between T'ung Chou and Peking one might pass and re-pass, and never see a human being, nor find at any of the countless tea-houses and inns along the route a single opportunity to purchase a mouthful of food, or even to water the animals. Unusually luxuriant crops were standing absolutely untouched, or if, as happened later, the heads of grain were cut off, it was done swiftly and furtively, and with scouts looking both ways to detect the presence of foreign troops on that much travelled military road. Many of the soldiers took a keen delight in shooting every human being in sight who looked like a "heathen Chinese," and the result was a broad belt of practically depopulated territory, where any one could pillage the empty houses with comparative impunity, except for the all-pervading fear of the sudden appearance of the dreaded polyglot foreign troops. Each of them represented a hasty and bitter nation, marching through the breadth of the land to possess the dwelling-places that were not theirs . . .

Many weary months was this heavy burden to be borne, with many nameless horrors upon which we do not venture to touch.

It took some time for substantial reports of the foreign atrocities and repressive acts against the Chinese to reach the American public. *The Christian Advocate*, which was sensitive to the issue, evidently had little material available for full discussion of it. On 9 May 1901, it finally was able to cite the State Department's issuance of "appalling information confirming what has long been suspected." It quoted from the lengthy report of a State Department investigator that had appeared in the daily press a few days earlier:

If the whole horror of the murder and pillage done between Tientsin and Peking comes to be understood in the United States and Europe, the sum of it is so great, as compared to the number of Christians who have suffered at the hands of the Chinese, that rightly or wrongly, the Chinese are to be held the injured party. Lancers wantonly impaling little children by the wayside in the streets of Peking are some of the least of the well-authenticated horrors, and to some foreign soldiers a dead Chinese Christian is just as satisfactory an evidence of no quarter as a dead Boxer—they neither know nor care for such trifling distinctions.

The State Department informant not only pointed to the brutal acts of the invaders, but also charged them with reducing a large area in North China to chaos, ignoring or repressing the elements in the Chinese community that could have restored order and authority in the wake of the Boxer troubles. Editorializing on the charges, the *New York Tribune* claimed that because

a number of the powers had disregarded the principles of reconstruction advocated by the United States, the Boxer affair would be remembered in the future "not for the magnitude of the Boxer outrages, but for the immeasurably greater magnitude of the woes inflicted upon China by Christian powers." *

During these months, public critics, of whom Mark Twain was the best known, accused China missionaries in general of various delinquencies of act and of attitude in the aftermath of the Uprising. Undoubtedly, much of the press criticism was prejudiced, exaggerated, or based on insufficient information. But there was one charge against which Methodist missionaries had only a thin defense. Said *World-Wide Missions* in their behalf in April, 1901:

Some of the daily newspapers, turning fiercely upon the missionaries, have asked why they have not borne testimony to the outrages by the foreign soldiery. The answer is, They have done so. Our Bishop Moore in a published article made indignant protest, not on hearsay, but on what he himself had seen.

Bishop Moore, however, was not a missionary in the ordinary sense, but an episcopal administrator barely arrived on the field from the United States. His apparently shocked comments referred only to the earlier, more spontaneous outbursts of vandalism and brutality in Peking, not to the later, deliberately organized expeditions that kept the waves of violence moving for many months. The ravages of the later period went unreported and unprotested in Methodist missions circles. Even Bishop Moore's letter was not published in one of the Missionary Society's own papers, but in *The Christian Advocate*. At no time did either of the Society's magazines publicize or protest against the outrages committed by the Western soldiers. Indeed, the Board of Managers of the Society itself spoke no word of official protest either to the United States Government or to the American public.

The Methodist China missionaries failed to furnish to their backers in the United States reports and protests of their own from which a general protest might have been fashioned. To be sure, they were prompt, assiduous, and voluminous in informing their sponsors and the general public of the barbarities practiced by the Boxers, providing material that kept coming into print long after the crisis was over. Sharing, as they did, the sensitivity of the general missionary corps to criticisms of the actions of its members, they and churchmen identified with their cause sprang swiftly and vigorously to the counterattack. But in their letters, in their published articles, and in their public addresses, they were silent about the atrocities committed by the Westerners. The few references to the foreign troops that appeared in the reports

* See note, p. 722.

to the North China Conference session of May, 1901 (not published in the United States until 1902), were made only incidentally, with neither the force nor the form of protest.

Indeed, some of the missionaries utilized the services of the military. George H. Verity of the Tientsin District wrote the New York office, "Escorted by a guard of U.S. soldiers I made two trips to adjoining counties in this Dist. making settlements for the destruction of our property with the local authorities." James H. Pyke brought out more explicitly the coercive nature of such co-operation between the military and the missionaries. He told the readers of *The Christian Advocate* that missionaries had accompanied military expeditions that were at the same time bringing given areas under foreign military discipline and helping to secure the arrangement of indemnities for the missions and for the Chinese Christians. "Naturally," he said, "in the presence of superior force such demands were promptly met. Also naturally, without force or pressure they would not have been paid, and never will be." He himself succeeded in settling indemnity business with local authorities in the vicinity of Linyu (Shanhaikwan) through the intervention of the British commander, Major General A. J. F. Reid, who led a military expedition into several large towns where all the Mission's property and much of that belonging to the Chinese Christians had been destroyed. This was the same expedition that was forcibly pacifying the area.

Pyke declared that he believed a military force should have been sent into every Boxer-ravaged district where the local magistrates had not attempted to restore order and "administer justice," which in his mind, of course, included making monetary reparations to the missions and their followers. Said Pyke:

The missionaries of that region should have accompanied the expedition as guides and interpreters. If perchance the missionary's judgment might have been warped by indignation and sympathy, the Anglo-Saxon love of fairness and the cool judgment of the military officers would have proved sufficient restraint.

Claiming that he did not know of a single instance in which a British or American officer did anything unjust or unwise, Pyke appeared to believe it was necessary to turn to no other criterion in judging the use of the soldier as claim collector for the missionary. Without referring to the brutal realities of the total setting and atmosphere in which it was being practiced by the occupying forces, he handled the question of coercion as follows:

To criticize the missionary for collecting indemnity by force is at the same time to condemn the military authorities and also the United States Minister and Consul. This needs no argument. This country may rest easy about the management of affairs at the front. The men in charge, Minister, soldier,

and missionary, can be trusted. They are true men and unselfish. . . . and without doubt they are the best judges of what needs to be done.

Methodism's field men proving capable of such practical ethical adjustments and so innocent of any concern with Chinese reactions to foreign soldiers, no generally accepted Methodist critique of even the grossest abuses by the foreign military forces emerged in North China and thrust itself into mission councils in the United States.*

MISSIONARY RESPONSE AND RECONSTRUCTION, 1900-1905

In addition to calling for military protection in the summer of 1900, the Missionary Society itself had acted to guard its missionary corps, largely by measured withdrawal from the areas of greatest danger. In July, the Board of Managers authorized calling all the missionaries out of China, to have them go either to the United States or to Japan, as might be required in order to provide for their safety. The Secretaries did not press their authority to the limit, but cabled their correspondents in Shanghai and Foochow to call in all who were in exposed positions in West and Central China and in Fukien Province. It was left to the missionaries to decide where they should send their families for still greater safety and to determine whether they themselves should leave China. Secretary Henry K. Carroll wrote James Pyke of Tientsin that "we do not desire them to take unnecessary risks. . . . and while we would not have them flee unnecessarily from duty, we would have them use a wise discretion in seeking places of safety until the present storm clouds have blown over." With the respective United States Consuls strongly urging them to leave their posts in the interior, the Methodist personnel in West and Central China complied with the Secretaries' cabled instructions by coming down the Yangtze to Shanghai. Missionaries also left the country districts in the Foochow Conference and converged on Foochow, but later on, most of the Foochow group, acting upon the urgent advice of the local Consul, departed from the city because of the tension there. Before the crisis was over, most of the missionaries who thus suspended their field activity or who left North China under the pressures created by Boxer violence found their way home, for one reason or another, to the United States. Some, however, remained in Japan ready to return to China as soon as possible.

As reports of the atrocities and the devastation perpetrated by the Boxers in North China circulated in the United States, they provoked a disillusioned and impatient reaction among American Methodists that made it necessary for the missions leaders to defend the soundness of continuing the missionary program for China. There were those who thought that the China fields should not be reoccupied, at least for some years to come. Particularly after

* See note, p. 722.

the triumph of the allied forces over the Boxers in August, however, the pessimistic reaction was countered by reiteration of the assurance that out of the crisis—a catastrophe for the reactionary elements in China—would come a great new opportunity for Christian missions in a country that would turn increasingly to new ways. “The blood of the martyrs is the seed of the Church” appeared so frequently in the literature of the crisis that sometimes it sounded, ironically, like a bloodless cliché tending too easily to reconcile the missions movement to the supposedly creative sacrifice of thousands of murdered Chinese Christians. Secretary Leonard employed Tertullian’s famous aphorism as follows: “My heart goes out in intense sympathy for our native Christians who are being slaughtered by their enemies, but the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the Church, and their persecutions will result in more rapid advances of Christianity in the Chinese Empire.” This assertion, made in a letter to James Pyke, immediately followed the statement, “God has certainly heard and answered prayer in the case of our imperilled missionaries in China. Up to this date, so far as we know, no lives have been lost.”

Of the negative view of future work in China Secretary Carroll wrote to Pyke in October, “I am glad this opinion is not the prevailing one, but the Church is being aroused to the belief that God is preparing a larger opening for missionary work in China than ever before.” Evidently, no serious challenge to continuing in China was advanced at the session of the General Missionary Committee in November. The Committee held that the Chinese martyrs “so abundantly vindicated the genuineness of our mission work in China as mightily to reinforce every appeal that may hereafter be made in its behalf.” It continued appropriations for China and asked for offerings for immediate relief for the “3,000 homeless and destitute survivors in North China,” who it said should be regarded as “the wards of the Church.” (Money for the relief fund already was coming in.)

Resolving to go ahead in China, the General Committee evidently was content not to rethink the basic position of its missionaries as aliens in that country. It was defined, of course, by the Treaty of Tientsin (1858), which the United States negotiated with China while the Chinese were under pressure generated by French and German capture of Canton and of the Taku forts linked with the defense of Tientsin. The Treaty guaranteed the right of American missionaries to propagate Christianity anywhere in China and granted Chinese converts the right to practice that religion.*

This was the ground of Spencer Lewis’s declaration when the troubles in West China were coming to a head late in 1894 that “the treaties guarantee protection to the missionary and freedom of belief and worship to his converts, and if these things are not insisted upon, we may about as well

* See note, p. 723.

pack up and go home." This was clearly the ground of an interdenominational missionary appeal adopted in Lewis's Chengtu residence in July, 1895, calling for international diplomatic intervention in Szechuan for the protection of missionaries and the punishment of rioters. This was the ground of the resolutions adopted the same month in Shanghai and—quite explicitly—of the Board of Managers' appeal to the United States Government two months later.

Secretary Adna B. Leonard had this treaty base for Methodist China missions in mind when he wrote to John R. Hykes, American Bible Society agent in Shanghai, in August, 1900, "I take it for granted that the Powers will not consent to any settlement with China that does not include the absolute safety of missionaries and the right of natives to profess and enjoy the Christian religion." In November, the General Committee reaffirmed this essential position:

For the lives sacrificed [in the Uprising] we can ask no indemnity in money; but the blood that has been shed cries out for more effective guarantees of religious liberty in the treaties hereafter to be made with the empire of China.

Pursuant to a provision of the Protocol of 1901, the post-Boxer settlement between China and the victorious foreign powers, the United States negotiated with China in 1903 a treaty that repeated the religious toleration clauses of the Tientsin treaty of 1858 and also added an explicit guarantee of the right of American missionary societies to acquire real estate in all parts of China for missionary purposes.* This, of course, met the General Committee's hopes. Thus the Methodist missionary enterprise went forward into the twentieth century unhampered by moral inhibitions about maintaining its public status in China on a foundation of treaties and military coercion expressive of foreign imperialist encroachment upon the sovereignty and the national spirit of that country. The terrible outburst of antifeignism in the Boxer Uprising seems not to have shaken the policy-makers' complacency as to either the rights or the rightness of the missionary presence in China.

Two of the China missions already had held post-Boxer sessions before the General Committee's November meeting in New York. The Foochow Conference met on 4 October, for its missionaries were back and ready to go to work even though the Consul and the viceroy banned their return to the outlying districts until the following spring. The Hsinghua Mission, whose missionary staff had not left the field, met on 17 October. Bishop Moore was present at neither of them, for he found it important to go instead to inspect the ravaged North China field, where he met with some of the missionaries. He did attend the meeting of the Central China Mission in Nanking on 7

* See note, p. 723.

February 1901, a full complement of missionaries being present. Most of them evidently had got back on the field by the end of the year. The Bishop did not reach Chungking for the session of the West China Mission on 10 April, but the missionaries were on hand. None of these missions had suffered severely or directly from the Boxer Uprising, though all had felt the hostile and anxiety-breeding pressures generated or heightened by it. The withdrawals of the missionaries had been strategic, and no lives of Methodist workers or parishioners had been lost. Little destruction of property had occurred, except for the loss of several churches and parsonages on the Kiukiang District of the Central China Mission. The West China Mission had been untouched by Boxer trouble, its difficulties from that source being delayed until the fall of 1902, when the Superintendent, Spencer Lewis, reported a serious and deadly outbreak of Boxer activity. These four missions, then, were faced only with normal or continuing problems.

But the North China Conference, meeting in Tientsin in May, 1901, with Bishop Moore in the chair, faced a tremendous task of reconstruction and rehabilitation in property, missionary work, church life, and community relations. Its dimensions varied from District to District (Shantung came off the best), but the essentials were the same. Hiram H. Lowry put it all in the barest terms when he said in his report for the Peking District:

The effect upon our work has been most disastrous. On the Peking District every foreign building has been destroyed, and every native building used for church purposes has been either partially destroyed, or so badly damaged as to be unfit for use without extensive repairs. The property of our church members has suffered in like manner. I do not know of a house on the district that has not been either destroyed or seriously injured, except in cases where ransom was procured at a large price.

The same is true of the live stock and the products of the farms of our members. More serious than the loss of property has been the loss of life. Some circuits have been almost entirely obliterated—not enough members remaining to perfect a church organization.

Such skeletal summaries become humanly appalling when clothed in detail gathered from concrete reports and eyewitness accounts of the sufferings and ruination experienced in particular localities. Even the cold financial dimension of property losses is impressive; the United States Claims Commission allowed the Methodist Episcopal Church in North China a total indemnity of \$316,187 (North China mission, \$173,662; Peking University, \$72,484; W.F.M.S., \$70,039). Taken in all its aspects, material and personal, the shock of the Boxer Uprising was the most crushing blow ever absorbed by an established Methodist foreign mission.

Rebuilding, repairing, and relocating church and mission buildings was a

long and demanding process. The missionaries also had to invest their leadership in re-establishing parish church organizations, reopening all kinds of parochial and institutional work, revising rolls and raising membership standards, working out indemnities for the missions with local authorities, assisting Chinese church people with their personal indemnity problems, coping with jealousies and discontent among church people over indemnity settlements (many were reported as having gone over to the Roman Catholics in order to secure greater advantages), smoothing out frictions between Christians and non-Christians (the latter resented the Christians' current favorable position; the former found it difficult to overlook the taint of Boxerism in their neighbors), toning up and developing Chinese leadership, and scaling their efforts to frequent lack of money. Great advances hardly were to be expected during these years; though many minor ones were made, and the mission in Peking took a major forward step in medical work by opening in 1903 The Methodist Hospital, John L. Hopkins Memorial, dedicated in memory of a brother of one of the Peking District doctors, Nehemiah S. Hopkins.

Recovery from the direct impact of the Uprising took most of five years. As late as June, 1902, the Peking District, for instance, had not a single church or chapel fit for use. Of the ensuing Conference year, George R. Davis, the District Superintendent, reported the following June, "Reconstruction has been the order of the year on this district." Not until May, 1904, four years after the Uprising, was he able to report, "The long period of reconstruction and reorganization is, happily, about closed."

Although the Boxer movement was broken up by the allied military forces and therefore failed to "extirpate the foreigner," it did successfully inflict upon the Methodist missions in China, directly and indirectly, serious numerical losses. During the year after the outbreak of the trouble in Peking, the membership of the North China Conference dropped from 4,375 to 3,328, the number of probationers being cut from 2,079 to 886. During that year, the membership of the five missions taken together dropped from 12,749 to 11,097, with the number of probationers decreasing from 11,815 to 10,408. But by 1905, the five missions climbed to the level of 15,216 members and 12,141 probationers. The strongest gains, however, appeared outside the Boxer-swept area. Though it had a large number of additional "adherents," the North China Conference, with 3,685 members and 1,566 probationers, still was not up to its pre-Boxer level, and as late as 1909, District Superintendents were citing losses under the Boxers as causes of the weakness of certain congregations. The statistics do not tell all—they reflect many variable factors—but the China mission clearly came through its travail at the turn of the

century as a constituency large enough and vital enough to achieve significant growth during the next fifteen years.

BISHOPS AND THE CONFERENCES, 1896-1920

During the four years that led up to the Boxer outbreak, the China Methodists came for the first time under the leadership of Bishops assigned to preside over its Conferences and Missions for more than one year. Bishop Isaac W. Joyce, whose official residence was Minneapolis, served on the field in 1896 and 1897, and Bishop Earl Cranston, resident in Portland, served in 1898 and 1899. These men were General Superintendents, not Missionary Bishops elected for and assigned to a specific field. Their successor, David H. Moore, was assigned to China for a full quadrennium, 1900-1904, and established his official residence in Shanghai. Bishops Joyce, Cranston, and Moore also supervised Japan and Korea during their assignments to China. Bishop Moore returned to the United States in 1904 and was followed in Shanghai by James W. Bashford, who served in China until his death in March, 1919. Bashford acquired a colleague in 1908, when Bishop Wilson S. Lewis took up residence in Foochow, with Bashford shifting to Peking. From these residences, they shared supervision of the China mission until Bashford's death. Lewis moved to Peking in 1920 and continued as the resident Bishop until his death in August, 1921. These two men carried out an unusually long, effective, and fine-spirited episcopal missionary partnership, the much better known Bashford and his less prominent colleague splendidly complementing each other.

Under this line of Bishops, China's pre-1896 system of two Annual Conferences (Foochow and North China) and two Missions (West China and Central China) developed, by 1917, into a pattern of seven full Annual Conferences. Bishop Joyce organized the Hinghua Mission Conference in November, 1896, from three Districts formerly included in the Foochow Conference, China's oldest Annual Conference. The Hinghua (Hsinghua) organization became an Annual Conference in November, 1908, under the presidency of Bishop Bashford. Bashford reorganized the West China Mission as a Mission Conference in January, 1908. The Central China Mission became a Mission Conference in October, 1907, and organized as an Annual Conference in 1909. The Annual Conference was divided in November, 1912, by the setting off of its western portion—the work in Kiangsi Province and in parts of Anwei and Hupeh Provinces—as the Kiangsi Mission Conference. It achieved full Annual Conference status in September, 1917. The remaining (eastern) division of the Central China Conference retained the name of the undivided organization. The West China Mission Conference became a full Annual Conference in January, 1915. The next Annual Conference to be organized, in November, 1917, was the Yenping Conference, formerly the

seven-county Yenping (now called Nanping) field of the Foochow Conference that lay northwest of Foochow in Fukien Province. In 1920, still other Conference changes were in prospect, for the General Conference passed enabling acts permitting the Hinghua and the West China Conferences to divide during the quadrennium. At the same time, the definition of the North China Conference was expanded to include Liaoning (Fengtien), a province of Southern Manchuria.

Uniting, and to some extent governing, the China Conferences and Missions was the Central Conference in China, which was organized with fourteen members (two were Chinese) in the office of the American Bible Society in Shanghai on 15 October 1897, Bishop Joyce presiding. The Conference both approved the new plan of episcopal visitation, whereby the Bishops were being assigned to preside at Conference and Mission sessions for two successive years, and at the same time recommended to the Board of Bishops that the term of visitation be increased to four years. When the Central Conference met in Shanghai in November, 1899 (this time thirteen of the twenty-six lay and ministerial members were Chinese), with Bishop Cranston presiding, it went still further, memorializing the General Conference to establish an episcopal residence in Shanghai, to which a General Superintendent should be assigned for a quadrennium. Bishop Moore's coming to Shanghai in 1900 fulfilled that request. Since in response to memorials from China and India, Central Conferences were that year made quadrennial, the China session next met in November, 1903, in Nanking. After prolonged discussion, this session went on record, 18 to 7, in favor of continuing supervision of China by Bishops who were General Superintendents rather than by Missionary Bishops. Incidentally, Bishop Moore believed that the best system of supervision would be to elect a Missionary Bishop for each foreign field, the man preferably to be chosen from the missionary corps on the field itself. Privately, he cited Hiram H. Lowry and Spencer Lewis as men of the desired calibre. In 1907, with Bishop Bashford now on the field, the Central Conference again dealt with the pattern of episcopal leadership. Its memorials to the General Conference requested an additional Bishop in China, called for the continued assignment of Bishop Bashford ("to remove Bishop Bashford from the field at this time would be an irretrievable calamity"), and specified that the additional Bishop should be a General Superintendent, not a Missionary Bishop for China "nor a Bishop for the Chinese race or language." The adoption of the last provision brought to an end a minority movement for the election of a Missionary Bishop.

The Central Conference sessions of 1907, 1911, and 1915 acted on organizational proposals that had expansive implications.

Church union emerged as a major emphasis of the 1907 session, which met in Shanghai in May, immediately following the close of the China Cen-

tenary Missionary Conference, which had brought to the same city for a fortnight's meetings eight hundred out of the thirty-eight hundred China missionaries working with eighty Protestant mission organizations. The Centenary Conference took steps to establish an apparently loose federal union to be called the Christian Federation of China. Its objects were stated to be:

to foster and encourage the sentiment and practice of union, to organize union effort whenever and wherever possible, and in general to seek through all such effort to hasten the establishment of the Kingdom of God in China.

Although there was much talk about union at the Centenary Conference, the voting delegates deliberately refrained from advocating an eventual "United Christian Church in China." The functional word in the adopted resolutions on interchurch or inter-Mission organization was *federation*. The conferees generally used the word *union* to refer to co-operative activities supported by various missions, not to the merging of churches or of denominational missions. Nevertheless, the Centenary Conference did appoint a Committee on Church Union that evidently was empowered to promote arrangements understood as moving in the direction of organic unions. The Committee was composed of consultative subcommittees with personnel from the Baptist, the Methodist, the Congregational, the Episcopal, the Lutheran and the Reformed, and the Presbyterian Churches and from the China Inland Mission and additional bodies, respectively. Hiram H. Lowry was the Methodist Episcopal man on the Methodist subcommittee.

During the Centenary Conference, the attending members of five or six Methodist bodies, including the Methodist Episcopal Church, twice met together to discuss Methodist union, finally resolving, "This meeting rejoices that there exists so great a unanimity among the branches of Methodism working in this empire for the formation of one Methodist Church in China." The meeting also appointed a commission of fourteen "to have charge of the subject of Methodist Union," the appointees to be subject to confirmation or substitution by their denominations. At that time, there were eight "Methodist" missions at work in China—the Methodist Episcopal Church, the Methodist Episcopal Church, South (in the delta of the Yangtze), the Wesleyan Methodist Church (British), the United Methodist Church (just coming into existence as the result of a merger of three British groups), the Free Methodist Church of North America, the United Brethren in Christ, the Canadian Methodist Church, and the United Evangelical Church—a variety of Methodisms naturally confusing to the Chinese.*

The expansive and co-operative atmosphere of the Centenary Conference and of the two Methodist meetings lingered about the Central Conference members as they met in their own official sessions, and the direction of their

* See note, p. 723.

thinking was further influenced by the presence and addresses of fraternal visitors from other Methodist bodies. The delegates also were aware, of course, of the movement in the United States towards reunification of the Methodist Episcopal Church, the Methodist Protestant Church, and the Methodist Episcopal Church, South. And they were sensitive to the fact that the first General Conference of the Japan Methodist Church (merging the Methodist Episcopal Church, the Canadian Methodist Church, and the Methodist Episcopal Church, South) was to meet in Tokyo that very month. Against this background, the Central Conference memorialized the General Conference of 1908 to create a commission with power to originate, consider, and consummate plans for union of the Methodist Episcopal Church in China with other Methodist bodies in that country. "In view of the growing desire for union among all Methodist bodies now laboring in China," it also requested its five Missions and Conferences to authorize inclusion in the Central Conference of delegates from the other Methodist groups, granting them voting power on questions of general interest.

Since the General Conference took no affirmative action on the memorial on Methodist union in China, the Central Conference session of 1911, meeting in Foochow, adopted another. This time, the memorial did not refer to "union," but asked for a declaration of "heartly sympathy with any wise and well directed plans for Methodist Federation in China." In calling for creation of a consultative and planning commission to submit a plan for consideration in 1915 and 1916 by the Central and the General Conferences, respectively, the memorial underscored the significance of the verbal shift from *union* to *federation* by specifying that the plans to be viewed by the commission should not involve severance of organic connection with the various mission-sponsoring Churches outside China. This change in emphasis was coherent with the thinking of Bishop Bashford, notably as expressed in two papers he prepared in September, 1909.

In one of them, "Co-operation Between Christian Churches in China," the Bishop pointed to the proved value and the promise of numerous areas of co-operation already achieved by China missions that still maintained their organic connection with North American and European churches—accomplishments in Christian literature, Biblical translation, tract distribution, *The Chinese Recorder*, publishing houses, hospitals, higher education, territorial comity, and local union churches offering affiliate membership. Bashford believed that the several Methodist groups could adequately develop their intra-Methodist co-operative work through joint meetings on the Central Conference level to discuss such mutual concerns as education, publishing, and creation of an "Arminian literature." He stated that the Methodist Episcopal mission already had invited the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, the Canadian Methodists, and the Wesleyan Methodists to do this at the time

of the Methodist Episcopal Central Conference meetings in 1911. (This plan was not carried out.)

The deeper ground of Bashford's conservative approach to church union on the field, whether with other Methodists or with non-Methodists, came out in his second paper, "A World-wide Christian Church *Versus* National Churches." Bashford saw field mergers as severing the uniting Churches' connections with those at home. This would tend to produce unified national churches in China and on other mission fields, thus aborting the creation of world-wide churches composed, respectively, of Anglicans, Methodists, Baptists, Presbyterians, and so on. "This policy," said Bashford, "threatens to be fatal to a world-wide single church embracing all Christians, because it will be more difficult to induce Christians to unite in one universal church after they have become segregated into national churches." Among the "fatal consequences" that would follow dissolution of the organic ties between mission-field churches and their home churches, he believed, were the following: (1) Field churches would become more vulnerable to heresies. (2) The flow of funds from sponsoring churches would dry up when they no longer could control field expenditures. (3) Parochialism in the home churches would increase. (4) The opportunities for independence for foreign churches within the world-wide Methodist Conference system would be sacrificed. (5) The churches would default on their responsibility to undergird the emergence of a growing world consciousness among nations (he cited the Hague Permanent Court of Arbitration) and large business interests. (6) The churches would contravene the teaching of the New Testament, which "puts the cross above the flag, not the flag above the cross." Hence Bishop Bashford did not want to see the American Methodist churches in China merged until the corresponding denominations in the United States should effect organic union. He was—quite consistently—skeptical of the wisdom of the projected three-church Methodist merger in Japan.

Three years later, reporting on China to the General Conference of 1912, which had in committee the 1911 memorial on "Methodist Federation in China," Bishop Bashford, speaking also for Bishop Lewis, carried the attack on church union still further by making a strong and lengthy criticism of the concept of a single Union Church for China. He advocated the way of active permissive interchurch co-operation involved in federal union—a plan that would keep intact the relationship between the Missions and their home churches. He interpreted the adoption of the Federation memorial by the Central Conference as a considered and overwhelming vote "against the national conception, and for the maintenance by Chinese Methodists of their birthright in ecumenical Methodism." Later in the session, the General Conference adopted the memorial from the Central Conference.

The Central Conference of 1911 acted also to broaden its official Methodist

relationships in the Orient outside China. Fraternal visitors presented to its members the desire of the Malaysia, the Philippines, and the Korea Conferences to be joined with China for Central Conference purposes. Considerations of distance and expense moved the Malaysia and Philippines Conferences to seek separation from the Southern Asia Central Conference, in which they were associated with the India work. The closer proximity of both groups to China and the fact that nearly all the constituency of the Malaysia Conference was Chinese made it natural for both to seek to combine with China. Korea, ironically, was politically annexed by Japan in 1910, but the Korea Conference could form no union with any denominational counterpart in Japan even had it desired to do so, for the Methodist Episcopal constituency in Japan was now part of the autonomous Japan Methodist Church. The Central Conference concurred in these positions and co-operated in memorializing the General Conference accordingly. The General Conference session of 1912 left Malaysia and the Philippines in the Southern Asia grouping, but linked the Korea Conference and the East Japan and the West Japan Mission Councils (organizations of American missionaries, not of Japanese churchmen) with the China Conferences in a new combination named the Eastern Asia Central Conference. Whether purposely or not, this alignment harmonized with the antinational, world-church trend promoted by Bishop Bashford.

The broader pattern of representation in the Central Conference was first observed in the session of 1915 in Nanking, with Merriman C. Harris, the Missionary Bishop for Korea and Japan, joining Bishops Lewis and Bashford in its presidency. The expanded Conference memorialized the General Conference—as had been done in 1911, and again unsuccessfully—to add to its membership the Philippines and the Malaysia Conferences. But it pressed no further the question of formal federation in China with either Methodist or non-Methodist bodies. Apparently the commission on federation authorized by the General Conference in 1912 never was raised and no plans were available from that source for action. The Central Conference strongly endorsed, however, what appeared to be the coming organic union of the Methodist Episcopal Church, the Methodist Protestant Church, and the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, and called for completion of the merger during the 1916 quadrennium. Bishops Bashford and Lewis also supported the proposed merger in their 1916 report to the General Conference and emphasized its value in removing confusion on the China field about the different brands of Methodism. "It is our fondest hope that a Church shall be established in China on such foundations that the child who kneels at her altars in the remotest hamlet shall know himself to be organically related to every other child in every land whose skies are blessed by the spires of Methodism." The Bishops

also sharply reiterated their rejection of the national church concept, branding it "subversive" of the highest interests of the kingdom of God. "It has not been nor is our intention, neither is it in the thought of our native people, to establish an independent Chinese Church."

BISHOP MOORE'S ADMINISTRATION, 1900-1904

Bishop Moore was the episcopal leader for China during the quadrennium of recovery from the Boxer Outbreak. Although the China mission—especially, of course, in North China—had just gone through a catastrophic experience, at the same time, the missionary corps led by Moore was largely a veteran group, some of the men having seen long service in China. Hence the process of recovery became largely the re-establishing of customary patterns of missionary activity. The feeling was abroad that the Mission, along with the other Christian groups, was now facing an era of great receptivity to Christianity on the part of the Chinese, for whose society the crushing of the Boxer movement by the foreign forces had broken the back of reaction. It was a new century, a new felt opportunity. But the Methodist mission remained very much a nineteenth-century enterprise in methods and outlook.

Bishop Moore himself belonged to the nineteenth century (he was born in 1838), and in his brief four years in China, he voiced no stimulating missionary philosophy that would turn China Methodism in new, creative directions. But he had strong doubts about the vitality and popular relevancy of the missionary corps as an effective evangelizing agency. When he had been in China for a year and had familiarized himself with his field, he very frankly expressed his disillusionment in a letter to the Board of Bishops.

He told his colleagues that coming to the foreign field (he was speaking to some extent of Japan and Korea as well as China) had dispelled the glamor the missionary life always had held for him. He said:

Except the separation from friends and the necessity of sending the children back to America for education, so far as the real comforts of life are concerned, I have never been where there are fewer hardships. The missionaries are better housed by far than the parsonages at home, and better paid by far than the missionaries that thread the prairies and climb the mountains of our [American] frontier. Hardships are to be found in the home missionary field—not in the foreign missionary field.

This situation tended, he declared, to breed softness and needless self-indulgence.

Bishop Moore also found the missionaries functionally limited because of addiction to the psychology of the compound:

The families naturally flow together in compounds, and build up a community of interests which localizes their operations, and separates the families from

that personal evangelistic contact with the natives so essential to the highest, best missionary work. We have missionary families who, save the husband, do not come into any relation of missionary life with the natives,—in some places attending other churches where services are in English, and never those carried on in the vernacular. It is natural that we should look down as a superior race upon those among whom we labor [did the Bishop appreciate the patronizing overtones of the word *native*?], and so insidiously does this tendency work that, before we are aware, there is a sort of barrier of contempt thrown up between our hearts and the hearts of those for whose salvation we are set [sent?], in the Name of Jesus Christ.

Less subtly, the missionaries' group consciousness was reflected in their administration of appropriations, which were

consumed upon the missionaries themselves, to such an extent that there seems to be little left to support the native preachers. . . . I think, on the whole, the redistribution is carefully done, and yet it is not done by disinterested parties. Everything is seen through the lenses of the missionaries themselves, whose first thought is for themselves, whose second thought is for the permanent features of the work, and whose last thought is for the evangelistic force of native workers.

Bishop Moore by no means turned sour on the missionaries as persons; he highly valued their commitment to the cause ("some of them are ideal in their devotion"), he honored them for their heroic leadership under fire by the Boxers, and he saw the true worth even of men so entrenched in their individualistic practices that they became foci of severe mission personnel problems. But he felt that "the self-sacrificing, unresting, unwearying push is wanting." He did not find the "fiery, consuming zeal to push out" and preach the gospel that he had been taught to expect. "I think," he said, "that every missionary center ought to be broken up, and the missionaries thrown out as firebrands to start new fires in the stubble of heathenism. We have *unused* property, expensive and really elegant, in different compounds, that is a sad commentary on this mistaken policy."

Bishop Moore gave China the closest supervision it ever had received. He had been in China less than a year when he characterized as "extravagantly foolish" a proposal originating in the United States to call him home "in mid-term for a whirl thro home conferences." He urgently desired to stay at work on the field throughout the quadrennium. He felt the same way, when early in January, 1902, he wrote, "The Bishops keep dinging into my ears that I should go home in the spring to work 9 months for some special drive for China." He finally went, briefly, later in the year, but only at the insistence of the Board of Bishops. Bishop Moore was a practical-minded administrator, habitually touching concrete problems and needs, dealing with people as individuals rather than by stereotypes, and endeavoring to effect specific and viable measures to move the Mission forward into an

actually foreseeable future. He avoided a trap into which men highly placed in the contemporary Methodist missionary movement often fell—the temptation to inflated talk about missionary strategy based on grandiose, but superficial and parochial, analysis of current events and deep social forces. In all his official letters from China, Bishop Moore allowed himself hardly more than a single paragraph of broad socio-political commentary, which was addressed to his fellow Bishops in 1902:

Politically, it is hard to diagnose China. Reform is in the air; reaction in the blood. All through the deepest interior, I saw only signs of friendship and peace, but withal, there was a sense of China's biding her time to square accounts. There was great eagerness for the Scriptures. I do not anticipate any general and successful outbreak:—rather sporadic uprisings. China is on the Ways. She starts slowly, but is sure to be launched. Japan is captain and pilot. If Japan is saved, China will be.

Either by critical evaluation or by proposals for action, he addressed himself to such concerns as missionary reinforcements for undermanned fields, the associated condition of substantial unused missionary residences, more realistic training for missionary recruits (especially as to language requirements), advantageous or necessary redeployment of personnel, replanning field work, difficult personnel problems involving important veteran missionaries, severe abuses in connection with special gift funds because of their independent cultivation and administration by individual missionaries, a Kiangsi Province scandal in which thousands of self-seeking inquirers had bought their way into affiliation with the Mission and in which corrupt Chinese churchmen had both feathered their own nests financially and used some of the illegitimately raised funds to buy mission properties, limited geographical expansion of the Mission, and administrative improvements.

Under the last category, Bishop Moore gave exclusive priority to two specific measures—formation of a union Methodist publishing house and establishment of a general treasury and business office for the Methodist Episcopal missions collectively. Both projects were to be implemented in Shanghai, which Moore almost passionately believed should be made an important functional center for the Methodist Episcopal Church because of the unique position of that metropolis in the Empire's commerce, finance, and pattern of internal and international travel. "We are fools or madmen not to plant ourselves here at once," he wrote. The general treasury was not set up until 1915, but Moore succeeded in leading his own China mission into a joint publishing venture with the Southern Church. The Methodist Publishing House in China opened on 1 January 1903. In 1904, it merged the denominations' two earlier periodicals into a single *Chinese Christian Advocate*. This Chinese-language publication later (1914) was supplemented by an English *China Christian Advocate*.

Bishop Moore was interested in four proposals for expansion of the Mission, but none of them was carried out during his brief administration. Two of them were limited in scope. "I shall go home in 1904 *miserable*, if we have not opened work in Canton to conserve our returning California-Methodists," wrote Bishop Moore. During Bishop Bashford's first quadrennium, Chinese Methodists returning from California founded their own church in Canton. Bashford visited it and, with some Wesleyan ministers, ordained its pastor, who had been elected by the California Conference. The church was never integrated, however, into the Conference system of the Methodist Episcopal Church in China. Bishop Moore also would have liked to inaugurate evangelism in Shanghai but was inhibited by the danger of rupturing comity with the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, which was at work there. As a result of negotiations initiated by the Central Conference of 1903, Bishop Bashford appointed a pastor for the Fukienese living in the port city, and the Southern Church mission provided his salary. Later, the arrangement lapsed, and the church became a union community church for Foochow-speaking people.

More ambitious than either of these was Bishop Moore's proposal—which he strongly advocated—to extend the Central China Mission into Hunan Province. He advanced two arguments for it. The first was political and economic, compounding national self-interest with the principle *noblesse oblige*, both rooted in recognition of secular advantages derived from a subordinate people. He applied it to the relationship of the Methodist Episcopal Church to China in general, holding that the United States was more directly and vitally related to China than to any other of Methodism's mission fields except Japan. He wrote in *The Christian Advocate* in the course of an article promoting the advance into Hunan:

Our commercial interests in China, actual and possible, are immense. China is our friend, and will be an increasingly valuable customer. The inter trade relations are bound to be extensive and intimate. Other things being equal, Americans should devote their labors of every kind to the advancement of American interests; we should push our missions in the zones of American trade and influence. Just now, for us, China is incomparably the greatest such zone. What the American people spend upon missions in China will come back to us with interest compounded.

The other argument was the need to observe sound missionary strategy in the deployment of missionaries. Secretary Henry K. Carroll expressed to Bishop Moore doubt about the financial viability of the Hunan plan; finally nothing came of it.

Bishop Moore's other more important expansive interest was Tibet. The initiative for the proposed move in that direction arose among the members of the West China Mission, who considered it at the Annual Meeting in

January, 1903, with Bishop Moore presiding. Spencer Lewis, the Superintendent, led off with a reference, in his report, to the penetration of "that fascinating fortress of Lamaism":

Is it not time for Methodism to be bringing up its forces to the attack? This Mission is in a strategic position for such a purpose. . . . Let the battle cry be raised of "On to Tibet," and let there be no faltering till we clasp hands with those who are hammering away on the other side of the Himalayas.

At the Annual Meeting in December of the same year, there was much singing of "our own Battle Hymn 'On to Tibet,'" written by Spencer Lewis, including one rendition, at the Bishop's request, for phonographic recording so that "he might sing it in the church at home until we possess Tibet for our God." The Mission adopted a report favoring the planting of a mission in Tibet—"the only remaining large territory of the world without the Gospel"—and asking Bishop Moore to promote the cause in the Church at large. "Would that men and money might . . . be forthcoming for an attack on the stronghold of Tibet," said Spencer Lewis.

Secretary Carroll took up the slogan "On to Tibet" in April 1904, in a *Christian Advocate* article "Knocking at the Doors of Tibet." He called for an immediate Methodist "campaign for Tibet," being encouraged by the current "knocking" by a commercially motivated British diplomatic and military expedition that since late in 1903 had been forcing its way from India into Tibet and on towards Lhasa, the capital. Carroll thought that this would compel Tibet to open itself to "the great outside world," including the Christian missionary movement. He believed that if the British were successful (the expedition reached Lhasa in August after a battle in which six hundred Tibetans were killed), the headquarters of any Methodist mission in Tibet "could be moved at once to the city of Lhasa." In issuing his call, Carroll commented on the Tibetans in not too complimentary a vein. He wrote of their religious life in undisguised disparagement:

The best and highest of the young men are taken for the monasteries. . . . Everything in Tibet exists for the monks, who are ignorant, immoral Buddhist zealots, turning prayer barrels, blowing their trumpets of human thigh bones, telling their rosaries, or engaged in some act of worship during most of their waking hours, with a class of "roughs" who spend most of their time in athletic exercises.

Announcing that there were several men ready to go to Tibet as Methodist missionaries, Carroll expressed the hope that warm-hearted wealthy Methodists would come forward with the necessary funds. "An offer of ten thousand dollars a year for five years would perhaps tempt the General Missionary Committee to establish a Tibetan Mission," he said. He finished by quoting

from a letter of Bishop Moore's an impassioned paragraph keyed to the pitch of "O raise the clarion cry for means . . ."

BISHOP BASHFORD'S ADMINISTRATION, 1904-1911

Secretary Carroll did his best, but the call for \$10,000 went unheeded by potential donors, and neither the General Missionary Committee nor the Board of Managers undertook supporting action. Only the General Conference acted—by adding the word *Tibet* to the Disciplinary definition of the field of the West China Mission. The initiative was returned to the Mission itself, which did not at once retrieve it. The Annual Meeting of February, 1905, displayed no enthusiasm for entry into Tibet: there was no singing of "On to Tibet"; Spencer Lewis, the Mission's firm veteran and advocate of the cause, had been transferred to Central China; Bishop Bashford, who presided, was against the Tibet plan; and the adopted report of the Committee on New Work mentioned the previous Meeting's expansionist battle cry but then smothered it with a plea for priority for consolidating gains made in the field already occupied. In 1906, Tibet was not mentioned at the Annual Meeting.

"On to Tibet" next rang out in the sessions of the West China Mission in January, 1907, when Bishop Henry Spellmeyer, a visiting General Superintendent, was in the chair. China was now reasserting its position in Tibet, having begun to send troops into the country in 1905. The Mission adopted a report containing a section that began:

Whereas the Chinese officials are offering inducements to emigrants to settle in and around Batang, and whereas this gives us an unprecedented opportunity to approach Tibet . . .

Following up this preamble both with words and with action, the Mission at once called for volunteers to serve among the colonists in Tibet as evangelist-teachers and to learn the Tibetan language. Six Chinese mission workers came forward, and Bishop Spellmeyer appointed two of them—Bu Shiao Lan, a Local Preacher, and Tsen Pei Tien, an Exhorter—to Batang, which was three hundred miles, or more than thirty days' journey, west of Chengtu. Their financial support came from offerings at the Mission session and from later collections in the West China churches. Beginning then, the slogan "On to Tibet" was printed on the front cover of the Mission's published Minutes for seven years.

The Conference appointees actually started work among the Chinese in Batang, but it took less than seven years for the project to peter out. No American Methodist missionary ever worked in the Tibet mission, and the attempt to supervise it from the Szechuan area proved unsatisfactory. Bishop Bashford even appointed a Presbyterian who was resident in Batang as

missionary-in-charge in 1908, but this and other earnest efforts to maintain an effective mission were fruitless. In January, 1911, the Conference voted to suspend the work; one of the Chinese evangelists in Batang had gone into business, the other had come home, and the Conference could not send out a new team at that time. In spite of the willingness of both Americans and Chinese in the West China Mission Conference to support the Tibet mission financially, it never was revived.

Although Bishop Bashford did not at first share Bishop Moore's interest in the move into Tibet, he had an expansion program of his own. He came out with it in 1907, offering six concrete proposals. Only two of them involved the prospect of fresh expansion into distinctly new geographical areas: (1) entry into Manchuria and (2) beginning work in Shansi Province. These two regions lay immediately north and west, respectively, of the field actively cultivated by the North China Conference. Bashford declared that opening work in either of these fields would require the pledging of a \$40,000 budget, to provide five missionaries (one physician, two teachers, and two evangelists), five missionary residences, a hospital, two school buildings, and "native" chapels and workers. During the next dozen years, the Church gradually put more missionaries and more money into the development of the already established work. But in spite of major financial appeals launched by Bashford, the two \$40,000 programs never were initiated, and Shansi and Manchuria still were unoccupied when the Bishop died in 1919.

Bashford's repeated call to the Methodist Church to invest more men and money in China was not dictated by temperamental missionary expansionism, but by his earnest acceptance of an analysis of the current Chinese situation that he quickly worked out in 1904 from his own reading and observation, from numerous missionary reports he heard in Conference sessions, and from many conversations with both Methodist and non-Methodist missionaries. He summed it up in the phrase "the awakening of China" and later expounded it in a book bearing that title. In a general sense, the term referred to a new social climate in China since the Boxer debacle—a quickening of interest in the outside world and its ways, a turning away from cramping tradition, a desire for modern education, a general increase in receptivity to Western civilization with its industrial technology. Religiously, the Chinese were showing a new openness to Christianity, and Christian missions were faced with an unprecedented opportunity.

Although Bishop Bashford welcomed the "awakening" of China, he also found a disturbing element of unrest worked through it. Writing in 1907, he said, "China is today in more danger from revolution than from conservatism." Declaring that Chinese students were almost universally reformist, he expressed his concern that indeed more and more of them were filled with "the revolutionary spirit." Students returning from Japan he found full of revolutionary ideas fired by hatred for the Manchu dynasty, by anger at the

harsh treatment of emigrants to the United States, and by resentment of aggression by Great Britain, Russia, France, Germany, and Japan. Said Bashford, "They have raised the cry 'China for the Chinese,' and it is running through the empire like wildfire. It has a double meaning: anti-foreign, anti-dynastic."

With the scars of the Boxer troubles hardly hidden from sight in North China, Bishop Bashford certainly did not desire to see any new conflagration of antifeign violence. Nor did he or the Methodist Episcopal Church advocate any disturbance of the pattern of special privilege that protected, at the expense of China's sovereignty, American economic and missionary activity in the Empire.

Bashford enjoyed a prime opportunity to become familiar with that pattern; for his first quadrennium, his official residence was in the Shanghai International Settlement, the scene of China's most broadly entrenched and most fully articulated expression of concessionism and extraterritoriality. Antifeign rioting erupted there on 18 December 1905. It was fired by Chinese resentment at a British attempt to enlarge foreign participation in the Shanghai Mixed Court at a time when, as Bashford testified, Chinese officials were strenuously endeavoring to retrieve extraterritorial privileges already in foreign hands. The rioting, and the boycott on foreign goods that accompanied it, also served as vehicles for anger at the Chinese Exclusion Act, which was remaining unmodified by the Congress of the United States. Bashford saw thousands of people in a mob surrounding the Methodist Publishing House, only a block from his own lodgings. Rioters looted stores, jostled foreigners in the streets, upset rickshaws, burned the municipal jail, damaged the town hall, and finally belabored forty or fifty foreigners with clubs and stones, robbed some, and knifed a few, but seriously injured only two. Marines were landed from foreign vessels and, assisted by belatedly equipped police and volunteers, cleared the streets by firing upon the rioters, killing some forty-five Chinese. Posters urging the Chinese to attack foreigners on Christmas had gone up in the city, but timely rains and the presence of the military ended the affair.

Two months later, a riot more damaging and deadly to Europeans broke out in Nanchang, resulting in the death of six French citizens and three British subjects. It was set off by a dispute between a Roman Catholic missionary and a Chinese magistrate that came to a climax in the violent death of the latter. When Bishop Bashford, in Shanghai, got his first reports of the wild mob action, including a wire from Spencer Lewis that the Methodist missionaries had escaped in boats, he consulted with the United States Consul General, who earlier in the day had received from Lewis a message predicting danger and asking for help. Then followed a conference between Bashford, Consul General Rodgers, and Captain Fletcher, commander of the United States squadron in Chinese waters, with Bashford participating

in the decision to send a gunboat to rescue the escaping missionaries. Bashford also provided, from his own sources, information used by Rodgers in framing his cabled report to the State Department in Washington. Bashford recorded in his Journal that he "especially suggested the putting in of Catholics as the cause because I felt the blame ought to be put where it belongs."

By this attribution of the "blame" for the Nanchang trouble, as with his reference to the admittedly unjustified British move in the Shanghai Mixed Court, Bashford intended no criticism of extraterritoriality as such. He was only pointing to two limited and localized abuses of it. He would have defended the British move to broaden the application of extraterritoriality in Shanghai if only the British officials had gone about it by due process of negotiation and not by using pressure tactics. He had no quarrel with the French Catholics' possession of extraterritorial status, but only with the gross and aggressive manner in which they were reputed commonly to exploit it to advance the interests of the Catholic community. As a missions administrator, he had no qualms about the existence of extraterritoriality and never called upon his government or his church to renounce it. Nor did he have any scruples, but only prudential caution, about emergency utilization of the protection offered his missionaries by the Consular and military agents of the United States who were at hand to implement extraterritoriality and the special privileges associated with it.

Bishop Bashford's thinking evidently was harmonious with the continuing position of the Missionary Society with regard to the public status of Christian missions in China. In a *Christian Advocate* article on "Missionary Policies in China—A Plea for Discrimination," Secretary Henry K. Carroll commented on the Nanchang affair a month after the event. He laid the trouble to Chinese irritation with the Roman Catholic Church for systematical and habitually interfering in the country's judicial processes so as to protect its converts and for stretching the implications of extraterritoriality so far as to gain for its priests and prelates public honors equivalent to those belonging to comparable Chinese officials. "The Roman Catholic clergy, holding official rank," charged Carroll, "really constitute a state within a state, which Chinese magistrates must recognize." But he exempted Protestant missions from responsibility for provoking antforeign feeling, stating that they had rejected any such system of public honors for their clergy. He also credited them with deliberately avoiding political complications and interference in converts' legal cases "except in rare instances when great injustice might otherwise result" and also with not calling "upon the representatives of their own government to prosecute claims except for the protection of life and property."

Behind Carroll's exceptions, which he obviously thought were quite innocuous, was hidden the actually substantial record of Protestant missions for judicial and diplomatic intervention and for reliance upon foreign military protection. Carroll summarized the significance of extraterritoriality by saying,

"That is, foreigners in China are considered, for legal purposes, as though they were not within the territory of the empire." And he said more concretely, "If they become offenders they are to be tried, not in native courts, but in the courts of the consulates of their respective nations." With that condition Carroll clearly found no fault; he felt no need to derogate it as a transgression of Chinese sovereignty. Discriminating between the bad behavior of the Catholic beneficiaries of it and the good behavior of the Protestant beneficiaries apparently exhausted his critical evaluation of the situation.

Bishop Bashford's lack of ethical concern over extraterritoriality undoubtedly was confirmed by his analysis of its function in Chinese public opinion as a current cause of antiforeign agitation. In mid-1906, he recorded in his Journal, in which he often shaped up materials that later emerged in addresses or published writings, a number of points in rebuttal of a patently antimissionary article in the *North American Review* that claimed that the United States was angering the Chinese and losing China commerce by holding to the right of extraterritoriality and that protection of American missionaries was the cause of the government's insistence upon it. Bashford claimed that he never had heard a Chinese mention extraterritoriality as the cause of Chinese agitation against the United States, that no missionary ever had reported to him a Chinese criticism of "our use of extra territoriality," and that the person who systematically read Chinese newspapers for him never brought him a report of "finding newspaper editorials or articles denouncing extraterritoriality." "Surely," he wrote, "if China were stirred to any appreciable extent over extraterritoriality, some criticisms would have reached those with whom I am in contact."

Unfortunately, those who interpreted Chinese affairs to the Bishop naturally served less as mirrors of current reality than as filters. To be sure, he traveled extensively, was an avid observer, and kept up a program of solid reading in English-language sources. But in his live contacts with people in China, he was largely confined to members of the converted Chinese community, the missionary corps, Chinese magistrates and a handful of higher government officials, Western diplomatic and military personnel, and a variety of people with whom he enjoyed social intercourse in international circles. Among the Chinese, he could converse freely only with those who spoke English. He did not cultivate vital exploratory communication with revolutionary-minded students or other sharp critics of the Chinese and Western establishments. He had no direct way of knowing the roots of their admitted opposition to foreign domination. Most of Bashford's informants held some vested interest in the stability of the *status quo* for foreigners or were committed to a policy of avoiding friction with them. Such informants naturally would press upon him no unsettling facts or opinions. Bishop Bashford's experience in China tended, therefore, to leave him both undisturbed by ethical doubts on such questions as extraterritoriality and at the same time

convinced that there was no substantial Chinese threat to the continuance of the system of privilege that sustained the presence of missionary and commercial Americans in China. He seemed to feel that it was enough to ask, in his *Journal* rebuttal, "Shall U.S. deny extraterritoriality to missionaries & continue it to those intruding rum & opium into China?"

Complacent as he was about American invasion of the sovereignty of China, Bashford was disturbed about the impact of the Chinese Exclusion Act upon Chinese public opinion. The United States Minister to Peking, William W. Rockhill, told him of receiving at the time of the Shanghai rioting letters from fifteen hundred "Chinamen" to the effect that the boycott would be renewed with much greater severity if the Exclusion Act was not modified. A little later, Bashford himself was hearing through Chinese officials and the press strong criticisms of the Act. The Bishop believed that the coverage of the Act should be liberalized and its administration humanized. He felt that the continued failure of Congress to improve the Act and its enforcement was the only questionable and unsettling factor in Sino-American relations. "If that difficulty were out of the way," he wrote, "I would say without reserve that it is the hour of dawn in China."

Beginning with a conference with President Roosevelt, and one with Secretary of State John Hay, in June, 1904, before leaving for China, Bishop Bashford conducted, by interviews and by letters, a four-year personal campaign for modification of the Exclusion Act, which had reached its most rigid and offensive form. He pressed his view with Minister Rockhill, upon whom he called in June, 1905. Some months later, he wrote to Vice-President Charles W. Fairbanks and two United States Senators and sent off letters that were published in the American press.

Bashford got his widest hearing for his views on the Exclusion Act when, on 1 May 1906, he testified before a committee of the United States Senate. He heavily stressed there the need for some improvement in the situation so as to give the Chinese trade guilds some basis for lifting the boycott against American commerce. His strongest expressed reason for desiring to see this accomplished was to give Americans, as he later said in his *Journal*, "a fair chance with English, German & Japanese merchants to capture our share of the trade of the Pacific."

In October, Bashford had his second interview with President Roosevelt. Before long he was writing in his *Journal* (1907), "China is angered over the exclusion act or rather over the terms of it," and was recording his observation that the anger was becoming an element in the antiforeignism associated with the "unusual & dangerous amount of revolutionary sentiment" he then found in China. The Bishop kept agitating for a change. In the summer of 1908, he again conferred with President Roosevelt and also saw Secretary of State Elihu Root. At the same time, he talked with the Republican Presidential candidate, William Howard Taft, on several China

questions, including improvement of the Exclusion Act. It was always modification of the Exclusion Act—not abolition of it—that Bashford sought; he desired changes in its terms and in the manner of its application by those who administered it. The changes he advocated were relevant to the reception of Chinese coming to the United States but represented for Bashford no prospective change in the basic posture of the United States in China itself. He wanted to see the Exclusion Act made sufficiently palatable to the Chinese to avoid having the American position in China upset.

Bashford resisted the idea of domestic revolution for China as decisively as he resisted any trend making for antforeign upheaval. He deplored the attitude of the "hot-headed young men" who believed that China must be reformed "in a day" and that there was no practicable method but revolution. He hoped to see the national energies of China so channeled as to remain amenable to the tutelage of the West. Indeed, the secular and the religious aspects of China's outreach toward modernity were so fused in Bashford's thinking as to provide him with a common rationale for both American foreign policy and American Methodist missionary policy:

My own conviction is clear that the United States will dominate the civilization of this great nation, not only on account of her geographical position, her resources, and her energy; but also because the Chinese themselves in breaking away from an ancient civilization can readily be led to accept a western, Christian, Protestant civilization.

Bashford's conviction was so strong that he advocated, and continued to advocate, doubling the Methodists' annual contributions of \$100,000 to China missions. He felt certain that if such multiplied contributions could be expressed by sending out a group of high-grade young men and women missionaries, it would be "*surely possible for us to have one million members and probationers in China within the next twenty-five or thirty years.*"

Bashford reserved his approval for current movements that gave hope of "evolution, and not of revolution": the emergence of more newspapers; educational reform with Western orientation; plans for more railroads, "under Chinese initiative"; adoption of Western inventions; the increasingly popular efforts against foot-binding; and the Chinese struggle against opium. This program of Bashford's was functionally modernist but substantially conservative. It offered no working goals that would require deep beneficial changes in the social and economic condition of the Chinese people.

Perhaps the pattern of reform Bishop Bashford found acceptable for China was limited in part by his broader view that "lasting reform can come only through the regeneration of individuals and that conversion would lead to evolution and not to revolution." His panacea for China's physical, social, economic, and spiritual needs was evangelical and evangelistic—preach the gospel and convert to Christ. It did not present the gospel, however, as a

force generating social imperatives for converted Christians in China. It had none of the flavor of the Disciplinary paragraphs on the Church and social problems (later called the Social Creed of the Churches) adopted by the General Conference in 1908. It lacked the philosophical perspective expressed in the Social Creed in 1912:

In the social crisis now confronting Christianity, the urgent need and duty of the Church is to develop an evangelism which shall recognize the possibility and imperative necessity of accomplishing the regeneration of communities as well as of persons; whose goal shall be the perfection of both society and the individual.

Politically, Bashford's opposition to revolution was specific; he was against the overthrow of the Manchu regime. American that he was, nevertheless neither in public nor in private did he voice any advocacy of political democracy for China. In a general way, in spite of his assertion that China had enjoyed much experience in local self-government, he believed that the country was not ready for popular government on the national level. More immediately, he judged that the Manchu rulers no longer were reactionary, but were beginning to make their government a usable vehicle for reform. He felt that the Empress Dowager had undergone a political conversion during her post-Boxer exile from Peking and that slowly but surely she was moving the Empire toward the very goals put forward by the reformist young Emperor she had deposed in 1898. Bashford also was profoundly impressed with the strength, competence, and progressiveness of Yuan Shih-k'ai, who was coming to the center of national power and effecting military and educational reforms. The Bishop's high evaluation of Yuan Shih-k'ai, whom he described as "New China embodied," revealed that he had more confidence in the enlightened rule of a strong man than in republican government. When upon the death of the Emperor and of the Empress Dowager, Prince Ch'un, the regent for the new boy Emperor, dismissed Yuan Shih-k'ai, Bashford transferred his confidence to the Prince Regent, who was moderately progressive but by no means so potent a figure as Yuan. Bashford himself was one of those "many Americans" whom he later cited as believing in 1911 that the Chinese should "advance their political organization from a despotism to a constitutional monarchy and then aim, a quarter of a century later, to advance from a constitutional monarchy to a republic."

As opposition to the Manchu regime became stronger, Bishop Bashford made it clear that he desired the Methodist Episcopal mission to maintain neutrality as between the regime and the anti-Manchu reformist groups. The *Minutes* of the Foochow Conference of 1907 report:

The Bishop spoke further of the great importance of our [Chinese] preachers, especially the younger ones, maintaining a right attitude to the social and

political reform movements. He urged active participation in the reforms looking to the purifying and strengthening of the Church in China, but warned the younger men of the importance of keeping free from any entanglements in reform movements which are revolutionary in relation to the government.

The Bishop's declaration hardly may be called a device to save the regime he favored from the embarrassment of attack by Methodists; it was essentially a correct position that he took in his capacity as an ecclesiastical administrator. Nor may it be conclusively attributed to his desire to protect his entree with government officials, with a number of whom he conferred from time to time, especially after moving to Peking in 1908; it would be easy to exaggerate the stake that Bishop Bashford had in retaining the favor of important Manchu leaders. Secretary Homer C. Stuntz enthusiastically confided to a correspondent after a conference with the two China Bishops in 1910:

Bishop Bashford has come to a place of entirely unique leadership in the spiritual affairs of that ancient Empire. He has been invited in [*sic*] the counsels of the government regarding the most fundamental questions laid before them in shaping their new Parliament, and in arranging the course of study for their new free public school system.*

Bishop Bashford's letters and his journals do not substantiate, however, the suggestion that he enjoyed any recognized status as a government adviser or any continuing confidential relationship with any high Manchu official. Much less is it clear that Bashford was exerting any measurable influence in the Imperial government.

Neutrality not only was Bishop Bashford's announced policy but also the public policy at least tacitly observed by the Central Conference and the five mission bodies represented in it. The Conferences and Missions not only refrained from supporting anti-Government elements, but hardly spoke out at all on current trends toward major change in Chinese society. Foot-binding and opium control were the issues eliciting their most continuous interest and their most forthright statements. Only as private individuals did any of the Mission's American or Chinese workers give sympathy or support to preparation of the political revolution that occurred in 1911.

THE ANTI-MANCHU REVOLUTION, 1911-1912

The first rumblings of the upheaval were heard at the end of August, when Szechuan Province was disturbed by a general rebellion against local implementation of nationalization of the railroads by the central government. The overtly radical anti-Manchu revolution broke out in Wuchang, in eastern Central China, in October and then spread quickly to cities and provinces throughout the country. Bishop Bashford first heard news of the Szechuan

* See note, p. 723.

affair when he arrived in Peking from the seaside resort Pehtaiho on 2 September. Inquiries at the American legation gave him enough cause for concern about the West China missionaries to prompt him to send off telegrams inquiring about the situation there. The answers he received did not sharply alarm him; he made arrangements for full dispatches to be sent to the New York office, did the best he could to keep track of public developments, and generally went on with his Mission business, though he did postpone the session of the Central China Conference when the Consul General wished him not to risk traveling to Nanchang for it.

Even after the revolution mushroomed to its full dimensions, Bishop Bashford was quite permissive as to whether the missionaries should leave their posts. As late as 6 November, he sent to each mission a letter urging the workers to estimate the danger for themselves and to withdraw to the nearest points of safety when they felt that it was necessary. The Secretaries in New York also were concerned, but the Board of Managers took no action to intervene in the operation of the China mission, except to approve the recommendation of Bishop Lewis, who was in the United States, that no new or furloughed missionaries be sent to China until the current disturbance should die down.

Now that guns were barking and revolution was a reality, Bishop Bashford still clung to his opposition to that radical method of reform. Recognizing the ultimate shakiness of the Manchu regime because of its long permeation by corruption, and believing that whichever group won out would be limited to certain necessary patterns of reform, Bashford nevertheless remained convinced that it was "far wiser to continue rapid evolution under Prince Chun rather than attempt a revolution." Furthermore, he feared that prolonged civil strife would endanger China's territorial integrity by encouraging aggression by Japan and Russia in Manchuria and Mongolia. He found himself, however, in a small minority, for he was aware that most of the missionaries, all the foreigners with whom he conversed, and "apparently all the Chinese" thought revolution the better course and were sympathetic with the uprising.

The Imperial government fought back against the revolutionists, but by the end of the year, the Manchu power was broken, and various forces were coalescing to establish a new regime. Yuan Shih-k'ai had been called back from political exile and charged with command of the Imperial armies and with negotiation of a settlement with the rebels. Bashford's earlier confidence in Yuan again became a relevant political attitude. "At present," he said, "Yuan Shih Kai seems to me to combine more fully than any one I know a knowledge of the art of government with a heart to serve the people." Bashford believed that only a government so inspired had the power to survive permanently. In a major expression of his characteristic opportunism, Yuan sold out his Manchu masters and secretly bargained with the rebel groups

for the establishment of a new regime, of which he should become the head. A provisional republican government was set up in Nanking, and Sun Yat-sen, the perennial underground revolutionary who had sponsored the Three Principles of the People (Nationalism, Democracy, and the People's Livelihood), became temporary President of China on 1 January 1912. On 12 February, the Manchu Emperor abdicated, conveying to Yuan full authority to form a united Republic of China. Yuan Shih-k'ai—no convinced republican—succeeded Sun Yat-sen and formally entered office as Provisional President on 10 March, thus providing the ground for the remark of a modern historian that the Revolution "had been less of a political revolution than a massive *coup d'état* arranged by that master of ceremonies, Yuan Shih-k'ai." *

The West China missionaries were, of course, the first to witness the revolutionary events, particularly in Chengtu, the station farthest west, where there were about a dozen men and women Methodist missionaries. The popular resentment toward the government's railroad policy was massive. There were angry but peaceful street demonstrations, shops were closed, internal customs payments were withheld, student strikes closed down government schools, and a new Anti-Loan Society quickly secured many thousand adherents and started publishing its own daily newspaper. When the officials arrested and threatened to execute leaders of the protest movement, crowds gathered to demand their release, and soldiers fired on the demonstrators, killing a dozen people. For a day, following that act, the city was the scene of riotous chaos. Supporters of the popular uprising, estimated at from ten to twenty thousand, swarmed in from the country and besieged the city. Armed as they were with primitive weapons, they were no match for the soldiers, who thrust them back after two days' fighting in which many soldiers and many civilians were killed. During the siege, at the bidding of the Viceroy, the foreigners in the city resorted for safety to the Canadian Baptist hospital building. For weeks, with rebels holding villages outside Chengtu, the city remained in a loose state of siege.

The tumult became widespread in West China, the popular uprising soon merging into the specifically anti-Manchu revolution that exploded at various points throughout the Empire. Before the Revolution became completely effective (Chengtu and Chungking fell late in November) and before the emerging new authorities could bring the area well under control, lawless bandits roamed parts of Szechuan, and the general commotion and its latent threats seriously hampered, in fact largely stopped, the work of the Methodist missionaries. The United States Consul ordered all missionaries to withdraw to a place of safety. Methodist workers in Tzechow, Hochow, and Suining made their way to Chungking, though some of them at first repeatedly turned down the Consul's request because their own cities were quiet. Later,

* See note, p. 723.

the Consul ordered all missionaries out of West China, and almost all of them, of various denominations, obeyed. Enough Methodist missionaries went down the river to Shanghai by the end of the year to make it possible to hold there on 17 January a well-attended—except for the absence of the Chinese preachers—session of the West China Mission Conference.

There was little serious trouble in the areas where the missions of the Central China and the Hinghwa Conferences were located.

Bishop Bashford traveled into Central China by river boat in October. At Kiukiang near the end of the month, he saw the white flag of the Revolution flying from many public buildings and observed many people wearing a bit of white cloth on the arm. Dr. Mary Stone, Superintendent of the W.F.M.S. Danforth Memorial Hospital, told him that the revolutionists had insisted that she fly the white flag on the hospital. In turn, she insisted that she must be free to care for any of the wounded on either side of the struggle, though she and all the local Chinese Christians favored the Revolution. The Bishop approved of her neutrality—it was humanitarian rather than technical—and advised her using the Red Cross as a symbol that was international, human, and Christian. The Central China missionaries, some under Bishop's orders and some in response to advice by the Consulate, withdrew to Shanghai late in 1911, and Bishop Bashford held their Conference session there in January.

In Hsinghua City, three missionaries—William N. Brewster, Winfred B. Cole, and Joseph W. Hawley—identified themselves with the people of the city in common preparation for armed defense against lawless raiders threatening the peace before the authority of the Revolutionary officials was fully established. With citizen patrols armed with guns, knives, spears, and swords moving through the streets, the mission bought ten secondhand Mauser rifles to help arm some of their sixty male employees and had the boys in the Anglo-Chinese High School and the Biblical Training School borrow muskets from their villages. There was some excitement, but as Cole wrote to a friend, "Our worst trouble is with the Consuls." The missionaries objected to a call from the United States Consul to come in to Foochow, claiming that Hsinghua held no more danger for them than did Foochow. The Consul wired back that their failure to comply would entail forfeiture of the protection of the United States Government. He insisted upon sending a Chinese guard and a steamer for the women and children. The men would not be budged, and they still were in the city when Bishop Bashford arrived to hold the Hinghwa Conference session on 29 November. By that time, as Cole said, the Chinese were shedding pigtailed wholesale—a sign of rejecting the Manchu rule.

As it turned out, the Foochow missionaries were much closer to the scene of revolutionary gunfire and flames than were the Hsinghua men. The revolutionary Reform Society maintained headquarters near the Mission's Anglo-Chinese College and acquired great influence among the students of the Col-

lege and of the Boys' Academy. During the fall term, it called for volunteers to prepare for service in the imminent revolution. Many of the students and some of the teachers responded and gave themselves faithfully to morning and evening military drill. The call to action came early in November. "It was with a feeling of pride, mingled with regret," testified George S. Miner, principal of the Academy, "that we saw our boys and teachers in uniform with muskets leaving the halls." Before dawn on the 9th, cannon fire burst out, and Miner was able to stand in his window, listening to the roar, and see the flashes of the battle, sharply conscious of the fact that the Mission's boys were in the thick of the fight. A rumor developed late in the day that a party of escaped Manchus were on the way to burn the suburbs and the residences of foreigners, and at dusk, Miner witnessed a great commotion among the boats just below the house where he was posted. Soon afterwards, he said, "eighteen men were shot within three minutes' walk of us." Fires were started nearby during the next day or two, but the Revolutionary forces' prompt punitive action kept down the attempts and the damage, and quiet soon was restored to the city. The more intensive fighting had lasted for thirty hours, and not a single Mission boy was either killed or wounded. Popular unrest continued for some months. Though there were eight Methodists among the band of seventeen girl bomb throwers that started for Peking to annihilate the Manchus, there was, nevertheless, a minimum of disturbance of the Mission's program even in the schools in Foochow City. Bishop Bashford held the Conference session there on 6 December.

Within the bounds of the North China Conference, troop movements, battles, and roving outlaws lighted fires of fear in the populace. The missionaries and their Chinese constituents naturally could not forget what had happened to foreigners and Christians during North China's last great time of violence, the Boxer Uprising. Many people fled to places of supposed greater safety. The United States Minister in Peking urged missionaries to leave for the coast, but the Methodist men stayed at their posts, some of them finally sending off their wives and children. Several Methodist doctors organized Red Cross teams to enter fighting zones, and Methodist hospital facilities were held ready to treat the wounded. Many people turned to the Methodist compounds in the larger cities for news, for morale, and sometimes for actual security. At one time, Tientsin's Wesley Church was filled with girls from one of the government schools.

In Peking, people rushed to get out of the city before the threatened violence came to a peak; nearly all the Southern Chinese departed. The cellars of Asbury Church were stocked with emergency provisions, and Christians were issued tickets of admission to use in case of pressing danger. Late in November came a rumor that the Manchus were planning to kill all the foreigners in Peking, beginning with the Americans and then turning to the Methodists' Peking University, which was charged with being a nest of revolutionaries.

Admittedly, there were three "famous revolutionaries" in the school, and the student body was pro-Revolution. Fully a third of the students left for home in the face of the rumor, and the women from other American missions in Peking came to the Methodist compound for safety. But no heavy, hostile blow fell on the Methodists of Peking or of North China as a whole during the crucial military struggle that dissolved the Manchu regime.

To the very end of the revolutionary conflict, Bishop Bashford endeavored to preserve Methodism's public image of neutrality and was uncomfortable with any act that tended to qualify it. He quietly complained to Secretary Stuntz that it was "sometimes difficult to keep the missionaries from direct participation in the new government." He himself refused to join with a group of missionaries in sending an open telegram to Prince Ch'un advising him to retire as Regent. He held that it was "highly improper for missionaries openly to take such action, highly discourteous & could only serve to anger the dynasty." He was embarrassed when his name nevertheless was so used and the American Minister complained about it. Bashford also declined, not long before Yuan Shih-k'ai's accession to the Presidency, to accede to the request of Wu T'ing-fang, a revolutionary leader, to aid in securing American recognition of the Republic by cabling to the State Department.

The Foochow Conference, meeting in Foochow early in December, soon after Prince Ch'un retired as Regent and Yuan Shih-k'ai was given charge of the broken Manchu government, gathered in special session one afternoon in a reception requested by General Sung, the head of the revolutionary provisional government for Fukien Province. The church was decorated with the flags of all nations, an emblem of the Revolution displacing the dragon flag of the Manchus. With a Chinese preacher in the chair, several members of the new administration fervently addressed the Conference on the Manchu oppression, on patriotism, and in praise of the Church of God. When the Governor, General Sung, rose to speak, the large audience greeted him with immense applause. Bishop Bashford responded, expressing appreciation for the good order maintained by the new government and assuring the visitors of the Methodists' sympathy with their efforts peacefully to establish a government based on principles of liberty and justice. At the request of one of the Cabinet members, Bishop Bashford prayed for the members of the administration, General Sung jumping to his feet and bowing his head the instant the request was made.

A week later, General Sung returned the courtesy of the Methodists, entertaining the Central Conference and its guests, a hundred people in all, at his official residence. Two of the Cabinet members in attendance were Christian church members. General Sung spoke in appreciation of the presence of the Church and of its soul-saving work in China. He appealed to the Methodists to work with the new government for the uplift of the nation.

Bishops Bashford and William F. Oldham and three missionaries (the three had been in the Siege of Peking) "made such replies as became American citizens and members of the Church," reported one of the missionaries. Three days later, the Central Conference officially assured General Sung "that his desire for our co-operation in the up-building of the new China meets with our hearty approval." The following day, the Conference adopted a report that appears, considering the current political situation, to have been at least moderately critical of the nearly defunct Manchu central government. It read in part:

All things are becoming new in China today. The Church under the old regime was discriminated against; and works of philanthropy were unknown. Christianity was off in an unobserved corner. We call upon the Government to grant to the people of China full religious liberty . . .

The Conference deliberately avoided further blurring of this statement, when it declined to substitute the word *era* for "regime."

Bishop Bashford justified the two Sung receptions in Foochow as strictly matters of protocol such as were not unknown under the Manchu regime, though he apparently overlooked the fact that General Sung's Provincial government was in rebellion against the legitimist Peking government of the Manchus. The Bishop acknowledged that the hearts of all the Chinese involved were with Sung's government, but told Bishop Lewis that the Foochow Conference reception to him was "almost unduly enthusiastic." When it was suggested that the gathering make financial contributions for the Revolutionary administration, Bashford had at once got to his feet and declared that although "the New Testament commanded us to be obedient to the powers that be, we had no right as a church to identify ourselves with either of the two contending parties in China and that foreigners must make no contribution to either side."

The Bishop later rejected a request for use of the Methodist church building in Foochow for a fund-raising meeting for the same purpose. He affirmed the right of Methodist members and preachers to attend Chinese-sponsored meetings and fully to express themselves as individuals by word or by donation, but he decided that the Revolutionary partisans "must not use property belonging to a church which was largely foreign for the propagation of the revolution." Bishop Bashford felt bound to make such a decision, in spite of his realization that it very much disappointed the Chinese Methodist community and also "condemned some acts which Americans quietly had performed for the revolutionists." He evidently did not feel impelled, however, to warn the Central Conference against passing its resolution of co-operation with General Sung and his colleagues. In two quick negative strokes, Bashford thus simultaneously announced a difficult policy of neutrality in Chinese internal affairs and also bluntly and openly labeled the Methodist Episcopal

Church in China as a significantly foreign agency, not an indigenous institution.

Along with the question of the Mission's neutrality, the problem of missionary security dogged Bishop Bashford during the crisis of 1911-12. Permissive as he was at first about the missionaries' withdrawal from danger spots, he took a more directive stance when in November, 1911, he heard that nine missionaries of the Board and of the W.F.M.S. had refused the Consul's order to leave West China. The Consul finally had given in to them but had served them written notice that the United States would not be held responsible for their safety if they remained in Chungking. The Bishop then wrote to all the China missions to tell the missionaries to follow every such order given by their Consul, in particular ordering the West China group to obey.

Some of the holdouts against the pressure to leave the West China field remained in Chungking until late in December, when all foreigners but the Consuls departed, under orders, for Shanghai. The only exceptions were Spencer Lewis and his wife, Dr. James H. McCartney, and Wilson E. Manly, who did not leave at all. Evidently the men persuaded the Consul to permit them to remain. But there was disagreement over two issues, which resulted in intense exchanges involving the Consuls, the missionaries, and the Bishop.

One difficulty was that Mrs. Lewis was staying on in Chungking without Consul Baker's approval, and he telegraphed Bishop Bashford through the Hankow Consul: "Most urgently request Bishop Bashford recall Mrs. Lewis. Her presence grave menace. She ignores Bishops letter. I allow three Methodist men remain. Mission reputation at stake. Cable New York if necessary." The Bishop then wired Spencer Lewis instructing him to follow the Consul's order. He said, "I shall order home [to America] all disobeying to prevent charges Washington of insubordination of Mission."

Later developed the second issue: Lewis and Manly's continuing to itinerate outside Chungking after the Consul ordered them to desist. Consul Baker wanted Bishop Bashford to recall the two men. He wired the Bishop: "Has your Society no discipline. They ignore you." He wired Consul General Wilder: "All Methodists here flout Bishop and the Consulate. Urgently appeal New York. Drastic measure needed." Bashford discussed the problem with Wilder, but reached an impasse; Wilder, who was backed by the American Minister, insisted upon the unconditional right of the Consuls to control the movements of the missionaries and wished Bashford to send orders to Lewis and Manly on that basis. This Bashford would not do, but on his own initiative sent the two men limited instructions to follow the Consul's request about itineration until a later communication should come from the Bishop. "Otherwise," he telegraphed, "I must transfer you from Szechuan. Government Washington America sentiment on missionary interests in-

volved." And the Bishop began jotting down in his Journal tentative new appointments for Lewis and Manly outside the province.

Although the affair did not come quite to that pass but soon petered out, it had caused Bishop Bashford much wrestling with questions that he judged were of immediate or of continuing importance to the public position of the Mission.

When the first signs of resistance to the Consuls appeared in November, 1911, the Bishop's thinking ran toward long-range policy. He wanted the missionaries to refrain from flouting, in the person of the Consul, the authority of the American government; if they did flout it, and if one of them should be killed, the Mission would be open to one of two dangerous alternatives. In the one case, the government might wash its hands of the missionaries who took their lives in their own hands in disobedience to authority and might decline to put forth any effort "to recover damages or inflict exemplary punishment, [thus] permitting their murder." This would encourage "the bad, element" in China to feel that it could with impunity kill American missionaries and terrorize "our Chinese Christians." In the other case, if the government actually should intervene in spite of the disobedience, it would provoke in China universal hatred for the United States, and most strongly among "the coming leaders of China." Either alternative, if realized, might well set back Methodism's China mission for a quarter of a century, the Bishop believed. Although China was in the throes of revolution, Bishop Bashford still was looking into a missionary future sheltered by at least the restraining threat of troops and gunboats.

Later, as the missionaries persisted in resisting the Consul's orders, the Bishop was pressed by other concerns, which underlay his administrative decisions: (1) Bad publicity in the United States for the Church and for missions because of missionary discourtesy and alleged insubordination must be avoided. (2) Increase in the power of Consuls over missionaries must be prevented. (3) As a practical course of action, the missionaries must duly support the prestige and authority of the Consuls. (4) Control of the missionaries must be exercised in harmony with "the Methodist doctrine of the subordination of the minister to the bishop," but the Bishop must not exercise his ecclesiastical power under "the Erastian doctrine of the subordination of the Church to the State." (5) The Bishop's authority over the ministers must be exercised with restraint, since it was largely limited to the power of appointment and reappointment. (6) Spencer Lewis, so Bashford judged, was stubborn enough to be capable of appealing to the General Conference against any felt abuse of episcopal power, particularly any direction appearing to subordinate a minister to the State. He tried to shape his current decisions to these aims.

The essential ground of the missionaries' case against withdrawal was practical; those who stayed behind had confidence in their own judgment that

the likelihood of violence such as that experienced during the Boxer Uprising was not sufficient to call for desertion of their posts and their people. Manly conceded later that the United States Government undoubtedly was justified in demanding that American citizens evacuate the supposedly dangerous parts of China. But he believed that considering their oft-repeated experience of sincere friendliness on the part of the Chinese and also the opportunity to serve as a stabilizing factor in a time of public turbulence and insecurity, "there was absolutely nothing for some of us to do but to remain. Nor did it require any special degree of courage or recklessness on our part." Dr. McCartney was asked by Chinese in Chungking, for instance, to organize a Red Cross society for emergency work. Spencer Lewis testified in November that the situation was utterly different from that in 1900, when the foreigners were the object of attack. In 1911, the revolutionists were going to the utmost lengths to avoid harming foreigners or their property; they did not wish to provoke foreign intervention, which would have been disastrous to their cause. That there were foreign gunboats on the Yangtze they well knew. And so did Bishop Bashford; he was shipwrecked on a night in October, when his boat collided with a Japanese war craft.

Lewis and some of his colleagues insisted that West China was much safer for foreigners than it looked from the outside. They enjoyed an immunity to attack that extended even to the humblest Chinese rural chapels related to the American Methodists. Dr. James O. Curnow, one of the last of the Methodists to withdraw, declared that except in connection with the opposition to the foreign-backed railway policy, the current uprising was not antiforeign, nor was it anti-Christian in form, origin, or spirit. Manly of Tzechow was cooped up in the Methodist chapel in an outlying town one night in September when it was besieged and finally more or less smashed up by a crowd of noisy demonstrators, who rather goodnaturedly did not stop him from picking a hole in a neighbor's wall so as to escape them. It was obvious that the real object of their anger was the magistrate who had escorted Manly there with a file of soldiers, for he represented the government they believed was leading them into yet another graft-riddled and unproductive railroad scheme. The only serious danger for the Christians was sporadic molestation by robber bands, especially in country districts. But even there, the missionaries found much quiet and safety. At one time, Spencer Lewis had gone about his work in the rural parts of the Chungking District for weeks without interference and without observing any attack on Christians.

In fact, although the overthrow of the Manchus as experienced throughout China was not a bloodless revolution, neither was it a pools-of-blood revolution. Hiram H. Lowry of Peking University reported, "While there have been destruction of property and massacre of innocent people by both revolutionists and Loyalists there has been a remarkably small loss of life when we consider the wide extent of the disturbance and the radical political

changes involved." The missionaries felt the impact of the revolutionary violence only as bystanders in the line of fire. They and their Chinese followers suffered, as such, only limited and local assaults under cover of public lawlessness, chiefly during the period of governmental readjustment in the early days of the new order.

THE REPUBLIC, 1912-1916

The events that were most reminiscent—but only on the surface—of the concerted violence of the Siege days of 1900 occurred during the period of political maneuver that followed the abdication of the Emperor early in 1912. Yuan Shih-k'ai, in order to avoid carrying out his commitment to the republicans to move the capital from Peking to Nanking, the seat of the provisional republican government and the center of power for the politico-military forces of the South, secretly contrived a series of "mutinies" of his own troops in several Northern cities, including Peking. He then was able to cite the outbreaks as decisive obstacles to his removal from Peking to exercise his Presidency, so that the new Parliament soon was established in Peking, the seat of Yuan's power. On Thursday, 27 February, the students of Peking University, with banners waving, bugles blowing, and drums beating, marched through the Methodist compound and out into the city to join a united student celebration of the founding of the Republic. Before they could return, they were cut off in the Imperial City by the outbreak of the gunfire that signaled the opening of the mutiny. That night, from their rooftops, the missionaries could see flames shooting up in a wide arc across the sky. Broad areas of the city were being burned and looted by the mutinous troops and by a crowd of civilians that joined them, creating ruins that everywhere stood smoking in the quiet streets the next day. When the trouble began, refugees started pouring into the Methodist compound from other sections of Peking. Among them were the women of three non-Methodist missions and the children from two schools. The missionaries went out in the morning and got the University boys home from the government University, where they had spent the night; they marched quietly through the streets ("not a dog barked"), their flags furled and their musical instruments stacked in a carriage. In a day or two, the civil trouble came to an end.

The day before the mutiny in Peking, the approaches to Asbury Church had been adorned with ceremonial arches and its interior packed with Chinese Protestants celebrating the advent of the Republic. Some days earlier, a small Christian delegation that included the Methodist Chinese District Superintendent had called upon President Yuan Shih-k'ai to offer him a letter of invitation. It was the first time a group of Christian preachers ever was received by the head of the nation—and it was handsomely done. Yuan said to the deputation:

One thing I have determined, that is that there shall be religious freedom throughout the land. I thank you for your prayers and interest at this time and can only wish that the churches which you represent may be more prosperous than ever. I recognize the value of the work you are doing—educational and religious—and look to you as intelligent men to instruct the people as to their duty, and I will do what I can to give Christianity the place she should have in this land of China.

The President's personal representative at the Asbury Church assembly on 26 February carried further this declaration of religious liberty. He assured the celebrating audience that the new Constitution would remove all obstacles to liberty of conscience and add the Christians to the Mongols, the Manchus, the "Mohammedans," and the Tibetans as one of "the five peoples of China" guaranteed their religious liberty. He accompanied these friendly assurances with a realistic comment on the nature of the long-standing public status of Christianity:

On account of the fact that Christian missions form a subject of treaty arrangement, they often take on a diplomatic aspect. It is not necessary to discuss here whether such arrangements were in former days indispensable or not, but it is evident that they must change in order to suit present conditions. Many Chinese Christians, realizing the modification of circumstances and desiring to remove every vestige of difference between Christians and non-Christians, have advocated the independence of the Church, so as to divest it of all political significance. We must admit that they are far-seeing, and they suggest a proper basis for the future work of Christian missions.

Yuan Shih-k'ai's spokesman thus voiced a view of neutrality for the Church in China that, if implemented to its fullest extent, could have cut the Church's ties with its sponsoring missionary groups from outside China and with the military protection of foreign governments. This was far from what Bishop Bashford meant by neutrality.

As if to underscore part of Yuan's message to the Asbury Church rally, there was an immediate sequel to the troop mutiny that dramatized the continuing historic ground of the presence of the missionary in China. A few days after the mutineers started firing, two hundred United States infantrymen (later replaced by marines) came to Peking from Tientsin, and various foreign legation guards were similarly reinforced. For several months, no Chinese was allowed inside the Legation Quarter without a pass. Fifty soldiers were quartered in Peking University, in the Methodist compound, and Old Glory was raised on the flagstaff of one of the halls, whose tower was used as a signal station. Similar garrisons were stationed in the American Board and the Presbyterian missions. The military men, who inspired the Methodist missionaries with confidence but inconveniently jammed their quarters, remained until mid-April. Thus, once again it was demonstrated that Methodist missionaries enjoyed the ultimate protection of foreign troops present under

sanction of forced treaties that imposed a limitation of Chinese sovereignty.

The potentially antiforeign—that is, nationalistic—force of the revolutionary movement, which might have caused special trouble for the missionaries, was exhausted in the more immediate attack on the Manchus as the authors of China's long submission to the foreign powers. And it was blunted by the fact that the new system was not inaugurated solely by singleminded revolutionists inspired even by the hope that China would be able to throw off the shackles of external imperialism, but with the co-operation of various conservative or middle-of-the-road antagonists of the Manchus. And the resultant republican administration of Yuan Shih-k'ai was so far from being antiforeign that after prolonged negotiations, it secured in April, 1913, from an international consortium representing Great Britain, France, Russia, Germany, and Japan, a reorganization loan of \$125 million. Indeed, in withdrawing the support of the United States Government from the intended American participants in the Consortium, President Wilson declared that the terms of the loan impinged upon the administrative integrity of China.

Popular antiforeignism, however, was not dead. Bishop Bashford believed that much antiforeign spirit still was alive in the nation's secret societies and held that it was idle to suppose that the newer, more tolerant views of China's intelligent leaders had "permeated the dense ignorant mass of 400,000,000." And some of the very West China missionaries who declined to withdraw from their field were among the minority of missionaries who reported that antiforeignism still existed. Spencer Lewis acknowledged in September, 1911, that there had been much talk against foreigners and Christians in rural places. Szechuan Province, of course, was the locale of the latest flare-up of Boxerism, two years after the Siege of Peking. James O. Curnow wrote a missionary friend in December that during the past six months, he had observed a latent hostility among the people in general that was showing through in small matters. Going his rounds of the churches, he had found several Chinese preachers "infected with a wish and purpose to form a church independent of foreign control." He felt that the only consideration holding them in check was the problem of finance, and he expected trouble in the future from the readiness of church people to mix politics and church affairs in an "impossible" and "explosive" compound. Curnow declared that it would be folly to believe that the intense antiforeign spirit that formerly was prevalent among the West China people had died out. "It only waits patiently," he said, "its own time for a practical outburst."

But in West China and elsewhere, the climax of the Revolution was not that time. The Methodists in China, both Chinese and American, never felt more secure than at the beginning of the new order. They generally welcomed the advent of the Republic and were optimistic about the future of Christianity in the Empire. Chinese preachers who previously had felt obliged to restrain the expression of their anti-Manchu attitudes now overtly supported the

republican system and participated in politics and community action sparked by the freer atmosphere of the Republic's early days, and missionaries more freely voiced their sympathy with the republican movement.

Shortly after Yuan Shih-k'ai took office as Provisional President, Bishop Bashford returned to the United States and reported to the General Conference, which met in Minneapolis during the month of May. He devoted a major segment of his episcopal statement, in which he spoke for Bishop Lewis as well as for himself, to the progress of the China mission during the preceding quadrennium. Describing medical work as the prime means of gaining access to the Chinese for the gospel, he cited an increase in the number of Methodist hospitals from twenty-one to twenty-three, with an increase of ward patients from 4,700 to 8,800 and an increase of total treatments (in wards, dispensaries, and homes) from 191,000 to 304,000. Describing schools as the second-best method of gaining access to the Chinese, he called attention to an increase of pupils at all levels (primary day schools, boarding schools, high schools, colleges, and professional schools) from 13,000 to 18,700. Reporting on the progress in evangelism, the Bishop pointed out that the number of church members had increased from 17,500 to 20,700, with the number of probationers rising a little, to 13,400, and the number of inquirers standing at 18,000. He found greatest encouragement for the future in the increase of Chinese mission assistants in all categories, including pastors, from 1,700 to 2,900 and in the Methodists' enrolling 29 per cent of all Sunday school pupils in China. He might also have mentioned the fact that the missionary corps (the Board's men and women appointees and the W.F.M.S. workers) had increased from 195, in 1908, to 266, in 1912.

Another segment of the Bishop's address was an interpretation of the awakening of China and the emergence of the Republic. His feeling that the address as a whole was received "with unexpected favor" may have derived ultimately from the fact that his treatment of the Revolution could have left with his hearers only a somewhat blurred impression of his own essential lack of identification with it. To be sure, he counted himself among the missionaries who—he put it euphemistically—"did not at first encourage the attempt to found a republic." And he limned some of the "dark lines in the picture of China's revolution" that he believed should be recognized by those who did not wish simply to abide in a fool's paradise under the spell of a millennial dream of China's future. But he thrust heavily into the balances numerous paragraphs tending to show that China was well prepared for its venture in republicanism, said both complimentary and harsh things about the Manchu Dynasty, and declared that both the Awakening and the Revolution were divinely generated. "If ever a movement in human history had a providential preparation and a gradual development," declared the Bishop, "The revolution reveals such a combination of natural forces under the hand of the Almighty." And he so underscored the evolutionary aspect as practical-

ly to contradict the very revolutionary character of the anti-Manchu movement that he earlier categorically had rejected.

The Bishop attributed the awakening of China to two causes—"her contact with the modern world, and the increase of her knowledge of the true God." More concretely and more immediately relevant to the interests of the moment, he gave American Christianity and American democracy high credit for the coming of the Revolution :

You sent forward missionaries and have poured out money for churches and schools and hospitals, and have nourished the famine-stricken, until you have compelled the Chinese to love the very name of America above that of every other government on earth. You have built up such homes and schools and churches in America as have made the young Chinese entering them and sharing their blessing, return to China tenfold more American than you are yourselves. You have contributed mightily to the upheaval, simply by building up and maintaining democratic Christian America, and thus demonstrating to the world for a hundred years that the human race best flourishes under the reign of freedom and of law.

Thus the Bishop made the accomplishment of the Revolution appear to the earnest Methodists and patriotic Americans in his audience a cause for celebration.

And celebrate they did. The Chinese delegates framed a resolution and presented it to the General Conference on 13 May, with Bishop Bashford in the chair. It acknowledged the significance of the missionary movement as a century-long preparation of China for the Republic, lauded American championship of China, and called for recognition of the Republic by the United States. Four Chinese members spoke, two of them in Chinese with translation by missionaries. Uong Di Gi was interrupted when he spoke gratefully of China's choice of the United States as the model for her new form of government. "At this point," recorded the *Journal*, "the audience rose en masse and sang, 'My Country, 'Tis of Thee.'" Li Diong Cui spoke of China's trust in America's love of freedom. "The audience arose and sang 'The Star-Spangled Banner.'" T. H. Ch'en started for the platform to make the next speech, and "a dozen delegations in the rear stood and broke out into the singing of 'The Star-Spangled Banner.'" Miss Li Bi Cu's concluding speech was interrupted—"Tremendous applause." Then the resolution was adopted, the Chinese-speaking Li Diong Cui was elected an assistant secretary, and it was ordered that the flag of the Republic of China be displayed with the American flag over the platform. The next morning the new flag was in place.

These were the major themes in Bishop Bashford's report to the General Conference—recent missionary progress and the advent of the Republic. But he also included a minor theme, minor in emphasis, minor in mood. Methodism, he believed, was not measuring up to the dimensions of the challenge

presented by that awakening of China that he so often had described; it was not now prepared to capitalize upon its new opportunity in the more open atmosphere of the post-Manchu period. He repeated that theme more soberly in a letter to Secretary North a year after the Conference adjourned. "I have never been so heavily pressed and even depressed by the burdens of China as during the last few months." He was disillusioned by Methodist failure to open any new territorial mission in China, or even a single major station, during his nine years on the field. This was a result, he fully realized, of the Missionary Society's utter inability even to provide for urgent needs of the areas already opened. The Society's appropriation for China in 1913 was \$164,819, which was only \$14,269 more than in 1907, when he first asked for two \$40,000 expansion programs. (The appropriation rose by \$39,000 more by 1918). The Bishop cited serious consequent lags in financing missionary housing, building construction for secondary schools, development of an advance program for Peking University, extension of hospital and medical services, and support of evangelism ("the end of all the efforts and our chief work"). Drawing upon one Conference after another for substantiating details, the Bishop demonstrated that matched against its extraordinary contemporary responsibility, the China mission was all but standing still and all but condemned to retreat because of a crisis of financial starvation.

In a report dispatched at about the same time and evidently not restricted to private consumption, Bashford wrote less pessimistically. But the brightest aspect of the mission scene was the quickened responsiveness of the Chinese, not any notable adequacy of the Methodist effort. Indeed, in order to make an optimistic addition to the statements in his General Conference report, the Bishop turned not to the Methodist program, but to developments in inter-Mission co-operation and federation. He had just spent the first four months of 1913 attending interdenominational conferences of representatives of all the Protestant churches in China under the presidency of John R. Mott. The meetings were devoted to formulating plans for uniting and improving the work of the various Missions.

As a result of the Mott conferences, all the Protestant missions voted to unite as soon as practicable in all educational work except primary schools; with the latter, they already were observing territorial lines in order to avoid overlapping. The Missions also voted to use a common name for all the Protestant churches—The Christian Church in China. They confirmed their longstanding project in Bible translation, looking toward issuance of a common version within a few years; agreed upon the translation of standard hymns for a hymn book; determined to establish comity agreements for rural efforts in hospital and church work and to extend that practice in the field of primary education; and decided, after the pattern of the committees growing out of the Edinburgh Conference of 1910, to have a China Continuation Committee that would meet several times a year in order to plan and

advance the common objectives of the Church. All this, believed Bashford, would work against the kind of denominational rivalry prevalent in the United States and would facilitate advantageous utilization of men and money for the most rapid evangelization of China that was possible.

Union educational ventures already were in operation. The first notable step had been opening the University of Nanking in 1910 under the presidency of a Methodist, Arthur J. Bowen. In this organic union with the Presbyterians and the Disciples of Christ, the Methodists merged their former Nanking University. At almost the same time, the West China Union University opened in Chengtu. This represented, partly on a union basis and partly in federation, an important concentration of secondary and postsecondary educational projects of the American Baptists, the British Friends, the Canadian Methodists and the Methodist Episcopal Church. It grew out of their experience in the West China Educational Union, in which the educational interests of all the Missions in West China were organized, on various levels, into a single educational system.

Missionaries in Peking had discussed educational union as early as the turn of the century, and plans for a union university were under serious consideration as Nanking and West China Union Universities were getting under way on the interdenominational plan. But in 1913, there yet remained four years before the union Peking University opened, with all but one of the Missions in Peking participating. The long delay in Peking was caused largely by the slowness with which the Missions were able to make mutual organizational concessions. Even theology sometimes delayed the process. Bishops Lewis and Bashford, for instance, firmly demanded evangelical Christian orthodoxy in teaching and in the personal attitude of every professor as an indispensable requirement of any plan for union in higher education. The bylaws of the Methodists' own Peking University required a signed pledge of adherence to the Apostles' Creed in thought and in teaching. This fully committed the teacher, in Bashford's view, to the doctrine of the Virgin Birth and such other "supernatural claims of Christ" as his "premundane existence," his supernatural character, and his efficacy as the sole way to salvation. The Bishops were resolved not to "abate one jot or tittle" of these demands.

In Foochow, however, where formal discussion of union higher education began in 1911, delay was caused both by lack of ready funds and by the necessity of developing units to compose the proposed university. By 1913, various Missions were co-operating in several professional schools and colleges. In 1917, four schools, involving the six principal Missions in Fukien Province, came together to form Fukien Christian University.

In addition to his concern for the advance of the Mission, Bishop Bashford carried forward into the post-Revolutionary period his close attention to political affairs. Although Bashford had much more confidence in the adequacy

of Yuan Shih-k'ai than in the strength of the Republic, he endeavored, both publicly and behind the scenes, to uphold the Republic as constituting the legitimate government of China and as deserving of international recognition and domestic loyalty. He saw that for the Republic to achieve stability would be the surest guarantee that China would develop sufficient unity and strength to resist encroachments against her territorial integrity, particularly by Japan. Hence, three weeks before reporting to the General Conference, the Bishop was in Washington conferring with both President Taft and Secretary of State Philander C. Knox, urging upon them not only recognition of the Republic of China by the United States, but also an attempt on their part to persuade the other powers (Great Britain, Russia, Germany, France, and Japan) to act in concert with the United States. That summer, Bashford saw President Taft and Secretary Knox again, and asked them to recognize the Republic unilaterally if their current effort to move the other powers should fail. He then visited Woodrow Wilson, Democratic candidate for the Presidency, and secured his cordial consent to receive from Bashford, in case of his election, a formal statement on United States relations in the Far East. After the election, Bashford wrote both Taft and Wilson, calling for recognition without further delay for the sake of unanimity. Taft left the matter for Wilson to conclude, and the new President granted recognition early in his administration. Bashford also directly approached the Wilson administration in 1915, when he wrote both the President and the Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, urging that the United States firmly resist the attempt of Japan to dominate the economic and political life of China through implementation of the Twenty-one Demands presented to Yuan Shih-k'ai early in the year. He presented to Bryan at length the necessity of thwarting this forcible compromise of Chinese sovereignty because of the undoubted detrimental effect it would have upon American trade with China and upon the political influence of the United States in the Far East. In a shorter communication to President Wilson, he emphasized the threat of the Twenty-one Demands to the future of Christian missions in China through official Japanese support for the extension of Buddhism at the expense of other religions.

Bashford's concern for political stability also led him to endeavor to forestall the Second Revolution of 1913. Yuan Shih-k'ai, in the advancing effort to build up his personal power within the framework of the Republic, acted in 1913 to destroy the strength of the Kuomintang (the Nationalist Party), which had emerged as the majority party in the Parliamentary elections held at the turn of the year. Among other moves, he instigated the assassination of Sung Chiao-jen, the active political leader of the Kuomintang, of which Sun Yat-sen was the titular leader. Bishop Bashford, several weeks after the killing, had a personal conference with Sun Yat-sen, who was understood to be contemplating armed rebellion against Yuan. Bashford warned the revolutionary leader that civil war would bring intervention by various foreign

powers, with resultant territorial losses for China. Sun felt that he could no longer support Yuan because of the Sung Chiao-jen murder. He was convinced that Yuan intended to destroy the Kuomintang and never would give way to Sun Yat-sen or to any other opponent who might be chosen permanent President in the election planned for later in the year. At one point, Bashford said to Sun, "You are abandoning the fundamental principles of a republic." He labored long and hard to restrain Sun from armed action, but could not convince him. "He may be right & I may be too conservative," he wrote in his Journal. "But I think he is wrong & spoke my convictions clearly to him." It was hard for Bashford to escape the dominance of Yuan Shih-k'ai over his political imagination. He had been aware, for instance, of the charge that Yuan had ordered Sung's murder, but did not believe it. Sun Yat-sen's position he finally dismissed simply as disloyalty, while characterizing Yuan's restraint in moving directly against Sun as showing "more of the slowness of Lincoln than the haste of a dictator."

Insurrectionary action did not come at once, for there was an antiresistance faction within the Kuomintang. Yuan Shih-k'ai, however, took further measures hostile to the Kuomintang, including dispatching the Northern army, which was under his control, southward toward the provinces that provided the geographical base of the Kuomintang and the earlier Parliamentary elements. Then in July came the revolution, with the provinces of Kiangsi, Anwhei, Kwangtung, Szechuan, Fukien, and Hunan announcing their independence of Peking and declaring war against Yuan Shih-k'ai. After two months, the revolution collapsed.

Being so short-lived, the Second Revolution did not directly disturb most of the Mission and its people, though Methodists in the Kiangsi and Central China Conferences were in areas disrupted by troop movements and battle action as the Peking government forces drove southward to suppress the rebellion.

In the Kiangsi Mission Conference, the harshest report came from Chiang Ming-chih, the Chinese superintendent of the Kienchang District, who told of bitter suffering from the civil strife (it was a social blow that followed hard upon the impact of recent flood and drought). When the rebellious Kiangsi army was defeated and broken up, the soldiers moved down across the province, ravaging as they went. Said Chiang, "There was no one in control of these soldiers, and they had no money with which to provide themselves food, but with sword and gun in hand, they slew at will—wherever they went, it was as if a wind had passed over the place laying the people low." When the soldiers reached Fuchow, from which many people had fled, Chiang undertook the role of a mediator, trying to bring the troops and the populace together.

In the Central China Conference, most of the churches on the Wuhu District were within the fighting zone, some of them for nearly two months.

All except routine missionary activity was suspended there, but the head of the District, the city of Wuhu itself, was spared the brutal blows that fell upon the people of Nanking, the head of a second District.

Nanking at first was relatively quiet. The fears of the people ran high, and many thousands left the city. But this was the political center of the revolutionary action, and the Southern soldiery did not grossly abuse the civilian population. Finally, the people could hear the guns of the Northern troops as they approached this last stronghold of the revolution and laid it under siege. During the weeks of fighting, wounded soldiers from outside the city were brought to the Methodists' Philander Smith Memorial Hospital, under the care of Dr. Robert C. Beebe. Along with the civilian refugees who were taken in, they filled every available space; the regular dispensary service got crowded out. At last, the city fell to the Northern troops, which were commanded by Chang Hsün, a sadistic reactionary general who still was active under the Republican regime. The Pigtailed General, as he was known, for flaunting his Manchu sympathies and compelling his army to join him in wearing the traditional symbol of submission to the Manchus, loosed his soldiers upon the Nanking populace.

For several days, the soldiers looted, raped, and killed. The people fled from them to whatever refuge they could find, many accepting sanctuary in foreign compounds. Seven hundred people turned to the compound of the University of Nanking, where they stayed for a month. Many of these were women and girls, who thus were protected by the missionaries from being ravaged by the soldiers. Wilbur F. Wilson, the missionary in charge in Nanking, reported that nearly every house and shop in the city was stripped of all valuable articles, and the people left desolate and desperate. A later historian writes, "For three days his [Chang Hsün's] men were absolutely uncontrolled. Rickshaws were commandeered to pull the loads of booty through the streets, while the corpses of women and girls floating in the river told their own story." * Bitter months followed the restoration of a measure of order. The University and other missionary groups put a thousand destitute men to work on physical reconstruction projects, helped re-establish numerous small businessmen, and offered relief, protection, and counsel to many others.

No word of the brutal and devastating character of the occupation of Nanking by the Northern army reached the Methodist constituency in the United States through the Board's *Annual Report* or through *The Christian Advocate*. In his letters to the New York office, Dr. Beebe roundly condemned Sun Yat-sen and his revolutionary colleagues for initiating the "dark crime" of the war and firmly championed Yuan Shih-k'ai. But when he referred to the "sack of the city" by Chang Hsün, he failed to identify him

* See note, p. 723.

as one of Yuan's generals. His co-worker, James H. Blackstone, likewise referred to Hsün's "horrible sacking of the city," but specifically described him as having the backing of Yuan Shih-k'ai. Blackstone also wrote Secretary North a very brief analysis of the revolutionary situation that fairly presented the case of the Southern leaders opposed to Yuan and portrayed him in the role of the dictatorial political aggressor provoking the civil conflict. Bishop Bashford, however, writing from Nanking in November, just after the close of the Central China Conference, reported no violation of the city by the Northern troops and did not mention Chang Hsün, to say nothing of linking him to Yuan Shih-k'ai.* He represented the Methodist people and missionaries simply as being grateful for having come through their "troubles" in the unity of the Holy Spirit and with no Christian lives lost. No citation of Chang Hsün and his exploits and no hint of Blackstone's analysis appeared in the *Annual Report*. Rather, it carried a ten-page report by Bishop Bashford on the China field, with a political section so partisan in its reference to Sun Yat-sen and Yuan Shih-k'ai as to appear, under the circumstances, a white-wash of the latter.

Before and during the Second Revolution and in its aftermath, Methodists in Hsinghua Prefecture, Fukien Province, were targets of peculiar hostility. The government not being effectively in control of the area, bandits gained power to plunder and punish with impunity. The people suffered robberies, beatings, burnings, extortion, kidnapping and killings. One measure fell more heavily upon the Methodists than upon others. At planting time in 1912, a powerful bandit chief known as Emperor Sixteen issued orders for the farmers to plant opium, and when many of them complied in spite of a ban already imposed by the Peking government, he levied taxes on their fields and also began to exact protection payments from them in return for promises to defend them against government troops. The Methodist Chinese drew the wrath of Emperor Sixteen by refusing to plant to opium. They long had been under the influence of missionary leadership that publicly and perennially advocated abolition of the opium traffic, and they also generally were loyal to the new Republic, whose administration was coming under attack in Fukien. The henchmen of the bandit chief therefore retaliated against the Hsinghua Methodists.

Since the local authorities were conniving at the opium racket, and since the Governor of Fukien was loath to act, only pressure from Peking could block the plans of the bandits to profit from the illicit harvest. Methodist leaders undertook to stir up the Peking authorities. Bishop Bashford went at it quietly and tried to persuade the Hsinghua missionaries not to act publicly; at one point, he even intercepted a telegram of William N. Brewster's and kept the Hsinghua missionary's protest from reaching the press.

* See note, p. 723.

Bashford made private representations to the Peking administration and to the Governor of Fukien, pointing out the danger that was developing for the Christian Chinese, eventually for the missionaries, and certainly for the government, whose authority was being challenged. He urged that Emperor Sixteen be captured and the poppy crop destroyed. In January, 1913, with the crop widely planted and the Provincial authorities remaining inactive, Brewster and his colleagues, especially Winfred B. Cole, decided to act independently in the alarming situation, fearing among other things the results of the bandits' arming themselves from opium profits. They reported the conditions in Hsinghua Prefecture to the International Reform Bureau and sent to the press provocative communications exposing the opium development, the connivance of the officials in Fukien, and the inactivity of the Peking government. Bashford believed that they had done this behind his back, having agreed not long before to withhold such a direct approach. He was convinced that their head-on methods would antagonize public officials by causing them to lose face and later would open the Mission to the charge, both by the Chinese and by the American government, of having interfered in Chinese political affairs.

The International Reform Bureau and American diplomatic officials then pressed the central government for action, and Yuan Shih-k'ai ordered the Governor of Fukien rigorously to destroy the disputed and illegal crop. The Governor obeyed orders, but reluctantly. He counted the incident as loss of face for himself and later charged the missionaries with responsibility for it. Although he allowed missionaries of other nationalities to remain, he ordered the Americans out of Hsinghua Prefecture during the antipoppy campaign, which wiped out most of the poppy crop.

This effort by the government failed to remove from the scene the bandits headed by Emperor Sixteen. They still were powerful enough to take cruel revenge on the Methodists. Whether Bishop Bashford's quieter methods had worked or whether the missionaries' public protest had stirred Peking to act, what the missionaries had done was known to all, and the Chinese members of the Methodist community suffered bitter consequences. "In June," reported Winfred Cole, who at first was in the midst of all the disturbance, "the bandits came out openly against the Methodist church saying in their proclamations that there was a certain band of people who were destroying idol and ancestor worship and it was their purpose to rid the country of them." The Chinese Methodist laymen and their preachers bore the brunt of the violence that followed, for the missionaries soon were ordered to Foochow by the Governor for the second time that year.

The bandits plundered and burned houses of church members, carried off men, women and children to their hideouts, shot a retired preacher, and killed and quartered a layman. As the violence developed, the Provincial government declined to act to put it down, until pressure once again was

exerted by Peking and soldiers went out after the bandits. One relief expedition arrived just in time to save a company of hostages from execution because of the failure of a demand for a large ransom. Many church members fearfully fled from their homes, and some were driven out and not allowed to return, the raiders destroying or stealing their crops. Some of the preachers went into hiding for fear of night raids. Churches were burned. Refugees in the mountains went without food and shelter. Violence and confusion continued for many months, and the fall session of the Hsinghua Conference had to be postponed because of continuing danger. The Methodist missionaries were not allowed to come back to the Hsinghua field until early in 1914.

Numerous domestic and international political factors were involved in this long interruption of missionary activity and in the slowness with which the authorities acted to relieve the Chinese Methodists from harassment. Yuan Shih-k'ai, for instance, had temporized with the Hsinghua bandit leaders in order to keep them from going over to the forces united in the 1913 revolution. But the frontal methods used by the missionaries to block the opium traffic and its promoters undoubtedly increased the fury of the bandits' attacks and provoked counterproductive antagonisms both in Foochow and Peking.

WORLD WAR AND "WORLD-WIDE CHURCH," 1917-1918

Unfortunately for the credibility of Bishop Bashford's perennial protestation of the supranational character of the Methodist Episcopal connection as a world-wide church, when the United States assumed belligerency in the World War in April, 1917, the Methodists exposed on the China field the fact that the heart of the Bishop's claim was not fact, but figment. They demonstrated that in such a crisis, and undoubtedly at all times latently, the church was essentially an American organization—nationalist in orientation, patriotic in spirit, and supremely responsive to the exigencies of American foreign policy. It now became necessary for all China missionaries to be loyal not only to Christ, but also to the American war cause.

The focus of the war loyalty issue was William Nast College, which was located in Kiukiang, Kiangsi Province. The College was named for the founder of German-American Methodism and long had enjoyed, as had the Kiangsi work in general, close associations with the German-American Methodist constituency in the United States, which contributed both important supporting funds and missionary personnel. When the United States declared war on Germany, the president of the College was Carl F. Kupfer, a native of Germany, who was brought to the United States at the age of three, later was converted and joined the ministry in the Central German Conference, and spent thirty-six years as a missionary in Kiukiang. The loyalty issue

came to the surface among the Kiangsi Methodists not long after Dr. Kupfer went to the United States on furlough at the end of 1917.

The United States consular service already had suspected him of pro-German expressions and activities before American entry into the war. In the spring and summer of 1917, he found it necessary to defend himself, both publicly and with the American Consulate-General in Hankow, against the application of earlier charges of pro-Germanism to his position after the declaration of American belligerency. When Kupfer and his wife protested that they were loyal to the cause of the United States, the Consulate submitted to him a formal statement of American allegiance, which he signed. The Consulate then granted him the benefit of the doubt about his commitment to American interests and in November verified his passport for travel to the United States.

Shortly after Kupfer's departure, the Consul-General, Edwin S. Cunningham, saw an official dispatch that reawakened his doubt. He at once initiated further investigations and "reliably ascertained" that when Kupfer signed the prescribed loyalty statement, he remarked, "I have signed that pack of lies." Cunningham's informant was Earl A. Hoose, a young Methodist missionary who had been two years on the field. Hoose, who was Superintendent of the Hwangmei District (North Kiukiang), made the charge to Cunningham in confidence, not desiring his name to be mentioned to Kupfer. Though Hoose's statement was the only item that Cunningham was willing to state as evidence, he became convinced that Kupfer was guilty of pro-Germanism, which now was disloyalty to the United States. He recommended to the Secretary of State in Washington that Kupfer's mail be rigidly censored, anticipating that it would reveal pro-German, anti-American expressions.

Hoose next drew a bead on Ottomar Knothe, a German holding a contract with Nast College as Professor of German Language and Literature. Knothe claimed that the British Consul in Kiukiang had been working to get him ousted from the College ever since he was engaged in 1916, finally trying to work through Chinese officials after China entered the war against Germany in August, 1917. Earl Hoose and Knothe both attributed his continuance at the College to Dr. Kupfer's resistance to attempts by General Wu, the Provincial Commissioner of Defense, to have him dismissed. But no sooner had Kupfer left the country, than Hoose, assisted by William R. Johnson, Principal of Nanchang Academy, and Frank C. Gale, superintendent of the Nanchang District, succeeded in having Knothe discharged by the College in spite of his holding a contract antedating hostilities between Germany and the United States. Evidently, no specific charges were brought against Knothe. He claimed that he had rigorously refrained from speaking to his students about the war and even had protected his policy of silence by giving up personal social contacts. Hoose informed Secretary North that it was pressure from the Consul-General and from "the members of the mission" that brought

about Knothe's dismissal. He also claimed that the College could not hire an English teacher because it was known as a German institution. Because of the technical status of the field contract, North declined on behalf of the Board to intervene.

Pointing to frequently recurring complaints about faculty members of Nast College as a reason for it, Consul-General Cunningham opened another investigation by sending his Vice-Consul to Kiukiang. Most of the information he gathered came from Earl Hoose, Charles F. Johannaber (a faculty member), Nelle Beggs (Vice-Principal of the Methodists' Rulison High School, in Kiukiang), and a non-Mission individual, Albert S. Tenny, M.D., whose father was connected with the American Legation in Peking. Another target now was exposed—the Acting President of the College, Roland T. Schaefer, a native-born American of German ancestry. The informers pointed him out as one about whom they had “grave doubts as to his possessing the loyalty that is now expected and demanded of every loyal American citizen.” They cited against him no overt disloyal act, but rested their aspersion upon the complexion of his ancestry and upon his having taken in the College no stand at all on the war question. (Schaefer obviously was not up to the pitch of the patriotic activism of Earl Hoose, who wrote to one of the men in the New York office that he had rather be in Kiukiang than anywhere else—except France. “Yes, I’d like to get a crack at Fritz,” he said.) As a result, Consul-General Cunningham recommended to Secretary of State Robert Lansing in March, 1918, that his Department report Schaefer’s questionable status to the Board of Foreign Missions and state that it would be necessary to watch his future activities for their effect upon the interests of the United States.

The Consul-General reported to Lansing, as a further result of the Vice-Consul’s Kiukiang probe, that it was strongly urgent that Dr. Kupfer, because of his overt display of pro-German sympathies, be removed from any position he held with the Board of Foreign Missions.

The Kiukiang accusers of Kupfer and Schaefer had brought no charges against them through Disciplinary channels at the September, 1917, session of the Kiangsi Conference, in which there was a large majority of Chinese members, but had dealt in secret with American diplomatic officials. Now they pressed their accusations and suspicions with church officials in a manner that favored summary ecclesiastical action. Bishop Herbert Welch, resident in Seoul and in charge of Korea and Japan, came briefly to China at the end of April and of May, 1918, with a view to preparing for supervision of fall Conferences (Bishops Bashford and Lewis both were in the United States). To him the patriotic missionaries communicated their concern to extirpate pro-Germanism from the Kiangsi Conference, and in this they were more than merely seconded by Frank D. Gamewell, the hero of the Siege of Peking, who came to their aid with all the intensity of a crusader.

Bishop Welch at once accepted, prior to any direct investigation, the general case against Dr. Kupfer, urged the Board to prevent the embarrassment of his returning to China, and assured the American Minister in Peking, Paul S. Reinsch, of the readiness of the Church to take any action necessary in order to clarify in China its attitude of loyalty to the American cause. At the end of May, the Bishop called in to a meeting in Nanking the Kiangsi missionaries Hoose, Schaefer, Beggs, and Fred. R. Brown, along with Gamewell, Arthur J. Bowen, Edward James, and others.

The committee discussed the question of the Kupfers' pro-German reputation and activity. Although the session was only a preliminary investigation, the Kiangsi men expressed the conviction that Kupfer and his wife should be completely and permanently divorced from the work. Bishop Welch helped them implement their conviction by suggesting preparation of a paper recommending to the Board that the Kupfers be not returned to China and that they be dealt with as might be necessary pursuant to that end. The paper was signed all but unanimously, by Earl A. Hoose, Fred R. Brown, Charles F. Johannaber, Edward C. Perkins, Frank C. Gale, J. Theron Illick, Earl L. Terman, and even Roland T. Schaefer, with whose own case the committee was about to deal.

It was made clear that Schaefer had indeed, for various reasons, remained publicly noncommittal about the war cause, but Welch was satisfied that he was nevertheless in full sympathy with the Allied side. The Bishop stated, however, that he could confirm Schaefer in his status as Acting President only on two conditions: he must take an open and aggressive position on the moral issues of the war; he must cope with the problem of Chinese faculty members with undoubted pro-German sympathies. To these conditions Schaefer finally agreed. He went before the student body of the College and made a speech explicitly designed to correct the current impression that the faculty and the students had been strongly pro-German. Interpreting America's unavoidable fight to the finish for the principles of right, liberty, and democracy and the commitment of the Methodist Church to it, he declared, "I want to say here that I am in full and hearty sympathy with the efforts of my country and my church. I was born in America, it is my native land, and I want you to know that I am first, last and always an American." He appealed to the students to join him in upholding the principles for which America and the Allies were fighting and to show the world that Nast College was on the right side.

After the Nanking meeting, the Bishop and Dr. Gamewell went briefly to Chinkiang, in Central China, to look into the reported pro-Germanism of Mrs. John Wesley Boyver, the German-born wife of a Canadian missionary who was home on furlough. As a measure to relieve the Mission of the embarrassment caused by her alleged words and actions, Bishop Welch drafted a loyalty oath for her to sign:

I wish to have it clearly and publicly known that I am with the Allies. I therefore solemnly declare that I believe in the righteousness of the cause for which the Allies are fighting, that I hope for the defeat of Germany because of the wrongs she has done and the militaristic method and the imperialistic aim which she represents, and that I will regulate my words and actions in conformity with the position of my church and loyalty to China, England, and the United States.

To give public evidence of my belief and purpose I plan to join the English or American Red Cross Society, and to break off any intimate relations with German people in Chinkiang; and if I do not fulfill this purpose in letter and spirit, I will at once relieve the embarrassment of the Methodist Episcopal Mission by withdrawing from its membership.

Bishop Welch's letter submitting the draft to Mrs. Bovyer was polite and ostensibly permissive: "I do not demand or even request that you sign this paper." But the hand within the velvet glove was firm: "If, however, you are unable or unwilling to take such action to place yourself in line with the position of our countries and of our church, the only fair thing for you to do is at once to sever your connection with the Mission, and I ask that you do this." Mrs. Bovyer signed. The Bishop had the additional safeguard, however, as he told Secretary North, that the British Consul-General at Shanghai had agreed that since Mrs. Bovyer was a British subject by marriage, he would deport her from China whenever the Methodists thought it wise.

Having to leave China before he could complete the thorough probe he felt was necessary, Bishop Welch commissioned Dr. Gamewell to represent him, both to investigate and to take action to clear the Mission of pro-Germanism and the reputation for it. For the next two months, Gamewell zealously and persistently applied himself to this assignment; he traveled five thousand miles, wrote numerous letters to the Bishop and to church officials in the United States, and made many contacts with American and British diplomatic officials. He believed that it was of first importance to keep these men thoroughly informed about what the Methodist Church was doing to clarify its patriotic allegiance. He undertook to show the Chinese mission workers that they, like the missionaries, were expected to take the Allied line. "So far as the Chinese are concerned," he assured Secretary North, "they will follow, to a large degree, where they are led and we are making provision for an educational campaign." He had just secured a large amount of material from the United States Consul-General, which he later had translated into Chinese and widely distributed among the Chinese with Mission connections. Visiting Kiangsi, he concluded that facts justified Earl Hoose's charge that the province was a hotbed for German propaganda centering in William Nast College. At Kiukiang, he found that Schaefer was taking the correct line on the war but was lacking in what he considered the requisite aggressive leadership. He therefore brought about Schaefer's resignation as acting head of the College. Co-operating in this ouster were the

Kiangsi missionaries Hoose, Brown, Gale, and Perkins, several other missionaries (Robert C. Beebe and William H. Lacy of Shanghai and Arthur J. Bowen and Harry F. Rowe of Nanking), and several government representatives. Although Schaefer had kept his promise to Bishop Welch in evident good faith, his best was considered not good enough, and home he went to America. Explaining the decision to North, Gamewell said, "In the estimation of the Legations, the Hankow Consulate and others his name was so involved in connection with this trouble that what was done was the only way to put ourselves on record with such clearness that there could be no possible misunderstanding with regard to the position of our church."

At the end of July, Gamewell went to Japan to put before Bishop Welch the results of his probe and purge. He supplied the Bishop not only with an account of his crusading activities but also with materials that enabled him to accompany his report to the Board with a collection of ten documents relevant to pro-German activity among the Methodists. They included a copy—evidently no Methodist ever saw the original—of a supposedly damning Kupfer-Reid letter.

The Board, however, had acted decisively on the Kupfer case long before it received Bishop Welch's July report and the supporting papers. Indeed, it acted prior to receiving either Bishop Welch's early recommendation for Kupfer's removal or the Kiangsi missionaries' recommendation against his return to China. The catalytic factor was a letter from the Department of State calling attention to Kupfer's alleged disloyal sentiments and suggesting that he be removed from any office he might hold with the Board. Enclosed was a copy of the report of the Consul-General for China in which Kupfer was charged with open expressions of pro-German sympathy after American entry into the war. They were based on "evidence" collected by the Vice-Consul: Kupfer had stood with bared head while a Chinese band played the German national air; a large portrait of the Kaiser hung conspicuously in his home; a German prayer book was placed in the cornerstone of "the new hall" for the College; and in a letter intercepted by the British authorities, Kupfer had commended "one Gilbert Reid" for his work in the interest of the Central Powers. The letter from Washington was the first official intimation the Board had received of any disloyalty on Kupfer's part, though the office had heard of indiscreet utterances by his "family." Secretary North replied at once, writing on 15 May that it was the policy of the Board to co-operate with the government in every possible way "in matters of this kind" and assuring the Secretary of State that it would give immediate attention to the case of Kupfer and that of Schaefer, who also had been brought under accusation by the department.

"Immediate" meant the next day; on 15 May, the Executive Committee emphatically confirmed what it understood to have been prior removal of Kupfer from his college post by the visiting Bishop presiding over the

Kiangsi Conference, banned his returning to China under Board auspices, and voted to retire him as a missionary at the end of his furlough. Promptly notifying the Department of State of this response to its representations, North also indicated that it would investigate Schaefer's conduct and stand ready to dismiss him if that should be required. North reassured the Secretary of State on behalf of the Committee concerning the policy of the Board "in all ways and at all times, at whatever cost, to cooperate with the Government in promoting loyalty at home and abroad." He declared that the Board pledged itself to act promptly and decisively in any specific case coming to its knowledge. Finding later on that Dr. Kupfer's connection with William Nast College had not actually been formally severed by Bishop Burt, the presiding Bishop, the Committee itself took that decisive step in July.

Secretary North, considering the mixture of political attitudes in China, realized that persuading the Chinese personnel of the Kiangsi mission to toe the line of loyalty to the Allied war cause would involve complications requiring diplomacy, moderation, and careful indoctrination, with perhaps some discharges of school staff members as a last resort. But the line of action with regard to the Board's missionaries appeared to him quite clear. He wrote to Bishop Welch:

If they are not 100% American holding with us in the convictions as to the issues of this war and standing in the position of responsibility which is given them by our Board and our church, for the things for which the Board and the church both stand, they should be recalled without hesitation, and the temper of the Board is such that on any proper representation and evidence of such pro-German or improperly neutral attitude, action would be promptly taken.

The Board showed somewhat less alacrity in consulting Kupfer and his interests than it displayed in its one-day reaction to the spur politely and judiciously applied by the Department of State. Although Kupfer was in the United States, the Executive Committee neither notified him of the charges against him nor gave him the slightest opportunity to defend himself before being condemned and ousted from active service. Indeed, Secretary North did not even notify Kupfer of the Executive Committee action until 12 June, pleading then, in extenuation of the delay, the Committee's consideration for Kupfer at a time when he was understood to be facing the possibility of serious surgery. Without citing any of the dates involved, North wrote Kupfer that consultation with him on the charges of pro-Germanism seemed impossible to secure and that the Committee, "feeling obliged to take action to satisfy the State Department," had found it impossible to postpone its decision.

At the end of July, Kupfer sent North a long and strong defense and protest against his being condemned, disciplined, and stigmatized without a fair hearing on charges he characterized as utterly unfounded. His detailed pre-

sentation constituted a prima-facie successful rebuttal of the charges as presented to the Board by the Department of State. Compared with the Department's almost entirely trivial and flimsy case, which certainly was completely unsubstantiated as far as the Executive Committee knew at the time it voted, Kupfer's statement was sufficiently impressive to demonstrate that the Board may well have allowed itself, through injudicious and unfair haste, to become the tool of distortion and exaggeration perpetrated by feverishly alarmist patriotic American missionaries and prejudiced American and British diplomatic officials moving with the tides of war hysteria sweeping their nations from 1914 to 1918. But these possibilities never were tested in any confrontation between Kupfer and his accusers. His rebuttal was not treated seriously by the Board; North simply passed it along to the Department of State without comment, letting the question of condemnation without a fair hearing peter out. During the summer of 1918 and afterwards, the problem of administering the Kiangsi field displayed many ramifications involving the Board, the China Bishops, Bishop Welch, the missionaries, and the Chinese Methodists. But the handling of Kupfer's tenure and missionary status was simple and decisive; the Department of State spoke, the Board heeded, and Kupfer's service was ended.

DIMENSIONS OF METHODISM, 1919

Two decades and a half after the Kuch'eng Massacre of 1895, twenty years after the Boxer Uprising at the turn of the century, and a decade after the Revolution of 1911, the Methodist constituency still was only a drop in the huge bucket of China's population of half a billion people. But in 1920, the drop itself was measurably larger than in 1895. The number of full members of the church had quadrupled; there were thirty-nine thousand. The number of probationers had more than tripled; there were thirty-five thousand. The largest growth had come during the post-Revolutionary years, a period of relatively greater public openness to Christian evangelism. In about eight years, the probationer group had nearly tripled, and the full members had doubled. This continued and recent augmentation of the formal constituency was largely a real expansion of the adult segment of the church. To be sure, the churches were training up many members from among the children in their Methodist schools and homes, but in 1919, adult baptisms were twice as numerous as child baptisms, and the adults received on probation outnumbered by three to one the baptized children similarly received.

During the post-Revolutionary years, the number of missionaries on the field increased by a third, to 437. The increment of W.F.M.S. missionaries—they increased by sixty-four—exactly equaled that of the Board appointees, who were mainly married missionaries and their wives. Working with the missionaries were 357 ordained Chinese preachers—twice as many as in 1911.

Simultaneously, gains strategic for the future of the church in China were made in the educational field. There were 1,700 students in the Mission's six universities and colleges, 579 in its eighteen theological and biblical training schools, 3,300 in its thirty-six high schools, and 21,000 in its 650 elementary schools.

During the last three years of the decade, notwithstanding this over-all broadening of the Methodist constituency and the enhancement of Methodism's less calculable general influence, the Mission and its people were being drawn into a vast maelstrom of social trouble that was to disturb the stream of Chinese life for ten years to come. Yuan Shih-k'ai was gone—he died in 1916 some months after the collapse of his effort to convert the Republic to an imperial regime with himself at its head—and gone with him was the last serious current hope for the development of effective central government. Now came the violence and destruction of anarchic regional warlordism. Now came the subjection of great numbers of the people—the Christians among the rest—to ruthless military dictators and predatory brigands.

NOTES

Page 648. The extent to which activities of missionary individuals or groups or their influence as a class were peculiarly provocative to the Chinese is too involved a question for treatment here from primary sources. It is discussed in Tyler Dennett, *Americans in Eastern Asia* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1922), pp. 572-6 and *passim*; also in Kenneth Scott Latourette, *A History of Christian Missions in China* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1929), pp. 502 and 507 and *passim*. See also Barclay's comments in Vol. III, pp. 432-35.

Page 663. See Isaac T. Headland, "How the Chinese Have Been Imposed Upon," in *The Christian Advocate* (23 May 1901), p. 809, for a serious representation of the provocative effect of decades of political, territorial, economic, and military aggression against China by foreign powers. Headland was practically alone among Methodist China missionaries in giving substantial public expression to this aspect of the situation in China. See also his "Review of the Situation in China," in *The Methodist Review* (1900), pp. 888-97.

Page 666. Bishop James W. Bashford wrote later on, "The Chinese received their first revelation of the power and the self-restraint which Christ has brought to Christian nations through the Boxer uprising." *The Awakening of China* (1907), p. 12.

Page 668. The only Methodist missionary to break the silence with a substantial critical comment was Isaac T. Headland, who described the "wreck, ruin, and wretchedness" spread all the way from Tientsin to Peking by "this

modern military monster"—the occupying force. He said of North China, "The worst phase of the present conditions perhaps is the brigandage of the foreign troops. . . . One would think that the Chinese had suffered enough at the hands of their own people, but they have suffered still more at the hands of foreign troops." But Headland did not return to Peking from a year's furlough until May, 1901, and his descriptive comment did not appear in print until July (see *The Christian Advocate*, 25 July 1901, pp. 1168 ff.) and received no notice at all in *World-Wide Missions*, the Missionary Society's official organ.

Page 669. Article 29 of the Tientsin Treaty, as quoted in Tyler Dennett, *Americans in Eastern Asia*, p. 562, provides:

The principles of the Christian religion, as professed by the Protestant and Roman Catholic churches, are recognized as teaching men to do good, and to do to others as they would have others do to them. Hereafter those who quietly profess and teach these doctrines shall not be harassed or persecuted on account of their faith. Any person, whether citizen of the United States, or Chinese convert, who, according to these tenets, peaceably teaches and practises the principles of Christianity shall in no case be interfered with or molested.

Page 670. John V. A. MacMurray, comp. and ed., *Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China, 1894-1919* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1921), Vol. I.

Page 675. The list of Methodist bodies is based on interpretation of a list given in *Minutes, Central Conference in China* (1907), p. 30. The Methodist Protestant mission in Kalgan, a hundred miles northwest of Peking, was not yet open.

Page 692. See Stuntz to Charles W. Drees, 28 July 1910. Stuntz was not incapable of making inflated statements. His reference to Bashford's influence may reflect somewhat inaccurately an oral statement of Bashford's about a limited incident such as the one he described in his Journal for 1 April 1909:

Dr. Lowry & I had an interview this morning with Hsu Shih Chang Pres. of the Board of Posts & Communications. We discussed opium reform, progress in schools, railways, postoffices, Provincial assemblies, moral teaching & Confucianism, America & China and Divine Providence and China.

Page 694. O. Edmund Clubb, *Twentieth Century China* (New York: Columbia University Press, Columbia Paperback Edition, 1965), p. 43.

Page 711. Henry McAleavy, *The Modern History of China* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1967), p. 193.

Page 712. Bishop Lewis clearly labeled the ravagers of Nanking as soldiers under the Northern government, but his description came to New York much later, in a letter to George H. Jones, 15 February 1915.

Autonomy in Japan

IN 1896, THE JAPAN MISSION, founded only twenty-three years earlier, was entering upon a decade of ecclesiastical reorganization.

First came a change in the structure of the Japan Annual Conference, under which all the missionary activity in the Japanese Empire had been organized.* Responding to the initiative of the two Districts centered on Nagasaki and Fukuoka on the island of Kyushu, the General Conference of 1896 authorized division of the Conference. As a result, the South Japan Mission Conference was set apart in July, 1898, and formally organized in April, 1899, under the presidency of Bishop Earl Cranston. It was composed of the Fukuoka and Nagasaki Districts, and began its life with seven hundred church members and seventeen ministerial Conference members, thirteen of the latter being Japanese. By definition, it covered Kyushu and the other Japanese islands south and west of Honshu, among them being Okinawa, where the Methodists had been active since 1892. Proportionally reduced in numbers, the Japan Conference went forward with three thousand church members and sixty-five ministers, all but a dozen of the ministers being Japanese. The two new Conferences eventually participated in the Central Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church in Japan, which met in Tokyo in March, 1904, to further their common interests.

The same session of the General Conference that authorized establishment of the South Japan Mission Conference also withdrew from Mission Conferences in general the privilege of representation in the General Conference and the power to vote on Constitutional questions. Feeling that they should have powers comparable with those of the Japan Annual Conference, to which they previously had belonged, the members of the Mission Conference voted in 1902 to memorialize the General Conference to restore to Mission Conferences the powers canceled in 1896. Two years later, however, having gained 40 per cent in lay membership and 81 per cent in self-support since separation from the Japan Conference, and having acquired the requisite number of ministerial Conference members, the South Japan men asked the General Conference for Annual Conference status. This was granted,

* See summary description in Vol. III, 733.

and the Conference was organized on the new basis in March, 1905. The powers of Mission Conferences, however, remained unchanged.

The second important readjustment altered the pattern of episcopal supervision under which Japan, like most foreign fields, was cared for by a constantly changing line of visiting Bishops from the United States. None came more than once or twice. In its first eighteen years, the Japan mission never saw the same episcopal visitor twice. William X. Ninde came in 1894, John M. Walden in 1895, Isaac W. Joyce in 1896 and 1897, and Earl Cranston in 1898 and 1899. The same Bishops also visited Korea and China. The Japan Conference memorialized the General Conference sessions of 1892 and 1896 to assign a Bishop to reside in Japan. Among the reasons for the proposal that were given in the first memorial were the deep-seated patriotism of the Japanese people and the futility of expecting the briefly visiting Bishops to gain a useful knowledge of the field. In 1900, memorials came from Japan, Korea, and China asking for one or more episcopal residences in Eastern Asia. The General Conference established a residence in Shanghai as a center for the supervision of the work in all three countries. Bishop David H. Moore was assigned to serve there for the quadrennium. When his term expired in 1904, Merriman C. Harris, newly elected a Missionary Bishop, was assigned to residence in Tokyo, with responsibility for Korea and Japan.* From this time on, China had separate episcopal leadership. From 1908 to 1916, Bishop Harris resided in Seoul, as did his immediate successor, Bishop Herbert Welch.

The third readjustment was a fundamental one—union of the Conferences in Japan with two other Methodist denominational missions, thus forming an autonomous Methodist church. Both as to the pattern of the merger and as to the achievement of autonomy, this was a new line of evolution in the world-wide mission of the Methodist Episcopal Church; for the first time, one of its foreign missions surrendered its original identity in a more inclusive ecclesiastical body, and for the first time in eighty years, one of its missions became completely independent of the founding church. Both the desire for union and the desire for autonomy contributed motive force to this development. Although in the long run into the future, the establishment of autonomy was to take on superior historic significance for the ultimate shape of world Methodism, at the time of these events, the demand for autonomy was undoubtedly corollary to the demand for union among the varieties of Methodism in Japan. The Japanese national spirit was operative, to be sure, but the purpose to mold an effective Methodist evangelizing force unhampered by Western idiosyncrasies that divided Methodist people and their energies and resources was the far more powerful drive. Autonomy

* See p. 754.

was desirable, but union was essential. Without autonomy, there could be no union; therefore, by all means let there be autonomy.

The movement toward autonomy originally had emerged during the first decade of the Mission's presence in Japan. Formal proposals involving union of the Methodist Episcopal mission with that of the Methodist Church, Canada, had come before the General Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church in 1884, 1888, and 1892. Although the Japan Annual Conference, with its overwhelmingly Japanese membership, strongly backed the 1888 and 1892 proposals, the initiative for the approach to the General Conference came, as it had in 1884, from the Japan Mission, which was composed of missionaries only. Along with the interest in Methodist union and Japanese Methodist ecclesiastical autonomy that was crystallized in the proposals had risen a broad interest in inter-Mission co-operation. Union activity had been achieved in a variety of concrete missionary projects. This latter trend, which was strong and continued strong, had involved both Methodist and non-Methodist mission groups. But in 1896, what proved later to have been only the first phase of the movement toward autonomy had lost force.

The second phase began with conversations at a meeting of representatives of six Methodist missions in Japan that was held in Tokyo in January, 1901, at the call of the Council of the Canada Methodist Mission. These Missions were connected, respectively, with the Methodist Protestant Church, the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, the Evangelical Association, the United Brethren in Christ, the Methodist Church, Canada, and the Methodist Episcopal Church. An inter-Mission committee organized by the Tokyo gathering developed a Statement of Principles on organic union that was available for formal presentation to the various Methodist official bodies in Japan. In April, the Japan Conference strongly supported the desirability of union and, for the purpose of forwarding the cause, raised from among its members a Committee on Methodist Union. Both publicly and privately, Bishop Moore supported the move in general. By December, *Tidings From Japan*, the monthly published by the Methodist Episcopal missionaries, was able to print a full-fledged Basis of Union produced by the missions' Joint Committee. It was intended for submission to the various General Conferences.

Now that the plan for union had reached the point of concrete formulation, Bishop Moore expressed his displeasure with it both as to its name and as to more substantial factors. Looking ahead to the meeting of the Japan Conference in April, he saw the projected union church, as he wrote the Board of Bishops, as "the cloud in the sky." He said of the Basis of Union:

I do not like it. . . . It practically eliminates the home bodies. It is the fledgling, too soon outnesteed. It is unable to take up and support the work, and provides for no date when the Missionary appropriation shall cease. It bows us out, yet follows us to the door, extending its hand for gifts. Something of the kind is bound to come, and ought to be effected: but this is

crude and premature. . . . What we ought to do, to appease the Japanese spirit and forge ahead, is to elect Honda [Yoitsu Honda, President of Aoyama Gakuin] Missionary Bishop.

Although there was strong support for the Basis of Union in the South Japan Conference, the members already had voted to postpone action on its adoption until the following year. In general, the South Japan missionaries were less involved in the negotiations for union than were the men in the other Conference and were slower in warming up to the concrete plans in which the movement was expressed.

Nevertheless, the movement continued gaining momentum both in Japan and in the United States. The General Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, meeting in Dallas in May, voted in favor of organic union of the Japanese Methodist bodies, but referred the Basis of Union to a commission of five that was authorized to confer with like commissions from other churches and to adopt a final basis of union. In April, 1903, both the Methodist Episcopal Conferences in Japan again considered the question of union, and in the spring of 1904 they and the Central Conference in Japan memorialized the General Conference in its favor. The South Japan Conference, however, included in its memorial a statement of a number of substantial objections to the Basis of Union formulated on the field, particularly criticizing it for its weakening of the episcopacy and holding that it would be better to secure a union that was less inclusive of Methodist bodies in Japan than to sacrifice strength in the episcopacy.

The General Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church acted in May, officially recognizing the desirability of union among Methodist bodies in Japan and providing for a Commission similar to the one established by the Southern church. It added a single significant proviso that ostensibly enhanced the power of the Commission to effect a union but also made it relatively easy to achieve it on a less inclusive basis than the movement's supporters in Japan hoped for; the Commission was empowered to adopt without further legislation any plan of union agreed upon with as little as one other body.

After much debate, the General Conference also voted to elect a Missionary Bishop for Japan and Korea, a measure that was challenged by some as raising a potential obstacle to union. Secretary Adna B. Leonard asserted in debate that he believed such an election would further the cause of union rather than hamper it. His remarks showed that he foresaw the Bishop's holding a permanent relationship with the new Japanese church and retaining some direction of its future. Leonard perhaps had not assimilated up to that moment the radical implications of the autonomy the Methodists in Japan desired. The prospect of a Missionary Bishop for Japan had been largely frowned on there, of course, long before its current association with the problems of union and autonomy. But Merriman C. Harris, the man elected—

a member of the first missionary team in Japan and, in 1904, Superintendent of the Pacific Japanese Mission in the United States—was himself well oriented towards Japan.

After a delay of many months, Commissioners representing four denominations—the Methodist Protestant Church, the Methodist Church, Canada, the Methodist Episcopal Church, and the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, met in a two-day session in Baltimore in the first week of January, 1906. Though they shared a substantial community of purpose, the session broke up on the rock of episcopacy. The Canadians and the Methodist Protestants represented nonepiscopal churches, and they desired for the new Japanese church only an episcopacy that was greatly reduced in its powers compared with that long entrenched in the practice of the other two churches. The men from the two Methodist Episcopal churches wished to retain a strong episcopacy. In addition to the shape of the office itself, the relationship of Bishop Harris to the new church also became a point of disagreement. The nonepiscopal group saw no official place in the Japanese church for a Bishop of the American denomination, whereas the Methodist Episcopal commissioners took the position that to oust Bishop Harris would constitute nullification of an act of their General Conference, inasmuch as Harris had been elected Missionary Bishop for Japan for life.

When the Joint Commission adjourned, Leonard expressed doubt that it would be possible to unite the two episcopal with the two nonepiscopal bodies; indeed he thought it unlikely even that the Commission would meet again. "I was very anxious that a union be brought about," he wrote to one of the Japan missionaries, "but the non-episcopal brethren were unwilling to make any concessions worthy of the name." The episcopally oriented Commissioners themselves evidently had made only a single concession, the acceptance of a twelve-year term episcopacy in place of the traditional life tenure practiced in their two churches. The Commission did meet again, however, in Nashville on 1 March, this time with Commissioners from the United Brethren attending. Nothing was accomplished but an understanding that any two groups could now go forward without embarrassment to form a less inclusive union.

The Commissioners of the Northern and the Southern episcopal churches acted immediately and, following some work by a special committee, met in Baltimore on 15 March and easily and quickly adopted a basis of union for the "Methodist Episcopal Church of Japan." It was to be a church episcopal in polity and conforming in every essential respect with the two American sponsoring churches. The Commissioners announced May, 1907, as the date for organizing the new church on the field.

News of the failure of the first Baltimore conference and then of the success of the second, less inclusive one produced an unhappy reaction in Japan, particularly among Methodists, but also among Protestants in general. Even

the Methodist missionaries were not so thoroughly committed to a strong episcopacy as were the Commissioners in the United States. As for the Japanese, *Tidings From Japan* reported that feeling was current among them that the Commissioners had not given their wishes appropriate consideration. Yoitsu Honda, who was a prominent leader in the union movement, expressed this view at the session of the Japan Conference. "The people are not children, and resent being treated as such," said *Tidings*. The risk that such a reaction would occur was implicit, of course, in the enabling legislation establishing the Commission. Whereas in 1888, the General Conference had been willing to leave the planning and final forging of union almost entirely to the Japanese and their leaders, the legislation of 1904 placed those powers exclusively in the hands of American churchmen. Officially, the Japanese had no power effectively to advise; they could only consent.

Early in April, nevertheless, the Japan Conference took strong initiative to revive the union movement on a three-Mission basis, desiring especially to have included the substantial Mission sponsored by the Methodist Church, Canada, for the two fields were contiguous. The Conference adopted a revised basis of union formulated at an unofficial but representative gathering of Methodist ministers and laymen and transmitted it to the Commissioners in the United States for their consideration. The Conference declared that despite the permissive minimum provision in the General Conference legislation, it was absolutely necessary to build a union of the Missions of at least the two episcopal Methodist churches and the Methodist Church, Canada. (Even the South Japan Conference, which heartily approved retention of a strong episcopacy, requested the Commissioners to make one more attempt to bring in the Canadians.) The Japan Conference also requested the Commissioners to send to Japan, after determination of the main aspects of the union, a subcommission with authority to make final detailed arrangements on the field.

Bishop Harris did the best he could to have the merger negotiations reopened on a basis more acceptable to the Japanese. The Japan Conference asked him to consider going to the United States to further the cause, but on his own initiative, he communicated more than once to Adna B. Leonard, one of the Commissioners, the great and deepening discontent in Japan with the two-Mission plan. He pointed out both the necessity of taking the spirit of the Japanese into account and the practical impossibility of putting a strong episcopacy into effect in the projected independent church. Later, the supporters of the broader approach to union were so concerned to have their views understood in America that they arranged to send Dr. Honda to the States in July.

The Methodist Episcopal Commissioners welcomed from Japan neither suggestion nor pressure. They were not required by the General Conference to consider Japanese opinion, and they did not take it upon themselves to do

so. Consulting only their own judgment, they proceeded with their task "by following as God led us along step by step." Two decades later, at a time when union in Korea was on the horizon, Bishop Herbert Welch, viewing the record of Japanese unification, noted with astonishment the extent to which Americans acting in America had shaped up the merger for Japan. The Joint Commissioners, notwithstanding "the impatience of our brethren in Japan for early action," even delayed holding their first meeting until "the return of peace to the empire." They finally scheduled it (Bishop Harris was concerned about the delay) for January, 1906, seven months after the last naval battle of the Russo-Japanese War and five months after the Treaty of Portsmouth was signed. This was a year and a half after the General Conference action. In its report to the General Conference in 1908, the Commission demonstrated that its primary emphasis was upon the development of a Japanese church that should meet norms acceptable to the American church. The Commissioners gave no credit at all to churchmen or missionaries in Japan for contributions to the final structure of the new church; indeed, they showed that they resented efforts in Japan to make any contribution. They referred to their own forbearance "with the embarrassments which, in the course of the negotiations, from time to time presented themselves, growing out of the repeated informal attempts of the missionaries and preachers of the several churches in Japan to reach an acceptable basis of union." Among the embarrassments were concessions made by the informal negotiators when they were trying to keep rigidity about a strong episcopacy from aborting fulfillment of their strong desire for a broad union. Adna B. Leonard found it so difficult freely to assimilate the legitimacy of Japanese thinking about union that in 1906 he was inclined to talk about the possibility of closing the purse of American Methodism to the new church if the Japanese became too insistent upon their own ideas of the future organization of Japanese Methodism.

Although Leonard and his fellow official negotiators evidently did not care clearly to acknowledge it to the General Conference, negotiations and adjustments carried out in Japan in the spring of 1906 actually caused a re-opening in America of the merger conferences that were thought to have been concluded by the decisions made in Baltimore. The effectiveness of those mutual approaches in Japan was enhanced by the presence there of Dr. Albert Carman and Dr. Alexander Sutherland, two of the Canadian members of the original Joint Commission. Dr. Carman, especially, was interested in bringing the Canadians into the union. On 25 June, the Commissioners from the two episcopal Methodisms and from the Canadian church met again, in the office of American University in Washington, D. C., and set themselves once more seriously to formulate a three-Mission union. Using the basis of union already agreed upon by the two American churches as a beginning for their studies, a special committee reported a revised plan to the Joint

Commission at a meeting in Buffalo on 18 July. Up to this time, difficulties about episcopacy had persisted, but the problems were resolved to the satisfaction of the Commissioners, and they announced that they now were ready to effect a merger of their three Missions in the spring of 1907.

Two Commissioners from each of the three North American churches arrived in Tokyo at the end of May to inaugurate the Japan Methodist Church. This subcommission consisted of Bishop Earl Cranston and Adna B. Leonard (Methodist Episcopal), Bishop Alpheus W. Wilson and Walter R. Lambuth (Methodist Episcopal, South), and Albert Carman and Alexander Sutherland (Methodist Church, Canada). Almost their last preparatory act was to come to an understanding with Bishop Harris about his position as a Missionary Bishop now that the two Japan Conferences of the Methodist Episcopal Church were no longer to be under the jurisdiction of the General Conference. Bishop Harris settled the question, which had nagged at the Commissioners throughout their negotiations, by announcing that he would retain his relationship with the Methodist Episcopal Church in full at least until the General Conference should meet, but that he would be ready to serve Methodism through the new church in whatever way that organization and the Commissioners should think best. He thus removed himself, to the satisfaction of all, as a possible focus of difficulty in establishing workable relations between the Japan Church and the parent church.

Sixty-four delegates elected by the respective Japanese Conferences to the first General Conference of the new church assembled in the chapel of Aoyama Gakuin on 22 May. The Commissioners, deciding to conduct the proceedings under their own presidency until the new organization should be complete, treated the elected body at first as simply a delegated organizing convention. The Discipline of the Japan Methodist Church, having been worked out by the convention and its committee and approved by the Commissioners, became effective on 1 June. Yoitsu Honda was promptly elected Bishop and then consecrated the next day. On 3 June, Bishop Honda assumed the chair of the finally and fully organized General Conference of the united and independent church. Bishop Honda expressed gratitude for the work of the Commissioners and also for the contribution made to union by Bishop Harris, whom the General Conference (Japan) subsequently elected as its Bishop Emeritus.

In his Methodist Episcopal connection, Bishop Harris remained the Missionary Bishop for Japan and Korea until 1916, when he was succeeded by Bishop Herbert Welch, a General Superintendent assigned to supervise the denomination's interests in the two countries. Bishop Honda served until his death in 1912. The Japan Church elected as his successor Yoshiasu Hiraiwa, formerly associated with the Canadian mission. Bishop Hiraiwa's term having expired in 1919, he was succeeded by Bishop Kagoro Uzaki, formerly affiliated with the Southern Methodist mission. At the time of

Bishop Uzaki's election the episcopal term was changed to four years.

Functionally, the church that emerged from the process of unification was fully autonomous. Ideologically, it was rooted, nevertheless, in the worldwide Methodist tradition, which was symbolized by the fact that embedded in the new Discipline was an eighteen-point statement of faith reduced from the Twenty-five Articles of Religion originally transmitted to the American church by John Wesley and for so long included in the Disciplines of the Northern and Southern denominations. Most of its organizational structure and terminology also was true to North American Methodist practice. It was governed by a quadrennial General Conference and a system of Annual Conferences. Unlike the Methodist Episcopal Church, it admitted laymen to membership in the Annual Conferences. Its supervisory and presidential system was episcopal, but with modifications of American custom. Bishops were to be elected for eight-year terms, with eligibility for re-election—a departure from the life tenure granted in the United States. The power of Bishops to appoint District Superintendents was limited by the provision that they should appoint from among nominees designated by the Annual Conferences. Their power to appoint ministers to charges was qualified by the requirement that they act only after consultation with the District Superintendents. Essentially, the Japan Methodist Church was built after an American model.

Some Methodists saw in this consummation of a national union with autonomy the potentiality of a trend that could radically alter the international scope of the Methodist Episcopal Church. Although he greatly overstated the contemporary situation, Richard J. Cooke, the Book Editor, correctly identified in 1906 the crucial character of what finally was done. He wrote in *The Christian Advocate*:

By this division of the church the dream of an Ecumenical Methodist Episcopal Church, which, like the kingdom of God in the vision of John in the Apocalypse, shall embrace all tribes and tongues and nations and peoples, vanishes forever away, and the Methodist Episcopal Church, no longer world-wide, becomes a provincial church, limited, cribbed, confined within well defined boundaries—the Methodist Episcopal Church *in the United States*.

The Bishops were aware of the same possibility and accepted grudgingly the necessity of organizing the Japanese church. They declared in the Episcopal Address of 1908:

We assent to that necessity. . . . Some regret the separation as affecting our ecumenical quality and tendency. We trust the General Conference will be slow to authorize other independent Methodist Churches at a time when we must contribute almost entirely the amount necessary for their support. We believe, as a rule, that self-support ought to be attained before self-government is granted.

And there were disapproving administrators, like Bishop James W. Bashford, in China, who often and fully declared his opposition to the formation of such national churches as the one brought forth in Japan in 1907.

There was nothing grudging, however, in Bishop Harris's evaluation of the achievement of autonomy for the Japanese Methodists. After studying the current church and mission situation when he returned to Japan in 1904 as a newly elected Bishop, he had become convinced that the time for independence had arrived. Missions associated with the Anglicans, the Congregationalists, the Presbyterians, and the Baptists already had taken that step. Only the Methodists and the Catholics had not. Bishop Harris confessed to the General Conference in 1908 that he had felt it his duty to encourage the movement toward Methodist union with autonomy. The prime reason he offered for its justification was "for the more speedy evangelization of the people." And he strongly urged the Methodist Episcopal Church to continue to support its former Japan mission with money and personnel.

Into the united church the Methodist Episcopal mission took five thousand members, who were gathered in some seventy pastoral charges. This contingent constituted half the membership of the Japan Methodist Church, which had 130 wholly or partly self-supporting organized churches, two thirds of them having their own church buildings. The ministerial leadership of the new denomination headed by Bishop Honda included a hundred ordained and fifty unordained ministers. Beyond normal parochial activities, the new church was actively reaching six thousand pupils through nearly three dozen day schools, a dozen boarding schools for girls, three institutions offering high school and college courses, two Bible schools for women, and two theological schools.

The total constituency of the United church was divided into two Annual Conferences, with Districts so arranged that they preserved the geographical separateness that had been characteristic of the preunification fields of the three denominations.

The East Conference had ten Districts, four of them formerly Canadian Methodist and six of them Methodist Episcopal. The latter group were centered on Hokkaido (Japan's northernmost island), Hirosaki and Sendai (both far north on Honshu, Japan's main island), and Tokyo and Yokohama (both in southeastern Honshu). The Canadian Districts lay west of the lower portion of the former Methodist Episcopal field.

The West Conference, whose membership was half as large as that of the East Conference, took in all the former field of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, and one Canadian District. From the Methodist Episcopal mission, it received one District of the Japan Conference and the whole of the field of the South Japan Conference. The four Districts contributed by the latter were based on Fukuoka, Nagasaki, Kumamoto, and Kagoshima, all of them on the southern island Kyushu. The former was the Nagoya

District, which lay midway along the length of Honshu. The Canadian District was contiguous with the Canadian Districts of the East Conference, and together they nearly surrounded the Nagoya District. The areas cultivated by the Church, South were located in the southwestern third of Honshu and on Shikoku along the coast of the Inland Sea.

The emergence of the Japan Methodist Church as an ecclesiastically independent unity by no means terminated the commitment of the Methodist Episcopal Church to the cause of evangelizing Japan. The evangelistic imperative felt by both churches demanded that they continue to work closely together even though technically severed. The Basis of Union had been drafted on the assumption that the missionaries would remain in Japan, and it recognized the desirability of maintaining a close relationship between them and the Japanese church.

Among the Board missionaries in the two Methodist Episcopal Conferences when the Japan Church was founded were Francis A. Cassidy, Charles W. Huett, Gideon F. Draper, Frank H. Smith, Herbert W. Schwartz, Julius Soper, Charles S. Davison, Edwin T. Iglehart, Chancellor N. Bertels, Robert P. Alexander, Frederick W. Heckelman, David S. Spencer, Benjamin Chappell, Edwin H. Fretz, Arthur D. Berry, Henry B. Schwartz, John C. Davison, Francis N. Scott, Willard de L. Kingsbury, Epperson R. Fulkerson, and Arch E. Rigby. A large proportion of these men had had long experience on the field; Julius Soper and John C. Davison had been there when the Japan Mission was organized in 1873, and others had come soon afterwards. Some were yet to serve for more than a decade to come; Alexander, Berry, Bishop, John C. Davison, Draper, Heckelman, Iglehart, Scott, and Spencer were still on the Board's Japan roster in 1920.

The Basis provided that regularly appointed missionaries should enjoy all the privileges of membership in the Conferences of the Japan Church except that of voting on the character or Conference relations of Japanese ministers. The General Conference of the Japan Church, once it was independently organized, in June, 1907, promptly acted to liberalize this pattern. It voted to open its Annual Conferences to full membership on the part of ordained missionaries who desired it, thus creating the possibility of a missionary's having dual Conference membership.

The Methodist Episcopal missionaries desired to take up the option offered by the Japan Church, and they so memorialized their own General Conference in 1908. But that body decided that the missionaries could not hold full dual membership; it would be inconsistent, it affirmed, either with true autonomy for the Japanese or with sound Constitutional practice in the American church. All the American ministers in Japan were transferred to their home Conferences in the United States.

The General Conference offered, however, an alternative plan; it authorized the transfer of American ministers from their home Conferences to temporary

full membership in Japan Conferences so that they could take specific missionary appointments in co-operation with the Japan Methodist Church. And it authorized similar transfers of Japanese ministers into American Conferences for appointment to Japanese-language work in the States. This plan soon went into effect in both directions and continued to operate for two quadrenniums. Under it, missionaries who worked in Japan were declared eligible to any office in the Japan Church. There was complaint on the field that this system of so-called transfers was cumbersome and somewhat hampered the work of the missionaries. Characterizing it as a sacrifice of usefulness in favor of theoretical Constitutional consistency, Arthur D. Berry, Dean of the Theological School at Aoyama Gakuin, declared in a pamphlet written in 1911 that in practice the plan already had broken down of its own weight. Finally, in 1916, the General Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church authorized missionaries to accept full membership in Japan Conferences on the basis originally proffered by the Japan Methodist Church. This effected true dual membership for the period of a missionary's service in Japan.

The Basis of Union, though it did not commit the Methodist Episcopal Church to direct financial support of Methodist work in Japan, nevertheless forecast it as a possibility. In November, 1907, the General Missionary Committee made it a reality. Resolving that the Japan Methodist Church should have "the most cordial and liberal support" of its three parent bodies, it appropriated for Japan the same amount of money as for the year before, namely, \$62,500. Over the following decade, the appropriations averaged \$65,000 annually. Each annual amount included an allotment directly to the Japan Church for its own work under its own administration. The Board of Foreign Missions thus gave its own affirmative answer to a Constitutional question of high practical relevance for this and all future grants of ecclesiastical autonomy to foreign missionary constituencies: Could the Methodist Episcopal Church legitimately make financial grants to the work of churches not under its own Discipline? Bishop Thomas B. Neely, perhaps the Church's leading Constitutional scholar, pointed out in *The Christian Advocate* in February, 1908, that such a grant was not without precedent; he cited Missionary Society appropriations to the work of the Wesleyans in France midway in the nineteenth century* and General Conference approval of another such prospective grant to the Evangelical Methodist Church of France and Switzerland in 1884.

The new position of Japan Methodism, however, made it more vulnerable when the partisans of various missions entered the financial arena of the General Committee to do battle annually for favorable field appropriations. Dean Berry, in his pamphlet *Methodist Episcopal Missionary Work in Japan*,

* See Vol. III, 1059n.

pointed to the lack of interest in Japan, in some American Methodist circles, now that it was no longer possible to build up there the membership rolls of the Methodist Episcopal Church. Writing in order to express to the home church some of the troubled concerns of the Japan missionaries, he reported that they had been made to feel that American financial support for their work was precarious. He said :

Each year the appropriation to Japan is held up, and the continued support of the work in Japan hung on the tenterhooks. This continued agitation has shocked the denominational pride and loyalty of the Methodist Episcopal missionaries in Japan, and this paper is an attempt to voice our wounded dismay.

Defending the integrity of the Japanese Methodists' motivation and their sense of financial responsibility, Dean Berry reasserted the bedrock fact of their substantial dependence upon grants from the parent churches if they were to carry on their mission. "This fact," he said, "is easily made into a taunt and thrown at the independency of the Japan Methodist Church, and certain hard things have been said by representatives of the rich home Churches." He criticized the "narrow consistency" of the recurring argument that the Japanese had no right to assert their independence until they could pay their own way, and he called upon the Methodist Episcopal Church to concentrate not essentially upon its financial subsidy to the Japan Church, but upon "the real question" before it—the evangelization of Japan.

An attempt had been made in 1909 to impose upon Japan a cut in appropriations that was greater than the cut being uniformly applied to the missions in general because of the Board's debt problem. One of the Bishops declared in debate that it was time to begin effecting a policy of gradual reduction of funds for Japan. But Bishop Cranston, Secretary Leonard, and others fought back, claiming that such a policy would hurt the new church and be interpreted as unfriendly action. They held that in any case, it should not be initiated without consulting the Canadian church and the Church, South. The partisans of Japan succeeded in beating back the attack, but the General Committee recommended that the Methodist Episcopal Commissioners on Union consult the missionary societies of the two other churches about the expediency of recommending to the three appropriating bodies a year hence a reduction in financial allotments to Japan.

Bishop Harris roundly deplored this proposal, calling it "fighting against God." He wrote to Leonard, "The object of union & independence was not the reduction of expenses, but the evangelization of the nation." He pointed out—and his claim was amply substantiated by the Corresponding Secretaries when they reported to General Committee in November, 1910—that all other Methodist groups concerned, both in Japan and in the United States, saw the condition of the work as crying out for the application of more funds,

not less. With the two other North American churches preparing to expand their commitment to Japan, the General Committee tacitly renounced its hesitation of the year before and increased the Japan appropriation by \$4,500 (committee proposals had called for a far larger increase).

During the first decade of independence, the Board of Foreign Missions gradually developed a co-operative apparatus for maintenance of its linkages of funds and personnel with the Japan Methodist Church. It utilized until 1916, when they were merged under the name the Japan Mission Council, two field organizations known as the East Japan and the West Japan Missions of the Methodist Episcopal Church. The Japan Mission Council was composed of all the Board's missionary corps (W.F.M.S. missionaries were not included) within the bounds of the Japan Church. The Council framed appropriations estimates for the Board, received and disbursed funds sent out from New York, and maintained consultative and planning rapport with the field organizations of the other parent denominations. Since Bishop Harris exercised no official function within the Japan Church itself, and since his residence was changed to Seoul, the Council also provided a base for his continued supervision of Methodist Episcopal interests in Japan and a medium of official contact with the missionaries.

The Mission Council transmitted the Board's remittances for the Japan Methodist Church through the agency of the Reference Committee, a group representing equally the field organizations of the three North American churches and dealing with the relations between the autonomous church and the parent denominations. The Board of Missions, or evangelistic board, of the Japan Church determined the local points to which these financial resources were to be applied. They were restricted, by the terms of the original grants from abroad, to supplementation of pastoral salaries and rent payments in churches that were not fully self-supporting. Since the missionary field groups were represented on the Board of Missions, which otherwise was composed of Japanese Methodists, missionaries were involved in helping to fix the salaries and the rents for all these churches.

The elements of unification and of autonomy effected by the merger of 1907 were not realized to an equal degree. The autonomy of the Japan Church was complete, but none of the three North American churches turned over to it quite all the activities or interests developed by its missionaries through the years. The Methodist Episcopal Church transferred to the new denomination only the organized church work that constituted its ecclesiastical system of Districts and Conferences.

Among the interests it withheld were the Board's educational institutions (notably Aoyama Gakuin, in Tokyo, and Chinzei Gakuin, in Nagasaki) and the Methodist Publishing House. The Japan Mission Council, through which the various administrative controls of the Board and the episcopal powers of Bishop Harris were expressed, was the instrumentality by which arrange-

ments were fashioned that secured to the Methodist Episcopal Church effective ownership and operation of these institutions. The Council also disbursed to them the Board appropriations for their support.

The work of the W.F.M.S. also was withheld from the merger. The Society continued its customary independent operation of its school system and its evangelistic projects through two Woman's Conferences. After unification, the former Japan Woman's Conference, which had correlated its activities with the work of the former Japan Conference, changed its name to the East Japan Woman's Conference and became associated with the East Conference of the Japan Methodist Church. The South Japan Woman's Conference, which had co-operated with the South Japan Mission Conference, retained its name unchanged, but became associated with the West Conference of the Japan Church. The two Woman's Conferences maintained relations with the Japan Church and with their parent organization in America by methods similar to those employed by the Japan Mission Council.

A large measure of the direct evangelistic activity of the Board's missionaries became a third element not fully integrated into the operation of the Japan Methodist Church. The Japanese ministry took entire charge of the organized churches that were founded by the earlier efforts of the missionaries, and Japanese leaders generally filled the District superintendencies formerly held by them. But the fledgling Japan Church was far from strong enough to press significantly into the vast unevangelized areas of Japanese life. It had to struggle not only to achieve self-support in its local churches, but also to carry an unfamiliar load of administrative and operational expense once borne by the American-financed enterprise. Therefore, in order to avoid bringing Methodism's expansion to a halt while the new church labored under burdens too great for it, it was agreed that evangelistic advance should become the special function of part of the Board's missionary personnel.

Under this division of labor, the evangelistic missionaries were to cultivate fresh areas, arouse the interest of inquirers, win converts, and form societies and then introduce both individuals and groups into the Japan Methodist Church for permanent membership and pastoral care. Typically, the evangelistic missionary worked within the bounds of a regular District of the Japan Church in the post of district missionary (after 1913, he was called missionary-in-charge), acting under direction of the District Superintendent. As a missionary of the Board, he received his appointment from Bishop Harris, but it was made a Conference appointment by being read out by Bishop Honda, or one of his successors, when the Japanese ministers were appointed at Conference time. Since he was paid and otherwise financed directly from the portion of the appropriation from the United States that was retained by the Mission Council, the district missionary was able to engage Japanese workers, hire preaching rooms, pay travel expenses and so on, without having to draw upon the financial resources of the Japan Church

or to be hampered by any of its financial stringencies. Some of the missionaries actually themselves became District Superintendents, thus relieving the Japanese of a measure of financial pressure. It also was one of the factors that tended to keep the evangelistic missionaries so little in advance of Japanese parochial activities that their effort never became so markedly a forward wing of Methodism as may have been envisioned at the beginning.

In Okinawa, this somewhat complex and none too sharply defined plan of co-operation yielded enough elasticity to make evangelistic advance possible in that previously underdeveloped area. John C. Davison was the first Methodist to explore this island group south of Kyushu, in 1887. Five years later, the Japan Conference sent Nagano Chiujo to Naha to open a mission. In 1896, he moved on to Shuri, the work continuing in Naha also. When the Japan Conference was divided in 1898, the Okinawa mission became a part of the South Japan Conference, remaining in that jurisdiction until the unification of 1907, when it had thirty-eight church members. Henry B. Schwartz began in 1901 a long association with Okinawa which that year came under his District superintendency, though he lived on Kyushu until he moved to Okinawa in 1906. Schwartz continued as District Superintendent for Okinawa under the West Conference of the Japan Methodist Church.

By 1910, the Okinawa mission included not only the churches at Naha and Shuri, which belonged to the West Conference, but also five appointments under the West Japan Mission of the American church. Schwartz (he left the field in 1915), with Japanese evangelists as assistants, was the pastor in charge of each of the Mission's churches. At the same time, he was still District Superintendent under the Japan Church for the entire combination, with the Church giving to its two charges financial aid derived from North American appropriations and with the Mission supporting its five appointments through an itinerancy fund disbursed directly to Schwartz. Earl R. Bull and his wife came to Schwartz's assistance in 1911—the beginning of a decade and a half of service in connection with Okinawa. In 1912, the Japan Methodist Church transferred its Okinawa appointments to the West Japan Mission, thus leaving all the Okinawa work in the hands of the Methodist Episcopal Church. The congregations and the Japanese workers belonged, to be sure, to the Japan Church, but the West Japan Mission Council was completely responsible for financing and supervising the work. By 1920, the members of the Japan Methodist Church in Okinawa numbered eight hundred.

Both before and after the birth of the Japan Methodist Church, Japan Methodism conducted what was in a sense a foreign mission in Korea. It began in 1904, when Korea was self-governing but under a recently established and then increasingly oppressive protectorate by Japan, and it continued into the period beginning in August, 1910, when Japan annexed Korea.*

* See p. 749.

In 1920, after a little more than a decade under the aegis of the Japan Methodist Church, the church membership of the areas originally cultivated by the Methodist Episcopal Church and continuing under the care of its Japan Mission Council had increased to 8,300. And the membership of the entire Japan Church had grown proportionately, to 17,000.

Captive Korea

THE KOREA MISSION WAS FORGIVABLY SMALL; it was hardly ten years old, its direct evangelistic efforts were even newer than that, and its handful of missionaries only recently had projected settled missions beyond Seoul, the capital, to Incheon, Pyongyang, and Wonsan. It was but beginning the popular growth that was to expand its church membership from little more than two hundred in 1896 to thirteen thousand in 1919.

Korea's episcopal leadership during this period of growth was identical with Japan's: visiting General Superintendents until 1899; Bishop David H. Moore, resident in Shanghai, from 1900 to 1903; Missionary Bishop Merri-man C. Harris from 1904 to 1915; and Bishop Herbert Welch from 1916 to 1919. Until 1907, the episcopal residence was Tokyo; from 1908, it was Seoul.

Twice the connectional status of the Korea enterprise was altered. In June, 1905, it became the Korea Mission Conference, and in March, 1908, the Korea Annual Conference.

The constituency with which the Annual Conference began was markedly larger than that of 1896. From about 1900, the churches had acquired from two to four hundred full members each year, until in 1906-7 the year's increment rose sharply to nearly eleven hundred members. In 1907-8, it rose again, to fourteen hundred. The cumulative result was a full membership of 5,300 persons. In addition, there were 19,000 probationers and 20,000 seekers (definitely recorded church attendants not yet received on probation). Among the contributing causes of this strong development were the lifting of earlier government-imposed or responsive self-imposed restrictions on direct evangelism, the emergence of a corps of Korean preachers, the influence of medical and educational work, the use of revival methods, and the penetration of new geographical areas—a pattern of complementary factors.

This expanded constituency was organized into four Districts centered on Seoul, Kongju, Pyongyang, and Yengbyen.

The Seoul District, in the upper part of southern Korea, included three charges in Seoul itself and nine outside, all of them within about thirty-five miles of the capital. The organizing session of the Annual Conference cut away part of this District to serve as the nucleus for a newly arranged Suwon

District. The nine charges administered from Suwon, a city south of Seoul, represented the existence of work spreading through a broad area covering twenty-two counties.

The Kongju District had less than 650 members in 1908, as against 2,500 recorded on the Seoul District. But it was a new enterprise, sprung from medical and evangelistic work begun by Dr. William B. McGill in 1903 in the city of Kongju, in western Korea eighty miles south of Seoul. But by 1908, the District based on Kongju included ten Circuits, with twenty Quarterly Conferences, and was growing strongly. There were 9,600 probationers and 6,500 seekers. At the end of the first Annual Conference year, however, due to a large transfer of mission territory and constituents in the Kongju area to the Presbyterians, the rolls listed only 307 members, 1,161 probationers, and 5,021 seekers.

The Pyongyang District, based on the city of Pyongyang, 125 miles from Seoul, represented Methodism's penetration of northwestern Korea. The District's territory was three times as long as that of the Seoul District, and its twenty-five pastoral charges and Circuits were three times as numerous as those of the Seoul District outside the capital itself. In size of constituency, the two Districts were comparable.

Sixty miles above Pyongyang was Yengbyen, the head of the Yengbyen District, which included eight Circuits in northeastern Korea. This was the smallest of the Districts; it had only 159 church members, with a thousand probationers and seekers. But its development was only in the initial stage. As late as 1905, it was not a District, but a single extensive Circuit, and in October of that year its new mission compound in the city of Yengbyen was occupied for the first time, by Charles D. Morris.

Through the activity on these Districts, the Methodist Episcopal mission now was well launched into two areas of southern Korea as well as into northwestern and northeastern Korea. Within a decade, it had become an enterprise no longer almost entirely locked within the vicinity of Seoul. This expansion was related to recent changes in the pattern of enlistment and deployment of workers. In 1896, there were eight men under active appointment as missionaries, with seven women working under the W.F.M.S.; in 1908, there were fifteen men and seventeen W.F.M.S. women. In 1896, only three of the men and none of the women were stationed outside Seoul; in 1908, eleven men and nine W.F.M.S. missionaries were resident elsewhere—in Chemulpo, Pyongyang, and Kongju. Thus the missionaries now were out close to the Circuits that were carrying the Mission's message into new towns and country places.

During the period when the number of Districts was rising from five to eleven, the list of churches and Circuits was increasing from seventy to a hundred, and the church membership was more than doubling.

Medical work remained a constant function of the growing Mission. Four

of the Board missionaries and one of the W.F.M.S. women in 1896 were medical doctors: William B. Scranton, John B. Busted, William B. McGill, E. Douglas Follwell, and Mary M. Cutler. Scranton and Busted cared for the general hospital and dispensary work in Seoul, and Dr. Cutler, assisted by Ella A. Lewis, operated the Woman's Hospital. McGill was in Wonsan and Follwell in Pyongyang.

The doctors continued for some years to work with meager physical facilities and supplies; little money was appropriated for their enterprises. Dr. Harry C. Sherman, who worked in the Seoul hospital from 1898 to 1900, said that it had a big name, Si Pyung Won (General Hospital of Seoul), but consisted of "a few old buildings located on a good lot" and deficient in the most elementary equipment. In Pyongyang, Dr. Follwell ran a "hospital" without wards. "My only available room is one 16 ft. x 12 ft. in wretched condition." In spite of repeated requests on his part, additional quarters were not provided until, in 1899, he himself built three small rooms (each one was twelve feet square) and a still smaller operating room. The funds were contributed not by the Missionary Society, but by friends of Rosetta S. Hall, M.D., and by Dr. Hall herself. This twelve-patient hospital was named the Hall Memorial Hospital for her husband, William J. Hall, M.D., the pioneer of medical work in Pyongyang (he died in 1895). But little money came Dr. Follwell's way from the Society for its operation; in 1901, the appropriations included only \$100 for drugs and instruments and nothing at all for maintenance of ward patients.

The humanitarian sensibilities of the men and women serving the sick may not be doubted, but neither may the fact that the purpose of the Mission's various medical projects was deliberately evangelistic. In the early years, overt evangelism by preaching involved risks. It lay under government restriction and social handicaps. But medical care of unconverted Koreans drew attention, won sympathy, opened doors, intrigued inquirers, won converts. Dr. Scranton said of Dr. McGill's activity in Wonsan, "His medical work is paying for itself both in converts and in general influence."

Doctor Busted strongly affirmed the evangelistic motivation of what he was doing as a doctor. "The end to which we are working in the Si Pyung Won is the salvation of men." Two religious services were held at the hospital each day, reaching not only the staff, but also the ward patients and the outpatients. A Korean evangelist circulated among the people in the wards and also held Bible classes with them. Busted believed that it was very important for the doctor himself to do personal religious work with the patients. "The patients will listen to the doctor gladly when they will not pay so much attention to the natives whose peculiar work it is to preach. The doctor has a peculiar influence over his patients." While he moistened the parched lips of a patient with water, he would urge him "to believe in Jesus

and seek His saving power." He cited one such patient, a boy, whom he had been trying for several days to lead to the Savior.

Doctor Follwell deeply accepted as sufficient justification of missionary medical service its usefulness as a channel for the Christian message. He rejected the concept of the medical missionary as one who should divide his time between doctoring the American missionaries and evangelizing the indigenous people. "Medical missionary work can be made to be one of the most powerful evangelistic agencies in the world," he said, and for that reason he regretted that that wing of the Mission's work was poorly supported. He was compelled, through lack of assistance, to limit the religious activity in his Pyongyang hospital, but he took up every possible opportunity to make personal contacts with patients and to conduct religious conversation with them in his broken Korean speech. For Doctor Follwell, the crux of the therapeutic process seemed, as revealed in his reports, to be not that the patient was healed, but that—being healed—he was grateful. Grateful patients and grateful families often became interested in Christianity. Thus he spoke of a boy who went home happy to be cured of bodily pain, "while the father carried the glorious news of the healing power of Jesus' blood to his home and friends." Follwell held that physical and spiritual relief were inseparable; medical work was necessary in Korea in order to "help win this people for Jesus Christ by showing that we care for their bodies as well as their souls."

The W.F.M.S. doctors shared the evangelistic passion and purpose characteristic of the healing work of the Missionary Society's medical appointees. In hospital, dispensary, or patient's home, in operating room or on the ward, in the city or on back country trek, they manifested intense preoccupation with the religious state of their human charges. Essential concern with physical suffering or disease was a minor, sometimes apparently an incidental, theme in their reports. A comment of Dr. Mary Cutler's on the incurables who pressed to the doors of her hospital suggests the function of evangelical dogma in subordinating humanitarian to spiritually didactic and salvationist responses: "I am not sure but God sends these to us, that we may show the Christian way of caring for the needy, and better still, that we may lead their souls into life, though their bodies perish." Doctor Cutler notably demonstrated the prevalent attitude by zealously conducting the Woman's Hospital in Seoul as a systematically organized soul-winning undertaking that almost relentlessly exploited every possible personal contact as a means tending to convert the patient. She counted "results" not so much by cases medically cured or ameliorated as by souls pursued or won. She certainly kept medical records but just as certainly tended charts of religious response on the part of the patients to the increasing and innumerable approaches by doctor or by Bible woman on behalf of Christ. She developed precise statistical categories

that closely indicated the number of patients in various stages of nearness to accepting the missionaries' Savior.

Superintendent George Heber Jones stated in 1902 that it was settled Mission policy that no new station with missionaries in residence should be opened without there being a doctor on its staff. At the same time, he referred to the Mission's success in entering new population centers in the interior.

Two changes in medical services helped release this two-pronged movement.

First, beginning in 1900, the medical work in Seoul was concentrated in the hands of the W.F.M.S. alone. The Missionary Society's hospital activity lapsed when Dr. Harry Sherman sickened, went on health furlough, and then died. His successor in the Korean medical work was not appointed to Seoul, thus releasing one male doctor for assignment elsewhere in Korea.

Second, the W.F.M.S. now sent more doctors to Korea, maintaining under appointment, from 1897 to 1910, from three to five physicians at a time. They were Doctors Mary Cutler, Rosetta Hall (reappointed after her husband's death), Lillian N. Harris (she died in 1902 of typhus), Emma Ernberger, and Esther Kim Pak (a Korean trained in the United States). Thus still more medical personnel was available for work outside Seoul.

In 1910, when the general expansion of the Mission was well under way, the policy of dispersal of medical resources was being fairly fully implemented, and better physical facilities were being developed. Medical services now were available in Seoul, Konju, Haiju, Pyongyang, and Yengbyen. By 1919, the medical enterprises of the Board of Foreign Missions included the Lovisa Holmes-Norton Memorial Hospital, in Haiju (founded in 1909); the Hall Memorial Hospital, Pyongyang; Severance Union Medical College, Seoul (the Methodists began participating in 1913); and the Swedish Memorial Hospital, Wonju (1913). The W.F.M.S. projects included the Woman's Hospital and Dispensary, Pyongyang (1897); the Lillian Harris Memorial Hospital (1909) and Dispensary, Seoul; and the Nurses Training School (1907), Seoul.

As the Methodist constituency increased by the thousands, the Mission's schools naturally multiplied more rapidly than did its medical services. In 1896, there were only two vehicles for the expression of its educational purpose, namely, the boys' school (Pai Chai) and the W.F.M.S. girls' school (Ewha Haktang) in Seoul. By 1920, the Board of Foreign Missions' roster of schools included five chief units in addition to its theological and medical institutions: Collins Boys School, in Chemulpo; Kongju High School; Boys High School, Pyongyang; Pai Chai Boys High School, Seoul; and Chosen Christian College, Seoul (opened in 1915 in co-operation with the Presbyterian missions). There were also two union schools for missionaries' children—one in Seoul, one in Pyongyang. The W.F.M.S. staffed four major

schools: Ewha Girls High School, Seoul; the High School for Girls, Pyongyang; the Girls Boarding School, Chemulpo; and the Woman's Bible Training School. The women also conducted in Pyongyang a school for blind and deaf children, kept a number of kindergartens, and provided normal training in Seoul for kindergarten teachers. In their hands was the direction of a network of more than a hundred elementary day schools caring for a total of five thousand children.

Not until the period beginning in 1896, after two decades of missionary effort, were the labors of the missionaries substantially supported by the activity of a sizable body of Korean mission workers—the beginnings of a typical Methodist itinerant ministry. In 1896, not a single Korean was listed in the Appointments, though Kim Chang Sik was functioning as pastor of the Pyongyang congregation under the direction of an American missionary-in-charge. Kim was one of five Local Preachers, who constituted, practically as well as in name, the Mission's local ministry. Also quite localized in outreach were the Mission's half dozen Exhorters. These workers, and those who for some years were added to them, were only sketchily trained for evangelism. Generally, they were not independent workers, but rather missionaries' helpers, and their efforts were not prominently cited by the missionaries in their annual reports.

The Mission made its first moves toward organization of a Korean ministry in 1901. At the Annual Meeting in May, Bishop Moore appointed nine Koreans from the Local Preacher group to supply churches or Circuits. At the urgent formal request of the Mission, he also ordained two of them (Kim Chang Sik and Kim Ki Pom) as Deacons, a procedure that exceeded the power of a Bishop acting within the jurisdiction of a Mission. Candidates for Orders were required by the Discipline to be previously elected by an Annual Conference. But the members of the Korea Mission respectfully and euphemistically asked the Bishop to violate the Discipline by ordaining the two men at the Annual Meeting and requesting the approval of the North China Conference *ex post facto*. The Bishop co-operated, and so did the Conference. For two years after that, men were ordained Deacon, but with previous election by the Japan Conference. But in 1905, the entire process of ordination came into the hands of the Korea group because of its augmented powers as a Mission Conference.

The Mission Conference then went forward to build a Conference membership of Koreans, electing two men on trial in 1906 and nine in 1907. In 1908, the year the Mission Conference was reorganized as an Annual Conference, Kim Chang Sik and Soon Hyen became the first Koreans in full connection. There now were a dozen Korean members on trial in the Conference, and more than fifty Koreans, including Conference men and supplies, were under appointment. This group of workers—pastors and evangelists—

substantially exceeded in number the combined personnel of the W.F.M.S. and of the men appointed by the Board of Foreign Missions.

Among the Board missionaries serving at this time were four who had been in the Mission in 1896: George Heber Jones, W. Arthur Noble, Dalzell A. Bunker, and E. Douglas Follwell, M.D. Still on duty, also, for the W.F.M.S., were Mary M. Cutler, M.D., Josephine O. Paine, Lulu E. Frey, and Mrs. Mary F. Scranton, a member of the original missionary party of 1885. William B. Scranton, M.D., and Henry G. Appenzeller, who also had arrived in 1885, no longer were active; Appenzeller had died in 1902, and Scranton had resigned in 1907 in order to engage in medical education for the Korean government.

Upon returning from furlough in 1906, George Heber Jones, continuing the more limited efforts of Doctor Scranton, Wilbur C. Swearer, and others, became the leader of the Conference program of training for the rising Korean leadership. He organized the Bible Training Institute of Korea, deliberately refraining from shaping it on the pattern of the conventional American theological school, which he held was too closely bound to the needs of a professional ministry alone. Jones directed the work of the Institute toward three groups of leaders: (a) preachers and helpers already engaged in full-time evangelism, (b) unpaid local lay leaders, and (c) a smaller group of second-generation Christians who were ready to enter institutional training for the regular ministry of the Methodist Church. Most of the men were unable to leave their church work or their secular occupation long enough for consecutive institutional education. The Institute, staffed by missionaries, conducted practically graded courses that ran for terms of weeks rather than of months. Seoul and Pyongyang were the favored centers. Many workers responded to the opportunities they offered; in the first season, the Institute drew 120 students oriented toward the ministry and 320 dedicated to lay service in the church.

Beginning with its second season (1907-8), the Biblical Institute was operated as a joint enterprise of the missions of the Methodist Episcopal Church and the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, some of the sessions being held in Kaesong, where the latter mission was active. The theological department gradually became distinct from the rest of the Institute and by 1912 was offering a four-year curriculum as the Union Methodist Theological Seminary, on a campus developed at Seoul. The missionaries of the two Methodist groups participated with Presbyterian missionaries in the Pierson Memorial Bible School, which also was located at the capital. Completion of work at Pierson Memorial became a requirement for matriculation in the Seminary. The original Biblical Institute did not continue as a separate training project.

Now that the door to Conference membership was open and theological education was well under way, the ministry rapidly became overwhelmingly

Korean in composition. In 1908, two years after Kim and Yi were received on trial, the Conference roster, counting both full members and men on trial, was evenly balanced between missionaries and Koreans. In 1912, there were enough Koreans in full membership in the Conference to have given them a voting majority of two to one. By 1919, the majority was four to one, with twenty nonvoting Korean probationers standing just outside the threshold of voting membership.

Simultaneously, Korean District Superintendents emerged, though not in the same numerical proportions. Bishop Harris initiated this step in 1910, when he appointed Kim Chang Sik, the Conference's most experienced pastor, superintendent of the West Pyongyang District, a newly organized combination of the Chinnampo charge with four Circuits. For three years after that, there were two Korean District Superintendents, and for the four years following, there were four. Korean appointments to this post remained about at the same level until late in the nineteen-twenties. Generally, about two-thirds of the Districts were headed by missionaries. Until 1917, each District with a Korean superintendent also had a "missionary-in-charge," and until 1916, the printed Appointments in the *Minutes* carried the name of the American missionary above that of the Korean District Superintendent. In 1917 (this was Bishop Welch's first year as the appointing Bishop), the position in the listing was reversed, and from 1918 on, the missionary's title was "District missionary."

As the Korean ministry became more numerous and more effective, the Mission was able to man more churches and provide for the itineration of more Circuits. In one aspect, this was reflected in an increase in the number of Districts. They gradually increased from five in 1908 to eleven in 1915 and continued at that figure until 1919. This was a process of multiplication by division rather than by extension into new and more distant fields. In 1910, the Kongju District was divided into Kongju East and Kongju West, which were renamed the Chunan and the Kongju Districts, respectively, in 1917. In 1910 also, a new West Pyongyang District was separated from the Pyongyang District, and in 1911 the original District again was divided by the creation of the Haiju District, the Pyongyang unit later being renamed Pyongyang East. The Seoul District yielded part of its western area in 1914 to provide for the organization of the Chemulpo District. The Yengbyen and the Suwon Districts remained undivided.

The Wonju District was the only new combination that grew out of the extension of Methodist Episcopal evangelism into a new area. It evolved from a constituency acquired from the Presbyterian mission in 1909, at first being tied to the Seoul District as a Circuit. The city of Wonju was less than fifty miles southeast of Seoul, but the entire region involved was a set of eleven counties in the southern part of Kangwun Province, which ran down the coast of the Sea of Japan. A mountainous territory divided the

populous eastern and western sections of the District from each other, making travel and administration difficult. In 1914, the eastern, coastal section was set off by itself as the Kang Neung District.

The Methodist Episcopal Church also had in Korea a constituency not developed or led by the ministers and missionaries of the Korea Conference—a following among the ever more numerous Japanese immigrants. Its organized work was a part of Japan Methodism and was led by personnel sent from Japan.

"Thousands of Japanese are moving into Korea," Bishop Moore wrote to the New York office in 1903. "It is imperatively necessary that we should follow them [from Japan]. We should act at once." The session of the Central Conference in Japan in March, 1904, endorsed a proposal for early opening of a mission in Korea. A few days later, Bishop Moore read out a letter from Wilbur C. Swearer, superintendent of the Seoul District, presenting the need and opportunity for Christian work among the Japanese residents of Seoul and offering to supply a substantial portion of the support of any preacher who should be sent from Japan. Following favorable action by the Conference, the Bishop appointed Hokashichi Kihara as missionary to Korea and also named a committee to establish policy for the work and to raise money for it. As a result of Kihara's efforts, a Japanese Methodist Episcopal Church was organized in Seoul early in 1905. By 1907, there were nearly a hundred church members distributed among Seoul, Pyongyang and Chinnampo, and Chimulpo.

When the Methodists in Japan achieved autonomy, in 1907, the Korea project was taken over by the Japan Methodist Church and became the Seoul District, later the Korea District, of the West Conference, with Kihara as its first superintendent. For two years, Gideon F. Draper, superintendent of the Nagoya District (Japan), served as evangelist to Korea on a visitation basis, to stimulate the work and to gain support for it. He was succeeded by F. Herron Smith as missionary-in-charge. At first, Smith also visited the Korea work from Japan, but under the sponsorship of the West Japan Mission, he took up residence in Korea in 1914 in order to give full time to Japanese evangelism there. By 1920, there were seven hundred Japanese church members in Korea.

During the years (1908-15) when the number of Districts in the Korea Conference was rising from five to eleven, the list of church charges and Circuits they included lengthened from seventy to a hundred, and the church membership more than doubled. The substantial growth in membership demonstrated not the rate of conversion of non-Christians, but mainly the induction into full membership of people drawn from the large reservoir of already converted and enlisted probationers. From 1908 to 1912, the number of probationers always was much larger than the number of full members—from 5,000 to 13,000 larger.

But from the high point of 19,500 in 1907, the year of an important revival, the body of probationers shrank to 15,500 in 1912. In the following year, it dropped precipitately to 9,500, then remained about the same for two years more, and finally declined to 6,667 in 1919. This shrinkage of the company of probationers (Bishop Herbert Welch reported in 1919 that it was matched by a decline in the number of enrolled seekers) was a practical measure of a marked recession in the flow of non-Christians into the Christian community associated with the Methodist mission. That recession was in turn largely a measure of the effect of secular developments in the life of the nation upon the desire or readiness of non-Christians definitely to ally themselves with the Christian church. That was particularly true of the impact of political events and conditions in Korea upon the religious situation.

The strong eight-year upsurge of full membership in the Korean Methodist church ended in 1915. During Bishop Welch's first quadrennium, the growth was so modest that it indicated a leveling off of the earlier upward trend. This numerical pattern also reflected, but not nearly so radically as the reversal of the trend in probationary membership, the influence of public events and political developments that from time to time made people reluctant to become churchmen or impelled a certain number of full members to withdraw.

Obviously, the Mission and the church it developed did not live in a social vacuum, and the quarter century of cultivation and growth after 1896 did not unfold without vicissitude for the Korean Methodists and their leadership.

Although Christian missions no longer lay under any practical general ban by the national government, individual Methodists and various Methodist groups still suffered from sporadic hostile acts that the missionaries reported as persecution. The essential cause of aggression against them was their conscientious policy of refraining from public sacrifices and other traditional religious ceremonial acts associated in their minds with what the missionaries called heathenism, but associated in the minds of the unconverted with loyalty to ancient social custom and public order. In the Mission year 1897-8, repressive acts by unfriendly public officials on the Suwong Circuit resulted in a reduction in church membership. When the Mission met in May, 1899, four members of one of the Suwong charges were in jail (the release of one of them was reported at late as 1903) on a trumped-up secular charge, "but in reality," affirmed Wilbur C. Swearer, the missionary head of the Circuit, "simply because they were Christians and would not deny their profession." Although held "in constant and torturous confinement," they succeeded, and persisted, in holding meetings for scripture study and prayer, until they increased their little company of four professing Christians to fifteen. Two years later, Swearer reported from another place on the Suwong-Kongju Circuit that persecution of the church members was begun because they declined to contribute toward the purchase of an ox to be sacrificed to the spirit of the

village well. The headman assembled the villagers and bade them not to allow the Christians to take water from the well. Being doubly angered because the local Methodist preacher had accused him of tolerating illegal gambling, he also incited them to compel the Christians to move away from the village. Swearer arrived in the village two days later and himself was compelled to drink dirty water. When he discovered what was going on, he summoned the headman and demanded that the anti-Christian action be stopped and all restrictions be removed from Christians for the future. The harassment stopped.

Some of the attacks were intensely abusive; some rose to serious dimensions. For several years, beginning in 1900, Methodists suffered sharply in northern Korea in the region of Pyongyang. It was a period when the control of the Seoul government over most of the country was almost nonexistent; local officials acted with license, and mob and gang rule often was stronger than any official administration of justice. The violent exploits of the Boxers in China encouraged public officials in various places to initiate aggressive measures against the Korean Christians, and the people followed their lead. There were no fatalities, but people were driven from their homes, beaten by official underlings, imprisoned, and subjected to a terroristic campaign of ugly threats. Some of the Mission's helpers were among those seized and assaulted. After the Christians there came the foreigners, illegal elements seizing their property, arresting their servants and other employees, and treating them to a barrage of public vilification. The foreigners in Pyongyang held their free status there under treaty rights arranged with the Seoul government. The Methodist and the Presbyterian missionaries therefore appealed to the American Legation for relief. The Minister, Horace N. Allen, pressed the case clear into the audience chamber of the Emperor, taking along with him as interpreter George Heber Jones, superintendent of the West Korea District. (The Methodist missionaries had appealed to Allen before to intervene on their behalf in troubles with local Korean officials.) The persecutions continued, however, into 1903, and in the very month that saw the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War (February, 1904), Arthur Noble reported to New York that the missionaries and other foreigners in his area were preparing to meet a threatened onslaught by "Korean Boxers" to kill foreigners and the Christian converts of the foreign preachers. It was bruited among them that their reactionary purpose enjoyed the sanction of the Emperor, who was supposed to be moved by vengeance for death of the Queen eight years before. Evidently this violent movement was swamped by the upsurge of the war itself.

There also was trouble on the Chemulpo Circuit, farther south and not far from Seoul. Tension between the Christians and the non-Christians was especially bad in 1900-1901. One of the worst episodes occurred in Yonan, where Kim Keui Pom, the Local Preacher in charge of the Yonan subcircuit,

intervened on behalf of one of the church members, who was being unmercifully beaten by two policemen while bound hand and foot. They were trying to force money out of him on the strength of a forged warrant. One morning at daybreak, soon after Kim had reported the incident to the provincial Governor, a force of policemen and hirelings of the Governor's office armed with swords, spears, and guns entered Yonan, attacked the Methodist church, seized the husband of the Bible woman (Kim escaped), and instituted a reign of terror among the Christians. The attacking party broke into Christian homes, insulted and intimidated the women, beat and dragged about some of the church members, and extorted money from them. Claiming that they were acting on direct orders from the Governor and that they were commanded to shoot down any Christian who opposed them, they announced that the entire membership of the church in that vicinity was to be arrested and taken to the capital. The man taken at the church was the special butt of their brutality; he was heavily beaten, dragged by the hair of his head for miles, saved from death only by the intervention of one of the policemen, abused in the magistrate's court, officially beaten once again, locked in chains, and imprisoned under sentence of death. Energetic action by George Heber Jones delivered the man from the death sentence, finally brought about the punishment of the policemen and their accomplices, and secured financial restitution to their victims. Jones reported that this case had been especially dangerous, for it was discovered that the Governor had intended to build up the trouble he himself had incited into a pretext for broader anti-Christian action. He had notified the head of the Peddlars, a national conservative faction, that the Christians were rising and that the guild should be called out to suppress them. Fortunately he was rebuffed; otherwise the Christians, both Methodists and Presbyterians, would have been gravely endangered throughout the province.

Such harsh experiences did not decisively halt the growth of the Mission, but there were times when they resulted in discouraging potential members from enlisting as probationers and scared away from the church some of the less deeply committed members.

All aside from the opposition for which it was a natural target—though progressively less frequently—Korean Methodism lived and grew in this period under buffeting winds of danger stirred up by outbreaks of social disturbance, political coercion, imperialistic pressures, international intrigue and competition, and military action that made up much of twentieth-century Korea's real environment.

Sometimes the missionaries and their people simply were in the vicinity of violent events. In 1896, the Sino-Japanese War, of which Korea was the central theater, was barely concluded, and the country was divided between two struggling factions—the conservatives, who were anti-Japanese and temporarily pro-Russian, and the liberals, who currently were pro-Japanese. As

recently as the previous October, the Queen had been murdered with the connivance of officials from militarily successful and politically ascendant Japan, and four months later, the King, a virtual captive of the Japanese in his own capital, fled to the security of the Russian legation in Seoul, only a stone's throw from the Methodists' general hospital. Dr. John Busted's ward book for 14 February read:

12:30 A.M. On all night duty with case No. 34, gun-shot wound. . . . My wife is with me in the hospital as she did not like to be alone in the house on account of the unsettled state of affairs in the city. The king escaped to the Russian Legation and the streets leading to the latter are lined with troops. Old Cabinet members have been killed and their bodies dragged through the streets by an angry mob.

At other times, potential involvement in the political melee threatened embarrassment for the Mission, particularly through the activism of the students in the Pai Chai school. The schoolboys and a number of adult Methodists gravitated toward the party of the Independents, as the pro-Japanese faction was called by virtue of Japan's ostensible championship of Korean independence in the arena of international competition for control of the troubled country. The boys were given not only to discussing current affairs in their active debating society, but also to public demonstrations. Adult converts joined them during the turbulent month of November, 1898, in a crucial confrontation with the Peddlars in an effort to wrest reforms from the King. Although this brought no real damage to the Mission, the missionary leaders felt relieved when the students withdrew from the continuing popular agitation that was shaking the stability of the government; they were trying to keep the Mission itself strictly aloof from embroilment in politics.

The missionaries had no privileged status in Korea beyond that which inhered in their rights as individual American citizens under the current treaty arrangements between Korea and the United States. And they were under warning by the Secretary of State that they should strictly refrain from attempting to influence the operation of the Korean government and from meddling in the country's political questions. This admonition was contained in a letter sent by the American Minister to every American citizen in Korea in 1897. It declared that if American residents disregarded their own government's advice, "it may perhaps not be found practicable to adequately protect them from their own consequences." They could best display their patriotism and best justify their claim to effective protection abroad by "confining themselves to their legitimate avocations, whether missionary work, or teaching in schools, or attending the sick, or other calling or business." This warning was directly aimed at the missionary community, the Russian and Japanese governments having complained at different times following the conclusion

of the Sino-Japanese War about the failure of missionaries to observe political neutrality.

At times, the Methodist missionaries showed themselves aware on their own initiative of the dangers of political involvement. Their unanimous fears were expressed for them by Arthur Noble in a letter to Secretary Leonard in 1903, a time when Japanese dominance in Korea was not yet fully established. Discussing the possibility that the forthcoming General Conference might elect a Japanese to serve as Missionary Bishop for Korea and Japan, Noble declared that because of political conditions in Korea, such a move would threaten to produce the gravest consequences to the Mission. He reminded Leonard of the current political unrest in the country and of the suspicious attitude of the Korean government toward Japan, an attitude intensified by the fact that political offenders and reformers had been taking asylum in Japan and there continuing their political scheming. Neither condemning nor approving the Japanese influence, Noble asserted that the Korean government would not tolerate it if it could help itself. He warned that if the Methodist Church should become linked in any way with Japan, the Korean official class would regard every Christian in Korea as pro-Japanese. And if that feeling should spread among the populace, he said, "it would do us a world of harm." The government already was watching with suspicion Methodist members who had been connected with the Japanese-sponsored Independence movement, some of whom had been imprisoned a few years earlier because of their political activity. Most of them still were regarded as pro-Japanese, and some of them actually were. The missionaries recently had taken vigorous action to scotch the development of an admittedly pro-Japanese and anti-Government association called the Company of Friends into which some of the Methodists' "best men" had formed themselves. "If the Soul [*sic*] officials had gotten hold of the fact before we did they would have arrested a large number of our Christians among whom would have been several Local Preachers." Noble said that the sympathies of the Korean Methodists in general did not lie with such movements, but that episcopal supervision by a Japanese nevertheless would greatly harm "the cause of Christ in this country."

In 1904, the Korea Mission received its new Bishop, a man so closely identified with the Japanese as to come close to matching the fears Noble was expressing. Merriman C. Harris, elected as Missionary bishop for Japan and Korea, had been a missionary in Japan from 1873 to 1886, and from that time until his election to the episcopacy, he had superintended Methodist work among the Japanese on the west coast of the United States. He was thoroughly sympathetic with the Japanese and with Japan's increasing hegemony in the Far East—and he remained so throughout his administration of the Korean field. William B. Scranton confided to Secretary Leonard a year after Harris's assignment to Korea that the "Bishop is pro and ultra

Japanese. I have thought that we might almost omit the pro and ultra. They are wild with enthusiasm over him wherever he goes." Scranton contrasted Harris's position with that of the missionaries working with the Koreans:

As foreigners living in Korea, and Koreans, we are nearly all pro-Japanese to the extent of wishing well for Japan in Korea, if she will do well by Korea. We are Korean sympathizers first, and look at Korea from the local standpoint.

By the time Bishop Harris arrived in the Orient, however, his being a partisan of Japan did not threaten the particular political danger that Noble and his colleagues were trying to fend off. The Russo-Japanese War, which had been caused essentially by the two powers' competition in Manchuria and in northern Korea, was effecting a radical change in the balance of power in Korea. Success in the war stopped the ebb tide of Japanese influence and enabled Japan to sweep into real power in Korea, overwhelming the weak and corrupt government of the Emperor. It no longer was urgently necessary for the Mission and its people to stand well with Korean officialdom. When the war was only a week old, Bishop David H. Moore, soon to make way for Bishop Harris, reported to Secretary Leonard, "The Korean Emperor is cowering in his palace, promising to be good & to look only to Japan for protection"—an informal way of saying that Korea was about to enter into a formal alliance with Japan that would make her virtually a Japanese protectorate. Indeed, the situation became much worse than that. Korea soon was forced to accept Japanese diplomatic and financial advisers, and Japanese personnel rapidly infiltrated government posts and departments. From 1906 to 1908, the most significant political figure in Korea was Prince Ito, Japan's Resident-General. Under his influence, Korean administration was almost completely subjected to Japanese direction. In 1907, the Emperor was forced to abdicate in favor of his son, who was unable to reign except as a political puppet. In 1910, he too abdicated the throne, and Japan annexed Korea. Thus the prime political necessity for the Methodist mission became not maintenance of its safety by keeping fresh from any stain of pro-Japanese thought or activity, but avoidance of any incriminating association with influences the Japanese officials might consider subversive. This political reversal opened up in Bishop Harris's comfortable connection with the Japanese a number of potentialities not foreseen by the missionaries in 1903.

The Mission dealt well enough, and without any permanent setback, with the realities of the disturbing war crisis of 1904-5 (in the early stage, in the North, troop movements and panic widely scattered Methodist civilians from their communities, and the missionaries found themselves imperiled by the closeness of military action). Far more serious and far more lasting was the problem of coping with the new political situation the war produced. From this time on, the basic cleavage in Korean public life was the opposition be-

tween the passionate desire of Koreans for national independence and the determination of Japan to suppress it. The subterranean pressures of Korean nationalism erupted from time to time in action against Japanese domination. Among the Koreans dedicated to achieving independence were many Christians, Methodists included, some of them engaged in anti-Japanese action and some of them suspected of it. In the long run, the Mission could afford to incur the live hostility neither of the people longing for freedom nor of the stronghanded Japanese regime. More immediately, the sharpest danger lurked in Japanese official quarters, for Japanese policy could be implemented and protected by many government sanctions and by rigorous use of military and police power.

The signatures on the Treaty of Portsmouth were scarcely dry when, in November, 1905, William Scranton initiated the Mission's first protective action under the new conditions. Acting as Superintendent, he summarily disbanded the Epworth League, the Methodist youth organization, for engaging in political activity, and for several years the Mission Conference deliberately allowed it to remain defunct. Scranton charged that the League had grasped at an autonomy that did not belong to it under the Discipline and that it was growing away from the central purpose of the Methodist Church. Non-Methodist outsiders had infiltrated it through the loophole of associate membership and were turning it in secular directions, particularly political directions. "Unfortunately," he reported to Secretary Leonard, "the League is strongly patriotic, and that means that it is used for anti-Japanese sentiment. We cannot allow any chances of political complication with either Government, and as yet, we stand in the best of favor with both Governments." Scranton, indeed, took the precaution of reporting the affair to both the Korean and the Japanese officials. He later reminded the members of the Mission Conference that following his ban on the League, his life and the lives of others were threatened by anonymous persons accusing him of thus weakening their cause against Japan. And after that, he said, so-called Leaguers, gathered in one of the Methodist churches in Seoul, "threatening the life of all who would not aid them in murdering the Ministers of State, who had been concerned in the making of the obnoxious treaty with Japan." Although Scranton's decisive action scotched the trouble inherent in the Epworth League crisis, the changed and changing political situation pressed upon the Mission troubles it was powerless to avoid.

With much of the country in an anarchic state, Methodists in various places continued to suffer serious abuses and acts of repression, as on the Suwon Circuit, where at numerous points Christians were harassed by hostile groups and subjected to loss of property, beatings, and imprisonment. Such lawless acts often were strongly tinged with, if not inspired by, chronic xenophobia and socio-religious reaction. But new and more dangerous forces now were emerging in the general turmoil. As the people awakened to the

fact that the Japanese were taking over Korea, popular resistance even to the point of localized armed insurrections swept through the land; and this development stimulated antagonism to all foreigners and their interests, including missionaries and their converts. Moving in the opposite direction was a society known as the Iljinhoi (Japanese Friendship Society), which was associated with a faction of Korean political leaders zealously co-operating in the ever deepening Japanese control of Korean affairs. This group, which was active in two areas where the Methodists were at work, manifested hostility to Christianity. On the Yengbyen District in northern Korea, for instance, the Iljinhoi was for a time so powerful that it intimidated public officials and practically ruled certain provinces. In this region, it strongly opposed Methodism and in one place severely persecuted the Methodist people. Caught in the interplay of such violent forces, the Methodists and their fellow Christians almost inevitably were badly bruised, no matter whether they were activists or whether they were neutralist in their public attitude.

Before long, the Japanese army entered the picture, at first sending out small units to wipe out pockets of insurrection, but later using greater force. In the summer of 1907, the Japanese forced the abdication of the Emperor—he had appealed against them to the Second International Peace Conference at the Hague—and the dissolution of the Korean armed forces. Korean military units throughout the country rose against the Japanese, and a rash of anti-Japanese political assassinations broke out. The Japanese army reacted strongly, with brutal effects upon Methodists, among others. Presenting his annual report to the Mission Conference in March, 1908, George Heber Jones called the past Conference season "a year marked by bloodshed and violence."

The Japanese army attacked and occupied the city of Kangwha, on the Chemulpo District, where rebelling Korean soldiers were lodged. There was a general exodus of the inhabitants, and the Methodist congregation was scattered abroad for several months before being reunited though somewhat depleted in numbers. One of the Exhorters and two members of the city's Methodist church were charged with participating in the insurrection, were arrested, and then killed by Japanese soldiers while being taken to Seoul to stand trial. On one of the Circuits of the Kongju District, the Japanese burned a Methodist church to the ground and on a neighboring charge seized three of the Christians, tied them to the stake, and shot them with rifles. One of them escaped death only because the soldiers neglected to pierce his body with bayonets as they had done with his fellows. On another charge, a Christian was one of fifteen men arrested by the Japanese because they earlier had been forced at the muzzle of the rifle to feed some of the insurrectionists. They were tied to the stake and shot, but again one of them, the Christian, escaped because the soldiers failed to use the bayonet on him. It was everywhere a dangerous and unsettled time because of the general

turmoil. The rebelling members of the Koreans' "Righteous Army" were conducting raids and inflicting damage throughout the country, and their Japanese military pursuers were dealing ruthlessly with all who were suspected of supporting them. Elmer M. Cable reported of his own District (Kongju) in words that well fitted the trials the Christians suffered in many areas: "Insults, beatings, burning of churches, persecutions from within and from without, Japanese soldiers, Insurrectionists, Il-chin-hoi, these have been the common lot of our people . . ."

After 1908, these bitter and brutal elements disappeared from the Mission's annual reports for a full decade. Japan fairly quickly broke the back of overt massive resistance and brought Korea thoroughly and ruthlessly under the control of its Governors-General, army, and ubiquitous police.

Although the Christians now enjoyed greater public safety, there were times of special danger, as when, in 1909, the year before annexation, Prince Ito, the former Japanese Resident-General, was assassinated. Far more ominous were the conspiracy trials of 1912-13.

Early in 1911, the police had begun investigations that resulted in their charging that a minimum of five hundred people were connected with a plot to assassinate the incumbent Governor-General, Terauchi Masataka, and other officials. Their suspicions focused especially on the teachers and students of a Presbyterian mission school in northwest Korea, and when the authorities finally brought 123 suspects to trial, most of them were Christian preachers, teachers, and students—the majority of them Presbyterians, a few of them Methodists, and one of them Baron Yun, a prominent Southern Methodist who was President of the Y.M.C.A. The charges were based heavily on the alleged confessions of the defendants, who in the first trial repudiated them, declaring that they had been wrung from them by torture and threats of torture by the police and in secret preliminary hearings. The lower court sentenced 105 men to prison for terms ranging from five to ten years. In the course of a succession of appeals and new trials, ninety-nine men were acquitted, and the sentences of six charged with being the ringleaders were reduced from ten years to six. After serving some eighteen months in prison (they already had been detained for two years), they finally were released in February, 1915, under amnesty granted by the Emperor. The most serious concrete effects of the arrests were the torture, harassment, and confinement of the accused men. Fortunately, no general reprisals were carried out against other members of the Christian community. The arrests and the trials themselves evidently were allowed to serve as warning enough to potential subversives.

There also was no lack, during this decade, of general issues pregnant with risk to the continuance of Methodist work, especially if the Mission should sufficiently antagonize the Japanese. In October, 1908, the government issued an ordinance calling upon all private schools in Korea to secure recognition

from the Department of Education—a requirement involving conformity to government standards and regulations. With the assistance of the American Consul-General, an arrangement was worked out with the government that was satisfactory to the Protestant missionaries. The government officially sanctioned freedom of religious instruction, approved the use of the Bible as a textbook, signified its co-operation in continuing established Christian school work, and ended educational discrimination by giving Christian schools and their graduates the same recognition and benefits accorded government schools and their students. George Heber Jones counted the decision “an historic document of great interest in the development of education in Korea.” Similarly, an ordinance issued in 1915 required all churches and religious propagandists to be registered and to file reports with the government. Though with no little practical difficulty, the Methodists were able to meet this requirement. Complying with the two ordinances won the missionaries and their work clearer public sanction than they had enjoyed under the old Korean regime. But license granted may become license withdrawn. No well-tailored administrative glove could conceal the iron hand of Japanese government control. The ordinances of 1908 and 1915 implicitly demonstrated the power of the government not only to grant privileges but also to suppress officially unacceptable religious groups or activities by arbitrary decree or by regulations deliberately so drafted as to make compliance impossible. This power provided practical incentive for Christian missionaries to stay in line with government policy.

Confronted with the growth and consummation of Japanese power in Korea and with the reaction of patriotic Koreans against it, the Korea Mission established a strictly nonviolent and nonrevolutionary policy as to public statements and political action. This discipline extended to both the missionaries and the Korean ministry and set the standard for the guidance they were expected to give the lay constituency. Bishop Earl Cranston and Secretary Adna B. Leonard had advised the Korean Christians at the Conference session of 1907 that it was their duty to submit quietly to the authorities in control of the country and not to engage in rebellious activity. Bishop Harris always upheld the policy of abstention from politics. There were Korean Methodists who did not abide by the official policy, but few of the Korean workers broke ranks, and evidently all the missionaries kept carefully to the line of nonintervention. Naturally, this policy ran counter to the hopes and passions of most of the preachers and mission workers, and as Japan fully tightened its grip on Korea, there were missionaries who became disillusioned with Japan's purpose. There were other missionaries for whom Japan's civilizing efficiency in reordering and modernizing the life of Korea was sufficient to quiet any scruples they might have entertained about the violation of the country's independence and about the coercive and violent methods employed in consolidating and maintaining Japanese domination.

While in Seoul in 1909 to attend the Korea Mission Conference, Bishop James W. Bashford of China had a conference with Bishop Harris and two non-Methodist Bishops, one from Seoul and one from Tokyo, on Korean-Japanese relations. Although they eschewed all possibility of political influence and all desire for it, the four Bishops (Bashford reported the incident to Secretary Homer B. Stuntz) agreed to use such moral influence as they had "in favor of peace, in favor of giving Japan a fair trial, in the meantime urging the Japanese to treat the Koreans not only with justice but with kindness and thus win their co-operation for the greater plans which Japan hopes to realize in the twentieth century." For his part, Bashford agreed to try to influence Chinese officials in favor of noninterference in Korea so as to give Japan a fair chance there.

In corresponding with the Board's New York office, Bishop Harris consistently refrained from expressing the slightest criticism of Japanese activity in Korea. Although Bishop Bashford interpreted this, in 1913, as a result of strict adherence to the intention to be fair to Japan, Harris's restraint appears to have been no agonizing exercise of self-discipline, but rather the natural posture of a man who was thoroughly pro-Japanese. His speaking no evil of Japan seemed to arise from his seeing and hearing no evil of Japan. His letters played down the existence of Korean resistance to Japanese rule, ignored the coercive police and military power employed in order to establish and maintain it, favorably mentioned numerous aspects of Japan's modernizing influence, expressed confidence in Japanese officialdom and the integrity and humaneness of Japanese policy, voiced no slightest criticism of Japanese imperialism, showed no sign of awareness that there was any natural or moral case at all for Korean nationalism, and maintained silence about tensions within the Mission Conference over the Japanese question. His communications were so onesided that they provided the Board's officers no body of information upon which to ground a realistic understanding of what was going on in Korea and in the Korean church.

Harris was perennially and invincibly optimistic about the destiny of Japan and about Japan's contribution to Korea. In 1905, he visited the Japanese army in Manchuria, with all expenses paid from the Imperial purse. He went home to Tokyo exhilarated, believing that the recently concluded struggle between Russia and Japan had greatly advanced the Kingdom of God. He felt that a new and promising friendliness toward Christianity was occurring among the Japanese that would have great consequences for the evangelization of both Japan and Korea. Of the latter he said, in his written report to the General Missionary Committee:

The old order is passing. The Topnot [*sic*] and the White garment are going with it. The steam car, electric car, the school and church have come. As a result of the Russo-Japanese war and the Treaty of Peace, she is under the protection of Japan. The reorganization of the Government, the development

of the resources of the country, and progress in all lines, is the firm decision of Japan, and Japan's watchword is, "Korea for the Koreans." These are facts to be accepted. The Japanese Authorities welcome our Missionaries and assure us of sympathy and assistance in the Christianization of the people.

In 1907, immediately after Prince Ito, backed by Japanese troops, forced the abdication of the Emperor and then ordered the Korean army disbanded, the Bishop wrote to New York, "The situation in Korea continues to improve. . . . The Nation-at-large is quiet, and really welcomes the new order." Harris was convinced that the interests of the two empires—Japan and Korea—were not antagonistic, but mutual; even as late as 1909, he could not believe that Japan would annex the weaker country. And in 1911, just a year after annexation had become a reality, he wrote against a background of enthusiastic reports about the progress of the Christian work, "Peace reigns in all our borders, the authorities continue to be sympathetic and helpful, the largest religious liberty is granted unto us, and sympathy with all forms of good work is given unstintingly."

The element of danger in the situation of the churches in the period that generated the conspiracy trials of 1912-13 appears not to have disturbed Bishop Harris's optimism. As far as his reports would indicate, the fact that almost all the persons arrested were Christians raised no doubt in his mind as to the security of Christianity under the Japanese administration of Korea. He seems not to have wondered why out of the mass of patriotic Koreans, hardly any but members of the minute Christian minority were caught in the police nets. But of that very postannexation period Bishop Bashford wrote in 1913 to his China colleague, Bishop Wilson S. Lewis, that the Japanese government seriously distrusted missionary activity and the Christian movement in Korea. He confessed to his co-worker that the Japanese had some ground for this distrust, because Christians had been implicated in already well publicized anti-Japanese assassination plots and in a preannexation patriotic league devoted to preserving Korean independence. In order to substantiate their suspicion that Christians were promoting rebellion and assassination, he said, the Japanese police resorted to arresting and torturing suspects. *The Japan Chronicle*, an English-language journal published in Kobe, similarly testified that at this time the Japanese authorities were nervously watching the Christian schools and churches in Korea, believing that a movement hostile to Japanese occupation might well start among "men who had so enthusiastically embraced the religion of the West at the very time their country had lost its independence." The *Chronicle* reported that some of the militant phraseology of Christian doctrine and of certain Old Testament stories inevitably, as they were described for the authorities "by men who were in the Christian churches but not of them," aroused suspicion. However accurate or inaccurate the information possessed by the police may have been, it became clear that Japanese dominance in Korea did not neces-

sarily guarantee the free exercise of Christianity, as Bishop Harris hoped, but left it vulnerable to official suspicion and repression.

It is not clear that Bishop Harris believed, at least when the conspiracy case entered its early public phase, that the police had been using torture in order to secure confessions. In February, 1912, he sent to Secretary Leonard without criticism an article from a Seoul newspaper that contained a statement in which the police official in charge of the alleged conspirators completely whitewashed the police of accusations by certain supposedly credulous foreign missionaries to the effect that the authorities were wilfully persecuting Korean Christians and using torture on suspects. "This man," commented the Bishop, "holds a high rank & is a good man as I am informed. There is not the slightest doubt but justice will be done." Nevertheless, when reports of torture came to him, Harris acted. In March, he wrote that he had vigorously and promptly protested to the authorities against "harsh treatment of Christians." But he appears to have been easily reassured: "Torture & persecution have been emphatically denied, & promises made that the prisoners will have fair trial. This I am compelled to believe will be true. The work does not suffer thank God." Bishop Bashford noted that Harris also protested when it became clear that the first trial, in the lower court, was conducted unfairly; he strongly portrayed the rapid loss of Japanese prestige among civilized nations because of the unjust trial methods. Bashford credited Harris with major influence in persuading the authorities to adopt a softer policy, allowing the entire conspiracy case eventually to peter out in face-saving measures for the government. He also declared that the Korean Methodists benefited from Harris's loyalty to the government, to the extent that few Methodists were among the Christians arrested in the case.

Bishop Harris's strong and outspoken support for the Japanese in their position in Korea did not endear him to the Korean Methodists. Bishop Bashford discovered when he assisted in presiding over the Korea Conference in 1913 that Harris's pro-Japanese stand had resulted by 1912 in very serious danger that the Koreans would revolt against their Bishop's leadership. Missionaries with whom Bashford conferred felt that the situation was much improved over that of the year before, but that a break between the Koreans and Harris still was a practical potentiality. Bashford judged that the Korean workers probably were not yet responding to Harris's leadership so fully as they would have to that of a man "who had expressed larger sympathy with them in their recent struggle." Bashford himself had not given them much sympathy; he hoped that they would largely renounce politics and express their aspirations and talents in deepening the spiritual life and in spreading it throughout Asia and the Far East.

At the moment, two incidents fed the fires of anti-Japanese feeling smoldering in the Conference. The Korean preachers were stirred up over a factional struggle in the Seoul Y.M.C.A. between Koreans and Japanese. The

Japanese-controlled government, which for ten years had been contributing 5,000 yen annually to the Seoul organization, was trying to establish what it held was its right to participate in directing the Association's affairs. Phillip L. Gillett, who had been the Y.M.C.A. secretary for Korea for some years, had sent to the United States a letter condemning the Japanese government for the injustice of the conspiracy trial. Unfortunately, it was published, which led to a confrontation between Gillett and the Japanese administration in Korea. John R. Mott, foreign secretary of the international committee of the Y.M.C.A., found it prudent to remove Gillett from his post, at least temporarily. This was followed by strong Korean resistance within the Association when Japanese members insisted upon the nomination of two Japanese to the Board of Directors. Added to this continuing source of excitement among the Korean preachers was the rather untimely appearance at the Conference session of the Japanese Minister of Education and of Bishop Hiraiwa of the Japan Methodist Church. Bishop Hiraiwa not only presented fraternal greetings from the Japan Church, but also asked and received the opportunity of making a full address. In the course of it, he proposed that the Korean church merge with the Japan Methodist Church, a step that would have called for severance of their organic relationship with the Methodist Episcopal Church. Though Bashford did not say so, it also would have meant loss of their Korean identity through absorption into a basically Japanese ecclesiastical organization. "The Koreans," said Bishop Bashford, "felt deeply wounded over this proposal. On the other hand, they did not feel free to stand up and openly oppose it lest they might be suspected by the government of disloyalty." Although Bishop Harris was in no way responsible for Bishop Hiraiwa's advancing this suggestion and did not approve of it, it increased tension in the Conference and presented him with the necessity of coping with still another point of dissatisfaction on the part of the Koreans. So reticent was Harris about the tensions between him and the Korean preachers over the Japanese question, however, that it remained for Bishop Bashford, not Harris himself, to report to the Board officers in New York the state of affairs that had developed.

In spite of all these tensions, when Bishop Harris retired in 1916 and went to Tokyo to make his permanent home, he felt that he carried with him the good will of the Korean Methodists. His successor, Bishop Welch, inherited no active split in the Mission Conference, for Harris, reinforced by the threat the conspiracy trials had leveled at any potential anti-Japanese activism, had succeeded in firmly establishing the policy of political neutrality and restraint for the Mission. Regardless of their personal feelings about Korean independence or Japanese imperialism, the Korean preachers and the American missionaries were ready for the time being to recognize political reality to the point of maintaining silence. To be sure, relations with the government still raised problems for the Mission, particularly with regard to enforcement

of the government requirement that religious teaching be banned in schools desiring to receive the educational privileges involved in being registered with the government. But this question did not result in trouble with the authorities; nor did any other. Bishop Welch's estimate of the situation, as he expressed it in his report for 1917, was, "The feeling between the Koreans and the Japanese is slowly improving, and the attitude of the missionaries is becoming more co-operative." And no severe test of the ability of Korean Methodism to live peaceably with the Japanese administration arose until a massive explosion of Korean nationalism broke upon the threshold of the nineteen-twenties.*

* See Chapter 37.

21

Malaysia

THE MALAYSIA MISSION CONFERENCE WAS IN 1896 a small mission functioning in education and evangelism in Singapore and on the west coast of the Malay Peninsula. It was also an ecclesiastical organization in the world-wide Methodist Episcopal connection (it became an Annual Conference in 1902).

In the latter aspect, it thrust its antennae during the following fifteen years far out into the Malay Archipelago. New missions in the Philippine Islands (1899), Sarawak (1901), Sumatra (1905) Java (1905), West Borneo (1906), and Bangka (1911) thus became units in the Conference structure, though each had a peculiar growth that was essentially distinct from that of the original Malaysia mission. Indeed, all of them but Sarawak later were separated from the Malaysia jurisdiction—the Philippines in 1905 as the Philippine Islands Mission Conference and the others in 1918 as the Netherlands Indies Mission Conference.

Until 1920, the Malaysia Conference was a component, along with the Indian and Philippines Conferences, of the Central Conference in Southern Asia. Bishops assigned to this larger field provided episcopal supervision for the Malaysia Conference, thus bringing to its sessions Bishops James M. Thoburn, Frank W. Warne, John E. Robinson, William F. Oldham, William P. Eveland, John W. Robinson, and a few Bishops associated with them for single sessions. The longest episcopal relationship with the field was that of Bishop Oldham's, who resided in Singapore from 1904 to 1912. The other Bishops lived in India, except for Bishop Eveland, who was assigned to Manila.

Functionally, three widely separated cities were the foci of the Malaysia mission at the beginning of 1896.* The earliest was Singapore, just off the end of the Peninsula, where William F. Oldham and James M. Thoburn had begun the Methodist expansion into the region in 1885. Three Hundred miles up the coast from Singapore was the newest center, Ipoh, in the state of Perak, entered by the Methodists in 1894. The third point, seventy-five

* The rest of this chapter covers only the Peninsula and Singapore. For the other missions, see the Index.

miles north of Ipoh, was George Town (Penang), the seaport and capital of the state of Penang. Methodism thus was established in three states: Perak and two of the Straits Settlements, Singapore and Penang.

The mission was just about to reach beyond these three areas. During 1896, Benjamin F. West, superintendent of the Penang District, bought a farm in Kulim, in the state of Kedah (a Siamese dependency until 1909), north of Penang, and began evangelistic work there. In 1897, William T. Kensett opened Methodist work in Kuala Lumpur, the capital of Selangor, about two hundred miles northwest of Singapore. In the same year, Henry L. E. Luering made a beginning in Malacca (the capital of Malacca, the third of the Straits Settlements), about half way between Singapore and Kuala Lumpur. In 1903, a station was established in Seremban, capital of Negri Sembilan, forty miles northwest of Malacca.

These extensions completed for the time being the regional pattern of Methodist occupation—a bank of five contiguous British-oriented states on the west coast of the Peninsula, with Kedah lying above them to the north and with Singapore to the south. Between Singapore and the rest lay the Muslim-ruled state of Johore, where the Methodists founded no stations. But this pattern itself was expanded in 1915, when the evangelization of the east-coast state of Pahang was begun at Bentong. The Mission accomplished the rest of its geographical expansion by establishing new stations and new churches within the bounds of these states and sometimes by adding new congregations in cities already entered. Thus the membership of the churches, which was about 300 in 1896, increased to 750 by 1903 and to 2,400 in 1919.

Since Singapore was geographically restricted to begin with, the Methodist activity there could manifest no true geographical expansion. But during the entire period, the number of its Methodist churches increased from three to nine, and its church membership rose from two hundred to seven hundred. The evangelistic work in the state of Penang—it was the northernmost reach of the Mission—which in 1896 was limited to George Town, spread by 1919 into five other places. George Town still had three congregations, and the others had six among them. The membership in George Town had grown from 63 to 150, and the total for the state was 264. Malacca was small, and the Methodist constituency of some forty members was confined to the capital.

The Methodists eventually organized their work in the Federated states as the Federated Malay States District. When the Mission's territorial expansion began in 1897, Ipoh (the first unit in the four-state combination) had twenty church members. By 1919, there were fourteen hundred members in thirty-four congregations meeting in twenty localities, with two Circuits in addition. Among the stations with two churches or more were Ipoh, Kuala Lumpur, Seremban, three places in Perak (Kampar, Taipeng, and Sitiawan), and Klang, a town in Selangor.

The constituency of twenty-four hundred members and fourteen hundred probationers that the Mission developed over the years was by no means a homogeneous group; rather, it was sharply and extensively fragmented along lingual and ethnic lines. The attempt to communicate the gospel to the multilingual Malaysian population fastened on the missionaries the necessity of drawing their converts and listeners together in clusters of people who could listen and worship and hold fellowship together in languages they understood. Hence the churches listed in the annual Appointments always carried language designations. This situation created a methodological and administrative problem for the missionaries, for it confronted them with numerous language barriers they could not themselves surmount, thus demanding the development of a multilingual Asian ministry for the emerging Malaysian church. It also militated against the forging of a united Methodist community on the Peninsula; even the need for interpreters at Conference sessions involved no little difficulty.

The Malay-speaking people constituted the large population group that was least represented in the Methodist following. Typically, the indigenous Malays were Muslims, a people everywhere notably almost impervious to Christian evangelization. In the early years of the Mission, a definite attempt was made to reach them, and a Malay church was established in Singapore. William G. Shellabear was in charge of this mission in 1896, but in spite of his efforts and those of Henry Luering and John R. Denyes, his immediate successors, few native Malays were brought into the congregation, and it finally ministered almost entirely to another ethnic group. No fully Malay church was formed elsewhere in the Mission.

The population of the Peninsula included a substantial minority known as the Baba Chinese, Malay-speaking Chinese whose forebears had been in Malaysia for many generations. They not only spoke Malay but also had assimilated many other elements of Malay life, generally retaining, however, their loyalty to religious traditions rooted in China. They often were called Straits-born Chinese. Some of them became members of the Malay church in Singapore, and it was this element in the congregation that very soon became dominant. American missionaries perennially were in charge of the church, usually with Baba Chinese supply pastors associated with them. The evangelistic work of the W.F.M.S. in Singapore provided a stimulus for this work, for the women's group specialized in contacts with Malay-speaking girls and women. The congregations also benefited from the attendance of boys and girls in the Methodist schools. The membership of this church long remained modest in size, but by 1919 there were about two hundred members, which made it one of the largest churches in the Mission. Nowhere else, however, did a church of the Straits-born Chinese emerge during this period. Attempts were made in George Town for several years, but the only lasting

result was the maintenance of preaching services for pupils in the Girls' School.

A much smaller minority on the Peninsula—but a somewhat larger one in the Methodist constituency—was composed of a variety of English-speaking residents and inhabitants, not only British civilians, but Eurasians, Asians, British soldiers, and other English-speaking Westerners. The Methodists were working with this small fraction of the population in 1896 in each of the three cities in which the Mission was established. Singapore and George Town each had an English church, and Ipoh had an informal English congregation but no English-speaking members. Ipoh gathered its first few church members from the English community in 1899. English preaching was conducted in Seremban and Malacca from time to time, but in neither place did it result in a bona fide English-language church. It was not always easy to provide preachers for these churches, but generally they were staffed by American missionaries, a missionary sometimes being sent from the United States for that purpose. The pastor of the Singapore church long served as chaplain to the British troops, and the government stipend for this work supplemented the regular salary. These congregations maintained themselves financially better than did the other churches and even contributed to the support of the evangelistic outreach to members of the other lingual groups. Their membership was transient and remained small. The English church in Singapore had 140 members in 1919, but the comparable churches in the other cities could report only a dozen or two each.

During this period, the Mission substantially increased its following among the many thousands of Tamils living on the Peninsula, to which they came from South India and Ceylon because of the opportunities for employment open to them, particularly in the rubber industry. Involving them in the fellowship of the Methodist Church was facilitated by the fact that many of them had been affiliated with Christian churches—Methodist and others—in their homelands. It was possible for the same reason to secure a certain number of Tamil preachers and teachers to serve as Methodist workers among their countrymen. At the beginning of 1896, George Town had a Tamil church with forty-two members. The following year, Frederick H. Morgan, pastor of the English church in Singapore, began Tamil evangelism that quickly developed into a church of sixteen members. From then on, the Tamil work gradually spread, until in 1913 the Conference organized its activity in the three occupied Federated Malay States—Selangor, Malacca, and Negri Sembilan—into a separate Tamil District, a lingual District overlapping the Federated Malay States District. Its superintendent was Samuel Abraham, a Tamil who had become a full member of the Conference in 1902. Abraham extended the work into the remaining Federated state of Pahang in 1916. The District was broken up late in 1918 by his sudden death and soon was reabsorbed into the Federated Malay States District. In 1919, the Conference

as a whole had six hundred Tamil church members in seventeen localities.

During these years, immigrants came from China in such increasing numbers that the Chinese segment of the population finally rivaled the Malay group. Among these immigrants the Mission developed its largest following. The members of a Chinese church in Singapore under the leadership of Benjamin F. West already constituted, in 1896, nearly a third of the Mission's total membership. There also was a Chinese church of a dozen members in the charge of William Kensett in George Town. By 1919, Singapore had five Chinese churches, and their membership totaled about three hundred. George Town and another Penang Chinese church together reported over a hundred members; Malacca had a single Chinese congregation of forty members; and the Federated Malay States had eighteen charges, with nearly nine hundred members. Four of the Malay States churches had more than a hundred members each—Ipoh, Kampar, and two in Sitiawan. Thus, well over half the Mission's members were Chinese.

The presence of so many Chinese in the Methodist constituency did not add simply one more language to the multilingual pattern. Even in some of the earlier churches that were listed in the Appointments as "Chinese," the people spoke and understood a variety of homeland dialects, but without understanding dialects common in other than their own regions. The character of a local congregation in Malaysia would shift to an appreciable extent according to the language in which the current pastor could preach or converse. Gradually, separate congregations were formed for various language groups, and sometimes they would thrive or decline depending upon the Mission's success in supplying them with pastors speaking the appropriate languages. Chinese preachers often were secured from Methodist sources in China, but like their people, they tended to be transient. Among the nearly thirty Chinese churches active in 1919, ten were listed as Chinese, without further language designation. Among the rest, six used the Hokkien dialect, three used Hsinghua, two used Foochow, two used Hakka, and two used Kucheng and Cantonese, respectively. Even the large Chinese Methodist community, therefore, was far from achieving unity.

The Mission's relative success in winning Chinese members and constituents by no means represented sheer achievement in converting non-Christians to Christ. Among the immigrants from the homeland in the north were numerous Methodists and other Christians, and from them came nuclei for new churches and lay leadership to nurture their growth.

The outstanding instance of this advantage was the Chinese community in Sitiawan, Perak, where the Mission deliberately founded a Chinese settlement and then set about evangelizing it. With the backing of Bishop Frank W. Warne and the Conference, Henry Luering, superintendent of the Perak District, accepted in 1903 a commission from the British administration in Perak to introduce Chinese agricultural colonists into the state. After spending

more than three months renewing and developing contacts within the bounds of the Foochow and the Hingwha Conferences and enlisting emigrants for Perak, preferably Christians or those hoping to become Christians, Luering returned with the nucleus of a Chinese colony. The Perak government provided twenty-five hundred acres for the new Sitiawan Agricultural Colony, paid the steamship fares of the Foochow-speaking immigrants accompanying Luering, and gave free land grants to the individual settlers. Nearly four hundred soon were settled on the land in attap huts. The Mission opened services there in a thatched house, and put a Chinese pastor in charge. By Conference time early in 1904, Luering had organized a church of fifty members and forty probationers, with nearly four hundred informal adherents. Its Quarterly Conference included four Local Preachers and two Exhorters as well as class leaders and stewards. Benjamin F. Van Dyke began in the same year a period of five years as missionary in charge at Sitiawan.

Many other Chinese settled in the Sitiawan neighborhood, some of them under Mission sponsorship, some brought in under secular auspices, but all serving to augment the Mission's evangelistic opportunity and responsibility. Luering's successor as District Superintendent, William E. Horley, announced at the Conference session of 1906 that a Chinese entrepreneur was bringing in a thousand of his countrymen to settle on a government concession he had secured near by. A stream of hundreds of immigrants from Foochow began arriving at Sitiawan in 1910, immediately yielding numerous new attendants at Methodist services. By March, 1911, eight hundred Chinese were living on the Mission concession alone, with many others in the vicinity. Within a year, a thousand more Foochow Chinese arrived at Sitiawan, most of them obtaining temporary employment on neighboring rubber estates. This latest influx doubled the basic Christian constituency. In 1918, Horley settled five hundred colonists on fifteen hundred acres at Ayer Tawar, eight miles from the Mission colony at Sitiawan, and began religious work among them by establishing a paid Local Preacher in a mission hall at the new location. The population of the area was increased also by the settlement of many Tamils who came seeking employment on local plantations.

Over a decade and a half, the Sitiawan mission organized an orphanage (sometimes called the Industrial School) harboring as many as thirty boys, an Anglo-Chinese elementary day school for boys, four vernacular day schools, a Foochow Chinese church, a Kucheng Chinese church, a Tamil church, much general religious activity in the vicinity, and a certain amount of evangelistic outreach to other places, such as Lumut and Pangkor, in the Dindings, a section of Penang. In 1919, the membership of the local churches included three hundred Chinese and two score Tamils. These were the core of a company of a thousand people the Mission counted as coming within the sphere of its religious influence.

The largely planned immigration from China, along with government land

grants and rubber planting, provided a special economic foundation for the development of Methodism at Sitiawan. After several years, settlers who had received initial grants of three acres reaped profits from planting to rubber, and some of them enlarged their holdings until they became not only economically secure but even affluent. Thus, the Chinese who joined the church were able to contribute enough financially to provide a large measure of local self-support for the churches and related projects. More than that, several parts of the Malaysia mission's enterprise in the community received profitable land grants from the government. When Henry Luering brought down the first colonists in 1903, the government set aside ten acres for the church and fifty acres for the orphanage, later evidently adding sixty acres more to the latter plot. It also reserved a dozen acres for church use when William Horley brought the colonists in to Ayer Tawar in 1918. These plots were heavily planted to rubber, and when eventually harvests began to be marketed, substantial income was realized for the maintenance and development of the work in Sitiawan.

In addition, the Malaysia mission secured a grant of two hundred acres that was held as the Sitiawan Mission Plantation, and in 1906 a company was formed to improve the land and plant it to rubber. Half the income from the enterprise was allotted to the Mission to be used for training schools and church extension, and half was distributed among the holders of the Company's eight hundred ten-dollar shares. Shareholding was restricted to missionaries in the Malaysia Conference, who were able to buy into the Company on a very advantageous basis. The Company was controlled by the Mission's Finance Committee, and the Plantation was managed by the resident missionary at Sitiawan. The responsibility for this plantation and the others absorbed a great deal of the missionary's time, thus limiting the attention he could give to evangelistic and educational concerns. After a year's admittedly effective service by Richard H. Silverthorn, who came to the post on contract in 1917, his District Superintendent, John R. Denyes, pointed out to the Conference the impossibility involved in the attempt to have a missionary combine the management of the Sitiawan rubber business with other important missionary functions. The mission urgently needed, he held, the services of another missionary.

Paralleling the development of evangelistic activity and church life on the Peninsula, sometimes complementing it, but largely overshadowing, even competing with it, was the expansion of the Mission's day school system. The kernel of it already existed in 1896; Singapore and George Town each had a well-attended school for boys and a much smaller school for girls. Among them they had about a thousand pupils. As the Mission reached into new communities, still other schools were established, the expansion of the system being greatly facilitated by income from tuition fees and local contributions and by the availability of substantial government grants-in-aid. The

Board's financial contribution to the maintenance of the schools was relatively modest.

Keeping the schools staffed involved many difficulties, and the quality of instruction often was deficient, but constant application to its educational objectives enabled the Mission to establish as many as thirty-three regular day schools by 1919. A few were English schools, a few were vernacular; most were called Anglo-Chinese Schools, which meant that the pupils were Chinese and the language of instruction was English. A few of the day schools had boarding departments, and a few additional schools or homes had only boarding pupils. In all, including about a dozen institutions maintained by the W.F.M.S., there were eight thousand pupils in the system, the great bulk of them in elementary classes. Only the three oldest of the Conferences in India had gathered more pupils into day schools than this, and India and China were the only national missions with more pupils under instruction than in the Malaysia mission. No mission in the Methodist Episcopal Church, however, had so many pupils in proportion to the number of its church members.

But this educational record was established at a heavy cost to the Mission's evangelistic effort. The schools absorbed as teachers and principals so much of the missionary personnel that evangelistic advance and church development suffered drastic deprivation of the very missionary leadership the missionaries themselves typically believed was necessary to the Mission's progress. Such appointments to church work as the missionaries were given almost always were supplementary to school posts that severely cut down the amount of time they devoted to pastoral or evangelistic activities.

In 1909, William T. Cherry, superintendent of the Singapore District sharply attacked this priority of school work as he found it in Singapore. He deplored the fact that the schools, the Publishing House, and the English Church had first call on the time of the entire missionary corps, leaving available for supervision of the five vernacular churches only men doing full-time institutional or other nonevangelistic work. Only a minority of the missionaries even knew a single vernacular tongue. Cherry declared that the attempt to operate such an arrangement might provide the Church with a "display of heroics" or proof of "ingenuity in making a little go a long way," but was not an acceptable plan for "getting men saved and sanctified and multiplied."

Pinpointing the result of this policy, he said:

I have known the downtown Chinese work intimately for nine years, and in all that time there has not once been a missionary who has had both the time and the language equipment to put into that work one-tenth of the energy that a patent medicine vendor would expend in that same district, where there are probably 100,000 Chinese within the radius of a mile.

Cherry condemned the Mission's spending \$800 in a year simply to maintain services in "an ill-suited and ill-smelling shop" to which Methodist constituents were loath to send their women and children and to which one could not dream of expecting former students in the Methodist schools to resort. "The result is that our Sunday School there is more or less of a failure, the growth of the congregation is stunted, scanty, and unhealthy, and the attractiveness of the service to non-Christians is practically nil." Cherry saw the schools and the Publishing House outstripping the churches, which were left ill adapted to garnering the fruits of the religious interest aroused through the schools themselves. He believed that it was essential to have the evangelistic work develop at the same pace as the institutional. What was needed, he said, was an excellent church building housing a full and challenging program and supervised not by a "tired, played-out school teacher or printer, but a rested, Chinese speaking, Holy Ghost anointed man, who can push the campaign in and out of doors continually."

Ten years later, Cherry found still operative in Singapore the same imbalance between the institutional and the evangelistic in the utilization of missionaries, and he earnestly protested against it to the Conference for the sake of the work. At the same session, the Conference Committee on the State of the Church implicitly broadened Cherry's criticism by asserting that essentially the same condition prevailed throughout the Mission. It pointed out that the Conference faced a grave problem in the form of a dearth of workers that was rendered all the worse because those in action were spending their time and energy in work that was not definitely evangelistic.

The Appointments for 1919 buttressed the Committee's position. Only two male missionaries were given no formal school appointment—William Horley, who was the superintendent of the large Federated Malay States District, and Richard Silverthorne, whose major responsibility was management of the complex Sitiawan project—and even these men were co-opted for part-time school work before the year was out. Likewise, two-thirds of the women missionaries (missionary wives, single women, and appointees of the W.F.M.S.) were engaged in full or part-time educational activity. Nearly half the Board's missionaries and a few of the W.F.M.S. workers were, indeed, on the field under educational contracts. This pattern of missionary appointments (all together, about seventy people were involved) throws more light on the frequent complaints of missionaries about lagging efforts and results in evangelism than did their repeated call for more men and money for Malaysia; the Mission was strongly committed to the practical primacy of the school program.

The women mission workers met annually at the time of the Malaysia Conference sessions in an organization of their own, the Malaysia Woman's Conference, which received work reports, held discussions, and made recommendations to the Conference cabinet and the home office of the W.F.M.S.

The Woman's Conference reflected by 1919 the activity of a score of W.F.M.S. missionaries, a dozen missionary wives in active service, a dozen or more wives of Asian pastors, a corps of women teachers from the United States, and several Asian Bible women. The W.F.M.S. itself maintained in six communities a total of eight boarding or day schools for girls, a training school for Bible women, and two homes. Some of the W.F.M.S. workers also served, as did a number of other women, on the staffs of the schools operated by the Board of Foreign Missions. In addition, the women carried on much local church work and informal evangelistic activity, especially among girls and women.

The male leadership of the Mission held membership in the Malaysia Conference.* There the non-Asian missionaries were numerically predominant, for a long time heavily so. Only slowly, usually one or two at a time, and often with short tenure, did Asian ministers—Chinese and Tamils—make their way into Conference membership. Although in 1896 there were a dozen Local Peachers of Asian extraction, none of them had Conference membership. The first Asian to become a full member was Ling Ching Mi, who was transferred from the Foochow Conference in 1897. At the same session, the Conference received on trial Lau Seng Chong, a Chinese, and Silas Saleh, a Malay. The first Tamil member, Samuel Abraham, who became the Mission's most influential Tamil minister, entered the Conference on trial in 1900 and was elected to full membership in 1902. In 1906, the Asian group included Abraham and four Chinese, only one of the Chinese being a full member. By 1912, the group included Abraham and two other Tamils, along with three Chinese full members and three Chinese probationers. At that same time, three dozen Asians were under appointment in the work of the Mission, but only these few had status in the Conference. By 1919, there were six Tamils in full membership and six Chinese. At the end of the decade, the Asians thus were coming into rough numerical balance with the full members who were non-Asian missionaries, although the Tamils and the Chinese hardly could be counted a cohesive group, separated as they were by cultural and language differences.

In spite of their gradually increased Conference membership, the Asian ministers by no means controlled the Malaysia Conference—even when they held theoretical voting strength nearly equal to that of the non-Asians—or even had any substantial influence in it. Indeed, their effective participation in it was minimal. It was the missionaries who held the reins. Even as late as 1919, Asians chaired no standing committees or boards, wrote no committee reports, read no organizational reports in Conference session, and held no Conference offices. Because the sessions were conducted in English, some of the Asians were able to understand only with difficulty or at second

* Malay Archipelago members are not counted here.

hand what was going on. At the session of 1919 in Singapore, the Chinese members of the Conference were assigned seats together in a separate section of the meeting room in Wesley Church, and Mrs. James M. Hoover was assigned to interpret the proceedings for them. At one point, they were voted permission to withdraw still farther, in order to have the District reports interpreted. This physical separation of the Chinese well symbolized the position of the Asians as spectators in the life of the Conference—except for teaching and the care of the local churches and Circuits.

The paramount locus of power in the Methodist enterprise in Malaysia, however, the factor that demonstrated that it was primarily a mission and not a church, a foreign organization in which decision-making was reserved to Americans and not shared with Asians, was the Finance Committee, not the sessions of the Malaysia Conference.

The Conference handled little more than the formalities of the field's relationship to the Methodist connection under the Discipline—hearing work reports from the charges and institutions, expressing group opinion on various ecclesiastical and secular affairs, voting on the technical ministerial relations of the members and on their advancement in the Conference courses of study, electing delegates to the General Conference, listening to inspirational and sometimes informative addresses, and hearing the annual reading of the Appointments. Seldom did it substantially determine Mission policy or direct the disposition of its resources.

The Finance Committee, however, drew up the Mission's budgetary askings, administered appropriations, governed salary payments to local churches for Asian pastors, directed the Sitiawan Mission Plantation Company, handled financial and property dealings with the government, and made loans to individuals, even to its own members. It largely determined, by its loan policies, where and when churches and other mission buildings should be erected or improved, and it bought, sold, maintained, and rented real estate at its own discretion. It operated a financial pool that combined all current and permanent Conference accounts and holdings and that involved investments by individuals and by Conference enterprises. It kept this complex system of Mission finance solvent by internal juggling of accounts and by running large overdrafts on the banks, not hesitating to go outside the rules the Board of Foreign Missions normally required of other Missions. And its power extended even to personnel matters; it not only granted or withheld emergency money grants to missionaries, but also effectively controlled (by strategic recommendations to the Board) their furloughs and involuntary termination of their field tenure.

In this extensive manipulation of factors vital to the maintenance and progress of the Mission, the Committee acted with almost no amenability to the Conference, and it was too far away from New York to be seriously bound by Board controls. It seldom reported to the Annual Conference,

except for limited one-item reports. Its sessions were private; indeed, on every copy of its printed Minutes was inscribed "For Private Use Only." Even these generally were formal and only technically but not substantially informative.

The Finance Committee perennially was composed of four elective and five *ex officio* members—the District Superintendents and the Conference Treasurer (not an elective officer). This smaller, powerful committee was manned solely by non-Asian missionaries, usually men enjoying the longest tenure on the field. In 1919, three of them had been associated with the Conference from twenty-one to twenty-six years—William Cherry, George F. Pykett, and William E. Horley. Only one Asian ever sat on the Finance Committee; Samuel Abraham became a member *ex officio* when he was appointed superintendent of the Tamil District. Thus the Malaysia mission, which was slow in overcoming the difficulties involved in raising up a trained and stable Asian ministry, had a structure that offered almost no opportunity to Asian ministers to move into places of influence in determining the progress of the movement in which they labored, but always under the dominance of American missionaries.

India: Imperial Design

THE MISSION IN 1896

TWO DAYS AFTER WILLIAM MCKINLEY, soon to be elected President of the United States, addressed the General Conference in the new armory in Cleveland, Ohio, on 6 May 1896, Bishop James M. Thoburn, Missionary Bishop for India and Malaysia, arose on the same platform to report on the Methodist movement in India. As he followed to the rostrum Africa's Missionary Bishop, the six-foot-two William Taylor, Thoburn cut a slight figure. But his clear, penetrating voice told the story of a mission many times stronger than the one supervised by the burly Taylor. India was the denomination's most substantial and extensive foreign mission enterprise; in several significant respects, it was twice as strong as the China mission, the next most impressive field abroad—and it was growing stronger.

The work Bishop Thoburn represented when he spoke for India that day was organized in five Annual Conferences.

The most compact of the five, and numerically the strongest, was the North India Conference, which lay close to the center of upper India between the Ganges River and the borders of Nepal and Tibet. Its assigned jurisdiction was "the Northwest Provinces east of the Ganges, and the Province of Oudh." Its nine Districts—Bareilly, Garhwal, Gonda, Kumaun, Moradabad, Oudh, Pilibhit, Sambhal, and Sitapur—included eighty-nine preaching charges, with 13,244 full members and 22,170 probationers. These charges, close to William Butler's early chosen points of concentrated effort, accounted for more than half the membership of the Methodist Episcopal Church in India.

Bordering on the North India Conference to the west was the Northwest India Conference, a collection of seven Districts: Agra, Ajmer, Allahabad, Bulandshahr, Kasganj, Meerut, and Mussoorie. By definition, it included the "portion of the Northwest Provinces which lies south and west of the Ganges, the Punjab, and such parts of Rajputana and Central India as lie north of the twenty-fifth parallel of latitude." This definition included most of upper India between the Ganges, the Indus, and Kashmir. Most of the territory actually occupied by the Methodists, however, lay along the Ganges. But

the elongated Mussoorie District had a few stations deep in the Punjab, and the Ajmer District was planted in the heart of Rajputana. The seven Districts together had 9,504 full members and 18,789 probationers.

These two northern Conferences thus included nine-tenths of India's total Methodist membership.

The Bengal-Burma Conference, which lay in the valley of the Ganges east of the North India Conference and also in the province of Burma, had no aspect of compactness at all. The General Conference ordered in 1892 that it should "consist of Bengal, Bekar [Bihar], and Burmah." It included three widely separated clusters of charges. The Tirhut District covered six charges concentrated in the section of the province of Bihar that lay north of the Ganges. In all Bengal there were only eight charges, in the Calcutta District; five of these were confined to the capital city of Calcutta and its environs, and three were scattered from 100 to 170 miles north of the city. The third concentration was Burma (a part of British India until 1937), where there were three charges in Rangoon (seven hundred miles by steamer from Calcutta), and two charges in Pegu, forty miles to the north. There were only 979 full members and 1,081 probationers in the entire elongated Conference.

The formal geographical dimensions of the Bombay Conference were extensive—a thousand miles from its northern to its southern extremity, a thousand from east to west at its greatest width. By definition it included "the Bombay Presidency, the Central Provinces, Berars [Berar], that portion of the Nizam's Dominions [Hyderabad] north of the Godavery River, and all of Central India south of the twenty-fifth parallel of latitude." The Methodists' occupation of this expansive territory was modest in the extreme. Three of the Bombay District's eight charges were in the city of Bombay itself, two were in Poona (over a hundred miles southeast by rail), two were on the rail line from Bombay to Poona, and one was about seventy-five miles northeast of Bombay. Eight of the twelve charges in the Central Provinces District were scattered for three hundred miles along the Bombay-Jubbulpore railway, and four were located south of the same stretch of railroad. The Sind District had two charges in the Arabian Sea port of Karachi and maintained a charge, 350 miles north of Karachi, in Quetta, British Baluchistan, outside the formal bounds of the Conference. The work in Gujarat was organized in a District containing three charges located relatively close together—Ahmadabad, Baroda, and Godhra. The total membership in this vast area was 882 full members and 1,327 probationers.

The South India Conference was likewise geographically broad, sparsely occupied, and numerically small. The General Conference assigned to it "the Madras Presidency, and all of the territory south of the Godavery River, not included in the Bombay Conference." That was a spread of some twelve hundred miles along the eastern coast, from Bengal to the southern tip of India, with a sweep inland across most of South India. The Hyderabad

District consisted of twelve charges sprinkled across the large province of the same name, most of them within 150 miles of the city of Hyderabad. The fourteen charges in the Madras District were highly concentrated—a few in the city of Madras and vicinity, and the rest in and near Bangalore and Kolar, in Mysore. This left extensive areas within the Conference quite unoccupied. In all the assigned territory there were only 617 full members and 465 probationers.

Comparatively important as the India mission was among the Methodists themselves, this organizational fabric of five Annual Conferences afforded only thin missionary coverage when spread over India's broad territory (it was about three-fifths the area of the United States) and her 235 million people. Methodism's forty years' effort by no means had blanketed India with missions, missionaries, and church members. Huge areas saw nothing of Methodist activity. There was more than a dash of unreality in contemporary prophecies of the conquest of India for Christ. Being able to count 25,226 people as members of the Methodist Episcopal Church did not strongly undergird such sanguine expectations.

But bare descriptions of the India Conferences also yield an unrealistic view of the Mission's strength. Using the more generous statistical yardstick known as the "Christian community" more accurately measures the condition on the field. On that scale—counting the full members, the probationers (43,832), and the baptized children—the native Methodist constituency was nearly 97,000 in number. Counting Europeans and Eurasians made it more than 100,000. And though there were only about 240 pastoral charges in the entire country, the charges generally were not single points of missionary organization, but webs of evangelistic activity. Most of them were circuits of one kind or another. The pattern observable in a single district in 1891 suggests the proliferating influences lying back of any formal listing of charges during the 1890's:

The Mussoorie District comprises seven mission stations. Each of these stations has many sub-stations, and each sub-station again has a cordon of villages attached to it, which are visited, preached in, and cared for by our native workers. For example, the station of Meerut has nine sub-stations, and some of these sub-stations cover a tract containing twelve or more villages in which work is being done.

The charges were led by about 170 missionaries, including married couples, and over a hundred Indian members of Annual Conferences. Spread out through the entire network of stations and substations were more than three thousand paid Indian workers—452 Local Preachers, 671 Exhorters, 1,241 teachers, 57 colporteurs, 560 Bible readers, and 94 others. Supplementing the activity stemming from the regular Conference appointments were 58 missionaries sponsored by the Woman's Foreign Missionary Society, with 96 assistants.

The efforts of all this corps of workers were not exhausted in preaching. Within their spheres of influence were 2,201 Sunday Schools, reaching 75,721 pupils. There were 139 chapters of the Epworth League, with 6,555 young people participating. In addition there were 1,275 educational institutions of all grades, with 28,896 pupils enrolled. And there were other missionary institutions, among them four publishing houses.

THE BISHOPS (1896-1919)

Thoburn had found traveling through this field and supervising its work no mean task. The year before the Cleveland General Conference, the bespectacled and bearded little Bishop, who wore a bowler hat and a long black coat that was buttoned up close to his white clerical collar, sailed from Bombay, a thousand miles across India from his Calcutta home, on 23 March. He arrived in New York on 13 April and spent the next six months traveling through the United States raising special funds to supplement the Missionary Society's appropriations for India. He returned to India aboard a steamer that left New York on 5 November and reached Bombay on 1 December. Twenty-four hours later, he was on a train north into Gujarat, where he spent a day near Baroda ministering to a group of recent converts to Christianity. By 11 December, he was in Hyderabad, nearly five hundred miles to the southeast, opening the session of the South India Conference. On 8 January, he was eight hundred miles north, in Bareilly, at the opening exercises of the North India Conference. Nine days after that session was adjourned, he was in the chair at the Northwest India Conference, which opened on 22 January in Meerut, a hundred miles away, across the Ganges River. This was eight hundred miles west of Calcutta. On 15 February, Bishop Thoburn landed in Singapore, in Malaya, nearly two thousand miles east of Calcutta, across the Bay of Bengal. After presiding there over the Malaysia Mission Conference, he was back in Calcutta on 4 March for the Bengal-Burma Conference, March 4-8. His tour of duty since returning to India three months earlier had taken him six thousand and five hundred miles (airplanes and automobiles did not figure in any of this), counting only his principal movements. On his sixtieth birthday (7 March), his friends not inappropriately presented him with a handsome traveling bag and dressing case. And then he soon was off again, to attend the Central Conference in Poona, more than seven hundred miles away, before embarking for the United States and General Conference from Bombay on 21 March.

This kind of thing Bishop Thoburn had been doing for many years—only one of the considerations that long had made it clear to him and his co-workers that the India mission must have augmented episcopal leadership. Therefore the General Conference heard from the Bishop in 1896 a strong plea for the election of an additional Missionary Bishop for his field.

After extensive debate the General Conference declined to elect any Missionary Bishops except for Africa, where a vacancy was being created by the retirement of Bishop Taylor. Negative factors emerging in the debate included the claim that in view of the Missionary Society's current debt and depleted treasury, it would be too expensive to support another Missionary Bishop. It was announced that the Bishops were opposed to increasing the number of Missionary Bishops, since they felt that they themselves would be able to superintend all the Church's work, both at home and abroad, during the following quadrennium. One of the opponents of the Committee's recommendation sharply charged (Bishop Thoburn took the floor to enter a denial) that Bishop Thoburn's interpretation of his prerogatives as a Missionary Bishop arbitrarily and unconstitutionally limited the powers of General Superintendents in the India mission field. After the General Conference voted its refusal, Corresponding Secretary Adna B. Leonard arose and declared that this "failure to provide proper supervision for our work in eastern Asia is the most stupendous mistake that has ever been made by a General Conference."

The General Conference made a gesture, however, towards complementing Bishop Thoburn's supervision of the India and Malaysia field. It provided that once during each quadrennium, every mission under the jurisdiction of a Missionary Bishop should be administered "conjointly" by a General Superintendent and the respective Missionary Bishop.

Bishop Cyrus D. Foss arrived in Bombay in November, 1897, as the first General Superintendent assigned to India under the new policy. He spent four months traveling with Bishop Thoburn—attending District Conferences, observing missionary activities and needs and sharing the presidencies of the six Conferences in India and Malaysia, but saving Thoburn no time or wear-and-tear. The quadrennial visitation remained a feature of episcopal supervision in India for as long as that field continued to have Missionary Bishops. The General Superintendents who came out in later years were Henry W. Warren (1903-4), James N. FitzGerald (1906-7), William F. McDowell (1910-11), William Burt (1917-18), and Homer C. Stuntz (1918-19). The plan of visitation was suspended only in the quadrennium beginning in 1912, when the designated Bishops did not go to India because of wartime conditions.

Bishop Thoburn co-operated, but he did not accept the sufficiency of the plan. In 1900, he came to General Conference in Chicago and boldly and urgently asked not for one additional Missionary Bishop, but for two. There were now ten thousand more church members and probationers in India than in 1896, there was new work in the Philippine Islands that was under Thoburn's jurisdiction, and a new Conference (the Burma Mission Conference) was about to be established. Furthermore, declared Thoburn, the visitation by General Superintendents from the United States was almost

irrelevant to effective missionary supervision. The office of Missionary Bishop could offer, in contrast, Thoburn still believed, the advantages of administration by a man experienced as a missionary, episcopal residence on the field, and tenure long enough to provide continuity in policy.

This time, there was more personal urgency in Thoburn's request. He was now sixty-four years old and not well, and it was impossible for him to carry on as he had done for the twelve years past. He had been seriously stricken in January at the session of the North India Conference, in Lucknow, and had written at once to Secretary Leonard: "After preaching on Sunday evening I had a somewhat sharp attack for which I am not able to give a medical name, but it chiefly affected the brain, and the doctors say was caused by exhaustive and long-continued work, especially of a mental character. . . . It settles the question, however, that it will be wholly impossible for me to assume for another four years the care of this vast field without one or more colleagues."

As in 1896, the request for Missionary Bishops for India and Malaysia provoked extensive debate. Secretary Leonard told the General Conference that Thoburn would decline to continue in the effective relation if he did not have the assistance of two additional Bishops. One of India's delegates warned that Thoburn's doctors reported that his broken health might keep him from returning to India for at least two years. (William) Rockwell Clancy, superintendent of the Allahabad District, graphically portrayed on the floor of the Conference the need for Bishops who could operate under the conditions in India:

We want men who have been missionaries; men who have hazarded their lives for the gospel of the Lord Jesus Christ in India; men who count not their lives dear unto them, but are willing to go into the most remote villages, where there is fever, where there is cholera, where there is plague, where there is smallpox, where there is famine. We want men who will go and live in tents when the sun is 150 Fahrenheit. We want men who will go and sit in the mud huts of our native preachers and presiding elders and who will understand them and the situation.

The opposition to the proposal for India was centered almost exclusively on the claim that the General Conference could not constitutionally elect more than one Missionary Bishop for a given field. Thomas B. Neely, who specialized in interpretation of the Constitution of the Methodist Episcopal Church, not only supported the constitutionality of the plan, but also pressed upon the Conference the significance and the need of the India mission, identifying it as the largest Methodist Episcopal field anywhere abroad—"a greater church in India today than Bishop Asbury had when he was Bishop in the United States of America."

The workers in India for whom Clancy had spoken got what they wanted both as to measures and as to men. The General Conference voted to elect

two Missionary Bishops for Southern Asia (from 1900, the official designation for the India and Malaysia field), adding the provision that any two, or more, Missionary Bishops on a given foreign field should be co-ordinate in authority. The two men elected were Edwin W. Parker, superintendent of the Bareilly District of the North India Conference, and Frank W. Warne, superintendent of the Calcutta District of the Bengal-Burma Conference. Parker, whose record of missionary service in India reached back to 1859, only three years after the arrival of William Butler, had been a District Superintendent during most of his Indian ministry. Warne, a native of Canada, after three years in pioneer missionary work in Manitoba and brief pastoral experience in Illinois, had come to India in 1888 at Bishop Thoburn's behest. From that time until his election to the episcopacy, he had served as pastor of the English Church in Calcutta, combining his pastorate, for all but the first two years, with the superintendency of the Calcutta District.

Unfortunately, the election of Parker and Warne did not solve the problem of episcopal leadership. Bishop Parker, now sixty-seven, worn out from extraordinary labors during 1899 and from an exhausting schedule of public activity while in the United States to attend the General Conference, did not live to conduct a single Annual Conference session in India. He arrived in Bombay from the States on 16 October 1900, on the verge of invalidism. In June, 1901, after months of increasing weakness, he died in Naini Tal.

Though Bishop Thoburn was continued in the effective relation by the General Conference, the necessity of his conserving his health radically limited his activity in India. He did not return from the United States until December, 1902. At that time, and also a year later, he spent about three months on the field, each time holding a few Conferences. He retired in 1908, after forty-nine years devoted to the India mission.

Bishop Warne now became saddled, in his turn, with an administrative load that should have been carried by three. Although he was only forty-five when elected, he nearly broke down under the burden.

In 1904, the General Conference approved without debate the request of the Central Conference in Southern Asia for two more Missionary Bishops for its still expanding constituency. One of the new bishops was William F. Oldham, forty-nine, an assistant secretary of the Missionary Society and founder, in 1885, of Methodist mission work in Malaya. The other was John E. Robinson, fifty-five, superintendent of the Calcutta District and editor of *The Indian Witness*. Although Oldham had been reared in India, his ministerial life had been spent in Malaya and the United States; Robinson, a native of Ireland, had served in India since 1874, when he went out from the United States as a William Taylor recruit. Bishops Warne, Robinson, and Oldham carried on the direct administration of the field for the next two quadrennia. Warne took up residence in Lucknow, where he remained

throughout the rest of his service as a Missionary Bishop. Oldham was resident in Singapore, and Robinson in Calcutta (1904) and Bombay (1908). Oldham's activity was divided between India and the Malaysia and the Philippines Conferences.

The next change in episcopal personnel came in 1912, when Bishop Oldham resigned as Missionary Bishop after the General Conference elected him a Corresponding Secretary of the Board of Foreign Missions. John W. Robinson, forty-six, for the past twelve years superintendent of the Oudh District of the North India Conference, was elected as an additional Missionary Bishop for Southern Asia. William P. Eveland, forty-eight, president of Williamsport Dickinson Seminary, Pennsylvania, was elected for "Southeastern Asia" (Malaysia and the Philippines), but upon the resignation of Bishop Oldham, the General Conference extended his jurisdiction to include India. He was finally classified as a Bishop for Southern Asia (India, Malaysia, the Philippines), though his primary administrative responsibility was the work in the Philippines, where he established his official residence in Manila.

Bishop John W. Robinson went to Bombay, and Bishop John E. Robinson to Bangalore, in South India. With Bishop Warne in Lucknow, the India Mission for the first time had three episcopal leaders fully resident within the country. And their efforts were expended mainly in India, for after the first two years of the quadrennium, Eveland took over the responsibility for Malaysia from John E. Robinson, who had assumed it after Oldham's resignation.

The episcopal combination effected for Southern Asia in 1912 was broken on 24 July 1916 by the accidental death of Bishop Eveland in Pennsylvania. His responsibilities were transferred to the three remaining Bishops, who were further handicapped by Bishop Warne's absence for twenty months on Centenary work in the United States. Some relief was afforded by the assistance rendered by the visitations of Bishops Burt and Stuntz.

THE CONFERENCES (1896-1919)

While the episcopal team in Southern Asia was being expanded (1900-1912) from one to four members, changes in the pattern of organized Conferences also were occurring. Upon the initiative of the Central Conference, which had been memorialized by the Bengal-Burma Conference, the General Conference of 1900 authorized the organization of the Burma District of the latter Conference into a Mission Conference. Back of this provision was no pressure of expanding membership; there were only 212 probationers and 237 full members in all Burma. But it was a large unexploited field of ethnically distinct peoples, remote from other centers of Methodist activity.

Therefore the Burma Mission Conference was constituted by Bishop Warne at Rangoon on 2 February 1901, the day observed in India for funeral services for Queen Victoria. The new Conference had three ministerial charter members and five organized congregations—one English-speaking and four vernacular.

With the severance of Burma, the Bengal-Burma Conference became known as the Bengal Conference.

On 27 January 1905, at Khandwa, Bishop Warne, carrying out a mandate of the General Conference of 1904, organized a new Conference, the Central Provinces Mission Conference. It was formed as the result of several years' discussion, on the field, of the problem of administering the sections of the Bombay and the South India Conferences that lay within or close to the Central Provinces, these sections being distant eastern and northern outposts, respectively, in their Conferences. The new Conference was built up out of the Central Provinces District of the Bombay Conference and the Godavery and Raipur Districts of the South India Conference. Geographically, the General Conference assigned to its jurisdiction the Central Provinces, Berar, a section of Central India south of the 25th parallel, and a long strip across the state of Hyderabad in the region of the Godavari River.

The Central Provinces Mission Conference began with sixteen ministerial charter members and a constituency of about a thousand full members and eighteen hundred probationers. Its fourteen charges were arranged in four Districts: the Central Provinces Marathi, the Godavery, the Jabalpur, and the Raipur Districts.

There were now seven Conferences in British India: the North India Conference, the Northwest India Conference, the Bengal Conference, the Bombay Conference, the South India Conference, the Burma Mission Conference, and the Central Provinces Mission Conference. Except for the re-organization of the Central Provinces Mission Conference as an Annual Conference on 27 February 1913, Bishop John W. Robinson presiding, the status of these Conferences remained unchanged up to 1920. Only one territorial change was made: in 1912, a part of Bihar was transferred from the Bengal Conference to the North India Conference.

The seven Conferences in India were associated, in 1905, in the Central Conference in Southern Asia, with the two Conferences representing the mission work in Malaysia and in the Philippine Islands. The Malaysia Mission Conference had participated in the Central Conference since the organization of the former in 1893 and continued to do so after it became an Annual Conference in 1902. After being administered, since 1900, as a District of the Malaysia Mission Conference and then of the Malaysia Annual Conference, the work in the Philippines was organized as the Philippine Islands Mission Conference in 1905, and as the Philippine Islands Annual Conference in 1908. This total field composed of the nine Conferences must be kept in

mind when considering the scope of the essential, and often the functional, responsibilities resting upon the Missionary Bishops in India.

THE CONSTITUENCY, 1919

Citing the number of Conferences falls far short of indicating the true growth of the India mission during this period. In 1919, the seven Conferences had 74,000 church members (it was triple the number belonging in 1896). They also had 172,000 probationers and 167,000 Sunday school pupils, the latter organized in 5,700 schools. Leading this greatly expanded constituency were 172 Board missionaries (including married couples) and 138 missionary appointees of the W.F.M.S. Assisting them were 453 ordained Indian ministers, 3,300 unordained men mission workers, and 2,600 women workers.

India: Mass Movements

IN 1896, INDIA METHODISM WAS MOVING UNDER THE stimulus of Bishop James M. Thoburn, a vigorous apostle of missionary expansionism. For nearly twenty-five years before coming to the office of Missionary Bishop in 1888, Thoburn had been participant, champion, and leader in the far-flung territorial expansion that pushed the India mission's original boundaries west and south of the Ganges ("our Chinese wall," he called it) and finally resulted in the deployment of Methodist missionaries across all India and into Malaysia. His objective was nothing short of imperial; conquest was his aim. Methodism, he proclaimed, must be not a mission *in* India, but a mission *for* India—all of India. It must not work in a corner, but everywhere in the land. The Empire of India had to be conquered for Christ. "We too represent an empire," he said to the members of the Central Conference in 1896 as he reminded them of the conquests of the Moguls, in whose ancient capital (Poona) the Conference was meeting.

The Bishop's aggressive approach to the Mission's task, which he repeatedly framed in military concepts and voiced in a militant and military vocabulary, was echoed in utterances and actions of missionaries everywhere in India. They justified in action on the field the view of their evangelistic function that Thoburn advanced to the General Conference in Chicago in 1900:

In the nature of the case all our missionaries may be expected to become expansionists, in the missionary sense of that term. We have often been told to restrain our ardor, and not to add to responsibilities which are already beyond our strength, but it seems impossible to resist a law of life. We might almost as well try to make living trees cease to grow as to reverse a law of spiritual life, which ever seems to prompt a living Christian organization to move onward.

Thoburn himself certainly never attempted to resist the pressure of this "law of spiritual life," but steadily endeavored to make the India mission a ready and effective channel for its operation.

MASS-MOVEMENT STRATEGY

By 1896, the onward movement spearheaded by Thoburn was no longer advancing by long leaps across India into new and distant areas. The ex-

pansionist drive was still on, but it was taking a more dynamic form: the Mission was making its major advances in areas where it was stimulating and guiding mass movements.

The strategy of the leaders of the mass movements was not essentially geographical, but popular. Its aim was not primarily to enter new localities for the sake of completing the network of missionary organization, but to reach the people by following up, and extending, continuous lines of personal contact between converts and potential converts. Mass-movement evangelism, moreover, was more than an intensification of person-to-person communication of the Christian message. Its method was not gathering in separately converted individuals, but securing the affiliation of the converted group.

In its implementation of this emphasis upon collective action, the mass-movement technique was a deliberate exploitation of the social structure of India's pervasive and intricate caste system, a system the missionaries roundly condemned on moral and religious grounds.

At first, the power of caste had appeared as an unlikely source of reinforcement for the efforts of Methodist missionaries. It confronted them with two roadblocks to the rapid extension of Christianity.

The first block was the strong social cohesion of the caste group. An individual had to muster extraordinary initiative in order to bring himself to the point of breaking with the rites, the rules, and the customs of his caste group by becoming a Christian. If he made the break, he invited the severest punitive ostracism. Obviously, when conversion required such radical personal independence, and resulted in such radical separation of the convert from the group that formerly completely enfolded him and guaranteed his status in Indian society, the Methodist missions could win converts only with painful slowness.

The second block was the fragmentation of the Indian community into many exclusive and segregated caste groups. The divisions were so sharp that it was impossible for Christianity to spread through a whole town or village by general contagion. Each caste line was like a sanitary cordon, preventing the infection of one caste group by carriers from another. This too slowed the missionaries down to inching progress.

But Thoburn and his mass-movement leaders were actively capitalizing, in 1896, upon a discovery made by the Methodist workers thirty years earlier (and by others before them) that transformed the apparent obstacle of caste into an advantage frequently embarrassing in its opportunities. They had found that to convert a family rather than an individual could readily start a chain reaction of conversions. Families were related to families within the same caste group. The impulse to move towards Christianity could be

transmitted from one family to another within that group. The result often was the baptizing of clusters of entire families. Since there were no artificial barriers within the caste group, sometimes an entire local caste group would enter the Christian community by virtue of a group decision to move together. Then the movement would spread to members of the same caste in other localities.

This pattern of "mass" conversion conserved the immediate social relationships of the individual convert, and by utilizing them as lines of infiltration within the caste walls, the missionaries often immensely speeded up the evangelizing process. Their crucial task was to break into particular caste groups through initial individual or family conversions. In the missionary vocabulary, the first significant penetration of a group was called a "break." When breaks appeared, conversions came not in drops and dribbles, but in streams and freshets, even floods. Bishop Thoburn wrote, in 1892, of the early discovery of the large possibilities of the mass movement, that "the progress which has been since achieved has nearly all followed from this recognition of a very simple fact in Indian social life."

BEGINNINGS IN NORTH INDIA

The first mass movement to produce pronounced numerical gains emerged in the North India Conference in 1888, after thirty years of gradual growth had developed a Methodist constituency of 3,121 full members and 2,899 probationers. Believing that they now had enough Indian evangelistic workers for a more rapid advance, the leaders in North India planned and launched an aggressive campaign along family and caste lines. It was immediately successful, with the number of baptisms mounting sharply each year for four years. The campaign received a powerful impetus in July, 1890, when Bishop Thoburn sent back to India from the United States a call for a still stronger advance. He backed his message with the encouraging news that Dwight L. Moody, raising \$3,000 in ten minutes after a speech by the Bishop at a conference in Northfield, Massachusetts, had assured him of the support of a hundred more Indian pastor-teachers. The superintendents began almost at once to put these new workers on the field in direct contact with potential converts. The additional pastor-teachers contributed heavily to the recording of 14,478 baptisms in 1891, the full membership within the Conference rising to 8,820 and the Christian community to 32,992 (the latter was 9,226 in 1887).

In 1892, the tide of accessions by baptism rose still higher. While it was rising, the North India Conference gave up its Agra and Aligarh Districts,

and three additional Circuits, to form part of the Northwest India Conference, which was organized in 1893. That year, the number of baptisms again rose in the combined original North India Conference territories, exceeding 17,000. This, however, was the movement's peak in baptizing activity.

GUJARAT

Just as the mass movement in the North India Conference was slowing down, another was being born. In 1895, an exciting break came in the Bombay Conference, in Gujarat, a fertile, densely populated, linguistically unified region in the northern section of the Bombay Presidency. Suddenly, the Bombay District found that it had a flock of six hundred converts under its care in this region where a year earlier there had been only a handful.

The new movement was related to impulses generated in connection with the work of the Gujarati Circuit in the great port city of Bombay, where since 1887, Methodist workers had been seeking converts among the thousands of Bhangis who lived there. The Bhangis were members of a widely scattered exterior caste of sweepers and scavengers. Many of them came down from Gujarat to earn the higher pay available in the city and then returned to their native villages after a few years. Among those who went back were Christians converted by the Methodists in Bombay. They were scattered through several villages about twenty-five miles north of Baroda, where they were visited—but only sporadically—by workers from the Methodist mission in that city.

In November, 1894, John E. Robinson, superintendent of the Bombay District, carrying out his standing desire to evangelize the close-packed and easily accessible villages on the Baroda Circuit, stationed an Indian preacher at Kasar and Od to follow up the returned converts. A month later George W. Park, earlier attached to Gujarati work in Bombay and Baroda, was appointed to cultivate the area north of the Mahi River.

The following March, the desired break came in Kasar and Od, among the Dheds, an exterior caste of laborers and private servants. Park began baptizing in both villages, sickness later compelling him to surrender the work for several months to Edwin F. Frease, who was stationed at Baroda. The movement toward Christianity spread rapidly from village to village among Dhed families. By the end of the year, 550 people were baptized in the area north of the Mahi River.

It was news of this activity that sent Bishop Thoburn speeding to Baroda as soon as he landed in Bombay early in December. Thoburn and Robinson, after a day in conference with Park and Frease, went out to Bhalej, a nearby central village, to see something of the movement with their own eyes. Four hundred fresh converts met them at a hastily called all-day camp meeting in the shade of a great banyan tree. There the Bishop baptized forty-two

people, and administered Communion to more than two hundred, most of them receiving the sacrament for the first time.

When Bishop Thoburn read out the appointments at the Conference session in Jubbulpore later in the month, he set apart a new Gujarat District, which included three Circuits in Gujarat, and the Gujarati Mission in Bombay. The Bishop appointed Frease to superintend the District, thus inaugurating what became a twelve-year administration that Frease prosecuted with energy, strategical skill, organizing ability, and facility in improvising in the face of repeated crises.

Frease supervised the District from Baroda, the Gaekwar's capital, a city of about 100,000 people. Here was located the only Methodist church building in Gujarat, erected to house the small English church. The city's Gujarati work was centered in a mission property that held the District's only parsonage. There was a small boys' boarding school, run by Mrs. Frease, and a small training school for adult evangelistic workers. Here also was a center of Woman's Foreign Missionary Society work, with two missionaries and two assistant missionaries maintaining a small girls' boarding school, sponsoring zenana visitation, and conducting combined evangelistic and medical work that, during 1896, was reaching out to thirty villages.

The first year's work on the Gujarat District was located mostly within a large triangle formed by Baroda, Ahmadabad (a city of about 150,000 in population, some sixty-five miles northwest along the railroad), and Godhra (about forty miles northeast of Baroda).

George W. Park was sent to Ahmadabad. Although he later took his family to live in tents nearer to his work, at first he had to travel thirty miles to reach his nearest convert. Park moved between the villages of the Ahmadabad Circuit by camel-back, the mode best suited to the sandy Gujarat roads. He began with relatively few Christian constituents, scattered through eight villages, and with a few Indian assistants. In Nadiad, about halfway between Baroda and Ahmadabad, Park started work among the Bhangis. A number of them were baptized here and in two other villages, and members of this caste were reached elsewhere on the Circuit. Three subcircuits were organized during the year, and were based on Nadiad, Mehmabad, and Mahudha, which formed an equilateral triangle with sides about ten miles long. As a result of activity in and near this area, Park baptized converts in twelve new villages, enrolled candidates for baptism in a dozen others, and pushed the work north to within twelve miles of Ahmadabad.

In February, Arthur W. Prautch was sent to the Mahi River Circuit (formed after the Conference session), a strip about ten miles deep, lying for some thirty miles along the Mahi, and bounded on two sides by the Bombay, Baroda and Central India Railway and the Anand-Rutlam Branch Railway. Here the Methodists had their largest concentration of constituents. Prautch had to live in Baroda, twenty-five miles away from the center of his work,

and he too traveled by camel-back—a highly disconcerting experience at first. The work spread so fast, with heavy demands upon him to organize, train, and protect converts, that Frease reported that Prautch, “with headquarters literally in the saddle, has been incessantly on the move, not even pausing for the hot weather.” His year’s labors secured baptisms in twenty-four new villages, and candidates in twenty others. On this Circuit, which like the Ahmadabad Circuit, ran to a population density of 650 to the square mile, with sizeable villages every few miles, the Methodists had now gained converts in the great majority of villages. In two Dhed villages, almost every person, young or old, was a Methodist adherent.

The Godhra Circuit, manned by an Indian exhorter, had not a single convert when it was opened, but during 1896, forty-four people were baptized.

Frease himself directed the Baroda Circuit, relying heavily upon the efforts of Indian workers because of his time-consuming duties as superintendent and in boarding school and training school work in Baroda itself. The one village north of the Mahi River where there were converts was increased to four, and eight new villages south of the river, in Gackwari territory, were penetrated.

The reports that came to the Bombay Conference of 1896 from the Gujarat District thus fulfilled the long-held hope for a mass movement in that region. Frease and his colleagues were baptizing members of three exterior castes: the Dheds (chiefly from these), the Bhangis, and the Chamars (skinnners and tanners). The total for the year was 876, including converts from forty-seven new villages. There were candidates for baptism in thirty-three other villages.

Three new leaders came to the District in 1897: Thomas P. Fisher and Thomas E. F. Hudson, missionaries; and Robert C. Ward, Local Preacher, in place of Prautch. With the assistance of a growing corps of Gujarati workers, Frease and Park, with their new colleagues, began an intensive “closing-up process” in the territory already occupied. Their strategy was deliberate and carefully executed. They closed up gaps between and within their circuits by reaching and winning converts in nearby villages. Their aim was compactness and continuity in the coverage of their field, which soon included a large densely populated tract in which there was hardly a village without converts of the Methodist movement. Within two years, the average number of converts in occupied villages rose to thirty-five, with more than double the average in some and with the entire population of several of them consisting of converts. And as this closing-up process continued, the movement also generated enough energy to extend the field, almost uniformly in every direction, into new areas.

There had been only seventeen Gujarati mission workers when cultivation of the new mass movement was started in 1895. By the end of 1897 there were 131. All but a handful of them were recruited from among the con-

verts, who came from illiterate groups. Many of the workers were themselves quite illiterate when converted, and only a few were then capable of more than laboriously spelling a few words. They were placed under close supervision on the subcircuits, however, and were given simple courses of study at the summer training school in Baroda. Meagerly trained as they were, these men were close to the people. They made the involving meshwork of the evangelistic net Frease and the other trained workers were casting across a large section of Gujarat.

The effectiveness of the Gujarati workers, co-operating with the mission staffs of the Board and of the W.F.M.S., was proved by the marked rise in baptisms that fed the growth of the Gujarati Christian community. There were 1,134 baptisms in 1897 and 1,824 baptisms in 1898. The Christian community, which had numbered only about 600 late in 1895, included 4,793 persons by the end of 1898. The converts were located in 140 villages.

Some of the results of the mass movement were dramatized for Bishop Thoburn and his traveling companions, Bishop Foss and Dr. John F. Goucher, when Thoburn returned, on 1 December 1898, for another mass meeting at Bhalej. Two thousand people, fifteen hundred of them enrolled Christians, hundreds of them having walked from ten to eighteen miles, listened to the preaching by Bishop Foss and Doctor Goucher—the people seated on straw scattered on the ground in the shade of a row of trees, the speakers standing on a simple platform made of earth. At the close, candidates for baptism were seated in long arcs in front of the platform, to listen to Bishop Thoburn. They gave prompt and hearty responses to the ritual questions put to them, and joined in reciting the Apostles' Creed. Then with the missionaries and their co-workers carefully checking names on prepared lists, Bishop Foss and Doctor Goucher moved among the candidates carrying fonts and baptizing the new Christians, until 225 had received the Sacrament of Baptism.

Suddenly the leaping growth of the Gujarat Christian community was cruelly checked by a sequence of disastrous attacks by plague, famine, and cholera.* As the famine crisis came on in mid-1899, the missionaries canceled their regular baptizing activities and did not resume them until 1901. They shrank from the prospect of baptismal rolls padded with the names of people who might profess conversion in hope of becoming beneficiaries of famine relief administered by the Mission. Baptisms dropped to 399 in 1899 and to 46 in the following year.

The long months of famine and epidemic disease disorganized, but did not entirely halt, the work of preaching and instruction. Although the missionaries became absorbed in efforts to relieve the plight of the suffering people all about them, nevertheless they built up a large reservoir of candidates for baptism. When the sluices were opened early in 1901, by acting District

* See pp. 850-858.

Superintendent Daniel O. Fox and by William E. Robbins, hundreds of baptisms came in a rush. On a single day, the two workers baptized 800 persons at Vaso; two days later, they baptized 600 at Mahuda. Bishop Warne came to Gujarat in July, and in four days' meetings, 1,330 candidates were baptized. Robbins traveled at large in the District, baptizing about 2,200 newly declared Christians. The District finally reported 6,286 baptisms for the year.

Baptisms did not again reach this high-water mark in Gujarat, but the level remained high for the next six years. Under Frease's leadership, the missionaries pressed their campaign for conversions, though not without having to overcome repeated hostile conditions, including numerous outbreaks of persecution of converts, serious financial problems, and natural disasters. In 1902 came a wave of agricultural unemployment, a new and bitter brush with famine, fresh demands for temporary relief work, and an outbreak of plague; but there were 3,238 baptisms. Plague was rampant in 1903, bringing serious mortality to the Christian community; but there were 2,388 baptisms. In 1904, plague was more virulent and widespread than ever ("a hideous march of the grim destroyer" that took toll of a tenth of the converts), and this fifth year of drought yielded only ten-per-cent crops and a season of awful famine; but there were 1,034 baptisms. Plague fatalities continued for months in 1905, popular hunger remained severe until September, and a terrible water famine made it necessary for the missionaries to provide water supplies for six score towns; but there were 2,389 baptisms. In 1906, early scarcity gave way to good rains and good crops, the welcome rains brought (bitter irony!) high mortality to a population weakened by seven lean years, and plague drove the Mission's local workers and their people out of their homes into the fields; but there were 2,672 baptisms. In 1907, the missionary staff was badly depleted by sickness; yet there were 1,766 baptisms.

The growth in the number of adherents resulting from administering twenty thousand baptisms during these seven years was accompanied by steady geographical expansion. Frease and his colleagues still were proceeding in accordance with the campaign strategy they had projected in the early years of the movement—filling in unoccupied gaps between and within Circuits, reaching into new but contiguous areas, and filling in the fresh gaps created by the most recent expansion, always moving towards the achievement of an unbroken village-to-village constituency within the occupied territory. By 1903, this had been accomplished in an area a hundred miles long and eighty-four miles deep near the Mission's chief centers—Baroda, Godhra, and Nadiad. The work continued to spread north and east of Ahmadabad, east beyond Godhra, south and west of Baroda to the Arabian Sea, and west of Nadiad into the Kathiawar peninsula—new villages being occupied each year, and new Circuits being formed. In 1906, the new but not large work in Kathiawar (a part of Gujarat) was formed into the Kathiawar District of the Bombay Conference, with William E. Robbins as superintendent. By

the end of the year, the mass movement in Gujarat involved Christians in over eight hundred towns and villages.

Except, perhaps, for phases of the initial advance into Kathiawar, by far the most of this plotted geographical expansion continued to follow, more spontaneously, the natural channels running from group to group within particular castes—mostly within the Dhed, Bhangi, and Chamar exterior castes. Two more groups, which had first become acquainted with the missionaries in their emergency grain shops in 1900, were penetrated. By 1903, converts were being won—in one case, a whole village—among the Kolis, a widespread low caste of cultivators and laborers. And Robert Ward, working east of Godhra, soon was baptizing among the Bhils, an important exterior tribe of bowmen and bandits. Altogether, the Methodist workers had got inside caste lines that enclosed some 2,000,000 people in Gujarat proper.

During the twelve years (1896–1907) of Frease's leadership in Gujarat, 24,275 persons were baptized. As they were absorbed into the Christian community, the composition of the Methodist constituency displayed a pattern that appeared in other pronounced mass movements in India. It is implicit in the following statistical expression of the growth of the Gujarat movement:

<i>Year</i>	<i>Total Baptisms</i>	<i>Child Baptisms</i>	<i>Adult Baptisms</i>	<i>Probationers</i>	<i>Full Members</i>	<i>Christian Community</i>
1896	856	274	582	939	140	1,859
1897	1,114	426	688	2,033	187	3,039
1898	1,817	609	1,208	2,981	207	4,458
1899	399	116	283	3,498	290	5,531
1900	46	9	37	2,921	250	4,667
1901	6,286	2,196	4,090	6,301	395	10,082
1902	3,238	1,144	2,094	8,857	441	14,001
1903	2,388	776	1,612	10,304	681	15,748
1904	1,304	583	781	10,083	1,001	15,679
1905	2,389	1,155	1,234	11,889	1,046	18,063
1906	2,672	1,251	1,421	13,484	759	19,204
1907	1,766	786	980	13,855	888	19,624

The persons baptized in large numbers year by year, as the result of mass conversions, were enrolled in the Gujarat "Christian community," those receiving adult baptism (twelve years of age and over) being listed as probationers. The growth of the Christian community was striking—from less than a thousand, to nearly twenty thousand. The growth of the probationers group was comparably impressive—from less than a thousand, to nearly fourteen thousand. But most extraordinary of all, comparatively, was the pedestrian growth of the full membership of the church—only 541 in a seven-year period that saw nearly nine thousand adult baptisms; an increase of only forty-six during the year following more than four thousand adult baptisms; and arrival at a total of only 888 full members, after four successive years when the list of probationers stood above the 10,000 mark.

As the movement burgeoned, the missionaries brought to the doorstep of church membership many, many thousands of newly baptized converts whom they did not permit to cross the threshold into full communion. "We have not had and have not 'the baptism fever,'" asserted Frease at the close of the year when the Gujarat District reported 6,286 baptisms. "We recognize clearly that numbers do not win the battle." But the tremendous numerical gap between baptisms and full membership remained, indeed increased, throughout his administration.

There were conditions extenuating this failure to assimilate more of the probationers into church membership. Chief among them was the numerical weakness of effective leadership for the task of organizing and instructing the thousands of potential church members. The missionary staff was always too small. Never were there more than seven non-Indian workers on the field, seldom were more than four or five appointed, and often the number was further depleted by severe illness. For the first four years, there were no Indian preachers available; for five years more, the average was five; and for the final three years, the average was sixteen. The most numerous element in the working corps, the pastor-teachers and other popular Indian helpers, who finally numbered more than four hundred, generally were nearly illiterate, meagerly trained, and too thinly spread.

Throughout the years of Frease's aggressive leadership, the missionaries, in spite of their growing awareness of the merely creeping increase in church membership, kept on baptizing thousands of converts they knew would not achieve full membership. Only briefly did one or two men attempt to slow down on baptizing in favor of a stronger effort to assimilate their probationers into the church.

But a slowdown did come at last, as soon as Frease's superintendency ended at the close of 1907. Under his successors George W. Park and Lewis E. Linzell began a deceleration of baptizing activity that changed the character of the Gujarat mass movement as an aggressive evangelistic force during most of the twelve years 1908 to 1919. The change of pace reflected essentially a change of policy.

Upon succeeding Frease as District Superintendent, George Park, long seasoned under the rigors of the Gujarat field, inaugurated more careful and conservative evangelistic methods. These were continued when, in 1909, the Gujarat District was divided, and he headed the new Ahmadabad District, with Lewis Linzell taking charge of the new Baroda District. The two men were determined to raise the quality of baptizing activity by improving the instruction of baptismal candidates and by raising the level of Christian practice required of them. They hoped thus to prepare more converts who could be expected to become full members of the church.

The new superintendents began a vigorous campaign against the practice of child marriage and the "heathen" marriage rites associated with it. Every

man seeking baptism was required to renounce these customs completely, and many hundreds signed pledges to do so. This at once applied brakes to the speed of the baptizing movement. William E. Bancroft reported to Linzell in 1909 that without this exaction, he could have baptized twice as many prospective Christians as he did. More than that, the missionaries began to exercise great care in teaching the meaning of baptism to the candidates. By 1911, Linzell's workers on the Baroda District were baptizing nobody for whom pastoral care could not be provided. Linzell was convinced that pastoral care was essential to building up the Church, as distinct from merely extending the Christian community numerically. "We dare not baptize men until we can care for them," he said. Park, his colleague, already had hotly declared to Secretary Adna B. Leonard that he would not continue to over-extend the work as Frease, long the only full Board missionary in Gujarat, had done. The energies of the evangelistic workers were devoted more fully to assimilating converts rather than to pressing for expansion. Even the new converts now began to come in larger proportion from villages where Methodist groups were already established.

These emphases produced immediate and marked changes in the rate of the Gujarat Mission's growth and in the balance between the various groups in its constituency, setting trends that extended beyond the administrations of Park and Linzell and that were not overcome by 1919. They are clearly suggested by the deposit of statistics left by these twelve years of evangelism in Gujarat:

<i>Year</i>	<i>Total Baptisms</i>	<i>Child Baptisms</i>	<i>Adult Baptisms</i>	<i>Probationers</i>	<i>Full Members</i>	<i>Christian Community</i>
1908	753	496	257	12,913	1,015	19,035
1909	798	443	355	12,650	1,250	18,016
1910	1,121	615	506	13,666	983	19,013
1911	2,268	1,430	838	13,187	1,072	19,381
1912	1,148	606	542	13,958	1,310	20,119
1913	1,192	830	362	13,721	1,589	21,040
1914	649	475	174	13,014	1,803	20,496
1915	1,077	817	260	13,339	1,871	20,814
1916	1,231	920	311	13,408	1,971	21,108
1917	2,219	1,345	874	13,526	2,737	22,724
1918	2,066	1,192	874	13,183	3,007	23,187
1919	2,945	1,721	1,224	13,561	3,133	24,663

In 1908, the number of baptisms dropped sharply and remained low enough to produce a twelve-year total far below that for the Frease administration. In the same year, suddenly rising from twelve years in the minority, child baptisms exceeded adult baptisms, and remained decidedly in the majority every year up to 1919. Adult baptisms, the core of evangelistic advance, dropped radically and by 1919 the total stood at only 44 per cent of the total for the Frease administration. The size of the Christian community

increased; but the rate of growth was substantially retarded, and about 65 per cent of the accessions were children, including a large proportion from already established Christian homes. All these shifts are indications of the milder thrust of the Gujarat mass movement into the non-Christian community. Insofar as they were caused or accompanied by qualitative gains, they represented some success for the conservative policies initiated by Park and Linzell.

The number of probationers remained practically stationary throughout the entire post-Frease period, thus arresting the earlier tendency of the movement to show a constantly expanding group of unassimilated converts, and decreasing the proportion of probationers in the Christian community. This was a gain for the conservative policy. But it was a qualified gain: the large number of probationers was not decreased—a reflection of the inability of the Mission to overcome this heritage from the earlier, more aggressive period.

The most positive improvement in the balance within the Methodist constituency was the gradual tripling of the full membership. In 1908, the proportion of church members to the Christian community was one to twenty; in 1919, it was one to eight. Even this progress was modest: there were still regularly more than four times as many probationers as full members; after twenty-four mass-movement years, with 41,742 baptisms (more than half were of adults), there were only 3,133 full members in 1919.

NORTHWEST INDIA

The Gujarat movement ran through its dozen years of dynamism and its dozen years of moderation in a spacious corner of the Bombay Conference. The movement in the Northwest India Conference, however, was virtually an entire Conference in forward motion as a converting force. Born out of the North India Conference when the parent organism was pulsing with the energy of Indian Methodism's original great mass movement, the Northwest India Conference itself was born a mass movement and remained so clear down to 1919.

The thick perennial core of this movement lay north of Agra in a narrow area between the Jumna and the Ganges Rivers, and in a thin strip of the Punjab on the west side of the Jumna near Delhi. It was a group of close-lying Districts variously organized from time to time, and variously named—Agra, Aligarh, Bulandshahr, Delhi, Kasganj (relinquished to Presbyterian missionaries in 1913), Meerut, Muttra. Other Districts participated significantly as new work developed, and only on the two Districts closely tied to the cities of Allahabad and Cawnpore did mass-movement phenomena fail to appear.

Under the impetus of the wider mass movement of the early 1890's, the

constituency of the Northwest India Conference was steadily growing in 1896. A stream of baptisms was generously replenishing the Christian community in a volume characteristic of well-developed mass movements. The number of child baptisms, and the probationers' group, had far outstripped the full members' group in size—both mass-movement symptoms.

But there were signs that the movement was losing momentum, and these signs continued to appear—in some respects were gradually accentuated—down to 1902. The total number of baptisms dropped from 10,332 in 1892 (the year before the organization of the Conference) to 5,924 in 1902. Child baptisms steadily gained on adult baptisms (the gap in 1892 was over 2,700; in 1902 it was 38). The full membership grew more rapidly than was typical of active mass movements, and it rose to 50 per cent, rather than 40 per cent, of the size of the probationers' group—a reversal of the usual mass-movement trend.

During this period of moderating tempo in evangelistic activity, the District Superintendents—always the key men in making and implementing local policy—set the new pace on their respective Districts. In general, they were not opposed to mass-movement goals and techniques. They hoped for accessions by the thousands; they shared the spirit of Christian conquest of India; when the time was right, they were willing to press hard for mass results. But they found themselves burdened with the responsibility for assimilating many thousands of new converts and ill supplied with workers to help carry the burden. Therefore they restricted their outreach for fresh baptismal candidates in favor of stronger efforts to instruct their new converts—almost exclusively illiterate and generally superficially prepared for baptism—in Christian teaching and practice. J. B. Thomas, superintendent of the Agra District, reported for 1901: "I have discouraged rather than encouraged our preachers-in-charge in baptizing new converts. . . . this phase of the work has a very feeble claim upon our thoughts and plans for the general work."

Thomas, who put the case perhaps more sharply than some would have done, went on to say, more positively:

The importance of teaching our people, both young and old, cannot be over-estimated. . . . We begin at the very bottom and work up as fast as we can, but at best it is a slow process. For more than two years our religious teaching has been limited practically to the Lord's Prayer, the Ten Commandments and a few simple lessons in elementary catechism. About 2,500 [out of some 12,000 constituents] now know these fundamentals. Four hundred and fifty can read the Bible. In the 65 village schools for boys nearly 1,000 boys are learning to read . . .

Available to meet this stark need for Christian tutelage on even this elementary level were Thomas, his wife, a W.F.M.S. missionary, and seven Indian preachers, at the head of a corps of insufficiently trained Indian workers.

Philo M. Buck, surveying the Conference situation at the end of 1902 for

the Committee on the State of the Church, pointed out that in the earlier boom years of the mass movement, the evangelistic workers had fewer enrolled converts to absorb their time and attention, and thus were free for more active extension work. "But our [present] workers, with large and growing Christian communities to care for," he said, "are unable to find time to devote to the multitudes seeking instruction in the truths of Christianity." And when time was found for instructing new seekers, he held, the preparatory teaching needed to be more careful and substantial than in the past, in order to obtain better results. Buck, who was the superintendent of the Meerut District, said at the Conference session in January, 1902:

Perhaps the chief peril that faces us is in an unchristianized Christianity. Multitudes await the nominal acceptance of the Gospel; but to win them to the real life that is in Christ, and to nourish them up unto the full stature of manhood in grace, is a very different matter.

Leaders like Buck and Thomas felt compelled, therefore, to make the difficult decision to baptize more slowly in order to teach more thoroughly. This deliberately enforced restraint by no means blocked the mass movement, for the barriers around numerous caste groups already were breached, and Christian influence was widely at work inside them. Earlier penetration during the years of aggressive campaigning for converts kept producing large annual accessions. But conservative policy did reduce their dimensions.

In 1903 came a steep and sudden numerical spurt: preachers in the Northwest India Conference reported 8,010 baptisms. This large gain began a permanent upsurge of the Northwest India Conference mass movement which continued through a decade of steady increases in the annual numbers of converts baptized. The 10,000 mark was passed in 1907; the 15,000 mark was reached in 1914.

The upturn in 1903 arose from no important change in policy in the core area near the Ganges, but from developments in two regions to the west of it—the Punjab and Rajputana.

In Rajputana (organized as the Ajmer District), the numerical increase was essentially the result of the work's maturing after slow, hard years under the handicaps of difficult terrain, multilingual population, and lack of workers. The Ajmer District, under the superintendency of J. E. Scott, reported over two thousand baptisms in 1903, and maintained that level for three years more, reaching 2,461 in 1906. But this four-year record did not establish the Ajmer District as a permanently strong mass-movement area. Year after year, Rajputana parried the thrust of the missionaries with a hard shield of epidemic disease, famine, transiency in population, and sparseness of Christian settlements. These conditions heightened the problems involved in responsible assimilation of converts. The missionary leadership, beginning with J. B. Thomas in 1907, responded realistically by concentrating the efforts

of the evangelistic personnel upon teaching rather than upon liberal baptizing. Baptisms dropped to 640 in the year 1907, and finally much lower, the District never again showing signs of becoming a significant mass-movement sector.

The Punjab District, however, augmented the Conference constituency in 1903 with the emerging force of a fresh and lasting movement. It baptized 1,934 converts in 1903, followed that with 3,047 and 3,462 in the next two years, and remained a plentiful source of baptisms throughout the second decade of the century. J. B. Thomas organized the Punjab District in 1902, beginning the first serious effort to advance from the eastern edge of the vast province into its western expanses, with Lahore at the heart of the District, as of the province. The rapid growth of the new Punjab Christian constituency was mostly the rapid growth of new work. As it became well rooted, the new enterprise displayed the general characteristics that soon appeared in the rest of the Northwest India Conference mass movement.

Just as the Conference was reaching the point of baptizing ten thousand converts a year, the unceasing labors of the evangelistic workers began to open up significant caste breaks. In 1907, P. M. Buck and his Meerut District co-workers were in the midst of a lively extension of Christianity into the Chamar shoemakers caste, which numbered about 600,000 in the area occupied by Buck's corps of evangelists. They had been praying hard and working hard for this opening, which had a far broader potentiality than the position they already had won among the more scattered Chamar tanners. Impressed by its possibilities, Buck—always a relatively conservative leader—pressed the work energetically but not over-aggressively. "The heavy burdens upon us in caring for the work already in hand," he explained, "has [*sic*] rendered it quite impossible to take up this work with a large and comprehensive plan. What has been accomplished has resulted from increased burdens on shoulders already fully laden." The progress of the movement from group to group and town to town stimulated, beginning in 1906, an immediate four-year upward trend in baptizing on the Meerut District—828, 1,409, 1,598, 1,934.

The movement among the Chamars spread so far and so fast on the Meerut District that Buck's workers baptized 1,600 of them in 1910, raising the District's total for all baptisms to 2,740. Buck realized that the leaders in the two Conferences in Upper India now recognized the Chamar development on his District as the key to a great campaign for the evangelization of the millions in this caste within the Northwest and the North India Conferences. Since the Chamars constituted the largest and currently most accessible caste in the region, he felt that success on his District was crucial. Evidently Bishop Warne did too. The Bishop made two tours to the heart of the new movement, holding special services, baptizing, and observing the enthusiasm of the new converts. A thousand of them came from forty villages

to attend one of his meetings; Warne saw them—both men and women—marching through the village shouting at the top of their lungs, "Glory to Jesus Christ!" The Bishop provided Buck with funds for seven new workers to cope with the growing opportunity.

The next seven years were years of powerful resurgence in the mass movement whose progress since the early 1890's had been strong but tempered. Exciting, tantalizing breaks appeared not only on the Meerut District, but throughout the core area and in the Punjab. The missionaries soon faced a new and widespread popular receptivity to Christianity that offered them an embarrassment of opportunity. There were not enough of them to visit all the villages that requested preaching. Thousands of inquirers could not be prepared for baptism, but only enrolled. Other thousands of candidates ready for baptism had to be held back for lack of preachers with time to receive them. Baptism was granted to many thousands for whose assimilation into the Christian community the missionaries could offer no adequate pastoral care. In four years—1911 to 1914—annual baptisms increased from 10,776 to 15,404, and the Christian community expanded from 100,000 to 122,000. Baptizing continued at this high level through 1917.

Up to 1911, no special mass-movement techniques, either calculated or unintentionally functional, were being used by the District Superintendents to intensify caste results. The revival method, upon which they all placed great reliance in their annual evangelistic programs, was a general method not trained especially upon caste group targets; nor was it aimed primarily at prebaptismal conversions. But as the movement acquired fresh momentum, the District leaders began to adopt methods that speeded up the spread of the movement and swelled its human volume.

Exploitation of the social machinery of caste for purposes of conversion to Christianity was not new among Methodist missionaries. Group conversions had long been brought about by vote of caste councils (panchayats). Now began the utilization of the chaudris, the key men in the panchayats. The chaudris were the deeply entrenched and powerful headmen of the caste villages and the caste wards (mohallas). Through the panchayats' complete control of the villagers' social, economic, and religious behavior, the chaudris were influentially involved in all caste discipline and in all decisions by which the caste groups acted as units. Among the Chamars—so numerous and so accessible—the local and the sectional panchayats in which the chaudris wielded power were strongly organized. If the chaudri could be made a converting agent, the conversion of his village could be accelerated.

Bishop Warne attributed the demonstration of the evangelistic possibilities of the chaudris to the originality of a humble Indian rural Local Preacher on the Delhi District, whose ingenuity also included invention of a practical incubator for chickens which was made of a Standard Oil can packed with mud. This is how it happened, according to Warne:

He selected the Chaudhrion ka Chaudhri, or the highest Chaudhri in that part of the country in one of the lower castes. He made him his friend and then took him into the jungle, so that his people would not see him talking long with a Christian. The two men remained there alone for hours and the preacher explained Christianity to the Chaudhri. He said, "Go home and think of this for two weeks and let us meet here again." When they met two weeks later, the preacher answered the Chaudhri's difficulties and gave him instruction and sent him home to think it all over for another two weeks. When they met the third time alone in the jungle, the preacher prayed and the Chaudhri received just such an infilling of the Holy Spirit as the preacher had received and became on fire to save his people. The preacher said, "Go and tell all about this to your Chaudhri friends and bring as many of them as you can two weeks later to meet me here." At this meeting there were ten Chaudhries and some were converted.

Thus there leaped out of the jungle the impulse for a laymen's movement that grew rapidly on the new Delhi District and reached into other Districts. Missionaries had appropriated the title of chaudri before, to designate local stewards of a sort in Christian communities. But now bona fide caste chaudris who were Christians (or near-Christians) went out and converted non-Christian caste headmen. Armed with the prestige—and power—belonging to their traditional status, they also labored to swing their own caste groups to Christianity; or if their groups were already partly Christian, they worked to win the members remaining unconverted. Thus caste sanctions were exerted in a less cumbersome manner than before; the element of social pressure was now concentrated in the activity of the leader rather than only dispersed among his constituents. As the newly converted chaudris assumed their Christian commitments, they too took up this strategic evangelistic work.

Within little more than a year's time, a large number of unpaid chaudris were working under Franklin M. Wilson, superintendent of the Delhi District, not only cultivating their own communities, but spending several days each month carrying the gospel to villages where it had not been proclaimed before. There were 2,446 baptisms on the District that year (1912), and Wilson attributed almost all of them to the effective spadework done by the chaudris in finding inquirers. There were 3,129 baptisms the next year (and also "multitudes pleading for baptism"), and Wilson again gave the credit to the chaudris.

He undergirded their efforts by holding a six-day summer school for them. Bishop Warne was impressed when he found two hundred chaudris attending, instead of the expected enrollment of fifty or sixty. The long hours of instruction were almost wholly devoted to the life and teachings of Jesus, to provide the content for the dramatic story-telling method that was the chaudris' chief tool—a method nicely adjusted to their limited, almost non-existent educational attainments as well as to the customs and capacities of the illiterate villagers who eventually listened to their Christian stories and learned to

join in their gospel songs. As a chaudri learned the Biblical story of incarnation, crucifixion, resurrection, and ascension, he would rise and tell it to his fellow pupils. Bishop Warne, himself moved by their fervent recitals, recalled, "The story of the crucifixion was told so vividly by the Chaudries, after they learned it, that the audience would sway, and moan, and weep, and cry out, 'It was all because of our sin' . . . It will be told and retold throughout the villages for many a day to come."

The pupils at the chaudris' school also participated in conference sessions on the religious problems of the Christian mohallas. By this time, the District Superintendents were designating the chaudris not only as evangelists in the van of the mass movement, but also as the administrative and spiritual lay leaders of the growing number of Christian communities. Therefore they earnestly discussed measures to obtain observance of Christian customs by the people under their care and eradication of the older customs that threatened to keep them tied to dangerous vestiges of their old faiths. The chaudris became convinced that their charges would not be safe for Christianity until none of the people in the Christian mohallas and their neighboring villages remained unconverted. They left the school with intensified common determination to pursue their evangelistic objectives.

Rockwell Clancy, Wilson's successor on the Delhi District, continued the annual summer training school for chaudris, housing it in an old palace in Delhi that once had belonged to a Mogul emperor. He also developed a system of shorter chaudri meetings scheduled for various points on the District at other times in the year. By 1916, he had a corps of Christian chaudris numbering 446. All of them assisted their local pastors and teachers, and more than a third of them—with the number constantly increasing—were regularly visiting adjoining villages as evangelists.

Other Districts began to follow the lead of the Delhi District in enlisting and training the chaudris. But for several years, most of the Districts used the services of the chaudris primarily to conserve and administer the parochial life of the new Christian communities, and not to press the evangelistic penetration of non-Christian groups.

Where the chaudris were sent out in significant numbers to work as evangelists, however, they became effective spearheads of advancing Methodist evangelism. Illiterate and poorly trained as they were, they enjoyed far more intimate and successful contact with the mass of potential converts in the villages than did any of the other workers. Bishop Warne once asked an Indian preacher why he was so enthusiastic about his illiterate chaudris. Warne related that the preacher

turned to an Indian carpenter, sitting on the ground near by, making a cart-wheel with his simple tools, and he asked the carpenter, "Did you go out into the jungle and cut down the tree from which the wood came, saw it up, dry it, and carry it in here?" "No, no," said the carpenter. "Untrained men

did that—I am a trained carpenter.” Then the preacher turned to me and said, “That is what the Chaudhries do; they go out into the jungles of Hinduism and tell the stories about Jesus and bring the people to you ready to be made, shaped, or trained into Christians.”

These were the men who, where they were utilized, made almost all the first moves into new villages and laid hold upon most of the mass of inquirers who signified a desire for prebaptismal teaching.

As the pressure of evangelistic opportunity mounted year by year, each mass-movement area of the Conference developed a bottleneck through which it was impossible for the stream of converts and potential converts to flow evenly enough to prevent frustration among inquirers and baptismal candidates and slowly enough to conserve the quality of the baptized Christian community. The bottleneck was everywhere the same—the inadequate size of the evangelistic working corps.

Some of the District Superintendents, revealing a sense of concern that varied in degree and in orientation from one leader to another, tried to adopt controls that would cut the flow of baptisms down to the work capacity of their preachers and teachers. Attempts were made to increase the amount and quality of instruction given to candidates for baptism and to hold out for more reliable evidences of true conversion. More rigorous promises were exacted. The baptismal applicants must tear down their shrines; they must destroy all symbols of their pre-Christian faith; they must publicly accept Christ—these were some of the demands Franklin Wilson made on the Delhi District. In Southern Punjab, James Lyon, seeking to keep the baptisms down to the point of sound spiritual quality, circularized the following code among all his workers:

(1) Baptize no seekers that do not believe with all their hearts that Jesus Christ is the Son of God, according to Acts 8 and 37.

(2) Baptize none who are not willing to abstain from meats offered to idols, and from blood, and from things strangled, and from fornication, according to Acts 15 and 29.

(3) Baptize no seekers if provision cannot be made for their instruction, according to Matt. 28:19 and 20.

(4) Remember that it is the privilege of each one baptized to receive the gift of the Holy Spirit at the time of baptism, according to Acts 2 and 38.

But such attempts to regulate the volume of baptisms usually diminished the pressure only temporarily, certainly not strongly, and in the long run not enough to make any marked difference in the evangelizing boom. The chaudris kept bringing in more and more people, the long-established Christian community was constantly raising up more affiliates out of its own families, the self-propagating chain reactions within the caste groups never ceased, and the intensive annual revivals kept stirring the baptized Christians to exert

their influence to extend Christianity. The missionaries had started, as a result of many years' labor, a movement that was too potent to be seriously retarded by any measures the missionaries were prepared to adopt.

ARRAH-BALLIA

The Arrah-Ballia mass movement, like the one in Gujarat, flared up all at once and then was confined—through far more closely—within a Conference corner. It appeared, just as the Gujarat movement was about to die down, in the Tirhut District, at the western end of the Bengal Conference. Its two foci were the cities of Arrah and Ballia, which headed two Circuits just south and north, respectively, of the Ganges River. Methodist activity in Ballia began in 1906, with the adoption of about 250 Chamar converts inherited from an independent Canadian mission that was withdrawing from the field because of failure of its funds. Arrah came into the Methodist picture late in 1907, when Arthur L. Grey, head of an independent American mission, also in financial straits, donated his mission property to the Methodist Episcopal Church and entered the Bengal Conference, bringing into the Mission a single convert and several Indian workers.

J. A. Ilahi Baksh, a convert from Islam, took charge of the Ballia constituency in 1907, and quickly impressed a number of the Chamar caste leaders by his religious zeal and his attractive personality. These chaudris were concerned for the moral betterment and the economic and social advancement of their abysmally underprivileged people. They found hope in Ilahi Baksh's presentation of Christianity, and soon began to turn their influence towards group adoption of the new religion. Within a year Baksh, assisted by his wife, a physician, built up the Christian community to 1,092.

In 1908, after 320 baptisms, Grey's new Arrah Circuit had a Christian community of 331.

Although no other part of the District or of the Conference showed mass-movement growth, the Arrah and Ballia workers under John O. Denning, District Superintendent, reported more than 2,100 baptisms from 1908 to 1911. When Denning and his District, with Fred M. Perrill working on the Arrah Circuit and Herman J. Schutz on the Ballia Circuit, were transferred into the North India Conference in 1912, they brought with them an Arrah-Ballia Christian community of 2,682 persons, with 2,000 probationers (but with only 40 full members—an early appearance of an imbalance typical of mass-movement constituencies).

After the transfer, the movement annually gained momentum—660 baptisms, 1,199 baptisms, 1,642 baptisms—and came to a peak in 1914, when there were 5,103 persons in the Christian community. The movement was spreading almost exclusively among the Chamars, traditionally designated as leather workers, but in this area devoted mainly to agricultural labor. There were

about 221,000 of them within reach of the Arrah and Ballia Circuits. The new converts were actively spreading the gospel to new families and new villages; many calls were coming in for Christian teachers and preachers; the number of people willing to be baptized far exceeded the number of those being baptized: the missionaries obviously were tapping a great evangelistic potential. "I stand astounded at the largeness of our opportunity," said Herman Schutz, the missionary on the Ballia Circuit.

To exploit this opportunity, Schutz opened an extensive drive to win the entire Chamar caste in the surrounding area a group at a time, by systematically enlisting the explicit co-operation of the caste chaudris. The possibilities in this method were obvious. One of these chaudris, for instance, was headman for 307 villages. In February, 1914, Schutz toured the villages of some of the friendly chaudris, ending with a meeting of seventy of them at Madhupur. Bishop Warne was on hand to preach to them. After discussing the missionaries' challenge to them to evangelize their non-Christian fellow villagers, the assembled chaudris resolved to work at the task until all 57,000 Chamars in the Ballia civil district should become Christians. The impulse quickened by the work of Ilahi Baksh had reached so far abroad that it was by this time commonly assumed among the Chamars that this eventually would come to pass. A second meeting, attended by over a hundred chaudris and with Bishop Warne again present, was held in October.

Results were soon to be observed. On a single missionary tour, chaudris brought in for baptism all the Chamars of six villages, 360 persons. By the end of the year, baptisms in the Arrah-Ballia area reached 1,642—a new high mark.

Just when the outlook was brightest, the evangelistic work on the Ballia Circuit went into a deep slump. The Circuit organization was damaged by the absence, in 1915, of Herman Schutz, "the dynamo that ran the entire plant." The next year, Schutz was back in Ballia as the head of the Tirhut District, only to see the countryside devastated by floods that swept the entire District, demolishing thousands of houses on circuits under his supervision. Schutz reported, later on:

Here in Ballia city, the overflow of the Ganges coupled with the floods swept away 1,100 houses, including the jail and part of the Post Office. All the streets, the bazaar and practically all of Ballia was under water. Throughout the District the same conditions prevailed and hundreds of lives were lost and thousands were made homeless. Most of the country on both sides of the Railway embankments for miles and miles was a sea, and huge country boats sent out on life-saving expeditions rescued many from drowning. There were whole villages where only the thatched roofs of the houses were left and where one could see only the tops of the trees.

The floods were disastrous, but they passed. The Ballia evangelistic drive suffered more drastically—and permanently—from waves of coercive re-

action started by powerful elements in the Hindu community that resented or feared the encroachment of Christianity.

After two years of wartime rumor-mongering calculated to disconcert the illiterate Chamar converts and of sporadic but not decisively effective persecutions, antagonists of Christianity launched a fierce drive against the Christians on the Ballia field in 1916 and 1917. The agitators were members of the Arya Samaj, the aggressive Hindu reform sect, whose reaction to the Christian missionary movement was everywhere radically hostile. The *agents provocateurs* for the Arya Samaj combined with the Ballia landlords in an alliance that added to the propagandist intensity of the Samajists the economic power the landlords wielded over the Chamars. The Chamars—ignorant, bitterly poor, socially repressed, suffering exploitation of their labor, immersed in debt, seldom enjoying dependable land tenure—were easily vulnerable to being squeezed into submission by the economic overlords in their communities. And the dominant economic class was naturally hostile to any movement that threatened, as Christianity appeared to do, to upset any aspects of caste organization that played into their hands through age-long sanctions providing them with an unailing reservoir of subservient labor.

The landlords and Arya Samaj agents imported from Benares and Muttra at the landlords' expense staged large meetings of Chamars, to check and reverse the trend towards Christianity. The iron hand of economic pressure was at first gloved with seductive promises. The lowly Chamars were treated to the extraordinary sight of high-caste leaders rising to advocate Chamar interests. They heard themselves called brothers by men who had always treated them as outcasts. They heard their social superiors flattering them and cajoling them with offers of schools and of social recognition—benefits that would come to those who rejected Christianity.

The landlords and the agents of the Arya Samaj rammed home their purposes by adopting a strategy that had a point in common with that of the missionaries; they concentrated upon the caste chaudris. These men they handled without gloves. The non-Christian chaudris, some of whom were inclined towards the new faith, were warned that to become Christians would be to lose their authority as headmen. The promise to grant concessions to the Chamars was sternly qualified by the threat to take the land away from Christian Chamars. The anti-Christian campaigners told the chaudris that they could secure their status only by subjecting Christians to social ostracism and by refusing to practice intermarriage with them. Threats also were thrown out to chaudris who were already Christians.

Some of the Christian sympathizers in the chaudri group broke their developing alliance with the missionaries, and some of the converted chaudris threw off their new Christian allegiance. Converted headmen who would not

resume the chutiya (the sacred lock worn by Hindus and shorn by Christians) sometimes found threats turning into blows. Schutz saw three of them shortly after landlords had beaten them with sticks and left them on the ground bruised and bleeding. They knew why they in particular were the butt of landlords' blows. "We are the leaders," said one of them, "and if we fall away he thinks all the rest will follow our example; but don't fear, Sahib, we will not leave Jesus. If we die, we die, but we will not put on our Chutiyas again or in any way deny Jesus."

But many Christian chaudris did not stand firm, and non-Christian chaudris were bound by no religious allegiance that forbade co-operation with the anti-Christian drive. The villagers now felt the combined impact of Arya Samajist, landlord, and chaudri—all mobilized in an attack that struck at the foundations of the Christian community as the earlier scattered persecutions never had done. An influential chaudri and two of his associates, charged Fred M. Perrill, conducted a "reign of terror." Their workers sought out Christian inquirers one by one and warned them that receiving Christian preachers would subject them to fines. Christians who until now had suffered no serious impairment of social intercourse with their previous caste fellows were suddenly told that these familiar relationships would have to be broken off until their caste groups paid fines and were reinstated as bona fide Chamars. This was an exercise of the deepest social and economic sanctions known to the villagers, whose very livelihood came to them through caste group arrangements.

Unfortunately, there was no missionary in charge of the Ballia Circuit during one of these critical years, and the District was otherwise badly undermanned. The besieged Christian villagers were pitifully in need of leadership that could fortify them. Said Schutz, "Where we had one worker, the Aryas had a dozen, and humanly speaking it was impossible to cope with our foes." But paucity of leadership, he reported, was only one side of the picture:

Enemies thick as mosquitoes, educated, powerful, rich, employing bribes, threats, expulsion from the brotherhood, annulling of all marriage arrangements among the Christians (the hardest blow of all to the Indian), cessation of all social privileges and there you have the other side of the picture.

Under the radical attack by the Arya Samaj and its allies, thousands of inquirers broke off their relations with the Christian movement. In spite of a temporarily promising counterorganization of some of the chaudris by the Methodists, baptisms in 1916 and 1917 were few. Many Chamar Christians renounced their allegiance to Christ, and many Christian villages paid the special fines and had their people restored to their old social relationships on a non-Christian basis. The villages that refused to turn back from their

Christian course were penalized by uncompromising social persecution, and often by economic reprisals. Except in a few villages, most of the still loyal Christians were afraid to welcome their missionary or the Indian preachers.

The worst years were 1916 and 1917, but even when eventual modest gains were made as the persecution showed signs of waning, baptisms remained at a low level (in 1919 there were only eighty-three). The coming of the public census count in 1921 brought a recrudescence of coercive action. The landlord-Arya combine was determined to keep the count of Christians as low as possible. Christians in the Ballia sector (by this time the Ballia District) were so effectively threatened and frightened that many villages that formerly welcomed the superintendent, Fred Perrill, no longer would receive him. He reported, "One circuit with over seven hundred Christians, if we count the names on our records, has hardly any who dare to openly confess Christ or welcome their pastor."

Although aggressive tactics on the part of the Arya Samaj and its allies largely failed on the Arrah side of the Ganges, the intensive efforts of the census year threatened for a time to produce a dangerous crisis in the Arrah Methodist constituency. J. Waskom Pickett, superintendent of the Arrah District, encountered "terrific" opposition both to evangelistic work and to registration of Christians; it "continued throughout the year with unabated fury." Anti-Christian teams devoted their entire time for weeks to visiting the villages to try to block the final conversion of inquirers and to win Christians back to the Hindu fold. Community councils were organized to bring about reconversion of Christian converts. Christians, supported by vigorous leadership by Pickett and his preachers, had to lodge hundreds of complaints with the police in order to stop census workers from listing them falsely. In the face of the fierce social pressures of the 1921 campaign, most of the Arrah Methodist constituency finally held steady. As earlier, Arrah came back more quickly and more decisively under attack than did Ballia.

In fact, Ballia did not come back as a strong mass-movement area. Herman Schutz made in 1917 a comment whose aptness lasted for some years to come: "On the Ballia side we have an arrested Mass Movement—a tragedy to make the angels weep." It remained a sobering demonstration of the result of a hard-hitting anti-Christian reaction reducing the flow of conversions and blocking a mass movement by utilizing the very caste patterns, devices, and pressures employed, nonviolently, by the Christian mass movement itself. The missionaries had shown that certain caste pressures could move Chamar villagers toward Christianity; the Samajists now showed that reactionary caste pressures could move them back again. Nowhere on the Methodist field was the social nature of mass-movement conversion more clearly underscored by events.

The Arrah-Ballia sector entered the 1920's, however, with a combined

Christian community of about 9,000 persons. This community, with its 5,557 probationers and 344 church members, had been built up virtually *ex nihilo* in a dozen years.

SOUTH INDIA

The mass movement on the multilingual field cultivated by the South India Conference was the second one to break out as the Gujarat movement was slipping into slow speed.

It might have come much earlier, but during the seven years 1896 to 1902, the South India Conference remained only pregnant with mass-movement possibilities. By 1902, through steady but slow growth, the full membership had increased from 617 to only 904, and the probationers' group from 468 to 1,214. The Conference constituency would have expanded more rapidly had not the superintendents of the Districts that held immediate promise of mass responses—William L. King on the Hyderabad District, David O. Ernsberger on the Raichur District—kept down the tempo of the movement. These two leaders were averse to seeking or accepting more baptismal candidates than could be offered adequate pastoral care.

Following these years of deliberately slow motion came six years of deliberately accelerated growth, with King and Ernsberger cautiously accepting more converts than before. The District Superintendents still insisted, however, upon halting the baptismal procession whenever, as they saw it, it threatened to go beyond the point of sound pastoral assimilation of the converts. The years 1907 and 1908 yielded strong gains, well distributed across the Hyderabad and Raichur Districts. The Conference entered 1909 with 1,469 full members, 4,423 probationers, and 8,004 persons in its Christian community.

Then arrived the mass movement—briefly on the Raichur District, more strongly on the Belgaum District, and most potently and consistently on the Hyderabad-Vikarabad District. Accessions by baptism now rose to an average of 4,200 a year from 1909 to 1911. In 1912, came the most extraordinary evangelistic harvest reaped in the South India Conference during the first two decades of the twentieth century. It was a yield of 9,091 baptisms, which compared well enough with that gained by the more mature mass movement in the Northwest India Conference. The next year brought an almost equal number of baptisms, and while the totals for the succeeding years did not run so high, the movement advanced with power. Baptisms now averaged 6,000 a year down to 1918.

The movement on the Belgaum District came from fresh evangelistic growth; the District itself was established in 1909, when the work among the depressed classes was less than three years old. The new approach to these underprivileged groups at once brought several hundred baptisms a

year. In 1910, the number of accessions was almost quadrupled, and in this and the following year, the Belgaum District reported more baptisms—1,949 and 1,367, respectively—than any other District in the South India Conference.

For the next five years, baptisms averaged more than 700 annually; and in 1917 and 1918, they rose again, to 1,325 and 1,136, successively. These were significant numerical gains, but for seven years they came in a metered flow, checked by the cautious, restraining hand of the District Superintendent, David O. Ernsberger. And Ernsberger's successor (1916–19) and former co-worker Charles W. Scharer was similarly conservative.

Ernsberger's deliberate restraint of the Belgaum mass movement was dictated neither by ineptness nor by lack of commitment to mass-movement goals. He was a convinced evangelist, clearly understood the great potentialities of the field, and was eager to lay broad plans to convert large numbers of people. But as he always had done earlier on the Raichur District, he consistently adjusted the District's baptizing activity to his ability to provide instruction for the converts.

Indicative of Ernsberger's perennial disciplined approach to mass-movement problems was his frank explanation of the recession in baptisms that followed the peak reached in 1910:

. . . we have again to report a decrease, the number baptized being only 699. Last year the number was 1,367. The decrease cannot be attributed to a lack of candidates. Of these there are many. It must be attributed to conservatism, chiefly on the part of the District Superintendent [himself]. We have observed the condition of converts who have not been properly cared for and feel that we dare not add to their number. If they were literate, we might put the Word of God into their hands, and hope for some progress even without much help from human sources. But alas, they are, almost to a person, illiterate. So we have declined to baptize persons whom we are unable to afford a considerable amount of intellectual and spiritual help. This course has been adopted after much observation, deliberation, and prayer. May God show us if we are in error in this matter.

Ernsberger was ready enough to baptize when he felt that the converts could be soundly assimilated. One morning in 1912, he and an Indian preacher stopped to preach to a group of men and women sitting under a tree. That afternoon, the village elders came to tell the Local Preacher that their people desired to become Christians. In the evening, Ernsberger went back and baptized 42 persons. "I had no hesitancy in baptizing them," he said, "because the preacher lives in that town and can look after them. This sort of thing could be repeated indefinitely if we could provide the pastor-teachers to instruct and lead them after their baptism."

But there was a distressing shortage of Indian workers equipped to carry the District towards the goals of religious cultivation Ernsberger had set for his converts. Nor was there any school in which he could train men for

the required parochial functions. For five years he tried to get the Board to back such a school—"not a great Theological Seminary, but only an elementary or a preparatory school for a very simple class of workers"—and the Conference Finance Committee supported his plea for special-gifts recognition for it. In 1913, he finally protested against the Board's failure to approve it even when the necessary money was in sight, and criticized its policy of limiting training schools to one for each language area. Ernsberger's people spoke Kanarese, and the Kanarese training school was in Kolar, five hundred miles away. The simple village Christians would not let their young men go so far from home. And the poor families hardly could afford to lose the earnings the young men brought in; scholarships were necessary.

Ernsberger never got his training school (it was not started until 1918, during Scharer's term); so he kept the District's evangelistic outreach within what he conscientiously judged were responsible limits.

Ernsberger and Scharer, remaining steadily loyal to the principle of ordered and responsible growth, broadened the Belgaum Christian community from 1,734 persons in 1909 to 9,827 in 1919, but also deliberately refrained from adding to it the many thousands more that undoubtedly could have been won if they had thrown prudence to the winds.

Although the Raichur District repeatedly displayed signs of deep mass-movement potentialities, its numerical contribution to the Conference advance was limited to a three-year period (1911-13) under the aggressive direction of Joseph H. Garden. During his term, baptisms numbered 857, 1,704, and 943, in successive years. Then came two years of unsettled supervision, followed by three years under the conservative superintendency of Marcellus D. Ross, who found when he took charge of the District, that no more than half the Christian community was under systematic instruction.

Ross's reluctance to baptize liberally was grounded not only in his devotion to the principle of adequate pastoral care, but also in his concern about mixed motives on the part of converts—a problem that dogged India missionaries year after year everywhere that members of the exterior castes were moving into Christianity out of social repression and economic exploitation. In 1916, for instance, one of his workers asked him to go out to baptize 550 candidates, but posed a sharp problem for Garden by admitting that some four hundred of them had civil or police cases outstanding. Said Garden, of these and like applicants:

Our heart goes to these poor people in their troubles. But in receiving them into Christianity in circumstances like this, it behooves us to move very cautiously, lest the preacher or the Missionary who attempts to help them should appear their saviour if he wins, or perhaps their satan if he loses . . .

Rather than simply open to them a door of escape from their social troubles, Garden chose to hold them back from baptism and to try to win their eventual

(more religious) allegiance to Christ by sympathetic preaching that taught them "that there is spiritual bondage even more terrible than the iron hand of the police patel, and that there is a deliverance greater than from the clutches of the money grafter."

The cautious policy carried out by Ross, which was capped in 1919 by a year of Ernsberger's still measured approach, kept the Raichur District from returning to the level of baptisms reached during Garden's time. Hence in 1919, the Christian community on this fertile field had grown from 2,264 in 1909 to not more than 3,482 a decade later.

Far more consistently powerful than the mass-movement activity on the Belgaum and Raichur Districts was the growth that burst out on the Hyderabad District in 1909 under the stimulus of Charles E. Parker, the missionary assigned to evangelistic work on the Vikarabad Circuit. Parker was a ready believer in direct answers to prayers for divine assistance. He prepared for the coming year's evangelistic campaign by organizing a prayer campaign, beginning with prayer groups among his workers. Parker prayerfully wrote home to all his special-gift patrons and to selected persons in all forty-six states of the Union, asking them to form groups that would pray on a given day each month for five hundred conversions on the Vikarabad field that year.

At the close of a day of prayer together in Vikarabad, west of the city of Hyderabad, Parker and his entire team of Indian evangelists started out on a 300-mile walk. They went to every village on the Circuit where there was even a lone Christian—not preaching, but testifying to their own Christian experience. Conversions began on the third day and, after that, marked every day of the tour. The workers, many of them suffering discouragement before the tour, returned enthusiastic about the future of their work.

Another campaign quickly followed. Moving by a closely drawn schedule, out from each village where workers were stationed went two evangelists, to visit all the villages within a radius of five miles. They moved through the countryside preaching and teaching the single message, "For God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life." Parker spent some time with each worker and with groups they were reaching. "We did not confine ourselves to villages alone," he said. "We followed the man as he plowed and taught him. We sat down with the carpenter, shoemaker, tailor, or village leader and taught him."

Within a week, the traveling evangelists stirred up a lively response to their immediate personal appeals to accept Christ. In one village, Parker started to leave the home of the village leader at ten o'clock at night. The man would not let him go; he wanted to be told the way to salvation.

"Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ," quoted Parker, "and thou shalt be saved, and thy house." And he added, "Will you come to Him now?"

"But how shall I come?" asked the village leader.

Parker told him to come just as he came to Hanuman—the monkey-god; he bade him pray to Christ.

"But how shall I pray?"

"Just as you prayed to Hanuman."

The man removed his shoes and his turban, lay down on his face, and cried out to Jesus Christ for his salvation. "Within a few minutes," reported Parker, "that whole village was on its face; heaven opened; the Spirit came; Christ spoke to them. They gave their hearts to Him from the leader down. They were baptized in His name."

As the campaign progressed, Parker's arrival in a village sometimes touched off a celebration. The people, with their drums in hand, would come out to meet the tall, handsome missionary and his co-workers and then march through the village singing hymns to Christ. At the welcoming reception, they would break in upon the ceremonies, to shout praises to God and testimonies of salvation. Hundreds were converted—more than 1,200 before the immediate drive was completed—with baptism quickly following.

By the end of 1909, new baptisms on the Hyderabad District totaled 2,956. The Vikarabad Circuit reported two-thirds of them—handsomely in excess of the five hundred Parker and his supporters originally had prayed for. William King, the District Superintendent, already perplexed by the problems in assimilation that were posed by 1,849 baptisms in the two previous years, found this new and sudden swelling of the Christian community almost too much for him. He was convinced that it was imperative to train the new converts; but ever larger numbers of people were requesting baptism (a call that "could hardly be considered less divine than the call of old into Macedonia"), some of the Indian workers were fired with an aggressive spirit, and Parker (a tireless activist) had been turned loose for strictly evangelistic efforts. Almost in the same breath in which he reported the year's nearly three thousand accessions and the baptizing of people in sixty-seven new villages, King said, in review, that "*teach* rather than *baptize* has been the motto for the year."

The following year, Parker was on furlough, and King—inwardly torn by the double responsibility to reach and to teach—resolutely confined the District efforts almost exclusively to teaching its constituents and to receiving a few converts in villages already occupied. But in the middle of October, fearing "possible stagnation and the death of the militant spirit more than the possible dangers of a well-safeguarded advance," King finally deserted his conservative program and struck out in a carefully planned five-week campaign of aggressive evangelism. More than eight hundred people were baptized in the first fifteen days, and in spite of heavy rains, three hundred more were baptized in the remaining days of the campaign. The baptisms for the

year were 1,484—a striking demonstration of the fertility of the field, considering King's cautious and troubled leadership.

But it was Parker who most deeply plowed and most abundantly reaped. When he became the head of the Hyderabad District, in 1912, he and his workers went out to their evangelistic task praying for ten thousand souls for Christ. Forceful implementation of the aggressive policy suggested by such a goal soon thrust the District into a dynamic converting movement that swept on throughout the year.

Occasionally Parker paused to contemplate a question that generally had moderated King's leadership but did not curb his own either now or in the following years. He wrote to Secretary Oldham:

Several times, I have felt that perhaps we ought to stop baptizing the people because of the awful responsibility of training them; but a Voice has seemed to whisper to me, "Do not put forth your hand to touch the Ark of God." This movement is not of man but of God. The training of the people is not alone man's problem but God's.

Thus encouraged by his confidence that God would take care of His mass-movement converts, Parker drove hard for evangelistic results. It was a difficult year; the District's missionary staff was badly depleted, and at no time did the dread spectres of plague and cholera leave the District unattended. But at the close of the year, Parker reported 5,935 baptisms—more than any District Superintendent in India since Edwin Frease turned in the record report from Gujarat for the postfamine year 1901.

Parker's next assignment was the superintendency of the new Vikarabad District formed out of the Vikarabad and the Bidar Circuits in 1913, with the Gulbarga Circuit added in 1914. In the first year, Parker had no full-time evangelistic missionary to assist him, but he and his workers were able to report another year of remarkable evangelistic results; the 4,689 baptisms on the nine Circuits of the Vikarabad District were more than half the Conference total of 8,880.

In 1914, Parker had more missionary assistance than before, particularly with the Kanarese-speaking work on the Bidar, Gulbarga, and Homnabad Circuits. But the real power in the movement still resided in the nine Telugu-speaking Circuits. It was limited only by the inability of the preachers to baptize all the converts who applied (the waiting list grew to nearly four thousand) and by the raging of plague and cholera throughout the year. Deaths of Christians from these causes nearly equaled the number of full members received. But Parker reported 3,798 baptisms from the Vikarabad District—again more than half the Conference total, which was 6,310.

Then came four years of Parker leadership as superintendent of the new Hyderabad-Vikarabad District, which was a consolidation of the Telugu Circuits on the two previously separate Districts. During this period, only the

potent Meerut District in the Northwest India Conference surpassed Parker's new District in baptizing activity. Each year it contributed at least half the additions to the Christian community in the South India Conference; and the Vikarabad field, the sector that had been most directly under Parker's influence for a decade, remained at all times by far the most generous source of conversions on the District.

During his seven strenuous years as District Superintendent, which included institutional as well as evangelistic responsibilities, Parker was undergirded, and relieved of much routine labor, by the faithful services of an unofficial volunteer missionary. George O. Holbrooke, a layman in Brooklyn, and a friend of Bishop Thoburn's, had been a student of mission work for many years and had found the chief interest of his later life in the Vikarabad Mission, long the object of his missionary contributions. His gifts had built the dormitories for the J. L. Crawford Boys School there. Now, in 1912, Holbrooke paid his own passage to India, and came out to contribute his personal labor.

He undertook the entire load of Parker's special-gift correspondence—a burden such as many a District Superintendent found crushing. Although he had no right hand, he would work from morning to late at night typing Parker's letters. He also taught classes at the Crawford School, took teams of students on evening preaching and teaching excursions into villages near Vikarabad, and conducted a regular Sunday service at the bazaar. At other times, he moved from village to village doing what he could to relieve the sick (cholera was abroad the year he arrived, and influenza the year he left the field). "You never see him without a medicine bottle in his pocket," said Parker.

While he was working with Parker, Holbrooke contributed the funds to house the training home for village men and women preparing to do evangelistic work and contributed \$2,800 for the erection of a children's ward at the Huldah A. Crawford Memorial Hospital in Vikarabad. Inspired by Parker's consuming devotion to the mass movement, Holbrooke bewailed the circumstance that made it impossible to convert his last piece of real estate into cash, or to reach the principal of his funds, to be donated to the work. He left the field, to which he was passionately devoted, only when Parker left on furlough, late in 1918. But his unofficial mission in India was projected beyond this seven-year term by the provisions of his will, which devoted his estate to the Board's work for destitute children in India.

Aided by Holbrooke and abetted by missionary and Indian co-workers though he was, Parker never diminished the blazing intensity of his own evangelistic work. Six feet two in height, physically vigorous, temperamentally restless to be in action, emotionally responsive to the people, impelled by a deep sense of mission, careless of the depletion of his personal energies—he drove himself with relentless hand. Throughout his seven-year superinten-

dency, he spent himself prodigally, ceaselessly in motion by cart and afoot, sleeping in tents and in the huts of villagers, covering again and again the many thousand square miles of his District, preaching and baptizing, supervising and inspiring his Indian evangelists, inflaming the working corps by his self-consuming zeal, and ministering to the people of the villages.

George Holbrooke was hardly on the field, in May, 1912, when he and one of the Board officials in New York were sharing their fear that someday Parker would come to the limit of his great endurance and break down in the midst of the successes won by his prodigious hard work. But Parker himself was off on spring tours on which he baptized a thousand people, moving even through a region stricken by cholera and by water famine. From one village on his itinerary every inhabitant had fled to the jungle, leaving the dead unburied. Parker developed apparent symptoms of cholera, but recovered. Before he got home to Vikarabad, the two-wheeled cart he rode broke down, and he walked for fifty miles, bringing on an old lameness. By June, Secretary Oldham was writing him from New York:

I write to earnestly exhort you to cease from the terrific rate at which you are driving your work . . . I know your intense zeal and greatly admire it, but we do not want a sick missionary on our hands . . . Accept the words of your old-time friend and brother and do abate your activities and take care of yourself.

Parker thanked Oldham for his kind advice—and kept on working.

As the hot season of 1913 approached, he was still driving himself, feeling compelled to maintain the momentum of the mass movement. He sent his family to the hills on vacation, but contrary to the admonition of his resident Bishop, he sought no relief from the heat for himself. With a regular month-long evangelistic campaign hardly out of the way, he was planning to embark almost at once on an extensive personal campaign through his District. He explained to Oldham:

The people are so hungry for the Gospel that I can hardly bear to leave them. When I go away I can imagine that I can hear them calling for me. This is such a good time to get at them that it seems hard to go away even though it is hot. I am going to travel and work at nights up until the first of June and then I will run away for a week and rest.

Only the sudden death of his three-year old daughter actually called him away from his work for a short time.

But he quickly returned to his immensely fruitful evangelistic labors, pursuing them relentlessly season after season. One day in mid-March, 1916, in the midst of a campaign that already had yielded eight hundred baptisms, Parker sat on the ground eighty-six miles from home, penning a letter to George M. Fowles, the Board's treasurer. His feet were so badly blistered

from a ten-mile walk the night before that he could hardly walk. Apologizing for tardiness in correspondence, he confessed to Fowles that even after cutting his sleep to five hours a day, he could not cover the exhaustive demands of his work.

Parker had been on the road for a dozen weeks, broken by only three or four days at home, and he expected to be off again most of the time before the summer rains. "I had planned to go to the hills for a month this year and get away from the rush, and ramble around through the woods and try to quiet my nerves," he wrote. But instead of a vacation, he was contemplating an extra evangelistic tour, into the Gulbarga section (temporarily under his care) to see if he could kindle a flame there as on his own District. In more than four years, he had vacationed only once. He was constantly harassed, and bound to his work, by his piercing sense of the urgent spiritual needs of the ever growing numbers of people pressing to crowd across the threshold of Christianity.

Only the day before, one of his workers, running alongside his train as it left a railroad station, cried out to him, "You must come to my circuit. I have 400 people ready for baptism. Many others want to be baptized but I have four hundred names written and they must have a chance now." As he listened, Parker had in his pocket a letter, just received from another worker, saying, "I have 1,500 ready for baptism. Do please come at once and bring some workers." And just before this he had heard from a worker calling him to come to baptize six hundred waiting candidates, and from another with 1,927 people ready for baptism. Parker said to Fowles:

These are only a few of the many calls. Oh how they do go through my heart! They make my heart ache and ache and ache. I do not see how I can do more. I cannot get on with less sleep. There is not another day in the week to serve. I often wish that God would send me a motor car so that I could save time which is lost on the road and thus be able to do one more man's work.

The nervous strain, and the headaches that accompanied it, told on Parker so severely that three months later, Fowles heard from Parker that finally he had taken some vacation. In July, Secretary North, evidently aware of Parker's dedication and of the passion with which he tore into his task, cabled him the practical prescription: "Buy Ford car. Take rest. Funds provided."

But car or no car, the fever always to be getting on with his mission raged within Parker. He never stopped. When he was closing up his work in December, 1918, preparatory to being furloughed, he hardly wrenched himself away from the people long enough to get his report to the Annual Conference written on time. To the last minute, he was busy doing what he could for the victims of an epidemic of influenza—the plague was not to be

compared with it, said Parker—that was killing the Christians on his District by the hundreds. He did not want to leave the field because of its crying needs. "I suppose if it were left to me I would never go on furlough," he wrote North. Yet when he reached the United States, he was in a condition of marked nervous exhaustion—in his own words, "on the verge of a nervous breakdown."

Three forces—temperamental, religious, and social—met and fused in Charles Parker, and impelled him to action; he felt the goads of a compulsive work-drive, he felt the ceaselessly thrusting sword of spiritual crisis in the issues of popular conversion, and he felt the engulfing pressure of the urgent demands laid upon him by the people among whom he constantly moved. These inner dynamics made Parker's zealous ministry a sole personal force determining more than any other the power and magnitude of the South India mass movement. The temperamental factor fired the heroic, almost self-destructing aggressiveness with which he exploited the mass-movement opportunities in the Vikarabad region. The religious factor inspired his passion to receive as many thousands of converts as possible. His reaction to the social factor, triggered by his spontaneous susceptibility to the conscious and overtly expressed wants of the people, undoubtedly overrode any effective concern of his with the more subtle and less clamant requirements for the permanent spiritual guidance and growth of the formally converted thousands in the mushrooming Christian community. Given, of course, were the mass-movement potentialities of the Hyderabad-Vikarabad field; nevertheless beyond all that, the man made the movement what it became.

Similarly, Ernsberger's personality was the chief stimulating and molding influence in the Belgaum mass movement; his basic evangelistic purposes and methods were little different from Parker's. It was his ready strategic use of conservative controls on baptizing activity that produced the markedly slower rate of growth on his District. These practical controls were essentially a reflection of the prominence of rational controls in Ernsberger's thinking. He had a logical mind and evidently felt impelled to trust its dictates in practical affairs. Throughout his long missionary career, Ernsberger consistently exhibited a realistic temper, tailoring his plans to his resources, refusing to let his humanitarian or religious impulses override his critical judgment. He had the emotional stamina required for holding hard to a chosen line of considered responsibility. He acted conservatively because he thought critically.

THE MASS MOVEMENTS AND THE MISSION

The mass movements described above—Gujarat, Northwest India, Arrah-Ballia, South India—were distinct movements both in their genesis and in their evolution. The motivation of the converts was similar in all the major

fields; for the new Christians belonged almost exclusively to the depressed classes, and the social, economic, and spiritual hungers that were fused in their appetite for Christianity were generated under conditions common to the lives of many millions of dispossessed people throughout India. But the mass movements were geographically localized and dynamically unrelated to one another. In no one of the movements did the inquirers and converts move towards Christianity because of the impetus of people moving Christward in one of the other movements. The exterior castes taken all together enjoyed no far-reaching *esprit de corps* that unified all their millions of people and tended to make them march in large groups out of Hinduism or into Christianity. They were one in their rejection by the approved caste society of India, but among themselves they were almost endlessly stratified and compartmented by their own caste patterns. The social pressures that played effectively upon the groups moving into the Christian fold generally were exerted by their immediate caste-group neighbors. As far as the people were concerned, there was no organically unified Methodist mass movement.

Neither was there a single organically functioning mass movement as far as the missionary organization was concerned. Mass-movement policy and cultivation originated not in concerted decisions made by Annual Conferences or by the Central Conference, but in decisions made by field leaders who grasped, or sought, opportunities to develop mass-movement activity. The working unit of mass-movement administration was the District, sometimes the Circuit.

The key administrator, as in so much else, was the District Superintendent. He made the operating decisions that determined whether the evangelism on his District was to be directed towards mass-movement objectives. When caste breaks occurred, he decided how energetically and by what methods they were to be followed up. The huge areas "occupied" by the Annual Conferences made it impossible for the Bishops to provide close supervision of the mass-movement fields, and the scattering of Conference missionaries across these wide areas made the Annual Conference an unrealistic unit for planning and legislation. This condition contributed to the crucial importance of the District Superintendent's position. He was confirmed in it by the fact that while appropriations were funneled through the Conference-centered finance committee, the equally important and more elastic financing provided by special gifts was very much under the superintendent's control. By giving direction to special gifts he solicited and received, he acquired power to intensify, to deflate, or to renounce mass-movement work.

The major mass movements were, then, from both sides, localized phenomena; in relatively small local groups, the converts responded to Christian evangelism, and the missionaries, through their corps of workers, responded to emerging and accumulating opportunities to win local groups to Christ. The converts seldom looked beyond their own neighborhoods, and the mis-

sionaries worked within District boundaries, depending little upon integration of their efforts with those of their colleagues who headed other Districts.

In spite of their lack of organic connection, however, the mass movements showed one essential common aspect—growth by caste-group accessions arrived at by group decision. And this kind of growth showed a common pattern of results in the different movements.

1) *The mass movements produced new and powerful waves of missionary expansion.* To be sure, Thoburn's overt and wide-sweeping expansionism gave way to the more cautious emphasis the Missionary Bishops made in their 1912 address to the Central Conference: "Let concentration, and not expansion, be our future watchword." But watchword or no watchword, strong expansive forces were at work in the mass-movement fields. Caste-group converts to Christianity could not communicate their new-found religion to other groups in their own towns because of caste barriers. To express their evangelistic impulses, they and the popular workers associated with them very shortly had to move out to their caste-fellows in other communities. This necessity automatically lengthened the lines and broadened the areas of missionary activity. New villages were penetrated by dozens, by scores, by hundreds. This expansion was more dynamic than the India Mission's earlier field-to-field expansion, for it was generated by spontaneous popular impulses rather than derived from map-reading by missionary imperialists bent upon capturing formally strategic positions.

2) *The waves of expansion undermined the adequacy of missionary supervision and trained leadership.* Drastically needed missionary reinforcements failed to appear in any number commensurate with the requirements of the evangelistic work. Trained preachers emerged from the converted communities very slowly and in insufficient numbers. But the baptizing of converts went on at a sharp pace. New villages turned Christian so fast, and new groups of inquirers appeared so rapidly, that the trained leaders were being steadily and automatically overwhelmed by the sheer volume of the popular and administrative demands upon their time and energies.

3) *The inadequately led Christian communities failed to assimilate effectively the floods of new converts.*

There were so many Christian village groups scattered across the countryside, and their numbers increased so rapidly compared with increases in working personnel, that individual pastoral workers were made responsible for too many villages. They had from three to twenty villages apiece; some had as many as forty. They had to spread their work so far and so thin, and could visit a given village so infrequently, that it became impossible for them carefully and intimately to shepherd the scholastically and spiritually illiterate people recently received from what some of the missionaries called "raw heathenism." And ironically, the mission workers who came closest to the people and engaged most directly in mediating the Christian message

to their condition were the most superficially trained of all in the evangelistic hierarchy. They themselves generally had a limited grasp of the Christian religion and were not far removed from illiteracy. This was typical, also, of the evangelists who first sought the people out and persuaded them to become inquirers. The pastoral guidance given the people thus was deficient both in volume and in quality.

The failures in the work of assimilation were compounded by the fact that the missionaries' outreaching evangelism never ceased and was quickly successful in building up large reservoirs of inquirers who needed prebaptismal instruction. Missionaries who were especially impressed by the mounting requests from inquirers typically assigned as many workers as they could to augmenting and consummating the baptizing movement, at the expense of the work of teaching and guiding those who were already baptized. And then the newly baptized thousands were promptly poured, in turn, into the widening pools of poorly tended Christian neophytes. Extension consistently outran assimilation.

4) *The mass movements eventually became the dominant forces shaping the future of the India Mission.*

As they became stronger and their effects became more marked, the Christian community of the India mission taken as a whole began to approximate the structure and the pattern of growth observable in the specifically mass-movement areas. As early as 1912, there were in all India twice as many probationers as there were full members. The Christian community was nearly five times the size of the full membership. Adult baptisms were running well ahead of child baptisms. At the same time, however, the probationers outside mass-movement areas exceeded the full members by only 50 per cent, the Christian community was about three times the size of the full membership, and the number of adult baptisms was only about 40 per cent of the number of child baptisms.

By this time the mass-movement areas were contributing a heavily preponderant share of the India mission's evangelistic growth: in 1912, four-fifths of the 28,639 accessions by baptism were in these regions. The profound cumulative effect of such growth is evident from the fact that two-thirds of the 118,245 probationers, half the 54,008 full members, and three-fifths of the Christian community of 241,860 were in mass-movement areas. There, also, resided the Mission's great potential for the immediate future—the many thousands of inquirers pressing forward on the heels of the thousands already baptized.

Obviously, the combined problems and the opportunities of the mass movements were destined to become the chief problems and opportunities of the Mission as a whole. Planning for the entire range of personnel, finance, supervision, education, evangelism, and institutional development would have to be realistically geared to the demands created by the mass movements.

The impact of these movements now had the power to thrust the Mission forward to extraordinary success or to mire it in disorganization and frustration by winning and then neglecting scores of thousands of nominal Christians. Under current conditions, the Mission had neither the men nor the money fully to exploit or to channel this simultaneously promising and threatening power.

ATTEMPTS AT POLICY AND SUPPORT

Not until 1912, however, did the Methodist Episcopal Church begin to shape any explicit and unified mass-movement policy for the India field. To be sure, the various District Superintendents had been supported by their respective Bishops as conditions commanded the attention or provoked the active interest of the episcopal leaders. Bishop Warne, especially, was a warm advocate of mass-movement work and was eager to have the Mission press deeply into it. But only slowly did the field leaders, the Bishops, the Board executives, and other concerned workers begin to draw together in their thinking and planning for the mass movements.

The three Missionary Bishops, in their opening Address, raised the mass movements as a question for consideration at the 1912 session of the Central Conference—the first time they had broached it in that forum. Their statement was hardly an urgent one. They simply pointed to the mass movements as “very special opportunities in various centers” which should receive careful consideration and special provision for their development. They posed the question, Should the India Mission withdraw some of its limited forces from comparatively unfruitful fields and direct them into areas where evangelistic harvests were being wasted because of lack of workers?

The Bishops recommended no concrete action; the Central Conference took none. It only adopted a report from the Committee on the State of the Church recognizing the mass movements as a wide door of opportunity and urging that the door be entered as rapidly as adequate spiritual oversight of baptized converts should become possible.

A few months later, the General Conference heard about the mass movements for the first time, when Bishop John E. Robinson devoted to the subject a passage in the episcopal report from Southern Asia. He made a resounding plea for India at “a time when the gates of empires and kingdoms are being lifted off their hinges,” but drew no clear picture of the mass movements, made no clear statement of the missionary problems involved in them, and failed to spell out the measures and the resources required to meet the need they presented.

Later in the year, William F. Oldham, entering the Board office in New York as a newly elected Corresponding Secretary, brought to his administrative work a special interest in India and a sympathetic awareness of the

problems of the India mission. Into his hands came an article on the mass movements that was under preparation by Thomas S. Donohugh, who was freshly returned from service at the head of the Meerut District. In December, Oldham acknowledged himself profoundly moved by Donohugh's statement—perhaps the most precise and informative description of the Methodist movements then available in the United States—and decided to give close personal and official attention to the question.

Oldham's interest was quickened by correspondence, during the early months of 1913, from Bishops Warne and John E. Robinson. The latter was now fervently pleading for increased support for mass-movement work, having found it impossible to put brakes on the movement in South India. Bishop Warne was trying to interest Oldham in cultivating the holiness groups in the United States as financial supporters of mass movement evangelism in India; and this Oldham agreed to do.

At the June meeting of the Board of Managers, India was one of three countries cited by the Committee on Home Base as illustrations of fields whose work drastically demanded appropriations in excess of current giving for foreign missions. The Committee, directly reflecting a strong statement by Bishop Warne on the needs of the Northwest India Conference mass movement, reminded the Board that India was in the midst of the most remarkable mass movement in the history of the Christian church. Pointing to the accessibility of millions of low-caste Indians to Christian evangelism, the Committee urged liberal support of the work in India. "For us to falter or delay to move ahead strongly at this time," it reported, "would be an error, comparable only to failure which in the early centuries lost Africa to the Christian Church."

Materials describing the current mass movements now began to flow more freely from India into the New York office—into the hands of makers of Board policy and, in various forms, into the missionary and church press in the United States. Bishop Warne sent along the manuscript for an informative and interpretative booklet, and saw to it that articles written in India reached the Board's headquarters—notably a well-developed special mass-movement number of *The Indian Witness* with contributions by himself, Bishop John E. Robinson, Brenton T. Badley, Franklin M. Wilson, Herman J. Schutz, Charles E. Parker, and others. This was followed a fortnight later by an edition of the *Witness* devoted to the educational problems of the India mission, with emphasis upon the relation of the educational work to the progress of the mass movements.

In an earlier *Witness* article by Badley lay the challenge:

Will America realise this day of opportunity and help in a worthy manner—cease *playing at Missions*, and enable her representatives in India to meet this situation in a statesmanlike way?

By the turn of the year, Oldham was satisfied that the challenge of the mass movements was leavening the thinking of people influential in missionary circles. He himself had scheduled for early publication a book containing a chapter on mass movements that liberally quoted Donohugh and Warne.

Initiating committee work in January, 1914, Oldham secured adoption by the Board of Managers, on 16 June, of a fairly comprehensive plan for reinforcement of the mass-movement efforts in India. Oldham considered this an encouraging commitment on the part of the Board, and he promptly invited the leaders in India to offer their views about its implementation. He renewed his request several months later. In November, the General Committee of Foreign Missions recognized the existence of missionary responsibility for "proper shepherding and further teaching of thousands of converts" in the mass-movement areas and acknowledged that it could not be met within the regular appropriations. It voted to appeal to the Church to increase its general missionary giving enough to make possible adequate support of the mass movements, although such requests usually were fruitless.

In India, a Mass Movement Commission representing the six India Conferences—established on this basis by the Executive Board in 1913—already was at work and was available for co-operation with the New York office. With Bishop John W. Robinson as chairman and Brenton T. Badley as secretary, the Commission's executive committee met in Khandwa, Central Provinces, on 23 February 1915 to review the plan approved by the Board of Foreign Missions. It began by fashioning a working definition :

A Mass Movement is a movement along family lines within a given caste of people, in numbers sufficiently large so as to make it especially marked, and constituting a problem as to the care of active enquirers and converts for whom we are unable to care with our present resources.

The words after the second comma, expressed not the essence of a mass movement but the evangelistic and educational crisis facing the India mission.

The committee modified and amplified the Board's plan in several respects, though not radically, and then sent its recommendations on to New York. Along with them went a classification of the localized mass-movement fields in terms of the committee's working definition and in accordance with three categories of current activity.

Among the fields fully corresponding to the definition, the Committee listed the Bulandshahr, Delhi, Meerut, Muttra, Punjab, Roorkee, Tirhut, Vikarabad, and Raichur-Gulbarga Districts. For immediate and aggressive follow-up work on the basis of past movements or of certain current mass-movement conditions, the Committee recommended the Bareilly, Baroda, Belgaum, Budaun, Bijnor, Ahmadabad, and Moradabad fields. Listed as regions containing potential movements were the Rajputana District, the

Marathi area of the Bombay Conference, the Oriya-speaking area of the Central Provinces, and the Tuticorin Circuit. The proposals sent to the Board were arranged in a concrete administrative program fitted specifically to the various fields in these categories.

The Board of Managers approved the India Mass Movement Commission's plan at its June meeting. The plan called for the provision of nine W.F.M.S. missionaries and five male missionaries. In addition, \$27,900 was budgeted to provide 7 District schools inspectors, 7 training schools, 7 District summer schools, and 160 primary schools. The Board hoped to secure \$7,900 from Indian sources, already had word of \$5,000 appropriated by the W.F.M.S., and expected to raise the balance of \$15,000. These items were intended to move each active mass-movement District towards implementation of a staff plan that included a District superintendent, a W.F.M.S. evangelistic missionary, and a male evangelistic missionary. It was hoped to have a training school for primary teachers in each of eight language areas (funds for one already had been sent out to India), with a group of Indian inspectors of primary schools, these also presumably on a vernacular basis. Each mass-movement District was to have a summer training school for about ten students each.

Both in India and in New York, two major concerns ran through the discussions surrounding the building of this program: (1) the education of the many thousands of village children in the Mission's Christian families and (2) the reception of many more thousands of people from among the masses of illiterate rural people amenable to conversion. The addition of evangelistic missionaries was aimed primarily at the extension of the converting and baptizing work. The addition of primary schools, training schools, and educational inspectors was aimed at the elementary education of the children.

The educational program, which was planned to reach only 16,000 children, clearly was inadequate; the India mission had 60,000, not just 16,000, boys and girls in its Christian community for whose schooling it had no provision. At the same time, the proposed evangelistic reinforcements, if they were as successful as the most earnest mass-movement advocates passionately hoped, would bring additional thousands of children within the circle of Methodist educational responsibility.

Apparently forgotten in the framing of the new program were the masses of adults already baptized but unprovided with teaching pastoral care to lead them into a growing experience of the Christian way of life. Not only were great numbers of them evidently to be left without proper guidance, but the Mission was seeking to baptize scores of thousands more, who would then be added to the ranks of the spiritually untrained. The program officially approved in India and in New York was not calculated to overcome the spiritual illiteracy of the Mission's adult community—the condition that

was the ground of the conservative baptizing practices of such cautious missionaries as David Ernsberger.

This condition underlay the distress felt by Albert A. Parker, Director of Religious Education for India and Burma, when he said, "I am appalled, though I cannot say surprised, at the almost complete ignorance of things spiritual and Biblical among the people of our Mass Movement areas." He was convinced that it was already too late for the Church ever to overtake the task of giving the opportunity for primary education to all the children in its vast Christian community. But of the religious assimilation of the baptized constituency he said that "we must either plan for adequate religious instruction for our converts or else cease to baptize them."

Whatever functional deficiencies may have been inherent in the plan that Secretary Oldham had steered to adoption by the Board, it appeared at least to be the beginning of a frontal approach to the problems and opportunities of the mass movements. There now was an official policy—to promote the mass movements; and there now was a program designed to implement the policy.

The 1915 program was discarded, however, even before Oldham left office a year after its adoption. When the Central Conference met at Jubbulpore at the end of January, 1916, it adopted for the first time a substantial and critical statement of concern with regard to mass-movement problems. And well it might, for the India mission's Christian community had increased by 43 per cent during the past four years. After reviewing the accessions for the past quadrennium, it authorized the immediate dispatch to the Board of an urgent cablegram—"One hundred and forty thousand baptized, 160,000 waiting. Fifty new missionaries each Board, with support, needed." This call for a hundred missionaries at once made the dimensions of the official program already agreed upon look like creations of child's play.

The Central Conference also established a permanent Mass Movement Commission with authority to promote the work and to administer funds collected for that purpose. Just before adjournment, the Conference was "electrified" by the announcement of the first large special gift for mass-movement work—\$10,000, with \$7,000 of it designated for the organization of seven training schools. When the Commission, the same day, began to allocate the \$10,000 to the fields, it quickly dropped its sights from the level of the brave cablegram for a hundred missionaries, and trained them on targets far below the level of the 1915 program. The Commission decided upon four training schools, forty evangelists, and forty village schools, and voted to make this limited arrangement cover two years, instead of spreading the money more widely but only for a single year.

With these purposes in view, about half the \$10,000 was distributed by the Commission in 1916 and half in 1917. After all the ambitious planning in India and in New York, this was the extent of the Board's special financing of the mass movements which the Commission could budget in advance for

these two years. During 1917, however, various mass-movement projects benefited from extra funds that reached India through remittances, quite apart from official Board channels, from William E. Blackstone, trustee of the Milton Stewart Evangelistic Funds. These gifts totaled \$30,000.

The Board of Foreign Missions, at its annual meeting in New York in November, 1916, appointed a special India Mass Movement Commission to consider means of conserving the Mass Movement. (By this time, the caste-group movements in India were being referred to more frequently as though they constituted a single movement, rather than a cluster of relatively localized and unconnected movements.) The sponsor of the resolution establishing the new Commission—Frederick B. Fisher, a former India missionary—soon became its executive chairman.

In February, the Executive Committee of the Board approved the Commission's decision to try to raise one million dollars for the Mass Movement, the funds "to be provided within the next five years by still hunt methods, largely utilizing parlor conferences and private interview for this purpose." The hope of the Commission was to get money started to India soon, and then to seek the remaining portion of the one million dollars as a part of the India program for the forthcoming Centenary movement, though still perhaps by independent methods.

The creation of the India Mass Movement Commission and its quietly announced goal made stirring news for the Mass Movement leaders in India. The Bishops met late in May, at the height of the hot season, and began to lay plans to allocate the expected funds to projects in property development, education, evangelism, and missionary support. They intended to use the money "for Mass Movement work, pure and simple," but also felt that funds might be used judiciously at strategic points to stimulate more speedy breaks in caste groups that had shown no special desire to convert to Christianity. The Bishops also reminded the Commission in the United States that the sending out of a reinforcement of selected missionaries was of paramount importance to the success of the Mass Movement.

Later in the year, Frederick Fisher—"that fisher of facts and funds and men," an India missionary called him—came out to India and spent many weeks closely inspecting the entire field. He was staggered by what he saw. At the end of his visit, he wrote to Secretaries Taylor and North:

The missionaries have not exaggerated in the slightest degree when they say that hundreds of thousands are actually PRESSING toward the Kingdom of Christ. I have seen them hold them back. I have seen the struggle to provide teachers for villages of illiterate Christians. I have seen districts of sixteen thousand Christians led by just eight preachers in charge. I have seen districts where there are as many members as there are in the New England Conference—led by just two missionaries. I tell you the task is gigantic. It takes a hero on the field to stand up before it and keep heart.

Fisher's visit stimulated the missionaries; they everywhere received him enthusiastically. Bishop John E. Robinson, warmly praising him for his quick and masterly comprehension of India's missionary situation, said that Fisher saw "more of the real work we are trying to do in this land and has gotten to the bottom of things more effectively than all the honored General Superintendents who have visited us."

Before sailing from India in December, Fisher met with a subcommittee of India's Mass Movement Commission (Bishop William Burt, chairman of the United States commission, also sat in), to help plan for the extension of the mass-movement work. The India leaders proceeded to draw up a budget for 1918 that was twenty-seven times as large as any annual amount previously budgeted for special mass-movement activity. They planned to spend \$137,000 for 30 training school teachers, 11 training school building projects, 509 training school scholarships, 70 primary school scholarships, 15 new missionaries, 188 preachers, 208 village schools, and 11 mission plant projects—the best-articulated and most comprehensive scheme yet proposed for the reinforcement of the mass movements. Fisher assured them that the funds required for this program would be forthcoming from the proceeds of the Mass Movement campaign in the United States. This he confirmed by cable after returning to New York.

Further encouragement in this direction came to the leaders in India from reports published in the church press in the United States after Fisher's return to New York. On 21 February 1918, *The Christian Advocate* announced that the Mass Movement Commission's campaign for funds had resulted, in less than eleven months, in the raising of \$1,060,000 "in amounts varying from \$1 to \$250,000." (Up to this time, the Methodist public in the United States had heard nothing about the campaign; it had been conducted quietly, at times even confidentially, in order not to interfere with financial plans of the Board of Education.) The editorial in the *Advocate* stated that \$200,000 had thus been "made available annually for immediate use during the next five years." It announced that fourteen new missionaries were provided for and that funds were in hand for their support. Two months later, Thomas Donohugh, now the Board's Candidate Secretary, wrote Bishop John W. Robinson that Fisher had "authorized" him to provide fourteen men for the Mass Movement centers.

Acting upon the assurances given by Fisher, the Mass Movement Commission began to expand the work—employing evangelists and teachers, opening village schools, taking on additional boarding school pupils, and making commitments for building projects. In July, it decided to scale down its plans by framing its annual budgets at about \$100,000 a year for ten years. The Commission members realized that the workers and equipment their new plan called for could not be "called into existence at once, but must be gradually created."

It was fortunate that the Commission revised its goals, for news soon reached India that the announcement of total success for the \$1,000,000 Mass Movement campaign had been, to say the least, a piece of premature publicity. Campaign calculations had gone badly awry; far less than \$200,000 a year would be forthcoming.

To be sure, the Mass Movement Commission in the United States had got its work off to a flying start in the spring of 1917, with Fisher rapidly organizing the search for special Mass Movement gifts, and reporting early successes. In June, in a letter to Secretary Frank Mason North, Fisher enthusiastically had estimated that subscriptions to date, counting renewals of certain pledges, would yield \$470,250 for the five-year period.

But when Fisher sailed for India in August, the canvassing was uncompleted; the Commission put two other workers in charge of it. Before Fisher returned, these men were taken over by the Centenary Commission, the Mass Movement campaign was discontinued, and the office was closed. When he got back from abroad, Fisher found that even the office furniture was being used by the Centenary people. He himself was promptly caught up in Centenary work and gave little more attention to Mass Movement interests as such.

Fisher's figures on the returns expected from the campaign, which he used both in New York and in Calcutta, were largely flawed by his optimistic assumptions about the results of a visit he made in the spring of 1917 to William E. Blackstone in California in company with Bishop James W. Bashford. Fisher understood that Blackstone was pledging \$71,000 on behalf of the Stewart Funds. Blackstone's premillennial Adventism proved a little difficult to reduce to figures, but Fisher took a try at it. He wrote North while en route from California:

Of course Mr. B. would not guarantee more than one year's continuance of the \$71,000 because he expects the Lord to come. But, he is perfectly sane about it, and says that he intends to continue these gifts for the five years "if He tarries" that long. Hence Bishop Bashford and I both feel that this means an annual renewal.

Mixing mathematics and eschatology, Fisher projected the realization of nearly half the goal of \$1,000,000 counting on Blackstone for \$355,000 all told—a very large share.

Fisher's understanding of a second visit with Blackstone, on his way home from India, confirmed his faith in the level of giving to be expected from the Stewart Fund. To this he added other five-year subscriptions of \$42,000 per year, and counting on "other prospective leads," he cabled the India Commission that it could count on \$137,000—still far short of \$200,000. Almost simultaneously appeared the *Christian Advocate* announcement of the subscribing of \$1,060,000 at about \$200,000 a year. No official report of this

achievement was sent to India. Secretary North later—many months later—wrote that the announcement had not been approved by the executive officers of the Board and was unofficial.

But the India leaders knew of the *Advocate* article, and that journal never carried any official disclaimer of the announced figure. Fisher's explanation of its publication—many months later—was that "the spirit of expectancy [in New York] was such that there crept into the papers and Advocates notices of the subscription of a million dollars to India." The report had not had to creep very far; the *Christian Advocate* offices were located at 150 Fifth Avenue, New York City. Indeed, much of the rest of the *Advocate* editorial report containing the reference to the \$1,060,000 obviously was derived from sources close to Fisher. It advanced liberal statements about the number of church members, the rate of baptisms, and the implementation of mass-movement plans in India that revealed exuberance leaving accuracy far behind.

By summertime, it was clear to North and his colleagues that the Blackstone-Stewart estimates would not hold up. Mr. Stewart, so North discovered, was not himself interested in India, and Blackstone was being expected by the committee of the Milton Stewart Evangelistic Funds to justify the large allocation planned for the India Mass Movement. Blackstone asked the Board's representatives some searching questions about the amount of money the Board was sending to India and about the proportion of it that was actually going currently into specific mass-movement activity. Blackstone wanted definite information about the extent to which others besides the Stewart group were committed financially to the Mass Movement. The fact was that the Board's officials had been depending upon Blackstone to provide substantially more than all the other campaign subscribers together. The Secretaries found it difficult to disentangle specific mass-movement funds from the Board's regular appropriations and current special gifts.

The upshot of negotiations with Blackstone was that the Stewart giving was definitely pegged below Fisher's estimates. "He [Stewart] intends," wrote Bishop Warne to Secretary North, "to keep for India's Mass Movement each year until the Lord returns \$30,000, and \$13,900 in addition in specials." Thus the expected income from the Commission's narrowly based campaign among potentially large givers was radically cut. It now promised to be about \$42,000 a year plus the Stewart contributions. This is all that North felt that the fully dependable subscriptions came to.

More immediately distressing to the men in India than the deflation of their long-run expectations was the fact that as late as December, 1918, only \$46,000 of the \$137,000 originally expected for 1918 reached India. But their commitments, after paring the operating budget down to \$100,932, demanded \$54,932 more for the year then drawing to a close. Dr. North notified the Commission in India on 9 December that the Board had remitted

\$20,000, and indicated that \$30,000 more would be on the way from the funds contributed by the Stewart Funds. This latter amount actually was 1919 money for certain designated purposes. North admittedly was advising its use in 1918 for Mass Movement work, thus shifting the financial problem to the following year. In 1919, this work on the field was sustained by \$71,000 from Board sources and \$30,000 from the Stewart Funds. From this time on, the Board's financing of the Mass Movement was merged with the administration of receipts from the Centenary campaign.

India: Person-Centered Missions

By rail I have travelled nearly 5,000 miles this year. By motor, ox-cart, horseback and shanks horses I have done another 5,000 miles. Like Wesley and Asbury we have to keep accounts, only very much larger in size than they did. We have to buy cloth, medicines, rice, chillies, grains, blankets, etc., just like merchants. In the villages we have administered medicines and performed operations just like Doctors. In the office and in the Conference we have sat and tried cases and administered justice just like Lawyers. We have crawled under motor cars, dug them out of mud holes, troubled over not being able to find the mistakes in the mechanism just like chauffeurs; but we did not swear like them. We have slept on the soft side of a board, on mother nature's bed, on fine cushions, in cow stables and on a good bed just like all true Indians. We have been away from home almost half of the time; lived out of a tiffin basket and are alive today. We have sat in the school-room, under the trees, in primitive huts and taught by the wayside just like the early disciples. We have preached the Gospel; have had converts; have given baptisms; have helped to bury the dead . . .

Such an account as this could have been composed by almost any evangelistic missionary on any vernacular field in India in any year from 1896 to 1919. Not a phrase in it betrays whether the writer was a mass-movement evangelist or an evangelist working outside the mass movements. Mass-movement evangelism differed from person-centered evangelism in its strategic emphasis upon group conversion. But the mass-movement worker's concrete evangelistic methods and day-by-day collateral ministries differed hardly at all from those of his fellow worker in the less broadly oriented wing of the India mission's evangelistic outreach.

Both groups of evangelists followed fairly closely, during these decades, the operating methods prevalent in the closing decades of the nineteenth century—open-air preaching, informal teaching, the rural tour, zenana visitation, the Christian mela, preaching near Hindu melas, religious teaching and devotions in mission institutions, distribution of tracts and Testaments, tes-

timony by convert bands, occasional public demonstrations, periodic evangelistic campaigns.

PERSON-CENTERED EVANGELISM

Among the areas in which the labors of the evangelists remained exclusively or predominantly person-centered, Burma was unique. It had no mass-movement potential at all, for Burmese society (Buddhism was the dominant religion) was not organized on the caste system. Even the India immigrants—a small minority of Burma's population—did not provide this element, for they were uprooted from the Indian setting where caste permeated all levels of society and all localities.

The Methodist constituency in Burma in 1896 was small—242 full members and 209 probationers; in 1919 it was larger but still small. Evangelistic workers under the Board and the W.F.M.S. labored, during this period, in a handful of centers in the Rangoon area, maintaining small congregations in several communities and visiting outlying rural areas by cart and by river boat.

The handicaps limiting both geographical extension and conversions were great; the educational institutions absorbed most of the missionary personnel, few Burmese workers were available, building facilities were inadequate, and the complex language situation fragmented the work.

The Mission continued to work with English-speaking, Burmese, Tamil, and Telugu groups, and added Chinese (1897) and Hindustani (1914) vernacular activity. Language difficulties penetrated even the sessions of the District Conference, in which the Burmese work so overshadowed the other segments that the English-speaking constituency, the Indians, and the Chinese had little interest in the Conference. In 1917, all the Burmese language work was set apart as the Burmese District, with the rest of the charges organized as the Rangoon District. The two-District plan, which involved geographical overlapping, still left the Rangoon District with a perplexing lingual problem both for administration and for evangelistic cultivation. Its constituents spoke English, Tamil, Telugu, Hindustani, and two Chinese dialects (Hokkien and Cantonese). But the crucial deficiency in the Mission's multi-lingual approach to the people was the lack of enough consistent or full-time leadership in any particular lingual field to make for strong development.

In 1919, the full members in Burma included 216 Burmese in five charges, 211 English-speaking persons in Rangoon's Epworth Memorial Church, 147 Chinese in three charges, 8 Hindustanis in Rangoon, and 172 Tamils in three charges. (After 1909, the Telegus were not reported separately.) The Burma Christian community in 1919 numbered 1,627, including 754 full members and 473 probationers. Members were reported from charges in Rangoon, Pegu, Syriam, Thongwa, Twante, and Dalla—a pattern that reveals the Mission's evangelism as still anchored in the Rangoon area.

The Bengal Conference territory—unlike Burma, with which the Methodists linked it until 1901—lay within the realm of India's caste-dominated society. Nevertheless, except for the few years when the Conference contained the localized Arrah-Ballia mass movement, evangelistic progress in Bengal, as in Burma, followed the individual rather than the mass pattern. Three factors limited the availability of caste mechanisms as devices for securing conversions: (1) about a third of the population, both in Calcutta and in the rural areas, was Muslim; (2) the Santals—an important animistic, aboriginal minority, only beginning to be Hinduized—were unaffected by caste; and (3) large numbers of Hindu dwellers in the city of Calcutta were relatively free of the caste sanctions that would have rested upon them in the villages from which many of them had migrated. In spite of the hopes and predictions occasionally voiced by missionaries, even the rural caste localities penetrated by the Methodists yielded no mass movements.

At best, the winds of evangelistic response blow where they will. In Bengal, they blew mildly, largely because the Mission was too thoroughly shot through with inner weaknesses to be able to stir the non-Christian community. The problem of manpower for evangelism was acute. The few missionaries not assigned to work in the Conference institutions often had to couple administrative and institutional responsibilities with evangelism, to the serious disadvantage of the latter. Trained preachers were too few, and field workers were too seldom visited by supervising missionaries. Consistency of administration, pastoral work, and evangelistic outreach were badly shattered by short tenure in appointments and in Conference membership. For years, the only missionary to the Santals, among whom only men had prestige as religious leaders, was Pauline Grandstrand, the W.F.M.S. Pakur District evangelist. Evangelistic itineration was limited in extent and often superficial in method. Rural converts won by it were too few and too scattered to be well followed up and assimilated. Sometimes the outreach of the Mission was restricted by a mission-compound psychology that tended to turn it and its converts in upon the isolated society of the compound itself. Affiliation with the Christian mission was still, for some converts in this field, a demoralizing form of dependency. There were times when the activity of some of the organized churches failed to rise above the level of conventional church work. Conference morale generally was not aggressive.

The negative effects of these weaknesses were all the more crucial because of the demands inherent in three major conditions on the Bengal field—the multilingual situation (colporteurs on the Pakur District distributed literature in seven dialects), the presence of three large non-Christian religious groups, and the complex social conditions inevitably enhancing the difficulty of religious work among the million people in the great commercial city of Calcutta.

The vernacular evangelistic effort in Bengal was numerically the least pro-

ductive one in the caste areas of the India mission across the decades. The Bengal workers slowly built their Christian constituency by child baptisms rather than by accessions of adults, which regularly were far fewer in number. As late as the quadrennium 1916-19, adult baptisms, scattered through the various charges, totaled only 63, 48, 44, and 94, respectively. In 1919, the vernacular Christian community came to about 4,000 persons, including 1,540 probationers and 1,037 full members. This modest constituency was spread among three not extensive Districts based on Asansol (four charges), Calcutta (seven charges), and Pakur (eight charges). Thoburn Church and the Kidderpore church and seamen's mission, which were in the Calcutta English District, along with the Asansol English Church, augmented the Conference constituency by 350 full members and a thousand adherents of the Christian community.

The Central Provinces Conference, like the Bengal Conference, produced no mass movement. Although it was a stronger evangelistic organization in a somewhat more favorable field, its accessions came individually, sometimes in families, but seldom in groups of any size. After the first five years of its independent existence, its adult baptisms, which had averaged about four hundred a year, dropped down to an average of two hundred for the following seven years, with child baptisms running well ahead.

The Conference began in 1905 with 1,071 full members in a Christian community of 3,666 persons—a modest start. Evangelistic progress came hard. The field was linguistically mixed and geographically diffuse, and the itinerating missionaries often found travel laboriously slow. Its leaders struggled with a full budget of the inadequacies in money and manpower that everywhere plagued the India mission.

In spite of these difficulties, the Central Provinces evangelists pushed out beyond the cities and larger communities heading their Districts and penetrated the surrounding rural areas. The four original Districts—Central Provinces Marathi, Jubbulpore, Godavery, and Raipur—became seven Districts—Balaghat, Basim, Jubbulpore, Khandwa, Nagpur, Raipur, and Sironcha. The fourteen evangelistic charges became thirty in number.

The missionary workers won converts in conventional Hindu communities, among the numerous aborigines, and among the Satnamis, an important reformed-Hindu group. Typical caste-group movements towards Christianity among these latter, differently organized peoples were not to be expected. To be sure, upon occasion, large-scale conversion of Satnamis emerged as a live possibility, but the missionary leaders held back because the Satnamis' paramount interest in affiliating with the Christian community obviously was economic betterment. In the Hindu communities, caste remained strong enough to serve as a brake upon conversions rather than as a lever to facilitate them.

There were times when, for lack of teachers for postbaptismal instruction,

missionaries refrained from baptizing groups of inquirers whose accession might have provided catalysts of mass movement response. These conservative decisions were not made in self-conscious hostility to mass movements as such; neither were they made under strong pressures like those felt by some of the South India missionaries who were impelled to resist heavily accumulating mass pleas for baptism. The Central Provinces workers would have welcomed mass response; but potent and sustained caste breaks did not occur. This condition demonstrated negatively the dependence of mass movements not upon missionary activity alone, but also upon spontaneous indigenous forces.

Although adult baptisms increased markedly beginning in 1917, yielding a three-year average of nearly five hundred, the full members in the Central Provinces Conference in 1919 still numbered less than nineteen hundred, and the Christian community included about ninety-five hundred persons.

The four Conferences in which the major mass movements thrived—Bombay, Northwest India, North India, and South India—also maintained vernacular evangelistic missions that remained person-centered.

The chief such vernacular fields in the Bombay Conference, except for Gujarat, were the city of Bombay and its environs and also the Poona-Marathi section.

At the turn of the century, Bombay was an important industrial and commercial city with a polyglot population of three quarters of a million, soon to reach towards a million. Here Methodism's most consistent vernacular outreach from 1896 on through the first two decades of the twentieth century was effected through Marathi, Gujarati, and Hindustani missions. The Marathi Mission, an organized church since 1874, had a building of its own. The Gujarati Mission, the original seedbed of the Gujarat mass movement, was also an organized church, but enjoyed no permanent location. In 1896, earlier informal Hindustani work among transient mill hands and street car employees was combined with a newly inaugurated approach to Indian seamen at the Seamen's Rest, built in 1887 for work with European sailors. The Hindustani work soon became associated with Grant Road Church (an English congregation), and in 1903 was established as a separate church. The Hindustani group also included some Tamils who had a working knowledge of the Hindustani tongue.

About 1906, a fourth vernacular group began to emerge. A number of English-speaking Kanarese Christians from southern India became attendants and members of Taylor Memorial Church (English) and after some years formed a separate congregation. In 1917, a Hebrew Mission was established, with Messiah David, a self-supporting lay worker, as superintendent. Bombay, like the other large commercial cities, harbored a number of Jews fairly recently arrived in India, but it also included a community of the Beni Israel, an ethnic group said to have come to India's west coast from abroad

about fourteen centuries ago. About ten thousand of them lived in Bombay and its vicinity and for a hundred miles along the coast to the south of the city. They believed themselves to be descended from the Palestinian Jews and revived, several hundred years ago, the use of a broad pattern of Jewish religious belief and practice. The Methodist Hebrew Mission gained converts in its first year. By the second year, a convert had gone to Mesopotamia and, in turn, made converts there. Soon there were six young Jews from Bagdad in the Bombay Bible School. In its first year, the Hebrew Mission evoked violent opposition, which brought property damage and beating of adherents.

The Bombay urban work included several suburban points, reached across the harbor to Panvel on the mainland, and was linked with circuit evangelism centering in three outlying points less than a hundred miles east and north of the city—Kalyan and Igatpuri perennially, Tarapur from 1915.

Measured against the massive non-Christian population of India's great second city, Methodist vernacular evangelism was a minute investment of resources. Failure steadily and adequately to mobilize personnel for vernacular efforts repeatedly hobbled the Mission's activity. After a decade, the Hindustani work, starved of leadership and of funds, almost vanished. Although it was improving by 1909, Henry C. Scholberg reported in 1907, "Our entire work among this people is in the hands of an exhorter who less than four years ago was a Hindu religious medicant." William H. Stephens, superintendent of the Marathi District, in 1912 said of Methodism's impact upon Bombay's approximately 900,000 unevangelized people, "We thank God that something has been done, but little more than a ripple has been produced on the great sea of Hinduism and Mohammedanism and other non-Christian faiths which surround us."

At best, the obstacles to successful evangelism were enormous. The exterior-caste laborers who generally were most amenable to Christian influence were largely a floating population—drifting into Bombay from rural areas, scattering widely through the city, working there for a time, and then drifting back home again. Sunday labor militated against church attendance by industrial workers. Individuals detached from family life were unsettled by the swirling life of the metropolis, and no weak mission could easily compete for serious attention in the mélange of social and economic forces beating upon the relatively emancipated city dwellers. Missionary workers found it difficult to follow up and organize converts and inquirers into stable congregations. Many of the transient people whom they served or converted took their places in Methodist and non-Methodist communities elsewhere after finishing their sojourns in Bombay. Since the people of rural origin were cut off from their home-town caste groups, there was no basis in caste decision for their mass conversion to Christianity while they remained in the city. As in Calcutta and other large cities, converts had to be gathered one by one out of Bombay's multitudes.

During seven years (1912-18) as a District Superintendent in charge of vernacular efforts in Bombay, William E. Bancroft specialized in an evangelistic approach to educated Muslims and to Brahmins and other high caste Hindus and enjoyed more than usual success with young men from these typically unresponsive groups. Within a year, he had over forty converts of this calibre. Bancroft's success led to hot opposition by non-Christian elements, including attempts to kill some of the converts. Bancroft was often in court on their behalf. His concern with their predicament—discharge from their jobs and ostracism by their families and friends were normal reprisals for conversion—led him to found the Bombay Bible School as a Christian home for them. He also won Jewish converts.

In 1919, after nearly fifty years of vernacular evangelism in this complex and transient area, Methodism could count only three hundred members in Bombay, with less than eight hundred in the Christian community. The groups in the outlying Circuits augmented this constituency by only a few dozen.

Two Districts in the Northwest India Conference—the Allahabad District and the Cawnpore District—conducted vernacular evangelism without mass-movement manifestations. Both Districts were oriented towards large cities. All but fifty of the three hundred church members on the Allahabad District lived in the city of Allahabad. Less than 250 of the Cawnpore District's seven hundred members lived outside the city of Cawnpore. As for the two cities, a third of Allahabad's members and a quarter of Cawnpore's belonged to the English-speaking churches.

The Allahabad District was not without caste members—Doms, Bansphors, Kols, Chamars. The half million Chamars, however, constituted the only group among whom a substantial mass movement might have been expected to emerge. That it did not was due in part to the Mission's failure to take the appropriate initiative. George W. Briggs, the District Superintendent, reported in 1917 that there were whole sections of the District in which the Methodists had done nothing to meet the opportunity latent in the Chamar group. Briggs also reported an economically inhibiting factor, pointing to the opposition of the landlords. The Chamars, who rented the land they worked, were afraid of the owners. And said Briggs, "In some places the Kols are in a state which is practically servitude, and they are consequently, under the heel of the landlords." Briggs's colleague, William W. Ashe, superintendent of the Cawnpore District, simultaneously reported the impossibility of securing suitable workers as the reason for not pressing the current work among the Chamars, among whom there were some openings.

The North India Conference, using essentially person-centered evangelistic approaches, gradually increased its membership from more than fifteen thousand full communicants in 1896 to somewhat less than twenty-three thousand in 1919. Only its relatively small Arrah-Ballia segment was engaged

in significant mass-movement activity at the end of the period, and even that development had come relatively late. This did not mean that the growth of the Conference was unaffected by mass movements, but rather that North India's effective mass movements were in the past. North India had been the cradle of the original Methodist upsurge of the early eighteen nineties. The years 1896 and 1897 were the last in which the Conference reports registered characteristic signs of the mass-movement impulse. From that time on, for instance, child baptisms were consistently a larger source of accessions to the Methodist community than were adult baptisms. The Conference was involved in building a church of assimilated communicants rather than in pressing to the limit for mass conversions by social decision. As it faced this task, it inherited both the benefits and the drawbacks of earlier mass-movement activity. It inherited the benefit of access to a large reservoir of people constituting a potential source of members for the growing church. But in this reservoir accumulated a large backlog of candidates for full participation in the life of the church that the Conference never had the capability of assimilating into membership and participation according to its own standards.

In the South India Conference during this same period, the areas not significantly involved in mass-movement evangelism were relatively limited—quite the reverse of the North India Conference pattern. Person-centered evangelism was dominant chiefly in the two small Districts centered in the large cities of Bangalore and Madras. The church membership of the two Districts finally constituted less than a fifth of the Conference total of six thousand. It was generated by the work of a part of the Conference (the Madras District) that in 1896 had four hundred church members. The large remainder of the 1920 membership—more than five thousand—was generated from an area (the Hyderabad District) that in 1896 had two hundred members.

Naturally, the English-speaking churches in the India mission were a segment of the Methodist community devoted to person-centered evangelism and churchmanship. Partly because of their location in cities, partly because caste was a Hindu phenomenon, but essentially because they were designed to be and to remain English churches, they enjoyed no relevant access to the vernacular-speaking caste groups so energetically cultivated by the mass-movement missionaries. Because their general orientation and their organizational problems were so different from those of the popular Indian Methodist constituencies, a movement emerged in 1912 to set them off into a separate jurisdiction. Acting upon the request of the South India Conference, the Central Conference memorialized the General Conference to authorize the formation of an English Mission Conference in India. The General Conference responded by enabling the Central Conference to create a Mission, not a Mission Conference, for the English churches and, no implementing action

having been taken, renewed the enabling act in 1916. The South India Conference acted within its own jurisdiction, however, by forming in 1914 an English District that drew together congregations in Bangalore, Belgaum, Hyderabad, Madras, and Secunderabad. The District remained in existence until 1924, when its churches were reassigned to the geographical Districts from which they had been taken. The General Conference of 1920 ordered the creation of an English-Speaking Mission in India and authorized organizing it later into a Mission Conference. The General Conference directive was not put into effect in India.

THE JUBILEE REVIVAL

The Christian community, always trying to expand through evangelism, itself became an arena in which dynamic evangelistic forces were loosed. What came to be known as the Jubilee Revival broke out in the Methodist constituency more than a year before the great celebration at Bareilly. The Revival was a succession of loosely connected, locally spontaneous, but nevertheless broadly contagious group experiences of high emotional intensity and inspirational power. Many Methodist church people, responding to the emphases of the Twentieth Century Forward Movement, a campaign for individual spiritual renewal inaugurated in 1900 by a General Conference commission headed by Bishop Thoburn, had been praying and hoping for a revival to sweep India. But when the first symptoms of revival appeared in 1905, they erupted unexpectedly.

One of the first signs appeared at the Muttra District summer training school for Christian workers on 21 August 1905 following an address on the Holy Spirit given by Bishop Warne before several hundred students. A young woman arose and began quietly to relate how the Holy Spirit had come to her recently. Suddenly, a wave of conviction of sin swept through the audience, the people groaning, trembling, and crying aloud. Bishop Warne suggested that the young woman invite the women and girls to come forward into a large empty space, to seek the "fullness of the Spirit for service." Warne wrote later :

Instantly, impelled by the power of the Spirit, about 150 women and girls, up to that time apparently unmoved, arose and followed her, and broke out in a roar of agony. For several hours there was such weeping, confessing, and crying for mercy, as I had never before heard among timid Indian women. In front of the altar the men, preachers, and other workers present, cried aloud for hours, under the awakening and convicting power of the Spirit.

The Oudh District's annual Dasehra meetings in Lucknow early in October were the occasion of the next revival outbreak, which finally involved the students at Reid Christian College in prayer and praise meetings and in

days of fasting and prayer. Scores of boys were converted, and nineteen dedicated themselves to the work of the ministry, after fifteen years during which the College had produced only a single minister. The District Conference session in November became virtually a six-day revival session, and the enthusiasm generated there began to spread through the District. At about the same time, revival activity emerged in Bengal on the Asansol District, bringing "spiritual shocks" to people who had prayed for such an outbreak, arousing emotional public conversions in the Asansol church, turning the session of the District Conference into an ecstatic occasion, and provoking responses of spiritual "intoxication" in the Asansol Leper Asylum.

Pentecostal excitement began to sweep through the boarding schools. One of the first was the Girls' High School in Moradabad, in the North India Conference. In March, 1906, after weeks of special emphasis on daily prayer, accompanied by a spreading conviction of sin and almost daily conversions, the emotional tension pervading the whole school reached a high pitch. One night, after their usual prayer period, the girls spontaneously remained together in the school's prayer room for two hours after bedtime. One of the staff, aroused at eleven o'clock, found them there, all of them kneeling or prostrate on the floor—praying, singing, and crying. The praying and weeping were so loud, and the girls were so enrapt, that the teacher had difficulty in making herself heard and in getting them off to bed. For several nights after this, they were allowed to pray as late as they wished to: some prayed until one and two o'clock in the morning; some prayed until they fainted; some kept at it all night.

There were girls who were so engulfed by the religious emotion flooding the school that they had visions and saw strange lights. Many became convinced of the real personal presence of Satan. One girl was even heard talking aloud to Satan, who she said was trying to dissuade her from attending prayer meetings. The prayer meetings continued on the initiative of the pupils, who added to their nightly exercises praise, testimony, and exhortation of the unsaved. They persevered until every girl in the school was converted.

The Revival leaped from one Methodist center to another, quickly picking up force, spreading throughout the northern areas of the Mission, and even penetrating to southern points. It was largely confined to Methodist boarding schools, orphanages, and other institutions, along with District Conference sessions, city churches, workers' training schools, and large religious meetings organized around the personnel in these groups. Almost all the institutions and District Conferences in the North were affected. Bishops Robinson and Warne were close to the movement. From July to December, 1906, Bishop Warne, who often preached at revival sessions, attended fifteen District Conferences and summer schools—every one of them fired by the revival spirit.

The missionary leaders were exhilarated by the outbreaks of religious fervor characteristic of the Revival and generally looked upon them as spontaneous

responses to the direct action of the Holy Spirit. They gave something less than full recognition to the effectiveness of the limited and controlled conditions under which the supposed divine manifestations occurred—certain factors of communal living, select personnel, indoctrination, group pressure, and explicit preparation.

Most of the people caught up in the revival enthusiasms and converted under their power were missionaries, Indian preachers, mission workers of various ranks, preachers' families, residents of institutions, well-assimilated members of organized congregations, orphans long dependent upon mission support and teaching, and other persons fairly closely identified with the missionary organization. These were the most thoroughly indoctrinated people in the Christian community, and their indoctrination, both before and during the course of the Revival, included a constantly reiterated practical theology of revivalism itself.

The members of this inner core of the Mission's constituency were taught that the true center of Christian experience and the guarantee of effectiveness in Christian work and witness was the baptism of the Spirit, a cataclysmic divine visitation marked by a profound, often prostrating, emotional crisis. Many preparatory prayer bands were formed. The people were taught to pray persistently for the Spirit to come upon them and to expect to be riven by a sharp conviction of sin that would induce deep grief and then give place to spiritual peace through confession, repentance, and restitution. This dogmatic ritual of spiritual expectation was riveted into the minds of the people most consistently exposed to the Mission's preaching and teaching ministry. And as the Revival gained headway, this, naturally enough, became the ritual of realization as the people one by one were possessed by the Spirit. The phenomena of emotional reaction observed at the revival meetings, or witnessed to by the converts, followed the inculcated patterns of expectation, and were accepted, without further criticism, as attestation of the presence and working of the Holy Spirit.

The Revival produced converted individuals, but produced them under social conditioning and influence—even psychological coercion. The uniform preparation for a local revival was prolonged, repeated mass prayer. The missionaries were prone to see the striking of revival energies as heavenly responses to prayer, grossly underestimating the potent emotional influences that beat directly upon the individuals who participated in the often fervid praying. Mass suggestion induced mass emotion, even mass hysteria.

Nowhere was this more obvious than in the boarding schools and orphanages, where the boys and girls were largely regimented, isolated from the world, closely packed together in communal living quarters, strongly susceptible to missionary leadership, sensitive to group pressures, and typically vulnerable, through their immaturity, to the impact of influences surcharged with emotion. In October, 1906, Bishop Warne and a missionary couple

held a few days of special services in the Moradabad Boys' School. After the meetings, prayer continued all night, and in these prayer meetings, rather than under the preaching that preceded them, boys were converted. In one prayer service, the Bishop tallied twenty testimonies given by boys converted while lying awake praying on their dormitory beds between midnight and two o'clock in the morning.

Early in the same month, the boys' and girls' boarding schools in Meerut were stirred. "What may well be termed a tornado of grace," reported Philo M. Buck to the Northwest India Conference, "fairly swept our boys and girls of the schools into the kingdom, nearly all of them in two nights . . . They, although they had flocked together when the storm came, won their blessing with little or nothing of human aid."

The commotion started in a prayer meeting held by some of the residents of the girls' school. One of the girls suddenly stood up and asked to have all the others called in, announcing in an alarming voice that something dreadful was about to happen. Then she began to shriek and cry out, finally throwing herself to the floor. The other girls at once were thrown into a passion of weeping and confession. The noise finally caught the attention of one of the teachers, who rushed to call in the missionaries. William P. Byers, a visiting evangelist, said that the noise coming from the girls' school was enough to make anybody think that a massacre was going on. He related:

I took a lantern and made my way to the girls' quarters, and there witnessed a sight which those present will always remember. All the girls [there were about 150 in the school] were on the floor weeping, beating their breasts and crying at the top of their voices as though their hearts would break. They paid no attention to any of us, but kept on crying and confessing till ten o'clock, when they became more quiet and were pointed to the "Lamb of God that taketh away the sin of the world." Soon they began to sing and to claim pardon through the blood of Jesus, and by eleven o'clock nearly every one of them was joyfully converted and gave testimony to having found peace. It was a remarkable sight upon which we looked. All those girls were on their faces before God. Chums and sisters had their arms around each other, and were confessing their sins together at the feet of Jesus.

Mrs. Buck and the young ladies were quite overcome and rejoiced with exceeding joy over this work of grace among the girls. The preachers who came in were filled with amazement and cried, prayed and praised God. They will never forget that affecting sight, and now they understood what it is to be convicted by the Holy Spirit.

Meanwhile, a "roar of repentance" arose in the boys' school. Here also, the pupils were on their faces, sobbing, praying, appealing to God. The preachers came in from the girls' school. Some began to pray and cry; some looked on in tearful bewilderment; one or two walked about trying to guide the greatly excited boys. The headmaster mingled his tears with his passionate prayers. "At first," said Byers, "we had to let them cry out their penitence,

and by and by when we were able to get a hearing we pointed them to Jesus. A number found peace, and the preachers were greatly blessed."

Sometimes the forces of the general hysteria were deliberately concentrated upon particular young people, so that contagion advanced to the state of coercion. In the Girls' Orphanage in Bareilly, where there were several hundred girls, there was one girl who, after revival services, late-night prayer meetings, and numerous conversions, would not confess. The whole school prayed for her for days. The matron, Mrs. Benjamin J. Chew, pressed her to confess, explaining that otherwise she would die in darkness. Various girls prayed with her and for her, and cried out to God on her behalf. At length, she stood up one night and made a partial confession. But one of the assembled pressed further: "We want to know if you have perfect peace in your soul now." "No," replied the harried girl. Immediately thirty girls dropped to the floor and lay on their faces, raising up a great volume of oral prayer. The next night, this specific social attack having overwhelmingly reinforced the general emotional bombardment of mass excitement, the laggard was converted.

Among the results of such disturbances in the schools and orphanages were the dedication of four hundred boys to the work of the ministry and the commitment of a similar number of girls to Christian service of various kinds. In the heat of revival excitement, while they were still overstimulated by what they were taught were visitations of the Holy Spirit, boys made vocational decisions to enter ministerial work that cut them off from the far more remunerative occupational opportunities for which their schooling fitted them. Fifty-seven students at the boys' school in Moradabad committed themselves to the ministry in response to an altar call given by Bishop Warne. Missionaries recognized and welcomed the sacrifices involved in these revival-generated decisions.

Although boys and girls were peculiarly susceptible to the intensities of the revivals and often were among the first to crack under the stresses they created, adults were convicted and converted in equally overwhelming emotional crises. With them too, the individual crisis was conditioned, excited, and exploded by the mass experience of the group revival. Said Bishop Warne of a meeting at the Hardoi District Conference, "a marvelous wave of conviction suddenly swept over the audience and they prayed in agony for over an hour." Again, he described the sudden advent of a revival at Jubbulpore as a *wave* of conviction that swept over the assemblage. Under the flow of such tides of mass emotion, individual men and women attending revival meetings displayed symptoms of profound and temporarily shattering depression. People would fall to the floor and remain there senseless, even for hours on end. Others would kneel immobile for prolonged periods. Some would keep up an outpouring of hysterical appeals to the Lord. Great numbers of people engaged in paroxysms of moaning, weeping, and desperate praying.

Sometimes the sheer noise during this phase of the meeting was tremendous. Occasionally men were seized by the jerks (a term and a phenomenon more familiar in the camp meetings of the American frontier in the previous century)—a violently spasmodic and convulsive twitching of the entire body. Bishop Warne saw hysterical behavior like this continue for hours when he was holding a revival service on the Raipur District. "The Holy Spirit," he said, "fell on the audience one morning in such power that the people trembled and shook all over the House. It was like unto what Peter Cartwright called the 'Jerks'."

Obviously, the sense of sin induced in these revival experiences was no mere acknowledgement of the convert's technical spiritual status under some didactic or formal plan of salvation. It was an intense personal realization—however potently stirred up by mass excitement—of one's real and current sinfulness, one's abysmal personal corruption. Its tone is suggested by a statement, quoted by Bishop Warne, that a devout Christian girl made to her missionary mentor: "One night when praying I felt myself so loathsome that I imagined there was a horrible stench of sin all around me and that the terrible smell was stifling me." But the people involved in the revivals were mostly already committed Christians, persons not typically given to gross forms of sin. And the concrete sins generally confessed by the repenting converts were not impressive for bigness or for sordidness—quarrels, vocational laziness, smoking, petty filching, and various minutiae of the moral life moralistically, perhaps puritanically, conceived and, among the boys and girls, inflated by adolescent exaggeration. The conviction of sin that so often fell upon people in the meetings like a spiritual stroke gained its radical force largely from the abnormal emotionalism of the gatherings themselves.

Many of these aspects of revival behavior appeared in the evangelistic tent meetings held by Bishop Warne when he came to the Pilibhit District Conference for that purpose in November, 1906. After his sermon at the climactic Sunday evening service (revival work had been going on throughout the weekend), there came, he recorded, "a perfect tornado of prayer from about three hundred people. Then a sacred hush came over the audience, and for more than an hour everything seemed as still as death." Finally people began to break under the tension. Some of the men, completely overcome, fell to the ground, and lay there apparently unconscious for hours. One man had the jerks. There was a general medley of weeping and praying. Then the rejoicings of the converted began to be mingled with the agonizings of the convicted. Groanings gave way to singing and rejoicing, for conviction and confession were followed by assurance of forgiveness and by inner peace and joy openly expressed. Many saw visions of Christ. The men lying senseless began to come to, the pendulum of their feelings now swinging from prostrating shock to spiritual exuberance. The last to regain his faculties—a young man—stood up with "his face shining with a heavenly radiance"

while he gave a glowing testimony to his new happiness and then burst out singing. With fervent and sweeping enthusiasm such as Bishop Warne never had heard before, some began to prophesy great victories for Christ in India. This meeting followed the pattern roughly repeated in most of the revival services—mass prayer, conviction and conversion, mass enthusiasm.

Meetings like this (not many years later, their noisiness and hysterical demonstrativeness declined) typically came to happy climax in the singing of praises by the congregation, interspersed by free song by individuals. Bishop Warne described this practice as a notable feature of the Jubilee Revival:

The praise singing does not begin until after the blessing has been received. . . . When the blessing comes, although no two meetings are alike, it also comes sometimes like a wave. Songs are begun softly and quietly, but gradually increasing in fervor. The people sing, and sing, and sing. I heard of one chorus of praise that was sung over and over again for an hour or more. . . . Oh, how these dear people do sing, saved as they are, not only from heathenism, but also from their sins. Sometimes they clap their hands and dance for joy.

The Revival continued strong throughout the quadrennium ending in 1908. Great numbers of Christians, typically—except for the youngest ones—already once converted from Hinduism to Christian allegiance, enjoyed the pentecostal conversion which the missionaries taught was the crown of Christian experience. For many this resulted in beneficial changes in their personal lives and in an intensification of their religious faith and loyalty. People gave themselves more earnestly to prayer, witnessing, and other religious duties. Hundreds of new recruits enlisted in the Mission's working corps, the enthusiasm of missionaries and preachers was enhanced, and the general evangelistic thrust of the Mission was stimulated to new energy.

Bishop Warne believed that the pentecostal method was "the only effective method, and that it embodies the only teaching and experience that will save India." When the first outbreaks of revival interest occurred among village Christians early in 1907, Warne prayed and expected that the Revival would finally reach all the village Christians, thus generating an influence that would convict "the heathen" by the thousand.

This did not happen. The village people touched by the typical revival generally enjoyed its benefits not at the center, but at the periphery. Genuine village revivals were relatively few, and revival forces came far short of permeating the great mass of baptized converts. Revivalism was an American import, and it was capable of thriving only in the circumscribed areas of India that could be specifically molded to its theological and social requirements. These people did not offer to the hand of the pentecostal evangelist the kinds of relatively isolated and manageable groups in which revivals

usually occurred. Nor were the bulk of the village Christians sufficiently indoctrinated to provide the formal lines for the patterned, if lively, developments characteristic of the revivals. Bishop Warne perhaps unintentionally underlined this consideration when he claimed that only the revivals themselves brought into Indian life the sense of sin, as he and his fellows understood it. But the very expectation of conviction of sin and of ecstatic conversion had to be drilled into those who were to be visited by the Holy Spirit. These expectations actually were inculcated in few of the village Christians.

The crucial importance of relevant indoctrination—often concealed by enthusiastic talk about the initiative of the intervening Holy Spirit—was suggested when Bishop Robinson read out in the Episcopal Address at the Central Conference of 1908, "Naturally, the only section of our field really indoctrinated is the oldest Methodist territory of Northern India." It was precisely that section that was most stirred by the Revival. The Bishop's address continued, "When India, east, west, and south, shall have had the grounding of the north, a deeper work of grace will be found in those parts also." Even in the northern areas, however, the necessary indoctrination was only thinly spread through the villages.

If the revivals did not sweep the Christian village groups, then because of similar conditions, neither did they swing great numbers of non-Christian villagers into Christian allegiance—indeed, far less so. Bishop Warne suffered one of his occasional lapses from critical rigor when, writing of the Jubilee Revival as beginning in power and increasing in momentum to 1912, he offered as proof the statement that "our Mission alone has had over 200,000 baptisms during the past eight years." It is true that the Revival fired the Mission's workers to higher enthusiasms and more energetic efforts; but the vast bulk of the conversions to Christianity in this period resulted from the mass movements, not the Revival. These movements typically did not follow lines of pentecostal excitement, but lines of social influence. Having little significance as direct instruments of conversion in the mass movements, the revivals therefore were a minor factor in the Mission's general evangelistic extension by conversion of non-Christians.

AGGRESSIVE EVANGELISM

Beginning in 1908, the impulses associated with the Jubilee Revival were conserved and renewed—though never again with such cumulative intensity—through a program called Aggressive Evangelism. The term came from the name of a commission of the General Conference that had promoted an evangelistic emphasis in the United States and abroad in the quadrennium just ending. At the Central Conference of 1908, the Missionary Bishops, acting on the request of the Conference, appointed a Commission on Aggressive Evangelism for the Southern Asia field. The Commission's first appeal

to the District Superintendents, the missionaries, and the preachers urged them to pray and work for the maintenance and spread of the revival spirit and called upon them to mobilize the entire constituency "in the interest of the work that finds accomplishment in genuine revivals of religion."

The various Annual Conferences followed up the Central Conference action by organizing their own committees or commissions on Aggressive Evangelism, which kept drawing the attention of the Conferences to the cause year after year. The chief permanent contribution of these groups was the establishment of the annual month of Aggressive Evangelism, which became a regular feature of the work on Districts throughout the India Conferences. The special observance generally was held from mid-February to mid-March. Strong emphasis was placed upon the spiritual reinvigoration of the workers as they prepared for the month-long intensive program of evangelistic meetings and tours. Not only the maximum number of regular workers, but also praying and witnessing bands of students and other converts went out to awaken the Christian community to pentecostal vitality and to work for conversions.

As time went on, the methods used in the campaigns of Aggressive Evangelism became varied, for the Superintendents adapted the campaign activities to the requirements of their particular Districts. The revival meetings familiar during the Jubilee Revival became—as did other pentecostal incidents—less frequent and less broadly influential and held their place as only one among the other evangelistic methods. Although the work of Aggressive Evangelism concentrated upon spiritual cultivation of the Christian constituency, it often garnered converts from the non-Christian community. Particularly in mass-movement sections, numerous baptisms sometimes were counted among the results of the month of Aggressive Evangelism. Indeed, here the special-month drives—although they were imbued with revival spirit among the workers—tended to become, largely, periodic intensifications of the general mass-movement work, which was oriented towards formal, as contrasted with pentecostal, baptism.

The drift of the Aggressive Evangelism movement away from its uniquely revivalist character appears in the spread of objectives announced by Bishop Warne for the campaign of 1916; he called for a revival in every English congregation, the deepening of the spiritual life of the entire Christian community, the weeding out of vestigial non-Christian religious observances and their replacement by Christian rites, the baptism of "left-overs" (children and other individuals not covered by earlier group baptisms), and the circulation of Christian literature.

EMERGENCY RELIEF: GUJARAT

Social service as a separate, continuing, organized form of mission work figured little in India Methodism, and humanitarian services generally were

offered through the Mission's institutions, in which they usually were secondary to evangelistic purposes. Many emergency humanitarian services were performed, however, because of the fact that the Mission was established in a land tragically and repeatedly overtaken by social disaster—plague, flood, famine, cholera. Then with whatever resources they had at hand, the missionaries ministered as they could to suffering people belonging to their missions or outside them.

The Gujarat District missionary staff displayed a striking instance of such responsiveness at the turn of the century, when though thoroughly absorbed in mass-movement evangelism, they acted quickly and effectively in the face of pestilence and famine.

Bubonic plague, first showing itself in Bombay in 1896, began racing through western India. By 1898, the plague had leaped the Mahi River, invading the main territory of the Gujarat District, until that time protected by quarantine. In September, it got into the rented quarters of the evangelistic workers attending the seasonal training school at Baroda and killed a woman worker. A few days later, twenty-five rats had died in the mission compound itself. Plague was beginning to strike close to the heart of the Methodists' Gujarat mass movement.

Here was a contagion that could spread infinitely more rapidly than a Christian mass movement. In 1899, it swiftly ran from village to village, until almost every community on the Baroda and Mahi River Circuits was infected, and many on the Nadiad and Godhra Circuits also. All the contaminated villages were ordered vacated as a precautionary measure. Edwin F. Frease, the District Superintendent, reported:

it was a weird thing to pass from village to village and find not a soul in them. The people were scattered about in the fields belonging to the village, living in rudely constructed "chuppers" made of branches of trees, reeds or long grass. The desolate appearance of the deserted villages was enhanced by the gaping roofs, from which the tiles were removed to let in the sunlight and heat. Many of the villages remained vacant for months, and only those who move directly among the people can appreciate the hardships endured.

Among those moving among the people was Dr. Emma H. Hodge, the W.F.M.S. physician stationed at Baroda. She began inoculating people when the plague first burst out. The public authorities believed that good will towards her as a Mission doctor would give her far greater access to the villages than was enjoyed by government doctors, whom the people often could not be persuaded to approach. Therefore they refrained from announcing that Dr. Hodge was working at their request.

Fortunately, the missionary staff and the District's entire corps of Gujarati workers had been inoculated when the plague first hit Baroda during the training school session. Therefore they all were granted permission to move

freely through the makeshift settlements, spending their time and energies largely in aiding and encouraging both Christians and non-Christians. Even under these conditions, converts were baptized, nearly all of the 399 reported for the year being secured while the plague raged.

But worse was to come. "Plague is a grim visitor," wrote Frease. "Through the ages famine has been one of the most dreaded destroyers of humanity. When these two walk one after the other or, worse still, hand in hand, it is a union before which the stoutest heart need not be ashamed to tremble." Not long after the epidemic of plague petered out and the people returned to their homes, famine—rife on the Central Provinces District for three years past, but absent from Gujarat for nearly a century—suddenly fell in acute form upon the latter's 12,000,000 people.

Frease understood the appalling omen of the failure of the monsoon to bring its normally heavy rains, especially when plague had disrupted the storing of family grain supplies. He promptly organized his missionaries into a District committee for famine relief, directed them to survey conditions in their localities, and called them to a planning conference at Nadiad. Subordinating their role as directors of mass evangelism to their pastoral concern for the six thousand people under their care, they adopted an eight-point program to help their Gujarati families fight the famine. For the next year and a half, their energies and their emotions, finally even their health, were consumed in carrying it out.

Their first two steps moved towards protecting the integrity of the Mission and of its potential converts. First, to guard against pseudo-conversions prompted by expectations of assistance during the emergency, the missionaries decided to give no gratuitous relief contributions except to people suffering extreme handicaps in the harsh struggle to keep alive. Second, they at once suspended their regular baptizing activity, a measure they realized would also be necessitated by the extraordinary work load their relief activity would press upon them.

The third step was an appeal to the Board in New York for special funds to undergird practical relief projects. Frease made an initial request for a total of \$12,000, urging speedy remittance of \$2,000. When he sent his first appeal, in September, the country already was parched, half the cattle in some sections of Gujarat had died, and the water supply for the people was beginning to give out. Signs of starvation were appearing among the normally abysmally poverty-stricken Methodist families, and grain merchants were exploiting the emergency by boosting prices to merciless heights.

Frease next started a project to provide employment for the Dhed handloom weavers who made up about three-quarters of the Methodist families. Ordinarily, the weavers got yarn from Muslim borahs (village merchants), wove it into cloth, and were paid by the borahs when they brought in the finished product. But the approach of the famine had quickly undermined

the cloth market, and the borahs had stopped issuing yarn early in July. The weavers were left without any source of income at all. The missionaries decided to take up the function of the borahs, and Frease and Park went down to Bombay in September to arrange for purchases of yarn. By October, they had yarn in the hands of the weavers, and before long seventeen hundred people in 350 families were at work. As the weavers came back to the mission stations with the cloth they wove, the missionary group paid them wages that enabled them to buy food. The missionaries sold the cloth to public hospitals, poorhouses, relief camps, and other agencies. More weavers were taken on as large government orders came in. The proceeds were turned back into a revolving fund for the purchase of more yarn.

Just as the weaving program was getting under way, the District's executive committee on the emergency—Frease, Park, and Hudson—started an even more far-reaching project. They began importing grain by arrangement with a Bombay firm, almost at once getting 123 tons on the field. Grain shops were opened at twelve accessible places, and corn was sold without profit, the proceeds, like those from the weaving, being returned to a revolving fund. For a short time, only Christians were eligible to buy; but this policy was soon revoked, and hundreds of non-Christians appeared among the buyers.

One of the busy grain shops was set up at Godhra, with the missionary's wife, Mrs. Robert C. Ward, largely supervising it. There was no doubt of the need for it; the people in the neighborhood were frightfully emaciated, and dead bodies—in one place, literally by the dozen—lay where the hungry victims had fallen.

"The people came in by the hundreds," wrote the District Superintendent, "thronging the shop all day long. The purchases were for small amounts, and the cash in small copper coins, most of them old, irregular coinage, difficult to count. Night after night Mrs. Ward would be up to one and two o'clock before the cash of the sales for the day was counted and verified." Among the needy customers were members of the Koli caste and other unconverted caste people, as well as crowds of Bhils. The Bhils were members of a hill tribe outside the caste system. Until then, they had been fearful and distrustful of foreigners and their civilization, but now they showed many touching expressions of gratitude for the relief available at the grain shop run by Mrs. Ward.

The feeding program went on month after month, not only bringing grain to thousands of people, but also helping to curb inflationary prices in the general market. When, in July, 1900, the *Quito* put in at Bombay with a shipload of gift grain sent from the United States by the nondenominational journal *Christian Herald*, the Methodist group distributed a thousand tons of corn from the large supply sent into Gujarat. The sales at the emergency grain shops ran to many thousands of tons. When finally the famine was

nearly spent and it was time for the rain-bearing monsoon, the missionaries helped the government distribute seed corn and cash subsidies to the farmers preparing to plant.

Nevertheless, after months of intensive effort to feed the hungry, Frease was torn by the realization that he and his colleagues were touching only the fringe of the frightful distress all about them. Gujarat was one of the worst areas of suffering from the famine, which was ravaging vast expanses of the land, especially the territory of 30,000,000 people living in parts of Central and Western India. In March, 1900, Frease had to journey north through Gujarat and Rajputana to Delhi. For six hundred miles along the railway, he was oppressed by the abnormal heat and disturbed by the shocking signs of famine that he observed.

At each station, the train was besieged by gaunt, skeletal famine sufferers of all ages, who broke through the station fences, desperately crying out for food. Railroad employees tried to hold them back, even driving them out of the stations with whips. Between stations, Frease saw no dead bodies of famine casualties; they had been removed, to avoid bad publicity for some of the states through which he was passing. At the railroad stations, he saw great piles of bones and stacks of hides that told of the almost complete destruction of the cattle. The smaller branches of the trees had been peeled of their bark to feed the remaining cattle and even to provide the people something to mix with their meager portions of flour. Everywhere the countryside was desolate—the plains dry and barren, bleak hills glaring in the fierce heat, small whirlwinds whipping along clouds of dust.

By this time, about 5,000,000 people were receiving government aid. The harsh irony running through those awful months of wasting suffering and enormous mortality was the presence of adequate foodstuffs in India. The popular hunger came in the wake of unemployment combined with abnormal prices. This fact gave point to the Methodist projects for employing weavers and selling low-price grain. It also opened a third avenue of service.

The missionaries gave valuable assistance to the large numbers of their constituents whose families had to leave home to live at government relief work projects (the government's program included labor on roads, water tanks, canals, railways, and earthworks). They arranged for many of their people to travel in parties. Pastor-teachers sometimes accompanied these groups, and some of them even became foremen of work gangs. Thus they were able to watch over their people, protecting them from being defrauded or mistreated and conducting regular religious services for them. The missionaries visited the work projects as often as possible, to give aid and to keep track of the members of their Christian communities.

In June, another terror struck in Gujarat; cholera swept through the entire District. It first made its ugly and virulent appearance at the government relief work camps, where people died so fast it was impossible to dig graves

for them, and the bodies had to be burned. At the Godhra reservoir project, where thirteen thousand people were billeted, the bodies of two thousand victims were cremated. One hundred forty-five thousand people fled the camps, carrying the deadly disease with them as they tried to make their way home through the parching heat. When they arrived, the missionaries did what they could to care for them, Christian and non-Christian alike, in their indescribable emaciation and helplessness.

All through the complex emergency, the Gujarat Mission worked at yet another sobering responsibility, "the culminating horror of them all." Famine makes orphans, and casts them adrift to die. The Gujarat missionaries were determined that no Christian child should be lost, and that as many other children as possible should be saved. Freese hardly had got his first appeal for famine relief funds off to New York, when a hundred abandoned boys and girls were brought to the boarding schools in Baroda. As the famine heightened, there were thousands of forsaken orphans in all stages of starvation in Gujarat, many of them in public relief poorhouses, many wandering about like walking skeletons. By April, 1900, the missionaries were caring for six hundred boys and girls at Baroda, still more at Godhra, and others at Nadiad. After the earliest stages of this work, mission agents gathered children into smaller village centers, where they kept them long enough to build them up physically and to avoid overcrowding at the main orphanages. Buildings to house the children were erected at each of the three stations, and the W.F.M.S. rented quarters for those who were placed in their care at Baroda.

Along with the orphans whom they gathered in on their own initiative, the missionaries sheltered children turned over to them by public authorities. They received practically all the famine orphans from the two districts near Nadiad and Godhra, and from sections farther west, along with boys and girls from the poorhouses in the Ahmedabad district and many from the Gaekwar's jurisdiction. About three thousand children finally were dependent upon the Gujarat Methodist organization for food, shelter, clothing, and training. Out of the necessity for vocational training for some of the boys thus left in their care, Park later founded an industrial department of the boys' orphanage school at Nadiad which finally became a separate and permanent institution.

The only major aspect of the Gujarat District emergency program that was not carried through substantially as projected was the plan to make work for some of the non-weaver laborers by employing them in building simple village chapels with living quarters for pastor-teachers. There was urgent need for these modest, inexpensive places of worship, for the entire District had only one small church building that could be used for its mass-movement converts. Evidently the timing of the flow of relief funds from the United States did not make it possible to go ahead with these permanent additions. Hundreds of workers were employed in building the orphanages, however,

and on other property improvements on mission stations during the time when public work projects were disorganized by the cholera attack.

During the first half of the famine crisis, neither the Central Conference Famine Relief Committee nor Secretary Adna B. Leonard, in New York, expected that American Methodists would contribute very much to India famine relief. Leonard doubted that even \$10,000 would be donated. The Missionary Society's only direct contribution was an appropriation by the Board of \$1,000 from its Contingent Fund. After some months, the Board began issuing famine fund appeals in the church press, and contributions came in from all over the United States. By the end of 1900, when the worst of the crisis was past, the New York office had sent out \$149,768 for famine emergency purposes within the India mission. India's Interdenominational Famine Fund assigned to the Methodist relief work \$89,000, a large share of the funds dispatched to India as the result of a campaign conducted by the *Christian Herald*. From these two sources, and a few miscellaneous ones, the Central Conference Committee sent about \$85,000 into the Gujarat District to finance its manifold relief program. Methodist donors continued their gifts into 1901, but by that time most of the emergency fund was being spent for the support of orphans received before 30 November 1900. For this purpose, also, cash balances in the Gujarat District relief funds were being expended.

Through all the harrowing months of mass suffering, the missionaries added to their exhausting efforts on the District's own projects heavy duty for some of the government agencies. Thomas Hudson had charge of a large government station for the conservation of agricultural cattle. Robert Ward worked indefatigably at the superintendency of the public famine poorhouse and hospital in Godhra, which he operated at a high level of efficiency and compassionate service. Frease reported to the Board's New York office:

The average number of inmates was about 2,000, and they were brought in by the scores from the roads and lanes on stretchers, ghastly objects. For months the daily death rate was about 40, all of the bodies of whom had to be burned, a most grewsome task. There [Godhra] too was the greatest cholera outbreak of that awful year, and night and day Bro. Ward devoted himself to the saving of the people regardless of personal risk.

George Park, stationed at Nadiad, served as executive vice-president of the government's District Famine Relief Committee, was a member of two other public boards, distributed about \$33,000 in public charitable funds to individuals, and like Hudson, ran a government cattle conservation station. All this was in addition to his activities as director of thirty evangelistic workers in forty villages and as supervisor of four emergency grain shops, a fast-growing orphanage, and 125 Christian families engaged in weaving.

The extraordinary difficulties created by the long emergency did not ruin

the Gujarat mission, but it nearly ruined the missionaries. Indeed, Thomas Hudson, overwhelmed by the human distress he tried unceasingly to relieve across the Mahi River District and in the boys' orphanage in Baroda, reached the point of physical and emotional exhaustion, and a few days after nursing cholera patients among his young charges, was struck dead by cholera on 28 June 1900. The next day, Miss Brown, the new orphanage matron at Nadiad, died from cholera. Cholera also took Park's ten-year-old boy and Ward's infant daughter. Soon afterwards, Ward, who did not recoup his strength for years, was hospitalized in Bombay for two months, and Frease almost lost his life in a critical attack of typhoid that kept him immobilized for more than eight months. Finally, towards the end of the year, Park was the only member of the missionary team left on the field. With the help of two young lay volunteers from Dharamtala Church, Calcutta, he tried to carry on the entire District enterprise in the face of the receding but still present waves of popular distress. "Bro. Leonard," he wrote to New York in November, "we must have help in Gujarat quickly, not so much money as men—strong both in mind and body and who are not afraid of disease and dirt."

The terrible crisis of 1899–1900 brought baptizing activity almost to a dead stop; the accessions fell to only forty-six in 1900. But this interlude was not an essential interruption of missionary work.

To be sure, Secretary Leonard, trying to keep his gift voucher system straight, ended an appeal for India famine relief in *The Gospel in All Lands* with a word of caution that seemed to reflect a curiously unimaginative philosophy of missions: "It should be remembered that money contributed for famine sufferers is not for missions, but for bread . . ." Leonard also was inclined to see the emergency growth of orphanages not as a missionary opportunity, but as a problem threatening the Mission's solvency. "I cannot suppress a fear," he wrote to Frease, "that through their sympathy and generosity they are in danger of over-loading our mission with orphans . . . This means an enormous expenditure for several years to come."

The missionaries in Gujarat also appreciated the humanitarian aspect of the emergency, and undoubtedly with greater poignancy than Leonard, for they saw and felt its raw demands day by day. They were moved by impulses far deeper than the hope of organizational exploitation of the exigencies of the famine period, "these hours of great distress and almost limitless opportunities for following in the footsteps of the Master." Nevertheless, they were aware of the inevitable organic relationship between their ministries of compassion and their more conventional missionary activities. While informing Leonard of the suspension of baptizing in the early days of the famine, Frease commented on the outlook for the future in a realistic vein:

But if we carry our plans through, I believe a large section of Gujarat will have been won for Christ in what is doubtless a perfectly legitimate

method of evangelization. If we fail, our work will suffer irreparable harm.

I am aware that through the above runs a view of motive which may not be of the highest; and recognize that our obligations to shepherd the "flock" are higher and more imperative than any visions of wider success as a result. But they are live factors we have to deal with, and hence I mention them.

A large reservoir of candidates for baptism built up during the famine months, for preaching and instruction, though disorganized, had not halted entirely. When the sluices were opened early in 1901, by acting District Superintendent Daniel O. Fox and by William E. Robbins, hundreds of baptisms came in a rush. On a single day, the two workers baptized eight hundred persons at Vaso; two days later, they baptized six hundred at Mahudan. Bishop Warne came to Gujarat in July, and in four days' meetings, 1,330 candidates were baptized. Robbins traveled at large in the District, baptizing 2,200 newly declared Christians. The District finally reported 6,286 baptisms for the year.

CONTINUING MINISTRIES

Although the Mission faced from time to time high crises of need or of opportunity, a significant volume of constructive and life-enhancing activity flowed steadily through its institutional channels of teaching and healing.

Year after year, the India mission was in touch with thousands of children and young people through the work of many hundreds of Methodist schools. By 1919 there were forty-four thousands boys and girls in eighteen hundred schools of all grades. Almost all the curricula were limited chiefly to regular academic subjects, though there were half a dozen boys' schools, and two for girls, that also taught manual, or "industrial," arts. Closely associated, also, with the Mission's educational system were ten orphanages.

The school system was headed, as in 1896, by two colleges in Lucknow—Lucknow Christian College, for men, and Isabella Thoburn College and Normal School, for women (it was called Lucknow Woman's College until the death of its founder Miss Thoburn in 1901). Only a small number of Christian students attended the colleges—twenty-seven men and twenty-eight women out of the combined enrollment of about three hundred. Only thirty-two women in all attended Isabella Thoburn College. Proportionately more girls went to the Methodist high schools: 2,100 pupils attended the fourteen girls' schools, and 3,600 pupils attended the dozen boys' schools. The 6,200 pupils in the Mission's fifty-eight middle schools were about equally divided as to boys and girls, as was the number of middle schools. The enrollment in the 1,138 primary schools for boys was 21,000, and the total for the 518 primary schools for girls was 10,000. About two-thirds of all the pupils on these levels of the Methodist educational enterprise were Christians.

More specifically designed to perpetuate the Methodist movement in India

were the Mission's forty-five theological and Bible training schools, in which were enrolled 519 men and 276 women. Prominent in this group were the Florence B. Nicholson School of Theology, at Baroda, and the Bareilly Theological Seminary.

About fifty of the Mission's schools were affiliated with the W.F.M.S.

The W.F.M.S. shared even more significantly in the Mission's medical work. In 1919, there were twenty-six hospitals and dispensaries recognized by the Central Conference. Among the more substantial projects were six hospitals maintained by the Woman's Society: Pakur Hospital, the Mrs. William Butler Memorial Hospital (Baroda), the Zenana Hospital (Bareilly), Brindaban Hospital, Pithoragarh Hospital, and the Ellen Thoburn Cowen Memorial Hospital (Kolar). Among the projects of the Board of Foreign Missions were the Thoburn Memorial Hospital (Nadiad), Shahjahanpur Dispensary, Bidar Methodist Hospital, and the Huldah A. Crawford Memorial Hospital (Vikarabad).

The organized medical projects taken all together reported treating 12,000 inpatients in 1919, with over 700,000 outpatients coming to the hospital and dispensaries.

This medical ministry, valuable as it had been, was recognized by the 1919 session of the Central Conference as inadequate under the conditions existing in India. During the past year, one out of every eighteen Indian Christians died of influenza, smallpox, cholera, bubonic plague, fever, or lung troubles. The Conference therefore called for a large extension of medical facilities and personnel under a new Medical Board of the Central Conference. The purpose of the plan was to combat the high death rate of the Church's trained workers and active Christians, to meet the increasing demands of the growing Christian communities, and to undergird "aggressive evangelistic medical work."

Part III

THE AMERICAN FIELD

1896-1919

Home Base and Home Missions

IN 1896, THE ACTIVITY OF THE Methodist Episcopal Church reached into two dozen foreign countries on five continents.* In Africa there were missions in Liberia, Angola, and Mozambique and at a few points on the Congo River. In Asia, Methodist missions were spreading the gospel in China, Korea, Japan, India, and Malaysia. In Europe, the mission fields included Germany, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Russia, Switzerland, Bulgaria, and Italy. The South American missions were located in Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, Brazil, Chile, and Peru. And on the North American continent there was Mexico.

At the same time, the Church was carrying on a broad program of "domestic missions" in the United States, including both maintenance of special missions to geographic and ethnic groups and distribution of missionary funds to many of the established Annual Conferences to supplement their missionary efforts. In addition, the Church had a mission in Hawaii under the Japanese District of the California Conference, a connection that made it a domestic mission in spite of the fact that annexation by the United States did not come until two years later.

All these interests were administered by the Missionary Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church in a single undepartmentalized executive operation. Auxiliary to the Society were the Woman's Home Missionary Society and the Woman's Foreign Missionary Society. Supplementing the domestic work of the Missionary Society, but not controlled by it, were the Board of Church Extension and the Freedmen's Aid Society.†

Subject to the Board of Managers, three Corresponding Secretaries, coordinate in authority, served as the chief executive officers of the Missionary Society, with offices at 150 Fifth Avenue, New York City. Each Secretary gave special attention to particular areas of the work in patterns that changed from time to time. In 1896, the Corresponding Secretaries were Adna B. Leonard, Abraham J. Palmer, and William T. Smith, a combination that lasted until 1900. In that year, the General Conference ordered that there be a single Corresponding Secretary, who should be the executive officer of

* See Part II.

† For all these groups, see Vol. III.

the Society, and a First Assistant Corresponding Secretary. The General Conference elected to these posts, respectively, Adna Leonard and Henry K. Carroll. The Board of Managers added to the staff two Assistant Secretaries, William F. Oldham and George B. Smyth. This group worked together until 1904, when Oldham was elected to the episcopacy and was succeeded by Frederick H. Sheets. Around these Secretaries gradually was gathered a headquarters staff that by 1906 numbered seven men.

The decade following 1896 was a period of rapid expansion of the Missionary Society's foreign enterprise.* Methodist work was begun in Austria in 1897; in Southern Rhodesia, Madeira, Ecuador, and Hungary in 1898; in the Philippine Islands in 1899; in the Cape Verde Islands, Bolivia, and Sarawak in 1901; in Lithuania (it was still a part of Russia) in 1903; in Sumatra, Java, and Panama in 1905; and in West Borneo in 1906.

During this period, the Society also opened two new outpost missions that it classified as domestic, namely, Alaska and Puerto Rico.

The Woman's Home Missionary Society, however, already had been at work in Alaska on the large Aleutian island of Unalaska. A Local Preacher named John H. Carr and his wife had begun a mission for Indians on nearby Unga Island in 1886. The work developed into the Jesse Lee Home, which was maintained by the W.H.M.S. on Unalaska. By 1904, it was a home and industrial school staffed by a physician-superintendent, Dr. A. W. Newhall, and by three W.H.M.S. women missionaries. In its several buildings it harbored thirty-seven Aleut and Eskimo boys and girls.

The Missionary Society made its own beginning in sparsely settled Alaska in 1897 upon the initiative of Bishop Charles C. McCabe, who appointed C. J. Larsen as superintendent of the Alaska District of the Western Norwegian-Danish Conference. Larsen arrived in Alaska in October and held his first service there on Douglas Island on the twenty-fourth of the month. He settled at Dyea, then a village not many miles above Skagway. The General Missionary Committee formally recognized the Mission in November and started it off with an appropriation of two thousand dollars.

J. J. Walter, a member of the Oregon Conference, came to Alaska in March, 1899, under appointment by Bishop McCabe as superintendent of the Alaska mission. He found already in operation, in Skagway and in Juneau, two churches founded by Larsen, who withdrew from the Mission in July to enter other missionary work in the interior. In 1900, Walter started churches in two places in southeastern Alaska, namely, Douglas City and Ketchikan. After repeated and urgent calls from an Indian tribe located twenty-five miles from Ketchikan, he opened a mission among them "at their ancient capital, Klukwan." To this mission he sent as pastor Milo A. Sellon, a young man converted in Skagway, who with Walter's help soon established a church and set about learning the people's Tlingit speech. Sellon, who taught school,

* See Part I.

preached, and effectively counseled the Indians on his field, gathered 175 of them into the Methodist Church by 1902. Walter's successor as superintendent, W. H. Selleck, then was compelled regretfully to transfer the Indian mission to the Presbyterians because of a longstanding Missionary Society compact granting the former exclusive right to evangelize the tribes of southeastern Alaska. Bishop Earl Cranston secured an agreement, however, that for the future the limiting compact would stand annulled.

Up to 1903, the field suffered a rapid turnover of both superintendents and pastors, who were drawn from Conferences in northwestern United States. Bishop John W. Hamilton in that year drafted a new set of men from well-developed churches in the States and sent them to Alaska. One of them was stationed on Prince of Wales Island, thirty miles from Ketchikan, and opened a mission there at Dolomi. Another revived the church at Juneau, which had been discontinued for lack of funds.

The following year, Bishop Hamilton presided over the first Annual Meeting of the Alaska Mission organized as a separate and formal unit in the Methodist connection. The churches reported a total of sixty-four members. In August, John Parsons, the Superintendent, made the first move to project the work beyond southeastern Alaska; he visited Seward, a new town nine hundred miles northwest of Juneau by steamer. In 1905, following a visit by Secretary Leonard to the Annual Meeting at Ketchikan and to Fairbanks and Nome, it was decided to press forward into the north. Preachers thereupon went to Seward, to Fairbanks, 350 miles northwest into central Alaska, and to Nome, more than five hundred miles west of Fairbanks, across the Bering Strait from Russia. At about the same time, the W.H.M.S. opened its second Alaskan enterprise, a mission for native people, which was located at Sinuk, near Nome. The missionaries were Milo Sellon and his wife, who earlier had conducted the Indian mission near Ketchikan.

The founder of the Puerto Rico Mission was Charles W. Drees, the veteran missionary to Mexico and Argentina. He submitted to the January meeting of the Missionary Society's Board of Managers in 1899 a proposal—which they adopted—that Secretary Leonard and Bishop William X. Ninde be asked to visit Cuba and Puerto Rico to evaluate the opportunity and responsibility of the Methodist Episcopal Church for religious work in the two islands. Both places, of course, now were open to unfettered Protestant evangelization because of the recent removal of the Catholic-oriented power of Spain. Leonard and Bishop Ninde made the requested trip in February and presented reports urgently recommending that the Society establish a mission in Puerto Rico but that Cuba be left to the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, which already had made a beginning there.

A public appeal for special gifts toward an immediate opening in Puerto Rico yielded \$3,500 by the time the General Missionary Committee met in November, when it authorized the founding of the new mission. It increased

the fund available to \$6,000 plus a conditional appropriation of \$5,000. The Board of Church Extension also acted to support the new venture, issuing an appeal for gifts for building purposes. To his surprise, Charles Drees soon was recalled from Buenos Aires to become the superintendent of the projected Puerto Rico mission.

Drees landed in Puerto Rico on Sunday, 25 March 1900. Within forty-eight hours, he secured a meeting hall in San Juan, and there he held a preliminary prayer meeting on the following Friday evening and on Sunday conducted public worship with a congregation of fifty. This English-speaking group became San Juan's First Church. The first Spanish-speaking church, which was named Trinity Church, was opened on 8 April. Its first permanent pastor was Manuel Andújar, who took charge about a year later, after the church had been served by a series of temporary leaders. A month after landing, Drees also opened a church in Puerta de Tierra for English-speaking Protestants, mainly colored people from the English islands. Its first pastor was George S. James, a Wesleyan lay preacher. Spanish-language work soon was added to the program and after a while became the stronger element in the work because of the removal of most of the members of the English congregation from the area.

Moving east along the northern coast from San Juan, the Methodists established a church in Arecibo in July. The missionary appointed to develop the work was Achilles H. Lambert, a former Roman Catholic priest and Wesleyan preacher with many years' experience in religious work in the West Indies. The Arecibo mission soon developed outstations in Utuado, Camuy, and Hato Viejo. Methodist preachers also reached Aibonito, Dominquito, and Abra Honda.

In February, 1901, the Mission sent Buel O. Campbell, a former Chile missionary, to establish a Methodist center in Guayama, in southeastern Puerto Rico. From this post, Campbell carried the Methodist preaching ministry to El Corazón, Las Guásimas, Las Marcas, Arroyo (Guayama's seaport), Patillas, and Aguirre, going to some weekly and to some less regularly. In April, Drees dispatched George James to Vieques, an island just off the eastern coast, of whose six thousand inhabitants nearly a third were English-speaking and chiefly Protestant. He reinforced the English-language mission begun some months before on the personal initiative of N. J. Young, who had been preaching there without missionary support. Later in the year, Samuel Culpeper was sent to Vieques to inaugurate Spanish preaching. The Vieques mission soon was reaching successfully Isabel Segunda, Esperanza, Playa Grande, Santa Maria, and the nearby island of Culebra.

In addition to inaugurating these first churches and evangelistic activities, the Mission took up three institutional projects. Washington Institute, a school for the children of Puerto Rican and American families unwilling to

send them to the public schools and unable to send them to the United States, opened in San Juan in September, 1900, under the direction of George B. Benedict. Its pupils came, reported Drees, "from the most influential classes of Puerto Rican society." McKinley Free School offered primary instruction for the poor children associated with the Mission's Spanish work in San Juan—children not able to enter the public schools, which did not have accommodations for all children of school age, especially those of the very poor. In Arecibo, the Mission took over, under the direction of Achilles Lambert, a small orphanage surrendered by a Methodist laywoman who was unable, because of ill health, to continue it.

The W.H.M.S. sent three deaconesses to Puerto Rico to supplement the program launched by the personnel enlisted by the Missionary Society. Sarah P. White came to San Juan in July, 1900, at once began studying Spanish, and then threw herself into visitation evangelism, home service to the sick, and Sunday school teaching, until in December, 1901, she was transferred to Guayama. Isabel F. Horton arrived in San Juan several months after Sarah White and took up visitation, social work, and teaching, both in the capital and in Puerta de Tierra. Alice McKinney joined the San Juan work in November, 1901. Workers of the W.H.M.S. later not only served in the McKinley Free School but took up teaching in elementary schools connected with other Methodist churches.

Among the other organizations co-operating with the Missionary Society was the Board of Church Extension, which contributed funds to help get the Mission's building program started, especially in San Juan and in Guayama. Varied assistance came also from the Tract Society and the Sunday School Union of the Methodist Episcopal Church and from the American Bible Society and the American Tract Society.

All this initial work—it was done by a variety of lay volunteers, former missionaries, deaconesses, and American ministers, some of whom stayed only briefly—was accomplished in time for Superintendent Drees to be able to report it to the First Annual Meeting of the Puerto Rico Mission as a formal connectional unit. This session was held in San Juan in March, 1902, under the presidency of Bishop John M. Walden. A statistical gauge of the result of the Mission's two-year effort was the report that there were then 195 full members and 640 probationers enrolled in the Methodist Episcopal Church.

Two new missions were opened in 1902, at Ponce, midway along the southern coast, and at Aibonito, thirty miles northwest of Guayama. Thus was completed the occupation of what Drees described as "our central quadrilateral with its four angles at *San Juan, Arecibo, Ponce, and Guayama*, and the extremities of its central axis, east and west, at *Aibonito and Utuado*."

When Charles Drees departed from the Mission in April, 1904, he left

behind him a general Methodist constituency of twelve hundred people in over thirty regular congregations. This Methodist following had been gathered rapidly but not without difficulty. The Mission was operating in a situation of mixed advantage and disadvantage, which Drees described to its Annual Meeting two months before his departure :

The outward conditions under which we prosecute our work continue practically unchanged. Under the protecting folds of the flag [of the United States] we move forward on all lines of activity with that unrestricted liberty which is the glory of our American Christian Protestant civilization. . . . The *Roman Church* has been aroused to undisguised hostility manifested in denunciatory and comminatory preaching especially in every new station which our advance movements lead us to occupy. . . . Constant espionage over our congregations, Sunday schools, and, in San Juan, over the McKinley Day School, visitation by nuns, and the invocation of social relationships, together with offers in some cases of gifts in clothing have been employed to induce adults to withdraw from our congregations and children from our schools.

These measures won, however, only qualified success. They undoubtedly accounted for the choice of a name for the Methodist monthly paper founded in 1903 under the editorship of Manuel Andújar; it was called *El Defensor Cristiano*.

In January, 1906, Benjamin S. Haywood, one of Drees's successors as Superintendent, reported to the Annual Meeting, in session on Vieques, that the Mission had grown to a constituency of twenty-five hundred "communicants" gathered into eighty-three congregations in touch with fourteen mission stations. In addition to the missionary leadership, the Mission staff included twelve Local Preachers and sixteen Exhorters.

In 1896, the Board of Church Extension was headed by two Corresponding Secretaries, Alpha J. Kynett and William A. Spencer, with Manley S. Hard as Assistant Corresponding Secretary. Alpha Kynett, who had taken office in 1866, died in 1899. James M. King then joined the staff as First Assistant Secretary, later becoming Corresponding Secretary, in which capacity he served until 1906.

During this decade, the Board of Church Extension's loans and donations were channeled into church and mission projects throughout the United States. In addition, assistance went to missions outside the United States—to the Alaska Mission, the Hawaii Mission, the Puerto Rico Mission, and the Philippine Islands Mission Conference.

In 1907, the major interests in the Missionary Society and in the Board of Church Extension were reorganized by order of the General Conference. The foreign work of the Missionary Society became the province of the Board of Foreign Missions. Its domestic missions, which now became known as home missions, were constituted one of the components of an agency called the Board of Home Missions and Church Extension, the other

component being the longstanding work of the Board of Church Extension. The former organizations were not dissolved; their corporate identities were conserved as the legal bases of the newly shaped enterprises. By amendment of their charters of incorporation, they were given new names, and the respective statements of the objects of their work were revised to conform to the new patterns of activities. The Board of Foreign Missions retained the headquarters location of the Missionary Society at 150 Fifth Avenue, New York City, and the Board of Home Missions retained the headquarters in Philadelphia that had belonged to the Board of Church Extension.

The Woman's Foreign Missionary Society continued its work as before, but in auxiliary relationship to the Board of Foreign Missions. The Woman's Home Missionary Society became auxiliary to the Board of Home Missions and Church Extension. The Freedmen's Aid Society, however, was not included in either of the missionary combinations, for it was classified by this time as essentially an educational agency. It was merged in 1907 with other denominational educational units in an expanded Board of Education.

Adna W. Leonard, who had been a Corresponding Secretary of the Missionary Society since 1888, became the sole holder of that office in the Board of Foreign Missions, serving until his retirement in 1912. He was succeeded at that time by three men with co-ordinate authority: S. Earl Taylor; William F. Oldham, who resigned from the episcopacy to take the Secretarial post; and Frank Mason North. Oldham re-entered the episcopacy in 1916, leaving Taylor and North in office. North remained in the position until he retired in 1924. Taylor took leave of absence because of ill health in June, 1920, and resigned a year later, being succeeded by Titus Lowe. When North retired as Corresponding Secretary and Lowe was elected Bishop in 1924, Ralph E. Diffendorfer and John R. Edwards took their places. These two men worked together until Edwards's withdrawal in 1936. His successor as Diffendorfer's colleague was William E. Shaw. These two continued as the Board's Corresponding Secretaries until it was absorbed in the new Board of Missions of The Methodist Church following unification of the Methodist Episcopal Church, the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, and the Methodist Protestant Church in 1939.

Working under the Corresponding Secretaries were assisting Secretaries, whose titles and functions changed from time to time. Homer C. Stuntz served as First Assistant Corresponding Secretary under Secretary Leonard from 1908 to 1912, when he resigned upon election to the episcopacy. From 1913 to 1918, the Corresponding Secretaries were assisted by various functional Secretaries added to the headquarters staff to direct such activities as missionary education, editing and publication, income procurement, enlistment of missionary candidates, and missionary evangelism. Among them were George F. Sutherland, George Heber Jones, Thomas S. Donohugh, James M. Taylor, Ralph E. Diffendorfer, Harry Farmer, and Brenton T. Badley.

Until 1919, the Corresponding Secretaries shared, under varying patterns of assignment, responsibility for supervising correspondence with the missionaries and the Bishops on the Board's some three dozen foreign fields. But in that year, the Executive Committee announced a staff reorganization that included designation of five Secretaries to have charge of administrative contacts with specific groups of foreign fields. Thomas Donohugh was assigned to Africa and Southern Asia, Harry Farmer to Latin America, Ralph A. Ward to China, Edwin F. Lee to Europe and North Africa, and Arthur B. Moss to Japan and Korea. This system was the first substantial move toward utilizing experienced foreign missionaries as home base field secretaries in charge of areas in which they previously had served, though at first there was not full correlation between the fields first served and then later supervised by particular Secretaries. A single functional Secretary for foreign work, Eric M. North, was assigned at this time to promote education and literature abroad.

Another element in the reorganization announced in 1916 was creation of the Medical Department, which was organized by Dr. John G. Vaughan. He became responsible for examination of missionary candidates, conserving the general health of missionaries on the field, the health of furloughed missionaries, enlistment of medical missionaries, and standardization of medical mission work abroad. This Department was a valuable addition in an area long tragically plagued by physical and mental breakdowns, by many deaths in missionary families, and by poorly developed, ill supervised, and inadequately maintained medical field projects.

The Corresponding Secretaries were elected by the General Conference and were currently amenable to Board control. The Board of Foreign Missions retained in 1907 a form of organization similar to that of the Missionary Society that in part it succeeded. Its Board of Managers—composed of the Bishops (*ex officio*) and of ministers and laymen elected by the General Conference—met monthly to direct current administration. The Board of Managers was amenable to the General Committee of Foreign Missions, which was comprised of the Bishops, the officers of the Board of Missions, representatives of the Board of Managers, and a large number of laymen and ministers chosen from fifteen General Conference Districts. This committee, which met annually in November, established Board policy, determined what mission fields should be entered, and made appropriations for the work.

During the first decade of the Board of Foreign Missions, expansion into new foreign fields continued, but not so rapidly as in the last decade of the Missionary Society. Five fields were opened up during that time: France (1907), North Africa (1908), the Belgian Congo (1910), Bangka (1911), and Costa Rica (1917).* The Board established thereafter only two new

* See Part I.

missions—in Spain (1919) and in the Union of South Africa (1920).^{*} The appearance of the Baltic and Yugoslavia missions on the roster of Methodist foreign fields after World War I represented not essentially new work, but administrative reorganization necessitated by the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the separation of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia from Russia.

The Board of Foreign Missions undertook in 1928 a single foreign project that was not a popular evangelistic mission; it participated in opening in Jerusalem the Newman School of Missions, which was named for Bishop John P. Newman. The Board had received in 1911, pursuant to the will of Bishop Newman's widow, a trust that included real estate in Jerusalem and an endowment for the maintenance there of a school and mission. Some use of the property for educational purposes was made before World War I, but though various proposals for further implementation of the trust were made, it long remained inactive. The Board deliberately refrained, for instance, from entering evangelistic work in Jerusalem. When the Newman School finally was opened, the Board, still maintaining and managing the trust, made the Jerusalem property available rent free to house a school of Islamic studies and a general study center for missionaries and native Christian workers for Syria and Palestine. The School was placed in the operational care of a special Board of Directors appointed by the United Christian Council of Syria and Palestine. Its first head was Eric A. Bishop, a missionary of the Church Missionary Society. It began with eleven students and by 1935 had eighty-one.

The Board of Foreign Missions not only extended its outreach, but also retracted it. When it was created in 1907, the small missions on the lower Congo already had disappeared, early in Bishop Hartzell's administration; the Cape Verde Islands mission was gone, having failed to last a full year; and the Brazil work had been transferred to the Methodist Episcopal Church, South. The Board closed the Ecuador mission in 1914 and ended its work in Paraguay in 1916. The mission in Bangka faded out during the twenties, and a reorganization of the Netherlands East Indies missions brought about surrender of the missions in Java and West Borneo in favor of concentration upon Sumatra. The work in France and Italy lapsed in the thirties, and by 1939, the Board had lost contact with its mission in Russia.

In its first year in charge of the foreign fields, the Board of Foreign Missions maintained 673 missionaries abroad, 343 of them men, the rest of them wives of missionaries. The year 1923 marked the peak of the Board's deployment of missionaries. At that time there were 663 men, 523 wives of missionaries, and 123 single women serving abroad under Board auspices. Beginning in 1924, when serious financial cuts in appropriations first were felt on

^{*} See Part IV.

Methodist fields around the world, missionary personnel declined in number. In 1939, the Board's missionary corps totaled a little over 500 workers.

The W.F.M.S., which over the decades increased the size of its body of missionaries in proportion to the number of workers commissioned by the Board of Foreign Missions, had 473 missionaries on the field in 1939—nearly as many as there were in all categories of Board missionaries. They were at work in Angola, Southern Rhodesia, Mozambique, India, China, Japan, Korea, Malaya, the Philippine Islands, Sumatra, Bulgaria, North Africa, Mexico, Argentina, Uruguay, and Peru. The Society's appropriations for work in these fields was \$1,336,400, which was larger than the Board's field appropriations of \$783,286.

Since the Methodist Episcopal Church consistently integrated its foreign missions into its connexional system of Annual Conferences and Mission Conferences, the Bishops in charge of the Conferences constituted, especially because of their control of the appointments to particular places and functions on the field, an important element in foreign administration co-ordinate with the Missionary Society and, later, with the Board of Foreign Missions. The Bishops' foreign responsibilities were implemented in accordance with several single or combined patterns.

In 1896, the method of periodic visitation of the foreign Conferences from the United States by a series of Bishops of the category of General Superintendent was still in effect in Europe, Japan, Korea, China, and Latin America. Beginning in 1900, the system of brief assignments of visiting Bishops soon was replaced in these areas by deployment abroad of a certain number of General Superintendents who became resident on the fields in their charge. Their assignments were quadrennial, but they resulted in some cases in continuous service for more than one quadrennium on a given field—for example the record of Bishop James W. Bashford, who served the China field from 1904 until his death in 1919.

In other areas, resident Missionary Bishops, elected by the General Conference to serve only in specific fields and not in the connection at large, were in charge; and in 1904, Japan and Korea also were placed under a Missionary Bishop. The Missionary Bishops during this administrative phase were assigned as follows: to Africa, Joseph C. Hartzell (1896–1916) and Eben S. Johnson (1916–20); to Liberia, Isaiah B. Scott (1904–16) and Alexander B. Camphor (1916–19); to India and Malaysia, James M. Thornburn (1888–1908), Edwin W. Parker (1900–1901), Frank W. Warne (1900–1920), John E. Robinson (1904–20), William F. Oldham (1904–12), John W. Robinson (1912–20), and William P. Eveland (1912–16); to Japan and Korea, Merriman C. Harris (1904–12). The majority of these men had served first as missionaries in the countries they were sent to supervise.

In 1920, the General Conference abolished the missionary episcopacy in favor of supervision by General Superintendents in foreign residence, thus

removing a point of distinction between the Church abroad and the Church in the United States that at times had been a focus of controversy. At the same time, the remaining active Missionary Bishops were elected General Superintendents. This policy was modified, however, when the General Conference elected Edwin F. Lee Missionary Bishop for Southeast Asia in 1928 and John M. Springer for Africa in 1936.

An important broadening of the base of the episcopacy as an instrument of foreign supervision occurred in 1929, when by Constitutional amendment it became possible for the Central Conferences to elect Bishops for their own jurisdictions. The Eastern Asia Central Conference elected in 1930 John Gowdy and Chih P'ing Wang and in 1936 Ralph A. Ward. Southern Asia elected Jashwant R. Chitambar in 1930 and J. Waskom Pickett in 1935. Latin America elected Juan E. Gattinoni in 1932 and Roberto Elphick in 1936. Germany elected F. H. Otto Melle in 1936. All but three of these men—Gowdy, Ward, and Pickett, who were missionaries—were nationals.

Granting power to the Central Conferences to elect Bishops was the climax of a long and gradual development in Methodist polity and practice. In 1896 there was only one Central Conference, the Central Conference for India and Malaysia, whose jurisdiction later was redesignated as Southern Asia. The General Conference of 1896 authorized a Central Conference for China. It was organized in Shanghai in October, 1897, later being renamed the Eastern Asia Central Conference. A Central Conference for Japan was authorized in 1900; it met in Tokyo in 1904—evidently for its only session. The European fields were organized into a Central Conference in 1911.

Although the Central Conference eventually became an important medium for indigenization of the Church on the foreign field, an important opportunity for development of trends and forces moving in the direction of larger if not complete autonomy, it was in 1896 mainly an apparatus intended to enhance unity and efficiency in the administration of fields including more than one Conference. Until as late as 1920, its administrative authority extended only to such educational, publishing, and "other connectional interests" as were committed to it from time to time by the constitutive Annual Conferences. This limitation was restrictive enough in itself, especially with the added provision that the Central Conference in handling these matters must not go contrary to the Discipline or to the orders of the General Conference, which realistically considered, was an American-dominated body. Furthermore, numerous concerns affecting the life of the churches abroad were completely, if tacitly, reserved for General Conference legislation.

The General Conference of 1920 greatly strengthened the position of the Central Conference in the Methodist system, especially in the direction of indigenization. It granted the Central Conference real authority over its participant Annual Conferences by giving it direct, not conditional, power to supervise the connectional interests within its field. It also granted it powers

previously reserved to the General Conference itself: to provide for courses of study for the entire range of the ministry and of mission workers, including vernacular materials; to simplify and adapt the Ritual and publish it in vernacular versions; to extend Article XXIII of the Articles of Religion so as to recognize the governments of countries within its field; to make adaptations regarding membership, worship, and the local ministry; to establish rules and ceremonies for the solemnization of matrimony; to incorporate an Executive Board for transaction of its business between sessions; and to govern the buying, holding, and transfer of property for the indigenous Church. The General Conference also provided for the establishment of three additional Central Conferences. To the Central Conference for Southeastern Asia were assigned the Conferences in Malaysia, the Philippines, and the Netherlands Indies. To the South Africa Central Conference were assigned the Conferences covering the work in Angola, the Belgian Congo, Southern Rhodesia, Mozambique, and the Union of South Africa. The Central Conference for Latin America included the Conferences and Missions in South America, Central America, and Mexico.

The General Conference of 1928 initiated legislation providing for election of Bishops by Central Conferences.

The question was raised in the Episcopal Address, read by Bishop Luther B. Wilson. The Bishops, after asserting that no change in the form of episcopal supervision was desired on some foreign fields, declared:

But in other Central Conference territories there is a clear and reasonable demand that the task of episcopal administration shall be shared by nationals or others already resident on those fields, and that the national church, through its Central Conference, shall participate more weightily in the choice of its own leaders.

Citing the memorials coming from Central Conference sources asking for the power to choose their own Bishops, the Address continued, "These new national aspirations command our warmest sympathy. We believe the time for action has come . . ." The Corresponding Secretaries of the Board of Foreign Missions recommended, in the course of a report on the foreign fields, that the Central Conference be empowered to elect their own Bishops. Indeed, the Secretaries went so far as to point out that the logic of this proposal was that the church in the United States should be governed by a Central Conference for that country.

The General Conference appointed a Commission of Twenty-five on Powers of Central Conferences to study the various relevant proposals before it and to draft appropriate legislation. The Commission, headed by Lewis O. Hartman, Editor of *Zions Herald*, was comprised of delegates from South America, Korea, Italy, India (3), Malaya, China (2), Germany, Mexico, and the United States (12). It reported to the General Conference proposed Con-

stitutional amendments authorizing the General Conference to empower Central Conferences to elect Bishops for their own territories. It also completely redrafted in amplified and completely detailed form the Disciplinary legislation on Central Conferences. The General Conference accepted the proposed Constitutional amendments and submitted them to the Annual Conferences for adoption. It also adopted the Commission's legislative draft, with the proviso that it become operative upon final adoption of the amendments. The amendments were overwhelmingly approved by the Church at large and became operative in 1929, as did the new statutory legislation.

The newly granted power was significantly limited only by the provision that the number of Bishops to be elected by a Central Conference should be fixed from time to time by the General Conference. The new statutory legislation included, however, a power not exercised in the case of Bishops elected by the General Conference, namely, authority for each Central Conference to limit the tenure of its own Bishops. This was a break with the long tradition of life tenure for General Conference Bishops, with retirement because of age or other sufficient reason. Inauguration of the new plan for Central Conference Bishops was implemented simultaneously by contingent legislation enabling the election of a specific number of Bishops by the Central Conferences for Eastern Asia, Southern Asia, and Latin America, respectively.

Although this enhancement of the Constitutional status and functional scope of the Central Conference gave some of the churches abroad a larger degree of independence and encouraged indigenization of their internal life, it left them far from free. The essentially American-based missionary enterprise of the Methodist Episcopal Church, which so often was boasted to be a world-wide church, still was largely and crucially governed from the United States. Inefficiencies and tensions rooted in long-distance control of missions and churches in faraway countries schooled in their own, non-American cultures still remained. The potentiality of discontent arising from them was amply demonstrated in 1932-33, when an American Bishop endeavored to enforce in the Philippine Islands Conference a General Conference judicial decision in a case originating in Filipino church life and shaped by Filipino cultural perspectives.*

Furthermore, the legislative and Constitutional changes of 1928-29 did not represent a deliberate policy on the part of the Methodist Episcopal Church to advance the foreign churches to the point of full autonomy. The creation of completely autonomous national churches remained a controversial question in the larger Methodist community. Many Methodist leaders still believed in the superior value of Methodist world connectionalism, which they held kept the nationally oriented churches in creative relationship with a world-wide religious community, thus saving them from isolation and eccentricity. And

* See p. 1169.

in practice, neither did the strengthening of the Central Conference apparatus go far during this period to produce urgent pressure for autonomy on the part of the churches directed by Central Conferences. Indeed, the two autonomous churches created on the foreign field in 1930, in Mexico and Korea, came into being without any determinative Central Conference stimulus. Sheer desire for independence of foreign control was the overriding cause in neither case. Although nationalistic feeling was active among Korean Methodists, they were more crucially motivated by the desire for union with their Korean brothers of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South. This also was the major motivation for the call of the Mexican Methodists for autonomy; and accomplishing it was a realistic solution to a situation in which foreign clergymen could not function in the Mexican Methodist ministry because of government bans. These two fields actually had not enjoyed any full-bodied participation in a Central Conference. And Japanese Central Conference experience was too early and too brief to affect its achievement of autonomy, which was consummated in 1907. The strengthened Central Conference undoubtedly went far enough toward realization of ample self-determination to forestall for the time being radical demands for severance of organic relations with the American-centered denomination.

Quite appropriately, considering the great amount of attention given by the General Conference of 1928 to the status of the churches abroad, the *Discipline* that came out of its deliberations contained in the chapter on the Board of Foreign Missions a statement of the basic aim of foreign missions. It was the first such official declaration; up to that time, the *Discipline* had carried only a limited formal statement sufficient for purposes of legal incorporation. In 1924, the Board's Constitution, slightly revised since 1907, read:

Its objects are religious, philanthropic, and educational, designed to diffuse more generally the blessings of Christianity, by the promotion and support of all phases of Church work and missionary activity in foreign countries; and also in such other places subject to the sovereignty of the United States, but not on the continent of North America or the islands adjacent thereto, as may be committed to the care of such organization by the General Conference . . .

The *Discipline* of 1928 retained this statement but also included at the head of the appropriate chapter the following empirical, normative, and Christological passage:

The supreme and controlling aim of Foreign Missions is to make the Lord Jesus Christ known to all men as their Divine Saviour, to persuade them to become his disciples, and to gather these disciples into Christian Churches which shall be, under God, self-propagating, self-supporting and self-governing; to co-operate so long as necessary with these Churches in

the evangelizing of their respective countries, and to bring to bear on all human life the spirit and principles of Christ.

This statement, which left open the question of what kinds of ecclesiastical arrangements and what missionary methods would best implement it, remained the official position of the Church until 1939.

The Board of Home Missions and Church Extension operated from the beginning, and throughout its existence, under a strictly functional statement of its purpose. The Discipline stated simply that it would be to prosecute missionary work in the United States and its possessions, except for the Philippine Islands. Its Charter of Incorporation under the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania stated:

The objects for which the said Corporation exists are to enable the several annual conferences of the Methodist Episcopal Church to extend and establish their Christian influence throughout the United States and Territories, by aiding wherever necessary, to secure suitable houses of public worship and other church property as may promote the general design; and to have, in addition to the foregoing powers, all such as are necessary and proper for the prosecution of the mission work of the Methodist Episcopal Church within the limits of the United States and such other mission work of the said Church in the countries under the jurisdiction of the United States as may be assigned to it by the General Conference.

The basic organization of the Board of Home Missions was similar to that of the Board of Foreign Missions. It had a Corresponding Secretary, who served as its executive officer, with a First Assistant Corresponding Secretary and two additional Assistant Corresponding Secretaries. In addition, there were three regionally located Field Secretaries, or Field Agents. The number of Assistant Secretaries and Field Secretaries varied somewhat during the first five years, but there was a single Corresponding Secretary until 1912, when the General Conference specified that there should be three, but with no Assistant Secretaries.

The first Corresponding Secretary of the Board of Home Missions was James M. King, who had held the comparable office for the Board of Church Extension. King died, however, before the end of 1907 and was succeeded by Robert Forbes, also a member of the staff of the Board of Church Extension. Forbes died early in the 1912-16 quadrennium, which he began as one of the three co-ordinate Corresponding Secretaries. David D. Forsyth served as Corresponding Secretary from 1916 until his death in 1926. The following year, Edward D. Kohlstedt became his successor and continued until 1939, his title being changed to Executive Secretary in 1932.

In 1916, the General Conference reorganized the Board, eliminating the General Committee of Home Missions and Church Extension, leaving the Board to serve as the policy-making group, and providing for an Executive Committee. At this time, it also returned to utilization of only one Cor-

responding Secretary, eliminated the office of Field Secretary, and provided for five Departments, each with its own Superintendent. The Departments were Church Extension, City Work, Rural Work, Evangelism, and Frontier Work.

The activities of the Board's major Departments were complemented at various times by a cluster of Bureaus with special functions, some of them eventually being administered by their own Directors. The organizational plan of the Board following the General Conference of 1932 showed the Bureau and Department relationships in close to their finally developed arrangement. The three major Departments—Church Extension, City Work, Rural Work—were related to the Board itself, with its officers and Executive Committee. Related to the Department of Church Extension was the Bureau of Architecture, with Elbert M. Conover as Director. Related to the Department of City Work was the Bureau of Goodwill Industries, with Edgar J. Helms as Director. This Bureau maintained the Board's connection with the nation-wide association of institutional services for the handicapped and the unemployed that originated in Boston early in the century under Helms's leadership. "Indian Activities," though not a distinct Bureau, represented from this time on an aspect of the work of the Department of Rural Work. In addition to these units there were three Bureaus not subordinate to the major Departments but amenable directly to the Board. Their activities naturally touched the work of all the Departments. William A. C. Hughes, a Negro, directed the Bureau of Negro Work, J. S. Stowell directed the Bureau of Publicity and Promotion, and Secretary Kohlstedt directed the Bureau of Bilingual Work.

The Department of Church Extension that emerged in the Board's 1916 reorganization carried forward a church-building program that had been continuous since the founding of the Church Extension Society in 1865. More recently, from 1907 to 1912, the Assistant Secretaries of the Board of Home Missions and Church Extension had been responsible for administering its work, and from 1912 to 1916, its affairs had been in the hands of the three Corresponding Secretaries of the Board.

Unlike the Frontier, Rural, and City Departments, its field was not geographically delimited, except for its status as part of a home missions agency. Geographically, it overlapped and functionally strengthened all the other domestic fields; it channeled its resources into frontier, rural, and city projects throughout the country. Its general Disciplinary functions were to encourage the erection of churches in new communities not already adequately supplied, to assist in the building of churches and parsonages "where assistance is most needed," and to give special attention to church architecture, helping the local societies to plan structures adapted to their requirements. Administratively, it was responsible for making recommendations of appropriations for all church extension grants and loans.

The first Superintendent of the Department of Church Extension was Whitford L. McDowell, who served for three quadrennia. McDowell early applied himself to the task of reducing the indebtedness of the churches to the Board (in 1917, loans totaling more than \$500,000 were overdue). By 1920, two-thirds of the amount had been repaid. In 1917, the Department established the Bureau of Architecture in co-operation with the Board of Sunday Schools, at first using the services of a firm of architects, but later securing Elbert M. Conover as working Director. In 1919, the Bureau received more than six hundred applications when the Board required that building plans for Centenary-sponsored construction be approved by the Bureau before payments on grants could be made.

Income from the Centenary greatly swelled the Department's grants to the Church's building enterprises. From 1869 to 1919, church extension contributions for local purposes had totaled \$6,500,000. Grants for the quadrennium 1920-24 came to more than \$9,500,000, aiding 933 urban projects, 2,195 in rural districts, 677 among the Negroes, 205 in foreign-speaking communities, and 9 for Indians. Stimulated partly by results flowing from the use of Centenary funds and partly by general prosperity, many churches undertook their own building programs without active encouragement or financial aid from the Board. More than \$40,000,000 was spent in 1926.

By 1925, however, the Department of Church Extension itself was compelled drastically to curtail its disbursements to church projects, for the receipts of the Board dropped just before that by about 57 per cent. Nevertheless, by careful development of its loan funds, including a new Revolving Fund, the Department kept its financial assistance high enough to be able to help several hundred churches each year.

A new Superintendent, Fred W. Mueller, who had been in the church extension work for eight years, took up the administrative reins in 1928 and held them clear through the nineteen-thirties, guiding the Department through the worst of the nation-wide Depression. He soon was joined by H. C. Leonard, who became his Associate. The effects of the nation's economic troubles upon the churches were widespread and disastrous. Church indebtedness was large and difficult to remove, partially finished buildings could not be completed, and the need to overcome the wretched inadequacy of thousands of churches remained. The Department did the best it could to assist financially. In 1929, for instance, it distributed \$190,000 in grants but had to deny four out of five applications because of its lack of funds. To the end of the thirties, the Department simply could not meet the extraordinary demands arising from the plight of the overburdened and impoverished churches.

The Department's leaders established in 1930 the Division of Finance and Debt Raising, an on-the-field counseling service designed to assist churches in planning to meet their building needs or financial problems related to projects already begun or completed. A major effort of the Division was pro-

motion of the Save the Sanctuary Campaign, which in 1935-36 brought in \$130,000 and saved from confiscation churches valued at \$1,950,000. Augmented by a new permanent Sanctuary Fund, this effort went on to raise still larger amounts, saving millions of dollars more in church properties.

The Department of Evangelism, like Church Extension, reached across lines defining the geographically oriented Departments and provided special missionary service in rural, frontier, and urban areas. As the Discipline put it, the Department was established for "the purpose of promoting aggressive evangelism throughout the home field." George B. Dean was its Superintendent from 1916 to 1932, when it was discontinued by the General Conference as a separate unit.

One of the earliest demands upon the Department arose from situations created by the war of 1917-18. It was the Church's agency for liaison with the 350 Methodist Episcopal chaplains in the United States Army and Navy. The Department equipped each chaplain, as he left training school and received his commission, with a typewriter, a communion service, and \$250, adding motorcycles and sidecars for men retained at military camps in the United States. It endeavored to maintain connections between local churches and their men in military service, co-operated with other agencies at work in military camps, assisted churches ministering to military personnel in camp zones, and attempted to strengthen religious and social service work in war industry areas. After the war, the Department maintained contacts between the Church and the reduced number of military chaplains.

Relationships also were established with dozens of civilian chaplains in general hospitals, and evangelistic programs were organized for reaching people in vacation areas such as the National Parks. From 1926 to 1932, the Indian work previously assigned to the Department of the Frontier was the responsibility of the Department of Evangelism. The Department endeavored to raise the standards of conventional mass evangelistic campaigns by operating a bureau of accreditation of evangelists to be employed by Methodist churches. It also employed a number of full-time evangelists of its own to work with needy churches.

Quite aware of the essentially limited outreach of mass evangelism, George Dean endeavored through the Department's training program to shift the emphasis in Methodist evangelism. He reported in 1928, after studies inspired by diminishing success in conventional evangelism:

At once it was made evident that the public method, at its best, made little or no effort to reach any but those who belonged to the families of the members of the Church, those who attended its Sunday School, and those who strayed into its services. Whole areas of people, as well as whole areas of life were being omitted. Vast multitudes of unsaved and unchurched people were neglected or forgotten.

The Department therefore organized short-term schools for the purpose of training pastors in evangelistic methods more directly aimed at winning people not normally reached by public campaigns. These schools developed an emphasis on pastoral evangelism, encouraging regular pastors in sparsely settled areas to seek out isolated people, such as those in mining camps, logging camps, and oil fields. They also promoted the use of personal visitation evangelism by laymen, who would go out two by two in an outreach to their unevangelized acquaintances and neighbors. As the economic troubles rising in the late twenties appeared, evangelistic workers were sent to some churches to combine evangelistic revitalization meetings with debt-raising work.

When the Board of Home Missions was organized in 1907, it came into relationship with thirteen Missions in the United States and its territories that were established, according to the same Disciplinary pattern observed on various foreign fields, as units formally separate from Annual Conferences. They were the Alaska, Arizona (Arizona and the Mexican state of Sonora), Black Hills (parts of Wyoming and South Dakota), Chinese (the Pacific Coast, except Oregon and Washington), Hawaii, Kalispell (Flathead County, Montana), Nevada (Nevada and parts of California), New Mexico English (New Mexico, part of Texas, and the Mexican state of Chihuahua), North Montana, Pacific Japanese, Puerto Rico, Utah, and Wyoming Missions. Various Bishops were in charge of these Missions; they selected the working sites, chose the Superintendents, and appointed the missionary workers. In addition, the Board became associated with the work of three Mission Conferences: the Atlantic Mission Conference (parts of North Carolina and Virginia), the New Mexico Spanish Mission Conference (for Spanish-speaking people in territories covered by the Arizona and New Mexico English Missions), and the North Pacific German Mission Conference.

The great majority of these mission enterprises were in the West. Their people generally were widely scattered, their population was shifting, many of their communities were remote and hardly settled, living conditions for many of the settlers still were primitive compared with those farther east, economic opportunities were limited or accompanied with great risk, patterns of religious and social life were tenuous or nonexistent. It was the function of the Board of Home Missions to encourage evangelization of these new and changing populations and to assist in the development and housing of their religious institutions.

Through successive quadrennia, the list of designated Missions and Mission Conferences showed many changes, partly by addition of new sections, partly by absorption of various Missions into the Annual Conference structure. In place of the North Montana Mission, for instance, later appeared the North Montana Annual Conference. By 1916, only three Missions with strictly geographical Western definitions remained. The other Western units

were ethnic: the Pacific Swedish Mission Conference, and the Southern Swedish Mission Conference (Texas). But the West itself remained, its religious needs and opportunities remained. Changes in Disciplinary definitions did not remove the necessity for the church as a whole to supplement the resources of the religious workers in the frontier areas.

To this region and its needs, therefore, the new Department of Frontier Work turned its attention in 1916. Its first Superintendent was Edward Laird Mills. He was succeeded by Charles E. Vermilya, who resigned in December, 1923, to become Secretary of the interdenominational Home Missions Council. From that time until 1928, the Department had no Superintendent, but was the responsibility of a ten-member committee that included both Vermilya and Mills.

In 1916, the nation's internal frontier was becoming less distinct, fading into rural America. Although the West certainly was largely a new and developing area for the Church, the Board did not find it easy to define its missionary frontier by reference to a commonly accepted definition of the national frontier. Tentatively, it settled upon the one hundredth meridian of longitude, which ran through the middle of the Dakotas and Nebraska. It realized, however, that a frontier could be sociologically defined, as Secretary Forsyth indicated in the Board's report to the General Conference of 1920 (he was repeating Mill's annual report for 1919): "From the point of view of the Department of Frontier Work any regrouping of population by which the religious beliefs and practices thereof are dislocated, constitutes a frontier." He cited as examples of such frontiers the Florida Everglades, Aroostook County in Maine, the Italian settlements of the Mohawk Valley, Philadelphia's Hog Island area, and large sections of cut-over timber land in Minnesota, Michigan, and Wisconsin—none of them in the West. But between these sociologically defined frontiers and the geographically defined frontier of the West Forsyth drew a distinction: in the former, frontier conditions were not predominant, but occurred in juxtaposition to strong and well established religious institutions; in the latter, frontier conditions were predominant and likely to continue for many years. This distinction, the Board felt, justified its choosing a "practically wise" geographical definition of the Department's field. Forsyth designated it as the episcopal areas of Denver, Helena, Portland, and San Francisco, along with Alaska, Hawaii, and Indian Missions.

The Department's Indian work, which did not fit within its general geographical pattern, was a continuation of a responsibility the Board of Home Missions received from the Missionary Society in 1907. The Indian missions that came within the Board purview were located within the bounds of the California, Central New York, Columbia River, Detroit, Genesee, Michigan, North Montana, Northern Minnesota, Northern New York, Oregon, and Wisconsin Conferences and of the Nevada Mission. There were thirty-five

of them, with a total of some seventeen hundred church members, led by thirty mission workers and twenty Local Preachers. The Board's first appropriation for them was \$9,457.

In dimension and in character, the Indian field was little different from what it had become by the end of the nineteenth century.* The day of new ventures was gone; from 1896 to 1906, the Missionary Society had started only one new Indian mission, a project begun on Pyramid Lake Reservation (Nevada) in 1901 by Robert G. Pike. Although they received funds from the Board of Home Missions, the Indian missions were administered, as they had been previously, by the Annual Conferences.

Indian activities did not constitute a major element in the Board's work, and its leaders typically were pessimistic about the accomplishments and possibilities in that area. When it was assigned to the Department of Frontier Work in 1916, Superintendent Mills bluntly declared that the Board had spent a hundred thousand dollars in Indian missions, but with unsatisfactory results. The W.H.M.S. had appropriated a similar amount of money. Laird proposed some rather fundamental measures for vitalization of the Indian work, but none of them were adopted.

The General Conference of 1920, noting that there was a growing demand for closer correlation and co-ordination of Indian work and that the Home Missions Council was working on the allocation of unoccupied Indian fields to the various denominations, requested the Board of Home Missions "to make generous financial provision for this needy and too long neglected field, and to devise suitable measures for effective service and supervision of the same." The Board promptly appointed a Committee on Indian Affairs to carry out this request. As a result, representatives of the Board and of the W.H.M.S. organized a seven-member Joint Committee on Indian Work to correlate the activities of the two agencies in that field. They elected Elmer E. Higley Superintendent of Indian Missions, with Mrs. S. S. Beggs of the W.H.M.S. as Assistant Superintendent and Treasurer. Higley made optimistic reports to the Board in 1921 and 1922—reports in this area seldom were optimistic—but the new administrative approach to the Indian missions soon lapsed. By 1926, Indian activities were being supervised by the Department of Evangelism.

To the three outpost missions on its farthest frontiers—Hawaii, Alaska, and Puerto Rico—which it had inherited from the Missionary Society, the Board added another Caribbean mission, namely, work in the Dominican Republic, which was under American military occupation from 1916 to 1922. The Methodists' first, small beginning in the Republic resulted from interest in its evangelistic possibilities on the part of the mission workers in Puerto Rico, about a hundred miles away. They sent one of their number to the Island in 1917 to study the religious situation and in 1918 opened a

* See Vol. III, 324-64.

small mission project there at San Pedro de Macoris. In 1919, Samuel Guy Inman visited the Republic for the Committee on Co-operation in Latin America. As a result of his report, representatives of three American denominations—the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A., the United Brethren, and the Methodist Episcopal Church—organized in January, 1920, the Board for Christian Work in Santo Domingo. The Board took over the small Methodist mission, and from that time on, the Methodist missionary contribution was made through this interdenominational organization. At the very beginning, one worker each from three denominations in Puerto Rico were sent, along with financial aid, to help get the Dominican movement under way.

By 1925, churches were established in San Pedro de Macoris, La Romana, San Cristóbal, Barahona, and Santo Domingo City, the capital, all of them important centers. Rural work also had begun. A hospital staffed by an American doctor and American nurses was open in Santo Domingo, and a dozen Dominican girls were in nurses' training.

The Methodist work in Hawaii was elevated to the status of a Mission by the General Conference of 1904. Both the Hawaii Mission and the Alaska Mission retained that position to 1939. The Puerto Rico Mission, however, with which the Dominican Republic work was associated, was established as a Mission Conference in 1916 and remained so throughout the period.

The Department of Frontier Work, like the Joint Committee on Indian Work, ceased to function with 1926, and it was formally discontinued by the General Conference of 1928. Administratively, this followed naturally from the fact that no Superintendent had been engaged after the resignation of Charles Vermilya at the end of 1923.

More broadly, it was related to the Board's realization that the religious frontier, like the national frontier, now had undergone important changes and was becoming less distinct. Churches in many of the larger towns and cities actually had passed out of the frontier category and resented being included in it. They deserved, Secretary Edward Kohlstedt pointed out to the General Conference of 1928, the recognition belonging to self-supporting churches. Other churches were moving into that class, and one of the greatest needs was for essentially church extension work. In other, sparsely settled frontier sections, expansion of the Church had gone as far as could be expected in the light of the slender hope for large increases in population in the near future. There still were opportunities, as Secretary Forsyth had declared in 1924, in exceptional situations such as in new and old mining camps, sections opening for settlement because of irrigation, and among special groups and rapid city developments. But otherwise, the problem had shifted to a large extent to giving "a second lift" to struggling churches. But this was not essentially frontier work; it had become so similar to other rural work that

its transfer to the Department of Rural Work in 1926 was a natural development.

Formation of the Department of Rural Work in 1916 marked the emergence of the first strong emphasis upon rural work as a distinctive aspect of the Church's mission to America. The country was heavily rural; the Methodist Church was even more so. From 1907 to 1916, rural churches and mission projects comprised by far the majority of the end-recipients of the hundreds of thousands of dollars distributed by the Board. And so it had been under the Missionary Society.

But neither in the Board nor in the church at large was there any consciousness, during most of these years, that rural churches were significantly different from urban churches. The Board made no effort to promote recognition of the fact that the social, economic, and geographic environment of the rural churches thrust upon them special needs, unique handicaps, and peculiar problems, which called for application of methods of church work different from those that were productive in the cities. In harmony with this lack of appreciation of the special character of the rural churches, the Board had practically no direct contact with them or their leaders; the funds it invested in them were appropriated in bulk to some dozens of Annual Conferences and then filtered down at last to the country mission fields. But in the few years before 1916, the Church began to develop some awareness of the rural church as such. It was felt that its many weaknesses could be overcome only by approaching rural work with a new relevance, and it was to meet this requirement that the Department of Rural Work was created.

Its functions, as legislated by the General Conference, were to make surveys in rural church fields in order to ascertain their needs and resources and to determine where permanent church centers serving the whole community might be located; to apportion funds to a number of widely distributed strategic demonstration centers; to recommend interdenominational exchanges and plans for co-operation or federation in order to prevent overlapping of churches; to recommend the uniting of Methodist churches where parishes overlapped; and to promote the study of rural sociology by field ministers and students in Methodist colleges and theological schools. The Department also was expected to encourage organization of District or Annual Conference rural societies auxiliary to the Board, for the purpose of carrying out the aims of the Department on particular fields. The general field for which the Department was responsible covered roughly the entire expanse of the Church in the eastern half of the United States.

During its first two quadrennia, under Superintendent Paul L. Vogt, formerly a professor of rural economics and sociology at Ohio State University, the Department succeeded in advancing the emerging interest in the rural church to the stage of actual promotional, educational, and field programs. Many rural societies were organized—there were eighty-five by 1920—and

missionary funds were distributed through their treasurers rather than through general Annual Conference officers. The entire campaign to enhance appreciation of the significance of the rural segment of the Church was begun by an intensive program of addresses and discussions at Conferences, institutes, and institutions throughout the country. Gradually, hundreds of informed leaders were enlisted in the movement; they not only endeavored to arouse the church at large, but also were available to help train rural church workers. Thousands of rural ministers, stirred to a new sense of the dignity and crucial importance of their labors, attended summer schools for special training. Hundreds of local pastors began conducting improved programs in their parishes. By 1923, more than two dozen educational institutions, including six theological schools, were co-operating by offering special courses oriented toward the rural ministry and by providing advisory service to student pastors. Many surveys made or encouraged by the Department were used by District Superintendents in their planning for more effective rural work. A number of successful rural projects became demonstration centers to stimulate workers elsewhere. Some churches were rearranged into larger-parish groupings intended to provide better service to the individual churches, and some circuits were broken up into separate stations, resulting in better financial support for each minister. An important beginning was made in increasing rural ministerial salaries, in some cases enabling former student charges to engage full-time pastors. As the rural church movement gained momentum, large numbers of ministerial students began to make rural service their preference for their future pastoral work.

Vogt's successor, in 1924, was Mark A. Dawber, who for several years had been teaching rural church work at Boston University School of Theology. He remained at the head of the Department of Rural Work until 1937, when he resigned to become Secretary of the Home Missions Council. The merging of the Department of Frontier Work with the Department of Rural Work gave Dawber, early in his administration, responsibility for a vastly expanded rural field. His jurisdiction was still further broadened by the transfer of Indian work into his Department from the former Department of Evangelism in 1932.

Dawber visited most of the Indian reservations during his first year in charge of Indian projects and took a number of steps toward effecting "a more justifiable program" for them. He initiated elimination of some of the work and consolidation of some of the rest, at the same time taking some projects into co-operative arrangements with other denominations. Like Edward Laird Mills before him, Dawber made important policy proposals for the future of the Indian work in 1934; but as with Mills's proposals, the Board did little to implement them. In 1936, Dawber reported to the Board, "Our work among American Indians goes forward very slowly. It is the most difficult work the Protestant mission boards are doing."

In his last report, in 1937, Dawber repeated this theme, detailing the "usual problems" handicapping work with the Indians. He cited the very wide scattering of this relatively small home mission group of 330,000—a factor that made access to them difficult and expensive. He also pointed to the superstition and ritualism of Indian religion, which were obstacles to successful approach by informal evangelical churches. Special knowledge of the racial, religious, economic, and political background and needs of the Indians were requisite—it was rarely achieved—to leadership among them. Dawber also stressed the confusion and resistance provoked in the Indians by the religious divisions in the white community and by the independent and divisive Indian mission programs pursued by the denominations working among them. Dawber's own program called for pooling all Indian missions under the administration of the interdenominational Home Missions Council, appointing experienced and capable nondenominational leaders, and training Indian leadership for Indian religious work.

The number of Indian missions ready to go into the Methodist merger of 1939 was somewhat lower than that of the groups with which the Board had begun in 1907. Not only the inherent difficulty of the work, but also the pruning out of some of them under Dawber's attempt to maintain only viable projects had reduced an earlier maximum. The remaining missions were scattered through California, New York, Michigan, Montana, Minnesota, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin.

In his prosecution of the Department's general work, Dawber carried forward many of his predecessor's emphases and programs, especially through continuing provision for training rural ministers. During much of his administration, Rural Work was a one-man Department, for Dawber had no assistants. As time went on, all his efforts were handicapped or curtailed by this fact, by lack of funds, and by the crushing burdens the Depression loaded on top of the usual problems afflicting the rural field.

With the total of the funds available for rural work steadily declining, Dawber strove to make sure that the maximum amount possible actually went to bona fide missionary projects. This required that a distinction be made between Board support of efforts to develop constructive religious work in needy fields and sustentation of underpaid pastors, which was the responsibility of the Annual Conferences. He further endeavored to protect the missionary character of the field appropriations by having competitive churches deprived of Board support. A Board survey showed that more than 40 per cent of the rural churches receiving Board funds were competing with churches of other denominations. By 1930, more than four hundred of them were removed from the home missions program. As an additional measure to strengthen the position of the impoverished country churches, Dawber carried still further Vogt's promotion of larger parishes, securing significant recognition of this field pattern by the General Conference of 1932.

The chaotic conditions undermining the rural churches during these years of depression, however, inhibited the achievement of strong advances in this direction.

While working toward separation of general salary sustentation from purely missionary appropriations, Dawber counseled with a number of Annual Conference commissions on the development of plans for more equitable pastoral salaries, with the purpose of establishing definite minimum salaries for Conference members. The General Conference opened the way for such plans in 1932, when it authorized the Annual Conferences to adopt schedules of minimum support and to undergird them with appropriations to all the churches in a Conference. In reporting to the General Conference of 1936 on the difficulties gouging at the morale and sapping the strength of the rural churches, Dawber pointed to the pitifully small salaries of their pastors—many were less than \$1,000, many as low as \$500—as one of the most serious factors. He said:

The Church has had much to say about injustice and inequality in the economic structure in general, but has failed to deal with it within her own institutions. Some of the most glaring injustices and inequities obtain within the ministry itself. This has created conditions of poverty with all its consequences in the homes of the poorly paid pastors. . . . Under the varying conditions of our work with its multiplicity of situations there can be no such thing as a flat equality. But equity there must be. A ministry based upon such conditions of salary range that now obtain in our Church is impotent to deal with the problems of modern society.

This factor was related to another cited by Dawber in the same report. He declared that many rural churches had been weakened because of the negative attitudes, the lack of interest, on the part of many denominational leaders. That deficiency made it difficult to keep up the morale of the ministry. Said Dawber:

Many of the outstanding rural pastors became discouraged and accepted appointments to city churches. There is a feeling abroad that, unfortunately, has too much truth behind it—that, if a man wants to get anywhere, he must get out of the rural church.

In 1936, the General Conference rewrote the basic legislation on rural work, changing the departmental name to the Department of Town and Country Work. For the first time, the Discipline clearly defined the nature of a rural field, by declaring, "The Department of Town and Country Work shall promote missionary work in the United States in places of less than ten thousand population."

Mark Dawber was succeeded in 1938 by Aaron H. Rapping, a rural extension sociologist at West Virginia Wesleyan College.

The Department of Urban Work inherited in 1916 many decades of special

attention to urban missionary endeavor.* First had come, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the organizing of City Missionary Societies (by 1896 there were thirty of them). Then, in 1892, the National City Evangelization Union had been organized and given recognition by the General Conference. In 1912, the year it was dissolved, Frank Mason North, its Corresponding Secretary since 1897, said that its chief end had been "the agitation of the city question until the church should be profoundly aroused to its import, and the standardizing of City Societies so that their permanent place in the program of Methodism should be defined and secured." More concretely, the Union had been commissioned to encourage the formation of City Missionary Societies, and sixty-nine of them were in action in 1912. The City Societies themselves raised most of the funds they expended, but the Missionary Society also had contributed, though the appropriations for this and all other city work were small. The General Conference of 1908 authorized the Board to organize and administer a Bureau of Cities, but no such unit, evidently, became operative during the quadrennium. The succeeding General Conference directed the Board to establish and administer a Department of Cities, but gave the Department minimal powers and duties.

The Department of City Work inaugurated in 1916 under the leadership of Melvin P. Burns, an experienced District Superintendent, was the Board's first direct and full-fledged effort to extend and improve city missionary activity. The General Conference gave it a broad, positive commission—to "further in every practicable way the organized religious and social work in places having City Societies." It was directed to aid in making city surveys, with special emphasis on the religious condition of foreign-speaking peoples, necessary changes in the location and adaptation of church buildings, and the relation of the Church to needy and congested areas. It also was required to aid in organizing and developing adequate religious centers "in the heart of great cities." The administration of the Department's appropriation for city work was assigned to it.

The new home missions legislation clearly designated the City Missionary Society as the chief local instrument of the Board's program and made it auxiliary, and in part amenable, to the Department of City Work. The Discipline provided:

The City Society may include in its work the organization of Churches and Sunday Schools, the aid of weak Churches, the acquisition of real estate, and the erection of buildings, the adaptation of downtown Churches to their altered environment, the conducting of missions among foreign-speaking peoples, the maintenance of kindergartens and industrial schools, the promotion of social and settlement work, the support of rescue missions, and of institutions for the relief of the sick and the destitute. A City Society may also devise plans for promoting the connectional life of Methodism, and for cooperation and federation with other denominations.

* See Vol. III, 221 ff.

The Department of City Work undertook its mission at a time when the cities were being filled with ever larger numbers of unevangelized immigrants and when many Southern Negroes were coming into Northern cities. Simultaneously, the cities were being depleted by the withdrawal, especially from the inner cities, of the older population groups, the "native stock." The flight of the latter group was weakening the established churches at the very time that the influx of the new peoples was demanding the presence of strong serving churches and missions in the cities. The need for action was towering; the Church's power to act was drastically limited by inadequate local organization and by insufficient funds.

One of the Department's first moves was to set up an Opportunity Fund of \$70,000, which promised to the City Societies a Board-appropriated dollar for every three raised locally. In the first year, this stimulus helped produce \$800,000 in local contributions for advances in Boston, Chicago, and Cleveland. Boston built its Church of All Nations, Cleveland established its Broadway Bohemian Church, and Chicago undertook a strong expansion program directed toward organizing or strengthening two dozen Negro, Bohemian, Scandinavian, German, Italian, and native American churches. The proceeds of the Centenary movement from 1919 to 1922 gave the Department's work a still stronger lift.

Under Burns's administration, the Department and its auxiliary City Societies kept wrestling with almost overwhelming financial problems and with the accompanying need to develop continuing and competent leadership for urban mission projects. When he retired in 1929, the general outlook, in spite of encouraging advances in both areas, had become increasingly clouded by the Centenary's failure to meet its financial goals and by declining World Service contributions. These lapses necessitated damaging cuts in the Department's appropriations for the City Societies.

Channing A. Richardson, Burns's successor, also found the problems facing his office and the City Societies practically insuperable in the mass. He, like Mark Dawber, had no assistants. Only eight Societies—Boston, Brooklyn, Chicago, Detroit, Los Angeles, New York, Philadelphia, and Pittsburgh—had full-time executive secretaries. And available for the support of city work by the Board of Home Missions were only shrinking funds. Many City Societies needed reactivation and many large cities had no Societies. Richardson's own work was confined largely to attempts to stimulate and inform city mission leaders and workers. He convened four sessions of the Council of Cities between 1930 and 1937, conducted city institutes for various Annual Conferences, was involved in summer school training sessions, visited the cities as often as he could to make recommendations on programming, and endeavored—with only partial success, because of lack of time and funds—to make a major survey of cities of 80,000 to 150,000 in population for the Home Missions Council.

Of course, Richardson came into office just as the American bubble of economic prosperity burst leaving masses of city people tasting the tragedy of unemployment and radical deprivation. The Department was unprepared for the crisis and neither in 1929-30 nor at any time during the Depression had substantial resources to throw into the fight to save from poverty and despair the needy people swirling around the city churches. Some of the churches, though themselves without large funds, nevertheless thrust themselves as deeply as they could into the struggle in the early days before government measures to check the Depression were fully under way. They set up employment offices and organizations for the unemployed, distributed food and other forms of relief, provided emergency shelter, in one case distributed public funds for unemployment relief, and in another operated a scrip system of bartering work for food, clothing, and services.

Undoubtedly, the arm of the home missions best equipped for this kind of service was the activity supervised by the Department's Bureau of Goodwill Industries. Referring in his report to the General Conference of 1932 to a recent period of eighteen months, Richardson said:

Think of \$1,505,987.62 being spent for the handicapped and opportunity wages, of 2,105,882 Goodwill bags being collected, 5,118,683 hours of employment given, 37,767 different people employed. . . . All this is directly the contribution of the Bureau of Goodwill Industries of this department.

Although the Missionary Society and the Board of Home Missions were related to many foreign-language missions in the United States, the largest numbers of foreign-speaking constituents of the Methodist Episcopal Church were organized in groups that were not essentially home missions. Many thousands of people of German and Scandinavian extraction were gathered into regular Annual Conferences, the organizational fruit of the cultivation of nineteenth-century home missions among the immigrants.* In 1896 there were nine German Annual Conferences, two Swedish, and two Norwegian-Danish. There was also a North Pacific German Mission Conference, which in 1905 became the Pacific German Annual Conference; and there was a Northern Swedish Mission Conference, which later became the Northern Swedish Annual Conference. The Missionary Society and the Board of Home Missions made appropriations to these Conferences for missionary work within their own boundaries, but the Conferences themselves received the funds on precisely the same basis as did the English-language Conferences. The only significant difference in the status of the German and Scandinavian Conferences was that they were organized on the basis of language. The earlier strong tides of immigration that they represented were spent, the basic missionary work among them was finished, and they were well integrated into the American Methodist connection. Indeed, most of the foreign-language

* See Vol. III, 265-84.

Conferences had been founded before 1890, and the founding process did not continue into the twentieth century.

The pattern of foreign-language Conferences remained practically unchanged until 1924. At that time there were ten German Conferences: Central German, Northwest German, East German, Chicago German, Southern German, St. Louis German, West German, Northern German, California German, and Pacific German. There were four Scandinavian Conferences (Central Swedish, Western Swedish, Norwegian and Danish, Western Norwegian-Danish) and two Mission Conferences (Pacific Swedish and Southern Swedish).

Partly as a result of tensions arising from the difficult position of the German Conferences during the War, but more fundamentally because of conditions resulting from the broad Americanization of the German and Scandinavian constituencies, the General Conference of 1924 began a process of liquidation of the foreign-language Conferences. In order to accomplish gradual elimination of them with a minimum of coercion, the General Conference acted mainly permissively through adoption from time to time of specific enabling acts facilitating changes for particular Conferences. In 1924, for instance, it authorized the Central Swedish, St. Louis German, and West German Conferences to merge with contiguous English-speaking Conferences, authorized the South German Conference to drop the language designation from its name, authorized reduction of the Norwegian and Danish Conference to the status of a Mission, directed the Northern German Conference to unite with the Minnesota Conference, and authorized the California German and Pacific German Conferences to unite under any name—presumably including the possibility of a nonlingual designation—that they might choose. General permissive legislation also was adopted, thus enabling a foreign-language Conference to initiate a merger with an English-speaking Conference.

The dispersion of the foreign-language Conferences was nearly completed by the time of Unification; only four vestigial Conferences—East German, Eastern Swedish, Central Northwest (Swedish), Norwegian and Danish—were carried forward into The Methodist Church in 1939. And these all were dissolved as separate jurisdictions before the General Conference of 1944. Thus were absorbed into the lingually undifferentiated body of the Methodist Episcopal Church and its successor constituencies that in 1924 had numbered over 83,000 members organized in 727 charges.

This disposition of the full-fledged language Conferences did not cover, of course, all the foreign-language work of the Church. In 1924 there were 136 organized foreign-language (*bilingual* now became the preferred term) churches and mission centers attached to English-speaking Conferences. They included 13 Norwegian-Danish, 45 Italian, 13 Czechoslovak, 7 Polish, 14 miscellaneous Slavic, 12 Finnish, 8 Spanish and Portuguese, 6 French, 3

Armenian, 5 miscellaneous, and 9 polyglot projects. Among their leaders were ninety-one language pastors. All these were scattered through forty-one Conferences under the supervision of eighteen different Bishops. The Board of Home Missions had had no direct responsibility for them during the years but simply appropriated to the Conferences funds that in the end reached these projects because of their missionary character or their church extension needs.

But in 1924, the Board came into a more direct relationship with them. The General Conference, in order to conserve and advance the interests of these less numerous, more miscellaneous bilingual missions, ordered the establishment of the Bilingual Mission. These missions—and certain others, such as churches not included in the language Conference mergers—were thus united under the jurisdiction of a single Bishop for purposes of administration and the appointment of ministers and missionaries. The Superintendent of the Bilingual Mission was W. I. Shattuck. In order to foster better understanding between the bilingual churches and their surrounding English-speaking Annual Conferences, the District Superintendents in the latter presided over the bilingual Quarterly Conferences. To complement the Bilingual Mission, the Board of Home Missions established, as ordered by the General Conference, the Bureau of Bilingual Work, which undertook in this field functions similar to those exercised elsewhere by the Departments of City Work and of Rural Work. Ezra Cox became its Director in 1927.

The foreign-language work also still included, as long had been the case, a number of formally organized Missions. In 1928, they were the Hawaii Mission, William H. Fry, Superintendent; the Latin American Mission (for people west of the Mississippi who spoke Romance languages), Vernon M. McCombs, Superintendent; the Norwegian-Danish Mission, Ottar Hofstad, Superintendent; the New Mexico Mission, George M. Henderson, Superintendent; the Southwest Spanish Mission, H. A. Bassett, Superintendent; the Pacific Chinese Mission, John F. Wilson, Superintendent; and the Pacific Japanese Mission, Frank Herron Smith, Superintendent. There was also the Puerto Rico Mission Conference, with Manuel Andújar as Superintendent. Cultivation of these fields was another responsibility of the Bureau of Bilingual Work. Four of these Missions—Hawaii, Latin American, Pacific Japanese, and Pacific Chinese (renamed California Oriental Mission)—and the Puerto Rico Mission Conference were taken up into the new denomination upon Unification.

Throughout the period 1896–1939, the Woman's Home Missionary Society strongly complemented the activity of the Board of Home Missions both broadly and in particular places. In one respect, it went markedly beyond anything accomplished or attempted by the Board; it founded and maintained numerous institutions, whereas most of those to which the Board was related grew up under the initiative of Conference or local interests. The Society's

field taken as a whole was the same as that covered in the domestic and outpost outreach of the Board.

The year before it was merged into the Woman's Division of Christian Service of The Methodist Church in 1939, its field work was organized under ten Bureaus: Alaska and the Northwest, California and Hawaii, City Missions (subdivided into six groups), Hospitals, Indian, Mexican and the Southwest, Mountaineer (two subdivisions), Negro (including work jointly with the Board of Education), Puerto Rico and New York, and Rest Homes. Nearly six hundred workers were employed in the ninety projects under the administration of the Bureaus, and the Society spent in the fiscal year 1937-38 for the support of these enterprises a total of \$1,263,444. Another million dollars expended through local treasuries went into ninety Conference W.H.M.S. projects beyond those administered by the ten Bureaus.

When they began their separate developments in 1907, the Boards of Home Missions and of Foreign Missions, like the Church's other Benevolent Boards, financed their work from year to year mainly by quite independent approaches to the churches for support. There was so little consultation among the various Boards that the promotion and financing of the different benevolent causes gradually was seen to be inefficient, even competitive. In the two quadrennia 1912-20, the Church began working toward a unified financial plan, by establishing the Commission on Finance, with members representing the General Conference and with active participation by Secretaries of the Benevolent Boards. The Commission was given some power of review over the askings of the separate Boards and some power of review and of initiative over the promotion of benevolences in the church at large. In 1920, the General Conference replaced the Commission with the Council of Boards of Benevolence, which was much larger in membership (representation of the Boards was high) and empowered to exert more extensive controls over the activities of the Boards. The Discipline stated that the aim of the Council was to achieve such correlation of the denomination's Boards and Societies as to secure (a) one harmonious and unified world program of missionary, educational, and benevolent activities, (b) one unified financial policy and appeal, (c) elimination of duplication of all activities, and (d) a larger measure of economy and efficiency.

In 1924, the General Conference brought the centralizing process to its permanent form, establishing the World Service Commission to administer what henceforth was known as the World Service program. This was clearly a Commission controlled by the church in general; the members represented the Board of Bishops and the General Conference, the Board representatives being reduced to advisory, nonvoting status. The World Service Commission exerted extensive control over the Board of Foreign Missions and the Board of Home Missions, along with the Board of Education, the Board of Pensions and Relief, the Board of Temperance, Prohibition, and Public Morals, and

the Board of Hospitals and Homes and Deaconess Work. It fixed the total unified budget of askings to be apportioned to the Annual Conferences, established the ratio of receipts to be distributed among the various Boards from the single World Service treasury, and held power to correlate the work of the Boards "in the interest of cooperation, economy and efficiency." Under this system, the Board of Foreign Missions and the Board of Home Missions each received in 1924 38.5 per cent of the total benevolent giving of the denomination, with the Board of Education receiving 17.6 per cent and the other groups much smaller proportions.

One of the developments that accelerated the movement toward unified financing and promotion was the Centenary campaign, an intensive financial drive launched in 1919, the centennial of the founding of the Missionary Society, by the major Methodist benevolent agencies. Its immediate aim was a radical increase of giving for a period of five years, in order to improve and expand the world-wide ministry of the Methodist Episcopal Church. The Centenary came at a time when the annual receipts for the Board of Foreign Missions had increased from \$1,320,000 in 1907 to \$2,216,000 in 1918, and when current receipts of the Board of Home Missions and Church Extension from the churches totaled about \$1,200,000. The inclusive financial goal for the Centenary was \$113,725,000; pledged subscriptions reached \$112,000,000.

Pursuing the Centenary's central purpose and relying upon the pledges made, the Board of Foreign Missions planned major extensions and developments in foreign work based on field surveys of need and on its expectation of receiving \$10,000,000 annually. Payments on Centenary contributions, however, fell far short of pledges; total receipts from the campaign were 46 per cent below the expected income. Corresponding retrenchments had to be made in the planned world program; projects already begun had to be abandoned or long delayed; results on the field were calamitous; the Board's affairs were in severe crisis. Nevertheless, the Board's receipts for the Centenary period (the fiscal years 1920-24) did rise, averaging about \$5,500,000 a year, compared with about \$200,000,000 from 1914 to 1918. By 1928, the year before the economic depression became acute, however, the receipts had dropped to \$2,900,000; and by 1939, they were down to \$1,400,000, yielding planned appropriations for the foreign field that were lower than in 1918.

The finances of the Board of Home Missions and Church Extension went through a like rise and fall, the abortive aspects of the Centenary producing similarly damaging dislocation and retrenchments on the field. By 1939, the Board's current receipts from World Service amounted to \$900,000, which was somewhat less than in 1918.

On many fields and repeatedly from time to time, the Boards of Foreign Missions and of Home Missions and Church Extension participated in comity

agreements, union churches, the federation of churches across denominational lines, regional committees, and a variety of interdenominational projects and institutions. The officers of the Boards maintained close co-operative relations over many years with the executive officers of the Mission Boards of numerous churches. The Boards and the Methodist Church at large relevantly shared in the activities of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, the Foreign Missions Conference of North America, the Home Missions Council, the Committee on Co-operation in Latin America, the International Missionary Council, and the major international assemblies, such as the Edinburgh Conference of 1910, that contributed to the emerging ecumenical movement. The Board of Foreign Missions also was deeply involved in the financing and promotion of the abortive Interchurch World Movement of 1919-20.

In 1939, the missionary interests of the Methodist Episcopal Church were merged, as a phase of the process of Unification, with those of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South and of the Methodist Protestant Church. The new administrative agency was the Board of Missions of The Methodist Church. The foreign missionary work of the Board of Foreign Missions was absorbed into new Board's Division of Foreign Missions, which later became known as the World Division. The work of the Board of Home Missions and Church Extension became part of the new Division of Home Missions and Church Extension, which later was called the National Division. The work of the Woman's Home Missionary Society and of the Woman's Foreign Missionary Society was taken up into the Woman's Division of Christian Service, later renamed the Woman's Division. For a number of decades, the two Boards and the two Societies of the Methodist Episcopal Church had engaged in co-operative relations with the missionary agencies of the two other Methodist denominations, thus helping to bring closer together the three long-separated Methodist churches that became one at the Uniting Conference of 1939, from which emerged The Methodist Church.

Part IV

GROWTH AND ADJUSTMENT

1920-1939

Liberia

THAT THERE WAS SOMETHING ROTTEN IN LIBERIA, "the graveyard of mission funds,"* finally dawned on the Board's executive leadership early in the nineteen-twenties. Secretary Thomas S. Donohugh was the officer who not only made the discovery but also resolved that there should be something creative in Liberia. And as a result of his insight and effort, Methodism made a fresh beginning there by establishing a new mission station, one not dependent upon Liberian resources or initiative, but decided upon in America.

GANTA: A FRESH START

Donohugh took the first step while he was on a 32,000-mile tour of Methodist missions in Africa in 1923. Having broached to the Liberian president, Charles D. B. King, the Board's interest in starting a new mission deep in the hinterland, Donohugh accompanied him to a meeting of African chiefs gathered to meet the President. Donohugh himself had an opportunity to talk with the chiefs, by whom he was very much impressed. Through him they invited the Methodists to open missionary work far back in the interior close to the border of French Guinea. Although Donohugh did not travel all the way in to the area the chiefs discussed with him, he told the General Missionary Committee in November that the Secretaries desired to send missionaries in 1924 to take up the invitation. He presented the plan to the Committee as a new effort, which should be separated from the old work in Liberia, with the latter, they hoped, to be placed on a self-supporting basis.

Shortly after Secretary Donohugh's conference with the chiefs, Bishop Matthew W. Clair visited the Sanaquelle district, the general area in view, two hundred miles from Monrovia. There, on a November day, he addressed a large audience that included twenty-five or thirty chiefs, and again came an invitation to the Methodists to send preachers and teachers to the surrounding towns. The Bishop decided that the new station should be located near Ganta, at the crossroads of two ancient trade routes. At Ganta, in the midst of two dozen villages, was an African native town where lived the paramount chief of the vicinity, and close by it a government post. It well ful-

* See p. 547.

filled the two important elements in Donohugh's strategy for a new start—closeness to the indigenous people of the hinterland and effective geographical separation from all previous missionary work in association with the Liberia Conference and its Americo-Liberian ministry.

For the new venture, the Board enlisted, carefully prepared, and finally dispatched to Liberia four missionaries: George W. Harley, M.D., and Henry T. Miller, a pastor in the Kansas Conference, and their wives. The Harleys arrived in Monrovia early in the fall of 1925 and were on hand to greet the Millers when they landed in January, 1926. Accompanied by Revington L. Embree, the new president of the College of West Africa, and James L. Sibley, an interdenominational educational adviser, the Harleys soon left for Ganta, which they reached after two weeks of rough travel and delay. Early in March, the Millers also were in Ganta. There both families (their traveling companions went back to the coast) lived for the time being in a three-room house, and later in two houses, in the government compound near the native town.

For the first year, the Ganta mission had no authoritative appointed head; Harley and Miller were coequals in charge. During that year, and for a time later on, the four missionaries conducted the mission's business affairs and directed its operational activities through a mission council organized under a constitution. Dr. Harley was the elected president, Mrs. Harley served as secretary, and Mrs. Miller was the treasurer. The mission was connected with the Liberia Conference through the Sanaquelle District, which included only a single appointment besides Ganta. At the Conference session of 1927, Bishop William O. Shepard appointed Miller District Superintendent and head of Ganta Mission. Miller and Harley each assumed special responsibilities, Harley's being the dispensary work, but they also found their activities overlapping. Direction of the mission, which at times involved tension between the two men, finally was unified when Miller was appointed in 1929 as head of the Nanakru mission and superintendent of the Sinoe Kru Coast District during Walter B. Williams's furlough year. Harley then became sole director of the Ganta mission and remained so until his retirement in 1960.

While Miller and Harley were together at Ganta, they secured from the government a land grant for the specific mission site they finally had settled upon. It was about a mile and a half from the town of Ganta, thirty miles from Sanaquelle, and only two miles from the French border. During the three years, the two missionaries established contacts with the surrounding people, planted gardens, put up living quarters and buildings for mission functions, and took initial steps in the development of work in medicine, industrial arts, and general schooling. Harley was responsible for the dispensary and Miller for the very small schools.

When Doctor Harley went out to the Conference session of 1929 at which Miller received his new appointment, he was shocked, and not for the first

time, at what he learned of the condition of the Americo-Liberian ministry. When he returned to Ganta, he wrote Secretary Donohugh:

Conference was a revelation to me—a revelation of the hopeless corruption of the ministerial personnel, including the District Superintendents and almost all of the preachers. . . . Bishop Shepard was astounded and disheartened. To him it seemed almost hopeless. He said once to me that he wondered if such men as Embree and I were not wasting our time trying to work in co-operation with such people. At another time he urged us to become Elders and join the Conference so that we could use our influence and power of vote in the Conference to help clean up the general corruption and immorality of the preachers themselves. They are open to the severest charges. Very few of them are full time ministers. The picture is too frequently of a man who is a preacher on Sundays, a corrupt politician on week-days and an immoral man every night in the week. There is a queer mixture of legal marriage, native polygamy, and immorality which may be found all in the same household, and all apparently under the full sanction of the church. . . . Bishop Shepard insisted that one preacher accused of immorality be expelled from the Conference. Afterward one of the other preachers told me that there was not one present who, without guilt, could have cast the first stone. It was patent to everyone that the man would not have been expelled if the Bishop had not stood very, very, firmly against any sidestepping of the issue.

What Harley discovered at that Conference session in Upper Caldwell only confirmed him in a view of the Americo-Liberian church that he had held since his arrival in Monrovia in 1925. Then also he had written Donohugh about his disillusionment at the sexual immorality that was prevalent among the Liberian ministers and some of the Negro missionaries sent to Liberia by the Board. Their reputation and their influence were so bad that any new missionary like himself, he felt, already had a negative reputation to live down because of the general missionary image created by these sub-standard mission workers. He found that their influence had contaminated even the native boys they trained. "The system of ethics actually in practice among the coast Christians has won for them," wrote Harley, "the reputation of dishonesty, and I am absolutely sure that the reputation is as a rule deserved." He cited cases of non-Liberians who would not employ mission boys because of their unreliability, preferring instead boys from the bush, who were still honest, still unspoiled by the mission brand of Christianity. Harley himself decided then that he would employ "raw country boys" whenever he could.

Harley was particularly troubled, in 1925, about the situation that faced him as he was about to take up residence at Ganta. An Americo-Liberian preacher had been sent in to prepare the way for the new mission by building temporary missionary residences, and Harley feared that the man already had spoiled the atmosphere in which he and Miller hoped to establish a Christian mission. In violation of Harley's view that the work in the interior

should be as free as possible from the expectation that "a mission will have all sorts of things to give away," the advance worker regrettably had been "one of these coast men who was even more than just 'another one of them.' He was a positive living evidence that '*Christian*' may mean *privileged to prosper*." Harley found that the man had been recalled from Ganta because of dishonesty and sexual immoralities. "This will put a fine color on the beginnings of an effort so carefully planned," he wrote. "I distinctly shrink from living in the houses after this use has been made of them, and really question whether it is wise to even locate in the same town." And he told Donohugh that he probably would feel impelled to take a blunt and open stand against the low practices infecting the dominant group in the Conference-directed mission enterprise, not only because they were repugnant to him, but also because keeping silent would tend to create the impression that he himself was the usual sort of mission man. "I do not intend at this stage of the game to throw a cloud over all my subsequent efforts by identifying myself with these negro Methodists, some of whom are regularly appointed missionaries."

There was another detrimental, if less immoral, element in the missionary image as held by the tribesmen in the Ganta area—"Americanism." Actually the stigma expressed their own repugnance for the Liberian government. Harley found that the surrounding country had been made secure for Liberian government officials only five years before his own arrival. "At that time," he wrote Donohugh, "the native institutions were necessarily suppressed, and are still further being destroyed in all these towns on the new road where the people are exposed to the pilfering of the soldiers and Govt. messengers." When Revington Embree came up to visit Harley in 1930, he was struck by the existence of a wide belt of land between "the civilized group on the coast" and the natives of the interior—an area "barren of people, farms, or any sign of life." It seemed to him like a no man's land between two armies. As Harley told him, the people had left their towns and farms and moved out in order to escape further profiteering and extortion by the elements on the coast.

The people were trying to escape what they called the American palaver. To them, Harley told Donohugh, the government was American, and "America" was Monrovia. He wrote:

Thus it happens that we missionaries are merely "White Americans," and while the people realize that there is some difference, we are little more than the foster children of the "American Palaver." We live [1927] in houses erected by Govt. labor, and are still indirectly under Govt. protection; though we are now paying for all labor, and trying as fast as possible to let the people see that we are not the government. The very fact that we pay for labor is a big thing in our favor. These people are no fools, and they will soon see the difference.

Harley saw the factor of the people's identification of the mission with the Monrovia administration as a potential obstacle to their acceptance of the mission's program. And it applied particularly to the principle of "learning by doing" by which he expected the mission's educational program to be shaped. He hesitated to accept what he felt the casual observer would find an easy conclusion, namely, that the Mano people living near the mission were lazy. "I am not at all sure but that it is nothing more than passive resistance to outside pressure."

Harley still was concerned with this problem when he returned from Conference in 1929, for it was related also to the extreme smallness of the school that Henry Miller had started at Ganta. Not more than five or six boys were then enrolled, including a few who had been suspended for stealing while Harley was absent. Patrons of the school came from among those in sympathy with the American palaver. Those who were not, did not care to support the mission school, because of its association with the Monrovia regime and its foreign backers. Rejecting the mission school was another form of the passive resistance with which the people patiently were waiting for the day when, as Harley's interpreter put it, the American palaver would be finished and they could have their country back again. This was the attitude of the people in general and of the traditional chiefs still left in power.

But the majority of the chiefs were government appointees, either young men trained in Monrovia or men who had sided with the government in the recent war of subjugation and had fought against their own people. Some of these collaborationists could be expected to send their sons to school—but only their own sons, not the sons of the people, whom they did not wish to have educated. The boys coming from among the common people would be likely to be orphans or adventurous lads who had broken away from parental authority. "It seems apparent, therefore," said Harley, "that we must conduct a school largely for the sons of chiefs, and other boys destined to be the rulers of their people." The only alternative to accepting this situation at least for the time being would have been to hold to Henry Miller's plan for securing pupils for the coming year—to ask the District Commissioner to requisition boys from the chiefs. This method, which was used in government schools, entailed an involvement with the government that Harley was extremely reluctant to pursue.

In order to win the confidence of the people for whom Ganta Mission was founded, then, Harley had to grapple with no mean problem in diplomacy. He had to break out of the stereotype of corrupt and mercenary mission personnel, and he had to overcome the heavy suspicion of mission collusion with the people's masters in Monrovia. He had to build a mission, that is, that was untrammelled by Americo-Liberian Methodism or Americo-Liberian government.

Before his first term ended in furlough, in 1930, Harley was successful in

moving measurably toward his ideals for Ganta Mission. As early as 1927, he had his dispensary building in operation on the new mission site and was treating as many as a hundred patients a day, each person paying the equivalent of a shilling. He thus actually was reaching the people he had come to serve and was schooling his patients from the beginning not to expect medical handouts from the clinic. When Embree came to Ganta just before Harley went on furlough, he visited villages near Ganta, finding the people well disposed toward the mission because of Doctor Harley's medical ministry and because of his straightforward dealings with them. When they learned that he was going on furlough, a typical response was, "Who will take care of us as Dr. Harley has? Plenty of people will die this year while he is away." Embree tried to probe the people's appreciation of Harley's motivation for the unaccustomed kindness and care they received from him. Men in different towns said that in his work with the people he followed "God's palaver." When one man suggested that Harley might be acting for the government, others instantly made the rebuttal that the government never acted with the helpfulness the doctor showed. Neither, they said, did the government pay for labor, which Harley always did.

EMBREE OBSERVES

Revington Embree himself was a new focus of missionary responsibility in Liberia. Bishop William O. Shepard was attempting to administer the field from unfortunately far away in Paris. He needed in Liberia a man in whom he had confidence, to whom he and the Board of Foreign Missions could turn for sound liaison unbiased by ulterior commitment to the methods and purposes of the Americo-Liberian ecclesiastical machine. He needed somebody who would provide the Mission with financial responsibility at the center and with reliable and unified general administration. Therefore, shortly before Embree went to Ganta in 1930, the Bishop appointed him as functional superintendent of the Liberia mission. Technically the move was defective, for the Discipline had no provision for such an office for a Mission that was governed by an Annual Conference, with an apparatus of District Superintendents. Despite this defect and at the risk of irritating the District Superintendents, Bishop Shepard gave Embree the post. In this capacity, he soon was called upon to interpret for the Bishop and the Board events connected with a new outbreak of serious trouble on the Kru Coast.

The year 1930 was a time of turmoil for Liberia. Social conditions in the country were being probed by a commission established by the League of Nations to investigate forced labor, slavery, and maltreatment of indigenous natives by the government. Disturbing revelations of government corruption and oppression were being made, variously provoking reactions of outrage, shock, disillusionment, and rebelliousness in different segments of the population. Not only the natives but also rank-and-file Americo-Liberians were

upset. Embree, during a June visit to the Cape Palmas area, heard chiefs complaining of extraordinary cases of "rank injustice, extortion, and grinding down of the native." He was depressed by reports he gathered of the evidently unchecked, pervasive corruption among public officials and of current outrageous abuse of the taxing power. Later in the year, he found the whole country in a dangerous and rebellious mood because of the presence of the international commission, which caused many discontented people to hope that relief from oppression now was on the way. The government had added to public resentment by threatening to use soldiers on the populace near Monrovia, and the military actually had been employed to bludgeon and frighten the natives on the Kru Coast to remain in submission. Never was the prestige of the government so low among the people.

WILLIAMS AND THE KRUS

When Walter B. Williams returned to the Nanakru mission in September from furlough in the United States, the situation in the immediate neighborhood was tense. Antigovernment elements among the Krus had risen against government-sponsored chiefs and had thrown them out, new leaders taking their places. The current struggles between chiefs, backed by their supporting factions, were sharpened by various standing grievances and rivalries, but they involved basically a popular move against the Monrovia regime, the victorious chiefs and their people going so far as to refuse to pay taxes.

Twenty years earlier, he had seemed, because of his apparent commitment to their interests, the Mission's best hope for a vital outreach to the natives. But by 1930, he had used such aggressive methods in his campaign to make the Kru Coast safe for Christianity, and he had so steadily and urgently courted favor with government officials in Monrovia and with Americo-Liberians in Sinoe, that he was badly alienated from large numbers of the Kru people. They never had forgotten, for instance, his participation in the destruction of the Nanakru juju house and the objects in it, which they viewed not as an attack on Williams's Satan, but as an assault on their tradition as a people. His optimistic reports of the success of the Nanakru mission had somewhat outrun the facts.

Now in the crisis precipitated by the visit of the League Commission, he appeared to act with an overriding compulsion to keep the Nanakru Methodist movement in recognized alliance with the government and to dragoon the neighboring Kru people into remaining unconditionally submissive to Americo-Liberian authority. It was the authority not only of Monrovia officialdom but also of local Sinoe officials and traders, who sometimes acted independently of Monrovia to keep the Krus subordinate to their own economic interests. The Krus had become familiar with this bias of Williams's;

they realized that he was against them and for their masters. They accused him of many offenses against them. Some of the charges—a number of them serious—were true.

Upon arriving at the mission, Williams promptly began searching out rebel sympathizers among his own workers and dismissed them from mission service. At his first two Sunday services, he harshly harangued the congregation for their alleged disloyalty to the government. He ridiculed the people for trusting in the League of Nations Commission and threatened them with dire consequences. He entered closely enough into the local politics of the crisis to denounce before the congregation a "half-English" woman formerly engaged by Henry Miller to teach in the Nanakru day school, a Mrs. Davies, who had sided with the restive people and supported their efforts to get their story of government oppression before the Commission. He even undertook to defend local and Sinoe official and trading figures who had earned the hostility of the people, including two men who were hated for holding many Krus in debt-slavery. He invited some of these recognized enemies of the Krus to his home and also gave them places on the platform when he spoke. Among the provocative figures thus favored was Joseph O. W. Garber, the progovernment pastor of Asbury Church in Nanakru, who though he had been in the local Kru work for several years, had no sympathy with the people and never learned to speak their language. There was antagonism between Garber and Mrs. Davies, whose husband was a Kru, and Garber had, like Williams, used the church services as an opportunity to berate the Krus for their attitude toward Liberian authorities.

After this beginning, Williams became, evidently on his own initiative, virtually a government spy on the Kru Coast. At least twice that fall, he wrote President King to alert him to antigovernment activity and to stir the administration to restraining or punitive action. He warned in particular of the allegedly inflammatory conduct of Mrs. Davies, whom he branded a very dangerous woman, and suggested that she be arrested while she was still in Monrovia's Kru Town. "If this she-enemy . . . could be arrested things would quiet down a bit."

Government action, when it came, was not a quieting influence. On a day in November, headed by a party of Sinoe officials and business men, more than a hundred soldiers of the Liberian Frontier Force advanced upon the towns of Nanakru and Settra Kru to enforce the payment of taxes and to frighten the people into submission to authority as represented by themselves. Egged on by the civilians, the soldiers beat the townspeople, plundered their houses, frightened the women off into the bush, and arrested Kru men and put them in chains. The antigovernment chief at Nanakru charged that Williams joined the attacking party and participated in the raid, especially the plundering of Mrs. Davies's home. The Kru people believed that the charge was true, and Revington Embree, who closely investigated Williams's

activities in this period, believed at first that it was probable, for Williams's contacts with the Sinoe Americo-Liberians and with the Monrovia administration, as well as his open and energetic government partisanship, were well known. Whatever Williams's specific relation to the affair may have been, his colleague Garber evidently did take part in it.

Always concealing the Krus' real case against the government, consistently blaming them for the turbulence on the Kru Coast, soft-pedaling all references to the soldiers' actions, portraying the Sinoe exploiters of the natives as victims rather than as oppressors, Williams also managed to cast himself once again, when he reported to the Board, as a peacemaker holding back enough Krus from opposition to the soldiers to avert a destructive war. Though he did not hide his full sympathy with the government, he revealed to his superiors in New York nothing of the aggressive sternness of his handling of the Krus. But when an officer came down from Monrovia to investigate actually what had happened at Nanakru and Settra Kru and then determined that the soldiers and the Sinoe men had gone too far, Williams did not agree. When the officer released the Kru captives and sent the Sinoe men packing, Williams wrote to a party in Sinoe bitterly complaining of such leniency.

Embree and Bishop Shepard received complaints about Williams's conduct from Kru sources and also from the American chargé d'affaires in Monrovia, the chargé criticized Williams for "interference in local politics," particularly for his writing to the President. The Krus, through the *de facto* chief at Nanakru, accused him of identification with the raid and of many instances of anti-Kru activity. The chief represented people who wanted Williams removed from the Kru Coast mission. The American State Department consulted the Board in New York about Williams's erratic behavior, and the American Minister in Monrovia wrote him on 4 January 1931 conveying to him the Board's suggestion that he and his wife withdraw from the Kru area to Monrovia in time for the Annual Conference, which was called for 28 January. A fortnight before Conference, Embree cabled the Board that in the midst of serious disturbances, Williams had displayed such great hostility toward the Krus that he had lost all confidence in him. He indicated that Williams would be quite useless in mission work anywhere in the District and stated that he believed Williams's mind to be slightly deranged, a judgment he later reiterated in written correspondence.

While the Liberia Conference was in session, the Board cabled Embree that it approved transferring Williams from the Kru territory if serious charges against him should be established. Williams chose, however, not to come up to the capital, even though the government sent a launch to fetch him there to have him in attendance upon a case involving the Kru resistance. But the charges against him were so serious, and the tensions involved in

his position were so severe, that Bishop Shepard left him without appointment, putting another man in his place as District Superintendent and leaving his school and mission posts to be supplied. He then cabled the Board to arrange for the immediate return of the Williamses to the United States. Shortly afterwards, the Board wrote Williams directing him to return and making passage money available to him. Williams hung back, and evidently he was able, after awhile, to appease both the church officials and the State Department people by explaining his former correspondence with the Liberian government and by agreeing to send through the American Legation any reports on the Kru Coast that he desired to convey to the Liberian administration. The officials relaxed their attitude, and it was agreed that Williams should stay on his familiar field until his retirement, which would be due in a year or two. Before long, Williams was back in command of the District and of the Nanakru mission.

But to the Krus 1931 brought no peace. They held to their stance of resistance against impositions from Monrovia, and the government's punitive forces ranged up and down through their vulnerable, inflammable towns. A hundred soldiers remained stationed at Nanakru until late in the fall. In September, Williams wrote to Bishop Shepard, "Some nine large towns have been burned [by soldiers] and the people are scattered into the jungle and swamps." He predicted that still fiercer warfare was on the way—a misfortune he declared the Krus had brought on themselves.

Although Williams steadily portrayed himself as a peacemaker during this terribly destructive war, he did not stop meddling in it even after being called to book by the Board for his anti-Kru activity. After the colonel stationed in Nanakru returned to Monrovia, Williams became responsible for the arrival of still another punitive expedition into the Kru country; he wrote to Monrovia to the Secretary of War, who replied:

20th December 1931

Reverend Walter B. Williams,
Nana Kru, Sinoe County,
Kroo Coast District
My dear Brother Williams,

I am in receipt of your letter dated December 10, 1931, in which you give information of the condition of affairs on the Sinoe Kroo Coast. I thank you very much for this interesting letter, which I showed the President. I am therefore losing no time in despatching [*sic*] Colonel T. E. Davis and Major M. N. Grant back to the coast, to put down the rebellion which seem [*sic*] to be existing down your way. They have full instruction, this time, to totally subdue the enemies of the Government. You need not have any fear about the person who is in charge of the troops as he is a loyal and patriotic officer. All who are rebellious, will be captured and brought up to the Central Government to be death [*sic*] with.

In case you are in any way disturbed by these rebels, you are to report same to Colonel Davis, who will give you the necessary protection.

Thanking you again for this very important letter,

I have the honour to be,
Yours faithfully,
J. Sam'l Dennis
SECRETARY OF WAR

Williams reported to the Conference session, late in January, on his purging the Nanakru mission of workers who had been "badly mixed up in this native uprising and tried to break up the Mission, because of our loyalty to the Liberian Government." He also reported on the extent of the damage done:

Many Kru towns have been destroyed in this war by fire and shot, and our churches have suffered also in the same way. Because of the war, some of these churches are without congregations just now. The Liberian Government tried its hardest to prevent hostilities, but without success. Some 30 Kru towns, therefore, have passed out of existence for the present.

But Williams did not report on his correspondence with the Secretary of War, with its hand-in-glove co-operation between himself and the authorities responsible for the activities of the Frontier Force in his neighborhood.

Hostilities were suspended for 1932. Mrs. Williams attributed "the twelve months' armistice" on the Coast to the League of Nations representative and the government. At Conference time, in March, 1933, some of the tribes still were in exile, she reported, and others were engaged in rebuilding their houses. Williams's statement on the cessation of the fighting was far less muted than his wife's; he rejoiced in the peace, harmony, and fine spirit of co-operation on the District in 1932. He obviously was highly pleased with the political results flowing from suppression of the antiadministration tribesmen and their non-Christian leaders. He said:

The bitter and unfriendly spirit that was engendered by the Kroo rebellion has largely died away, and now the work is well organized and in splendid shape. Large crowds are attending the church services each Lord's Day, and the most significant fact now is that the chiefs[,] kings, and big men of the Kroo towns are attending church services freely. At Nana Kru we have one of our church members as paramount chief. At Nuah Point the chief is also a member of the M.E. Church. Neroh has a chief who is an ordained local deacon. At Sobobo the chief and all his cabinet go to church on Sundays. And at Sobo the chief and his counsellors attend church. This is a tremendous stride in the right direction of a bright future for our church and I hope, also, for the Liberian Government. . .

As in Grand Cess at the end of the Kru troubles of 1915-16, Williams had his eyes well adjusted to the advantage of having the Kru tribal system in the hands of men sympathetic with his purpose to exterminate the customs belonging to the indigenous religion.

He was somewhat less than realistic, however—or was he less than frank?—when explaining to his colleagues how the political change had been brought about. He did not attribute it to the sheer impact of the burning of thirty towns, the killing of many Kru, and the dispersion of village populations—that is, to the armed ruthlessness of the government with which the Mission as represented by himself was known to be allied. Though his own enmity toward the Kru leaders had been longstanding and too overt to be forgotten, he credited the change to his persuasiveness in winning them over from their former “hostility to schools and churches, believing them to be the enemies of their race and a great source of trouble in their towns.” He ascribed their “fine change of attitude towards the Christian Mission” to his having made a special effort to assist them in their time of great need *after* the burning of the towns. But the climax of his interpretation, with the brutal means being left unmentioned was religious:

This wonderful change of mind, and I trust of heart as well, of the rulers of the Kru is like a beautiful dream to me. They were so soaked and dyed in superstition and ju-ju worship and human sacrifices that it seemed almost impossible to break through this hard, deep-rooted crust of devil worship. But the glorious dynamic power of the Lord Jesus Christ has marvelously undermined these evils and the darkness is passing away slowly but steadily by the compelling love of Christ our Lord for the world of lost men.

Receiving the retired relation at the hands of the Conference, Williams sailed from Monrovia three days after delivering his report. However valid or questionable his interpretation of the war may have been, it is true that the Kru Coast now was quiet. His successor could say a year hence, without being suspected of capping an argument, “There is a fine spirit of cooperation between the town people, and between the church people and the chiefs of the coast.” The outlook for the mission work certainly was far less clouded locally than it had been.

Williams’s successor as superintendent of the Kru Coast District and as head of the Nanakru Mission was Everett P. Veatch, M.D., whom the Board sent to Liberia with the purpose of making another constructive move in medical missionary work. He arrived at Nanakru in August, 1932, six months before Williams’s departure. He combined supervision of the District with development of a substantial medical service. However, he remained on the field only three years, and upon his leaving, he was not replaced by a medical man.

GANTA: BUILDING FOUNDATIONS

It remained for George Harley to carry forward the only Methodist medical mission in Liberia. Doctor Harley returned to Ganta by March, 1932, after an extended furlough in the United States. Most of the time during his

absence, Hattie T. Hooks, a Negro missionary under Board appointment, had charge at Ganta, and she stayed on with Harley in school work for a few years more. Harley himself finished out the decade, but his field work was twice interrupted. Ill health dogged him at various times after his 1930-32 furlough. This necessitated his sojourning in London from May to November, 1933, a period he turned to advantage not only for recuperation but also for the pursuit of research and writing in the fields of anthropology and tropical medicine. He and his family also were absent from the field from May, 1937, to January, 1939. The latter absence covered his normal furlough time but also was essential because of his having become infected with sleeping sickness, which evidently had invaded his system a year before he finally succeeded in diagnosing his trouble for what it was. When he left for the States in 1937, there was danger that the effect of the disease would keep him out of the tropics permanently.

In spite of many difficulties, including an excruciating lack of funds that kept him from developing Ganta Mission as originally planned and expected, Harley kept persistently at the task throughout the decade. Compared with the later progress of the mission and its eventual manifold service to the people and to the nation, this remained essentially a phase of continued preparation for its broad ministry. School work, general medical practice, special treatment of lepers, forging local relationships, erecting and improving buildings, teaching industrial arts, and studying the culture of the people, however, absorbed an immense amount of energy and called for constant creative improvisation by Harley and his wife.

After ten years at Ganta, Harley felt that the mission had been an experiment. In an important aspect, it had been a trial of the soundness of implicit, indirect evangelism as against the more conventional evangelism that majored in frontal preaching of the gospel with the immediate aim of conversion to Christianity. Writing to Secretary Donohugh in 1936, Harley said that direct evangelism had not yet begun in the Ganta neighborhood. No mission worker had preached outside the compound or attempted evangelization of the patients at the clinic. In harmony with a policy agreed upon even before Harley first came to Liberia, all had been done on the assumption that the external forms of evangelism had been overdone in Liberia and had been practiced without sufficient background or follow-up, thus failing to produce a dependable type of convert.

"We accordingly waited," said Harley, "to build foundations which would furnish a practical background of good works and moral living with the emphasis on character-building among school boys and employees, and quiet Sunday services on the Mission." He assured Donohugh that he would welcome at Ganta a missionary whom Donohugh and Bishop Springer had suggested as a possible reinforcement, a man who could take up specific evangelistic work, for the way was now prepared by definite results from the

relaxed approach the mission had been practicing. Even government officials had responded to the mission's influence. Harley felt, for instance, that his own personal influence—"purely a matter of personal friendship, not through any religious pressure or 'conversion' of any sort"—was partly responsible for an amazing change in the District Commissioner in the Ganta area. "In short, Ganta Mission has had a strong moral influence on the whole community so that a stronger program of evangelistic effort would now be timely." Harley hoped—his hope was not realized during this period—that a man would be sent who, understanding the "power of the native religious institution—a mixture of fetichism and terrorism"—would begin evangelistic work in a way that would not openly antagonize the people's former native religious leaders.

The evangelism of the established Americo-Liberian Methodist church long had ignored the bulk of the indigenous people, while patronizing a few of them; Walter Williams's evangelism generally had mounted militant and repressive crusades against the people's ancient ways and their resistant leaders; Harley's evangelism sought first to understand the people and appreciate their culture, to serve them responsibly, quietly to demonstrate in personal relations a new and winning way of life, and thus to prepare the ground for the preaching and acceptance of the Christian gospel.

But by 1939, Ganta Mission was not launched upon its overtly evangelistic phase. The 8,600 church members in the Liberia Conference were products of the old ways in church life and of frontal, revivalistic evangelism.

The Belgian Congo

ALTHOUGH THE CONGO MISSION ORIGINALLY WAS thrust upon the Methodist Episcopal Church by the purpose and persistence of one man, less than a decade after its founding it was a corps of ten Board of Foreign Missions appointees and eight missionary wives. In the group assigned to the Belgian Congo in 1920 were John M. Springer, the founder, and his first two colleagues, who arrived in 1914—Arthur L. Piper, M.D., and Roger S. Guptill. And there were Doctor Piper's first two co-workers at Kapanga (1916)—Thomas B. Brinton and C. Marie Jensen—with Coleman C. Hartzler (1917) and two 1918 arrivals, Edward I. Everett and Wesley A. Miller. The two most recent recruits were William E. Shields (1919) and John N. Dana (1920).

Others soon came to participate in the Mission. Two single women missionaries of the Board, Laura A. Wyatt and Helen E. Everett (sister of Edward Everett), arrived in 1921. William C. Berry, M.D., came to Elisabethville the same spring, in time to be ordained by Bishop Eben S. Johnson at the May session of the Mission Conference. John E. Brastrup, a native of Denmark and a member of the Norwegian-Danish Conference (U.S.), who had met the Springers in his homeland, was the fourth to join the Mission in 1921. Two years later, the Mission Conference gained its first African member, when Nelson B. Capempe was received on trial. In 1924, Roy S. Smyres, who had left the Congo in 1919 after serving as a short-term volunteer, returned to the field with five more years of academic work back of him. Preceding him by a few months was a new recruit, Ray L. Smalley.

At the beginning of the decade, the Mission's Finance Committee was shaping plans for the future development of the work of the Congo Mission Conference. The Committee, which included all the male appointees of the Board, was the chief factor determining the operation of the field, having acquired its functional importance during the two-year furlough (1918-20) of John Springer, who previously had been the Mission's decision-maker. In 1921, the Committee was planning for two new stations to be added to Elisabethville, Kambove, Kabongo, and Kapanga, the four already established under Springer's leadership.

One of the new stations was to be located at Sandoa, which was on the Luala River about a hundred miles south of Kapanga. The real promoter of the Sandoa plan was Thomas Brinton, who during his stay in Kapanga, had extended the outstation activity of that northern post along the path to Sandoa, even establishing a school, the southernmost project, at Mbakou, across the river from the Sandoa government post. Brinton was interested in the new location not simply as a matter of evangelistic extension, but also for economic and educational reasons. Although Kapanga still was supplying the men in its Christian community with a good deal of work through its building program, Brinton felt that within a few years it would be necessary to develop a settlement more favorable for agricultural and industrial work and better located for railway transportation and for the marketing of the products of the mission people. In harmony with this, he viewed Sandoa as a possible site for the central department of the Congo Institute, the training school the Finance Committee still hoped to establish in spite of its necessary surrender of the Mulungwishi site in 1919.

Coming back from furlough in the latter part of 1922, Brinton succeeded Edward Everett as superintendent of the Lunda-Chiokwe District, whose two centers were Kapanga and now Sandoa. He settled down at Sandoa, which was in the heart of the Chiokwe section, and began erecting the buildings required for station work. "Brother Brinton is digging in hard at Sandoa and will have good place there," wrote Roger Guptill in January, 1923. A year later, Brinton had fifty boys attending school and planting extensive gardens for their own maintenance and that of the mission. His building activities extended to some of the outstations. The Sandoa Circuit included some points previously reached from Kapanga as well as a number of new ones cultivated for the first time during Brinton's residence in Sandoa. He opened nine new outschools during the Conference year 1923-24, and at the Conference session in September, Bishop William O. Shepard appointed African pastor-teachers to thirteen Sandoa Circuit outposts, with six more villages designated as "to be supplied." At the same time that he was developing the Sandoa complex, Brinton was responsible for the supervision of the similar network that he had created around Kapanga before his furlough. The requirements of District supervision and cultivation sent him itinerating constantly through an area extending 240 miles north to south, from Mwine-Chiyng to Dilolo, and 150 miles east to west, from Kayembi Makuru to the Kasai River, moving by motorcycle along government roads and, by more laborious means, along the rural paths.

Kinda was the second new location figuring in the plans of the Finance Committee in 1921. When John Springer came back to Elisabethville in 1920 after two years in the United States, he was assigned, along with William Shields and John Dana, to an exploratory trip into the country around Kinda, which was two hundred miles northwest of Elisabethville and sixty miles west

of Bukama. The purpose of the trip, which occupied the months of October and November, was to look for a site for the main department of the Congo Institute. While the men were out on the trail in November, Springer got word that Bishop Johnson had appointed him superintendent of the Luba District. The three-man team brought to the attention of the Finance Committee two sites in the Kinda neighborhood. Shields and Dana reported that in their opinion (Springer did not agree), a farm site near the village of Kanene, about twenty-five miles west of the Kinda government post, would do well for the Congo Institute location. Springer was more interested in the immediate vicinity of the government post—so much so that he began laying plans for a regular mission station there and, before returning from the trip, put up three mud-pole-and-grass structures as a start. He left in charge of the station Willie Kasanda, one of the former Fox Training School boys, who opened school there in January, 1921. Within a few months, Kasanda was directing a program of weekly services at six nearby points and a schedule of monthly services on three circuits farther out. At Conference time in May, the Finance Committee voted to acquire land for the station begun by Springer, and Bishop Johnson appointed Springer himself as resident missionary for Kinda.

Within two months, however, the appointment was canceled, and Springer never took up residence there. When Bishop Johnson came to the Conference session in Elisabethville, he found that Springer was in deep trouble with the entire missionary corps and that resolution of the trouble was the one consuming issue in the Conference and in the secret Finance Committee sessions that accompanied it. All the missionaries, to one degree or another, had grievances against Springer, and some of them were strongly opposed to him. The accumulated and varied grievances all were poured out at once before the Bishop during five or six days' unhappy meetings. Some of the complaints were rooted in personal friction, some in administrative differences, some in Springer's tenacity in pursuing his own way in the Mission affairs, and some in a particular maneuver he employed in order to get around a vote of the Committee involving the assignment of missionary residences in Elisabethville. The upshot of many distressing hours of confrontation was that Springer could not be appointed to District work for the coming year, because none of the missionaries wished to work under him. Indeed, it was the consensus of the Committee that he should be returned to the United States. Bishop Johnson finally unknotted the problem by appointing Springer to Kinda. This was a comedown for the man who had founded the Congo mission and so largely directed its growth up to that time. But he bowed to the situation and expressed his willingness to take the new, undeveloped charge. Before Conference was over, the missionaries had the grace to elect him a delegate to the Central Conference soon to meet in Old Untali, Southern Rhodesia. Springer thus went down to Rhodesia at a time when that

field was very much undermanned. As a result, Bishop Johnson transferred him to the Rhodesia Mission Conference and appointed him to head the newly formed two-Circuit Matambara District.

The work in the Kinda area developed according to a pattern that roughly combined the Springer and the Shields-Dana plan. Willie Kasanda and other African helpers carried forward the teaching and preaching among the villages near the Kinda post, and several of the missionaries helped at different times to prepare the Kanene farm as a base for the Mission-wide central training institute for which Shields and Dana originally had spotted the location. Edward Everett, upon being appointed to Kanene in August, 1922, spent nearly a year and a half there before going home on furlough. After an interval of a year, Roy Smyres came to Kanene in January, 1925, to serve as Principal of the Congo Institute and to supervise the Kinda Circuit, which was manned by African pastor-teachers at Kanene, Kinda Poste, and Kinda Village. Later, Ray Smalley joined Smyres and took charge of the agricultural work. Though he spent little more than a year at Kanene before leaving for Elisabethville to take up the superintendency of the "Elisabethville-Luba District," Smyres succeeded in starting the Congo Institute, getting together a group of seventeen boys and men as the institution's first pupils. Coleman Hartzler succeeded him and, assisted by Smalley, had twenty-six pupils at work by the end of 1926 on a curriculum in advance of anything previously developed in the Mission. The Institute included pupils from five other stations in the Mission, from five different language areas, and from six different peoples.

When one of the Secretaries in New York, hearing rumors about the healthfulness of Kanene, questioned the advisability of putting up permanent buildings there, Roy Smyres defended the proposal. Conceding that a better site might eventually be found, he held, nevertheless, that if "we are going to train teachers, we cannot afford to keep kicking our school around from one place to another, or to allow uncertainty of entire permanence to paralyze action." Smyres believed that the Mission could afford no further delay in organizing the Congo Institute. "Where is a native trained in our Mission," he asked Secretary Thomas S. Donohugh, "who could pass a third grade examination?" Kanene remained the home of the Institute for more than a decade and a half.

In addition to the Sandoa and Kinda-Kanene missions, which were planned to provide for resident Board missionaries, the Mission also established, fifty miles northwest of Elisabethville, a center to be administered by its African minister. In 1922, Bishop Johnson appointed Nelson Capempe to the village of Katanga, whose chief had sent word to William Shields in 1920 that he wanted a Christian teacher sent to his people. Upon coming down to Conference in Elisabethville in 1924, Capempe reported that he had been keeping the work going only under difficulty and discouragement because of sharp

opposition, even violence, by Roman Catholics. But he had resisted the temptation to run away, and his charge now had a new brick church, which had been erected with the assistance of Smalley, Springer, and Guptill. At that session of the Conference, Capempe was appointed to Katanga Circuit, with the villages of Mangombe, Mushikatala, and Luishi attached to it. By 1930, the village was moved nearly a mile away, and it became necessary to tear down the church and rebuild close to the farther side of the community's new location. Although worthy of notice as the Mission's first formal Circuit assigned to the care of an African minister, Katanga eventually became only one among many Congo charges.

Although Sandoa and Kanene were the only new locations that became full-fledged stations during these two decades, Likasi, which already was among the appointments in 1919, also became a central station during this period. It won its strategic status through a shifting of priorities that simultaneously eliminated Kambove from that position.

The shift occurred under the impact of new industrial developments in the Kambove-Likasi-Panda area. Kambove no longer was the railhead of the Cape-to-Cairo line, as it had been when Springer settled there the Mission's first permanent station; indeed, the main line bypassed Kambove in 1921 and left it on a side line. The Kambove mine still was active, but the town was being rapidly outstripped by Panda and Likasi, which no longer were simply African rural locations. Panda now was the name given to the mining operation and community near Likasi where the Union Minière, the region's dominant concessionaire, built its large copper-processing plant, with miles of railroad sidings. Two miles away was the new Likasi township of seven hundred white people, and in the general neighborhood were nearly ten thousand Africans—all drawn there by the growth of the mining and processing activities. It was clear that Panda-Likasi offered the Methodists by far their greatest local evangelistic challenge, and William Shields' energetic attempt to care for Kambove, the surrounding villages, and the Panda-Likasi constituency while still living in Kambove demonstrated that it would be necessary to transfer the missionary residence to some point near Likasi. A hint of the trend away from Kambove appeared in the Conference Minutes for September, 1919, which listed Shields' appointment as "Kambove and Likasi."

Coming to Kambove as District Superintendent in 1921, Roger Guptill also took direct charge of the Panda-Likasi work, frequently bicycling over the fifteen miles between Kambove and Panda. In 1922, he secured from the Union Minière short-term use of a plot of land at Panda and got building operations under way. Late in the year, John Dana came to Panda to live, finished erection of the missionary residence, put up other mission buildings, and finally made the new station a center for educational, social, and evangelistic work among both whites and Africans in the locality. As Dana was

beginning his Panda work, Guptill wrote to Secretary North that Kambove was becoming "a place off in a corner," no longer enjoying even dependable freight service. Buildings were being torn down, and the place looked "like a deserted village." Dana remained at work in the booming situation at Panda-Likasi until December, 1923, when he departed on a health furlough.

Only with difficulty did the Methodists keep their foothold on the new location. Returning from Southern Rhodesia after nearly three years, John Springer became simultaneously both Superintendent of the Mission Conference and resident missionary in charge of the Panda-Likasi work. In the spring of 1925, the Union Minière notified him that he would have to abandon the Panda station because the company required the land for its own purposes. Springer and his wife had to move out so soon that the only place they could find to live in was a storage room they had engaged in the African quarter. Fortunately, the Governor-General authorized a grant of government land for a new station. It was located in Likasi on the path to Panda. Here Springer at once started a new building program, using money from the sale of the Panda quarters and materials salvaged from the dismantling of the Kambove station. Within a few months, however, Springer was off on furlough, and it fell to William Shields to build the new station and redevelop the mission's work in the locality. At first, for lack of a church building, Shields held religious services outdoors, but he was able to move them inside a new temporary structure in October, 1926. A new missionary from the United States, Victor D. Longfield, was assigned in 1927 to assist with building operations, which continued busy and productive throughout Shields' tenure. In 1928, Springer again returned, after nearly three years in the United States, and succeeded Shields at Likasi, which was now the head of a thriving circuit. At the end of his first year, Springer reported that he had a group of twenty African pastor-teachers at work on it.

While Sandoa, Kanene, and Likasi were becoming important points on its map, the Mission was attempting, though with setbacks, to add Kabongo to Kapanga as the second station offering effective medical service to the people. To that rough Luba outpost Bishop Johnson appointed in 1921 Dr. William Berry and his wife, who was a nurse. The Board had sent out the Berrys in spite of the fact that it was not yet providing funds for adequate equipment and housing of Dr. Piper's work at Kapanga. Dr. Berry's first efforts were aborted by unfortunate personal tensions in the three-family staff at Kabongo, where Wesley Miller was superintendent. Berry soon found himself in trouble with the Millers, with whom Coleman Hartzler, the other missionary, was having renewed personal difficulty. It was a bitter situation, from which Hartzler soon withdrew by going on furlough. After some months, Berry concluded that it was impossible for him to work with Miller. He resigned from the Mission, sold or gave away some of his goods, and started south to take ship for the United States. Responding to a telegram

from Bishop Johnson, Roger Guptill intercepted Berry at Kambove late in January, persuaded him to withdraw his resignation, and gave him educational and evangelistic work to do until Conference time, six months later. Miller having gone home on furlough, from which he was not returned, Dr. Berry then went back to Kabongo as the sole missionary on the station until Hartzler's return a year later.

Berry went back to work in the small grass-covered hut in which he had performed his first operation with dust pouring down from the roof. That primitive clinic-laboratory-surgery now not only became too small for his activity, but showed signs of falling down. The Doctor planned a new dispensary to replace it and, when his bricklayer quit, began making bricks with his own hands and teaching boys how to do it. In addition to his personal medical ministration, he trained a small corps of young men for dispensary work. He not only treated the sick in Kabongo itself, but went out to carry his services to the people in the outlying villages. He finally set up several of his young assistants in village dispensaries, where they could apply simple remedies and give first aid.

While on a journey a hundred miles north of Kabongo in November, 1923, to deliver the wife of a Belgian official, the 32-year-old doctor fell seriously ill. Within a few days, he was dead of pernicious malaria, his wife at the same time being saved from death by the efforts of one of his young assistants. Mrs. Berry's health was shattered by the experience (she was temporarily blinded, for one thing), but after convalescing at Cape Town, she returned to Kabongo the following May, resolved to carry forward as much of her husband's medical mission as she could. Coleman Hartzler and some of the eight assistants trained by Dr. Berry had transferred the center of the medical work to the new dispensary building. Mrs. Berry began by taking on a new team for training—seven young men and one woman—and closing down the village dispensaries for a month so that all the assistants could be brought together for further instruction and inspiration. The month of July was given to a circumcision camp for thirty-six boys, in which an attempt was made to conserve some of the values of the traditional tribal circumcision camp. She also led a combined medical and evangelistic traveling mission that took the young medical workers and some of the pupils in the girls' school on a ten days' tour through nearby villages. Her report to the Conference session in August stated that dispensaries were being continued in four villages, one dispensary was being reopened, and one was about to be started in an additional village. Priscilla Berry looked upon this medical outreach as a means of carrying the gospel to the people.

Mrs. Berry stayed at Kabongo with the Hartzlers for a year, adding varied missionary tasks to her medical efforts. Part way through the year, Hartzler drafted a passionate humanitarian appeal for another doctor to be sent to their station. While he was writing, Mrs. Berry was in her house "over

beyond the mulberry hedge," ministering to a little child dying of the same disease that had struck down her husband. But Hartzler knew that the best she could do in the fight against disease and death among the neighboring people was not adequate. They needed a fully prepared doctor. Hartzler wrote: "Seventeen young men in training here to help him; two women; a good microscope, tables, medicines, instruments, dispensary, grass houses for patients—people dying because that doctor to replace William Clark Berry is not here! . . . surely some one can be found immediately." Signed by five missionaries, the appeal was sent off to New York. In the spring of 1925, it was answered in the person of Dr. Frederick Morton, who was transferred from Mozambique and appointed, with his wife, to Kabongo. There he took up his medical ministry by Hartzler's side just as Priscilla Berry was leaving on furlough.

Kabongo failed to come to its full potential as a medical station even with Dr. Morton on the field. Morton had been at work less than a year, when Hartzler was moved to another post, leaving the doctor to carry a work load that once had been considered heavy enough and varied enough to call for the presence of three married missionaries at Kabongo. Medical practice had to compete with school work, evangelism, and circuit supervision for Morton's time and energies. And then, because of his wife's ill health, he had to leave the Congo after only two years. For the second time, Kabongo was bereft of its doctor.

Once again Priscilla Berry stepped into the gap. Back from her furlough after completing a course in tropical medicine in Brussels, she took over the Kabongo mission early in the fall of 1927. For the first nine months, she had no missionary colleague there, until Anna A. Olson, a new recruit, came to work with her. Like her predecessor, she carried the entire work of the station and the leadership of the circuit of fifteen outstations. She began with a reduced African staff and was faced with unsettled conditions in the vicinity—political difficulties, the removal of many villages to new sites, and recently generated opposition of chiefs to Christian work. But she won the friendship of the chiefs, reopened work in several places, established several new schools and directed the rebuilding of nearly all the village chapels, personally supervising the erection of four of them in adobe brick. She got out into the villages in an attempt to keep in close touch with the people. At the station, she held quarterly institutes for the village preacher-teachers and, with Anna Olson's assistance, maintained a boys' school with over a hundred pupils. It was a period of progress at Kabongo, but the medical work—as to some degree, the rest of the work—suffered, said Mrs. Berry, from "the inability of the staff to do everything that needed to be done." The training of medical assistants had lapsed, and Kabongo still needed a doctor.

After a year and a half at Kabongo, Priscilla Berry herself was sick enough to write her District Superintendent about it. She was having times—she

did not know why—"when the lights went out," as she said later. Just after Conference, 1929, she went to Cape Town, and wrote back to Edward Everett, "As far as I can tell now I have said Good-bye to the Congo. . . . the doctors find that I am nearly blind. By leaving now and stopping quinine, I may be able to put off total blindness for a shorter or longer period of time. Don't worry about me. I'm O.K. I shall look for some new field of usefulness."

Back to Kabongo for a third term went Coleman Hartzler, to carry on with a staff of African teachers at the principal station and at eighteen out-stations. In the latter, more than fourteen hundred children were enrolled in the Methodist schools. Spending part of their time on subcircuits of from six to twenty-eight locations, the evangelist-teachers had Christian "beginners" registered in thirty-five villages and were reaching nearly two hundred villages in all with the gospel. Hartzler confessedly did not have the skill to carry on the dispensary as it had been done before; nor did he have the time or the assistants he needed. Medical service was reduced to administration of first aid and occasional provision of automobile transportation to get sick people to the nearest doctor, seventy miles away. Hartzler testified that curtailment of the medical work meant that people died who might have lived. It also caused, by default, the falling away of numerous converts into their former pagan religious habits because of their return within the orbit of the African medicine men. The Christian doctors at Kabongo and the medicine men always had been natural competitors. There were many other social influences that tended to pull the Christians back into habits and allegiances that were incompatible with what the missionaries had taught them. Being unassisted by any other missionary, Hartzler had a hard fight to resist these forces. Sometimes the competition was organized, in the form of African sects—the Bambundji, a phallic society that thrived on blackmail and theft; Ntambwe, a thieving group that apparently was antagonistic to white men; and Maleka, a sect that gained followers through dancing and theft. But in spite of handicaps, the number of places and people reached by the Kabongo evangelistic and educational work kept growing during Hartzler's term.

Nevertheless, the Mission discussed from time to time the advisability of transferring the entire work to another missionary organization. Finally, in July, 1933, on motion of John M. Springer, the man who had founded the station in 1917, the Mission Conference voted to withdraw from Kabongo in favor of the Congo Evangelical Mission, which was active in all the surrounding territory and also sufficiently equipped and manned to be able to care for the area hitherto worked by the Methodists. Though travel now was much faster than sixteen years earlier, the Conference acknowledged that Kabongo was too isolated from the other Methodist stations. Also, largely for financial reasons, the field had long been deprived of missionary personnel and other resources required for cultivation and extension of its fruitful

activity. Thus the Congo mission gave up a second one of its original stations, the second site on which it seriously had attempted a medical ministry.

Meanwhile at Kapanga, medical service continued throughout the twenties and thirties under the direction of Dr. Piper, and in spite of heavy handicaps, it developed significantly. From the time of his return to the field in 1920, Piper experienced delay, discouragement, impatience, and frustration in his attempt to build a well-planned and permanent hospital to house his central medical work. The Board very soon let him know that its financial receipts were down and that no money would be available for this purpose. But the greatest drag on the building program was the Board's decision that no permanent buildings should be put up at Kapanga until the Mission had clear title to the land. In 1920, with the effectiveness of his first term already undercut by lack of facilities for good work, Piper found the prospect of a five-year term without adequate hospital housing almost intolerable and felt tempted to transfer to some other country, where he could get directly into his life work in an already well-founded medical situation. But he stayed in Kapanga and worked with what he had or could scrape together or could develop with his own hands. "After fifteen years of residence here," he wrote to Secretary Thomas S. Donohugh in 1930, "we have not as yet received definite title to any land. . . . For fifteen years there has been this excuse for not building permanent buildings here. Would it be expected that a man should spend his lifetime in the field working in temporary buildings . . . ?"

But Piper persevered. He planned and pressed for a full medical installation—though perforce erecting temporary and limited hospital units—repaired them when they decayed or the ants ate into them, and rebuilt when they burned down or no longer were usable. He got along with inadequate supplies and equipment, chafed at Mission and Board red tape—though enduring through love for the Kapanga work—trained African assistants, and devoted furlough time to increasing his own professional competence. While running his own central clinic, he directed village workers, conducted medical itineration, searched out leprosy cases, made regional medical surveys, and fought sleeping sickness (he himself was a victim over many months in 1928). He repeatedly devoted himself to nonmedical mission work, sometimes undertaking direction of the entire varied Kapanga enterprise. He always strived to increase the quality and outreach of the medical service, finally adding to the project, in co-operation with the American Leprosy Mission, a colony for 250 leprosy patients, for which he began construction of a permanent treatment center before leaving on furlough in 1939.

Among those who shared the work with Doctor Piper at Kapanga were four women—Laura Wyatt, Marie Jensen, Helen Everett, and his wife. Among the men who served as his colleagues or substituted for him during

furloughs were Thomas Brinton, John Dana, Edward Everett, and John Brastrup.

One of the Mission's most vexing problems began to emerge in the southern mining area of Katanga in 1923 and 1924. After years of informal, sometimes helpful co-operation with the Methodists, the powerful Union Minière du Haut Katanga initiated a shift in policy that blocked the efforts of the missionaries freely to exploit the great evangelistic opportunities inherent in the large concentrations of Africans assembled in response to the booming mining industry's demand for a large labor supply. The Mission first sensed the change when the Union Minière discouraged continuance of its work near the Star of the Congo Mine and at Ruashi, holding that the Methodists were located too close to the mine compounds and also declining to make other convenient locations available. In 1925, the Mission sold the Union its buildings at Panda-Likasi, the Union having declined to renew the lease on the land they stood on.

Then the Union refused to grant the Mission any other site, thus thrusting it into long negotiations with the Union, the Comité Spécial (the Government land company), and public officials. At this point, the Union's new policy—the Chemin de Fer du Katanga and other companies took similar positions—became explicit. They now decisively declined to permit the Methodist missionaries to hold services or classes in or near the compounds in which the African laborers had to live. Indeed, the missionaries and their African evangelists were forbidden all access to the compounds, even to invite the laborers to meetings held outside the company reserve. The laborers themselves, even though committed Methodists, were prohibited from holding religious meetings in their own quarters or outdoors on Union property. Since the Union Minière's land holdings were extensive, the nearest Methodist posts generally were far enough away from the lodgings in the compounds to inhibit, to one degree or another, attendance by the people the missionaries desired to reach. This factor especially hobbled the mission in the Panda neighborhood, where the Union holding was so large as to make the relevant distance greater than usual.

In the Lubumbashi area, the missionaries felt the weight of the Union's ban at the Lubumbashi Compound, the Star of the Congo Mine, and the Ruashi Mine. Near Likasi, the restrictions affected Methodist projects for the Panda, Kakontwe, Kambove, Chisanga, Chituru, and Luishi Mines. The only labor-camp locality unaffected by such curbs was the Dilolo section of the Sandoa Circuit, where in 1928–29 Bastrup was developing new work in numerous villages and compounds. Here Bastrup found contractors, evidently independent entrepreneurs connected with railroad construction, willing to receive more evangelists than he had available.

Simultaneously with this development, the Union Minière granted the Roman Catholic Church narrowly defined but strategic privileges inside com-

pound precincts. It turned over to the Benedictine order, which brought a generally Belgian corps of workers to the Congo, the maintenance of schools on its reserves, declaring that the schools were to be secular in nature, that is, devoted neither to religious education nor to other religious activity. The Methodist mission did not question the right of the Union to make such a contract. But as their leaders saw it, this measure when combined with restrictions placed upon Protestant activity in the compounds, belied the Union's profession of neutrality between religious groups and gave the Catholics an unfair advantage. The Methodists charged that the schools admitted to Union Minière areas were in practice not neutral, but Roman Catholic, schools. They claimed that the Benedictines took full advantage of their immediate and exclusive contacts with the African workers to promote Catholicism, conducting religious services and religious instruction inside the compounds. This violated, in the Methodists' view, the principle of religious liberty, to which the Kingdom of Belgium was formally committed by the Constitution of 1831. Privately, the Methodists were convinced that there was collusion between the Union Minière and the Roman Church, with the latter diplomatically manipulating the natural rapport of the Belgian Catholic industrialists with the Belgian churchmen.

The Mission repeatedly protested on its own behalf and on behalf of the Africans deprived of freedom of choice, sending official delegations and written communications to Union Minière officers and government officials. One round of attempted negotiations ended in December, 1926, with the Union Minière agreeing that where the size of its holdings made it difficult for its African compound families to leave the reserves to attend Methodist classes or services, it would allot to the Methodists plots for the installation of chapel-schools about a third of a mile from the edge of the respective compounds. But this apparent relaxation of the Union's attitude was illusory; the company simply did not put it into effect when specific requests were made. Only at Panda was an allotment made, and that at a long distance from the compound—"far away on the back side of everything," complained William Shields—and only after extended correspondence.

As legal agent for the Mission, Roy Smyres drafted in December, 1928, a major appeal to the government—an inclusive and well argued case for religious neutrality towards the various evangelizing groups and for religious liberty for the African subjects of the Kingdom of Belgium. He held that the government should permit no business concessionaire such as the Union Minière so to usurp governmental powers as to abrogate the religious liberties guaranteed by the Constitution. The appeal was sent to the Governor of Katanga Province, he having previously agreed to transmit it to the Ministry of Colonies if the Mission's requests should not be granted by officials in the Congo. Although until the issue of exclusion from the compounds was drawn by the Union Minière, the Mission had received much co-operation and oc-

casional encouragement from various government men, the Smyres communication failed to persuade the government to interfere with the enforcement of the Union's proscription of Methodist activity in the compounds.

Several factors combined to militate against realization of such a hoped-for intervention. The government and the Union Minière were important partners in the economic and social development of the Katanga. The government also entered into a significant contract relationship with Roman Catholic interests by placing the Benedictines in charge of a newly emerging system of public primary schools. Attendance at these schools was not compulsory, and the Protestants were permitted to establish their own, but those operated by the Benedictines received financial support from the government. Back of these relationships and the natural sympathies of official and company personnel in the Congo lay the political scene in Belgium. Although the anti-clerical Liberal and Socialist Parties were numerically strong and capable of bringing Catholic-oriented colonial policy under sharp criticism in the parliament in Brussels, Roman Catholicism enjoyed political expression through the Christian Socialist Party, which generally was the strongest party in the Kingdom. Belgian Protestants were a small minority of the population and had no political power.

Not only did this combination of interests and influences serve to deprive the Methodists of the power of effective appeal to a neutral mediating force, but it also so enhanced the prestige of Catholicism among the Africans as to give strength to repressive and abusive acts by individual Catholic priests, catechists, officials, or partisans to coerce the people to ally themselves with Catholic schools and missions as against Protestant enterprises. At the Panda-Likasi station, police harassment of boys coming for classes finally broke up a small night school. African Methodists sometimes were beaten up by Catholic priests and teachers. At Katanga Village, the wife of Nelson Capempe, the pastor, was beaten by the priest and later by the Catholics' African teacher, as was one of the assistant teachers. The priest also would drive pupils out of Capempe's school-chapel. The Methodist teacher at the village of Ntombo, where the Mission had been active for years before the Catholics arrived, was beaten. The company police chief brutally beat a young man who was holding a service for Protestants in a Chemin de Fer du Katanga compound. When the young African workmen then cleared a space for services outside the C.F.K. compound, the chief threatened to imprison them if they continued. African Methodist constituents in a certain cluster of villages were threatened with being jailed if they did not forsake the Methodist for the Catholic mission. Such intimidation was all too effective, especially in the villages, for the Congolese still were afraid of white men, too much afraid to serve publicly as witnesses against their abusers.

Various Union Minière managers continued to treat the missionaries with personal courtesy, and there were individual colonial officials who gave un-

biased administrative decisions and attempted to enforce fair play when certain Catholic priests or teachers told African chiefs and parents that since the Catholic schools were official, their children had to attend them. Some of the Belgian administrators were privately anticlerical, though they had to implement government policy. John Springer found that many chiefs, though preferring Protestant schools, feared to do anything to put themselves in bad with the government and did not distinguish between the authority of the Church and that of the government. But there were some local government men who, evidently following their personal prejudices, took measures on their own initiative to hamper the Mission's work, particularly by interfering with the activities of the African evangelists. In Lubumbashi, the local governor went so far in 1929 as to forbid the missionaries to hold any kind of religious service among the people in the African quarter of the city. He also ordered that African Methodists must stop conducting there, even in their own homes, the meetings they had been devoting to prayer, singing, and fellowship. The Mission protested and a year later was protesting still.

Although the government co-operated with the Mission in various ways as time went on, and notwithstanding minor favors granted by the Union Minière, the essential problem of the favored position of the Catholics in the compounds remained unsolved, and the frictions arising from attempts to coerce village people into patronizing the Catholic-staffed public schools continued.

For a short time, beginning in 1927, the Mission faced a different set of public difficulties—tensions between some of the African Methodists and their chiefs. These occurred in both Lunda and Luba country, with a good deal of disturbance on the Kabongo and Kapanga Circuits. The bone of contention was the custom of *kwikale*, which was a sign of respect paid to a chief by his servants and by people who ate with him. As Roy Smyres described it, when a person performed *kwikale*, he touched the hand of the chief and then snapped his own thumb and finger. A woman servant would divide a leaf with the chief, he taking part of it and the servant the other part. If the chief was absent, the people might *kwikale* to his bed, gun, chair, or dog. The African Christians claimed that this was more than a gesture of respect. The leaf came from a tree representing an ancestor of the chief's, and he would be afraid that some misfortune such as sickness or death was to befall him if people refused to *kwikale*. The Christians declared that this act acknowledged that the chief possessed a supernaturalistic status that made it a violation of the First Commandment. The men used to try to avoid the issue by avoiding the chief, but the women servants had no such means of escape. They felt compelled to declare their faith by refusing to *kwikale*. Some of the women were beaten, some were imprisoned. Both men and women refused, even when a government administrator appeared and tried to enforce compliance with the custom. This, of course, aroused the opposition of the chiefs to the

Christian missions among their people. After a year or two, however, the difficulty disappeared.

Doctor Piper of Kapanga concluded that the *kwikale* dispute illuminated for the missionaries how the growing Christian church conflicted with "heathen custom on every side" and "how the native is chained down by his customs which are his laws." While the controversy was still on, the Mission Conference, meeting in August, 1927, added to the section of its standing Policy that covered "Native Affairs" a statement that it discouraged among its people "every practice which has to do with ancestral worship." This was an obvious reference to the practice of *kwikale*.

Simultaneously, the Mission Conference retained in the same section of its Policy the declaration that most of the "native" dances were "not fit for the Christian to indulge in; we therefore feel that no Christian should dance." (this was at a time when the Discipline lifted up "a solemn note of warning and entreaty" against dancing by church members in the United States.) The Conference also retained its sharp ban on any use of fetishes by African Christians and reaffirmed but rephrased its opposition to allowing them "to resort to sorcerers or diviners when seeking medicines or healing herbs." Fullest attention, in this section, was given to marriage customs. The Policy deplored the early marriages still practiced in many Methodist families but in general adopted, as against the version of 1921, a more permissive and gradualistic, even a more creative, approach to the reform of marriage customs. Instead of blunt condemnation of marriage between a Christian "native" and a "heathen," it referred to holding up "our ideal as set forth in the Scripture, 'Be not unequally yoked together with unbelievers.'" The responsibility for premarital counseling was largely shifted from the missionaries to the lay leaders of the churches. The Policy urged upon all mission workers much study of the marriage customs of particular tribes so as to be able to discourage "the sensual practices of young children looking toward preparation for marriage" and related customs deplored by the missionaries.

More positively, the Policy stated that "we recognize that there are many old customs which are based on splendid principles and which by adaptation may be made to contribute much to the training of young people," and cited the tribal initiatory rites for boys and girls as examples. This was an advance upon the more mechanical and psychologically more repressive statement of 1921:

While we feel that we cannot force the native to give up all of his customs that are decidedly heathen [,] we urge that our missionaries make a careful study of the native customs and to be prepared to help *formulate a set of rules* concerning a Christian's relation to them.*

* Author's italics.

The Appointments for 1927 carried the names of a group of missionaries who continued on the Mission's roster until 1939 or later: Edward I. Everett, Coleman C. Hartzler, Thomas B. Brinton, Arthur L. Piper, Helen N. Everett, John E. Brastrup, and C. Marie Jensen. Roger S. Guptill was on furlough, and eventually it became clear that he could not return to the Congo because of his health. Three other men soon went on furlough and remained in the United States: William E. Shields (1928), Roy S. Smyres (1929), and Ray L. Smalley (1929). John M. Springer, the first in the line of modern Congo missionaries remained a member of the Mission until 1936, when he was elected to the episcopacy.

Anna C. Lerbak and Newell S. Booth and his wife arrived in 1930, and Leslie C. Sarah and his wife arrived in 1937, all of them remaining beyond 1939. Booth and Sarah were among the best trained men yet to come to the field. Booth headed the Congo Institute at Kanene until he went in 1937 to Lubumbashi, where the mission developed strongly under his leadership, especially in its educational program. Sarah became his successor at Kanene.

Although almost from its very beginning, the Mission had depended upon African evangelist-teachers for its village workers, only the smallest step toward the development of a formal indigenous ministry had been taken by 1927. In that year, Nelson Capempe was continued on trial in the Mission Conference, and Titus Balimwebwa was received into the same relationship. Three more men were so received in 1928, three in 1931, five in 1932, and three in 1933. The first African men to become full members of the Mission Conference were Amos Chimbu and Jeremiah Mwakasu, who were elected in 1932. As the candidates came into the ministry through these channels, they took Conference courses of studies supervised by the Missionary members.

Meanwhile, the larger group of untrained evangelists outside the threshold of the full ministry enjoyed no formal recognition by the Conference. To be sure, about seventy of them were cited in the Appointments in 1924, most of them by single names. But after that, the names were not published there. In 1933, the Conference somewhat improved the situation by taking up a new category of ministry adopted the year before by the General Conference—the designation "supply pastor." In addition to recognizing in this way Marie Jensen and Anna Lerbak (women could not become Conference members) and two sons of Coleman Hartzler, the Conference designated forty Africans as supply pastors. By 1939, when the Conference became a unit in The Methodist Church, there were forty-five. The total corps of mission workers had expanded so far beyond the formal categories that there were also as many as 285 pastor-teachers and teachers and more than a hundred temporary or volunteer teachers.

Over the same period, Conference membership by Africans increased to a total of nineteen, including ten full members and nine on trial. Except for

attendance, devotions, and the reading of reports on their work, participation in the Conference sessions by African members generally was minimal. Undoubtedly because of the travel involved, not all African members and only a small proportion of the accepted supply pastors attended Conference. Joab Mulela and André Nawej were elected "Ministerial National Delegates" to the Central Mission Conference scheduled for 1940. The official Lay Conference was organized in 1939, with a dozen African laymen present at the seat of the Mission Conference in Lubumbashi. Almost all of them were from the mining area in the southern part of the Conference.

A large increase in the number of locations where Methodists were preaching and teaching accompanied the expansion of the working corps. The Mission Conference finally was represented in more than three hundred places where one or more teachers were regularly stationed, with services being held in nearly as many additional villages. No new regions were opened up during the nineteen-thirties. The administrative Districts were the Elisabethville, Jadotville, Kanene, Kapanga, and Sandoa Districts, each with a missionary as its superintendent (Booth, Hartzler, Sarah, Everett, and Brinton, respectively), and with each District Superintendent serving as pastor at the station heading his District. Within the Districts were Circuits of from five to thirty villages. All the Circuits were manned by Africans.

The full members of the church—they had numbered less than two hundred in 1919—totaled four thousand six hundred in 1939. The preparatory members, less than fifty in 1919, now were two thousand in number. About nine thousand children attended some 250 primary schools, and twelve thousand children were enrolled in the Mission's Sunday schools.

The most promising single move for the occupation of a new mission site emerged not in the course of the Mission's gradual expansion, but from a specific plan introduced—or reintroduced, at long last—by Bishop Springer to establish the Congo Institute at Mulungwishi, twenty-five miles from Jadotville. In 1937, the Bishop visited Joseph P. Ellis, the owner of the Mulungwishi farm on which the Mission had made its unsuccessful attempt at settlement in 1918-19. Mr. Ellis had been able finally to secure clear title to the land and still had possession. Springer found him in poor health and without funds. He gave Ellis some personal assistance and referred him for any further help to John Brastrup, in whose home in Jadotville he convalesced after being hospitalized early in 1938. During his illness, he willed his Mulungwishi farm, as he once had started to do many years before, to Bishop Springer in recognition of their long friendship. When he recovered from his illness, he deeded the farm, in exchange for a life annuity of \$100 a month, to Springer, who took title to it in his own name in March, 1938. Springer refrained from having the property transferred directly to the Mission, because the Mission had not been consulted and because that method would have

entailed legal delay. Springer then proposed that the Mission take over ownership of the farm and develop it as the site of the Congo Institute.

Over the next three years, Bishop Springer won approval of the plan by the missionaries and the Conference, wrote many letters and statements to promote it in the United States, presented the case to the Board, persuaded Board officials, initiated purchase of a valuable second land concession adjacent to the Ellis farm, devised and pressed for adoption of a financial plan to reimburse Joseph Ellis, negotiated for title clearance, raised special funds for it while in the States in 1940, and finally drew the Board into beginning payments when it was reluctant, in 1940, to risk sending any large sum to the Congo because of uncertainty about the outcome of World War II. By the time the Board started sending payments out of funds raised by the Bishop, he already had contributed \$3,000 from his personal resources in order to keep the project alive.

The Institute, looking forward to development of a varied training program for both boys and girls, moved to Mulungwishi in 1941. By vote of the Southern Congo Provisional Annual Conference, it had a new name—Springer Institute.

Portuguese Africa

Angola

WHEN THE ANGOLA MISSIONARIES GATHERED IN Conference session at Quessua in February, 1921, Bishop Eben S. Johnson called them to order under a new name. After eighteen years as the West Central Africa Mission Conference, they now were organized as the Angola Mission Conference. Coherently with its new designation, the Conference henceforth included only Angola charges; its former Madeira District now was a part of the North Africa Mission Conference.

Six missionaries answered "present" at the Quessua session: Robert Shields, Herbert C. Withey, William S. Miller, Ray B. Kipp, John C. Wengatz, and Austin J. Gibbs. The first three had been connected with the Mission since the days of Bishop William Taylor, who retired in 1896, and the others had been at work in it since 1903, 1910, and 1919, respectively.

When Bishop John M. Springer convened the Conference at Luanda in August, 1939, it again acquired a new designation, the Bishop pronouncing it no longer a part of the Methodist Episcopal Church, but a unit in the newly founded denomination The Methodist Church. On this occasion, four missionaries—an entirely new group, and two less than eighteen years earlier—answered the roll call: Eddie E. Edling, arrived in mid-1921; Alexander H. Kemp, M.D., arrived in 1923; August Klebsattel, returned to the field in 1923; and Ralph E. Dodge, who entered the Conference in 1937. At this time, the W.F.M.S. also had half a dozen missionaries on the field.

Between the two Conference sessions, the ethnic character of the ministerial membership changed radically. In 1921, the two Africans affiliated with the Conference, Mateus P. Inglez (full member) and João L. Webba (probationer), were absent. In 1939, Bishop Springer heard twenty-one African members and twenty-three African probationers answer the roll call. Three of the Americans—Klebsattel, Edling, and Dodge—were District Superintendents, and Kemp had nonpastoral appointments; Klebsattel and Dodge were pastors of the churches in Luanda and Quessua, respectively. Hence, with these exceptions the entire body of churches and evangelistic outposts of the Mission were manned by the African ministers, whose services were

complemented by the activities of a corps of eighty African accepted supplies. Africans were well represented on Conference committees in general, but none served on the Finance Committee, whose composition was limited by the Board of Foreign Missions to "all male missionaries of the Board." The development of the African ministry reached this point without being troubled by any rebellious or schismatic troubles such as those associated with the emergence of the Ethiopian movement in the area of the Mozambique mission.

Sitting in the Conference sessions in 1921 as an observer was a lay missionary of the Board, Harral A. Longworth, who had come to the field the year before as the Mission's first agricultural missionary. To be sure, the Angola missionaries had more than dabbled in agriculture from the beginning but had not approached it as a primary channel of missionary involvement with the Africans. Until Longworth's arrival, it had been mainly either a business activity providing financial self-support to the missions or food production for consumption in the mission communities themselves. But the purpose represented by Longworth's presence on the Mission's staff was to make the practice and teaching of agriculture an essential contribution of the Mission to the Angolans themselves, especially as a part of their developing new life as Christians.

Longworth settled at Quessua, organized his work as the Quessua Farm Department, and began extensive development of a new site near the original Quessua location—an 8,000-acre ranch adequate for a large agricultural enterprise and for the housing of the other aspects of Quessua's varied program. On the new tract, Longworth and his helpers built miles of new roads, began draining and clearing swampland, reconstructed the irrigation facilities, erected farm buildings and fencing, planted lanes and orchards of numerous fruit trees, acquired and managed live stock, prepared new fields, put in large vegetable gardens, and began marketing the farm's products.

Methodical research and experimentation in the production of suitable crops for the area lay at the foundation of Longworth's effort. He aimed to stimulate realization of the agricultural potential of the Angolan environment rather than to sweep it aside and impose American practices on a primitive people. When the mission's new tractor arrived, it proved a great labor-saver for him in his particular manifold task, but he was determined not to use it for large-scale crop production, as would have been done in the United States. "Our task," he said, "is to apply scientific principles to conditions as we find them, and through methods that the people themselves can use." He declared that he would have banned the purchase of the tractor if it had threatened to defeat this aim. He began, and intended to press further, an extension service to demonstrate and popularize agricultural methods that would enable the people to increase and vary their production of food.

The first to benefit from Longworth's leadership were the pupils in the Quessua Institute, as the boys' school came to be called. They earned their

keep at the school by laboring in the gardens and other farm projects and at the same time learned skills they could utilize later on at home. In addition, Longworth taught classes in agriculture that introduced the boys to an understanding of the principles of scientific farming. Longworth's broadest dream for the Quessua project was to set up model Christian villages on the farm lands, with each residential family cultivating its own area under mission direction. And he made a start toward implementing his dream.

Although Harral Longworth raised the agricultural ministry above the level of supplying the Mission's institutional needs and endeavored to project it into the lives of the people for their enrichment, his deepest commitment was evangelistic. "The life of an agricultural missionary is not all in the fields or among the cattle," he said. Sometimes through informal or incidental personal contact with the African boys, but often in deliberately educational or evangelistic work like that of the other missionaries, he exerted a purposeful religious influence. When asked for justification of his special emphasis as an agricultural worker, he claimed that he did nothing but religious work and would not want to stay in Africa overnight if evangelism should cease to be his aim. Reiterating this point of view in one of his reports to the Conference, he said, "I want to bring you again my testimony before God that your agricultural missionary is at heart first of all a missionary, that his agriculture is the means and not the end of his effort."

Unfortunately, Longworth died shortly after going on furlough in 1925. Although a measure of agricultural work was carried on at Quessua after his death, no full-fledged agricultural missionary succeeded him there, and no such broad program as his was put into operation.

Another specialized form of missionary work became a part of the Mission's program in 1923, when Bishop Johnson appointed Dr. Alexander H. Kemp to medical work. At the same time, the Conference adopted a statement of policy calling for maintenance at each of the Mission's main stations of a medical staff, a hospital, nurses' training, and instruction in health care.

The first steps toward realization of these goals already had been taken. Like many a Methodist foreign missionary, John Wengatz distributed medicine to the sick as he went about his evangelistic and supervisory activity on the Quiôngua District. In 1921, a time when smallpox, fever, pneumonia, and the bubonic plague were rampant, Maria E. Lindquist, a nurse from Sweden, established a clinic in Luanda. In her first year, receiving patients at the clinic and also making many visits to outlying villages, she gave some two thousand medical treatments. At the same time, Alice K. S. Ekstromer, another Swedish nurse, who later married Harral Longworth, began a similar ministry at Quiôngua. Mrs. Eddie E. Edling, who came to Quessua with her husband in 1921, soon began clinical treatments at Quessua itself and visiting-nurse work in the outlying villages. "My pantry is also my medicine-room, my clinic-room consists of a table and two benches outside the kitchen

window, under a rude shelter from the sun, and the crowded kitchen is the frequently traversed thoroughfare between the two." In 1923, following a year in which she gave twelve thousand treatments, Mrs. Edling transferred her medical work to a three-room infirmary.

Doctor Kemp settled first at Quiôngua, where he was assisted by Miss Ekstromer, from whose porch the medical work soon was moved to a newly erected building planned for that function. After about two years, he moved to Quessua, which became the permanent center of his activities. There he built for a hospital a house with three rooms and a veranda, along with more than a dozen small two-bed houses for patients. He began treating people at the rate of a thousand a month, periodically visiting the other clinics to supplement and direct their work, and also ministering in the villages near Quessua. With his medical practice he combined various evangelistic functions, efforts at educating the Mission's following in public and private health, and an interest in promoting the planting of dietetically beneficial fruits.

The Mission's medical work had an evangelistic purpose. Alice Ekstromer said of her treatment of the village people, "I am glad for every one who learns to know what medicine and good care can do instead of idols and witch doctors." Maria Lindquist reported, "Many of the village people whose sores I have healed with God's medicine have declared that they never more will have any faith in witch doctors." Doctor Kemp also recognized the destruction of the power of the witch doctors, whose functions were largely religious, as one of the goals of his work as a doctor. He tried to involve young Africans from the Quessua school in his treatment of patients in such a way as to acquaint them with scientific medical treatment and thus permanently wean them away from trust in witchcraft, making them enthusiastic for a Christian alternative. His professed aim was always to make his medical ministry a spiritual ministry: "when we 'carve our initials' upon the outward parts of our patients, we aim also to carve the Cross of Christ upon their hearts."

The agricultural and medical efforts, which were significant for the whole Mission, were factors in developing Quessua into one of the two most important Methodist centers in Angola. By the middle twenties, the missionaries stationed there and their protegés had constructed an impressive complex of buildings housing a variety of activities. There were three residences for missionaries, farm and utility structures, homes belonging to the Christian community started by Harral Longworth, the hospital group, quarters for the day and boarding pupils in the Institute for boys, buildings for the 150 boarding pupils in the W.F.M.S. Girls' School, and a capacious church for the large Sunday congregations. Eventually, the Quessua constituency included five hundred church members, two hundred probationers, more than five hundred day school pupils, and eight hundred Sunday school pupils, in addition to the boarding pupils.

The other most important center was Luanda, which once had been so

weak that it became little more than a name on the Mission's plan of appointments. During the twenties and thirties, it continued its revival, benefiting especially from the pastoral and supervisory leadership of Robert Shields and August Klebsattel and the educational leadership of Mrs. Shields. The Luanda mission's influence was enhanced by the church's ministry to African workers coming to Luanda from other parts of Portuguese West Africa, through the services of teachers trained in its principal school and sent out to other communities, and through the home missionary interest of the Luanda members that sent evangelistic workers into outlying towns. By the end of the period, Luanda had about eight hundred church members and an equal number of probationers, fourteen hundred Sunday school pupils and three hundred day school pupils.

Whatever degree of temperamental or traditional missionary conservatism may earlier have inhibited the geographical expansion of the Mission had fallen away by the nineteen-twenties. The missionaries of that decade—and Bishop Johnson too—felt the urge to press on into the Lúbulu country south of the Cuanza River and also north and northeast of Luanda toward the Belgian Congo, but also into the Lunda district, which extended from a hundred miles east of Malanje on eastward to the Kasai River boundary of Angola with the Congo. The Bishop, who in 1920 traveled from Luanda a thousand miles eastward to the Congo mission across the Kasai, demonstrated his interest in the unevangelized areas to the east. John C. Wengatz, who went with him part way into the Luanda district, was stirred by the opportunities for fresh mission work there and urgently desired to be appointed to begin it.

The twenties were the decade of the automobile. Several became available for the Angola missionaries, thus greatly extending the reach of their exploratory trips into unevangelized areas and increasing their supervisory contacts with the outstations tended by African ministers and lay workers. Angolan roads were improved to meet the requirements of automobile travel, and in some cases the Mission built roads of its own and so located its stations as to take advantage of the new mode of transportation.

In 1921, John Wengatz, who apparently loved to break away from a fixed situation in order to preach on tour, took a 250-mile trip by auto into unoccupied territory south of the Cuanza River, below the Quiôngua-Quessua-Malanje area. Robert Shields also utilized his automobile for extensive penetration of new places, making as many as thirty visits to the lower Cuanza section in 1924. By 1926, the Mission had a new Songo-Bangalo District there, with Wengatz supervising a dozen African workers in eight churches, with four schools. In 1925, Wengatz had made another journey into the Luanda district, soberly viewing its religious needs and hopefully estimating its great evangelistic opportunities. Similarly, William E. Nelson and Elmer L. Pierce thrice explored in 1924-5 the Lúbulu district, the location of Wil-

liam P. Dodson's now defunct Ndunga mission, though these men dispensed with the aid of the automobile and tramped from village to village, covering on one excursion two hundred miles. In August, 1925, after earlier attempts had been frustrated by an unco-operative Portuguese local official, Robert Shields installed Methodist workers in the large Lúbulo town of Mbanguanga.

Improved transportation and heightened interest in expansion did not result, however, in occupation of new regions other than the not distant Lúbulo and Songo districts. Money to provide for missionaries to develop new regional missions was unavailable. Ralph E. Dodge was the only new Board missionary to go to Angola in more than a dozen years. Indeed, the size of the missionary staff often was dishearteningly inadequate for the work in the areas already opened.

As in earlier decades, the Mission necessarily hammered out its accomplishments on anvils of hardship and discouraging circumstance. Its leaders and its workers had to fight blackwater fever, common malaria, influenza, typhoid fever, sleeping sickness, and bubonic plague. For the missionaries there were heavy burdens caring for the afflicted, general overwork, physical breakdown, forced health furloughs, and furloughs unduly prolonged for lack of funds to provide for return to the field. Severe shortage of funds complicated many of the Mission's problems and curbed its program, especially through its consequent depletion of missionary personnel. From time to time, the work suffered from increasingly troublesome opposition by Roman Catholic missionary interests, government regulation, harassment by minor public officials, and drafting of Methodist constituents for forced labor.

It was, of course, the people themselves who suffered most from the exaction of contract labor. Although the Mission could not have protested against the practice in itself without being expelled from the country, the missionaries referred to it in their reports now and then. John C. Wengatz described its operation in the Board's *Annual Report*:

The severe draft by the government on the young and the strong for plantation and road work that ought to be done by machinery, has an evil appearance and effect that is rapidly ruining the country. It is called contract labor but when the people are roped and tied up and led off under the lash and simply appointed to their task without any questions and scarcely any pay, for a period of six months, except their taxes, I fail to see the contract in it.

Wengatz saw the practice as sheer financial profiteering by the exploitation of drafted labor. He realized that it undermined the Africans' ability to carry out their own economic plans, disillusioned and demoralized them, and created contempt for the law, social indifference, and unresponsiveness to the Christian message. "All they seem to think about," he said, "is to run away and hide from such treatment that is working havoc among them."

Preoccupation with missionary objectives could lead a missionary to appear less concerned with the humane aspect of current labor practices than with their disruption of mission school schedules. In 1923, Mrs. Robert Shields, long a leader in shaping the Mission's educational program, reported that the Luanda rural schools had to be shut down because the pupils were obliged to go pick cotton or to work on the roads. When the mission protested, the pupils preparing for examinations were returned to school, but the others were not released until the cotton season was over. For the next season, the Mission received a promise that school children of fourteen and under would not be taken for compulsory labor. Mrs. Shields evidently thought that the best solution for both planter and school (but what of the pupils and their families?) would be to shift the long winter school vacation to the cotton picking months. "We do not want to see vast fields of cotton lost to the world for want of children's hands to pick the ripened flower. . .," she said.

The labor system under which the Mission's people lived was far from benevolent. When the people of the Catete area, on the Luanda District, hired a lawyer in 1921 to protest unfair treatment by certain minor officials, they were reported to the government as being in revolt. As Adão G. Domingos, pastor at Calomboloca, told the next Conference session, forty soldiers then came to the town early one morning and began firing on it, some of the bullets passing through the mission property. "The people assembled without resistance," said Domingos, "ten men were picked out from the crowd and given 50 to 60 strokes each with a hippo hide whip, and many were taken away prisoners, and put at hard labor." An official party visited the mission soon afterwards, and when Domingos, in answer to questioning, attempted to explain the workers' protest not as resistance to government work, but as opposition to being unfairly exploited and underpaid on contract labor, the District Governor replied with a threat. Before driving off in his car, he directed Domingos to tell the people that if they did not do the required government work, he would return and raze the town to the ground. At Conference time in April, 1922, Domingos had materials ready for rebuilding the hurricane-wrecked church at Calomboloca, "But," he said, "the people are scattered and discouraged, the school boys even ten and twelve years old have to go on forced labor, and there will be famine in the months to come."

During the twenties, the question of the Mission's position under the Portuguese government became a center of concern for the Methodist mission to a degree not felt before. In December, 1921, the Republic's High Commissioner for Angola issued in Luanda a declaration setting forth a detailed pattern for government regulation of the "working of missions for religious propaganda, in such a way as to watch over the public order and security, and to guarantee the maintenance of Portuguese constitutional principles of right." Its more concrete professed function was to carry out the responsibility

of the Provincial government in Angola for promoting the material betterment, education, and general progress of the African natives.

The proclamation, which was known as Decree 77, established requirements to be met by any mission receiving permission to operate in Angola. These included registering designations of intended locations, submission of its civilizing and vocational program for review, the obligation to teach the Portuguese language and no foreign or native language, commitment to medical work and health education among the natives, and presentation of detailed annual reports of its activities. The Decree also placed heavy restrictions on general or literary use of any language but Portuguese, demanding entire elimination of the native languages as soon as possible, and announced the right of the government to ban circulation of any literary materials prejudicial to public order and security. African mission personnel were made subject to close government control by a system of required identification certificates that made mandatory for them a knowledge of Portuguese and provided for withdrawal of recognition from individual African workers for infractions of the Decree's educational or security code. More drastically, the sanctions described by the Decree included potential suppression of an entire Province-wide mission for failure to perform its civilizing functions, for becoming "incompatible with the native population" in its locality, or for proving "noxious to the interests of Portuguese sovereignty, and public order and security."

At least formally balancing the Decree's requirements were certain promised advantages. Approved missions might have free land grants, permission to cut timber on government lands, annual subsidies for missions maintaining staff members competent to teach Portuguese, and smaller subsidies for rural schools in charge of properly qualified native teachers. In the post-Republican period, the offer of financial grants to non-Roman schools was canceled.

The practical difficulties involved in adjusting to the new language requirements constituted the element in the situation created by Decree 77 that was most disconcerting to the Mission. Herbert Withey, reporting to the Mission Conference session at Quiôngua several months after its issuance, declared very drastic and ill advised the abolition of practically all use of the native languages. He did not object to the effort to teach Portuguese—that was already a part of the Methodists' program—but he spoke up for the native language as a medium that had not been displaced or much changed by several centuries of foreign occupation. Thinking of the Mission's need to communicate the gospel to the Africans as directly as possible he said. "It is the language which reaches their hearts, and we do not hesitate to predict that it will continue to be used, and hold its own, long after all the present day actors will have passed away."

Withey also was concerned, of course, lest enforcement of the Decree curb

the circulation of Kimbindu materials in whose translation or preparation he had spent many years. He had in mind, for instance, the probable suppression of such an item as the "edition of the nicely illustrated Kimbindu primer" the Mission had on hand. And he hoped for sufficiently liberal administration of the Decree to permit use of a thousand Kimbindu hymnbooks then in stock, publication of his translation of the New Testament (it was already set in type), and issuance of his translation of *Pilgrim's Progress*, for which he long had been gathering material.

In general, the missionaries, even Withey, were inclined to make the best of the problems of conversion to the new language arrangements. Months before formal promulgation of the Decree, Ray B. Kipp declared to the Conference that the Methodists should sincerely respect the government's emerging policy and move toward implementing it in their schools. He saw it as a policy of "anti-denationalization," by which he evidently meant the trend toward full integration of Angola with European Portugal. In 1922, the Mission Conference adopted a committee report that read:

We urge strict conformity in letter and spirit with the new ruling of the Alto Comissario [High Commissioner] in regard to the work of the missions in Angola. More attention should be given to the Portuguese language in our church work, and strict obedience to law and respect for government officials should be urged upon all members, and especially upon our preachers and teachers. In this matter we must abstain from even the appearance of evil.

Evidently some of the Mission's workers did not need this exhortation. The African preacher-teacher at Caxicane, on the Luanda District, wrote Robert Shields, his superintendent, that he had held a special Sunday service on the theme "Submission to Authorities, and Duty of Christian Servants." He had invited people from all the villages round about to come to hear what the Scripture had to say about the duty of "obeying and respecting the laws of the Government, which for lack of understanding some seek occasion against a good Government." The High Commissioner, on his part, had sent Shields words of praise for the Caxicane school. The administration also had notified Shields that he should apply for the subsidy of three thousand escudos for which the Luanda school was eligible, but neither then nor later did the school accept it.

The Conference declared in a resolution adopted at the 1922 session that "we wish to express our hearty appreciation of the friendly attitude of the Portuguese Government, and our high esteem for His Excellency the High Commissioner, General Norton de Matos . . ." The numerous facets of a Conference policy adopted a year later included a statement acknowledging that the government's educational standards were a beneficial stimulus to the Mission's prime function of evangelization: "Evangelization means trained native workers. Decree 77 means better trained workers." The Conference

Policy proposed building up the Institute at Quessua as a means of providing for the Mission's entire educational effort more teachers prepared to meet the new requirements.

The good words for High Commissioner and Governor-General Norton de Matos were more than routine congratulation. For a decade, de Matos, a servant of the Republic and a man genuinely interested in improving the level of life in Angola, had shown good will toward the Mission. The missionaries co-operated with the government through necessity, but also because they held a measure of confidence in his reasonableness and good purpose. They depended upon him to put the bans and requirements of Decree 77 into effect with some leniency, with some allowance for their problems in switching over to the new system. And indeed that is what happened during the early years under the reforms.

Two dangers, however, lurked under cover of Decree 77. One was its long-range potentiality as a well articulated system that easily could be manipulated for severe harassment or suppression of a mission the Portuguese government found, or wished to find, guilty of acts or positions unfavored by it or unfavorable to it. The other was the fact that, though subject to appeal, administration of the Decree in various sections and localities in Angola was assigned to a variety of local administrators. At the least, the system was bothersome; as John Wengatz pointed out when acting as a District Superintendent, the large size of his District gave him "three district governors to report to, nine administrators to wrestle with, and fourteen *Chefes dos Postos* to put up with." More seriously, it made the Mission subject to hostile acts captiously visited upon its stations by local authorities entertaining their own special or prejudiced reasons for moving against the Methodists on their neighborhood scene. Even in the early phase of the application of Decree 77, there were places at which Methodist rural schools were closed down by overstrict interpretations of the Decree by local officials whose negative rulings were reversed by high authorities only after a lapse of two or three years.

But harsher difficulties arose in the mid-twenties, when the republican regime in Portugal came under attack and finally, in 1926, was overthrown. It was succeeded first by reactionary military administrations and later by the eventually long-lasting fascist regime of Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, who became influential in 1928 and assumed dictatorial power in 1932. Simultaneously, there was a resurgence of Roman Catholic influence in Portugal and in Angola after more than a decade under restrictions imposed upon it by the anticlerical leaders of the Republic. In this period, Decree 77 became one of a variety of tools employed seriously to harass the Methodist mission, largely at the instigation of pro-Catholic interests.

The competitive missionary interests of the Catholic Church and the exigencies of maintaining the international reputation of the Portuguese

government came into conjunction during this more difficult period.* The Angolan press fiercely denounced Protestant missionaries as spies and traitors, Catholic missionaries sought to embroil Protestant missions with public authorities, and the civil administration on higher than local levels found its own motivation for acting against the Methodists.

As pastor or as District Superintendent, August H. Klebsattel was close to much of the trouble during these tense years. In 1934, for instance, the Military Tribunal issued a summons to him to appear in answer to accusations from Europeans and Africans in Caxicane that the Methodist mission there was teaching the natives disrespect for Portuguese officials, tending to denationalize natives who had been well behaved until they learned otherwise from the mission. Roman Catholic priests appeared to be back of the charges. As a result, the Caxicane mission had been shut down and mission natives had been taken into custody. Klebsattel and Herbert C. Withey, presenting the Mission's case before the authorities in Luanda, declared that the Methodist missionary organization was doing its best to be helpful in the area, to work harmoniously with the government, and to keep out of politics. The officials accepted these assurances, and the Caxicane mission was allowed to reopen and the prisoners to go free.

A year later, a new Catholic bishop arrived in Luanda and announced his intention, recorded Klebsattel, to "finish the heretics." Public pressures multiplied. Friendly local administrators told Klebsattel that they had received orders from above to hinder the evangelical missions.

Perhaps the most threatening development—it became interwoven with other hostile forces and enhanced their effectiveness—was the opposition flowing from publication of the Ross report on slavery and forced labor in Africa, including Angola. Prof. Edward A. Ross, an American sociologist, published in *The Nation* in August, 1925, an article entitled "Modern Slavery in Africa," which was so challenging that it came to the attention of the Assembly of the League of Nations and its commission on slavery and forced labor. The world publicity Ross's revelations thus received were so influential that out of the League's handling of his report came a formal international agreement to eliminate slavery and control forced labor that was ratified by numerous nations. The affair damaged Portugal's international reputation and somewhat clouded the justification of its continued administration of its African colonies. There was angry reaction both in Portugal and in Angola.

The lightning of public antagonism fell especially in Luanda, where Klebsattel was stationed. During the visit of Professor Ross to the capital, Klebsattel had received a traveling companion of his as house guest at the Methodist mission upon Ross's plea that the hotel was too unbearably dirty for his colleague to stay there. When the Ross Report came out, the Portu-

* See *Abundant Life in Changing Africa*, Emory Ross, ed., p. 26, on a Concordat (1940) and a Missionary Accord with the Vatican later giving the Roman Church important special privileges.

guese authorities accused Klebsattel of having collaborated with the detested American investigator by securing derogatory material for him.* The press joined in an intense campaign against the Protestant missionaries, attacking them as hypocrites, traitors, liars, and suppliers of false information. Walking the streets as individuals, Klebsattel and his people found themselves in an arena breathing insult and hateful accusation. And out of this initial outpouring of hostility flowed an aftermath of opposition that was not dispelled for years afterwards.

Following the Ross exposé, the government initiated some improvements in the colonies, but certain educated Africans protested to the League of Nations that Angola still harbored harsh abuses of Africans. The government then resorted to a series of arrests to smoke out the identity of the complainants. Methodists at Quiôngua, Malanje, and Luanda were arrested. Upon returning from a visit to the Lúbulo country in the summer of 1928, Klebsattel found that soldiers had entered the mission house and arrested João Webba, the African pastor, and seven African leaders of the Christian community. The Africans not daring to worship in the church as usual, had crept into the bush to pray, and the men finally had disappeared from the village altogether. Soldiers brought to the mission an official note charging it with violation of the law. Klebsattel spent a week trying to have Luanda officials release the prisoners. Some time later, the men returned home, and the situation was cleared up—"but not altogether for all," commented Klebsattel.

Eight years later, Klebsattel still found it necessary to parry attacks on the missions of his District. Under the administration of the incumbent Governor-General, whom Klebsattel identified as an intimate friend of the Roman Catholic bishop, local missions were harassed, stations from time to time were closed down, and African preachers (catequistas) were arrested on various pretexts. In midsummer, Klebsattel found that African preachers assigned to the neighborhood of Caxito, in the Dembo country, were being improperly denied permission to open stations. When Klebsattel protested, the district administrator declined to budge; he would not issue the catequistas the required identity cards without direct orders from the Governor-General. Believing that any such appeal would be useless, Klebsattel nevertheless went back to Lunda and presented the case to the Governor-General, who listened considerately, assured Klebsattel that his petitions would be granted, and sent him back to the Caxito official. Taking some of the African teachers and preachers with him Klebsattel returned to the Caxito office and at last secured for his men the certificates they needed in order to represent the Mission. "After all," commented Klebsattel, who had suffered many frustrations, "miracles still happen."

A month later, his skepticism partially justified, Klebsattel again was endeavoring to dig necessary identification cards out of a local administrator who

* See Note, p. 960.

was blocking the work in the neighborhood of Quibaxi. At eight in the morning, he had an interview with the pajama-clad official in a Luanda hotel and heard him frankly declare that the African Christians of four villages in the area had been persecuted for holding Christian meetings in secret. He admitted that he had, among other things, punished twelve men for being evangelical Christians, sending them to Ucuva to lumber-camp work. This time, Klebsattel's private exclamatory comment was, "How many of our Christians have been driven into the forced labor camps, received palmatories, 60, 75, and as many as 150 of those hand-ruining terrible beatings."

Conditions did not improve; in 1940, Eddie E. Edling reported in Conference the existence of growing opposition and competition from the Roman Catholic Church, which was trying to occupy as many of the African villages as possible, in order—so Edling believed—to forestall Methodist expansion through new outstations. He said:

In many places the sobas [chiefs] and the people stand out against them, however, and insist that they will have no mission but ours. Many times sobas and others have been called before authorities in an attempt to frighten them into accepting their [the Catholics'] doctrine, but we are glad to say that in most cases that have come under our observation these people have not surrendered their faith.

But in spite of all difficulties, the Mission grew. The expansion of the African ministry and of the group of African lay preachers and teachers made possible not only the extension into the Lúbulu and Songo areas but also an increase in the number of charges in the districts entered earlier. Thirty in 1919, the charges on the Mission's three Districts (Luanda, Malanje, and Cuanza North) numbered ninety-eight in 1939. The church membership had risen proportionately more amply, from five to sixty-nine hundred, with seven thousand probationers to draw from for future members. At the same time, the Mission's day school population advanced from seven hundred to five times that number.

Mozambique

The Conference for the Mozambique mission adjourned in 1919 as the Inhambane Mission Conference. It reconvened in November, 1920, as the Southeast Africa Mission Conference. The significance of its name had been broadened, and so had its administrative scope. Along with its eleven Circuits in Mozambique, which comprised its Mozambique District, it now had a Johannesburg District, which included the Circuits of the mission newly opened in the Transvaal, Union of South Africa. In this section, however, we deal only with the Mozambique work.*

* For the Transvaal mission, see pp. 965-971.

Two decades later, in October, 1939, the Mission Conference first met as a part of the reunited denomination The Methodist Church. Although the Mission then numbered some hundreds more in membership and was organized into twenty Circuits, the intervening years were not notable either for growth in constituency or for geographical expansion. Most of the Mission's modest territorial advance occurred step by step in basically the same areas of the country as already were under evangelistic cultivation. At the end of the twenties, seeking to minister to Methodist constituents from the northern districts who were working in the capital, the Mission for the first time entered Lourenço Marques. Beginning in the mid-thirties, the Valanculos Circumscription became the target of the Mission's hopes for pioneering work to the north of all its previously developed stations. Shortly after Conference time in 1938, Julian S. Rea, superintendent of the Northern Inhambane District, and Pliny W. Keys organized a Quarterly Conference at the site of the new station. At the next Conference, Rea reported that there were beginnings also in four sections of "that huge territory known as Hlengweland."

One element in the Mission expanded markedly—the full-fledged African ministry. When Bishop Eben S. Johnson, held his last session of the Conference, in 1936, the members gave him credit, in the Resolutions, for building on the foundation of the earlier foreign-led Mozambique mission a truly indigenous church. Realizing that many African preachers keenly felt the ecclesiastical disability that prevented them from holding Conference membership on equal terms with white missionaries, he used his influence to bring about a change in policy. By the time of his retirement from the field, nine Africans working in the Mozambique mission and four assigned to the Johannesburg District, were full members of the Conference, definitely outnumbering the white members.

Quite coherently with this development, the Mission was not again so much disturbed by Ethiopianism as it had been prior to 1920. To be sure, there was a flare-up in 1925–26, when the familiar "spirit of independence" appeared among some of the Shangaan Methodists in the Gaza district in southern Mozambique. For a time, four Methodist Circuits were seriously affected, influenced by the existence of eleven independent Ethiopian movements in the district. After about a year, the disaffection began, as William Terril put it, to die a natural death. A few Methodists drifted into other organizations, but many returned.

Four missionaries—Pliny W. Keys, Dr. Charles J. Stauffacher, James D. Pointer, and Ira E. Gillet—served throughout the two decades. William C. Terril served until 1934, though he was resident most of the time in Johannesburg, from which point he supervised work in both Mozambique and the Union of South Africa. Josef A. Persson served throughout the twenties, until he went to Johannesburg, working there but retaining membership in the

Conference. Julian S. Rea, a new recruit of 1925, still was at work in 1939. Thus the Mission enjoyed continuity of missionary leadership during this period. Others came and went, but the Board's missionary team in Mozambique in 1939 was smaller than in 1920. The W.F.M.S. maintained a group of two to six missionaries on the field—two in 1920, four in 1929, six in 1939. Four of those on duty in 1939—Victoria C. Lang, Ruth E. Northcott, Bess L. Phillips, Ruth F. Thomas—had records of ten years' service or more. Ruth Thomas served throughout the period. Generally, the W.F.M.S. missionaries were appointed either to its Hartzell Girls' School at Chicuque or to medical service.

Food production long had held a place in the school and station work of the Mission. Julian Rea came to Mozambique as a missionary specially trained in agriculture at Massachusetts Agricultural College and in Portugal. He was appointed to the faculty of the Central Training School at Kambini, and he perennially infused into the Mission from that post scientific and practical agricultural leadership on a level it had not enjoyed before. The agricultural program he soon developed at the School—gardening and keeping cattle and other farm animals—sustained the School community of three or four score people, but also its thorough involvement of the schoolboys in the farm work provided them both basic work experience and training in improved methods. Within a few years, groups of boys were living in their own houses in a village system, not in large dormitories, and were cultivating their own gardens and separately storing the crops they harvested. These crops—corn, beans, rice, sweet potatoes, and so on—were raised by methods that greatly increased the productivity of the land, for Rea gradually introduced simple improvements that practically doubled the usual yields. The influence of what went on at the School gradually permeated the Mission's entire following in the villages, for the people found that the new methods worked out on the experimental plots maintained by Rea and his workers were devoted to improving their own condition. Rea reported in 1939 that a vast reserve of seed stalks and cuttings was being kept to give to the people in time of need. And the demonstration work itself actually was reaching the villages through student evangelists' cultivation of plots of winter corn and fields of Georgia peanuts far from the School's farm. With all his attention to the agricultural program, however, Rea carried through the years full responsibility for a regular Circuit, and in 1939 he was superintendent of the Mission's northernmost District.

Under Doctor Stauffacher's continued and sustained leadership, the medical program made significant advances. The hospital he long had desired was opened at Chicuque in 1920, giving him a base from which he could reach out to implement some of his plans for more effective medical activity throughout the Mission. It provided him with an instrument to make the medical work more fully what he believed it should be, namely, "the great power to break

down heathen superstition and witchcraft." Here he now was able to train African girls as nurses, teaching them anatomy, physiology, surgery, medicine, first aid, public health, nursing care, obstetrics, and Bible.

The girls trained at Chicuque, who were recruited from the various Circuits, were placed at outstations or sent out to tour the villages. They variously maintained permanent clinics, provided obstetrical service, and taught baby care and village hygiene. Once a year, the nurses in the outstation clinics—they were graduates—returned to the hospital for four weeks' refresher courses.

Doctor Stauffacher was by no means a hospital-bound worker; he still acted as medical director for the entire Mission. For a few years in the thirties, he was reinforced by an associate director, Dr. T. J. Thomas, who was recruited and supported by the Free Methodists of Great Britain, who also enrolled some of their girls in the nurses' training classes. Victoria C. Lang, a nurse, served as Stauffacher's assistant at Chicuque for more than ten years, notably as supervisor of the nurses' training work. A new hospital, headed by Esther Bjork, was opened at Kambini in 1933, and though the building program was only half completed, the unit gave eighteen thousand treatments in its first ten months. Three years later, the Kambini and the Chicuque hospitals together were administering fifty thousand treatments to forty-three hundred patients in a year's time and were instructing 175 mothers a week in the baby clinics. Among the many other medical aspects of the Mission-wide enterprise were the long-maintained circumcision camp at Chicuque that received twenty boys every three weeks, home visitation of former hospital patients (the purpose was partly evangelistic), the erection of special units for tubercular patients, and the development of a program for the treatment of leprosy.

Doctor Stauffacher long had desired to open a colony for leprosy patients. "Many lepers come and want to stay," he wrote in 1917, "it is inconsistent to tell them of the love of Christ and then drive them away." At that time, he had two leprosy sufferers in isolation and under treatment at Chicuque. Less than two years later, these were discharged as cured. But for a number of years, the station could accommodate only a few victims of this disease. Finally, in 1927-28, with the co-operation of the American Mission to Lepers, the Methodist mission's first full-fledged leprosy camp got under way on a 500-acre farm property several miles from Chicuque. Its accommodations soon were taken up by sufferers from leprosy who came in as the result of a campaign conducted on the Mission's various Circuits. By Conference time, 1929, the camp had nine buildings and fifty patients. In 1929-30, the second leprosy camp was opened about two hundred miles from the Chicuque project, at the Tavane station, Manjacaze Circuit, where there was a dispensary with Mrs. Alice E. Longworth as nurse in charge. This camp benefited from the co-operation of nurses and missionaries from the nearby Nazarene mission.

The two camps together eventually were caring for well over two hundred patients. In 1939, at a time when Mrs. Longworth's ministry was touching 120 patients, the government closed down the Tavane camp and transferred the people to an island about fifty miles away. This left the Mission's neighboring workers simply to endeavor to meet the patients' spiritual needs.

Up to the early nineteen-twenties, the Mission had been enjoying a dozen years of workable relationships with the colonial administration following resolution of the schools' language crisis of 1907-9 and the inauguration of the Republic in 1910. James Pointer, reporting in 1922 as the Mission's superintendent, declared that relations with the Portuguese were pleasant and cordial. "They have been very kind and considerate in their dealings with this old established mission."

To be sure, one of the government's policies, the practice of forced labor, created difficulties for the Mission, but not intentionally. As Pointer had reported only the year before, some of the outstations were almost depopulated of men because of the search for forced labor. Those who were not caught by the police were running off to hide in the jungle or to work in the mines at Johannesburg. Some of the Africans were moving away to more secluded or remoter areas in order to elude police vigilance. Many of the Methodist outstations therefore suffered both numerically and financially. Before long, however, the forced labor policy was to become a focus of far more serious trouble for the Methodists.

Hardly had Pointer made his sanguine report of 1922, when the easy relations between Mission and government broke down and gave way to years of hostility and harassment that threatened to undermine the entire position of Protestant missions in Mozambique. Three factors strongly and negatively affected the situation that became endemic for most of the rest of the twenties and thirties: (1) Portuguese resentment because of the alleged connection of missionaries with the Ross report on forced labor and other Portuguese colonial practices, (2) the overthrow of the Republic and the withdrawal of many administrators co-operative with the missionaries, and (3) the resurgence of aggressive Roman Catholic power.

The first round of troubles began in 1923, with local officials taking the initiative in issuing rulings that drastically hampered Protestant missions in the southern part of the Mission's territory. The two chief devices employed were a ban on mission schools or houses of religious propaganda within fifteen kilometers (about nine miles) of any Portuguese Roman Catholic mission and an order demanding that all schools have teachers carrying Portuguese secondary certificates. The Protestants regarded these rulings as weapons in the hands of a coalition of Catholic administrators and Catholic priests campaigning to limit and destroy non-Catholic missions. The measures were so effective that they soon resulted in the closing of all Methodist schools in the Limpopo region and in suppression of all missionary work on

many Methodist charges, in the latter case by withdrawing government licenses from preacher-teachers assigned to places within the fifteen kilometer limit.

In the Inhambane area, relations between Mission and government remained good, but to the south, drastic means were used to enforce and reinforce the restrictive rulings. When in some places Methodist preacher-teachers refused to quit, they were arrested and sometimes imprisoned for as long as six months. Preachers, school children, and adults repeatedly were subjected to harsh threats, coercion, and economic and physical punishment, not only to give up their Methodist connections but even to enter the schools and mission churches the Catholic Church was opening partly in order to take in Africans squeezed out of the Protestant missions by their own aggressive tactics.

The hostile efforts in the south continued for about three years on a locally-generated basis. But in the midst of that period, the harassment began to move to a national level because of the bitter reaction of Mozambique officialdom to the publication of the Ross Report in 1925. As in Angola, the officials blamed the missionaries for co-operating with Ross and his associate by providing them with information about forced labor and other inhumane or backward practices in Portugal's African possessions, thus embarrassing her in the world community. Whether the authorities knew it or not, William Terril, who served as superintendent for Mozambique but lived in the Transvaal, actually had arranged for Ross, when he came to Johannesburg, to meet Mozambique miners and others from whom he undoubtedly received some of his material on conditions in their home area. The relation of the missionaries, especially the Americans, to the Ross affair was discussed in Mozambique's Legislative Council, which conceded that it could not oust the missionaries from the country because of existing international agreements but also determined that it would enforce the laws to the limit against foreign missions and foreigners. The Council also augmented by £1,000 its annual grant to the Portuguese Roman Catholic missions, so as to advance their work and to thwart Protestant efforts by planting Catholic missions close to Protestant missions, as already had been done in some localities. In addition to giving fuller backing for the Catholics, the government began to favor the independent African missions, encouraging the native leaders in such a way as to provoke strife between the Africans and the foreign missions. This, declared Terril late in 1925, evidently referring to the Shangaan disaffection, was having a disastrous effect upon the Methodist work.

Although it was generally disruptive of the Mission's work, the Legislative Council did not at once mobilize its full strength against the Protestants; indeed, the pressure let up somewhat after a while. But in June, 1927 (the military dictatorship now was firmly in control in Lisbon), the broad nature

of the damage the Council could do was revealed when it offered for promulgation by the government Proposal Number 10, a fully articulated and extensive pattern of regulations and prohibitions whose enforcement easily could have resulted in eradicating Protestant missions from the life of Mozambique. The preamble to the Proposal expressly attacked foreign missions because of their practice of inter-Mission competition administratively embarrassing to the government, their divisive influence among the African population, their failures as truly civilizing agencies, their withdrawal of many men from the work force belonging to the Mozambique economy, their inculcation of false notions of popular rights, and their effect in preventing the natives' nationalization (to Portuguese, not African, nationalism). Since the Proposal was aimed only at foreign missions, the Roman Catholic missions, being Portuguese, did not come under its restrictions. Thus, implicitly as well as explicitly, Proposal Number 10 was an anti-Protestant instrument.

Enactment of the Proposal, however, was delayed long enough so that the Protestant missions active in Mozambique (the Anglicans, the Wesleyans, the Swiss Romande mission, and the Methodist Episcopal mission) were able to join together in making representations to the government asking for amelioration of the new system of controls. Their appeal had some ground in international law, for both in Mozambique and in Angola the religious liberties of the Africans and toleration and protection of foreign missions were guaranteed not simply by Portuguese law, but also by a cluster of international agreements: the Berlin Act (1885), the Brussels Act (1890), the Anglo-Portuguese Agreement (1891), and the Treaty of Saint-Germain (1919). On that basis, they protested some provisions of the Proposal as being infringements of the Africans' freedom in worship. They also tried to persuade the government that their work, particularly in education, actually buttressed the Portuguese policy of nationalization. When the new restrictive laws finally—and suddenly—were promulgated in revised form in August, 1929, the missionaries were distressed to find them more drastic than they expected. This move again heightened the tension under which the missionaries and their helpers carried on, though eventually it was somewhat relieved by the apparent willingness of the government to interpret some of the restrictions less than strictly and to grant Missions a certain amount of time in which to bring their schools and churches up to the required norms.

Then in 1933-34, repression of the missions broke out afresh and continued throughout the decade. Not everywhere uniformly, but nowhere restrained by any over-all administrative policy and often co-operating with Catholic clerics, government officials vigorously enforced the legislation of 1929. There were innumerable detailed restrictions and requirements governing mission buildings, property-holding, use of vernaculars in school and church, employment of Portuguese teachers in schools training teachers, educational qualifications of African evangelists, certification of mission workers,

and so on. The officials concentrated on so manipulating the manifold rules as to try to reduce the Mission's force of African evangelists. The crux of that strategy was the licensing of evangelists based on the requirement that they hold certificates on the secondary level of the Portuguese educational system. The officials grasped every possible occasion to withdraw or refuse licenses to Methodist evangelists and acted to coerce them to desist from their mission activities. They were variously harassed, threatened, summoned before administrators, even arrested. Some were forbidden to ring their chapel bells or to hold chapel services—bans that often were circumvented by using whistles instead of bells and by holding devotional meetings with small groups in the homes of members of their congregations. When young Africans desired to receive educational certificates that would qualify them for Methodist work, they were denied opportunity to take the requisite public examinations. By 1937, the hobbling of the Methodist evangelists was so effective that half of them were without official standing and the Mission was practically helpless to replace them. The entire body of workers in the Inharrime-Limpopo District, normally including sixty-five charges, was immobilized, the evangelists all having been refused licenses in a blanket reregistration.

The repressive activity was broadened in 1940 to include the missionaries in the pursuit of their administrative functions. Since the stations in the Methodists' Inharrime-Limpopo District all were under government bans, they were held to be technically nonexistent. Hence, James D. Pointer, the superintendent, was refused permission to hold Quarterly Conferences or any other meetings at all in the Inharrime Administrative District, the claim being that the Mission had no work in that area which the missionaries knew as one of their most flourishing fields. In another section of the country, Pliny W. Keys, another District Superintendent, met on the road one of his African evangelists who was being taken in under arrest by the African chief because Keys was scheduled to hold a Quarterly Conference at his station. When Ruth Thomas went into the area to do evangelistic work with women, she too was ordered not to hold services there.

In all their difficulties under government stringencies, the missionaries were keenly aware of the Roman Catholic presence in Mozambique as an instigating and enforcing factor. Pliny Keys told the Board Secretaries in 1940 that the government had put into the hands of the Catholics all educational matters and practically all direction of native affairs. The latter utilized their privileged position to establish a system of schools competitive with the Protestant mission schools. Keys reported to the Conference in 1939 that on his Inhambane Southern District had been built twenty-three Catholic schools, all of them deliberately placed close to other Christian schools. He said:

In many instances they stake out a large piece of land including the Mission station, in their survey, since the Government freely grants them all the

land they may ask for, while refusing the Protestants any concession for land. As soon as they can put a teacher on the ground, under the shade of a tree, or in a mud and grass hut, a Catholic school is established; whereas with the Protestants a stone building is required, and a Government certificated teacher, in addition to other things. Throughout all our work, they are forcing our children into the Catholic schools, by pressure on the native chiefs as well as by sending policemen through the country to force them to attend.

Once the Methodist children were in the Catholic schools, Keys declared, insistent demands were made that they be rebaptized, with priests and even some of the administrators calling in the parents and threatening punishment if they did not accede. Similarly, Methodist evangelists were forced to withdraw from public religious activity. The Roman Catholics, warned Keys, were trying to drive foreign missions out of Mozambique.

Although the Mission was led by men who were self-consciously Methodist by commitment and tradition, they generally did not comport themselves as arrantly competitive denominationalists in their missionary administration. Far from deserving the charge of divisive competition that the Legislative Council threw at the Protestant missions in 1927, the Methodist leaders entered into many fraternal and practical arrangements with other Missions in order to achieve co-operation in what was felt to be a common devotion to evangelizing the country's African population.

The Methodist project in Lourenço Marques, for instance, was operated in close connection with that of the British Wesleyans. Desiring to concentrate upon its promising northern area, the Mission in 1930-31 transferred three Circuits in the Limpopo region—they included nearly nine hundred members—to the mission of the Nazarene Church and sold its station property at Tavane to the Nazarenes to serve as their headquarters. At the same time, a group of twenty Nazarene members on the Zavalla Circuit joined the Methodists. The Free Methodists' support of Dr. T. J. Thomas as Dr. Stauffacher's associate at the Chicique hospital was indicative of the noncompetitive relationship between them and the Methodists. In Manica, the site of the government normal school, the Methodists co-operated with the Swiss mission and four others in maintaining a union hostel with a chaplain in charge. In the early twenties, the Methodists, the Free Methodists, and the Church of England missionaries were working together against the practice of locating new mission stations in close proximity to stations already established. They agreed among themselves that they would refrain from setting up work less than five kilometers from one another. Closest of all the Methodists' nondenominational working arrangements was its permanent connection with the American Mission to Lepers, which supported the leprosy work administered by the Methodist missionaries.

The fraternal and co-operative relationships of several of the Missions—

Anglican, Free Methodist, Methodist Episcopal, and Swiss Romande—were formalized in the Southeast Africa Evangelical Missionary Association. Missionaries and lay churchmen, both African and non-African, attended the Association's annual meetings, which were devoted to inter-Mission relations, study of missionary problems and developments, and consideration of united action on public affairs. In several instances, the Methodist mission turned to the Association or its committees for guidance in settling matters at issue between itself and other Missions. The Association became particularly valuable as a medium of negotiations between the Protestant missions and the government following the publication of Proposal Number 10 in the year 1927, and it helped the missionaries to work together in appealing to international co-operative groups and diplomatic agents for support of their position on religious liberty for Mozambique. In 1930, a week-long missionary conference similar to the Association meetings was held at Contra Costa, with the Anglicans, the Swiss, the Wesleyans, and the Methodist Episcopal missions represented. The conference, which went deeper than the Association's meetings, stimulated a significant number of constructive inter-Mission arrangements. One of the immediate results was a fruitful medical conference, chaired by Dr. Stauffacher, that brought representatives of six Missions to Chicupe. Another Contra Costa conference was held in 1933.

Madeira

After sixteen years' connection with the West Central Africa Mission Conference, the Madeira Islands mission was transferred to the North Africa Mission Conference in 1920—a by-product of General Conference legislation establishing a Central Conference for South Africa. This new Conference relationship was in itself no less an organizational formality than the one it supplanted; the Madeira workers neither attended the sessions of the Conference nor shared in its fellowship. Although the Superintendent, William G. Smart, did not favor the change, the veteran missionary George B. Nind had believed for some years that the Madeira mission would be more efficiently administered from Europe than from South Africa; unrelieved problems were mounting in Madeira because communication with the Missionary Bishop for Africa was sluggish and episcopal visitation was infrequent. The shift to the North Africa Mission Conference brought the Islands within the jurisdiction of Bishop Edgar Blake, head of the Paris Area.

In May, 1925, the Madeira District of the North Africa Conference was constituted the Madeira Mission. It thus became an independent unit, but its ministerial members retained their individual Conference relationships in North Africa, and Bishop Blake, resident in Paris, still supervised the work, until Bishop William O. Shepard succeeded him in 1928.

At the close of its five years under the North Africa Mission Conference,

the Madeira mission was essentially no stronger, and functionally little more developed, than at the beginning. Among the country congregations, Ribeira Brava became a more settled group under its first pastor, Julio G. Viterbo Dias, who served in the capacity of an Exhorter, holding services in the house rented for his home. Benjamin R. Duarte, returning from an extended furlough, resumed his work in Machico—continuing the Ribeira Grande project and making a new evangelistic beginning in Machico Village, where he lived. George B. Nind, after a decade and a half at the Mount Faith mission in Santo da Serra ended his labors in Madeira in 1920 and returned to the United States. Mount Faith then had a succession of several leaders.

William G. Smart, the Mission's founder, was District Superintendent and head of the Funchal enterprise, as he had been under the West Central Africa Mission Conference. With Julio da Freitas and Viterbo Dias out from under his feet, in country stations, the elderly missionary now was free to carry on in Funchal in his habitual, conventional way. For a year and a half after Bishop Eben S. Johnson's episcopal visit of January, 1920, the Madeira Mission enjoyed peace and some progress.

Smart himself, however, finally broke the peace. In the summer of 1921, he went out of his way to revive the old conflict with Dias. He broke off all consultation and normal communication with the younger man, forbade him to come in to Funchal (even to settle his recently deceased father-in-law's estate), would not go to Ribeira Brava to baptize Dias's baby until Duarte pushed him into it, and finally told Duarte that he was washing his hands completely of Dias and his family. At the same time, he began a new campaign to have Dias transferred out of the Madeira mission. Duarte held no brief for Dias, but he was convinced that Smart's impatient and aggressive attitude needlessly threatened loss of the Ribeira Brava congregation and alienation of enough of his other sympathizers to cause serious trouble for the whole Mission.

Smart's fresh attack upon Dias followed shortly upon the coming of a promising new volunteer worker to the Funchal mission—a young Briton named L. G. Burgess, who became, for a time, a tool of Smart's anti-Dias effort and a focal victim of an extraordinary intrigue maintained by the otherwise largely inept superintendent of the Mission. Burgess, converted while in military service in the recent world war, first came to the Church House services as a worshiper, but by midsummer, 1921, he and his wife were deeply involved in the work of the Funchal mission. Smart unburdened himself to Burgess about Dias, enlisted his sympathies, used him as a vehicle of complaint to New York against the Ribeira Brava man, and let Duarte believe that Burgess was the true initiator of aggressive measures against Dias.

During the summer and fall months, Smart played a double game with young Burgess—pretending to play along with him in his enthusiastic efforts

to revive and expand the Funchal work and to plan for its future, but at the same time making many accusations against Burgess to Duarte, who most of the time, of course, was out in Machico. Mission administration deteriorated into a state of indecision, inconsistency, and confusion. When Duarte tried to deal with Smart, the Superintendent repeatedly charged that he was laboring under severe pressures from Burgess. He finally convinced Duarte that the newcomer was arrogantly reaching for power and was forcing Smart to act against his own judgment. He made Duarte feel that he was completely under Burgess's domination, yielding concessions out of arrant fear of the younger man. Duarte, always ready to defend Smart when he could, reluctantly reported to North his shock at Smart's impotence as a leader and his conclusion that somebody must be sent from the United States to replace Smart as the working force in the Mission.

Meanwhile, Smart was feeding Burgess a diet of derogatory, even false and defamatory, criticism of Duarte and of his other co-workers, both present and past. He retold his perennial delusions of continual conspiracy against him by all hands in the Mission and imprinted upon Burgess's mind an image of the Superintendent as an innocent man always surrounded by wolves within the walls of the Mission. Indeed, he asked Burgess to come into the Mission to serve—partly, at least—as his defender against his attackers.

Smart's double dealing isolated Burgess from all the rest of the Mission personnel except his friend Nigel D. Power, another young Englishman, who had entered the Methodist work along with him. Smart so slanted Burgess's thinking about his fellow workers that the new recruit soon broke off, to Duarte's mystification, the spontaneous friendly relations that had grown up between his family and Duarte's. Burgess was betrayed into attitudes and positions that aroused bitterness and opposition towards him among Funchal church attendants and among the workers in the country stations—a development whose cause he could not understand.

When Bishop Blake visited Madeira for the District Conference at the end of January, 1922, he found the Mission and its field much more promising than he had anticipated. His report to North was optimistic, pointing to potentialities that only awaited aggressive leadership and a sufficiently large and varied program. In spite of a two weeks' stay, he evidently failed to locate and plumb the serious cleavages in the mission group and remained unaware, as did everyone else, of Smart's duplicity. "There is not any serious dissension among the workers," he told North. "Such misunderstandings as have occurred have arisen from this lack of a definite program and leadership." Blake prepared for the coming year a program for wider development of the evangelistic, educational, and recreational activities of the Funchal center. Matching the Bishop's hopeful attitude, an optimistic cablegram went from the District Conference to the New York office—"District Conference great success mighty hopes future progress."

Bishop Blake considered Smart "eminently faithful and trustworthy" and felt that he possessed "the confidence of the community to a remarkable degree." But he sensed Smart's timidity and lack of initiative well enough to refrain from relying upon the Superintendent to carry the advance program. Indeed, he voiced to Secretary North, but not urgently, his feeling that a successor to Smart should be found by the end of the year. Not realizing that Smart had been shamelessly using Burgess as a pawn in his own devious game of mission politics, Blake appointed the Burgesses and Nigel Power to the work in Funchal and gave them responsibility for much of the advance program. Their appointment had been urged by Smart—a twist that Duarte, after listening to Smart's criticisms of the younger man, failed to understand. The three young people enthusiastically received the Bishop's program (it incorporated a number of suggestions originally made by Burgess); and during the following year, their energetic and intensive work greatly livened and widened the Mission's activities in Funchal, especially in work with children and youth.

But whatever peace Bishop Blake thought he found, or managed to patch together, in the Madeira Mission vanished almost as quickly as the wake of the vessel that carried him off to Spain. Smart wrote North on 15 March, "I am glad that I have three new helpers in Mr. and Mrs. Burgess and Mr. Nigel Power—they are young and strong and will help us continue in the good work we have in hand." But Smart, a month earlier, already had begun peddling among the mission workers a new string of damaging accusations against Burgess. He portrayed expenditures to implement Bishop Blake's program as Burgess's attempt to embarrass the Superintendent with the New York office by emptying the treasury. He even made up a spy story, about a woman's being planted in the Church House group to keep tabs on Smart and to report his doings to Burgess by hiding letters in books in the library.

Smart's hostile talebearing spread trouble not only in Funchal, but through the country stations. It further embittered life among the workers, turning people afresh against the new recruits. The Burgesses, on their part, reacted against the creeping ostracism they suffered; Mrs. Burgess, for instance, reportedly refrained for many months from speaking to any of the other workers. Neither side understood the cause of the bitterness on the other side.

Before the year was out, however, a good deal of the trouble gathered about Burgess's alleged conduct in the Mission was drained off, for Duarte and he succeeded, through frank discussion, in reaching some common understanding of what was going on. And Duarte, straightforwardly confronting Smart, managed to break through the net of intrigue spun by the older worker. But Smart did not give up his essential opposition to Burgess and Power. Early in 1923, the two young men left the Mission. Burgess entered independent,

but not competing, evangelistic work in Funchal, supporting himself in it by business activity for many years thereafter.

Acting on the Bishop's advice, the Board's Executive Committee voted in May, 1923, to approve Smart's retirement, the date to be arranged. In December, it sent out to Madeira as the intended successor to Smart a Southern California minister, Earl H. Haydock. In January, at the District Conference, Bishop Blake appointed Haydock as Superintendent and as Smart's associate in the Funchal pastorate. A year later, he officially retired Smart with pension, but he kept him on as Mission Treasurer and as the supply pastor for Funchal.

Haydock stayed in Madeira for about four years. Although Smart did not accept him with entire grace, Haydock did not find the long-time leader of the Mission a serious problem. More troublesome was the activity of a Local Preacher named Anselmo F. Chaves, Haydock's assistant, who took a number of Methodist members and adherents to the Presbyterian Church for services. There were many familiar difficulties in the work, but Haydock felt gratified at numerous signs of sound progress. He wrote to Bishop Blake in 1926, after containing the trouble caused by Chaves and the "revolutionists":

God has sent a revival to the Methodist Church and 25 are asking to join our church. Meetings crammed. S.S. growing. New faces in all schools and services. Members and workers united, optimistic spirit. . . . Things going smoothly. Glory to God! Halleluiah!

The most deeply disturbing problem for Haydock was the intensely restricted financial situation caused by the nearly 50 per cent cut in appropriations beginning in 1925. He felt so sharply its damaging effect upon the work that he even was willing to return to the United States in order save for the Mission the amount of his own salary. However, he did not leave until he was furloughed in 1927.

Shortly before Haydock left Funchal, there began an investigation of the Mission that soon resulted in the cessation of its work in Madeira.

During a nine-day visit to the Island in mid-January, 1927, Bishop John L. Nuelsen of the Zurich Area held the first Annual Meeting of the Madeira Mission and, at the request of the Board's Executive Committee, made a thorough study of the work. His report, along with one prepared by Bishop Blake, was studied by the Commission of Ten established at the Annual Meeting of the Board in November, 1925, for the purpose of determining what mission fields and projects should continue to receive Board support.

At the Annual Meeting of the Board in November, 1927, the Commission of Ten, reporting that the Madeira Mission had been costing about \$5,000 a year, but had long been showing little growth, stated that the Methodist Episcopal Church "has little to conserve by continuing work in the Madeira Islands." The Commission recommended, and the Board adopted, three

proposals for liquidation of the Mission—transfer of the work to some other evangelical church if possible, discontinuance of appropriations, and sale or transfer of the properties.

The Corresponding Secretaries already had reported to the Annual Meeting that the Brazil Conference of the Methodist Church, South, was considering taking up work in Madeira (and Portugal). "In this direction," the Secretaries said, "we may find solution of our Madeira problem." Indeed, for some months, Secretary John R. Edwards had been discussing with Bishop James Cannon, Jr., of the Church, South, the possibility of having the Brazil Conference take over the Madeira Mission. Negotiations with the Southern church continued for two years more, with the Board keeping Benjamin Duarte on the field to maintain the Mission's work until plans for its transfer should mature. The November, 1927, vote of the Board stood, meanwhile, as its official act of withdrawal of the Mission, its consent to the interim arrangement having been given only because the Secretaries were able to put their hands on a special gift offered for two years' support of Duarte on the field.

In 1928, the Madeira Mission was assigned to the Paris Area, under the administration of Bishop William O. Shepard, who after visiting the Island in 1929, was somewhat reluctant to have the Methodist Episcopal Church surrender its Madeira enterprise.

Nevertheless, as a result of the interdenominational negotiations, the Board terminated its missionary operation in Madeira on 1 April 1930. On that day, Antonio P. Rolim of Brazil assumed responsibility for the work as representative of the Brazil Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, which became a part of the autonomous Methodist Church of Brazil proclaimed on 2 September 1930. The Methodist Episcopal Board of Foreign Missions backed the Brazilian venture by granting the use of its Madeira mission properties (except Mount Faith) for a period of five years, and by making two appropriations of a thousand dollars each.

William Smart, after forty years in Church House, moved out to make way for Rolim, and Benjamin Duarte sailed for Brazil, where he took the pastorate vacated by Rolim. A year later, Duarte, already entered on the Board's roster of retired missionaries, left Brazil because of poor health, and returned to Funchal to plan for full retirement. In January, 1932, he became the Board's agent in Madeira.

The Board called upon Duarte because the Methodist Church of Brazil, hampered by falling income, had sent notice that it was compelled to withdraw from Madeira almost at once. Rolim turned over the Funchal Church House to Duarte on 1 March and departed for Brazil. Duarte also took custody of the chapels in Ribeira Brava and Ribeira Grande and of the parsonage in Machico Village.

Although officially retired, Duarte continued for three years as the Board's

agent and as occasional informal leader of the Methodists on the Island. He promptly threw his influence on the side of Methodist participation in a movement that was afoot for unification of the few Protestant groups in Madeira. But the Madeira Methodists rejected the unification movement and asked permission to meet in the Church House in Funchal and in the two chapels in the hills. The Board favored ultimate union of the evangelical "forces" in Madeira in one strong church, but it permitted the Methodist people to use the three places of worship and also allotted them \$20.00 a month to help them meet their reciprocal responsibility for taxes, repairs, and insurance.

Duarte impressed upon the Funchal Methodists the Board's intention to stop sending money to Madeira after the end of the year and to stand by its earlier act of withdrawal from the field. They soon began to warm up to the possibility of church unification, and in the fall, encouraged by the Board, asserted enough leadership in the Funchal congregation to bring about a favorable vote. By the time Bishop Raymond J. Wade visited Funchal in February, 1933 (a year earlier, Madeira had come into the Stockholm Area, which he administered), an Evangelical Union including Methodists, Presbyterians, and others was beginning to function.

Under Wade's direction, Duarte made an agreement with the Union, as represented by the Madeira Regional Council of the Evangelical Church of Portugal, granting the privilege of holding meetings in the Ribeira Brava and the Ribeira Grande chapels and of using the ground floor of the Church House in Funchal. Pursuing his original mandate from the Board, Duarte went forward with the liquidation of Methodist property holdings on the Island. In August, he sold the Funchal property to the Regional Council. Within a month, he also disposed of the Machico Village parsonage. At this time, the Regional Council was paying the Board instalments on the Mount Faith property. The transfer, begun in June, 1932, was completed just three years later—practically Duarte's last official act before moving to the Azores to make his final home there. This left the Methodist Episcopal Church holding only the two hill chapels.

Bishop Wade had left Funchal in February, 1933, believing that the evangelical merger was satisfactorily established and that Methodist Episcopal preaching and mission supervision in Madeira were at an end. But final withdrawal, already six years delayed, was not to be so handily accomplished; Wade was still grappling with the Madeira problem at the end of another six years. In 1935, Methodism emerged once more as a separate movement, as a result of disillusionment with the leadership of the Regional Council. Outraged by the personal conduct of the pastor of the Evangelical Church, the Council's principal executive leader, church people began to rebel against receiving the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper at his hand, some of them turning to Benjamin Duarte for this purpose. When the Council failed to

shed its offending official, a great many members threw off its aegis. Among those who thus came out from the Evangelical Church of Portugal were more of the former Methodists. The congregations at Ribeira Brava and Ribeira Grande unanimously withdrew. Duarte then closed the two back-country chapels to the Council and opened them to the local Methodist groups.

These newly merged Methodist groups and one in Funchal drew together as "The Madeiran Methodist Evangelical Church," with William Smart serving as their spiritual counselor. Bishop Wade sympathized with the Methodists in their current differences with the Regional Council organization, advised Corresponding Secretary John R. Edwards that only they should be allowed to use the two chapels, and entertained the idea of visiting Madeira to investigate personally. Edwards, confessedly passing the buck to Bishop Wade, declined to touch the Madeira question: "Since the Board has withdrawn its appropriations to Madeira and has interest only in the property, the affair would seem to be entirely one of episcopal administration." Edwards' citation of the episcopal connection undoubtedly was based on the listing of the Madeira Mission in the *Discipline* of 1932; and it was so listed for five more quadrennia.

Bishop Wade, now convinced that the evangelical combination had been put together too rapidly, passed on to the Board, early in 1936, an appeal originating with the "Madeira Methodist Church," Avelino Brazao, Secretary. The Madeira group desired to remain independent of the former union, and to have a Methodist pastor who would be supported co-operatively by the Methodist denominations in the United States, Britain, and Brazil, with supervision by a Methodist Episcopal Bishop. Wade asked Associate Secretary Thomas S. Donohugh to have the Board consider taking responsibility within some such pattern. Donohugh promptly replied that both he and Edwards felt it would be hopeless to ask the Board to assume further obligations in Madeira; the Secretaries already had been heavily criticized for the slow implementation of the withdrawal policy. The Board would not be interested, said Donohugh, in the move to maintain a separate Methodist Church on the Island, but would much prefer to see brought about a new fusion of the evangelicals—an objective Donohugh commended to Wade's "friendly counsel with all parties concerned." Wade, who had come to think of the Regional Council as "the opposition group," agreed to promote "a real union," but held that in the meantime it was his duty to "counsel, shelter and assist" the Methodists who were under his care. "Let us at least help them with our blessing," he said.

Bishop Wade's pastoral concern did not wane; he continued to personalize the Madeira issue. Visiting the Island in February, 1937, he found "our brave band of Methodists were struggling on." "They have demonstrated their real worth and Christian character," he wrote to Corresponding Secretary Ralph E. Diffendorfer. They were holding regular services in the two chapels and

in a rented hall in Funchal, their members augmented by a sizeable group of people formerly associated with the abortive union project. By this time, the Regional Council had sold the Mount Faith chapel, not long after acquiring it, and it was in the hands of the local Roman Catholic priest. The Methodists had not abandoned the idea of an eventual union of Madeira evangelicals, but Wade evidently did not press them towards it. He recognized as valid their conscientious scruples against the divorce and remarriage of both the pastor of the Evangelical Church and the pastor of the Presbyterian congregation, the leading officials of the Regional Council. The Methodist Episcopal Church had long sternly frowned on divorce,* and the *Discipline* that was in effect until 1928 declared, "No divorce, except for adultery, shall be regarded by the Church as lawful . . ."—a standard tempered but still approximated in the *Discipline* in use in 1937. The Bishop also understood the Madeira Methodists' reaction to what he described as the careless drinking habits of one of these pastors; had they not been tutored by Americans schooled in the longstanding devotion of the Methodist Episcopal Church to temperance and prohibition,† and by the Smart-Newton family, for decades known in Madeira as advocates of temperance?

Bishop Wade encouraged the Methodist groups, but promised them no money from the United States. When writing the New York office of the Board about his visitation, he told of the lively interest the superintendent of the work of the British Methodists in Portugal displayed in Madeira Methodism; and Secretary Diffendorfer penciled in the margin of Wade's letter, "Let them look after it." Upon an official ear thus closed, then, fell Wade's expressed wish that the Board could find a couple of hundred dollars a year for the Madeira Methodists. But before he left Funchal, Wade—backed by what vote of a Conference is not clear—ordained two men as Deacons, one to serve as a pastor, and one to be a lay helper. He reassured the new church with a promise of his co-operation and of their continued use of the chapels. Thus the Bishop, exercising episcopal functions, was taking steps that could only bind the Madeirans closer to the Methodist Episcopal Church, while the missionary executives of the same denomination desired to be rid of them.

Bishop Wade treated the Madeira Methodist movement, evidently with some lack of Disciplinary precision, both as a bona fide mission and as a District of the North Africa Conference. Having ordained a third Madeiran, he caused Julio Figueira, W. Mendes, and Antonio T. Rodriguez of Funchal to be listed by the North Africa District Conference in 1939 as Local Deacons. The names remained on the roll for a number of years. Likewise for some years, beginning in 1937, the Madeira Islands appeared among the appointments of the North Africa Conference, to be supplied. Bishop Wade also saw to it that Madeira was counted separately in the Methodist fold at the semi-

* See Vol. III, 57 f.

† *Ibid.*, 54-57.

official Uniting Conference for the Methodist Church in Europe held in Copenhagen in August, 1939, shortly after Unification. Antonio Rodriguez attended as official delegate from the Madeira Islands, with the Board, at the Bishop's behest, contributing to his expenses.

On the closing day of the Conference, Bishop Wade ordained Rodriguez as an Elder for pastoral work in Madeira. The Bishop obligated himself to send Rodriguez \$25.00 a month. The new pastor, who had been studying in England for the past two years, expected to have the work self-supporting by 1941. Wade requested the Board to cover the \$25.00 payments for 1940, and asked whether there was any way in which the Church House in Funchal could be repossessed under the original terms of transfer. "Our people," wrote Wade, "are compelled to go on and they deserve our sympathy and complete cooperation." But Secretary Diffendorfer, appealing to the Board's 1927 act of withdrawal and citing the necessity for financial retrenchment, declared that it was impossible for the Secretaries to recommend resuming work in Madeira and shrank from the probable costliness of any legal measures to regain the Funchal property. Thus at the end of 1939, Madeira was a Mission without missionaries or missionary appropriations and with a parent missionary board straining to confine itself to the role of landlord.

NOTE

Page 941. Assuming that Klebsattel was innocent of collaborating with Ross, it nevertheless is true that William E. Terril, Superintendent of the Inhambane and Transvaal Districts of the Southeast Africa Mission Conference, *did* so collaborate. When Ross came to Johannesburg in September, 1924, Terril spent much time helping him make contacts with interviewees and serving as personal guide. Among his services to Ross was his organization of a meeting with a group of Methodist men from Mozambique. Terril wrote to Secretary Donohugh:

On Saturday afternoon a very important meeting was held with a representative group of natives, about 33 altogether, all members of our own Church, from Portuguese East Africa, but who are here for work in the mines. This meeting was strictly private and confidential. Some very far reaching, vital and searching questions were put to this group of natives by Dr. Cramer and Prof. Ross.

Africa North and South

North Africa

AFTER SPENDING A MILLION DOLLARS AND A HALF and involving dozens of missionaries in their anti-Islam crusade in North Africa, the Methodists making the appropriations for it paused in the mid-thirties to make a searching evaluation of the success of their effort.

It was not an isolated assessment, for in 1933 the Board of Foreign Missions, faced with a serious decline in income, voted in Annual Meeting to reaffirm a previous decision that sound strategy called for concentrating its missionary effort in fewer regions, in order to increase the quality of its service and to provide an adequate base for future developments. It was an expression of the same kind of thinking that already had brought about concentration of the Board's Netherlands Indies enterprise in Sumatra alone. The studies involved in planning for North Africa continued to the end of 1935.

Bishop Raymond J. Wade, who was in charge of North Africa, already had taken a close look at what was happening there. He saw that the Mission had suffered in recent years a more serious finance-inspired reduction in staff than had most fields and that it had closed almost half its service centers. Knowing that numerous adjustments on the field were being made in order to keep going, he nevertheless felt impelled to appeal for the Board's support in maintaining four large centers in North Africa, which he designated as Algiers, Constantine, Tunis, and Oran. This proposal left out the missions in Kabylia, but included both French and indigenous work along the coast. The Board made no decision about the future of the field at the 1933 session but continued the annual appropriation at about twelve thousand dollars, which was less than half the appropriation for 1932.

The Corresponding Secretaries, John R. Edwards and Ralph E. Diffendorfer, brought to the Annual Meeting in November, 1934, the preliminary results of further study of the North Africa question under its Executive Committee and by a joint committee of consultation between the Board and the W.F.M.S. The Secretaries emphasized the characteristic difficulty and

slowness involved in forming organized groups of Christians in Muslim territory, though they did not cite the size of the Methodist body in North Africa. At that time there were 322 church members, and about a hundred of these had come out of Islam, not all of them in their adulthood. The Secretaries attributed to boycott and persecution the hesitation of former Muslims to become overt Christians. "Prejudice against Christianity is still strong." In the light of that difficulty, they affirmed that the main question about the North Africa mission was "whether we are prepared to go on with a slow, and relatively expensive service in order to share with this group of people the full benefits of the gospel of Christ."

Edwards and Diffendorfer did not advise abandonment of direct efforts to secure conversions, but they did tell the Board that field experience had proved that it was time to make fuller use of "indirect lines of service, which shall lift the people to better temporal conditions, give the benefit of Christian fellowship rather than to stress insistence upon conversion from Mohammedanism to Christianity." Translated into concrete projects, heightening this emphasis would call for more hospitalization, child care, and vocational training for youth.

By voting to continue appropriations to the field for 1935, the Board accepted the Secretaries' recommendation that the work in North Africa be continued. The figure adopted, however, was a further reduction of three thousand dollars. The appropriation was made against the background of a committee recommendation for intensive study of a reconstructed program for the indigenous populations, the elimination of unproductive institutions and activities, and the concentration of the work in three centers—Constantine, Algiers, and the mountain region. This designation of mission centers omitted Oran and Tunis, but drew no line between indigenous and French activity. Indeed, the Secretaries had spoken favorably of the potentiality of the French work as a bridge to people breaking away from Islam. They believed that developing French Christians would be securing messengers of Christian good will to the native population. "Through the use of the French language, customs and processes of education and government," they said, "our French membership will be in better position in the future than missionaries from America" to meet the problems of Christianization of the native North Africans moving out of Islam.

At the Annual Meeting of 1935, the Board affirmed more deliberately, less tentatively, its purpose to continue its ministry in North Africa, the W.F.M.S. already having announced its intention to go forward. The Board's reasons for staying in North Africa were the dire need of the North African natives for a Christian ministry, the adequacy of Jesus Christ to meet this spiritual need, and the desirability of supplementing the activity of the independent missions (the Methodists were still the only connectional denomination on the field).

Looking forward to new emphases, the Annual Meeting adopted a number of shifts in policy. The work of both the Board and the W.F.M.S. was to be concentrated in a limited number of centers "where there is now good will among the native peoples, especially among the Kabyles." This emphasis upon indigenous work was accompanied by a decision to end within three years all appropriations for support of the French Methodist churches, the North Africa Conference being encouraged to help them establish new connections with the French Protestant Church. This move appeared to be contradictory to the view about the evangelizing potentialities of the French Methodist constituency that the Secretaries had advanced the year before. The native ministerial members of the Conference were to be retired as soon as possible and compensated financially in accordance with French law. This step was based upon acceptance of advice from many sources that in approaching Arabs and Kabyles, the effort to establish a church was not a fruitful one. The Secretaries, reflecting the results of the numerous committee studies, reported, "We were repeatedly told that . . . a church was a hindrance rather than a help; that the employment of native evangelists, lay or ordained, rendered the preachers' testimony of little value."

Flowing from adoption of these proposals was a decision to dispose of all properties not needed for implementation of the new strategy. The Board chose at this time no concrete methods for future mission work but expressed its intention to approach the development of the centers experimentally and pragmatically. Overcoming at last with unusual rapidity and decisiveness the methodological rigidity that often clung to mission field work, it declared that the centers would be patterned "on the basis of helping to meet the needs of the people whatever they may be, by daily contacts and service in Christ's name on the part of the missionaries and lay witnesses." Far from voicing radical hostility toward Islam and the Muslim culture, the Board expressed the hope that the Mission's witness would be made without controversy, opposition, or bitterness. It was expected that in this way there would emerge first a fellowship of Christians rather than a Christian church.

By the time the Board thus decided in 1935 to rechannel the Mission's energies, only two of the charter members of the American Mission in North Africa organized in 1910 remained in service—Mary A. Anderson, assigned to evangelistic work with French girls and women, and Said Flici, pastor of the native church in Algiers. Edwin F. Frease had ended his continuous superintendency of the field several years earlier, being succeeded by Fred J. Kellar.

The Mission had made some advances in outreach in the early nineteen-twenties, and the reports reaching New York from the field were optimistic. By 1924, there were twenty-three Board missionaries, ten W.F.M.S. appointees, and enough French and native staff members to bring the total of mission workers to seventy-five persons. In 1922, three Swedish women

working for the Woman Missionary Workers of Sweden were transferred to the Mission and given regular appointments, and nearby Bizerte, their former station, was listed in the Appointments as an outstation for Methodist visitation. And there was simultaneous financial progress. The Board appropriation for 1919 was \$25,378. In 1920, with Centenary funds becoming available, it rose to \$133,883, maintaining the high level of \$127,138 for 1921. The budgets for 1922-24 still were relatively high, averaging sixty thousand dollars. But then the Board appropriations for North Africa steadily—sometimes sharply—decreased, until the figure for 1936, the year for the initiation of the proposed new departures, was \$4,400. This was lower than any other appropriation in the history of the Mission. Along with the financial decline went the reduction in missionary personnel and the surrender of local mission projects cited by Bishop Wade. At the beginning of 1936, the Board was represented by only three missionary couples—Kellar, C. Guy Kelly, Elmer H. Douglas, and their wives. There were a dozen W.F.M.S. missionaries, some of whom had been with the Mission for ten to fifteen years. Counting a dozen and a half French workers and the nine native workers, the Mission's larger staff included about forty persons. Among these workers, the one most unique in approach to evangelistic work was Kelly, who had organized two thousand North African youths into 130 baseball teams, using this activity as a means of securing access to the young men for Christian witness.

Four years after the Board's major policy decisions of 1935, the pattern of appointments and mission activities showed no important changes. The most immediate and urgent effort of the North Africa mission to meet the Board's expectations was to trim its expenditures in 1936 to stay within the framework of the appropriations. The withdrawal of a number of French workers from paid service evidently was more directly related to this effort than to any move to take the Mission out of the French-language field. Certain French workers went off the payroll, but the French churches remained. Neither was there less emphasis than before on indigenous church work, with its devotion to confrontation evangelism. The Mission overtaken by the War in 1939 was very much like the Mission of 1935.

Only when the War was over did the Mission turn to the unfinished business handed to it in 1935. In order to carry out its postwar plans, it asked the Board of Missions for an increased appropriation. The Board declined, and at the same time brought forward three expectations requiring fulfillment by the North Africa mission: (1) that the recommendations of 1935 now be implemented, (2) that the Mission divest itself of all responsibility for missionary work among the French, and (3) that the North Africa program be so reshaped that the Mission's ministry to the indigenous peoples could be vigorously and effectively pursued.

Union of South Africa

Just a year after the declaration of the Armistice, the Union of South Africa became officially the scene of a new mission of the Methodist Episcopal Church. In December, 1919, the Annual Meeting of the Board of Foreign Missions voted to approve the opening of Methodist work in the Johannesburg area, in the Transvaal. By this vote it registered its concurrence in the judgment of Bishop Eben S. Johnson and of a deputation sent by the Board to study the advisability of the new opening. The Board's purpose was to conserve and properly to extend its activity in Southeast Africa, which until then had been confined to Mozambique.

Although the mission in the Transvaal was a new enterprise, thus requiring approval by the Board, and involved entry into an additional country, it was not an independent organization. It became the Johannesburg District of the Southeast Africa Mission Conference, formerly the Inhambane Mission Conference, whose larger and earlier component was the missionary work in Mozambique. The first superintendent of the Johannesburg project was William C. Terril, a Mozambique missionary. So close was the association of the Transvaal mission with the mission in Mozambique that Terril for more than a decade resided in Johannesburg and supervised both missions from that point.

The primary bond between the two missions was not organizational, but popular and dynamic—the residence of many thousands of men and boys from Mozambique in the Transvaal, where they supplied labor to work the mines. Among them were hundreds of Methodists from the Inhambane region who came to the mining section on contract. The conserving element in the opening of a Johannesburg mission was the desire of the Board and its missionaries to keep the men who were absent from home from wandering from the Church; they went out Christians, and it was hoped that they would return home Christians. Somewhat more negatively—or defensively—the Mozambique mission was anxious to keep the absentees from drifting into the Ethiopian movement that had become such a divisive threat to the Methodist Episcopal Church there. The Mozambique mission desired not only to conserve the enrolled membership of its absent contract laborers, but also to retain their financial support and certainly to keep them from providing funds for the Ethiopian group in the Transvaal, which had been an important factor in financing schismatic activity in Inhambane.

The Mission's representatives on the ground in Johannesburg exploring among the Inhambane residents the potential of the proposed new mission did not wait for final approval of it by the Board. They were so strongly committed to it, and found the Africans so eager, that they turned the exploratory process into an actual beginning. At a rally of six hundred Inhambane men filling, overflowing a building in Johannesburg on 26 October,

Bishop Johnson announced that the Mozambique mission would open a branch for them. The men received the news with great enthusiasm.

Terril, who was an Englishman, rapidly and systematically organized the new expansion, using a method common among the Wesleyans in Great Britain, where extensive use was made of circulating lay preachers. He began issuing in February, 1920, printed plans covering the shifting weekly preaching appointments of a group of African evangelists he succeeded in recruiting. Each of them carried a printed copy of the quarterly plan on which he was listed by name and by number, the bottom line on the blank reading, "Please Pass the Bearer _____ No. ____ to his Preaching Appointment." The first plan included fifty workers, who were assigned to twenty-four locations and mining compounds. By April there were ninety men going out on a rotating schedule to forty-one points. These were scattered along the narrow sixty-mile stretch of Witwatersrand, the gold mining area running thirty miles east and thirty miles west of Johannesburg, and also in the Witbank coal mining area about ninety miles from Johannesburg.

The compounds in which the laborers from Mozambique and from other outside areas lived were long, low dormitories, often arranged in quadrangles with service buildings in the inner courts. Sometimes the Christian miners occupied quarters by themselves, not only sleeping there, but also holding in them worship services and classes in reading and writing. Sometimes they lacked this advantage. Said Terril, who well knew what the compounds were like, "In other compounds they must share their rooms with heathen, who, when our native Christians are having their services and conducting their schools, indulge in a beer drink, or a small native dance, accompanied by the beating of their native drums." Terril deplored the possibilities of moral contagion in this proximity as well as in the contacts of the Methodist men with followers of certain other missions, which permitted smoking, drinking, "and other unchristian practices." But he encouraged the Methodist men to believe that all this gave them a good opportunity to witness to the others what "real practical Christianity" did for them.

At the Conference session in Chicupe, Mozambique, in November, Bishop Johnson announced for the direct supervision of the compound work the appointment of three Africans—Philip M. Hlabangwane, James M. Langa, Abraham M. Kome—who would head the East Rand, West Rand, and Witbank Circuits, respectively. Under their direction were 121 lay evangelists, who were reaching the Mozambique natives at more than four dozen stations. The recognized Methodist church constituency in the Transvaal at this time included 349 full members and 590 probationers. The members themselves were supporting the entire work, including the three paid Circuit leaders, by a system of monthly contributions.

When the Methodist Episcopal workers entered the Transvaal, other churches and missions already were at work and generally welcomed their

coming. Terril and his colleagues enjoyed co-operative relations with these groups, especially with the Wesleyans and the Free Methodists from Britain and with the Swiss Mission. From the beginning and for years afterwards, tension existed between the Methodists and some of the representatives of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, who felt that the Methodists were violating comity and were launching competitive missions in the Johannesburg area in place of earlier arrangements by which the American Board workers were to care for Methodist men from Mozambique. The Methodist position was that they fully desired to work in harmony, but that they were driven by current conditions to open missions there in order to make sure that the Methodists away from home had pastoral oversight and to protect the future of the Mission in Mozambique. Terril found the compound managers generally cordial and helpful in getting the new evangelistic activity under way.

Reporting on the first year's work, William Terril expressed concern that the 35,000 Inhambane natives going to the Transvaal each year (Mozambique as a whole was sending more than a hundred thousand) were absorbing there too many results of influences "detrimental to the best interest of the native people." He warned his colleagues that the South African and the Mozambique native never again would be the same as in the prewar period, and he urged them to prepare without delay to meet, before the point of social crisis, the problems bound to come. More optimistically, he reassured them that there was stirring among the Africans in the Transvaal a spirit that could mean the salvation of Africa. He declared that the pendulum of feeling among the best of the native leaders was swinging in favor of seeking closer union with the white race. This undoubtedly was his way of voicing his personal observation that Ethiopianism, which had both religious and political implications, was now a lessening influence. To check the inroads of Ethiopianism upon Methodist missions was, of course, one of the Mission's basic objectives.

Early in 1922 occurred an upheaval that for a time potentially jeopardized the entire position of the Mozambique laborers in the Transvaal. The government's postwar policy to organize the mining industry more economically by employing Africans for semiskilled work threatened to change the structure of the industry, which had been rigged in favor of white labor. White workers on the Rand (a great majority were of Dutch extraction) reacted strongly, mounting a three-month strike that erupted into violence, first against Gen. Jan C. Smuts's South African Party government, then against Africans. After only two weeks of the strike, Pliny W. Keys reported to Secretary Thomas S. Donohugh of the New York office that it was seriously affecting the Methodists' Johannesburg work. "More than 25,000 natives have been returned to their homes," he said, "and they are continuing to go as fast as the trains can handle them. . . ." The government finally suppressed the strike by

police action, but not before 230 lives were lost. The Mozambique contract laborers continued to work in the mines.

Although Smuts won this battle with white labor, he was beaten at the polls in 1924, and the government came into the hands of Gen. James B. M. Hertzog's more radically racist Nationalist Party in coalition with the Labor Party. Terril and his interdenominational associates found unsettling Hertzog's dedication to fuller segregation of Africans and, in particular, his Urban Areas Act. Tightened pass regulations caused much unrest among the Africans and raised obstacles inhibiting free movement of the Methodist mission's scores of visiting evangelists, who of course were covered by the restrictions. The missionaries hoped for modification of the new rules, and early in 1925 Terril spent much of his time in committee work in an endeavor to ameliorate that and other conditions falling heavily on the Africans. Indeed, he even came under the spell of Hertzog for the moment. After a brief audience with him as a member of a missionary delegation, Terril said, "I have not met a more refined, cultured, sympathetic and Christian government official in my life . . ." Hertzog's manner made Terril and most of his fellow petitioners feel that "along the lines of segregation nothing will be hastily done which will be detrimental to the best interests of the native."

But a few months later, Terril realized that in Hertzog and his government the missionary churches and their people faced a far grimmer reality. He wrote to the Board's treasurer that the problems then more fully emerging in South Africa were causing all right-thinking people grave concern. He said:

It has the appearance that almost every piece of legislation recently passed and those that are suggested have in view the suppression of the native. I fear for the future if such a spirit continues. Our natives cannot stand it for much longer. General Hertzog . . . has publicly stated that Church leaders have no right to interfere with any legislation passed or suggested by the present government. He severely criticized all who opposed the recent Color Bar Bill and was thankful that the Dutch Churches kept still on the subject. All the others protested and were consigned by him to utter oblivion.

When the Hertzog regime came in, the question of continued use of imported labor from Mozambique was reactivated. This, of course, involved the future of the Methodist mission in the Transvaal, for if the influx of contract workers should stop, the Mission would dry up for want of a constituency. Terril eventually sensed that uncertainty about the future of the Mozambique labor force may have made the Board hesitate to augment its support for the mission in the Union of South Africa, especially as to its cherished plan for a central mission building. The situation finally was cleared in 1928, when the governments of the Union and of Mozambique signed an agreement that enough men could be recruited in Mozambique to keep the group working in South Africa at the level of 80,000. This meant a gradual reduction from the 112,000 men on the Transvaal mining fields at that time.

Terril and his co-workers concluded, however, that the required resources of the Methodist mission would not be lessened by this change.

The most serious disruption of the work during these years was generated inside the Mission itself, not by the racially restrictive Hertzog government's regulation of the Africans' activity. If Terril thought in 1921 that the missionaries' troubles with Ethiopianism were over, he learned better three years later. A number of Methodist Shangaan tribesmen from Mozambique's Gaza district* had come into the Methodist fellowship in the Central Circuit of the Transvaal mission bringing with them independent impulses stimulated by previous contacts with Ethiopianism and stirring similar feelings in some of the other Mozambique Methodists in the compounds. In 1924, they began to make demands: (1) more pay for their pastor-teachers back home; (2) permission for these pastor-teachers, if not paid enough for their support, to visit the Transvaal as often as they desired (presumably to better themselves financially); (3) immediate ordination of a Shangaan minister; and (4) appointment of a Shangaan evangelist to have charge of the Shangaan group in the compounds.

When their demands were rejected, the Shangaans went "on strike." At Conference in July, 1925, Terril, who still was superintendent for both Mozambique and the Transvaal, reported that he had been trying for eighteen months to conciliate the differences between the Shangaans and the administration. A year later, he reported that Methodist work had been reopened in the compounds struck by the Shangaans and in 1927 he reported, "The Red Bolshevistic spirit of the Central District is well in hand."

The difficulties and the uncertainties of the period failed to keep the Mission from growing. More evangelists were enlisted, more compounds were penetrated, more listeners were attracted, more members were won. The Central Circuit, with seventeen compounds, which included the vicinity of Johannesburg, was added in 1921. The Mission's first African minister, Philip Hlabangwane, was ordained Deacon in 1924 and assigned to the new Circuit. At the same time, the leadership was further reinforced when Josef A. Persson moved the Mission Press of the Southeast Africa Mission Conference from Inhambane to Johannesburg. By this time, the general work—it still was self-supporting—involved nearly three hundred evangelistic workers visiting seventy-six compounds. Small chapels were being erected in the coal mining areas. The work reached farther and farther from Johannesburg; by 1927, Methodist preachers were visiting Klerksdorp, a hundred miles west southwest of the city, and various locations in the Orange Free State, south of the Transvaal area. That same year, the Transvaal District Conference voted to contribute fifty pounds toward the support of a new Methodist project in Lourenço Marques, Mozambique, which lay due east of Johannesburg. Because

* See pp. 561-569.

its financing was based on miners' wages, the Transvaal District was more prosperous than the Circuits at home, and the Conference began adopting measures designed to siphon off monthly for the home work the proceeds of stated levies on contributions made in the Transvaal compounds. By 1928, the year in which the agreement with Mozambique stabilized the size of the foreign labor force, the Transvaal District had among its followers in South Africa eleven hundred church members and a thousand probationers—a group half the size of the much older home constituency in Mozambique itself.

William Terril, who during these years gave the Mission its permanent character, continued as superintendent of the Transvaal District and in residence in Johannesburg until the end of 1931. He then was succeeded by Josef Persson, who supervised only the Transvaal District and not the work in Mozambique that Terril had for so long combined with his responsibilities in the Union of South Africa.

Under Persson, the Mission remained not an evangelistic arm of the Church outstretched to the people of South Africa, but as always, an organization of one or two white missionaries from abroad, four African Circuit leaders, and from two to three hundred lightly trained African lay evangelists preaching, teaching, and ministering among the thousands of Mozambique laborers moving into and out of the Transvaal in a constant stream. From the beginning, the work had been organized into a District Conference, but Persson developed Circuit Conferences, through which he involved lay stewards and trustees in direct responsibility for local support.

When Persson assumed direction of the Transvaal work, the mining industries were in severe depression, and the number of jobs open to Mozambique's contract workers had been sharply reduced. They had dropped in two years from 110,000 to below the 80,000 called for by the government agreement of 1928, until they numbered a little over 50,000, thus making room in the mines for natives of the Union of South Africa. By 1933, the Mozambique work force had dropped to 40,000. Persson felt that this situation was good for the stability of family life in Mozambique, since it forced more men to stay at home and find ways of making a living in their own country. But of course, it made the Transvaal mission's self-support program more difficult, substantially reduced the amount of money sent home for church work in Mozambique, and cut the size of the Methodist following in the mining compounds. In 1934, the church membership there was down to five hundred. But economic conditions then began to improve, resulting in a boom in the mining areas. More alien workers again were needed. Recruiting in Mozambique increased, the Mission's work revived, and the members in the Transvaal compounds in 1939 were nearly as numerous as they ever had been.

At the end of the thirties, Josef Persson realized that the evangelists speak-

ing for the Mission were going to face increasingly critical tests of their credibility:

The time is passing when any earnest evangelist can be assured of a hearing. In order to gain their attention [the Africans'] we must adjust our message to the needs of the present day. Even among the young men who come to the mines for the first time we do not meet the unquestioning faith in the white man and his works that was so common in earlier years. The Bantu are beginning to expect consistency of confession and practice both among white and black.

Southern Rhodesia

Dr. Samuel Gurney, pioneer and builder of the Mrewa District, in the northern stretch of the Southern Rhodesia territory cultivated by the Methodists, died in 1924. But just before he died, he became part of the plan for still another north-country thrust by the Mission's workers. And not many years after his death, this new projection of Methodism became the core of a new District.

The point of departure in the new venture was a 4,000-acre farm the government granted the Mission at Nyadiri, which lay between the Mrewa and Mtoko native reserves. It was not far from, though not closely surrounded by, a population of more than fifty thousand non-Christians potentially approachable by the Methodists without fear of competing with other Missions. The grant was confirmed in 1922, and Thomas A. O'Farrell, superintendent of the Mrewa District, began brick-making there. At Conference time, 1923, he had a supply of 189,000 new-made bricks on the site. Doctor Gurney and Lawrence E. Tull were appointed at that session to "Nyadiri Center." But before they could operate it, they had to build it. By January, they had transformed the stock of bricks into a set of buildings. Tull then was transferred to Mrewa, leaving Gurney to carry on. Shortly afterwards, three W.F.M.S. missionaries (Frances Quinton, Bertha E. Ramsey, and Grace Clark) went out to the lonely, otherwise unpopulated station to live—again, not to carry forward a mission, but to create it. They set themselves to clearing the grounds and erecting poles-and-mud buildings for prospective boarding school girls. By summer, they had started a girls' school, in spite of being limited by the fact that at that time no Africans lived on the farm and very few near by on the native reserve. Frances Quinton reported, "The first school room was the shade of one of the grass huts in which the workmen had lived. The pupils were three girls from Mrewa School, two tiny children, and their mothers. The equipment was two slates, two primers, and a Bible."

When Doctor Gurney died that summer, his African assistant Job Tsiga carried on at Nyadiri, handling such sick cases as came to him. The three W.F.M.S. workers went forward with their development of the mission's

general work—making evangelistic trips to the kraals, visiting village churches, entertaining African preachers' wives, and working up a following for their girls' boarding school, for which they kept building huts as the group expanded. In June, 1925, they were able to report sixty-five pupils.

The next year and a half was a time of substantial advance at Nyadiri. The continuing program for construction of permanent buildings already was well along, and other structures were put up during these months as new mission activities developed. Rush F. Wagner, an agricultural missionary, took charge of the center as a whole, and Dr. Stanley R. P. Montgomery of Toronto, undertook direction of the medical work.

Doctor Montgomery began treating patients in the hospital built at the end of Doctor Gurney's interrupted ministry and also received many hundreds of outpatients in the dispensary, thirteen auxiliary buildings being erected to house the people coming in for help. Toward the end of 1926, Ona M. Parmenter, a W.F.M.S. nurse, came to Nyadiri to assist the Doctor. His activities were by no means restricted to Nyadiri, for he was appointed government medical officer for the Mrewa and Mtoko districts, a traveling function that brought the Nyadiri medical work to the attention of many Africans who otherwise might have become aware of it only very slowly. Montgomery opened in co-operation with the government a clinic for venereal diseases and one for the treatment of leprosy. His outside work demonstrated the character of the Nyadiri project as not simply a station, but a center with a radiating influence.

That was true also of the appointment given Grace Clark. Returning to Nyadiri after some months spent at Matambara, she took up evangelistic visitation of the outstations on four Circuits—Uzumba, North Mrewa, South Mrewa, and Mtoko—visiting churches, Sunday schools, and the people in the kraals. Nyadiri was her base, but she traveled widely by donkey and by Ford car.

At the Center itself, Rush Wagner established a boys' boarding school with forty enrollees, supervised the establishment of a "model Christian village" on the farm, conducted church work involving five services a week, cultivated the interest of several families of young Muskwe people two or three miles away on the reserve, carried on extensive agricultural work involving the boys and girls of the boarding schools, and supervised an eleven-station Circuit.

At the Conference session in June, 1927, Nyadiri Center became the functional and formal head of a new Nyadiri District, with Thomas O'Farrell as superintendent and as director of the Center. The District included the Center itself, Nyadiri Circuit (eleven charges), and Uzumba Circuit (fourteen charges). Doctor Montgomery was no longer at Nyadiri, and Nurse Parmenter and Job Tsiga carried on extensive medical work at the hospital and

dispensary. As time went on, the Center became the focus of many stimulating and supporting activities that strengthened the work on the Circuits.

The Nyadiri venture, started from scratch on a new site with no immediate African neighbors, was indeed the Mission's strongest single advance during this period. But it soon found its place in a broader expansion of the northern activity of the Mission. All that happened in the north country in that respect was essentially the outgrowth of the Mrewa District as it existed in 1921. It then had two Circuits—Mrewa, with twenty-seven charges, and Mtoko with four. In 1939, the geographically related Mrewa, Mtoko, and Nyadiri Districts had a total of eighty-eight charges (Nyadiri's were twenty-seven). The 1921 church membership of the original Mrewa District numbered 148 (Mrewa, 141; Mtoko, 7). In 1939, the growth in the northern territory first penetrated by Doctor Gurney's pioneering produced a total of about 1,900 members, representing an increase equivalent to two-thirds of the Conference membership for 1921.

At one point, the extension of the Mrewa District was conservative rather than expansive. Many workers in the areas evangelized by the Methodist mission were attracted to Salisbury, the country's capital, because of opportunities for employment. Beginning in the nineteen-twenties, the Mission maintained an African preacher there in order to follow up Methodist workers who might otherwise drift away from the church while in the city. The Wesleyan Methodists tendered the use of their church building for Methodist Episcopal group meetings, and the preacher shared in the preaching program for the Wesleyan services. Special observances were held together, and the American District Superintendent was welcomed to the Wesleyan pulpit on his quarterly visitations.

Although the same three Districts—Umtali, Old Umtali, and Matambara—covered throughout the twenties and thirties the Methodist work nearer the Umtalis, not thrusting far into new areas, nevertheless these Districts expanded internally. The number of Circuits increased from fifty in 1921 to seventy-five in 1939. And accessions of members raised the total for these sections from twenty-three hundred to forty-five hundred.

Benefiting from growth in various aspects of its life, the Rhodesia mission, which changed its status from Mission Conference to Annual Conference in 1931, became by 1939 a church of more than six thousand members, with four thousand probationers, and thirteen thousand Sunday school pupils. The Mission was operating four boarding schools, which cared for a thousand pupils, and 122 elementary schools, which had a total of eight thousand children enrolled.

The number of Board missionaries on the field dropped during the two decades from twenty-one to fifteen. But the total number of missionaries remained the same, for the W.F.M.S. group was doubled, giving twelve Society appointees in 1939. The composition of the African leadership, which

in 1921 included no men with Conference membership, now included twenty-six full members, outnumbering the missionary members several times over. The largest growth was in the number of unordained Local Preachers; in 1921 there was only one, but in 1939 there was a corps of 390. There were also fifty-six Exhorters and ninety-four other African mission workers, both men and women.

Europe Between Two Wars

The Continent

Reflecting in part the divisive influences of the World War, episcopal supervision of the European mission field was reorganized in 1920. Since 1904, all the Conferences and Missions on the Continent together had constituted the Zurich Area, which had been administered by a single Bishop resident in Zurich. From 1912 to 1920, the Bishop had been John L. Nuelsen. But in 1920, the General Conference assigned two more Bishops to Europe and divided the Zurich Area into three.

Bishop Nuelsen remained at the head of the Zurich Area, but his jurisdiction was reduced to include only the Switzerland, South Germany, and North Germany Conferences and the Austria, Hungary, and Russia Missions. Bishop Edgar Blake, newly elected to the episcopacy, came to Europe to administer the Paris Area, which included the France, North Africa, and Bulgaria Mission Conferences, the Yugoslavia and Spain Missions, and the Italy Conference. Bishop Anton Bast, also just elected to the episcopal office from the ministry of the Denmark Conference, was assigned to the Copenhagen Area, with responsibility for the Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland Conferences.

This three-Area plan, with some rearrangement of the constituent units, remained in effect until 1932. Bishop Raymond J. Wade replaced Bishop Bast in 1928 as administrator of the northern group, which was renamed the Stockholm Area. Bishop Bast had been tried by a Committee of Seventeen headed by Bishop Francis J. McConnell on charges of imprudent and unministerial conduct, in a complicated case arising from his ecclesiastical conduct in Denmark. The General Conference, the charges having been sustained, permanently suspended him from the exercise of the functions of the office of a Bishop and ordered him enrolled as a ministerial member of the Denmark Conference.* In the same year, Bishop William O. Shepard succeeded Bishop Blake in charge of the Paris Area, serving until his death in November, 1931. The General Conference of 1932 reduced the European

* Lack of further time and of certain sources forbids exploration of this case.

Areas to two, Bishops Wade and Nuelsen remaining at the head of the Stockholm and Zurich Areas, respectively.

Up to this time, the Conferences and Missions were related to one another not only through episcopal areas, but also through membership in Central Conferences. In 1920, they all belonged to the European Central Conference, which met in Frankfort on the Main in September, 1922. This was the first official all-Europe gathering since the 1911 session of the Conference, and it was the last until 1939. In 1924, the General Conference provided for three Central Conferences in Europe: the Central European, the Mediterranean, and the North European. These three Central Conferences geographically coincided with the three episcopal areas. In 1932 came another realignment, which resulted in a pattern of two Central Conferences. The Central European Central Conference included the German Annual Conferences, the Austrian and the Hungarian Mission Conferences, and the Switzerland Conference. The Northern European Central Conference included the Scandinavian countries, Finland, the Baltic states, and Russia. The Mediterranean Central Conference was eliminated. The General Conference of 1936 continued the two remaining Central Conferences, but later in the year, in pursuance of enabling legislation, the Germany Central Conference, which included only the five Germany conferences, was organized, replacing the Central European Central Conference. Thus, several national mission units were at this time without any Central Conference connection.

Since the Germany Central Conference at once elected F. H. Otto Melle as its Bishop, resident in Berlin, there now were three episcopal areas, and the three incumbent Bishops—Melle, Nuelsen, and Wade—continued in charge until after the Uniting Conference of 1939. The Germany and the Northern Europe Central Conferences were carried over into the merged denomination, The Methodist Church, and the Methodist Episcopal Conferences that then had no Central Conference relationship were taken up into the new Central and Southern Europe Provisional Central Conference along with European Conferences of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South. No new all-Europe organization was created at the time of Unification, but a delegated "Uniting Conference" including all the European mission fields in Europe met in Copenhagen in August, 1939, to facilitate the inauguration of the new denomination and to celebrate for European Methodism a unity that was rudely shattered three weeks later by the eruption of World War II.

Germany

The postwar Germany mission was organized as before the War, in two Annual Conferences—the North Germany and the South Germany Conferences. In 1920, their combined constituency included more than twenty-three thousand church members. In 1928, the General Conference ordered reorgani-

zation of German Methodism into five Conferences—the Central, Northeast, Northwest, South, and Southeast Germany Conferences. At that point, the combined constituency included thirty-two thousand members. In 1936, the five Conferences were set apart in a Central Conference of their own (the Central Conference of Germany) under a Bishop elected by themselves. By 1939, the Central Conference churches had thirty-six thousand church members and eighty-nine hundred probationers.

When in 1914 the War broke up normal patterns of church life, the churches in Germany had been approaching independence of Board appropriations from the United States. In the latter nineteen-twenties, they were sufficiently recovered from wartime disruption and postwar economic chaos to approach self-support once again. They even were sending contributions to other fields, especially southeastern Europe. In 1927, the Board adopted a self-support program that called for termination of appropriations for North Germany in 1928, for South Germany after five years, for Northwest Germany after eight years, and for Southwest and Northeast Germany after ten years. This plan was adopted at a time when appropriations for Germany totaled \$30,000. Beginning with a cut of \$4,000 for 1929, the Board gradually decreased the allotments to the level of \$9,800 for 1933, when the South Germany Conference became self-supporting. They then dropped sharply to \$3,200 for 1936, when the Northwest Germany Conference went off the appropriations list. The last funds to be sent to Germany under regular appropriations were \$806 for the Northwest Germany Conference and \$910 for the Southwest Germany Conference in 1937. The cuts in some instances were determined in part not simply by the original plan for self-support, but by depletion of the Board's income.

With no American missionaries on the field (there had been none for many decades), with their own Central Conference, and with no regular financial dependence upon the American church, the Methodists in Germany now enjoyed a high degree of independence within the ecclesiastical system of the Methodist Episcopal Church. All that bound them to the mother denomination was the transmission of occasional special gifts, their Conference ties to the Methodist connection under the Discipline, and the lingering strength of certain phases of the Wesleyan tradition. In the language of the German tradition, they belonged among the free Churches, as distinguished from the established, state-endowed churches. Thus they were, practically speaking, a self-directed church.

But the freedom of the Methodist Episcopal Church in Germany came into dire jeopardy in 1933, when Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party took over the government of Germany, subjecting all traditions, all institutions, all organizations, all persons, to their arbitrary exercise of power.

On 30 January, Hitler became Chancellor of the Reich. On 27 February came the burning of the Reichstag, followed by President von Hindenburg's

suspension of the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press and other liberties. On 30 March, Bishop John L. Nuelsen and F. H. Otto Melle joined the District Superintendents in sending a radiogram to the Board in New York:

. . . PROTEST ENERGETICALLY AGAINST PUBLIC DEMONSTRATIONS AND REPORTS IN PRESS AMERICA AND ENGLAND CONCERNING ALLEGED ATROCITIES COMMITTED AGAINST JEWS BY NATIONAL MOVEMENT GERMANY . . . CONSIDER THIS PRESS CAMPAIGN AN EFFORT TO REVIVE ABOMINABLE ATROCITY PROPAGANDA OF WORLD WAR. . . WITH THE EXCEPTION OF A FEW INCIDENTS WHICH WERE IMMEDIATELY CHECKED BY NEW GOVERNMENT PEACE AND ORDER WERE NEVER DISTURBED.

This was the last communication in any way defending the Nazi regime that came from Bishop Nuelsen.* Less than two weeks later, he wrote Secretary John R. Edwards about the disturbed political conditions in Germany, telling him that tremendous pressure was being brought to bear upon everybody to conform absolutely to the national program, which of course now was the program of the Nazi Party. The demand to conform, said the Bishop, covered not only politics, but every phase of life—church activity, youth organizations, the religious press, schools, everything. “The programme of the ruling party is the supreme, the only law.” He considered the advent to power of the Hitler regime an intensification of the narrow, bigoted, anti-Christian nationalism rampant in Europe. Infecting the churches, this nationalism created a conflict between the gospel of the universal kingdom of God and of brotherly love with “modern paganism in the garb of the Gospel of Christ.” Nuelsen pleaded for the international Methodist Episcopal Church not to surrender its witness by withdrawing from Europe.

In August, Nuelsen wrote to the Board of Bishops in the United States to inform them of conditions in Germany, labeling his letter confidential because any public reference to its content or even its existence would cause great harm and might jeopardize the very existence of the Methodist Church in Germany. Nuelsen’s letter left no doubt as to his personal rejection of the Nazi regime. He clearly saw its character and bluntly stated it:

. . . Germany today is not a free country. It is under a ruthless and unscrupulous dictatorship. Any statements which criticize the Government or even imply criticism are considered as “counter-revolutionary” and are liable to the most rigorous measures of suppression and retaliation. The Government is in absolute control of the situation. It is not bound by any former legislation or by any parliamentary restrictions.

* Nuelsen later deliberately refrained from disavowing the intent of the message. Investigation convinced him that the particular protested reports actually were untrue.

With all the non-Nazi political parties and the labor unions dissolved and all other actually or potentially unco-operative organizations broken up, Nuelsen wrote, "It would require merely a stroke of the pen of Hitler and the Methodist Episcopal Church would be wiped out of existence." He himself felt the need to exercise extreme caution lest his personal statements be seized upon as an excuse for dissolving the Methodist Church or incorporating it into the newly formed *Reichskirche*. He feared at that point that suppression might occur anyhow, but he desired that the government take the entire responsibility for it, leaving it no pretext that antigovernment attitudes by the denomination's Bishop made it necessary.

Nuelsen not only conducted himself discreetly for the sake of the church in Germany, but also spent much time in Germany during the early months of the revolution, holding numerous conferences with state church leaders and with leading "political men" in an attempt to interpret the position of the Methodist Church and to protect it, if possible, from captious action. He also interceded frankly and earnestly with several influential Cabinet ministers—no doubt at some risk to his success on other points—on behalf of the Jews. He evidently took satisfaction from being told that his representations had some influence in limiting to one day the boycott against Jews conducted in Berlin in April. As for the immediate results for his own church, he was able to conduct his five Germany Conferences without official interference. He had been assured at the Foreign Office that the international connections of himself and the church were well and favorably known there.

Both Nuelsen and the majority of the Methodist churchmen strongly desired to preserve those connections. He was not at all sure at first whether a break could be avoided; there were among the Methodist ministers a few pronounced Nazis. Their leader was K. Albert Wenzel, a District Superintendent in the Central Germany Conference and delegate to the General Conference of 1932. Mrs. Wenzel was prominent among Nazi women as a National speaker and organizer. A few weeks before the Annual Conference, Wenzel's Nazi group distributed a circular insisting upon immediate independence of the Germany Methodist Church from the international connection. Nuelsen sent out a letter suggesting delay until the question could be handled in a session of the Central European Central Conference. When the Central Germany Annual Conference met in May, the Nazi sympathizers introduced an apparently innocent motion to divide the Conference into ten districts (there were two regular Districts), abolishing the office of District Superintendent and assigning to a number of pastors the supervision of three or four churches apiece. This was really a plan to put Nazi pastors in charge of the churches. It was defeated because, with a small majority of preachers voting for it, the laymen voted overwhelming against it.

With Wenzel's term as District Superintendent due to expire by Disciplinary limitation at the close of the Conference session, Nazi members

urged Nuelsen to continue him, and that action was pressed upon him by a visiting uniformed delegation of "brown shirts." The Bishop declined to accede to their demands. After Conference, Wenzel and his friends started a German Methodist Movement with the purpose of penetrating Methodism with the spirit of National Socialism. They threatened several times to ask the government to appoint a commissar for the Methodist Episcopal Church. Wrote Nuelsen:

I told the Brethren that by so doing they would render a disservice not only to the church, but to the nation, because as soon as the Government Commissar should be appointed, I would raise a storm in the American and English Press and go on a lecture trip to America to talk against such political interference.

Nuelsen evidently believed that the Nazi regime was at this time somewhat amenable to the impact of certain segments of world opinion.

In Nuelsen's eyes, what was happening to the churches under Hitler and the purposes of the regime foreboded evil, perhaps extinction, for German Methodism. The state churches already had been combined into a national church (*Reichskirche*) and subjected to direct control by a Nazi bishop chosen by the government. It seemed likely that Methodism would be taken up into this controlled church. Already it was clear that the government claimed control of the boys and girls brought up in the Church. Every boy had to become a member of Hitler Youth. The Epworth Leagues and Sunday schools were compelled to join an all-inclusive Christian body called the Evangelical Youth Movement, which was under the supervision of the government's Leader of Young People's Work, a man openly favoring the Hitler Youth. He had decreed that membership in both Hitler Youth and a church organization would not be permitted. Even if the church youth groups should continue, said Nuelsen, they would have to receive State Instructors who gave addresses and instructions in the principles of National Socialism and of military preparedness. The Hitler Youth organization enjoyed many advantages in what was an unequal competition between itself and the as yet still existing church youth groups. The potentialities were so discouraging that Nuelsen felt that it would make little difference eventually whether Methodism was absorbed into the *Reichskirche* or left to continue as a distinct organization. "Twenty years from now, its young people will have been weaned away and trained as 100% Nazis." Some of the best men among the Methodists, said Nuelsen, saw this danger and felt it deeply.

Nuelsen also saw that the first step toward nationalization of the Church's institutions had been taken. Methodism's important and highly developed ministry of deaconess work and children's homes already were under government control. Said Nuelsen:

The Government now prescribes the rules for admission, for training etc. Our Deaconesses must henceforth salute each other by raising their right arm. The Hitler greeting is now the official greeting.

After his last Conference session early in July, 1933, Nuelsen stayed out of Germany as much as was compatible with performance of his duty to the German churches. "I know perfectly well what is expected of me [there] in my public utterances. It is quite impossible to preach the Gospel of Jesus Christ without extolling the religious significance of the glorious revolution led by Adolf Hitler." In every one of his public meetings to date, uniformed Nazis had been present, adhering to the scriptural pattern, "He who is not for me is against me." Nuelsen was willing to go to the limits of conscience, but not beyond. "I am unwilling to talk against internationalization and preach a purely national and racial Gospel." Nuelsen, because of what he had seen in Europe during and after World War I, had become a confirmed pacifist. He could not preach against "unchristian pacifism" as he heard Methodist preachers doing. Internationalism and pacifism, he well knew, were considered hostile to the new Germany. He did not question the sincerity of his German brethren. "But it seems to me," he said, "that they are the victims of a terrific irresistible mass obsession." As for himself, he was determined that he could maintain no future relationship to the Methodist Church in Germany—for instance, working in co-operation with the national bishop of the German state church as Bishop of a thoroughly "co-ordinated" German Methodist Church—that would put him in the position of "appearing to be in harmony with the principles of the new German State Church and the present German Government while I find myself in fundamental disagreement."

Nuelsen nevertheless did his best to help the Methodist leaders arrange some kind of *modus vivendi* with the Hitler state, fearing that the Methodist Church was in danger of being swept entirely away. Under Hitler, the prerogatives of the States gave way to the central administration in Berlin, for Germany no longer functioned as a federalized republic, but as a strongly centralized nation. All the churches now depended upon the government of the Reich for whatever status they were to enjoy, only two being fully and formally recognized by 1933. One was the Roman Catholic Church, working under a Concordat between the Vatican and the new government. The other was the German Evangelical Church, a forced merger of all the former state churches under a government-appointed bishop. Through the operation of these devices, the two churches severally were completely under the control of the Hitler regime. When members of a small executive committee appointed by Bishop Nuelsen to maintain liaison with the Berlin government visited Hitler's plenipotentiary for church affairs, they were told that they must submit to the government a draft of a constitution for the Methodist Church as a German church. Up to this time, the Methodist Episcopal Church in Germany had operated under charters granted by nine States, but it now

was necessary for it to secure the central government's recognition—as had the other churches—or it would have no legal status at all and, particularly, to say the least, would lose its exemption from taxation.

Bishop Nuelsen therefore secured the formation of a representative commission to draft a constitution that would be in harmony with German law and the Methodist Discipline. When the first draft worked out in consultation with government officials appeared to entail separation from the international Methodist Episcopal connection, all five Conferences in 1934 voted against separation, and a new draft was submitted to the government. Unofficial government approval being granted, the Conferences promptly adopted the new instrument (“Official Statement of the Methodist Episcopal Church in Germany”) and then, because events were moving so rapidly in Germany, the commission safeguarded the position of the Church by gaining final government approval for it without waiting for authorization by the General Conference, which was not scheduled to convene until 1936.

The Official Statement declared, “The Methodist Episcopal Church in Germany . . . has for its purpose the religious and cultural renewal and advancement of the German people, together with the practice of the ethical requirements of the Christian religion.” The scope of the Church was expressed in the statement “Members of the Church are all members of the Methodist Episcopal Church within the borders of the German Reich.” The statement of principles included acceptance of the authority, for both faith and conduct, of the Holy Scriptures as the revealed Word of God, allegiance to the “Apostolic Creed” and the principles of the Reformation, and emphasis upon “the personal assurance of salvation of those who believe.” The basis of the Church's internal government was stated to be the “free church principle of self-government and self-administration.”

The Methodists in Germany were gratified that the Statement as approved recognized the Church as “a part of the Methodist Episcopal Church,” the international Methodist connection under the Discipline. Both the independence of the German group and the international connection were preserved thus: “The legislative and supreme administrative body of the Church is the Central Conference. . . . The Central Conference makes the necessary laws in accordance with the *Discipline* of the Methodist Episcopal Church.” The Central Conference had the power to elect a single supervising Bishop.

After themselves approving it, the German Conferences submitted the new constitution, the Official Statement, to the Central European Central Conference in September, 1935. That body petitioned the General Conference to sanction the Statement, to authorize organization of a German Central Conference, and to authorize the latter to elect a Bishop. The General Conference in 1936, acting on the assurance of its Judiciary Committee that “it finds nothing in this document which contravenes the Discipline,” approved the Official Statement, with its authorization of election of a Bishop.

Close comparison of the provisions of the Statement with those of the Discipline shows that the Judiciary Committee and the General Conference winked at the existence of several discrepancies. But the Central Conference device, originally created to provide a measure of regional autonomy in Church management, served in this case to cope with the ticklish task of maintaining an international connection for a regional church hard pressed by fierce nationalism. It also helped avert the danger of that church's being wiped out by the xenophobic nation. Practically speaking, the adoption of the new arrangements for Germany constituted no pure triumph for the professed international spirit of Methodism's oft-vaunted world-wide organization, but an accommodation of international ecclesiastical structure to exigencies evoked by radical nationalistic passions.

The Germany Central Conference met in September, 1936, and elected F. H. Otto Melle its Bishop. Two years earlier, there had been much sentiment in favor of the continuance of Bishop Nuelsen as the leader of German Methodism—a hope that proved not viable, and not least on his part. Undoubtedly, his quiet, conscientious statesmanship up to this point had saved the German church from destruction by the Nazi juggernaut and had conserved its relationship with the Methodist Episcopal connection outside Germany. But from this time on, and even earlier, German ministerial leadership of a kind well embodied in Otto Melle was equally, perhaps even more fully, responsible for the freedom of the Methodist churches from overt persecution and from possible extinction by Nazi power. Whereas Nuelsen helped preserve the Church by resorting to strategic organizational adjustment, Melle and the ministers like him preserved the Church by making profound ethical adjustments.

Bishop Melle and his likeminded colleagues accomplished their compromising protective ethical adjustments by ignoring all ethical problems that might be involved in practicing or supporting the Nazi philosophy of the national life. Their capacity to do this flowed from the kind of religion they were accustomed to express and promote. They confined themselves, customarily and also in the Nazi crisis, to prayer, Bible study, church worship, subjective religious testimony, the gospel preached as heart-religion, loyalty to Christ as individual Savior, and individual-centered good works such as those done through the personal ministries of the deaconess movement. By this exclusive concentration upon pietistic religion, they so restricted their definition of the function of the Christian church as to renounce all responsibility for prophetic moral judgment upon the state and the larger social structure.

In this way, by keeping hands off all subjects related to what they called "politics," these men managed to avoid all expression of opinions that could have put them in danger of Nazi reprisals. It was not simply that they refrained from criticizing totalitarianism as a form of government—they did so refrain—but rather that they refrained from passing judgment in the name

of Christian values upon any of the concrete acts or implementing methods of the totalitarian state as they witnessed its embodiment in Germany. They tacitly demonstrated that they regarded as irrelevant to Christianity the ethics of political coercion by brutal street gangs, deadly abuses by secret police, political killings, militarism, territorial aggression, arbitrary arrests, concentration camps, lying government propaganda, the corruption of education, or the persecution of ethnic minorities. It was not simply that they were afraid to speak out, but rather that they maintained a deliberate, religiously rationalized unconcern with such social phenomena. And it is obvious that they sympathized with the Nazi revolution itself sufficiently to lead them to accept such practices as justified by the ends of the Nazi program.

Far from being plagued by any sense of guilt over silence in the face of Nazi atrocities or over enjoying some immunity from government repression because of the innocuous religious stance of the Methodist Episcopal Church, Melle repeatedly revealed himself as satisfied and even optimistic about the condition of German Methodism under Hitler. In a report on "Methodism in Germany, 1937-1938," prepared by him and presented by the Corresponding Secretaries for purposes of information at the Board's session in New York in November, 1938, the Bishop said:

I am glad for being able to report that the work of the Methodist Episcopal Church in Germany is going on in a hopeful way. That we—like other Evangelical Free Churches—found a positive relation to the new state, that we kept neutral in the church-conflict, and that we confine our task like Paul in Corinth, to know nothing but Christ and to preach his gospel, won the confidence of the government, made us known in the public, and gave us new opportunities.

The new opportunities were of the character of permission for the Methodists to pursue their traveling tent evangelism and to hold important church gatherings in fine public halls.

Melle's optimism included being untroubled by such fear as Bishop Nuelsen had held about nationalist corruption of Methodist youth. In his 1937-38 report, Melle revealed that he and his colleagues were not distressed by Nazi control of their young people as long as the ministers still were free to teach them piety. He held that it was only a matter of organization. He explained what finally happened to the Epworth League in the Methodist Church:

As all youth-organizations had to unite with Hitler Youth, we resolved—in full agreement with the leaders of the Hitler Youth and of the government—to dissolve our special youth organization. The same did—unanimously—all the youth organizations of the Free Churches. *But there was not the least objection, that the churches take care of the religious education of their young people.*

Melle and his colleagues went happily on holding youth meetings devoted to Bible study, prayer, and religious testimony of the pictistic type, but apparently unconcerned about what the Nazi youth organizations were doing to the minds of Methodist young people. For instance, they never raised in the name of the supreme God any questions about the rightness of allowing the Nazis to teach their youth unchallenged the supremacy of the state presided over by Adolf Hitler; to this categorical contradiction they seemed insensitive. And they never raised any moral question about Nazi-sponsored inculcation of anti-Semitism.

The latter issue was raised, however, at the very meeting of the Board of Foreign Missions in 1938 that received Bishop Melle's report. Lewis O. Hartman, editor of *Zions Herald*, introduced the following resolution:

That the members of the Board of Foreign Missions of the Methodist Episcopal Church, profoundly shocked by the unspeakable persecution in Germany of the members of the race to which humanly speaking the Saviour of men belonged, in the name of outraged humanity do now most vigorously re-emphasize the historic Christian attitude of love and good will against all this wicked hatred and cruelty, and express their deep sympathy not only for the suffering Jews, but also for the millions of men of good will in Germany who in their hearts are likewise shocked by the outrages which they have been compelled to witness.

Bishop Nuelsen rose and said, "I second this motion with a heavy heart." The Board adopted the resolution and sent it to the President, the Secretary of State, the German Ambassador, and the church press. Melle would not have approved; he repeatedly expressed his wish that the Americans and others abroad would not issue statements critical of the Nazi regime.

By this time, informed Methodists were beginning to realize that the Methodist Church in Germany was in the hands of leaders who were sympathizers with Nazism and apologists for it. This had not been clear at first. Until 1936, Bishop Nuelsen, deeply anti-Nazi, had been the official head of the German church, and he had delivered his General Conference report on the condition of German Methodism and its organizational adjustments to the new regime objectively, with no overtones of approval of the Nazi regime and without exposing the element in the Church that was attempting to bring it into moral harmony with the Nazi program. Bishop Nuelsen had written in 1933 for the fall issue of *Religion in Life*, the Methodist intellectual quarterly published in New York, a substantial and searching critique of the Nazi philosophy, but he had not revealed the extent of its popularity within the Methodist denomination. In 1937, however, Bishop Melle, having succeeded Bishop Nuelsen, clearly revealed in full view of the ecumenical community where he and German Methodism stood on the Nazi question.

Melle went to England in July to attend the Oxford Conference on Church, Community, and State, which drew together delegates from all major Christian communions, except the Roman Catholic, in forty-five countries. A substantial delegation from Germany had been expected to attend, but the government declined to permit the delegates of the Confessional Synod to leave Germany for that purpose. The other delegates of the German Evangelical Church then supported the Confessional group by refusing to go to Oxford without them. This left the German churches represented at Oxford only by three Free Church delegates—Bishop Melle, Dr. Paul Schmidt of the Baptist Church, and one other. The undenominational journal *The Christian Century* (Chicago) editorially raised the question as to whether the two American-fostered churches were allowing the Nazis to use them to undercut the “heroic stand of other German Protestants” in their resistance to state control. “To use the terminology of industrial conflict, did the German Methodist and Baptist delegates,” queried the *Century*, “go to Oxford in order to scab on the other Protestants of their nation?”

In its formal message to the Christian churches, the Oxford Conference clearly defined and reaffirmed the ultimate subordination of the state to the judgment of God. The Message declared: “The Christian can acknowledge no ultimate authority but God; his loyalty to the State is part of his loyalty to God and must never usurp the place of that primary and only absolute loyalty.” It stated that the Church has laid upon it by God duties—proclaiming the Word of God, for instance—that it must perform at all costs, “whether or not the State consents.” The State must assure the Church full liberty to perform its God-given duty. And the Conference concluded its treatment of the question by declaring that the Church can claim such religious liberty for itself “only as it is also concerned for the rights and liberties of others.”

The Conference also sent a special message to “their Brethren in the Evangelical Church in Germany,” mourning their absence from Oxford and welcoming the fact that the Confessional and the non-Confessional churchmen had been able to agree upon a common delegation for the Evangelical Church. It came right to the crux of the current crisis in Germany:

We are greatly moved by the afflictions of many pastors and laymen who have stood firm from the first in the Confessional church for the sovereignty of Christ, and for the freedom of the church of Christ to preach his gospel.

We note the gravity of the struggle in which not your church alone, but the Roman Catholic Church as well, is engaged, against distortion and suppression of Christian witness, and for the training of the young in a living faith in Jesus Christ as son of God and King of Kings and Lord of lords.

This was a picture of church life in Germany that was offensive to Bishop Melle. He tried to correct it by defending the Nazi regime; on the platform of the Conference, he rose to testify to the gratitude of the Free Churches

for the full liberty they enjoyed in Germany. They were thankful, he said, that

God in His providence sent a leader who was able to banish the danger of Bolshevism in Germany and rescue a nation of sixty-seven million persons from the abyss of despair, to which it had been led through the World War, the Versailles treaty, and their tragic consequences, and give it new faith in its mission and its future.

Commenting on the incident, *Zions Herald* expressed astonishment and sadness at Melle's theologically couched rationalization of acceptance of national leadership that cruelly persecuted the Jews, that flagrantly denied freedom of press, speech, and religion, and that was imprisoning Roman Catholic priests and Protestant ministers. Lewis O. Hartman, the editor, hoped that Melle's words did not mean that German Methodism had surrendered its Christian convictions to the state. "We salute the brave Niemoelers!" he declared.

Melle himself was gratified to receive many expressions of support from Free Church sources in Germany and also to observe what he read as signs of government approval of his Oxford position. Melle regarded tensions between the German Evangelical Church and the government—there were many—as essentially invalid, for he regarded them as the consequences of a classic Church-State conflict that the state churches long had been satisfied to resolve by becoming state establishments supported by taxation. He sympathized ecclesiastically neither with the Confessional Synod nor with the German Christians, for he regarded them as simply competing factions within a state church structure that the German Methodists always had opposed and by which they felt themselves abused. Melle, who could perceive no spiritual grounds for any church to protest or resist the course of the Hitler state, hoped that increased public awareness of the Free Church position of complete separation between church and state would result in the government's abolishing the privileged position of the state church. He hoped that the result of the current church crisis would be to pull down the state church and bring the Free Church principle into favor with the state.

Bishop Nuelsen was very much embarrassed by Bishop Melle's Oxford speech and told him plainly what he thought of it. "However," wrote Nuelsen to Secretary Ralph E. Diffendorfer in the spring of 1933, "he as well as our German Methodists are living in [a] watertight compartment. He is convinced that he has rendered a great service to Methodism as well as to Germany. He is now drawing large crowds, because the Nazi papers advertise him as 'an upstanding German.'" Melle was glorying, said Nuelsen, in the fact that Hitler had donated 10,000 Reichsmarks to the Methodist church at the Polish frontier for the purchase of an organ. "I confess I wish Hitler had not done it. It is rather a disastrous gift." Commenting on the current situation in Germany, Nuelsen said:

It is true our Methodists have a certain liberty. But they confine themselves to a limited pietistic gospel of strictly personal piety and our official paper, *Der Evangelist*, prints all the stuff that the Propaganda ministry sends them. The situation really makes me heart sick. The Germany, which I knew and which I loved and for which I worked is no longer in existence.

Nuelsen sadly pointed out that the German Methodists had become isolated from the bulk of German Protestantism because of their adherence to the position advocated by Melle. The Lutheran bishops of Württemberg and Bavaria, for instance, had publicly advised their people to boycott Methodist meetings and even union meetings in which Methodists participated. The Bishops' being compelled by the government to retract their public statements did not improve the situation. Ever since coming to Europe, Nuelsen had worked for better understanding between the Methodists and the state churches. Now he felt that all his labor in that direction had been "knocked in the head."

Nuelsen, who always was concerned for European Methodism as a supranational fellowship, also reported that a sharp rift had opened between the Methodists in Germany and in Switzerland, where he still lived. In the Swiss Methodist journal appeared a statement of the District Superintendents', disagreeing with the sentiments Melle expressed at Oxford and also very plain declarations of support for Martin Niemoeller and of condemnation of German treatment of the Jews. The church paper in Germany, said Nuelsen, kept "absolute silence." Nuelsen himself, desiring not to create difficulties for Melle and the German Methodists, was guarded in his public statements. But the fact that he did not come out openly in favor of Melle was sufficient, so he said, to mark him in the eyes of the German government as at least "lacking in understanding," and to leave the German Methodists disenchanted with their former Bishop.

News of German Methodism's accommodation to the Nazi regime provoked no loud or voluminous protest in American Methodist missionary circles. The Board's Corresponding Secretaries evidently played it down. It was perhaps fortunate for their purpose that not much news of that character was available. But in the spring of 1938, Secretary Diffendorfer wrote Bishop Nuelsen, after a meeting of the Board's Executive Committee, that there was deep and widespread resentment against any statement that came in intending to show "the liberty and freedom" of the Methodist churches in Germany. He said, "The men openly said that the church that gets freedom in Germany today is not worthy of being a Church. Some are just as bald as that." Bishop Melle, though not appreciating public expressions of American Methodist opinion critical of Hitler's Germany and the German Methodist churches, still looked to the United States as a source of special gifts for the institutional work under his care. Commenting just a week later on Melle's plan to visit the States in order to raise funds, Diffendorfer wrote

to Nuelsen that he feared Melle would not receive a very good reception in his fund-raising; not only was it difficult to raise money for any cause because of the economic depression, but also there was "tremendous opposition to Germany among most people."

But Melle came a year later, in time to attend the Uniting Conference, a few months before the beginning of World War II. While he was in the States, he endeavored to interpret the current life of the German church for American Methodists. Speaking in a Methodist church in Mount Vernon, New York, in March, he painted a highly optimistic picture of the vitality of German Methodism and of its continuing progress and spoke of the favorable attitude of the government. He said:

Somebody will ask how is it that Methodists enjoy these privileges while we read of persecution of Christians [,] of church leaders [,] in the concentration camps, etc. . . . I am free to give you some reasons for the freedom we enjoy. What I say is meant also for the other Evangelical Free Churches. *We do not deal at all with political questions in the pulpit*, but—following the example of Jesus, of Paul and the Primitive Church—preach the gospel in a Biblical way. *And I state that so far nobody has tried to influence our preaching or our confession of faith*. What the authorities are concerned about is not the religious conviction but whether there is any opposition against the state.

Austria

"The Austria-Hungary Mission Conference was nearly as complex as the Hapsburg empire," said Bishop Nuelsen in his postwar report on European Methodism in December, 1918. It included constituencies among several ethnic and lingual groups and in regions that in the postwar settlement finally were assigned severally to Austria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Italy. As Bishop Nuelsen said, "The dissolution of the empire necessitates a re-arrangement of our work."

In the general settlement, Trieste went back to Italy. Therefore, Trieste's Methodist society was transferred to the Italy Conference, and with it Felice Dardi, its pastor. The churches in the Backa region of Hungary became the nucleus of a Yugoslavia mission established in the newly created Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. The work in Budapest became the kernel of a separate Hungary mission. And the churches in Austria, with Trieste lopped off, composed a separate Austria mission. To effect the transfer of the charges to their new jurisdictions, Bishop Nuelsen went to Vienna in September, 1919, and reorganized the Austria-Hungary Mission Conference for the time being into three Districts—German Austria (Hinrich A. Bargmann, Superintendent), Hungary (Martin Funk), and Yugoslavia (John Jacob). This plan continued until the General Conference of 1920 legislated permanent arrangements.

The first session of the Austria Mission Conference met in Vienna in July, 1920. Although its field was the Republic of Austria, its real constituency was confined to Vienna and Graz. This made it a very small mission, but the Conference met in an optimistic atmosphere. For one thing, the little church on Trautsohngasse, where it met, no longer carried the oldtime doorplate inscribed "For Invited Guests Only." Instead the church was marked by a large name sign bidding all comers welcome to the services. This signified the advent of religious liberty for the Methodists. The new Socialist-oriented government had issued a decree granting the same rights as the previously favored churches enjoyed. The Mission's workers observed an encouraging public response to the freer situation.

The small Mission Conference found itself laboring in a hard field. Launched into the difficult postwar years, its people had to make their way under extreme economic hardships, feeling the impact of political turbulence, faced with resurgent Catholicism after the early twenties, unable to develop adequate church properties, and plagued by deep and steady recession in missionary appropriations. Nevertheless, it increased its contacts in Vienna, reaching into eight sections of the capital and maintaining five churches, one of them for Czechs and two in working-class districts. In addition to Vienna, three other provinces came under cultivation by the Methodists. In Lower Austria, surrounding Vienna, they were at work in Saint Pölten, in Krems, and in Türrnitz, where many hundreds of children, youth, and older people annually enjoyed the varied residential, recreational, and retreat facilities of a well developed site acquired during the postwar relief phase of the Church's program. In Upper Austria, the Methodist workers entered the city of Linz am Donau. In the province of Steiermark, the church in Graz not only maintained its program in the city, but also began making contacts in other communities. Although financially handicapped, the Mission at various times started social service projects with more modest dimensions than the outstanding Türrnitz enterprise.

Eventually, the Austria Mission Conference became one of the nonpolitical casualties of the German invasion of Austria and the imposition of the Anschluss in 1938. Political reality now dictated a new ecclesiastical pattern. Ten days after the Austrian plebiscite that ratified the political union by a vote of 99.75 per cent, Bishop Nuelsen, acting in agreement with Bishop F. H. Otto Melle, transferred the five ministerial members of the Austria Mission Conference to the South Germany Conference. With them went the some six hundred lay members of the nine Methodist charges in Austria.* The Mission Conference thus automatically ceased to exist as anything but a formal designation in Paragraph 1373 of the *Discipline* of 1936. Functionally, Austrian Methodism now was a part of German Methodism, from which it had sprung more than two generations earlier.

* The statistics are for 1935; later figures were unavailable.

The pastors from Austria were welcomed in a celebration at the session of the South Germany Conference in Nuremberg in June. One of the speakers was Robert Möller, the pioneer of the Austria mission, now eighty years of age and a member of the South Germany Conference. Bishop Melle reported to the Board of Foreign Missions that it was an hour not easily to be forgotten by those privileged to share it. As for the Anschluss, he said, "It was nothing else than an expression of the self-determination of the people." Presumably, he was referring to the plebiscite vote under Nazi auspices and not to the views of the Austrian opponents of the Nazis who were ruthlessly repressed and consigned to concentration camps between the invasion and the plebiscite. Melle's own approval of the Anschluss was categorical. He wrote to Bishop Charles W. Flint after a brief visit to Austria in April:

In my own opinion Adolf Hitler did more for the peace of Europe than any other statesman in the time after the war, the whole League of Nations included. One of the most difficult danger-zones of Europe has been put aside, and a new chapter of European history begins. I hope that our beloved Methodist Church is big enough and great enough to see the opportunity that providence gives her, and I am convinced, that the people called Methodists in the so-called "totalitarian" Germany will do their duty and prove to be Christians in earnest just as their brethren in democratic countries.

Yugoslavia

When Yugoslavia, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, was born out of the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918, Methodism already was established within its borders. Into the composition of the new country went the Backa region of Hungary. By virtue of that political shift, the Methodist churches in the Backa, which for a generation had been an important segment of the Hungary mission became Yugoslavian churches and subject to the laws of the new government.

The General Conference of 1920 recognized the realities of the political situation by removing these churches from the jurisdiction of the Austria-Hungary Mission Conference, in which they briefly had constituted the Yugoslavian District, with John Jacob as District Superintendent. Their new organization was the Yugoslavia Mission Conference. As the General Conference put it, "Jugo-Slavic Mission Conference shall include the work in Jugo-Slavia." Bishop Edgar Blake of the Paris Area promptly appointed as general superintendent of the new Mission, Samuel W. Irwin, formerly the principal of East Greenwich (Rhode Island) Seminary until he entered Y.M.C.A. war work in Europe. Irwin and his wife arrived in Yugoslavia in the fall.

The work that came under Irwin's supervision had a constituency of about three hundred church members, with preachers residing in five places. During the year, preaching was undertaken at several points.

The Yugoslavia Mission Conference held its first annual session at Novi Sad in April, 1921, with Bishop Blake presiding. John Jacob was appointed District Superintendent over the five charges—Crvenka, Novi Sad, Stari Becej, Nova Urbas, Veliki Beckerek—that made up the only District. In addition to the churches, the Mission maintained in Novi Sad a school, a home for the aged, and a children's home, operated children's homes in three other places, and contributed financially to a hospital in Belgrade.

In December, 1921, the Yugoslavia mission received by transfer from the American Board (Congregational) twelve churches in Macedonia that previously had been supervised from the Board's Greek headquarters in Salonika. The transfer also included a school at Monastir (Bitolj). Thus at its session in May, 1922, the Mission Conference had nearly two dozen charges, organized in two Districts—the Northern District, covering the work in "Old Hungary, north of Belgrade; and the Southern District, for the Macedonia work received from the American Board." The District Superintendents were John Jacob and P. D. Temkovitch, respectively.

The Mission entered a new territory following its Conference session in May, 1923, making an evangelistic beginning in the northwestern city of Zagreb, capital of predominantly Roman Catholic Croatia, and later in Maribor, fifty-five miles away, close to the Austrian border. Thus was established, small as it was, the jurisdiction the Mission designated as its Western District. Unlike the Northern District, in whose churches German and Hungarian were spoken, the new District to the west used the Serb-Croat language.

The Yugoslavia Mission Conference became in 1924 a constituent of the Central European Central Conference and also was attached to the Zurich Area, which was supervised by Bishop John L. Nuelsen. In the same year, it lost its resident Superintendent, Samuel Irwin, who was transferred to Rome.

Although, as he surrendered jurisdiction over Yugoslavia in 1924, Bishop Blake reported that the work was growing, the Methodist field he turned over to Bishop Nuelsen was undergoing hardships. The Orthodox Church was dominant both in Serbia and in Macedonia; and in Serbia, which was the dominant politico-ethnic power in the country, loyalty to the Orthodox Church and Serbian patriotism were considered only the two sides of the one coin of Serbian nationalism. The Serbian-controlled government gave no formal recognition to the Methodist mission, which was suspect because its work seemed to the ruling group in the still divided country to be among people who were aliens—Germans and Hungarians in the Backa and former Bulgarians in Macedonia. This fact entailed many difficulties, even persecutory harassments, for local churches and their pastors. Late in 1924, the Yugoslav government enhanced the difficulty of the Mission's position by decreeing that only citizens of the country would be allowed to exercise public

functions as pastors; all alien clergymen already in service would be denied further exercise of pastoral privileges and even asked to leave the country. This struck home to the Methodist mission, for several of the pastors were Swiss or German nationals.

The Mission's position vis-à-vis the government became so precarious in 1925 that Bishop Nuelsen went to Belgrade, the national capital, in an attempt to secure relief for the Methodists. He evidently felt that the relationship had deteriorated significantly because of the departure of Samuel Irwin, who always had kept in close touch with the Belgrade authorities, pleasing the men in power because he had certain funds available that he was able to expend in relief work. Now nobody with funds or with the prestige of an American citizen was on the field. Bishop Nuelsen fully realized what kind of government the Mission was confronting. He wrote Corresponding Secretary John R. Edwards that it was ruthlessly reactionary and despotic. "The political methods of Mussolini in Italy or the Bolschewiks [*sic*] in Russia are fully equalled, if not surpassed by the terrorism exercised by the Belgrad [*sic*] government in those sections of the country which formerly belonged to Austria or Hungary or Bulgaria."

The Bishop, warning that the government intended to prohibit Methodist, Nazarene, and Adventist work, though tolerating the Mennonites and the Baptists, cabled the Board advising immediate appeal to the government in Washington. Edwards and Bishop William F. McDowell of the Washington Area carried the Methodists' Yugoslavian problem to the State Department. As a result of the good offices of "Mr. Dulles" of the State Department, Bishop Nuelsen was able to call on the Yugoslav Minister of Public Worship in the company of the American Minister and receive from the Belgrade official a promise to instruct the authorities in the Backa to display broader tolerance toward the work of the American missions there.

Nuelsen found the situation in Macedonia less amenable to amelioration—practically impossible, so he thought. The crux of the government's tougher policy there was its view that the unity of the Orthodox Church in Macedonia was categorically necessary for the consolidation of Yugoslavia. It would tolerate nothing that in any way might weaken that Church's absolute power. "It is not a religious question at all but a purely political question," Nuelsen wrote Edwards. "The Orthodox Church is in the eyes of the Government a political organization."

After talking with the Belgrade authorities, Nuelsen concluded that the Mission would have "much smoother sailing" in Yugoslavia if it would abandon the Macedonian wing of its work. He recommended to the Board that the Methodist Episcopal Church discontinue its responsibility for the Macedonian field, seeking to retransfer the churches to the American Board or encouraging them to affiliate with one of the officially recognized denominations. He cited as reasons the Board's financial limitations, which prevented

adequate supervision and development toward Methodist goals in Macedonia, and the need to overcome the government's suspicion of Methodism's association with disloyal political activities. In April, the Board accepted the Bishop's recommendations and authorized the closing of the work in Macedonia. In June, the Mission shut down the Bitolj school, which had been plagued with internal difficulties, and turned the property back to the American Board. Plans for the doffing of the rest of the Macedonia enterprise, however, were not materialized, and two years later, John Jacob, District Superintendent for the northern work, reported that the Methodists in Macedonia, where "a Methodist cannot be a true Serbian," were still under suspicion of disloyalty.

The year 1925, however, saw other actual reductions in Methodist projects besides the closing of the Bitolj school. The cause lay partly in reduced appropriations. From 1922 to 1924, the remittances from New York had been above \$21,000 annually, but the appropriations for 1925 dropped to about \$14,000. Therefore, Bishop Nuelsen decided to dismiss all the supply pastors, end the services of two American teachers (he finally was compelled to keep one), cut out all support for social work, and make other budgetary adjustments. Financial stringency also dictated discontinuance of the work in the two Croatian cities of Zagreb and Maribor when it had hardly secured a foothold. The Croatian points were too far from the center of the Mission's activity to make maintenance of the evangelistic effort feasible.

The Novi Sad school, which enrolled about fifty girls, became both a financial and an administrative problem during Bishop Nuelsen's quadrennium in charge of Yugoslavia. The Bishop found it less a school than part hostel and part orphanage—an institution established by Samuel Irwin as a relief project and given government approval and tax exemption on that basis. It was practically impossible for the Board to operate it as a bona fide school conducted by foreign teachers or by a foreign principal, for the government insisted on maintaining a complete monopoly of education, with no private schools or nonnational teachers allowed. This fact blocked the desire of the Bishop and the Board to pursue the possibility of turning the School over to the W.F.M.S. In 1927, Bishop Nuelsen transferred the School's management to a committee of Yugoslav Methodists headed by John Jacob, hoping to make it a genuinely Yugoslavian enterprise. Jacob he appointed as head of the School. No fundamental change in its status was made until several years later.

William O. Shepard succeeded Bishop Nuelsen as resident Bishop of the Paris Area in 1928 and supervised the Yugoslavia mission until his death in 1930. It was in 1929 that the nation, upon the proclamation of a dictatorship by King Alexander, was renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. This was a period of energetic repression of strong regional drives for ethnic autonomy in Croatia and Macedonia, the central government striving inten-

sively to overcome the old divisions and consolidate the prewar components of the young nation.

The troubles of the Macedonian churches continued, and the plight of the pastors worsened. They apparently tried to preach in Serbian but often were jailed. Temkovitch, formerly the District Superintendent for the northern work, was forced out of the pastorate at Strumica in 1930. Corresponding Secretary Thomas S. Donohugh confessed to his Congregational colleague James L. Barton that it was baffling to know what to do with the remnant of the Methodist community surviving the persecution. "There seems an evident determination to crush out this work by repressive measures, imprisonment, destruction of church property, increased taxation . . ."

It became clearer than ever in 1931 that the government monopoly on education made it impossible to conduct a school in the Novi Sad property, which recently had been used for the training of probationers for deaconess work. The Mission Conference voted to turn over much of the responsibility for the institution to a Sister who had prepared herself for deaconess service. Retaining a few workers already attached to the School, the Sister and associates of hers converted the property to use as a mother house and home for deaconesses and probationers. They also maintained a hostel for Methodist country girls desiring to have the advantage of Novi Sad's city schools. Swiss Methodists assisted the promoters of the Novi Sad project by training some of the Yugoslav young women as nurse deaconesses in the hospital in Zurich, loaning Swiss deaconesses to the Novi Sad institution, and paying the costs of remodeling the school building. By 1936, the Novi Sad deaconesses, assisted by several leading physicians of the city, opened a hospital on the old premises. In all Yugoslavia there was only one other hospital, a small Protestant institution. By 1939, the hospital group was looking forward to enlargement of its facilities.

Just when the outlook seemed darkest for Methodist freedom, the Ministry of Public Worship granted the Methodist preachers, in 1931, previously non-existent privileges tantamount to informal toleration. They were to be permitted henceforth to baptize, to marry parishioners, to record members, and to bury the dead. One of the preachers in Macedonia took advantage of the new dispensation by baptizing a hundred persons. The more relaxed attitude on the part of the Belgrade authorities evidently resulted from cumulative and combined efforts of Bishop Nuelsen, Bishop Shepard, the American Minister, and two of the Yugoslav Methodist leaders, George Sebele and a co-worker named Lichtenberger. The change thus hard won did not constitute, however, full formal recognition of the Methodist Episcopal Church.

The Yugoslavia mission was a hard field. Shortly after Samuel Irwin's departure, it became another of Europe's missions without a missionary and one with a native ministry that was largely and significantly alien in a nation going through the throes of artificial, imposed, treaty-manufactured nation-

alism. Even its own constituency was lingually and ethnically divided. It suffered heavy persecution in the south and less heavy but handicapping harassment and uncertainty in the north. And it was poor; with underdeveloped financial resources of its own, it was dependent upon American appropriations that constantly ebbed—from \$14,000 in 1925, to less than \$1,400 in 1935, to \$1,100 in 1936, and then to sharing a \$2,000 allotment with Austria and Hungary for each of the next three years. Yet the Mission's churches displayed a certain vitality, even the capacity to increase their constituency by 1939 to the level of eight hundred church members and nine hundred probationers organized in twenty charges.

Hungary

The second mission field carved out of the Austria-Hungary Mission Conference in the postwar period was the Hungary Mission. Since the creation of the Yugoslavia Mission Conference cut away the previously Hungarian work in the Backa region, there remained as the nucleus for the new Hungary Mission, at the beginning, only the Methodist work in Budapest, the capital.

By the time the Hungary Mission was formally organized in Budapest in April, 1921, Budapest itself had three Hungarian congregations and a German-speaking project. Fresh activity already had begun in Nyíregyháza, a town north of Budapest, and in Dombóvár and Nagyrézékely, two towns to the south. At this first annual session of the Mission, Bishop Nuelsen appointed Martin Funk as Superintendent and Arthur Szalos and Julius Reichert as pastors and designated six communities to be supplied with pastors. Funk retained the same post until he returned to Germany in 1931. The work year 1921-22 began with a recorded membership of 170 church members and 239 probationers, all of them belonging to the Budapest churches. And Funk and his colleagues had available an initial appropriation of \$20,000.

The Mission made ample strides in its first year. In 1922, it had five new preachers at work, and preaching was being done at twenty new stations in Hungarian, German, and Slovak. Six deaconesses were active in the churches, and seven young women were preparing for deaconess service. There were fifteen new Sunday schools, bringing the total to more than two dozen. With the co-operation of the government and with the help of Scandinavian Methodist contributions, a home for children was opened near Budapest, in Budakeszi, where six orphans were cared for permanently and two hundred poor and undernourished children were given summer recreation. Budapest had a girls' home, and the prewar young men's home was reopened. Hundreds of the poor were receiving free advice from the Mission's legal staff. Church property was being developed.

In 1923, the Hungarian government granted the Mission full freedom to

pursue its public religious work. Nevertheless, practical and formal handicaps lay heavily on the Methodist churches. The church members still were required, in spite of their Methodist affiliations, to pay church taxes for the support of the established church. In 1925, a new government regulation required all the children to attend the services of the established churches. Martin Funk reported, "In many cases our children were beaten by priests and teachers . . ." But five hundred boys and girls attended twenty Methodist Sunday schools in spite of the pressure exerted to penalize them.

Of the general work in 1925 Funk wrote :

We have had a year of struggle and difficulty. The established Churches have used every means possible to suppress our Methodist work. We have been accused of being "burdensome foreigners," "agitators of the people," "Bolshevists," "heterodox teachers," and "false prophets." Detectives, policemen and soldiers have been sent to our meetings and many times they were forbidden. Two of our pastors were arrested during their revival work.

Such harassments were not sanctioned, however, by the central government. Nevertheless, they continued from time to time, and four years later, Funk was reporting on them once again :

Windows were broken, meetings disturbed, children had troubles in school, because they went to the Methodists. Even today you can see Bibles burning in the open street, before school children, by leaders of Roman Catholic Churches. And the Bible colporteurs have been driven out of some villages even though they had a license to sell the Book.

In 1924, the Mission was reorganized as the Hungary Mission Conference. This occurred at a time when the church membership had increased to six hundred and the Mission was showing progress in religious education, property development, and social service. "There is no field in the Zurich Area, perhaps none in the whole Church," said Bishop Nuelsen, "where more has been accomplished with pitifully small resources . . ." He deplored Hungary's "paltry" \$5,000 appropriation. An initial cut of 50 per cent in the appropriation in 1924 brought about the loss of a number of the Mission's workers and a discouraging shrinking of its work. The Board restored the appropriation, but only after urgent representations by Bishop Nuelsen. With the appropriations at this level, further disruption of the work was avoided only by Bishop Nuelsen's personally raising and applying to Hungary several thousand dollars a year for several years. Eventually, appropriations dropped radically and irremediably; in 1934, Hungary's allotment was \$1,935, and in 1935 it was \$967. The Hungarian church members had a special financial handicap under these circumstances, for they still were required to pay church taxes for the established church.

By 1939, when the Hungary Mission Conference participated in the three-Church Unification that resulted in creation of The Methodist Church, it had nearly eight hundred church members and a thousand probationers. Eleven ministers were under appointment in charge of a dozen churches or Circuits.

Bulgaria

The Bulgaria mission received in 1920 a new definition of its field. The General Conference, abandoning the traditional confinement of the Mission to northern Bulgaria, redefined the boundaries of the Bulgaria Mission Conference to coincide with the national boundaries. Technically, this brought the Methodists into a section of Bulgaria formerly looked upon as territory reserved for the work of the American Board (Congregational). In spite of this formal expansion, however, the Mission remained essentially a northern Bulgaria enterprise.

After the war, the work continued under the leadership of its prewar Superintendent, Elmer E. Count, who guided it through several years of reconstruction. Kate B. Blackburn, and Dora Davis finished their long period of service in Bulgaria in 1922, and the W.F.M.S. sent three missionaries, Edith M. and Elizabeth Fern Perry and Mrs. Florence G. T. Reeves, to replace them. Elmer Count and his wife remained on the field until 1927, when they went on furlough. Not long after returning to the field in 1928, Count died, closing a period of twenty-three years at the head of the Mission.

The Mission, proceeding without benefit of substantial Centenary contributions such as had been bestowed upon many other Missions, suffering sporadic acts of repression by collaborating political and ecclesiastical reactionaries, struggling to thrust its evangelical message into the life of a nation unsettled by political confusion and bloody revolutions, hardly had righted itself after the cumulative impact of the wars of the pre-1920 period, when in 1925 the Board's world-wide cut of 50 per cent in appropriations drastically depleted the resources of the Methodist workers in Bulgaria and severely curtailed their activity. Count called the cut "a stunning blow." It entailed dismissing six young preachers, suspending publication of the Mission's effective journal for communication with the highly literate Bulgarian population, depriving the Superintendent of the car required for his evangelistic and supervisory mobility, eliminating a school valuable in training young men for mission work, and dispensing with a productive printing and publishing activity. In spite of many handicaps restricting the Mission and encouraged by the emergence of a group of younger preachers, Count died convinced that the small Bulgarian Methodist enterprise had vital evangelizing potentialities and opportunities that were worthy of much fuller support by the Board. Of course, his own death itself reduced the Mission's thrust.

After an interim under Bulgarian leadership, the work gained new strength when Alfons Pratsch was transferred from Germany in 1931 to serve as Superintendent. However, financial support from the United States receded, dropping back from \$6,500 for 1929 to \$1,000 for 1935, with Superintendent Pratsch appealing with the Board to continue that meager grant for 1936. In 1938 and 1939 there were increases, the appropriations rising from \$2,100 in both years. The Mission remained small in size, indeed almost stationary, throughout the period.

Having outgrown the competitive misunderstandings of earlier decades, the Methodists and the missionaries of the American Board began to draw together in the nineteen-twenties in common desire for union of their constituencies in a single church that would enable the evangelicals to present a united front in Bulgarian life. By 1927, the movement had gone far enough for the Board of Foreign Missions to approve a proposal for the formation of a joint committee of the two Boards to carry out a field study looking toward development of a plan for uniting the work of the two Missions. The men on the field collaborated in a joint commission of five ministers and five laymen from each denomination, which drafted a basis of union. By 1934, the Congregationalists were ready to go ahead and desired to have the union consummated at Easter, 1935. It was necessary, however, for the Methodists to secure the approval of the General Conference, which would not meet until 1936. Although Bishop Nuelsen reported to the Board late in 1934 that there was not much enthusiasm for the union among the Bulgarian ministers, the Bulgaria Mission Conference memorialized the General Conference to clear the way for union.

The General Conference responded by adopting an enabling act making it possible for the Mission Conference to unite with the Congregationalist group during the ensuing quadrennium. Implementation of the union agreed upon by the Methodist Conference and by the representatives of the American Board mission lagged, however, because under the congregational polity governing the American Board constituency, local churches held the power to vote on the question of entering the union; a number of them were reluctant to do so. Evidently, the disposition of property lay at the crux of their hesitation. The American Board had recently turned over the local properties to the local churches, and now the churches were proving slow to favor surrender of their property titles to a central organization. The Bulgaria Mission Conference reaffirmed in 1938 its strong desire to see the union accomplished, and decisively and without reservation signified its full readiness to unite under the plan recommended by the joint committee. But in 1939 the question was still unresolved, and formation of the union was in abeyance.

The Baltic States

Beginning in 1918, when they proclaimed their independence, the Baltic States Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania no longer could be counted by the drafters of Methodism's missionary map as a part of the Russian Empire; the Empire was no more. Nor could they be assigned to the mission to revolutionary Russia, for it was from the Bolshevik regime that the Baltic States broke away and against Bolshevik military power that they maintained their independence in 1918 and early 1919. The General Conference took account of this shift in political reality in 1920, by defining a new European mission: "*Baltic Mission* shall include the Baltic and Slavic republics contiguous to Russia."

George A. Simons, who had supervised the churches in the three states before war and revolution interrupted, arrived in Finland in February, 1920, ready to establish contact with the Baltic Methodists. There he awaited news of the arrival of two ships that were on the way from the United States carrying Methodist relief supplies for him to distribute—in one, a ton of sugar, six hundred cases of milk, and fifteen cases of clothing; in the other, a large consignment of clothing. Martin Prikask, the Methodist leader in Estonia, managed to come to Helsinki to see Simons—the first postwar face-to-face meeting. Finally, early in April, travel conditions and the military situation at last permitting, Simons spent a week in the Baltic states arranging for distribution of the relief supplies. After a quick journey to the United States, he returned to Finland in July, whence he traveled to the Baltics in September for a tour of six weeks through the three countries. In January, 1921, he was back again, in Riga, Latvia, arranging for distribution of the second, long delayed, shipment of relief materials. In April, he was on his fourth visitation from Finland, re-establishing and strengthening relations with the Methodists, who still were holding together in societies in spite of the ravages and disruption of the wars.

In the course of this trip, Simons organized the first Methodist church of Lettish people to be established in Latvia. At Libau, he received into the membership of the Methodist Episcopal Church 150 members of Alfred Freiberg's independent Moravian society. Thus was consummated a plan that had been interrupted by the advent of the War, which had caused suspension of the work of the Riga Methodists with whom Freiberg had been in contact.

The newly defined Baltic Mission met for the first time in July, 1921, in Hapsal (Khapsalu), Estonia, but in a somewhat irregular manner that was dictated by a piece of organizational improvising that Bishop Nuelsen felt compelled to do. In order to provide conveniently for both the Russian work and the Baltic work, he convened jointly the workers active in both Missions as the Russia Mission Conference and Baltic Mission. This involved formal organization of the Russia Mission Conference that had been author-

ized by the General Conference in 1920 to provide for the work in "the republic of Russia." Into this Conference Bishop Nuelsen then transferred the regular ministers working in Russia, who were members of the Finland Conference. He also utilized the Mission Conference as the locus of membership for ministers working in the Baltic states. This called for receiving one man from the North Germany Conference and granting Conference relationships and ordination to various men already involved in Methodist church leadership in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Because of the prevailing political antagonism between Russia and the Baltic states, no Russian Methodist workers could come out to attend the Khapsalu meeting and no Baltic workers would have been allowed to enter Russia for a Conference session there.

To serve as Superintendent and Treasurer for the Russia Mission Conference and Baltic Mission organization, Bishop Nuelsen appointed George Simons. He divided the work into three Districts: the Estonia District, Martin Prikask, Superintendent; the Latvia-Lithuania District, Heinrich Holtzschuber, Superintendent; and the Russia District, Hjalmar Salmi, Superintendent. In this way and by the arrangements made for ministerial relations, an apparatus was supplied for maintenance of the Methodist Church both in Russia and also in the Baltics, which had no Conference with power to maintain a formal ministry. Shortly afterwards, Simons came to Tallin, Estonia, to live and later on took up permanent residence in Riga, Latvia.

In his first General Conference report on this postwar work, in 1924, Bishop Nuelsen was enthusiastic. "The growth of the work in the three Baltic Republics is marvelous." He cited significant increases in the number of ministers at work, in church membership, and in Sunday school enrollment. The Mission had good properties in all three capitals: Tallin, Estonia; Riga, Latvia; and Kaunas, Lithuania. The preachers were using from two to five languages, and periodicals and pamphlets were being published in the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian languages.

During the following quadrennium, under authorization of the General Conference, the Baltic Mission was reorganized as the Baltic-Slavic Mission Conference.

Year after year throughout the twenties and thirties, the preachers in the Baltic states labored with the benefit of only meager resources for their church work and under conditions of poverty that struck deep into their own family life. Their bravery, their faithfulness, and their perseverance in pressing for evangelistic results won the admiration and praise of the Bishops who administered their area. Impoverished as their countries were, they succeeded in building chapels and churches both in country and in city. And they saw their efforts result in excellent growth in church membership. By 1939, the three Districts—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—had fourteen, seventeen, and six pastoral charges, respectively, registering a total church membership of twenty-three hundred, with five hundred probationers.

Russia

As a religious movement inside Russia, Methodism never lapsed during the revolution and the aftermath of the World War. But when George A. Simons left Leningrad (Petrograd) in 1918, its link with world Methodism was broken, and it remained unrepaired for more than two years.

Simons began re forging the link when he was in Finland in 1920 awaiting shipments of relief supplies from the United States. He first explored the possibilities of sending communications and relief goods to the Methodists in Leningrad by way of the Danish and the American Red Cross. Later he had the co-operation of the Finnish and the Estonian governments. Shortly after the first major relief shipment reached Finland in February, Simons heard from Sister Anna Eklund, the deaconess in whose care he had left the Leningrad mission when he departed from Russia. As a result, he cabled the Board in March: "Sister Anna well property intact church open economic sanitary moral conditions Russia defy description." At the session of the Finland Conference in Helsinki the following summer, Simons saw several pastors from Russia. Before the end of the year, he was getting letters and modest amounts of relief supplies through to his friends in Leningrad. Early in 1921, friends from outside Russia began writing him about their most recent contacts with Sister Anna in starving Leningrad. Hearing again directly from her, he again cabled the Board: "Sister Anna's letter March tenth reports all intact."

The organizing session of the Russia Mission Conference that was held in Estonia in July was Russian—at just that time—more in name than in reality, for none of the Russian Methodist workers could leave the country.* But shortly after Conference, Hjalmar Salmi, the Finnish minister Bishop Nuelsen appointed Superintendent of the Russia District, became the first foreign Methodist representative to penetrate, under the protection of the Finnish government, to Leningrad. He left Vyborg, Finland, on a train that included two freight cars of Methodist European Relief supplies—over five hundred boxes of food, clothing, shoes, medicines, New Testaments, hymnals, and copies of the Russian-language *Christian Advocate*. At the Russian border, the goods had to be reloaded onto Russian cars under the eyes of Russian customs officers and Tcheka inspectors, who opened and scrutinized almost every box. With the cars sealed and locked and with Salmi riding on the engine with the guards, the train steamed across the border and pulled into Leningrad on the morning of 28 August.

It was Sunday morning, and when Salmi walked into the Methodist church hall, the morning service was over and the congregation of fifty people, led by the newly arrived young preacher Oscar Poeld, were on their knees praying for deliverance from hunger and destitution. With them was Sister Anna

* See page 1000 f.

Eklund, who had refused to leave Leningrad for the security of her home in Finland, but had stayed with the little Methodist company, serving as their spiritual guide and watching over them sacrificially through many months of terror, starvation, unrelieved cold, and death, selling her own possessions for the purposes of her compassionate ministry and wasting away from hunger while she helped clothe and feed others.

Salmi spent several weeks in the Leningrad area distributing to the Methodist people and others the desperately needed relief supplies he had brought with him and visiting the churches. His visitations took him out into the villages of Ingria (Ingermanland), where he found the prewar Methodist societies still carrying on. He then left Russia in time to meet with Simons and the two other District Superintendents in Tallin early in October.

The four superintendents, reporting the results of Salmi's survey of Methodist prospects in Russia, conveyed to the Board, apparently with their concurrence, his conclusion that the time now was ripe for renewing and strengthening the Russia mission. In spite of the general antireligious position of the government, the Methodists were finding favor with various public officials because of the ministrations of Sister Anna and the Methodist relief work. The superintendents felt that "the crying need of Russia's millions" was the gospel of Jesus Christ and that Methodism was pre-eminently fitted to meet the need "through its evangelistic passion, practical idealism, democratic organization and ecclesiastical solidarity." (Methodist missionaries seemed always and everywhere to arrive at this assessment of need and of the adequacy of Methodism to meet it.) Current signs advanced as auguring Methodist success in Russia were the reported facts that the Methodist preachers were respected, their meetings were unmolested, the District Superintendent was free to move in and out of the country, and a cordial invitation to Simons and his sister to return to Leningrad had been tendered "by the authorities."

The men at the Tallin meeting held that three things should accompany renewed evangelistic efforts in Russia: (1) a substantial program of property development, (2) a Bible institute to train ministerial candidates, and (3) strong and well-organized relief activity "worthy of Methodism and America." There should be five relief centers in Russia, they declared, with Moscow, which had not been entered by the Methodists before the War, being given strong priority.

The Russia mission went forward for another year under the same double superintendency—Simons shaping working policy from Tallin and then from Riga, Salmi giving implementing direction on the field. In December, Sister Anna Eklund, who had been the mainstay of the Mission for two years and who continued influential in its affairs, came out to Helsinki in December, 1921, to confer with Salmi and Simons together. When she and Salmi returned to Russia in January, they took back with them fifteen carloads of

relief goods. Salmi continued organizing such consignments, until the delegates at the European Central Conference in Frankfort on the Main the following summer heard Anna Eklund report that European Methodist Relief supplies to Russia totaled fifty carloads, with more to come. Aside from contributions to individuals, food for fourteen thousand children had been given to government-operated children's homes. Salmi also proceeded to strengthen the preaching corps, enlisting a number of men for active work in regular charges. Among these preachers were several who had returned from abroad.

Bishop Nuelsen, of course, was back of this program of re-entry, relief, and restoration extending into the Leningrad area from Finland and from Simons's headquarters in Estonia and Latvia. He not only convened the organizing session of the Russia Mission Conference in Khapsalu in 1921, but also presided at sessions in Riga in 1922 and Kaunas in 1923. The ministerial corps built up by Salmi was, like Salmi himself, under Nuelsen's appointment. And Nuelsen was instrumental in making available for the relief work in Russia substantial funds from various Methodist sources.

But Bishop Nuelsen became convinced that conditions in Russia demanded and invited a program of Methodist activity broader and more strategically related to Russia's religious crisis than simply strengthening the pre-Revolutionary work would be. By the end of 1921, he had decided to visit Russia to see for himself what could and should be done, but many months were to pass before he was able to go.

For some time before he came to his decision, Nuelsen and Secretary North had been discussing a suggestion by North that the Methodists send to Russia, to scout the religious situation, Julius F. Hecker, a Russian-born minister in the New York East Conference, who eventually was influential in helping Nuelsen to explore and understand the Russian scene. Hecker had worked with Russian immigrants in New York City's East Side Parish, among Russian prisoners of war in Austria, and later in Switzerland under the Y.M.C.A. developing Russian-language materials for war prisoners and for Y.M.C.A. work in the Baltic states. He had been recalled from Switzerland because his outspoken sympathy with the objectives of the Russian Revolution had got him into trouble with the American State Department. Hecker being in Europe on another errand, Nuelsen suggested that he go into Russia as a member of a recognized relief expedition. So it was that at the end of 1921, Hecker was in Moscow with a relief unit of the American Friends Service Committee, with which, however, he did not stay long. His formal appointment in his home Conference was "Russian Relief Work, Zurich Area," though he was not in Russia as an official representative of the Methodist Episcopal Church or of the Board of Foreign Missions.

After a month in Moscow and a month traveling elsewhere in Russia, Hecker submitted to North a comprehensive and discriminating report on

the government's religious policy and on the church. The latter he found in flux—disestablished and dispossessed but still valued by many millions of Russians, confused, complicated, problem-ridden, groping toward unity, under heavy public attack from the organs of government propaganda, and containing vital elements showing potentialities of spiritual and intellectual growth. The former he found aggressively atheistic, maintaining a large measure of freedom of religious expression, and administratively less repressive of religion than commonly believed in the United States.

When Nuelsen began early in 1922 to plan for his own visit to Russia, both Hecker and secular relief officials in Switzerland advised him that the Russian government did not want merely investigative commissions to enter the country. The only way to get in was to be associated with a relief train or come bringing a definite proposal for action of interest to the government. Nuelsen scraped together all the relief money he had available and spent \$20,000 for a relief train for the Saratov famine area on the lower Volga. The Nansen Committee (the explorer Fridtjof Nansen organized relief that fed more than a million and a half Russians in the Volga and South Ukraine regions) dispatched the supplies from Odessa and had them distributed as Methodist Relief by the International Save the Children Fund and the German Red Cross. Though the Methodists' contribution was a comparatively slender one, it was reported to Moscow, and appreciation for it smoothed Nuelsen's way when at last, in September, his health permitted him to make the journey to the Soviet capital.

Secretary North welcomed Bishop Nuelsen's going to Russia, for he felt the need of such reliable orientation of the American church on the nature of the program it should carry out there as the Bishop would provide. But he warned Nuelsen (the Bishop had inquired) that the Methodist leadership in the States was not ready to mount any large undertaking for Russia in any area of Christian service or philanthropic activity. "I think you will find that there are a great many people who are not thinking of the suffering in Russia but are irritated and reluctant because of the economic and political conditions." North cited his surprise at finding "one of our most representative men" rather strongly declaring that he would not advise giving a single dollar to Russia. And North, stressing various difficulties in the way of working out a fruitful and acceptable approach to Russia, expressed his own great diffidence about having any dealings with the Russian government—"the Bolsheviks" was the term he used for it. Evidently, he was moved to this feeling by reports of the execution of priests for being "loyal enough to their faith to defend their churches in their most sacred possessions," apparently not taking into account the possibility of counterrevolutionary activity by churchmen seeking to subvert the government—a side of the Russian struggle of which Bishop Nuelsen became aware when he discussed such questions with people inside Russia. North also reported to Nuelsen

the coolness of the Harding administration in Washington to the proposal that a delegation of churchmen be organized to visit Russia in the name of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America.

Nuelsen did not deny the accuracy of North's estimate of public opinion in America, and he realized the necessity for good promotional strategy and realistic timing in developing support for a generously augmented mission to Russia. But he still felt the challenge of Russia's religious need: "Russia has a tremendous appeal," he said. And he went forward with his visit.

Bishop Nuelsen went into Russia from Helsinki, he and his traveling companions taking with them five carloads of relief supplies for Leningrad. With him on the trip to Moscow, after a week in Leningrad, went Ernest Lyman Mills, a European representative of the Board of Sunday Schools, Sister Anna Eklund, and the Leningrad pastor, Oscar Poeld. In the capital, the Bishop enjoyed courteous treatment, opportunity to visit Soviet institutions, and freedom to go to church services, which he found freely and well attended. He conferred with the Archbishop of Moscow and a number of other leading churchmen and also met political leaders, including Kalinin, chairman of the Central Executive Committee, who the next year became president of the Soviet Union. He then went back to the Leningrad area to see more of the Methodist work, meeting all the Russian preachers, ordaining four deacons, and appointing preachers to two new charges, one of them on the railroad line to Moscow. When he departed from Russia, he left in the hands of the government commissar for ecclesiastical affairs a letter calling attention to the impression made upon European and American Christians by the treatment, especially executions, of Russian priests and asking for lenient treatment of priests then under sentence.

Bishop Nuelsen carried away with him an invitation to the Board of Bishops of the Methodist Episcopal Church from the leaders of the Living Church, a major reform movement in the Orthodox Church, to send a delegation to the plenary Council of the Russian Orthodox Church to be held in Moscow in February, 1923. At his suggestion, he was given a similar invitation to be delivered to the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America. The Board of Bishops appointed Bishops Nuelsen, Edgar Blake, and Anton Bast, the three Bishops for Europe, as its fraternal delegation to the Council. Because of postponements of the announced session and the inability of Bishops Bast and Nuelsen to be present in Moscow when the Council finally was convened in May, Bishop Blake was the only official Methodist delegate present. He was closely supported, however, by Lewis O. Hartman, editor of *Zion's Herald*, who went to Moscow in order to interpret events there for the Methodist press.

As Bishop Blake reported later on, the reformist elements in the Council—three groups were reformist, one was neutralist, one was reactionary—constituted the voting majority, and the Council therefore adopted many liberaliz-

ing measures for the reform and renewal of the Church. Bishop Blake, who addressed the Council, carefully refrained from committing the Board of Bishops or the Methodist Church to acceptance of any position with regard to the Russian social experiment, and made no promises of official action. But before he left the Council, he grasped the opportunity to announce what appeared to be the most appropriate means for the Methodists of America to assist the Russian church to minister relevantly to the life of the new Russia that was emerging under the influence of the Revolution. He pledged himself (Methodist Bishops frequently made such commitments) to raise \$50,000 for the purpose of stimulating theological education in the Orthodox Church, which had left not a single one of the fifty theological seminaries that existed under its aegis before the Revolution. The money, which was to be contributed in three annual amounts, was to be channeled through an Educational Commission of the Russian Church directed by Julius Hecker, which was developing a varied practical program for the education of young Orthodox priests and for the reorientation of older priests to modern needs and issues. Blake's pledge, in which he was joined by Doctor Hartman and Bishop Nuelsen, was a personal responsibility, not an official commitment of the Methodist Church or any of its agencies.

Blake's action at once came under strenuous attack in Methodist circles in the United States even before he and his colleagues Hartman and Nuelsen had an opportunity to issue the reasoned, informal statements they eventually made. The personal character of Blake's financial pledge, his status at the Council, the official nature of the Council session as a democratically elected body representing the entire Russian Orthodox Church, and the whole effort of the three American churchmen to understand and interpret the current condition of the Russian Church and to offer friendly aid in its attempt at renewal were widely misunderstood, misinterpreted, and condemned. Reports of the Blake-Hartman visit to Moscow quickly blew up in the Methodist Church a hot controversy that was fed by the fears, suspicions, propaganda, and passionate antagonisms to the Soviet regime that were rife in the secular community. The Blake-Hartman-Nuelsen position of measured reinforcement of the vital elements in the Russian Church was widely and roundly rejected because of revulsion for the Soviet regime and for any group or activity that seemed to work with it, thus strengthening its power and enhancing its prestige. Public opinion was inflamed at just that time by the execution by the Russian government of a Roman Catholic priest who had been involved in counterrevolutionary, subversive activity. *The Christian Advocate*, whose editor, James R. Joy was an aggressive critic of the Blake proposal, condemned it all as "bolstering Bolshevism."

Official renunciation of the Blake venture was not long delayed. The Board of Bishops at a meeting in Wichita, Kansas, in May, declaring that the Council in Moscow was not what they originally had understood it to be, but rather

"a general convocation of former ecclesiastics of the Russian Orthodox Church," and that conditions in Russia had changed during the months since the issuance of the invitation they had received, voted to recall its delegation. Bishop Blake testified that when he first heard of this through the public press, it seemed inconceivable to him that the Bishops should repudiate their colleagues while they were engaged in performing the duty assigned them; such an act "had too much the appearance of ordering a soldier into an advanced position and shooting him in the back while engaged in the undertaking . . ." After clearly explaining the official and representative character of the Council's membership, Bishop Blake said that the Bishops' Wichita statements and the atmosphere in which they were framed evidently "were the outcome of an emotional panic rather than the result of a calm and judicial consideration of the case." His statement, printed in *The Christian Advocate*, caused the *Advocate* to modify in certain points, but not to withdraw, its original attack on Blake's activity in Russia.

In June, the Executive Committee of the Board of Foreign Missions acted to protect itself from being penalized by potential contributors not in sympathy with the Blake approach to the Russian Church. It authorized Corresponding Secretaries North and Titus Lowe to issue a public statement declaring that none of the money appropriated by the Board for work in Russia was being used for the implementation of the Blake pledge to Russian theological education. The Secretaries stated that the Board, concerned for the religious needs of the Russian people and desirous of keeping abreast of changing conditions in Russia, had hopes and plans for developing the Russian work "when the proper opportunity arrived." They made it clear, however, that the Board's future contribution to Russia would be kept within the framework of Methodism's regular missionary work as officially administered abroad by the Board. The Board office often acted as receiving treasury for incidental funds, but the Executive Committee now voted that "under the circumstances," it was inexpedient for the treasurer of the Board to serve as treasurer for the \$50,000 fund pledged by Bishop Blake and Doctor Hartman. Blake, Nuelsen, and Hartman themselves undertook to handle it, Hartman making available the facilities of *Zions Herald* in Boston for payments to the "Zions Herald Russia Fund" sponsored by the three.

With the controversy still unresolved, Bishop Nuelsen spent two weeks in July in Russia visiting all the Methodist work and then going on to Moscow to attend a session of the Russian Church's Educational Commission (Nuelsen and Blake were advisory members) and to interview church leaders, including Tikhon, the reactionary Patriarch deposed by the Council held in May. In Novgorod, he enjoyed a friendly visit with the Orthodox bishop, who was a friend of Tikhon's and with a number of priests, of both the Tikhon party and the Living Church party. Nuelsen found that far from detrimentally involving the Methodist Church in support of a single

faction of the Russian Church, Bishop Blake's visit to the Council had been received by all, including the conservatives, as a friendly service complimentary to the Russian Church as a whole. "In consequence of the visit," he wrote Hartman, "Methodism enjoys today a prestige in the Russian Church which it never had before." He deplored the fact that some of the *Advocates* in the United States had felt impelled to publish adverse criticism of the visit, thus playing into the hands of enemies (he undoubtedly had in mind Roman Catholic attackers of Methodism in the Monte Mario controversy in Rome) who were doing "their best to trump up against the Methodist Church the charge of pro-bolshevism." The potentiality of embarrassment to the Methodist Church, held Nuelsen, lay in the attacks on the visit in the Methodist press, not in the visit itself.

Early in the fall, Bishop Nuelsen submitted to the Executive Committee a comprehensive report on Russia that covered the state of religion in the country, Methodist activity there, and proposals for the enlargement of Methodism's commitment—a report originally requested by the Board in November, 1921. Two features marked the budgetary plan he recommended to the Board: (1) division of the over-all mission to Russia into two segments, namely, the work within the regular Methodist missionary organization and co-operative assistance to the Russian Orthodox Church; (2) a very large increase in Board appropriations for the field.

The Mission was working at that time under a total appropriation of \$6,000. Nuelsen advocated, however, spending \$18,000 a year for adequate maintenance of the current program, the increase being required mainly to support a resident Superintendent and an American pastor for Leningrad. And he asked for \$31,500 for non-recurring property expenditures and \$20,000 for relief during the coming winter.

But he went even further, for he wanted to see the Methodist mission branch out beyond conventional evangelism and charitable relief ("We cannot content ourselves with 'leading souls to Christ,' with feeding children, with clothing the naked.") to new forms of socially relevant activity. He told the Executive Committee:

the Russia of today, bolshevistic, materialistic, atheistic Russia cannot be won, unless the church faces the social and political problems and renders its contribution in a practical, constructive way demonstrating that the Church of Jesus Christ is vitally interested in everything that pertains to human life and is bending all its energy to turn the currents of spiritual motives and energies into the channel of practical helpfulness.

In a general way, Nuelsen saw this approach as requiring a manifold effort to raise the level of existence of the peasant in overwhelmingly agricultural Russia, to found social service institutions, to develop a Christian school system, and to make the local church not a merely ceremonial, but a socially useful, community center.

For the extension of the Mission in these new ways, Nuelsen recommended spending \$1,150,000, to provide four model farms, six children's homes related economically to the farms, a theological school, a publishing house and literature, educational institutes, and an American church and pastor for Moscow. Added to the amount budgeted for the work as already established, this would make a total expenditure of \$1,201,500 for definitely Methodist work.

Rather than skirting the controversy aroused by Bishop Blake's visit to the Moscow Council, Bishop Nuelsen forthrightly dived into the midst of the issues involved in it. He recommended that the Board of Foreign Missions take over on its own initiative the annual contribution of \$17,000 that Blake had pledged for the Educational Commission, formally appoint Dr. Julius Hecker as Secretary of the Commission and assume his support, officially recognize the Commission as a service organization with which it was ready to co-operate, send a Methodist theological professor and a leading American pastor to Russia each year to lecture at Russian theological seminaries and to assist in institutes for priests, charge the personnel of the Methodist mission and churches to aid in institutes and evangelistic services conducted by the Educational Commission, found Russia scholarships in American Methodist seminaries for promising Russian priests, and contribute financially to the provision of libraries and social equipment for the two Russian theological seminaries already planned for. For such purposes—outside the regular Mission's budget—Nuelsen wanted the Board to make an initial expenditure of \$59,000, thus bringing the entire Russia appropriation for the near future to \$1,201,559, a sum unheard of in the annals of the Board's field appropriations.

The Annual Meeting in November rejected almost all of Bishop Nuelsen's expanded program for Russia. The only change in the budget for 1924 was the addition to the combined Russia and Baltic States category of \$10,000 for "New Work in Russia." This was made in order to increase the amount for Russia in such a way as to provide for sending two workers for a mission in Moscow and to strengthen the current work in Leningrad. But nothing was provided for the larger, social aspects of Nuelsen's plan. Lack of funds was an obvious reason, and no campaign for special funds was voted, although the Board paid some lip service to the religious needs of Russia as presented by Nuelsen. Not a dollar was appropriated for assistance to the Russian Church. The Board took no position either in criticism or in favor of the Russian regime or the Orthodox Church, but covered the matter by putting on a cloak of administrative formality that exposed it only a little to the charge of yielding to anti-Russia prejudice or pressure. With specific reference to Russia, it adopted the statement:

To avoid at once confusion of thought as to the ideals of the Methodist Episcopal Church and its policies, and to prevent embarrassment in its world

service we agree that as a Board, except in such union educational or other projects as are or shall be formally and authoritatively approved, we recognize the necessity of working through the agencies which are subject to and controlled by the Methodist Episcopal Church, and we hold ourselves responsible for these only in conduct and support.

Nuelsen was not daunted by the failure of the Board to rise to the opportunity he had presented; on the first day of the General Conference in 1924, in May, he threw out the challenge once again. He told the Conference that instead of spending \$6,000 a year for Russia, the Methodist Church should be spending over a million dollars. Recalling the program he had outlined for the Board, he focused especially on his proposals for aiding the Russian Orthodox Church, by which he declared he was convinced the bulk of Russia's 130,000,000 people could best be reached for Christ.

Nuelsen informed the Conference that in the Russian Church were reform movements holding promise of evangelical power. To be sure, they were as yet not fully defined or unified. But, said he, hundreds, even thousands, of Russian priests had as sincere a yearning for the power of the gospel as ever had existed at any time in the history of the Church. Their church, living isolated for centuries from the major cultural movements that had shaped Western Christianity, was fighting against "a tremendous atheistic propaganda." All at once at this late date, it was being shaken and torn by the leading ideas and ideals of the Renaissance, the Reformation, the French Revolution, Socialism, and Communism. Hence, Nuelsen wanted to see the Methodist Church invest substantial funds in assisting every promising reform movement within the Orthodox Church.

Realizing that more than lack of money lay back of the reluctance of the Methodist Church to aid the Russian Church, Nuelsen boldly grasped the deeper issue molded by the fears and antipathies evoked by anything smacking of support of Communism or the Red regime in Russia. Referring to the readiness of leaders in the Russian Church to receive counsel, inspiration, and material help from American sources, he said:

The issues have been blurred by some American writers. The religious questions have been confounded with political and economic problems. What if some of these men are leaning toward Communism in their economic views[?]. Is the gospel of Jesus identical with our capitalistic order of society? One of the greatest mistakes which the state churches of Europe committed was to identify organized Christianity with [the] monarchical form of government. Let us beware of the mistake of identifying organized Christianity with either capitalistic or Communistic order of society.

On the tenth day of the General Conference session, the members listened to the reading of a cablegram from the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church:

Holy Synod sends fraternal greetings to your great Conference, trusting that Holy Spirit will guide you wisely at this time of unprecedented need for world peace. Our Church will never forget Samaritan service which Bishops Blake, Nuelsen, Doctors Hartman, Hecker, and your whole Church have unselfishly rendered us. May this be beginning of closer relationship of our Churches and nations.

The Conference ordered its Committee of Fraternal Delegates to make a "suitable" reply. Suitable or not, the real answer of the General Conference was its adoption a fortnight later of a report of its Committee on Foreign Missions, whose sixty-line treatment of Russia and the Baltic States devoted only seventeen lines to Russia taken by itself. It dealt with the future program for Russia in a single sentence :

As our work in Russia is not operating as a so-called church of religious activity, but under the caption "American Methodist Relief and Child Welfare," it would seem most advisable to strengthen that part of our activity by giving a regular amount for that purpose.

Garbled and inaccurate as the sentence was—particularly in view of numerous careful descriptions of the Russian situation by Blake, Nuelsen, and Hartman—its essential message was unmistakable: The General Conference declined to commit the Methodist Episcopal Church to give aid to the Russian Orthodox Church or to advocate any other major advance in its work in Russia.

During the quadrennium ending in 1924, Bishop Nuelsen had found the superintendency of the Russia mission a problem. Development of the old work and inauguration of a prospective broader enterprise required the attention of a Superintendent resident in Russia and available for residence in Moscow if that should become a Methodist center. Nothing could be done in Russia without the co-operation or the toleration of the government, which was intent upon building and protecting a Communist society. Any Methodist superintendent from outside Russia, therefore, would have to be politically acceptable to the government in order to carry on the work of the Mission or even to be permitted to enter the country. Bishop Nuelsen felt that to continue the close relationship of the Russia mission with the mission in the Baltic States, which were politically antagonistic to the Soviet regime and harbored counteractivity against it, was in this perspective an embarrassment in attempting to gain and keep the confidence of Russian officialdom. And to have the Methodist superintendent resident in the Baltics and carrying on his activity there through working relationships with the three anti-Russian governments made the embarrassment all the more concrete.

Unfortunately all these considerations applied to the position of George A. Simons, the appointed Superintendent, in ways disadvantageous to the enlargement of the program for Russia. To cap it all, Simons had become strongly anti-Communist, had so expressed himself publicly, and had gained

a good deal of attention for it in the United States. Simons evidently was not entirely unacceptable to at least some Russian officials, especially in Leningrad and on one occasion in Moscow, but Nuelsen found, upon himself applying to enter Russia, that Simons officially was *persona non grata* there and would not be allowed to enter the country. When the Bishop visited Moscow, he learned there also that Simons was in official disfavor. He finally concluded that such privileges as Simons eventually received were granted him because of the good will created by Methodist Relief and by the publicly helpful activities of Sister Anna Eklund and her Leningrad associates. The Russians tolerated Simons, insofar as they did, because of the Methodist mission—not the reverse, which was the impression Simons tended to convey in Methodist circles. In Nuelsen's view, Simons was politically as well as psychologically far from ideally fitted to head the Methodist mission under a regime devoted to Communism.

In 1922, the Bishop began discussing with the New York office the desirability of divorcing Simons from the Russia mission and getting another man, who would reside on the field. Since no ready solution appeared, however, Nuelsen had to continue working within the same unsatisfactory pattern. It was all the more difficult because Simons, who had molded his leadership of the Russian workers on a highly personalized basis and was very possessive about the enterprise he had developed there over a decade, was insistent upon going to Russia and taking a direct hand in Mission affairs. When he came to Helsinki to join on his own initiative the party accompanying Nuelsen into Russia on his first visit, the Bishop had to decline to take him along.

After returning from Russia, Nuelsen relieved Simons of the superintendency and treasurership of the Russia mission and restricted his jurisdiction to the Baltic Mission. But Simons refused to recognize the Bishop's order: "Whether you rescind your official decision or not I shall, nevertheless, devote my strength and time to Russia, to Sister Anna's humanitarian work as well as to the extension of our beloved Methodist work in such a manner as I shall be able to do . . ." Simons was as good as his word; late in December, he flouted the Bishop's authority by going to Russia without notice and spending seven weeks there, acting in numerous ways as though he still were the Superintendent. Evidently, he was able to enter the country and enjoy freedom of movement there because he was vouched for by Sister Anna Eklund. His stay included two weeks in Moscow.

While he was in Russia, superseding Nuelsen's earlier arrangements, Simons made some kind of official registration of the various parts of the Methodist work, with himself evidently being recognized as Superintendent. He then cabled the New York office from Moscow requesting that the Board and the Bishops take no action of any kind about the Russia field without consulting him, Sister Anna, Oscar Poeld, and Johann Sante, Poeld's Len-

ingrad associate. The Secretaries bluntly backed the Bishop, cabling Simons that he must accept Nuelsen's authority and his action on the Russia superintendency and that the Board would send relief funds for Russia only under supervision of the Bishop. Writing to Secretary North, Nuelsen expressed his disappointment and distress at Simons's action, interpreting it as an attempt to force his reinstatement as Superintendent of the Russia mission. He felt sure, lacking knowledge of what Simons actually did in Russia, that the Leningrad situation would be greatly complicated. "Sister Anna," he said, "is completely under the influence of Doctor Simons. She will go to any lengths and risk anything to have Doctor Simons remain in Russia." And he observed, "It sometimes seems to me as though these good people look upon our whole work there as a personal affair of Doctor Simons and Sister Anna." He confessed himself unable to be governed by their personal preferences.

To Simons himself Bishop Nuelsen wrote characterizing his unauthorized visit to Russia as a clear case of maladministration. Late in February, 1923, he had an intensive conference with Simons in Zurich on this and other complaints about the latter's activities. As a result, Simons's removal from the Russia mission was confirmed and he was forbidden to go to Russia without special permission from the Bishop. In addition to the factors considered previously, Nuelsen's decision was influenced in part by the emergence of a clear difference between the two men concerning Russia mission policy. Simons believed that the Russian government would not tolerate openly evangelistic work and that it was necessary to disguise it from the Russian officials as humanitarian work. Nuelsen believed not only that Russia was open to genuinely evangelistic endeavor but also that the Russian people should know that Methodism had a definite spiritual message and that its humanitarian activity was the result of its religious convictions. He also believed that the Methodists should orient their evangelism toward "real Russians," not simply to Germans, Finns, and Americans, the groups strongly predominating in the work cultivated by Simons.

Simons was allowed to remain in charge of the Baltic work, but Nuelsen wrote Secretary North that the Board should find an understudy for him who eventually should take his place. He was confirmed in this view by receiving evidence that Simons not only was psychologically incapable of overcoming his obsession with Russia, but also was becoming less acceptable among workers in the Baltic area. He was convinced that Simons was under great strain, somewhat confused, experiencing difficulty in practical concentration, perhaps approaching a nervous breakdown. But again, no solution appeared, and Nuelsen continued to have severe difficulties with Simons, whom he found it necessary to dispatch to Russia once again in order to prepare the way for a change in the leadership of the Leningrad mission. Simons insisted upon acting as a law unto himself, especially as to the Russia

mission—undermining the Bishop's plans, failing to report, using dictatorial methods, disobeying orders, stubbornly pursuing his own objectives, and finally decisively alienating the Russian authorities.

The problem of Simons's unsatisfactory relation to the Russia mission finally was handled in the course of implementing a formal change in the Disciplinary organization of the work. As a result of General Conference action, the Baltic Mission was reorganized in 1924 as a Mission Conference and assigned to the Copenhagen Area, which was administered by Bishop Bast. At the same time the Russia Mission Conference was divested of its Baltic appointments and for the first time met as a solely Russian organization. Bishop Nuelsen transferred Simons out of the Russia Mission Conference and into the new Baltic and Slavic Conference, of which he remained the Superintendent until what proved to be his terminal furlough in 1928.

The position of the Methodist Episcopal Church with regard to its commitment to Russia became clearer in the quadrennium beginning in 1924. In that year, the Board spent a total of \$20,000 for the Russia work, but the appropriation for 1925 was cut to \$3,000. In 1938 it was only \$3,500. At the General Conference of 1928, Bishop Nuelsen told the members that this contribution was not to the credit of the Church. He declared, "Methodism is marking time in Russia, while the most unprecedented providential opportunities are beckoning us to advance." In 1928, the Russia Mission Conference was assigned to the Stockholm Area and came under the administration of Bishop Raymond J. Wade. No Superintendent was dispatched to Russia, and Sister Anna Eklund remained the leading figure in the Mission until her health failed in 1934 and she retired to Finland. By that time, the government's antireligious policy had tightened, and the Mission was laboring under what was a heavy load of taxes for a small mission supported by an annual appropriation of only \$950. Beginning in 1935, the appropriation dropped to \$500, and for 1940 there was none. Episcopal and Board contacts with the Russia mission became minimal, and by the outbreak of World War II, the Methodist Church in the United States had little information about it.

Finland

The Finland Conference, ministering in a land militarily and economically ravaged by war, began the nineteen-twenties with the financial advantage of having its entire church debt removed by contributions from the Centenary Movement. In the first quadrennium, the Conference benefitted from numerous revivals, enjoying a substantial increase in church membership and advances in giving both for domestic self-support and for foreign missions. Half a dozen new churches were organized, and a like number of societies acquired church buildings.

Up to this time, both the Finnish-speaking and the Swedish-speaking Churches belonged to the same Conference. In 1924, however, the General Conference divided the Conference on a language basis, setting apart the Swedish churches as the Finland Swedish Mission Conference and leaving the Finnish Methodists in the Finland Conference. The former Conference achieved Annual Conference status in 1930.

At the time of the division, the Finland Conference, which drew its constituents from among 90 per cent of the population, had sixteen hundred church members, and the Finland Swedish Mission Conference, which drew from a minority of the population and was a more transient group because of continual homegoings to Sweden, had a thousand members. During the twenties and thirties, the two Conferences showed only temporary or very small increases in membership. Together they had at the end of the period twenty-six hundred members.

Scandinavia

During the first quadrennium of the period, the Scandinavian countries still were struggling to lift themselves out of the economic dislocation and depression into which they had fallen because of the European war. The Methodist churches naturally were in financial straits during these years, but they contributed generously to relief work in Austria and Germany and took underfed German and Austrian children into their homes even while political feeling still ran high. In spite of the years required for recovery, the Scandinavian churches began to work toward self-support without Board appropriations.

Bishop Nuelsen told the General Conference of 1920 that he confidently expected Scandinavian Methodism, with the help of Centenary funds, to be on a self-supporting financial basis by the end of the quadrennium. But Centenary receipts were disappointing, and in spite of advances in self-support in the three countries, the combined Board appropriation for 1925 was \$38,000. The three Conferences steadily applied themselves to the problem, however, eventually with great success. Five years later, receipts from appropriations were down to \$24,000; in 1933, they were \$7,700; and in 1939, they were only \$1,600, with Sweden receiving only \$250.

While they were endeavoring to become self-supporting members of the world-wide Methodist community, the Scandinavian Methodists also devoted themselves to increasing their contributions to foreign missions. By 1932, the Sweden Conference had for some years been giving more for Methodist missions within and outside the country than it received from Board appropriations. In the following quadrennium, each of the Conferences increased its foreign missions giving for three consecutive years, contributing through both the Board and the Scandinavian unit of the W.F.M.S. The women

gave substantial support to the maintenance of women missionaries in Angola, North Africa, and India.

Scandinavian Methodism's over-all church membership, however, declined during the same period that its financial strength and independence were increasing. The Norway Conference membership in 1939 was 6,400, a gain of fifteen hundred over the two decades. But the Denmark Conference, (3,100 members) had lost seven hundred since 1920, and the Sweden Conference (13,000 members) had lost three thousand.

Switzerland

As head of the Zurich Area, Bishop John L. Nuelsen resided in Switzerland throughout the two decades. Here as elsewhere in the parts of the European field under his direction, he always was interested in bringing about better relations between the Methodists and the state churches. In 1922, the Methodist Episcopal Church in Switzerland was admitted into the Church Federation of Switzerland, an organization that included the Evangelical National Churches in the various cantons, thus becoming the first free church to be so received on a footing of equality. Nuelsen's gratification was reflected in his description of the event to the General Conference of 1924 as constituting the outstanding fact about the Switzerland Conference for the preceding quadrennium.

Bishop Nuelsen also found significance, however, in the heroic efforts the Swiss Methodists made to move towards self-support in spite of severe economic conditions produced by the recent war. And along with their efforts to provide financially for their own churches, they engaged deeply in relief services for economically stricken Germany and Austria. During the early twenties, they took thousands of German and Austrian children into their homes for one or two months at a time, meanwhile feeding and clothing them. Their relief activity resulted in dispatching sixty freight cars of clothing and provisions into Austria and Germany.

By 1936, the Switzerland Conference not only was fully self-supporting, but also was assuming financial responsibility for Methodist enterprises elsewhere in Europe and beyond. There were 177 W.F.M.S. societies, whose representatives co-operated with the Conference in a unified program for support of foreign missions. Seven missionaries of the international W.F.M.S. and four Board missionaries received all or part of their support from Swiss sources. Swiss Methodists were providing the bulk of the financial base for the work in Austria, Hungary, and Yugoslavia. Indeed, Bishop Nuelsen declared that but for the funds contributed by the Swiss, it would have been necessary to abandon the three Southeast European missions.

In 1920, the Swiss church had ten thousand members; in 1939, there were twelve thousand. And by the end of 1939, these Swiss Methodists—so stra-

telegically situated in the heart of warring Europe—were caught up once again in an effort to provide as before humanitarian alleviation of the problems and sufferings of people scourged by yet another world conflict.

France

When Bishop Edgar Blake came to the Paris Area in 1920, the France mission was in an expansive phase. The period of immediate war relief was over, and implementation of an extensive program for the development of the Mission's institutions and for the establishment of Methodist social centers had begun. With strong backing from the Centenary Movement, the Mission was engaged in acquiring properties for churches and social service centers on a scale not dreamed of in the Mission's first decade.

The most extensive and widely known of the new social service ventures was a village project along the Marne River in the vicinity of Château-Thierry. At its height, the program provided relief and social services to thirty-two villages assigned to the France mission by the French government. Château-Thierry was the headquarters for the entire project and the site of a three-story social center for the people of the community. The other towns were reached through ten centers equipped with portable huts purchased from the Y.M.C.A. and staffed by two French-speaking young women at each center. A number of surplus Red Cross and Y.M.C.A. trucks and cars were used to service the area. Although the Methodist workers helped restore the Protestant church in the village of Monneaux and sometimes assisted temporarily in rebuilding homes, the major work of reconstruction was in the hands of the government, the principal function of the Methodist mission being to help the people take up life again in their war-blasted villages. The personnel engaged was mainly men and women released from Y.M.C.A. and Y.W.C.A. work, though some came directly from the United States. The project was begun in the summer of 1919 by Albert H. Marion and his wife from New Jersey. The permanent director, Julian S. Wadsworth, and his wife arrived to take charge in September.

The Mission hardly had under way the expansion program of which the Château-Thierry project was a part, when the pattern of financial expectations evoked by the Centenary campaign fell apart, necessitating drastic retrenchment in France, as in many Methodist fields. No new projects were begun under Bishop Blake's administration, for completion of payments on various properties that already were planned for was soon overlapped by reductions in appropriations and by the initiation of a schedule of gradual disposal of institutional real estate holdings, beginning with those where it had become impossible to open or carry forward the projected activities. The first decisions to sell were made in 1922, and the process of sale or transfer continued

through the first two years of Bishop William O. Shepard's administration, to 1930.

As the Mission variously divested itself of its properties—churches, schools, orphanages, or social centers—it also reduced its missionary personnel. In 1923, there were sixteen missionaries or special workers: Ernest W. Bysse, Roy A. Welker, Alfred T. Halsted, Julian A. Wadsworth, Paul Burt, Emile J. Palisoul, Edgar Blake, Jr., and their wives and two W.F.M.S. missionaries, Grace M. Currier and Gertrude C. Lockhead. By the end of 1929, only four actually were on the field, and the regular church work was being superintended by a French minister, Emile Lanniée. In 1930, Julian Wadsworth and his wife, withdrew from the field. By that time, the village work outlying from Château-Thierry had been turned over to the French communities themselves. And that is what was done with the much more fully developed Château-Thierry center known as the Methodist Memorial when Wadsworth went home; it was transferred to the municipality along with an endowment of \$20,000 for its maintenance, it being understood that the social center for the people would be continued.

The year 1930 was decisive for the France mission. Adopting a recommendation of the Corresponding Secretaries, the Board's Annual Meeting voted that appropriations for the Methodist work in France be discontinued within two years, in the meantime being maintained at 50 per cent in order to allow for certain current financial obligations and for organizational adjustments. The Board expressed the hope that other evangelical bodies would take over the evangelistic and pastoral work, which was organized in a score of charges, and the Secretaries were authorized to enter into negotiations to that end. Bishop Shepard already had had conversations with representatives of the Wesleyan Methodist Church (British) regarding union of the two Missions. He did not consider turning over to the Wesleyans what was left of the France mission to be a practical arrangement, but preferred to have the Methodist Episcopal Church participate financially and otherwise in some kind of co-operative enterprise.

Further discussions with the Wesleyans produced no agreement for the transfer of the Methodist Episcopal churches to Wesleyan jurisdiction. The churches in the Alsace District—Strasbourg, Colmar, and Haguenau—which had entered the France Mission Conference following the World War, were transferred into the Switzerland Conference in July, 1931 along with their pastors. This change was confirmed by the General Conference in 1932 by redefinition of the Switzerland Conference to include the German-speaking churches in France. During the next few years, almost all the rest of the congregations were transferred to Reformed churches. One church remained independent. Some pastors were transferred and some were retired. A final session of the France Mission Conference was held in April, 1935, and at that time, the Spanish churches, Seville and Alicante, with their pastors, having

been affiliated until then with the work in France, were transferred to the North Africa Conference. Except for a few vestigial property holdings, the France mission, including both the Board work and the W.F.M.S. projects, was finished by the time of the General Conference of 1936.

Italy

The Board of Foreign Missions undertook in Italy during the twenties and thirties a program of withdrawal similar to its surrender of the mission in France. Although the final result of its action was not foreseen at the time to be withdrawal, the Board adopted at its Annual Meeting in 1927 a policy that started the Mission moving toward that outcome. Even more directly than in the case of France, the new policy grew out of the studies of the European deputation of the Board's Committee of Ten for the survey and evaluation of the foreign fields.

The Deputation examined a number of aspects of the Mission that called for remedial action or brought into question the degree of Board support it merited. In 1926, there were just over three thousand church members, and this level of membership had not changed for the past sixteen years. The Deputation reported:

There are some weak churches with a mere handful of members. There are some churches in places where the continuation of a church is not justified. Until recently there has never been any systematic encouragement toward assuming self-support. Some of the pastors are weak and inefficient. As a result there are churches that have not shown any growth in years.

The examining team found that the Mission, including the International Institute opened on Rome's Monte Mario in 1921 as successor to the Boys' School, was heavily in debt, partly as the result of decreasing appropriations by the Board, but even more substantially so because of the field policy of covering annual deficits with loans that remained unpaid. Although measures taken recently by Bishop Edgar Blake, John M. Maynard (newly appointed Mission Treasurer), and Carlo M. Ferreri (Superintendent of the Italy District) working together, had improved the general administration of the field, the Deputation reported that much more needed doing.

The Commission therefore recommended continuation of the recent reorganizing of the ministerial and parochial aspects of the Mission, which involved closing certain unfruitful charges, retiring inefficient ministers, selling unused local properties, and reducing a number of church charges to the status of points on Circuits. It favored complete reorganization of the finances of the Monte Mario Institute on a nondeficit basis so as to support it adequately "as a matter of major importance in the southern European field." Even more broadly, it urged that the entire expensive 10 per cent

bank loan outstanding in Rome be paid and the debt transferred to New York, to be liquidated by sale of properties in Italy. Other remedies advanced by the Commission included the proposals that support of formal theological training be discontinued, that the Italian-speaking churches in Switzerland be transferred to the Switzerland Conference, and that beginning with the year 1930, appropriations for Italy be reduced annually. Thus was established—for the Board adopted the recommendations—the essential pattern that ultimately effected the Board's withdrawal from Italy.

The proposal that was crucial in turning this pattern of reorganization into a process of withdrawal was the provision for reduced appropriations, which was put into effect for 1930 as planned. In that year, the Board allotted the Mission \$53,700, a drop of \$5,400 from the 1929 figure. Appropriations were cut in the succeeding years to \$47,700, \$42,600, \$18,100, \$16,400, until in 1935 the Mission had only \$5,400 (it was designated entirely for Monte Mario) and in 1936 no funds at all from New York. The Board had voted in 1930 to schedule the reductions in such a way that the Italy mission would be self-supporting in twenty years, but the entire process was thus completed by 1935-6. In reaffirming the general appropriations policy for Italy in 1931, "The permanency of our work in Italy is not to be questioned." But the Board's increasingly difficult shrinkage of income for its worldwide missionary effort forced adoption of the reductions for Italy regardless of the capacity of the Italy mission to adjust itself to such rapid changes. Appropriations went down far faster than self-support could be increased.

This overpowering financial pressure speeded up implementation of the general reforms suggested by the Committee of Ten, but some more effective method had to be found to conserve the interests of the Italian constituency of the Methodist Episcopal Church. In 1932, Bishop Nuelsen, with John Maynard and Carlo Ferreri, turned to union with the Wesleyans as a possible solution, Bishop Nuelsen holding several conferences with Wesleyan leaders in London. The Board approved these overtures, and after the movement was furthered by the simultaneous convening of the British and the American-sponsored Conferences in Naples in 1933, the Board empowered Nuelsen and Ferreri to negotiate on its behalf definite proposals for union.

In 1934, with the Venice Industrial School already closed and up for sale and with the W.F.M.S. announcing its intention to withdraw from Italy, the Methodist Episcopal leadership (Bishop Nuelsen, Superintendent Ferreri, Corresponding Secretary Ralph E. Diffendorfer, and Board Treasurer Morris W. Ehnes) made a set of concrete proposals for the adoption by the Methodist Missionary Society (London) of all the Methodist Episcopal work in Italy. To the American churchmen, the union was an urgent concern, for a further financial cut was about to be made. They informed the British Methodist officials, "Should you not find it possible to accept this proposed adjustment, we see no other alternative but to liquidate our Church work in

Italy, immediately, and regret that we shall be compelled to so recommend."

The negotiators reserved from the transfer scheme only Monte Mario International Institute. When in 1914 they purchased the ground for the Institute (or College) on the hill of Monte Mario, overlooking the Vatican precincts, with the dome of St. Peter's clearly visible in the vista below, the Methodists had been proudly aware of the function of this elevated site as a symbol of the challenge of the evangelical message to the Roman Catholic Church. They heavily invested in the Institute both through appropriations and through special gifts in order to provide good buildings for it and to maintain it as a school of educational and inspirational value for the evangelical movement. When it was opened on the new site in 1921, it was subjected to blasts of public criticism. Roman Catholic priests and prelates, both Italians and Americans, strongly seconded by the Roman Catholic press and other journals in Italy and the United States, fiercely condemned the Methodist move to Monte Mario as arrogant religious and cultural aggression against Italy and her people by an alien, American organization. Methodists both in Italy and in the United States roundly defended Monte Mario in the name of religious freedom, being afraid that the attacks would bring about suppression of the Institute by the civil authorities. Though they did not burn so hotly as in the shorter Methodist-Catholic conflict of 1910, the fires of controversy flamed for awhile, then died down, and smoldered for a few years. The government, however, did not intervene to ban or seriously to restrict the Methodist institution, and it continued to operate for a decade and a half.

During its first years, the Institute attracted a numerous clientele, thus necessitating expansion of its facilities. Although the visiting representatives of the Commission of Ten found it a school somewhat below the high school level, they were impressed by its already achieved quality and its possibilities for the future. Toward the end of the twenties, however, its registration seriously declined. The drop resulted not from harassment or repression by the Fascist regime or from any handicap laid upon the Methodists because of the rapprochement between the Roman Church and the government and the climactic signing of the Lateran treaty and concordat between the Vatican and the government in 1929, but from a more general result of the heightened nationalism of the Fascist period. What cut down the Institute's Italian clientele was the fact that in the new atmosphere, Italian parents now desired to have Italian-oriented education for their boys.

Having reacted so strongly in defense of Monte Mario and having put so much into its development, the Methodists found it an interest and a symbol hard to put aside. They tried to the end to keep the Institute open, reserving for it their last Italy appropriation, which was made in 1935. The institution finally was closed in 1936 because of the establishment of a govern-

ment policy to permit and encourage only national schools. Crandon Institute, which was maintained by the W.F.M.S. also was closed.

Substantial negotiations with the British Methodists continued into 1937, but no agreement for the transfer of the Methodist Episcopal Churches could be worked out. The essential difficulty was that the Methodist Episcopal Board of Foreign Missions could not readily extricate itself from its legal and financial involvements in Italy, and the British group was not in a position to take over the American-sponsored churches unless they could come into union unburdened by the financial handicaps carried by the New York Board. It appeared that according to Italian law, the Methodist Episcopal Church in Italy had no sufficient legal standing, and the Board of Foreign Missions was the owner of all the Mission's property except Crandon Institute, which was held by the W.F.M.S. The Board also paid all the bills of all the Mission projects, including the salaries of the pastors. Thus it was legally the employer of all the ministers in the Italian Methodist Churches. It therefore came under the operation of government regulations requiring that all employees retired or otherwise removed from employment be indemnified by the employer. This provision made it necessary for the Board to secure large funds to finance terminal pay of all the ministers who were not to be continued in service under the policy of concentration governing first the reorganization of the present church and then, prospectively, the transfer to the British jurisdiction. It was a complicated and embarrassing situation, which was made more difficult by government red tape that delayed real estate sales and also by a ban on sending funds out of Italy. Once Monte Mario was closed, its sale became important to the solution of the entire financial problem upon which union with the British Methodists hinged. That was not realized until 1939.

By the end of that year, a number of other Methodist properties had been sold, including those in Naples, Bari, Pistoia, and Firenze and the Industrial Institute in Venice. The Board finished indemnifying the pastors not being continued in service, employing therefor a rate fixed by the government. Their ecclesiastical status and relevant government regulations were covered by their being transferred, twenty-two of them, into the Switzerland Conference. There twenty were placed in the technical category "located," and two withdrew from the ministry. Bishop Nuelsen retained six ministers to serve in a group of Methodist churches that had not been sold. Five former ministers were designated to serve with them as supply pastors. Around this small ministerial corps was arranged a pattern of twenty-nine churches—seven as stations for regular ministers, eight to be served by supply pastors, and fourteen constituting local groups for occasional visitation. The regular ministers became the members of a new Italy Mission Conference, succeeding the former Italy Annual Conference. Since government regulations forbade allocation of further proceeds of sales of property to current uses, the remain-

ing churches were to be supported by contributions in Italy and by the income from funds already invested there. The Board would make no further appropriations to Italy; it would remain only as the technical holder, ad interim, of Methodist property. This constituted withdrawal of the Board from Italy as a working missionary organization, but it protected residual Methodist property interests and left a nucleus of churches that could form in the future an alliance with some other group—perhaps the British Methodists, perhaps the Waldensians.

The inauguration of this plan left the Italian Methodists (there now were fourteen hundred church members) practically, if not technically, an independent church. When Bishop Nuelsen held the Mission Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church of Italy in Milan in October, 1939, the appointments listed as the seven central stations churches in Bologna, Genoa, Milan, Portici, Rome, Turin, and Venice.

The following October, the Mission Conference, meeting in Rome under the assigned presidency of Carlo Ferreri, the Superintendent, took a final step into independence. Earlier in the year, the Board's Executive Committee had voted to donate to the Methodist Episcopal Church of Italy the Board's Italian properties and had prepared and proffered a deed understood to be in harmony with Italian legal procedures. When the Mission Conference met, the members voted that the Italian church become autonomous and independent, believing that this was the only basis on which it could have a secure position in Italy. The new Church resolved to remain Methodist in name, in doctrine, in discipline, and in loyalty to the Methodist tradition and to maintain fellowship with the American church. It elected Carlo M. Ferreri as its Superintendent. The deed of donation was not formally accepted by the Italian church because of the outbreak of World War II, and the property question had to be reopened in 1946, following the union of the American and the British branches of Italian Methodism.

Spain

The *Discipline* for 1920 included a new boundary definition that represented full and final acceptance by the Methodist Episcopal Church of a new mission in Europe: "Spain Mission shall include the work in Spain." The mission was acquired by adoption in March, 1919, when representatives of the Board of Foreign Missions signed in Spain agreements to take over the Evangelical School in Seville and the Model School in Alicante. It was done by a few pen strokes, but it was preceded by fully a decade of serious discussion by American Methodist leaders of the advisability of opening a mission in Spain.

Charles W. Drees, the experienced Latin America missionary leader, opened up the question with the Board's Corresponding Secretaries in 1908.

Naturally, it was a proposal for the General Committee of Foreign Missions to handle. Secretary Adna B. Leonard was categorically opposed to entrance into Spain, and his assistant Homer C. Stuntz was hesitant. They finally decided not to prejudice the question by taking it to the General Committee in 1909, for the Board was grappling with a debt of \$112,000 that was beginning to cripple already established missions because of reduced funds. The following spring, however, the Board of Managers requested Frank Mason North, William I. Haven, and James M. Buckley, all of whom were scheduled to visit Spain, to investigate there and report to the Board on the advisability of opening mission work in that country. The Board heard the reports of its three members in October; Haven and North were for opening a mission, Buckley was against it.

When the General Committee took up the question on 5 November, it had before it the reports of these three investigators and two letters from James L. Barton, secretary of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions. Barton stated that the American Board was ready, for administrative reasons, to transfer all its interests in Spain to the Methodist Episcopal Church if it would take up work there. The transfer would involve eight organized churches, primary and intermediate schools with a total of a thousand pupils, and \$20,000-worth of property belonging to three stations. By a vote of 35 to 24, the Committee accepted Buckley's negative position—that the social, religious, and financial obstacles were too great to justify a Methodist opening in Spain. It also declined with regret the American Board's "generous proposition."

The year 1910 saw a new Liberal premier, José Canalejas, with the approval of Alfonso XIII, sharply challenging the Roman Catholic Church on a number of substantial questions. Standing for liberty of conscience, his government undertook to implement by law the principle of religious toleration that was written into the same Constitution that recognized Catholicism as the religion of the state. But the Roman hierarchy in Spain made a massive counterattack, and the Vatican intervened. Canalejas himself countered by withdrawing the Spanish ambassador to the Vatican. No solution had been effected when in November, 1912, Canalejas was slain by an anarchist. Evangelical worshipers and preachers were left as before—loaded with legal handicaps, barred from fully public exercise of worship, and pressed down by unofficial but numerous sanctions instigated by the Catholic clergy and enforced by hostile Catholic laymen. The Alicante mission, of course, felt many a turn of the screw, as did Evangelical groups elsewhere in the kingdom.

Interest in projecting Methodism into Spain did not die. The Central Conference of Europe, meeting in Rome in 1911, recommended it to the Board of Foreign Missions. In 1914, Secretary S. Earl Taylor, while on a tour of Europe, visited Spain and viewed the work of the Evangelical schools in Seville and Alicante. Upon his return, he reported that these

cities were important evangelical centers and expressed the urgent hope that the Methodists would go to work in them. Charles Drees also visited Spain in 1914. Later in the year, the General Committee raised a Committee on Work in Spain to report a year hence on all that was related to a request received from the Irish Presbyterian Church that the Methodists take over their work in Spain. William Haven and Earl Taylor were among the members of the Committee. A month later, the Special Committee on War Relief Measures appropriated \$200 and \$500 for special needs in the schools in Seville and Alicante, respectively—the first of several such allocations. Bishop John L. Nuelsen and Frank Mason North, now a Corresponding Secretary, wrote each other about the Spain question in 1916: both were favorable to an opening, both were against pressing it upon the Board prematurely. The General Committee had continued the Committee on Work in Spain in 1915 but did not act decisively until November, 1918. It then adopted a recommendation of the exploratory Commission on Europe that a special committee go to Europe to investigate opportunities in France, Belgium, and Spain, with the Board's Executive Committee empowered to decide, on the basis of the special committee's report, whether mission centers should be started there.

So it was that North and Bishop William F. Anderson, members of the special committee, accompanied by Edwin F. Frease of North Africa, went to Spain in March, 1919, and agreed to accept the work and the property associated with the Seville and Alicante schools. The two projects at once received cash for appropriations for the first quarter of 1919. All together, North and Anderson obligated the Board for \$15,000 for the first year and cabled Secretary Taylor that there should be a large investment in Spain later. The Board promptly confirmed what North and Anderson had done and sent Charles Drees to Spain briefly to make further arrangements for the new Methodist work and to attend the congress of Evangelical Churches assembled in Madrid to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the provision for religious toleration written into the liberal Constitution of 1869 and to promote religious liberty and freedom of conscience. Drees, who knew the country well from extended residence during Bible translation work, made a second, longer visit to Spain in the fall.

The mission in Seville was founded by a preacher named Cabrera, who appeared in the city a few days after the Liberal and anti-Bourbon revolution of 1868, making his first public address from one of the tables of the Cafe de Emperadores. He soon formed the Holy Trinity Church in a private house and then opened schools for boys and for girls. His second successor, Emilio Carreño, became pastor and headmaster in 1894 and was still in charge in 1919. The congregation belonged to one of three presbyteries in Spain that were united in the Iglesia Evangelica Española (Spanish Evangelical Church). Mr. and Mrs. George D. Crawford, originally from Scotland, but

long resident in Spain, were the chief supporters of the Seville church and its schools, which met in rented property. The schools had an average attendance of well over two hundred children, and the church was conducting both adult services and children's Sunday school classes. But when the Methodists took it up, the mission was badly in need of financial reinforcement.

The Alicante Model School was conducted by Francisco Albricias, its owner and founder, who had been a missionary evangelist in Spain for more than twenty-five years when he established the School in 1897. Alicante, whose adult literacy rate was very high, needed good schools. The public schools were few and, like the various neighborhood private schools, were badly housed. In the midst of what Albricias called "this lamentable state of affairs," the Roman Catholic Church had no schools at all. Albricias had maintained his Model School as an independent Evangelical enterprise, supporting it by his own efforts and by gifts from friends out of his student days in Switzerland. He turned to the Methodist Episcopal Church in order to perpetuate the Evangelical use of the property he had bought and developed. There were more than three hundred boys in the school, who were drawn from all the provinces of Spain, from Cuba, from South America, even from the Philippines. Albricias' Sunday school reached more than five hundred children, and people came to the center twice a week for Evangelical church services. Albricias also distributed tracts and Gospel portions, and he preached in half a dozen surrounding villages.

Between the mission in Alicante and the one in Seville there was hardly any functional relationship either before or after the Methodists assumed responsibility for them. To be sure, they became officially components of the Spain Mission, which the General Conference defined in 1920 and then assigned to the Paris Area, supervised by Bishop Edgar Blake. But the Mission never met as such and never was formally organized. The few Methodist ministers assigned to it held their Conference relations with the France Mission Conference until 1935, when the remaining minister was transferred to the North Africa Conference. Except for the two brief advisory visits by Charles Drees in 1919, the Spain Mission never had a superintendent. There were occasional inspections by the Bishops assigned to Paris and by official or semi-official representatives of the Board of Foreign Missions. But for the most part, the Board's Secretaries administered the Mission by correspondence from New York. Above all, the enterprise was another of the Church's missions without missionaries; according to Board policy none of the Spaniards involved in the work could receive that status.

Methodist sponsorship of the Seville Evangelical Mission lasted for fourteen years. Mrs. Crawford, widowed less than a year after the arrangement was inaugurated, became the Board's perennial agent in Seville, unflaggingly soliciting gifts from British friends, directing application of the Board's appropriations, fixing up property, and shaping policy for the schools. She gave

up her unofficial superintendency of the work in 1932, but only because she was seventy-six years old and an invalid and was ready to follow her family to Switzerland. For some years, her son Robert did the minimal work of the Mission's treasury, and her son-in-law, son of an Italian Methodist preacher, succeeded her briefly as the Board's business agent. Mrs. Crawford's initiative was crucial, for in Seville itself there was no other strong lay sponsorship for the mission. Emilio Carreño died in 1921 and was succeeded by Patricio Gomez, who was received on trial in the France Mission Conference in 1922.

The initial planning for the new mission in Spain partook of the sometimes inflated optimism of the projected Centenary program for world Methodism. A few weeks after North and Anderson committed the Board to responsibility for the Seville and Alicante enterprises, readers of *The Christian Advocate* learned that the Centenary planners had mapped out a five-year program involving expenditure of \$708,500 among four important centers in Spain. Two of them were Alicante and Seville. In addition, Madrid was to have a large student center and three community centers intended especially for industrial workers, and Barcelona was to have three community centers. The plan had not been formally adopted by the Board, but it represented the scale on which the Centenary leaders were projecting the future of Methodism in Spain. Late in the year, the Board's Executive Committee allocated \$25,000 to Spain for 1920. But that turned out to be the largest appropriation ever made for that field. Contributions to the Centenary failed to match the Church's great expectations, and the Board never was able to implement its large hopes for Spain. The Mission began to suffer from financial malnutrition almost as soon as it was born.

Seville, the weaker of the two local missions, was the first to feel the deficiency. It had no school building of its own, and its rented quarters were unsuitable and overcrowded with the several hundred children that from time to time were enrolled. At the beginning, Secretary North encouraged the Crawfords to expect not only a general strengthening of the work by the Methodists but also early financial support for the purchase of school property, which was essential to the School's progress. But before a year was out, he was writing Mrs. Crawford that the Board could make no property grant in the near future. He cited as reasons the Board's sensitivity to unsettled economic and political conditions in the world and uncertainty about the receipts that could be expected from Centenary pledges. The Board never did come to the point of assisting the Seville mission to meet its crucial building requirements or to secure the better qualified educational leadership it needed. Little money came to the School from the United States beyond the annual appropriations, which began at \$2,300 but did not stay on that level; by 1925, the allotment was down to \$1,250, finally dropping to \$1,000 for the year 1932. Bishop Blake declared to the General Conference in 1928,

"In Seville we have an opportunity even greater than the opportunity in Alicante . . ." But neither he nor any other official visitor was satisfied with the school quarters or the curricular work as they found them in Seville. Hanford Crawford of New York City, an honorary member of the Board of Managers, wrote of his visit in 1926, "No one can think of the school here as standing for the effort of a church of nearly five million members without hanging his head in shame or looking on in derision."

Beginning with 1927, the Seville appropriations were so much in question within the Board that they were made practically, and at times officially, conditional upon prior accomplishment of improvements in the School. Although he acknowledged the Board's responsibility for the Evangelical School, Frank Mason North now turned to the elderly Mrs. Crawford with the suggestion that the Seville mission itself find acceptable new quarters and engage an effective new headmaster qualified to reorganize the School, thus to avoid withdrawal of Methodist support. The Board would be willing, he wrote, to provide no more than \$300 to \$500 extra to help implement the changes. But Mrs. Crawford's earlier contributors no longer were available, and she was all but alone in Seville in her effective devotion to the School. Ironically, North's request meant that its very need for help was being used as an argument against helping it; hardly able to stand on its own feet, it was being asked to pull itself up by its own bootstraps. But the money was found neither in Seville nor through special gifts from the United States.

The Board finally ended its support for Seville in 1932, first cutting its disbursements for the last four months of the year to the level of \$500 a year and then deciding to make no appropriation at all for 1933. Patricio Gomez, who still was in charge in Seville, made a radical adjustment in order to keep the mission going. Utilizing the fund thus far accumulated for building on a larger scale, he bought a modest building in a poor section of the city. There he established his own family quarters, the church meetings, and a sharply reduced school program. On the basis of a promise of a year's salary and a little money for general expenses, he regretfully left the Methodist ministry and allied himself with a Dutch mission that had come to his aid. The Methodist mission in Seville thus was terminated, leaving in the Spain Mission only Alicante.

Francisco Albricias, no longer young or in good health, long had withstood heavily coercive attacks against his work from anti-Evangelical sources. He greatly strengthened the leadership of the Alicante mission by enlisting his two well-trained and capable sons. Franklin Albricias, twenty-nine years old, resigned his professorship in the State Normal School at Albacete in 1920 and took up Model School teaching, Sunday school work, and preaching. In 1923, the other son, 26-year-old Lincoln, a Doctor of Natural Science from the University of Madrid, came to his father's side and soon was director of the school work and business manager for the mission. Francisco

Albricias became a member of the France Mission Conference in 1922 by recognition of his credentials from the "Evangelical Church of Spain," and his son Franklin was received on trial.

In December, 1922, the incumbent Conservative government gave way to a Liberal coalition that soon prepared to change the law so as to permit freedom of public assembly, which would have opened the way for unhampered public activity by Evangelical churches. But when the Cardinal Bishop of Zaragoza threatened its continuance in power shortly before an impending Parliamentary election, the Government backed down from its libertarian position; it renounced the reform and expelled the Minister of the Interior, a representative of the reform element. Franklin Albricias organized a number of meetings of Liberals in Alicante and other places to protest the Government's submission to the reactionary threat. No real improvement in the position of the Evangelicals occurred, however, and the Liberals before long were thrust out of office.

They gave way to General Primo de Rivera, who seized the government in September, 1923, and set up a military dictatorship that lasted more than six years. "This is not an opportune moment to think of enlarging or broadening our activities," wrote Franklin Albricias to Secretary Thomas S. Donohugh, "as political circumstances have brought a formidable Catholic reaction." Indeed, it was a hard time for the Alicante mission. Everywhere in Spain, the Roman hierarchy could count on the de Rivera regime to support its effort to repress the Evangelicals by holding them to the strictest possible observance of the customary prohibition of non-Catholic public worship. No longer was there any effective countervailing public force such as the formerly influential Liberals. Francisco Albricias pointed up the situation for the New York office when he wrote in 1924 that the eminent Miguel de Unamuno, former rector of the University of Salamanca and a non-Protestant, had been deported to the Canary Islands for having spoken out publicly in Madrid for liberty of worship.

In Alicante, the Model School became the target of virulent attack by the local Catholic press and pulpit, which attempted to stamp out its popular influence and to embroil it with the public authorities. "The Model School is a foreign school," declared one newspaper, "a heretical school, an illegal school, an unpatriotic school, a school that is an enemy of God and Jesus Christ, an enemy of the Virgin, and an enemy of society." The Provincial Governor banned the street parades of the Model School student body, which had been accustomed to march out with banners flying and its fife and drum corps playing—a lively form of publicity. He also prohibited public distribution of the School's curricular prospectus and forbade an All Saints Day cemetery observance at which the Methodist group used to distribute a thousand bound Gospels and many tracts. The military government in 1926 more than tripled the School's taxes. Associations of Catholic women sent their

members from door to door to press Model School families to withdraw their children—offering bribes or threatening economic reprisals. At times, they were successful in lowering the registration. The most substantial, perhaps the most constructive, opposition engineered by the Catholics was the opening of deliberately competing schools. By 1929, six Catholic orders had entered Alicante and started large Catholic private schools and also free Catholic schools to serve all sections of the city—a dozen schools in all. The national government also now for the first time came into the local educational field; it opened several excellent schoolhouses near the Model School.

And all the time, until de Rivera fell in 1930, the Catholic priests and press denounced and denounced, the Model School maintained a strong enrollment, the congregation (*Iglesia Metodista Episcopal*) both prudently and boldly endured, and the appropriations from the Board of Foreign Missions sank to their lowest level.

Unlike the Seville school, the Alicante Model School always enjoyed the highest approval of the American Methodists who were familiar with it. From the beginning, the Board was financially far more generous with it, particularly in helping with its building needs (by 1921, there were five hundred pupils). Under the original compact of 1919, the Board helped pay off the School's current deficit, retired the mortgage on its building, reimbursed Francisco Albricias for the investment of his personal funds in the property, paid \$900 for repairs and remodeling, and made a grant of \$4,500 for the purchase of additional land next to the school building. In 1922, it authorized the School to borrow \$13,000 (it finally went to \$15,000) for the erection of a third story on its building, and then for some years helped further with interest payments and grants for mortgage retirement that ran to \$3,000 a year. It also steered generous special gifts toward Alicante from time to time.

But in spite of all this assistance, Alicante got into financial trouble. Contributions from Switzerland dried up, costs rose, taxes increased, and remittances from New York shrank just when they were needed most. Up to 1924, regular appropriations reached more than \$5,000 annually. Then suddenly they dropped by 40 per cent and went down to \$2,000 by 1933. This resulted, of course, in heavy deficits. The Albricias family always co-operated with the Board in good spirit but were disillusioned—having given their valuable school property to the Methodists—with the failure of the Board's generous original assurances of maintenance and expansion of the work. They continued devoting their personal resources to the School, including Franklin's salary as a public official. None of the efforts of the Methodist Church through interdenominational co-operation relieved the financial straits of the Alicante school.

In 1931, Spain adopted a new republican Constitution, which granted freedom of expression and of worship. The Alicante mission, along with other

Evangelical groups, thus began to operate for the first time under true religious liberty. Francisco Albricias died in 1934, leaving full leadership in the hands of his two sons. The following year, Franklin was transferred to the North Africa Conference, but remained at work in Alicante. He served as President of the Provincial Congress from the inauguration of the Republic to January, 1934, when conservative political elements again were becoming stronger.

In 1936 came the Civil War, launched by rebellious military forces and led by the fascist General Francisco Franco. Alicante was within the territory held by the Loyalist government, and so the Methodist mission continued its activities without government interference and in freedom from Catholic repression. Franklin Albricias reported that except for some initial popular excesses on the part of people angered by the general accommodation between the Catholic Church and the fascists, the Catholic churches remained unshackled in Loyalist Spain but were poorly supported by the disillusioned people. Albricias' letters to the Board repeatedly carried news of the complete suppression of Evangelical churches in most of the fascist-controlled territory. Many Protestant leaders were jailed. Many Protestant pastors were shot, including the former Methodist pastor in Seville, Patricio Gomez.

Although Alicante was safe from fascist occupation, it was terribly depleted and battered by the war. Prices rose, the active men went out to fight, family income shriveled, food became scarce, starvation crept in, medicines became unobtainable, the sick lacked doctors. And during the last year of the conflict especially, vicious and terrifying bombing raids scattered families to outlying towns, at times reduced day school attendance to a handful, finally stopped for safety's sake the gathering of Sunday school children, cut off church services, forced people to dwell in fear of the repeated attacks, destroyed homes, killed civilians (there were no soldiers or military targets in Alicante). Lincoln Albricias wrote on 26 May 1938 to his brother, who was out of the country with a commission soliciting moral support and food parcels for Spain's embattled Evangelicals:

We had four weeks of bombardments but that of yesterday was of a great ferocity. Three groups of big aeroplanes crossed the center of the town several times sowing the most important streets with bombs of great weight. All I could tell you is nothing in comparison with the catastrophe. More than three hundred wounded [his next letter set the total casualties at two thousand]. Several bombs fell in the streets around the School. Several more in the market, full of women! Only in one street forty-two houses were destroyed. Pray for us!

Lincoln Albricias had only eight pupils with him in the Model School on that fearful day. The mission never knew normalcy again. The Civil War went on for many more bruising, debilitating months, until in March, 1939, Franco

triumphed. By that time, six hundred were dead in Alicante from the bombing raids, and twenty-five hundred wounded. Lincoln left Alicante only days before Italian troops marched in and found the School in the hands of an old teacher and displaying the futile protection of a document from the United States Consul General in Valencia testifying to American ownership of the property. Lincoln and his family escaped from Spain among six hundred refugees, finally reaching Oran, Algeria, on a British freighter. There they suffered long internment. Franklin was in Belgium and later, the World War having broken out, he was in France searching for his family, from whom he had become separated. He and his brother were convinced that to be in Spain in the aftermath of the Franco victory would be to risk the firing squad. In many parts of Loyalist Spain, the Protestants were being crushed—churches closed, schools banned, buildings confiscated, people imprisoned, some shot. Before long, they heard that the Methodist school property in Alicante had been confiscated by the new regime and converted to other purposes. The day before Madrid was surrendered to Franco, Franklin Albricias wrote to Secretary Ralph E. Diffendorfer from Liège, "I feel very sad when I think of the 42 years of work of my father, my brother and myself to create a fine congregation and the best protestant Schools of Spain. Perhaps some day we will be able to go back to Alicante to renew the work of our heart. I hope so." They never did. The Methodists held the deed to the buildings, but the Spain Mission was dead.

Latin America

THE GENERAL CONFERENCE OF 1920 acted to bring together in a single regional organization the Methodists of Mexico, Central America, and South America by authorizing the creation of the Central Conference of Latin America. The constituent groups of the new Conference were the Eastern South America Conference (Argentina and Uruguay), the Bolivia Mission Conference, the Chile Conference, the North Andes Mission Conference (Peru), the Central America Mission Conference (Panama and Costa Rica), and the Mexico Conference.

The Central Conference held its first session in April, 1924, in Panama City. The members elected by the constituent Conferences included both missionaries from the United States and nationals of the eight Latin American countries, the latter being in the majority, nineteen to fourteen.

In 1920, the Mexico Conference and the Central America Mission Conference were assigned to the episcopal administration of Bishop Wilbur P. Thirkield, whose official residence was Mexico City. Bishop William F. Oldham continued in charge of the South American fields, with residence in Buenos Aires. In 1924, Bishop George A. Miller succeeded Bishop Thirkield as head of the Mexico Area, with Bishop Oldham remaining in charge of the Conferences on the southern continent. The Bolivia and the North Andes Mission Conferences were transferred to Bishop Miller's area in 1925. Bishop Oldham retired in 1928, and Bishop Miller succeeded him in charge of the Buenos Aires Area, to which now were added the Central America, the Mexico Conference was linked administratively to the New York Area, whose Mexico Conference was linked administratively to the New York Area, whose resident Bishop was Francis J. McConnell. Two years later, the Mexico work became part of the new autonomous Methodist Church of Mexico.

The delegates to the 1924 session of the Central Conference voted to ask the forthcoming General Conference, which was to meet in a few weeks, to authorize Central Conferences to elect their own Bishops beginning in 1928; their purpose for their own field was to secure Spanish-speaking Bishops, whether nationals or missionaries. Not until 1928 did the General Conference respond. It then proposed a Constitutional amendment incorporating the desired change, which was adopted in 1929 by Church-wide referendum. The

Latin America Central Conference first grasped the new opportunity in 1932, when it elected to the episcopacy Juan E. Gattinoni, a member of the Eastern South America Conference, who was assigned to Buenos Aires. Early in 1936, being advised that Bishop Miller desired to serve no longer, and the enabling act covering Bishop Gattinoni's election no longer being in effect, the Central Conference elected as Bishop another South American, Roberto Elphick, and memorialized the General Conference to ratify its action. This was done later the same year, and Bishops Gattinoni and Elphick finished out the decade together, Gattinoni remaining in residence at Buenos Aires and Elphick going to Santiago, Chile.

The eight Latin American countries included in the Central Conference in 1920 made up a field that stretched four thousand miles, from Mexico south to Punta Arenas, at the lower end of Chile. Scattered across this field, separated by seas and sierras, were small pockets of Methodist church members totaling fourteen thousand persons, approximately equivalent to the membership of the New Hampshire Conference. During the nineteen-twenties, significant changes occurred on the Bolivia, the Central America, and the Mexico fields that more clearly established the continuing structures of those three missions.* But with the others—Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, and Peru—although developments occurred, the basic patterns of mission development remained essentially unchanged.

In South American Methodism, both east and west, appeared a more substantial stress on social ministries than before.

The most impressive and innovative was announced at the close of the Chile Conference session in January, 1920, when Bishop William F. Oldham read out from the list of appointments the name of a new charge, "Instituto Agrícola Bunster." The Bunster Agricultural Institute announced by the Bishop was the nucleus of what became a manifold mission enterprise centered in an agricultural program. The setting for the program was a richly developed 3,800-acre farm called El Vergel, near Angol, in the Southern District. The Board of Foreign Missions had purchased it in 1919 as a phase of the Centenary effort in South America. On the farm, which had been operated on a large-scale commercial basis by its previous owner, lived a number of working families, and the Mission already was working it under the direction of Floyd L. Crouse. The income from the sale of its products was to be devoted to paying the purchase price and to supporting elements in the mission's future development. The mission's novelty was twofold; it was the first agricultural mission founded by the Board of Foreign Missions in South America and also its first attempt at organizing a lay residential community on a mission site.

Two units in the program that began unfolding at El Vergel were estab-

* For separate treatments, see Chapters 32, 33, 34.

lished in 1920. The Agricultural Institute opened with twenty-five boys enrolled, and a worshipping congregation was formally organized and assigned one of the farm buildings for its meetings. The Director of the Institute and pastor of the church was Ezra Bauman.

Although general economic conditions brought the farm stormy financial weather during the few years immediately after its purchase, by 1924 the El Vergel enterprise was well under way. The Institute was graduating boys from its study and work curriculum and utilizing their services on the Farm, and the church had more than two dozen members and as many probationers. There were new summer cottages for missionaries, and a pine-grove tabernacle for summer assemblies housed Epworth League institutes, sessions of the Annual Conference, and interdenominational Christian workers' conferences. In the country at large, El Vergel was gaining a wide reputation through its effective exhibits at national agricultural fairs; and in the religious world, it was becoming a focus of spiritual morale for the evangelical churches.

A decade later, the farm was a large and successful business—its hills planted to forest trees and its river bottoms to vegetable gardens, its orchards widely selling 100,000 fruit trees in a season, and its fields producing a market crop of high-grade lentils. The profits were adequate to finance the continued improvement of the farm establishment itself and also to pay the salaries of four missionary couples. It was enjoying national fame for importing and freely distributing a minute wasp that parasitically destroyed the wooly aphid, which had been threatening the country's apple orchards. By such measures, which contributed to Chile's agricultural progress, it carried out El Vergel's humanitarian purpose. The Board's Corresponding Secretaries said of El Vergel in reporting to the General Conference of 1936, "It was bought to begin with, because a missionary saw the families of the poor pawning their furniture and decaying in their hovels, in the Chilean towns and on the haciendas." El Vergel developed its own community of fifty families that lived on the land and cultivated it, occupied improved and permanent homes, shared in the profits of the lentil crop, enjoyed social services, and had a primary school for their children. At the end of the nineteen-thirties, El Vergel still was enlarging its facilities and expanding its multifaceted program. Among those who served longest as leaders of the project were Floyd Crouse, who continued until 1925, and Dillman S. Bullock and Elbert E. Reed, both of whom were colleagues of Crouse's and still at work in 1939.

Social ministries also were developed in urban areas. The Chile Conference established in 1926 in a tenement quarter of Santiago a broadly conceived and conducted social service enterprise named the Sweet Memorial Institute. The Institute ran a clinic, developed general social service work, operated a training school for women religious workers, and provided religious opportunities in the neighborhood through the activities of the Second

Church, which was housed in the Institute's quarters. The Uruguay District conducted, under the name Pan-American Institute, a mission oriented toward the poor of Villa del Cerro, a stock yard district next to Montevideo. Based upon earlier social service and relief work among the people by Estella C. Long, M.D., who was appointed to evangelistic work in the quarter, it became Uruguay's first consciously institutional Methodist church, under the leadership of Arthur F. Wesley, whose pastorate began in 1920. In 1928, it added to its extensive program of group activities and personal services a unit of Good Will Industries. Under the leadership of Juan C. de Bohún and later that of Arthur Wesley, Boca Mission (Fifth Church, Buenos Aires), strongly developed its social service work in the capital's dockside slums. De Bohún's efforts were cited in the Board's Annual Report for 1920: "Our pastor has done a noble work among the poor, feeding, clothing, and giving medical aid to thousands, without receiving one cent from the mission treasury. He raises money among his many friends and admirers." Boca Mission came to be recognized as Argentine Methodism's outstanding institutional church. By 1939, it was well housed, staffed, and equipped as a modern social settlement, with plans evolving for further development.

A number of medical centers also approached the people on a social service basis. Methodist pastors and missionaries organized in Santiago in 1919, for instance, the Good Samaritan Dispensary, which operated as a free clinic. Funds were contributed locally, and many doctors, nurses, and other professional and auxiliary workers from the general community contributed their services. The Methodists supplied organizational leadership. Three less extensive clinics were opened in Chile in the nineteen-twenties. First came a child care clinic in Concepción in 1921. Not long afterwards, another was established in Los Ángeles, and in the Iquique church a hall was devoted to dispensary work.

The Methodists opened their first hospital in South America at Lima, Peru, in 1921. British and American residents incorporated as the British-American Hospital Association purchased a well known local hospital in Bellavista, put it in condition for service, and turned it over to the Peru mission to operate. The Mission provided the medical and nursing staffs and gave the enterprise general oversight through a predominantly Methodist Board of Governors. Its first superintendent was Dr. Eugene A. MacCornack of Wisconsin, who built it up into a very successful institution. Unlike the various Methodist clinics, the British-American Hospital was not primarily for the benefit of the impoverished or the underprivileged. Although it gave many thousands of dollars' worth of free service each year, its patients belonged largely to British, American, diplomatic, and government families, who were able to keep it well enough financed finally for it to be completely self-supporting. By 1930, the Hospital had a budget of \$150,000.

The pattern of major Methodist schools shifted somewhat during these

two decades, but they still were considered the core of the Methodist effort to project evangelical teaching and influence into the South American countries, as was evidenced by the fact that the great bulk of North American missionaries were at work in them. At the end of the thirties, the principal general schools in Argentina were Ward College, (Buenos Aires), Nicholas Lowe Evangelical Institute (Mercedes), the American Grammar and High School (Buenos Aires), and the North American College (W.F.M.S., Rosario, Santa Fe). Crandon Institute (Montevideo) was the chief school in Uruguay. More closely related to the personnel needs of the Eastern South America Conference were the Evangelical Theological School and the Model Institute for Christian Workers, both centered in Buenos Aires. On the West Coast, Chile's Iquique College and Santiago College stood at the head of the educational enterprise in that country. Concepción College and Concepción's Colegio Americano had been merged in 1929, and ten years later, the school born of the merger was destroyed in a powerful regional earthquake and was not reopened. In Chile, both Sweet Memorial and the Union Biblical Seminary in Santiago were graduating Chilean Christian workers. Peru was served by two schools on the secondary level (American College, Callao, and North American College, Lima), a primary and commercial school (Andean College, Huancayo) and three schools for primary instruction (the American School in La Oroya and the Anglo-American Schools in La Victoria and Callao). Early in the thirties the Board founded the Wolfe Memorial Biblical Seminary to provide theological training for candidates for Peru's very small Methodist ministry.

The Methodist schools generally were enriched academically during these two decades and gained in popularity. The more easily observable improvement in the condition of some of them was their acquisition of new and better buildings. Centenary funds made possible the purchase of new land and buildings for the Andean College in Huancayo in 1920. Crandon Institute acquired a \$300,000 modern plant in 1922. Two units for Ward College were erected in 1932 on a new eighteen-acre campus on the outskirts of Buenos Aires. In the same year, \$400,000 contributed by alumnae and by friends in the United States provided Santiago College a new and beautiful campus on the periphery of the capital, and Santiago's Biblical Seminary had new buildings at about the same time. Early in the twenties, under the stimulus of the Centenary movement, there was a spurt of building activity among the churches also, but it did not last; the schools more easily came by special gifts, thus outstripping the churches in property development.

While laboring at their own direct responsibilities, the Methodists also were thoroughly aware of the fact that they constituted only a segment of the larger evangelical movement in predominantly Roman Catholic Latin America, and they entered numerous co-operative relationships and arrangements with other denominations. In Argentina, the Disciples of Christ co-

operated with the Methodists in maintaining Ward College, the Model Institute for Christian Workers, the Theological School, and (with several other groups) the Union Book Store. The Chile Conference worked closely with the Presbyterians, with whom they had comity agreements covering division of the mission field and with whom they operated jointly an evangelical book store, the church paper *El Heraldo Cristiano*, and the Biblical Seminary in Santiago. The Methodists played host at El Vergel to annual meetings of Chile's interdenominational Christian Workers' Conference. In Peru, they developed friendly relationships with Scotch Presbyterian, Baptist, and other missions but found it impossible to arrive at territorial comity understandings with certain denominations holding to exclusivist doctrinal positions.

Bishop Oldham was a strong supporter of the interdenominational Committee on Co-operation in Latin America and expressed, on the eve of his retirement from the field in 1928, gratification at the unexpected progress in inter-Mission unity accomplished in the decade just past. The Methodists participated fully in the Congress on Christian Work in South America that was convened in Montevideo in March-April, 1925, under the auspices of the Committee on Co-operation. The Congress was successor to the Panama Congress of 1916.

Though the evangelistic workers in eastern and western South America carried the gospel into numerous new localities, they did not generate settled charges beyond the principal sections in which churches and Circuits already were established. Similarly, though the total number of church members increased, there was no strong surge of new members into the churches. For the four Missions together—Argentina, Uruguay, Peru, and Chile—the roster of church members showed an increase of only a thousand persons. To this net gain, Argentina, the largest of the South American missions, contributed only a little over a hundred members, thus remaining practically static at about thirty-one hundred. Peru, the smallest Mission, contributed the same number as Argentina, to reach the level of about four hundred members. Uruguay had two hundred fewer than in 1920, namely, between eight and nine hundred. The Chile membership increased by a thousand members, to thirty-one hundred.

The number of North American missionaries serving in the four Missions radically declined between 1920 and 1939. In 1920 there were 145 (Board missionaries numbered 127; the W.F.M.S. had 18). In 1939, the Board sent 45 missionaries and the W.F.M.S. sent 12, totaling 57. By the end of the period, not more than one or two missionaries were assigned to evangelistic work; the institutions absorbed the services of all the rest. The practical corollary of that utilization of workers was that the churches and the Districts were led almost entirely by a ministry native to South America.

Bolivia

THE AMERICAN INSTITUTES

WHEN BISHOP WILLIAM F. OLDHAM MOUNTED THE HEIGHTS of Bolivia in December, 1916, to organize the Bolivia Mission Conference, the mission was at the peak of a crisis that threatened to destroy the only part of its work that was even moderately successful. For the past three years, the two American Institutes, in La Paz and Cochabamba, had been kept going only by the sacrificial labors of the faculty members under disastrous financial conditions caused by suspension of subsidy payments by the Bolivian government. Both on the field and in New York, missionary leaders entertained shutting down the Institutes as the live alternative to rescuing them from being swamped by deficits.

But the rescue operation was accomplished, and the Institutes remained for more than three decades the core of the Mission—accounting for the largest expenditures, continuing to absorb most of the missionary personnel, and generally gaining the most public attention and approval. Indeed, since the Board's offices were so remote from the Bolivian scene, and since episcopal supervision also was a form of remote control by Bishops who usually appeared in Bolivia for a few days once a year, the missionaries in the La Paz and the Cochabamba schools dominated the development of policy and projects, sometimes curbing noneducational missionary ventures, sometimes providing resources for new departures, and often determining (especially in La Paz) the framework of success or failure for individual missionaries.

Oddly, it was the schools' fiscal travail that at last won them unambiguous status as a direct responsibility of the Board of Foreign Missions. From the beginning, the Institutes were considered self-supporting institutions, and funds for their maintenance were not provided under the Board's annual appropriations. Failure of the government subsidies banished the possibility of self-support. The Board therefore assumed full responsibility for financing the Institutes, first by sending emergency relief in 1915, then by advancing loans against prospective subsidy payments by the government, and finally by making direct appropriations for educational work. From 1918 on, the Institutes had a place in the Board's annual budget.

Once the Institutes were disengaged from government patronage and unconditionally taken up by the Board, they got effective assistance with their building problems. Neither school owned any property; both had to pay crushing rents; each needed better accommodations. In April, 1917, the Board authorized the expenditure of as much as \$69,000 for the purchase of school properties for the two institutions.

In October, the La Paz Institute, long scattered among four unsatisfactory buildings, acquired land favorably located in the heart of the city—the first real estate purchased in Bolivia by the Methodists. During the next few years, Charles A. Irle, director of the Institute and later roving architectural consultant for Methodist interests in South America, supervised the purchase of additional lots to round out the property and erected adobe buildings to house the Institute. By 1922, the Institute harbored all its activities on its own land. In December, 1917, Cochabamba Institute bought the Plaza Colón property it had been renting since its founding, and in 1920 it acquired a building at "Calle Baptiste," several blocks away, for the girls' school. The La Paz Institute buildings, which were considered temporary structures, were inadequate to provide for the growth of the student body during the nineteen-twenties; so an extensive program of building and improvements was carried out under Irle's direction in 1930 and 1931.

By 1926, the permanent pattern of the student bodies in the two American Institutes was complete. Having added girls' departments to their boys' work in 1913 and 1914, respectively, La Paz and Cochabamba Institutes took a further progressive step by gradually introducing coeducation—they were the first Bolivian secondary schools to adopt this policy—when the girls desired to go beyond their limited curricula to full secondary studies. In 1926, Cochabamba Institute became coeducational throughout, and the La Paz Institute was coeducational on the secondary level.

Cochabamba introduced kindergarten classes in 1918, and La Paz in 1919. The Institute plan then became kindergarten, six-year primary school (elementary), and six-year secondary school. Twice Cochabamba responded to financial stringencies by eliminating the upper years of the secondary course, graduating no students from the full curriculum in 1919-21 and 1927-36. Cochabamba's perennial specialty was commercial subjects on the secondary level. La Paz held closely to the full academic curriculum, which was essential to maintenance of patronage by the professional and governmental classes more highly concentrated there.

Indeed, the Institutes' students came almost entirely from families belonging to Bolivia's privileged social and economic minority. Champions of the schools repeatedly boasted of the prominence of some of these sponsoring families; on occasion, they could point to children of the President, the Vice-President, ministers of state, high military officers, Congressmen, and of other influential officials. Merchants, proprietors, and legal practitioners were the occupational

groups most strongly represented among the patrons; bankers and other businessmen, farm landlords, and technicians came next.

There were few boys and girls from Indian or from cholo artisan families. The Institutes did not exclude them or discriminate against them when admitted but the tone of student life was distinctly upper-class, and children of the people were expected to adopt upper-class dress. Whatever the social status of their parents might be, these students were counted, by the Institutes, on the higher stratum of "Bolivians" rather than as cholos or as Indians. Lower-class students in La Paz Institute were known even to conceal the identity of their visiting parents of humble social standing. Indian youths, including children of Methodist converts in La Paz and the Lake region, typically lacked both the money and the preparatory educational background to enable them to benefit from Institute training. Although the Institutes taught democratic ideals and stimulated some interest in the problem of the Indian, the privileged students were effectively isolated in their school life, as elsewhere, from live social contact or intercourse with Indians. Practically speaking, the Institutes were class institutions.

Exponents of the missionary importance of the American Institutes justified their position in the Bolivia mission by citing their strategic penetration of the upper classes with evangelical ideals and influence: the Institutes drew from the elite, they also poured back into it. By 1939, Carl S. Bell and LeGrand B. Smith, the directors of the La Paz and Cochabamba Institutes, respectively, could speak of the earlier influence of the Methodist schools in terms of

the offices and positions held [presumably in 1939] by a few of their graduates, such as bank presidents, heads of important and influential business firms, Rector of the University of La Paz, teachers and other school officials, Consulting Lawyer for the Patiño Co., several congressmen, government officials, directors of government bureaus, government engineers, physicians, surgeons, dentists and agronomists.

Episcopal and Board administrators of the Bolivia mission received or personally garnered, from time to time, varying and conflicting reports as to the amount and quality of religious work the Institutes were doing with their students while preparing them for their vocations. Opinions varied among Institute workers themselves both about what was being done and about what should be done. Sometimes one Institute or the other was accused of maintaining an evangelistic vacuum or of making little effort to bring evangelical teaching and worship to the children of their almost exclusively Roman Catholic clientele. Certainly, devoted teachers (those involved in dormitory life had special opportunities) year after year directly influenced the spiritual outlook and experience of their students—a creative Christian work impossible to compute. In various periods there were meetings for

worship, Sunday school activities, and other voluntary classes and discussion groups on religious beliefs, Christian living, and the Bible. But the overt religious activity in the Institutes varied with the successive policies of newly appointed Directors and with the initiative and availability of given teachers.

Some directors were more ready than others to rationalize evangelistic moderation or inactivity in order to meet the supposed necessity of refraining from irritating Catholic public opinion and unsympathetic governmental officeholders. Naturally, the teaching of evangelical religion could not be introduced into the regular curriculum, which was arranged to meet the Bolivian government's requirements for certification for University credit. But the Institutes often failed to develop their religious work as fully as their legal and practical opportunities allowed.

The two Institutes entered the nineteen-twenties with the original complexion of their teaching staffs unchanged—roughly a dozen American teachers and a half dozen Bolivian teachers in each school. Rising registrations, however, soon made larger faculties necessary, and the demand was met by engaging more Bolivian instructors. Midway in the decade, the Bolivian personnel took and kept a strong numerical lead. In La Paz Institute it was about two to one; in Cochabamba Institute, where the American contingent fell as low as from two to four teachers in the nineteen-thirties, the proportion of Bolivians ran from six to as high as ten to one.

Thus the major, academic vehicles of the Methodist missionary message were staffed in significant proportions by teachers who were not integrated into any Protestant church. The irony of this limitation was sharpened by the fact that the American missionaries, who presumably were the most direct bearers of the evangelistic message, often worked under the great disadvantage of not knowing the language or the customs of the Bolivians well enough either to effect a good social adjustment or to make their best religious or cultural contribution. Since the Bolivian clientele of the Institutes appreciated them most as English-speaking and American institutions, the value of the schools both for the Bolivians and for the American Methodists tended to diminish, in some respects, as the proportion of Bolivian teachers increased. The imbalance in the faculties was partly rectified to the advantage of the evangelical impact of the Institutes, however, by utilization of some of their own graduates as teachers.

Student enrollment in the American Institutes was at its nadir in 1917, the year following cancellation of the government subsidies; it stood at 160 for Cochabamba and 171 for La Paz. With some temporary recessions, especially at Cochabamba, registrations rose through the years between the two World Wars, until in 1939 there were 400 students in Cochabamba Institute and 800 in La Paz.

This strong development and the positive educational influence it represented came out of a background replete with difficulties—repeated, continu-

ous, or characteristic—within the life of the Institutes. The faculties chronically were undermanned, teachers were overburdened, instructors often had no special qualifications in their subjects, some came to the field immature and ill motivated as missionaries, missionary terms generally were short (with notable exceptions), Institute Directors were untrained in school administration, each school had a dozen Directors in two dozen years, the high altitude (especially in La Paz) lowered physical efficiency and tended to upset the nervous stability of hard-pressed North Americans, general health problems were numerous, living quarters often were uncomfortable, faculty families were badly crowded in upon one another (particularly in La Paz), cliques troubled the peace at La Paz Institute, personal and administrative conflicts were frequent and disruptive there, equipment was inadequate, salaries were low, building and financial problems harassed administrators, there was little consistency in the maintenance of evangelistic policy and practice, and sacrifices by missionaries were many. Difficulties like these sapped missionary morale and limited educational efficiency.

In 1939, the problems of basic financial support and of building accommodations were so acute that Mission and Board leaders were considering closing at least one of the Institutes. The growth in enrollment and strong new competition from other secondary schools now demanded increasing, practically prohibitive expenditures for staff, equipment, and buildings.

Cochabamba Institute still was using the Plaza Colón and "Calle Baptiste" properties. By this time, they were in wretched condition; a section of roof had fallen in at "Calle Baptiste," parts of the building on Plaza Colón were beginning to cave in, enclosing walls were being condemned by the city, and extensive repairs were becoming imperative. Since only three of the La Paz Institute's newer units were permanent buildings, that school also was handicapped by old and unsatisfactory housing. Both schools drastically needed new buildings.

It appeared to be impossible to support and develop both institutions. Which should be closed?—this was the question troubling the Mission's leaders on the threshold of the nineteen-forties.

THE INDIANS

For nearly twenty years after the first Methodist itinerant appointed to Bolivia arrived in La Paz, in 1901, concern for the evangelization of Bolivia's Indians, who made up more than half the nation's population, had no determining function in the evolution of the Mission.

By far the major drive of the Mission was directed towards maintaining the Institutes in La Paz and Cochabamba, institutions that served almost exclusively the children of families on the thin upper crust of the Bolivian society. The general evangelistic work was conducted primarily for the benefit

of Spanish-speaking Bolivians. That single defining factor automatically restricted the evangelistic outreach to the whites and the cholos and stopped it short of the Indians, who spoke only their own languages, which were chiefly Aymará and Quechua.

When Bishop Oldham organized the Bolivia Mission Conference in 1916, the Aymará night school in La Paz was the single specifically Indian project sponsored by the Methodists. A night school for Indians was opened in Corocoro in connection with the general evangelistic work begun there in 1917.

The Mission showed, however, no important sign of interest in comprehensive or aggressive Indian work, and the Board of Foreign Missions had no plan for reaching the Indian masses either in Bolivia or elsewhere in South America. The Board's South American enterprise reflected the practical premise that a mission to South Americans was, in the nature of the case, a mission to Latins.

That premise finally was attacked by a champion of the Indians who spoke up from a remote mission pastorate at Tucumán, in northern Argentina. In October, 1917, James H. Wenberg began dispatching to the Board a series of letters vigorously advocating the opening of Indian missions in South America and offering himself as a missionary among the Indians. "It is incredible," he wrote, "that the M.E. Church which has supported missionaries in this country [Argentina] for 50 years had done and is doing nothing for the aborigines of which there are millions." He bluntly told his correspondent that it was "about time that the Missionary Societies' attention be called to these poor neglected heathen."

The next spring, Wenberg followed his letters to New York, en route to Wisconsin to recuperate after a long term of service in South America as preacher and American Bible Society colporteur. At the Board's Fifth Avenue office he left, for multigraphing, a circular letter promoting the Indian cause. Frank Mason North, one of the Corresponding Secretaries, later wrote him that his promotional letter had better be held up. "While this work among Indians no doubt is very necessary and probably holds great opportunities," said North, "still it hardly seems wise to send a letter from the Board of Foreign Missions which might give the impression that the Board of Foreign Missions is ready to undertake work among the Indians." North stated that the Board "had not formulated any program for such work." A month later, he reiterated the absence of a plan for the Indians, and clinched his statement by declaring that there was no money to finance the work.

This weak blast on North's uncertain trumpet disappointed Wenberg but did not daunt him. On a day in November, North found on his desk, in Wenberg's handwriting, a thirty-page survey of the social and spiritual needs of the South American Indians. The report showed them living on a plane of exploitation hardly elevated above that to which the Spanish conquerors

had pinned them down. Wenberg portrayed them as social outcasts, unfranchised, deprived of the education that would have qualified them to vote, many of them in servitude to white and cholo landowners, living in extreme poverty, and shackled by the vices of coca-chewing and heavy drinking.

Wenberg quoted the eminent James Bryce on the Indians of Bolivia: "They are entirely illiterate. Nominally Roman Catholics, their religion is the primitive spirit worship of their ancestors with a varnish of Christian forms and the cult of the Christian saints." Wenberg added on his own, "A closer observation will convince one that they are not even varnished; simply whitewashed, and that comes off at the mere smell of alcohol." He classed the rural priests among the Indians' oppressors, because they promoted the religious festivals that reduced many Indians to penury and that debauched the thousands of participants in the festival celebrations that moved from Mass to dance to drunken stupor.

"See the overwhelming Indian population!" he said, pointing to the 52 per cent for Bolivia and the 75 per cent for the Department of La Paz. Yet he did not see Bolivia's 900,000 Indians as statistics. He did not see them—as did many Bolivians—as economic units defining the value of the farms to which they were attached. "The owner treats them like animals," he wrote. To Wenberg the Indians were persons; he was convinced of their cultural and religious potentialities. But he found them inadequately and badly served by an inferior rural Catholic clergy and grievously neglected by Protestant missionary groups.

Wenberg's survey was a passionate plea for missionary action; its urgency was inescapable. "Say, that report of Wenberg is a corker," wrote George A. Miller, superintendent of the Panama mission, to Harry Farmer. "There is material to kindle a fire with in that. I am afraid it will keep me awake tonight." North and Farmer also were impressed. Farmer's letter forwarding the report to Bishop Oldham even displayed something of a sharp edge of awakened responsibility: "We are all the time talking about the neglected Indians of South America, but do not seem to have any program prepared for taking care of them."

Wenberg kept writing and talking, and finally he got action. On 1 April 1919, he sat down in New York with Bishop Oldham, Farmer, and a few others for a conference on starting Indian work in Peru and Bolivia. Bishop Oldham showed signs of distress at Methodist inactivity in that field, confessing that the missionary work of the Methodist Episcopal Church in South America had been characterized by opportunism rather than by planning. The conferees were agreed upon the necessity of making a beginning with the Indians. They decided that Wenberg should gather data on the field, to be able to advise with Bishop Oldham and the South American missionaries as to where the mission to the Indians should be started.

Wenberg arrived in La Paz on 20 September as a newly appointed missionary of the Board, to become Superintendent of Indian Mission Work and to explore openings for the new work. He promptly started scouting the country to find possible mission locations and to study Indian mission enterprises already in operation by non-Methodist groups. The bleak Altiplano and the pleasanter valleys below it were by no means foreign territory to Wenberg. He had first come to work in Bolivia less than three months after Francis M. Harrington opened settled work there. One of his treasured possessions was the Methodist Local Preacher's license, signed by Harrington in August, 1906, that made him the first man so authorized in Bolivia. Wenberg had spent five years as the Bible Society's subagent for Bolivia at that time, traveling extensively throughout the country, everywhere coming into intimate contact with the predominant Indian population and observing its way of life.

In 1911, Wenberg tried to interest Secretary Homer C. Stuntz in the education of the Bolivian Indians. Earlier in the year, Antonio Chiriotto, an eighty-year-old native of Italy, arriving in La Paz not long before his death, had established by will the nondenominational Peniel Hall Christian Society of Education and bequeathed it \$32,000 for education and Christian propaganda. Wenberg suggested that this fund might be devoted to work with the Indians. In 1913, the Society bought, as a site for an Indian mission, a farm of about a thousand acres at Guatajata, on the shores of Lake Titicaca. More than two hundred Aymarás living there were retained as sharecroppers, working both the farm's land and the small plots assigned them for their own subsistence. Wenberg was put in charge of the venture, which was called Peniel Hall Farm, after the name of the California mission where Chiriotto had been converted.

Altiplano Indians were notoriously unresponsive, even hostile, to advances made by white men. But the former colporteur quickly established rapport with the Indians at Guatajata. They readily sent their boys to the school he started. In four months' time, he had fifty pupils; in the second year, sixty-seven. In spite of this promising beginning, he vainly pleaded with the trustees to supply money for materials to go into the construction of a badly needed schoolhouse, which he himself was willing to build. Unable to secure their backing, Wenberg offered his resignation. The trustees evidently snapped up the offer, and Wenberg regretfully left.

After Wenberg's departure, John E. Washburn, director of Cochabamba Institute, became one of the trustees, succeeding George M. McBride. Wenberg was grieved to find that the work he had begun soon was destroyed, and he was outraged by the methods that caused its disappearance. One of his communications to the Board in 1918 contained an unchallenged quotation from a letter from Washburn about instructions the trustees gave Wenberg's successor on the farm:

I was named trustee in Mack's place. . . . We bought Craigin a Bs. 15 whip, told him to shoe and feed up the horse out there, have no classes Mon. & Tues. but get on the horse with the whip, have the mayordomo with him & get some order and work out of those Indians, and keep them from being drunk all the time. Think he will do it. Must close. Washburn.

A letter from Dr. C. W. Foster also was quoted by Wenberg:

After McBride left and Washburn took his place, radical changes were made in the Peniel Mission with disastrous results. The Indians were barbarously treated and driven to rebellion. They boycotted the school till only one from the farm attended.

Wenberg's devotion to the Indians, however, never flagged. Now in the fall of 1919, he was back in Bolivia, commissioned to find out how and where the Methodists could begin to tap the missionary opportunity represented by the hundreds of thousands of Bolivian Indians. He visited the government normal school for teachers of Indians, near Cochabamba; the disappointingly meager activity of the interdenominational Bolivian Indian Mission centered in San Pedro, Department of Potosí; the extensive and well developed Indian mission of the Seventh Day Adventists near Puno, Peru; and the much smaller farm project of the Evangelical Union of South America near Cuzco.

During a three-week foray into the Titicaca area, Wenberg kept his eyes open for a likely site for the Methodists' new undertaking. He spent most of his time at Peniel Hall Farm, where there was now a good schoolhouse but no teacher and no missionary on the ground. The school had remained closed for several years. Negotiations with the Canadian Baptists for the development of evangelical work at the Farm had been hanging fire for a long time. Bishop Oldham had recently urged action. Charles A. Irle, treasurer of the Methodist mission, also a Peniel Hall Society trustee, had suggested that Wenberg be set to work at the Farm. Alexander Haddow, a Canadian Baptist, the only other incumbent current trustee, did not agree, and he continued to refuse his consent when Wenberg proposed that the Peniel Hall Society make its financial income and the Farm's facilities available to the Methodists for Indian work.

The delay involved in reaching a decision about Peniel Hall halted Wenberg's work plans for the time being. He sent Farmer, however, a series of informative and consistent reports on the prospects for Indian work, and prepared to report in person to Bishop Oldham, who was expected to come to Arica, Peru, on his way home to the United States. A shift in Bishop Oldham's itinerary broke up Irle and Wenberg's plan to meet him on the coast. Unfortunately, Harry Farmer was away from the New York office for two months at about the same time. Just when Wenberg was making his reports and needed specific instructions, he did not hear from Farmer for about three months.

Farmer's letter in answer to Wenberg's request for instructions finally reached Wenberg in May, 1920. It was a rambling and inconclusive communication that revealed that Farmer's thought on Indian work was oscillating between several tentative plans. But of crystallized Board policy on the Indians there was no specific delineation. Wenberg found the letter confusing and disconcerting.

Wenberg was convinced that the Board was in confusion. He felt that his reports were being brushed aside, that Farmer was listening to less reliable voices than his; that there was no common understanding among those concerned with Indian matters, and that the Board was not backing the Indian project as it should. He renewed, insistently, an earlier request for permission to return to the United States to help clarify and mobilize the Board's effort. Then before Farmer could again say no by letter, and probably too quickly to be reached by a hasty restraining cablegram, Wenberg left Bolivia without permission.

Naturally, by the time he got to New York on 16 June, he was in administrative hot water; the officials regarded him as insubordinate. Washburn helped to bring the trouble to a boil by discussing Wenberg's case with Farmer, conveying to Farmer uncomplimentary and passé Bolivia mission gossip about Wenberg's personal affairs. He also evidently influenced Farmer to think of Wenberg as a man who could not get along with people, raising criticisms of Wenberg's dealings with the Peniel Hall Farm trustees in 1913 and 1914. Wenberg probably did not know about the gossip, but Farmer told him about the Peniel Hall charge. Wenberg, who regarded Washburn as one of the destroyers of his work at the Farm, sent Farmer a strong written defense. "I did get along with the Indians," he protested. Once again quoting from the Washburn letter about the whip for the overseer at Peniel Hall Farm, Wenberg claimed that his work at the Farm was "ruined by slave-driving missionaries." He felt that the current attack upon his past was a stab in the back by men supposed to be his friends and fellow workers.

Neither written defense nor oral explanations to Farmer, North, and Oldham changed the officials' reaction against Wenberg. They wasted little time in getting rid of him. On 15 July, the Executive Committee discontinued Wenberg as a missionary of the Board. Both the speed and the decisiveness of this action were concealed by Farmer in his communications to Irle, the official Bolivia correspondent. In notifying Wenberg himself, Farmer finally took the position that the action hinged solely on his having broken discipline by his unauthorized return to the United States.

Thus, by an organizational indiscretion triggered by his passionate devotion to the Indians, Wenberg unintentionally had dissipated his opportunity to serve them. The Board chose to capitalize upon his error rather than to exploit patiently his admitted potentialities as a missionary to Indians. By failure to cope more promptly with its own bungling liaison and by fumbling

with plans for Indian missions, the Board thus lost the services of a worker whom Farmer had called, little more than a year earlier "the one outstanding man in South America who is interested in Indian work and wishes to devote his life to it."

The Wenberg case was closed, but it left on the hands of the Methodists and the Canadian Baptists an unresolved question about denominational priorities in the Lake Titicaca area. Haddow's reluctance to bring the Methodists, represented by Wenberg, to Peniel Hall Farm had been shaped by his desire to give the Baptists another chance to send missionaries there. The Baptist claim to consideration rested upon the comity agreement by which mission territory had been divided at the Bolivian Missionary Conference of 1916. The Lake Titicaca area that included the Farm was part of the territory assigned to the Baptists.

When Bishop Oldham came to La Paz for the Conference session late in September, 1920, he worked out with Haddow a new agreement about territorial priorities. It assigned to the Baptists the southern half of the territory bordering Lake Titicaca and to the Methodists the northern half, near Sorata. Irle, who was now the single Methodist on the Peniel Hall Society's three-man board of trustees, readily consented to clear the way for the Baptists to undertake evangelical work at the Farm, and Baptist representatives promptly signed an agreement binding their Foreign Missionary Board to do so.

For a full year after Wenberg's dismissal, the Methodist mission to the Indians of Bolivia remained a figment of administrative talk. Secretary Farmer had little to offer except indefinite statements about sending out missionary couples that never seemed to reach Bolivia and about rather hazy schemes for medical and evangelistic itinerancy. Bishop Oldham, who had failed to redeem Wenberg's explorations in Bolivia and Peru from what he termed "somewhat fecklessly working around," confessed that he himself was greatly perplexed about how to get the Indian mission started. He wrote Farmer somewhat apologetically, pleading reduced appropriations, the difficulty of knowing where to begin, and sheer busyness, as factors accounting for the delay. "I am almost ashamed to confess that after all these years we are no nearer solution than five years ago," he said.

Although he had the advantage of being in Bolivia itself, Washburn, the District Superintendent, moved with no more sureness or dispatch than the other officials. His own pet plan for an agricultural station near Cochabamba was not essentially an Indian project at all, though Farmer once had characterized it as such. Washburn's original lengthy exposition of it said not a word about Indians. During his years in Bolivia, Washburn was generally preoccupied with public relations with the privileged and governing classes—a bent shared by a good many other Bolivia missionaries. His agricultural project was so conceived as to promise, most of all, profits for non-Indian

landlords and prestige for Cochabamba Institute. On the whole, Washburn appeared to be putting Farmer off with talk about making further surveys on Indian work. "I am studying it as carefully as I can," he wrote late in April, 1921, "and when some plan is formulated, I will write you immediately. . . . just at present I think it would be preferable not to send our [out?] people for immediate Indian work."

Washburn finally became involved in a remarkable demonstration of the opportunism that Bishop Oldham had deplored as characteristic of Methodist work in South America. In May, he reported to Farmer from La Paz that "in the mind of some there," Mrs. Irving Whitehead, directress of the girls' school, was lacking in the personable elements expected in the head of a girls' school in Bolivia, especially in the capital city. It was thought, he said, that competent and hardworking as she was, it would be necessary to replace her when her term ran out in 1922.

Some three months later, Washburn sent Farmer news of the appointments just made at the Annual Conference session. He called special attention to the assignment of Mrs. Whitehead "to lead the Indian work, which everyone feels she is admirably fitted to do." He added, "We feel the Indian Work is really opening up in an effective manner." Bishop Oldham, who made the appointment, also thought that it was a significant move. Evidently Mrs. Whitehead was considered good enough for the Indians, if not for the Bolivian upper classes.

Mrs. Whitehead was far from enthusiastic about her new appointment; she had been forced out of the girls' school, felt that she had been demoted, and was disturbed by the fact that the strong-minded nurse assigned to assist her already had served notice of her reluctance to work with Mrs. Whitehead and her ministerial assistant.

This was an inauspicious approach to what all looked upon as the first distinctly Indian program in the Mission's twenty-year history. Nevertheless, Mrs. Whitehead quickly responded to the palpable need of the Indians and was at once successful in reaching them. A house in La Paz was rented for the Whitehead family, and there under the same roof, the mission to the Aymará of the city was housed. (By this time, of course, the earlier work stemming from the efforts of Eloy Rodríguez had petered out.) The mission center was located in the Los Andes section on the outskirts of the city, where it was accessible to Indian families, which typically subsisted on their own small plots of ground and on the dairy cattle they herded in the daytime in the mountains close by. Mrs. Whitehead was assisted by Néstor Peñaranda, himself a native of the Indian quarter of La Paz; later on, another Bolivian assistant was engaged. By January, 1922, they were reaching eighty-five Indians in day and night school work, and by May, the enrollment was up to 245. Soon there were two night schools and a day school.

Mrs. Whitehead taught mornings and evenings, with her Aymará-speaking

assistants helping out and taking charge of activities requiring use of the Indians' language. Peñaranda preached in Aymará at morning and evening services on Sundays. A Sunday school averaging sixty-five in attendance soon was formed. In the afternoons, Mrs. Whitehead visited the Indian homes, where she made herself understood through the children, who spoke Spanish. She became acutely aware both of the primitive poverty of the homes she entered and of the gratitude she found readily sparked by a modest show of kindness by the visitor. The Indian families soon gave her their confidence and invited her to their funerals and weddings. Finding that the Indians wanted to learn trades, she looked for ways of extending the mission's educational work to manual training and domestic arts.

Since rental of adequate quarters was impossible, Mrs. Whitehead wrote to ask the Board for money to build a school and chapel so as to capitalize promptly upon the enthusiasm of the Indians. In April, she had made the long trip down to Antofagasta to ask Bishop Oldham for funds. But what he made available was insufficient, and she proposed to supplement what the Board might send, by giving her own tithe money. ". . . and when the tithe money is gone," she wrote, "I shall give more still for if this work does not go forward it will not be my fault." The combined home and mission center where the mission staff taught and preached was so jammed with Indians that the family dining room was converted into a classroom each night. Soap boxes and planks were used to make seats. "I am thinking of writing an article on 'Evangelization by Soap-boxes,'" wrote Mrs. Whitehead.

Politically, it was a touchy time to be promoting projects on behalf of Indians. The government suppressed a rebellion in the summer of 1922, and the Cabinet remained unstable. At several points, local priests and minor civil officials worked together to harass Protestant missionary workers. In San Pedro, Potosí, the head of the Bolivian Indian Mission was jailed for a week; in Torocari, a fellow worker of his was charged with murder, and long confined and embroiled with the law; in Viacha, not far above La Paz, two Seventh Day Adventists were taken from a train and confined without food or blankets until the American consul came up from La Paz on a snowy night to get them out. Seventh Day Adventist Indian converts out at Lake Titicaca got into trouble with the Bolivian government, and refused to treat with the government agent sent out to bring them to terms. The Bible was their only authority, they claimed. Washburn reported to Bishop Oldham that the government was taking seriously the question of seditious teaching by Protestant missions. "I think, however," he said, "that we are too well known to be classified in this list." He believed that good contacts counted.

Contacts did count—in more than one direction. As the La Paz mission effort gathered momentum, news of its ministries reached out into the Indian communities of the Altiplano. Delegations arrived at Mrs. Whitehead's door

to ask for the missionaries to come out to their towns to start schools and to give them the gospel. But men and money were not yet available for the exploitation of such evangelistic opportunities. At the 1922 Conference session, Mrs. Whitehead's husband became associated with her in the La Paz Indian activity, and Nurse Maude Rhode was added to the staff. She devoted herself to dispensary work and home visitation. When Miss Rhode left in May, 1923 (now married to a man named Christensen), Mrs. Whitehead added what nursing work she could to her other duties. In addition to handling general ailments of her Indian constituency, she went through two epidemics of whooping cough and scarlet fever. "I lost two babies of scarlet fever," she reported, "but none of whooping cough."

Virginia Whitehead learned deep sympathy with the Indians among whom she worked, and she could mingle tolerance with the disappointment she felt when they reverted to deplorable but deep-rooted patterns of social conduct after beginning to move toward new ways. When the boys were swept into the wild festival dances that surged through the district where the schools were located, she said:

. . . they cannot be expected to break away from those old customs all at one time and when they hear the "tum tum tum" of the drums and the call of the flute their inborn dancing spirit springs up and before they realize what they are doing they become a part of the great drunken, spectacular mass carrying on the ancient rites of superstitious religion.

She saw the Indians as people who knew "only what it means to be exploited, kicked around like dogs and used as beasts of burden."

When the Whiteheads left for their furlough in October, 1923, many of their Indian friends saved up ten cents to pay their way into the railroad station to say good-bye to them. They came wearing their ponchos, humbly advancing to shake hands, then walking sadly away with tears running down their cheeks. As the train rolled out of the station, the Whiteheads saw that the sidewalk was lined with still other Indians too poor to pay their way into the station for farewells. The two hardworking, sometimes discouraged missionaries, said to each other, "God willing we'll be back for this is worth the two years of hard work we have given them." They never were sent back to Bolivia, however; in spite of their willingness to pay their own travel expense to the field, they finally were notified that there was not money enough in the Bolivia budget to support them. They went instead, in 1925, to the Andean Institute, in Huancayo, Peru.

Behind them in La Paz the Whiteheads left three day schools and three night schools, with 420 Indians enrolled. There were 341 enrolled in three Sunday schools, and prayer meeting and preaching services were attended by more than a hundred Indians.

After the Whiteheads went home, Peñaranda carried on with the Indian

constituency in La Paz, with increasing effectiveness. When Bishop Oldham came to Bolivia late in 1924, he found that the nucleus for a Methodist church had emerged from the response to the evangelistic activity in Los Andes. Attending a service in Peñaranda's crowded Los Andes schoolroom, the Bishop was struck by the rapt looks on the faces of the Indian women as, with half closed eyes, they sang evangelical hymns in Aymará to their familiar Indian tunes. Peñaranda himself was the translator of the hymns, and his people now had an Aymará hymn book in their hands. He also had translated for them the Creed, the Commandments, some psalms, and other scripture portions. At the close of the service, Bishop Oldham organized the first Aymará Methodist Episcopal church in Bolivia, with a membership of twenty-seven probationers and forty-three catechumens.

The congregation organized that day became known as Los Andes Church and remained, under Peñaranda's perennial leadership, the permanent core of the La Paz Indian Methodist movement.

Mrs. Whitehead's successor as director of the Indian work was Henry C. McKinney, a Methodist who for five years had been working for the Bolivian Indian Mission. He and his wife came to La Paz in 1924 to take over the work during the Whiteheads' furlough. Later, they permanently succeeded them on the roster of the Board's Bolivia missionaries. The Methodist Board and the American Bible Society jointly supplied McKinney's support in La Paz. Half his time was assigned to the Society's work.

Hostility toward Protestant efforts to educate Indians still erupted, now and then, in violent localized persecutions. A national anti-Protestant movement got going, however, in the spring of 1926. The plight of the Indian, who perennially was neglected by his social superiors, suddenly came to national focus in a blaze of publicity. On the adobe sides of houses in La Paz—they made excellent billboards—appeared hundreds of posters a yard square, each bearing the head of a typical Indian and appealing for support for the Great National Crusade for the Indian. A campaign to promote patriotic interest in raising the Indian mass to the level of intelligent and responsible citizenship was under way.

The original call for the Crusade came from a meeting of the clergy of the Diocese of La Paz, which was addressed by the Papal Nuncio. The meeting followed upon receipt in La Paz of a letter from the pope, which emphasized the Indian problem as a social concern of the Church. The Papal Nuncio's address itself revealed that the Crusade was conceived partly as a countermove to the Indian work of Protestant missionaries, which was looked upon as the insidious labor of enemies of the Church.

The government and members of the social elite joined the Church in sponsoring the Crusade. Publicity experts were hired from abroad, the posters appeared, funds were collected, and the cause was promoted by a spate of dinners, dances, and full-page newspaper ads.

The government simultaneously made tentative repressive moves against the Adventists. But public opinion swung against the Crusade, with workers' groups, students, and liberals leading the reaction, which reached the point of noisy public demonstrations. Anticlerical propaganda punctured the patriotic and humanitarian pretensions of the Crusade. The sponsors retreated, and the movement collapsed. The government, now keeping the Church out of the picture, announced that a school for Indians would be built near La Paz. At the same time came news of a government decree recognizing the right of Protestant missionaries to preach and teach among the Indians. The failure of the Crusade, however, was essentially an anticlerical, not a pro-Protestant, victory.

When the furore died down, the problem of the needs of the Indians remained unreduced. The Methodists continued their modest efforts to attack it, for the first time shaping a comprehensive plan for future moves to serve the Indians. The Bolivia Mission Conference, Bishop George A. Miller presiding, adopted at its La Paz session in December, 1926, a five-fold official policy for Indian work:

- 1) To develop the work in the vicinity of La Paz, and to enter new territory near Lake Titicaca, ministering to Aymarás, but not attempting to reach the Quichuas.

- 2) To emphasize evangelism, education, recreation, and medical service.

- 3) To erect in La Paz a building for the training of young Indians as pastor-teachers for Indian missions to be housed in a series of simple school-chapel-parsonage buildings on the field.

- 4) To erect in Los Andes a church building for the principal Indian congregation; to erect in Los Andes a two-story clinic and dispensary with living quarters for the staff, and a nearby central school and parsonage; to branch out into other Indian sections of La Paz, utilizing hired buildings.

- 5) To budget appropriations so as to provide for gradual and persistent increases for Indian work; also to seek special gifts from the United States for building purposes.

On the whole, the development of the Indian mission and its facilities over the next two decades followed this pattern.

During most of his term, McKinney's supervision of the Methodist mission to the Indians was confined to La Paz. The mission had no buildings of its own, but cared for the Indians in rented quarters. One of the centers was the Los Andes church, and one was a single windowless room on Calle Linares. When McKinney withdrew in October, 1927, there were three Indian night schools, two preaching points, and two Sunday schools in La Paz. The membership of Los Andes Church grew from 37 probationers in 1925 to 151 full members in 1927.

McKinney tried steadily to develop and encourage responsible leadership on the part of Peñaranda, the Los Andes pastor, gradually turning over the practical functioning of the work to him and his helpers and finally releasing himself from certain routine work in favor of extension work out in the countryside. Not long before McKinney quit, Peñaranda made several trips out to rural points where he hoped to be able to place evangelical workers. He was inspired by the thought of taking from the Los Andes congregation Indians who could preach and teach under his direction among the country Indians.

The first to be sent out under this plan was Mariano Molina, who was put in charge of evangelical work at Santiago de Huata, in the Titicaca region. As a result of opposition stirred up by the local priest, a number of drunken Indians took Molina out of his house, tied him to a donkey, rode him around the public plaza, and finally took him three miles out of town and left him there with a warning never to return. When he came down to La Paz, it was thought advisable not to reopen the mission in Santiago de Huata for the time being.

Néstor Peñaranda, already groomed by McKinney for broader activities, was appointed Superintendent of Indian Work (and also superintendent of the La Paz District) at the Conference session in early November, a month after McKinney resigned as a missionary. He continued the outreach towards Lake Titicaca. To Calaque, only a few miles from the scene of Molina's unfortunate beginning, he sent another native worker, Cristomo Quinta. Quinta fared better, for the two thousand Indians in Calaque's fertile valley generally were friendly to the evangelical mission. They had driven out their last priest, and when Quinta came, they offered the use of the Catholic church for Methodist services. He held three religious services a week, with weekly attendance reaching 160. More than twenty boys went to school to him in a windowless building, ten by fifteen feet, with a single small door. To get light and air, the classes generally met outdoors, the boys sitting on five-gallon oil cans that they carried to and from school each day, the teacher setting up a portable blackboard. Quinta received a daily paper sent by the missionaries at La Paz and translated it aloud into Aymará for the villagers.

On the evening of 30 October 1928, Néstor Peñaranda and his Los Andes parishioners turned out for an enthusiastic homecoming reception for Frank S. Beck and his wife, whom they showered with rose petals and confetti. After more than five years' study in the United States, Beck was now a Doctor of Medicine, with a diploma from Northwestern University. Since his earliest teaching days at Cochabamba Institute in 1912, he had been impressed with the stark medical needs of the communities in the Bolivian interior, especially among the lower classes. This concern became fused with a growing interest in working with the Indians. Now he was ready to start clinical work in connection with the thriving evangelistic and educational

activity among the Aymará in the capital city, expecting gradually to reach out across the Altiplano to the smaller Indian communities.

Soon after being appointed Superintendent of Indian Work by Bishop George A. Miller at the Conference session in December, Dr. Beck began visiting the Indian communities near Lake Titicaca. He and Peñaranda made a two-day trip out to Calaque in February, 1929, going by automobile as far as they could over the steep and stony mountain roads and then changing to muleback. The villagers announced the missionaries' unexpected arrival by shooting off a stick of dynamite. People soon began coming in from all directions to meet the visitors. The doctor's work started with a rush, for the Aymará found that he was ready to inspect their ears for the much-feared ticks that crawled inside during sleeping hours. Beck worked until dark examining patients and extracting teeth. Then he held an evening service in the little church, which was crowded to the door. Beck and Peñaranda were put up in a small hut, where they spent an uncomfortable night lying on mud brick beds against the wall, both of them wet from the rain water that leaked through the straw roof.

The next day, patients came to the doctor from dawn to late in the morning. Then came another religious service, this time held outdoors to accommodate the hundred Indians that attended. After dinner, the two men from La Paz wanted to leave, but people still kept bringing in the sick from all around the valley. This was perhaps the first medical work ever done in the neighborhood; there were no doctors at all in such outlying areas. When Beck at last started home, the sick were even brought out to the side of the road along which the people knew he would pass; and he did what he could to help them.

During 1929, Beck and Peñaranda teamed up to make seven visits to the Indian work outside La Paz, including Calaque, Corocoro, Pocopocó (a wandering, guitar-playing, nearly blind old Indian was preaching there), and Guatajata, where Beck helped the Baptist missionary at Peniel Hall Farm with medical work.

Early in August, a delegation of Indians from Camata, an Indian community near Ancoraimes, close to the Peruvian border, searched Beck out in La Paz; they wanted a teacher for their village. Told that none was to be had, they refused to go home without one. Beck finally sent out Mariano Molina, the Indian worker who had got such rude treatment in Santiago de Huata. Back of him Molina had two years of Aymará night school in La Paz. Beck secured government permission for him to open a school in Camata, and the Camata Indians built him a residence and began a school-house.

Beck and Peñaranda came to Camata one evening in October after covering ninety miles of rough mountain roads on their Harley-Davidson motorcycle in five hours. Tired as he was, Beck reported to the nearest police

station, vaccinated many children, tended sick cases, and later in the night baptized seventeen adults. In the morning, the mayor of the village sent for the two missionaries, and when they rode in for what they thought would be only a routine call, he arrested them for starting a school. The local priest and about twenty others were called in to testify against them. Beck thought for a while that they would be mobbed. Their motorcycle was taken away from them, and the rear tire was cut with a piece of glass. The priest kept yelling at the people, "Let us kill these Protestants." When he quieted down, the two Methodists were bound over for the afternoon session of the court and given the liberty of the town plaza while two Indians remained locked up as hostages for them. Late in the afternoon, the judge returned from out of town. Being a good friend of the two workers from La Paz, he let them go. By that time, the town officials were so drunk that the mayor and the others were staggering when he dismissed Beck and Peñaranda. Molina went back to La Paz until things quieted down. Before long, with a guarantee of more effective government protection, he returned to Camata to resume teaching the sixty boys in his school, to start a school for girls, and to finish construction of the schoolhouse. By the end of the year, the Indians sent in \$70.00 to buy materials for the roof, doors, and windows of the schoolhouse.

The developing Indian mission in the country districts drew favorable attention from the government. In May, 1930, the government inspector of schools made Dr. Beck a challenging offer; he asked whether the Methodists would be willing to assume full direction of the rural schools throughout Bolivia. Since reduced appropriations already had curtailed plans for extension of Methodist endeavor among the Indians along Lake Titicaca, Beck had to decline this highly strategic opportunity.

In La Paz, Dr. Beck conducted a clinic for Indians, at first in rented quarters near Los Andes Church and later in a converted dormitory near the American Institute. On Christmas Sunday, Bishop Miller dedicated some new buildings designed and built for the Los Andes center by Charles A. Irlé. They provided a church seating 300 people, an apartment for teachers of the Indian school, and a parsonage for the pastor, Peñaranda.

Supervision of the Indian work now gradually gravitated into the hands of a new leader, Burt T. Hodges, as Beck became increasingly tied down to medical work in La Paz. Hodges, a teacher at the American Institute, became the Superintendent of Indian work at the Conference of 1931, and had his academic duties cut by half to allow time for his new activities. In the latter part of 1932, another American Institute teacher, John S. Herrick, succeeded Hodges, and remained at the head of the Indian work throughout the nineteen-thirties.

Like Hodges, Herrick at first continued to serve on the Institute faculty

but spent as much time as he could out in the Indian communities, helping and guiding his Bolivian workers.

In 1932, Bishop Juan E. Gattinoni visited the Indian charges near Lake Titicaca, bringing with him a gift of Bs. 549 from Argentine Methodist women interested in the Indian missions—the first of continued contributions from Argentina.

In June, 1934, another official visitor inspected the Indian work, when Herrick took Corresponding Secretary Ralph E. Diffendorfer on an automobile trip out to the Lake Titicaca region, where he spent a day in conference with the Indians at Camata. Noting Herrick's deep interest in the Indians, Diffendorfer urged him to go out and live among them and build a well-rounded, self-supporting Indian mission from the ground up. The visit brought Diffendorfer and Herrick into a rapport that lasted through years of constructive planning and effort in development of the Indian work.

Shortly after Doctor Diffendorfer's visit, Cleto Zambrana, a Bolivian discharged from military service in the Chaco War, got to work in Camata. For most of a year, he labored with the Indian constituents, building a five-room mission house designed by Herrick. Zambrana taught some of the men how to lay a stone foundation, supervised construction of a furnace for burning roof tiles, and organized the making of adobes and the erection of the house. Herrick went out from time to time and worked with his own hands, helping the Indians put up the adobe walls. The two workers agreed with Diffendorfer's view that the entire extension of the mission should have an indigenous character based on the principle that "not a thing should be done for those Indians. Everything should be done with them and through them . . ." In March, 1935, with the rainy season not yet over, Herrick drove Zambrana and his family out to Ancoraimes in the American Institute truck. There the Zambranas lived until the mission house was completed some months later. Zambrana walked daily the three miles to Camata and walked several miles in other directions to hold religious meetings to nourish the increasing demands in the neighborhood.

Zambrana's energetic application to his task was so successful that it stirred violent reaction against the evangelical Indians by some of their fellow Aymarás who still were loyal to the Roman Catholic Church. At Llojllata, Zambrana revived mission activity that previously had been nearly abandoned. The followers of the renewed congregation all were beaten by Catholic Indians and were warned to renounce the Methodist pastors. Persecution spread against other congregations in the area. Zambrana wrote to Herrick for assistance and finally came in to La Paz to join with Herrick in a direct appeal to government officials. Before the troubles were over, Herrick had to spend a great deal of time consulting lawyers, waiting in government offices, and traveling to the scene of the attacks. The worst of the persecution lasted for about two months and was followed by a longer period of general

agitation. Herrick succeeded in getting a measure of government protection for the evangelical Indians during the rest of 1935.

Persecution by no means quenched the growing evangelical movement around Camata; requests for new schools and for worship services poured in. There was more work than Zambrana could handle. His only assistant was a native worker named Victor Duran, whose zealous preaching sometimes waxed overly anti-Catholic. At the end of Zambrana's first year, there were about a hundred baptized Indians under his pastoral care, and there were more than five hundred communicants and sympathizers.

During 1935, Herrick opened four new schools near Lake Titicaca, the farthest nearly a hundred miles from La Paz. At the Conference of 1935, early in August, Camata, Cajjata, Llojllata, Ispaya, Ocola, Quillima, Pacoma, and Sokokoni were listed as Indian charges for the coming year. The first six had appointed preachers, and the last two were to be supplied. The new teachers sent out to the Indians were well received by the Methodist sympathizers among them and were reasonably well sustained by the Indians' gifts of money and food.

Following the session of the Mission Conference in October, 1938, Herrick guided Bishop Gattinoni on a two-day visit of the Indian schools and preaching places. The Indians warmly received the Bishop, listened to his simple talks, and entertained him and his companions at meals consisting of Indian dishes. The Bishop and the Indian Superintendent found that Cleto Zambrana, assigned to Camata and living in Ancoraimes, was traveling the district constantly and had vaccinated nearly a thousand people against the highly prevalent smallpox during the past year. He was not a doctor, but a trained nurse. For miles around, he had won universal confidence as a healer, thus extending his Christian influence among people who did not frequent religious meetings. In Ancoraimes itself there were now more people who were receptive to evangelical activity, and Methodist workers were allowed to preach there openly. A new volunteer worker, Eusebio Magne, was left in the village to capitalize upon the fresh opening.

Herrick was unable to supervise the Indian work in 1939; he had to fill in as Director of the Institute in La Paz. There now were seven Indian charges on the Altiplano that reported to the Conference on church membership—in all, 289 probationers and 44 full members. Los Andes Church, in La Paz, still under Peñaranda's guidance, had 250 probationers and 250 full members.

Fortunately, Herrick was under no pressure to act for quick results. Diffendorfer wanted him to take plenty of time—a whole term of service if necessary—to move patiently and imaginatively in discovering and laying the foundations of a genuinely indigenous and self-supporting Indian movement. Diffendorfer's views were carefully explained at a meeting of the Conference Committee on Indian Work in March, 1938. The Committee discussed

methods of undergirding all the mission's efforts by improving the living conditions of the Indians. They talked about the possibilities of mechanical and manual training shops, the improvement of crops, diversified cropping, modest fairs for exhibiting individuals' products, and the weaving industry.

The Camata Indians already were considering the purchase of a small piece of ground for experimental farming, and property already had been purchased at Ancoraimes as a site for a school-chapel-home combination that Herrick himself hoped to occupy in 1940. Land purchases also had been completed at Pacoma, Ocola, Quillima, and Llojlata. Some half dozen young Indian converts in the Ancoraimes neighborhood, who could read, write, and speak broken Spanish, awaited preparation as teachers and preachers.

Determined to go out and live among his Indian constituents, Herrick bought a pick-up truck with family funds, and started settled work in Ancoraimes in May, 1940. The only living quarters available were a small, unfinished, Mission-owned adobe house in Camata. To complete it was Herrick's first task. Here he and his wife dwelt (she came after the house was made livable) in a fairly well defined, but not closely settled community of six hundred Indian families, with about sixteen thousand Indians in the vicinity and sixteen thousand more in the adjoining district.

Herrick devoted weekdays to construction, poultry keeping, bartering food-stuffs, simple and friendly approaches to Indians, and constant careful observation of the Indians so as to find out how they could be attracted into co-operative activities later on. At the same time, Herrick was trying to learn to speak Aymará. On Sundays there were two, sometimes three preaching services. Naturally, Herrick had to depend on Zambrana for communication in Aymará, the only language used by most of the Indians.

By living among them, Herrick exerted an influence that penetrated community life far more deeply than the signs and single words and short phrases that were his first vehicles of communication. His overt acts preached when his language could not. A servant girl returning from the local market was killed by lightning. Her body lay in the road for an hour. No one would touch it. The Indians believed that she had been punished by the ancient gods, that her body must be avoided, that even the place where she fell must be shunned. At the request of the girl's employer, Herrick brought her body home in his pick-up truck. The Indians warned him that he would be struck by some great misfortune unless he appeased the gods. Thus Herrick acted out, in view of all the superstitious people of the countryside, a sermon that supplanted the angry gods with the God who cares.

His position on the field thrust Herrick into the role of a trusted friend of the Indian community and its leaders. A group of Indians in his neighborhood contracted to plant and harvest a crop for the owners of a tract of land left dry by a recession of the waters of Titicaca. Indians from a lakeside community, jealous of the crop's success, stole out by moonlight and started

to harvest it for themselves. The next day, a tribal war broke out. A Camata Indian was shot and killed, though the Indians were not supposed to have arms. The community ruler (the *corregidor*) appealed for Herrick's help. Together they went to the provincial capital and brought back soldiers, who arrested some of the crop thieves and took them in to jail in the capital. Fearing that their houses would be robbed in reprisal, the Indians near Herrick asked him to guard their clothing and other valuables. Forty bundles thus were stored in the schoolhouse, and the Indians' confidence in Herrick kept growing.

At Ancoraimes Herrick saw with more brutal clarity than ever the staggering dimensions of the problem of approved social drunkenness. Most of the evangelical Indians were breaking away from the oldtime mass drinking orgies, though it came hard. Some occasionally succumbed. Herrick found that the two-day celebration of All Saints Day was a particularly difficult time for them. Celebrations were held in the cemeteries in recognition of the spirits of the dead, who evidently were supposed to return for a day. Liquor was handed out freely at the graves of people who had died during the previous year. Before the *fiesta* was over, the cemeteries were filled with the bodies of Indians lying about in alcoholic stupor.

One of the Indian teachers being trained by Herrick was the son of a devoted Protestant who had died of typhus. The son built a small stone mausoleum over the grave in the local cemetery. On All Saints Day, he decorated it with flowers, and then stood beside it and, like John Wesley in the Epworth churchyard, began to preach. This was both an act of high courage and an attempt to Christianize the observance of a Christian feast day that had been perverted to paganism.

Herrick believed that the best method of fighting the evils in Indian social life was to train native preachers and teachers for the major part of the task. They suffered no language lag and they understood the nature of the people as the missionary hardly could do. Therefore he tried to buy a larger piece of land in Ancoraimes for the erection of a Bible and normal school for Indian leaders. There still was enough intense local antagonism to make people afraid to sell him land for the mission. Yet he pushed forward with his plans and began building on the smaller lot already available. He expected the erection of the Ancoraimes center and the development of the school for Christian leaders to be a slow, trying process, but he was patient, ready to adjust himself to the conservative tempo of the Indians.

The project at Ancoraimes did progress slowly. Rising wartime prices and scarcity of building materials added to the difficulties. Furthermore, the Board and the Conference—so Herrick felt—were giving the Indian work niggardly financial treatment; only \$600 had come to him for construction purposes in six years.

Symptoms of far deeper danger to the growth of the Indian mission, how-

ever, burst out in the Ancoraimes neighborhood only a few days after Herrick reached the United States on furlough in July, 1942. Incited by the corregidor, Estanislao Zegarra, some hostile Aymarás who were Roman Catholic in their sympathies opened a series of violent attacks upon the evangelical Indians associated with the Methodist mission. On 5 August, an underling and a son of Zegarra's drunkenly and brutally assaulted Manuel Cruz Mamani, an evangelical Indian teacher, in the public plaza of Ancoraimes.

Three days later, a group of Cajjata Indians invaded Camata. Manuel Linachi, teaching in the mission schoolhouse, looked out and saw the marauders advancing. He halted the classwork, led the children outdoors, and retreated with them for safety towards a nearby hill. Some of the parents came up to protect their children, but the invaders fell upon them and beat them. Three of them were wounded close to Herrick's cottage. The attackers broke the schoolhouse windows, shot bullets into the wall, and pelted the exterior with stones that left hundreds of scars. Herrick's garden was completely destroyed, and the stucco on two walls of his house was ruined. The invaders chased off all the evangelical Indians in sight, and then departed, taking with them cattle and flocks. On 10 August, Cleto Zambrana's house was attacked in the night while he was in La Paz soliciting the protection of the civil authorities for his parishioners and co-workers.

The evangelical Indians at Llojllata were the next victims. While Zambrana was away, the house of Manuel Cruz Mamani, the Llojllata teacher, was violently attacked by Catholic Indians. Many were wounded, five seriously. Zambrana took the wounded to the provincial capital for treatment. One of them—Manuel Cruz's mother—soon died, and the official report on her death listed murder as the cause. The rest of the village's evangelicals were scared into hiding or into flight. In fact, many actually moved away.

At Pacoma, raiders killed an evangelical named Manuel Samuel Mamani. "They murdered this man," reported Zambrana, "in the most terrible way recorded in these days; after having mutilated the sexual organ and made several wounds in his body, they finished him with axe-blows."

Zambrana, after several efforts, finally got a measure of punitive action from the authorities, but the harassing of evangelicals continued. Zegarra, who was discharged from his official post, directed reprisals against Zambrana's family. It was a bitter time, severely trying the courage and faith of Zambrana and his followers.

When Herrick got back to Bolivia in September, 1943—he was eager to return—he at once investigated the Ancoraimes situation. He concluded that Zambrana, who at one point had been asked to leave the community, had been opposed "99.44% because he is and has been an evangelical. Of course," he continued, "this is only part of the story: when Don Cleto sees an Indian unjustly treated he tries to protect him and invoke the protection of authorities. The country people, mestizos [cholos], like to be their own authority

and they resent interference, hence their passion to eliminate Don Cleto." It was clear that the time had not yet come when the Indian mission could advance without meeting local resistance that was pregnant with violence. Canata was the only community in the Ancoraimas area where Protestants and Catholics could live peaceably together. It would take persistent effort to overcome the intolerance of the country cholo class and to win freedom of thought and worship for the Indians near the Lake. Religious liberty had been enshrined in the Constitution for nearly four decades, but it was by no means universally a community reality.

Herrick took two immediate steps: he began cautiously to work for the safe return to Llojllata of six evangelical families that had been forced to abandon their properties there, and he resumed his search for a larger purchasable property in Ancoraimas. Persecution or no persecution, he planned to have on that property a good home for the Bolivian pastor and the missionaries, a well-located clinic, and an additional experimental area for fruits, vegetables, and trees. These would supplement the educational and evangelistic work based on the Bible-Normal Institute he hoped now to launch. "This is a daring step to take," he said, "and we feel that we take it only in the strength of the Lord."

GENERAL EVANGELISM

During the period when the mission to the Indians was gathering strength, the general evangelistic mission to the Spanish-speaking public faded out and finally vanished. No Methodist church in Bolivia today enjoys continuity with any of the four preaching appointments read out at the organizing session of the Bolivia Mission Conference in 1916.

The church in Chulumani, organized as recently as 1914, was short-lived; regular work there was not carried beyond 1918.

The church in Cochabamba was closed in 1919. When Associate Secretary Harry Farmer tried to jog the District Superintendent, John E. Washburn, into evangelistic activity in Cochabamba in 1921, Washburn was cold to the idea of reopening the church. "If we were to start up in rented buildings as we did before," he said, "we would get the lower class of people in the church and have the higher class people in the schools. That these cannot be mixed without bringing disgust to the higher class is well known."

Moses Merubia was sent to Cochabamba in 1923, and for about three years, he conducted a kind of indirect community evangelism by cultivating members of workers' organizations, intellectuals, and university students. But when he left the city, his successor found it impossible to build a continuing church group upon the foundation afforded by Merubia's work. The pastoral appointment to Cochabamba, which was renewed each year to 1930, became little but a chaplaincy for Cochabamba Institute.

Ironically—considering how Secretary Stuntz used to chide the District Superintendents for confining their evangelism too much to La Paz—the preaching mission to the Spanish-speaking people of La Paz itself collapsed during the early nineteen-twenties.

When the Bolivia Mission Conference was organized in 1916, the La Paz church had forty members and three Sunday schools. From 1917 to 1921, the church ran through a succession of four brief pastorates. When Moses Merubia, the last pastor in the series, had to give up late in 1921 because of his health, he was drawing good congregations. Conversions had added new members, but removals from the city had cut into the membership. Merubia left only twenty-two members and a sharply diminished Sunday school enrollment.

The church was still meeting in the small, dark hall it had been using for a decade. The room was so uncomfortable and unimpressive that it hampered the growth of the congregation. "It is so cold these winter days," complained Frank Beck, director of the American Institute, "that to go into the room makes one almost lose his religion." In December, the Mission purchased a church site well located at the junction of six streets. But before funds could be found for a house of worship, the society itself vanished from the religious life of La Paz.

Before this happened, however, the Board made a direct attempt to strengthen the church work in La Paz as well as to stimulate the evangelistic advance outside the capital city. Jay L. Clow, formerly a missionary in India, was sent out from New York to La Paz to be the missionary in charge of evangelistic work. He and his wife were instructed by Secretary Farmer to engage in no educational activity at the American Institute except classes that were directly related to training workers for general evangelism. He enthusiastically took up his work in March, 1922.

Clow's pastorate was brief but busy—devoted to Sunday morning services in co-operation with the Canadian Baptist pastor, midweek prayer meetings, well-attended Sunday evening services, informal social activities in his rented parsonage, parsonage Bible classes for American Institute boys, a Bible class for young men from five other schools, tutoring Peñaranda in his Conference studies, preparing a young Bolivian for Conference membership, and guiding several young men in preministerial studies in co-operation with the Institute. By 1923, he was introducing young Bolivians into the evening services as preachers. Before this time, far from being interested in the ministry or being willing to preach, the young men from the Institute had been reluctant to acknowledge their religious interest publicly. By the time Clow left, in December, he had seen slow but definite growth in the church, and was able to report for 1923 an increase of 68 per cent in the membership—a small increase, to be sure, but a reversal of the earlier downward trend.

Clow did not restrict his activities to La Paz, but tried to reach out beyond

the capital city as much as he could. He soon made an eight-day walk through the mountains to and from Chulumani to see what could be done to reopen the work there. He also journeyed a hundred miles south of La Paz to Eucaliptus (Tomás Barrón), and hoped to visit the lowlands of the Beni, to the north, and still other areas. But further travels had to be given up; Clow found the distances great and travel expensive, and he had no funds for itinerating at his disposal. He traveled enough, however, to make contacts with the Indians and to sleep in their hovels.

In making these attempts at expansion, Clow was carrying out instructions given him in New York by Secretary Harry Farmer, who impressed upon the young missionary the fact that he was expected to become the effective spearhead of a distinctively evangelistic movement in Bolivia.

Farmer's letters to Clow on the field repeatedly underscored this and reminded him of the broad scope of his appointed task. He was told not to consider himself simply as the pastor of the church in La Paz, but as missionary-in-charge for the entire evangelistic program in the city, including a direct interest in the Indian work. Farmer urged him to remember, while planning for La Paz, the rest of the area of Bolivia for which the Methodists had responsibility under the comity agreement of 1916. He wanted Clow to push out in every direction as far as he could reach. Indeed, Farmer gently chided him for seeming to limit his mission by using a letterhead on which he designated himself as pastor of First Methodist Episcopal Church, La Paz.

When Clow wrote appreciatingly of the important organic relationship between educational and evangelistic work in Bolivia, Farmer took pains to reply that whereas the relationship was real, the educational work, valuable as it was, remained secondary in importance to evangelistic activity. He warned Clow against becoming

inoculated with the virus that there is no virtue in the preaching of the Bible as over against secular education. We must put on as rapidly as possible a regular program of itineration and evangelization, and this is exactly what your Training School will bring about. As soon as possible you must train preachers who can act as settled pastors. You cannot afford to be tied up to La Paz or any part of it as you are a missionary to Bolivia and must extend your activities and influence as widely as possible.

The cumulative result of Farmer's correspondence was to confirm Clow in his resolve to push the evangelistic work. "As to my work here," he wrote in reply to the Secretary's reminder about his title, "I am glad to accept the larger appointment as missionary-in-charge rather than simply that of pastor of the church."

At the Conference session early in October, Clow discovered that his position in Bolivia was a focus of resentment by the Bishop. Unfortunately, Bishop Oldham still was nettled by the fact that when he was confined to a

hospital in the United States, Clow had been appointed as an evangelistic missionary in La Paz without his final episcopal cognizance. In a meeting of the Finance Committee, the Bishop questioned the validity of Clow's membership on the Committee, made a point of repudiating Clow's made-in-New York title "missionary-in-charge," ridiculed his presumption in expecting to serve as an evangelistic missionary in Bolivia without years of experience on the field, declined to approve the modest budgetary allowance suggested for Clow's evangelistic tours beyond La Paz, and told off Harry Farmer, *in absentia*, for his interference in the administration of a South American field. Clow was caught in the middle, between two administrators with their wires crossed.

Clow was also in trouble with influential Bolivia missionaries, with whom his faithfulness to Farmer's instructions (evidently Bishop Oldham sent him none) had incriminated him. In the glow of a cordial welcome to the field, he forgot Farmer's forewarning that he would face some opposition in Bolivia. He failed to see that Farmer's outline of his functions might easily be interpreted as competitive with the prerogatives of the District Superintendent, John Washburn.

But Washburn had a deeper reason for opposition to Clow's mission. Washburn was a convinced and somewhat ruthless partisan of the educational mission as against the evangelistic mission. His supreme passion was protection of the stability and growth of the two Institutes; he had founded one of them and had directed both of them. His perennial policy as an academic director and as District Superintendent rested on the primacy of good public relations for the Institutes. He showed no more pressing concern for the general evangelistic work than he had for Indian evangelism. To keep the schools in good favor with their Bolivian clients and with the public authorities, Washburn was willing to tone down the religious emphasis in the life of the schools, to restrict or jettison projects in general evangelism, and to dissociate the schools in the public mind from whatever expressly evangelistic Methodist work was going on in Bolivia. No significant project in general evangelism was started during Washburn's superintendency, and it was mainly during his incumbency that the movement wilted and died. Farmer and Washburn sharply differed on Mission policy, and the La Paz preacher, all unknowingly, was caught in a crossfire between them.

Clow realized that the coals of Bishop Oldham's irritation were being blown to flame by bellows plied, as he had found out not long before Conference, by missionaries who were "bitterly" opposed to him. They made two attempts, at the Conference session, to cripple his work. One proposal was to transfer him to Cochabamba, which would have sidetracked him beyond range of attendance at Finance Committee meetings between Conference sessions. The other was to have him assigned exclusively to educational work in La Paz, thus thwarting his attempt to carry out the evangelistic purpose

for which he had been sent to Bolivia. "To accomplish one or the other thing everything imaginable, even the pettiest personal things were taken to the bishop," said Clow after the 1922 Conference session was finished. Clow was left in evangelistic work for the ensuing year, but his functions and his prestige were cut down to dimensions that suited Bishop Oldham's ideas.

The opposition continued, and at the Conference session a year later, in November, Clow fared even worse. On the first day, before hearing Clow's report on his year's work, Bishop Oldham sent for him and requested him to relieve the Conference of embarrassment by resigning on his own initiative and asking to be sent home. The Bishop told him that the other missionaries wanted him to leave. Clow refused to offer his resignation. Oldham then had his homegoing and terminal salary payments put into the budget for 1924 and at the end of the Conference, after nearly two days devoted to tense discussion of Clow's position in the Mission, Oldham left him without appointment. Clow later told Secretary Farmer that the Bishop said to him, "It is no longer a question of whether or not your work has been a failure, it is not even a question of justice. It is a question of a situation that has to be faced in which I will have to move you or a whole group."

Clow thus became another casualty of missionary politics and of loose-jointed and absentee administration. More particularly, he was a victim of the tendency of dominant elements in the Bolivia missionary group, in the nineteen-twenties, to break missionaries unfortunate enough to be, in their eyes, *personae non gratae*.

Following Clow's departure early in December, 1923, Daniel Breeze, a worker taken over from the Salvation Army, served as the Methodist pastor for La Paz for more than a year.

For more than two months in the spring of 1925, during the absence of their pastors, the Methodist and the Baptist congregations met together in the new Canadian Baptist church, the first Protestant church building (it was dedicated in 1923) erected in Bolivia. When Washburn, the District Superintendent, returned from the Montevideo Congress on Christian Work in South America, he found that the two congregations, the two pastors, and the Methodist missionary group heartily favored continuing the arrangement.

Washburn accepted the *fait accompli*. He kept the Methodist preaching hall closed, made a personal agreement with the Baptist pastor to continue united worship and religious education in the Baptist building, and let the Methodist congregation merge with the other group under the name Evangelical Union Church.

Washburn strongly approved the merger. Indeed, he had already tried, on his own initiative, to bring about a more far-reaching one. In May, 1923, he appeared before the Conference of the Canadian Baptist missionaries and proposed a plan for combining both the evangelistic and the educational activities of the two denominations in Bolivia. The Baptist Conference turned

down the proposal. Washburn so fully supported the 1925 merger in La Paz that he took personal responsibility for its consummation and then notified Bishop Oldham of what had been done.

The Bishop, who was preparing to transfer administration of Bolivia to Bishop George A. Miller, made no official decision on the merger, but gave Washburn his personal support. He wrote:

Personally I am entirely agreeable to your Union with the Baptists in La Paz, on one condition, and that is that the Communion Table be not closed against Christians who have not been immersed, and that in the case of new converts they be permitted to choose their own method of Baptism after due explanation. And these things I ask, not in defense of Methodism, but of Christian liberty.

Bishop Oldham was generally kindly disposed towards measures of inter-denominational co-operation.

When Bishop Miller came to La Paz in December for the Conference session, he found, however, that the newly formed group was a "union" church only in name. It was still essentially a Canadian Baptist church, and a person could join it only by being properly immersed. "I find," said Bishop Miller, "that we have simply abandoned the field, and turned over our members, contributions and interests to the Canadian Baptists." He saw that the Methodists would be "out of business as a church in La Paz" as long as the Baptists kept their brilliant pastor, Herbert E. Wintemute, and the Methodists kept their evangelistically unaggressive District Superintendent.

A year later, Bishop Miller found that the Baptist mission was unwilling to enter into any official agreement about the La Paz church. By 1927, they had a new pastor, were disowning the informal Wintemute-Washburn merger agreement, and were refusing to recognize Methodist members as members of the "union" church. The new Baptist pastor informed Hugh C. Stuntz, president of the Conference session of 1927, that he wanted Methodists to pull out and start on their own again. Stuntz reported to Bishop Miller that the general Methodist evangelistic work in La Paz had vanished.

Stuntz went further. "There isn't enough Evangelistic work being done in this conference aside from Indian work," he said, "to put in your left eye." All that was left was the work in Corocoro, a mining community of six thousand people on the La Paz-Arica railway, where Peñaranda had begun preaching and school work in 1917. From 1921, the work, which included a night school for Indian employees in the copper mines, was carried by Eliodoro Zelaya, another Bolivian pastor. In 1931, with the local mining industry almost completely shut down, the Methodists withdrew their Corocoro pastor in order to effect economy in the Conference budget. Zelaya's final report to the Conference noted a full membership of sixty-seven persons.

Bishop Miller was much distressed by the Spanish-speaking evangelistic situation as he viewed it on his 1925 visit—"After all these years we have not a single organized church in all Bolivia." The much-touted religious influence of the Institutes did not, in his mind, compensate for failure to conduct public evangelism directed towards developing evangelical church life. He wrote to Associate Secretary Thomas S. Donohugh:

We are doing good school work, and trying to freshen the salt water of the sea by pouring in our graduates with a somewhat religious result attained in our schools. As there is no organized church work anywhere, the graduates and ex-pupils soon drop back into their old lives and the results of our toil and sometimes tears is largely lost.

The Bishop knew that the schools had made friends for the American missionaries, he knew that they fitted numerous young men for social usefulness and economic competition; but he had doubts about their effective inculcation of distinctly Christian living.

Miller was skeptical about the efficacy of trying to filter the Mission's religious message into Bolivian life through the schools. He learned that for some time, the Institutes themselves had been seriously in default with regard to promoting student religious life within the area of voluntary action left to them by the regulations governing their relationships with the national school system. When the Conference, under his guidance, in 1926 adopted a statement of general policy for the Mission's work, it included, along with expansion of the Indian work and establishment of medical work, a demand for a strong development in student work.

"The weak spot in this mission is in the religious and evangelistic work," said Bishop Miller in 1926. This judgment remained true throughout the nineteen-thirties, during which there was no revival of Methodist evangelism among Bolivia's Spanish-speaking people.

MEDICAL WORK

The building of the fourth wing of the structure of Methodist missions in Bolivia got effectively under way late in 1928, when Frank S. Beck returned to La Paz, with his medical degree from Northwestern University. The work to which he then devoted himself was the substantial beginning of the medical ministry of the Methodist Episcopal Church in Bolivia. There had been earlier attempts, but they had failed.

In midsummer, 1915, Secretary Oldham had been startled by being suddenly confronted with a batch of small gift checks designated for "Hospital, La Paz, Bolivia." They were turned in by Corwin F. Hartzell, who was giving furlough addresses out in Iowa. Never having heard of such a project, Oldham sent two letters of inquiry to Hartzell, in one of them warning that "the starting of a hospital is a very serious matter concerning which I am

very sure the Board must hear a great deal more than it has before the enterprise can be entered upon."

Mrs. Hartzell, replying during her husband's absence, offered Oldham a neat rebuttal—"and the going without a hospital is a very serious matter also." She knew what she was talking about. Five years earlier, her little boy had been ill with smallpox in La Paz. The boy and his parents spent three weeks in the "pest house" of a Catholic hospital. The filth in the room was indescribable. Mrs. Hartzell was afraid, due to lack of sanitary protection, even to give the sick boy the medicine the nuns brought. The door had to be closed to keep out mental patients, lepers, and incurably diseased people who were housed in the same section of the hospital.

With this family experience in mind, and giving weight to reports of unfortunate experiences by evangelical converts in Catholic hospitals, Hartzell was asking not for a regular hospital, but for a simply furnished two- or three-room "shelter" costing about \$3,000, that would provide at least safe and isolated sick quarters under certain conditions. Mrs. Hartzell acknowledged that it would be a makeshift, a step towards the day when there would be a good hospital building staffed by a doctor and nurses.

The Hartzells had put their finger on a much broader need than they described. At that time, there was no hospital in operation under any mission board anywhere in South America. Oldham said three years later, reporting as Bishop, "The story of the medical mission work in these lands is like that of snakes in Ireland—there is none." He and Miss Charlotte Aiken, who made for the Board a survey of medical opportunities in South America, were agreed that the most outstanding and immediate need under the Centenary's medical program for South America was to open a small hospital and medical work in La Paz.

The Board acted in June, 1919, appropriating \$6,000 as a special advance against Centenary funds. Charles A. Irle, the mission treasurer, used the money as the down payment on a \$30,000 residential property of three acres close to the American Institute. He set about altering and improving the two-story building to provide a limited number of rooms for patients, a diet kitchen, a consulting room, and living space for a doctor's family and for a nurse—altogether a modest hospital. The site also afforded room for prospective erection of a dispensary and a larger hospital building.

The man the Board chose to pioneer its South American hospital work came to La Paz in mid-April, 1920. He was Dr. Bacil A. Warren, a man of forty-seven, with seventeen years' experience as physician and surgeon behind him. In the course of his career, he had run a drug store, superintended a hospital, worked for the United States Indian Service, and served as an army doctor. His mission in Bolivia was not only to open and operate the hospital in La Paz, but also to prepare for the extension of medical work into the other areas reached by the Bolivia Mission.

Doctor Warren spent only a year in Bolivia. It was a hard year. The hospital building, only partly renovated, was not ready for full use, and there were times when no patients at all could be received. Hospital supplies and equipment were not at hand. Medical practice had to be taken up with caution because of uncertainty about licensing by the Bolivian authorities. Travel was difficult, and the doctor's dormant pulmonary tuberculosis rose to plague him. By fall, his family left for the United States for reasons of health.

But Warren's worst frustrations sprang from the Mission itself. Upon arriving in La Paz, Doctor Warren had prepared at once to move his family into the apartment set aside for them in the hospital. Blocking the way he found Nurse Rose A. Driver, a strongminded and sturdily independent middle-aged contract nurse whom Bishop Oldham had brought to La Paz seven months earlier. Evidently she had painted a mental picture of herself running the hospital with the aid of an additional nurse. The picture was shattered when Corresponding Secretary Harry Farmer let her know that the Board was sending down a doctor to take charge; her earlier enthusiasm cooled and turned into opposition. Now the doctor, in the person of Warren, was on the field ready to head the new institution. "My nose went a little out of joint because I thought that was my part," she wrote to Farmer. It was so far out of joint that she refused to recognize Warren as head of the hospital, and said she would not let him move into the unfinished building, in which she had installed herself. Irle quickly called a meeting of the Finance Committee, which voted to house Warren in the hospital building and to recognize him as the head of the Mission's medical and hospital work.

Helpfully seconded by Irle, and in spite of the handicaps upon his enjoyment of free and effective medical practice, Warren soon was treating numerous patients. But he encountered missionary interference with his professional work and, finally, opposition to it. On one occasion, for instance, a child with smallpox in a contagious stage was allowed to return to classes in the Institute contrary to his orders. On another occasion, "some kind-hearted missionary or missionaress" tampered, in the doctor's absence, with the binding of a fractured thigh he had set, and the break had to be painfully reset. "I was mad and said so quite freely," reported Warren. Such incidents produced tensions between him and members of the missionary corps. In addition, conflict flared up out of Warren's resistance to their lay attempts to intervene in areas of medical policy in which he, as the doctor in charge, felt that no professional man could brook interference.

When Bishop Oldham came to La Paz for the Conference session late in September, he had to attempt a solution to the puzzle posed by the Mission's confusion about medical policy. Warren, being a new hand at Conference business, was at a disadvantage. The Bishop did not solicit his opinions, and he was not a party to the private committee session in which decisions were hammered out. His antagonists had the Bishop's ear; their opposition to his

work prevailed. The La Paz hospital was practically abandoned—assigned to the girls' school as a dormitory. Doctor Warren was appointed to general medical work in La Paz and in Chulumani, which was in the Yungas, with Bishop Oldham indicating that he wished the doctor to live in the Yungas. Nurse Driver, who had stayed in La Paz in spite of being transferred to Lima, was appointed as district nurse, and Warren was given to understand that she would now work independently of him. To cap it all, the Finance Committee established a Hospital Committee with power to make plans "for the conduct of the Mission Doctor and the District Nurse," to fix a policy on medical fees, and to judge priorities among medical cases requiring treatment. Warren was convinced that he had been made a victim of Conference intrigue and of fumbling by the Bishop. The New York secretaries, North and Farmer, and the Board's medical associate, Dr. John G. Vaughan, agreed with Warren's essential position, and felt that he had been handled unjustly. Doctor Vaughan was categorical in his criticism of Rose Driver's part in Warren's troubles, and felt that she should be removed from Bolivia.

From this time on, Warren was hamstrung as far as hospital work in La Paz was concerned. In mid-December, Mrs. Irving Whitehead, who had moved into the hospital building preparatory to opening the girls' dormitory there, wrote Farmer an emotionally charged letter roundly condemning Warren. She attacked the value of his practice, questioned the validity of some of his medical diagnoses, portrayed him as a man with revolting personal habits, described him as a health menace, expressed confidence in the ministrations of Rose Driver, and excitedly pleaded for Warren's removal. It was a grossly lopsided and partisan letter, and Warren was not shown it or informed of it. Indeed, he never had an opportunity to defend himself against its aspersions. Mrs. Whitehead showed it to her missionary colleagues, and it was sent off to New York carrying the signatures of all the La Paz teachers except Frank S. Beck, who nevertheless approved it and sent a copy to Bishop Oldham. As though to emphasize the partisan cast of the letter, among the signatures was that of Rose Driver, which stood out in heavy penstrokes—a veritable John Hancock.

Bishop Oldham visited La Paz in February, 1921, and Warren's antagonists had an opportunity to renew their complaints against him. The Bishop neither saw Warren, however, nor heard his side of the controversy, for the doctor was on a medical trip down in the Yungas. Bishop Oldham decided to remove him from Bolivia. When Doctor Warren returned to La Paz about ten days later, he received a letter from Oldham directing him to return to the United States because of his poor health. The Bishop made it clear that he was accepting the missionaries' interpretation of Warren's health and of his value in Bolivia. After some delay in La Paz, Doctor Warren left South America in May, and his resignation as a missionary became effective.

Doctor Warren was sent down from Bolivia chiefly because he had become

a victim of Mission politics. The Mission had no leadership capable of keeping administrative friction from degenerating into hostility or of preventing hostility from blossoming into personal attack aimed at the liquidation of the weaker party. Unfortunately, the Board's secretaries were informed of the trouble too late to be able to act constructively. The Bishop was too easily swayed by partisan reports and, because of the personal conflict between the doctor and the other missionaries, failed to wait out the essential problems involved in starting hospital work in Bolivia. After only five months, the Bishop had shelved the Board's hospital plan. Thus the first attempt of the Methodist Episcopal Church to implement its emerging program for hospital work in South America became a fiasco.

Seven years and a half elapsed between Doctor Warren's departure from La Paz and Doctor Beck's arrival, in October, 1928, to make the second attempt to provide Methodist hospital service in Bolivia. At first, he could treat even the Institute's students and the missionaries only under technical supervision of a Bolivian doctor. When he took up his work, the licenses of all foreign doctors had recently been cancelled. Beck enjoyed special status, because his passport to the United States, when he went home to study medicine, classified him as a Bolivian student. He quickly secured official permission to practice among the Indians. The medical authorities were willing for him to do this, "as the doctors here do not care for that kind of work as there is no money in it," wrote Beck. Before his first year was out, he secured a general license to practice anywhere in Bolivia.

As we already have seen, the first few years of Doctor Beck's medical activity were merged with his superintendency of the Indian missions. He at once started clinical work in La Paz, intending to have it supplement the other Indian mission activities already being conducted at Los Andes. Indeed, he confined his first year's ministrations almost exclusively to the Indians. He held his morning clinics in two rented rooms near Los Andes Church and his afternoon clinics at his own living quarters across the street from the Military College, near the American Institute.

Not all his patients came to Doctor Beck's clinic rooms. He visited some of the Indians in their cramped and airless hovels, where often he would find his patient lying on a dirty blanket or a hard mud bed. At first, he had no hospital beds to which to remove the sickest of them. Few would follow his advice to go to the city hospital, for they had a horror of it. Going there looked to them like taking the last step before the graveyard; they preferred to die at home. Therefore he had to do what he could for them in the squalor of their bitterly poverty-stricken homes.

Beck was especially concerned, as always in later years, with the care of mothers in childbirth and with their babies. He knew that the La Paz mortality rate for children under one year was one of the highest in the world. Seventy-five years after Semmelweiss fought his classic battle against puer-

peral septicemia in Vienna, Doctor Beck was engaged in the same fight in La Paz. Here the adversary was not a lagging medical profession, but the inability of the Indians to discard their childbirth customs. Because they never had known medical care at childbirth, they refused—even the Indian church people—to call Doctor Beck until after the child was born. In a single year, three mothers in the Methodist Indian community died because the doctor was called too late. Children often were lost because of acute intestinal disorders brought on by being given all kinds of harmful things to eat. Again and again, the babies were brought to Doctor Beck too late. He realized that a prolonged process of education would be necessary in order to teach the Indians proper maternity practices, protective child care, and confidence in hospitalization.

For the year 1929, Doctor Beck reported treatment of 2,671 medical cases, with 3,776 visits to the clinics. He also served as examining physician at the Methodist schools in La Paz and Cochabamba. On his numerous trips to the Indian communities out on the Altiplano, where there were no doctors at all, he treated hundreds of cases. Wherever he stopped, Indians quickly crowded about him for treatment. As soon as they heard the sound of his approaching motorcycle, they would hurry to the roadside to intercept him, bringing their sick for healing.

At the end of 1929, the Conference placed at Doctor Beck's disposal the building near the American Institute that originally had been purchased for a hospital in Doctor Warren's time and later converted into a girls' dormitory. He and his family moved to the new location, which throughout the following decade served as the center of what became known as the American Clinic.

As the hospital work started in earnest at the new site, Doctor Beck began to accept a certain number of upper-class patients, in the hope of securing enough income to approach the goal of self-support for the Clinic. This, he trusted, would enable him to continue medical care for the Indians, who most needed it. He was sensitive to the fact that even the wage-earning urban Indians received not more than thirty to fifty cents a day and might easily become unemployed. He charged them small fees and carried many free cases.

At first, Doctor Beck had no regular nursing assistant in the hospital. Beulah M. Hartley, a missionary nurse, came to work with him in July, 1930, and two Bolivian girls, graduates of the American Institute, entered training as nurses. In March, 1931, Lia Peñaranda, a daughter of the Los Andes pastor, returned from Lima, where she had been graduated from the British American Hospital. She brought to the Clinic staff familiarity with the Aymará tongue native to the Indian patients. In 1932, Lula Mae Allen, a missionary nurse, replaced Beulah Hartley (now Mrs. Howard H. Fuller) and became chief nurse.

By September, 1931, the monthly totals of hospital cases were running to more than twenty bed patients and over three hundred outpatients. There

were ten rooms for patients—two classes of paying clients, and a few charity cases. The hospital needed enlarging so as to make room for more patients and particularly to provide a well-equipped operating room. Doctor Beck performed a few operations, but any serious venture into surgery had to await better facilities. With so limited a nursing staff (now including three part-time aides), the nurses' energies were severely taxed, and Beck's hours of duty were almost endless.

In November, 1931, Beck relinquished his superintendency of the general Indian work, which he had been carrying ever since his return from the United States. The American Clinic now became a distinct and major phase of the Bolivia mission rather than an activity contained within the Indian program. From now on, the Clinic absorbed Beck's full time. His visits could no longer be a regular feature of the missionary treks out to the Indian communities to the north. The Bolivian upper classes, with their superior ability to pay, now began to replace the Indians as the predominant element in the Clinic's clientele.

Most of the La Paz doctors were unsympathetic with what Beck was doing, in spite of the fact that he granted them at the American Clinic privileges they could not enjoy at the city hospital. It was not that the Clinic was in popular disfavor, but that the doctors were sensitive to professional competition. In 1930, they petitioned the military junta provisionally ruling Bolivia after the June revolution to revoke the licenses of all foreign doctors and to close the American Clinic. The move was blocked by friends of the Mission among the government officials. Further efforts to have Beck's license canceled were made in 1931—first by attempted general legislation and then through pressure for administrative action. Opposition like this threatened the existence of the hospital. "So much depends on the broken reed of our political friends," said Howard Fuller. Beck's position as practicing physician and surgeon remained somewhat tentative for several years.

The period of active hostilities in the Chaco war with Paraguay soon interrupted the continuity of Beck's gradual development of the La Paz clinic. Fighting broke out in July, 1932. As troops were being sent to the front, the Methodist clinic was busy training Red Cross nurses, a hundred at a time, for the government. The war situation reduced the number of regular patients, and Beck offered to care for wounded soldiers who might be sent back from the Chaco. The first trainload of wounded reached La Paz on 8 October. By that time, Beck had agreed to do medical work with the Bolivian fighters in the Chaco, and Doctor Diffendorfer had cabled the Board's permission, provided that the doctor's services be strictly noncombatant and personal and not in his capacity as a representative of the Mission or the Church. Feeling that he had an obligation to the government because of the relation of his medical license to his earlier passport status as a Bolivian student, he took a leave of absence from the Mission. Being identified with war propa-

ganda would have been distasteful to him, but the opportunity for humanitarian service to the Bolivian youths caught in the Chaco war was compelling. Although Doctor Beck was given rank as a major in the army and was granted military pay, his noncombatant status was recognized by the government, and his first assignment was 250 miles from the front.

Beck went to Villa Montes, on the Pilcomayo River, to organize and direct an evacuation hospital for sick and wounded soldiers. Villa Montes was in the southeastern lowlands, and his wife rightly predicted, "The thing he will have to fight there is a tropical climate, insects, and disease, more than bullets." To carry on this fight for the care and comfort of his patients—the number soon was rising from fifty towards a hundred—Beck had only very limited facilities and equipment. He suffered from the intense tropical heat, and struggled to provide sanitary conditions for the hospital. Along with his medical responsibilities, a share of the station's varied chores fell to him, even breadmaking and milking the cows. His efforts to sustain morale at the hospital during the rainy season that annually turned the Chaco from a hot and almost waterless desert into a trackless swamp endeared him to his charges. With the assistance of a nucleus of men from the American Institute, he worked for the moral and religious welfare of the soldiers.

Nursing a mild case of malaria, Beck came home to La Paz on furlough at the beginning of 1933. During his leave, the President of Bolivia granted him "the degree of Director of Hospitals for all of Bolivia." Beck treated many returned soldiers at the American Clinic and was asked to become assistant surgeon at a 200-bed hospital for soldiers that was to be opened by the Central Bank. But early in May, he was back in the Chaco, first in a town where for a month he battled a smallpox epidemic, and later in charge of an evacuation hospital. Again he added to medical care an expressed concern for the moral welfare of the soldiers brought to his hospital. He provided them with recreation and entertainment and distributed Bibles among them.

Four months later, Doctor Beck was back in La Paz, beginning to busy himself with the work of the Clinic. Not until October, 1934, however, did Congress pass the bill that granted him, in recognition of his service in the Chaco, an unconditional license.

Fortunately, his absence in the Chaco had not necessitated closing the Clinic, though naturally the number of cases decreased. It fell to the nurses, headed by Lula Allen, to keep the Clinic going. Dr. Guillermo Pacheco, a young Bolivian graduate of the American Institute, who had recently completed his medical training at the University of Chicago, came in twice a day to tend the outpatient section and to visit the bed patients.

The case load increased during Beck's first furlough from the Chaco, and the Clinic was full most of the time that he remained in La Paz. By April, 1933, the project was being maintained on a self-supporting basis. When Beck left for his second stint in the Chaco, he was able to leave as interne

a young Bolivian with a record of two years' medical study in the United States and two years' experience in the American Clinic. Dr. James Price, a North American doctor formerly employed by a mining company in Bolivia, took up residence at the Clinic.

Lula Mae Allen, the 25-year-old nurse upon whom Doctor Beck leaned so heavily, was the focus of a new venture in Methodist Episcopal missions. She was the first Negro accepted by the Board of Foreign Missions for service in any region but Africa and apparently the first so assigned by any major missions board. The possibility of securing a Negro nurse for La Paz had been raised by Secretary Donohugh before Beck returned to Bolivia in 1928. After returning to the field, the Doctor more than once wrote the Board that he was favorable to the plan for a Negro nurse who would be supported by Negro churches, and he finally offered to have the Clinic assume full responsibility for her salary.

The Board made a search for a well-qualified candidate, and Lula Allen, whose home was in Texas, was recruited from Flint-Goodridge Hospital, a Negro institution in New Orleans where she was serving as a supervising nurse. Her outgoing expenses were covered by contributions from Negro churches in the New Orleans and the Covington Areas, under the leadership of two Negro Bishops, Robert E. Jones and Matthew W. Clair.*

When he first broached the question of engaging a Negro nurse, Doctor Beck had some reservations about the likelihood that a Negro would "be able to take care of all high class trade, and develop a training school for nurses." He felt that she might fit in very well as assistant in the Indian work and in the hospital, but that another nurse probably would be required for general work. Therefore he asked the Candidate Department to find a white nurse for him, and Beulah Hartley was sent down before Lula Allen was accepted. Miss Allen, however, was not actually thrust into any subordinate position implying any doubt about her adequacy as a nurse or her acceptability as a person. As soon as she reached La Paz, Doctor Beck informed her that she would be his chief surgical nurse. She became the mainstay of the hospital staff and won high commendation from Doctor Beck and from his "high class" clients. Her coming was cordially expected by members of the La Paz missionary group, and she was warmly welcomed by them. In 1935, she was named as Beck's alternate on the influential Finance Committee during his absence in the United States.

Lula Allen had no critical difficulty with racial discrimination in La Paz. She was well liked and well received by Bolivians of all classes, whose acceptance of her was determined by her social and cultural status rather than by her race. "The Bolivian people, in general, are better [in racial attitudes] than the North Americans in general, and so are the English," she wrote.

* Bishop Clair was the father of the later Bishop Matthew W. Clair, Jr.

"They have not been brought up with a race prejudice against the blacks, as a race. The Bolivians have something like it toward the Indians, but it is more a question of money and education than race." Miss Allen sometimes experienced rudeness in public, but the cause was mainly curiosity on the part of people who were unaccustomed to seeing Negroes. Most Bolivian Negroes were in the Yungas, where they lived on the same general social and cultural level as the underprivileged Indians.

Miss Allen wrote to Virgie Mitchell, a Negro nurse scheduled to join her at the Methodist hospital, "There are a few southern families here, and I just have sense enough to stay home from any social function where they are likely to be present. The American minister and family are southern, and when they invite all the Americans to a Fourth of July reception or anything I stay home as I know it would be uncomfortable for me as well as for the hostess and some of the guests if I should go. I trust you will have enough sense of humor to be able to stand a few of these things." The attitudes of the missionaries evidently were above reproach, and in addition to giving her their friendship and respect, they tried to help her cope with the measure of unpleasantness she did meet in the community.

Virgie C. Mitchell, a 39-year-old nurse at Provident Hospital, Chicago, was commissioned as a missionary at Saint Mark Church, Chicago, on 2 September 1934, by Bishop Clair. She was the second Negro nurse to go to Bolivia under sponsorship of Negro churches. Her recruitment was the result of the desire of Doctor Beck to have another Negro nurse and of the Board's encouragement of this second step towards widening opportunities for Negro missionaries. She soon arrived on the field and established a record of excellent service.

Lula Allen left La Paz in January, 1936, to go on furlough, but not saying whether she would return for another term. In spite of requests from Bolivia and from the Board, she never came back. Eight months later, Virgie Mitchell resigned after only two years' service and soon left for home, in spite of Doctor Beck's efforts to persuade her to stay in La Paz. The failure of the two women to continue was regretted by Doctor Beck and by the Board, both because of their intrinsic merit and because of the possibility that it would discourage further enlistment of Negro missionaries.

Doctor Beck offered the New York authorities no substantial explanation of Miss Allen's decision, nor did she; the New York men were left in the dark. The Doctor attributed Miss Mitchell's resignation to a combination of several factors—misunderstanding about financial arrangements, particularly as they affected her ability to meet her family obligations; a certain sensitivity to her racial status, though not to the point of radical difficulty; loneliness; some lack of rapport, at least for a time, with Lula Allen; and the somewhat unsettling influence of a nonmissionary white nurse with whom she was friendly.

Doctor Donohugh got some light on the background of the Negro nurses' difficulties from a missionary confidante of theirs whom he consulted. He found that initial friction between the two nurses was allayed, and they became good friends. Undoubtedly both of them were lonely, especially Virgie Mitchell, who felt the isolation of her position as almost the only Negro in La Paz. Her worry about being able to care properly for her mother nagged at her throughout her stay in Bolivia. But exacerbating the personal problems of the two nurses were other conditions, whose impact they felt together.

Their experience at the hospital during Doctor Beck's furlough in 1935 had been highly disturbing and physically wearing. The interne left in charge had managed the hospital badly, and the nurses had borne the brunt of his deficiencies. Lula Allen, for instance, was expected to prepare for operations when the requisite supplies were not on hand, sometimes using her own money to buy them and sometimes, to her great embarrassment, borrowing materials for last-minute preparations. She finally "struck" as far as these expedients were concerned, and one morning the country's leading surgeon had to postpone an operation because supplies were lacking. Such conditions produced friction. When Doctor Beck returned, the two nurses already were upset and tired out from overwork. Lula Allen left shortly afterwards.

Although both women felt better when Doctor Beck once more was in charge, they were troubled by some of his methods. With the background of their training in United States hospitals in mind, they found it difficult to adjust themselves, in the less advantageous environment of the La Paz hospital, to what they considered tolerance of dirt and makeshift methods, along with the uncleanness and inadequate sterilization of instruments that violated the standards to which they were accustomed. They could not seem to communicate their concern to Doctor Beck, though they tried to talk with him about it.

Virgie Mitchell also was upset because of some of the results she observed flowing from the necessity of cultivating a clientele in order to make the hospital pay its way. She believed that that policy led Doctor Beck to make unjustifiable concessions to the practices of Bolivian doctors and provided less attention for the Indians than for the wealthy. This condition helped to undermine her faith in the missionary motivation of the Methodists' La Paz institutions, a faith that was already badly sapped by the internal dissension that was racking the American Institute at that time.

In spite of the Board's original interest in the commissioning of Negro nurses to be supported by Negro churches, evidently no official study of the factors involved in the termination of Lula Allen and Virgie Mitchell's service in Bolivia was made. It still is not clear, from any evidence available, which factors were decisive in their withdrawal from the field.

When Doctor Beck returned to La Paz from furlough, in December, 1935, everyone was aware that the development of the Clinic was to take a new

turn. The Board had received in September, through his assistance, the promise of a gift of \$25,000 (it was later voluntarily raised to \$30,000) by Mrs. Henry Pfeiffer of New York City for the erection of a new hospital in La Paz. This was highly welcome news in La Paz; space in the old Clinic building was limited, and many current applications for beds had to be declined or postponed. In order to provide an adequate area for the projected new building, the Board authorized the purchase of land adjacent to the original Clinic property.

When Charles A. Irle, the Board's roving architectural engineer for South America, took up the hospital project in March, 1938, repeated attempts to buy the desired additional land had proved fruitless, and no other good site could be found in La Paz. The missionary leaders and their local backers then settled upon a site in Obrajes, a suburb about three miles from the center of La Paz. The altitude of Obrajes was nearly a thousand feet lower, the climate was somewhat warmer, and there was more room there for later expansion. In May, the Board approved the erection of the hospital in Obrajes, at the same time loaning \$3,000 for land purchase, rather than accepting Doctor Beck's offer to loan the money from his personal funds. It was his hope, at this time, to maintain the old clinic station in La Paz along with the prospective hospital in Obrajes. The new institution would be principally for the better-paying, upper-class patients, and the older one would provide services to the poor, that is, the Indians.

Irle promptly started building operations in Obrajes. When he left Bolivia in February, 1939, the nurses' home was only partly finished and the main building was far from complete. Doctor Beck had to add supervision of the construction to his medical duties. The nurses' home—much smaller than the main unit—was ready for use early in the summer, but not for nurses only; the Becks and the nurses lived on the first floor, and patients were received on the second floor. In these cramped quarters, they cared for fifty-eight patients and twenty-one deliveries in less than two months. Part of the main building was ready for use a few months later. All the clinical work was then moved to Obrajes, because it became clear that running two clinics would be too expensive.

The project taking shape in Obrajes drew much favorable attention in the neighborhood of La Paz. On 12 August, the Vice-President of Bolivia awarded Doctor Beck, whose tireless labors and winning spirit had given him high stature in the eyes of many Bolivians, the order of the Grand Condor of the Andes, the nation's highest decoration. But the days of anxiety over the future of the American Clinic were not ended. Although the hospital was already dedicated, it was little more than half finished, and important items of equipment—operating table, maternity table, sterilizers, wheel stretcher, wheel chair, surgical instruments—were critically needed. The walls already were up, but the half of the hospital that was planned to hold the surgery and

certain other departments had no roof over it. The Clinic was in drastic need of funds. It was in such straits that Doctor Beck bought with his own money (it was refunded in 1943) a station wagon, a portable X-ray machine, a short-wave diathermy, a tonsillectomy machine, a microscope, and various surgical instruments, costing all together \$2,450.

Several factors had combined to bring on this crisis; a government decree suddenly increased minimum wages, taxes on all imports were raised, new plans had to be paid for, new land had to be bought, and the full effect of all these increased costs was realized too late for basic revision of the project as originally planned. C. Rogers Woodruff, an assistant treasurer of the Board, who visited Bolivia in September, reported, "It all boils down to this: in La Paz we have an outstanding missionary family in the Becks [their daughter Miriam was now on duty as a nurse], and in the Hospital we have one of our best pieces of work in western South America; and about \$25,000 more is needed to finish the Hospital as it ought to be done. The big question is, Where is the money coming from?"

The question was not answered satisfactorily until 1942, when the Board allocated to the American Clinic \$25,000 from funds exceeding \$108,000 that were given the Board by the executors of the estate of Henry Pfeiffer. As late as 1943, Doctor Beck still was bringing the Clinic, by that time officially called the Pfeiffer Memorial Hospital, to completion.

Soon after its opening, the Obrajes hospital had a capacity of thirty private rooms, eighteen baby bassinets, and four children's beds. It eventually used fifty-five beds. Important Bolivian doctors, including the Minister of Hygiene and Health, brought their patients there. In August, 1940, its training program for nurses, which had started soon after the Clinic was organized, became a full-fledged nursing school recognized by the government on the basis of an authorized curriculum. The Pfeiffer Memorial Hospital took its place as the only large modern private hospital in Bolivia.

Central America

RECOGNIZING THE FACTS OF GEOGRAPHY and of administrative practice, the General Conference of 1920 legalized the connection between the missions in Panama and Costa Rica by redefining the Panama Mission to include the two republics. Central America still appeared in the definition of the Mexico Conference, but Costa Rica was now specifically excluded, and Panama evidently was not counted as a part of Central America.

At the same time, the General Conference gave both Panama and Costa Rica a new functional association with Mexico by assigning the redefined Panama Mission to the Mexico City episcopal area. The Area, itself a new combination, also included the Mexico Conference, the North Andes Mission Conference, and the Ecuador Mission, under the supervision of Bishop Wilbur P. Thirkield, resident in Mexico City. This arrangement ended what George A. Miller, superintendent of the Panama Mission, had protested against as "bifurcated episcopal leadership."

The Panama-Costa Rica work remained a part of this geographically more compact episcopal area for two quadrennia. But in 1928, the General Conference once more lumped it in with the entire South America enterprise by severing it from association with Mexico and assigning it to the Buenos Aires Area. From 1932 to 1939, the work again was included in a more compact jurisdiction, becoming a unit in the Santiago Area, along with Chile and the Peru Mission Conference. This was a relationship closer to that of Panama's original connection with the North Andes Mission.

Bishop George A. Miller, who had been closely associated with the development of the mission in Panama and the founding of that in Costa Rica, was the resident Bishop from 1924 to 1936. Bishop Roberto Elphick succeeded him in 1936.

The Panama Mission, meeting in Seawall Church, Panama City, on 14 January 1921, constituted itself a Mission Conference, under an enabling act of the General Conference of 1920. Some months earlier, Edwin M. Oliver of the Panama group had proposed having the prospective Conference drop the term *Panama* from its name in favor of a more inclusive one, claiming that the Panamanian designation for the Mission caused confusion and

jealousy among Costa Rican Methodists. On Oliver's motion, the new seven-member Conference voted to call itself the Central America Mission Conference.

Bishop Thirkield divided the Mission Conference into two Districts—the Panama District, Edwin M. Oliver, Superintendent; the Costa Rica District, James A. Brownlee, Superintendent. Brownlee also became subtreasurer for the Costa Rica District, since the Conference treasurer resided in Panama.

Panama

The Panama Mission brought a new man to the Isthmus in 1920. He was Armando O. Bustamante, 32, born in Cuba, experienced in evangelistic work there, graduated from Ohio Wesleyan University and Boston University School of Theology, a citizen of the United States by virtue of military service, and a member of the Delaware Conference.

Plans to send Bustamante to Panama almost went awry during the summer. On July 15, the following harmless-looking cable was delivered at the Board's New York office: SPANISH YNHEJSYMSL BUSTAMANTE HAAHNGRYAJ. Decoded, it read, "Spanish workers have strong prejudice against Bustamante. It will be advisable to delay departure for the present. Mission station begs Board to reserve decision until further correspondence; will write as soon as possible." The sender was Ulysses S. Brown, Superintendent of the Panama Mission.

Two weeks later, the mail brought Brown's explanation of the cablegram. The Spanish-speaking workers on the Isthmus were sizzling with gossip sparked by a meddling letter about Bustamante's appointment to one of them from Harry Farmer, Associate Secretary. They had jumped to the conclusion that Bustamante had been hand-picked, over their heads, to start new work in Colón and to take charge of all the Mission's Spanish work, particularly in the Seawall Church in Panama City. Gabino Arandilla, who was Eduardo Zapata's assistant there, and so in line to succeed him upon his imminent return to Mexico, began excitedly advertising the fact that Bustamante, whom he had known at Taylor University, was a Negro. He displayed a picture of Bustamante's sister to prove it, and he sententiously informed Brown that Bustamante's uncle, a resident of Panama, was a "black Negro." The gossip about Bustamante and his wife's being Negroes leaped from the Mission's Spanish workers to members and friends of Seawall Church. People began saying that the church might as well lock its doors as to have Bustamante come to work there. The talk went so far that Brown greatly feared that Bustamante's usefulness in the Panama Mission already had been aborted—hence the cable. "Personally I do not know him," he wrote, "but I do know that there is a strong dislike for Negroes among the Spanish folks. I am at my wits' end and have no suggestion to offer."

This was not the first time that racialism and the supply of missionary personnel for the Panama Mission had run together. In fact, Bustamante himself had once been briefly involved in that particular mixture. While he was still in Ohio Wesleyan University, in 1917, Secretary Thomas S. Donohugh had recommended Bustamante to Superintendent George A. Miller for the prospective new post in David. Miller bluntly responded by Western Union, "Bustamante is too black for David. How about Rodriguez?" And Donohugh promptly sent back racial clearance for the other candidate: "Rodriguez is rather small, and white and would be all right for David." Evidently Bustamante's pigmentation was considered no absolute bar to missionary usefulness, for both Miller and Donohugh were willing, at that time, to employ him for West Indian work on the Isthmus, that is, in work with black constituents.

At that very time in 1917, George Miller was also trying to find a man to head the agricultural mission he hoped to open with the assistance of the Panamanian government. In the same telegram with the inquiry about Bustamante's color, he asked about another candidate, whose name had been coupled with that of Hampton Institute, a Methodist institution for Negroes, "Is Floyd Crouse a black man?" When he got an ambiguous reply from Donohugh, Miller raised his guard against error still higher; he telegraphed a more emphatic request for information—"Is Crouse white or black? Must be white." Donohugh finally let Miller relax; he wired, "Crouse is white. Writes that he is deeply interested."

The American leadership did somewhat better by Bustamante in 1920, though with more caution than courage.

Frank Mason North, Corresponding Secretary, let Bustamante sail for Panama on schedule, and wrote Brown politely asking for fair play and for time for official consultation on the issue raised by the touchy appointment. Secretary Farmer did his best, through correspondence with Mission leaders in Panama, to portray Bustamante as a man of high calibre and, like North, called for fair play. He also touched on the spiritual issue involved:

I certainly cannot understand that type of Christianity which would refuse to work beside a man of the highest type of learning and Christian experience simply because of his color . . . I will feel something is wrong with our interpretation of the Gospel if we cannot use this man to great advantage.

When Bishop Thirkield, only recently assigned to the Area, heard of the fuss in Panama, he washed his hands of Bustamante's appointment as decisively as he could, asking Farmer to tell the Panama workers that he had not been a party to it. Thirkield was well known as a leader in efforts for the advancement of Negroes, having been both the general secretary of the Freedmen's Aid Society and the president of Howard University. But rather than urging acceptance of Bustamante, Thirkield showed that his primary

concern was to avoid leading the Panamanians to suspect, in view of his record, that he was intending to inaugurate a new racial policy for Panama, where he understood race relations were "somewhat strained . . . especially on economic lines."

When Ulysses Brown heard that Bustamante was actually en route to Panama, he assured Secretary North that he would receive the Board's unexpectedly controversial appointee without prejudice, and would do all he could to smooth the way for him. Bustamante and his family landed at Cristóbal in mid-August, and Brown found quarters for them in Colón. The plan originally agreed upon for his assignment had been to set him temporarily at evangelistic spade work in Colón, and then start him on a pioneer project in one of the interior provinces. Brown gratefully turned to this previous arrangement as a means of avoiding trouble by keeping Bustamante at work at the other end of the Canal from the center of the anti-Negro talk. Bustamante did appear before the English-speaking congregation at Seawall Church, but he was not invited to speak to the Spanish group shepherded by Zapata and Arandilla.

After his first fine statements about race and Christianity, Farmer showed little disposition to hold out for a decisive trial of the workability of his ideals. Bishop William F. Oldham, passing through Panama on his way from New York to South America only a fortnight after Bustamante's arrival, sent back to Farmer a statement of Bustamante's situation that was patronizing and pessimistic, as well as brief and extremely hasty. Farmer snapped up the Bishop's superficial comment, and quickly concluded that the Bustamante appointment to Panama was doomed. He was quite ready to write Bustamante off as a missionary by returning him to the United States or to Cuba. "I have no doubt," he wrote Oldham, "the Methodist Episcopal Church, South would be very glad to have him in Cuba."

Fortunately, Bustamante stayed in Panama long enough to get over the hump. It is clear that the Mission's Spanish constituency was not untainted with racialism. But it is questionable that without Farmer's original administrative blunder, and Arandilla's resorting to the game of mission politics, there would not have been any Bustamante controversy at all. At any rate, the immediate issue petered out within a few months, and Bustamante later demonstrated that a Negro missionary could achieve effectiveness and acceptance in the Panama Mission.

Brown and Bustamante went out early in September and reconnoitered two of the interior provinces, finally deciding that Bustamante would find his best opening in Chitré, a town in Los Santos Province on the Azuero Peninsula, which projects out of central Panama into the Pacific. They came loaded with no prefabricated missionary schemes, but determined to search for some vital point of contact with the local people. They studied the town for what it was—a thoroughly Roman Catholic community—and Bustamante

kept studying it after he settled down there in November. The Roman priest was "the center of all authority and power" in Chitré, at least in the manipulation of popular opinion and of extralegal social sanctions. The two evangelical workers realized, as Bustamante wrote to the New York office, "that to change the ideas and customs that have permeated the life of these people for more than four hundred years, is a thing that cannot be done in a short period of time." Bustamante hoped that the Board would have patience with the Chitré development, and not press for the starting of a church just for the sake of having one. Overt evangelism would have to await careful preparation of the ground through slower and more informal approaches. Bustamante did not expect to be able to preach openly, or even have a Sunday school, until he had gained the confidence and good will of the people.

The most promising point of contact with the people, judged Brown and Bustamante, would be their economic condition, particularly their need for improved agriculture. The people were poor not, the missionaries believed, because the soil was poor, but because they were using antiquated farming methods. Their livestock was inferior and run-down. Bustamante was not a farmer by occupation, but he had worked on several Ohio farms, and had read agricultural literature for a number of years. Therefore Brown decided to make agricultural experimentation and demonstration the special emphases at the Chitré station. "It is the intention in this Mission," announced the Board's *Annual Report* for 1920 a little later on, "to carry the Gospel message through the cultivation of the soil."

The Chitré mission rented a building with enough land for experimental purposes, aroused the interest of a number of leading citizens, and got together some seed and agricultural equipment. Bustamante's first public missionary act—and it got plenty of attention in the town—was to break ground, in December, for a demonstration planting. Many scores of people came to see the first modern plow ever used in the parish. Bustamante laid plans for several months' experimentation with irrigation methods, and for later projects in nonirrigated cultivation.

Just as Bustamante was opening his agricultural work, he received two disconcerting letters—one from Edwin M. Oliver, the Mission's treasurer, which strongly urged him to make no public promises about agricultural projects, and to keep expenses down; and another from Secretary Farmer, which instructed him to turn to colporteur work and direct general evangelization, and played down Bustamante's agricultural project, which was further advanced than Farmer realized. Farmer had a perennial fixation on peripatetic, scatter-the-seed-abroad evangelism, without much consideration of its usability in particular fields. He had favored having Bustamante rove an entire province to preach and teach the evangelical message. Brown had rejected Farmer's strategy, partly because he knew far more than Farmer about travel conditions in the interior of the country, where road systems

were either incomplete or even non-existent. And of course, Brown found it impossible to co-ordinate Farmer's tardy long-distance directive with the already launched program derived from his own empirical study of the community in which Bustamante was stationed. By the time Brown got Bustamante's tangled instructions unraveled for him, a month's time had been wasted, the demonstration seed potatoes were rotted, and Roman Catholic critics were yapping at Bustamante's heels. Brown protested to the Board at this additional attempt of Farmer's to run the Panama Mission from 150 Fifth Avenue, New York City. "There are some conditions that must be met on the field," he said. "Theories that may look fine in New York are sometimes impracticable where folks live."

Bustamante got a fresh start, however, and worked hard throughout 1921—earning the friendship and co-operation of community leaders, conducting an English night school for public school men and others, extending his agricultural experimentation to land outside the town, developing a Sunday school of two dozen children, conducting a Bible-selling campaign in Chitré and adjacent communities, directing two women in house-to-house visitation, and finally starting up Sunday evening preaching services that crowded his small meeting hall. He faced constant hostility from conservative Roman Catholic elements, and repeatedly had to resist the effects of social pressures exerted against his work and his emerging group of inquirers and followers. In all his efforts in Chitré, he suffered, however, no hindrance on grounds of race, either from the people in general, who enjoyed in themselves liberal mixtures of Indian and Negro blood, or from the numerous white people who worked with him for community betterment.

The Chitré venture was short-lived. Secretary Farmer declared in February, 1922, that the two interior stations, Chitré and David, held more strategic promise than the Panama mission's city work. Nevertheless, a few months later, on Farmer's recommendation, Bishop Thirkield permanently transferred Bustamante to Panama City, where he had been filling a temporary vacancy in the Spanish pulpit at Seawall Church. To keep the Seawall post manned, the Bishop and the Secretary gambled on the continuance of their new opportunity, in Chitré, to project the Methodist mission into the interior of Panama. They gambled—and lost. The Chitré mission's projects fell apart, Bustamante's good contacts among local leaders evaporated, the mission was put out of its rented quarters, purchasable property became harder to get, plans to send another missionary failed, and the emerging evangelical sympathizers dropped back into the Roman Catholic community. The only serious attempt to recoup the losses was made in February, 1924, when Bishop Thirkield reappointed Bustamante to Chitré—a course advocated for many months by George A. Miller, the Superintendent. Bustamante actually went out to Chitré, but by June, he was back in Panama City; the officials had failed to make sure of proper financial undergirding for the

reopening, and Bustamante was put into Seawall Church again, to fill the vacancy created by the transfer to Peru of his February successor.

The David station, which was located far deeper in the interior than Chitré, remained under the financial sponsorship of the Union Churches of the Canal Zone throughout the 1920's. They provided an \$1,800 missionary salary for David, thus sustaining the successive ministries of four men—Newman M. Powell, who finished a five-year term early in 1924; James N. Smith (1923–25), who worked with Powell for a year; Edward W. Bossing (1926–27); and Erik W. Allstrom, who began in 1928.

Newman Powell's chief labor, along with the school work, was construction activity on a mission site purchased by the Board. His advance thinking about the grounds and the central mission building, and about the missionary functions to be centered there, was ambitious. The Board's New York office approved his building plans, and the Executive Committee took permissive financial action. But the financial guidelines were not clear, Conference supervision of the back-country project was sketchy, and Powell became deeply and distressingly involved in a burdensome operation that consumed an enormous amount of his time and personal energy, and won him few plaudits. Successive Superintendents and other workers agreed that the mission house was an expensive monstrosity, ill adapted for educational, religious, and residential purposes. The building program cost the Panama District some \$20,000, and unexpected current costs and the amortization of loans rested heavily on the entire Conference.

As a popular religious movement, the David mission built up no momentum. The busy school director generally served as pastor, a hostile Roman Catholic element maintained pressures that discouraged evangelical growth, and removals of new converts to the capital city helped keep the committed constituency small. Not until 1923 did a church society appear, and it was barely able to hold together as an organization. In 1925, Pedro Barbero, an educated Spaniard brought into the Methodist ministry through Seawall Church, was appointed to David to assist James Smith with the church work. During Edward Bossing's two-year term in charge of the school, Barbero was the pastor in David. He not only brought a measure of new strength to the local church, but also itinerated through the country round about, preaching and distributing evangelical literature. In 1926, for example, he conducted an evangelistic campaign throughout eastern Chiriquí Province, on an informal circuit including Las Lomas, Lajas, Tolé, and the Serranía, up to the Province of Veraguas. He even preached at a large festival celebration among the aboriginal tribesmen of Cerro Blanco.

At the end of his three years' service, Barbero himself felt that his traveling ministry had prepared the ground for the spread of the gospel to all parts of Chiriquí Province. But his efforts abroad in the province were not followed up. And in David itself, by 1929 the church—it was small to begin with—

was near the vanishing point, and the missionary in charge was devoting hardly any time to evangelism.

The weekday educational effort in David generally involved about three American and three Panamanian teachers, working in the day school and the small night school. Although it was known as American College until 1924, most of its pupils up to that time were in the first six grades. Under James N. Smith's administration, its name was changed to Pan-American Institute, the first four grades were dropped, and the seventh and eighth grades became the basis of a commercial department. The Institute reached its peak of attendance and influence during this year, with 55 grade pupils, 14 music pupils, and with 60 graduates of the public grade schools in the day and night divisions of the commercial school. The next year, the total attendance began to decline; public school opportunities were increasing. By 1929, there were only 36 pupils in the Institute—25 seventh and eighth graders and 11 night school enrollees.

Thus, at the end of the decade, the David mission was a diminishing enterprise.

Both Pedro Barbero and Armando Bustamante were associated with a third Methodist penetration of the interior, which began in 1923 in the village of El Valle, in the highlands back of Antón, in Coclé Province. One night, a man named Bienvenido Bettencourt walked into the midweek prayer meeting at Seawall Church. He had arrived in Panama City that morning from El Valle, some eighty miles away, to search out a non-Roman church. On a visit to the coast sixteen years earlier, he had found a Bible—to him an unfamiliar book—half buried in the sand. He took it home, studied it, sometimes read portions of it at burials in his priestless neighborhood, hoped for someone to interpret it for him, and held on to it through the years in spite of the warning of a visiting priest that it was a bad book and should be burned. Finally, he had saved some money and made a five-day journey to Panama City to satisfy his curiosity about his salvaged Bible.

Bettencourt, who never before had heard a hymn or a sermon, remained in touch with the missionaries at Seawall for three weeks, absorbing all that Bustamante and Superintendent George Miller could teach him. Then the humble countryman returned to El Valle carrying Testaments and other Christian literature, and resolved to give the evangelical message to the people of his village. Mission workers soon began visiting the neighborhood in response to his call for help—first Bustamante, then Barbero, and finally others.

Barbero and Bustamante once traveled to El Valle together, by coastal steamer to Antón, and the rest of the way by horseback. Since they had to lodge in Antón overnight, the eloquent and easily heard Bustamante began preaching that evening in the open air, drawing most of the townspeople within the radius of his voice. The next morning, Bustamante and Barbero found

themselves in trouble, charged by the local priest with being agitators. They were forced to pass through a frightening double line of men armed with machetes, to the jail, where they were locked up. Finally, they were released and ordered out of town. Out of town they went—to El Valle, to preach the gospel.

In the course of his early exploration of the new field, Barbero visited, in addition to El Valle and Antón, Río Hato, Llano Grande, Betania, and Aguacatal. He and the other Methodist visitors to the area gathered a loose constituency which they hoped someday would become a stronger evangelical movement. For several years, little could be done to develop it. The most consistent influence was the untrained, but industrious and intelligent, Bettencourt, who became an Exhorter. The seriousness of his purpose was reflected in the reorganization of his family life. Since he had acquired, in years past, two farms, one in Río Hato and one in El Valle, he also had taken, after the custom of the countryside, two wives, one in each town. When he became an evangelical worker in association with the Methodists, he sent his second wife back to her home, and continued supporting both sets of children, all together making a large family.

Bettencourt remained the only Methodist worker in the area until, in 1928, Pedro Barbero was appointed to evangelistic work there, but under the limitations involved in serving also Guachapalí and its local Circuit. He found the Río Hato-El Valle constituency, which he reported to the Conference session of 1929 as the Antón Circuit, somewhat disillusioned, especially because of the Mission's failure to provide regular leadership for it. Barbero was able to stir a hopeful response.

Thus the nineteen-twenties left the Methodist Episcopal mission, after twenty-five years in Panama, with an unimpressive showing in evangelization of the interior of the country. The David mission was declining, Chitré was lost, and the Río Hato-El Valle constituency was a bare beginning. Nowhere in the interior was there an active church.

During the same decade, the Panama mission's approach to the West Indian population was neither decisive as to policy nor consistent in action.

Ulysses S. Brown, succeeding George A. Miller as Superintendent in 1919, found the Panama Mission working with West Indians only in Guachapalí, the Negro congregations in Red Tank and Colón having been disbanded. Evidently assuming that West Indian work was a normal part of the Mission's responsibility, Brown made a new opening in Colón in the summer of 1920, organizing a West Indian church, and taking on as pastor Frank R. Wilkins, a West Indian preacher formerly engaged by another mission. By the next spring, Wilkins built up a membership of about fifty, and had a growing congregation in the ramshackle Methodist mission house.

In less than two years, however, the congregation threw off its Methodist Episcopal connections, and Harry B. Fisher, the incumbent Superintendent,

sold it the mission building. Neither Fisher nor Secretary Farmer bewailed this severance. Fisher believed that British missionaries were better qualified to work with West Indians than Americans were. And although the Methodist Episcopal leaders had no formal agreement with the Wesleyans, Farmer was inclined to keep out of West Indian activity in their favor, except for Guachapalí.

When George Miller returned as Superintendent in 1923, he deliberately did nothing to revive the missionary work among the Negro people of Colón. The omission sprang not so much from considered policy as from annoyed disillusionment with the false starts already made there. Further, Miller reported to the New York office that there were fifteen West Indian evangelical churches in Colón, and that there was no need of a sixteenth.

Only a few weeks later, however, Miller was off on a different tack with regard to the Colón West Indians, and was purposefully pursuing, in West Indian affairs in general, a course quite opposite to the one held by Fisher and Farmer. He began negotiations for the return of three West Indian congregations that had split off from the Methodist Episcopal work, began new West Indian projects at several points, started an interdenominational periodical for West Indian churches called *The Inter-Church Voice*, and in January, 1924, organized near Panama's St. Thomas Hospital a new church with a West Indian constituency, which became known as Bethel Church.

Miller not only took these concrete steps, but also exerted his influence to have the annual meeting of "the Mission" (evidently a session of the Panama missionaries apart from the national workers) adopt a definite policy on West Indian missions—a point of decision to which the Panama missionary corps never had come before. The new policy was expressed through the actions of the Finance Committee of the Central America Mission Conference, which met in February under Miller's chairmanship five days before the annual session of the Conference itself was convened under the presidency of Bishop Thirkield. The Committee recorded the following statement as Conference policy:

It is our desire to assume our proper share of responsibility for the evangelization of the West Indian people, and to accept such leadership as may devolve upon us in the providence of God and the development of the work. Our ideal is declared to be the development and establishment of West Indian churches that shall become self-supporting and self-extending, by divine direction.

Anticipating this declaration, Miller had arranged for the return of Salem Church, as the Colón West Indian group was now called, to Methodist Episcopal jurisdiction. The "Mission" voted to receive Salem church, and the Finance Committee voted to appropriate over \$1,200 to repair the church building and also \$50.00 a month towards the pastor's salary. The Salem

Church people were duly notified of the decision to accept and assist them.

But Bishop Thirkield, arriving for Conference, pronounced his disapproval of the Miller policy and program. Setting aside the Mission's votes as irrelevant, he vetoed the plan to receive Salem Church into the Conference. (In spite of this, Salem Church somehow appeared in the list of appointments printed in the Minutes, as a charge to be supplied.) The Bishop, according to Miller, claimed that the West Indians in general needed no help, and more particularly that the church building and social standing of the Colón church would not contribute to the prestige of Methodism. Miller, quite reversing his earlier judgment on the Colón situation, protested that the West Indians were morally and spiritually as needy as the Panamanians, many of their churches being no better than the Catholic churches. Not statistically, but actually, the Colón West Indians were far from overchurched, and there were no government schools for their children, he reported to the Board. As for social standing, the Salem Church people were "as clean and wholesome a set of West Indians as I know."

Having to discard his plans at Thirkield's orders caused Miller great personal and administrative embarrassment. Having the Mission's West Indian program pushed aside by a Bishop on a "once-a-year visit of a few days" seemed to him so unjust that acquiescence strained his conscience. Miller felt that it was impossible for him to participate any longer in the Panama work; so he notified Thirkield of his intention to resign. "Of course," he wrote to Harry Farmer, "we will wait and see what happens in May."

Miller evidently was hoping that the forthcoming session of the General Conference would assign Bishop Thirkield, whom he did not admire as a missionary administrator, to another Area. What did happen in May was Miller's election to the episcopacy, and his own replacement of Thirkield as the Bishop in charge of Central America.

Ironically, this shift did not produce unity on West Indian policy, for Raymond E. Marshall, Miller's successor as Superintendent, strongly felt that the Methodists should drop West Indian work altogether and concentrate on the Spanish-speaking people only, the former being well cared for by other missions. Perhaps more ironically, Miller's accession to episcopal authority brought no extension of the West Indian work, but rather coincided with the beginning of its liquidation. Miller did not desert the policy he had so warmly defended against Thirkield's opposition; he simply did what apparently had to be done in order to cope with lack of workers and lack of funds.

Shortly after the Miller-Marshall administration was inaugurated, Levi Latty, pastor of the Guachapalí West Indian congregation, gave up his work because of illness, went home to Jamaica, and soon died there. He was succeeded briefly by C. M. Sealey, the West Indian layman who had been heading the new Bethel Church. At the end of the year, Sealey also left, to

become the pastor of the Free Methodist Church in Red Tank. The Guachapalí congregation was disbanded, and before long, hardly anything was left of the West Indian part of the project but the day school directed by Elsie Keyser. The West Indian congregation at Bethel Church also disappeared, and the other beginnings made under Miller's recent superintendency petered out.

The condition of the Panama mission's finances, depleted by reduced appropriations by the Board, dictated the closing of the Guachapalí day school when Miss Keyser went on furlough in 1926. Upon her return in 1927, she was assigned to teach in Panama College, and the Guachapalí school remained closed. The Guachapalí property was devoted to the uses of the Spanish congregation which had shared it with the West Indians.

This final withdrawal from West Indian work resulted from no aggressive campaign by Marshall and others who favored Spanish work, but as the financial situation worsened, the underlying commitment of all the leaders to the primacy of Spanish work naturally affected critical choices with regard to funds and personnel. In the showdown, Bishop Miller himself acknowledged the same priorities as the others, and even the very much disappointed Elsie Keyser could admit that the Spanish work could not be cut down, because of the small number of evangelical workers of any kind that were engaged in cultivating the Spanish-speaking people of Panama.

The first attempt, in the nineteen-twenties, to extend Spanish-speaking evangelism on, or near, the Canal zone occurred in Colón. Believing that there was great need for it there, Superintendent Ulysses S. Brown tried to make an opening the same year (1920) that he organized the West Indian congregation. First he turned to Eduardo Zapata, who was reluctant to put in any time in Colón; then briefly utilized Bustamante, before settling him in Chitré; and finally tried to get something started under James A. Brownlee, the new missionary who arrived from the United States in September. Brownlee's efforts proving fruitless, Brown changed his mind about the advisability of the venture, and at Conference time, in January, Brownlee was shifted to Costa Rica. But Secretary Farmer, laboring under the extraordinary error that there were 15,000 Spanish-speaking people in Colón kept urging the strategic importance of founding a Spanish mission. At last, in 1923, George Miller straightened out Farmer's statistics, reminded him that the Colón mission property had been lost, and succeeded in permanently spiking the Secretary's proposal. "Colón is the most nearly utterly impossible location for missionary work that I know in Latin America," he declared.

Miller was far less negative in his approach to the Colón question two years later, when he handled it as the supervising Bishop. He approved a plan of Superintendent Raymond E. Marshall and Secretary Thomas S. Donohugh's to place a missionary there. The plan called for co-operation by

the Gatun and Cristóbal Union Churches, the Chinese community, and the Methodist mission. A Chinese day school was the key factor in the proposal, with the missionary also continuing the Cristóbal Union Church's night classes for San Blas Indians, and possibly beginning to reach Spanish-speaking people in Colón. But the scheme fell through when the Chinese sponsors decided upon a different disposition of their funds.

No further efforts were made at the Colón end of the Canal to reach the Spanish population.

Such efforts at the other end became associated with a growing emphasis on Spanish activity at Guachapali's Grace Church, with Seawall Church extending its radius of influence at times.

At the Seawall site, the Spanish congregation, already having outstripped the English group numerically by 1919, became before long the only pastoral charge. During Eduardo Zapata's Spanish pastorate (1919-1921), the much depleted English group had a pastor of its own, Edwin M. Oliver. But Oliver was the last man so appointed. Reflecting Seawall's new status as essentially a Spanish-speaking church, its most prominently displayed outdoor name sign no longer read, by 1922, "Methodist Episcopal Church," but "Iglesia Metodista Episcopal."

When George A. Miller brought Zapata to Seawall Church, he hoped to have the Mexican preacher use it as a base from which to develop, from Centenary resources, a new institutional church on Plaza Santa Ana. He expected that the new center, being strategically placed in the congested Santa Ana quarter, would carry on a more extensive popular Spanish ministry than Seawall Church could conduct, thus revolutionizing the evangelistic work in Panama. Bishop Thirkield favored the plan, but Superintendents Brown and Oliver and Secretary Farmer were unenthusiastic about it, especially considering the large property investment it would involve. Farmer believed that rather than plunging into the purchase and development of real estate, it would be desirable first to experiment by placing a settlement worker in Santa Ana in rented quarters. When he visited the city in 1920, Farmer found neither Zapata nor Gabino Arandilla willing to take up the work. Of course, Miller, the originator of the plan, was off the field—and so was the Bishop; and the Centenary was not generously funneling funds into Panama. Hence the Santa Ana proposal dropped out of sight by 1922.

Zapata, somewhat discontented with his position in Panama, and sporadically straining to return to Mexico, not only led no revolution in Santa Ana, but also led no marked advance at Seawall Church during his three-year tenure. Indeed, he left the Seawall constituency in something of a furore over the background and circumstances of his marriage, in February, 1922, after being several years a widower.

Zapata had been a severe critic both of common-law marriages and of the practice of divorce. Common-law unions were numerous in Panama, and

protagonists of the evangelical movement used their prevalence in the country's Catholic-dominated society as a stock criticism of the Roman Catholic Church. Much closer home, a number of members of Seawall Church had been granted membership while still remaining parties to common-law marriages with unconverted partners. As for divorce, the Methodist Episcopal Church at that time officially held divorce to be unlawful "except for adultery," and strictly limited the power of its ministers to solemnize marriages of divorced persons. And the Roman Church was, of course, categorical in its renunciation of divorce.

Hence, early in the year, the Seawall parish was aboil with the news that its pastor intended to marry a woman whose marital record was reported to include a civil marriage on the Zone, a nonlegal separation from her husband, a common-law marriage yielding one child, and a Panamanian divorce decree at the end of December, 1921, terminating the original marriage. Twice a committee visited Edwin Oliver, the Superintendent, to ask him to delay or stop the marriage. The second time, just before it finally took place, Oliver told the committee that its only recourse was to petition Bishop Thirkield. This the committee did, stirring up gossip as it went from home to home picking up signatures. Evidently not investigating the affair thoroughly, Oliver took the view that it was a tempest in a teapot stirred up by jealous females. The divorce decree was not legally effective until the end of 1922, but Zapata by-passed this condition by going across the line into the Zone, where Oliver married him under what to the Panamanians was a foreign jurisdiction. Oliver then left for the United States, and Zapata and his bride (there seemed to be no aspersions against her current personal conduct) left for a vacation in Costa Rica.

As the Guachapalí West Indian congregation declined, the Spanish group became better developed. In 1923, the Conference assigned it a pastor of its own, Pedro Barbero, who was just entering the ministry. Barbero was able to stabilize the Spanish preaching program in midsummer, 1924, when the West Indian group surrendered use of the Grace Church building. Alberto R. Delgado, a Colombian, who was also beginning his ministry, was pastor from 1925 to 1927, and Barbero again took charge in 1928 and 1929.

Both pastors, assisted by women workers engaged by the Conference, labored in other sections of the Capital and in nearby villages. In addition to the Spanish part of the work at Bethel Chapel, they furthered home visitation, Sunday schools, and preaching services for various periods at 18th Street West, Santa Mesa, Chorrillo, Pueblo Nuevo, Juan Díaz, and San Francisco. Seawall Church had an extension project at 14th Street, but also co-operated in developing the Spanish activities led by Guachapalí pastors. None of the new enterprises was large; some were not permanent. Even the Guachapalí church showed no marked growth after the first half of the decade. Except for Seawall Church, the Spanish missions near Panama

City reported all together for 1929 no more than 128 Sunday school enrollees among two schools, and 43 probationers and 15 church members.

Costa Rica

In January, 1921, Costa Rica received its first official visitation by a Methodist Bishop. The visitor was Bishop Wilbur P. Thirkield, come to make a brief survey of the field before going on to Panama to organize the Central America Mission Conference.

When Bishop Thirkield landed at Limón, two high-ranking Roman Catholic ecclesiastics with whom he had fraternized on the voyage south were detained aboard ship for twenty-four hours. Thirkield understood that they had run afoul of a legal ban on the entry of foreign priests; indeed, there was a ban on Jesuits at that time. It took a special order from the President to effect the release of the two Catholic clerics. Yet Thirkield was permitted to go ashore without delay, and entrain for San José, where he had a long friendly visit with President Acosta. This contrast dramatized for Thirkield the essentially favorable Constitutional status of Protestant religious workers in Costa Rica, and the cordial reception given him by various officials both in public and in private made him optimistic about the political climate for the growth of the evangelical movement. He also was impressed—and George A. Miller and other Methodist workers had been too—with the apparent superior cultural progressiveness of Costa Rica among the Central American countries.

Bishop Thirkield sent off to Secretary North thumbnail sketches of the Methodist work as he rather hastily observed it or heard it described. *Cartago*: no real constituency—a fanatical city—vacationing Americans a spiritual drawback—"one of our accustomed little storerooms for worship," promising "not a ghost of a chance" of affecting the community constructively. *San Ramón*: "hopeful." *Alajuela*: excellently located mission buildings—Provincial governor warmly interested—sizeable nucleus of promising young men and women—"hopeful." *San José*: "the most favorable missionary opening that I have seen." Estimating the possibilities of the field as a whole, the Bishop declared that he was convinced that it was in Costa Rica, rather than in Panama, the Methodist Episcopal Church was to take strong root; "here we are to raise up the group of teachers and Christian ministers and workers who shall evangelize these lands bordering the Pacific."

Thirkield also spoke and wrote optimistically to President Acosta. But in summarizing for him the purpose of the Methodist mission in Costa Rica, he was somewhat less than completely frank about the intended function of the mission as the builder of the Church:

our entire work is open and clear of any selfish or narrow propaganda. Our aim is not primarily to build up a great ecclesiastical organization but

rather through the Church to render the largest service possible in the moral, spiritual and social betterment of all the people.

Bishop Thirkield soon moved, through work plans and new appointments, to strengthen the little mission for which he had such high aims. And well he might, for new as it was, the Costa Rica enterprise already had suffered serious damage, not from external enemies, but from within. It was already displaying symptoms of the inner sickness and weakness that for some years kept it from developing much momentum as an evangelistic movement.

For one thing, there was again only a single Methodist missionary in the country; for Charles W. Ports had returned to the United States in March, 1920, leaving only Sidney W. Edwards to represent the Board of Foreign Missions.

Even more injurious than the sheer fact of this early depletion of the staff were the cause and the manner of it. Ports' departure was the culmination of many months of friction between him and the other mission workers, his physical and nervous ill health being an important exacerbating factor. The constant quarrels, unfortunate enough in themselves, were the more serious and incorrigible because Ports and Edwards took sharply different approaches to the missionary task in San José. Edwards went strictly by the book—the infinitely detailed *Doctrines and Discipline of the Methodist Episcopal Church*; Ports dispensed with the book, and sometimes ignored both stated procedures and official mission plans, testified Ulysses S. Brown, his superintendent. Edwards emphasized overt and direct presentation of the religious message and concentrated upon careful preparation of converts for church membership; Ports played down Protestantism and aimed at involving people in the Church's activities by indirection, employing methods and establishing connections that Edwards—and Brown—believed were superficial.

Arriving in San José in December, 1919, in an endeavor to reduce the mounting trouble, Brown had found Ports laboring insistently at an impracticable tangential plan of his own. He was making a survey of the prostitutes of San José, with the intention of buying property and machinery, setting up a home and a candy factory for the delinquent women, and having them make and sell candy as a self-support project. When he had to relinquish this plan, Ports persistently failed to carry out plans approved by the superintendent, and he so completely upset the work and the workers that it became impossible to open the San José day school scheduled to begin early in 1920. By mid-February, all the workers, including Edwards, had resigned or were on the point of doing so. The entire mission was in crisis, in danger of going under completely—an emergency Brown fully reported to the New York office. On a twelve-hour hit-and-run visit to San José a month later, Secretary Harry Farmer ordered Ports' return to the United States, but left to Brown, who had barely succeeded in holding the mission personnel together, the dis-

tressing task of sending Ports back to the States and of carrying the onus of blame for the unfortunate termination of Ports' two decades of faithful missionary labors.

To compound the trouble, Sidney Edwards, the remaining missionary, was off the field for three months. Two months after Ports left, Edwards returned from Mississippi, bringing with him his wife and five children, whom he had gone to fetch. He found that the work in San José was "shot to pieces," all services there having been suspended during his absence.

Although Edwards began rebuilding the San José congregation, he was accused, before long, of dragging his feet in the mission work. Certainly, during most of the rest of the year, he was a seriously discontented worker, and confined himself to tidying up current projects. Secretary Farmer had got him stirred up by indiscreetly and prematurely leaking to him the news that Edwin M. Oliver, one of the Panama missionaries, was slated to become the superintendent of the new Costa Rica District to be formed under the Mission Conference.

Already aggrieved at not being promoted from contract worker to full missionary, Edwards protested, declaring that he would leave Costa Rica if the plan went into effect. He felt that it would be an affront to his dignity, and a fatal blow to his public influence, to have to work under a new man after he himself had founded all the Methodist congregations and Sunday schools in Costa Rica. Believing that he was being unfairly penalized for deficiencies in his record prior to coming to Costa Rica, he chafed under the reprimands and the felt humiliations administered by the sometimes overweening Farmer. Ulysses Brown did his best to get Edwards calmed down, but the case dragged on, and Brown complained, "Again we are marking time and accomplishing absolutely nothing for months, in the way of developing mission work."

At the Mission Conference in January (1921), Edwards gave Bishop Thirkield an ultimatum—he must be granted full missionary status. The Bishop reasoned with him, and then gave Edwards an ultimatum—accept appointment as a contract missionary under the new District Superintendent, or take himself and his family out of the mission, without any allowance for travel home. Edwards stayed.

To implement his purpose to energize and develop the troubled and flagging mission, Bishop Thirkield brought to Costa Rica three new missionary couples—Mr. and Mrs. Louis M. Fiske, Mr. and Mrs. James N. Smith, and Mr. and Mrs. James A. Brownlee (the Fiskes were transferred from Panama, the others came down from the United States). The Bishop also transferred from the Panama work Gabino Arandilla, the converted priest, now a probationer in the Mission Conference.

Late in March, two years after Charles Ports' assignment to educational promotion, Louis Fiske opened a day school in the San José mission center.

The mission's troubles in 1920 and Ulysses Brown's hesitation when not enough financially competent patrons were in sight were not the only causes of the delay. There had been no stimulus from the New York office to launch a general day school. Secretary Farmer wrote to Edwin Oliver, when he was being considered for Costa Rica, "We want to fight shy of a school proposition as much as possible. Schools are very expensive and tie up a great many missionaries." He believed that the most urgent need—on *any* field—was a Bible training school for mission workers, such as he had known in the Philippines. Pending the emergence of a training school, he preferred only a school for the children of Americans and other English-speaking foreigners in Costa Rica; for they, except for the missionaries themselves, would make good tuition-paying clients. His only support for the Costa Rica school movement was some meager co-operation with Sidney Edwards in forwarding the latter's desire for a school for the English-speaking children.

Nearly all the American children in San José were enrolled in Fiske's school. But because the curriculum was bilingual, two thirds of the pupils were from Costa Rican-American and Costa Rican homes—that is, they were Spanish-speaking children, the group Fiske assumed that the mission was supposed to reach. But a restrictive principle other than language was at work; because he did not allow his school to be "flooded with free students" as he claimed was the case in Panama College, Fiske developed "a school of the better class." Pupils who could not afford to pay were actually, if reluctantly, turned away—an instance of the kind of economic determinism not infrequently effecting class orientation of so-called self-supporting mission schools. Another potentially restrictive factor evidently did not work to curb the school's registration; the parents, most of them Roman Catholic in background, voiced no special objection to the compulsory daily chapel, with its Bible lessons. The presence of the mission, especially that of its school, was welcomed by many liberals and others who did not wish to be formally associated with Methodism.

Assisted principally by his wife, the former Marion V. Eastman of the Panama College staff, and by James Smith, the youthful Fiske built up the school's enrollment from an initial seventeen pupils to seventy-three at the end of the year. Only a few children and a single teacher were lost as the result of the systematic public and private campaign of a Roman Catholic committee to discourage Catholic parents from sending their boys and girls to school to the Methodists. Fiske achieved a co-operative relationship with the public school system, and endeavored to symbolize the school's identity with the community at large by having his pupils march with the public school children in the parade in observance of the centenary of Costa Rican independence from Spain. Perhaps less intentionally, he expressed a more particular bond when he took his school group to the Fourth of July celebration (firecrackers and all) held otherwise exclusively for the American colony.

Both the school accommodations and the equipment were inadequate and unsuitable. Fiske even had to borrow blackboards from the public schools. He tried to run a recreation program with a playground that measured only thirty-five by twelve feet. One of the classrooms had no outside window, but only an overhead skylight through which water poured in on the children, among whom were represented "the best families of Costa Rica." Fiske, with his American and Costa Rican helpers, held classes "with the odors and noise of a bakery on one side and the constant buzz and clamor of a planing mill on the other." Said James Brownlee, the District Superintendent, "the din is sometimes so pronounced that it is difficult to be heard."

Abetted by the other missionaries, Fiske soon began to agitate for rental or purchase of a better building, repeatedly pointing out to the Board the impossibility of making marked progress without it. Again and again, the New York office turned thumbs down—general receipts falling disastrously far behind, no money available, non-essential building operations must be dropped. Not until the school year 1924, after parents had begun demanding provision of adequate and sanitary facilities, and it had become doubtful that the school could continue for another year without improvement, was Fiske's agitation fruitful. The school moved into a rented building near the center of the city, thus acquiring a hall, a gymnasium, and rooms for all the classes, along with permission to use a large public park nearby for a playground. By now, the enrollment stood at times nearly double that of the first year.

During these years, Fiske consistently endeavored to identify himself and the school with civic causes and activities. One of his contributions was the introduction and development of Boy Scout activity, then little known, if at all, in Costa Rica. Fiske became a respected figure with people of public influence. He also tried to raise the school work to levels approved by government authorities. Almost as constantly, he was hampered, even after getting the new building, by disruptive changes in the teaching staff, by lack of enough teachers, and sometimes by poor teaching. He kept the school close to the church life, for he held that the aim of the school was to make the children Christian and to bring them into the church and Sunday school. More than a third of them did go to Sunday school.

James A. Brownlee, the second missionary imported by Bishop Thirkield in 1921, not only became the superintendent of the Costa Rica District, but also took direct charge of the station in Alajuela. Sidney Edwards and Bishop Thirkield both thought Alajuela a promising field, but neither Brownlee nor his successor was very hopeful about it. The Costa Rican interim worker who had preached there in 1920 "did a good job in scattering the congregation," said Brownlee. All the old members of the church had withdrawn because the preacher was not returned to them, and they continued for some time to work against the church. After six months, Brownlee reported, "Interest in the work in Alajuela still remains below zero." A year

later, he had made some progress, but knowing local conditions better, he still did not "look to see anything accomplished that would bring joy to the heart of the statistician."

And right he was. There were only three church members to report to Conference in February, 1923. The best statistic Brownlee could turn in was a Sunday school enrollment of eighty-one children. Although the mission site was desirable, the little building set on it—a small church room and a missionaries' residence under the same roof—was old, dilapidated, unsanitary, unfit for a parsonage or for a church that would please the eye of people accustomed to the more impressive Roman Catholic churches. Roman Catholic pressures were all too effective in dampening interest in the Methodist church. Brownlee, who spoke Spanish well, maintained a busy program in Alajuela, and kept in close touch with the people. The demands of the superintendency and, in 1923, the necessity of assisting in the San José day school both increased his heavy work load and limited his efforts in Alajuela. Brownlee worked extensively with children and youth, and was well liked in the town, but because of the difficulties inherent in the slowly developing situation, could build no solid following among the adults.

Secretary Farmer, Brownlee's Board correspondent, showed little understanding of the conditions under which Brownlee and some of the other missionaries labored. Sitting in his New York office, and drawing upon his experience in the Philippines, he prescribed for the Costa Rica superintendent an itinerant program covering the entire country. Brownlee should make a thorough survey of Costa Rica, he wrote, mapping it off into circuits for regular visitation. He should divide the territory into four large districts, taking from five to ten days to cover each.

Brownlee's reply that such a program would make it impossible to keep up the work in Alajuela (nor could he leave his family for so much of the time) did not impress Farmer. He persisted in trying to make Brownlee into a one-man flying squadron in perpetual motion across the country. "You ought to secure a horse or a bicycle, or a motorcycle, whichever may be appropriate to the country," he wrote, "and then go out distributing tracts, selling Bibles and preaching the Gospel." He was certain that Brownlee would be surprised to discover how many people in the outlying districts (Farmer had never been there himself) had been waiting for some messenger to come and tell them about the Word of God. Brownlee should make numerous contacts and keep detailed records of them for the sake of those who would travel the country after him. "Our program is to evangelize Costa Rica and we want to do it as soon as possible," said Farmer. "We must not forget that people are dying and if we are up and doing we will be able to bring salvation to 'the least of these.'"

Brownlee reiterated to Farmer, in more detail, the impossibility of running off from the as yet infant work in Alajuela and then expecting to see it

grow. "These folks need constant nursing," he said. He did go occasionally to preach in Puerto Linión, on the Caribbean, and in Puntarenas, on the Pacific. But he told Farmer that he could not conscientiously neglect the local work for the more diffuse evangelizing activity recommended by the New York official. Calling upon his knowledge of the history of the evangelical movement in Costa Rica, he reminded Farmer that the country already *had* been pretty well evangelized except for a few areas—"I mean that tracts have been scattered, Bibles sold and the Gospel preached." Had Farmer forgotten the Miller-Zapata rejection of the Central American Mission's preach-and-run variety of evangelization?

Brownlee left Alajuela in June, 1923, and returned to the United States, largely because of a serious break in his wife's health. Lloyd D. Rounds, transferred from Mexico, immediately succeeded him in the local post, but not in the superintendency of the District, which was merged once again with the Panama work. Secretary Farmer, in his first letter to the new man in Alajuela, however, importuned him, as he had done Brownlee, to get hold of the Alajuela work as soon as he could, and "then begin traveling over the entire field of Costa Rica." And he urged him to begin training a corps of national preachers, when no such group was anywhere in sight, when Alajuela itself as yet had less than a half dozen Methodist church members.

George A. Miller realized that the Costa Rica venture was encountering constant pressure by Roman Catholic interests, pressure strong enough to affect the availability of rentals in San José and elsewhere, and to make Miller doubt, for a time, that teachers could be found to man the day schools planned for Alajuela and one of the other towns. He found that only three of the followers gathered by Brownlee were on hand when Rounds took over the pastorate, and that Rounds could not even get a servant to stay in the mission house; the people were frightened off by coercive attacks made by the local priest and his allies. Concluding that he had at first only scratched the liberal and progressive surface of Costa Rica life, he believed—rightly or wrongly—that the country was in fact "one of the most fanatical and backward of all Latin America." He said, "It takes more than [good] climate to offset three or four centuries of Catholic miss-rule." It was becoming clear that in Costa Rica, as in other Latin American countries, few converts came to the evangelicals from among the liberal and the educated, who often were friendly enough, and that the less privileged classes, from which inquirers did come most spontaneously, often could be restrained, by ecclesiastically inspired social pressure, from firmly affiliating with evangelical churches.

Miller, superintendent of the combined Panama-Costa Rica field for a year following Brownlee's departure, respected Brownlee and Rounds' capabilities and efforts, and added to his appreciation of them a more realistic view of the possibilities in Costa Rica than Farmer had. When first promoting the mission, Miller and other Methodist leaders optimistically had adopted

an image of Costa Rica as an unusually liberal and tolerant country, but by the time he ended an eleven-week sojourn there at the end of 1923, he had redrawn this image in his own mind. He hesitated to push Rounds out from Alajuela into circuit work because of what he called the "unbelievable fanaticism of the people of the villages, who were completely dominated by the priests, and drive all workers out of town, often with stones." (Perhaps Harry Farmer, not Brownlee, would have had some surprises in the Costa Rican towns.)

Things did not, and could not, happen fast in Alajuela. Rounds, like Brownlee, served there for about two years and a half, but got hardly any further in overcoming the unresponsiveness of the community to preachers of the evangelical stripe. The Roman Catholic bishop who lived in Alajuela kept the heat of opposition on throughout Rounds' stay; Rounds felt it, and often spoke of it to his missionary colleagues. Most of the time, he had no church for his preaching services, for the earthquake shocks that shook the country in March, 1924, wrecked the ramshackle mission center, and the remaining walls had to be razed. "Time and patience are the elements that count on these fields," said Rounds, knowing that the confidence of the people was hard to win. After two years on the field, Rounds confessed that the general evangelistic work was at a standstill. "There is nothing new . . . everything seems to go along about the same day after day and month after month, which is not a very encouraging thing," he wrote to Thomas S. Donohugh, his more recent Board correspondent.

Housing the mission consumed much of Rounds' time and energy. He built a modest parsonage in the summer of 1924. And by the turn of the year, he had erected and brought to the point of occupancy a small three-room schoolhouse, which stood close to the parsonage. Its occupants were twenty to thirty pupils in a day school started the March before, and the attendants at a small night school. For lack of funds to hire good teachers, Rounds labored "more than full time" in the school. At the end of 1924, he also opened a Sunday school in a home in La Ceiba, a few miles out in the country, and gathered in about twenty persons. In 1925, two more homes were opened to Sunday school work, in Río Segundo and in Barrio de San José. This was all Rounds was able to do to penetrate "the entire field of Costa Rica."

Fortunately, Rounds had some help with his work in the latter months of 1925. Adán Soto, a capable and well known young native of Alajuela, who was teaching in the day school, decided to give up his emerging political career to become a preacher. (He became a probationer in the Mission Conference in 1927). And Arturo Andrade, who was transferred from the Mexico Conference, was at work in Costa Rica under the sponsorship of the Epworth Leagues of Mexico. Both young men assisted Rounds effectively, especially in cultivating the few centers of interest outside Alajuela itself.

Alajuela needed no more short pastorates, but it got still a third one; James O. Swain, who was transferred from the San José day school, served during 1926 and 1927. Adán Soto continued teaching and preaching under Swain's leadership. Swain and Soto began in 1927 a small evening school of commerce for adults, which ran for about a year. The small Sunday school in La Ceiba was dropped because of the greater importance of giving the work time to the classes in Alajuela. Andrade helped at times with the preaching, and some evangelistic progress was made, but no essential change in the condition of the Methodist enterprise occurred.

Alajuela finally got its church building in 1928—a concrete structure that fortunately looked more as though it belonged in Latin America than did many a church designed by foreign Methodist missionaries. It was planned to accommodate church services, school classes, and resident missionaries. Lloyd Rounds came back to Alajuela in 1928, with Adán Soto as his assistant, but returned to the United States in August broken in health. Soto, Andrade, and Louis M. Fiske had to share the work he left behind, until Moses Merubia of the Bolivia Mission Conference was brought down from a Spanish-speaking pastorate in California, in February, 1929, and assigned to the Alajuela church.

The third objective in Bishop Thirkield's 1921 plan for missionary advance was the beautifully situated mountain town of San Ramón, to which he sent Gabino Arandilla. San Ramón was off the beaten track—ten hours by horseback from Alajuela—with roads impassable in the rainy season. The mission acquired, and converted to its purposes, a new theatre-store-residence building. There Arandilla held his first public service, in September, 170 people packing the interior, a hundred more pressing about the door, and six policemen standing by, at the order of the town fathers, to nip any budding trouble. The police guard turned out to be an unnecessary precaution. And the size of the crowd gave no reliable augury of success; curiosity subsided, organized Roman Catholic influence discouraged popular response, attendance at services was very small, no body of church members emerged. Arandilla left the town for his native Spain early in 1924. A year later, the Superintendent reported that the mission in San Ramón was deserted, and the work was absolutely nil. So it remained for six years after Arandilla's departure.

The mission in San José remained weak, chiefly from internal causes.

Hardly was it strengthened by Louis Fiske's advent and his founding of the day school, when it was again weakened by trouble revolving around Sidney Edwards, the pastor. Before Ports left for the United States in 1920, he and his wife charged that Edwards was guilty of indiscretions with two women, with overtones of immorality. Stories associated with the charges began to circulate in the church, and all the more actively when Edwards brought his Cuban wife and five daughters to San José. The rumors then

became entangled with unfortunate stories growing out of severe maladjustment between Edwards and his wife. All questions of guilt to one side, a full-fledged scandal confronted the mission. It poisoned and divided the San José church, undermined its standing in the community, and even hampered the associated work in Alajuela and elsewhere. Late in the summer of 1921, James Brownlee, the superintendent, and the other missionaries became convinced that the Edwards family must be gotten out of the country for the good of the mission.

Following informal investigation of the case by the missionaries, Edwards was legally separated from his wife, with Brownlee inducing Mrs. Edwards (she said it was coercion) to sign the necessary papers. He also urged both of them to leave Costa Rica (this Secretary Farmer also strongly desired), and in October they departed—first she, with the youngest child; then he, with the four other girls. Except for involuntary location of Edwards by the Mission Conference in 1923, the case was closed. But the talk about it had been widespread and damaging both within the church and abroad—a disaster for a small, new Protestant mission in a far from cordial Roman Catholic environment.

The next pastorate in San José lasted four years; Eduardo Zapata, partner in the Zapata-Miller exploration of the field in 1917, served from 1922 to 1925. He found the church nearly destroyed by the Edwards affair. Only a very small congregation remained. A troublesome remnant of dissidents at first disturbed its peace, but withdrew before the year was out. Zapata nevertheless made a good start at strengthening and reorganizing the group, building upon what had been salvaged under the influence of Louis Fiske, respected Director of the day school.

But fresh trouble, fresh quarreling, broke out among the missionaries part way through Zapata's tenure. When George Miller came to San José on a supervisory visit in the summer of 1923, he discovered a mission row so severe that it threatened to break up the entire enterprise in the capital city. Tensions allowed to develop between school interests and church interests—strains that were heightened by joint occupancy of the mission center—produced most of the trouble. On one side was Fiske the school man, on the other was Zapata the church man, the latter abetted by Jaime Brenes, a Spanish-speaking worker who seemed at times to be retained largely for the purpose of turning his local influence into good public relations for the mission. And most of the church people were lined up in the controversy on the side of Zapata, whom Miller found generally disgruntled, almost violently antimissionary (he himself wanted to be a regular missionary), and prone to add to the difficulties faced by Fiske in endeavoring to raise the standards of his school and make it self-supporting. For two weeks in July, the most distressing fortnight he had experienced in many years, Miller labored through a series of conferences "trying to untangle the skein" of opposition

between the non-co-operating parties in San José. "If we break down there," he wrote to the New York office, "we may as well close all of our work in Costa Rica."

Miller returned to Costa Rica in November, and remained until mid-January—part of the time sick and worried by the San José imbroglio, for several weeks cut off from the outside world by a washout on the San José-Puerto Limón railway, and wrestling most of the time with the urgent personnel and property needs of the entire Costa Rica mission. He finally managed, before returning to Panama, to allay the strife among the San José workers. The crux of the solution was the renting of the new quarters for the day school, which made it possible to install Fiske and his pupils in one building, and Zapata and his church people in another. Thus ended the fourth destructive disturbance within the San José mission in four years. The fifteen hundred earth tremors in the spring of 1924 hardly more than cracked the plaster in the church building, but these four intramural shocks left the organization itself profoundly shaken, radically weakened as an evangelistic instrument.

But before Zapata left San José, in 1925, the mission accomplished one new opening in the city at large—a chapel for preaching and for Sunday school work in Barrio Mexico, a populous and growing neighborhood. The outlook seemed promising; so early in 1926, the mission bought the chapel building.

But announcement of this transaction caused a serious rupture of the generally nonviolent conditions under which the Methodist workers had been pursuing their evangelical course in the cities where their centers were located. Boys began regularly disturbing the evening services by screaming outside the chapel and throwing stones on the roof. Unsuccessful in breaking up the meetings, the street gang terrified the congregation one evening by invading the service—throwing stones, clods, and bags of powdered tobacco, and breaking the windows towards the street. From then on, the chapel people were able to keep the peace only by placing guards in the street. The next antievangelical move was a public procession, with music, firecrackers, banners, religious images, and priests—good Catholics decorating the houses and the streets along the route—which swelled in volume as it advanced towards its objective, the detested Methodist chapel. Arrived there, the procession halted, and the barrio priest solemnly anathematized the chapel and whoever should enter it. This act was supported by the sanction of excommunication. For many weeks, the Methodists found it impossible to persuade the former attendants to return; they began reappearing only two or three months later.

A far stronger evangelistic impact was made, during the decade, by the Latin America Evangelization Campaign (later called the Latin America Mission), which entered Costa Rica in 1921. The Campaign's founders, Mr.

and Mrs. Harry Strachan, made San José the center for an aggressive evangelistic movement intended to reach into other Latin American countries also. It was a Fundamentalist faith mission with North American backers, evidently well financed, and because of its broad outreach was able to enlist outstanding Spanish-speaking preachers from outside the country for campaigns in Costa Rica. It specialized in mass evangelism promoted by broad publicity, and held its large campaign meetings in public places deliberately selected to dissociate the evangelical message from the typical Latin American evangelical chapels, which usually were unimpressive and always were considered off bounds by people involved with the Roman Catholic community. The Evangelization Campaign made two major efforts in Costa Rica, in 1922 and 1927. The later one was especially successful in carrying the gospel to many thousands, securing many converts and sympathizers, and thrusting the evangelical cause into the consciousness of the country at large. (It also aroused hot Roman Catholic opposition.) A result of the campaign was the erection in San José in 1929 of a 1,500-seat tabernacle known as the Biblical Temple.

The Methodists in San José co-operated in the campaigns of 1922 and 1927, holding well-packed auxiliary meetings in their church. They also co-operated with the Biblical Institute founded by the Strachans in 1924 for the training of preachers and evangelistic workers for the Latin American countries, the Methodist workers James O. Swain and Eduardo Zapata joining the faculty. Raymond E. Marshall, the Methodist superintendent for Costa Rica and Panama, publicly supported the Institute and the Evangelization Campaign's general evangelistic activity.

The popular success of the Latin America Mission (Evangelization Campaign) stood in contrast with the weakness of the Methodist mission. The Methodist enterprise could not stir the public response evoked by the Strachan-led movement, it could capitalize only modestly upon the popular results of the former group's highly publicized campaigns, and it was hardly ready to begin feeding students into the Biblical Institute. But the Latin America Mission itself had an essential weakness; during the nineteen-twenties, it evangelized thousands of Costa Ricans, but founded no churches or other groups to integrate the evangelical sympathizers permanently into the Protestant fold. Therefore, there still was a function for the Methodist Episcopal mission in Costa Rica, weak as the mission was at that time. The Methodists were committed to the development of church life, and no group was adequately meeting this need for the Spanish population.

After Zapata, San José had several pastors in quick succession—Lloyd D. Rounds (1926), doubling as superintendent of the Costa Rica District; Arturo Andrade, the preacher from Mexico (1927-8); and Alberto Delgado, transferred from Panama (1929). From 1928 to 1930, the San José mission (and Alajuela too) enjoyed the services of Miss Soledad Romero, a deaconess

nurse and teacher sent to Costa Rica by the Methodist women of Mexico. She worked variously with women and children. About the same time, Rosa Cauvin, a Costa Rican woman, began a ministry of home visitation and of general women and children's work in San José. Her activities, which continued throughout the nineteen-thirties, finally carried her into other parts of the Costa Rica mission.

In 1928, Barrio Mexico became a separate appointment, with Louis Fiske as pastor; and the other men in San José were assigned, from then on, only to the older, central church, which became known as the Church of the Redeemer. In 1929, the Barrio Mexico group became an organized church, with a nucleus of charter members transferred from the Church of the Redeemer. Fiske, assisted by Hernán Bautista, a Colombian teacher, took the leadership of both churches in 1930. The same year, new work was begun in San Antonio and Cinco Esquinas.

The Costa Rica mission survived the difficulties of the nineteen-twenties, but was not successful in projecting itself into Costa Rican life as an effective evangelizing force. The evangelical potential of Cartago and Heredia—reached by the Methodists when they first entered the country—remained unexploited; there were not enough workers to provide resident leadership. The mission remained bipolar, centered on San José and Alajuela, the latter hampered by the essential difficulty of the field, the former for too long troubled by its intramission quarrels, and both weakened by frequent changes in personnel and inadequate resources. Remaining thus underdeveloped where it actually worked, the mission was seriously handicapped, in a broader aspect, by its inability to inspire, enlist, and train Costa Rican workers for missionary extension and resident local leadership. All this occurred against a background that was less favorable to missionary work than George A. Miller realized when he explored Costa Rica in 1917. Wilton M. Nelson, for many years a missionary of the Latin America Mission, declares that many missionaries have found Costa Rica a hard field. "In spite of their culture and *simpatía*," he says, "Costa Ricans are a difficult people to work with when co-operation and organization are involved."

When the threat of Methodist withdrawal fell upon the Costa Rica workers in November, 1930, the receding tide of shrinking appropriations already had washed away the results of Bishop Thirkield's move to maintain an augmented corps of missionaries in the country. Once again, only a single Board missionary, with his wife, remained on the field—Louis M. Fiske, in San José. And Fiske was doing double, even triple, duty, not only heading the day school and a small Bible school for young women Sunday school teachers, but also serving as pastor to the Church of the Redeemer and the church in Barrio Mexico. In Alajuela, the other significant center of Methodist work, where Adán Soto directed the day school, Moses Merubia had resigned the pastorate, and was on the way to the United States to see his sick wife. In San

Ramón, renewed activity was barely under way under the direction of Clemente Alpírez, a young man sent there in January by Corwin F. Hartzell, the Superintendent. The churches were not large—all together they had about a hundred members and a hundred probationers—but San José had overcome, in the latter nineteen-twenties, its original internal handicaps, Barrio Mexico was a promising fresh shoot, Alajuela had finally begun to open up to Methodist overtures, and lay preachers and workers were beginning to emerge.

The first and most easily identifiable casualties of the severe pruning of the 1931 budget were the two day schools, which did not reopen for the new season. The school in Alajuela was beginning to penetrate some of the nonevangelical families effectively enough to gain adult converts. But the final enrollment was only thirty-one pupils, and with insufficient income from tuition payments, the school was unable to pay its teachers. The San José school was doing better—it finished with eighty-seven pupils, with a good record of educational progress, and with finances in better condition than in some previous years—but it also had to be closed. Louis Fiske's assignment for 1931 was limited to the pastorate of the two San José churches.

From the time the Board placed the Costa Rica work on conditional appropriations, it made no increase in the size of the missionary staff—indeed, quite the opposite. When Fiske left for the United States in July, 1931, on a badly needed furlough, Hartzell came to Costa Rica to live, and took over the pastoral care of the two San José churches while still maintaining the superintendency of the Mission Conference. And when Hartzell in turn went on furlough in January, 1934, that was the end of residential missionary work in Costa Rica. In fact, it also was the end, by agreement on the distribution of funds for Central America, of sustained and direct supervision of the field by the Mission Conference.

It was the rise or fall of native leadership that would affect, for the rest of the decade, the barometer of Methodist progress in Costa Rica. Hartzell carefully prepared for this development before leaving the field. Young Alpírez having remained in San Ramón only a year, before being transferred to David, in Panama, Hartzell counted on his three young Methodist protégés from the Latin America Mission's Biblical Institute to pick up the reins he was about to drop. He gave them varied and responsible on-the-job training as assistants in the churches. Indeed, one of them, Hernán H. Pérez, having been received on trial in the Mission Conference in 1932, was already pastor of the Alajuela church in 1933, following brief terms of service there by Arturo Andrade and by Hartzell. Carlos Alpizar and Luis Jinesta became Conference probationers in December, 1933, just before Hartzell's departure. All three of them stood before the Conference session in Panama City that year, and at the request of Bishop Miller told how they were converted and became Methodists. Hartzell and the Bishop also expected

that in addition to this trio, a young Local Preacher named Dionisio Mora would become a useful leader.

Looking forward to the independent activity of these young men, whose combined support would come from slender local contributions and from sporadic remittances from the \$1,200 conditional appropriation and other specific gifts he could dig up, Bishop Miller characterized their commitment to the ministry as real heroism. He saw their emergence as a sign of a radical transition, in Costa Rica as well as in Panama, "from the old run-by-the-missionary days to a new and vigorous era" based on native initiative and leadership. The work in Costa Rica, he claimed, was in good condition, showing naturally rooted life and growth in fourteen different communities.

In San José, where Carlos Alpízar succeeded Hartzell, the new leadership soon met its first serious test. In the fall of 1934, Joaquín Vela, a high-powered evangelist sponsored by the Latin America Mission, whipped up a large personal following, defected from the Mission, and led his partisans out into a new, independent movement that appealed to their nationalist sentiments. The Grand Evangelistic Movement, as they called it, all but emptied the Mission's roomy Biblical Temple, where Vela had begun his meetings, and generated fervid enthusiasm among evangelical sympathizers in the capital city, catching up many Methodists. Some of the revival's activities centered in the Church of the Redeemer itself, where many people, notably a number of young men, were converted or experienced sanctification. Vela's eloquent emotional preaching drew such crowds to the church that one of the interior walls of the auditorium had to be removed. The movement threatened—so Bishop Miller feared—to overpower the San José Methodists, and even to destroy their Methodist connections.

The Bishop visited San José at the height of the excitement, and found Alpízar and Hernán Pérez impressed by the forces Vela had released. Miller believed that Costa Rican Methodism had a unique mission to offer "a sane and more reasonable interpretation of the Christian message" than was taught by the Central American or by the Latin America Mission, which he declared represented radically reactionary Christian positions. The latter he described as "missionary-dominated, abundantly-financed, excessively-fundamentalist." He wanted Methodism to keep its own identity in Costa Rica. Hence he was concerned to avoid its engulfment by the movement led by the Latin America Mission's disaffected evangelist. But Miller could throw up no overt barriers against Vela's advancing revivalist wildfire; too many Methodist constituents were aflame with it. Concluding that it would be better to wait for the conflagration to burn itself out, he left the protection of the Methodist work in the capable hands of Alpízar (he was about to become a full member of the Mission Conference), whose religious horizons were rapidly outgrowing the limitations of his training in the Biblical Institute.

Six months later, the movement was spent, and the Methodist church in

San José was left damaged, divided, and numerically deflated to its earlier level. But within a year, Alpízar and his co-workers had reconciled the conflicting forces in the church, and had forged a new unity among its people. It was ready once again to advance.

Alpízar remained at his post in San José throughout the nineteen-thirties. Particularly through its young men's league, the Church of the Redeemer conserved some of the personal results of the 1934 revival, developing and maintaining a certain outgoing evangelistic thrust. In 1937, Alpízar began broadcasting on a small radio station of his own. As under his immediate predecessors, Sunday school and preaching efforts were made in places like Guadalupe, San Miguel, Ipis, Cinco Esquinas, and San Antonio de Desamparados. Little permanent new growth occurred, however, in the vicinity of San José. The Church of the Redeemer and the church in Barrio Mexico (the latter became known as St. Paul's) remained the strongest and most stable among the local enterprises. Alpízar, the pastor, made evangelistic trips to the Río Sierpes region, the canton of San Carlos, and other fairly distant points, but opened no new fields beyond the San José area.

It was by starting two pieces of evangelical work associated with the San José enterprise that Dionisio Mora already had demonstrated his initiative and devotion before Hartzell's departure from Costa Rica.

A couple of years before the Conference pushed the Costa Rican preachers out on their own, Mora took up religious studies with Corwin Hartzell in San José. Under Hartzell's spiritual guidance, he soon became converted, turning out to be a passionately and constantly active evangelist. One day, responding to Mora's invitation, Hartzell went to Guadalupe, a San José suburb, to dedicate to religious uses part of a property belonging to the young convert. To Hartzell's surprise, Mora had the place packed with eager inquirers, a number of whom were converted not long afterwards. Hartzell appointed Mora as Class Leader for Guadalupe, but after shaping up a congregation there, the slender, boyish-looking evangelist started another one, with a Sunday school, in San Miguel about four miles away, walking out and back each week for Saturday evening and Sunday morning meetings.

In 1933, Mora became a Local Preacher, and added to his Guadalupe-San Miguel charge—with which Hartzell, Jinesta, Alpízar, and other young San José Methodists assisted him—a new congregation and Sunday school in Ipis, and evangelistic meetings in Calle Ancha. In Guadalupe, a converted couple donated the first lot given by Costa Ricans for the erection of a chapel.

The same year, Mora broke away from his Guadalupe circuit, and projected the Costa Rica mission into the canton of Osa, in the southwestern part of the country—the first time the work was extended beyond the high central plateau where San José was located. Mora made his first move in El Pozo, two or three days' journey by launch down the Pacific coast below Puntarenas. By December he had gathered a congregation of eighteen people.

Accepting responsibility for his own financial support, Mora moved south, and established a home for his aged mother and his widowed sister and her children on the field. In February, Carlos Alpizar came down from San José to help him. Together they mounted a three-week campaign of preaching and visitation evangelism in El Pozo, Coronado, La Florida, Las Playas, and other places. This effort won a large number of converts and resulted in many baptisms. It expanded the continuing work into four congregations, one of them a church of nine members and sixteen probationers. The next year, on another trip to help Mora, Alpizar reported evangelistic activities in Las Juntaderas, El Palmar, San Isidro del General, and Puerto Cortés.

The rigors of the new field and the pioneering character of the work came alive for Bishop Miller when he and Alpizar went down to visit Mora and his constituents in May, 1935. The Bishop found himself in a little-known region where thousands of people, who themselves were not primitive, nevertheless were living under rather primitive physical and social conditions. Their habitat was a dense jungle country, threaded with the Sierpes and other tidal streams, and alive with the songs and colors of exotic birds and the chatter of monkeys. Their homes were thatched shelters with mud floors, generally open on three sides because of the tropical climate. Their diet was rice, beans, bananas, plantains, and coffee. They had no schools, no clergy, no police, no post offices, no roads, and few stores.

A recently established air service sped Miller and Alpizar from San José to El Pozo, where they held a religious service and spent the night. But they did not find Mora there, for he had moved back from the coast deep into the forest. It took Miller and his companion a day to find horses, ford the river opposite El Pozo, and accomplish a slow four-hour journey through the thick jungle to the Sierpes River, where friends of Mora's took them in out of a drenching rain. They were up at three in the morning, and off on the tide in a dugout, arriving at Mora's riverside house four hours later.

They found that all travel in the area was up and down the tide-water rivers by dugouts like the ones they had come in. "Dionisio had paddled his way," said Bishop Miller, "into every watery nook and corner of that delta country and he had taught the people to sing and everywhere we heard them singing hymns across the water." Mora had two thatched churches in his watery parish, and the members of the congregations customarily traveled to church by dugout, singing as they came. And by dugout, the singing converts soon arrived to crowd about the Bishop for almost continuous meetings before he took to exploring the water routes by now so familiar to the hardworking Mora. Miller held a Quarterly Conference, reorganized the work, baptized converts, and went back to San José hoping to secure a few hundred dollars more for the field, to provide a decent mission center as a base for Mora's arduous journeying.

Bishop Miller next saw Dionisio Mora in the hospital in Puntarenas two

months later. The young man had brought his dying mother there, and there he himself had fallen dangerously, deliriously ill. When the Bishop inquired what had prostrated Mora, his physician replied, "Two things. Jungle fever and starvation."

Mora, however, recovered and remained on the Río Sierpes Circuit throughout the nineteen-thirties, building a constituency that compared very well numerically with the Methodist followings on other, more compact fields. He was ordained Deacon in 1940.

Luis Jinesta was appointed to succeed Dionisio Mora in Guadalupe for 1934, but soon had to withdraw from pastoral work because of ill health.

Hernán Pérez, Corwin Hartzell's fourth protégé, remained in the Alajuela pastorate from 1933 to 1941, building up and enriching the church as it had been impossible for his short-term foreign predecessors to do. His ministry was far from merely parochial. He thought of his charge as a church with a mission field of its own, and he made it that—arousing the missionary enthusiasm of his Alajuela parishioners, training some of them for evangelistic work, and taking lay workers with him into new fields.

Periodic visits by Pérez over more than five years fanned the quiet fires of the evangelical faith in San Ramón, which earlier had been tended occasionally by Arturo Andrade and Corwin Hartzell. During his first year in Alajuela, Pérez made monthly evangelizing trips to San Ramón by horseback, even in the rainy season, when the ride over the muddy road was perilous, almost impossible. The next year, he cut his visits to one every two months, gradually reducing them to fit them in with the increasing activity in Alajuela and the more extensive evangelizing tours he took up. But he kept the San Ramón people in touch with Methodism until, in 1938, he was able to place there, to work under his direction, a young man named Carlos Luis Jiménez, who was coming forward as a new member of the Costa Rican preaching team. Jiménez was appointed to San Ramón on his own in 1939. He developed a congregation there, mainly of new people, and also reached out into a number of places in the vicinity—Bolívar, Santiago, and La Angostura were among them—visiting, starting Sunday schools, and holding preaching services. Both he and his followers had to stand up against severe social pressures, even threats of death. While returning home from a service in La Angostura, Jiménez himself once was attacked by men wielding machetes. Pérez continued to visit San Ramón, to help Jiménez.

In addition to sustaining the outlying work in San Ramón, Pérez was pursuing, by 1935, a coherent strategy of missionary extension. First had come two years devoted mainly to strengthening the Alajuela church itself, including counterattacks against proselyting incursions by Seventh Day Adventists and by Russellites. And now Pérez led a group of lay workers in a systematic house-to-house evangelistic visitation within the city. He claimed that the campaign reached two-thirds of Alajuela's population of 15,000. Then

Pérez and selected workers moved out, afoot or on horseback, into nearby communities, again calling house to house. They went to Itiquis, San Isidro de Alajuela, San Antonio del Tejar, Barrio de San José de Alajuela, and El Cacao—spreading the evangelical message, winning sympathizers, starting preaching services in homes, beginning Sunday school classes, indeed shaping the Alajuela enterprise into a true circuit.

The same year, Pérez himself pushed out still farther, on an exploratory evangelizing tour directed towards projecting the work beyond the Alajuela area. Traveling by horseback over rough terrain, much of it mountainous, some of it unexplored, he moved west and then to the north, visiting Atenas, Barrio de San José de Atenas, Candelaria de Palmares, Palmares, and San Ramón, and finishing in Naranjo, about ten miles east of San Ramón, before riding home to Alajuela, some twenty miles to the south. On this scouting excursion, he testified to the gospel as he traveled, developed contacts in the towns, and distributed religious literature.

The following year, Pérez pressed still farther, riding horseback through the rugged mountain country north of San Ramón into the canton of San Carlos. There, in San Lorenzo de San Ramón, beginning with preaching in a private home, Pérez quickly attracted a following and molded it into a church. The new San Lorenzo churchmen themselves caught the missionary spirit, and helped Pérez evangelize the nearby communities of San Clara and Bella Vista, where two new churches soon emerged as the result of numerous ready conversions.

Pérez continued visiting the San Carlos area as often as he could during the next three years, gradually extending the work until it was recognized in the Appointments as a regular Circuit. Among the places named in reports of the new evangelical activity in the canton were La Tigra, El Río San Carlos, El Muelle de San Carlos, Parrita, Quepos, and Quebrada Azul. By March, 1940, chapels were under construction, without benefit of contributions from outside sources, in San Lorenzo and in Quebrada Azul. In all this field work, Pérez was sustained by the faithful labors of Alajuela laymen who kept the church going there during his absences.

There are no clear statistical mirrors to reflect the condition of the Costa Rica mission in 1939, but it was far stronger after its six years under indigenous leadership than it was when the missionaries left it. The continuity resulting from the longer pastorates of Mora, Pérez, and Alpízar proved beneficial, as did the fact that these effective young preachers were themselves Costa Ricans, and not foreigners. They were naturally sensitive to Costa Rican life, and suffered no unnecessary delay in winning the confidence of the people. They were not cramped by some of the missionary patterns within which American missionaries working in Latin America often confined themselves—consuming concern with developing properties, institutions, and good contacts with people from the “better” and more influential

classes; trust in the method of winning converts by the oblique influence of mainly secular schools; and belief in the possibility and necessity, of working from the top down. The young Costa Rican leaders replied upon less sophisticated, more direct evangelistic methods aimed at the general population, not at special classes. Getting people into waiting church buildings seemed less important, in their strategy, than having both preachers and laymen carry the church's message everywhere into city or town, through the streets, door to door, into the homes. They spent little effort in arranging public programs attended by local or national bigwigs—or generally, even with revival services for group evangelism—but emphasized simple presentations of the gospel in personal conversation, and in quiet classes and services with small groups of inquirers and converts.

By the end of the decade, many more lay workers were active, financial self-support was more substantial, the membership was larger, the few continuing churches were more fully organized as to program, and stronger evangelistic forces were at work. The mission now had five, not two, vital foci—San José, Alajuela, San Ramón, Río Sierpes, and the work in the canton of San Carlos. Bishop Miller called it all the most rapidly growing piece of evangelistic work in all Latin America.

Central America

Startling news about the Central America missions reached the workers in Panama and in Costa Rica, and also Bishop Miller far south in Montevideo, in November, 1930; the Board had marked the dual enterprise for early liquidation. Wrestling with the problem of a continued serious decline in income, the Annual Meeting had finally voted to cut the lumped appropriations for each of the major fields by 17 per cent, with relevant retrenchments in field work. But Central America was singled out for special treatment—a cut of 50 per cent for 1931, preparatory to complete withdrawal as soon as practicable. The plan called for reducing the appropriation from \$22,950 to \$11,500.

Diffendorfer and Edwards, the Corresponding Secretaries, who originated the proposal, acknowledged that Central America was a needy field, but foresaw no reasonable measure of success there on the basis of the funds available for it. Better use the funds and the personnel to shore up important established work in older and stronger fields, they counseled the Board. "Our lines in Central America are so thin that we are able to do little more than hold the ground." Undoubtedly the Board tacitly accepted this evaluation of the field along with the Secretaries' recommendation to cut and withdraw.

The Methodists were to accomplish their retirement from Central America as soon as responsibility for conserving the evangelical cause in the vacated

areas could be transferred to other groups. The Annual Meeting authorized the Secretaries to negotiate with the recently established Methodist Church of Mexico about taking up the Costa Rica work, and with the Union Church movement in Panama about the mission activities on the Isthmus.

Bishop Miller had received in advance only an inkling of what was to come—a two-line hypothetical cabled query from Diffendorfer as to whether in case of a big reduction in appropriations, Miller would prefer closing out Central America to “weakening all fields.” Miller had replied immediately: he preferred to hold on to the Central America missions, and offered, as an alternative to withdrawal, a set of specific curtailments of the weaker parts of several Latin American fields. He was ready to co-operate in arriving at a workable plan, hoping that Diffendorfer would come down for a conference with him on the field. But without any genuine consultation of the Bishop at all, and quite ignoring his concrete suggestions, Diffendorfer and his colleague pressed, successfully, for adoption of the proposal to withdraw.

Bishop Miller hotly protested. He attacked the Board’s “astounding” decision to close the entire field without consulting the resident episcopal administrator, when none of the Board people ever had visited Central America. The Board, he charged, was exceeding its rights, was attempting to make his field supervision nothing but a rubber stamp for the New York office. He formally notified the Executive Committee that the proposed closing would be over his emphatic protest and “refusal” to concur. “I want the records to clear my name on that score,” he wrote.

Miller was not merely letting off steam; he had a case to present. In his judgment, Central America was by no means the weakest or least productive Latin American field. Closing the entire Central America work was the method of retrenchment best calculated, he held, to damage morale and cut into missionary results in the whole area south of Mexico. To dismantle the Central America Mission Conference (the Mexico Conference was going into the new autonomous church) would destroy the Central Conference for Latin America by reducing its ministerial membership to less than the Disciplinary minimum—a loss that would not be repaired for a number of quadrennia. This would mean “a setback and discouragement little less than fatal to the spirit of our entire work in South America.” Of course, Miller was concerned at this point to protect the measure of regional autonomy promised Latin American Methodists by the only too new device of the Central Conference.

The Bishop took no comfort in the Board’s intention to search for other sponsors for the work it expected to surrender. He bluntly wrote this off as wishful thinking. Mexico, already weak in financial resources, would be taking its own cut in appropriations, and the Union Churches of the Canal Zone were more likely to reduce than to increase their missionary contributions. There was no other group in the Zone that would be ready to take over

the Methodist projects, and it would be extremely humiliating, Miller asserted, to consider turning over the work in Costa Rica to such a highly personalized and Fundamentalist group as the Latin America Mission led by Harry Strachan.

Corwin F. Hartzell, the new superintendent for the Central America Mission Conference, communicated to the Board the consternation and opposition of the field workers. He cited Louis Fiske, who deplored the planned desertion of the Methodist constituency in Costa Rica just when the work there was acquiring real momentum for the first time in its thirteen-year history. Hartzell was sure that whatever successor group might possibly emerge in Costa Rica, none would appear in Panama; for he had already explored the question with the Union Churches. He wrote Secretary Thomas S. Donohugh that the loss in prestige for the movement begun by the Methodists would be far more painful and more fully publicized in Panama than in Costa Rica:

Brother, the scrutiny, here, will be much more critical. How the men in black robes will laugh: and they will point the finger of scorn at those who have accepted our faith and say, "Did we not tell you that they would some day abandon you? That only the Great Church of Rome can endure? Now you shall suffer for your heresy, ha,ha! ha,ha!" . . . I am not hysterical. I am only telling you words of sober truth.

Hysterical or not, Hartzell also submitted to the Board an alternative to its drastic preparation for liquidation—a detailed plan of readjustments in the Central America work on the basis of a Board appropriation of \$13,327 for 1931, and a prospective appropriation of \$9,150 for 1932. Reviewing the problem in January, the Executive Committee tentatively approved the Hartzell plan for 1931, raising the appropriation to his figure by drawing upon an adjustment fund reserved for Latin America. In February, Bishop Titus Lowe presided over the Central America Mission Conference, and came back to New York convinced that it was important to continue, not abandon, support of the work. Impressed by his report, the Executive Committee, in March, finally confirmed the Hartzell financial plan. This action effectively sidetracked the withdrawal policy, and the Board did not reinstate it.

But other threats to the Central America work appeared. The work operations appropriation was reduced to \$4,980 for 1932, and to \$2,000 for 1933, with accompanying pressures on missionary salary funds. In the spring of 1932, Raymond E. Marshall, the Mission Conference treasurer, proposed that the Board meet the tightening financial squeeze by closing down the Costa Rica work in favor of concentration on Panama.

Corwin Hartzell disapproved, and he reiterated his disapproval in 1933, when Corresponding Secretary Donohugh, having taken up the Marshall pattern, proposed that the Methodists transfer their Costa Rica work and

property to Strachan's Latin America Mission. Hartzell advocated instead selected adjustments or curtailments of local projects in both Costa Rica and Panama, and offered the Board a carefully prepared plan to effect them. He agreed that if the Board should finally be compelled to close one of the two fields, Costa Rica should be dropped—but because it was the stronger of the two, and its people were better able to continue on their own!

Hartzell protested particularly against turning the mission over to the Strachan group. He informed Donohugh that its San José church was "radically Baptist," practicing a closed-union immersionist policy of the strictest kind. The leaders of the Methodist laity repeatedly declared their unwillingness to enter such a church. They believed in the freer and more vital evangelism of the Methodist mission, and were resolved to go forward with the work even if abandoned ecclesiastically and financially by the Methodist Episcopal Church. Hartzell held that whatever might be done with the Methodist property, "we cannot turn our people over to another mission, when they do not want to go, just as if they were property or cattle."

Hartzell took the Costa Rican Methodists seriously. If the Methodist Episcopal Church should finally withdraw, he advised, it should help launch them as an independent movement. The mission properties should be conveyed to a board of trustees composed of San José laymen (he named a dozen he believed were qualified). For pastoral leadership, he would turn to three young Costa Rican Methodists soon to be graduated from the Strachan-sponsored Biblical Institute. They had gone there because there were no funds to send them to Methodist schools elsewhere in Latin America, but the Methodist missionaries had kept in close touch with them in order to counteract the Institutes' peculiar teachings. Hartzell wanted to stay on the field as a missionary, but he was so confident of the promise of these young men that he believed the work would do better under them and without him than under him and without them.

Bishop Miller also opposed abandonment of Costa Rica. He would have consented to turning the Methodist interests over to "any reputable Board," but not to the Latin America Mission, whose work he felt was widely at variance with everything the Methodists stood for. He too was hopeful about Hartzell's three young preaching candidates, and believed that the movement might be kept going under their pastoral leadership. Bishop Miller offered to raise the required funds outside of regular appropriations beginning in 1934. The Board's Annual Meeting for 1933 approved Miller's work plan and his financial estimate, dropping Costa Rica operations (including expenses of supervision) from the regular appropriations, and providing for a conditional appropriation of \$1,200 that would have to be covered by the special gifts the Bishop would seek. The entire Central America operations appropriation (\$1,250) was reserved for Panama, and future policy for the mission on the Isthmus was referred to Bishop Miller and the Corresponding Secretaries.

Throughout the remainder of the 1930's, even after his retirement in 1936, Bishop Miller was the mainstay of the Central America work. Without his initiative it undoubtedly would have been lost to the Methodist movement. The work appropriation never rose above its 1934 level, and Costa Rica continued to subsist on the special funds raised under the stimulus of Bishop Miller's constant interest and promotion. He also elicited special contributions to supplement the meager \$1,250 appropriations for Panama. For these purposes, he turned again and again to supporters in California. When Corwin Hartzell finally left the superintendency in 1936, Bishop Roberto Elphick, resident in the Santiago Area, appointed Miller superintendent for the Central America Mission Conference.

Mexico

THE METHODIST CHURCHES IN MEXICO FACED IN 1920 a calmer prospect than they had known for most of the decade past. Ignacio D. Chagoyan, superintendent of the Mexico District, beginning his contribution to the Board's *Annual Report*, spoke of it optimistically :

As the last echoes of the revolution are losing themselves among the rocks of the highest mountains of Mexico there is heard in our cities the preludes of the hymn of victory being sung to reconstruction, work and progress. Peace is a fact. The country is now entering again upon the path of productive activity. Our church, improving the occasion, lays out new plans and doubles its energies to gain Mexico for Christ.

Neither in the nation at large nor in the field of Methodism's missionary effort did the events of the ensuing decade fully justify this sanguine view. To be sure, the churches made progress, but serious problems came into view, latent tensions came out into the open, unsettling changes occurred that demanded important readjustments in missionary strategy, and chosen ventures and unsought crises produced new tests.

One of the stimulating and encouraging, but ultimately disappointing, factors was the Centenary movement, which not only toned up the morale of the participating Mexican pastors and parishes, but also brought a surge of useful dollars into the treasury of the Mexico mission, thus enlarging the scope of missionary planning. For the ten years prior to 1920, Board appropriations for Mexico had averaged \$60,000 a year. The appropriation for 1919 was \$66,646. Suddenly, in 1920, under the impact of the Centenary campaign, it shot up to \$103,733, with the W.F.M.S. investing an additional \$45,092 in the field. Further sums from Centenary loans and advances raised the Board's disbursements for that year to more than \$137,000. The comparable figure for 1921 was \$146,610, with the W.F.M.S. adding \$80,845. The special advances soon were reduced, but the regular appropriations remained on the same level, \$103,000 to \$106,000 for 1922 through 1924.

Then, in 1925, just as suddenly as it had risen five years earlier, the Board appropriation dropped to about \$63,000, where it remained for four years. In 1929 and 1930, the appropriations dropped twice more, to \$53,759 and

\$49,125, respectively, thus receding below the pre-War level. These reductions were made not because the Mexico field was achieving a large measure of self-support—its improvements in that respect were scattered and modest—but because of the slump in Centenary and post-Centenary giving in the United States and because of the over-all indebtedness of the Board of Foreign Missions. These factors shrank both the funds available for missionary salaries and those allotted to field work, thus limiting the Mission's ability to broaden its effort and also cutting the size of the missionary corps.

The Board had eighteen missionaries in Mexico in 1920, including seven married couples and four single persons; the W.F.M.S. missionaries numbered twenty-three. By 1926, the Board group had been cut to six married couples, but the W.F.M.S. still had two dozen workers, its appropriations, now larger than the Board's, having dropped back only to \$67,817. In 1929, the W.F.M.S. still was maintaining this level of support for its work and had twenty-six women on its Mexico roster. The Board, however, was down to two married couples, Mr. and Mrs. J P Hauser and Mr. and Mrs. Matthew D. Smith.

The reduced size of the missionary staff in the mid-twenties by no means posed an unmitigated problem. Both its size and its complexion contributed to the orderly progress of the Mexican church as a national institution. Shrinkage in missionary leadership brought forward and developed native leaders; the ministry was now entirely Mexican in character. In 1926, only two of the Board appointees from the United States were ministers, and even they were not engaged in performing ministerial duties. One of them, J P Hauser, was administering the Puebla District as District Superintendent, and the other, Raymond A. Carhart, was serving as Treasurer of the Mission and as a professor in the Union Theological Seminary. Two of the laymen—Matthew D. Smith and Paul E. McGuire—were in educational work in the Methodist Institute in Puebla, and three—Dr. Raymond C. Illick and Dr. Levi B. Salmans and his wife—were under appointment to hospital work in Puebla and in Guanajuato, respectively. It was a situation that had resulted not entirely from budget cuts, but also from the Mission's policy of obedience to the Constitutional ban on performance of clerical functions by ministers from abroad.

In 1926, after nine years of permissiveness, the national government began strict enforcement of the ecclesiastical controls in the Constitution of 1917. Although harsh measures carried out by some of the state governments had fallen heavily upon the Roman Catholic Church during those years, it had widely flouted the Constitution with impunity as far as the national government was concerned. Both unpreparedness in the educational field and political prudence had kept the Carranza and the Obregón administrations from vigorous action against the Church, which meanwhile substantially recouped and augmented its strength. In 1926, however, the ax fell, and within months,

the national government promulgated regulations and laws concretely implementing the Constitutional restrictions on public religious activity. Failure to obey government requirements, particularly the demand that all priests and ministers register with the authorities, brought about the arrest of many priests and the deportation of foreign ecclesiastics. Fighting back against the government, the Church suspended all its services in Mexico, and for three years the people—most of the country still was Catholic—were without the Sacraments and its other ministrations.

The immediate occasion of the crackdown by the government was the public display of disobedience to the Constitution by Catholic organizations, the Mexican episcopacy, and the Archbishop of Mexico, particularly the launching of a head-on campaign through which, announced the Archbishop, the Church and its people would not only declare nonrecognition of the Constitutional articles on religion, but also would combat them. The government reacted quickly to the Church's direct, if not seditious, attack. President Calles declared, however, that even if it had not been made, "this government in complying with its duty to observe and cause to be observed the Constitution of the country would have proceeded in the manner it has." * Among the swift blows the government now struck at the Church were arrest and deportation of foreign priests, complete severance of private primary schools from connection with churches and ecclesiastical corporations, banning of ministers or members or religious orders from teaching posts in private schools, prohibition of all religious teaching or display in private schools, state restrictions of the number of ministers permitted to function (all had to be Mexican-born) in a particular state, registration of all ministers with the government, and government holding of all church properties. The imposition of such measures upon the Catholic Church, when coupled with the Church's rebellion against them, was devastating.

Whereas the Roman Catholic Church invited conflict with the Mexican government and was treated to damaging punitive action, the Methodist Episcopal Church avoided harsh treatment and the necessity of sudden radical readjustment by giving the government its co-operation. In this the Board's executives, the missionaries, and the Mexican Methodist leaders were at one. The Board leaders attended in July, 1925, in Nashville, an emergency meeting of a number of Protestant mission boards and a deputation from Mexico to discuss the Constitutional status of foreign missionaries and of mission properties in Mexico. The consensus was that the severe restrictions in the Constitution were necessary in order to curtail and eliminate the longstanding abuses practiced by the Roman Catholic Church and that there was no course open to the evangelical groups but to conform to the law and to co-operate with Mexicans and their government, as the Board's Secre-

* See Note, p. 1129.

taries reported to the General Conference, "for the development of the social, moral and spiritual life of the Mexican people, and not interfere in any way in governmental or political affairs." This was essentially an acceptance of the validity of Mexican nationalism and of the separation of Church and State for that country. This point of view was confirmed for the Board as a result of conferences Corresponding Secretary Ralph E. Diffendorfer held in Mexico with Methodist churchmen and with government officials, educators, lawyers, and businessmen just as the conflict between the government and the Roman Catholic Church was flaming up in February and March, 1926. Among the Methodist leaders, Diffendorfer found a sympathetic appreciation of the position of the Mexican government on ecclesiastical affairs and a willingness to make necessary adjustments. Bishop George A. Miller, who was in charge of the Mexico Area, was so sensitive to the real issue of Mexican nationalism both within the Methodist Church and in the country at large that at the Annual Conference of 1926 he asked the members to elect from among themselves a Mexican to serve as President of the session—a precedent both he and Bishop Francis J. McDonnell observed thereafter.

Actually, Methodist co-operation under the Constitution had begun shortly after its adoption in 1917. For some years, the Mission had given what under the circumstances could be called voluntary compliance with the prohibition of strictly church work by non-Mexican ministers and clerical missionaries from outside the country. And long before the Calles administration began tightening up on enforcement of the religious code, the Mission had given up maintenance of the forbidden primary schools and had discontinued having ministers teach in its higher schools. Therefore, the Methodists already had made enough adjustments in function and in attitude to avoid feeling the abrupt demands of 1926 as radically hurtful or destructive blows. The government's regulations applied to them just as specifically as to the Catholics, and they had to make more adjustments than before in order to comply with the full spectrum of the government's expectations. But they did not have to feel that their church was a deliberately sighted target of dangerous governmental animus. Perhaps only in one area did they suffer a special handicap not felt by the Catholics. The ban on religious exercises outside of regular church buildings hurt modest parishes that previously had had to use temporary informal or rented quarters rather than churches of their own. Some churches had to stop holding services of public worship, but the Mission soon found that this deprivation served as a stimulus to a number of societies to provide themselves with church buildings.

The Methodists had less trouble with the Mexican government than with aggressive partisans of the Roman Church. Co-operative relations between Protestant missions and government officials at the very time that the Catholic clergy and hierarchy were leading their people in rebellion against the national administration aroused in some quarters the resentful feeling that

the Methodists, among others, were being treated with partiality. This provoked extremists to threats and even overt persecution that sometimes made it necessary to suspend religious services. Scattered incidents, especially in more remote areas, occurred for several years. In one town, misinterpreting as a government ban the closing of Catholic churches by the Church's own boycott, local officials closed the Methodist church in the name of impartial treatment. In another, an armed band, apparently posing as agrarian insurrectionists, dispersed the Methodist congregation, killing one person, wounding others, driving off still others, and inaugurating a tyrannous local situation that lasted into 1927. In a town near Querétaro, a rabid mob attacked the Methodist chapel and broke doors and windows, destroyed books, and stopped just short of lynching the woman in charge, who was rescued by friends. Raymond Carhart reported from another town a case in which "a member was shot in cold blood in his little store because of his Christian fidelity and earnestness." In 1927, a leading man in a Methodist church was killed in his own home, and the Methodist people fled for a time. In 1928, there were a number of bad incidents on the Puebla District, including the assassination of the founder and leading member of one of the churches, the burning of a Methodist home in another place, and numerous threats of violence. In 1929, reports still came in of threats of death for Methodist people. But through these often troubled times, the Methodists suffered no persecution by the national government.

The W.F.M.S. found it necessary to make many adjustments when the strict-enforcement policy of 1926 was applied to its schools and when later immigration regulations limited the number of missionaries it could send into Mexico. But, like the Board of Foreign Missions, it took a co-operative stance toward the government. Since its properties were not held by the Methodist Episcopal Church, but by a Board of lay women incorporated in the State of New York, it was able to continue operating schools under Mexican law even though under strict regulation. It successfully adapted its school curricula to government requirements. Mrs. Francis J. McConnell, one of the Society's Vice-Presidents, reported in 1927 to the Annual Meeting of the General Executive Committee :

I bring word that the Woman's Foreign Missionary Society is obeying the laws of Mexico and at the same time has remained true to the Christian ideal. . . . The Board acknowledges the protection given by the Mexican government during the past fifty years, trusts that protection for the future and will look to no foreign power.

In the nineteen-thirties, however, the Society reached a limit beyond which it felt it could not go in accommodating its schools to government educational policy. Under more drastic legislation enacted in 1934, no religiously oriented organization of any kind was permitted to conduct primary, sec-

ondary, or normal schools, and no school could carry on any kind of religious propaganda. Although the Society realized that the Catholic Church, not the evangelical movement, again was the primary target of the government's action, it decided that it was not justifiable for it to run schools in which its workers could not teach religion. Therefore, the Society withdrew its missionaries from their teaching posts and provided for the future of the educational institutions by renting the school properties for modest fees to trusted Mexican women, who carried them forward under the rules of secular operation required by the government. Thus were perpetuated the former W.F.M.S. colegios in Mexico City, Pachuca, and Guanajuato and the normal institute in Puebla.

Surrendering the schools enabled the W.F.M.S. to assign all its Mexico missionaries to other forms of service. The activity closest to the former educational work was the maintenance of hostels for girls, which were established on the parts of its school properties that were reserved from the school-rental plan in Mexico, Puebla, Pachuca, and Guanajuato. Since the government classified the hostels as homes, not schools, the W.F.M.S. women were able to teach religion in them and to influence the girls to attend Methodist churches. They also continued the Bible Training School in Mexico City on a religious basis, for the government did not include it in the pattern of secularized private schools. In 1935, the Society augmented its assignment of available missionaries to evangelistic work. For the rest of the decade, they labored thus in collaboration with both rural and urban Mexican pastors and were in close touch with the social service work of the churches. The Society supported the work of a Mexican woman doctor, Dr. E. Báez Méndez, who operated a clinic in connection with the Aztecas Street Church, in one of the poor sections of Mexico City. On duty in Mexico in 1939, at a time when the Board of Foreign Missions had in the country only a single married couple, the W.F.M.S. still had, after many adjustments of its work, twelve missionaries.

During these two decades of crucial adjustment to the post-Revolutionary government, the Mexico mission also was developing its relationships with other denominational groups. The Methodists participated in 1919 in an important step forward in practical co-operation among eight Missions and their sponsoring Boards. As many as sixty missionaries, Mexican workers, and Board executives and representatives assembled in Mexico City and organized the National Committee on Co-operation. The founding sessions produced two major results: (1) a pattern of territorial comity agreements assigning to each Church a limited field for intensive evangelization and (2) plans that resulted within a year in united operation of a publishing house and a bookstore and broader participation in the Union Theological Seminary.

The National Committee on Co-operation became a steadily functioning organization, keeping the Mexican missions in touch with the Committee on

Co-operation in Latin America (New York), generally promoting interchurch co-operation, and providing a medium for solution of common problems, including these related to relations between the missions and the government. But in spite of equal representation on the Committee by Mexicans and missionaries, the latter tended to become dominant in Committee affairs, perhaps, said Raymond Carhart, because of more regular attendance at meetings. In 1925, a special committee was named to work out a plan for a more distinctly national body. As a result of their efforts, representatives of seven or eight denominations organized in 1927 the National Council of Evangelical Churches in Mexico. Some missionary representation was retained under the Council's constitution but was expected to fade out before long.

Out of the comity plans of 1919 came formal delimitations of the fields being cultivated by the missions of the Methodist Episcopal Church and the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, respectively. The mission of the Methodist Episcopal Church already (1918) had provisionally absorbed seven Circuits in Mexico City and vicinity previously belonging to the Church, South, which was assigned the entire group of Northern frontier states—Nuevo León, Coahuila, Durango, and Chihuahua and parts of Tamaulipas and Sonora. The Methodist Episcopal Church, surrendering the states of Vera Cruz and Oaxaca to the Presbyterians, retained Guanajuato, Querétaro, Hidalgo, Puebla, and Tlaxcala and parts of Morelos and the state of Mexico. Mexico City was agreed upon as common territory for all the co-operating churches.

Before many years, the question of uniting the work of the two fields thus defined became a live mutual concern. Bishop James Cannon, Jr., with a committee of Americans and Mexicans from the Church, South mission, came to the Methodist Episcopal Conference session in Puebla in 1926 to discuss it. The consensus of feasibility settled upon a plan drafted by Bishop Miller. In 1927 and 1928, after a temporary lapse in discussion, the proposal was revived through an exchange of fraternal delegates by the two Conferences. Carhart reported to the Board that if the practical aspects of the move could be worked out, "some kind of federation, if not a closer union," undoubtedly soon would be realized. Indeed, the Mexican delegation to the General Conference of 1928 offered a memorial requesting authorization for the Mexico Conference to unite with its Church, South counterpart to form an autonomous Methodist Church of Mexico. The General Conference adopted the memorial, and the Board of Bishops proceeded to implement it by appointing Bishops Miller and McConnell, Secretary Ralph E. Diffendorfer, Juliet H. Knox, the W.F.M.S. Corresponding Secretary for Mexico, and Frank S. Wallace of California to serve on the Commission on Unification in Mexico. The Mexico Conference appointed four Mexicans—Vincente Mendoza, Epigmenio Velasco, V. D. Báez, J. T. Ramírez—and J P Hauser. The General

Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South and that denomination's Mexico Conference acted similarly in 1930.

The Joint Commission on Unification then met in Mexico City in July, with Bishop Miller absent. One of its major problems was to reconcile a discrepancy in the empowering acts adopted by the two General Conferences. The Northern Church, perhaps ambiguously, had authorized formation of an "autonomous" Mexican church, but also had called for the continuance of "organic relationship" of the Mexican Conferences with the parent denominations. The Southern Church authorized autonomy but did not mention the question of an organic connection with the mother churches. The maintenance of such a connection with the American-based churches, involving sending voting delegates to the General Conferences, had been at the heart of Bishop Miller's plan, and when he found that the Commission meeting in Mexico had turned it down, he strongly objected. It had become clear to the Commission members, however, that the price of organic unity with the American churches would be to stop short of organic unity between the Mexican churches. Responding to a strong demand in Mexico for unity closer than federation, the Commission drafted an instrument of union that provided for the two Mexican missions to be forged into a single, fully independent national body, the Methodist Church of Mexico.

The first General Conference of the new Church met in Mexico City on 16 September at the call of the Commission and under the presidency of V. D. Báez. It implemented the unification of the two Mexican Methodist groups by electing Juan N. Páscoe as Bishop, by providing for general agencies to administer the Church's interests in religious education, missions, and church extension, and by arranging for final drafting of its General Rules and Articles of Religion in time for the next General Conference session. The first Conference also provided for a Council of Co-operation of sixteen members, eight of them Mexican Methodists and eight of them representatives of the parent churches, to channel the co-operative action of the Mexican and American-based organizations. The Council was to handle all matters regarding the continued financial subsidies from the United States, remaining questions as to real estate not yet transferred to the Methodist Church of Mexico, and the relation of foreign missionaries to the work of the Mexican church. Secretaries Edwards and Diffendorfer commented on this arrangement in their report to the Board of Foreign Missions:

One thing is noticeable and that is that the whole "mission" conception is gone. There is no longer any "mission" in Mexico or organization of missionaries, or any "Missionary Council," as is provided in Japan. What we have now is a self-governing church, free and independent so far as its own church life is concerned, with an official body through which the mother churches connected co-operate with the new church.

Since there had been no geographical overlapping of the two fields joined in the Methodist Church of Mexico, the autonomous church organized its work into two Annual Conferences corresponding to the two former combinations—the Central Conference (formerly the Methodist Episcopal Church) and the Frontier Conference (formerly Methodist Episcopal Church, South). Together, in approximate numerical balance, they constituted a denomination of over ninety charges, with eleven thousand members.

NOTE

Page 1123. J. Lloyd Mechem attributes the government's rigorous enforcement of the religious articles in part to the temperament of President Calles:

He, unlike his predecessor in the presidential office (Obregón), was a man with an essentially one-track mind; tenacious, stubborn, uncompromising, once he embarked upon a given course, nothing could swerve him. Having determined to enforce the constitutional law the President would let no consideration deter him, and whatever might be the consequences he insisted that the commands of the fundamental charter be observed.

(See Mechem, *Church and State in Latin America*, p. 480.)

India

BISHOPS AND CONFERENCES

AFTER THIRTY-TWO YEARS UNDER THE GUIDANCE OF Missionary Bishops, India in 1920 came under the leadership of four Bishops who were General Superintendents. This shift was part of General Conference action that left no Missionary Bishops active on the Church's foreign fields. Two of the General Superintendents elected and assigned to India were Frank W. Warne and John W. Robinson, until then Missionary Bishops for India, but now elected under the less restricted category. The others were Frederick B. Fisher, formerly the executive chairman of the Mass Movement Commission, and H. Lester Smith, a Detroit pastor. Bishops Warne and Robinson retained residence in Lucknow and Bombay, respectively, Bishop Smith became resident in Bangalore, and Bishop Fisher in Calcutta. Thus the four episcopal leaders were located in four major cities of India—north, west, south, and east.

Bishop Smith served in India for only one quadrennium. The General Conference elected in 1924 and assigned to India Brenton T. Badley, India-born son of a Methodist missionary and himself a missionary to India for more than two decades. Bishop Badley took up residence in Bombay, Bishop Fisher remained in Calcutta, and Bishops Warne and Robinson moved to Bangalore and Delhi, respectively. When Bishop Warne retired in 1928, the General Conference assigned no one to take his place, and Bangalore was dropped as an episcopal residence.

India's episcopal leadership was reduced to two Bishops in the spring of 1930, when Bishop Fisher resigned from the episcopacy to accept the pastorate of First Church, Ann Arbor, Michigan. A third Bishop was added, however, upon the election (31 December 1930) and consecration (4 January 1931) of Jashwant R. Chitambar by the Central Conference of Southern Asia. Bishop Chitambar, who was the first Indian to be elected Bishop and the first Bishop to be elected by the Central Conference, established his official residence in Jubbulpore. The second Bishop elected by the Central Conference, on 31 January 1935, was J. Waskom Pickett (consecrated on 5 January 1936), an American long a missionary in India. Bishop Pickett's election

preceded by four months Bishop Robinson's retirement. Bishop Badley took the latter's place in Delhi, and Pickett went to Bombay.

The Bishops reporting to the General Conference in 1920 asked for enabling acts for the formation of four additional Annual Conferences and three Mission Conferences—a prospective doubling of the major administrative units for India. They advanced this proposal as a measure that would make for closer and more effective supervision in a situation characterized by geographical vastness, travel difficulties, linguistic variety, the proliferation of Districts, and an increase in the number of worthy candidates for Annual Conference membership. Although this request was numerically in excess of what the General Conference granted, the number of Conferences expanded to eleven by 1939.

From four Districts of the North India Conference and two belonging to the Northwest India Conference, Bishop Warne organized in February, 1921, the Lucknow Conference. In January, 1922, Bishop John W. Robinson organized the Indus River Mission Conference from the former Sind-Baluchistan District of the Bombay Conference combined with the former Ajmer, Batala, Bikaner, Hissar, and Lahore Districts of the Northwest India Conference. (The new Mission Conference became the Indus River Annual Conference in November, 1924.) Bishop Robinson also organized, in December, 1922, the Gujarat Conference, which included the former Gujarat section of the Bombay Conference. In December, 1926, with Bishop Badley presiding, the Hyderabad Conference was organized from the northernmost portion of the South India Conference. It lay mainly in Hyderabad State and partly in the Central Provinces. In 1924, out of territory originally included in the North India Conference, namely, the Bhabua subdivision of Bihar, the General Conference ordered created the Bhabua Mission. In November, 1927, the Burma Mission Conference achieved the status of an Annual Conference.

Beginning in 1920, the India Conferences and the Bhabua Mission, as they were successively organized, became the only components of the Southern Asia Central Conference, the Malaysia and the Philippine Islands Conferences being regrouped in that year to form, with the Netherlands Indies Mission Conference, the Central Conference for Southeastern Asia. The Southern Asia Central Conference convened in December, 1923, January, 1928, December, 1931, and December, 1935.

POLITICS, PRUDENCE, AND PROPHECY

Up to 1920, the American Methodist mission in India defined itself in action primarily as a religious enterprise in competition with traditional non-Christian religions rooted in India. For some time after 1920, that competition was relaxed only a little; the Methodists' essential missionary pattern still was close to Bishop Thoburn's avowed religious imperialism, fashioned in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. In its social aspect,

Methodist evangelism had not moved far beyond application of the principle, Attack and destroy. But after 1920, the Mission was compelled to begin defining itself not simply in battle stance against Hinduism and Islam, but also by finding and defending a tenable position in the national life as a whole. India now was a country deeply in revolution, churned up as never before by turbulent forces of nationalistic feeling and action that were to result in less than three decades more in bringing down British power and establishing the political independence of the Indian people. How was Methodism to be related to the Indian surge toward independence?—that was the question.

In the nineteen-twenties, the Mission's perennial position could not go unchallenged by political reality. One of its latest concrete expressions was a resolution prepared by Bishop John W. Robinson that was adopted by the Central Conference of Southern Asia in 1916 by a rising vote accompanied by the singing of "God Save the King." In the name of true religion and true patriotism conjoined and as set forth in the denomination's historic Articles of Religion, and in "deep appreciation of the protection and liberty our Missionaries in British India have enjoyed under the British Government," the Conference resolved:

That our Board of Education be instructed to suggest to our various institutions text books for study and plans for impressing upon the hearts and minds of all students who attend our schools, the obligation, the privileges and benefits of loyalty to the ruler and the Government under whom we live. That as a means of deeply impressing the minds of the pupils with sentiments of loyalty and patriotism, we recommend the introduction into our schools of what may be termed the flag salute, in which the Union Jack shall at a convenient time each day or each week be unfurled before the assembled pupils, to be saluted by them in words, from the various vernacular areas, such as shall express in clearest form an appreciation of the blessing, the protection, the justice which is enjoyed because of it, and the pledge of loyalty and service to the King, and to the country it represents, the ceremony to be accompanied by the singing of the National Anthem in the language used by the pupils.

The next day, again to the singing of "God Save the King," the Conference adopted a second, even broader, and certainly fulsome resolution of gratitude and loyalty to the King. It went so far as to pray, at a time when the United States was still a neutral power, that "the present dreadful conflict may issue in the speedy victory of the Allied forces." The voting membership of the Conference was overwhelmingly American, but it spoke officially for the entire communion of Indian Methodists.

Never again did the Methodist Church in India issue so full and categorical a statement of allegiance to the British regime, though it never took any step incoherent with it. The next session of the Central Conference, in January, 1920, adopted a modest request, unsupported by explanatory pre-

faces, that Bishop Warne convey to the Viceroy "an assurance of sincere loyalty on behalf of our people, and of our earnest desire to co-operate in any possible way for the betterment and uplift of India."

By 1923, the Central Conference resolutions included not even a complimentary reference to the Viceroy. Instead, the Conference adopted, in the report of its Committee on the State of the Church, a recommendation that as a part of the Indian Christian community the Methodist Church identify itself with non-Christian communities "in such national movements as reflect legitimate aspirations." It specified as one of these the "movement to obtain *Swaraj* as the ultimate goal." Since the term *swaraj* was yet to acquire its more restrictively radical connotation, and since its realization was cited as an ultimate but chronologically indefinite goal, this step was not inconsistent with adjustment to current British policy. At the same time, it constituted the Methodists' first official gesture of sympathy with Indian nationalism, even though it did not exceed the bounds of respectable reformism. It certainly did not commit the Methodists to the revolutionary program of the more advanced wing of the Indian nationalist movement led by Mahatma Gandhi, who when the Conference met in Baroda was in prison for his activity at the head of a campaign of non-co-operation and civil disobedience.

In 1928, the Conference neither reaffirmed nor went beyond its initial commitment to ultimate *swaraj*. The question of political loyalty was concentrated entirely in the single word *loyal* in a complimentary resolution adopted in greeting to the Viceroy, "His Excellency the Right Honourable Baron Irwin of Kirby Underdale, P.C., G.C.B., G.M.S.I., G.M.I.E.," which mentioned favorably his regular churchgoing, his devotional life, and his "lofty endeavours for the peace, prosperity and happiness of the people of this great land."

The session of the Central Conference that met in Cawnpore in December, 1930, was the first to grapple quite openly with the political problem. It was moved in part by the realization that the Methodist people were confused as to what should be the attitude of Christians toward the national life in general and toward current political problems and movements in particular.

Through its Committee on the State of the Church, it laid down a policy of neutrality. It recognized that the American missionaries, regardless of their personal opinions, were debarred from participating in political movements. It further declared that the policy of nonparticipation must extend also to the Church as such, holding that the Church could not "give itself over to, or ally itself with, any Government, or political party or group." But the Conference recognized the freedom of the individual Indian, Anglo-Indian, or Briton who belonged to the Methodist Church to participate or to refrain from participating in politics and national movements as his conscience should dictate. And the Church should be understanding enough to contain within itself those of differing political persuasions.

By the same vote that adopted this policy of neutrality, the Conference took, however, a political position that under the circumstances was implicitly—indeed substantially—partisan. It strongly affirmed its acceptance of the idea of dominion status and pledged itself "to help in every legitimate way possible toward the making of Dominion Status a success." It also voted to engage in a period of intercessory prayer for the success of the Round Table Conference then in session in London. The British government in India already had announced its adherence to the principle of dominion status, and the more moderate nationalist groups were supporting it. Indian princes and co-operating liberals were participating in the Round Table Conference, which was attempting to work out a plan for its implementation. But the demand for full independence now had become so strong that the Indian National Congress had overruled its moderate wing and voted to work for independence, deciding at the same time to boycott the Round Table Consultations. Gandhi had inaugurated his second civil disobedience campaign, and when the Central Conference met in Cawnpore, he had been in prison for nine months. His arrest was only one of many measures of repression undertaken by the government in the endeavor to cope with the popular revolutionary upheaval in India. Therefore, for the Central Conference to come out at this time for dominion status was to side with the government and the co-operating moderate nationalists against the partisans of independence. This was essentially to jump into national politics with a vengeance.

The Episcopal Address presented at the Cawnpore session by Bishops Badley and Robinson was markedly more political than the resolution passed by the Conference itself. Welcoming the recent general awakening of national aspiration and revealing their preference for some kind of dominion status for India within the British Empire, the Bishops also criticized the civil disobedience and independence movements. They clearly aligned themselves with the Christian leaders who they said heartily welcomed the revival of the nation's interest in its political future but who showed "little willingness to stand with the extremists who have sought to paralyze Government through lawlessness." They interpreted the attitude of almost all the Christian citizens of India—and of the great majority of the general citizenry—to be a preference for constitutional methods of securing a larger measure of self-government and eventually some kind of home rule within the Empire. The Bishops criticized the Congress party by name, claiming that the leaders of the independence movement largely were Brahmans and therefore had stood definitely for the continuance of "the Hindu caste system." That, they said, was one reason why the movement was unable to gain the sympathy and support of the Christian Church in India. The Bishops discounted the statements of certain independence leaders in opposition to untouchability (evidently they were referring to Gandhi among others) as being unproductive of any influences promising true release for the millions of outcaste and low caste

people. The Christian church must continue to oppose caste in favor of a casteless brotherhood.

The stand taken by the session of 1930-31 remained unchanged, and the Central Conference did not again, indeed, deal so fully with the root question of independence and with the revolutionary methods of non-co-operation and civil disobedience. The Conference of 1936 said little more than, "We hold that our people should be obedient to the government as legally established, but that does not mean that the Church is to be a flying buttress to the state nor to any party within the state." Only by the slight tint of asserted non-entanglement in this reference to the state did the Methodist Church ever express any possible disenchantment with the position of the British in India. The Conference of 1938-39 briefly pledged the loyalty of the Methodists to "the Government of the land," welcomed the initiation of new measures of self-government under the Government of India Act, and called upon its people to exercise participatory good citizenship.

It is impossible to affirm with assurance that a thoroughly Indianized Methodist Church in India would have aligned itself with the independence movement led by Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. It is clear that the church as it existed in the twenties and thirties still was potently influenced by the American missionary group, which was conservative on the revolutionary issue of independence and the secondary issue of non-co-operation. As late as 1939, only two-fifths of the voting members of the Central Conference were Indians. And there is no evidence that any considerable number of Indian Methodists ever pressed for greater expressed sympathy or co-operation with the activists working for full independence.

The missionary personnel had more than trivial or subjective reasons for exerting their leadership in the direction of holding the Church to public loyalty to the British administration. Every foreign missionary society represented in India was active there on sufferance of the British, and following World War I, that situation was formalized and embodied in specific regulations. The government had expelled German missionaries from the country during the war as a security measure and afterwards had limited their return. As a result of that experience, it decided to place the presence of all missionaries from abroad under permanent controls and established appropriate regulations early in the nineteen-twenties (their finally revised form was established in 1925).

The regulations provided for lists of recognized foreign missionary societies. Under the government's "Memorandum A," American societies gained approval by being recommended and guaranteed by the interdenominational Foreign Missions Conference of North America. As an applicant society—it was duly accepted—the Board of Foreign Missions of the Methodist Episcopal Church was required to sign a declaration recognizing

that all due obedience and respect should be given to the lawfully constituted Government, and that, while carefully abstaining from political affairs, it is its desire and purpose that its influence, insofar as it may be properly exerted in such matters, should be so exerted in loyal co-operation with the Government of the country concerned, and that it will only employ agents who will work in this spirit.

Every American Methodist missionary who went to India under this arrangement was required to have an individual entry permit issued by the British authorities, which involved his signing a declaration "to do nothing contrary to, or in diminution of, the authority of the lawfully constituted" government of India. In addition, the Board was expected to guarantee him personally, expressing its confidence that he would carry out his undertaking and declaring that it would make every effort to facilitate his doing so.

Regardless of the angle of variance of a missionary's personal views from British policy in India, he was bound during his stay there not to express them in action in any way contrary to his initial pledge. Violation of it could lead to his deportation or to the penalizing of any educational institution in which he served that received subsidies or other privileges at the hand of the government. Even before the inauguration of this system of controls, a few Methodist missionaries had been at least temporarily banned from India by government action. William T. Ward had been ousted in 1914 because of his allegedly causing political unrest, and three missionaries were experiencing difficulty in 1919 in securing re-entry permits because of German ancestry or suspicion of pro-German attitudes.

Not only individuals, but any society whose missionaries did not abide by the pledges involved in official recognition stood vulnerable to administrative action entailing expulsion from the country. Early in 1917, before the United States' entry into the war, the British government notified the Board of Foreign Missions that the entire Methodist Episcopal mission in India would be subject to expulsion from the country if any Methodist missionaries showed hostility to the Empire's war cause. Although Secretary Frank Mason North had confidence in most of the missionaries, he had been seriously concerned about this possibility. He called on the India Bishops to caution all the missionaries about their utterances, to give special warning to doubtful individuals, and to consider notifying the British government of the Board's readiness to withdraw any missionary unacceptable to the government. He trusted that such actions would remove any danger of condemnation of the Mission as a whole. Of course, what could happen in wartime could happen in peacetime also.

That the damaging potentiality of the pledge regulations was no mere figment of missionary nervousness was demonstrated by what happened in 1928 to Boyd W. Tucker, principal of Collins High School in Calcutta. Tucker, who deeply but unaggressively identified himself with the Indians,

was hailed into the office of a British deputy commissioner in Darjeeling and told that the government objected to his attending political meetings and considered it a violation of the undertaking given by the Board of Foreign Missions as to the loyal co-operation of its missionaries. The Commissioner reviewed with Tucker various meetings he had attended as far back as 1923 or 1924. A number of them had dealt only with social, economic, and industrial questions with no intended political implications. Tucker's pointing out this fact did not impress the Commissioner. Tucker also had attended two sessions of the India National Congress, at the latter being the personal guest of Mahatma Gandhi. Feeling that the contacts he had made with Indian leaders at the two sessions were very valuable for his work among educated Indians and had created a measure of international good will, he protested that his attendance should not be construed as political activity or disloyalty to the government. But the Deputy Commissioner insisted that that was the government's position. "He intimated," Tucker wrote to Secretary Diffendorfer, "that if I were to attend any more political meetings I should have complaint made against me to the Board, and that Collins Institute would probably lose its Government grant." Tucker also reported that he had been shadowed for some time by agents of the Criminal Intelligence Department.

Tucker wrote to his Bishop, Frederick B. Fisher, that he could not remain in India under such unfair restrictions. "I demand the right to attend any public meeting as a visitor the same as British missionaries are permitted to do." Tucker had no political, revolutionary, or propagandist intentions; he desired only to be able to develop associations with Indian leaders that would enrich his own contribution to Indian life. He also realized the seriousness of the situation for the Mission and had no desire to embarrass its cause in any way. But his basic conclusion, as he voiced it to Diffendorfer, was that "it would be better for our Church to entirely withdraw from India rather than submit to such orders." And he added, "I know that I have the support of the younger group of missionaries in this matter."

Fortunately, Tucker—an irenic and reconciling personality—was not actually harassed to the point of resignation of his missionary status. He continued his close association with progressive Indians and maintained his friendship with Gandhi. In 1931, at the Karachi meeting of the Congress, once again he was Gandhi's guest—living in a tent near his quarters, wearing Indian garb, eating Indian food, and sharing the Mahatma's daily devotions. Nevertheless, Tucker's experience with the government's representative in Darjeeling demonstrated that the missionary pledge was a very real Damoclean threat for the Mission.

Against such a background, therefore, the missionary company as a whole inevitably influenced the Indian church in the twenties and thirties to maintain the same pattern of public loyalty to the government to which they them-

selves were committed. The only practical difference they recognized was that Indian churchmen, lay or ministerial, could participate in forms of political activity recognized as legitimate under the current governmental system. Though as a dynamic factor it was far removed from the Indian scene, there was one aspect of membership in the Methodist Episcopal Church, however, that had implications for both the missionaries and the Indian church members. Ever since the nineteenth century, the *Discipline* had carried as an interpretive footnote to the Twenty-third Article of Religion:

As far as it respects civil affairs we believe it the duty of Christians, and especially of all Christian Ministers, to be subject to the supreme authority of the country where they may reside, and to use all laudable means to enjoin obedience to the powers that be: and therefore it is expected that all our Preachers and People, who may be under the British or any other Government, will behave themselves as peaceable and orderly subjects.

The missionaries' universal adherence to the loyalty oath by no means indicated uniform private acceptance among them of pro-British views or personal justification of the fact of British domination or of all acts of the British administration. There was a spectrum of private assent and dissent.

At one end of the spectrum were men who long and thoroughly had accommodated themselves to the fact of the British raj. They did not change their settled tendency to defend it and to reject all moves toward independence that were not congenial to British officialdom. Psychologically, they continued to stand where the Central Conference had stood in its declaration of 1916. Some of them felt as comfortable with the imperial *status quo* as did Bishop John E. Robinson, who in a letter to Secretary North on 8 May 1919 wrote the following comment on current newspaper cables he assumed the Secretary had been reading in New York:

I have never known at any time during my nearly 45 years in India such bitterness between rulers and ruled as presently exists. The estrangement is deeper and wider than on any previous occasion of unrest. . . . The prompt and firm measures adopted by the authorities may be expected to give the agitators pause. They must be blind if they do not see where lawlessness will certainly lead them, for Government, never more anxious as it seems to me to secure the administrative co-operation of the people together with their confidence and goodwill, is not prepared to stand any nonsense.

The Bishop was writing three weeks after the Amritsar Massacre, in which government troops fired on an assemblage of unarmed civilians, killing 379 persons and wounding 1,200. Men who tended to react as Bishop Robinson did naturally did not feel unhappy about signing and respecting the Official "undertaking" and did not hurry to change their views as the independence movement gathered momentum.

At the other end of the spectrum, separated by many gradations of thought and feeling about India's future, stood a few men like Gordon B. Halstead. Halstead was a young American member of the staff of Lucknow Christian College with three years' experience in India. Fervently idealistic in temperament, he underwent after a year on the field a deep revival of his spiritual idealism. One result was his determination to break the rule of silence on the question of Indian independence. In December, 1931, he sent out printed copies of:

A MANIFESTO!

Issued in the name of Truth, Justice and Morality.
From a Christian Missionary to his fellow
Missionaries and all Christians in India, Irrespective
of National Affiliations

The Indian struggle for independence is fundamentally based on deep, underlying moral issues. . .

. . . Where or what is the Moral Principle or Justification for any nation in this modern world to continue to hold any other peoples in Bondage, no matter how beneficial or paternal that bondage may be, when the Moral Judgment of the citizens of those nations demands freedom and release. . .

Can we . . . seal our lips . . . blind ourselves . . . surrender our moral leadership, when we should hold the banner of righteousness high above our heads and plunge straight into the wilderness of untruth and immorality. **No and again, no, no, no!** . . .

Missionaries and Christians, I call you to battle in the name of the Christ you love—in the name of the India you desire to serve . . .

Will you respond? Will you take a stand? If so, sign your name below and return this to me at once.

As a writer representing a small group of concerned fellow missionaries, Halstead already had gained a good deal of attention in the missionary and ministerial communities for a recent series of articles in *The Indian Witness* radically criticizing and calling for reform of missionary patterns of daily living and association that he believed were inconsistent with Christian principles of love, sharing, and simplicity and with true fellowship with Indian co-workers and servants and with the Indian people in general. Morally, his Manifesto was thus only the most drastic of the challenges he was thrusting upon his fellow missionaries as professed Christians. It was, however, not a neatly limited and quiet expression, but a public call to action that had the earmarks of intended organization and of potential resistance to British authority. And it came out at a time of renewed political tension in India; shortly afterwards, Gandhi and other national leaders once more were in jail, and Gandhi soon was embarked on a hunger strike to enforce his demand for the inclusion of political rights for the untouchables in the government's new electoral plans.

Upon publication of Halstead's Manifesto, the government informed him that he had forfeited his status in India because of his political activity and

gave him the option of leaving the country voluntarily or being deported. Halstead therefore resigned his post at Lucknow Christian College and prepared to leave for the United States. Bishop Chitambar and Ralph D. Wellons, president of the Board of Governors and president of the College, highly valued Halstead and his wife for their unusual influence among the students. The two officials believed, however, that as long as it enjoyed the "law and order" provided by the government, the Mission should do nothing to hinder it. Before the Halstead incident occurred, the College already had been warned by the public administration that it should not keep on its staff teachers who engaged in political activities. Nevertheless, Chitambar and Wellons personally interviewed the appropriate government official in an effort to make it possible for the Halsteads to continue to work in India. The government did not relent, however, except to grant them three weeks' time in which to make their preparations for departure. It would not accede to Halstead's claim that he had acted as a private individual, but held the College responsible for him.

As soon as news of the popular teacher's resignation reached them, students at the College went on strike in a period of mourning. As a result, the College expelled one student activist—a Christian receiving benefits from the College and from Dr. E. Stanley Jones, the head of the Sat Tal Ashram—and warned other students who had subverted the College's discipline. In order "to bring back a semblance of discipline and a spirit of co-operation," it further decided that it was necessary summarily to dismiss one member of the staff and to inform two others that their services would be terminated at the close of the school year. Halstead promptly departed from India, carrying with him a petition signed by four hundred Indian young people, messages from national leaders "still out of jail" (one was Rabindranath Tagore), a large number of Gandhi caps and Indian national flags to be sold for a wing of the nationalist movement, and the intention to promote in the United States the cause of Indian independence.

Halstead evidently considered the issuance of his Manifesto not so much subversive political activity as moral prophecy against "an Empire based on a huge immorality." Although he actually was strongly committed to the more radical demands of the Indian National Congress ("it is the India of the future"), he couched his public statement in moral terms. He was not unmindful of the significance of his pledge to the British government of India, but just as fully recognized his pledge to a moral power higher than any state. He quoted Mahatma Gandhi: "Disobedience to the law of the State becomes a preemptory duty when it comes in conflict with the law of God." Relevant to his departure, Halstead expressed only one regret about his relationship with the Methodist mission and Lucknow Christian College—that there had been "practically no missionaries with the courage and the love to cry a halt to the whole barbaric business" of Britain's connection with

India. "Only an ominous silence reigns," he wrote to the Board on his way home. Although the Board office received him courteously and without censoriousness, Halstead's own breaking of the silence brought his service in India permanently to an end.

Not until seven years after Gordon Halstead's resistance to the British government's missionary pledge did any other Methodist take a similar stand. Then upon the outbreak of World War II in 1939, the issue of the relation of foreign missionaries to the British administration became more acute. This was indicated in September by the action of the American Consulate General in sending to all American missionaries in India a circular strongly urging them to "refrain both in written communications and in conversation from any criticism of the British Government or its representatives, or its acts in connection with the prosecution of the war." Four Methodist missionaries, however, were stirred to public protest: Paul Keene, a young contract teacher in Woodstock School, in Landour; J. Holmes Smith, who was associated with E. Stanley Jones in ashram work; and Ralph T. Templin, principal of Clancy High School in Muttra, and his wife. These four shared two urgent commitments—Christian pacifism and fervent identification with the Indian people in their struggle for independence. These commitments were professedly and obviously rooted in their fundamental religious convictions. When the war began, they determined to remain loyal to their pacifist principles, though without engaging in provocative war-resisting activism tending to produce antagonistic confrontations with the public authorities.

However, the British government soon took India into the war without seeking the country's consent. The Indian National Congress, which had won control of two-thirds of the provinces in the most recent elections, asked the British government further to clarify, and unequivocally, their announced war aims on democracy and imperialism and to state how they were to be applied currently in the elimination of imperialism in India and in the treatment of India as a free nation. The Viceroy's answer was soon forthcoming, but it only promised political consultations following the war and invited the major groups in India to unite meanwhile in the endeavor to mobilize public opinion in support of the Empire's war cause. Like the Indian nationalists working for independence, the four Methodist pacifists were outraged at what they considered the imperialist hypocrisy of the British attitude. They felt that the government had confronted them with a crisis within the general crisis—they had considered this contingency in advance—that they could not ignore. They decided to act.

A few weeks after the Viceroy's answer to the National Congress, they associated themselves in the inauguration of a movement they called *Kristagraha* and issued a Manifesto in the form of an Open Letter to the Viceroy. In it they denounced Britain's war aims as hypocritical, condemned India's being "dragooned" into the conflict, branded Britain's control of India as

evil, and declared that it must end. Whereas Gordon Halstead once had attacked the British raj in peacetime India, the signatories of the Manifesto now attacked in war-time both Britain's continuing civil control of the country and her emergency military activity. On 2 December, they again publicly opposed the British cause by issuing Kristagraha Manifesto—II. Although both declarations were radical in content and strongly denunciatory in tone, the government registered no complaint either with the signatories or with Methodist officials.

The Kristagraha group found themselves in trouble, however, in ecclesiastical quarters, particularly with the India Bishops. Smith enjoyed the sympathetic understanding of Stanley Jones, the leader of the Ashram, who was himself a Christian pacifist. Knowing, however, that Jones believed that a missionary who chose to violate the missionary pledge should choose also to leave the country, Smith freely resigned from the Ashram to relieve it of embarrassment. But his superior, Bishop John W. Robinson, took the initiative in pressing the pledge issue upon him, indicating that he intended to cable the New York office requesting Smith's immediate recall from India. Because of his inability conscientiously to accept any longer the restrictions evidently imposed by the missionary pledge, Smith acquiesced in Bishop Robinson's decision. And as soon as Bishop Badley saw Paul Keene's name on the second Kristagraha Manifesto, he called him to account (other Bishops later joined him) for meddling in politics and for breaking the pledge. When Badley made it clear to Keene that he could not stay in India unless he promised to refrain from further antigovernment propaganda, he elected to go. Badley thereupon cabled the Board to recall Keene to the States. The Board Secretaries, necessarily acting without benefit of any information except that in the cryptic cables from the Bishops (communication by mail normally required a number of weeks), took no stand on the issues between the two missionaries and their superiors, but simply cabled authorization for their homecoming, deliberately refraining from using the word *recall*. Early in the new year, both Smith and Keene left India.

Ralph Templin, who had drafted the Kristagraha Manifestos, had more trouble with the Bishops, particularly Bishop Badley, his superior—and gave them more—than did Smith or Keene. For one thing, he did not limit his public protests to sponsorship of the Kristagraha papers. For another, he did not promptly accept the Bishops' judgment that his acts clearly violated the missionary pledge. Further, he challenged Badley's claim that the pledge was a commitment given by him to the Church rather than to the government. Templin firmly held to the view that his alleged political and subversive activity would be an issue between him and the government if and when the latter should choose to make something of it. He resisted Badley's making it primarily a matter of ecclesiastical discipline. Early in December, he placed in the Bishop's hands his resignation both from his

appointed post and as a Board missionary, but with the proviso that it was not to take effect until the government should so interpret his activity as to make it seem to the Bishop an embarrassment to the mission or its work.

The government, however, conveyed no expression of disapproval of his stand to Templin himself; nor did it complain about him to Bishop Badley. Indeed, Badley took the initiative and wrote the Viceroy informing him of Templin's activity and voicing his own regret that it had occurred. This he did because he felt that he could not run the risk of jeopardizing the Mission's entire cause by letting the government believe that the Methodist Church was condoning Templin's course of action. The Viceroy's reply to Badley, however, carried no suggestion that the Church was being compromised or was likely to be penalized because of Templin. Badley quoted to the New York office only a single sentence from the reply from the Viceroy's office that in any way seemed to put the government back of him: "His Excellency desires me to express his appreciation of the attitude which you have taken in this matter, which he considers is entirely correct." Badley refrained from quoting this limited, cryptically expressed statement to Templin—he did not trust his motives—for fear that he would put it to unfortunate political use. Badley wrote Secretary Diffendorfer that it was believable that Templin would give it to the anti-Government nationalist press, in which it could be treated under headlines embarrassing to the Viceroy—for instance, "Viceroy supports autocratic American Bishop," or "Viceroy backs Bishop in expelling Missionary from India."

Backed by the other Bishops, by the District Superintendents of the Northwest India Conference, and by the American Consul-General (Badley had solicited his opinion), but never pressed by the British administration, Bishop Badley made a sustained and urgent effort to have Templin recalled, cabling to the Board a drastic warning of disastrous consequences to the general missionary cause and particularly to the Methodist organization because of the likelihood of extremely unfavorable publicity and of direct action by the government. Badley was impatient with Templin, partly because he counted the outspoken missionary not only as politically subversive but also as recalcitrant under ecclesiastical discipline. That a man could persist in such a personally chosen course against the advice of four Bishops—and of a Consul-General—and with little or no support among his missionary colleagues ran beyond the Bishop's comprehension. Incidentally, Templin did have overt support in Muttra, from which Bishop Badley received an appeal on his behalf signed by nineteen teachers and ten other members of the Methodist community.

Consummation of the recall requested by the Bishops was delayed throughout the spring of 1940. Templin refused at certain times to go through with his once proffered resignation because he believed that Badley was attempting to link his proposed withdrawal to factors that were not justified by

the real issues in the case. To Badley's further chagrin, the Board also caused delay, partly because the Secretaries were unwilling, in spite of Badley's importunities, to recommend action until they had fuller information. Unfortunately, they received during much of the period of long-distance negotiation and decision no letters from Templin, only a few delayed letters from the Bishops, and no copies of the disputed Kristagraha Manifestos and other relevant papers. Not only was correspondence by mail impossibly slow, but also the British censors suppressed various materials, ironically even items mailed by Bishop Badley in his effort to stand by the British administration in India. With communication between New York and Delhi thus dependent almost entirely upon cablegrams, there was hesitancy in the Board offices and much misunderstanding all around. Months elapsed before the return of J. Holmes Smith, the arrival of Bishop Pickett for General Conference, and the landing of Templin's son from India brought more substantial information.

While waiting for the Board to act, Badley at one point notified the Secretaries, obviously approvingly, that the American-Consul General had intervened, asking the Templins to deposit with him their signed resignations, of whose receipt he would then notify the Board by cable. If this did not work, wrote Badley, "then we have no recourse on this field, except to turn the case over to the Consul-General and have him secure Templin's recall through Washington."

On 18 April, after conferring at length with Bishop Pickett and reviewing a number of papers finally received from India, the Board's Executive Committee made a policy declaration on the general pledge issue. Conveying it to Bishop Badley by letter and referring to the Bishop's own communication to the Board, Secretary Diffendorfer wrote, "The missionary's pledge is not to the Church but is to the British Government, contrary to your interpretation in the above-quoted letter." The Board's interpretation was based on a fresh study made in New York of the history and nature of the undertakings signed by the Board and its individual missionaries and a review of the actual processes involved. And the result flowing from it was that the Board was not undertaking to pass on the rightness of the decision of the Bishops or of the Consul-General that Ralph Templin had violated his pledge by signing the Kristagraha manifestos. It held that it had no responsibility to make such a determination at that point, for it had received through the designated channels (the National Christian Council of India and the Foreign Missions Conference) no complaint from the British government that Templin—or the others—had thus broken the missionary pledge.

The implication of Diffendorfer's statement—he did not make it explicit—was that the Bishops had stepped beyond their prerogatives in claiming that Templin had broken his pledge and in then using disciplinary pressure with Templin and appeals to the Board to bring about his return to the United

States. Two months earlier, Diffendorfer had questioned whether Badley's quotation from the Viceroy's letter could be interpreted conclusively as an express judgment by the government that Templin had broken his pledge. And he had told Badley that he hoped that if the government should pass such a judgment, the Bishop would see to it that it expressed it to the Board, presumably through the channels designated in Memorandum A. "We will then take the responsibility," he added. And now in April, by sending out to the India Bishops for duplication and full distribution among the missionaries copies of the controlling Memorandum A and of the form of pledge that the missionaries were required to sign, the Board held that it was honoring its own undertaking with the British government to facilitate the missionaries' carrying out their individual undertakings. "We are especially calling the attention of Mr. Ralph Templin of Muttra, India, to the nature and character of these undertakings," said Diffendorfer.

Although the Board thus finally took a view of the nature of the missionary pledge that supported Templin's rather than Bishop Badley's, it nevertheless recalled Templin and his wife from India in July, continuing his financial support until the following January. Unfortunately the message recalling the Templins came by cable, and they misunderstood it. The cablegram ran in part, "Executive Committee after careful review concluded your missionary effectiveness seriously impaired making necessary with regret immediate recall yourself and family." Before coming home to the States early in the fall, Templin strongly protested this basis for his recall, holding both that his educational work was demonstrably effective (it was experimental, creatively oriented toward the realities of the Indian scene, and widely approved, though not in favor with some conservative missionaries) and that his recent Kristagraha stand had evoked valuable sympathetic response among numerous Indians and non-Indians that augured well for the future. The Board, however, stood by its decision to bring him home. Templin himself had recognized in another context the practical impossibility of continued work under the tensions that had developed between him and the missionary authorities on the field. Diffendorfer later wrote him that the Board did not question his proved effectiveness as a working missionary, but that "your effectiveness was so seriously impaired by controversies that the Board felt it was necessary to withdraw you from India."

Obviously, the rest of the Methodist missionaries in India did not approve the kind of action taken by Halstead, Smith, Keene, and the Templins. Even Boyd Tucker, though he offended the authorities, had intended no attack on the British administration. Some of the missionaries were strongly pro-British, some were motivated primarily by protective fear for the continued good standing of the Mission with the government, some were appreciative enough of Indian political aspirations in general but were satisfied with current British moves gradually to broaden the areas of self-government, and

some were simplistic soul-winners. But others strongly sympathized with the independence movement. Because of their deep commitment to the interests of the Indian people, the missionary pledge constituted for them as sharp a question of conscience as it did for the radical activists. They sincerely wrestled with the problem of determining priorities among their several legitimate commitments and finally decided to refrain from activity inconsistent with the pledge or likely to provoke punitive action by the government for violation of it.

Though they thought independently and acted autonomously, Bishop Frederick B. Fisher and E. Stanley Jones, both admirers and friends of Gandhi, were representative of this group. Fisher worked in India for ten years under the missionary pledge, but holding convictions about India's future that led him in 1932, when he was living in the United States, to become a member of the national committee of the newly organized American League for India's Freedom, which sought, under the chairmanship of John Haynes Holmes, to express support of Indian independence through nonviolence. Gordon Halstead was a member of the same committee. In his sensitivity to the Indian people and to the fundamental values involved in their struggle for independence, Jones belonged essentially with men like Halstead, whose spiritual renewal was stimulated by his experience at Jones's Sat Tal Ashram, and J. Holmes Smith, who was a member of the Sat Tal staff. In frank and friendly correspondence with Smith in 1939 (Jones was likewise a Christian pacifist) and in a full article in *The Indian Witness* in February, 1932, when the Halstead affair was still fresh, Jones revealed his essential position. He showed that his heart was with these men in their sympathy with the non-violent struggle for national freedom even though he felt obliged to work on under the missionary pledge. He wrote in the *Witness* of himself:

After weighing the probabilities for good he has decided that it would be best for him to refrain from any political stand or activity and confine himself, as an evangelist, to the work of presenting what he finds in Christ to the individual, social and economic life of India, touching only indirectly the political. He feels, however, that this touch upon the political though indirect is really vital, for the whole of the progress of the political depends and rests upon inner character which he believes can be renovated by his Gospel.

Jones realized that in taking this position, he would be open to the charge of "dodging the issues and the consequences of facing them," but he also was aware that his views on India were well and widely known among both the British and the Indians. He felt that in his stand on the pledge question he was being true to his life calling and work.

The gradual movement of the country toward self-government thrust upon the Methodist Church during this period a political question on which it did not hesitate to take a stand—the creation of communal electorates. This

system called for the various religious communities—Hindu, Muslim, Christian, Sikh, and so on—to vote separately for their own group representatives in legislative bodies. By 1928, when it was apparent that further government reforms were in the offing, communal representation was a live issue. The Central Conference announced in January of that year that it opposed the plan, because it desired an electoral system that would unite India rather than divide her into suspicious and warring religious groups. The Conference declared that it would not seek the establishment of a Christian electorate, but would trust instead to the ultimate fairness and good will of the Indian people as a whole. It conceived the special function of Christians in the national life to be that of reconciliation: "We believe that the Christians of India are remarkably situated to become mediators and ambassadors of good will in the present unhappy communal strife." Three times more during the following decade, the Central Conference proclaimed its opposition to communalism. In 1939, welcoming "the beginnings of self-government both in British India and the Indian States" and urging Indian Methodists to take up their individual responsibilities as active citizens, it declared that "communalism is a curse to India and impedes its progress."

The Methodists also had more limited, pragmatic reasons for their opposition. The communal plan held no advantage for them; the Christians constituted so small and denominationally so fragmented a minority that they would have been swamped in any test of political strength. More than that, the prospect of the extension of communalism was causing them serious trouble, for among Hindus and Muslims it was taken seriously, even fiercely. These two religious communities were in profound conflict. Pressing for the broadest possible basis for the allotment of representation, each sought to increase its registered voting strength. This made trouble for the Methodists and their fellow Christians, generating many urgently persuasive and coercive attempts to influence converts to desert Christianity and be counted among the adherents of their traditional faith. Similar efforts were made to keep inquirers from affiliating with the churches.

Even at the time of the decennial census of 1920, the Methodists already were feeling the force of this tendency under pressures and persecutions like those suffered on the Arrah District when the caste leaders, the Arya Samaj, and local landlords joined forces to reverse the movement of the Chamars from the Hindu community into the Methodist fold. But all this was intensified toward the end of the decade. Bishop John W. Robinson reported to the General Conference of 1928 the repercussion of this heightening of Hindu-Muslim political competition upon the Methodist work. "In many of the villages where our Christian converts have been living," he said, "they have been subjected to violent persecution on the one hand, and seductive allurements on the other, to get them to renounce their faith in Christ." And the Bishop pointed out the special danger of leaving many thousands of recent con-

verts "almost at the mercy of these unscrupulous attacks" at a time when financial difficulties had necessitated the withdrawal of pastoral workers from several hundred such villages.

IN TENSION WITH NON-CHRISTIANS

The intensification of communal aggressiveness and of the nationalist spirit increased the frequency and sharpness of the perennial charge that Christianity denationalized its converts. In 1920, the Bishops expressed to the Central Conference the need for the Methodists to make an effort to remove "the mistaken impression" that for an Indian to become a Christian was to become denationalized. The Conference responded by recommending publication of a booklet that would be widely distributed among the educated classes to show that such apprehensions were groundless. Indian Christians, held the Conference, could be "among the foremost of the loyal Communities of this land in the development of the true national spirit in India." But the charge did not vanish; in 1931, H. Narottamdas, one of the District Superintendents, reported to the Gujarat Conference, "Non-Christians still have a wrong conception about the Christians of the land, because they consider Christians to be anti-Nationalists and spies of the British Government."

In *Indian Church Problems Today*, a book edited by Bishop Badley in 1930, Amar Das, a District Superintendent in the Punjab, rebutted the charge of the general denationalizing of Christians. Conceding that it had occurred to some degree, he charged the responsibility for it primarily to the structure of the Hindu community. The untouchables, from among whom the Methodists won the largest numbers of their converts, were detached from the rest of Hindu society, which counted them as nationally unimportant until it felt it necessary to number them as adherents in reckoning the basis of legislative representation. The Hindus contributed to the isolation of Christian converts by "excommunicating" them. "If Hinduism," said Amar Das, "is really in earnest as to keeping the Christian convert in his environment, all she needs to do is discontinue her caste discrimination."

The Methodist Church endeavored to some extent to enhance the Indian aspect of its Indian community. When it declared in 1923 for *swaraj* as the ultimate political goal, the Central Conference described its step as an act of identification with non-Christian communities. At the same time, it urged the establishment of social relations with non-Christian communities, advocated the teaching of patriotism in its schools and communities, recommended the use of national scripts rather than romanized forms of the vernaculars, favored the adoption of national modes of dress and national social manners such as names and salutations ("where they have no religious significance"), and encouraged the use of Indian songs, tunes, and musical instruments, though warning against "all songs containing heathen ideas,

tunes or sentiments." Also, Indian members were urged at various times to participate in political activities involved in the country's emerging self-government.

Measures like these were not adequate to overcome the conditions that evoked the charge of separateness. Although some made their way into political life, few Methodists boldly identified themselves with the drive towards independence. Closer to the common concerns of the people was the fact that in village life, the scene of Methodism's most extensive accessions from among the Hindus, missionaries and Indian preachers and leaders purposefully worked for a kind of separateness that they counted primarily religious but that actually involved tearing Methodist converts out and away from the social fabric of the general community. There were many ways in which the converts were implicated in the practice of ancient folk-ways that in the view of the missionaries tied them close to their old religion and blocked their achievement of the Christian way of life. This was one of the consequences of the long-continued baptism of large numbers of Indians through the mass movements, which produced so many new adherents that they could not be assimilated through careful teaching and pastoral guidance. For the development of vital Christians and for the religious purity of the Christian community, felt the Methodist leaders, these customs had to be stamped out. This was the pressure behind the development of a "separation movement" just when the Church was under the necessity of defending itself from the imputation of antinational separateness.

Lewis E. Linzell, superintendent of the Baroda District, was touching on the problem when he complained in 1924 about the very small number of Christian marriages he observed among the Methodist villagers—a clear indication that the majority of the Christians were continuing to carry out the marriages of their children by Hindu rites. "Among the village Christian community," said Linzell, "there are found very many earnest followers of Christ who have not the courage to defy the caste system and suffer the social ostracism which would inevitably follow." Such observations were followed by action. In describing the program of his Ballia District in 1928, for instance, Robert I. Faucett cited as a high priority "the putting away of all signs and symbols of the old life." He and his workers were determined to rectify the condition of almost complete disregard of Christian marriage and burial on the District. As for the continued wearing of the Hindu ceremonial lock, he said, "We are going to wage war against the *chutiya* among Christians to the very limit. Already many have been cut." And in 1933, the Gujarat Conference received a committee report that the separation movement had spread widely in the Conference:

So far many of our village Christians were observing caste dinners, child marriages, idol worship and other superstitious beliefs. By God's grace strenuous efforts have been made this year to stop this. Many men and

women have cut themselves from such observances and have entered anew in Christian life.

It was inevitable that the missionaries' attempts to consolidate the process of conversion by having their people cut their customary social ties, thus adopting ways dictated by a movement that had no traditional roots in India, should contribute to the sensitivity of non-Christian Indians to an aura of denationalization surrounding the Christian community. And of course, the Mission's continued efforts during these decades somehow to maintain the flow of accessions from Hinduism through mass movements added to the Hindu-Christian tensions already created by the mass movements prior to 1920.

MASS-MOVEMENT HERITAGE

The full-fledged, overflowing mass movements of the past thirty years did not extend in comparable volume beyond 1920. Nor was their former prevalence matched by the emergence of similarly powerful new movements in new areas. But they left to the continuing Mission and the growing Church a heritage of passive problems, of addiction to mass-movement psychology, and of the persistence of mass-movement methods in the effort to win new adherents from Hinduism. Though the classic period of the mass movements was over, the India Methodists of the twenties and thirties were still engaged, however confusedly and erratically, in a mass-movement Mission.

Among the Mission's leaders as it moved into the twenties were men who were thoroughly and enthusiastically devoted to the continuation of mass-movement work as before. Bishop Frank W. Warne, for instance, was all for it. And when Bishop H. Lester Smith came on the field in 1920, he was quickly converted to it; on one occasion, he rushed out and baptized a large number of candidates after simply looking them over and coming to a quick decision about the advisability of the act. Various missionaries sought means of pressing for more mass-movement accessions, holding the hope that they now would be able to move on from their successes with the depressed classes and penetrate the higher castes.

There also was much talk in Mission circles about the heavy problems left in the wake of the earlier movements, especially the need for assimilation of the converts and the need to provide education for the children of the converts and for the potential Indian leaders who should mold the whole mass into a Church. Bishop John W. Robinson cited the existence of such problems when writing for *The Christian Advocate* in January, 1925, about his own jurisdiction, the Delhi Area, which was receiving between fifteen and twenty thousand converts each year:

It is the very success of our work that has created our greatest problems: How are a hundred and three men and women foreign missionaries, and

perhaps twenty-five hundred workers of all grades to properly shepherd a church of a quarter of a million people just out of heathenism, educate their children, develop in them a conscience that responds to the spiritual impulse, create an esprit de corps that will make them loyal amidst the downward pull of their old habits and customs, make them understand the binding nature of the Christian standards of morality so entirely at variance from all they had ever known before; and while doing all this and a score of other important things keep on with the evangelization and instruction of the thousands of inquirers that are today pressing upon us?*

Bishop Robinson knew that the Mission was not coping with these cumulative problems generated by the mass movements, but well as he knew it, he was one of those who did not want to do anything to arrest mass-movement activity. From time to time, missionaries proposed solutions, but the Mission never clearly decided to make pressing forward in mass work conditional upon its ability to catch up with the unfinished business of assimilation and education. Even when neither the personnel nor the money to extend the assimilative work was forthcoming, the advocates of the mass movement did not want to call a halt.

Nevertheless, a certain amount of cautious critical thinking was going on, and it came to public expression particularly in the Central Conference session of 1928, sparked by the episcopal Opening Address, which was read and evidently framed by Bishop Frederick B. Fisher. In a passage offering a measured critique of the "Mass Movement," the Address declared:

Christianity in India is slowly coming to realize that it is insufficient merely to uproot individuals from their religious groups, out of their old social order, away from their economic inheritance, by means of the mysterious rite which we call Baptism. No one can expect this ceremony to act as a charm to keep men from future sin. Baptism is only the beginning of our responsibility. . . . It is not numbers that we seek. It is the highest possible Christian character.

The Conference members to whom Fisher delivered the Address heard the meaning of this responsibility expanded far beyond trite insistence upon conveying to the converts a cluster of holy habits and simple catechetical statements of Christian dogma. The goal he set involved a redemption of the whole soul and life that would take in even the economic and social order, preparing a soil in which the recreated character would find a recreated society. It called for the achievement of personal change of a sort not to be created in the mass. Fisher said, on behalf of his colleagues:

We have been able [through mass movements] to persuade thousands of lowly Indian people to break with their past and to accept baptism in the name of Christ; but the responsibility of our church in India will never cease until a Christlike culture has been firmly planted in the thousands of individual lives and upon Indian soil.

* The quotation is in italics in the source.

Following Fisher's delivery of the episcopal statement, the Conference gave sober attention to the mass-movement problem by adopting a set of recommendations suggesting measures to advance the assimilation and education of converts. The Central Conference of 1931 also expressed its concern. In the same year, the National Christian Council of India, Burma, and Ceylon, the over-all ecumenical group in which the Methodists participated, undertook a broad survey of mass-movement phenomena. The Methodists made an important contribution by the Lucknow Conference's granting J. Waskom Pickett a special appointment to serve as Director of the Council's Mass Movement Study. The results of Pickett's studies were published in 1933 in his book *Christian Mass Movements in India*, which was recognized for long afterwards as an authoritative treatment that established Pickett himself as the outstanding authority on the mass movements. It recounted the history, advantages, opportunities, disadvantages, and problems of this approach to the evangelization of India.

But expressions of concern and purpose, even when informed by Pickett's systematic study, constituted no effective grappling with the problem of securing adequate new resources that would make possible a substantially successful attack on the troublesome difficulties the missionaries all knew so much about. Later field developments showed that the Mission arrived at no real solution of its over-all mass-movement problem—neither a marked improvement in the rate of assimilation, nor any strong development in education, nor any real decision to slow down the baptizing process. Only as late as the Central Conference of December, 1938, did the Bishops report the beginning of any deliberate and fuller slowdown in the acceptance of candidates who could not be given pastoral care. One of the factors affecting the failure to carry out a positive program was, of course, the development of financial troubles due to sharply decreased appropriations by the Board of Foreign Missions and to the Missions's associated failure to pay off property debts. The financial recession entailed crucial depletion of missionary and Indian mission personnel. The result was that the Mission was in no position to take any truly aggressive or progressive steps involving any great expenditure of resources. This may have accounted for the ultimate modesty of the proposals for Methodist action in the face of the challenge of the Harijan movement led by Dr. Bhimrao R. Ambedkar.

THE HARIJAN MOVEMENT

Doctor Ambedkar was a Western-educated university man, formerly a government official and then an independent lawyer, who had originated among the people of the depressed classes—the Harijans, as they now were popularly called. During the twenties and thirties, he had come forward as the Harijans' own spokesman (Gandhi was not a Harijan), representing them

at the Round Table Conference in London. Under his leadership, a group of Harijans held in October, 1935, a Bombay Presidency Depressed Classes Conference that came out for complete severance of the Harijans from the Hindu community, with the intention of embracing some other religion, one that would guarantee them equal status and treatment with the other members of the faith. Ambedkar announced:

What religion we shall belong to we have not thought out; but we have decided one thing, and that after due deliberation and with deep conviction, that the Hindu religion is not good for us. Inequality is the very basis of that religion and its ethics are such that the Depressed Classes can never acquire their full manhood. . . . I agree with Mr. Gandhi that religion is necessary, but I do not agree that man must have his ancestral religion if he finds that religion repugnant to his notions of the sort of religion he needs as the standard for the regulation of his own conduct and as the source of inspiration for his advancement and wellbeing.

Ambedkar's announcement was a call to the entire Harijan group, estimated at 70,000,000 people, to move out of Hinduism in a body to join some other religion.

The Ambedkar announcement created a sensation that stirred all India. Muslim, Sikh, Hindu, and Christian interests made overtures to Ambedkar and his followers. The Methodists in India participated in the attempts of the National Christian Council to cultivate the interest of the Harijans. Methodist missionaries were challenged by the potentialities of the movement, and missionary-oriented Methodists in the United States were optimistically excited by the possibility that millions of Hindus were about to become Christians en bloc.

Two months after Ambedkar spoke out, the Central Conference of 1935-36 responded to the challenge in a set of resolutions on "Movements among Depressed Classes." Declaring, "While we rejoice in the amazing possibilities which this opens before us, we are humbled that we are not better prepared for this hour," the delegates made a fourteen-point commitment to prepare the way for Harijans to enter the Methodist community.

Eleven of the measures they were ready to undertake, however, were directed essentially to the methods by which they would seek to facilitate the conversion, reception, and assimilation of Harijans from the point of view of raising them to active Christian discipleship as perennially understood and sought by the Christian missions. These measures—excellently and ecumenically expressed—took essentially little more account of the human motivation and socio-economic needs of the as yet non-Christian Harijans than ever had been the case in mass-movement work. Indeed, most of this Methodist program was oriented toward more and better mass-movement work of the kind so long practiced, and its success depended upon its securing resources that never yet had been available in sufficient volume.

Only three of the Methodists' proposed measures were oriented directly toward the expressed hopes of the Harijans for improvement of their lot by changing their religious affiliation; they would seek:

1) "To cleanse from our midst all distinctions based on class, caste or colour, and to create a brotherhood that may be worthy of the Gospel of Christ and of the Depressed Classes who seek a new society based on equality and brotherhood."

2) "To help them become literate by the use of the Laubach method, or any other method which may prove more efficient."

3) "To give ourselves to the study of how we can help improve the economic conditions of these millions; to the teaching of better sanitation, better housing, better child welfare, in short, everything that will help their total uplift."

These three intentions constituted a Christian program much too limited to have a serious appeal for the Harijan movement. Taken in combination with the lengthier list of emphases on evangelistic methodology and Christian patterns of devotional education, they betrayed a parochial approach to the Harijan challenge that was none the less real in spite of the shift in aim toward larger mass goals. William W. Reid, a Board staff member, who made an official world tour that gave him an opportunity to explore Ambedkar's thinking with him, rendered a masterly report in 1939 that set forth the Harijan leader's expectation for his people in the event they should enter Christianity. In this reference, Ambedkar was calling for Christian resources and leadership directed toward massive reconstruction of the economic, social, and political life of an entire class in the Indian population. He outlined for Reid a four-point program for a Christian ministry to the Harijans. The first proposal, as presented by Reid, demonstrated the scale of Ambedkar's demands:

Doctor Ambedkar asks the Christian Church . . . to send to India a commission of agricultural experts, economic experts, social welfare experts, industrial experts, and educational experts: this commission to study India from the viewpoint of what natural resources there are in the land which can be used in new and undeveloped industries for which there will be a world market; what legal regulations should be made surrounding and protecting the millions who should be transferred from the farms to industries, and in what places . . . what educational changes should be made in the schools in order to prepare millions of boys and girls for a new industrial life . . .

The other proposals in Ambedkar's program were:

1) Provision to some of the most intelligent young men among the Harijans of education in economics, industrial management, and some of the sciences essential to the industrialization of India.

2) Organization of a body like the American Civil Liberties Union to defend Christians from the unjust court charges frequently trumped up against

them in order to coerce them into deserting their new religious affiliation.

3) Political activism: "I wish the Christians in India would be more aggressive in public life, would enter into the political and other life of the nation, and make themselves felt as a power in their communities."

While Ambedkar was calling for a major social revolution in India, he also was calling implicitly for a response from the Christians that for the Methodist missionary enterprise would have entailed a revolution against its own devotion to conventional evangelistic principles and customary mission activity, as well as against its adjustment to the felt exigencies of the political *status quo*. After talking with Ambedkar, Reid realized that the Harijan leader and his colleagues could not be satisfied by any conventional conventional evangelism. Reid himself was capable of saying, "If people in India are going to die of hunger and neglect and disease, it may not be supremely important whether they die Christians or Hindus or Moslems." And perhaps Bishop Fisher, acting on the principles he voiced in his Episcopal Address of 1928, would have been capable of moving to the larger, social evangelism evidently required by the confrontation with Ambedkar and his people. But the Methodists' India mission and the Indian church of the nineteen-thirties generally lagged well behind Fisher's 1928 position. The Methodists proved too inflexible to be able to approach the Harijans on a sufficiently humanitarian basis; they were devotees of a form of Christian salvationism in which the prime concern was to win people to accept Christ as individual Savior. Humanitarian measures that did not lead directly to that end generally were not considered an essential part of Methodism's mission. The advent into Christianity of masses of Harijans under Ambedkar's leadership was—if it ever actually constituted a real opportunity for the Church—a lost opportunity as far as Methodism was concerned; it did not occur.

THE METHODIST COMMUNITY

Nevertheless, over the two decades taken as a whole, the Mission was able to develop a much larger constituency, although the latter thirties showed some decrease in most categories of affiliation with the Church. The growth the Mission experienced flowed from its receiving the children of Methodist families and from its utilizing and harvesting the results of its regular time-tested evangelistic methods in approaching the non-Christian community. The Warne-Robinson-Smith-Fisher episcopal leadership of 1920 headed a church of over 71,000 members—nearly triple the enrollment in 1896. In addition there were over 181,000 probationers—more than quadruple the number in 1896. By 1939, there were 103,000 full members and 220,000 probationers. This more recent growth included an increase of 45 per cent in full membership and an increase of 22 per cent in probationary membership. These percentages express a marked deceleration in the rate of growth as against that which characterized the development from 1896 to 1920.

Southeast Asia

Malaya and Singapore

GROWTH WAS THE MOST NOTABLE CHARACTERISTIC of church life in the Malaysia mission* during the nineteen twenties.

One of the objective signs of it was the emergence of a new Malacca District, headed by Marmaduke Dodsworth. At the opening of 1920, Methodism was just beginning to reach out beyond Malacca, the capital, touching less than a hundred church members, including some at Bukit Asahan. During the following two years, new points were reached, and many new members came into the Church. When the Malacca District was established at the beginning of 1922, it included not only Malacca, with its two Chinese churches and its Tamil church and Circuit, but also Batu Anam, Bemban, Bukit Asahan, Sungai Baru, and Tangka. By 1931, the District had twenty-two churches and Circuits at eighteen places in the state of Malacca and across the northern border of the neighboring state of Johore, the latter points marking the Mission's penetration of an additional state. All aspects of the work were thriving. The churches had nearly a thousand members and over three hundred probationers, among them both Chinese and Tamils.

But the older Districts also expanded and acquired many new members. In 1926, the Federated Malay States District had become large enough to be divided into the Ipoh District, under William E. Horley, and the Kuala Lumpur District, superintended by Robert A. Blasdell. Before this division, earlier attempts to establish Methodist evangelism at Bentong—thus to make a beginning in the state of Pahang—had been renewed, and settled church work was begun there. Under the new Kuala Lumpur District, expansion was begun in 1930 to other points in Pahang. In 1931, the Mission once more formed a separate Tamil District; Tamil charges formerly in the Ipoh District were combined to form the Perak Tamil District, superintended by Solomon S. Pakianathan, one of the founders of the Sumatra mission. A year later, the new District reported seven hundred members, thus registering a large increase.

* For the Sarawak segment, see the following section.

The Mission's combined membership by this time was a body of fifty-four hundred full communicants, nearly triple the size it had been a decade earlier. At this point, the Conference proposed, in the name of self-expression for "the indigenous church," division of the Malaya Conference into a Malaysia Chinese Conference and a Malaya Tamil Conference, leaving the original organization to include such groups as would not naturally go into the new Conferences. The General Conference of 1932, being so memorialized, authorized the adoption of essentially this plan. It was not implemented, however, until January, 1936, and then not in quite the same form as originally proposed.

Transferring fifteen active and seven retired ministers from the Malaya Conference, Bishop Edwin F. Lee organized the Malaysia Chinese Mission Conference, with three Districts that together covered roughly the same territory as that occupied by the Malaya Conference. The Southern District (Lim Hong Ban, Superintendent, and Paul B. Means, District Missionary) included Chinese charges in Singapore, Johore, and Malacca. The Central District (Yaw Yee San, Superintendent) included similar appointments formerly belonging to the Malaya Conference's Kuala Lumpur District. The Northern District (C. E. Fang, Superintendent) was composed of charges formerly in the Penang-Ipoh and Perak Districts of the undivided Conference. The Chinese Mission Conference started off with twenty-two hundred members divided among twenty-eight congregations.

Originally, the Malaya Conference had suggested the separation on a racial basis, that is, in the interest of self-development for "two major racial groups." When the General Conference of 1936, meeting in the spring, confirmed the establishment of the Malaysia Chinese Mission Conference, it defined it as a jurisdiction that "shall include any vernacular Chinese work within Malaysia." As the larger Malaysia mission actually was reshaped, however, the basis of organization was neither purely vernacular nor purely racial. To be sure, the new Mission Conference was an all-Chinese organization, and the older Malaya Conference set up two all-Tamil Districts. But the Malaya Conference retained two broadly inclusive Districts (Singapore and Penang-Ipoh) that together included—particularly the latter—vernacular Chinese, Baba Chinese, English, and Tamil churches. It also retained all the English-speaking Anglo-Chinese schools. Thus the organizational complexion of the Malaysia mission after the separation was mixed—lingually, racially, and geographically.

For the next few years after adoption of the new Conference pattern, there was additional membership growth in the Mission as a whole, but the Malaya Conference showed no net increase up to 1939. The only real advance was made in the Chinese Malaysia Mission Conference.

Efforts were made, especially in the thirties, to project the Mission evangelistically into more remote or uncultivated areas. The Malaya Conference

elected a Committee on Home Missions in January, 1930, and shortly afterwards a Home Missionary Society was organized, with Solomon S. Pakianathan as President. Its objects were to "preach the gospel throughout Malaya" and to "strengthen the nucleus of our developing indigenous Church." Directed by a committee of both laymen and ministers, it began enlisting subscribers and raising funds to support mission work on the field. Its first chosen field was the state of Pahang. Using funds collected by the Society and donated by Dr. William G. Shellabear, who long had been interested in Malay work, the Conference sponsored three home missionaries in the first year. They were S. M. Rajamoney, Ang Giok Sui, and Lam Thau Onn, who worked among the Tamils, the Chinese, and the Malays.

The freshest field they opened up was among the Sakais, an aboriginal Malayan people, among whom a beginning was made in Perak in 1931. The work with this primitive group developed moderately through modest efforts to evangelize, to teach the children, to care for the people's medical needs, and to show them how to raise crops in the jungle. By 1934, contacts were being made with them at three points. By 1935, two Batak home missionaries from Sumatra were living among the Sakais, at some detriment to their own health because of malaria in the forest areas. By 1939, the missionaries were reaching new clusters of Sakais, particularly by establishing a station in the Jelai Valley, in Penang. To its other paid workers the Home Missionary Society added Bah Prah, a Sakai trained over several years for Christian work among his own people.

The Mission went through financial ups and downs during these two decades, difficulties arising especially in the support of mission work that depended upon the rubber economy. For instance, a serious slump in the rubber market in 1921 brought trouble for the Sitiawan community. As William E. Horley reported to the Conference, "The bottom has dropped out of things financially . . . for all the Sitiawan people had their eggs in one rubber basket, and now the eggs are all smashed." The Mission Finance Committee's private Minutes stated, more formally, "The rubber slump has reduced the community to insolvency. The Orphanage, Anglo-Chinese School, Church Lot, Hospital Building Fund, Mission Plantation, and church buildings at Ayer Tawar and Sugai Wangi are all being given financial aid, in most instances by monthly loans."

Although the Finance Committee was able to help the local Sitiawan projects over the current financial hump by drawing upon its general resources, the recession of 1921 affected the Mission's finances for years afterwards. When rubber prices fell, the Sitiawan Mission Plantation was hard hit. Operations were suspended, the plantation was leased, and finally, in 1925, the corporation was liquidated. The description of its closing out that reached print in the Board's *Annual Report* (1925) made it appear as simply a measure deemed advisable because of the improved prosperity of the Sitiawan

Chinese immigrant community, which assertedly turned the Plantation into an unnecessary and purely business venture. More accurately, the enterprise failed financially.

One of the most immediate effects of the failure was to bring about the transfer of the Orphanage to Ipoh, where it became part of the boys' boarding school. Another, deeper effect was to impair the Mission's financial strength at a time when the annual deficits of the boys' schools had reached a cumulative total of over \$120,000. At this period the Finance Committee was carrying with the banks overdrafts amounting to \$200,000. It took many years' interest and principal payments to bring the school debts close to complete liquidation. The W.F.M.S. schools were not a part of this problem, for the Society kept its projects currently funded from appropriations based on its members' contributions.

Some of the problems, both financial and educational, that created difficulties for the schools in the early postwar years were related to the impact of emerging government educational policy. As time went on, however, the relation of the Mission's schools to the government became stabilized, particularly when the latter finally determined that it would lean heavily on mission schools to educate Malayan youth. When that point was reached, government grants-in-aid became more important than ever for the Methodist schools. Lester Proebstel, principal of the Penang Anglo-Chinese School, said in a Conference report in 1935:

I was once asked by a Presbyterian investigator of Foreign Missions if I considered our Malayan School programme worth while or essential to our Mission programme. My answer was very brief and very easy: "No Schools—No Mission—No argument." Many missionaries and laymen have questioned the Grant-in-Aid system, but the answer here is the same: "No Grant-in-Aid—No Schools."

The Mission's own school investment, not dependent upon Board appropriations, was substantial; Proebstel declared that it had totaled a million dollars in twelve years. But grant-in-aid money for Methodist schools was far more substantial; for example, as Proebstel reported, the grant for 1933 alone reached \$165,000.

The result of this priority of the school system in Mission thinking, reinforced as it was by the availability of government subsidies that extended to both current budgeting and building funds, was that the Malaysia mission retained, even enhanced, clear through to the end of the nineteen-thirties its character as primarily an educational mission as far as the employment and expression of American missionary leadership was concerned. Almost all the Board's missionaries were school teachers and administrators; only a handful were directly and fully engaged in evangelistic work. And school work was the principal sphere of the W.F.M.S. missionaries. Evangelism was the sphere

of the Asian workers. The gathering and guidance of a body of some twenty thousand pupils, both Christian and non-Christian, was the Mission's most impressive achievement.

Sarawak

"We returned from furlough just three weeks ago," said James M. Hoover to the Malaysia Conference, in Singapore, in February, 1921, "therefore did not have time to visit Sarawak before Conference." He and his wife had been on furlough in the United States, and direction of the Sarawak mission had been left in the hands of Wong King Hwo and another Chinese minister.

Arriving in Sarawak after Conference, Hoover began to grapple with economic difficulties that had arisen during his absence, difficulties that affected both the financial administration of the Mission itself and the economic condition of the Chinese community with which its prosperity was so intimately intertwined. Rubber was king, and in the year that Hoover was away, units of rubber that were bringing the Sarawak people \$130 dropped to \$10. Consequently, Hoover's constituents took heavy losses, rubber gardens were mortgaged at highly usurious rates of interest, prices of consumers' commodities were wildly inflated, contributions for the church work sharply ebbed, preachers' and teachers' salaries went unpaid, and the Mission dropped rapidly into debt. With the help of Bishop George H. Bickley, through contributions from friends of his and friends of Hoover's, with the stimulus of an initial rise in rubber prices, and with leverage applied to the mortgage bankers by Hoover, who followed up his fruitless negotiations with them by making an effective threat to appeal to the Rajah, Hoover managed to start the Mission well along the way to financial recovery by the end of the year. He also added to the Mission's economically productive projects a rice mill, a sawmill, and a rubber factory, which were set up at Binatang, at the mouth of the Binatang River, a branch of the Rajang thirty miles below Sibu.

Hoover, though for years an enthusiastic rubber promoter and still conserving the rubber plantings developed by the Mission, now began to look for a complementary economic base for the life of the people under his political and religious guidance. He turned to sago, a starch product of the sago palm that was used in puddings and, in greater bulk, in textile processing. Said Hoover, referring to Sarawak's 58,000 square miles of virgin soil as her true wealth, "Pepper, rice, and sago, these three, but the greatest of these is sago."

In order to start sago planting, Hoover sought large new land concessions from the Rajah's government. In 1922, when the new movement began, the grants already negotiated by Hoover for the Chinese colony included a five-mile frontage on the Egan River, twelve miles on the right bank of the Rajang, twenty miles along the left bank between Sibu and Binatang, and a

ten-mile frontage on the Sarikei. Since these tracts had no back boundaries, their area could not be estimated. In 1924, the colony received a concession measuring some forty miles of river frontage, all the way from Sibü to Sarikei. Sago planting did not immediately follow, however, for it was held back by a rise in rubber prices and shortage of labor, by the necessity of completing debt payments, and by a continuing drain upon the colony's funds through heavy remittances to relatives in China, who were living very precariously.

Hoover reported to his colleagues of the Malaysia Conference that granting the vast new tract to the Chinese marked a fundamental shift in government policy. Its goal, he said, had been "Sarawak for the native," which had been inspired by the vain hope that the Malays and the Dayaks would become the developers of the country's resources. Hoover now reiterated his own negative view of the indigenous people :

For years I have pointed out that the present condition of the Malay and Dayak is not a state reached on the way up, but on the way down—they are not progressing but going backwards. They have no desire for anything better, and if they have, they soon lose these desires when it means hard work. So somebody else is to be given a chance to develop the agricultural resources of Sarawak. The man with the hoe and the plow [the Chinese] is to be encouraged and helped. The Dyak and Malay will still have their chance, but they will not be allowed to cumber the ground.

Suddenly, in 1925, before the sago concession could be developed, a new plan was adopted to meet new conditions. Four thousand immigrants from China arrived during the year. Many earlier immigrants returned to China, but a large proportion of them were planning to bring their families back to Sarawak. The latest immigrants, plagued in the homeland by bandits, soldiers, and forced labor, were eager to work hard and to get ahead. Simultaneously, rubber once more began to bring high prices, and a new enthusiasm to plant to rubber raced through the Chinese community and swept sago off the agricultural field. Hoover and the government both veered again toward rubber. Hoover asked and received from the Rajah a large tract on the Binatang River to be devoted to rubber planting by the Chinese. It offered a promising new opportunity to both the new immigrants and the ones who had preceded them.

When the occupation began, at Hoover's signal, it went forward with unexpected force :

We went in with such a rush that a new situation developed in Sarawak. The old fellows with money, grubstaked the new fellows on the most generous terms and they whacked in—jungle fell as though a tornado had passed through . . . The Dyaks were scared plumb stiff. First, they complained, then they did everything they knew to hold up the slaughter of their jungle.

A high official came from Kuching, the capital, to investigate, and the Dayaks crowded into Sibü to appeal to him to save them from the ruthless invasion of the land by the Chinese. The situation was so volatile that the government ordered the Chinese out after three months' work in the jungle. The Rajah himself finally came from Kuching, adjustments were made, several rivers were designated as boundaries to the concession, and Hoover soon was able to say to his fellow ministers at Conference, "we are moving in again." And he began to talk with his old promotional optimism about the great opportunities for investment in Sarawakan rubber: "The Sarawak Government offers the best terms, the soil is the best, the conditions of climate ideal, and we furnish the labor, which means we grow, Sarawak prospers, America gets rubber, and the poor Chinese find a living." A year later, Hoover cited the impressive dimensions of the beginning of the enterprise—more than a million rubber trees had been planted.

Hoover's enthusiastic projection of Sarawak's future, however, hardly was all-inclusive; absent from it were the country's many thousands of Dayaks. Hoover's categorical denigration of them in connection with the opening of the extensive new rubber concession reaffirmed a long-held attitude of his. It revealed him as a man never to be expected to move the Mission toward a policy of evangelizing or educating the Dayaks. And this he never did; as long as he headed the Mission, it had no Dayak work. If he had made the effort, he might, indeed, have failed, for the Dayaks hardly could be expected, on their part, to warm up to a mission led by a man who for two decades had despised and rejected them and completely identified himself with the interests of their economic competitors to the detriment of their own.

The Chinese community constituted a relatively small minority in the population of Sarawak. Although Hoover generally put a good deal of stock in achieving numerical growth for the Mission, by his policy of confining its efforts exclusively to this ethnic minority, he inevitably imposed limitations upon the numerical potential of the Mission. As long as this policy endured, it would be impossible for the Methodist constituency to develop to proportions greater than those of the Chinese colony or of the segment of it reasonably to be expected to profess Christianity. The Methodist constituency was vulnerable to depletion by the periodic return of substantial numbers of Chinese to their homeland. And in 1934, the government reversed its 33-year stand on Chinese immigration and stopped their entry into the country. This cut off the source from which the Mission perennially had received many members by transfer. Hoover's Conference report pointed out the consequent complexion of the incoming membership:

Our whole gain has been from our own boys and girls. We make practically a clean sweep of them into the church as they become twelve years old. This is the joy of our work. We have 1660 baptized children under twelve years, children of our own members coming through our schools (in which

are boys and girls) into the church. Then just for proof that we have something started in Sarawak, we had 47 marriages during the year . . . again mostly our own boys and girls. If we can do another 30 years in Sarawak there will be a great story to tell.

By citing this reliance on the pool of church children and on the birth rate, for numerical growth, Hoover perhaps unintentionally revealed that the Methodist Episcopal Church in Sarawak now had become an ingrown religious fellowship and had no expansive evangelistic thrust. No matter how many heads it could count for its membership statistics, it was operating on a policy that barred it from becoming a truly national church in Sarawak.

Even the extension of the Mission to new locations, with new church societies and new church buildings, could not deliver it from the limitations of its restrictive ethnic preoccupation. Such extension did occur during these two decades. In 1920, preachers were appointed to seventeen places; in 1935, the charges were forty-six in number; in 1940, they were fifty-eight. But all these appointments were to Chinese congregations, and all the church sites were within the area worked by the Chinese farmers. New churches generally signified, toward the latter part of the period, the relocation of old members.

James M. Hoover's leadership of the Sarawak mission ended, after thirty-two years, with his death in Sibü in February, 1935, after his return from furlough. Behind him, in the network of Methodist churches developed under his stimulus and guidance, he left a constituency of more than three hundred probationers and more than twenty-one hundred church members.

In 1936, leadership of the Mission was divided. The churches were organized into two Districts, each with a Chinese minister at its head—Lee Hock Hiang on the Sibü District, Wong King Hwo on the Sarikei District. The latter had seen service as District Helper under Hoover. Gerald V. Summers, formerly headmaster of the Middle School in Singapore, became District Missionary for both Districts. Mrs. Summers took Mrs. Hoover's place as head of the Methodist Girls' School in Sibü. This combination continued for the rest of the nineteen-thirties, except that the two superintendents exchanged Districts beginning in 1938.

Under these leaders, and as the result of the work of a corps of Chinese ministers and supply preachers finally numbering fifty, the Mission kept growing in numbers, until in 1940 there were seven hundred probationers and thirty-six hundred full members of the church. Among them were no more Dayaks, however, than when Hoover died, and no move towards the Dayaks had been made since then. In 1940, the Sarawak church remained a Chinese church.

Netherlands East Indies

The separation of the Methodist missions in the Netherlands East Indies from the Malaysia Conference in 1918 to form the Netherlands Indies Mission

Conference was but the first phase of a continuing process of reorganization.

In the spring of 1920, the new Conference became a part of the Singapore Area, along with the Malaysia Conference. George H. Bickley, a newly elected Bishop (a General Superintendent) administered the Area until 1924, when he was succeeded by Bishop Titus Lowe, also just elected to the episcopacy.

Until its session of February, 1920, the Netherlands Indies Mission Conference had a single Superintendent, Harry B. Mansell. But Bishop John W. Robinson then arranged the work for the coming year in four Districts, each with its own superintendent: Java, Raymond L. Archer; North Sumatra, Leonard Oeschli; South Sumatra, Mark Freeman; and West Borneo, Charles M. Worthington.

In February, 1922, under an enabling act of the General Conference of 1920, all the work in Sumatra except that in Palembang, in South Sumatra, was separately organized as the North Sumatra Mission, under the superintendency of Oeschli. The Methodist enterprises in Palembang and on the island of Bangka remained the components of the South Sumatra District. In 1925, the North Sumatra Mission became the North Sumatra Mission Conference.

In November, 1927, Secretary Ralph E. Diffendorfer brought to the Annual Meeting of the Board a report proposing substantial, as well as further jurisdictional, reorganization of Methodism's multiple Netherlands Indies field. It was derived from a study Diffendorfer had completed during a visit to Sumatra and Java early in the year, and it came to a head in a single inclusive recommendation, namely, that the entire Netherlands Indies work be consolidated in Sumatra, with the reorganized enterprise becoming the denomination's sole mission in the Dutch-administered islands.

In reviewing the Netherlands Indies situation as a whole, Diffendorfer brought forward several factors necessitating the development of a more effective missionary strategy for the area: the comparative smallness of the missionary corps, its wide geographical dispersion, and the multiplicity of language and racial groups being evangelized. These factors, with accompanying unfortunate health conditions, had variously caused too many shifts in assignments of workers to particular posts, isolation of missionaries and consequent failure to achieve mutual understanding, lack of a common policy because of individualistic development of mission stations, practically insuperable problems in the preparation and distribution of Christian literature, and excessive costs of administration and travel. Diffendorfer concluded that the overall result of the Methodists' two decades of labor in the Dutch colonies with these drawbacks had been failure to make any significant contribution to the Christianization of the Islands.

Although in his plan there was room for the work in South Sumatra, he was aiming chiefly at what he considered the superior opportunity awaiting

the Methodists in North Sumatra when it should be properly developed. He had in mind a large tract along the eastern coast that the Dutch colonial authorities were setting aside for exclusive missionary exploitation by the Methodist Episcopal Church. It extended from ninety miles north of Medan southward for four hundred miles and reached inland to an average depth of sixty miles. This was a very much larger area than the one opened up by the government to William T. Ward at the end of 1915. Diffendorfer found this an especially promising field not only because it was not being worked by any other missionary organization, but also because the area was rich in economic possibilities, because it was due to grow through immigration from favorable sources, and because it still was only lightly touched by incoming Islamic influences. The last factor left the indigenous population open to Methodist teaching while the people were still in the stage of animistic religion—a condition from which it was far easier to convert them to Christianity than would be found after they should be influenced by Islam. It was in every respect a crucial time for the development of small Christian groups that would establish contacts with the new elements in the population. "Christianity has a message for the people," said Diffendorfer. "If we leave them to Islam, they will not progress morally and spiritually to any great extent." The Methodists should move in, he believed, because the people would listen to American rather than to European missionaries and because Methodism had a peculiarly valuable message of "Christianity as a heart experience."

The Board adopted Diffendorfer's recommendation for the Netherlands Indies work, and the changes involved soon were under way. The General Conference of 1928 authorized the merging of the North Sumatra Mission Conference and the Netherlands Indies Mission Conference, and that was consummated in Medan on 25 January 1929 under the presidency of Bishop Edwin F. Lee, the new organization being named the Sumatra Mission Conference. The Conference began with a membership that included the two remaining members of the Netherlands Indies Mission Conference and nineteen members from the North Sumatra Mission Conference.

To implement this planned consolidation the Methodists liquidated all their work in Java—an enterprise that included over four hundred church members, concentrated chiefly in Djakarta, Bogor, and Soerabaja; eleven hundred Sunday school pupils; five hundred pupils in fifteen vernacular schools, including schools for the training of preachers and women religious workers; several hundred pupils in the English schools in Bogor for boys and for girls; and the Tjisaroea hospital, which finally was opened in September, 1918. With the merging of the two Conferences, some of the work was closed—the hospital, for instance—some continued independently, and some was taken up by the Dutch Mission.

Pursuing a variety of such arrangements, the Netherlands Indies Mission Conference also closed out all its projects in West Borneo, where there were

two hundred church members among a dozen churches, about a hundred pupils among four Sunday schools, and over two hundred in vernacular schools.

Geographically, all that came into the new Conference from the Netherlands Indies Mission Conference was Palembang, in South Sumatra, and the island of Bangka.

Bangka, however, almost immediately dropped out of the picture. Indeed, it figured in the new organization as hardly more than a line in the Appointments at the first annual session: "Pangkal Pinang . . . *To be supplied.*" But from then on, it never was supplied; nor for a decade had it been sent any mission worker, except for one year. Resident laymen alone carried on the little society, with diminishing effectiveness. Mark Freeman, serving as superintendent of the Palembang District, paid a number of visits to the Island early in the twenties, but for five or six years, no missionary made the week-long trip from Sumatra to Bangka and back, partly for want of funds, partly for lack of time. In 1926, Ting Tsai Lin, a Hokkien-speaking Chinese minister, was sent to Pangkal Pinang, but sometime in 1927 he had to be withdrawn because he did not speak the necessary Hakka tongue. By May, 1927, Freeman had ceased his visits. In 1929, his successor, Harry C. Bower, twice traveled out to Bangka, visited all the towns, and reported the Methodist congregation largely dispersed and the work at a very low ebb. His report was the last mention of Bangka in the sessions of the Sumatra Mission Conference.

The Palembang District, which included all the limited Methodist mission work in South Sumatra, had been supervised by Mark Freeman during the decade before the merger. Its only Sumatran activity was in Palembang itself—a Malay congregation, a Chinese congregation, and the Methodist Mission School. By 1929, the membership of each congregation had increased from a dozen to three dozen, and the enrollment of the School had quadrupled, to the point of over four hundred enrollees. Harry Bower, who then took charge, found that two-thirds of the Malay congregation was composed of former students in Methodist schools elsewhere. Palembang was an overwhelmingly and intensely Muslim town. Bower and August H. Prussner, who succeeded him in 1935, had to cope not only with this condition but also with the rotating transiency of the Chinese members between China and Sumatra. Considering also their heavy duties in the School, the two missionaries quite naturally were unable to achieve large growth in the Palembang neighborhood or more than modest extension beyond it. Bower established in 1930 a Malay congregation in Telekbetung, the growing capital of the Lampung Residency, 240 miles from Palembang. While he was on furlough in 1932, Armin V. Klaus, began preaching services in Soengai Gerong, the English-speaking colony at an oil refinery near Palembang. About five years later, the Methodist mission in Telekbetung reached out some

thirty miles, to Trimoerdjo, a new colonization project for immigrants from Java, and initiated evangelistic work, also later opening there a Chinese school.

All the rest of the some two dozen points at which Methodist evangelists and teachers were active in Sumatra in 1929 were in North Sumatra, and in that area lived three-quarters of the eight hundred church members in the new Sumatra Mission Conference.

Nearly a third of the members in North Sumatra belonged to half a dozen Chinese churches, which were included in the Conference's organized Districts along with the Malay and Battak churches. In 1931, Egon N. Ostrom, transferred from the Sweden Conference, was appointed District Missionary for Chinese work on the Medan District (he later took that function for all North Sumatra). He went to China that same year for language study and returned in time to delve fully into the Chinese work in 1932. In December, 1931, the Mission Conference memorialized the General Conference to authorize transferring the Chinese churches on the East Coast of Sumatra to the Malaya Conference in order to provide a more fluid appointment situation for the Chinese pastors. The churches never were thus transferred, but an arrangement was effected whereby for a few years the Chinese pastors were enabled to be members of the Malaya Conference but to serve in the Sumatra Chinese churches. In 1938, the Chinese churches were set apart in a separate District, and Ostrom was made the District Superintendent. At the end of the decade, there were Chinese churches in Brastagi, Bagan Siapiapi, Bindjai, Kisaran, Siantar, and Tebingtinggi, as well as Medan, the scene of the earliest Methodist approach to the Chinese in Sumatra. Although the Chinese membership increased by half during these years, the same conditions restricting the movement in Palembang also handicapped the efforts in North Sumatra, and evangelistic results in the rest of the Conference far outstripped those among the Chinese.

With minor exceptions (eventually, Medan and Palembang each had a Malay congregation), the rest of the Sumatra following were Battaks, whom the Methodists had not begun to evangelize until 1921. Under the leadership of Leonard Oeschli, superintendent of the North Sumatra District, Lamsana L. Tobing then was brought from Java and appointed to Kisaran, in the Asahan region. There he established a mission base from which he and Oeschli began to visit the neighboring Battak villages, in two of which additional Methodist workers soon became active. From that beginning developed, during the years when the North Sumatra enterprise was organized separately from the other Netherlands Indies missions, an Asahan Battak constituency of thirty charges organized in Circuits headed by Kisaran, Rantau Prapat, Tandjeong Balei, and Tebingtinggi. During the same period, a beginning in Battak evangelism also was made in Medan. Thus the Battak churches

brought into the Sumatra Mission Conference in 1929 a combined membership of more than five hundred.

Either as District Superintendent or as Superintendent of the Sumatra mission as a whole, Arvin Klaus was in charge of the Battak work throughout the nineteen-thirties. Under his leadership, the evangelization of the Battak communities expanded until in 1939 there were fifty-six Battak Congregations, extending from 110 miles north of Kisaran to 120 miles south of it, with a general constituency of four thousand Christians, including some two thousand church members. These groups, a few of which included Malay-speaking minorities and already Christianized Battaks moving in from other areas, were served by six pastors and evangelists, twenty school teachers, and one missionary. Located as they were, both in towns and in the heart of the jungle, over so wide an area, they constituted a mission of such proportions that Klaus finally judged that it would be necessary to call a halt to evangelistic extension unless more money, and thus more and wider-ranging workers, could be provided. The Battak membership—quadrupled within ten years—provided 80 per cent of the Mission Conference total, with the Chinese and Palembang Districts accounting for the rest.

In contrast with the growing body of laymen, the missionary corps and the Asiatic evangelistic working group in Sumatra remained numerically almost completely static during the thirties. In 1939, the expanded constituency was led by eight male missionaries and their wives along with three single women missionaries, eleven Asiatic ministerial Conference members (three were Chinese), and thirty-five lay preachers under appointment (five were Chinese). The Conference roster showed a gain of only two Asiatic ministers and five lay preachers.

The Philippine Islands

For two quadrennia, the Philippine Islands Conference constituted by itself the Manila Area, with its own Bishop, a General Superintendent, in residence at Manila. Bishop Charles E. Locke, newly elected, came to Manila in 1920. He was succeeded there in 1924 by Charles B. Mitchell, another recently elected Bishop. But in 1928, the Conference again was without a resident Bishop. The Central Conference for Southeastern Asia elected as Missionary Bishop to administer its constituent Conferences (Malaya, Netherlands Indies Mission Conference, North Sumatra, Philippine Islands) Edwin F. Lee, formerly a missionary in Malaya and, earlier, briefly in the Philippines. Bishop Lee was assigned residence in Singapore, thus depriving the Philippines of resident episcopal supervision. He had essentially the same assignment from 1932 through 1939, except that he lived in both Singapore and Manila, and the Area was known as the Singapore-Manila Area.

The Philippines church maintained a strong rate of growth in church membership throughout the nineteen-twenties and nineteen-thirties. The number of full members increased from 24,000 at the beginning of the twenties to more than 35,000 in 1930. By 1936, the membership included 40,000 full members, and in 1939 there were more than 50,000, plus 35,000 probationers. They belonged to more than two hundred charges spread through twelve provinces in central and northern Luzon. The growth was a result of continued cultivation of the same field the Mission opened up during the first decade of the century.

During the same period, the Board missionaries gradually assumed a diminishing role on the Philippine scene. Although during the twenties, they held a majority of the District Superintendents' posts, in 1925 it became a bare majority. In 1930, seven Filipinos were serving in that office, as against one American missionary. From 1932 to 1939, all the Superintendents were Filipinos. Indeed, the missionary corps as a whole was reduced for budgetary causes such as affected the Methodist missions throughout the world. By 1939, the Board was maintaining only five missionary couples in the Philippine Conferences and was expending, in addition to their salaries, only a few thousand dollars on the work. The W.F.M.S. group also was greatly reduced, but it still had a dozen missionaries on the field and was spending more both for salaries and for field work than was the Board of Foreign Missions.

In 1933 occurred a temporary countermovement to the Mission's growth, the most serious split in the Methodist Episcopal Church in the Islands since the Zamora schism of 1909. It grew out of the handling, over several years, of a disciplinary case involving charges of adultery against Melecio de Armas, a prominent minister, who was alleged to have seduced a young girl belonging to a Methodist church. The accusers of de Armas were frustrated over a period of three years in their attempt to have him brought to trial in accordance with the Discipline. They charged that Joshua F. Cottingham, the relevant District Superintendent, and others had tried through dilatory action, unfair investigations, and dishonest methods to whitewash the scandal and protect de Armas from being disciplined. They finally succeeded, however, in having him formally charged at the session of the Annual Conference in February, 1932. The Conference ordered him tried before a Select Committee of Fifteen, which met during the Conference and reported that de Armas had been found guilty of adultery and that the penalty was to be expulsion from the ministry.

De Armas appealed his case to the General Conference, which met in Atlantic City, New Jersey, in May. It was reviewed—not with benefit of witnesses from the Philippines, but solely on the basis of documents presented by de Armas and the Philippine Islands Conference—by a Special Appellate Committee raised by the General Conference. The committee, with full Disciplinary power, reversed the verdict of the Philippine Islands trial group

and decreed that the Conference at its next session restore de Armas to the ministry and to Conference membership.

When the Conference met in San Nicolas, Pangasinan, in March, 1933, resentment was running high among the members. Many of them were angered that the General Conference had overruled the result of the disciplinary action of the Philippine church, in which there was much sentiment for eventual independence from the world-wide Methodist Episcopal Church. Firing this resentment was the widespread feeling that a guilty man was going unpunished because biased, coercive, and dishonest methods had been used in order to protect the accused from being penalized for conduct that could not be tolerated on the part of a pastor. Many were convinced that there had been a loose self-seeking conspiracy on the part of the ecclesiastical establishment—in this case including the American and the Filipino District Superintendent, certain Conference members, and the resident Bishop—to cover up not only de Armas's offense, but also its own practice of favoritism and other administrative delinquencies. It also was believed that the judicial process at Atlantic City had been aborted by the failure of the Appellate Committee to enable the Philippine Annual Conference relevantly and fully to present its case against de Armas. A good many Filipino ministers came to Conference believing that the General Conference was unjustly dictating to the Philippine Annual Conference.

By this time, another stream of resentment had melded with the flow of angry feeling springing from the handling of the de Armas case itself. As the case unfolded, Samuel W. Stagg, a popular and successful young missionary, who as pastor of Manila's important Central Church had developed an extraordinarily influential work among the capital's students, had taken up the cause of the complainants against de Armas, believing that a grave miscarriage of justice was under way. At one point, he became the counsel for the Conference in the prosecution of de Armas, later resigning because he found the investigating committee weakly and incompetently yielding to intra-Conference political pressures to leave de Armas untouched by disciplinary action. When he became aware of the forces at work to obstruct impartial investigation and the mounting of a fair trial of the case, Stagg became an open critic of the establishment's obstructionism and finally strongly protested against the General Conference's manner of handling the case.

In December, 1932, Bishop Lee, who was one of those who came under fire of Stagg's criticism, recommended that the Board recall the young missionary to the United States, where Lee himself was at the time. The Board, following the Bishop's advice, cabled Stagg that he was recalled and should sail for home at once. It cited the financial emergency of the Board and of the Philippine field as the reason for this action. This was the first of a series of cables exchanged over the next few months by Lee and the Board Secretaries with Stagg and Central Church, Manila.

The Official Board of Central Church at once pledged itself to pay Stagg's full salary, thus relieving the Board of financial responsibility for his work in Manila, and it asked the Board to reinstate Stagg immediately in order to avoid incalculable damage to the unprecedented progress of the church under his ministry. Stagg informed the Board that he was accepting the church's salary offer and declared his determination to continue in the student work in Manila at any sacrifice to himself. Bishop Lee and Secretaries Diffendorfer and Edwards joined in rejecting the salary proposal and insisted that Stagg's recall must go through. The church then demanded that since the financial problem was solved as far as Stagg's ministry was concerned, the Board declare its grounds for taking Stagg out of the Philippines. The Manila churchmen also voiced their resentment at the Board's "arbitrary action" and protested against "dictation from New York" without any consultation of the wishes of the nationals involved. Stagg made a similar demand. But the Bishop and the Secretaries simply renewed their order to Stagg to come home, indicating no more specific reason for it than consideration of the best interest of the work on the field. From this position the Board and the Bishop did not budge, even when Stagg asked for suspension of the order until the arrival of important explanatory documents he proposed sending to New York. Stagg finally, on 24 January 1933, cabled the Board office, formally charging widespread corruption in maladministration of the Philippine field and claiming that the corrupting element, fearing exposure, had instigated his recall. He claimed that the Bishop had been seriously misled in the case. He told the Board that the issues were clear: the right of nationals to a voice in field affairs must be respected; administrative "corruption" must not be tolerated.

The Board of Bishops assigned Bishop Herbert Welch to substitute for Bishop Lee as presiding officer at the Conference session in San Nicolas—a sensitive function in a potentially rebellious situation. Bishop Welch came to the Conference convinced that it was his responsibility to enforce the directive of the General Conference Appellate Committee requiring the Philippine Conference to reinstate de Armas. Although the Committee had directed that the Conference restore de Armas's name to its roll, Bishop Welch himself reinstated de Armas and announced the restoration of his name as a *fait accompli*. He refrained from submitting the disposition of de Armas's status to a vote of the Conference, so he stated later, because he had good reason to believe that the result of the vote would be nonacquiescence in the ruling of the General Conference Committee. (He felt that duty would have compelled him in that case to overrule the Conference action in order to uphold the superior prerogative of the General Conference.) Bishop Welch also ruled that the de Armas case was closed and there could be no further discussion of it by the Conference.

However, the Conference did discuss, and accepted, the report of the coun-

sel for the Annual Conference in the de Armas case, thus indicating its opposition to the fiat of the General Conference. Bishop Welch then reaffirmed his ruling on reinstatement of de Armas, having sought through consultation during a three-day interval some means of resolving the conflict it had called forth. "There are reasons why I should be glad to change that ruling," he told the Conference, "but I have not been able to find any reason which would justify me in doing so. I have earnestly sought to discover some solution of our common problem which would be acceptable to the conscientious convictions of many of our people, and yet would conform to the law of the Church . . ."

The Bishop earlier had indicated to the Conference the formal means by which his ruling could be appealed to the General Conference (it would not meet until 1936), but more urgent action by the objectors quickly dissipated that possibility. Cipriano Navarro, a leader in the floor discussion, got up and, holding aloft his ministerial credentials, explained that he intended to withdraw from the Methodist Episcopal Church. He proceeded at once, however, to offer the following motion:

Whereas, the course of events has made it clear that connectionalism with the General Conference in America and supervision of our churches in the Philippines as provided by such Conference is no longer a source of true inspiration and wise leadership, I therefore move that we here and now declare ourselves independent from the American General Conference.

The Bishop ruled the motion out of order and declined to put it to a vote. Navarro then attempted to put the motion himself. There was a shout of "Aye" from an uncounted number of persons. Bishop Welch ruled that no such vote could have any effect. Using a comparison that struck deeper and closer to the heart of the trouble than perhaps he realized at the moment, he told the members that the Annual Conference had no power to declare itself independent of the General Conference, which had created it, "than you would have power here and now to declare yourselves independent of the American Government without the consent of Congress." Declaring dilatory a motion to recess then made by Stagg, the Bishop insisted on going forward with the Conference business. "If there are any who do not wish to share in that work, they are at liberty to withdraw," he said. A large number of Conference members, including the Secretary, thereupon left the room, accompanied by some others attending the session.

The day before this outbreak there had been a joint session of the Annual Conference (ministerial) and the representative Lay Conference. The combined group adopted a resolution commending the ministry of Samuel Stagg and protesting the action of the Board of Foreign Missions in recalling him from the Philippines. The resolution petitioned the Board to reverse its action. Later in the day of the walkout from the Annual Conference, the members

who remained again took up the Stagg question and voted, forty-six to two, its approval of the recall of Stagg and his wife, directing that its action be registered with the Board at once by radiogram. At the closing session, the Conference also expressed its profound appreciation of Bishop Welch's "masterful and divinely-inspired leadership of the Conference sessions." Bishop Welch himself wrote twenty-nine years later that this sojourn of his in the Philippines was "what I felt were the three most unhappy weeks of my life, in the midst of a serious division."

According to Bishop Welch's estimate, the "come-outers" from the Conference session numbered thirty-four of the eighty members in attendance at San Nicolas. A few of them returned to the sessions before the Conference was adjourned sine die. But most of them had signed in advance, along with a group of laymen, the declaration of independence Navarro endeavored to have adopted by the Conference. They became the nucleus of a new church, the Methodist Episcopal Church of the Philippines, Incorporated, for the incorporation of which they filed papers in Manila, two days after the walkout, for the purpose, stated one of their sympathizers, of "preaching Methodism free from the control of the mother church in the United States."

The precise extent of the Mission's loss of ministers, parishes, and people to the new church remains unclear. N. R. Baugh, a trustee of Samuel Stagg's church, claimed a few months after the declaration of independence that forty-three congregations had formally allied themselves with the separated denomination and that twenty-five pastors had withdrawn from the Methodist Episcopal Church in its favor. Evidently, almost the entire membership of Central Church, Manila, went out with Stagg. The report of the Mission's District Superintendents at the Conference session at San Fernando, Pampanga, in February, 1934, included numerous citations of defections of former constituents to the independent church and various unsettling influences stemming from the secession. Among the signs of the strength of the new movement—none are fully indicative—two are reasonably sound, if only partial. The number of full members finally recorded at San Fernando as withdrawn from the Methodist Episcopal Church was nineteen, plus three members on trial. Further, careful reading of the lay membership statistics reveals the loss of over four thousand members presumably as a phase of the secession. Ironically, Melecio de Armas, from whose alleged derelictions the entire controversy arose, was recorded in the 1934 *Minutes* as having been permitted to withdraw from the ministry under charges or complaints.

The secession from the Philippine Islands Conference was the climax of several years of criminations and recriminations that finally brought the Conference to the conclusion that one of its members deserved expulsion from the ministry for serious moral delinquency. It also left many members firmly convinced that the missionary-ecclesiastical system had been corruptly and unfairly manipulated to protect the accused man, conceal administrative de-

linquencies by a missionary, a Filipino District Superintendent, and the resident Bishop, and unjustly to thwart the will of the Annual Conference. Ultimately, the Board of Foreign Missions and the General Conference were held to be among the agents of the Methodist Episcopal Church violating the rights of the Philippine Islands Conference. The incident at the Conference of 1933 thus became in the end a radical confrontation between a demand for self-determination for the Filipino church and a demand for obedience to the law of the Church as represented by the General Conference in the United States.

Here, then, was another conflict within the world-wide ecclesiastical system of the Methodist Episcopal Church that generally was referred to as its connectionalism but that groups of its foreign constituents experienced from time to time as ecclesiastical imperialism. The fact that the ministerial corps in the Philippines was overwhelmingly Filipino (there were only five American missionaries among the eighty Conference members answering the roll call in 1933) sharpened, if anything, the imperialistic implications of the conflict. It made it all the more amenable to interpretation by the protesting party as bald and insensitive assertion of authority over Filipinos by Americans far away. Unfortunately, Bishop Welch came to the Conference essentially as an enforcer, not as a mediator. The legalistic emphasis in his crucial presidency of the Conference rendered it sadly inadequate to the human situation in which otherwise loyal Methodists were driven into schism by feelings of injustice and moral outrage with ethnic overtones. Those feelings were not ameliorated by the fact that at that time there was much talk in Philippine Methodism, including statements by Bishop Lee, about achieving some form of independence for the native church sometime in the not too distant future. The crisis amply demonstrated the fact that though the Methodist Episcopal Church was making long strides toward freedom, even autonomy, on some of its foreign fields, it still was impotent, upon occasion, to operate fairly and efficiently in a sensitive situation involving a high-spirited foreign constituency whose people were trained in a different culture from that taken for granted by American Protestants.

At the Conference session of 1936, Bishop Lee, acting under permissive legislation adopted in 1932, divided the Philippine Islands Conference into two successor Conferences. The Philippines Conference, which included all the work south of the Provinces of Pangasinan and Nueva Vizcaya, began with about 75 per cent of the previously combined membership. The Philippine North Conference, which included the Provinces to the north of the Philippines Conference, began with the rest of the original membership.

The last session of the undivided Philippine Islands Conference memorialized the General Conference to separate the newly organized Philippine Conferences from the Southeast Asia Central Conference and erect them into a Central Conference for Philippine Methodism alone. The memorial argued

that in view of the recent establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth (1935), authorization of the new Central Conference would be psychologically valuable. It also petitioned that the hoped-for Central Conference be empowered to elect its own Bishop. The General Conference did not grant these requests, but the Uniting Conference of 1939 ordered the establishment of the Philippine Islands Central Conference.

Eastern Asia

THE EASTERN ASIA CENTRAL CONFERENCE, which was organized in 1915, continued through the nineteen-twenties to serve as a bond between the Methodist missions in Korea, Japan, and China.

To be sure, the delegated membership of the sessions of 1920, 1923, and 1928 were overwhelmingly Chinese in orientation; Chinese and missionary members of the Conference came from as many as nine China Conferences. But each of the three sessions was attended by missionaries belonging to the Japan Mission Council and by a delegation of missionaries and Koreans from the Korea Conference.

The formal linkages between the Missions became more tenuous in the nineteen-thirties. Upon the declaration of union and autonomy for the new Korean Methodist Church in 1930, the Korean relationship to the Central Conference was no longer membership of a full-bodied Annual Conference, but that of an essentially administrative group, the Korea Central Council, which included a small number of missionaries and of representatives of the Korean Church. China Methodism now became more than ever the substantial, dominant element in the Central Conference. Indeed, the session of 1930 was convened for the special purpose of electing Bishops for China; no Korea delegates attended, and a single delegate of the Japan Mission Conference came as a courtesy. Although the General Conference continued until 1939 to list the Japan and Korea Councils as constituents of the Eastern Asia Central Conference, they sent no representatives to the remaining sessions, convened in 1934 and 1937.

KOREA MISSION, 1920-1930

For the Korea mission the nineteen-twenties opened with their people and their churches suffering the effects of smashing physical and social blows. Methodists, like many other Koreans, were involved in the independence movement that broke out on 1 March 1919, the day thirty-three prominent Koreans declared the country independent of Japan. Hundreds of thousands of Koreans greeted the reading of the proclamation in various places by mounting public demonstrations. The Japanese struck back with brutally

repressive action by police and the military, bringing the movement to an end after two months of turmoil. Methodists, whether implicated in the movement or not, were among those punished for the outbreaks or investigated under measures designed to prevent further trouble.

Gathering in Seoul for the Korea Conference session in November, the District Superintendents brought in reports of widespread tragic suffering by the people and the preachers and of damage and disruption to the churches. W. Arthur Noble described the trouble on the Suwon District :

Five of our preachers and thirty-four other leaders were imprisoned and thirteen Church members were killed in the massacre by the Japanese soldiers at Chaïam. This makes a total loss of 52 Church Workers from the District. Three of these pastors have been released and one is out of prison on bail waiting for his trial.

Seven of our Churches were destroyed on the Namyang, Chaïam, and Osan Circuits by the Soldiers. In that section 329 houses were burned, 1600 people made homeless. It is difficult to know how many people were killed on the whole District, but from the best information I have given the number at 82. That means, of course, Christians and non-Christians. . . . The terror created by the massacre of 23 persons in our church at Chaïam was such that even today the people live in fear of a repetition of that scene, so that attendance upon the church services is with fear and trembling. Of a total of 334 believers 173 have been either killed, imprisoned or scattered to distant parts of the country. . . . All the responsible men of the church are dead and all the families were present at this human sacrifice . . .

Details like these were scattered throughout the reports from the various Districts. On one District, a Korean pastor had said, "I think the best place to hold our District Conference this year would be the prison"—a remark occasioned by the fact that 160 of the District's regular Methodist workers were in jail because of the independence movement.

The Japanese themselves announced that 553 Koreans had been killed in the course of the affair, with fourteen hundred wounded and nineteen thousand imprisoned. After two years, eleven thousand Koreans still were under arrest. Although the trouble subsided, District Superintendents brought to the Conference session of September, 1921, reports of continuing punitive action and investigative harassment.

News of the sufferings of the Korean Methodists reached abroad and stirred sympathetic response. The General Conference of the Japan Methodist Church, understandably employing muted terms, in 1919 sent the Korean Methodists a formal resolution of sympathy. The General Conference meeting in the United States in 1920 spoke more bluntly. It adopted a report of its standing committee on Foreign Missions that renounced the function of passing judgment on political issues but affirmed the Church's duty to speak out always and everywhere for human and just treatment of all people :

We therefore deplore the lamentable outrages in Korea during the past fifteen months, when under the Japanese rule brutalities, killings, burnings, and torturings have occurred, to the humiliation of the better sentiment of Japan and to the horror of the civilized world. We rejoice that better conditions now prevail, and we call upon the Japanese government to put a stop to all abuses which still continue under the new administration, and to grant to the Korean people those privileges of safety, freedom, and participation in their own government which modern civilization regards as due to all.

This statement may possibly have gone further than Bishop Herbert Welch would have desired; a year earlier, he had given notice that when he visited the United States from his post in Seoul, he would give no interviews and make no speeches on Japanese political questions related to Korea and would limit himself to making a full private report to the Board. He felt that the situation was too complicated and too sensitive for public missionary or denominational statements to be helpful.

The Mission leadership had to face the delicate problem of preserving a sympathetic relationship with the oppressed Koreans and a workable relationship with Japanese authority. At the Conference session in November, 1919, for instance, decisions had to be made about caring for the families of Methodist preachers imprisoned on charges of participation in the independence movement. The Conference decided to place those of its members and probationers who were political prisoners on the supernumerary list, a temporary category involving good standing but without appointment. It also decided to gather a fund of \$3,000 for benevolent support of their families, half to come from Conference funds, half from a special gift from the Board as requested by the Korean Finance Committee. The most embarrassing aspect of the situation arose from the fact that two of the absent preachers were understood to be in Shanghai working for a provisional government of Korea established there by Korean nationalists. Since these men actually were at liberty and working under their own choice, it was agreed that financial responsibility for their families should rest with the revolutionary group rather than with the Church.

The Mission also faced a problem in the necessity to maintain a position in balance between the Koreans and the Japanese in administrative situations like that in the Pai Chai high school in Seoul. Early in 1920, partly because of what Bishop Welch called "the intense difficulties of one placed between the Korean people and the officials in this time of unrest," the Principal, Hugh H. Cynn, a Korean, resigned his post. The Bishop appointed to succeed him Henry Appenzeller, an experienced missionary. No other Korean was available for the assignment, and Welch felt that a foreigner might do better under these particular circumstances.

Almost at once, however, Appenzeller ran into trouble. At the request of the Japanese-controlled authorities (they sent him six communications), he

warned the students in advance against participation in demonstrations or in strike action in observance of the anniversary of the proclamation of independence, 1 March. When the anniversary time arrived, the school was for two days under close and overt surveillance by inspectors from three government departments. Appenzeller worked hard to preserve quiet, and when the boys broke discipline by not returning after lunch on the first day, he warned them that they would be penalized in accordance with school rules. On the second day, the appearance of a Japanese inspector in the schoolyard proved provocative to the boys, who also were sensitive to sounds of excitement outside. A mild, evidently incoherent vocal demonstration occurred. The officials charged (the entire faculty denied it) that all the boys had called out the forbidden word *manzei*, a Korean nationalist rallying cry. The police then established a cordon that kept in detention both the students and Appenzeller himself.

For several hours, the police labored with Appenzeller, trying to get him to interrogate the students and smoke out and punish the offenders. Appenzeller labored with more than equal persistence to convince the police that he would not let them make him a police tool; he refused to conduct the investigation. The police themselves then began grilling the boys in the school buildings. According to specific data—they were identified by boys' names—gathered by Appenzeller, they brutally maltreated more than two dozen boys and then at midnight carried fourteen more off to the police station, where they too were tortured. For his refusal to accede to the demands of the inspectors, the governor of Keiki Province revoked Appenzeller's permit to act as Principal.

Bishop Welch, who was in Tokyo at the time, as was Baron Saito, the new Governor-General appointed to Korea after the 1919 demonstrations, asked Appenzeller to come to the Japanese capital to explain what had happened. Equipped with the full information supplied by Appenzeller, Bishop Welch then had a number of interviews with Baron Saito and other influential Japanese. He became quite certain that the higher officials felt that their local representatives had been too rigorous in handling what should have been treated as a minor incident. Not long afterwards, Appenzeller was reinstated at Pai Chai. Bishop Welch finally described the incident as an illustration of the stupidity and narrowness that characterized much of Japanese officialdom.

At the end of the year, Bishop Welch reported to the Board that there still was political unrest in Korea, that promised reforms were being realized only slowly, and that the reforms accomplished were not being warmly received by "a people whose heart has been set on independence." But he pointed out that an increasing number of Korean leaders were able to adjust themselves to the view that immediate independence was impracticable; they recognized that the statesmanlike procedure was to devote the national

energies to education and other morale-building enterprises, to developing natural resources, and to preparing for future political effectiveness. "Cooperation with every progressive measure initiated by the existing Government—such as the local advisory councils—is felt by many," he said, "to be advisable and advantage is wisely being taken of all the means of training in the art of modern government."

But the fires of Korean nationalism were only banked. Missionary leaders still had to walk warily lest they offend either party to the deepseated Japanese-Korean tension. In 1922, Bishop Welch felt it necessary to write for the *Seoul Press* a long letter decisively renouncing, denouncing and rebutting widely advertised statements by William L. Stidger, a Methodist minister who had written a book called *Flashlights From the Seven Seas*. Stidger, on the basis of a fortnight's stay in Korea in 1919, had made sensational and irresponsible charges against the Japanese for their brutal treatment of the Koreans. As late as March, 1924, Bishop Welch received in the United States a cablegram from Seoul Methodists expressing serious embarrassment because the Bishop had been quoted in the press as having told interviewers in San Francisco that Korea had abandoned all thought of independence. The Board later received a fiery and threatening printed circular, signed "By Koreans in the Korean Independence Movement," replying to Bishop Welch's alleged statements. The circular cited *The Far Eastern Times* as having declared that Bishop Welch said:

The Koreans are settling down to work and the old time peaceful conditions are returning. There are some mal-contents, the great bulk of the people have abandoned all thoughts of Korean independence. Having settled that issue, they have returned to the normal ways, and are now prospering as they never did before.

KOREA: UNION WITH AUTONOMY

"In Korea the outstanding fact," said Bishop Welch in his quadrennial report to the General Conference in 1924, "is the movement for union with the Methodist Episcopal Church, South." The pastors and members of the two churches, he declared, desired to go beyond the institutional co-operation they already had been enjoying, to become one church. They wanted it to be a Methodist church, not yet being ready for union with other denominations; and they wanted it to have international Methodist connections.

The Korea Conference took its first concrete step toward this goal in 1926, when it raised a committee of three Koreans and two missionaries to confer with the Korea Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South on the union of Methodist work in Korea. It took the next step at the session of 1927, after committee consultation between the two churches. At that time, it memorialized the General Conference to authorize its uniting with the Southern church and to appoint a General Conference commission to meet

with a like commission from the Church, South and with commissions of the two field churches, the joint commission to be empowered to adopt a plan of union and to effect the actual union of the two Korean churches. The preamble to the memorial affirmed:

We wish it clearly understood that there is no lack of appreciation for the work of the missionaries and the Mission Boards, and that there is no desire to sever the cordial relations which have existed and do now exist between the Church in America and the Church in Korea. . . .

However, there is a strong conviction among the preachers and members that the two Methodist Conferences in Korea should be organically united. . . . that the many new and pressing problems which now confront the kingdom of Christ in Korea can best be met and solved by a united, self-governing Church. . . .

The General Conference of 1928 adopted the memorial from Korea and established the commission it requested. Similar action having been taken by the Korea Conference and the General Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, the two American commissions met in Washington, D.C., in July, 1930, and agreed upon a plan of procedure. But the substantial preparatory work for the union was done in Korea by subcommittees of the two Korean commissions assisted by two delegates from the American groups. The full Joint Commission of twenty, assisted by a number of co-opted members, met in Seoul for twelve days in November under the chairmanship of Bishop Welch, who had been succeeded in the Seoul Area in 1928 by Bishop James C. Baker. The Commission composed an historical statement, a doctrinal statement, a proclamation of union, a constitution, and a body of legislation to constitute the Discipline of the new church. The Proclamation alone was in final form. Under its authority, the two Korean Methodist churches were declared united as the Korean Methodist Church; and upon its call, the first General Conference of the new denomination convened in Seoul on 2 December. Working for ten days on the basic materials prepared by the Joint Commission, it completed the organization of the new church. On 8 December, it elected as its first Bishop (General Superintendent) Ju Sam Ryang.

Bishop Ryang thus became the leader of a church of twenty-two thousand full members and thirty-nine thousand additional enrolled constituents, organized under 350 pastoral charges, worshipping in 900 church buildings, and led by 150 ministerial members of Annual Conferences. In the churches' thousand Sunday schools were forty-six thousand pupils. Among the denomination's institutions were two hundred primary schools and kindergartens, a dozen higher schools and colleges, and ten hospitals. Its three Annual Conferences covered about a third of Korea, an area holding about six million people.

The new, autonomous church retained its devotion to the Wesleyan reli-

gious tradition in which the missionaries had nurtured its people, and its organizational structure included many features of the American episcopal type of Methodism familiar in Korea.

It showed itself less rigid as to the imposition of required doctrinal patterns than was the Methodist Episcopal Church, which had embedded in its Constitution, under conditions intended to make them forever immune from amendment, twenty-five Articles of Religion adapted from the set of thirty-nine articles maintained by the Anglican Church. Adherence to these Articles was required of ministers of the Methodist Episcopal Church. But the Korean Methodist Church made its Doctrinal Statement not an unamendable part of the fundamental law of the Church, but an inductive, experiential declaration of common faith. The Statement freely affirmed the new communion's essentially liberal theological ideal:

Upon those persons who desire to unite with us as members, we impose no doctrinal test. Our main requirement is loyalty to Jesus Christ and a purpose to follow Him. . . . the conditions of membership are moral and spiritual rather than theological. We sanction the fullest liberty of belief for the individual Christian, so long as his character and his works approve themselves as consistent with true godliness.

The first General Conference adopted a formulation of the specific doctrines "most surely believed among us" that was almost entirely the product of Bishop Welch's authorship. It was conceptually less abstract, more understandable, and more usable than the cumbersome, popularly neglected twenty-five Articles of Religion. And it was more fully inclusive of Christian values and social purpose and more harmonious with modern thought than was the Apostles' Creed, which was used almost universally in the public worship of the American church. The Korean formulation, which became popularly known abroad as The Korean Creed, soon found its way into liturgical and catechetical use in the United States.

The new church also proved itself less ironbound than the American church was by reluctance to tamper with the long unmodified institution of the episcopacy. It adopted a major administrative innovation when it decided to elect its Bishops for fixed terms of six years rather than with permanent tenure.

In 1932, Bishop Ryang appeared on the platform of the General Conference in Atlantic City, New Jersey, as a fraternal delegate from the Korean Methodist Church. In his hands he bore a roll forty feet long on which were the names of 505 ministers, laymen, and missionaries of the Korean church subscribed to a resolution adopted by a joint session of the three Korean Annual Conferences. It made two requests of the two American Methodist denominations—that they continue to send to Korea spiritual leaders of the calibre of

Bishops Welch and Baker and that they send more missionaries than before. Interpreting the second request, Bishop Ryang said:

. . . I am afraid that the organization of an autonomous Church in Korea may have created the impression that *no more* missionaries are needed. That is far from the truth. Missionaries are needed in Korea today more than ever.

Additional missionaries were required, said the Bishop, both to conserve and advance the evangelistic work and to meet the urgent needs of the Church's institutions. This view was supported by Hugh H. Cynn, who also spoke as a fraternal delegate, and by Bishop Baker, who urged continued financial support for the work of the Korean Church.

Doctor Cynn also stressed the desire of the Korean Church to maintain a close ecclesiastical relationship with the parent churches notwithstanding its autonomy. He pointed to the need to fashion a stronger bond, feeling motivated in part by fear that there might exist some suspicion that hidden within the expressed desire of the Korean churches for union there had been a tacit but effective desire for separation and independence. Rejecting that interpretation of the movement, he said that the Methodists in Korea actually had enjoyed the same full freedom and independence that Methodists elsewhere had. "The necessity of uniting forces in Korea and meeting the needs of Korea and facing the onslaught of non-Christians brought about our union," declared Cynn. He hoped that with the apparent approach of Methodist unification in the United States and the development of further Central Conference legislation, the Korean Church might be able in the future to enter into some kind of organic relationship with the parent churches.

Close relations did continue. The American churches kept their missionaries in Korea, where they worked in and with the new church and under the authority of its leaders. Their participation was sealed by the practice of double Conference membership for ministerial members; they were granted full membership in Korean Annual Conferences without surrendering their status in their home Conferences in the United States. Missionaries without full Conference membership held associate membership in Korean Conferences. Relations between the three Methodist bodies were maintained through the activity of a Central Council of thirty-five persons: sixteen Korean Methodists, sixteen missionaries from the American churches, the Bishop of the Korean Church, and the two Bishops assigned, respectively, to represent the two American churches. The Council dealt with adjustments in the organizational relations of the three churches, utilization of missionaries in the Korean Church, and the channeling of financial contributions from the parent bodies. It provided an opportunity for the Korean Church to benefit from the counsel of the appointed foreign Bishops, though no longer under their authority. When Bishop Baker returned to the United States in 1932, Bishop Welch, after four years in the Pittsburgh Area, went to China to head the Shanghai

Area, where his supervisory assignment included two China Conferences, the Japan Mission Council, and the Korea Central Council. The Korea Council included the work among the Koreans (not the Japanese) in Korea and among the Koreans in Manchuria, where an earlier mission among Korean immigrants had been renewed by the Korea mission during the nineteen-twenties. Thus the Korean Church had the benefit of contact with a Methodist Episcopal Bishop with twelve years' experience of Korean Methodism.

JAPAN MISSION, 1920-1939

No essential change in the character of the co-operative relations between the Japan Methodist Church and the American-based Methodist Episcopal Church occurred between 1920 and 1939. The Western church still sent missionaries into service with the Japanese church and still gave financial support to its work.

The size of the contribution of funds and personnel, however, increased for a time and then greatly diminished. The Board of Foreign Missions appropriation more than doubled in 1920; it was \$166,714 for both missionary support and field work—the peak for the entire period. For the next four years it was twenty thousand dollars less. In 1925, it dropped to \$105,750 and remained at about that level until 1929. Still further cuts came in the early nineteen-thirties. The contributions for field work up to that time had dropped more sharply than the amounts devoted to missionary salaries. This meant in part that the Japan Church was developing greater self-support, but it also reflected the falling income of the Board. The amount for field work alone in 1931 and 1932 was about \$30,000, but in 1933 it plummeted to \$1,400 and did not again rise by more than five hundred dollars.

With the exception of 1920, the W.F.M.S. appropriations exceeded those of the Board throughout the period, running from fifty to a hundred thousand dollars higher from year to year. The Society's contribution, counting salaries and field work, was \$133,498 in 1920, and it reached its peak in 1924, at \$259,718. Not until 1937 did it drop below \$100,000 and in 1939 it was \$89,560.

The W.F.M.S. also maintained a larger missionary staff in Japan than did the Board of Foreign Missions. The Board's thirty-four missionaries—fourteen married couples and six single persons—on the field in 1920 were more than matched by the Society's fifty-nine. For both groups, the commitment of personnel contracted as budgets shrank, until in 1939 the size of each missionary corps had decreased 50 per cent, to twenty Board workers and thirty-one appointees of the Society.

CHINA MISSION, 1920-1936

The China mission began the nineteen-twenties with an enlarged comple-

ment of Bishops. The veteran Wilson S. Lewis took the Peking Area, and two newly elected Bishops, Laress J. Birney and Frederick T. Keeney, assumed supervision of the Shanghai and Foochow Areas, respectively. The Peking Area soon lost the leadership of Bishop Lewis, who died in August, 1921. In 1924, Bishop Keeney returned to service in the United States, and two more newly elected Bishops came to China—George R. Grose to the Peking Area and Wallace E. Brown to the Foochow Area. In 1928, the China Areas were reduced to two, Peking and Shanghai, with the Conferences being redistributed under Bishops Grose and Birney, Bishop Brown being reassigned to work in the States. This was the last episcopal panel for China consisting only of Bishops elected by the General Conferences.

In 1928, the General Conferences authorized the election of two additional Bishops in the event that the proposed expansion of the powers of Central Conferences by Constitutional amendment should be adopted—as indeed it was. In 1929, Bishop Grose returned to the United States and in 1932 resigned from the episcopacy. Bishop Birney was left in sole charge of the field, but precarious health necessitated his retirement from the active list in 1932. Meeting in Nanking in 1930, the Eastern Asia Central Conference, which included both Chinese and missionary members, elected two Bishops, as already authorized by the General Conference, to work alongside Bishop Birney. The first man elected was not—contrary to what might have been expected at this time when national feeling was growing strong in the church—a Chinese, but a missionary, John Gowdy, of Foochow. Bishop Gowdy, however, was the clear choice of the Chinese by a vote of forty-two out of fifty-four votes cast in a body that was three-fourths Chinese in composition. Some missionaries, furthermore, refrained from voting for any missionary, believing that the time for Chinese leadership had come. The second man elected was Wang Chih-ping, pastor of Asbury Church in Peking.

The connectional Board of Bishops assigned Bishop Herbert Welch to Shanghai in 1932, to replace Bishop Birney. Bishops Wang and Gowdy supervised the Chengtu and Foochow Areas, respectively. Bishop Gowdy was re-elected in 1936, and Bishop Wang having withdrawn from further service, the Central Conference elected Ralph A. Ward, a missionary. Harry W. Worley explained* that the electors were practically unanimous in the conviction that the post should go to a Chinese but turned to a missionary because none of the Chinese they considered fully qualified were then available to serve. They preferred a non-Chinese to an unqualified Chinese. A third Bishop, Wilbur E. Hammaker, just elected by the General Conference, was assigned to Nanking, Bishop Gowdy remained in Foochow, and Bishop Ward went to the Chengtu Area. The two latter retained these assignments following the Uniting Conference in 1939, and Bishop Arthur J. Moore, a former

* *The Central Conference . . .*, pp. 278 f.

Bishop of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, went to Nanking under authority of the General Conference.

For the first two quadrennia of the period, the heads of the China mission were, except briefly, men without roots either in the episcopacy or in China. They addressed themselves with energy, however—what field was making more exhausting and complex demands of its episcopal leaders?—to the needs and opportunities of the Mission as a farflung church organization. But as time went on, the mainly ecclesiastical concerns that could be handled through implementation of episcopal, missionary, or Conference policy and by application of resources from the United States became less and less the dominant realities in the practical life of the Church these men were sent to supervise. It was impossible to impose upon the deep social chaos of China more than very limited patterns of ecclesiastical organization or missionary purpose. The people who made up the Methodist churches and participated in their auxiliary or complementary institutions were amenable to church and missionary leadership, but they also were profoundly open to the impact of the total life of their nation. The Church projected hopes and plans, and the people gave broad and earnest co-operation, but the secular forces in groping, struggling, suffering, persevering, non-Christian, renascent, revolutionary China crucially determined what the Church actually could be and do.

Thus, on one level, Bishops Birney and Keeney were concerned from 1920 to 1924 with many developments not unlike those appearing in other foreign fields. They reported to the General Conference on the generously increased financial contributions and enlarged missionary corps the connectional Centenary campaign sent to China; the Chinese Methodists' enthusiastic participation in the Centenary in their own country; the widespread disillusionment among Chinese churchmen when financial promises projected under Centenary planning were not fulfilled and many projects consequently were canceled or left unfinished; the founding of the interdenominational National Christian Council, with a high proportion of Chinese nationals involved; important surveys and planning by the Christian Education Association, directed by Frank D. Gamewell; the stimulating of morale by the celebration of the seventy-fifth anniversary of the China Mission ("the Jubilee"); the launching of a Jubilee Forward Movement for 1923-27; the large increase in church membership; augmentation of W.F.M.S. personnel and financial contributions; the building of scores of churches and parsonages, with significant parochial sponsorship; Fukien University's occupation of a new site; the new charter for Hwa Nan College for young women; increased self-support by local churches; establishment of the South Fukien Mission Conference in 1923; a Conference-wide, ten-day revival meeting in Hsinghua; the organization of training conferences and institutes for Christian workers; the fixing of parochial evangelistic goals; and the exciting baptism in one day, widely

publicized in America, of thirty-seven hundred soldiers in the army of the "Christian General," Feng Yu-hsiang, one of the Northern warlords.

But on another level, Bishops Birney and Keeney and their fellow workers in the Mission were compelled to face the reality that for many Chinese Methodists personal life and church life were filled with the agonies and the efforts of the struggle to survive the dreadful onslaughts and depredations of two types of violence ravaging large areas of the country. In broader dimensions, the vacuum left by the absence of strong central government was being filled by unscrupulous and competing regional war lords seeking by force of arms and political plotting to dominate particular large areas of the country and to forge enough personal power to become influential factors on the national scene. Their military operations against one another subjected the people and their home places to all the horrors and deprivations of warfare, their lives and fortunes being counted as nothing. To maintain their armies, the war lords scavenged on the people, levying unconscionable series of "taxes" and permitting their soldiers to carry off food stores and harvests, to loot private property, to occupy homes and churches. More sporadically and within more limited spheres, the vacuums left by the war lords and their underlings were filled by marauding bandits, who robbed, beat, burned, kidnapped, killed, and tortured as they swept through the countryside or into towns and out again, bitterly disrupting the lives of the people by their repeated attacks. Sometimes the activities of the soldiers and of the bandits overlapped—when was a soldier a soldier, and when was he a bandit? To the exploited, brutally oppressed householder and country man, both bandits and the war lords brought pure misery, the exactions of the latter being distinguished from those of the former chiefly by the fact that they were accompanied by some pretension to functions of government. Both meant unrestricted tyranny over the people.

Year after year, these tyrannies not only brought intense personal suffering to Methodist people, but also frequently smashed their purposes and plans for their churches. The Centenary could help build a church, but a bandit torch could burn it down; a preacher could ask a farmer for an offering, but a raider could make off with the man's last coin and his last bag of rice; a pastor could shepherd a congregation, but a robber band could drive it away. All these things and many more were tearing down the strength of the Church at the same time that it was progressing in other, more fortunate areas.

Conditions still more threatening to the progress of the Mission developed in the second quadrennium, the period of the Birney-Brown-Grose administration.

Potential, ever more actual danger to Christians emerged in the upsurge of Chinese nationalism that burst out most explosively after the famous incident of the Thirtieth of May (1925). On that day in the International

Settlement at Shanghai, police officered by a Briton fired into a crowd of demonstrators at the police station, killing a dozen students who were in the throng protesting the arrest of several hundred of their fellows earlier in the day for anti-Japanese demonstrations resulting from a labor dispute in a Japanese-owned cotton mill. Massive antforeign strikes and boycotts supported by labor, students, and shopkeepers immediately followed in Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Canton's British concession. British, French, and Portuguese police and gunboats fired on Cantonese demonstrators against foreign concessions. The country soon was aflame with antforeign fury.

Missionaries naturally did not welcome antforeignism, whose demonic possibilities had been potently demonstrated in the Boxer uprising twenty-five years earlier. But missionary sensitivities had sharpened since then, and sympathies had shifted; there was wider friendliness to the basic aims of China's rapidly growing nationalism. Whereas once Bishop Bashford had been capable of brushing extraterritoriality aside as a matter of hardly any importance, Bishop Brown, writing in the *Annual Report* for 1925, had the relevance of extraterritoriality specifically and sharply in mind. He referred sympathetically to the fact that recent declarations of Chinese, European, and America missions groups on unequal treaties and their toleration clauses

indicate the almost universal Christian conviction that the hour has struck for the rewriting of all the treaties on the basis of Christian, international justice and the abrogation of all special privileges which infringe upon the sovereignty and integrity of China.

Bishop Birney, after reviewing in the *Report* for 1926 the shattering of the old China and the emergence of the new, nationalistic China after "the appalling blunder" of the Shanghai police on the Thirtieth of May, said:

The life currents liberated on that fateful day have deepened and broadened rapidly in the intervening months in every part of China, until the prestige of the foreigner, be he missionary, commercial, diplomatic or military, is swept aside by the irresistible tide of Nationalistic sentiment. All this, the foreigner who has China's interests rather than his own at heart, and whose judgments are Christian rather than economic, political or racial, not only understands, but with it he deeply sympathizes.

Missionary administrators in the United States also were thinking in new terms about the relations between China and foreign powers and about the identification of China missions with Western imperialism. A group of officers and members of various missions boards and societies met in New York for two days in October, 1925, to discuss these concerns. They adopted a set of resolutions heartily sympathetic with China in her sense of the injustice of existing treaties and her aspiration to be treated with justice and equality in international relations. They urged early revision of the treaties with China

in harmony with respect for her sovereignty, independence, and administrative integrity, as pledged by the powers participating in the Washington Conference of 1922. More concretely, the missions leaders favored abolishing extraterritoriality at an early date and also went straight to the point of missionary privileges in a resolution declaring that they did "not desire any distinctive privileges for missions and missionaries imposed by treaty upon the Chinese Government and people."

The leaders' resolutions were taken up into resolutions on China that were adopted by the Board of Foreign Missions at the Annual Meeting in the following month.

It was too late, however, for altered missionary attitudes and proclamations of church groups abroad to protect the field missions and the Chinese Christians from the consequences of their long association among the Chinese people with the gunboat-and-dollar diplomacy of the country's foreign exploiters. Nationalist passions that had been stirring large numbers of people all over China began to find massive organized expression politically and militarily. The Kuomintang became the dominant political vehicle, establishing a government in Canton in 1925. Forces controlled by war lords in the South gradually coalesced into what became the Nationalist army, the military arm of the Canton government. Before long, Chiang Kai-shek became both the civil and the military leader of the Nationalists, and in July, 1926, the armies under his direction started north in a campaign to unify all China under the Nationalists. They moved through the countryside, occupied city after city, faced and fought Northern armies, and spread their power through all China. They took Hankow, Foochow, and Nanchang before the end of the year and were in Shanghai and Nanking by March, 1927. A little more than a year later, the Nationalists' final military campaign brought them into Peking, and with the Peking government now defunct, the new regime established itself in Nanking. The nationalist revolution came to a formal climax on 10 October 1928, when the movement led by Chiang Kai-shek became the National Government of China. And during most of this period, the Methodist people suffered not only further ravages of more widespread warfare that they shared with the general populace, but also special and deliberate hostility because they were Christians and tainted with foreignism.

Anti-Christian action became more intense as the Nationalist armies moved into Central China and the North during 1926-27. Bishop Birney strongly emphasized in his report for 1926 the effectiveness of the Russian-oriented Communists in heightening the latent anti-Christian feelings of the people. The Kuomintang at that time included, in uneasy alliance, both Communists and conservative nationalists, and official Soviet advisers functioned significantly in its councils. The Russian agents sponsored an energetic and sophisticated anti-Christian propaganda that was dictated in part by a

strategy of more general attack upon foreign imperialism and in part by the Soviet Union's official anti-religion philosophy. Birney was convinced that the majority of the nationalist revolutionists were opposed to the policy of radical aggression against Christianity but were compelled to give the Russian-inspired propagandists free rein because of Moscow's financial backing for the Kuomintang armies. He realized, however, as he later reported, that the Western powers shared responsibility for the success of the strong and skillful Communist drive to convince the people that patriotism demanded their being antforeign and anti-Christian, ready to drive the intruders from the country. He said that "there was ample material at hand, due to unwarranted Western aggression, to give easy credence to the extravagant claims everywhere made that to this alone were due China's worst ills."

Under the stimulus of the antforeign campaign, foreigners were harassed, abused, robbed, even killed—seven lost their lives in a bad outbreak in Nanking. But the propaganda against foreigners was by no means a savage bloodletting such as the frenzied attacks of 1900 had produced. The pressures were social, economic, political, organizational, psychological; as far as the Christians were concerned, the effort was not to decimate the churchmen, but to undermine or suppress the Church. The purpose evidently was not to destroy Christian people, but to break up their religious loyalties and thoroughly secularize and nationalize their allegiances, to remove Christianity as a force allied with the foreign powers and, for some of the agitators, competitive with Communism.

In one place or another, radical propagandists would cover all available wall space with anti-Christian slogans: "Down with the Church," "The Church is Imperialistic," "The Church is Promoted by Foreign Treaty," or "Preachers Are the Running Dogs of Imperialism." Church members constantly were threatened with violence in order to coerce them into renouncing their Christian ties, anti-Christian speakers harangued the people in public places and even thrust their way into churches to treat the members with insulting abuse. Some congregations were broken up, some preachers were so pressed that they gave up their parishes, church buildings were occupied by agitators and looted or wrecked, religious services were suspended, church work was widely disrupted by public danger to preachers or parishioners. Methodist day schools were depleted or closed when their pupils were lured into government schools by appeals to patriotism or were frightened away by threats. In higher schools, the student bodies were largely captured by the high-pressure methods of an officially promoted anti-Christian student movement. Uniformed propagandists invaded the schools and gave radical lectures on patriotism. And under the impact of these and other methods, some Christians deserted, but most remained loyal and kept the church alive and, so some missionaries believed, spiritually more vital than before.

The anti-Christian movement never reached its full potential for damage,

because the conservative nationalists, led by Chiang Kai-shek, expelled the Communists from the Kuomintang and the National Revolutionary Army in July, 1927. From then on, the atmosphere was more hospitable to Christianity and its advocates from abroad. Chiang Kai-shek himself, for instance, even became a baptized Christian.

But while the campaign still remained sharpest, it contributed to a temporary protective missionary retreat from the country in the early half of 1927. The exodus from the Foochow Conference began after radical agitators stirred up a riot against a Catholic orphanage in Foochow City because, reported Frank T. Cartwright, of the rumor that "the nuns boiled the babies and took their eyes for medicine." This was closely followed by a more extensive antiforeign attack at many points within the city walls, with soldiers from the South being brought in to do the dirty work. Foreigners were roughly treated, and a number of missionary homes were looted. Inflammatory "paper propaganda" was spread through the entire Province. Under instructions from the United States Consul, who could secure no guarantees of protection for Americans, and from Bishop Brown, the Methodist missionaries began to depart. A few remained at relatively safe points, and some refused for reasons of conscience to leave places of danger. A few W.F.M.S. workers in administrative posts stayed in Foochow City. Bishop Birney, at first fearful only of the possible conduct of Northern soldiers retreating from Nanking and not dreaming that harm could come from the Nationalist army approaching from the South, withdrew all the Methodist missionaries from the area after their homes were looted and burned in the brutal antiforeign outbreaks by the incoming soldiers from the South on 24 March. He thus averted, so he believed, even more tragic attacks on the missionaries themselves and also saved from reprisal Chinese Christians and non-Christian friends who came to their defense. Consular officials also ordered the evacuations in order to prevent international complications. Similar withdrawals occurred elsewhere both south and north of the Yangtze, and by May few Methodist missionaries were left in the country. Many were sent home to America, and others were assigned temporarily to posts elsewhere in the Orient.

On 31 March 1927, Corresponding Secretary Ralph E. Diffendorfer arrived in Manila in the course of nearly a year's journey through Methodist mission fields. There he learned for the first time of the serious impact of revolutionary events in China upon the Methodist mission, spending some time conferring with missionaries just arriving from China. Shortly afterwards he went on to China. In July, he reported his observations and recommendations to the Board's Executive Committee, which passed them along to the Annual Meeting in November. The Board adopted at that session a number of his suggestions on China policy in the light of recent nationalist developments.

Prominent among the positions thus announced by the Board was the

declaration that the notable gains in Chinese leadership and responsibility during the recent crises should be conserved as "the basis of self-control and self-administration in China." The Board conceived its statement to cover opportunity for self-expression in ecclesiastical organization and supervision, ritual, creedal statements, and "the whole outward expression of the Christian religion [,] that they may be true to the genius of the Chinese people." (The adoption in 1928-29 by General Conference action and Constitutional amendment of broad new legislation expanding the powers of Central Conferences went far toward providing this opportunity, as evidenced, for example, by the action of the Chinese in electing their own Bishops in 1930.) In a further move towards self-expression for China, the Annual Meeting of 1927 supported the calling of a representative All-China Conference of Chinese Methodists to discuss issues arising from the nationalist situation and to voice them to the church at large. It also recognized that ownership and control of its own properties was essential to the progress of the church in China in initiative, responsibility, and self-determination. It directed that local properties should be transferred to the Chinese as soon as field administrators could work out the requisite methods and that the general institutions be studied one by one as to the advisability of transfer and for the development of national requirements and resources.

The Board adopted two measures keyed to the necessity of adjusting to the advance of the general nationalist revolution in China. Contrary to what had been done in the days of the Boxer troubles, it notified the State Department in Washington that it would make no claims upon the Chinese government for damages for destruction of Methodist church property and equipment during the recent civil war and revolution. It asked the Department to take no initiative on its behalf and left to missionaries individually the responsibility for claims they might make for personal losses (the Executive Committee later recommended that missionaries make no such claims and provided funds to make it unnecessary). And looking a little more to the future, the Board took cognizance of the nationalist situation and sensibilities of the Chinese in connection with missionary personnel:

those missionaries should return to China who are acceptable to the Chinese, who are individually approved by the Board of Foreign Missions, are physically able to go, who keenly desire to go in spite of present hazardous conditions, and who, above all, are prepared in the light of the new situation in China to identify themselves with the Chinese churches and people to the limit of their ability. . . .

The missionaries, at the request of Chinese Methodists, began returning to China not many months after their withdrawal, those in nearby countries coming first, those on leave in America continuing to return as late as the latter part of 1928. They came back, but not to occupy administrative posts.

Said Bishop Birney, "Advantage is being taken of the exceptional opportunity to achieve the end which they have long sought, namely, Chinese administration and leadership."

Many missionaries did not take up duty in China again, and the missionary corps was not restored to its pre-evacuation level. In various ways, the Board continued the policy of reduction under pressure of falling income that already was in force. The Board had 358 missionaries, including 153 wives, in the China mission in 1923. When the evacuation began in 1927, the Mission staff was down to 311. A year later there were 242 names on the roster, and by mid-1929 there were 196. The W.F.M.S. also reduced its work corps, cutting it from 311 at the time of evacuation to 196 in the year 1930. By 1937, the Board's China missionaries numbered 130, and the Society's about the same.

In some aspects, the Mission's work during the years following the triumph of the Kuomintang and the ouster of the Communists was less hampered and more productive. Anti-Christian feeling subsided from its highest levels, and radical anti-Christian interference in mission schools abated. Chinese Methodist churchmen made advances toward self-determination and autonomy. Understanding relations between foreign missionaries and their Chinese co-workers became firmer. Evangelistic campaigns went forward, and encouraging signs of spiritual progress were noted from time to time. Progressive adaptation in mission methods was made, as when in 1933 the W.F.M.S. decided to close all its China hospitals but two and thus released many hospital workers for essential public health work in the villages. The Board and the Society achieved greater unity of action largely under the stimulus of the Central Conference policy committees composed of equal numbers of men and of women. The program of higher education gained strength, and the best educated mission workers began to show more interest in rural work.

But there were many obstacles, many handicaps, many stresses. In various sections and to various degrees, the Methodist people and their leaders suffered the results of political and military turmoil still rife in the land. The central government at no time controlled the entire country. The Nationalist administration—Nanking was its capital—fought year after year to put down in different sections rebellions by would-be independent rulers, and civil warfare between the Communists and the conservative Chiang Kai-shek regime continued until interrupted in 1931 by one of the most devastating floods in Chinese history. The months-long disaster directly affected 50,000,000 people over 40,000 square miles in the thickly populated Yangtze Valley, bringing bitter loss to Methodist parishioners in the Kiangsi and Central China Conferences, inundating homes and churches, and making exhausting demands upon the missionaries, who organized relief projects to minister to the bereft people.

Then came the distracting and unsettling trouble between China and Japan

over control of Manchuria, leaving wide areas subject to Communist control and still others unprotected from the ravages of intensified banditry, which greatly restricted the movements of preachers and missionaries. As usual, the bandits captured church members and preachers, impoverished them by exacting ransom, killed some of them, and captured a few missionaries. Methodist preachers were captured by the Communists and robbed of all they possessed; a few missionaries were jailed by them.

The mission schools lay under severe government restrictions with which they found it not easy to comply: the heads of all educational institutions had to be Chinese; schools had to be registered with the government under conditions as to property, equipment, and endowment that many could not promptly meet, thus entailing their being closed for various periods; mission schools were expected to renounce their Christian aim and to refrain from continuing to make religion a subject required of all their pupils.

In 1934, drought-caused famine scourged the Hsinghua and Foochow Conferences. Impoverished church members could not pay their preachers enough money to enable them to feed their starving families, and Board finances could not be stretched for the purpose. In 1936 came unprecedented economic distress in a belated phase of the world depression that the United States had been experiencing for some years.

The Board's order in December, 1930, withdrawing all missionaries from the South Fukien Conference for reasons of economy was a blow to the work in the Foochow Area. The Board later withdrew missionaries from the Chengtu Conference, leaving there by 1935 only one man, who was teaching in the medical college. The Mission had to rely for supervision in this section upon two retired men, Spencer Lewis, aged eighty-two, and W. Edward Manly, but even they did not serve much longer. Bishop Wang's resignation brought about a reassignment of his Conferences that was onerous for the remaining Bishops.

METHODISTS AND THE JAPANESE STATE, 1935-1939

In connection with Japan's military exploits on the Chinese mainland in the nineteen-thirties arose a religious problem that confronted both Korean and Japanese Christians as well as the American missionaries sent to the Korean Methodist Church and the Japan Methodist Church. With those aggressive adventures well launched and with the supporting militaristic nationalism tightening its control over the domestic life of Japan midway in the decade, the government began laying heavy stress upon the observance of state, or shrine, Shintoism.

This became a problem of peculiar significance for the Christians within the Empire because, along with bowing to the portrait of the Emperor and the reading of the Imperial Rescript on Education, attendance upon the cere-

monies observed at Shinto shrines on certain holidays and anniversaries was required of the students and teachers in all schools, including Christian schools. Although these practices obviously were acts of patriotic ceremonial, they also bore for many the outward aspect of religious worship. The Shinto tradition expressed the national spirit and interpreted the origin of the nation through a religio-mythical pattern that associated the Japanese people with ancient gods, established a line of descent from the sun goddess through the Emperors to the most recent of them, and taught that the current Emperor was a divine being. Intensification of the observance of this tradition served in the thirties the purpose of forging national unity to the degree of strength required for the Japanese imperialistic effort. But for many Christians, attendance at the shrines constituted religious worship contrary to their exclusive Christian commitment.

The shrine question was especially difficult for the Korean Christians, for it touched them both as Christians and as patriots. All aside from its alleged religious implications, Shintoism was an expression of the national culture of Korea's conquerors; if it was incompatible with Christianity, it certainly was anathema to Korean nationalism. Being compelled to accede to it on that basis, however, was only one side of the many-faceted political reality with which the Koreans were forced to live as a subject people.

The Japanese had confronted the Korean Methodist schools and other Korean Christian schools with the shrine problem in the early nineteen-twenties, when they were engaged in integrating Korean schools into the Japanese educational system. There was sufficient resistance to the expectation that Koreans would attend the shrines to prompt the Governor-General, Baron Saito, whose wife was a Christian, to issue in 1925 a public statement evidently intended to ease the situation for the Christians on the occasion of the dedication of the famous Chosen Shrine. The authorities had ordered the Christian schools in the capital to attend. Baron Saito reminded the Koreans that the shrines were dedicated to the memory of the ancestors of the country and that acts of obeisance performed there were purely and simply signs of veneration for ancestors. He affirmed that requiring school pupils to attend was not forcing religion upon them or depriving them of freedom of belief.

When the government began more extensive and rigid enforcement of shrine requirements in 1935—representatives of all public institutions were expected to attend patriotic observances there—Koreans expressed a considerable volume of protest, partly from secular motives and partly from conscientious objection to participation in what was taken to be worship of strange gods. The Educational Director issued a statement to all Christian educators in which he took essentially the same position as had Baron Saito twelve years earlier. He stated that the government had not "the slightest intention of attempting to interfere with the propagation of Christianity or

with the religious faith of the Christian adherents," but with "hearty appreciation of the past great accomplishments of Christianity contributing to development and culture," would continue the religious freedom guaranteed by the Constitution. Early in 1936, Bishop Ryang of the Korean Methodist Church and eight other leading Christians conferred with the head of the Educational Department at his invitation. He declared to them:

1. Attendance upon the shrine is not religious but a Government Ceremony. It is not an act of worship, but is the paying of the highest respect to ancestors.

2. The Educational system has the object of training loyal subjects as well as giving them knowledge. Therefore, school teachers and pupils must make obeisance at the shrines. The attendance of others is a voluntary act and not required.

For Missions engaged in high school or college work, the alternative to fulfilling the government's shrine requirements was to withdraw from such educational work. That is the course taken by one of the foreign Missions working alongside the Methodist Episcopal group. Majority opinion in the sister denomination, both among missionaries and the Korean churchmen, was opposed to participation on the basis of the government's interpretation of the shrine practices as being nonreligious. The issue became so acute that one of the missionaries had to leave Korea, and the Mission voted to withdraw from secondary and postsecondary education until government pressure should be lifted. Even then, serious pressure was exerted on the Korean church body, which broke in 1938 with the position taken by the missionary group and voted to conform on the government's terms.

The Corresponding Secretaries so placed in their 1938 report to the Annual Meeting an account of the other Mission's difficulty in Korea as to suggest that the Methodist mission would have faced similar pressure had it not voted to conform, a decision agreeable to their co-workers in the Korean Methodist Church. The Korean missionaries decided to accept at face value the Japanese administration's declaration that the shrine observances were patriotic and nonreligious, to teach their students and church members to understand and accept the distinction between religious Shintoism and state Shintoism, and to remain in the educational field. Thus they retained the opportunity to teach Bible and to hold student worship services, instead of resigning the education of their youth to state schools, in which they would have been compelled after all to attend the shrines and also would have received a completely secularized education. The missionaries also determined that they would not go out to meet in advance the issue that might sometime arise under some ultraradical Japanese administration forbidding Christian teaching and mission work. In June, 1937, the Board's Executive Committee voted approval of the position taken by the missionaries.

Among the Japanese Christians, who were more familiar than the Koreans with the Shinto tradition and the essentially nationalistic-secular sources of its modern establishment during the Meiji Restoration in the nineteenth century, little if any real resistance to the government's command to observe the shrine ceremonies emerged. For the Japanese Christians, shrine practices were a part of their general culture and not *prima facie* alien to them. Furthermore, since the Japanese Christians were loyal to Japan, their leaders realized that radical rejection of shrine obeisance would attach to them the false and unnecessary stigma of being unpatriotic. That would have had the potentiality of provoking the authorities into banning the entire Christian movement as subversive.

The National Christian Council of Japan advanced in 1937 a threefold pattern of guidance for Christians sensitive to the shrine question: (1) recognizing the national character and value of the shrines, they should pay homage to those memorialized there; (2) accepting the government's claim that the shrines were not religious, they should help advance understanding of the difference between worshiping God and doing the obeisance paid there to national heroes; and (3) they should press for the elimination of any religious features connected with the shrines. The National Council itself implemented the third advice when in 1938 Osaka police circulated among the city's Christian pastors a questionnaire attempting to get them to commit themselves on sensitive questions that included their attitude towards the so-called national gods at the shrines. The Council issued a public statement calling upon the national government further to clarify the meaning of shrine attendance. It asked that in harmony with the government position that the shrines were not religious, all elements of apparent worship be removed from the shrine ceremonies so that they could be observed as unquestioned signs of legitimate patriotism.

Both in Japan and in Korea, the shrine question could have resulted in heavily repressive action against Christian conscientious objectors, but on that issue both the Christian and the government leaders steered away from courses that would have made head-on collision inevitable. The issue was indicative, however, of the existence of clear and present danger to the Christian communities in the accelerating mobilization of Japanese resources for the Continental war.

Just before the initiation of military action and on into 1938, the Japanese police arrested numerous Korean Christians—not an unfamiliar move. Among those seized by the police were men outstanding in the Korean Methodist Church and other denominations; they included prominent teachers and leaders of church-wide activities. Most of them had studied abroad and were alleged to have been members of a secret Korean patriotic society. The Board's Corresponding Secretaries reported, "Stories of extreme brutality in applying the third degree seem too well authenticated to be ignored." Some

were held for questioning and then released without restriction; some were freed, but forbidden to resume their professional work; some were kept in jail.

In the spring of 1938, the Japanese administration in Korea began the process of abolishing all Korean organizations having international relations, holding out only the possibility that some of them might be absorbed into similar groups operating elsewhere in the Empire. Among the early casualties of this policy were the Young Men's Christian Association, the Young Women's Christian Association, the Christian Endeavor, the Epworth League, and the National Christian Council. The Council met the pressure by announcing its dissolution in September.

But mobilization for the war effected an increasingly thorough government-inspired regimentation of organized Christianity in Japan. Under authority of the director of the Religious Bureau of the Department of Education, representatives of the three religions enjoying official standing—Buddhism, religious Shintoism, and Christianity—were called together and asked to prepare, respectively, reports on plans for their co-operation in the government's Spiritual Mobilization Movement. The National Christian Council, in which the Japan Methodist Church participated, announced its "utmost loyalty to Imperial aims, and to accomplishing the unity and peace of the Far East, in reverential loyalty to the Imperial Will." More concretely, the Council pledged that the churches would enter energetically into the Spiritual Mobilization Movement and also the movement for Spiritual Awakening—two government-originated campaigns for patriotic indoctrination of the people in general and of students in the public schools. Most denominations passed resolutions affirming their own patriotic support of the government's cause. The Board of Foreign Missions, though the Secretaries commented on the problems confronting the Japanese churches, made no public statement as to what reservations existed in the minds of the Japan Methodist missionaries as to the justice of the Japanese action on the Continent.

The plan of co-operation reported to the government by the National Council included the following proposals, which were expected to meet the desires of the authorities:

1. To stress the harmony between Christianity and the National objectives.
2. To make plain the official purposes for the establishment of a new order in East Asia and to cooperate in their realization.
3. To give deep religious quality to the observations [*sic*] of the monthly Far Eastern Service Day, with special prayers for the imperial family and the country.
4. To redouble efforts to realize the government's economic policies of economy and savings and the advancement of public health.
5. To continue and increase service to widows and orphans of soldiers and respectful participation in memorial services.
6. To continue and increase service to men at the front through the rest houses in China.

7. To continue and increase support of the women's settlement in Peking founded by our Christian women.

8. To cooperate with all the Christian work of all countries in the occupied areas, seeking to develop understanding of the new order.

9. To seek the cooperation of English and American missionaries in Japan and the churches they represent for the rectification of international misunderstandings of Japan and particularly to seek to deepen the understanding of the missionaries in China.

Back of the plan for Christian work in occupied China lay a visit to the area by a small group of Japanese Christian leaders sent to investigate for the Council the feasibility of sending missionaries to the Chinese residents. Among the delegates was Dr. Yoshimune Abe, president of Aoyama Gakuin, who not long afterwards was elected Bishop of the Japan Methodist Church.

SINO-JAPANESE WAR, 1937-1939

Distressing as was the flood of difficulties faced by the Mission and its people up to 1936, they endured their profoundest trial during the Japanese occupation in 1937-39. Mission interests in the North China and the Shantung Conferences, which lay in territory quickly taken by Japan early in the struggle, suffered least of all, though movements of missionaries and of Christian rural workers were somewhat curtailed. The effect upon the Mission of the Japanese presence in the country and of localized bombing raids was minimal in the Foochow Area and in West China. Mission properties in Chungking and Chengtu, perhaps unintentionally, were bombed, however, in the second year, and the main building of the Union High School three miles from Foochow was deliberately attacked at low altitude by Japanese planes dropping fire bombs and by others strafing it with machine gun bullets. The Methodist Episcopal Church was not active in the Shanghai, Wuhsien (Soochow), and Hangchow areas, where the mission of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South was well developed and where loss of life and property was heavy because some of the worst of the war was fought out there. It was in East China territory lying between Chinkiang and Kiukiang that the Methodist Episcopal mission suffered most in the first year of the conflict.

In that hard-hit region, the Mission's activities and its institutions were almost completely disrupted. In the course of the earlier fighting and also after the Japanese occupation was established, Methodist missionary residences in Kiukiang were burned, residential property was damaged in Nanking, and that city's large Kiantankiai Church was partly burned. During the later battle for Kiukiang and in the course of air attacks on nearby Nanchang, still more Methodist property was damaged. But the Corresponding Secretaries reported to the Board in 1939 that such losses were the least

important factors in disruption of Methodist work. They cited far more disturbing conditions :

The mass flight of civilians before the invading army, estimated to include the movements of between twenty and thirty million people, carried with it an unknown but very large proportion of the members of the Methodist churches. Entire congregations have disappeared.

A year later, the Secretaries, describing the ravaging of the country and the destruction of life by the Japanese war machine, reported of roughly the same area and the territory west of it :

A survey made during the year among the Methodist missionaries in the Yangtze Valley disclosed the fact that between 80 and 90% of the membership of the Church had moved into remoter areas of China, some into the Far West, and most of these had not returned even though the Japanese were urging the return of all citizens.

Everywhere in the war zone, of course, school work was broken up. Most of the higher schools in the Yangtze Valley and the Foochow area that were maintained by the Methodists either by themselves or in co-operation with other groups moved—both faculties and students—to new locations where they could continue the educational process in relative safety. In this they were encouraged by the Chinese government, which itself was relocated in Chungking. The University of Nanking, Nanking Theological Seminary, and William Nast Academy moved into far western Szechwan Province, and Nanchang Academy took a new site in a remote part of Kiangsi Province. Fukien Christian University, the Anglo-Chinese College, Union High School, Union Theological Seminary, and Min-I High School all resettled far from their home centers. The schools, though carrying out these extraordinary adjustments with high *élan*, nevertheless accomplished them only by making long and laborious treks, settling into strange quarters, and struggling with financial shortages, the students living on poor food, the faculties limited by salary cuts, and all together existing under great psychological strain.

The Board's Executive Committee promptly explored the question of the safety of the missionaries in the war zone and decided upon a permissive policy. Missionaries were neither ordered nor advised to evacuate their posts, even though the United States Embassy in 1937 issued frequent and strong warnings—sometimes almost tantamount to orders—for all American citizens to leave. The missionaries were permitted to choose for themselves, subject only to approval by their field committees and resident Bishops of decisions to remain. Mothers with young children were advised to depart. The only immediate departures were those of three missionary families and seven mothers with young children. Two years later, the Corresponding Secretaries reported with pride that 93 per cent of the active Methodist missionaries

at the outbreak of the war were still on duty or on regular furlough. Only three mothers with young children remained in the United States; only two missionaries withdrew for reasons connected with the war. The rest pursued their regular work as conditions permitted or threw themselves into relief or other emergency work.

Although the disturbing effects of the war reached throughout the country, the Methodists were able to maintain a remarkable level of activity in areas not directly and violently suffering its impact. In the pacified parts of occupied China, where physical conditions were relatively stable, evangelistic work went on much as before the Japanese came.

In the areas of high emergency, the Church spontaneously made three basically relevant approaches to the travail of the war-stricken people.

(1) The most immediate constructive reaction to the crisis was the determination of the medical missionaries to keep the Christian hospitals going whether in the midst of the fighting, in the path of the successful invading armies, under the continuing Japanese occupation, or in areas farther back that were flooded with refugees. Only the missionary-operated hospitals remained open in the face of the Japanese advance. Some Chinese staff members understandably felt that they could not remain, but others stayed on duty. Hardly any missionaries left their regular posts, though they were compelled to carry on with depleted staffs. Institutions like University Hospital in Nanking, Wuhu General Hospital, Water-of-Life Hospital in Kiukiang, Ensign Hospital in Nanchang, and the hospitals of the W.F.M.S. kept their doors open during the worst of the terror of the invasion, sheltering women and children and ministering to the sick and the wounded.

(2) In the region from which the people fled by the millions but where still lived masses of poverty-stricken Chinese who were unable to escape before the invading armies, there were churches that were able, though badly depleted, to keep active. Many of them became stabilizing creative centers of refuge for harried people. They conducted day schools for children of refugees, night schools for illiterate adults, playgrounds and nurseries for smaller children, and handwork groups for women, and sometimes opened parts of their buildings to out-clinics of the hospitals. Along with their manifold efforts to meet the emergency needs of the people, they kept up Sunday services of worship, prayer meetings, and Bible study groups.

(3) In the safer and more remote areas to which the escaped refugees flocked, notably Szechwan Province, the Mission endeavored to adjust itself to the need and opportunity confronting it in the thousands of Christians and the greater number of non-Christians arriving there, beginning, of course, with direct ministries to the hungry, the homeless, and the destitute. Some of the Christians came equipped with financial means, good education, and experience in church life. The larger group of refugees brought into the hitherto provincial-minded West new ideas, new practices, and sensitivity

to new trends. "In Szechuan Province the Church program is yeasty with change and glowing with opportunity," the Corresponding Secretaries reported in 1939. The Methodists and the other church bodies recognized the comparative weakness of the missionary movement in West China and therefore through the National Christian Council joined in surveying the situation there and in planning to meet it. Together they set up centers to aid in training for the Christian ministry, helped provide leaders for the promising China Industrial Co-operatives movement, launched evangelistic campaigns that combined educational and medical activity with direct preaching of the gospel, and increased their efforts through the exiled universities on the campus of West China University to prepare educational, industrial, and civic leaders for the region. Said the Board Secretaries, "Experiments in co-operative and union Christian activities are being tried in place after place. The Christian Church and all its agencies are seething with experimentation and aggressive activity."

The Methodist Secretaries, Ralph Diffendorfer and William E. Shaw deplored, however, the fact that the Methodists were not carrying their share of the co-operative load in West China and were not in any adequate degree meeting their assigned responsibility—"and our thin line of missionaries nears the breaking point." In all Szechuan Province at this critical time, the Board had at work only nine missionaries, and two of those were ready to return to the United States because of poor health. In Chungking, the capital, there were only two Methodist couples, one of them scheduled soon to return to America. The Secretaries urged that the Annual Meeting should solemnly explore this combined need and opportunity and "should sacrificially extend every possible aid, in men and resources, to the Chinese Christian leaders and to our heroic group of missionaries."

If the antiforeign thrust of rising nationalism during the nineteen-twenties began to extend a wall between the missionaries and the Chinese people, the humanitarian services performed by the missionaries and the churches among the suffering, war-battered people at the end of the thirties began to pull it down. The fact that the Mission and the Chinese church identified themselves with the Chinese nation in the tragic experience of the war was lost neither on the common people nor on the country's leaders. It was in grateful recognition of it, for instance, that the government announced in April, 1938, cancellation of the ban on compulsory teaching of religion in Christian schools.

METHODISM AND THE FAR EASTERN CONFLICT, 1937-1939

At the end of the thirties, the Board of Foreign Missions had missionaries at work in the Far East in three countries raked by international political hostilities that complicated its sponsoring function. Japan long ago had con-

quered Korea and was holding it in subjection, attempting to absorb it into the Japanese Empire and to integrate Korean education and public life into the pattern of Japanese imperialist nationalism. Japan also was engaged in an aggressive war against China. Board policy as framed by sessions of the Annual Meeting in the United States and as administered from New York had to take account of the problems, views, or expectations of three sets of foreign missionaries, three national bodies of Methodist churchmen abroad, two Far Eastern governments, and the state of American Methodist public opinion on Eastern affairs. It had to listen to many conflicting voices and absorb many conflicting pressures, and at the same time remain sufficiently independent of all particular current urgencies to be relevantly loyal to the Christian idealism inherent in its mission to the world. "A foreign missionary movement that is not essentially interested in Christlike attitudes between nations," said the Corresponding Secretaries to the Annual Meeting in 1939, "is falling short of the completeness of the Christian message."

In spite of the risk of compounding the difficulties faced by its foreign missionaries and the Asian Methodists among whom they ministered, and in spite of the possibility of alienating certain groups of financial supporters in the United States, the Board did not refrain from speaking out on the Far Eastern conflict. In 1938, the Annual Meeting declared on the Korea-Japan question:

Our brethren in Korea are carrying on their work under increasing restrictions and amid a people feeling the weight of the heavy hand of military authority. Our sympathy goes out to them in full measure, and we pray for them sustaining grace.

The Annual Meeting's identification and characterization of Japanese military activity in China were fuller and more condemnatory:

In Japan, whatever restlessness and opposition to present national policies may exist beneath the surface, outwardly the nation seems united in following a course which cannot fail, in the long run, to prove disastrous to the hope of a happy and progressive national life. Japan, like all others, must be a good neighbor if it is to be a creator of peace. The methods pursued in China during the past year, of unrestrained looting, indiscriminate bombing of military and civilians alike, added to the rape and deliberate slaughter that have accompanied the capture of some cities, have shocked the moral sentiments of mankind. With full recognition of the noble character and the high Christian ideals of many of the Japanese people, we lament, with hearts which are sick with horror, the excesses and the outrages that have marked the Japanese invasion of China.

And the Annual Meeting followed its denunciation of Japan's military exploits in China with an attack upon the complicity of American interests in the war:

We are shamed by the knowledge that a large proportion of the exports that assist in preparation for war and war materials used in this ruthless attack upon a neighboring people has been bought in this country, and we urgently petition the Administration and Congress to take whatever steps are necessary to put an end to this disgraceful traffic. The interests of commerce and finance, altogether too influential in determining government policies, must yield to the interests of humanity. The blood of China cries against us from the ground!

In 1939, the Annual Meeting again expressed its position on the war:

The war in China has entered its third year. Tragic loss of life and destruction of property continue. Unparalleled suffering is the lot of millions. Methodists of the United States of America respectfully call upon the Government to inform Japan in a firm and friendly way that the people of this nation entertain the earnest hope that hostilities may speedily be brought to an end. Methodists pray for a cessation of conflict.

SOURCES

Sources

The sources cited below usually are those especially or most directly relevant to the particular chapters or sections of the text.

There are, however, a number of sources, usually official or semiofficial, that have been utilized throughout the Volume wherever relevant. These, which we call *general sources*, are not always cited in the particular sections, but they have been used extensively. The reader interested in the fullest identification of the documentation of the text will realize that appropriate examination of them would provide a great number of items. The text itself will offer many suggestions as to where to turn in the general sources for certain types of statement or action. It will be understood that all general sources are related to the work of the Methodist Episcopal Church.

Certain general sources cover all phases of the denomination's activity. *General Conference Journals* (the full form is *Journals of the General Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church*), published quadrennially in Presidential election years, include detailed proceedings, addresses, and reports of Bishops, Committees, and Board activities. Similar Journals are published by the various regional Central Conferences that are combinations of foreign Annual and Mission Conferences. The *Daily Christian Advocate*, published at the seat of the General Conference during its sessions, presents Conference proceedings augmented by transcriptions of debate and by various working papers. The *Discipline* (the full form is *The Doctrines and Discipline of the Methodist Episcopal Church*), published after each General Conference, is the official codification of the denomination's basic legislation. *General Minutes* (the full form is *Minutes of the Annual Conferences of the Methodist Episcopal Church*), published annually in spring and fall sections, give statistical tables, ministerial appointments, and condensed formal information about Annual Conference actions and ministerial relations. The official post-Conference publications of the Annual Conferences are variously known as Minutes or as Journals. We use below the abbreviated form, for example, *Minutes, New England Conference*. These *Minutes* follow universal patterns established by the General Conference, giving in typical form and sequence Conference proceedings, reports, and full statistical and personnel information. Minutes, using variant titles, also are published in foreign languages. Key words for some of them are *Actas* (Span.), *Sessioni* (It.), and *Verhandlungen* (Ger.), *The Christian Advocate*, published in New York, was one of the denomination's officially established weekly journals. We have used it as a general source and also for numerous cited special treatments.

Certain other general sources include official publications particularly rele-

vant to foreign missions as described especially in Parts I, II, and IV. *Annual Reports, M.S.* designates the Annual Reports of the Missionary Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church to 1906. They are succeeded in 1907 by *Annual Reports, B.F.M.*, which are similar publications of the Board of Foreign Missions. The proceedings of the Disciplinary group making policy for the Missionary Society (to 1906) and the Board of Foreign Missions (to 1911) are presented in "Minutes, General Committee." These Minutes for 1912-15 are issued in printed form. They are succeeded in 1916 by a series of fuller but functionally similar *Journals, B.F.M.* "Minutes, Board of Managers" designates the proceedings of the interim executive committee work of both the Society and the Board until they are succeeded in 1916 by "Minutes, Executive Committee." *The Gospel in All Lands* (1892-1902) and *World-Wide Missions* (1892-1912) are magazines published by the Society and the Board; we use them both as general sources and for citations for more substantial materials. *Annual Reports, W.F.M.S.* are publications of the Woman's Foreign Missionary Society. Taken as a whole, the Correspondence File of the World Division of the Board of Global Ministries (see Preface) is a general source, but specific utilization of it usually is cited in the various sections of the text. It covers the executive and missionary correspondence of the Missionary Society and of the Board of Foreign Missions, successively. Citations of letters almost always refer to this File; Letter Book citations are used to designate some of the pre-1912 executive letters in the File. "Contributed" letters and other materials have been made available by private parties.

General sources for Part III, the mainly organizational portion of the Volume, include both those above for foreign missions and certain sources for home missions. The latter include "Minutes, General Committee," to 1906; *Annual Reports, Board of Church Extension*, prior to 1900; *Christianity in Earnest* (1900-1906), a magazine that includes the Annual Reports of the Board of Church Extension; *Annual Reports, Board of Home Missions and Church Extension*, 1907-1939; and *Annual Reports, W.H.M.S.*, publications of the Woman's Home Missionary Society.

CHAPTER 1. AMERICANS IN AFRICA

For the transfer of the Africa field to Bp. Hartzell and for his earliest administrative acts, see *Annual Reports, M.S.* (1896, 1897); *Minutes, Liberia Conference* (1897); and *Minutes, Congo Mission Conference* (1897). See later *Minutes* of these Conferences and those listed in the Sources for the various Africa sections below. Formal details on Conferences and Bishops are derived from *General Conference Journals*. For Hartzell's first two quadrennial reports, see *General Conference Journals* (1900, 1904). Other items come from Hartzell to A.B. Leonard, 27 Jan. 1897, and Hartzell's article "Missions Among the Heathen of Liberia," in *The Gospel in All Lands* (June, 1897), pp. 290 ff.

Advance Into Rhodesia

The Official journals are *Minutes, Congo Mission Conference* (1897, 1898, 1899); *Minutes, East Central Africa Mission Conference* (1901, 1903, 1905, spring and fall sessions of 1907, 1909, 1910, 1911, 1912, 1913, 1915); and *Minutes Rhodesia Mission Conference* (1916-19). These are the chief sources for the development of the Mission to 1911. Partly parallel accounts are to be found in *Annual Reports, M.S. and B.F.M.*, but our chief reliance has been on the *Minutes*, which are rich in direct reports and personal accounts of missionary activity as well as useful for organizational detail.

In addition to letters specifically cited in the text, correspondence of the following is useful at chronologically relevant points: Bp. J. C. Hartzell, A. B. Leonard, R. Wodehouse, Edith Bell, J. M. Springer, and G. A. Baldwin.

For Hartzell's initial decision, Rhodesia visit, and negotiations, see especially *Annual Report, B.F.M.* (1913), pp. 449 f.; historical statements by Hartzell and Beetham in *Minutes, East Central Africa Mission Conference* (Nov., 1901), pp. i-viii, including an excerpt from the Grey letter; and *Minutes, Congo Mission Conference* (June, 1899), pp. 3 f. For the opening of the new Mission, see *The Gospel in All Lands* (1900), pp. 5 ff., 38 f., and 298 f. John M. Springer, *I Love the Trail; A Sketch of the Life of Helen Emily Springer* (Nashville: The Parthenon Press, 1952), pp. 31-57, is valuable for the settled work and the treks of both the Springers. Mrs. Springer's manuscript diary illuminates the 1901-6 period. On Mrs. Springer, see also *Annual Report, W.F.M.S.* (1901, 1902). Dr. Gurney's early work is described in his diary, an unpagged manuscript entitled "Notes by the Wayside."

The treatment of the field controversies of 1903-5 draws upon extensive correspondence involving Hartzell, Leonard, Wodehouse, Beetham, Baldwin, and Springer, numerous details and official actions recorded in the *Minutes* of the Mission Conference for 1903 and 1905, and scattered details in "Minutes, Board of Managers." The "called meeting" document is enclosed in Beetham to Leonard, 20 Dec., 1903.

Our study of Dr. Gurney's difficulties with Bp. Hartzell and the Board (1905-9) involved extensive correspondence between Hartzell and Leonard and also a number of Gurney letters. See also Leonard letters to Bp. Daniel A. Goodsell, 2 Dec. 1907; to James S. Chadwick, superintendent of the Brooklyn District, New York East Conference, 13 Feb. 1908; and to and from W. H. Lawrence, a relative of Gurney's, in the Gurney file and in the Board's letter books from 19 Nov. 1907 to 22 Jan. 1908. See Hartzell to individual Board members, 20 June 1906. The two papers Gurney gave to the Committee on Africa on 12 June 1906 were "Bishop Hartzell's Objections to My Return to Missionary Work in Africa" and "Mission Reports and Missionary Testimony Concerning the East Central Africa Mission" (see the Gurney file, 1906). Among numerous references in "Minutes, Board of Managers," see especially 20 Mar. and 19 June 1906, 15 Oct. 1907, and 20 Oct. and 15 Dec. 1908. For background on Gurney's marital embarrassment, see 1903 entries in his diary; *Minutes, East Central Africa Mission Conference* (1903), pp. 12 and 13; and *Minutes, New York East Conference* (Apr., 1908), pp. 17 f. and 36.

The presentation of the Wodehouse case of 1910 is based on a large number of letters of Hartzell, Leonard, Wodehouse—these three especially—J. E. Ferris, E. L. Sechrist, J. R. Gates, and Herbert N. Howard, 1908-11. See *Minutes, East Central Africa Mission Conference* (1909), pp. 15 and 67; also *Minutes* (1910),

for extensive detail of trial sessions. The transcript of the trial is "Proceedings in the Trial of R. Wodehouse" (filed with his letters). With Hartzell's letters are filed a printed list of the Finance Committee's charges against Wodehouse (with detailed specifications), additional specifications dated 20 Aug. 1910, and a copy of Wodehouse's signed confession. A long reply by Wodehouse to the charges is in his file near Leonard to Hartzell, 9 Feb. 1911. Board reactions to the case are recorded in "Minutes, Board of Managers" as well as in Leonard's letters. For the Stockdale case, see J. R. Gates to Leonard, 28 Dec. 1910; Hartzell to Leonard, 25 Mar. 1911, and Gates to Corresponding Secretaries 14 Apr. 1911; also *Minutes, East Central Africa Mission Conference* (1911), p. 41. C. A. Kent to Bp. Hartzell, 6 July 1915, covers copies of recent letters from Wodehouse to Kent.

The account of the liquidation of the white work draws upon numerous letters in the correspondence of Kent, Gates, and Bp. Hartzell, especially upon Kent's. See also Kent's historical sketch in his report in *Minutes, East Central Africa Mission Conference* (1915), pp. 24 f.

Kent's letters are the chief source for the expansion-comity question.

Adopting Madeira

The fullest magazine accounts of William G. Smart's independent mission and its adoption by Bishop Hartzell, written chiefly by Hartzell and Smart themselves, are in *The Gospel in All Lands* (Nov., 1899, and Dec., 1901), *The Christian Advocate* (21 April and 24 Nov. 1898), and *World-Wide Missions* (April, 1901).

Official details and occasional reports on the work will be found in *Minutes, Liberia Conference* (1898-1902); *Minutes, West Central Africa Mission Conference* (from 1903); and *Minutes, Cincinnati Conference* (1900), for George B. Nind.

The important correspondence files are those of Smart, Bishop Hartzell, George B. Nind (from 1904), Benjamin R. Duarte (from 1912), Bishop Eben S. Johnson (from 1916), and Julio G. Viterbo Dias (1917-19). The file of Ray B. Kipp (Angola missionary on health leave in Madeira) includes an important letter by him to F. M. North, 7 June 1918. Another essential single item is a memo, Thomas S. Donohugh to F. M. North, 19 March 1920, which is pasted to a letter by Smart to North, 23 Feb. 1920. A valuable later letter of Smart's to the Board is dated 16 Oct. 1922.

Much additional information has come from *The Christian Advocate* (especially for 1896, 1897, 1898, and 1910); *The New Africa*, Monrovia (1899-1901); *World-Wide Missions* (particularly for July, 1902, and May, 1908); a pamphlet *Christian Work in the Madeira Islands: Bishop Hartzell's Missions Among the Portuguese of the Islands, Sailors on Shore and in Harbour, and Others . . .* [1906]; a pamphlet by E.R.S. [Mrs. Smart], *Bishop Hartzell's Missions at Funchal, Madeira* (March, 1910); the diaries of Herbert C. Withey, Angola missionary, which describe his visits to Madeira in 1899 and 1908; Hartzell's reports to the General Conference, *G.C.J.* (1900 and 1904); *Annual Report, B.F.M.* (1926); "Minutes, Committee on Africa" (17 April 1905); A. B. Leonard's "Survey of Africa . . ." in "Minutes, General Missionary Committee" (6 Nov. 1908).

Della Dimmitt's *A Story of Madeira* (N.Y.: Eaton and Mains, 1896) introduces the story of the persecutions and emigrations of Madeiran Protestants in

the 19th century. Further historical religious background is treated in Eduardo Moreira, *The Significance of Portugal; a Survey of the Religious Situation* (London: World Dominion Press, 1933).

Pausing in the Cape Verde Islands

Some of the following sources touch upon several aspects of this treatment. See *Minutes, New England Southern Conference* (1891-95, 1897, 1899, 1900, 1901); *Minutes, Liberia Conference* (1901), pp. 9 and 22; Bp. J. C. Hartzell to A. B. Leonard, 10 Sept. 1900; Leonard to Hartzell, 19 Sept. 1900; S. L. Baldwin to George B. Nind, 24 June 1901; information blank in Deceased Missionary File, printed date 10 Sept. 1901, evidently filled out by Nind; *The Gospel in All Lands* (1900), p. 184, and (1901), pp. 43 f., 233 f., 327, and 549; "Minutes, Board of Managers" (18 Sept. 1900), p. 316, and (17 Nov. 1900), p. 396; and *World-Wide Missions* (Jan., 1902), p. 5.

Foothold in North Africa

The Missions's printed Minutes provide the basic body of information, supplemented by the *Annual Reports, B.F.M.* (1908-18). See for the Conference sessions, *Minutes, the Mission in North Africa* (1910-12); *Minutes, North Africa Mission Conference* (1913, 1914, 1916, and 1918; Dec., 1919, misprinted "1920"). *Minutes* for Feb., 1919, were not available. Minutes, North Africa District Conference are published with those of the Mission Conference.

Bishop Joseph C. Hartzell is the chief narrator of the genesis of the venture. Among a number of valuable letters of his, see especially those to S. O. Benton, 4 June 1907, and to the General Missionary Committee, 16 Oct. 1907. See also his accounts in *General Conference Journal* (1908), pp. 829 ff., and in *World-Wide Missions* (Oct., 1908), pp. 4 f.

Hartzell's letters are important up to 1916. In his correspondence file for Jan., 1915, is a statement "Under Martial Law in North Africa," which provides numerous miscellaneous details. Edwin F. Frease, both in his letters and his *Minutes* reports, provides the narrative and interpretive core for the field from 1909 to 1919. His long "Report and Tentative Recommendations," written 21 May 1909 and enclosed with Frease to A. B. Leonard, 29 May 1909, is basic for beginnings on the field, including pre-Methodist items.

Information on the enlistment of personnel comes from the letters of F. Roesch and from papers in the United Mission Library Biographical Files for W. E. Lowther, Emily S. Smith, Ada D. Welch, and Mary A. Anderson. For Lowther, see also Stefanie Roesch Lowther's *A Traveling Minister and His Family* (privately printed, ca. 1962). For Purdon, see J. H. C. Purdon, "Record of Operations of the Methodist Episcopal Church in Tunisia," which covers 1907-20 in journal form in Purdon's handwriting (United Mission Library Overseas Missions Files). For J. T. C. Blackmore, see Blackmore to W. C. Barclay (an autobiographical letter), 1 Oct. 1954 in Biographical Files. The last three items are also valuable for the missionary work of these men. For women workers in Algiers, see *Annual Reports, W.F.M.S.* (1910), pp. 64, 202, 257, and (1911), p. 70. Later formal recognition of Blackmore and others is recorded in "Minutes, Board of Managers," 19 May 1914. Many other details about personnel are to be found in the *N. Africa Minutes*.

For organization of the American Mission in North Africa, see *Minutes* (1910); for the Algiers Quarterly Conference, *World-Wide Missions* (June,

1910), p. 6; for the North Africa Mission Conference, *Minutes* (1913); for the North Africa District Conference, same. The *General Conference Journal* (1916), pp. 158 f. and p. 475, record supervision with Europe under Bp. Wm. F. Anderson.

The brief controversy with the North Africa Mission (London) is covered in E. F. Frease to A. B. Leonard, 20 Oct. 1910, and in "Minutes, Board of Managers" (18 Oct. 1910), p. 407; Bp. Hartzell to G. Wingate, 13 April 1911.

For W.F.M.S. organizational sponsorship, see Frease letters to F. M. North, 3 Sept. 1915, and 30 May and 14 Sept. 1916; also Frease to G. H. Jones, 18 Jan. 1915, and Hartzell to North, 13 Dec. 1915. See *Annual Reports, W.F.M.S.* (1913), pp. 211 f.; (1915), pp. 230 f., 240; (1916), pp. 217, 228.

Numerous Frease letters deal with the problem of property-holding in Algeria and Tunis—especially Frease to North, 3 March 1914, 22 Nov. 1915, and 29 Nov. 1915 (including copies of official documents on the Tunis Branch). The agreement between the corporate members of the Tunis Branch and the B.F.M. is dated 3 Oct. 1916, and is filed with Frease's correspondence. See "Minutes, Board of Managers" (18 Jan. 1916), pp. 14 ff.

For Bp. Hartzell's continuing anti-Islam policy, see the *General Conference Journal* (1908), pp. 833 f., and (1912), pp. 947 ff.; also *The Christian Advocate* (11 Sept. 1913), p. 1261, and (24 June 1915), 860. Frease's letter to North on Muslim immorality is dated 7 Sept. 1913. J. H. C. Purdon's statement on the Devil and Islam is in a letter to "Ten Donors," 18 July 1918.

The presentation of the hostels program is developed from numerous references in *Annual Reports, B.F.M.* (1910-18); items in *Minutes, the Mission in North Africa* (1911) and *Minutes, North Africa Mission Conference* (1916); "Statement Concerning the Redistribution for the Year 1916," filed in the E. F. Frease correspondence, 29 May 1916; and *Methodism in North Africa*, E. F. Frease, ed. (April-June, 1913). See Frease letters to F. M. North (9 Jan. and 7 Oct. 1913; 17 Apr., 1 June, 31 Aug., and 12 Oct. 1915; 16 Oct. and 18 Nov. 1918); Frease to G. H. Jones, 20 Feb. and 8 Mar. 1915; Percy Smith to North (14 July 1916; 2 Apr. and 6 May 1918); and North to Frease, 30 June 1915 and 20 Feb. 1917.

The transfer of the Il-Maten mission is dealt with in "Minutes, Executive Committee, B.F.M." (22 May 1919), pp. 39 f., and in Frease to North, 10 May 1919. The latter covers French and English copies of "Extract from the Minutes of a Meeting of the Committee of the Mission for Kabylia [Evangelical Methodist Church of France]," 9 April 1919. Frease to North, 9 Aug. 1919, dates the actual transfer.

A few details were gleaned from *Methodism in North Africa* (Jan.-Mar., April-June, 1913), ed. E. F. Frease. Certain letters of W. E. Lowther, F. Roesch, and J. H. C. Purdon are in the pre-1912 general alphabetical Correspondence Files.

Forging the Congo Link

John M. Springer wrote four books that are valuable sources. For the 1906-07 trip from Southern Rhodesia to the Atlantic coast, see *The Heart of Central Africa* (New York: The Methodist Book Concern, 1909), and for travels and mission work from June, 1910, to January, 1915, see *Pionering in the Congo* (privately published, 1916). The least valuable is *I Love the Trail: A Sketch of the Life of Helen Emily Springer* (privately published, 1952), but it provides additional details, 1906-17. *Christian Conquests in the Congo* (New York: The

Methodist Book Concern, 1927) supplements the story of the Kabongo mission given in *Pioneering*; see Chaps. 8–17 and pp. 38 and 40. Details supplementing the *Heart of Central Africa* account are drawn from Mrs. Springer's manuscript diary. The section's opening quotation is from *Pioneering*, pp. 38 f.

"Lunda Mission," a seventeen-page manuscript report by Springer (Correspondence File, January, 1915) is mainly a detailed historical sketch for 1911–14.

This section draws heavily on the Superintendent's and missionaries' reports in the following Conference journals: *Minutes, West Central Africa Mission Conference*, 1910, 1911, 1912, 1913, and 1915; *Minutes, Congo Mission*, 1915; *Minutes, Congo Mission Conference*, 1917 (includes Minutes of the final session of the Congo Mission), 1919 (Apr. and Sept. sessions), and 1921.

The missionaries' letters constitute another important source—those of J. M. Springer, R. S. Guptill, A. L. Piper, W. A. Miller, C. C. Hartzler, T. B. Brinton, E. I. Everett, C. M. Jensen, and W. E. Shields. W. A. Miller's quoted statements on the witch doctor and on slavery come from his letter to F. M. North, 10 July 1919. For Springer's claim to divine guidance on Mulungwishi, we quote from his letter to North, 21 July 1919.

Letters of Secretary A. B. Leonard are in Letter Books 111 and 113. Letters of Secretaries F. M. North and T. S. Donohugh are filed with those of the missionaries. Leonard's remark on Springer is quoted from Book 111 (9 Jan. 1907).

See also the letters of Bishops J. C. Hartzell (for 1906–16) and Eben S. Johnson (for 1916–20).

The Minutes of the Finance Committee of the Congo Mission begin with 20 March 1919 and are in the Correspondence File under "Minutes Congo Conference."

For correspondence on the Mulungwishi project (1918–19), see letters by Guptill, numerous contemporary letters by Springer, two letters by Bp. Johnson (3 May and 6 May, 1919), and letters in Bishop Springer's file for 1940, which includes an eight-page historical sketch by Springer (filed under January).

CHAPTER 2. IMMIGRANTS IN SARAWAK

General sources include *Minutes, Malaysia Mission Conference* (1901) and *Minutes, Malaysia Conference* (1902–20). References to Sarawak in the *Annual Reports, M.S.* and *B.F.M.*, will be found under "Malaysia."

THE FIRST IMMIGRANTS. Bishop Warne's accounts are in *The Christian Advocate* (9 May 1901), p. 745, and (23 May), p. 818; *The Malaysia Message* (April, 1901), p. 258 (page corrected from 158); and in a letter to A. B. Leonard, 8 March 1901. See also Tom Harrisson, ed., *The Peoples of Sarawak* (distributed by the Curator, Sarawak Museum, 1959); Steven Runciman, *The White Rajahs: A History of Sarawak From 1841–1946* (Cambridge: University Press, 1960); *Minutes, Foochow Conference* (1900, 1901); W. A. Mains's message in *The Gospel in All Lands* (Feb., 1901), p. 95; James M. Hoover, "Pilgrim Fathers of Borneo," *The Christian Advocate* (14 May 1914), pp. 671 f. (the article also covers other events up to 1914); and Frank T. Cartwright, *Tuan Hoover of Borneo* (New York: The Abingdon Press, 1938).

For the early period of supervision from Singapore, see *The Malaysia Message* (Sept., 1901), p. 146, (May, 1902), p. 76, and (Dec., 1902), pp. 22 f.;

Annual Report, M.S. (1902), pp. 269 f.; Harrisson, *The Peoples of Sarawak*, p. 120; *Minutes, Foochow Conference* (1902); and *The Christian Advocate* (27 Aug. 1903), pp. 1403 f.

HOOPER'S EARLIER PERIOD, 1903-8. The chief sources are numerous articles and items of current date in *The Malaysia Message* and a lesser number of reports and other materials in *Minutes, Malaysia Mission Conference*. Three pieces by Bp. W. F. Oldham were useful: "Two Letters from Borneo," *The Christian Advocate* (10 Aug. 1905), pp. 1265 f.; a manuscript dated July, 1909; and an undated manuscript referring to his third visit to Sarawak. The manuscripts also covered elements in the following section on the Chinese community.

See also J. M. Hoover's candidate papers; B. F. West to A. B. Leonard, 13 Apr. 1903; and detailed reports by Hoover in the *Advocate* (27 Aug. 1903), pp. 1403 f., and (21 Sept. 1905), p. 1520.

HOOPER AND THE CHINESE. For the years up to 1909, many facts were culled from *The Malaysia Message*; see especially the issues of Aug., 1904 (p. 108), Aug., 1905 (pp. 99 f.), and June, 1917 (pp. 66 f.). The 1905 article includes the quotation on Secretary Shaw. See also *The Christian Advocate* (21 Sept. 1905), p. 1520. For this period and also for 1910 on, see Oldham's "Two Letters." On the rubber economy, see Malcolm MacDonald, *Borneo People* (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin & Company, 1956), p. 75.

On Chinese affairs from 1910, see Cartwright's *Tuan Hoover of Borneo*, pp. 113 f. (Rajah's land grant); Hoover's "Pilgrim Fathers," *loc. cit.*; Oldham typescript (1911); the W. N. Brewster pamphlet "*Paradise Regained*" or *The Story of a Chinese Colony* (printed in Springfield, Ohio, by the Young & Bennett Co., June, 1913), which is a full account of the origin of the Hsinghua colony plan; Hoover to Oldham, 13 Aug. 1912; *Minutes, Hingwha Conference* (1914) for conditions in Hsinghua Province; and C. E. Davis to Oldham, 24 June 1912 and 2 June 1914. For the Baram River incident, see again the Hoover-Oldham and the 1914 Davis letters; also Cartwright's *Tuan Hoover*, pp. 125-40.

DAVIS'S LEADERSHIP, 1913-16. The most important sources are C. E. Davis's letters to Oldham, especially that of 18 May 1916; a culling of numerous items from *Minutes, Malaysia Conference* (1913-18); and a Davis account in *Missionary News* (Nov., 1916), p. 4, from which comes the quotation on the Dayak jungle boys. See also an article by Edna E. Wilson in *The Christian Advocate* (8 Aug. 1916), p. 996; Hoover to Oldham, 13 Aug. and 4 Dec. 1912; and Oldham to Davis, 6 Mar. 1916.

THE MINER AFFAIR. This account has been developed almost entirely from letters, including the following: G. S. Miner to F. M. North, 11 July and 26 Nov. 1917, 14 Mar. 1918, and 11 Nov. 1919 [1918]; Hoover to G. S. Miner, 26 Apr., 3 May, and 21 May 1917, all quoted, at least in part, in a Wallace H. Miner letter of 4 Dec. 1918; Hoover to North, 21 Aug. and 9 Sept. 1919 and 22 Sept. 1920; North to J. B. Eyestone, 24 Aug. 1917, to G. S. Miner, 18 Oct. 1917, to W. H. Miner, 7 May 1918, and to Bp. G. H. Bickley, 24 May 1921; Bp. Bickley to North, 31 Mar. 1921 and 26 Apr. 1922, the latter quoting G. S. Miner; Bp. Wilson S. Lewis to North, 17 Nov. 1917; Wm. T. Cherry to W. H. Miner, 12 Nov. 1917, and to North, 10 May 1918; Walter N. Lacy to John R. Edwards, 14 Oct. 1924; and Bp. John W. Robinson to North, 14 Feb. and 5 June 1919.

See also *Minutes, Malaysia Finance Committee* (1918), pp. 293 f., 300, and 311, which includes the Constitution for the Bukit Lan scheme, and (24 and 25 July 1919), pp. 400, 401, 403, and (1921), pp. 460 f. Also *Annual Report, B.F.M.* (1921), pp. 45 and 309, "Minutes, Executive Committee, B.F.M." (15 Dec. 1921), and *Minutes, Malaysia Conference* (1918), p. 170, and (1920), pp. 458 f.

DAVIS'S TENURE. See the letters of W. T. Cherry, especially 9 July, 9 Aug., 12 Nov., and 11 Dec. 1917 and also 12 and 22 Mar. 1918. Key letters by J. M. Hoover are dated 13 Dec. 1916 and 14 and 17 Aug. 1917, the letters being quoted in W. H. Miner to North, 4 Dec. 1918. See also *Minutes, Malaysia Finance Committee* (1918), pp. 293 f.

THE MISSION'S RUBBER ECONOMY. Hoover provides most of the facts, in his correspondence and in his District reports in *Minutes, Malaysia Conference* (1918, 1919). See *The Malaysia Message* (June, 1917), p. 66, for his quoted comment on the Rajah. And see W. F. Oldham to C. E. Davis, 6 Mar. 1916; Davis to Oldham, 18 May 1918; and *Minutes, Malaysia Finance Committee* (1914), p. 31, (1916), p. 175, and (1920), p. 386.

CHAPTER 3. EXPANDING INTO THE NETHERLANDS INDIES

Sumatra

The Sumatra section draws heavily on the relevant Conference journals: *Minutes, Malaysia Conference* (1903-18) and *Minutes, Netherlands Indies Mission Conference* (1919). The other major sources are *Annual Reports, M.S.* (1904-6) and *Annual Reports, B.F.M.* (1907-20). Various chronologically relevant issues of *The Malaysia Message* supplemented these sources.

Details were gleaned from extracts from the diary of J. R. Denyes, especially from entries dated 20 Feb. 1907, 18 Feb. to 16 Apr. 1908, and 21-27 Nov. 1908. Some of the extracts were in Denyes's handwriting, some were copies made by his wife. Two contributed letters of Denyes's to Epworth Leaguers (18 July and 6 Oct. 1910) were used.

For W. T. Ward, see his *Sunlight and Shadow of Missionary Life* (Medan: printed by J. Hallermann, 1915) and his correspondence, 1912-16; also letters of G. F. Pykett, 1912. Important references to the termination of Ward's field relationship are found in *Minutes, Malaysia Finance Committee*, 5 Jan. and 22 July 1916. See also H. B. Mansell to North, 2 May 1917, and North to Mansell, 5 July 1917.

"Java for Jesus"

The sources used extensively are *Minutes, Malaysia Conference* (1906-18); *Minutes, Woman's Conference of Malaysia Mission* (1907-13; 1915-17) and *Minutes, Malaysia Woman's Conference* (1918); the diary of J. R. Denyes; and accounts and details in *The Malaysia Message* through the entire period.

For the pre-opening period, see also *Annual Report, M.S.* (1899), pp. 232 f., for "Java for Jesus"; Elizabeth Harper Brooks, *Java and Its Challenge*, a mission study course for the Pittsburgh Conference young people (1910); Wallace G. Smetzer, *Methodism on the Headwaters of the Ohio: the History of the Pittsburgh Conference of The Methodist Church* (printed by the Parthenon Press, 1951); B. F. West to A. B. Leonard, 2 Aug. 1905; letters of A. B. Leonard,

1905, on Pittsburgh Conference sponsorship; and "Minutes, General Missionary Committee" (13 Nov. 1905), p. 268.

Miscellaneous letters used are Denyes to Epworth Leaguers of the Pittsburgh Conference, 10 June and 18 July 1905; Mrs. Denyes to the Malaysia Women's Conference of 1906, in Brooks, *Java and Its Challenge*, pp. 149 ff.; O. A. Carlson to A. B. Leonard, 29 Mar. 1908; and letters of C. S. Buchanan, 1914.

Various details are derived from the Missionary Society's application to the Dutch colonial authorities for permission to work in Java, Mar., 1905; "Minutes, Board of Managers" (15 Sept. and 15 Dec. 1908), pp. 330 and 394; and *Minutes, Netherlands Indies Conference* (1919). Details on the T.H.H.K. are drawn from reports in *Minutes, Malaysia Conference* (1910-18). Denyes's description of the Javanese village is in *The Malaysia Message* (June, 1907), p. 75.

West Borneo

For the nineteenth-century orientation of the Malaysia Mission toward Borneo see *Annual Report, M.S.* (1890, 1891); *Minutes, Malaysia Mission* (1890, 1892); J. M. Reid and J. T. Gracey, *Missions and Missionary Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church*, Vol. III (New York: Hunt & Eaton, 1896), pp. 188 and 191 f.; the diary of Bp. J. M. Thoburn; Thoburn's *India and Malaysia* (New York: Hunt & Eaton, 1892), p. 530; Thoburn letters to J. O. Peck, 7 and 11 Apr. 1890; an account of the North Borneo episode in *The Malaysia Message* (Mar., 1892); and articles on the people of Borneo by H.L.E. Luering in the *Message* for Nov., 1891, and Feb. and Mar., 1892.

The District reports in *Minutes, Malaysia Mission Conference* (1902-18) and numerous relevantly dated items in *The Malaysia Message* (1908-15) constitute the main body of material for the founding and development of the Mission.

Auxiliary items include excerpts from the diary of J. R. Denyes; informal items in contributed papers of Denyes's (on U Chim Seng); C. M. Worthington's missionary permits and other contributed Worthington papers; an unaddressed fragment in C. S. Buchanan's correspondence (3 Sept. 1912); *Minutes, Malaysia Finance Committee* (1914), p. 4; B. O. and Rita K. Wilcox letters, 24 July and 26 Oct. 1914; *Minutes, Malaysia Woman's Conference* (1916), pp. 125 f., and (1918), pp. 272 ff.; and "The Why of the Plan for the N.I. Dist. for 1917 and following years," in Buchanan correspondence, 24 Feb. 1917.

Bangka

The chief source for Bangka is the reports on the Netherlands Indies District in *Minutes, Malaysia Conference* (1911-18). See also in *Minutes* (1915, 1916) the report of the Committee on Public Morals. Details come from the correspondence of Mark Freeman, Harry B. Mansell, Wm. T. Cherry, and C. S. Buchanan and also from *The Malaysia Message*.

CHAPTER 4. FOLLOWING THE FLAG INTO THE PHILIPPINES

DEWEY'S GUNS AND MISSIONARY RESPONSE. For the politico-military background, including the Augustin y Davila quotation, see Leon Wolff, *Little Brown Brother; How the United States Purchased and Pacified the Philippine Islands at the Century's Turn* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company 1961). For Presbyterian reaction and Presbyterian-Methodist consultations, see

Arthur J. Brown, *The New Era in the Philippines* (New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1903); Homer C. Stuntz, *The Philippines and the Far East* (Cincinnati: Jennings and Pye, 1904); and "Minutes, Board of Managers, M.S.," 21 June and 19 July 1898.

METHODISTS' VIEWS, 1898-9. For A. B. Leonard, see *The Gospel in All Lands* (Aug., 1898), pp. 363 f. For A. J. Palmer, see *World-Wide Missions* (June, 1898), p. 4. For Bp. J. M. Thoburn, see his *India and Malaysia: Thirty-three Years a Missionary in India* (Cincinnati: Cranston & Curts, 1892), p. 504, as quoted in H. C. Stuntz, *The Open Door in the Philippines* (Missionary Society pamphlet, 1903), pp. 7 ff; the Bishop's diaries, which cover several decades of his public life and retirement (they are in the Library of Allegheny College); and citations in Kenneth M. MacKenzie, *The Robe and the Sword: The Methodist Church and the Rise of American Imperialism* (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1961), pp. 88, 97 f., and 111. MacKenzie also cites statements by Bp. F. W. Warne, W. F. Oldham, and others. See also Warne's view in Thoburn and Warne's *Light in the East* (Cincinnati: Jennings and Pye, 1900) Part II, p. 8.

OFFICIAL METHODIST ACTION, 1898-1900. For Missionary Society moves, see "Minutes, Board of Managers" (19 July, 2 Sept., and 20 Sept. 1898); A. B. Leonard correspondence, including the Board's letter to the Peace Commission, 22 Sept. 1898; Bp. Thoburn's correspondence; Pres. McKinley's statement to the Methodist delegation, *The Christian Advocate* (22 Jan. 1903), pp. 137 f.; and "Minutes, General Missionary Committee" (9, 10, 15, 18, and 21 Nov. 1899).

For McKinley's Pittsburgh speech, see the *Advocate* (7 Sept. 1899), p. 1428; for Lt. Paul Hurst's letter to Bp. J. F. Hurst, see the *Advocate* (28 Dec. 1899), p. 2110, and for the "Expansion Army," see *Minutes, Southwest Kansas Conference* (1900), pp. 201 and 209, and *World-Wide Missions* (April and May, 1900). The last source, however, incorrectly refers the Expansion Plan to the South Kansas Conference.

For Bp. Thoburn's first Manila visit, see the Thoburn-Leonard correspondence; the Thoburn diaries; Thoburn letter, 21 March 1899, in *World-Wide Missions* (June, 1899); Thoburn letter, 18 Feb. 1899, in *The Malaysia Message* supplement (March, 1899); Thoburn letter, 13 March 1899, in *The Indian Witness* (21 Apr. 1899); Thoburn report to the General Missionary Committee, in the *Advocate* (30 Nov. 1899), p. 1924.

For W.F.M.S. official and field action, see *Annual Report, W.F.M.S.* (1897-8, 1898-9, 1900-1901); *Woman's Missionary Friend* (Dec., 1898), p. 210, and (Jan., 1900), pp. 231 f. and 237; *Minutes, Malaysia Woman's Conference* (1901), p. 73; the article by J. Wisner and Dr. Norton in *The Malaysia Message* (Jan., 1901), pp. 1 f.; J. Wisner accounts in *Minutes, Malaysia Mission Conference* (1901), pp. 74 f.; field accounts in *The Gospel in All Lands* (1901), pp. 64-70 ff.; "Minutes, Philippine Islands District Conference" (1900), pp. 2, 10, and 17; and *Minutes, Malaysia Mission Conference* (1901), pp. 77 f.

UNOFFICIAL EFFORTS, 1898-9. The Stull incident is described in his "journal" quoted in Stuntz, *The Philippines and the Far East*, pp. 415 ff.; in a Stull account dated 2 Jan. 1898, in *World-Wide Missions* (Sept., 1899); and in Stull to Bp. C. C. McCabe, in *Minutes, Montana Conference* (1903). For the McCabe-Owens affair, see *Minutes, Puget Sound Conference* (1898); Owens's personal account in *World-Wide Missions* (Sept., 1899); *The Christian Advocate* (24

Nov. 1898), pp. 1900 and 1915 f.; and Leonard letters to Bp. C. C. McCabe and C. A. Owens. Also see references for Thoburn's first visit.

THE NEW FIELD. The early Prautch-Zamora activity in Manila is described by F. W. Warne in the *Daily Christian Advocate* (1900), p. 239; by James B. Rodgers in his *Forty Years in the Philippines: a History of the Philippine Mission of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, 1899-1939* (New York: The Board of Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, 1940); and a Prautch report in *World-Wide Missions* (March, 1900).

Personal and family details on Zamora come from Frank C. Laubach, *The People of the Philippines* (New York: Doran, 1925); Lewis B. Whittemore, *Struggle for Freedom: History of the Philippine Independent Church* (Greenwich, Conn.: Seabury Press, 1961); and Leon Wolff, *Little Brown Brother: How the United States Purchased and Pacified the Philippine Islands at the Century's Turn* (New York: Doubleday, 1961). On Zamora's ordination see *Minutes, South Kansas Conference* (1900); *General Conference Journal* (1900), pp. 343 f. and 657; Vincent-Thoburn cable, n.d., but ca. 8 March 1900, in Letter Book 171, p. 962; and *The Christian Advocate* (26 Apr. 1900), p. 665.

For the Martin and the McLaughlin periods, see A. B. Leonard's letters; Bp. F. W. Warne in *The Indian Witness* (22 Nov. 1900), p. 739; "Minutes, Philippine Islands District Conference" (1900 and 1901); *Minutes, Malaysia Mission Conference* (1900 and 1901), especially J. L. McLaughlin's District report in 1901, pp. 30 ff.; *The Gospel in All Lands* (May, Aug., and Oct., 1901), pp. 228 f., 376, and 477, respectively; *World-Wide Missions* (May, 1901); *The Christian Advocate* (19 Apr., 26 Apr., and 29 Nov. 1900), pp. 614, 665, and 1943, respectively; and Stuntz, *The Philippines and the Far East*, pp. 106 f.

COMITY. The chief sources are H. C. Stuntz, *The Philippines and the Far East*; A. J. Brown, *The New Era in the Philippines* (the comity agreement is on p. 190); Brown, *One Hundred Years: a History of the Foreign Missionary Work of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America* (New York: Board of Foreign Missions, Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A., 1937); J. B. Rodgers, *Forty Years in the Philippines*; *The Philippine Presbyterian* (Apr., 1921), pp. 3 ff.—evidently written with early Alliance and Union minutes at hand; Bp. Warne, "Third Visit to Manila," in *The Gospel in All Lands* (Aug., 1901), p. 374; John M. Dean, *The Cross of Christ in Bolo-land* (Chicago: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1902), Appendix B.; and Laubach, *The People of the Philippines*.

CHAPTER 5. EVANGELIZING THE PHILIPPINES

PROVINCIAL EXPANSION, 1901-5. See the comity sources for Chapter 4. For the new emphasis on church structures, see "Minutes, Philippine Islands District Conference" (April, 1901), pp. 28 ff. The expansion policy is described in H. C. Stuntz, *The Philippines and the Far East*.

The chief sources for the expansion process are "Minutes, Philippine Islands District Conference" (Mar., 1902); *Minutes, Philippine Islands District Conference* (Mar., 1903; 1904); *Minutes, Malaysia Mission Conference* (1902-4); *Minutes, Philippine Islands Mission Conference* (1905, 1906, 1910).

For the four unoccupied provinces, see A. J. Brown, *The New Era in the*

Philippines, p. 190; F. C. Laubach, *The People of the Philippines*, pp. 188 and 190; J. B. Rodgers, *Forty Years in the Philippines*, pp. 152 and 154; and L. B. Whittemore, *Struggle for Freedom*, p. 213.

MANILA AND VICINITY, 1901-8. See sources for expansion process (above), including additional years for the last reference.

And see also, for the American churches, *The Christian Advocate* (19 Dec. 1901), p. 2036, and (9 July 1903), p. 1112; *World-Wide Missions* (Mar., 1904); "Minutes, Board of Managers" (15 May 1906); the Board of Missions Foreign Property records; and the *Philippine Christian Advocate* (Feb., Aug., and Oct., 1907). For Chinese work, see also Daniel H. Klinefelter, *Adventures With God* (privately printed, 1933); *Minutes, Woman's Conference of the Philippine Islands Mission Conference* (1905, 1906). And see also for Filipino work, *Christianity in Earnest* (Jan.-Feb., 1900), pp. 47 f., on Knox Church; and the *Philippine Christian Advocate* (Mar. and Apr., 1908).

MISSIONARIES' HEALTH. Details are to be found in the Conference *Minutes*, numerous letters in the Correspondence File, and in "Minutes, Board of Managers." The two quotations are from Bp. W. F. Oldham to A. B. Leonard, 7 Sept. 1909, and *Minutes, Philippine Islands Conference* (1921), p. 69, respectively.

THE AGLIPAYAN SCHISM. For Aglipay's general background and activity, see Louis C. Cornish, *The Philippines Calling* (Philadelphia: Dorrance & Company, Inc., 1942); H. C. Stuntz, *The Philippines and the Far East*; L. B. Whittemore, *Struggle for Freedom*; and Vol. I of Pedro S. Achutegui and Miguel A. Bernard's *Religious Revolution in the Philippines: the Life and Church of Gregorio Aglipay, 1860-1960* (Manila: Ateneo de Manila, 1961). The Achutegui-Bernard volume is a Roman Catholic presentation. None of these treatments are fully satisfactory. Whittemore's is especially valuable for its quoted material.

For Stuntz on the Aglipay conference with Protestant leaders, see *The Christian Advocate* (16 Apr. 1903), pp. 623 f. For other Methodist reactions see Minutes of Conferences indicated; the *Advocate* (7 May 1903), p. 747; Bp. Warne's shake-the-tree comment in *The Malaysia Message* (Apr., 1903), pp. 68 f.; Stuntz's "loosening effect" in *World-Wide Missions* (Jan., 1905) and the Oldham-Rodgers statement in the issue for July; and Oldham's remarks to Aglipay in the *Advocate* (13 July 1905), p. 1102.

METHODIST SCHISMATICS. For the Baliuag affair, see A. E. Chenoweth to H. C. Stuntz, covered by Stuntz to A. B. Leonard, 15 Feb. 1905; Stuntz to Bp. H. W. Warren, 5 Jan. 1905; and *Minutes, Philippine Islands Mission Conference* (Feb., 1906), p. 44, and (March, 1905), pp. 25 f. and 35.

For the Tondo trouble, see J. L. McLaughlin's description of the Circuit in *World-Wide Missions* (Jan., 1905); *Minutes, Philippine Islands District Conference* (1905), p. 30; *Minutes, Philippine Islands Mission Conference* (1905), pp. 34 f., (1906), p. 43, and (1907), pp. 33 and 60; and Marvin A. Rader to [Harry Farmer], with Oldham letter enclosed, 9 Oct. 1906 (contributed). For the Filipino preachers' current discontent, see Oldham to Stuntz, 15 Apr. and 23 May 1905.

Bishop Oldham describes the Zamora secession in his letters, especially to A. B. Leonard, 23 and 25 Feb. 1909, and one cited in *The Christian Advocate* (13 May 1909), p. 745; in "The Philippine Situation," the *Advocate* (6 May 1909), pp. 701 f.; and in *The Malaysia Message* (Apr., 1909), pp. 50 f. *World-Wide Missions* (July, 1909), pp. 102 f., substantially presents Bp. J. W. Bash-

ford's account. See also M. A. Rader's Manila District report, *Annual Report, B.F.M.* (1909), pp. 349 f.; the correspondence of A. B. Leonard, H. C. Stuntz, H. Farmer, W. H. Teeter, D. H. Klinefelter, and M. A. Rader; and the Conference *Minutes* (1908-15).

NATIONALISM AND FILIPINIZATION, 1910-19. On the position of Filipinos in the ministry, see letters of Eveland, Oldham, and M. A. Rader. For Oldham's interview on the Jones Bill, see Farmer-Oldham letters, 1914; Eveland to Oldham, 13 June 1914; and *The Christian Advocate* (11 June 1914), p. 830.

SPECIAL MINISTRIES. In addition to regular field and Board sources, see for the W.F.M.S. work the Society's *Annual Reports*. Items on the Johnston Memorial Hospital are in the *Philippine Christian Advocate* (Oct., 1907); *The Christian Advocate* (1 Apr. 1909), p. 501; and *General Conference Journal* (1904), p. 905. Correspondence of E. S. Lyons and Bp. Eveland treats the Philippine sojourn of Dr. A. G. Nickles.

INTER-MISSION RELATIONS. Many references to Disciples of Christ affairs appear in the Conference *Minutes* from 1913 to 1920; see especially (1914), pp. 44 f. See many letters between Oldham and Eveland and in the correspondence of F. M. North, E. S. Lyons, and H. Farmer. In the North and Oldham files are numerous letters to and from Stephen J. Corey, the Disciples' secretary of the Foreign Christian Missionary Board; and see Bruce L. Kershner to Pres. A. McLean, presenting the views of a Disciples missionary contrary to Oldham's.

For the joint publishing projects, see the Conference *Minutes* (1911, 1912, 1914), pp. 18, 75, and 61, respectively, and *Annual Report, B.F.M.* (1912), p. 315. For the Union Church of Manila, see the Conference *Minutes* (1913, 1914, and Mar. and Dec., 1915) and Bp. Eveland letters, 1913 and 1914.

For the emergence of the Union Seminary, see historical sketches in H. Farmer to Geo. E. Nicholson, 12 Feb. 1915, and in the Conference *Minutes* (1911), pp. 48 f. Farmer's correspondence (partly contributed) is the most important, but see also that of F. M. North and Bp. John W. Robinson with S. J. Corey (1918-19).

The inter-Mission merger proposal appears in numerous letters, especially those of H. Farmer, E. S. Lyons, M. A. Rader, and F. M. North. The Farmer quotation is dated 19 Sept. 1914; the Oldham reply, 4 Nov. 1914.

CHAPTER 6. "ON TO BOLIVIA"

The relevant Conference journals are *Actas de la Conferencia Misionera de Sud-América Occidental* (1901-4); *Actas de la Conferencia Anual Andina* (1905-6); *Actas de la Conferencia Anual de los Andes* (1908-9); *Actas de la Conferencia Anual de Chile* (1910-16); and *Actas de la Conferencia Misionera de Bolivia* (1916). *Annual Reports, M.S.* and *B.F.M.* supplement the narrative material in these Spanish-language journals.

THE BEUTELSPACHER PERIOD, 1901-5. See Goodsil F. Arms, *History of the William Taylor Self-Supporting Missions in South America* (New York: The Methodist Book Concern, 1921); J. Lloyd Mecham, *Church and State in Latin America: A History of Politico-Ecclesiastical Relations* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1934), pp. 222-24; *Bolivia, Constitución Política del Estado y Reglamentos de Debates del Senado y de la Cámara de*

Disputados (La Paz, 1926); *The Gospel in All Lands* (Sept., 1901), pp. 404 f., and (Oct., 1901), p. 476; *Annual Reports, American Bible Society* (1898, 1902, 1903); Webster E. Browning, "The Romance of the Founding of Evangelical Missions in Latin America," n.d.; *The Christian Advocate* (23 Oct. 1902), p. 1701; H. E. Stillwell, *Pioneering in Bolivia* (Toronto: Canadian Baptist Foreign Mission Board, n.d.), pp. 101 f. and 137 f.; and Mrs. Roberto Olave's letter to Bp. C. C. McCabe, 20 Sept. 1904.

THE HARRINGTON PERIOD, 1906-8. See *General Conference Journal* (1908), p. 815; *Bolivia, Constitución Política*; Francis G. Penzotti, *Spiritual Victories in Latin America: The Autobiography of Rev. Francis G. Penzotti* (New York: American Bible Society, 1916); Browning, "The Romance," pp. 109 f.; A. G. Baker, "Memorial *re* Bolivian School Question," 1916; letters of Mr. and Mrs. F. M. Harrington; candidate papers of J. F. C. Harrington; G. M. McBride to Bp. H. C. Stuntz, 5 July 1913; letters of Secretary H. K. Carroll to F. M. Harrington and G. F. Arms (Book 152); and for the schools contract, "Minutes, Board of Managers" (20 Nov. 1906).

EVANGELISM, 1908-16. For the McBride-Schilling period (1908-12), see G. F. Arms to H. K. Carroll, 4 Mar. 1908; C. F. Hartzell to W. F. Oldham, 10 Jan. 1913; H. K. Carroll to G. M. McBride, 22 Apr. 1908 (Book 154); Secretary H. C. Stuntz to G. J. Schilling (Book 155), 24 Nov. 1909, 19 Jan. 1910, and 17 Feb. 1910 (quotation on New Testament plan); Stuntz to Bp. Frank M. Bristol (Book 155), 6 Jan. 1909 [1910; incorrectly dated]; and "Minutes, Board of Managers," 22 Oct. and 24 Nov. 1908. *Annual Report, B.F.M.* (1909), pp. 417 f., is important for the Aymará work. The account of Hartzell's administration (1912-16) is drawn from his correspondence.

THE INSTITUTES, 1911-16. The major sources for the establishment of Cochabamba Institute are the correspondence of J. E. Washburn (including his wife's letter to Dr. Fowler, 25 Feb. 1912) and Grace J. Washburn, "Early History of the Cochabamba School," a manuscript in the United Mission Library. See also a copy of the proposed government contract concerning the Institute enclosed in Washburn to the Minister of Instruction, 1 Sept. 1911; C. F. Hartzell to W. F. Oldham, 30 Jan. 1914; and Charles A. Irlé to Bp. H. C. Stuntz, 13 Jan. 1915.

For the Institute crisis of 1914-16, see the correspondence of J. E. Washburn (including Mrs. Washburn to Bp. H. C. Stuntz, 14 July 1914); C. A. Irlé to Stuntz, 13 Jan. and 29 Mar. 1915; Earl A. Robinson to G. M. Fowles, 28 Oct. 1916; Robinson, *et al.* to W. F. Oldham, 6 Sept. 1915; Bp. Oldham to S. E. Taylor, 16 and 19 Dec. 1916, and memo to Dr. [Harry] Farmer, 13 May 1919; F. M. North to Bp. Oldham, 24 Mar. 1917; Bp. Stuntz to W. F. Oldham, 28 Oct. 1914; Hallett Johnson memo to Bp. Oldham, 14 Dec. 1916; J. G. Brown to North, 3 Apr. 1918 and North to Brown, 8 Apr. 1918; A. Haddow to Dr. Brown, 16 Dec. 1916; and Moses Merubia to T. S. Donohugh, 19 Apr. 1928. The three letters on the pro-American orientation of the Institute in La Paz are Benjamin L. Miller of Lehigh University to Washburn, 8 Nov. 1915; Joseph T. Singlewall, Jr., of Johns Hopkins University to Washburn, 6 Nov. 1915; and Horace G. Knowles to Washburn, 28 Oct. 1915. See also Baker, "Memorial *re* Bolivian School Question," including Oldham to Baker, 16 Dec. 1916; Browning, "The Romance"; C. F. Hartzell, memorandum on unpaid subsidies, 23 May 1919; "Minutes, Executive Committee," 26 Apr. 1917; and "Minutes, Com-

mittee on Education in the Foreign Field," 16 July 1917. For the Bolivian Missionary Conference, see C. A. Irlle to G. H. Jones, 13 Mar. and 15 Oct. 1914.

CHAPTER 7. PROBING ECUADOR

For the public and Constitutional status of Protestantism and Catholicism, see J. Lloyd Mecham, *Church and State in Latin America* and Ramiro y Borja, *Las Constituciones del Ecuador* (Madrid: Ediciones Cultura Hispánica, 1951).

The latter nineteenth-century general activities of both American Bible Society and Methodist workers are treated substantially, though not always precisely, in Francis G. Penzotti, *Spiritual Victories in Latin America; the Autobiography of Rev. Francis G. Penzotti* (N.Y.: American Bible Society, 1916) and in Agnes J. Milne, *From Cape Horn to Quito With the Bible; Andrew Murray Milne* (Rosario, Argentina: 1942). We meet other Protestant workers in C. P. Chapman, *With the Bible Among the Andes* (Kansas City, Mo.: Gospel Missionary Union, n.d., but published as late as the middle 1940's). *Annual Reports, American Bible Society* are useful for this early phase and beyond.

The normal school project appears in the Board's Letter Books, especially the correspondence of H. K. Carroll from 1900 to 1902. Carroll writes to I. H. La Fetra, G. F. Arms, Bp. W. X. Ninde, Bp. C. C. McCabe, and A. W. Greenman, as well as to the field workers. Later letters are addressed to Robt. E. Speer (13 May 1904), Mrs. H. L. Williams (3 July 1907), La Fetra (22 Apr. and 22 May 1907), and Wood (29 Apr. 1907). Other letters, for the period 28 Oct. 1902 to 13 July 1903, were found in an informal letter book of Thomas B. Wood's.

The principal Letter Book source from 1908 to 1912 is Homer C. Stuntz, who writes to H. F. Compton, Taylor Compton, Philander C. Knox and Huntington Wilson (U.S. State Dept. officials), T. B. Wood, J. S. Willmarth, and V. M. McCombs. In Stuntz's personal file, see two letters to Bp. Wm. F. Oldham (25 May and 16 June 1914). See also a letter from Harry Compton to Bp. Oldham, 15 Apr. 1914. Certain minutes and reports relevant to the Committee on Co-operation in Latin America are in the World Division Correspondence File. Annual reports of the Committee, beginning as early as 1919, have been published.

Relevant Conference journals for the entire period are *Minutes, South America Mission* (1888); *Actas, Misión de la Iglesia Metodista Episcopal en Sud-América* (1891); *Minutes, South America Annual Conference* (1893, 1894); *Actas, Conferencia Anual de Sud-América* (1895-97); *Actas, Conferencia Misionera Occidental de Sud-América* (1898-1901); *Actas, Conferencia Occidental de Sud-América Anual* (1902-4); *Actas, Conferencia Misionera Andina del Norte* (1910-14). The minutes of the North Andes Mission (1905-9) were not available; appointments and statistics for this interval are in the General Minutes.

CHAPTER 8. ENTERING CENTRAL AMERICA

Panama

The basic Conference journal is *Actas, Conferencia Misionera Andina del Norte* (1910; 1911; Jan. and Dec., 1912; 1913; 1914; Jan., 1916). Minutes of the North Andes Mission, 1905-09, were not available. The only Panama Mission journal at hand was *Minutes* (1919).

The Wood-Neely-Carroll explorations of Panama are covered most fully in *Annual Report, M.S.* (1903), p. 402, T. B. Wood reporting; Bp. T. B. Neely to the Board, 10 Jan. 1905; Neely, article in *The Christian Advocate* (29 Mar. 1906), pp. 444 f.; and in H. K. Carroll's report, "Minutes, Board of Managers" (6 June 1905), pp. 350 f.

From 1905 to 1908, the many letters of Secy. H. K. Carroll (Books 151-54) are the source of special importance. See also the few by Bp. T. B. Neely; and his article in *The Christian Advocate* (30 Jan. 1908), pp. 170 f.

On Church and State, see J. Lloyd Meham, *Church and State in Latin America, and Constitution of Republic of Panama* (Panama: Imprenta "Star and Herald," 1904).

From 1908 to 1911, the letters of Secy. H. C. Stuntz (Books 154-55) are the special source. Stuntz to W. W. Gray, 22 Oct. 1908 (Book 154, pp. 349 f.) is his important policy letter. Bishop F. M. Bristol writes in *The Christian Advocate* (4 March 1909), pp. 330 f. *Annual Reports, B.F.M.* are steadily useful for these years.

Elsie J. Keyser, "Panama Panorama; a Collection of Letters" (n.d., but collected after 1948) supplies numerous details and impressions from 1911 to 1920, but requires checking as to some details.

For the general narrative for 1912-16, the letters of the following are basic: Secy. W. F. Oldham, Bp. H. C. Stuntz, H. Compton, C. W. Ports, and E. J. Keyser (only a few). There is no J. M. Taylor letter file. Two letters in Miss Keyser's file show him in correspondence with her. George A. Miller's *Prowling About Panama* (N.Y.: Abingdon, 1919) contributes some items. Miss Keyser's "Panama Panorama" is especially relevant, of course, to the Guachapalí story. Harry Compton makes an informative report to the North Andes Mission Conference of Jan., 1916 (*Actas*, pp. 10 f.).

The Union Church movement, and the Methodists' relation to it, may be traced in the reports of the Committee on the Religious Needs of Anglo-American Communities in Mission Fields, in *Annual Reports, Foreign Missions Conference of North America* (1914-20). See also *Christian Work in Latin America* (N.Y.: The Missionary Education Movement, 1917), Vol. III, pp. 154 f. The three volumes of this work contain the Commission reports presented to the Panama Congress of 1916. See Harry Owen to Board, 6 Oct. 1920 (letters of Committee on Religious Work in the Canal Zone); note wrong date for the Panama Congress. G. A. Miller describes the Union Church in *Prowling About Panama*, p. 233. For Harry Compton's attitude, see Compton to S. E. Taylor, 26 June 1916. On Compton and Miller, see E. J. Keyser's "Panama Panorama," p. 24. General sources for the David project of 1917 and after also refer to Union Church involvement.

The substance of the sessions of the Panama Congress is presented in *Christian Work in Latin America*. Bishop Rojas's broadside is filed with the first of three relevant letters from Harry Compton to W. F. Oldham (29 Sept., 1 Nov., and 7 Dec., 1915). The Panamanian President's ban is cited in Compton's correspondence and in *The Christian Advocate* (26 Aug. and 30 Sept., 1915), pp. 1162 f. and p. 1305, respectively. S. Earl Taylor writes on "Personalities and the Panama Congress" in *World Outlook* (April, 1916), p. 25. For the aftermath, see *Annual Reports, B.F.M.*, 1916 and 1918; and Elsie Keyser's "Panama Panorama," p. 35.

The general narrative for 1916-19 rests upon letters of G. A. Miller, Bp. W. F. Oldham, Bp. Stuntz, F. M. North, H. Compton, U. S. Brown, C. W. Ports,

and Secy. Harry Farmer. Among the recipients are S. E. Taylor and T. S. Donohugh.

For the David story, see especially *The Christian Advocate* (18 Oct. 1917); letter to Eusebio A. Morales, Panama's Secretary of Government and Justice (24 April 1917), filed with G. A. Miller correspondence; and various Miller letters.

West Indian policy under G. A. Miller is described in letters between Miller, W. F. Oldham, S. E. Taylor, F. M. North, and D. D. Forsyth, in 1917-18; and between Miller and Secy. Harry Farmer in the spring of 1919. There are some details on the work in *The Panama Progress* (1 April 1917), a small paper published by the Panama Mission.

Items of special interest for the Guachapalí project, from 1916 on, are Mrs. Harry Compton to W. F. Oldham (13 March 1916), H. Compton to J. M. Taylor (7 and 27 Dec. 1915), C. W. Ports to Oldham (18 and 19 Feb. 1916), Miller-Farmer correspondence (April-May, 1919), Miller to J. M. Taylor (5 Jan. 1916), Miller to North (19 Apr., 5 June, 24 June, 1918), Oldham to North (1 Sept. 1919), and of course, E. J. Keyser, "Panama Panorama."

Costa Rica

The relevant journal is *Minutes, Panama Mission* (1919).

For Methodist forerunners, see Wilton M. Nelson, "A History of Protestantism in Costa Rica" (Th.D. dissertation, Princeton Theological Seminary, 1957). This dissertation also appears in abridgement as *A History of Protestantism in Latin America* (printed at the Lucknow Publishing House, Lucknow, India, 1963). Francis G. Penzotti writes of his activities in *Spiritual Victories in Latin America, the Autobiography of Rev. Francis G. Penzotti, Agent of the American Bible Society for the La Plata Agency, South America* (trans. and edited by the Society; Centennial Pamphlet No. 16 of the American Bible Society; published in New York: American Bible Society, 1916). See also Penzotti's report in *Annual Report, American Bible Society* (1907), p. 72. For J. E. Wright, see William Taylor, *Story of My Life, An Account of What I Have Thought and Said and Done in My Ministry of More Than Fifty-three Years in Christian Lands and Among the Heathen, Written by Myself* (New York: Eaton & Mains, 1896), p. 678. and *The Christian Advocate* (23 June 1881), p. 392. For A. J. Church, see *Minutes, New England Southern Conference* (1906-07) and *The Advocate* (25 Feb. 1892), p. 120.

Protestantism's Constitutional status is discussed in J. Lloyd Mecham, *Church and State in Latin America*, and in Wilton Nelson's "History." See also Marco Tulio Zeledon, ed., *Digesto Constitucional de Costa Rica* (San José: Colegio de Abogados, 1946).

H. C. Stuntz's early policy views appear in his letter to W. W. Gray, 22 Oct. 1908 (Book 154, pp. 349 f.)

For the origin of the Costa Rica project, we turn to George A. Miller's pamphlet *Twenty Years After*. The quoted description of the Asilomar incident is found also, almost *verbatim*, in Elsie J. Keyser's "Panama Panorama," p. 27.

Numerous relevant letters, mostly 1916-20, a few in 1914, are in the correspondence files of G. A. Miller, W. F. Oldham, H. C. Stuntz, F. M. North, S. E. Taylor, C. W. Ports, John W. Butler, S. W. Edwards, U. S. Brown, and E. Zapata. Bishop F. J. McConnell, James M. Taylor, Harry Farmer, G. M. Fowles, and Clarence H. Markman are among the recipients.

Zapata's reports on his Costa Rica trip are in Zapata to J. W. Butler, 19 Oct.,

1 Nov., and 9 Nov., 1917 (in Butler file); and in a paper "Concerning the Exploring Trip to Costa Rica, Central America" (undated, but filed as of Oct., 1917) among the Zapata letters. There is a Spanish version of the latter in *Actas, Conferencia Anual de Mexico* (1918), pp. 102 ff. Miller's "Report on Proposed Work in Costa Rica" is filed with a Miller letter of 8 Nov. 1917.

For countermanding of the Zapata expulsion order, see copy of a government communication to the Mexican Legation in San José, filed with J. W. Butler to F. M. North, 1 Dec. 1917. The San José petition to the Mexico Conference is filed with J. W. Butler to F. M. North, 25 Jan. 1918 (Butler file).

Wilton M. Nelson's "History" discusses Francis W. Boyle and the relation of the Central American Mission to the general missionary movement.

CHAPTER 9. NEW MISSIONS IN OLD EUROPE

The Continental Pattern

Organizational details are gathered from numerous general sources. Among the special sources are *Minutes, Central Council of the Methodist Episcopal Church in Europe* (1895); *Minutes, Second European Methodist Episcopal Church Congress* (1903); *Minutes, Third European Congress of the Methodist Episcopal Church* (1907); and *Minutes, Central Conference of Europe* (1911).

Bishop Vincent's views are presented in his "An Appeal to the Members of the General Missionary Committee of the Methodist Episcopal Church in Behalf of the Work of Our Church in Europe" (Zurich: privately printed, 20 Oct. 1900), filed with a covering letter, Bp. Vincent to Bp. Walden, 18 Oct. 1900; *Annual Report, M.S.* (1901), pp. 48 f.; *Annual Report* (1902), pp. 60 f.; and *Annual Report* (1903), pp. 60 f.; and *World-Wide Missions* (Nov., 1903), p. 13. For Bp. Goodsell's views, see his article "Methodist Episcopal Mission in Europe," *World-Wide Missions* (Jan., 1901), p. 7.

See Bishop Burt's article "Why Do We Send Missionaries to Roman Catholic Countries?" in *The Christian Advocate* (13 Nov. 1902), p. 1815, and his book *Europe and Methodism* (New York: Eaton & Mains, 1909). His fraternal address to the Irish Wesleyan Conference is published in the *Advocate* (19 July 1906), pp. 1083. See also "Why Are Methodist Missions in Protestant Europe?" (editorial) in the *Advocate* (6 Feb. 1896), p. 82. In addition to the various fuller statements in the Minutes of the sessions of the all-Europe gatherings of 1895, 1903, 1907, and 1911, scattered expressions of relevant Methodist views appear in *The Gospel in All Lands*, the *Advocate*, and *World-Wide Missions*.

Austria-Hungary

The Minutes for the work connected with Germany are *Verhandlungen, Jährlichen Konferenz in Norddeutschland* (1898-1909), especially the extensive relevant passages in the District reports. See also supplementary accounts in *Annual Reports, M.S.* and *B.F.M.* The Minutes for the Trieste mission are *Sessioni, Conferenza Annuale d'Italia* (1898-1911). See also *Minutes, Central Conference of Europe* (1911).

Additional sources for the Germany-related work include R. Möller, "Methodism in Vienna," *The Gospel in All Lands* (July, 1898, pp. 315 ff.); G. G. Findlay and W. W. Holdsworth, *The History of the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society*, Vol. IV (London: The Epworth Press, 1922); Adolf Keller, *Church and State on the European Continent* (London: The Epworth Press,

1936); Hans Klecatsky and Hans Weiler, *Österreichisches Staatskirchenrecht* (Vienna: Druck und Verlag der Österreichischen Staatsdruckerei, 1958), pp. 10-46, 62-76, and 418, for full texts of Austrian ecclesiastical law; an article by Baroness Langenau in *The Gospel in All Lands* (Jan., 1899), p. 1; and letters of R. Möller and Bp. D. A. Goodsell.

Additional sources for Hungary include the Möller article; Möller's letters; Bp. Burt's report in *General Conference Journal* (1908), p. 798; *The Gospel in All Lands* (March, 1901), p. 107; F. H. O. Melle, "Methodism in Germany," *World-Wide Missions* (Nov., 1901), pp. 12 f.; Bp. Burt in *The Christian Advocate* (3 Nov. 1904), p. 1789; and for Hungarian ecclesiastical law, *Digest-Index of Eastern European Law [Mid-European Law Project] Hungary Churches and Religion*, compiled by John Fischer and Hugo Kalnosky.

Additional sources for Trieste include Wm. Burt, "Methodism in Austria," *World-Wide Missions* (March, 1901), p. 8; "The Evangelical Church in Austria," typed copy of a July, 1905, statement by Felice Dardi forwarded to A. B. Leonard, 11 Aug. 1905; four letters in the Dardi file that concern the U.S. State Department (Elihu Root to A. B. Leonard, 3 Oct. and 25 Nov. 1905; Bellamy Storer to Root, 9 Nov. 1905; Felician Slataper to Storer, (30 Oct. 1905); a *Christian Advocate* discussion of Dardi and his legal troubles (15 June 1906, p. 927); *Annual Reports, W.F.M.S.* (1905, 1906); Bp. Burt to Leonard, 23 Mar. 1906; a Burt interview, *The Christian Advocate* (11 Oct. 1906), p. 1566; *Österreichisches Staatskirchenrecht*; Bp. Burt's report, *General Conference Journal* (1908), p. 798; report by A. B. Leonard, "Minutes, Board of Managers" (11 Oct. 1910), p. 381; and report by H. C. Stuntz, "Minutes, General Missionary Committee" (16 Nov. 1911), p. 116.

For the organization of the Austria-Hungary work from 1907, see *Annual Report, B.F.M.* (1907), p. 97; *General Minutes* (Spring, 1907), pp. 100 f.; *The Christian Advocate* (3 Aug. 1911), p. 1037; *Sessione, Conferenza Annuale d'Italia* (1911), p. 62; and *General Minutes* (Spring, 1911), p. 82 f. For the work to 1914, see *Annual Reports, B.F.M.* (especially 1915); relevant *General Minutes*; *Verhandlungen Jährlichen Konferenz in Norddeutschland* (especially 1909); Bp. Burt's reports in *General Conference Journal* (1908, 1912); F. H. O. Melle's letters; and *Minutes, Central Conference of Europe* (1911).

France

The chief general source for the founding of the Mission is "Minutes, General Missionary Committee" (1904-6). The early European proposal for French work is cited in *Minutes, Central Council of the Methodist Episcopal Church in Europe* (1895). *Sessioni, Conferenza Annuale d'Italia* (1905-10) gives details on Italian work in Marseille (Marsiglia). Official Minutes for the France Mission and the France Mission Conference up to 1914 were not available, thus making necessary fuller use of *General Minutes* than usual.

William Burt, *Europe and Methodism* briefly describes the founding, but inaccuracies and omissions cast doubt on its reliability as a precise statement on John S. Huyler's initiative in the undertaking. Similarly, the earlier historical details in George H. Jones's typewritten report on France in 1913 are only partly useful. This report (a section in "Report on Special Visitation to Certain of Our Mission Fields," in the United Mission Library's Europe file) is otherwise valuable for the pre-War period.

For Huyler's background, see "In Memory of John S. Huyler" (privately printed, ca. 1910); also obit in *Minutes, New York Conference* (1911). A. H.

Lambert's pastoral record is in *Minutes, New York Conference*; and see *World-Wide Missions* (Oct., 1903) and *The Christian Advocate* (6 Dec. 1906), p. 1923.

For French ecclesiastical law, Adolf Keller, *Church and State on the European Continent* is valuable. For the general church situation, both Keller and Louise S. Houghton, *Handbook of French and Belgian Protestantism* (N. Y.: Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, 1919) have been used.

A. B. Leonard reports on France in "Minutes, Board of Managers" (11 Oct. 1910), p. 382.

The correspondence of E. W. Bysshe constitutes the most important field source. The file includes his Superintendent's report to the France Mission Conference, 30 April 1913. There are a few letters by A. H. Lambert and by Bishop William Burt that are relevant. The most important source for the New York office is the letters of H. C. Stuntz. These, along with letters of H. K. Carroll, A. B. Leonard, and other Board officers, are mostly in Letter Books 195 and 196, mainly addressed to Bysshe. A few items are in Books 152 and 190.

The most important periodical source is *The Christian Advocate*. *World-Wide Missions* provides some substantial items. *Woman's Missionary Friend* (Oct., 1909), p. 354, gives a statement by Bishop Burt on the purpose of the Mission.

CHAPTER 10. EUROPEAN MISSIONS WITHOUT MISSIONARIES

Switzerland

ITALIAN MISSIONS. The Conference Minutes for Italian work are *Sessioni, Conferenza Annuale d'Italia* (1890-1914); see especially the District Superintendents' reports. For Geneva beginnings, see *The Gospel in All Lands* (July, 1885), p. 330; William Burt, ed., *The Italy Mission of the Methodist Episcopal Church* (Roma: Tipografia Metodista, 1898), pamphlet; *Minutes, Philadelphia Conference* (1889, 1890).

SWITZERLAND CONFERENCE. The Minutes are *Verhandlungen der Sitzungen der Jährlichen Konferenz der Bischöflichen Methodistenkirche in der Schweiz* (1896-1914). The financial patterns are established in Henry K. Carroll's letters to Leonhard Peter. See especially 27 Feb., 18 and 30 Apr., 9 Nov., 1906. For deaconess work, see C. Golder, *History of the Deaconess Movement in the Christian Church* (Cincinnati: Jennings and Pye, 1903), pp. 140 f. Also *General Conference Journal* (1936), p. 1122.

Germany

The relevant Minutes are *Verhandlungen der Jährlichen Konferenz der Bischöflichen Methodistenkirche in Süddeutschland* and *Verhandlungen der Jährlichen Konferenz der Bischöflichen Methodistenkirche in Norddeutschland*.

For the Wesleyan union of 1897, see a full report of the General Missionary Committee session in *The Christian Advocate* (28 Nov. 1895), p. 773. Bishop Goodsell's letters carry copious details; see those of 26 July, 1 Oct., and 3 Oct., 1896, and of 8 Jan. and 30 Apr., 1897. For the General Conference debate, see *The Christian Advocate* (21 May 1896), p. 340. Wesleyan commentary is quoted in *The Gospel in All Lands* (May, 1897), p. 247. For a British Wesleyan account of the German Wesleyans and of the union, see G. G. Findlay and W. W. Holdsworth, *The History of the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society*, Vol. IV (The Epworth Press, 1922), pp. 460-476.

The United Brethren union of 1905 is described in *Annual Report, M.S.* (1905), pp. 73, 78, and 79 f.

For the deaconess work, see C. Golder, *History of the Deaconess Movement in the Christian Church* (Cincinnati: Jennings and Pye, 1903), pp. 128-59.

Finland

The Minutes are, from 1903, *Protokoll fördt vid Metodist-Episkopal-Kyrkans i Finland Missionskonferens* (with variants) and *Minutes, Finland and St. Petersburg Mission Conference* (1908).

See letters by G. A. Hidén, B. A. Carlson (1903-4), N. J. Rosén (file includes the memorial to the General Conference, 24 March 1904), J. W. Häggmann, G. A. Simons, Bp. J. H. Vincent, and Bp. D. A. Goodsell. Letters from Secretaries A. B. Leonard, A. J. Palmer, and H. K. Carroll are in Letter Books 192 and 194. The Vincent file includes "An Appeal to the Members of the General Missionary Committee . . ." (dated 20 Oct. 1900).

Russia

The narrative rests substantially upon *Annual Reports, M.S.*, and *Annual Reports, B.F.M.*, for appropriate years. *Annual Report, B.F.M.* (1920), p. 551, refers to Freiberg and the Lettish Moravians.

See the few letters of B. A. Carlson for 1889, 1891, and 1903; also a reference to his correspondence in "Minutes, Board of Managers" (16 June 1903), pp. 251 f. For other details about Carlson, see *Protokoll fördt vid Metodist-Episkopalkirkans i Sverige Arskonferens* (1889-91).

For later details about Carlson and Conference relations of other preachers in Russia, see from 1903 *Protokoll fördt vid Metodist-Episkopal-Kyrkans i Finland Missionskonferens* (and variants).

For Heinrich Ramke and George R. Durdis in relation to Kaunas, see *Verhandlungen der Jährlichen Konferenz der Bischöflichen Methodistenkirche in Norddeutschland* for various years 1900-1906.

The fairly limited 1907-12 correspondence of George A. Simons is an important source. The quotation on the Orthodox Church is from a Simons circular letter of 17 Oct. 1908. Among the 1911 letters is "Report of the Superintendent," which fully describes Täht's activity on Sarema. See also a few additional letters to Simons from A. B. Leonard, H. K. Carroll, and H. C. Stuntz in Letter Books 192, 194, and 195, respectively. For this period there are also informative letters in Simons's post-1912 file through 1914. Simons to Bp. John L. Nuelsen, 18 Oct. 1922, enclosed in Nuelsen to F. M. North, 30 Nov. 1922, refers to the purchase of the Leningrad property in 1914. Simons is quoted at length on Virbalis in *World-Wide Missions* (May, 1909), p. 77.

Minutes, Finland and St. Petersburg Mission Conference (1908) is a full source. It is the only Finland Minutes in English. The Salmi license is on p. 29. There are no published Minutes of the Russia Mission available.

Denmark

The narrative is based chiefly on *Annual Reports* of the Missionary Society and of the Board of Foreign Missions. See especially the *Report* for 1913, which carries a full description of Central Mission work, and that for 1919, which includes a history of Methodist social work in Denmark (pp. 397-401). For Anton Bast and for the Central Mission see *World-Wide Missions* for Sept.,

1909, and for May, 1912. The Minutes for Denmark are *Forhandlings-Protokol for den biskoppelige Metodistkirkes danske Praedikanteres Aarsmode, Forhandlings-Protokol for den biskoppelige Metodistkirkes danske Missionskonference* (from 1901), and *Forhandlings-Protokol for den biskoppelige Metodistkirkes danske Aarskonference* (from 1911).

Sweden

This account is drawn mainly from *Annual Reports, M.S., and B.F.M.*, supported by the Minutes of the Sweden Conference. The latter are published as *Protokoll fördrd vid Metodist-Episkopal-Kyrkans i Sverige Aarskonferens*. After 1907, the title is *Metodist-Episkopal-Kyrkans i Sverige Arsbok*.

For data on Swedish foreign missionaries, see *World-Wide Missions* (Nov., 1911), p. 170. Jansson on conditions in Sweden is quoted from the April issue, p. 59.

Norway

The chief source is *Annual Reports, M.S. and B.F.M.* The Minutes for 1905 to 1914 appear in various years as *Referat af Aarskonferensen for den Biskoppelige Methodistkirkes Mission i Norge* and as *Konferencens Forhandlinger den Biskoppelige Metodistkirches*, with further minor variations.

CHAPTER 11. CONFLICT IN ITALY

Basic sources include *Sessioni, Conferenza Annuale Italiana* (1889-92); *Sessioni, Conferenza Annuale d'Italia* (from 1893); *Annual Reports, M.S.* (1873-1906); *Annual Reports, B.F.M.* (1907-19); "Minutes, Board of Managers"; "Minutes, Committee on Europe"; "Minutes, General Missionary Committee" (to 1911); *Proceedings, General Committee of Foreign Missions* (1912-15); "Minutes, Finance Committee, Italy"; and *Minutes, Central Conference of Europe* (1911).

A great many relevant letters are to be found in the correspondence files of L. M. Vernon, Wm. Burt (both as missionary and as Bishop), E. Powell, E. E. Count, N. W. Clark, E. Peter, A. W. Greenman, Salvatore Mastrogiovanni, B. M. Tipple, E. S. Stackpole, A. B. Leonard, C. C. McCabe, J. O. Peck, H. K. Carroll, G. M. Fowles, F. M. North, Bp. J. L. Nuelsen, Bp. J. L. Walden, and the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society.

Periodical sources include *World-Wide Missions, The Gospel in All Lands, The Christian Advocate, The Methodist Review*, and *The North American Review* (1910). And see for the Fairbanks-Roosevelt-Vatican affair of 1910, the *New York Herald*.

Among the miscellaneous materials are J. M. Reid and J. T. Gracey, *Missions and Missionary Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church*, Vol. III, pp. 275 ff.; Everett S. Stackpole, *4½ Years in the Italy Mission: a Criticism of Missionary Methods* (Lewiston, Maine: printed at the Journal Office, 1894); Lebbeus H. Rogers, comp., *In Memory of John S. Huyler* (privately printed, ca. 1910); George Heber Jones, "Report on Special Visitation to Certain of Our Fields," (1913), pp. 1-38; R. Santi, *Casa Materna* (leaflet, 1944); R. Santi, *Lasciate I Fanciulli Venire a Me* (leaflet, n. date); *Casa Materna: 50 years of Life, Work, and Faith* (pamphlet, n. date); Bertrand M. Tipple, *Methodism in Italy* (pamphlet, n. date); A. B. Leonard, *Methodism in North Africa and*

Europe, pamphlet (New York: Board of Foreign Missions, October, 1910); Adna W. Leonard, *The Roman Catholic Church at the Fountain Head in the Light of the Fairbanks-Roosevelt-Vatican Incidents* (Cincinnati: Press of Jennings and Graham, 1910); and Foreign Property Records for Naples and Venice, Central Records Department, Board of Global Ministries, United Methodist Church.

CHAPTER 12. NEW LEADERSHIP IN BULGARIA

The special general source for Bulgaria is *Minutes, Bulgaria Mission Conference* (1892-1911), other years being unavailable. The year 1908 is in Bulgarian.

BULGARIA POLICY. The materials for the controversy over the Bulgaria Mission, 1896-1905, come chiefly from "Minutes, General Missionary Committee," with complementary reports in *The Christian Advocate* and from the Correspondence File.

In the correspondence of the Secretaries, there are various letters from W. T. Smith to Bp. D. A. Goodsell; J. O. Peck to L. T. Guild, S. Thomoff, and G. S. Davis; C. C. McCabe to Bp. J. N. FitzGerald, G. S. Davis, T. P. Semerdjettz, and M. E. Vulcheff; H. K. Carroll to Bp. J. H. Vincent, P. Todoroff, and F. J. Huback; and A. B. Leonard to Bp. Vincent. All are in Books 116 and 117 except one Carroll letter to Vincent (Book 119, p. 30).

Bishop D. A. Goodsell's letters are the most valuable for direct description of conditions on the field, especially one to W. T. Smith, 30 April 1897. The letters of G. S. Davis and of Bp. J. H. Vincent fill out the picture, along with one or two from T. Constantine. Bp. Wm. Burt to H. K. Carroll, 1 May 1905, introduces the fresh approach on the field.

JUSTIFICATION FOR THE MISSION. Essential statements are found in *Minutes, Central Council in Europe* (1895, 1903, 1907, 1911). See variant titles above. Bishop Burt's statement on Orthodoxy is in *The Christian Advocate* (6 Sept. 1906), p. 1373. S. Thomoff writes in the *Advocate* (28 Oct. 1897), p. 700. There are two important letters from E. E. Count—to H. K. Carroll, 20 Sept. 1907; to F. M. North, 3 May 1913. A. B. Leonard to Bp. D. A. Goodsell is in Book 189, p. 252.

RELATIONS WITH THE AMERICAN BOARD. The useful general sources include "Minutes, Board of Managers" (1855-63); "Minutes, General Missionary Committee" (1892, 1909); *Annual Reports, M.S.* (1855-59); *Annual Reports, B.F.M.* (1907-8); and for the American Board, *Annual Reports, A.B.C.F.M.* (1856, 1858, 1863, 1903-9)

Useful for American Board background and developments, but subject to a major reservation stated in the Notes at the end of Chapter 12, is William W. Hall, Jr., *Puritans in the Balkans: the American Board Mission in Bulgaria, 1878-1918, a Study in Purpose and Procedure* (Studia Historico-Philologica Serdicensia, Supplementi Vol. I. Sofia: 1938).

For the earliest period, the letters of J. P. Durbin are most important. They are in "Bulgaria Letter Book" (1854-66). (For variant listing, see Barclay, Vol. III, p. 1140, note 225, and p. 1154, "Letters. . .") A single letter from R. Anderson, Secretary of the A.B.C.F.M., 12 Dec. 1856, is copied into this book. Our only source for the crucial Durbin comity letter of 1862 is a quotation in J. O. Peck to G. S. Davis, 22 Oct. 1892 (Book 115, p. 494). Minor use is made of Cyrus Hamlin, *Among the Turks* (N.Y.: Robert Carter and Brothers, 1878).

See also *The Christian Advocate* (1858), p. 5, and *The Missionary Advocate* (1857-8). The latter is nondenominational, and not to be confused with the Baptist paper of the same title.

For the 1892 incident, there are a few items in the letter file of G. S. Davis—especially Davis to the Secretaries, 14 Oct. 1892; and N. G. Clark to J. O. Peck, 6 Feb. 1893, covering H. C. Haskell to N. G. Clark, endorsed by F. R. Kingsbury *et al.*, 24 Dec. 1892. J. O. Peck's correspondence (Books 115 and 116) is basic; it includes letters to G. S. Davis, N. G. Clark, Bp. I. W. Joyce, and S. Thomoff.

For the later Sofia case (1906-09) E. E. Count's letter to H. K. Carroll, 22 Dec. 1906, is important; also his letter to H. C. Stuntz, 14 Oct. 1909. In Letter Book 117 are letters of H. K. Carroll to J. L. Barton, E. E. Count, E. F. Bell, and Bp. Wm. Burt; A. B. Leonard letters to Barton and Count; and H. C. Stuntz letters to Count and G. D. Marsh. The *Minutes* of the Bulgaria Mission Conference, especially the various reports, are informative.

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY. For the incident of 1909-11, E. E. Count's correspondence is basic. See Count to H. C. Stuntz, 29 Oct. 1909, 17 Dec. 1910, and 4 Jan. 1911. The January letter includes Count's to John R. Carter, n.d.; and with it is filed P. Knox to H. C. Stuntz, 25 Jan. 1911. The incident also is covered in W. W. Hall, Jr., *Puritans in the Balkans*, and Count reports it in *Minutes, Bulgaria Mission Conference* (1911) and *Annual Reports, B.F.M.* (1910). On the U.S. State Department, see "Minutes, General Missionary Committee" (1911), p. 115.

Earlier and background materials on the issue include Benoit Brunswik, *Le Traité de Berlin* (Paris: E. Plon et Cie., Imprimeurs-Éditeurs, 1878), the texts of the Treaty of Berlin and of other relevant treaties appearing in the appendix; also statements in *The Christian Advocate* by Bp. D. A. Goodsell (1899), p. 1100, and by M. G. Vulcheff (1903), pp. 1466 f., and one by Trico Constantine in *Minutes, Second European Congress* (1903), pp. 50 f.

BALKAN WARS AND AFTERMATH. The rich letters of Mr. and Mrs. Count are the chief source. Bishop J. L. Nuelsen's also are valuable. Much narrative material is found in *Annual Reports, B.F.M.* (1912-14). For the Lovech School, see an account by Kate E. Moss in *Woman's Missionary Friend* (Aug., 1913), and *Annual Reports, W.F.M.S.* (1913), pp. 207 f. and (1914), pp. 219 ff. Various supporting details are scattered through *The Christian Advocate*.

CHAPTER 13. WARRING EUROPE, 1914-1918

The treatment draws heavily upon two sources: *The Christian Advocate* (1914-19), especially for developments in the United States; and numerous letters of Bp. John L. Nuelsen, especially for developments in Europe and for the relations between his episcopal administration of the European field and the church in the United States. Nuelsen's correspondence file includes relevant letters from Board Secretaries. His illuminating typescript "Some Human War Documents" is filed as of 2 Sept. 1914. The fullest statements of his position on the war and his presentation of the German cause are his letters to Dan B. Brummitt, 18 Nov. 1914 (enclosed with letter to W. F. Oldham 21 Nov.), and to C. Golder, 25 Feb. 1915. But all of Nuelsen's correspondence is important.

The open letter from the Germany committee of seventeen (March, 1915) is in the Correspondence File (Europe, Sept. 1914 to Dec. 1918) in printed form in both German and English versions, with a covering letter from Theophil Mann

to S. E. Taylor. *The Christian Advocate* title is slightly variant from the original, which is used in this volume.

The important formal sources are *Minutes, General Committee on Foreign Missions* (1914-15); *Journal, Annual Meeting of the Board of Foreign Missions* (1916-19); *General Conference Journal* (1916, 1920); *Daily Christian Advocate* (1916); and the *Annual Reports, B.F.M.* The *Reports* for 1914, 1915, and 1918 are the most informative on general developments (see the reports of the Corresponding Secretaries and of Bp. Nuelsen, especially Nuelsen's for 1918). All the *Reports* carry news of separate fields.

The statements of Bp. Henderson, Geo. R. Grose, and F. M. North are as quoted by Roy H. Abrams in *Preachers Present Arms* (New York, Round Table Press, 1933). On Henderson statements, see also *Minutes, New Jersey Conference* (1918), p. 350, and *Minutes, Philadelphia Conference* (1918), p. 272. For Wilson at the New York East Conference, see its *Minutes* (1918).

Board action on the Kupfer case is covered by letters of F. M. North to Bp. J. W. Bashford (16 and 17 July 1918), to Bp. W. S. Lewis (23 July and 6 Aug. 1918), and to Bp. Bashford, 27 Aug. 1918.

The chief general sources of information on particular countries are Bp. Nuelsen's letters, his reports in the *General Conference Journals* for 1916 and 1920, and the *Annual Reports, B.F.M.* Occasional items are drawn from *The Christian Advocate*.

Also see, for *Austria-Hungary*, F. H. Otto Melle to F. M. North, 14 Apr. 1915, enclosed in Nuelsen to North, 27 Apr. 1915; for *Bulgaria*, letters of Elmer E. Count and *Annual Reports, W.F.M.S.*; for *France*, the correspondence of Ernest W. Bysshe; for *Russia*, the correspondence of Geo. A. Simons (especially Simons to North, 6 July 1915) and several letters of Nuelsen's on *Kaunas* and *Virbalis* (especially 30 Dec. 1914; 31 Aug. 1915 and its enclosure of H. Schaedel to Nuelsen, 23 Aug. 1915; 19 Feb. 1916; and 26 Oct. 1917).

CHAPTER 14. AFRICA

Liberia

The substantial general sources are *Minutes, Liberia Conference* (1895-1920); *Annual Reports, M.S.* and *B.F.M.* (especially reports on Africa in the *General Conference Journals*). Letters of the following are important: Bp. J. C. Hartzell, Bp. I. B. Scott, M. A. Sharp, A. P. Camphor (in his missionary, pre-episcopal phase), and W. B. Williams. See also Walter B. and Maude W. Williams. *Adventures with the Krus in West Africa* (New York: Vantage Press, 1955).

Mozambique

Reports and data drawn from the Conference Minutes are used extensively in this chapter. The titles are *Minutes, Congo Mission Conference* (1897-8-9); *Minutes, East Central Africa Mission Conference* (1901-15); *Minutes, Portuguese East Africa Mission Conference* (1916); *Inhambane Mission Conference* (1917 and 1919); *Southeast Africa Mission Conference* (from 1920). The Minutes are supplemented to some extent by *Annual Reports, M.S.*, and *B.F.M.*

Letters constitute the other substantial source. See those of E. H. Richards (they include one from the African teachers, 26 Jan. 1900), Bp. J. C. Hartzell (especially Hartzell to Governor-General F. Andrade, 5 July 1909). F. D. Wolf (a few privately contributed letters to the Missionary Board of Control of

Northwestern University), W. C. Terril, P. W. Keys, C. J. Stauffacher, F. M. North (principally to Terril), and one from the African preachers, in Hartzell's file, 24 July 1915. The letters of Richards and of Terril are the most fully informative.

See Terril's pamphlet *The Ethiopian Movement at Inhambane*, 1918.

Angola

The Angola account is based on *Minutes, Congo Mission Conference* (1897-99); *Minutes, West Central Africa Mission Conference* (1902-15, 1919); and *Annual Reports, M.S. and B.F.M.*

CHAPTER 15. EASTERN SOUTH AMERICA

The general sources for the four Eastern South America fields are *Actas, Conferencia Anual de Sud-América* (1895-1909) and *Actas, Conferencia Anual Este de Sud-América* (1910-19). Although the name of the Conference was changed by General Conference action in 1908, the published Minutes did not bear the new name until 1910.

For the closing of the Paraguay mission, see two letters from Bp. Stuntz to W. F. Oldham, 27 Feb. 1913 and 15 July 1914, and the Minutes of the Executive Committee of the Committee on Co-operation in Latin America for 27 Sept. 1916 (pp. 3, 4, 5) and for 12 Jan. 1918 (p. 9).

For the Rio Grande do Sul transfer in Brazil, see the letters of Secretary W. T. Smith to Bp. William X. Ninde and to Bp. Eugene R. Hendrix of the Church, South, 17 Apr. 1900; "Minutes, Board of Managers," 24 Apr. and 19 June 1900; and *Annual Report, Board of Missions, Methodist Episcopal Church, South* (1901), pp. 68-70. Justus Nelson's letter to Bp. William F. Oldham, 28 Feb. 1925 is important for his extended ministry in Belém.

CHAPTER 16. WESTERN SOUTH AMERICA

Chile

The Conference Minutes for general references are *Actas, Conferencia Anual de Sud-América* (1893-97); *Actas, Conferencia Misionera de Sud-América Occidental* (1898-1900); *Actas de la Conferencia de Sud-América Occidental y de la Conferencia Anual de Sud-América Occidental* (1901); *Actas, Conferencia Occidental de Sud-América Anual* (1902-4); *Actas, Conferencia Anual Andina* (1905-6); *Actas, Conferencia Anual de los Andes* (1907-8); *Actas, Conferencia Anual de Chile* (1909-20).

For the period of transition to Missionary Society administration, see the pamphlet *The Chile Mission of the Methodist Episcopal Church, 1878-93* (Santiago, Chile: Published by the Mission, 1894); *Minutes, District Conference of the Chile District, South America Annual Conference* (1895, 1897); the pamphlet *Actions of the Board of Managers of the Missionary Society, the General Missionary Committee, and the General Conference in regard to Self-Supporting Missions in Chile*; "Minutes, Board of Managers," Vols. 15-20; "Minutes, General Missionary Committee," Vol. D; *The Christian Advocate* (1896), pp. 797 f., and (1897), pp. 259 f. and 768); *Report of Transit and Building Fund Society of Bishop William Taylor's Self-Supporting Missions*

From November 1, 1889, to December 31, 1890; same title, 1 Jan. 1891 to 1 Jan. 1892; *The Transit and Building Fund Society of Self-Supporting Missions to the Missionary Board of the Methodist Episcopal Church, New York City, October, 1897* (pamphlet); "Dear Brethren of the Committee," a typed letter of the Transit and Building Fund Society to a special committee of the Board of Managers, Sept.-Oct., 1893; numerous letters of Secretaries A. B. Leonard, W. T. Smith, and H. K. Carroll in Letter Books 145, 146, and 88 (I. H. La Fetra was their most frequent correspondent); and letters of W. C. Hoover, I. H. La Fetra, and W. F. Albright.

The sections on evangelism and on institutions draw heavily on the Conference Minutes (see above) supplemented by *Annual Reports, M.S. and B.F.M.* Letters of W. C. Hoover provide additional details on the Punta Arenas mission. For Powell's orphanage, see W. F. Albright to W. T. Smith, 4 Jan. 1900; *The Chile Mission . . . 1878-93*; and *Minutes, District Conference . . .* (1895, 1897).

Sources for the pentecostal schism included W. C. Hoover, "Pentecost in Chile," *World Dominion* (April, 1932), pp. 155 ff., for the Abrams quotations and other items; W. C. Hoover, *Historia del Avivamiento Pentecostal* (Valparaíso: Imprenta Excelsior, 1948), 128 pp., a photo copy of which is in the Missionary Research Library, New York City, as is a translation prepared by Deanna D. Gomez and the author of this volume; Hoover's Central District reports in *Actas* (1909, 1910); Webster E. Browning, John Ritchie and Kenneth G. Grubb, *The West Coast Republics of South America: Chile, Peru and Bolivia* (New York: World Dominion Press, 1930), p. 31; David C. Brackenridge, "Pentecostal Progress in Chile," *World Dominion* (Sept.-Oct., 1951), pp. 295 ff.; "Minutes, General Missionary Committee" (1909-10); "Minutes, Board of Managers" (1910); letters to B. O. Campbell, 25 July and 31 Oct. 1910; Bp. T. B. Neely to A. B. Leonard, 16 Oct. 1909, and Leonard to Neely, 19 Oct. 1909; *Annual Reports, B.F.M.*, for the relevant years; and letters on schismatic and ecstatic tendencies in the Presbyterian mission, especially in Concepción, in the Missionary Correspondence Microfilm Index, the Presbyterian Church in the U. S. A., Board of Foreign Missions, in the United Mission Library (Methodist-Presbyterian).

In Letter Books 155 and 156 are two dozen letters by Secretary Homer C. Stuntz that are especially relevant to the pentecostal schism. The recipients include the General Missionary Committee, J. G. Schilling, W. T. Robinson, G. F. Arms, Bp. Frank M. Bristol, W. C. Hoover, B. O. Campbell, and Samuel P. Craver. Letters of Bp. Bristol are unavailable; he is said to have been a very unproductive correspondent.

Peru

The Conference Minutes for Peru include *Actas, Conferencia Anual de Sud-América* (1896-97); *Actas, Conferencia Misionera Occidental de Sud-América* (1898-1901); *Actas, Conferencia Occidental de Sud-América Anual* (1902-04); and *Actas, Conferencia Misionera Andina del Norte*, (1911-19). Minutes for the North Andes Mission were not available.

Special sources include J. Lloyd Mecham, *Church and State in Latin America* (see Bolivia Sources above); *Annual Reports, American Bible Society*; *World-Wide Missions* (Jan., 1895), p. 7; *The Christian Advocate* (27 Apr. 1905), p. 657; W. O. Bahamonde, "The Establishment of Evangelical Christianity in Peru, 1822-1900" (Thesis, Hartford Seminary Foundation, 1952), pp. 120 ff., quoting from William E. Curtis, *Between the Andes and the Ocean* on T. B.

Wood's arrest; Webster E. Browning, "The Romance of the Founding of Evangelical Missions in Latin America," n.d.; A. B. Leonard to T. B. Wood, 29 Nov. 1895 (Book 147, p. 634); and T. B. Wood to Bp. John H. Vincent, quoted in John H. Lee, *Religious Liberty in South America, With Special Reference to Recent Legislation in Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia* (New York: Eaton and Mains, 1907), p. 47 ff.

CHAPTER 17. IN REVOLUTIONARY MEXICO

The *Annual Reports, M.S. and B.F.M.*, provide much information on the church in Mexico under revolutionary conditions. Some details are found in *Minutes, Mexico Conference* (1895-1913) and *Actas, Conferencia Anual de Mexico* (1914-20). The full correspondence of J. W. Butler is an important source throughout. Some of his letters are cited here. The *Annual Reports, W.F.M.S.*, are useful at some points.

FROM DIAZ TO MADERO. William Butler's view of Diaz is expressed in his *Mexico in Transition From the Power of Political Romanism to Civil and Religious Liberty*, 2nd ed. (New York, Hunt & Eaton, 1892), pp. 286 f. and 305. J. W. Butler's attitudes may be explored in his *History of the Methodist Episcopal Church in Mexico: Personal Reminiscences, Present Conditions and Future Outlook* (New York, The Methodist Book Concern, 1918), pp. 147 f.; in two of his letters to Homer C. Stuntz, 6 Aug. 1909 and 31 May 1911; and in two of his *Christian Advocate* articles "Centennial of Mexican Independence" (22 Sept. 1910), pp. 1321 ff., and "The Mission of Methodism in Mexico" (27 Feb. 1913), pp. 292 f. Bp. McConnell writes on Diaz in his *By the Way: An Autobiography* (New York, Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1952), pp. 144 f.

1913-14: HUERTA, INTERVENTION, EVACUATION. Bp. McConnell describes his Mexico City experience in "Mexico in Revolution," *The Christian Advocate* (20 March 1913), pp. 395 ff., and in *By the Way*, p. 144, but in the latter incorrectly identifies it as occurring during the anti-Diaz insurrection of 1911. J. W. Butler's account, which includes a letter to his sister Clementina, is in the *Advocate* (27 Feb. 1913), p. 296.

On intervention, see especially certain J. W. Butler letters: "Confidential to the Missionaries," 28 Mar. 1911; 20 Aug. 1913 (includes criticism of U.S. financial interests); to W. F. Oldham, 18 Mar. 1913, and from Oldham, 1 April and 18 July, on the request to the State Dept.; and to Oldham, 21 Apr., on the visit to Adm. Fletcher.

See Aurelia V. D. Lawyer to Mrs. King, 31 Aug. 1913. Also R. A. Carhart letters of 23, 24, and 27 April 1914.

UNDER CARRANZA, 1914-16. R. A. Carhart letters to the New York office amply describe the general situation, especially those of 31 Mar., 4 and 13 May, 10 June, 1921, and 22 July, and 4 Aug. 1915. On Catholic properties, see J. W. Butler to Oldham, 23 Oct., and 7 and 17 Dec. 1915; also Oldham to Butler, 18 Nov. On the public status of Protestantism, see L. B. Salmans' letters to Bp. McConnell (15 Sept. 1915) and Oldham (12 Aug. and 9 Dec.).

EVACUATION, 1916. For the Constitutional account, we rest heavily on J. Lloyd Mecham, *Church and State in Latin America: A History of Politico-Ecclesiastical Relations* (Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, 1934). See also the following letters: J. W. Butler to F. M. North, 16 June

1916, 14 Dec. 1917 (quotes letter of Aguirre Berlanger, Mexican Sub-Secretary of State in charge of the Department of the Interior to the Governors, 6 Dec. 1917), and 15 Dec. 1917; North to Butler, 23 and 26 June and 3 July 1916; R. A. Carhart to North, 21 and 28 June 1916; O. W. E. Cook to Thomas S. Donohugh, 29 Jan. 1916; Alvey A. Adce (Asst. Secretary of State) to North, 12 July 1916.

CHAPTER 18. IN AWAKENING CHINA

The Central Conference Minutes span the entire period. They are *Minutes, Central Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church in China* (1897, 1899, 1903, 1907, 1911) and *Minutes, Central Conference of Eastern Asia* (1915).

Antiforeign Activism, 1896-98

For the Kucheng Massacre, see *The Gospel in All Lands* (Sept. and Oct., 1895), pp. 473f. and 522, respectively; *Minutes, Foochow Conference* (1895), pp. 56f; *Annual Reports, M.S.* (1896 and 1900), pp. 33 and 106, respectively; and letters of Dr. J. J. Gregory. To identify the Vegetarians, see Victor Purcell, *The Boxer Uprising: a Background Study* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963) and a statement by R. W. Stewart, a Kucheng victim, in *The Christian Advocate* (12 Sept. 1895), p. 588.

The West China disturbances of 1895-96 are described at first hand in "The letters of Rev. H. Olin Cady and Mrs. Hattie Y. Cady, China, 1886 to 1904" (typescript in the United Mission Library) and in letters of Spencer Lewis. Bishop Ninde's letter to the Secretaries is dated 14 Nov. 1894. Secretary Leonard's letters to the State Department are in Letter Book 122, pp. 628, 653, and 690. The Shanghai resolutions are in *The Gospel in All Lands* (Oct., 1895), p. 504, and much related material appears on pp. 499-504. The Cady letters also cover the 1898 incidents (see especially letters to U.S. Consul Smithers, 17 Mar. 1898, and to "Bro. Martin," 25 Mar. 1898). See also the West China section in *Annual Reports, M.S.* (1898), especially pp. 158, 159, and 161-2.

The Boxer disturbances of 1902 in West China are described by Superintendent Spencer Lewis in *Minutes, West China Mission* (1903), pp. 25f., and—more in detail—in his letters of 1902.

The Boxer Uprising, 1899-1900

Frank D. Gamewell gives his eyewitness account of the Peking incidents in "The Story of the Peking Siege," *The Christian Advocate* (7 Feb. 1901), pp. 219-21. See p. 219 for his description of the Ketteler shooting. Mrs. Gamewell's account is given in A. H. Tuttle, *Mary Porter Gamewell and Her Story of the Siege of Peking* (New York: Eaton & Mains, 1907), pp. 185-278 (pp. 189f. for quotation). Numerous, if fragmentary, eyewitness pieces are included in Mrs. A. H. Mateer, *Siege Days: Personal Experiences of American Women and Children During the Peking Siege* (New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1903). Minimal use was made of Frederick Brown, "*Boxer*," and *Other China Memories* (London: Arthur H. Stockwell, Ltd., 1936), its late date of publication tending to limit its value. For casualties among the besieged in Peking, see the G. D. N. Lowry letter in *The Christian Advocate* (11 Oct. 1900), p. 1652.

The Correspondence File includes letters on the Uprising and its aftermath from John R. Hykes, J. H. Pyke, Hiram H. Lowry, Spencer Lewis, Bp. E. Cranston, G. H. Verity, and Bp. D. H. Moore (10 Dec. 1900). There are H. K. Carroll and A. B. Leonard letters in Letter Book 127 (see in particular Leonard to W. H. Curtiss, 14 June 1900, and to J. H. Pyke, 17 Aug.). Letters also appear in *The Christian Advocate*: Secretary Leonard's correspondence with the State Department in June, 1900 (pub. 21 June, p. 1002); Dr. G. D. N. Lowry, 15 Aug. 1900 (pub. 11 Oct., p. 1652); Miranda Croucher, from Medford, Mass. (pub. 11 Oct., pp. 1652 f.). Three letters from J. H. Pyke (26 June, 3 July, 9 July) appear in *World-Wide Missions* (Sept., 1900), pp. 7f.

For articles covering the same period, see Miranda Croucher, "From Perils Manifold," in *Woman's Missionary Friend* (Oct., 1900), pp. 94-7, written in Yokohama, 25 July 1900; Bp. D. H. Moore, "The Situation in China, and the Missions of the Methodist Episcopal Church," in *The Christian Advocate* (29 Nov. 1900), pp. 1929 f., written in Shanghai, 1 Oct. 1900. The quotation of the Italian missionary is from the *Advocate* (8 Aug. 1900), p. 1278. Much more uncited material is presented in the *Advocate* for 1900 and 1901. District reports in *Minutes, North China* (1901) contain much important material on the Uprising. The *New York Tribune* was consulted for general news dispatches during the Uprising and the period of foreign occupation.

Foreign Occupation, 1900-1901

Our description of the occupation and the military expeditions draws liberally upon Vol. II of Arthur H. Smith's two-volume work *China in Convulsion* (New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1901), the major quotations coming from pp. 716, 568, and 570, respectively. Smith was committed to the China mission cause, but his excellent book is a nonparochial and discriminating treatment. On the foreign troops, see also George R. Davis to Mary Davis, 22 Aug. 1900, in *The Christian Advocate* (4 Oct.), p. 1612, and Bp. Moore to the Secretaries, 22 Oct. 1900, in the *Advocate* (13 Dec.), p. 2024. We quote from Kenneth Scott Latourette, *A Short History of the Far East* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947), p. 437.

The Gamewells' press interview was reported in the *New York Tribune* on 11 Oct. 1900. Mrs. Gamewell's views on Chinese "savagery" appeared in *World-Wide Missions* (May, 1902), p. 7, and Dr. Gamewell's longer statement is in *The Christian Advocate* (7 Feb. 1901), p. 221. J. H. Pyke wrote on troops and missionary indemnities in "To the Critics of the Missionary," the *Advocate* (3 May 1901), pp. 859 f. The North China indemnity figures are recorded in "Minutes, Board of Managers" (16 Sept. 1902), p. 454.

Bishops and Conferences

The sources for the general pattern of episcopal and Conference administration are the *Discipline*; *General Conference Journals*; *Minutes* of various area Conferences; *Central Conference Minutes*; *Annual Reports, M.S. and B.F.M.*; Harry W. Worley, *The Central Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church, a Study in Ecclesiastical Adaptation . . .* (Nanking, China: Nanking Theological Seminary, 1940); and three letters of Bp. D. H. Moore (to H. K. Carroll, 16 June 1903; to the Board of Bishops, 14 Apr. 1902; to Carroll, 9 Jan. 1904).

For interdenominational and Methodist church union, see *China Centenary Missionary Conference Records: Report of the Great Conference Held at Shang-*

hai, April 5th [25 April] to May 8th, 1907 (New York: American Tract Society); *The Christian Advocate* (13 June 1907), p. 925; and *Minutes, Central Conference* (1907, 1911). The two papers by Bp. Bashford are filed with Bashford to H. C. Stuntz, 14 Sept. 1909.

Bishop Moore's Administration, 1900-1904

Bishop Moore's letters are the principal source. For the Kiangsi scandal, see also *Minutes, Central China Mission* (1901, 1902, 1903). On union publishing, see *Minutes, Foochow Conference* (1902 and 1905-7); *Annual Report, M.S.* (1903), pp. 126 f.; letters of Secretary Henry C. Carroll to Bp. Moore, 1901-2; and *Minutes, Central Conference* (1915), p. 67. For the proposed work in Shanghai, see the quotation from Bp. Bashford in Walter N. Lacy, *A Hundred Years of China Methodism* (New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1948), p. 74, and *Minutes, Central Conference* (1903 and 1907). For the proposed entrance into Hunan, see *The Christian Advocate* (19 Sept. 1901), p. 1495, and H. K. Carroll to Bp. Moore, 22 July 1901. For Tibet, see *Minutes, West China Mission Conference* (1903-15) and *General Conference Journal* (1908), pp. 780 and 786. Carroll's article is in the *Advocate* for 7 Apr. 1904, pp. 546 f.

Bishop Bashford's Administration, 1904-11

Extensive use is made in this section of Bishop James W. Bashford's Journal, a set of more than fifty handwritten notebooks covering his entire career in China. They present descriptions of his experiences, views, observations, and reading. The Journal is in the Missionary Research Library, New York City.

For particular aspects of Bashford's thought and activity, see other writings of his: "The Awakening of China," *The Christian Advocate* (23 Feb. 1905); "The Shanghai Riot," the *Advocate* (15 Feb. 1906); the pamphlet *The Awakening of China*, 2nd ed. (New York: The Board of Foreign Missions of the Methodist Episcopal Church China Centennial Commission, 1907); the pamphlet *The Widening Horizon in China* (New York: The Board of Foreign Missions of the Methodist Episcopal Church, Feb., 1907); and "The Opportunity in China," the *Advocate* (26 Sept. 1907).

Other sources include the *General Conference Journal* (1908), p. 790, and (1912), p. 985; "A Half Million for China" (editorial), in the *Advocate* (26 Sept. 1907), pp. 1533 f.; *Annual Report, B.F.M.* (1913), p. 199; and H. K. Carroll's article in the *Advocate* (15 Mar. 1906), pp. 362 f. For the Tibet question, see the references in Sources for the Moore administration above. For the *North American Review* article, see Richard Weightman, "Our Missionaries and Our Commerce," in the *Review* (June, 1906), pp. 886 ff.

The Anti-Manchu Revolution, 1911-12

Bishop Bashford's general view of the over-all period of the Revolution is presented in his *China: an Interpretation* (New York: The Abingdon Press, 1916), pp. 312-502, and in the *General Conference Journal* (1912), pp. 970 f. and 984 ff. See also, for developments in this section, his Journal.

Sources in correspondence include letters of Bp. Bashford (especially to H. C. Stuntz), James O. Curnow, James H. McCartney, W. Edward Manly, Spencer Lewis, Winfred B. Cole, Hiram H. Lowry, and William A. Main.

Other sources are W. E. Manly, "How the Insurrection Broke Out in West China," *The Christian Advocate* (16 Nov. 1911), p. 1555, the date of com-

position being 27 Sept. 1911; *Minutes, Central China Conference* (Jan. and Nov., 1912); *Minutes, West China Mission Conference* (1912, 1913); *Minutes, Foochow Conference* (1911, 1912); *Annual Reports, B.F.M.* (1911, 1912); "History of the North China M.E. Mission," pp. 317-19; *Minutes, Central Conference* (1911), p. 75; and a letter of Bp. Bashford to Bp. Wilson S. Lewis, 22 Dec. 1911, quoted in the *Advocate* (15 Feb. 1912).

The Republic, 1912-20

For Peking incidents, see "History of the North China M.E. Mission"; J. A. Lewis to F. M. North, 8 Apr. 1913; and *The Christian Advocate* (4 Apr. 1912), pp. 461 f. On antiforeignism, see Bp. J. W. Bashford to H. C. Stuntz, 13 Feb. 1912; Spencer Lewis to Stuntz, 22 Sept. 1911; and James O. Curnow to Harned, 4 Dec. 1911. Bashford's nonpublic field reports are in his letters to North, 5 May and 24 June 1913. For educational union, see *Annual Reports, B.F.M.* (1910, 1914, 1916, 1917); *Minutes, North China Conference*, especially for 1910 and 1914; pamphlet, *The Formal Opening of Yenching University, Peking China*, September 27 to October 1, 1929; and Bashford to North, 24 June 1913. Bashford's political activity is treated at length in his *Journal*. For the Second Revolution, see *Minutes, Kiangsi Mission Conference* (1913), p. 38; *Annual Report, B.F.M.* (1913), especially the Central China sections and Bashford's report on p. 200; letters of Bashford, Robert C. Beebe, Wm. Millward, James H. Blackstone, and Bp. W. S. Lewis; and *Minutes, Central China Conference* (1913), especially Beebe's Nanking Hospital report, pp. 43 ff. For the Hsinghua aspect, see Bashford's correspondence and his *Journal*; letters of William N. Brewster and Winfred B. Cole; *Minutes, Hingwha Conference* (1914); and *Annual Reports, B.F.M.* (1913, 1914).

World War and "World-Wide Church," 1917-18

Extensive use has been made of the correspondence of Bp. Herbert Welch, Bp. J. W. Bashford, Bp. W. S. Lewis, Carl F. Kupfer, Frank D. Gamewell, Ottomar Knothe, Earl A. Hoose, Fred R. Brown, J. Theron Illick, Carleton Lacy, Earl L. Terman, Charles F. Johannaber, Arthur J. Bowen, H. C. Hwang, and of Kuo [sic] Pao Cheng, chairman of the Chamber of Commerce, Kiukiang City. See also a letter of twenty-five officers and members of the Alumni Association of William Nast College to the Board, 5 Apr. 1919. A copy of Earl A. Hoose and seven other missionaries to the Board, 10 June 1918, opposing Kupfer's return to China, is enclosed with Bashford to North, 14 Aug. 1918.

Correspondence between the Board and the Department of State includes Alvey A. Adey, Second Assistant Secretary, Department of State, to the Board, 23 Apr. 1918; F. M. North to Adey, 29 Apr. 1918; Wilbur G. Cary [sic], Director of the Consular Service, to the Board, 11 May 1918, enclosing Edwin S. Cunningham, Consul General, to the Secretary of State, from Hankow, 27 Mar. 1918; and F. M. North to the Secretary of State, 15 May, 20 May, and 27 Aug. 1918 and 25 Jan. 1922.

Documents sent to the Board by Bp. Welch under cover of a letter of 31 July 1918 include a copy of the alleged letter of C. F. Kupfer to Gilbert Reid, 17 Aug. 1917; copy of Edwin S. Cunningham to the Secretary of State, from Hankow, 4 Jan. 1918; copy of Paul S. Reinsch, Minister to China, to Bp. Welch, declaring that the British Legation had suggested deportation of Kupfer and certain mission colleagues for pro-German utterances and actions; copy of

statement of R. T. Schaefer to the students, source not designated; copy of letter of Albert S. Tenney, M.D., from the *China Press*, 16 June 1918; copy of J. V. A. MacMurray, U.S. Chargé d'Affaires, Peking, to F. D. Gamewell, 1 July 1918; copy of Bp. Welch to Mrs. Bovyer, 30 May 1918, and of the statement he submitted for her to sign; and copy of Bp. Welch's statement on the issues of the War, read to the Korea Conference, 24 June 1918.

CHAPTER 19. AUTONOMY IN JAPAN

The treatment of Conference reorganization (1896-1905) rests on *Minutes, Japan Conference (1895-8)*, *Minutes, South Japan Mission Conference (1902, 1904)*, and *Minutes, South Japan Annual Conference (1905)*. See also *Minutes, First Session of the Central Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church in Japan (1904)*.

A special source for the change in episcopal supervision is *Minutes, Japan Conference (1895, 1900)*.

For the first phase of the autonomy movement (1883-96), the basic materials are found in the *General Conference Journals (1884, 1888, 1892)* and in *Minutes, Japan Conference (1887, 1888, 1891)*. See also "Minutes, Tokyo and Yokohama Stations" (Dec., 1883), p. 83; "Minutes, Japan Mission" (1887), especially pp. 351-54; and "Copy of the Action of the Board of Bishops on Union in Japan. Paper adopted May 10, 1890."

Origins and motivation of the movement are described in William H. Strong, *The Story of the American Board; an Account of the First Hundred Years of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions* (The Pilgrim Press: Boston, 1910), pp. 358 ff. and 363 ff., and in J. M. Reid, *Missions and Missionary Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church*, revised by J. T. Gracey, Vol. III (New York: Hunt & Eaton, 1896), pp. 474 f. and 477 f. There are several relevant articles in *The Christian Advocate (1887, 1888)*. See especially the comments of Abel Stevens, Methodist historian, *The Advocate (8 Dec. 1887)*, pp. 795 f., and (12 Jan. 1888), p. 19.

Important steps in the second phase of the autonomy movement are recorded in *Minutes, Japan Conference (1901 to 1904 and 1906)* and in *Minutes, South Japan Conference (1902, 1903, 1904, 1906)*. For legislation and Commission reports, see *General Conference Journals, M.E.C. (1904, 1908)*, and *General Conference Journals, M.E.C., S. (1902, 1906, 1910)*.

Very important for the process and consummation of the unification is the pamphlet *Report of Commission on Consolidation of Methodism in Japan* (cover title is variant), which presents to the General Conference of 1908 a detailed account of the Commissioners' work, the final Basis of Union, and other documents. See also the less detailed *Union of Methodisms in Japan; Report of the Commission to the Sixteenth General Conference, M.E. Church, South, Asheville, North Carolina, May 4, 1910*. Details are supplied from *Tidings From Japan (1900-03 and 1906)* and *The Christian Advocate (1902, 1904, 1906, 1907)*. Moves in Japan in 1906 to broaden the inclusiveness of the union are described by Julius Soper in "A Crisis in the Negotiations for Methodist Union in Japan," an undated paper in late files of F. M. North.

Citations from the Correspondence File relevant to the process of unification: Bp. David H. Moore, to the Secretaries, 12 Apr. 1901 and 2 May 1902, and to A. B. Leonard, 14 Apr. 1902; Bp. Merriman C. Harris to Leonard, 9 Oct. and 23 Dec. 1905; Leonard to Bp. Harris, 9 Jan. (description of the Baltimore

meeting of the Commissioners), 3 Apr., 1 May, 7 May, 10 May, and 4 June 1906; Leonard to Julius Soper, 13 June and 13 July 1906; Leonard to Gideon F. Draper, 8 Jan. 1906 (description of Baltimore meeting); Leonard to H. B. Schwartz, 4 Apr. 1906; Leonard to B. Chappell, 21 Feb. 1906; and Leonard to A. Sutherland, 20 Feb. 1906. (Leonard letters are in Book 205.)

The beginnings of the Japan Methodist Church and its relation to the continuing mission work of the Methodist Episcopal Church: *Report of the Commission on Consolidation* (see above); *Journal of the First General Conference of the Japan Methodist Church* (1907); *The Methodist General Conference Held in Tokyo, Japan, May-June, 1907*, a long account reprinted from the *Japan Mail*; *Minutes, West Conference, Japan Methodist Church*, (1908); "year-books" of the West Japan Mission, M.E.C. (1909, 1910) and the East Japan Mission, M.E.C. (1911, 1915); Bp. Merriman C. Harris, *Christianity in Japan* (New York: Eaton and Mains, 1907); and Arthur D. Berry, *Methodist Episcopal Mission Work in Japan* (1911). The *Annual Reports, B.F.M.*, are useful for District patterns and constituencies, but for missionaries' relation to the new Church, the Reports for 1907 and 1915 are especially relevant. See also A. B. Leonard to W. W. Pinson, 30 Sept. 1907 (Book 206); Bp. Harris to Leonard, 28 Jan. 1910; R. P. Alexander to Leonard, 23 Jan. 1909; Bp. Yoitsu Honda to Leonard, 20 Aug. 1909; Memorandum of Bp. Y. Honda, Oct. 1911 [date not verified].

The Okinawa mission is described in Henry B. Schwartz's pamphlet *The Loo Choo Islands* (1907; revised 1910). The official record is in *Minutes, Japan Conference* and *Minutes, South Japan Conference*. The rest of the account runs through *Annual Reports, B.F.M.*

CHAPTER 20. CAPTIVE KOREA

The Minutes for the Korea field are *Minutes, Annual Meeting of the Korean Mission* (1896-1904); *Minutes, Korea Mission Conference* (1905-7); *Minutes, Fourth Annual Session, Korea Mission Conference, and the First Session, Korea Annual Conference* (1908); *Minutes, Korea Conference* (1909-20).

The treatment of the Mission's general development is derived almost entirely from the *Minutes*. For the medical work, see especially reports in *Minutes* (1896-1900 and 1919), and for both hospitals and schools, see the lists in *Annual Reports, B.F.M.*, pp. 452-66.

For Japanese work in Korea, see *Minutes, South Japan Conference* (1905); *Minutes, West Conference, Japan Methodist Church* (1908); yearbooks of the West Japan Mission, M.E.C. (1909, 1910); and *Minutes, Korea Mission Conference* (1905-11).

For the sporadic acts of hostility to Christianity, add to the *Minutes* letters of George Heber Jones to A. B. Leonard, 31 Sept. and 25 and 27 Nov. 1902, and of W. A. Noble to Bp. D. H. Moore, 27 Feb. 1904.

On the Mission's relation to Korea's public turmoil and political troubles, the *Minutes* supply substantial information. Here certain letters also are valuable: numerous letters of Bp. M. C. Harris's; W. A. Noble to A. B. Leonard, 15 July 1903; W. B. Scranton to Leonard, 15 May and 1 Nov. 1905; Bp. J. W. Bashford to H. C. Stuntz, 17 Aug. 1909; Bashford to Bp. W. S. Lewis, 16 June 1913; and Bashford to F. M. North, 4 Sept. 1913. For the text of the 1897 letter of the American Minister in Korea and for a statement of its purpose, see Tyler Dennett, *Americans in Eastern Asia: a Critical Study of the Policy of the*

United States with Reference to China, Japan, and Korea in the 19th Century (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1922), pp. 571 f. See also p. 505. Details and comments on the conspiracy trials are found in *The Japan Chronicle*, 16 Feb. 1915 (clipping enclosed in Bp. Harris to G. H. Jones, 16 Feb. 1915). Material on the government ordinances of 1908 and 1915 is presented in *Minutes* (1909), pp. 37-9, and (1916), pp. 41 f., respectively.

CHAPTER 21. MALAYSIA

The chief sources are *Minutes, Malaysia Mission Conference* (1895-1901) and *Minutes, Malaysia Conference* (1902-1920). See also the *Minutes* of the Woman's Conference, which are published as part of the above *Minutes*.

CHAPTER 22. INDIA: IMPERIAL DESIGN

General sources for the Volume and for India are used extensively for this chapter. See also, especially for the Bishops, the *Daily Christian Advocate* (1896, 1900), Bishop Thoburn's diaries (see Sources for Chapter 4), and letters of Bp. Thoburn, Bp. Warne, and A. B. Leonard.

CHAPTER 23. INDIA: MASS MOVEMENTS

Beginnings in North India

The chief official sources for these beginnings are *Minutes, North India Conference* and (from 1893) *Minutes, Northwest India Conference*.

The opening of the 1888 campaign is described in Edwin W. Parker's paper in *Report of the Third Decennial Missionary Conference* (1892-3), Vol. I, 26 ff.

For the Moody missions see the same paper, p. 30; Frederick B. Price, ed., *India Mission Jubilee of the Methodist Episcopal Church in Southern Asia* (Calcutta: Methodist Publishing House, 1907), pp. 163 f.; *The Gospel in All Lands* (1891), pp. 476 f.; and *The Christian Advocate* (1890), p. 446.

Bishop Thoburn discusses caste and conversion in his *India and Malaysia* (Cincinnati: Cranston & Curts, 1892), pp. 287 ff. Reference to J. H. Hutton's *Caste in India; Its Nature, Function, and Origins* (Cambridge: University Press, 1946) is useful for this and other mass-movement sections.

Innumerable items come from *The Indian Witness*, an indispensable source. *The Malaysia Message* also is important. The latter was published monthly in Singapore, the former weekly in Lucknow.

Gujarat

To find the roots of the Gujarat growth from 1892, we turn to *Minutes, South India Conference*. From then on to 1919, we draw heavily upon *Minutes, Bombay Conference*, especially the reports of District Superintendents. The first "break," for instance, is cited by John E. Robinson in his Bombay District report in 1895.

The most valuable source for the period of acceleration of the mass movement is the excellent district reports written by Edwin F. Frease through the dozen

years beginning with 1896. (We found his report for 1907 in *Annual Report, B.F.M.* (1907), pp. 305-313.) See also his letters, especially a policy letter to A. B. Leonard on 15 August 1904. Bishop Thoburn's visit to Bhalej in 1895 is described in *The Christian Advocate* (1896), p. 90.

For the period of deceleration (1908-1919), the most relevant correspondence is letters of George W. Park and Lewis E. Linzell. See especially Park to A. B. Leonard, 15 April 1909, for the change to a more conservative policy. Note statements on policy during the post-Frease period by the Committee on the State of the Church, *Minutes, Bombay Conference*.

Northwest India

The mass movement in this Conference is thoroughly covered in its published Minutes.

The origin of the evangelistic use of the secular chaudris and the operation of the church chaudri system are treated in Bishop Frank W. Warne's Board of Foreign Missions pamphlet *India's Mass Movement* (New York, 1915). Similar material is found in Brenton T. Badley's *Warne of India; the Life-story of Bishop Francis Wesley Warne* (Madras Publishing House, 1932), which is well larded with quotations from Warne's diary. Benson Baker fully describes the utilization of the church chaudris in *The Indian Witness* (29 April 1915), p. 325, and (30 July 1914), p. 606.

A measure of information comes from the letters of Bishop Warne to William F. Oldham in 1913 and 1914. An especially important letter on unsatisfactory mass-movement conditions written to Rockwell Clancy is enclosed with Warne to Oldham, 26 August 1914.

Arrah-Ballia

To 1911, the principal facts come, mainly under Tirhut District headings, from *Minutes, Bengal Conference*. From 1912, turn to *Minutes, North India Conference*, variously under Tirhut, Arrah, and Ballia headings.

South India

The fullest source is the District Superintendents' reports in *Minutes, South India Conference*. See there also the reports of the Committee on the State of the Church.

Charles E. Parker surveys the mass movement from 1908 to 1913 in *The Indian Witness* (2 Oct. 1913), pp. 772 f.

A few of Bishop John E. Robinson's letters contribute to the picture—to W. F. Oldham, 18 Dec. 1912, and 7 May 1913; to A. A. Parker, 5 Dec. 1913; to F. M. North, 18 Sept. 1918; to T. S. Donohugh, 13 Aug. 1919. See also David O. Ernsberger's letters about 1912.

A number of letters enhance the view of C. E. Parker as a strenuously committed worker—W. L. King to A. B. Leonard, 6 July 1909; S. O. Benton to G. O. Holbrooke, 3 June 1912; W. F. Oldham to Parker 11 June 1912; G. O. Holbrooke to Oldham, 14 July 1912; Parker to Oldham, 4 Oct. 1912, and 13 April and 15 May, 1913; Parker to G. M. Fowles, 11 March 1916; North to Parker (cable), 24 July 1916; Parker to North, 11 Dec. 1918 and 6 June 1919; Dr. J. G. Vaughan to North, 19 Sept. 1919.

For the activity of George O. Holbrooke, see *Minutes, South India Conference* (1913), pp. 53 f., and (1914), pp. 47 and 50. And see the letters from W. F.

Oldham to Holbrooke, 3 June 1912; C. E. Parker to Oldham, 4 Oct. 1912 and 1 Aug. 1913; Holbrooke to Oldham, 14 April and 1 Aug. 1913; C. E. Parker to North, 10 April 1918.

The Mass Movements and the Mission

The statistical studies underlying the last division (4) of this section rest on figures drawn from the statistical tables of the 1912 *Minutes* of the Bengal Conference, the Bombay Conference, the Burma Mission Conference, the Central Provinces Mission Conference, the North India Conference, the Northwest India Conference, and the South India Conference.

Attempts at Policy and Support

The formal Addresses of the three Missionary Bishops, reports of the Committee on the State of the Church, and Central Conference actions are included in *Minutes, Southern Asia Central Conference* for 1912 and 1916. Other official actions in India will be found in *Minutes, Executive Board of the Methodist Episcopal Church in Southern Asia*.

Thomas S. Donohugh's influential article was " 'Mass Movements' in India," in *The Methodist Review* (Nov.-Dec., 1913), pp. 849 ff. The special mass-movements number of *The Indian Witness* was issued 2 October 1913. Brenton T. Badley's earlier article appeared in the *Witness* on 2 September.

William F. Oldham's mass-movement chapter is in his *India, Malaysia, and the Philippines; a Practical Study in Missions* (N.Y.: Eaton & Mains, 1914), pp. 167 ff. Bishop Warne's pamphlet *India's Mass Movement*, cited above, presents his general views. His letters, and those of Bishops John E. and John W. Robinson, are important at numerous points. An earlier mass-movement statement by Bishop Warne appears in *Journal, General Conference* (1904), pp. 657 f.

Other relevant correspondence files are those of W. F. Oldham, B. T. Badley (especially on the India Mass Movement Commission activity), A. A. Parker (on educational problems in 1914-15, and later on finance), F. M. North (especially from 1917), F. B. Fisher (from 1917), and T. S. Donohugh.

Oldham's first mass-movement plan is reported at length in "Minutes, Board of Managers" (19 May 1914), pp. 217 ff. The record of adoption is in the same volume, on page 265. The valuable detailed Minutes of the Executive Committee of the Mass Movement Commission (India) for 23 February 1915 are in typescript in the World Division Correspondence File (#55). A closely related printed letter from the Committee, 19 March 1915, which also reached Secretary Oldham, is filed with the Minutes. Reports of the Board's Commission on the Mass Movement in India appear, beginning early in 1917, in "Minutes, Executive Committee, B.F.M." The mass movements are treated at length in the India Bishops' Centenary survey, enclosed with Bishop Warne's letter to F. M. North, 20 Aug. 1917.

CHAPTER 24. INDIA: PERSON-CENTERED MISSIONS

For the Jubilee revival, the special source upon which we draw heavily is Bishop Warne's 32-page pamphlet *The Revival in the Indian Church* (New York: Board of Foreign Missions, Methodist Episcopal Church, June, 1907). The quotations (except that of Philo Buck) are as given therein.

For the story of emergency relief in Gujarat, see chiefly *Minutes, Bombay*

Conference, especially the District reports of E. F. Frease. See also letters of Frease, G. W. Park, Bp. J. W. Robinson, and A. B. Leonard, Leonard's being in Letter Books 171-3. The Indian Witness describes the Godhra poorhouse (23 Aug. 1900) and famine in Rajputana (27 Apr. 1900).

CHAPTER 25. HOME BASE AND HOME MISSIONS

This chapter, except for points drawn from other parts of this volume and from Volume III, rests almost entirely upon general sources: *The Discipline of the Methodist Episcopal Church*; *General Conference Journals*; *Annual Reports, Missionary Society*; *Annual Reports, Board of Foreign Missions*; *Journals, Board of Foreign Missions*; "Minutes, Executive Committee, Board of Foreign Missions"; *Annual Reports, Board of Church Extension (1895-1900)*; *Christianity in Earnest (1900-1906)*, a magazine that includes the Annual Reports of the Board of Church Extension; *Annual Reports, Board of Home Missions and Church Extension (1907-1939)*; and *Annual Reports, Woman's Foreign Missionary Society*.

But on Central Conferences, see also Harry W. Worley, *The Central Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church*; and for episcopal data, see J. Tremayne Coplestone, "Methodist Bishops: a List Compiled for the Committee on the Discipline of the Council of Bishops," *Discipline, The Methodist Church (1964)*, pp. 3-5.

CHAPTER 26. LIBERIA

The chief sources are the correspondence files of G. W. Harley, W. B. Williams, R. L. Embree, and H. T. Miller. See also letters of Bp. W. O. Shepard; *Annual Reports, B.F.M. (to 1929)*; and *Minutes, Liberia Conference (1921-34)*. Our Conference Minutes for the period after 1934 were condensed typescripts without narrative reports of missionary activity.

CHAPTER 27. THE BELGIAN CONGO

Reports in *Minutes, Congo Mission Conference (1919, Apr. and Sept. sessions; 1921; 1924; 1925, 1926, 1927; 1928, 1929, 1930, 1931)* are important for the narrative. Typewritten Minutes for 1922 (deposited in Correspondence File with Finance Committee Minutes) and for 1932, 1933, 1934, 1936, 1937, and 1938 have been available, but minus textual reports. See also similar typescripts of "Minutes, Congo Mission Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church and the First Session of the Congo Mission Conference of the Methodist Church" (1939) and of "Minutes, Southern Congo Provisional Annual Conference of the Methodist Church" (1940).

The general treatment draws upon the correspondence of J. M. Springer (separate file for Bishop Springer), T. B. Brinton, R. S. Guptill, W. E. Shields, J. N. Dana, E. I. Everett, R. S. Smyres, C. C. Hartzler, A. L. Piper, W. A. Miller, N. S. Booth, Bp. Eben S. Johnson. See also the file of correspondence with the Bureau des Missions Protestantes du Congo Belge.

A variety of important decisions and communications are included in the Minutes of the Finance Committee for the Congo; see Correspondence File.

The Springer difficulties of 1921 are set forth at length and with transparent fairness by R. S. Guptill in a memorandum to T. S. Donohugh, 25 May 1922. See also Guptill to Donohugh, 18 August 1921 and 16 March 1922. Bishop E. S. Johnson covers the affairs briefly in a letter to F. M. North, 16 March 1922.

For Dr. Berry's temporary withdrawal, see Bp. E. S. Johnson to F. M. North, 10 Feb. 1922, and R. S. Guptill to T. S. Donohugh, 16 Mar. and 28 Sept., 1922. On Berry's death and his wife's return, see Guptill to North, 10 and 14 Dec. 1923 and 24 May 1924; *Minutes* (1924); *Annual Report, B.F.M.* (1924); pp. 168 f.; and C. C. Hartzler to Donohugh, 13 Feb. 1924. Mrs. Berry's good-bye letter is in E. I. Everett's file, 6 Oct. 1929.

The "compounds" problem and the related school question surface in *Minutes* (1924, 1926, 1929, 1930, 1931); also in the Minutes of the Finance Committee for 22 June 1926 (p. 11), 28 June 1926 (p. 14), 5 Nov. 1926 (pp. 22-4; p. 24 for schools), 6 Aug. 1927 (p. 48), and 30 May 1928 (p. 56). See letters of W. E. Shields for 1926 and 1928, especially to the Governor of Katanga, 27 Mar. 1926, to T. S. Donohugh, 28 June 1926, and to Bp. Johnson, 28 Feb. 1928. R. S. Smyres' major statement is a letter to Gov. Heenen, 13 Dec. 1928. He also writes to Henri Anet, 21 Jan. 1927, and to Donohugh on 8 June 1928 and 21 Feb. 1929. For acts and attitudes of Catholic individuals, various administrators, police, and others, see *Minutes* (1924), pp. 40 and 49; *Minutes* (1930), p. 101; *Minutes* (1931), p. 141; Shields to Anet, 6 July 1926; "General Report" for 1932, in Springer file. For the ban in Lubumbashi, see *Annual Report, B.F.M.* (1929), p. 203, and *Minutes* (1929), p. 72.

The *kvikale* controversy is discussed in *Minutes* (1927), pp. 142 f., and (1928), pp. 28 f.

The Mulungwishi plan first appears in Bp. Springer to T. S. Donohugh, 28 March 1936. It is extensively treated in other letters and papers in Springer's file, especially for late 1939 and for 1940. Relevant implementing votes are recorded in the Minutes of the Finance Committee and in the Conference Minutes.

CHAPTER 28. PORTUGUESE AFRICA

Angola

Conference Minutes have been the chief source: *Minutes, West Central Africa Mission Conference* (1919); *Minutes, Angola Mission Conference* (1921, 1922, 1923, 1924, 1925-1926); MS, "Minutes, Angola Mission Conference" (1938); MS, "Minutes, Angola Mission Conference of The Methodist Church" (1939); MS "Minutes, Angola Provisional Conference of The Methodist Church" (1940).

Other sources included *Annual Reports, B.F.M.* (1920-29); typescript copies of handwritten diaries of August H. Klebsattel; letters of Herbert C. Withey; MS by Cilicia L. Cross, "Building With Christ Among the Bantu"; *Journals, Annual Meeting, B.F.M.: General Conference Journal* (1928); and John T. Tucker, "Survey of Protestant Missionary Work in Angola," in Emory Ross, ed., *Abundant Life in Changing Africa* (New York: Africa Committee of the Foreign Missions Conference of North America, 1946).

A translation of Decree 77 appears in *Minutes, Angola Mission Conference* (1922), pp. 64-6.

Mozambique

The chief sources consulted have been *Minutes, Southeast Africa Mission Conference* (1920-39) and letters of W. C. Terril, P. W. Keys, and J. A. Persson. For quotations from the relevant international agreements, see John T. Tucker, *Angola: the Land of the Blacksmith Prince* (London: World Dominion Press, 1933), pp. 158 ff.

Madeira

The most substantial source is a large number of letters from the correspondence of the following: W. G. Smart, G. B. Nind, B. R. Duarte, L. G. Burgess (including Burgess to Bp. Ferdinand Sigg, 12 Aug. 1960), E. H. Haydock, Abelino Brazao (to R. J. Wade, 5 Feb. 1936), Antonio T. Rodrigues (to Bp. Paul N. Garber, 9 July 1946); Bishops E. Blake, W. O. Shepard, and R. J. Wade; Secretaries H. Farmer, T. S. Donohugh, J. R. Edwards, and R. E. Diffendorfer (Diffendorfer to Wade, 30 Nov. 1939 and to Garber, 16 Mar. 1946); and Morris W. Ehnes, B. F. M. Treasurer.

General sources include *Annual Reports, B.F.M.*; the *Discipline*; "Minutes, Executive Committee, B.F.M."; *Journal, B.F.M.* (especially 1927, 1930, 1938); *Minutes, Angola Mission Conference* (1921); *Official Record, North Africa Mission Conference and North Africa District Conference* (1920 [erratum; read 1919]); *Rapport Officiel de la Conférence Missionnaire de l'Afrique du Nord* (1922-27); and *Rapport Officiel de la Conférence Annuelle de l'Afrique du Nord* (1928-39).

See also *Proclamação da Autonomia da Igreja Methodista do Brazil* and "Report of the European Deputation of the Commission of Ten as adopted by the full Commission on Oct. 15-16, 1927."

CHAPTER 29. AFRICA NORTH AND SOUTH

North Africa

The *Journals, Annual Meeting of the Board of Foreign Missions*, especially for 1933 to 1935, are important for North Africa mission policy. The relevant Conference Minutes are *Official Record, North Africa Mission Conference and North Africa District Conference* (1920 [erratum; read 1919]); *Rapport Officiel de la Conférence Missionnaire de L'Afrique du Nord* (1922-27); *Rapport Officiel de la Conférence Annuelle de L'Afrique du Nord* (1928-39); and *Rapport Officiel de la Conférence Annuelle de L'Eglise Méthodiste en Afrique du Nord* (1945).

Union of South Africa

The principal source is *Minutes, Southeast Africa Mission Conference* (1920-39). See also letters of W. C. Terril (1920-34) and J. A. Persson (1932-39).

Southern Rhodesia

See *Minutes, Rhodesia Mission Conference* (1921-30; no session in 1920); *Minutes, Rhodesia Conference* (1931-38); and *Minutes, Rhodesia Conference, Methodist Episcopal Church, and Rhodesia Conference, The Methodist Church* (1939).

CHAPTER 30. EUROPE BETWEEN WARS

Germany

The correspondence files of Bishops J. L. Nuelsen and F. H. Otto Melle are very important. See also Nuelsen's "Religion in the Third Reich," in *Religion in Life* (autumn number, 1933), pp. 541-52; *General Conference Journal* (1936), pp. 482-85, for the "Official Statement of the Methodist Episcopal Church in Germany"; *Zions Herald* (28 July, 4 Aug., and 13 Aug. 1937) and *The Christian Century* (28 July and 18 Aug. 1937) for Bp. Melle at Oxford; J. H. Oldham, ed., *The Oxford Conference: Official Report* (Chicago: Willett, Clark & Company, 1937), pp. 45 ff. and 259 ff., for the Oxford Conference message to the Christian churches and to the German church; *Journal, B.F.M.*, (1938), pp. 152 and 233-6, for Melle's 1937-38 report; and relevant formal sources.

Austria

The Minutes are *Verhandlungen, Missions-Konferenz der Prediger der Bischöflichen Methodistenkirche in Oesterreich* (1920-34). General formal sources provided most of the material. On religious liberty, see *Annual Report, B.F.M.* (1920), p. 550, and *The Christian Advocate* (23 Sept. 1920), p. 1281. For Anschluss and German-Austrian Methodist union, see "Minutes, Executive Committee, B.F.M." (21 Apr. 1938); *Journal, B.F.M.* (Nov., 1938), p. 236; and F.H.O. Melle to Bp. Charles Wesley Flint, 5 Apr. 1938.

Yugoslavia

The Minutes are *Verhandlungen der Missions-Konferenz der Prediger der Bischöflichen Methodistenkirche in Königreich der Serben, Kroaten und Slowenen (Jugoslawien)* (1921-27) and *Verhandlungen und Berichten, Missions-Konferenz der Bischöflichen Methodistenkirche in Königreich Jugoslawien* (1929-39). General sources also were used significantly.

Other sources are F. H. Otto Melle, "Report to the Board of Foreign Missions . . ." (1919); "Report of the Deputation to Central Europe . . ." (10 Feb. 1920); "Minutes, Executive Committee, B. F. M." (10 Apr. and 18 June 1925) on Macedonia work and (19 Jan. 1939) on the Novi Sad hospital; and the correspondence files of S. W. Irwin, John Jacob, Bp. J. L. Nuelsen, Secy. T. S. Donohugh, and Bp. W. O. Shepard. On U. S. diplomatic intercession, see Nuelsen to J. R. Edwards, 6 and 23 March 1925, and Edwards to Nuelsen, 18 March 1925. On Macedonia, see Nuelsen to Edwards, 12 Feb. and 1 May 1925.

Hungary

Among the *Annual Reports, B.F.M.*, see especially those for 1922, 1925, and 1929, the two latter on harassment of the Mission and government attitudes. The letters of Bp. J. L. Nuelsen, especially to Secy. John R. Edwards, are important. See also Nuelsen's quadrennial reports in *General Conference Journal* (1924), p. 1093; "Minutes, Executive Committee, B.F.M.," 16 June 1921 and 19 Feb. and 11 March 1925; and *Journal, B.F.M.* (1930), pp. 111 f.

The Baltic States

The chief sources are episcopal reports in the *General Conference Journals* and the correspondence files of Bp. J. L. Nuelsen and G. A. Simons.

Russia

The most important sources are the reports and letters in the correspondence files of Bp. J. L. Nuelsen and G. A. Simons. See also letters of Anna Eklund and Hjalmar Salmi. Other materials are found in the *General Conference Journals* and in *Journals, B.F.M.* For the controversy on the Blake visit, see *The Christian Advocate* (1922, 1923), which includes numerous important statements.

France

This section relies especially upon *General Conference Journals; Journals, B.F.M.*; the correspondence of Bp. W. O. Shepard; and numerous references in "Minutes, Executive Committee, B.F.M."

Italy

The fullest statements of the developments in Italy are found in the reports of the Corresponding Secretaries in contemporary issues of *Journals, B.F.M.* See also "Minutes, Executive Committee, B.F.M."; *General Conference Journals*; "Report of the European Deputation of the Commission of Ten" (typescript), 1927; and clippings and leaflets on Monte Mario Institute in the files of the United Mission Library.

Spain

The prime source for Alicante is the numerous letters of Francisco and Franklin Albricias. Statements by Lincoln Albricias are mainly quotations within family letters. The fullest account of Francisco Albricias' earlier life and work is in F. Albricias to F. M. North, 19 Feb. 1920. The more recent history is sketched in Albricias to H. Farmer, 4 Feb. 1925.

The chief source for the Seville mission is the correspondence of the Crawford family—Mrs. George (Agnes D.) Crawford, Robert H. Crawford, and Ernest Peter—with Board officials. For the earlier background, see enclosure with A. D. Crawford to F. M. North, 10 Aug. 1919.

For the first discussion of opening in Spain, see letters of Homer C. Stuntz: to C. W. Drees, 30 Dec. 1908 (Book 154); to Drees, 5 Nov. 1909 (Book 155); to Bp. Wm. Burt, 8 Jan. 1909 (Book 195). In the Correspondence File there are a few slim files of miscellaneous letters, memos, and minutes on the Spain work.

For the conclusion of Patricio Gomez' Methodist work, see Bp. Raymond J. Wade's letters: Wade to Juan Ortiz Gonzales, 18 Apr. 1933; Gomez to Wade, 18 Apr. 1933; W. H. Rainey to Wade, 22 June 1933.

Other Missions

General sources were used for Bulgaria, Finland, Scandinavia, and Switzerland.

CHAPTER 31. LATIN AMERICA

In addition to *Annual Reports, B.F.M.* and *Journals, Annual Meeting of the Board of Foreign Missions*, see *Actas Oficiales, Conferencia Anual Este de*

Sud-América (1920-39); *Actas, Conferencia Anual de Chile* (1920-39); *Actas, Conferencia Misionera Andina del Norte* (1920-31); *Actas Oficiales, Conferencia Misionera del Perú* (1933-39); and Harry W. Worley, *The Central Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church*, pp. 321ff.

CHAPTER 32. BOLIVIA

This chapter draws heavily upon the extensive letter files of C. A. Irle, C. S. Bell, L. B. Smith, J. E. Washburn, J. H. Wenberg, Mr. and Mrs. Irving Whitehead, H. C. McKinney, F. S. Beck, B. T. Hodges, J. S. Herrick, Moses Merubia, J. L. Clow, Mr. and Mrs. C. F. Hartzell, Dr. B. A. Warren, R. A. Driver, L. M. Allen, Virgie Mitchell, Helen B. Rusby (her missionary letters from La Paz were long and valuably filled with intimate detail of the Mission's life in the twenties, especially in the La Paz sphere), Bp. W. F. Oldham, Bp. G. A. Miller, Bp. M. W. Clair, and Board Secretaries F. M. North, Harry Farmer, R. E. Diffendorfer, and H. C. Stuntz.

See also *Annual Reports, B.F.M.*; "Minutes, Executive Committee, B.F.M."; and *Minutes, Bolivia Mission Conference*.

CHAPTER 33. CENTRAL AMERICA

The special sources for Panama include many letters of U. S. Brown, E. M. Oliver, A. O. Bustamante, Harry B. Fisher, R. E. Marshall, C. F. Hartzell, J. N. Smith, and N. M. Powell; Secretaries Harry Farmer, F. M. North, and T. S. Donohugh; and Bishops W. P. Thirkield, W. F. Oldham, and G. A. Miller. See also Elsie J. Keyser, "Panama Panorama" and George A. Miller, *Twenty Years After*.

Sources for Costa Rica include letters of Mr. and Mrs. S. W. Edwards, E. M. Oliver, J. A. Brownlee, U. S. Brown, L. M. Fiske, Lloyd D. Rounds, G. Arandilla, C. F. Hartzell, and H. Farmer. See also Wilton M. Nelson, "A History of Protestantism in Costa Rica"; J. Lloyd Mecham, *Church and State in Latin America*; Marco Tulio Zeledon, ed., *Digesto Constitucional de Costa Rica* (San José: Colegio de Abogados, 1946).

The Conference journals consulted for both Panama and Costa Rica were *Minutes, Panama Mission* (1919); *Minutes, Central America Mission Conference* (1921), *Actas, Conferencia Misionera Central Americana* (1923, 1924, 1925); *Actas, Conferencia Centro Americana* (1926-29). See also *Journals, B.F.M.* and "Minutes, Executive Committee, B.F.M."

CHAPTER 34. MEXICO

The relevant Minutes are *Actas Diarias E Informes, Conferencia Anual de Mexico de la Iglesia Metodista Episcopal* (1920-30); *Actas Diarias E Informes, Conferencia Anual del Centre de la Iglesia Metodista de Mexico* (from 1931); and *Actas, Conferencia Anual Fronteriza de la Iglesia Metodista de Mexico* (from 1930). Important, sometimes copious materials are to be found in the regular sources: *Annual Reports, B.F.M.*; *Journals, Annual Meetings, B.F.M.*; *General Conference Journals*; and *Year Books, W.F.M.S.* See also J. Lloyd Mecham, *Church and State in Latin America*, pp. 474-501) letters of Bp.

George A. Miller; and J P Hauser, "New Methodist Church of Mexico," *Zions Herald* (24 Sept. 1930), p. 1225.

CHAPTER 35. INDIA

GENERAL. General sources are used heavily throughout the chapter except for the passages on the loyalty oath cases. See the *Discipline; General Conference Journals; Annual Reports, B.F.M.; Journals, B.F.M.*: Minutes of the Annual and Mission Conferences in India; and *Minutes, Central Conference in Southern Asia*.

LOYALTY REQUIREMENTS. For the pre-1919 situation, see the correspondence of Bps. F. W. Warne, J. E. Robinson, and J. W. Robinson, especially with F. M. North. For the post-1919 pattern, see *The International Review of Missions* (1919), pp. 331-40; *Reports, Foreign Missions Conference of North America* (1919-23); *Journal, B.F.M.* (1933), pp. 90 ff.; memorandum by T. S. Donohugh, 6 March 1940; and R. E. Diffendorfer to the India Bishops, 18 Apr. 1940.

For the Boyd W. Tucker case, see his letters. On Gordon B. Halstead, see his letters; his articles in *The Indian Witness* for 16 and 23 July, and 10 and 17 Sept., and 8 Oct. 1931; and a *Witness* editorial on 23 July. On the Templin-Keene-Smith case, see the letters of R. T. Templin, J. H. Smith, E. S. Jones, Benson Baker, Leslie G. Templin, Murray T. Titus Secretaries R. E. Diffendorfer and T. S. Donohugh, and Bishops J. W. Robinson, B. T. Badley, J. R. Chitambar, and J. W. Pickett. Secretaries' letters are in both their own files and those of the field men.

MASS MOVEMENTS; HARIJANS. On mass movements, see J. Waskom Pickett, *Christian Mass Movements in India: a Study With Recommendations* (New York: The Abingdon Press, 1933). William W. Reid's treatment of Ambedkar and the Harijans is in *Journal, B.F.M.* (1939, pp. 134-7).

CHAPTER 36. SOUTHEAST ASIA

Malaya and Singapore

The background for this section is to be found in *Minutes, Malaysia Conference* (1920-24); *Minutes, Malaya Mission Conference* (1925-39); and *Minutes, Finance Committee, Malaysia Conference* (1921-24).

Sarawak

The chief source is Conference journals: *Minutes, Malaysia Conference* (1919-24); *Minutes, Malaya Conference* (1925-39); *Minutes, Malaya Conference, The Methodist Church* (1940). Minor reference was made to Frank T. Cartwright's *Tuan Hoover of Borneo* (see Sources and Notes for Chapter 2).

Netherlands Indies

The special sources for the Netherlands Indies are *Minutes, Netherlands Indies Mission Conference* (1919-27); *Minutes, Sumatra Mission Conference* (1929-40); *Minutes, Malaysia Conference* (1933-36); and *Annual Reports, B.F.M.* for 1927 (pp. 49-57, 343-46), for 1928 (pp. 112 f., 269 f.), and for 1929 (pp. 50 f., 87-95, 152 ff., 297 ff.).

Philippine Islands

The principal general sources were *Journals, Annual Meeting, B.F.M.; Year Books, W.F.M.S.; Disciplines;* and *Minutes, Philippine Islands Conference.*

Special sources for the schism of 1933 included Herbert Welch, "What Happened in the Philippines," *The Christian Advocate* (11 May 1933); Herbert Welch, *As I Recall My Past Century* (New York: Abingdon Press, 1962); *Methodist Episcopal Church, General Conference, Atlantic City, N.J., U.S.A., May, 1932, the Philippine Islands Annual Conference VERSUS Meluccio de Armas, Charge — Adultery, Appellant's Memorandum;* Samuel W. Stagg, *Has Methodism Lost Its Sense of Justice? A Tale of Corruption, Slander, Intimidation, Perjury and a Cruel Denial of Justice Visited Upon a Dying Mother and a Helpless Girl by Officials of the Methodist Episcopal Church, Reaching from the Mission Field to the General Conference, 1932* (pamphlet); Gregorio B. Vergara and Samuel W. Stagg, *An Appeal for Justice, 1933* (pamphlet); N. R. Baugh, *The New Independence Movement in Philippine Methodism, 1933* (pamphlet); and "A Message from the Filipino Methodist Superintendents," *Philippine Observer* (July, 1933).

CHAPTER 37. EASTERN ASIA

General sources chiefly have been used for most of this chapter: *Annual Reports, B.F.M.; Journals, Annual Meeting, B.F.M.; General Conference Journals; Year Books, W.F.M.S.; Minutes, Eastern Asia Central Conference* (1920, 1923, 1928, 1930, 1934, 1937); and the *Discipline*. See also Harry W. Worley, *The Central Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church.*

For Korea, three sources have been used most fully: *Minutes, Korea Conference* (1919-30); *General Conference Journals*, especially for 1928 and 1932 (the latter fully reports on the inauguration of the indigenous church); and letters of Bp. Herbert Welch. Bishop Welch's file includes (2 Aug. 1922 to F. M. North) a clipping of his *Seoul Press* letter and a printed copy (filed 8 March 1924) of the flyer "Korean's Reply to Bishop Herbert Welch." See also the letters of Henry D. Appenzeller on the school incident.

INDEX

Index

- Abraham, Samuel, 768, 774, 776
Abrams, Minnie F., 601 f.
Administration, 862 f., 868-871, 876-882, 883-895; *see also* Episcopal supervision
Africa, 3-113, 519-580, 862, 869, 870, 871, 961-974; *see* Contents for particular countries
Africa Conferences, 3-8
Aglipay, Gregorio, 218-223
Aguinaldo, Emilio, 180, 198, 219
Alaska, 178, 863 f., 867, 882, 883, 893
Albania, 453
Albrias, Francisco, 1027, 1029-1032 *passim*
Albrias, Franklin, 1029, 1032 f.
Albrias, Lincoln, 1029-1033
Algeria, 5, 60-92 *passim*
Algorta, Ruperto, 613, 619, 620, 621, 624
Allen, Lula Mae, 1075, 1077-1080
Allstrom, Erik W., 151, 154, 1089
Alpizar, Carlos, 1110-1115 *passim*
Ambedkar, Bhimrao R., 1152-1155
American Bible Society, 185, 191, 200, 210, 221, 260, 262-265, 273, 278, 310 f., 350, 610, 614 f., 619, 670, 674, 866, 1045
American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, 278, 455-466, 468, 475, 477, 558 f., 654, 664, 675, 967, 992, 993 f., 998 f., 1025
American Friends Service Committee, 1004
American Mission to Lepers (American Leprosy Missions), 945, 950
Anderson, Mary A., 64, 68-69, 963
Anderson, William F., 58, 85, 491, 498, 514, 1026, 1028
Andrade, Arturo, 1104 f., 1108, 1110, 1114
Andrews, Edward G., 409, 412
Andújar, Manuel, 892
Ang Katotohanan, 225 f.
Anglicans, 558, 950 f.
Angola, 4, 5, 51, 52, 59, 569-580, 862, 871, 930-942, 960n, 1017
Anschluss (Austria), 990 f.
Antay, Federico, 263 f.
Anti-Catholicism, 55, 320 f., 378-398 *passim*, 430
Appenzeller, Henry G., 747, 1178 f.
Arandilla, Gabino, 291, 304, 1084, 1086, 1095, 1099, 1105
Archer, Raymond L., 151, 154, 1164-1168 *passim*
Architecture, Bureau of, 877
Argentina, 581, 582 f., 862, 871, 1034-1039 *passim*
Arms, Goodsil F., 267, 593, 599, 601
Arndt, Mrs. Anna (m. Eddy H. Greeley), 8, 10
Arya Samaj, 808 ff., 1147
Asbury, Francis, 782
Asia, 862; *see also* regional names
Aulanko, Harras H., 365, 398
Aurora, Manuel, 223 ff.
Austria, 320-330, 334 ff., 337, 361, 503, 863, 975, 976, 989-991, 996, 1016, 1017; *see also* Austria-Hungary
Austria-Hungary, 316, 334-339, 487, 489, 491, 503, 989, 991; *see also* Austria and Hungary
Autonomous Methodist Churches, 875
Badley, Brenton T., 825 f., 868, 1130 f., 1134, 1142-1145, 1148
Báez, V. D., 1127, 1128
Baker, Archibald G., 243, 257 ff.
Baker, James C., 1181, 1183
Baksh, J. A. Iahi, 806 f.
Baldwin, Glenn A., 17, 35-41 *passim*
Baldwin-Wallace College, 497 f.
Balloch, Enrique C., 585
Baltic States, 870, 976, 1000-1001, 1010-1015 *passim*; *see also* Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
Bancroft, William E., 797, 840
Bangka, 167-169, 765, 869, 870, 1166
Bani, Vittorio, 397, 436
Baptists, Canadian, 241, 243, 252, 259 f., 1068 f.
Baptists (U.S.), 173, 179, 200, 201, 675, 708
Barbero, Pedro, 1089 f., 1096
Bargmann, Hinrich A., 336 f., 989
Barton, James L., 460, 462 f., 464, 995, 1025
Basconcillo, Theodore, 215, 227
Bashford, James M., 229 f., 673 f., 676 f., 678 f., 682, 684-692, 693-701 *passim*, 705 ff., 708, 712 f., 714, 716, 722 f., 733, 760, 762 f., 831, 871, 1188

- Bassett, H. A., 892
 Bast, Anton, 373, 491, 975, 1006, 1015
 Baugh, N. R., 1173
 Baughman, Burr J., 150 f., 154
 Bauman, Ezra, 1036
 Beck, Frank S., 1056-1058, 1070, 1073-1081
 Beetham, R. Emory, 8, 11, 12, 34-38 *passim*, 40, 41
 Belgium, 487, 489
 Bell, Carl S., 1042
 Bell, Edith M., 19 f.
 Berry, Arthur D., 734 ff.
 Berry, Joseph F., 493
 Berry, William C., 912, 917 f.
 Berry, Mrs. William C. (Priscilla), 917-920
 Bettencourt, Bienvenido, 1090 f.
 Beutelspacher, Carl G., 240-244, 245, 260, 595 f., 599, 615
 Bickley, George H., 1160, 1164
 Bik, Bruno, 148, 149, 156
 Bilingual work (U.S.), 877, 890-892
 Birney, Laress J., 1185-1191 *passim*
 Bishops; *see* Episcopal supervision
 Bishops, Board of, 487, 493, 497, 1006-1009 *passim*
 Bishops, Missionary, 871 f., 1130
 Bjorklund, Ellen E., 375, 556, 559 f.
 Blackburn, Kate B., 450, 469 f., 474, 504, 998
 Blackmore, Josiah T. C., 75-77, 81, 85
 Blackmore, Sophia, 135
 Blackstone, William E., 831 f.
 Blake, Edgar, 951, 953 ff., 975, 991 f., 992, 1006-1009 *passim*, 1012, 1020, 1027, 1028 f.
 Board of Missions of The Methodist Church, 868, 895
 Bohún, Juan C. de, 1037
 Bolivia, 240-260, 262, 270, 271, 272, 614, 615, 863, 1034 f., 1040-1082
 Bolivian Indian Mission, 259 f.
 Bolivian Missionary Conference, 259 f., 1050
 Booth, Newell S., 927 f.
 Borneo (*see* Sarawak)
 Borneo, British North, 158 f.
 Borneo, West; *see* West Borneo
 Bossing, Edward W., 1089
 Bovyer, Mrs. John W., 717 f.
 Bower, Harry C., 151, 155, 1166
 Boxer Uprising, 653-660, 661-668 *passim*, 670 ff., 685 f., 696, 701, 704, 721
 Boyle, Francis W., 309-312
 Brastrup, John E., 912, 922, 927, 928
 Brazil, 59, 581, 586 ff., 862, 956
 Brazil, The Methodist Church of, 956
 Brent, Charles H., 201
 Brewster, William N., 123 f., 695, 712 f.
 Brinton, Edward A., 582, 585
 British, Thomas B., 102, 104, 110, 912 f., 922, 927, 928
 Bristol, Frank M., 250, 277, 285 ff., 581, 585, 603, 606 ff., 621, 623
 British and Foreign Bible Society, 200, 221, 278, 485
 British South Africa Company, 7, 8, 40
 Brooke, Rajah Charles A. (d. 1917), 114, 119-124 *passim*, 131
 Brooke, Rajah Charles Vyner, 128, 129, 1161 f.
 Brooks, Elizabeth Harper, 144, 152
 Brown, Arthur J., 171
 Brown, Ulysses S., 305, 314, 1084-1091 *passim*, 1094 f., 1099
 Brown, Wallace E., 1185, 1187 f., 1191
 Browning, Webster E., 246, 610
 Brownlee, James A., 254, 255, 1084, 1094, 1099-1103 *passim*, 1106
 Bryan, William Jennings, 709
 Buchanan, Charles S., 140, 142, 149, 150, 155, 156, 164, 166
 Bucher, August J., 496
 Buchwalter, Abraham L., 18, 19, 549, 556
 Buck, Philo M., 799 f., 845
 Buckley, James M., 51, 171, 178, 391, 395, 410, 424, 444-446, 659, 1025
 Buddhism, 683
 Bulgaria, 315, 319, 375, 443-477, 486 f., 489 f., 491, 492, 503 f., 862, 871, 975, 998 f.
 Bull, Earl R., 739
 Bullock, Dillman S., 1036
 Burgess, L. G., 952 ff.
 Burma, 835 f.
 Burns, Francis, 6
 Burns, Melvin P., 888
 Burt, William, 41, 42, 43, 65, 316, 317, 326-329, 333, 335, 339-351 *passim*, 365, 367, 369, 378-381, 384 f., 393 f., 397 f., 402-413 *passim*, 414-425 *passim*, 429, 431 f., 439, 449 f., 452, 460, 462 ff., 469, 720, 781, 784, 830
 Bustamante, Armando O., 1084-1090
 Busted, John B., 743
 Butler, John W., 627-645 *passim*
 Butler, William, 783
 Byers, William P., 845
 Byshe, Ernest W., 344-351 *passim*, 486, 488, 490, 505-509, 1019
 Cabrera, Juan, 254, 255
 Cady, H. Olin, 648 ff.
 Campbell, Buel O., 601, 609, 865

- Camphor, Alexander P., 6, 84, 520, 521, 525-527, 871
- Campy, Louis, 71, 79-80
- Canadian Methodist Church, 676, 708, 726 ff., 734, 736
- Cannon, James, Jr., 1127
- Capempe, Nelson B., 912, 915 f., 924
- Cape Verde Islands, 52, 59-60, 863, 870
- Carhart, Raymond A., 631, 637, 641, 644, 1122, 1125, 1127
- Carlson, Bengt A., 366 f.
- Carlson, Otto A., 150 f.
- Carman, Albert, 730 f.
- Carr, John H., 863
- Carreño, Emilio, 1026, 1028
- Carroll, Henry K., 171, 173, 247, 266, 267, 280-282, 342, 359, 423, 445, 460, 462 f., 613, 620, 668 f., 682 ff., 863
- Cartwright, Frank T., 134, 1191
- Cartwright, Peter, 847
- Centenary Movement, 499 f., 894, 1015, 1018, 1028, 1038, 1121, 1186 f.
- Central America, 279-314 (specifically, 306 f.), 1034-1039 *passim*, 1083-1120 (specifically, 1083 and 1116-1120); *see also* Costa Rica and Panama
- Central Conferences, 317, 517, 673-678 ff., 872-874, 976, 1035, 1131
- Chaplaincies (U.S.), 879
- Chenoweth, Arthur E., 205, 223 ff.
- Cherry, William T., 127, 130, 772 f. 776
- Chiang Kai-shek, 1189, 1191, 1193
- Chile, 262, 276, 581, 589-610, 618, 862, 1034-1039 *passim*, 1083
- China, 175 f., 375, 608, 646-723, 769 f., 772, 862, 871, 1176, 1184-1194, 1199-1202, 1203 f.
- China, Bishops, 673, 1185, 1192
- China, Conferences, 673 f.
- China, Extraterritoriality, 686-689, 1188 f.
- Chinese Exclusion Act, 689 f.
- Christian and Missionary Alliance, 199, 200
- "Christian General," 1187
- Chitambar, Jashwant R., 872, 1130, 1140
- Church, Andrew J., 306
- Church and State, 50, 54, 62, 83, 84, 100, 220, 241, 243, 245, 247, 261, 262 f., 271 f., 280, 306 f., 322, 327, 332, 341 f., 347, 367, 371, 392, 466, 468, 600, 611, 622, 625, 643, 923, 948, 986, 1022, 1025, 1031 f., 1124; *see also* references to Government
- Church extension, 862, 865 ff., 876 ff.
- Church Extension, Department of, 301
- Church of England, 48
- City work (U.S.), 877, 887-890
- Clair, Matthew W., 898, 1078
- Clancy, William Rockwell, 782 f., 804
- Clark, N. Walling, 408, 420, 422 f., 425, 427 ff., 432 f., 434 ff., 439 f.
- Clow, Jay L., 1065-1068
- Cody, Mary A., 189, 191
- Coffin, Shirley D., 16, 22, 24, 27, 28, 32, 44, 46
- Coffin, Sophia J., 32
- Cole, James P., 151
- Cole, Winfred B., 695, 713
- Colombia, 271, 279
- Communists, 1190-1194 *passim*
- Compton, Harry B., 266, 268, 270, 273-277, 289-293 *passim*, 296 ff., 303, 305
- Congo, Belgian, 4, 5, 92-113, 577, 869, 912-929
- Congo, French, 4
- Congregationalists; *see* American Board of Commissioners
- Conover, Elbert M., 877 f.
- Constantine, Trico, 447, 448, 450
- Cook, Jean Paul, 74
- Cooke, Richard J., 393, 395, 732
- Cooksey, James J., 73, 78, 81
- Cortez, Enrique, 195
- Costa Rica, 300, 304, 305, 306-314, 869, 1034 f., 1082, 1094, 1097-1116, 1117-1120 *passim*
- Cottingham, Joshua F., 238, 1169
- Count, Elmer E., 408, 410 ff., 449-478 *passim*, 490, 504, 998
- Count, Mrs. Elmer E. (Viette), 470-472
- Cox, Ezra, 892
- Cranston, Earl, 481, 659, 673, 725, 731, 736, 759, 864
- Craver, Samuel P., 582, 584
- Crawford, Mrs. George D., 1026, 1027 f., 1029
- Crouse, Floyd L., 1035 f.
- Cuba, 171, 172, 177, 864
- Culver, Alice J., 8
- Curnow, James O., 701, 704
- Cutler, Mary M., 743, 745, 747
- Cynn, Hugh H., 1178, 1183
- Dana, John N., 106, 912, 914 ff., 922
- Dardi, Felice, 321, 325-328, 335, 989
- da Silva, Braulio F., 53 f.
- Davis, Charles E., 123-126, 129-132
- Davis, Dora, 450, 469, 474, 504, 998
- Davis, George R., 657 f., 660, 672
- Davis, George S., 443-449 *passim*, 451, 458, 477
- Dawber, Mark A., 885-887, 889
- Day, James R., 480 f.
- Deaconess work, 894
- Dean, George B., 879
- de Armas, Melecio, 1169-1173

- Debt-raising and finance (U.S.), 878 f.
- Delord, Suzanne, 348, 397
- Denmark, 315, 318, 372-374, 489, 491, 862, 975, 1017; *see also* Scandinavia
- Denyes, John R., 116, 136, 137, 140, 142, 144-156 *passim*, 160, 161, 164, 167, 767, 771
- Der Christliche Apologete*, 488, 495 f.
- Dewey, Adm. George, 170, 187, 221
- DeWitt, James L., 8-11
- Dias, Julio G. Viterbo, 53, 54, 56-58, 952
- Dietz, Paul, 324
- Diffendorfer, Ralph E., 868, 958 ff., 961 ff., 987, 988, 1021, 1059, 1076, 1116, 1127 f., 1143, 1144 f., 1164 f., 1191, 1202
- Dimmitt, John H., 35 ff., 40 f.
- Ding Chin Seng, 116 f.
- Disciples of Christ, 201, 235, 237, 708
- Dispensationalism, 310
- Dodge, Ralph E., 930, 935
- Dodson, William P., 570-577 *passim*, 934 f.
- "Domestic missions," 862; *see* Home missions
- Dominican Republic, 882 f.
- Donohugh, Thomas S., 58, 259, 830, 868 f., 898-901 *passim*, 910, 921, 958, 960, 995, 1070, 1078, 1080, 1085, 1094, 1118 f.
- Draper, Gideon F., 749
- Drees, Charles W., 263, 581 f., 864 ff., 1024, 1026, 1027
- Driver, Rose A., 1072 f.
- Duarte, Benjamin R., 53, 59, 952-958 *passim*
- Dunkum, J. A., 310 f.
- Durbin, 456-458, 461
- Durdis, George R., 368 ff., 370, 371
- Eastern Asia Central Conference, 678
- Eastern Orthodoxy, 319, 322, 366, 369, 370, 451-452, 468, 509, 512, 514, 992 f., 1006-1012 *passim*
- Eaton, Homer, 42, 592
- Eckman, George P., 480 f.
- Ecuador, 261-278, 614, 615, 618, 619, 621, 863, 870, 1083
- Edinburgh Conference (1910), 895
- Edling, Eddie E., 930, 942
- Education, Board of, 893 f.
- Edwards, John R., 868, 956, 958, 961 ff., 978, 993, 1116, 1128
- Edwards, Sidney W., 308, 1098 f., 1101, 1105 f.
- Ehnes, Morris W., 8, 9, 11, 1021
- Eklund, Abel, 163-164, 375
- Eklund, Anna, 368, 510, 515, 1002 ff., 1006, 1013 ff.
- Ekstromer, Alice K. S. (m. Herral Longworth), 932 f.
- El-Beddai, Mohammed, 64, 72
- Elkins, John C., 282 f.
- Ellis, Joseph P., 111, 928 f.
- Elphick, Roberto, 595 f., 1035, 1120
- Embree, Revington L., 899, 901, 903 ff., 906
- Episcopal supervision, 871-874, 1130, 1192
- Ernsberger, David O., 811-814 *passim*, 820
- Estonia, 370 f., 501, 509 f., 1000 f., 1002, 1004
- Ethiopianism, 561-569, 943, 965, 967, 969
- Europe, 315-351, 355-377, 479-518 (specifically, 491 and 516-518), 862, 871, 975-1033
- Europe, Central Conference of (and fore-runners), 317, 443, 452
- Evangelical Association, 726
- Evangelical Methodist Church of France, 77, 91
- Evangelical Union of the Philippine Islands, 201, 204, 235
- Evangelism (U.S.), 879 f.
- Eveland, William P., 142, 231-233, 238, 765, 784, 871
- Everett, Edward I., 106, 108, 110, 111, 912, 915, 922, 927, 928
- Everett, Helen E., 912, 921, 927
- Fairbanks, Charles W., 387 ff., 392, 689
- Farmer, Harry, 215, 229, 233, 234, 238, 868 f., 1046, 1048-1051 *passim*, 1064-1068 *passim*, 1072 f., 1084, 1086, 1088, 1092-1095 *passim*, 1099, 1102-1106 *passim*
- Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, 895, 1006
- Feliciano, Honorio, 194 f.
- Ferreri, Carlo M., 428, 433, 435 ff., 1020 f., 1024
- Ferris, Elizabeth, E., 135
- Ferris, James E., 22, 30, 31, 43, 44
- Field, J. Carleton, 249 f.
- Filipino Independent Church, 220, 223; *see also* Aglipay
- Finance, 893-895
- Finland, 315, 318, 362-366, 367-371 *passim*, 487, 489 f., 491, 510, 862, 975 f., 1000 f., 1002, 1006, 1015-1016
- Fisher, Alice H., 266 f., 270 f.
- Fisher, Frederick B., 829-832 *passim*, 1131, 1137, 1146, 1151 f., 1155
- Fisher, Harry B., 1091 f.
- Fiske, Louis M., 1099 ff., 1105 ff., 1109 f., 1118
- FitzGerald, James N., 382, 781
- Flici, Saïd, 65, 69-70, 963
- Flint, Charles W., 991

- Floyd, John C., 158
 Follwell, E. Douglas, 743 f., 747
 Forbes, Robert, 876
 Foreign missions, 3-351, 355-859, 862, 867-876, 893-895 *passim*, 898-1204
 Foreign missions, aim of, 875 f.
 Foreign Missions, Board of, 867, 868-876, 893-895 *passim*
 Foreign Missions Conference of North America, 895, 1135
 Forsyth, David D., 301 f., 876, 881, 883
 Foss, Cyrus D. 401 f., 404, 406, 781, 793
 Foster, C. W., 249, 1048
 Fowler, Anderson, 590, 592
 Fowler, Charles H., 199, 366, 424
 Fox, Daniel O., 794, 858
 France, 316, 320 f., 339-351, 355, 372, 468 f., 488 f., 490 f., 501, 505-509, 735, 869 f., 975, 1019-1020, 1027 f.
 Franco, Francisco, 1032 f.
 Frease, Edwin F., 64-90 *passim*, 790-798 *passim*, 816, 851-857 *passim*, 963, 1026
 Freedmen's Aid Society, 862, 868
 Freeman, Mark, 167-169, 1164
 Free Methodists, 950 f., 967
 Freiberg, Alfred, 370, 1000
 Fritz, William G., 199, 205
 Frontier work (U.S.), 877, 881-885 *passim*
 Fry, William H., 892
 Funk, Martin, 335, 339, 989, 996 f.
- Galung, Willie H., 164, 166
 Gamble, Mrs. Francesca (Fanny) Nast, 83, 372, 377
 Gamewell, Frank D., 655 ff., 658, 663, 716-719 *passim*
 Gamewell, Mrs. Frank D., 655, 663
 Gandhi, Mohandas K., 1135, 1137, 1146, 1152 f.
 Garden, Joseph H., 813 f.
 Gates, John R., 21, 28, 44, 46
 Gattinoni, Juan E., 582, 584, 1035, 1059 f.
 General Committee of Foreign Missions, 869
 German Americans, 481, 488, 495-498
 Germany, 315, 318 f., 329, 333, 336, 359, 360-361, 367 ff., 371, 375, 476, 480-486 *passim*, 487 ff., 490 ff., 495, 497, 501, 502 f., 513, 862, 975 f., 976-989, 990 f., 996, 999, 1001, 1016, 1017
 Gillet, Ira E., 549, 943
 Gomez, Patricio, 1028, 1029, 1032
 Goodell, Willard A., 200, 206
 Goodrich, Jay C., 185, 209, 221
 Goodsell, Daniel A., 316, 318 f. 361, 363, 416 f., 420, 444-449 *passim*, 454
 Goodwill Industries, 877, 890
 Gordon, Charles W. and Dr. Jennie M.T., 570 f.
 Goucher, John F., 401, 405, 793
 Government; *see also* Church and State
 Government, Angola, 936-939, 941
 Government, Austrian, 323 f., 326-329, 337
 Government, Belgian Congo, 924 f.
 Government, Bolivian, 246 ff., 253, 256-259, 1064, 1081
 Government, Bulgarian, 467 f.
 Government, China, 649 ff., 653-657 *passim*, 662, 664, 691 f., 693, 696 ff., 702 f., 704 ff., 709, 712 f., 1189, 1192, 1194
 Government, Ecuadorian, 262, 264, 266, 267 ff., 272
 Government, French, 347
 Government, German, 980 ff.; *see* Hitler; *see* Nazi movement
 Government, Hungarian, 997 f.
 Government, India, 1131-1148
 Government, Italian, 1022 f.
 Government, Japanese, 1198; *see* Shintoism; *and see* Government, Korean
 Government, Korean, 750-756 *passim*, 759, 761, 763, 1195 ff.
 Government, Liberian, 539, 540-545, 898-908 *passim*
 Government, Malaysia, 770 f.
 Government, Mexican, 627-645 *passim*, 1122-1125
 Government, Mozambique, 557, 946-949 *passim*
 Government, Panamanian, 296, 299
 Government, Peruvian, 613, 622, 625
 Government, Russian, 1005 f.
 Government, Spanish, 1030, 1032
 Government, Union of South Africa, 968
 Government, United States, 174, 175, 177, 187, 202 f., 208, 218, 253, 258, 265, 275, 327 f., 468, 491-494, 498, 517, 557, 566, 627-645 *passim*, 646-652 *passim*, 653-659 *passim*, 662 f., 665 ff., 668 ff., 688-700 *passim*, 703 f., 706, 709, 713, 714-721 *passim*, 751, 753, 759, 906 f., 993, 995, 1006, 1033, 1191 f., 1204
 Government, Yugoslavian, 992-995
 Gowdy, John, 872, 1185
 Grant, Richard, 590, 592
 Gray, William W., 283-289 *passim*
 Greeley, Eddy H., 8, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 20, 21, 29, 32, 36, 519
 Greenman, Almon W., 582, 584
 Greenman, Arthur W., 425 f. 436
 Gregory, James J., 646 ff.
 Grey, Earl, 7, 8
 Grissell, Marian B., 65, 72

- Grose, George R., 497, 1185, 1187
 Guerrero, Tomás, 619 f., 622
 Gupstill, Roger S., 99, 100, 103-111 *passim*, 912 f., 916 ff., 927
 Gurney, Dr. Samuel, 13, 14, 17, 21, 23, 24-27, 28, 32, 34-38 *passim*, 39-43, 44, 971 ff.
- Haddow, Alexander, 257, 1048, 1050
 Häggmann, J. William, 363, 367
 Haiti, 303
 Halford, Elijah W., 201, 208, 209, 232
 Hall, Rosetta S., 743, 745
 Hall, William J., 743
 Halstead, Gordon B., 1139-1141, 1142, 1145 f.
 Hamilton, John W., 864
 Hammaker, Wilbur E., 1185
 Hammett, A. C., 8
 Hammon, Annie, 64, 72-73, 81
 Hanna, Sister Theodora, 75, 80
 Hansen, Karl, 594 f., 596, 605, 608
 Hard, Manley S., 867
 Hargis, James H., 400 f., 403 f.
 Harijans, 1152-1155
 Harley, George W., 899-903, 909-912
 Harrington, Francis M., 245-249, 260, 596
 Harrington, John C. F., 247
 Harris, Merriman C., 678, 725-733 *passim*, 736, 741, 748, 755, 760 ff., 871
 Harris, William L., 399
 Hartford, Mabel C., 646 f.
 Hartman, Lewis O., 985, 987, 1006-1009 *passim*, 1012
 Hartzell, Corwin F., 254 f., 1070 f., 1110, 1112, 1114, 1118 ff.
 Hartzell, Joseph C., 3-17 *passim*, 32-55 *passim*, 59-85 *passim*, 89, 93 f., 100, 375, 519-525, 527, 547, 549, 557 f., 564, 569 ff., 573 ff., 577, 870 f.
 Hartzler, Coleman C., 104, 108, 109, 111, 112, 912, 918 ff., 927, 928
 Hauser, J P, 631, 641, 644, 1122, 1127
 Havránek, Franz, 331 f., 351
 Hawaii, 178, 862, 867, 882, 883, 893
 Hay, John, 658
 Haydock, Earl H., 955
 Headland, Isaac T., 722
 Hecker, Julius F., 1004 f., 1007, 1010, 1012
 Heinkel, Herman, 8, 9, 95-99 *passim*, 101
 Helms, Edgar J., 877
 Henderson, George M., 892
 Henderson, Theodore S., 493, 494, 498
 Herman, Ernest F., 253
 Hertzog, James B.M., 968 f.
 Herrick, John S., 1058-1064
 Herriot, Edouard, 507 f.
- Higley, Elmer E., 882
 Hinduism, 808 ff., 836 f., 841, 848, 1132, 1134, 1147-1150, 1152 f.
 Hiraiwa, Yoshiasu, 731, 763
 Hitler, Adolf, 977-988 *passim*, 991
 Hofstad, Ottar, 892
 Holbrooke, George O., 817 f.
 Holmberg, Hilda C., 153
 Home missions, 863-867, 876-893, 893-895 *passim*
 Home Missions and Church Extension, Board of, 301, 493, 867 f., 876-893, 894 f., 895
 Home Missions Council, 882, 885, 889, 895
 Honda, Yoitsu, 727, 731
 Hooks, Hattie T., 910
 Hoose, Earl A., 715-719 *passim*
 Hoover, Herbert, 658
 Hoover, James M., 117-134 *passim*, 1160-1163
 Hoover, Willis C., 593 f., 596 ff., 600, 601-610
 Horley, William E., 163, 770 f., 773, 776, 1156, 1158
 Hospitals and Homes and Deaconess Work, Board of, 894
 Howard, George P., 582
 Howard, Herbert N., 30-31
 Hudson, Thomas E. F., 792, 853, 856 f.
 Hughes, William A. C., 877
 Hungary, 330-334, 336-339, 503, 863, 975, 976, 989, 991, 996, 996-998, 1017; *see also* Austria-Hungary
 Hurst, John F., 176, 188, 199, 221, 401
 Huyler, John S., 340, 344, 350, 382
- Iglesia Evangelica Española, 1026
 Illick, Raymond C., 1122
 India, 375, 608, 674, 678, 772, 777-786, 787-833, 834-859, 862, 871, 1017, 1130-1155
 India, Bishops, 780-784, 1130
 India, Conferences, 777 ff., 785 f., 1131
 Indian National Congress, 1134, 1140 f.
 Indians (Bolivia), 1042, 1044-1064, 1079
 Indians (U.S.), 863, 877, 881 f., 883, 885 f., 893
 Inglez, Matheus P., 578 f., 930
 Inman, Samuel Guy, 297, 303, 883
 International Missionary Council, 895
 Ireland, Archbishop John, 388, 389, 391-397 *passim*
 Irigoyen, Zoilo, 263, 264, 276, 595, 610, 613, 615
 Irle, Charles A., 1041, 1048, 1058, 1071 f., 1081
 Irwin, Samuel W., 991, 992, 994, 995
 Islam; *see* Muslims

- Italy, 315, 320, 329, 339 f., 355-358, 378-442, 486 f., 488 f., 490 f., 505, 862, 870, 975, 989, 1020-1024
- Jacob, John, 989, 991, 992, 994
- Japan, 517, 678, 679, 681, 685 f., 724-740, 741, 749-764 *passim*, 862, 869, 871, 875, 1176-1180 *passim*, 1184, 1194-1204
- Japan, Bishops, 725, 731
- Japan, Missionaries, 734
- Japan, National Christian Council of, 1197-1199
- Japan Methodist Church, 676, 678, 731-740, 763, 1184, 1193, 1194, 1198 f.
- Japan Mission Council, 737
- Java, 144-157, 169, 765, 863, 870, 1164
- Jensen, C. Marie, 102, 103, 104, 109-110, 912, 921, 927
- Jerusalem, 870
- Jews, 72, 838 ff., 979, 985
- Jiménez, Carlos Luis, 1114
- Jinesta, Luis, 1110, 1112, 1114
- Johnson, Eben S., 6, 55, 58, 84, 103, 111, 871, 912, 914 f., 917 f., 930, 932, 943, 952, 965 f.
- Johnson, Harriette E. (m. Beetham), 8, 12, 40
- Johnston, Sir Harry, 113
- Jones, E. Stanley, 1140, 1142, 1146
- Jones, George Heber, 415, 569, 745, 747, 751 f., 757, 759, 868
- Jones, Robert E., 1078
- Joy, James R., 492, 498, 1007
- Joyce, Isaac W., 412, 455, 458 f., 581, 618, 673 f., 725
- Jutu, Joseph, 100, 101, 103
- Kalinin, Mikhail I., 1006
- Kaluwashi, 104, 105
- Kapanga, 113
- Kayeka, 99, 101, 102, 104
- Keene, Paul, 1141 f., 1145
- Keeney, Frederick T., 1185 ff.
- Kellar, Fred J., 963 f.
- Kelly, C. Guy, 964
- Kemp, Alexander H., 930, 932 f.
- Kensett, William T., 766, 769
- Kent, Charles A., 46-49
- Keys, Pliny W., 549, 556, 558, 563, 566 f., 943, 949, 967
- Keyser, Elsie J., 293 f., 302 f., 1094
- Kihara, Hokashichi, 749
- King, James M., 867, 876
- King, William L., 811, 816
- Kinsman, Rosina A., 266 f., 270 f.
- Kinzly, Rita M. (m. Berton O. Wilcox), 151
- Kipp, Ray B., 930, 938
- Klaus, Armin V., 151, 1166, 1169
- Klebsattel, August H., 579, 930, 940 ff., 960
- Klinefelter, Daniel H., 210, 215
- Knothe, Ottomar, 715 f.
- Kohlstedt, Edward D., 876 f., 883
- Knotts, Joseph, 620, 622
- Knox, Philander C., 275, 468, 709
- Korea, 375, 608, 678 f., 725, 731, 739, 741-764, 862, 869, 871, 875, 1176-1184, 1194-1199, 1203
- Korea, Missionaries, 743, 747
- Korean Methodist Church, 1176, 1181-1184
- Kristagraha, 1141 f., 1144 f.
- Kuch'eng Massacre, 646 ff., 721
- Kuchenius, Edward, 149
- Kumwenda, Moses, 100, 103
- Kuomintang, 1189-1193 *passim*
- Kupfer, Carl F., 499, 714-721
- Kuszli, Mr., 335, 338
- Kynett, Alpha J., 867
- La Fetra, Ira H., 266, 589, 592, 593, 601
- Laidlaw, Nellie (Helena), 603-609 *passim*
- La Iglesia Evangelica Metodista en las Islas Filipinas*, 228, 232
- Lambert, Achilles H., 340 f., 344, 865
- Lambuth, Walter R., 731
- Lang, Victoria C., 944 f.
- Langenau, Baroness, 323 f., 334
- Langlois, Arthur J., 341
- Lansing, Robert, 716
- Latin America, 811, 1034-1039; *see also* names of countries
- Latin America, Central Conference of, 1034 f.
- Latin America, Committee on Co-operation in, 278, 296 f., 303, 586, 895, 1039, 1126 f.
- Latin America Mission (non-Methodist), 1107 f., 1118 f.
- Latvia, 370 f., 501, 509 f., 1000 f., 1004
- League of Nations, 903 ff., 940 f.
- Lee, Edwin F., 151, 238, 869, 872, 1157, 1165, 1168-1175 *passim*
- Leonard, Adna B., 34-42 *passim*, 63 ff., 93 f., 171, 173, 181, 189, 266 f., 328 f., 342, 346, 349, 380, 385, 388 f., 397, 411, 414-426 *passim*, 446, 452, 454, 464, 523, 590, 669 f., 727-731 *passim*, 736, 754 ff., 759, 781 f., 856 f., 862 f., 864, 868
- Leonard, Adna W., 381, 396 f., 427, 1025
- Le Roy, Modesto, 311 f.
- Lewis, John P., 244, 245, 250
- Lewis, Spencer, 669, 674, 683, 699 f., 704, 1194

- Lewis, Wilson S., 123, 127, 673, 677 f., 693, 708, 716, 723, 1185
- Liberia, 3, 4, 5, 6, 49, 51, 519-547, 862, 871, 898-911
- Lieure, Gustav, 341, 345
- Lindquist, Maria E., 932 f.
- Ling Ching Mi, 115
- Linzell, Lewis E., 796 ff., 1149
- Lithuania, 369, 370, 371, 489, 501, 510 f., 863, 1000 f., 1004
- Livingstone, David, 16, 572
- Lochhead, James L., 65, 71, 81
- Locke, Charles E., 1168
- Loeppert, Adam J., 497
- Long, Albert L., 456, 458, 462
- Long, Estella C., 1037
- Longworth, Alice E. (Mrs. Harral A.), 945 f.; *see* Ekstromer
- Longworth, Harral A., 931 f., 933
- Lowe, Titus, 868, 1008, 1118
- Lowry, Hiram H., 661, 671, 674, 675, 701
- Lowther, William E., 63, 64, 65, 69, 70-71, 74-75, 80-81, 83, 87
- Luering, Henry L. E., 157-159, 766, 767, 769, 770 f.
- Lutheranism, 320, 332
- Lyons, Ernest F., 206, 207, 210, 214, 215, 233
- Lyons, Mrs. Ernest F., 235
- MacCornack, Eugene A., 1037
- MacDonald, Duncan B., 87, 113
- McAllister, Agnes, 519, 527, 529
- McBride, George M., 249 f., 1047
- McCabe, Charles C., 177 f., 182, 241, 243, 268 f., 271, 340, 382, 406, 410 f., 416-419 *passim*, 447, 581, 611, 617, 863
- McCartney, James H., 699, 701
- McCombs, Vernon M., 621 f., 623 f., 892
- McConnell, Francis J., 628, 631 f., 634, 975, 1034, 1127
- McConnell, William W., 306, 308
- McDowell, William F., 498, 781, 993
- McIntyre, Robert, 389, 392
- McKinley, William, 173-180 *passim*, 187 f., 658, 777
- McKinney, Henry C., 1054-1056
- McLaughlin, Jesse L., 189-199 *passim*, 210, 213, 221
- Madeira, 4, 5, 49-58, 59, 178, 863, 951-959
- Main, William A., 114
- Malaysia, 173, 175, 202, 375, 678, 765-776, 780, 784, 786 f., 862, 871, 1156-1160, 1164, 1167, 1168
- Malaysia Annual Conference, 135, 145, 157, 167, 765, 786, 1131
- Malaysia Mission, 144, 157
- Malaysia Mission Conference, 114, 115, 135, 765, 786
- Managers, Board of, 869
- Manly, W. E., 699, 701, 1194
- Mansell, Harry B., 141, 142, 143, 155, 166, 169, 1164
- Marquez, Felipe, 195, 215, 227
- Marshall, Raymond E., 1093 f., 1108, 1118
- Martin, Thomas H., 189, 192 f., 197, 205, 206
- Mass Movements, 787-833, 834, 1050-1052
- Matthews, Joseph B., 154
- Maweni, Jacob, 96, 98, 109
- Maynard, John M., 1021 f.
- Mecham, J. Lloyd, 1129
- Medical Department, 869
- Melle, F. H. Otto, 331 ff., 334-338 *passim*, 351, 489, 492, 503, 976, 978, 983-989 *passim*, 990 f.
- Méndez, E. Báez, 1126
- Merubia, Moses, 249 f., 251, 253, 1064 f., 1109
- Methodism, 319 f., 344, 369, 452, 465
- Methodist Church, The (1939-1968), 868, 893, 895, 912, 943, 976, 998
- Methodist Church (Britain), The, 1021, 1023; *see*, to 1935, Wesleyan Methodists
- Methodist Episcopal Church, 868, 895, 930
- Methodist Episcopal Church, South, 310, 675 f., 678, 682, 726-731 *passim*, 734, 736, 864, 868, 875, 895, 956, 976, 1127-1129 *passim*, 1180 f., 1186
- Methodist Protestant Church, 676, 678, 726, 729 ff., 868, 895
- Mexico, 304, 307, 862, 871, 875, 1034 f., 1083, 1121-1129
- Mexico, Methodist Church of, 1128 f.
- Mexico, National Council of Evangelical Churches in, 1126 f.
- Miller, George A., 156, 209, 297-304 *passim*, 306-314 *passim*, 1034 f., 1046, 1055, 1057 f., 1069 f., 1083, 1085, 1088, 1091, 1094 f., 1097, 1103, 1106 f., 1109, 1111, 1113 f., 1117 ff., 1127 f.
- Miller, Henry T., 899 ff.
- Miller, Wesley A., 106, 108-109, 912, 917 f.
- Miller, William S., 930
- Mills, Edward Laird, 881, 882, 885
- Mills, Ernest L., 1006
- Milne, Andrew M., 261, 263 f., 265, 613, 615
- Miner, George S., 127, 128, 129, 696
- Miner, Wallace H., 127-130 *passim*
- Missionary Society (M.E.C.), 862 f.
- Mitchell, Charles B., 1168
- Mitchell, Virgie C., 1079 f.

- Molina, Mariano, 1056 ff.
 Möller, Robert, 324, 330 f., 334, 351, 991
 Montevideo Congress (1925), 1039, 1068
 Montgomery, Stanley R. P., 972
 Moody, Dwight L., 789
 Moore, Arthur J., 1185
 Moore, David H., 659, 660 f., 666, 670 f.,
 673 f., 679-684, 725 f., 741, 746
 Moots, Cornelia C., 189, 190, 192
 Mora, Dionisio, 1111-1115 *passim*
 Moss, Arthur B., 869
 Mott, John R., 141, 296, 351, 707, 763
 Mozambique, 4, 5, 7, 16, 17, 38, 46, 49,
 59, 375, 547-569, 570, 862, 871, 942-951,
 960, 965-971 *passim*
 Mulliken, Pearl, 2, 3, 23
 Muslims, 62, 63, 66-67, 70, 85-92, 103, 148,
 156, 453, 454, 455, 766 f. 806, 852, 962 f.,
 1132, 1147, 1152 f., 1166
 Mwata Yamvo, 97, 102, 113
- Nast, Albert J., 495 f.
 National City Evangelization Union, 888
 Naylor, Dr. Wilson S., 92
 Navarro, Cipriano, 1173 f.
 Navess, Tizore M., 549, 551, 563, 567, 568
 Nazi movement, 977-988 *passim*
 Neely, Thomas B., 244 ff., 247, 274, 279-
 283 *passim*, 285, 295, 581, 618 f., 620,
 621, 625, 735, 782
 Negro work (U.S.), 877
 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 1135
 Nelson, Justus H., 586-588
 Netherlands East Indies, 135-169, 870, 1131,
 1163-1168
 New Bedford (Mass.), 59
 Newman, John P., 870
 Newman School of Missions, 870
 Newton family, 49, 959
 Nichols, Lee Edna, 151
 Nicholson, Thomas, 498
 Niemoeller, Martin, 988
 Nind, George B., 52, 53, 57, 60, 951, 952
 Ninde, William X., 405, 581, 613, 649, 725,
 864
 Noble, W. Arthur, 747, 755, 1177
 North, Frank Mason, 47, 48, 58, 81, 87,
 90, 103-104, 133, 301 f., 308, 313, 433,
 434 ff., 453, 469, 483, 497, 513 f., 539,
 569, 715, 719 f., 832, 868, 888, 917, 954,
 1005, 1008, 1025, 1026, 1028 f., 1045, 1049,
 1073, 1085, 1138
 North Africa, 5, 60-92, 113, 372, 491, 869,
 871, 961-964, 975, 1017, 1020, 1027
 North Africa Mission (London), 61, 64,
 65, 68, 78-79
 Norton, Anna J., 189, 191 f.
- Norway, 315, 318, 376 f., 489, 491, 862,
 975, 1017; *see also* Scandinavia
 Nourse, Emma D., 32
 Nuelsen, John L., 85, 316, 338, 351, 426,
 433, 434 ff., 453, 471 f., 474 f., 476, 479-
 492 *passim*, 499 f., 502, 504 f., 510 ff., 516-
 518, 955, 975 f., 978-989 *passim*, 989 f.,
 990, 992 ff., 996 f., 999, 1000 f., 1002-1015
passim, 1016, 1017, 1021, 1023 f., 1026
- Ocampo, Luis, 195
 Odum, George M., 8, 12
 Oeschli, Leonard, 143, 1164, 1167
 O'Farrell, Thomas A., 20, 971 f.
 Okinawa, 739
 Olave, Roberto, 244, 595 f., 601
 Olave, Mrs. Roberto (Kate Russell), 244,
 255, 595, 601
 Oidham, William F., 120, 122, 131 f., 137,
 140, 142, 144 f., 149 f., 156, 165, 176, 202,
 212, 221, 223-230 *passim*, 238, 253, 256-
 260 *passim*, 277, 299, 300 ff., 305, 308,
 484, 487, 509, 581, 588, 633, 698, 765,
 783 f., 818, 824 ff., 863, 868, 871, 1034 f.,
 1039, 1040, 1045-1052 *passim*, 1066-1073
passim, 1086
 Oliver, Edwin M., 1083 f., 1087, 1095 f.,
 1099 f.
 Ostrom, Egon N., 1167
 Outpost missions, 882
 Owens, Charles A., 177, 178, 182
 Oxford Conference (1937), 986
- Pakianathan, Solomon, 135-137, 143, 1156
 Palmer, Abraham J., 172, 177, 178, 862
 Panama, 271, 279-305, 581, 618, 621, 622,
 863, 1034 f., 1083-1097, 1116-1120 *passim*
 Panama Congress (1916), 259, 294-297,
 1039
 Paraguay, 581, 584 ff., 862, 870
 Park, George W., 790-798 *passim*, 853,
 855 f., 857
 Parker, Charles E., 814-820, 825
 Parker, Edwin W., 783, 871
 Pease, Kingsley E., 159, 161
 Peck, J. Oramel, 158, 404, 407 f., 411 ff.,
 416-419 *passim*, 446, 459, 477
 Peking, Siege of, 654-657, 663
 Peñaranda, Nestor, 255, 1051-1054, 1056 ff.
 Peniel Hall Farm, 259
 Pensions and Relief, Board of, 893 f.
 Pentecostalism, 601-610, 842-849
 Penzotti, Francis G., 261, 262, 279, 306,
 610 f., 613
 Pérez, Hernán, 1111, 1114 f.
 Perkins, Dr. Raymond G., 157-158
 Perrill, Fred M., 806, 809, 810

- Persson, Josef A., 375, 549, 557, 560, 943, 969 ff.
- Peru, 262, 270, 271, 277, 581, 610-626, 862, 871, 1034-1039 *passim*, 1083
- Peter, Ernst, 425, 428
- Peterson, Berndt O., 206, 238
- Pfeiffer, Mrs. Henry, 1081 f.
- Philippine Islands, 170-239, 678, 765, 781, 784, 786, 863, 867, 871, 1131, 1168-1175
- Pickett, J. Waskom, 810, 872, 1130 f., 1144, 1152
- Piper, Dr. Arthur L., 99, 101-103, 104, 109, 110, 912, 917, 921, 926, 927
- Poeld, Oscar, 1002, 1006, 1013
- Pointer, James D., 943, 946, 949, 950
- Polish Russia, 370 f.
- Ports, Charles W., 283-292 *passim*, 303 f., 1098 f., 1105
- Powell, Elmer E., 408, 411 ff., 426
- Powell, Newman M., 1089
- Powell, Roland, 601
- Power, Nigel D., 953 f.
- Pratsch, Alfons, 999
- Prautch, Arthur W., 184-194 *passim*, 221, 222, 791 f.
- Prautch, Mrs. Arthur W., 184, 193
- Presbyterians (Scottish), 47, 708
- Presbyterians (U.S.), 170 ff., 179, 200, 201, 205, 221, 234, 237 f., 246, 675, 684, 748, 751 f., 758, 864, 883, 1039
- Prettyman, Wesley, 456, 458
- Price, Frederick A., 527, 538
- Prikask, Martin, 1000 f.
- Protestant Episcopal Church, 201, 207, 675
- Prussner, August H., 1166
- Puerto Rico, 171, 172, 177, 190, 863, 864-867, 867, 882, 883, 893
- Purdon, J. H. Colpais, 64, 72-73, 81, 83, 86, 88
- Pyke, James H., 654, 658 f., 662 f., 667
- Pykett, George F., 119, 135, 136, 138, 776
- Quinta, Cristomo, 1056
- Rader, Marvin A., 208, 213, 225, 228 ff., 238
- Ramabai, Pandita, 602
- Ramke, Heinrich, 367 f.
- Rapking, Aaron H., 887
- Rasmussen, Mrs. Helen E. (m. John M. Springer), 8, 10, 12, 13, 15-17, 23, 28, 29
- Ravi, S. Vincenzo, 399, 408, 441 f.
- Rea, Julian S., 943, 944
- Reed, Elbert E., 1036
- Reekie, Archibald, 252
- Reid, John M., 400 ff., 404 f., 411
- Reid, M. H., 8, 9
- Reid, William W., 1154 f.
- Reyes, Carlos G., 244
- Reyes, Isobelo de los, 220
- Rhenish Missionary Society, 137, 140
- Rhodes, Cecil, 7, 523
- Rhodesia; *see* Southern Rhodesia
- Rice, William F., 582, 604 ff., 608
- Richards, Erwin H., 547-556, 557, 558
- Richards, Miriam, 65, 68-69
- Richardson, Channing A., 889 f.
- Rivera, Primo de, 1030
- Robbins, William E., 794, 858
- Roberts, John W., 6
- Robinson, John E., 765, 783 f., 790, 824 f., 843, 849, 871, 1138
- Robinson, John W., 128, 169, 765, 784 f., 826, 830, 871, 1130 f., 1132, 1142, 1147, 1150 f., 1155, 1164
- Robinson, William T., 266, 270, 587, 596 f., 604
- Rodgers, James B., 200, 221
- Rodriguez, Antonio T., 959 f.
- Rodríguez, Eloy, 243, 249 f., 252, 1051
- Rodríguez, Julio Paz, 304
- Roesch, Frederick, 63, 65, 67, 69-70, 79-80, 502
- Roesch, Stefanie (m. William E. Lowther), 63
- Rolim, Antonio P., 957
- Roman Catholicism, 50, 53-55, 59, 68, 70-71, 112, 118, 160, 170, 173, 184 ff., 194-198, 201, 210, 219, 220-223 *passim*, 241 ff., 245, 247 f., 251, 254 ff., 261 ff., 264, 265, 268 f., 271, 275, 280, 287, 294-296, 306 f., 314, 320-322, 324 ff., 328 f., 332, 341 f., 344, 349 f., 358, 378-398, 597, 600, 611 f., 613, 622, 625, 627-645 *passim*, 672, 867, 916, 922 ff., 939 f., 942, 946-950 *passim*, 959, 981, 986, 990, 992, 997, 1009, 1022, 1025, 1027, 1030 ff., 1054 f., 1059 f., 1064, 1087, 1088, 1097, 1100, 1102-1108 *passim*, 1122-1126 *passim*
- Romania, 453
- Roosevelt, Theodore, 171 f., 202, 387-392, 394, 689
- Root, Elihu, 202, 327 f., 689
- Rosen, N. J., 362
- Ross, Edward A., 940, 947, 960
- Ross, Marcellus D., 813 f.
- Ross Report, 940 f., 946 f., 960
- Rounds, Lloyd D., 1103 f., 1108
- Runfeldt, C. H. G., 375, 549, 555, 560
- Rural work (U.S.), 877, 884-887
- Rusling, James F., 424

- Russia, 315, 319, 362-365 *passim*, 366-372, 453, 486 f., 489 f., 501, 509-516, 862, 863, 870, 975 f., 1000-1015
- Ruth, Esther Naomi, 152, 153
- Ryang, Ju Sam, 1181 ff., 1196
- Salamanca, José, 195 f.
- Salmans, Levi D., 627, 638 f., 644, 1122
- Salmi, Hjalmar F., 367 f., 371, 1001, 1002-1004 *passim*
- Santi, Riccardo, 437 f.
- Santo Domingo, Board for Christian Work in, 883
- Sarah, Leslie C., 927 f.
- Sarawak, 114-134, 765, 863, 1160-1163
- Scandinavia, 487, 491, 501, 976, 996, 1016-1017; *see also* Denmark, Norway, Sweden
- Scandinavian Americans, 496
- Schaefer, Roland T., 716-720 *passim*
- Scharer, Charles W., 812 f.
- Schilling, Gerhard J., 250-252, 254, 582, 608
- Schutz, Herman J., 806 f., 809 f., 825
- Schwartz, Henry B., 734, 739
- Scofield, Cyrus I., 306, 309
- Scott, Isaiah B., 5, 527, 529 f., 540, 546, 871
- Scranton, Mary F., 747
- Scranton, William B., 743, 754, 756
- Sechrist, Edward L., 29
- Self-Supporting Missions, Bishop William Taylor's, 3, 4, 573, 586; *see also* Transit and Building Fund Society
- Self-Supporting Missions, Committee on, 590
- Serbia, 453 f.
- Shangaans, 943, 969
- Sharp, Mary A., 521-525
- Shattuck, W. I., 892
- Shaw, Leslie M., 121, 122
- Shaw, William E., 868, 1202
- Sheets, Frederick H., 863
- Shellabear, William G., 767, 1158
- Shepard, William O., 899 f., 903, 906 f., 913, 951, 956, 975, 994 f., 1019
- Sherman, Harry C., 743, 745
- Sherrill, Joseph C., 521, 527
- Shields, Robert, 570, 577, 930, 934 f., 936, 938
- Shields, Mrs. Robert, 934, 936
- Shields, William Erle, 106, 108, 912, 914 ff., 923, 927
- Shinto, 1195-1198
- Sik, Kim Chang, 746, 748
- Sikhs, 1147, 1153
- Sikobebe, Muti M., 562-567
- Silverthorne, Richard H., 771, 773
- Simons, George A., 365, 368-372, 398, 489 f., 509-516 *passim*, 1000, 1001, 1002 f., 1012-1015 *passim*
- Simpson, James A., 521
- Smalley, Ray L., 912, 915, 927
- Smart, William G., 49-58 *passim*, 951-956 *passim*, 958, 959
- Smith, Arthur H., 664 f.
- Smith, Emily S., 64, 68-69
- Smith, F. Herron, 749, 892
- Smith, James N., 1089 f., 1099 f.
- Smith, J. Holmes, 1141 f., 1145 f.
- Smith, LeGrand B., 1042
- Smith, Lester B., 1130, 1150, 1155
- Smith, Percy, 65, 71, 81
- Smith, William T., 176, 591, 862
- Smyres, Roy S., 105, 106, 107, 912, 915, 923 f., 927
- Smyth, George B., 863
- Soto, Adán, 1104 f.
- South Africa, Union of, 5, 565 f., 870, 942 f., 960n, 965-971
- South America, 307, 581-626, 862, 1034-1039 *passim*; *see also* particular countries
- Southern Rhodesia, 5, 6-49, 863, 871, 914 f., 971-974
- Smuts, Jan Christiaan, 968
- Spain, 316, 870, 975, 1019, 1024-1033
- Spangler, John M., 610, 614
- Spanish Civil War, 1032 f.
- Spaulding, Frank R., 586
- Spaulding, Winifred, 235
- Spellmeyer, Henry, 684
- Spencer, William A., 867
- Springer, John M., 4, 5, 8, 10, 12, 15-17, 22, 23, 28, 30, 31, 32, 34-39 *passim*, 92-112 *passim*, 577, 872, 910, 912, 912-917 *passim*, 920, 925, 927 ff., 930
- Stackpole, Everett S., 386 f., 392 f., 395, 398, 405-412 *passim*, 414 f.
- Stagg, Samuel W., 1170-1173
- State Churches (non-Catholic), 318 f.
- Stauffacher, Charles J., 549, 559 ff., 943, 944 f., 950, 951
- Stefanski, Pauline (m. Charles M. Worthington), 151, 153
- Stewart, Milton, 832
- Stixrud, Louise, 235
- Stockdale, George A., 44, 46
- Storer, Bellamy, 327 f.
- Stowell, J. S., 877
- Strachan, Harry, 1108, 1118 f.
- Stull, George C., 181-183, 203, 221

- Stuntz, Homer C., 128, 169, 200, 207 f., 216 f., 221 f., 225, 229, 233, 250 f., 254, 275, 276 f., 284, 286, 289, 291, 296 ff., 344, 346, 349 f., 389 ff., 395, 454, 468, 581, 585, 604, 607 ff., 692, 723, 760, 781, 784, 868, 1025, 1047, 1067
- Stuntz, Hugh C., 1069
- Sullivan, Floyd H., 166
- Sumatra, 135-144, 169, 765, 863, 871, 1164-1168 *passim*
- Summers, Gerald V., 1163
- Sun Yat-sen, 694, 709 ff.
- Sutherland, Alexander, 730 f.
- Sutherland, George F., 868
- Swain, James O., 1105, 1108
- Swaraj, 1133, 1144
- Swearer, Wilbur C., 747, 749 ff.
- Sweden, 315, 318, 363, 366, 374-376, 489, 491, 862, 932, 963 f., 975, 1016 f.; *see also* Scandinavia
- Swiss Romande, 950 f., 967
- Switzerland, 315, 318, 355-360, 362, 479, 487, 501, 735, 862, 975 f., 988, 995, 1017-1018, 1019, 1021, 1023, 1027, 1031
- Swormstedt, Virginia R. (m. Shirley D. Coffin), 32
- T.H.H.K. (*see* *Tiong Hwa Hwe Koan*)
- Taft, William Howard, 204, 208, 216, 217, 689, 709
- Tagliatalata, Eduardo, 428
- Taylor, James M., 277, 290-293 *passim*, 302 f., 868
- Taylor, S. Earl, 278, 307, 482, 484, 487, 507 f., 868, 1025 f.
- Taylor, William, 3, 4, 6, 51, 92, 240, 306, 519-524 *passim*, 527, 529, 546, 547, 570 f., 573 f., 578, 586, 589, 605, 626, 777, 781 f., 784, 930
- Temkovitch, P. D., 992, 995
- Temperance, Prohibition, and Public Morals, 893 f.
- Templin, Ralph T., 1141-1145
- Terril, William C., 549, 554-569 *passim*, 943, 947, 960, 965-970 *passim*
- Thiélé, Charles, 341
- Thirkield, Wilbur P., 1034, 1083 ff., 1095, 1099, 1101, 1105, 1109
- Thoburn, James M., 117, 118, 157, 158, 159, 173, 175, 176, 178, 181-184, 185, 187, 190 f., 202 f., 221, 765, 777, 780-783, 787 ff., 793, 842, 871, 1131
- Thoburn, Isabella, 858
- Thomas, J. B., 799 ff.
- Thomas, Ruth F., 943, 949
- Thomas, T. J., 945, 950
- Thomoff, Stephen, 454 f., 458 f., 462, 477
- Tibet, 682-685
- Tientsin, Treaty of, 669 f., 723
- Tiong Hwa Hwe Koan (T.H.H.K.), 137, 151-155, 161, 167-169
- Tipple, Bertrand M., 389, 390, 391, 427, 433, 434 ff.
- Tobing, Lamsana L., 154, 1167
- Torregrosa, Samuel, 249 f.
- Tourn, Edoardo, 345, 347, 355 ff.
- Transit and Building Fund Society, 589-593, 626; *see also* Self-Supporting Missions (Bishop William Taylor's)
- Tucker, Boyd W., 1136 f., 1145
- Tunisia, 5, 62-92 *passim*
- Turkey, 454 f., 457, 470, 474
- Turner, Charles J., 582, 585
- Tylerbest, George N., 302 f.
- U Chim Seng, 160-161
- Underhill, Carl C., 151, 154
- Unification (1939), 868, 895, 976, 989, 998
- Union Church of the Canal Zone, 290, 298 f.
- Union Minière, 922-924
- United Brethren in Christ, 200, 206, 207, 235, 237 f., 362, 726, 728, 883
- Urech, Lydia, 153
- Uruguay, 581, 583 f., 862, 871, 1034-1039 *passim*
- Uzaki, Kagoro, 731 f.
- Vance, Carl N., 281, 305, 622 f.
- Vásquez, Adolfo T., 610, 613, 619, 621 ff.
- Vaughan, John G., 869, 1073
- Veatch, Everett P., 909
- Venezuela, 271
- Vermilya, Charles E., 881
- Vernon, Leroy M., 378, 384, 399-409 *passim*, 411, 442
- Vernon, S. M., 393
- Vidoudez, Eduard, 341
- Vieques, 865 f.
- Vilika, James, 18
- Villon, Paul, 72
- Vincent, John H., 190, 316, 318 f., 333, 385, 393, 422 ff., 444-450 *passim*, 581
- Viteri, Antonio, 264
- Vogt, Paul L., 884, 885, 886
- Wade, Raymond J., 957-960 *passim*, 961, 975 f., 1015
- Wadsworth, Julian A., 1018
- Wagner, Rush F., 972
- Walden, John M., 316, 325, 331, 356, 414 f., 444, 449, 725, 866
- Walker, Wilbur F., 657 f.
- Wang, Chih P'ing, 872, 1185, 1194

- War Council (M.E.C.), 488, 493 f., 517
 Ward, Mrs. Charles B., 138
 Ward, Constance M., 432
 Ward, Ralph A., 869, 872, 1185
 Ward, Robert C., 792, 853, 857
 Ward, Mrs. Robert C., 853
 Ward, William T., 137-143 *passim*, 1136, 1165
 Warne, Frank W., 114, 115, 117, 134, 144, 145, 176, 190, 193, 194-201 *passim*, 206 f., 209, 765, 769, 783, 784 f., 802 ff., 807, 824 f., 832, 842-849 *passim*, 850, 858, 871, 1130 f., 1133, 1134, 1150, 1155
 Warren, Bacil A., 1071-1075
 Warren, Henry W., 264, 581, 781
 Washburn, John E., 252-254, 256, 258, 1047-1052 *passim*, 1067 f.
 Webb, Nora, 81, 83
 Webba, John (João) L., 576, 578 f., 930, 941
 Welch, Ada D. ("Dora"), 64, 68-69
 Welch, Herbert, 716-721 *passim*, 725, 731, 741, 748, 750, 763 f., 1171-1174, 1179-1183 *passim*, 1185
 Wenberg, James H., 246, 249, 250, 582, 1045-1050
 Wengatz, John C., 930, 932, 934 f., 939
 Wenzel, K. Albert, 979 f.
 Wesley, Arthur F., 1037
 Wesley, John, 66, 344, 349, 370, 371, 398, 732, 1062
 Wesleyan Methodists, 280, 292, 301, 303 f., 322 ff., 343, 360 ff., 439, 482, 558 f., 675, 735, 950 f., 959, 966 f., 973, 1019, 1021; *see*, from 1935, The Methodist Church (Britain)
 West, Benjamin F., 116, 130, 131, 135, 144, 145, 146, 157-161 *passim*, 766
 West Borneo, 157-167, 169, 765, 863, 870, 1164
 Whitehead, Virginia (Mrs. Irving), 1051-1054, 1073
 Wilcox, Berton O., 151, 164-165
 Williams, Henry L., 266, 269 ff.
 Williams, Walter B., 528-547, 899, 904-909, 911
 Wilson, Alpheus W., 731
 Wilson, Franklin M., 803 ff., 825
 Wilson, John F., 892
 Wilson, Luther B., 487, 493 f., 498
 Wilson, Woodrow, 481, 484, 492, 500, 513, 516, 632 f., 704, 709
 Wisner, Julia E., 189, 191
 Withey, Amos E., 570, 572-573
 Withey, Herbert C., 570, 578 f., 930, 937 f., 940
 Wodehouse, Robert, 8, 11, 17-21, 24, 28, 29, 32, 33-39 *passim*, 43-45
 Wolf, Frank D., 40, 41, 549, 555, 559
 Woman's Division, 893
 Woman's Foreign Missionary Society (W.F.M.S.), 10, 12, 31, 32, 33, 49, 68, 83, 135, 152, 153, 178, 183, 189, 191 f., 235 ff., 348, 375, 384, 429-431, 450, 493, 504, 507 f., 570, 579 f., 583 f., 611, 631, 634, 636, 641, 646 ff., 657 f., 671, 695, 721, 737 f., 742 ff., 767, 772 ff., 779, 786, 791, 793, 799, 827, 835 f., 851, 855, 862, 863, 868, 871, 895, 930, 944, 961-964 *passim*, 871 ff., 994, 998, 1016, 1017, 1019 f., 1021, 1023, 1039, 1121 f., 1125 ff., 1159, 1169, 1184, 1186, 1191, 1193, 1201
 Woman's Home Missionary Society, 493, 862, 863 f., 866, 868, 882, 892, 895
 Wong Nai Siang, 114, 116, 119
 Wood, Thomas B., 244, 261-273 *passim*, 279-282 *passim*, 610-621 *passim*, 625
 Woodruff, C. Rogers, 1082
 World Service, 893 f.
 World War I, 479-518, 714-721, 975 ff., 981, 1019
 World War II, 964, 976, 989, 1015, 1024, 1033, 1141
 Worthington, Charles M., 151, 154, 160, 161-163, 166, 1164
 Wright, Bruce S., 238
 Wright, Frederick H., 408, 427
 Wright, John E., 306
 Y.M.C.A., 57, 139, 200, 207, 285 f., 758, 762 f., 991, 1018
 Y.W.C.A., 1018
 Yafele, Charles, 12, 18, 28
 Young, Ethel, 153
 Yuan Shih-k'ai, 657, 691, 693 f., 697, 702-714 *passim*, 722
 Yugoslavia, 870, 975, 989, 991-996, 1017
 Zambrana, Cleto, 1059-1063
 Zamora, Jacinto, 185 f.
 Zamora, Nicolas, 185 ff., 190-199 *passim*, 211, 212, 213, 215, 221, 225-231, 1169
 Zamora, Paulino, 185 f., 221
 Zapata, Eduardo, 304, 306-312 *passim*, 639, 1084, 1086, 1094 ff., 1106 f., 1108
 Zinoviev, Grigori E., 515



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